Note: Guys naay 6 ka book wala nihatag , wala nakoy mahimu nila.. Salamat sa tanang ni digest ..

God bless nato tanan sa finals. He! He! He!. 1. Atong Paglaum . !ommission on "le#tions There are three groups that may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. On the part of national parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations hich intend to participate in the party-list race, the ne guidelines state that these parties !do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized or underrepresented sector.#$ %s for political parties, they may participate in the party-list race &y registering under the party-list system and no longer field congressional candidates. These parties, if they field congressional candidates, ho e'er, are not &arred from participating in the partylist elections( hat they need to do is register their sectoral ing or party under the party-list system. This sectoral ing shall &e considered an !independent sectoral party$ lin)ed to a political party through a coalition. The *uestion is: sectors come in+ here does representation of !marginalized and underrepresented$

The ans er: on the sectoral parties or organizations that intend to participate in the party-list system. The high court held that purely sectoral parties or organizations may either represent !marginalized and underrepresented$ constituencies or those !lac)ing ell-defined political constituencies.$ The high court ent on to enumerate !marginalized and underrepresented$ sectors, as follo s: la&or, peasant, fisherfol), ur&an poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, 'eterans, and o'erseas or)ers. The sectors that lac) ! ell-defined political constituencies$ include professionals, the elderly, omen, and the youth. The rule on nominees and mem&ers coming from the sector they intend to represent also applies only to the sectoral parties or organizations. The high court ruled that it is enough that !,a- ma.ority of the mem&ers of the sectoral parties or organizations/ must &elong to the "marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent.#$ The same is true for those ho lac) ! ell-defined political constituencies.$ %s for the nominees of these sectoral parties and organizations, the ne guidelines pro'ide that they must either &e mem&ers of the sector or ha'e a trac) record of ad'ocacy for their sector.

0hould some of the nominees of these national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations &e dis*ualified, the party or organization itself ill not &e dis*ualified !pro'ided that they ha'e at least one nominee ho remains *ualified.$ $he %a&ty'list system, a##o&ding to the (e#ision 1uoting 2hristian 3onsod, the main proponent of the party-list system, the high court stated that it is !not synonymous ith that of the sectoral representation.$ The high court stressed that the framers of the 1456 2onstitution did not intend to lea'e out !nonsectoral parties$ in the party-list system and e7clusi'ely limit it to sectoral groups. !The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, &ut not the entirety, of the party-list system/ 8n fact, the framers 'oted do n , 14-22, a proposal to reser'e the party-list system e7clusi'ely to sectoral parties. !There can &e no dou&t hatsoe'er that the framers of the 1456 2onstitution e7pressly re.ected the proposal to ma)e the party-list system e7clusi'ely for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include &oth sectoral and nonsectoral parties,$ the 9ecision read. To amplify its position, the high court pointed out 0ec. :(1), %rt. ;8 of the 1456 2onstitution, hich states: Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fi ed by law, who shall be elected from le!islative districts apportioned amon! the provinces, cities, and the "etropolitan "anila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and pro!ressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected throu!h a party#list system of re!istered national, re!ional, and sectoral parties or or!ani$ations. )HA$ *S $H" P+,,- $HA$ $H" PA+$. /*S$ S.S$"0 *S N,$ "1!/2S*3"/. -,+ S"!$,+A/ PA+$*"S4 SECTION 5(2), ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION WHICH MANDATES THAT, DURING THE FIRST THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF CONGRESS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS ALLOCATED TO PART -LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL !E FILLED, AS PROVIDED ! LAW, ! SELECTION OR ELECTION FROM THE LA!OR, PEASANT, UR!AN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN, OUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MA !E PROVIDED ! LAW, E"CEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR#$ 3oreo'er, 0ection :(2), %rticle ;8 of the 1456 2onstitution mandates that, during the first three consecuti'e terms of 2ongress after the ratification of the 1456 2onstitution, !one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representati'es shall &e filled, as pro'ided

&y la , &y selection or election from the la&or, peasant, ur&an poor, indigenous cultural communities, omen, youth, and such other sectors as may &e pro'ided &y la , e7cept the religious sector.$ This pro'ision clearly sho s again that the party-list system is not e7clusi'ely for sectoral parties for t o o&'ious reasons. %irst, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representati'es ould naturally &e open to non-sectoral party-list representati'es, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is e7clusi'ely for sectoral parties representing the !marginalized and underrepresented.$ Second, the reser'ation of one-half of the partylist seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first !three consecuti'e terms after the ratification of this 2onstitution,$ clearly ma)ing the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there ill &e no seats reser'ed for any class or type of party that *ualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system. Hen#e, the #lea& intent, e5%&ess wo&ding, and %a&ty'list st&u#tu&e o&dained in Se#tion 6718 and 798, A&ti#le 3* of the 1:;< !onstitution #annot be dis%uted: the %a&ty'list system is not fo& se#to&al %a&ties only, but also fo& non'se#to&al %a&ties . The 9ecision also pointed out pertinent pro'isions of <epu&lic %ct (<%) =o. 64>1, also )no n as the ?arty-list 0ystem %ct, specifically from 0ec. 3 (9efinition of Terms): (b) & party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties (c) & political party refers to an or!ani$ed !roup of citi$ens advocatin! an ideolo!y or platform, principles and policies for the !eneral conduct of !overnment and which, as the most immediate means of securin! their adoption, re!ularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office (d) & sectoral party refers to an or!ani$ed !roup of citi$ens belon!in! to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector %gain, the high court noted that defining these parties or groups, one from the others, could only mean that they are not one and the same. P&e ious &ulings &e e&sed by Atong Paglaum %s earlier stated, there are pre'ious rulings on the party-list system in the case of %ng @agong @ayani '. 2omelec and @%=%T '. 2omelec

9. //2= s. !omele# >une <, 9??< % misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is material hen it refers to a *ualification for electi'e office and affects the candidate#s eligi&ility. Ahen a candidate commits a material representation , he or she may &e proceeded against through a %etition to deny due #ou&se to or #an#el a #e&tifi#ate of #andida#y unde& Se#tion <; , or through #&iminal %&ose#ution unde& Se#tion 969 fo& iolations of Se#tion <@

of A.P.;;1. % misrepresentation of a non-material fact, or a non-material misrepresentation , is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under 0ection 65. 8n other ords, for a candidate to &e denied due course or cancelled &y the comelec, the fact misrepresented must pertain to a *ualification for the office sought &y the candidte. 800BC: Ahether or not an alleged misrepesentation of profession or occupation on a certificate of candidacy punisha&le as election offense. <BD8=E : =O. 8n case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the 2omelec is authorized to deny due course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a petition &y any person pursuant to 0ection 65 7 7 7 $he&efo&e, it may be #on#luded that the mate&ial mis&e%&esentation #ontem%lated by Se#tion <; of the !ode &efe&BsC to Dualifi#ations fo& ele#ti e offi#e. $his #on#lusion is st&engthened by the fa#t that the #onseDuen#es im%osed u%on a #andidate guilty of ha ing made a false &e%&esentation in BtheC #e&tifi#ate of #andida#y a&e g&a e E to %&e ent the #andidate f&om &unning o&, if ele#ted, f&om se& ing, o& to %&ose#ute him fo& iolation of the ele#tion laws. F. !a&los Su%e&d&ug s. (S)( ?etitioners assail the constitutionality of 0ection >(a) of <% 42:6, other ise )no n as the !C7panded 0enior 2itizens %ct of 2FF3.$ 0ection >(a) of <% 42:6 grants t enty percent (2FG) discount as pri'ileges for the 0enior 2itizens. ?etitioner contends that said la is unconstitutional &ecause it constitutes depri'ation of pri'ate property. <BD8=E: The permanent reduction in their total re'enues is a forced su&sidy corresponding to the ta)ing of pri'ate property for pu&lic use or &enefit. This constitutes compensa&le ta)ing for hich petitioners ould ordinarily &ecome entitled to a .ust compensation. % s a f o r m o f r e i m & u r s e m e n t , t h e l a pro'ides that &usiness esta&lishments e7tending the t enty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a ta7 deduction. The la is a legitimate e7ercise of police po er hich, similar to the po er of eminent domain, has general elfare for its o&.ect.

@. G.+. No. 1;9?;;

>anua&y F?, 9??:

(*=,N s !,00*SS*,N ,N "/"!$*,NS and 0A+*N, P. 0,+A/"S, Hor purposes of determining the resulting dis*ualification &rought a&out &y the th&ee' te&m limit,it is not enough that an indi idual has se& ed th&ee #onse#uti e te&ms in an ele#ti e lo#al offi#e, he must also ha e been ele#ted to the same %osition fo& the same numbe& of times. There should &e a concurrence of t o conditions for the application of the dis*ualification: (1) that the official concerned has &een elected for three consecuti'e terms in the same local go'ernment post and (2) that he has fully ser'ed three consecuti'e terms. Our ruling in the Rivera caseser'ed as 3orales# in'oluntary se'erance from office ith respect to the 2FF>-2FF6 term. *n olunta&y se e&an#e f&om offi#e fo& any length of time sho&t of the full te&m %&o ided by law amounts to an inte&&u%tion of #ontinuity of se& i#e. Our decision in the Rivera case as promulgated on 4 3ay 2FF6 and as effecti'e immediately. The ne7t day, 3orales notified the 'ice mayor#s office of our decision. The 'ice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 16 3ay 2FF6 up to 3F Iune 2FF6. The assumption &y the 'ice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter ho short it may seem to 9izon, interrupted 3orales# continuity of ser'ice. Thus, 3orales did not hold office for the full term of 1 Iuly 2FF> to 3F Iune 2FF6. Ae concede that 3orales occupied the position of mayor of 3a&alacat for the follo ing periods: 1 Iuly 144: to 3F Iune 1445, 1 Iuly 1445 to 3F Iune 2FF1, 1 Iuly 2FF1 to 3F Iune 2FF>, and 1 Iuly 2FF> to 1J 3ay 2FF6. Ko e'er, &ecause of his dis*ualification, 3orales as not the duly elected mayor for the 2FF>-2FF6 term. =either did 3orales hold the position of mayor of 3a&alacat for the full term. 3orales cannot &e deemed to ha'e ser'ed the full term of 2FF>-2FF6 &ecause he as ordered to 'acate his post &efore the e7piration of the term. 3orales# occupancy of the position of mayor of 3a&alacat from 1 Iuly 2FF> to 1J 3ay 2FF6 cannot &e counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-term limit. 8ndeed, the period from 16 3ay 2FF6 to 3F Iune 2FF6 ser'ed as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 Iuly 2FF6 to 3F Iune 2F1F term is effecti'ely 3orales# first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. 6. SuGette Ni#olas y Sombilon . Albe&to +omulo, in his #a%a#ity as Se#&eta&y of -o&eign Affai&sH +A2/ G,N=A/"=, in his #a%a#ity as Se#&eta&y of >usti#eH "(2A+(, "+0*$A, in his #a%a#ity as "5e#uti e Se#&eta&yH +,NA/(, P2N,, in his #a%a#ity as Se#&eta&y of the *nte&io& and /o#al Go e&nmentH S"+G*, AP,S$,/, in his #a%a#ity as P&esidential /egal !ounselH and /I!P/. (AN*"/ S0*$H

G.+. No. 1<6;;; -eb&ua&y 11, 9??: *SS2": This issue had &een raised &efore, and this 2ourt resol'ed in fa'or of the constitutionality of the ;H%. %pplying the pro'ision to the situation in'ol'ed in these cases, the *uestion is hether or not the presence of B0 %rmed Horces in ?hilippine territory pursuant to the ;H% is allo ed !under a treaty duly concurred in &y the 0enate 777 and &e#ogniGed as a t&eaty by the othe& #ont&a#ting State.$ H"/(: Hirst, as held in 'ayan v. (amora, the ;H% as duly concurred in &y the ?hilippine 0enate and has &een recognized as a treaty &y the Bnited 0tates as attested and certified &y the duly authorized representati'e of the Bnited 0tates go'ernment. The fact that the ;H% as not su&mitted for ad'ice and consent of the Bnited 0tates 0enate does not detract from its status as a &inding international agreement or treaty recognized &y the said 0tate. Hor this is a matter of internal Bnited 0tates la . =otice can &e ta)en of the internationally )no n practice &y the Bnited 0tates of su&mitting to its 0enate for ad'ice and consent agreements that are policyma)ing in nature, hereas those that carry out or further implement these policyma)ing agreements are merely su&mitted to 2ongress, under the pro'isions of the so-called 2aseLMa&loc)i %ct, ithin si7ty days from ratification. The ;H%, hich is the instrument agreed upon to pro'ide for the .oint <?-B0 military e7ercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main <?-B0 3ilitary 9efense Treaty. %ccordingly, as an implementing agreement of the <?-B0 3utual 9efense Treaty, it as not necessary to su&mit the ;H% to the B0 0enate for ad'ice and consent, &ut merely to the B0 2ongress under the 2aseLMa&loc)i %ct ithin JF days of its ratification. 8t is for this reason that the B0 has certified that it recognizes the ;H% as a &inding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this su&stantially complies ith the re*uirements of %rt. N;888, 0ec. 2: of our 2onstitution. %fter deli&eration, the 2ourt holds, on these points, as follo s: Hirst, the ;H% is a self-e7ecuting %greement, as that term is defined in "edellin itself, &ecause the parties intend its pro'isions to &e enforcea&le, precisely &ecause the %greement is intended to carry out o&ligations and underta)ings under the <?-B0 3utual 9efense Treaty. %s a matter of fact, the ;H% has &een implemented and e7ecuted, ith the B0 faithfully complying ith its o&ligation to produce DO2?D 0mith &efore the court during the trial.

0econdly, the ;H% is co'ered &y implementing legislation, namely, the 2aseMa&loc)i %ct, B02 0ec. 112(&), inasmuch as it is the 'ery purpose and intent of the B0 2ongress that e7ecuti'e agreements registered under this %ct ithin JF days from their ratification &e immediately implemented. The parties to these present cases do not *uestion the fact that the ;H% has &een registered under the 2ase-Ma&loc)i %ct. 8n sum, therefore, the ;H% differs from the ;ienna 2on'ention on 2onsular <elations and the &vena decision of the 8nternational 2ourt of Iustice (82I), su&.ect matter of the "edellin decision. The 2on'ention and the 82I decision are not selfe7ecuting and are not registra&le under the 2ase-Ma&loc)i %ct, and thus lac) legislati'e implementing authority. 6.ANG /A(/A( /GA$ PA+$. &e%&esented he&ein by its !hai&, (AN$,N +"0,$, . !,0"/"! G.+. No. 1:?6;9 A%&il ;, 9?1? -A!$S: &n! )adlad is an organization composed of men and omen ho identify themsel'es as les&ians, gays, &ise7uals, or trans-gendered indi'iduals (DE@Ts). 8ncorporated in 2FF3, &n! )adlad first applied for registration ith the 2O3CDC2 in 2FFJ. The application for accreditation as denied on the ground that the organization had no su&stantial mem&ership &ase. On %ugust 16, 2FF4, &n! )adlad again filed a ?etition for registration ith the 2O3CDC2. @efore the 2O3CDC2, petitioner argued that the DE@T community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disad'antaged &ecause of their se7ual orientation and gender identity( that DE@Ts are 'ictims of e7clusion, discrimination, and 'iolence( that &ecause of negati'e societal attitudes, DE@Ts are constrained to hide their se7ual orientation( and that &n! )adlad complied ith the 5-point guidelines enunciated &y this 2ourt in &n! 'a!on! 'ayani#*%+ )abor ,arty v. -ommission on .lections. &n! )adlad laid out its national mem&ership &ase consisting of indi'idual mem&ers and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of go'ernance. &n! )adlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it .ustified the e7clusion &y using religious dogma, 'iolated the constitutional guarantees against the esta&lishment of religion. ?etitioner also claimed that the %ssailed <esolutions contra'ened its constitutional rights to pri'acy, freedom of speech and assem&ly, and e*ual protection of la s, as ell as constituted 'iolations of the ?hilippines# international o&ligations against discrimination &ased on se7ual orientation. H"/(: C%&'()*+,- .)/0 /0- R-12)3-&-+/4 %5 /0- C%+4/)/2/)%+ *+6 R-'27(), A,/ N%# 7981 This argument that !petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition hen it alleged

its national e7istence$ is a ne one( pre'iously, the 2O3CDC2 claimed that petitioner as !not &eing truthful hen it said that it or any of its nomineesOparty-list representati'es ha'e not 'iolated or failed to comply ith la s, rules, or regulations relating to the elections.$ =o here as this ground for denial of petitioner#s accreditation mentioned or e'en alluded to in the %ssailed <esolutions. This, in itself, is *uite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner#s alleged non-e7istence ere already a'aila&le to the 2O3CDC2 prior to the issuance of the Hirst %ssailed <esolution. %t &est, this is irregular procedure( at orst, a &elated afterthought, a change in respondent#s theory, and a serious 'iolation of petitioner#s right to procedural due process. =onetheless, e find that there has &een no misrepresentation. % cursory perusal of &n! )adlad/s initial petition sho s that it ne'er claimed to e7ist in each pro'ince of the ?hilippines. <ather, petitioner alleged that the DE@T community in the ?hilippines as estimated to constitute at least J6F,FFF persons( that it had 1J,1FF affiliates and mem&ers around the country, and >,F>> mem&ers in its electronic discussion group. &n! )adlad also represented itself to &e !a national DE@T um&rella organization ith affiliates around the ?hilippines composed of the follo ing DE@T net or)s. R-()9)%+ *4 /0- !*4)4 5%3 R-524*( /% A,,-'/ A+9 L*6(*6:4 P-/)/)%+ 5%3 R-9)4/3*/)%+ Our 2onstitution pro'ides in %rticle 888, 0ection : that !,n-o la shall &e made respecting an esta&lishment of religion, or prohi&iting the free e7ercise thereof.$ %t &ottom, hat our nonesta&lishment clause calls for is !go'ernment neutrality in religious matters.$ 2learly, !go'ernmental reliance on religious .ustification is inconsistent ith this policy of neutrality.$ Ae thus find that it as gra'e 'iolation of the non-esta&lishment clause for the 2O3CDC2 to utilize the @i&le and the Poran to .ustify the e7clusion of &n! )adlad. P27(), M%3*(4 *4 * G3%2+6 /% D-+; A+9 L*6(*6:4 P-/)/)%+ 5%3 R-9)4/3*/)%+ Ae are not &lind to the fact that, through the years, homose7ual conduct, and perhaps homose7uals themsel'es, ha'e &orne the &runt of societal disappro'al. 8t is not difficult to imagine the reasons &ehind this censure L religious &eliefs, con'ictions a&out the preser'ation of marriage, family, and procreation, e'en disli)e or distrust of homose7uals themsel'es and their percei'ed lifestyle. =onetheless, e recall that the ?hilippines has not seen fit to criminalize homose7ual conduct. C'idently, therefore, these !generally accepted pu&lic morals$ ha'e not &een con'incingly transplanted into the realm of la . E12*( P3%/-,/)%+ Hrom the standpoint of the political process, the les&ian, gay, &ise7ual, and transgender ha'e the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same &asis as other political parties similarly situated. 0tate intrusion in this case is e*ually &urdensome. Kence, la s of general application should apply ith e*ual force to DE@Ts, and they deser'e to participate in the party-list system on the same &asis as other marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

F3--6%& %5 E<'3-44)%+ *+6 A44%,)*/)%+ Hreedom of e7pression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are fa'ora&ly recei'ed &ut also to those that offend, shoc), or distur&. %ny restriction imposed in this sphere must &e proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. %&sent any compelling state interest, it is not for the 2O3CDC2 or this 2ourt to impose its 'ie s on the populace. Other ise stated, the 2O3CDC2 is certainly not free to interfere ith speech for no &etter reason than promoting an appro'ed message or discouraging a disfa'ored one. N%+-D)4,3)&)+*/)%+ *+6 I+/-3+*/)%+*( L*. Our 9ecision today is fully in accord ith our international o&ligations to protect and promote human rights. 8n particular, e e7plicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the B9K< and the 822?<. <. A$$.. +".NAN$" A. ,+!", . !,0"/"! G.+. No. 1:?<<: 0a&#h 96, 9?1? -A!$S: This is a petition for certiorari *uestioning the 'alidity of <esolution =o. 561> insofar as it pro'ides that the term !firearm$ includes airsoft guns and their replicasOimitations, hich results in their co'erage &y the gun &an during the election period this year. ?etitioner contends that under <.%. =o. 61JJ, the term !firearm$ connotes real firearm. 3oreo'er, <.%. =o. 61JJ does not mention airsoft guns and their replicasOimitations. Kence, its implementing rules and regulations contained in <esolution =o. 561> should not include airsoft guns and their replicasOimitations in the definition of the term !firearm.$ H"/(: C'idently, the 2O3CDC2 had the authority to promulgate <esolution =o. 561> pursuant to 0ection 3: of <.%. =o. 61JJ. 8t as granted the po er to issue the implementing rules and regulations of 0ections 32 and 33 of <.%. =o. 61JJ. Bnder this &road po er, the 2O3CDC2 as mandated to pro'ide the details of ho may &ear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly eapons, as ell as the definition of !firearms,$ among others. These details are left to the discretion of the 2O3CDC2, hich is a constitutional &ody that possesses special )no ledge and e7pertise on election matters, ith the o&.ecti'e of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credi&le elections. The 2ourt holds that the 2O3CDC2 did not gra'ely a&use its discretion in including airsoft guns and airguns in the term !firearm$ in <esolution =o. 561> for purposes of the gun &an during the election period, ith the apparent o&.ecti'e of ensuring free, honest, peaceful and credi&le elections this year. Howe e&, the &e%li#as and imitations of ai&soft guns and ai&guns a&e e5#luded f&om the te&m Jfi&ea&mK in

+esolution No. ;<1@. The inclusion of airsoft guns and airguns in the term !firearm$ in <esolution =o. 561> for purposes of the gun &an during the election period is a reasona&le restriction, the o&.ecti'e of hich is to ensure the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credi&le elections. ;. !*3*/ S"+3*!" !,00*SS*,N s. N*$A P. >A3*"+ G.+. No. 1<F96@ -eb&ua&y 99, 9??;

*0P,+$AN$ P+*N!*P/" At %&esent, the&e is no law ena#ted by the legislatu&e that defines o& sets definite #&ite&ia fo& dete&mining %&ima&ily #onfidential %ositions in the #i il se& i#e. =either is there a la that gi'es an enumeration of positions classified as primarily confidential. Ahat is a'aila&le is only petitionerQs o n classification of ci'il ser'ice positions, as ell as .urisprudence hich descri&e or gi'e e7amples of confidential positions in go'ernment. Thus, the corollary issue arises: should the 2ourt &e &ound &y a classification of a position as confidential already made &y an agency or &ranch of go'ernment+ Iurisprudence esta&lishes that the 2ourt is not &ound &y the classification of positions in the ci'il ser'ice made &y the legislati'e or e7ecuti'e &ranches, or e'en &y a constitutional &ody li)e the petitioner. The 2ourt is e7pected to ma)e its o n determination as to the nature of a particular position, such as hether it is a primarily confidential position or not, ithout &eing &ound &y prior classifications made &y other &odies.The findings of the other &ranches of go'ernment are merely considered initial and not conclusi'e to the 2ourt.3oreo'er, it is ell-esta&lished that in case the findings of 'arious agencies of go'ernment, such as the petitioner and the 2% in the instant case, are in conflict, the 2ourt must e7ercise its constitutional role as final ar&iter of all .usticia&le contro'ersies and disputes. $he !ou&tLs +uling $he #ou&ts may dete&mine #lassifi#ation of a %osition in go e&nment. the %&o%e&

Bnder C7ecuti'e Order =o. 242, or the %dministrati'e 2ode of 1456, ci'il ser'ice positions are currently classified into either 1) career ser'ice and 2) non-career ser'ice positions.15

2areer positions are characterized &y: (1) entrance &ased on me&it and fitness to be dete&mined as fa& as %&a#ti#able by #om%etiti e e5aminations , or &ased on highly te#hni#al Dualifi#ations ( (2) o%%o&tunity fo& ad an#ement to higher career positions( and (3) se#u&ity of tenu&e.14 8n addition, the %dministrati'e 2ode, under its @oo) ;, su&-classifies career positions according to Rappointment status,R di'ided into: 1) %e&manent - hich is issued to a person ho meets all the re*uirements for the positions to hich he is &eing appointed, including the appropriate eligi&ility prescri&ed, in accordance ith the pro'isions of la , rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof( and 2) tem%o&a&y - hich is issued, in the a&sence of appropriate eligi&les and hen it &ecomes necessary in the pu&lic interest to fill a 'acancy, to a person ho meets all the re*uirements for the position to hich he is &eing appointed e7cept the appropriate ci'il ser'ice eligi&ility( pro'ided, that such temporary appointment shall not e7ceed t el'e months, and the appointee may &e replaced sooner if a *ualified ci'il ser'ice eligi&le &ecomes a'aila&le.2F ?ositions that do not fall under the career ser'ice are considered non-career positions, hich are characterized &y: (1) ent&an#e on bases othe& than those of the usual tests of me&it and fitness utilized for the career ser'ice( and (2) tenu&e whi#h is limited to a %e&iod specified &y la , or hich is #o'te&minous ith that of the appointing authority or subMe#t to his %leasu&e, or whi#h is limited to the du&ation of a %a&ti#ula& %&oMe#tfor hich purpose employment as made.21 % strict reading of the la re'eals that primarily confidential positions fall under the noncareer ser'ice. 8t is also clear that, unli)e career positions, primarily confidential and other non-career positions do not ha'e security of tenure. The tenure of a confidential employee is co-terminous ith that of the appointing authority, or is at the latterQs pleasure. Ko e'er, the confidential employee may &e appointed or remain in the position e'en &eyond the compulsory retirement age of J: years. 22 0tated differently, the instant petition raises the *uestion of hether the position of corporate secretary in a EO22, currently classified &y the 202 as &elonging to the permanent, career ser'ice, should &e classified as primarily confidential, i.e., &elonging to the non-career ser'ice. The current E080 @oard holds the affirmati'e 'ie , hich is ardently opposed &y petitioner. ?etitioner maintains that it alone can classify go'ernment positions, and that the determination it made earlier, classifying the position of EO22 corporate secretary as a permanent, career position, should &e maintained. %t present, there is no la enacted &y the legislature that defines or sets definite criteria for determining primarily confidential positions in the ci'il ser'ice. =either is there a la that gi'es an enumeration of positions classified as primarily confidential. Ahat is a'aila&le is only petitionerQs o n classification of ci'il ser'ice positions, as ell as .urisprudence hich descri&e or gi'e e7amples of confidential positions in go'ernment.

Thus, the corollary issue arises: should the 2ourt &e &ound &y a classification of a position as confidential already made &y an agency or &ranch of go'ernment+ Iurisprudence esta&lishes that the 2ourt is not &ound &y the classification of positions in the ci'il ser'ice made &y the legislati'e or e7ecuti'e &ranches, or e'en &y a constitutional &ody li)e the petitioner. 23 The 2ourt is e7pected to ma)e its o n determination as to the nature of a particular position, such as hether it is a primarily confidential position or not, ithout &eing &ound &y prior classifications made &y other &odies.2> The findings of the other &ranches of go'ernment are merely considered initial and not conclusi'e to the 2ourt. 2: 3oreo'er, it is ell-esta&lished that in case the findings of 'arious agencies of go'ernment, such as the petitioner and the 2% in the instant case, are in conflict, the 2ourt must e7ercise its constitutional role as final ar&iter of all .usticia&le contro'ersies and disputes.2J

:. 02N*!*PA/*$. ,- N2"3A "+A, */,!,S N,+$", &e%&esented by its 0uni#i%al 0ayo&, !A+,/*N" A+=A(,N'GA+3*(A, %etitione&, s. 02N*!*PA/*$. ,- 0A+!,S, */,!,S N,+$", &e%&esented by its 0uni#i%al 0ayo&, SA/3A(,+ P*//,S, and the H,N,+AA/" !,2+$ ,APP"A/S, &es%ondents. G.+. No. 16:@F6 -eb&ua&y 9<, 9??;

*0P,+$AN$ P+*N!*P/" The 2% erred in declaring that only the <T2 has appellate .urisdiction o'er the .udgment of the 0angguniang ?anlala igan (0?). True, appeal is a purely statutory right and it cannot &e e7ercised unless it is e7pressly granted &y la . =e'ertheless, the 2% can pass upon the petition for re'ie precisely &ecause the la allo s it. @atas ?am&ansa (@.?.) @lg. 124 or the Iudiciary <eorganization %ct of 145F, as amended &y <.%. =o. 64F2, 'ests in the 2% the appellate .urisdiction o'er all final .udgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or a ards of <egional Trial 2ourts and *uasi.udicial agencies, instrumentalities, &oards or commissions, among others.@.?. @lg. 124 has &een further supplemented &y the 1446 <ules of 2i'il ?rocedure, as amended, hich pro'ides for the remedy of appeal 'ia petition for re'ie under <ule >2 to the 2% in cases decided &y the <T2 in the e7ercise of its appellate .urisdiction.

Thus, the 2% need not treat the appeal 'ia petition for re'ie filed &y 3arcos as a petition for certiorari to &e a&le to pass upon the same. @.?. @lg. 124, as amended, hich is supplemented &y <ule >2 of the <ules of 2i'il ?rocedure, gi'es the 2% the authority to entertain appeals of such .udgments and final orders rendered &y the <T2 in the e7ercise of its appellate .urisdiction. 1?. $H" SANGG2N*ANG AA+ANGA. ,- AA+ANGA. (,N 0A+*AN, 0A+!,S, 02N*!*PA/*$. ,- AA.,0A,NG P+,3*N!" ,- N2"3A 3*S!A.A &e%&esented by AA+ANGA. NAGA)A( >,S" !"N"N SAN$,S, 0A+*, AA!2(, )A/$"+ -+AN!*S!,, +,S*$A S"AAS$*AN, /A2+"$A !AAA2A$AN, !"!*/*A A/*N(A.2 and 0"/. S*0ANGAN, Petitione&s, ' =-3424 ' P2N,NG AA+ANGA. S"3"+*N, 0A+$*N"=,+es%ondent. G.+. No. 1<?696. 0a&#h F, 9??; *0P,+$AN$ P+*N!*P/"S

1.

The pertinent legal pro'isions and cases decided &y this 2ourt firmly esta&lish that the 0anggunaing @ayan is not empo ered to do so. 0ection JF of the Docal Eo'ernment 2ode conferred upon the courts the po er to remo'e electi'e local officials from office: 0ection JF. Erounds for 9isciplinary %ctions.S%n electi'e local official may &e disciplined, suspended, or remo'ed from office on any of the follo ing grounds: 7 7 7 7. %n electi'e local official may &e remo'ed from office on the grounds enumerated a&o'e &y order of the %&o%e& #ou&t. (Cmphasis pro'ided.)
2.

The Office of the ?resident is ithout any po er to remo'e elected officials, since the po er is e7clusi'ely 'ested in the proper courts as e7pressly pro'ided for in the last paragraph of 0ection JF of the Docal Eo'ernment 2ode.

3.

The doctrine of e7haustion of administrati'e remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrati'e authorities in the resolution of a contro'ersy falling under their .urisdiction &efore the same may &e ele'ated to the courts of .ustice for re'ie .
4.

The doctrine of e7haustion of administrati'e remedies, hich is &ased on sound pu&lic policy and practical consideration, is not infle7i&le. There are instances hen it may &e dispensed ith and .udicial action may &e 'alidly resorted to immediately. %mong these e7ceptions are: 1) here there is estoppel on the part of the party in'o)ing the doctrine( 2) whe&e the #hallenged administ&ati e a#t is %atently illegal, amounting to la#k of Mu&isdi#tionH 3) here there is unreasona&le delay or official inaction that ill irretrie'a&ly pre.udice the complainant( >) here the amount in'ol'ed is relati'ely small as to ma)e the rule impractical and oppressi'e( 68 whe&e the Duestion &aised is %u&ely legal and will ultimately ha e to be de#ided by the #ou&ts of Musti#eH J) here .udicial inter'ention is urgent( 6) here its application may cause great and irrepara&le damage( 5) here the contro'erted acts 'iolate due process( 4) hen the issue of non-e7haustion of administrati'e remedies has &een rendered moot( 1F) here there is no other plain, speedy and ade*uate remedy( 11) hen strong pu&lic interest is in'ol'ed( and 13) in 0uo warranto proceedings.
5.

Ahere the case in'ol'es only legal *uestions, the litigant need not e7haust all administrati'e remedies &efore such .udicial relief can &e sought. The reason &ehind pro'iding an e7ception to the rule on e7haustion of administrati'e remedies is that issues of la cannot &e resol'ed ith finality &y the administrati'e officer. %ppeal to the administrati'e officer ould only &e an e7ercise in futility. % legal *uestion is properly addressed to a regular court of .ustice rather than to an administrati'e &ody.

11. 0A+2H,0 's. !,0"/"!, G.+. No. 1<:@F? -A!$S:

>uly 9<, 9??:

?etitioner Iamela 0alic 3aruhom (3aruhom) and pri'ate respondent 3ohammadali R3ericanoR %. %&inal (%&inal) ere mayoralty candidates in the 3unicipality of 3arantao, Danao del 0ur, for the 1> 3ay 2FF6 national and local elections. @oth 3aruhom and %&inal filed their respecti'e s orn 2ertificates of 2andidacy (2O2s) for the said position ith the 2O3CDC2 Clection Officer of 3arantao. %&inal as then the

incum&ent 3ayor of 3arantao ho

as see)ing re-election.

On 1 %pril 2FF6, %&inal filed &efore the 2O3CDC2 a ?etition for 9is*ualification and to 9eny 9ue 2ourse to or 2ancel the 2ertificate of 2andidacy under 0ection 65 of @atas ?am&ansa @ilang 551, other ise )no n as the Omni&us Clection 2ode of the ?hilippines (OC2), against 3aruhom. %&inal alleged that 3aruhom as a dou&le registrant, &eing a registered 'oter, @arangay ?anggao 0aduc, 3ara i 2ity and @arangay Pialdan ?roper, 3arantao. 3aruhom registered as a 'oter in 3ara i on 2J Iuly 2FF3. Only three days thereafter, on 24 Iuly 2FF3, 3aruhom registered again as a 'oter in 3arantao, ithout canceling her 3ara i registration. There &eing dou&le registration, 3aruhom#s su&se*uent registration in 3arantao null and 'oid ab initio. %nd, not &eing a registered 'oter in 3arantao, 3aruhom dis*ualified from running for municipal mayor of said municipality. as as

*SS2": Ahether or not the 2O3CDC2 has the po er to determine hether false representation as to material facts as made in the 2ertificate of 2andidacy if the candidate states a material representation in the 2ertificate of 2andidacy that is false. H"/(: Tes, the 2O3CDC2 is empo ered to do so. Bnder 0ection 65 of the OC2, a false representation of material fact in the 2O2 is a ground for the denial or cancellation of the 2O2. The false representation must pertain to a material fact that affects the right of the candidate to run for the election for hich he filed his 2O2. 0uch material fact refers to a candidate#s eligi&ility or *ualification for electi'e office li)e citizenship, residence or status as a registered 'oter. %side from the re*uirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deli&erate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that ould other ise render a candidate ineligi&le. 8n other ords, it must &e made ith the intention to decei'e the electorate as to the ould-&e candidate#s *ualifications for pu&lic office. *f the #andidate states a mate&ial &e%&esentation in the !,! that is false, the !,0"/"! is em%owe&ed to deny due #ou&se to o& #an#el the !,!. The person hose 2O2 is denied due course or cancelled under 0ection 65 of the OC2 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if such person ne'er filed a 2O2. 19. (+. HANS !H+*S$*AN 0. S"O"+"S 's. !,0"/"!, G.+. No. 1<;6<;, A%&il 16, 9??: -A!$S: 8n 1444, pri'ate respondent <o&les as elected president and chairperson of @uhay, a party-list group duly registered ith 2O3CDC2. The constitution of @BK%T pro'ides for a three-year term for all its party officers, ithout re-election. @BK%T

participated in the 2FF1 and 2FF> elections, ith <o&les as its president. %ll the re*uired 3anifestations of 9esire to ?articipate in the said electoral e7ercises, including the 2ertificates of =omination of representati'es, carried the signature of <o&les as president of @BK%T. On Ianuary 2J, 2FF6, in connection ith the 3ay 2FF6 elections, @BK%T again filed a 3anifestation of its 9esire to ?articipate in the ?arty-Dist 0ystem of <epresentation. %s in the past t o elections, the manifestation to participate &ore the signature of <o&les as @BK%T president. On 3arch 24, 2FF6, <o&les signed and filed a 2ertificate of =omination of @BK%T#s nominees for the 2FF6 elections containing the follo ing names: (i) <ene 3. ;elarde, (ii) 3a. 2arissa 2oscolluela, (iii) Ailliam 8r in 2. Tieng, (i') 3elchor <. 3onsod, and (') Teresita @. ;illarama. Carlier, ho e'er, or on 3arch 26, 2FF6, petitioner Kans 2hristian 0eUeres, holding himself up as acting president and secretary-general of @BK%T, also filed a 2ertificate of =omination ith the 2O3CDC2, nominating: (i) himself, (ii) Kermenegildo 2. 9umlao, (iii) %ntonio <. @autista, (i') ;ictor ?a&lo 2. Trinidad, and (') Cduardo 2. 0olangon, Ir. 2onse*uently, on %pril 16, 2FF6, 0eUeres filed ith the 2O3CDC2 a ?etition to 9eny 9ue 2ourse to 2ertificates of =omination. 8n it, petitioner 0eUeres alleged that he as the acting president and secretary-general of @BK%T, ha'ing assumed that position since %ugust 16, 2FF> hen <o&les 'acated the position. ?ushing the point, 0eUeres ould claim that the nominations made &y <o&les ere, for lac) of authority, null and 'oid o ing to the e7piration of the latter#s term as party president. Hurthermore, 0eUeres asserted that <o&les as, under the 2onstitution, dis*ualified from &eing an officer of any political party, the latter &eing the %cting %dministrator of the Dight <ail ay Transport %uthority (D<T%), a go'ernment-controlled corporation. <o&les, so 0eUeres ould charge, as into a partisan political acti'ity hich ci'il ser'ice mem&ers, li)e the former, ere en.oined from engaging in. *SS2": Ahether or not Kold-O'er ?rinciple may apply. H"/(: Tes, Kold-O'er principle applies in this case. %s a general rule, officers and directors of a corporation hold o'er after the e7piration of their terms until such time as their successors are elected or appointed. 0ec. 23 of the 2orporation 2ode contains a pro'ision to this effect, thus: 0ection 23. The &oard of directors or trustees.SBnless other ise pro'ided in this 2ode, the corporate po ers of all corporations formed under this 2ode shall &e e7ercised, all &usiness conducted and all property of such corporations controlled and held &y the &oard of directors or trustees to &e elected from among the holders of stoc)s, or here there is no stoc), from among the mem&ers of the corporation, ho shall hold office for one (1) year until their successors are elected and *ualified. The !holdo'er doctrine$ has, to &e sure, a purpose hich is at once legal as it is practical. 8t accords 'alidity to hat ould other ise &e deemed as du&ious corporate acts and gi'es continuity to a corporate enterprise in its relation to outsiders. $his is the

analogi#al situation obtaining in the %&esent #ase.

1F. P",P/" s. SP,@ "0*/*AN, AN,NAS G.+. No. 166;@<, >anua&y F1, 9??< -a#ts: Kerein accused as apprehended during a raid conducted &y the A?9 sometime on =o'em&er 144J. Thereafter, charges for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of prohi&ited drugs. Kerein accused then filed for a rein'estigation grounded on the allegations that he apprehended ithout any arrant of arrest. as

On %pril 1445 the motion for rein'estigation as granted, ho e'er, the prosecutor designated to conduct the preliminary in'estigation as appointed Iudge of the 8lo-ilo <T2. On Ianuary 2FF1, accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has &een 'iolated, ho e'er the trial court dismissed the petition, hence, accused filed a petition for certiorari ith the 2%. The 2% then granted the ?etition for 2ertiorari. *ssue: Ahether the appellate court erred in holding that respondent#s right to due process has &een 'iolated+ +uling: ?hilippine organic and statutory la e7pressly guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en.oy his right to a speedy trial. 0ection 1J, %rticle 888 of the 1456 2onstitution pro'ides that !%ll persons shall ha'e the right to speedy disposition of their cases &efore all .udicial, *uasi-.udicial, or administrati'e &odies.$ This is reinforced &y 0ection 3(f), <ule 112 of the 145: <ules on 2riminal ?rocedure, as

amended, hich re*uires that !the in'estigating officer shall resol'e the case (1F) days from the conclusion of the in'estigation.$

ithin ten

To ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases &efore the 0andigan&ayan, <egional Trial 2ourt, 3etropolitan Trial 2ourt and 3unicipal 2ircuit Trial 2ourt, <epu&lic %ct =o. 5>43 (The 0peedy Trial %ct of 1445) as enacted on He&ruary >, 1445. To implement its pro'isions, the 2ourt issued 02 2ircular =o. 35-45 dated 0eptem&er 1:, 1445 setting a time limit for arraignment and pre-trial for thirty (3F) days from the date the court ac*uires .urisdiction o'er the person of the accused. The earliest rulings of the 2ourt on speedy trial holds that accused persons are guaranteed a speedy trial &y the @ill of <ights and that such right is denied hen an accused person, through the 'acillation and procrastination of prosecuting officers, is forced to ait many months for trial. 8n Tatad 's. 0andigan&ayan, the court ruled that !=ot only under the &road um&rella of due process clause, &ut under the constitutional guaranty of !speedy disposition$ of cases as em&odied in 0ection 1J of the @ill of <ights (&oth in the 1463 and 1456 2onstitutions), the inordinate delay is 'iolati'e of the petitioner#s constitutional rights. % delay of close to three (3) years cannot &e deemed reasona&le or .ustifia&le in the light of the circumstances o&taining in the case at &ar .1

1@. !A.A$ s. !,0"/"! G.+. No. 16F<<6IG.+. No. 166<F6, A%&il 9@, 9??< -a#ts: 2ayat and ?alileng ere the only candidates for the mayoralty post in @uguias, @enguet in the 1F 3ay 2FF> local elections. 2ayat filed his certificate of candidacy on : Ianuary 2FF>. On 2J Ianuary 2FF>, ?alileng filed a petition for dis*ualification against 2ayat &efore the 2O3CDC2 <egional Clection Office in @aguio 2ity on the ground that herein petitioner is not eligi&le to run as 3ayor ha'ing &een con'icted &y final .udgment for a criminal offense &y the 3unicipal Trial 2ourt of @aguio 2ity, ?hilippines, @ranch 2, for the 2rime of Horci&le %cts of Dasci'iousness. 2ayat as then dis*ualified &y the 2O3CDC2, ho e'er, his name as not remo'ed from the list and after the election 2ayat recei'ed higher 'otes than ?alileng and as e'entually proclaimed. ?alileng then filed for an annulment of the proclamation, thereafter, the 2O3CDC2 granted the annulment and proclaimed ?alileng as 3ayor. On the otherhand, then

elected 'ice-mayor @ayacasan argued that he should &e proclaimed as mayor on the ground that the second placer rule should apply. *ssue: Ahether the second placer rule is applica&le+ +uling: The doctrine cannot &e applied in this case &ecause the dis*ualification of 2ayat &ecame final and e7ecutory &efore the elections and hence, there is only one candidate to spea) of. The la e7pressly declares that a candidate dis*ualified &y final .udgment &efore an election cannot &e 'oted for, and 'otes cast for him shall not &e counted. %s such, ?alileng is the only candidate and the duly elected mayor. 8n addition, there are specific re*uirements for the application of the doctrine on the re.ection of the second placer. The doctrine ill apply in @ayacsan#s fa'or, regardless of his inter'ention in the present case, if t o conditions concur: (1) the decision on 2ayat#s dis*ualification &emained %ending on ele#tion day, 1F 3ay 2FF>, resulting in the presence of t o mayoralty candidates for @uguias, @enguet in the elections( and (2) the decision on 2ayat#s dis*ualification &ecame final only afte& the elections. 2ayat#s proclamation on 12 3ay 2FF> is 'oid &ecause the decision dis*ualifying 2ayat had already &ecome final on 16 %pril 2FF>. There is no longer any need to ascertain hether there as actual )no ledge &y the 'oters of 2ayat#s dis*ualification hen they cast their 'otes on election day &ecause the la mandates that 2ayat#s 'otes ! shall not be #ounted.$ There is no disenfranchisement of the 5,1J> 'oters. <ather, the 5,1J> 'oters are deemed &y la to ha'e deli&erately 'oted for a non-candidate, and thus their 'otes are stray and !shall not be #ounted.$

16. !,!,-"( s. +"P2A/*! ,- $H" PH*/*PP*N" -A!$S: 8n 1461, <epu&lic %ct =o. J2JF as enacted creating the 2oconut 8n'estmentHund (28H). The source of the 28H as a ?F.:: le'y on the sale of e'ery 1FF )g. of copra. The ?hilippine 2oconut %dministration as tas)ed to collect and administer theHund. Out of the F.:: le'y, ?F.F2 as placed at the disposition of the 2O2OHC9, the recognized national association of coconut producers declared &y the ?2%. 2oco fund receipts ere ought to &e issued to e'ery copra seller. 9uring the 3artial Da regime, then ?resident Herdinand 3arcos issued se'eral ?residential 9ecrees purportedly for the impro'ement of the coconut industry. The most rele'ant among these is ?.9. =o.

6:: hich permitted the use of the Hund for the ac*uisition of a commercial &an) for the &enefit of coconut farmers and the distri&ution of the shares of the stoc) of the &an) it ,?2%- ac*uired free to the coconut farmers (0ec.2). Thus, the ?2% ac*uired the Hirst Bnited @an), later renamed the Bnited 2oconut ?lanters @an) (B2?@). The ?2% &ought the 62.2G of ?B@#s outstanding capital stoc) or 136,5JJ shares at ?2FF per share (?26, :63,2FF.FF) from ?edro 2o.uangco in &ehalf of the coconut farmers.$ The rest of the Hund as deposited to the B2?@ interest free. Harmers ho had paid the 28H and registered their receipts ith ?2% ere gi'en their corresponding B2?@ stoc) certificates. Only 1J million orth of 2O2OHB=9 receipts ere registered and a large num&er of the coconut farmers opted to sell allOpart of their B2?@ shares to pri'ate indi'iduals. 0imply put, parts of the coconut le'y funds ent directly or indirectly to 'arious pro.ects andOor as con'erted into different assets or in'estments through the years. %fter the C90% <e'olution, ?resident 2orazon %*uino issued C7ecuti'e Order 1 hich created the ?residential 2ommission on Eood Eo'ernment (?2EE). The ?2EE aimed to assist the ?resident in the reco'ery of ill-gotten ealth accumulated &y the 3arcoses and their cronies. ?2EE as empo ered to file cases for se*uestration in the 0andigan&ayan. %mong the se*uestered properties ere the shares of stoc) in the B2?@ registered in the name of o'er a million coconut farmers held in trust &y the ?2%. The 0andigan&ayan allo ed the se*uestration &y ruling in a ?artial 0ummary Iudgment that the 2oconut De'y Hunds are prima facie pu&lic funds and that 0ection 1 and 2 of ?9 =o. 6:: (and some other ?9s) ere unconstitutional. The 2O2OHC9 representing the o'er a million coconut farmers 'ia ?etition for re'ie under <ule >: sought the re'ersal of the ruling contending among others that the se*uestration amounted to ta)ing of pri'ate property ithout .ust compensation and impairment of 'ested right of o nership. *SS2": Ahat is the =%TB<C of the 2oconut De'y Hund+ +2/*NG: The 02 ruled in fa'or of the <C?B@D82. To &egin ith, the 2oconut De'y as imposed in the e7ercise of the 0tate#s inherent po er of ta7ation. 8ndeed, the 2oconut De'y Hunds parta)e the nature of T%NC0. The Hunds ere generated &y 'irtue of statutory enactments &y the proper legislati'e authorities and for pu&lic purpose. The Hunds ere collected to ad'ance the go'ernment a'o ed policy of protecting the coconut industry. The 02 too) .udicial notice of the fact that the coconut industry is one of the great

economic pillars of our nation, and coconuts and their &yproducts occupy a leading position among the countries# e7port products. Ta7ation is done not merely to raise re'enues to support the go'ernment, &ut also to pro'ide means for the reha&ilitation and the sta&ilization of a threatened industry, hich is so affected ith pu&lic interest.

16. A$*"N=A s. !,0"/"! G.+. No. 1;;:9?. -eb&ua&y 16, 9??6 -a#ts: 9rilon, the former president of the Di&eral ?arty (D?) announced that his party ithdre support for the administration of former ?res. Eloria 3acapagal- %rroyo. Ko e'er, %tienza, D? 2hairman, alleged that 9rilon made the announcement ithout consulting first the party. %tienza hosted a party conference hich resulted to the election of ne officers, ith %tienza as D? president. 9rilon immediately filed a petition ith the 2O3CDC2 to nullify the said election claiming that it as illegal considering that the party#s electing &odies, =C2O and =%?OD2O, ere not properly con'ened. 3oreo'er, 9rilon claimed that under the D? 2onstitution, there is a three-year term. 3eaning, his term has not yet ended. Ko e'er, %tienza contested that the election of ne officers could &e li)ened to people po er remo'ing 9rilon as president &y direct action. %lso, %tienza alleged that the amendment to the D? 2onstituion pro'iding the three-term had not &een properly ratified. The 2O3CDC2 held that the election of %tienza and others as in'alid since the electing assem&ly did not con'ene in accordance ith the D? 2onstitution. 3oreo'er, the 2O3CDC2 ruled that since the said 2onstitution as not ratified, 9rilon as only sitting in a hold-o'er capacity since his term has &een ended already. 0u&se*uently, the D? held a =C2O meeting to elect ne party leaders &efore respondent 9rilon#s term e7pired hich resulted to the election of <o7as as the ne D? president. %tienza et al. sought to en.oin <o7as from assuming the presidency of the D? *uestioning the 'alidity of the *uorum. The 2O3CDC2 issued resolution denying petitioners %tienza et al.#s petition. %s for the 'alidity of petitioners %tienza, et al.#s e7pulsion as D? mem&ers, the 2O3CDC2 o&ser'ed that this as a mem&ership issue that related to disciplinary action ithin the political party. The 2O3CDC2 treated it as an internal party matter that as &eyond its .urisdiction to resol'e. *ssue:

Ahether or not the 2O3CDC2 has .urisdiction o'er intra-party dispute+ +uling: The 2O3CDC2#s .urisdiction o'er intra-party disputes is limited. 8t does not ha'e &lan)et authority to resol'e any and all contro'ersies in'ol'ing political parties. ?olitical parties are generally free to conduct their acti'ities ithout interference from the state. The 2O3CDC2 may inter'ene in disputes internal to a party only hen necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions. The 2ourt ruled in 2alaw v. -ommission on .lections that the 2O3CDC2#s po ers and functions under 0ection 2, %rticle 8N-2 of the 2onstitution, !include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsi&le for its acts.$ 3oreo'er, the 2O3CDC2#s po er to register political parties necessarily in'ol'ed the determination of the persons ho must act on its &ehalf. Thus, the 2O3CDC2 may resol'e an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case &rought &efore it, as an incident of its po er to register political parties. The 2O3CDC2 did not err hen it upheld <o7as# election &ut refused to rule on the 'alidity of %tienza#s e7pulsion. 1< PAN/*/*, 3S. !,0"/"! -a#ts: The parties herein ere t o of the contending gu&ernatorial candidates in the pro'ince of ?ampanga during the 3ay 1>, 2FF6 national and local elections. The ?ro'incial @oard of 2an'assers of ?ampanga proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected go'ernor of ?ampanga ha'ing garnered the highest num&er of 'otes of 214,6FJ 'otes ith a inning margin of 1,1>6 'otes o'er the 215,::4 'otes of pri'ate respondent.'On 3ay 2:, 2FF6, pri'ate respondent filed an election protest against petitioner &ased on the follo ing grounds: a). ;otes in the &allots la fully and 'alidly cast in fa'or of protestant ere deli&erately misread andOor mis-appreciated &y the 'arious chairmen of the different &oards of election inspectors( &). Thousands of 'otes of protestant such as !=%=%T @%@T$, her registered nic)name ere intentionally andOor erroneously not counted or tallied in the election returns as 'otes 'alidly cast for the protestant( c). @allots ith &lan) spaces in the line for go'ernor read and counted in fa'or of protestee( d). ;otes reported in numerous election returns ere .ust the same

ere unla fully increased

in fa'or of the protestee, hile 'otes in said election returns for the protestant ere unla fully decreased (! da!da!#bawas$), such that the protestee appeared to ha'e o&tained more 'otes than those actually cast in his fa'or, hile the protestant appeared to ha'e o&tained less 'otes than the actually cast in her (protestant#s) fa'or( and, e). 3oreo'er, &uying of 'otes and other forms of 'ote-&uying ere resorted to &y protestee in order to pressure 'oters to 'ote for him or not to cast their 'otes for the protestant herein. *ssue: Ahether or not 2O3CDC2 acted ith gra'e a&use of discretion amounting to lac) or e7cess of .urisdiction in denying his omni&us motion and in failing to dismiss the alleged sham election protest filed &y pri'ate respondent against him. Held: The petition is ithout merit. ?etitioner insists that the 2O3CDC2 .n 'anc gra'ely a&used its discretion hen it denied his omni&us motion to certify his earlier motion for reconsideration and to stay the order directing the collection of &allot &o7es of the contested precincts in the pro'ince of ?ampanga. Ke argues that 0ection :, <ule 14 of the 2O3CDC2 <ules of ?rocedure, on hich the omni&us motion as anchored, clearly mandates the ?residing 2ommissioner of the 9i'ision of the 2O3CDC2 to certify the case to the 2O3CDC2 .n 'anc once a motion for reconsideration is filed, regardless of hether the order or resolution sought to &e reconsidered is an interlocutory order or a final one. This issue has &een s*uarely addressed in Repol v. -*".).-, here the 2ourt has declared that the remedy to assail an interlocutory order of the 2O3CDC2 in 9i'ision, hich allegedly as issued ith gra'e a&use of discretion or ithout or in e7cess of .urisdiction, is pro'ided in 0ection :(c), <ule 3 of the 1443 2O3CDC2 <ules of ?rocedure, hich pertinently reads: 0ection :. 1uorum( ;otes <e*uired. L (c) %ny motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a 9i'ision shall &e resol'ed &y the 2ommission en banc e7cept motions on interlocutory orders of the 9i'ision, hich shall &e resol'ed &y the 9i'ision hich issued the order. 8n Repol, the 2ourt held that since the 2O3CDC2#s 9i'ision issued the interlocutory Order, the same 2O3CDC2 9i'ision should resol'e the motion for reconsideration of the Order. The remedy of the aggrie'ed party is neither to file a motion for reconsideration for certification to the 2O3CDC2 .n 'anc nor to ele'ate the issue to this 2ourt via a petition for certiorari under <ule J: of the <ules of 2i'il ?rocedure. 8n the same case the 2ourt added that: 0ection :, <ule 14 of the 1443 2O3CDC2 <ules of ?rocedure go'erns motions for reconsideration of decisions of a 2O3CDC2 9i'ision, as

follo s: 0C2. :. Ko 3otion for <econsideration 9isposed of. - Bpon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a 9i'ision, the 2ler) of 2ourt concerned shall, ithin t enty-four (2>) hours from the filing thereof, notify the presiding 2ommissioner. The latter shall ithin t o (2) days thereafter certify the case to the 2ommission en &anc. 8n Eementiza '. 2ommission on Clections, the 2ourt e7plained the import of this rule in this ise: Bnder the a&o'e-*uoted rule, the acts of a 9i'ision that are su&.ect of a motion for reconsideration must ha'e a character of finality &efore the same can &e ele'ated to the 2O3CDC2 en &anc. The elementary rule is that an order is final in nature if it completely disposes of the entire case. @ut if there is something more to &e done in the case after its issuance, that order is interlocutory. Only final orders of the 2O3CDC2 in 9i'ision may &e raised &efore the 2O3CDC2 en &anc. 0ection 3, %rticle 8N-2 of the 1456 2onstitution mandates that only motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall &e decided &y the 2O3CDC2 en &anc, thus: 0C2. 3. The 2ommission on Clections may sit en &anc or in t o di'isions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to e7pedite disposition of election cases, including preproclamation contro'ersies. %ll such election cases shall &e heard and decided in 9i'ision, pro'ided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall &e decided &y the 2ommission en &anc. 8t is clear from the foregoing constitutional pro'ision that the 2O3CDC2 .n 'anc shall decide motions for reconsideration only of !decisions$ of a 9i'ision, meaning those acts ha'ing a final character. Kere, the assailed 0econd 9i'ision order did not completely dispose of the case, as there as something more to &e done, hich as to decide the election protest. @eing interlocutory, the assailed 0econd 9i'ision orders may not &e resol'ed &y the 2O3CDC2 .n 'anc. Hurthermore, the present contro'ersy does not fall under any of the instances of hich the 2O3CDC2 .n 'anc can ta)e cognizance. 0ection 2, <ule 3 of the 1443 2O3CDC2 <ules of ?rocedure pro'ides: 0C2. 2. The 2ommission .n 'anc. L The 2ommission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter specifically pro'ided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a 'ote of a ma.ority of the mem&ers of the 2ommission, or in all other cases here a

di'ision is not authorized to act, or here, upon a unanimous 'ote of all the 3em&ers of a 9i'ision, an interlocutory matter or issue relati'e to an action or proceeding &efore it is decided to &e referred to the 2ommission en banc. This case is not among those specifically pro'ided under the 2O3CDC2 <ules of ?rocedure in hich the 2O3CDC2 may sit en banc. =either is it one here a 9i'ision is not authorized to act nor one here the mem&ers of the 0econd 9i'ision ha'e unanimously 'oted to refer the issue to the 2O3CDC2 .n 'anc. Thus, the 2O3CDC2 .n 'anc is not the proper forum here petitioner may &ring the assailed interlocutory Orders for resolution. The Iuly 23, 2FF6 0econd 9i'ision Order as not a final disposition of the case. 8t as an interlocutory order, hich resol'ed an incidental matter and hich did not put a complete end to the contro'ersy. %ccordingly, petitioner#s motion for reconsideration of the said order as correctly resol'ed &y the 2O3CDC2 0econd 9i'ision, hich issued the assailed order. Kence the 2O3CDC2 .n 'anc cannot &e faulted for issuing its He&ruary J, 2FF5 Order denying petitioner#s Omni&us 3otion to certify his motion for reconsideration to the 2O3CDC2 .n 'anc and to stay the order for the collection of &allot &o7es. 1;. AAS>S 3S. (A$20AN,NG -a#ts: ?etitioner filed a petition for prohi&ition to pre'ent Iustice 0ecretary 9atumanong from implementing <. %. 422: entitled R&n &ct "a3in! the -iti$enship of ,hilippine -iti$ens +ho &c0uire %orei!n -iti$enship ,ermanent, &mendin! for the ,urpose -ommonwealth &ct 4o. 56, &s &mended, and for *ther ,urposes. R hich as signed into la &y ?resident Eloria 3. %rroyo on %ugust 24, 2FF3. ?etitioner argued that <.%. 422: is unconstitutional as it 'iolates 0ec. :, %rticle ;8 of the 2onstitution hich states that !dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to national interest and shall &e dealt ith &y la .$ ?etitioner contends that <% 422: cheapens ?hilippine citizenship. Ke a'ers that 0ections 2 and 3 thereof, together, allo dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. ?etitioner maintains that 0ection 2 allo s all Hilipinos, either natural-&orn or naturalized, ho &ecome foreign citizens, to retain their ?hilippine citizenship ithout losing their foreign citizenship. 0ection 3 permits dual allegiance &ecause said la allo s natural&orn citizens of the ?hilippines to regain their ?hilippine citizenship &y simply ta)ing an oath of allegiance ithout forfeiting their foreign allegiance. The Office of the 0olicitor Eeneral (O0E) claims that 0ection 2 merely declares as a state policy that R?hilippine citizens ho &ecome citizens of another country shall &e deemed not to ha'e lost their ?hilippine citizenship.R The O0E further claims that the oath in 0ection 3 does not allo dual allegiance since the oath ta)en &y the former Hilipino citizen is an effecti'e renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The

fact that the applicant ta)ing the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the ?hilippines is an unmista)a&le and categorical affirmation of his undi'ided loyalty to the <epu&lic. *ssues: 1. Ahether or not <.%. 422: is unconstitutional. 2. Ahether or not the court has .urisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance. Held: 1. =o. 8t is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting <ep. %ct =o. 422: is to do a ay ith the pro'ision in 2ommon ealth %ct =o. J3: hich ta)es a ay ?hilippine citizenship from natural-&orn Hilipinos ho &ecome naturalized citizens of other countries. Ahat <ep. %ct =o. 422: does is allo dual citizenship to natural-&orn Hilipino citizens ho ha'e lost ?hilippine citizenship &y reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. @y s earing to the supreme authority of the <epu&lic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. ?lainly, from 0ection 3, <ep. %ct =o. 422: stayed clear out of the pro&lem of dual allegiance and shifted the &urden of confronting the issue of hether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. Ahat happens to the other citizenship as not made a concern of <ep. %ct =o. 422:. 2. 0ection :, %rticle 8; of the 2onstitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a selfe7ecuting pro'ision. The legislature still has to enact the la on dual allegiance. 8n 0ections 2 and 3 of <ep. %ct =o. 422:, the framers ere not concerned ith dual citizenship per se, &ut ith the status of naturalized citizens ho maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin e'en after their naturalization. 2ongress as gi'en a mandate to draft a la that ould set specific parameters of hat really constitutes dual allegiance. Bntil this is done, it ould &e premature for the .udicial department, including this 2ourt, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. 3oreo'er, in Cstrada '. 0andigan&ayan, e said that the courts must assume that the legislature is e'er conscious of the &orders and edges of its plenary po ers, and passed la s ith full )no ledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting hat is right and ad'ancing the elfare of the ma.ority. Kence, in determining hether the acts of the legislature are in tune ith the fundamental la , e must proceed ith .udicial restraint and act ith caution and for&earance. The doctrine of separation of po ers demands no less. Ae cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of hat constitutes dual allegiance hen the 2onstitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining hat acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation &y 2ongress. 1:. S"NA$,+ AP2*N, 3S. !,0"/"! -a#ts: <epu&lic %ct =o. 416J created an additional legislati'e district for the pro'ince of 2amarines 0ur &y reconfiguring the e7isting first and second legislati'e districts of the

pro'ince. The said la originated from Kouse @ill =o. >2J> and ?resident Eloria 3acapagal %rroyo on 12 Octo&er 2FF4.

as signed into la

&y

To that effect, the first and second districts of 2amarines 0ur ere reconfigured in order to create an additional legislati'e district for the pro'ince. Kence, the first district municipalities of Di&manan, 3inala&ac, ?amplona, ?asacao, and 0an Hernando ere com&ined ith the second district 3unicipalities of 3ilaor and Eainza to form a ne second legislati'e district. ?etitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced &y <epu&lic %ct =o. 461J 'iolates the constitutional standards that re*uires a minimum population of t o hundred fifty thousand ( 2:F,FFF) for the creation of a legislati'e district. Thus, the proposed first district ill end up ith a population of less than 2:F,FFF or only 16J,353. *ssue: Ahether or not a population of 2:F,FFF is an indispensa&le constitutional re*uirement for the creation of a ne legislati'e district in a pro'ince. Held: =O. The second sentence of 0ection : (3), %rticle ;8 of the constitution states that: ! Cach city ith a population of at least t o hundred fifty thousand, or each pro'ince, shall ha'e at least one representati'e.$ There is a plain and clear distinction &et een the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a pro'ince to a district on the other. Hor a pro'ince is entitled to at least a representati'e, there is nothing mentioned a&out the population. 3ean hile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 2:F,FFF in order to &e similarly entitled. 8t should &e clearly read that 0ection :(3) of the constitution re*uires a 2:F,FFF minimum population only for a city to &e entitled to a representati'e, &ut not so for a pro'ince. 9?. (2"NAS 3S. H+"$ -a#ts: ?etitioner Kenry !Iun$ 9ueUas, Ir. and pri'ate respondent %ngelito !Iett$ ?. <eyes ere ri'al candidates for the position of congressman in the 2 nd legislati'e district of Taguig 2ity in the 3ay 1>, 2FF6 synchronized national and local elections. %fter the can'ass of the 'otes, petitioner as proclaimed the inner, ha'ing garnered 25,:J> 'otes as opposed to pri'ate respondent#s 26,1F6 'otes. =ot conceding defeat, pri'ate respondent filed an election protest, praying for a re'isionOrecount, alleging that he as cheated in the protested 16F of 632 precincts through insidious and ell-orchestrated electoral frauds and anomalies hich resulted in the systematic reduction of his 'otes and the corresponding increase in petitioner#s 'otes.

8n an order dated 0eptem&er 2:, 2FF5, the K<CT directed the continuation of the re'ision and appreciation of the remaining 6:G of the counter-protested precincts pursuant to <ule 55 of the K<CT <ules. 8nstead of complying ith the order, petitioner filed an urgent motion to ithdra Oa&andon the remaining 6:G counter-protested precincts on Octo&er 26, 2FF5. This as denied &y the K<CT, reiterating its order directing the continuation of the re'ision of &allots in the remaining 6:G counterprotested precincts and recalling its order re*uiring petitioner to augment his cash deposit. The Tri&unal instead ordered the use of its o n funds for the re'ision of the remaining 6:G counter-protested precincts. On =o'em&er 26, 2FF5, the K<CT issued a resolution under <ule 55 of the K<CT <ules and settled .urisprudence, ruling that it had the discretion either to dismiss the protest or counter-protest, or to continue ith the re'ision if necessitated &y reasona&le and sufficient grounds affecting the 'alidity of the election. This as ith the end in 'ie of ascertaining the true choice of the electorate. 8t as the K<CT#s position that the mere filing of a motion to ithdra Oa&andon the unre'ised precincts did not automatically di'est the K<CT of its .urisdiction o'er the same. 3oreo'er, it ruled that its tas) of determining the true ill of the electorate as not confined to the e7amination of contested &allots. Bnder its plenary po er, it could motu propio re'ie the 'alidity of e'ery &allot in'ol'ed in a protest or counter-protest and the same could not &e frustrated &y the mere e7pedient of filing a motion to ithdra Oa&andon the remaining counter-protested precincts. 2on'inced that it could not determine the true ill of the electorate of the 2nd legislati'e district of Taguig 2ity on the &asis alone of the initial re'ision of the 1FFG protested precincts and the 2:G counter-protested precincts, it had no other recourse &ut to continue the re'ision and appreciation of all the remaining 6:G counter-protested precincts. *ssues: (1) Ahether the K<CT committed gra'e a&use of discretion, amounting to lac) or e7cess of .urisdiction, in issuing the <esolution, to continue the re'ision and appreciation of all the remaining 6:G counter-protested precincts. (2) Ahether or not K<CT#s assumption of the &urden of the costs of the continued re'ision amounted to an illegal and unconstitutional dis&ursement of pu&lic funds under 0ection 24 (1), %rticle ;8 of the 2onstitution. Held: The petition has no merit. 0o long as the 2onstitution grants the K<CT the po er to &e the sole .udge of all contests relating to the election, returns and *ualifications of mem&ers of the Kouse of <epresentati'es, any final action ta)en &y the K<CT on a matter ithin its .urisdiction shall, as a rule, not &e re'ie ed &y this 2ourt /. the %owe& g&anted to the "le#to&al $&ibunal 5 5 5 e5#ludes the e5e&#ise of any autho&ity on the %a&t of this !ou&t that would in any wise &est&i#t it o& #u&tail it o& e en affe#t the same . Euided &y this &asic principle, the 2ourt ill neither assume a po er that &elongs e7clusi'ely to the K<CT nor su&stitute its o n .udgment for that of the Tri&unal.

718 H+"$Qs Powe& to (eny the 0otion to )ithd&aw I Abandon !ounte&'%&otest %irst, there are 632 precincts in the 2nd Degislati'e 9istrict of Taguig 2ity, here respondent protested the election results in 16F precincts and petitioner counterprotested :JF precincts. %ll in all, therefore, 63F precincts ere the su&.ect of the re'ision proceedings. Ahile 1FFG of the protested precincts ere already re'ised, only 2:G or 1>F of the counter-protested precincts (or a total of 31F precincts) ere actually done. Tet, ith >2F more precincts to go had the K<CT only &een allo ed to continue its proceedings, petitioner claims that respondents ere only speculating that a sufficient num&er of fa)eOspurious &allots ould &e disco'ered in the remaining 6:G counter-protested precincts and that these fa)eOspurious &allots ould o'erturn the result of the election. 8ndeed, due regard and respect for the authority of the K<CT as an independent constitutional &ody re*uire that any finding of gra'e a&use of discretion against that &ody should &e &ased on firm and con'incing proof, not on sha)y assumptions. %ny accusation of gra'e a&use of discretion on the part of the K<CT must &e esta&lished &y a #lea& showing of ar&itrariness and impro'idence. @ut the 2ourt finds no e'idence of such gra'e a&use of discretion &y the K<CT. Second, the 2onstitution mandates that the K<CT !shall &e the sole .udge of all contests relating to the election, returns and *ualifications$ of its mem&ers. @y employing the ord !sole,$ the 2onstitution is emphatic that the .urisdiction of the K<CT in the ad.udication of election contests in'ol'ing its mem&ers is e7clusi'e and e7hausti'e. 8ts e7ercise of po er is intended to &e its o n S full, complete and unimpaired. ?rotecti'e of its .urisdiction and asserti'e of its constitutional mandate, the Tri&unal adopted <ule 6 of the K<CT <ules: The Tri&unal shall ha'e e5#lusi e #ont&ol, di&e#tion and su%e& ision of all matte&s %e&taining to its own fun#tions and o%e&ation. 8n this connection and in the matter of the re'ision of &allots, the K<CT reser'ed for itself the discretion to continue or discontinue the process. The meaning of <ule 55 is plain. The K<CT could continue or discontinue the re'ision proceedings e propio motu, that is, of its o n accord. Thus, e'en if e ere to adopt petitioner#s 'ie that he ought to ha'e &een allo ed &y K<CT to ithdra his counter-protest, there as nothing to pre'ent the K<CT from continuing the re'ision of its own a##o&d &y authority of <ule 55. The only prere*uisite to the e7ercise &y the K<CT of its prerogati'e under <ule 55 as its o n determination that the e'idence thus far presented could affect the officially proclaimed results. 3uch li)e the appreciation of contested &allots and election documents, the determination of hether the e'idence could influence the officially proclaimed results as a highly technical underta)ing, a function &est left to the specialized e7pertise of the K<CT. %t the ris) of unduly encroaching on the e7clusi'e prerogati'e of the K<CT as the sole .udge of election contests in'ol'ing its mem&ers, the !ou&t #annot substitute its own sense o& Mudgment fo& that of the H+"$ on the issues of whethe& the e iden#e %&esented du&ing the initial &e ision #ould affe#t the offi#ially %&o#laimed &esults

and whethe& the #ontinuation of the &e ision %&o#eedings #ould lead to a dete&mination of the t&ue will of the ele#to&ate. The 2ourt should merely test hether or not the go'ernmental &ranch or agency has gone &eyond the constitutional limits of its .urisdiction, not that it e&&ed o& had a diffe&ent iew . 8f the 2ourt ill dictate to the K<CT on ho to proceed ith these election protest proceedings, the Tri&unal ill no longer ha'e !e7clusi'e control, direction and super'ision of all matters pertaining to its o n functions and operation.$ 8t ill constitute an intrusion into the K<CT#s domain and a curtailment of the K<CT#s po er to act of its own a##o&d on its own e aluation of the e'identiary eight and effect of the result of the initial re'ision. %inally, it is horn&oo) doctrine that .urisdiction, once ac*uired, is not lost at the instance of the parties &ut continues until the case is terminated. Thus, in Robles v. HR.T, the 2ourt ruled: $he me&e filing of the motion to withd&aw %&otest on the &emaining un#ontested %&e#in#ts, without any a#tion on the %a&t of &es%ondent t&ibunal, does not by itself di est the t&ibunal of its Mu&isdi#tion o e& the #ase . Iurisdiction, once ac*uired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties &ut continues until the case is terminated. !e&tainly, the $&ibunal &etains the autho&ity to g&ant o& deny the 0otion, and the withd&awal be#omes effe#ti e only when the 0otion is g&anted. $o hold othe&wise would %e&mit a %a&ty to de%&i e the $&ibunal of Mu&isdi#tion al&eady a#Dui&ed. Ahere the court has .urisdiction o'er the su&.ect matter, its orders upon all *uestions pertaining to the cause are orders ithin its .urisdiction, and ho e'er erroneous they may &e, they cannot &e corrected &y certiorari. $his &ule mo&e a%%&o%&iately a%%lies to &es%ondent H+"$ whose inde%enden#e as a #onstitutional body has time and again been u%held by 2s in many #ases . 798 H+"$Qs (is#&etion to 2se *ts ,wn -unds in +e ision P&o#eedings Ahen .urisdiction is conferred &y la on a court or tri&unal, that court or tri&unal, unless other ise pro'ided &y la , is deemed to ha'e the authority to employ all rits, processes and other means to ma)e its po er effecti'e. Ahere a general po er is conferred or duty en.oined, e'ery particular po er necessary for the e7ercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred. 0ince the K<CT possessed the authority to motu propio continue a re'ision of &allots, it also had the here ithal to carry it out. 8t thus ordered the dis&ursement of its o n funds for the re'ision of the &allots in the remaining counter-protested precincts. Ae har) &ac) to <ule 6 of the K<CT <ules hich pro'ides that the K<CT has e7clusi'e control, direction and super'ision of its functions. The K<CT#s order as &ut one aspect of its po er. 3oreo'er, <ule 5 of the K<CT <ules pro'ides that the Tri&unal shall ha'e and e7ercise all such po ers as are 'ested in it &y the 2onstitution or &y la , and su#h othe& %owe&s as a&e ne#essa&y o& in#idental to the a##om%lishment of its %u&%oses and fun#tions as set forth in the 2onstitution or as may &e pro'ided &y la . 2ertainly, the K<CT#s order that its o n funds &e used for the re'ision of the &allots from the 6:G counter-protested precincts as an e7ercise of a po er necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of its primary function as sole .udge of election protest cases in'ol'ing its mem&ers.

%ll told, it should &e &orne in mind that the present petition is a petition for certiorari under <ule J: of the <ules of 2ourt. 8t alleges that the K<CT committed gra'e a&use of discretion amounting to lac) or e7cess of .urisdiction hen it promulgated <esolution =o. F5-3:3 dated =o'em&er 26, 2FF5. @ut hat is !gra'e a&use of discretion+$ 8t is such capricious and himsical e7ercise of .udgment hich is tantamount to lac) of .urisdiction. Ordinary a&use of discretion is insufficient. The a&use of discretion must &e gra'e, that is, the po er is e7ercised in an ar&itrary or despotic manner &y reason of passion or personal hostility. 8t must &e so patent and gross as to amount to e'asion of positi'e duty or to a 'irtual refusal to perform the duty en.oined &y or to act at all in contemplation of the la . 8n other ords, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must &e a clear sho ing of caprice and ar&itrariness in the e7ercise of discretion. There is also gra'e a&use of discretion hen there is a contra'ention of the 2onstitution, the la or e7isting .urisprudence. Bsing the foregoing as yardstic), the 2ourt finds that petitioner misera&ly failed to discharge the onus probandi imposed on him. 91. S,+*AN, 3S. /AG2A+(*A 6;< S!+A <: ?@I9:I9??: %dministrati'e Da ( ?o ers of an administrati'e agency is ascertained from the la itself is li&erally construed. 3o'ie and Tele'ision <e'ie and 2lassification @oard (3T<2@) has the po er to issue a pre'enti'e suspension order. %dministrati'e regulation or su&ordinate legislation to promote pu&lic interest is a necessity in modern life. The grant of the rule-ma)ing po er to administrati'e agencies is a rela7ation of the principle of separation of po ers and is an e7ception to the nondelegation of legislati'e po ers. 8t is necessary &ecause of !the gro ing comple7ity of the modern life, the multiplication of the su&.ect the go'ernmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the la $. 2onstitutional Da ( The petitioner has not &een denied the e*ual protection of the la as the 8glesia ni 2risto (8=2) ministers he criticized are not facing any administrati'e charges. The facts in'ol'ing the 8=2 ministers are simply too different to e'en consider hether or not there is prima facie indication of oppressi'e ine*uality. <eligious Hreedom( ?lain and simple insults to another person cannot &e ele'ated to the status of a religious speech. Hreedom of 0peech( %s a standard of limitation on freedom of speech and press, the clear and present danger test is not a magic incantation. 8t as originally designed to determine the latitude hich should &e gi'en to speech that espouses anti-go'ernment action, or to ha'e serious and su&stantial deleterious conse*uences on the security and pu&lic order of the community.

99. (e GuGman s. !,0"/"! 6:? S!+A 1@: ?6I1:I9??: 2onstitutional Da ( %dministrati'e Da ( 2itizenship( Aho may &e allo ed to re-ac*uire and retain ?hilippine citizenship L <.%. =o. 422: as enacted to allo re-ac*uisition and retention of ?hilippine citizenship for: 1) natural-&orn citizens ho ha'e lost their ?hilippine citizenship &y reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country( and 2) natural-&orn citizens of the ?hilippines ho, after the effecti'ity of the la , &ecome citizens of a foreign country. The la pro'ides that they are deemed to ha'e reac*uired or retained their ?hilippine citizenship upon ta)ing the oath of allegiance. <.%. =o. 422: ho e'er, imposes an additional re*uirement on those ho ish to see) electi'e pu&lic office that is, renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under the said la . 8t re*uires a t in re*uirements of: 1) s earing to an Oath of allegiance and 2) e7ecuting a <enunciation of Horeign 2itizenship. 9F. Aangko Sent&al ng Pili%inas 0oneta&y Aoa&d 7ASP8 s. Antonio'3alenGuela 6?9 S!+A 6: 1?I9I9??: 9ue ?rocess( There is no pro'ision of la , no section in the procedures of the @0? that sho s that the @0? is re*uired to gi'e &an)s copies of the <eports of C7amination( 0ec. 25 of <.%. =o. 6J:3, or the =e central @an) %ct, hich go'erns e7aminations of &an)ing institutions, pro'ides that the <eport of C7amination (<OC) shall &e su&mitted to the 3onetary @oard (3@) L the &an) e7amined is not mentioned as a recipient of the <OC. !2lose no Kear Dater$ doctrine L under the la , the sanction of closure could &e imposed upon a &an) &y the @ang)o 0entral ng ?ilipinas (@0?) e'en ithout notice and hearing L this !close no , hear later$ scheme is grounded on practical and legal considerations to pre'ent un arranted dissipation of the &an)s# assets and as a 'alid e7ercise of police po er to protect the depositors, creditors, stoc)holders, and the general pu&lic. Iudicial <e'ie enters the picture only after the 3onetary @oard (3@) has ta)en action L it cannot pre'ent such action &y the 3@( The threat of the imposition of sanctions, e'en that of closure, does not 'iolate their right to due process, and cannot &e the &asis for a rit of preliminary in.unction. 8n the a&sence of a clear legal right, the issuance of an in.uncti'e a&use of discretion. 9@. -e&nandeG s. Go 6:; S!+A 96< rit constitutes gra'e

:I@I9??: 2itizenship( 2ases in'ol'ing citizenship are sui generis L once the citizenship of an indi'idual is put into *uestion, it necessarily has to &e threshed out and decided upon. 8n the case of Hri'aldo '. 2O3CDC2, e said that decisions declaring the ac*uisition or denial of citizenship cannot go'ern the person#s future status ith finality. This is &ecause a person may su&se*uently reac*uire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized &y la for the purpose. 8ndeed, if the issue of one#s citizenship, after it has &een passed upon &y the courts, lea'es it still open to future ad.udication, then there is more reason hy the go'ernment should not &e precluded from *uestioning one#s claim to ?hilippine citizenship, especially so hen the same has ne'er &een threshed out &y any tri&unal. 2itizenship proceedings are a class of its o n, in that, unli)e other cases, res .udicata does not o&tain as a matter of course. <es .udicata may &e applied in cases of citizenship only if the follo ing concur: 1) a person#s citizenship must &e raised as a material issue in a contro'ersy here said person is a party( 2) the 0olicitor Eeneral or his authorized representati'e too) acti'e part in the resolution thereof( and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed &y the 2ourt. The 3-year period for electing citizenship may &e e7tended as hen the person has al ays regarded himself as a Hilipino( The e7ercise of the rights and pri'ileges granted only to Hilipinos is not conclusi'e proof of citizenship, &ecause a person may misinterpret himself to &e a Hilipino and thus en.oy the rights and pri'ileges of citizens of this country( =o presumption can &e indulged in fa'or of the claimant of ?hilippine citizenship, and any dou&t regarding citizenship mut &e resol'ed in fa'or of the state. "le#tion of Phili%%ine !itiGenshi%H $he %h&ase J&easonable timeK has been inte&%&eted to mean that the ele#tion should be made within th&ee 7F8 yea&s f&om &ea#hing the age of maMo&ity. 9eportation( ?rescription( %n alien#s deportation may &e effected only if his arrest is made ithin : years from the time the cause for deportation arose( 8t is the legal possi&ility of &ringing the action hich determines the starting point for the computation of the period of prescription. 9eportation proceedings are administrati'e in character, summary in nature, and need not &e conducted strictly in accordance ith the rules of ordinary court proceedings( The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to &e heard, or as applied to administrati'e proceedings, an opportunity to e7plain one#s side or an opportunity to see) reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. ,n#e a %e&son is duly #ha&ged in #ou&t, he may no longe& Duestion his detention th&ough a %etition fo& issuan#e of a w&it of habeas #o&%us R his &emedy would be to Duash the info&mation andIo& the wa&&ant of a&&est duly issuedH The term !court$

in the conte7t of ha&es corpus includes *uasi .udicial &odies of go'ernmental agencies such as the 9eportation @oard of the @ureau of 8mmigration( Ahen an alien is detained &y the @ureau pursuant to an order of deportation &y the deportation @oard, the <T2s ha'e no po er to release such alien on &ail e'en in ha&eas corpus proceedings &ecause there is no la authorizing it. 96. +*0AN(, 3 !,0"/"! BG.+. N,. 1<6F6@ : Se%tembe& 1;, 9??:C

-a#ts: On Iuly 13, 2FF1, herein pri'ate respondent lodged a 2omplaint 3 ith the 2O3CDC2, Office of the ?ro'incial Clection 0uper'isor, 0anta 2ruz Daguna, accusing Iacinto 2arag, Ionry Cnaya and herein petitioner Iuanito <. <imando of 'iolating 0ection 2, paragraph (e) and 0ection 3, paragraph (d) of 2O3CDC2 <esolution =o. 3325> in relation to 0ection 2J1, paragraph (s) of the Omni&us Clection 2ode : and 0ection 32 of <epu&lic %ct (<.%.) =o. 61JJ. On or a&out He&ruary 26, 2FF1, andOor during the election period from Ianuary 2, 2FF1 to Iune 13, 2FF1, in 1uezon 2ity and 0anta <osa, Daguna, <imando &eing the ?resident of 8llustrious 0ecurity and 8n'estigation %gency, 8nc. filed an application for e7emptions ith the 2O3CDC2 &ut said application as denied. The complaint alleged that <imando permitted, allo ed and sanctioned 0E 2arag and Cnaya to carry firearms. The t o 0E#s shot Ionathan 3agno, a 14-year old student, and died later. 8n his counter-affida'it, <imando a'erred that he ne'er permitted the guards to carry firearms outside the su&di'ision &ut admittedly that the 0Es ere carrying guns ithin the su&di'ision to pro'ide protections to the residents. 2O3CDC2 ?ro'incial Officer dismissed the complaint holding that the firearms carried ithin the su&di'ision. 2O3CDC2 Cn @anc affirmed the resolution. *SS2": Ahether or not prior authority is re*uired &efore 0E can carry firearm or) in 'ie of the gun &an H"/(: % perusal of 0ection 2J1 (s) in its entirety ould sho that, as a rule, the &earing of arms &y a mem&er of security or police organization of a go'ernment office or of a pri'ately o ned security agency outside the immediate 'icinity of oneQs place of or) is ithin its place of ere

prohi&ited. 8mplicitly, the &earing of arms &y such person ithin the immediate 'icinity of his place of or) is not prohi&ited and does not re*uire prior ritten appro'al from the 2ommission. Ko e'er, 0ection 2J1 (s) also lays do n e7ceptions to this rule and states that the general prohi&ition shall not apply in three instances: (a) hen any of the persons enumerated therein is in pursuit of another person ho has committed or is committing a crime in the premises the former is guarding( (&) hen such person is escorting or pro'iding security for the transport of payrolls, deposits, or other 'alua&les( and (c) hen he is guarding pri'ate residences, &uildings or offices. 8t is only in the case of the third e7ception that it is pro'ided that prior ritten appro'al from the 2O3CDC2 shall &e o&tained. 8n the case at &ar, the cause of the confusion appears to &e the fact that the security guards ho ere &eing charged ith 'iolation of the election gun &an ere &earing firearms ithin the immediate 'icinity of their place of or), &ut their place of or) happened to &e a residential su&di'ision here they ere guarding the residences of pri'ate persons. 8ndeed, this seeming conflict &et een the general rule ( hich allo s the &earing of arms ithin the immediate 'icinity of the security personnelQs place of or)) and the e7ception ( hich states that prior ritten appro'al from the 2O3CDC2 is necessary hen security personnel are guarding pri'ate residences or offices) can &e harmonized if e interpret the e7ceptions as pertaining to instances here the security personnel are outside the immediate 'icinity of their place of or) or here the &oundaries of their place of or) cannot &e easily determined. A''(;)+9 /0)4 )+/-3'3-/*/)%+ /% /0- ,*4*/ 7*3, '3)%3 .3)//-+ *''3%=*( 53%& /0- COMELEC )4 %+(; 3-12)3-6 .0-+ * &-&7-3 %5 * 4-,23)/; *9-+,; )4 92*36)+9 '3)=*/- 3-4)6-+,-4 %2/4)6- /0- )&&-6)*/=),)+)/; %5 0)4 '(*,- %5 .%3>, %3 .0-3- /0- -<*,/ *3-* %5 0)4 *44)9+&-+/ )4 +%/ 3-*6)(; 6-/-3&)+*7(-# Kere, it is undisputed that security guards 2arag and Cnaya ere &earing licensed firearms hile performing their assigned tas) as guards inside the su&di'ision, hich as their place of or). That &eing the case, there as no need to secure a ritten authority from the 2O3CDC2 under 0ection 2J1(s) of the Omni&us Clection 2ode. Kence, there as no 'iolation at all of that particular pro'ision. Ae, thus, concur ith petitioner that he did not commit an election offense on He&ruary 26, 2FF1, the day the shooting incident happened ithin the premises of 0ta. <osa Komes at 0anta <osa, Daguna. 96. (uenas s. H+"$ H"N+. J>2NK (2"OAS, >+., s. H,2S" ,- +"P+"S"N$A$*3"S "/"!$,+A/ $+*A2NA/ 7H+"$8 and ANG"/*$, J>"$K +"."S E< =o. 15:>F1 Iuly 21, 2FF4

Sed 0uis custodiet ipsos custodies+ (@ut ho is to guard the guardians themsel'es+) Bnder our constitutional scheme, the 0upreme 2ourt is the ultimate guardian of the 2onstitution, particularly of the allocation of po ers, the guarantee of indi'idual li&erties and the assurance of the people#s so'ereignty. The 2ourt has the distinguished &ut delicate duty of determining and defining constitutional meaning, di'ining constitutional intent and deciding constitutional disputes. =onetheless, )/4 ?26),)*( 42'3-&*,; )4 +-=-3 ?26),)*( 42'-3)%3)/; (5%3 )/ )4 ,%--12*( .)/0 /0- %/0-3 73*+,0-4) %3 ?26),)*( /;3*++; (5%3 )/ )4 42''%4-6 /% 7- /0- (-*4/ 6*+9-3%24 73*+,0 8. I+4/-*6, ?26),)*( 42'3-&*,; )4 /0- ,%+4,)%24 *+6 ,*2/)%24 *.*3-+-44 *+6 *,,-'/*+,- %5 )/4 '3%'-3 '(*,- )+ /0- %=-3*(( 4,0-&- %5 9%=-3+&-+/ .)/0 /0- %7?-,/)=- %5 *44-3/)+9 *+6 '3%&%/)+9 /0- 42'3-&*,; %5 /0- C%+4/)/2/)%+# T024, .0-+-=-3 /0- C%23/ -<-3,)4-4 )/4 52+,/)%+ %5 ,0-,>)+9 /0- -<,-44-4 %5 *+; 73*+,0 %5 9%=-3+&-+/, )/ )4 *(4% 62/;-7%2+6 /% ,0-,> )/4-(5# O/0-3.)4-, .0% .)(( 92*36 /0- 92*36)*+@ H%2T0: ?etitioner Kenry !Iun$ 9ueUas, Ir. and pri'ate respondent %ngelito !Iett$ ?. <eyes ere ri'al candidates for the position of congressman in the 2 nd legislati'e district of Taguig 2ity in the 3ay 1>, 2FF6 synchronized national and local elections. %fter the can'ass of the 'otes, petitioner as proclaimed the inner, ha'ing garnered 25,:J> 'otes as opposed to pri'ate respondent#s 26,1F6 'otes. =ot conceding defeat, pri'ate respondent filed an election protest, praying for a re'isionOrecount, alleging that he as cheated in the protested 16F of 632 precincts through insidious and ell-orchestrated electoral frauds and anomalies hich resulted in the systematic reduction of his 'otes and the corresponding increase in petitioner#s 'otes. 8n an order dated 0eptem&er 2:, 2FF5, the K<CT directed the continuation of the re'ision and appreciation of the remaining 6:G of the counter-protested precincts pursuant to <ule 55 of the K<CT <ules. 8nstead of complying ith the order, petitioner filed an urgent motion to ithdra Oa&andon the remaining 6:G counter-protested precincts on Octo&er 26, 2FF5. This as denied &y the K<CT, reiterating its order directing the continuation of the re'ision of &allots in the remaining 6:G counterprotested precincts and recalling its order re*uiring petitioner to augment his cash deposit. The Tri&unal instead ordered the use of its o n funds for the re'ision of the remaining 6:G counter-protested precincts. On =o'em&er 26, 2FF5, the K<CT issued a resolution under <ule 55 of the K<CT <ules and settled .urisprudence, ruling that it had the discretion either to dismiss the protest or counter-protest, or to continue ith the re'ision if necessitated &y reasona&le and sufficient grounds affecting the 'alidity of the election. This as ith the end in 'ie of ascertaining the true choice of the electorate. 8t as the K<CT#s position that the mere filing of a motion to ithdra Oa&andon the unre'ised precincts did not automatically di'est the K<CT of its .urisdiction o'er the same. 3oreo'er, it ruled that its tas) of determining the true ill of the electorate as not confined to the e7amination of contested &allots. Bnder its plenary po er, it could motu propio re'ie the 'alidity of

e'ery &allot in'ol'ed in a protest or counter-protest and the same could not &e frustrated &y the mere e7pedient of filing a motion to ithdra Oa&andon the remaining counter-protested precincts. 2on'inced that it could not determine the true ill of the electorate of the 2nd legislati'e district of Taguig 2ity on the &asis alone of the initial re'ision of the 1FFG protested precincts and the 2:G counter-protested precincts, it had no other recourse &ut to continue the re'ision and appreciation of all the remaining 6:G counter-protested precincts. 800BC: (1) Ahether the K<CT committed gra'e a&use of discretion, amounting to lac) or e7cess of .urisdiction, in issuing the <esolution, to continue the re'ision and appreciation of all the remaining 6:G counter-protested precincts. (2) Ahether or not K<CT#s assumption of the &urden of the costs of the continued re'ision amounted to an illegal and unconstitutional dis&ursement of pu&lic funds under 0ection 24 (1), %rticle ;8 of the 2onstitution. KCD9: $he %etition has no me&it. 0o long as the 2onstitution grants the K<CT the po er to &e the sole .udge of all contests relating to the election, returns and *ualifications of mem&ers of the Kouse of <epresentati'es, any final action ta)en &y the K<CT on a matter ithin its .urisdiction shall, as a rule, not &e re'ie ed &y this 2ourt /. the %owe& g&anted to the "le#to&al $&ibunal 5 5 5 e5#ludes the e5e&#ise of any autho&ity on the %a&t of this !ou&t that would in any wise &est&i#t it o& #u&tail it o& e en affe#t the same . Euided &y this &asic principle, the 2ourt ill neither assume a po er that &elongs e7clusi'ely to the K<CT nor su&stitute its o n .udgment for that of the Tri&unal. 718 H+"$Qs Powe& to (eny the 0otion to )ithd&aw I Abandon !ounte&'%&otest F)34/, there are 632 precincts in the 2 nd Degislati'e 9istrict of Taguig 2ity, here respondent protested the election results in 16F precincts and petitioner counterprotested :JF precincts. %ll in all, therefore, 63F precincts ere the su&.ect of the re'ision proceedings. Ahile 1FFG of the protested precincts ere already re'ised, only 2:G or 1>F of the counter-protested precincts (or a total of 31F precincts) ere actually done. Tet, ith >2F more precincts to go had the K<CT only &een allo ed to continue its proceedings, petitioner claims that respondents ere only speculating that a sufficient num&er of fa)eOspurious &allots ould &e disco'ered in the remaining 6:G counter-protested precincts and that these fa)eOspurious &allots ould o'erturn the result of the election. 8ndeed, due regard and respect for the authority of the K<CT as an independent constitutional &ody re*uire that any finding of gra'e a&use of discretion against that &ody should &e &ased on firm and con'incing proof, not on sha)y assumptions. %ny accusation of gra'e a&use of discretion on the part of the K<CT must &e esta&lished &y

a #lea& showing of ar&itrariness and impro'idence. @ut the 2ourt finds no e'idence of such gra'e a&use of discretion &y the K<CT. S-,%+6, the 2onstitution mandates that the K<CT !shall &e the sole .udge of all contests relating to the election, returns and *ualifications$ of its mem&ers. @y employing the ord !sole,$ the 2onstitution is emphatic that the .urisdiction of the K<CT in the ad.udication of election contests in'ol'ing its mem&ers is e7clusi'e and e7hausti'e. 8ts e7ercise of po er is intended to &e its o n S full, complete and unimpaired. ?rotecti'e of its .urisdiction and asserti'e of its constitutional mandate, the Tri&unal adopted <ule 6 of the K<CT <ules: The Tri&unal shall ha'e e5#lusi e #ont&ol, di&e#tion and su%e& ision of all matte&s %e&taining to its own fun#tions and o%e&ation. 8n this connection and in the matter of the re'ision of &allots, the K<CT reser'ed for itself the discretion to continue or discontinue the process. The meaning of <ule 55 is plain. The K<CT could continue or discontinue the re'ision proceedings e propio motu, that is, of its o n accord. Thus, e'en if e ere to adopt petitioner#s 'ie that he ought to ha'e &een allo ed &y K<CT to ithdra his counter-protest, there as nothing to pre'ent the K<CT from continuing the re'ision of its own a##o&d &y authority of <ule 55. The only prere*uisite to the e7ercise &y the K<CT of its prerogati'e under <ule 55 as its o n determination that the e'idence thus far presented could affect the officially proclaimed results. 3uch li)e the appreciation of contested &allots and election documents, the determination of hether the e'idence could influence the officially proclaimed results as a highly technical underta)ing, a function &est left to the specialized e7pertise of the K<CT. %t the ris) of unduly encroaching on the e7clusi'e prerogati'e of the K<CT as the sole .udge of election contests in'ol'ing its mem&ers, the !ou&t #annot substitute its own sense o& Mudgment fo& that of the H+"$ on the issues of whethe& the e iden#e %&esented du&ing the initial &e ision #ould affe#t the offi#ially %&o#laimed &esults and whethe& the #ontinuation of the &e ision %&o#eedings #ould lead to a dete&mination of the t&ue will of the ele#to&ate. The2ourt should merely test hether or not the go'ernmental &ranch or agency has gone &eyond the constitutional limits of its .urisdiction, not that it e&&ed o& had a diffe&ent iew . 8f the 2ourt ill dictate to the K<CT on ho to proceed ith these election protest proceedings, the Tri&unal ill no longer ha'e !e7clusi'e control, direction and super'ision of all matters pertaining to its o n functions and operation.$ 8t ill constitute an intrusion into the K<CT#s domain and a curtailment of the K<CT#s po er to act of its own a##o&d on its own e aluation of the e'identiary eight and effect of the result of the initial re'ision. F)+*((;, it is horn&oo) doctrine that .urisdiction, once ac*uired, is not lost at the instance of the parties &ut continues until the case is terminated. Thus, in Robles v. HR.T, the 2ourt ruled: $he me&e filing of the motion to withd&aw %&otest on the &emaining un#ontested %&e#in#ts, without any a#tion on the %a&t of &es%ondent t&ibunal,

does not by itself di est the t&ibunal of its Mu&isdi#tion o e& the #ase . Iurisdiction, once ac*uired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties &ut continues until the case is terminated. !e&tainly, the $&ibunal &etains the autho&ity to g&ant o& deny the 0otion, and the withd&awal be#omes effe#ti e only when the 0otion is g&anted. $o hold othe&wise would %e&mit a %a&ty to de%&i e the $&ibunal of Mu&isdi#tion al&eady a#Dui&ed. Ahere the court has .urisdiction o'er the su&.ect matter, its orders upon all *uestions pertaining to the cause are orders ithin its .urisdiction, and ho e'er erroneous they may &e, they cannot &e corrected &y certiorari. $his &ule mo&e a%%&o%&iately a%%lies to &es%ondent H+"$ whose inde%enden#e as a #onstitutional body has time and again been u%held by 2s in many #ases . %s e7plained in the case of Dazatin '. The Kouse of <epresentati'es Clectoral Tri&unal and Tim&ol, E.<. =o. 5>246, 9ecem&er 5, 1455, thus: The use of the ord "sole# emphasizes the e7clusi'e character of the .urisdiction conferred ,%ngara '. Clectoral 2ommission, supra, at 1J2-. The e7ercise of the ?o er &y the Clectoral 2ommission under the 143: 2onstitution has &een descri&ed as Vintended to &e complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature# ,8d. at 16:-. Carlier, this grant of po er to the legislature as characterized &y Iustice 3alcolm as "full, clear and complete# ,;eloso '. @oard of 2an'assers of Deyte and 0amar, 34 ?hil. 55J (1414)-. Bnder the amended 143: 2onstitution, the po er as un*ualifiedly reposed upon the Clectoral Tri&unal ,0uanes '. 2hief %ccountant of the 0enate, 51 ?hil. 515 (14>5)- and it remained as full, clear and complete as that pre'iously granted the legislature and the Clectoral 2ommission ,Dachica '. Tap, E.<. =o. D-2:364, 0eptem&er 2:, 14J5, 2: 02<% 1>F-. The same may &e said ith regard to the .urisdiction of the Clectoral Tri&unals under the 1456 2onstitution. Thus, ".udicial re'ie of decisions or final resolutions of the Kouse Clectoral Tri&unal is (thus) possi&le only in the e7ercise of this 2ourt#s so-called e7traordinary .urisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the tri&unal#s decision or resolution as rendered ithout or in e7cess of its .urisdiction, or ith gra'e a&use of discretion or, paraphrasing 3orrera, upon a clear sho ing of such ar&itrary and impro'ident use &y the Tri&unal of its po er as constitutes a denial of due process of la , or upon a demonstration of a 'ery clear unmitigated C<<O<, manifestly constituting such a E<%;C %@B0C OH 9802<CT8O= that there has to &e a remedy for such a&use. (emphasis supplied) 798 H+"$Qs (is#&etion to 2se *ts ,wn -unds in +e ision P&o#eedings Ahen .urisdiction is conferred &y la on a court or tri&unal, that court or tri&unal, unless other ise pro'ided &y la , is deemed to ha'e the authority to employ all rits, processes and other means to ma)e its po er effecti'e. Ahere a general po er is conferred or duty en.oined, e'ery particular po er necessary for the e7ercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred. 0ince the K<CT possessed the authority to motu propio continue a re'ision of &allots, it also had the here ithal to carry it out. 8t

thus ordered the dis&ursement of its o n funds for the re'ision of the &allots in the remaining counter-protested precincts. Ae har) &ac) to <ule 6 of the K<CT <ules hich pro'ides that the K<CT has e7clusi'e control, direction and super'ision of its functions. The K<CT#s order as &ut one aspect of its po er. 3oreo'er, <ule 5 of the K<CT <ules pro'ides that the Tri&unal shall ha'e and e7ercise all such po ers as are 'ested in it &y the 2onstitution or &y la , and su#h othe& %owe&s as a&e ne#essa&y o& in#idental to the a##om%lishment of its %u&%oses and fun#tions as set forth in the 2onstitution or as may &e pro'ided &y la . (emphasis supplied) 2ertainly, the K<CT#s order that its o n funds &e used for the re'ision of the &allots from the 6:G counter-protested precincts as an e7ercise of a po er necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of its primary function as sole .udge of election protest cases in'ol'ing its mem&ers. %irst, if petitioner hypothetically admits that the K<CT has the po er to order the continuation of the re'ision of the 6:G remaining counter-protested precincts, then he should also necessarily concede that there is nothing to pre'ent the K<CT from using its o n funds to carry out such o&.ecti'e. Other ise, the e7istence of such po er on the part of the K<CT &ecomes useless and meaningless. Second, 0ection 1, 2hapter 1 of <% 4>45 pro'ides that the K<CT has an allotted &udget for the !%d.udication of Clectoral 2ontests 8n'ol'ing 3em&ers of the Kouse of <epresentati'es.$ The pro'ision is general and encompassing enough to authorize the use of the K<CT#s funds for the re'ision of &allots, hether in a protest or counterprotest. @eing allo ed &y la , the use of K<CT funds for the re'ision of the remaining 6:G counter-protested precincts as not illegal, much less 'iolati'e of %rticle 22F of the <e'ised ?enal 2ode. To reiterate, the la (particularly <% 4>45) itself has appropriated funds for ad.udicating election contests in the K<CT. %s an independent constitutional &ody, and ha'ing recei'ed the proper appropriation for that purpose, the K<CT had ide discretion in the dis&ursement and allocation of such funds. Third, K<CT haBsC the inhe&ent %owe& to sus%end its own &ules and dis&urse its funds for any la ful purpose it deemed &est. This is specially significant in election contests such as this here hat is at sta)e is the 'ital pu&lic interest in determining the true ill of the electorate. 8n any e'ent, nothing pre'ented the K<CT from ordering any of the parties to ma)e the additional re*uired deposit(s) to co'er costs, as respondent in fact manifested in the K<CT. 0uch dis&ursement could not &e deemed a gi'ing of un arranted &enefit, ad'antage or preference to a party since the &enefit ould actually redound to the electorate hose true ill must &e determined. 0uffrage is a matter of pu&lic, not pri'ate, interest. The 2ourt declared in &ruelo, 7r. v. -ourt of &ppeals that !,o-'er and a&o'e the desire of the candidates to in, is the deep pu&lic interest to determine the true choice of the people.$ Thus, in an election protest, any &enefit to a party ould simply &e incidental. %ll told, it should &e &orne in mind that the present petition is a petition for certiorari under <ule J: of the <ules of 2ourt. 8t alleges that the K<CT committed gra'e a&use of discretion amounting to lac) or e7cess of .urisdiction hen it promulgated <esolution =o. F5-3:3 dated =o'em&er 26, 2FF5. @ut hat is !gra'e a&use of discretion+$ 8t is

such capricious and himsical e7ercise of .udgment hich is tantamount to lac) of .urisdiction. Ordinary a&use of discretion is insufficient. The a&use of discretion must &e gra'e, that is, the po er is e7ercised in an ar&itrary or despotic manner &y reason of passion or personal hostility. 8t must &e so patent and gross as to amount to e'asion of positi'e duty or to a 'irtual refusal to perform the duty en.oined &y or to act at all in contemplation of the la . 8n other ords, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must &e a clear sho ing of caprice and ar&itrariness in the e7ercise of discretion. There is also gra'e a&use of discretion hen there is a contra'ention of the 2onstitution, the la or e7isting .urisprudence. Bsing the foregoing as yardstic), the 2ourt finds that petitioner misera&ly failed to discharge the onus probandi imposed on him. 9<. S,/*!*$,+ G"N"+A/ A.A/A /AN(, +,A*NS,NS /AN(, SHANG+*/A P/A=A !,+P AN( S0 P+*0" H,/(*NGS G.+. No. 1<<?66 Se%tembe& 1;, 9??:

-A!$S: <espondents %yala Dand, <o&insons, and 0hangri-la maintain and operate shopping malls in 'arious locations in 3etro 3anila. <espondent 03 ?rime constructs, operates, and leases out commercial &uildings and other structures, among hich, are 03 2ity, 3anila( 03 2enterpoint, 0ta. 3esa, 3anila( 03 2ity, =orth %'enue, 1uezon 2ity( and 03 0outhmall, Das ?iUas. The shopping malls operated or leased out &y respondents ha'e par)ing facilities for all )inds of motor 'ehicles, either &y ay of par)ing spaces inside the mall &uildings or in separate &uildings andOor ad.acent lots that are solely de'oted for use as par)ing spaces. <espondents %yala Dand, <o&insons, and 03 ?rime spent for the construction of their o n par)ing facilities. <espondent 0hangri-la is renting its par)ing facilities, consisting of land and &uilding specifically used as par)ing spaces, hich ere constructed for the lessor#s account. <espondents e7pend for the maintenance and administration of their respecti'e par)ing facilities. They pro'ide security personnel to protect the 'ehicles par)ed in their par)ing facilities and maintain order ithin the area. 8n turn, they collect the follo ing par)ing fees from the persons ma)ing use of their par)ing facilities, regardless of hether said persons are mall patrons or not. The par)ing tic)ets or cards issued &y respondents to 'ehicle o ners contain the stipulation that respondents shall not &e responsi&le for any loss or damage to the 'ehicles par)ed in respondents# par)ing facilities. The 0enate 2ommittee on trade and commerce conducted a pu&lic hearing to in*uire into the legality of the practice &y mall o ners in collecting par)ing fees. The 0enate committee found: !8n 'ie of the foregoing, the 2ommittees find that the

collection of par)ing fees &y shopping malls is contrary to the =ational @uilding 2ode and is therefor ,sic- illegal. Ahile it is true that the 2ode merely re*uires malls to pro'ide par)ing spaces, ithout specifying hether it is free or not, &oth 2ommittees &elie'e that the reasona&le and logical interpretation of the 2ode is that the par)ing spaces are for free. This interpretation is not only reasona&le and logical &ut finds support in the actual practice in other countries li)e the Bnited 0tates of %merica here par)ing spaces o ned and operated &y mall o ners are free of charge. F)923*/)=-(; 4'-*>)+9, /0- C%6- 0*4 -<'3%'3)*/-6$ /0- (*+6 5%3 '*3>)+9 A 4%&-/0)+9 4)&)(*3 /% /0- 4276)=)4)%+ (*. .0),0 3-12)3- 6-=-(%'-34 /% 6-=%/- 4% &2,0 %5 /0- (*+6 *3-* 5%3 '*3>4#$ 8n response to the senate findings, 9?AK and fe other DEBs intend to as) 0olicitor Eeneral to file a case in court to en.oin malls from collecting par)ing fees. Threatened &y such action, 03 ?rime Koldings filed a declaratory relief. <T2 held that there#s no pro'ision in the =ational @uilding 2ode hich re*uire the mall o ners to pro'ide for free par)ing space to its customers. 2% affirmed <T2 decision. *SS2": Ahether or not shopping mall o ners are o&liged to pro'ide free par)ing space H"/(: The 2ourt finds no merit in the present ?etition. The e7plicit directi'e of the afore-*uoted statutory and regulatory pro'isions, garnered from a plain reading thereof, is that respondents, as operatorsOlessors of neigh&orhood shopping centers, should pro'ide par)ing and loading spaces, in accordance ith the minimum ratio of one slot per 1FF s*uare meters of shopping floor area. There is nothing therein pertaining to the collection (or non-collection) of par)ing fees &y respondents. 8n fact, the term !par)ing fees$ cannot e'en &e found at all in the entire =ational @uilding 2ode and its 8<<. 0ince 0ection 5F3 of the =ational @uilding 2ode and <ule N8N of its 8<< do not mention par)ing fees, then simply, said pro'isions do not regulate the collection of the same. CN?<O?<8%T8O= The 2ourt is uncon'inced. The =ational @uilding 2ode regulates buildings, &y setting the minimum specifications and re*uirements for the same. 8t does not concern itself itht&affi# #ongestion in areas surrounding the &uilding. 8t is already a stretch to say that the =ational @uilding 2ode and its 8<< also intend to sol'e the pro&lem of traffic congestion around the &uildings so as to ensure that the said &uildings shall ha'e ade*uate lighting and 'entilation. 3oreo'er, the 2ourt cannot simply assume, as the

O0E has apparently done, that the traffic congestion in areas around the malls is due to the fact that respondents charge for their par)ing facilities, thus, forcing 'ehicle o ners to .ust par) in the streets. The 2ourt notes that despite the fees charged &y respondents, 'ehicle o ners still use the mall par)ing facilities, hich are e'en fully occupied on some days. ;ehicle o ners may &e par)ing in the streets only &ecause there are not enough par)ing spaces in the malls, and not &ecause they are deterred &y the par)ing fees charged &y respondents. Hree par)ing spaces at the malls may e'en ha'e the opposite effect from hat the O0E en'isioned: more people may &e encouraged &y the free par)ing to &ring their o n 'ehicles, instead of ta)ing pu&lic transport, to the malls( as a result, the par)ing facilities ould &ecome full sooner, lea'ing more 'ehicles ithout par)ing spaces in the malls and par)ed in the streets instead, causing e'en more traffic congestion. Aithout using the term outright, the O0E is actually in'o)ing police po er to .ustify the regulation &y the 0tate, through the 9?AK 0ecretary and local &uilding officials, of pri'ately o ned par)ing facilities, including the collection &y the o nersOoperators of such facilities of par)ing fees from the pu&lic for the use thereof. The 2ourt finds, ho e'er, that in totally prohi&iting respondents from collecting par)ing fees from the pu&lic for the use of the mall par)ing facilities, the 0tate ould &e acting &eyond the &ounds of police po er. ?olice po er is the po er of promoting the pu&lic elfare &y restraining and regulating the use of li&erty and property. 8t is usually e7erted in order to merely regulate the use and en.oyment of the property of the o ner. The po er to regulate, ho e'er, does not include the po er to prohi&it. % fortiori, the po er to regulate does not include the po er to confiscate. ?olice po er does not in'ol'e the ta)ing or confiscation of property, ith the e7ception of a fe cases here there is a necessity to confiscate pri'ate property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace and order and of promoting the general elfare( for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. W0-+ /0-3- )4 * /*>)+9 %3 ,%+5)4,*/)%+ %5 '3)=*/- '3%'-3/; 5%3 '27(), 24-, /0- S/*/- )4 +% (%+9-3 -<-3,)4)+9 '%(),- '%.-3, 72/ *+%/0-3 %5 )/4 )+0-3-+/ '%.-34, +*&-(;, -&)+-+/ 6%&*)+# E&)+-+/ 6%&*)+ -+*7(-4 /0- S/*/- /% 5%3,)7(; *,12)3'3)=*/- (*+64 )+/-+6-6 5%3 '27(), 24- 2'%+ '*;&-+/ %5 ?24/ ,%&'-+4*/)%+ /% /0%.+-3. =ormally, of course, the po er of eminent domain results in the ta)ing or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the e7propriated property( &ut no cogent reason appears hy the said po er may not &e a'ailed of only to impose a &urden upon the o ner of condemned property, ithout loss of title and possession. 8t is a settled rule that neither ac*uisition of title nor total destruction of 'alue is essential to ta)ing. 8t is usually in cases here title remains ith the pri'ate o ner that in*uiry should &e made to determine hether the impairment of a property is merely regulated or amounts to a compensa&le ta)ing. % regulation that depri'es any person of the profita&le use of his

property constitutes a ta)ing and entitles him to compensation, unless the in'asion of rights is so slight as to permit the regulation to &e .ustified under the police po er. 0imilarly, a police regulation that unreasona&ly restricts the right to use &usiness property for &usiness purposes amounts to a ta)ing of pri'ate property, and the o ner may reco'er therefor. %lthough in the present case, title to andOor possession of the par)ing facilities remainOs ith respondents, the prohi&ition against their collection of par)ing fees from the pu&lic, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a ta)ing or confiscation of their properties. The 0tate is not only re*uiring that respondents de'ote a portion of the latter#s properties for use as par)ing spaces, &ut is also mandating that they gi'e the pu&lic access to said par)ing spaces for free. 0uch is already an e7cessi'e intrusion into the property rights of respondents. =ot only are they &eing depri'ed of the right to use a portion of their properties as they ish, they are further prohi&ited from profiting from its use or e'en .ust reco'ering therefrom the e7penses for the maintenance and operation of the re*uired par)ing facilities.

9;. +,0"+, 3S. "S$+A(A -A!$S:

G.+. No. 1<@1?6

B+oMasC

The 0enate 2ommittee on Da&or, Cmployment, and Kuman <esources 9e'elopment (2ommittee) in connection ith its in'estigation in aid of legislation on the in'estment of O'erseas Aor)ers Aelfare %dministration (OAA%) funds in the 0mo)ey 3ountain pro.ect sent an in'itation to herein petitioner <omero. Bpon receipt, petitioner re*uested to &e e7cused from appearing and testifying in the said 2ommittee in'o)ing his right against self-incrimination and so he filed ith the 0upreme 2ourt this petition for the issuance of a T<O and prohi&ition under <ule J: of the <ules of 2ourt. Hurthermore, petitioner claims that the su&.ect matter of the in'estigation is su& .udice &ecause of the pendency of another petition (2ha'ez petition). *SS2": Ahether or not the su&.ect matter of the 2ommittee#s in*uiry is sub 8udice. H"/(:=o, it is no longer su& .udice. $he 427 ?26),- &ule &est&i#ts #omments and dis#losu&es %e&taining to Mudi#ial %&o#eedings to a oid %&eMudging the issue, influen#ing the #ou&t, o& obst&u#ting the administ&ation of Musti#e. % 'iolation of the sub 8udice rule may render one lia&le for indirect contempt under 0ec. 3(d), <ule 61 of the <ules of 2ourt. The sub 8udice issue, in this case, has &een rendered moot and academic &y the super'ening issuance of the en banc <esolution denying ith finality the 2ha'ez case.

%nd e'en if it is still pending, such ould not &ar the continuance of the 2ommittee in'estigation. % legislati'e in'estigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct hearings or li)e ad.udicati'e procedures to settle, through the application of a la , actual contro'ersies arising &et een ad'erse litigants and in'ol'ing demanda&le rights. On the other hand, in*uiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, underta)en as tools to ena&le the legislati'e &ody to gather information and, thus, legislate isely and effecti'ely( - and to determine hether there is a need to impro'e e7isting la s or enact ne or remedial legislation, al&eit the in*uiry need not result in any potential legislation. ,n'going Mudi#ial %&o#eedings do not %&e#lude #ong&essional hea&ings in aid of legislation. 9:. AA++, 3S. !,0"/"! -A!$S: ?etitioner @arro as proclaimed as the duly elected ?unong @arangay. Kis opponent filed an election protest ith the 3T2 of ?alompon, Deyte hich found out that petitioner and respondent ha'e e*ual 'otes and so ordered that to &rea) the tie, there shall &e dra ing of lots. ?etitioner filed a =otice of %ppeal ith the 3T2 stating therein that he had paid the appeal fee. %cting on the appeal, 2O3CDC2 Hirst 9i'ision dismissed the same for petitioner#s failure to pay the appeal fee &ecause receipt thereof as not attached to the record. 3< as filed &ut the same as again dismissed &y the 2O3CDC2 Hirst 9i'ision. Kence, this petition. *SS2": G.+. No. 1;69?1 B+,>ASC

1. AO= 2O3CDC2 Hirst 9i'ision

as correct in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the receipt of payment as not attached to the notice of appeal, hence, appeal fee as considered as unpaid. as correct in dismissing the 3< ele'ating the same to the 2O3CDC2 en &anc. ithout

2. AO= 2O3CDC2 Hirst 9i'ision

H"/(:=o. =o.

1. =o, 2O3CDC2 Hirst 9i'ision as not correct in dismissing the appeal on the ground of non-payment of appeal fee. 2iting %guilar 's. 2O3CDC2, the appeal to the 2O3CDC2 of the trial courtQs decision in election contests in'ol'ing municipal and &arangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the appeal fee to the court that rendered the decision ithin the fi'e-day reglementary period. The non-payment or the insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee does not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal. =OTC: 8t

must &e stated, ho e'er, that for notices of appeal filed after the promulgation on Iuly 26, 2FF4 of D)=)+*93*,)* =# C%&&)44)%+ %+ E(-,/)%+4 , errors in the matter of non-payment or incomplete payment of the t o appeal fees in election cases are no longer e7cusa&le.
2. =o, 2O3CDC2 Hirst 9i'ision

as not correct in dismissing the 3< ithout ele'ating the same to 2O3CDC2 en &anc. The rule is - The 2ommission on Clections may sit en banc or in t o di'isions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to e7pedite disposition of election cases, including preproclamation contro'ersies. %ll such election cases shall &e heard and decided in di'ision, %&o ided that motions fo& &e#onside&ation of de#isions shall be de#ided by the !ommission -+ 7*+,.

F?. S$+A$"G*! A//*AN!" ("3$ !,+P 3S. +A(S$,!N S"!2+*$*"S 1<;16; -A!$S:

G+

2onstruction 9e'elopment 2orporation of the ?hilippines (292?) as incorporation in 14JJ. 8t as granted a franchise to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities in the =orth and 0outh Duzon Toll ays and 3etro 3anila e7press ay. 292? 3ining 2orporation (292? 3ining), an affiliate of 292?, o&tained loans from 3aru&eni 2orporation of Iapan. % 292? official issued letters to guarantee for the loans although there as no 292? @oard <esolution authorizing the issuance of such letters of guarantee. 292? 3ining secured the 3aru&eni loans hen 292? and 292? 3ininng ere still pri'ately o ned and managed. Dater, 292?#s name as changed to ?hilippine =ational 2onstruction 2orporation (?=22) in order to reflect that the Eo'ernment already o ned 4F.3G of ?=22 and only 4.6FG is under pri'ate o nership. 3ean hile, the 3aru&eni loans to 292? 3ining remained unpaid. ?=22 @oard of 9irectors later passed @oard <esolutions admitting ?=22#s lia&ility to 3aru&eni. On Ianuary 2FF1, 3aru&eni assigned its entire credit to <adstoc) 0ecurities, a foreign corporation. <adstoc) send a notice and demand letter to ?=22. ?=22 and <adstoc) entered into a 2ompromise %greement stating, among others, that ?=22 shall pay <adstoc) the reduced amount (?J,15:,FFF,FFF.FF) in full settlement of ?=22#s guarantee of 292? 3ining#s de&t allegedly totaling more than ?16 &illion. 0trategic %lliance (0T<%9C2) mo'ed for reconsideration alleging that it has a claim

against ?=22 as a &idder of the =ational go'ernment#s share, recei'a&les, securities and interests in ?=22. 800BC: AO= the compromise agreement &et een ?=22 and <adstoc) in 'alid in relation to the 2onstitution, e7isting la s, and pu&lic policy. KCD9: =o, it is not 'alid. PN!!Qs toll fees a&e %ubli# funds. ?=22 cannot use pu&lic funds, li)e toll fees that indisputa&ly form part of the Eeneral Hund, to pay a pri'ate de&t of 292? 3ining to <adstoc). 0uch payment cannot *ualify as e7penditure for a pu&lic purpose. The toll fees are merely held in trust &y ?=22 for the =ational Eo'ernment, hich is the o ner of the toll fees. 2onsidering that there is no appropriation la passed &y 2ongress for the ?J.15: &illion compromise amount, the 2ompromise %greement is 'oid for &eing contrary to la , specifically 0ection 24(1), %rticle ;8 of the 2onstitution and 0ection 56 of ?9 1>>:. %nd since the payment of the ?J.15: &illion pertains to 292? 3ining#s pri'ate de&t to <adstoc), the 2ompromise %greement is also 'oid for &eing contrary to the fundamental pu&lic policy that go'ernment funds or property shall &e spent or used solely for pu&lic purposes, as pro'ided in 0ection >(2) of the Eo'ernment %uditing 2ode. <adstoc) is not *ualified to o n land in the ?hilippines. 2onse*uently, <adstoc) is also dis*ualified to o n the rights to o nership of lands in the ?hilippines. <adstoc) cannot o n the rights to o nership of any land in the ?hilippines &ecause <adstoc) cannot la fully o n the land itself. Other ise, there ill &e a &latant circum'ention of the 2onstitution, hich prohi&its a foreign pri'ate corporation from o ning land in the ?hilippines. 8n addition, <adstoc) cannot transfer the rights to o nership of land in the ?hilippines if it cannot o n the land itself. 8t is &asic that an assignor or seller cannot assign or sell something he does not o n at the time the o nership, or the rights to the o nership, are to &e transferred to the assignee or &uyer. The third party assignee under the 2ompromise %greement ho ill &e designated &y <adstoc) can only ac*uire rights duplicating those hich its assignor is entitled &y la to e7ercise. Thus, the assignee can ac*uire o nership of the land only if its assignor o ns the land. 2learly, the assignment &y ?=22 of the real properties to a nominee to &e designated &y <adstoc) is a circum'ention of the 2onstitutional prohi&ition against a pri'ate foreign corporation o ning lands in the ?hilippines. The said circum'ention renders the 2ompromise %greement 'oid.

F1.

P!GG

3S

SAN(*GANAA.AN

AN(

,--*!"!,

H,/(*NGS

-A!$S: 8n connection ith criminal proceedings initiated in the ?hilippines to locate, se*uester and see) restitution of alleged ill-gotten ealth amassed &y the 3arcoses and other accused from the ?hilippine Eo'ernment,,1- the Office of the 0olicitor Eeneral (O0E) rote the Hederal Office for ?olice 3atters in @erne, 0 itzerland, re*uesting assistance. the Office of the 9istrict %ttorney in Murich, pursuant to the O0E#s re*uest, issued an Order directing the 0 iss @an)s in Murich to freeze the accounts of the accused in ?2EE 8.0. =o. 1 and in the !Dist of 2ompanies and Houndations.$,3- 8n compliance ith said Order, @an)ers Trust %.E. (@T%E) of Murich froze the accounts of Officeco Koldings, =.;. (Officeco). Officeco filed the complaint hich as doc)eted as 2i'il 2ase =o. F1J> of the 0andigan&ayan. The complaint prayed for the ?2EE and the O0E to officially ad'ise the 0 iss go'ernment to e7clude from the freeze or se*uestration order the account of Officeco ith @T%E and to unconditionally release the said account to Officeco. Kence this ?etition for 2ertiorari and ?rohi&ition ith ?rayer for 8ssuance of a Temporary <estraining Order filed &y ?2EE to restrain and en.oin respondent 0andigan&ayan from further proceeding ith 2i'il 2ase =o. F1J>.

<es .udicata means a matter ad.udged, a thing .udicially acted upon or decided( a thing or matter settled &y .udgment.,2F- The doctrine of res .udicata pro'ides that a final .udgment on the merits rendered &y a court of competent .urisdiction is conclusi'e as to the rights of the parties and their pri'ies and constitutes an a&solute &ar to su&se*uent actions in'ol'ing the same claim, demand, or cause of action.,21Hor the preclusi'e effect of res .udicata to &e enforced, the follo ing re*uisites must o&tain: (1) The former .udgment or order must &e final( (2) 8t must &e a .udgment or order on the merits, that is, it as rendered after a consideration of the e'idence or stipulations su&mitted &y the parties at the trial of the case( (3) 8t must ha'e &een rendered &y a court ha'ing .urisdiction o'er the su&.ect matter and the parties( and (>) There must &e, &et een the first and second actions, identity of parties, of su&.ect matter and of cause of action. $his &eDuisite is satisfied if the two a#tions a&e substantially between the same %a&ties. ,22Ahile the first three elements a&o'e are present in this case, e rule that the fourth element is a&sent. Kence, res .udicata does not apply to pre'ent the 0andigan&ayan from proceeding ith 2i'il 2ase =o. F1J>. $he a#t of state do#t&ine is one of the methods by whi#h States %&e ent thei& national #ou&ts f&om de#iding dis%utes whi#h &elate to the inte&nal affai&s of

anothe& State, the othe& two being immunity and non'Musti#iability. ,34- 8t is an a'oidance techni*ue that is directly related to a 0tate#s o&ligation to respect the independence and e*uality of other 0tates &y not re*uiring them to su&mit to ad.udication in a national court or to settlement of their disputes ithout their consent. ,>F- 8t re*uires the forum court to e7ercise restraint in the ad.udication of disputes relating to legislati'e or other go'ernmental acts hich a foreign 0tate has performed ithin its territorial limits. The parameters of the use of the act of state doctrine ere clarified in @anco =acional de 2u&a '. 0a&&atino.,>3- There, the B.0. 0upreme 2ourt held that international la does not re*uire the application of this doctrine nor does it for&id the application of the rule e'en if it is claimed that the act of state in *uestion 'iolated international la . 3oreo'er, due to the doctrine#s peculiar nation-to-nation character, in practice the usual method for an indi'idual to see) relief is to e7haust local remedies and then repair to the e7ecuti'e authorities of his o n state to persuade them to champion his claim in diplomacy or &efore an international tri&unal. The act of state doctrine finds no application in this case and petitioners# resort to it is utterly mislaid. C7haustion of %dministrati'e <emedies

?etitioners ad'ert to Officeco#s failure to e7haust the administrati'e remedies pro'ided in 0ecs. : and J of the ?2EE <ules and <egulations 8mplementing C7ecuti'e Orders =o. 1 and =o. 2.Ko e'er, a reading of said pro'isions sho s that they refer only to se*uestration orders, freeze orders and hold orders issued &y the ?2EE in the ?hilippines. They cannot &e made to apply to the freeze orders in'ol'ed in this case hich ere issued &y the go'ernment of another country.

The follo ing allegations culled from Officeco#s complaint in the 0andigan&ayan ould, if pro'en, entitle Officeco to the main reliefs sought in its complaint in 'ie of petitioners# refusal to e7clude Officeco#s account ith @T%E in the list of ill-gotten ealth, to it: (1) The freeze order has &een in effect for ele'en (11) years, since 145J, ithout any .udicial action instituted &y the ?2EE and the O0E against Officeco( (2) The ?2EE and the O0E ha'e no document or proof that the account of Officeco ith @T%E &elongs to the 3arcoses nor their cronies. 8nformation on this matter as e'en re*uested &y the O0E from the ?2EE and the latter from 0 iss authorities ho, up to the present, ha'e not responded positi'ely on the re*uest(,>5- and (3) <e*uests,>4- &y Officeco to the ?2EE and O0E to ma)e representations ith the 0 iss authorities for the latter to release Officeco#s account ith the @T%E from the freeze order remain unacted upon despite the mandate in 0ection :(a) of <epu&lic %ct =o. J613.

The truth of the a&o'e allegations, hich must &e deemed hypothetically admitted for the purpose of considering the motion to dismiss, may properly &e determined only if 2i'il 2ase =o. F1J> is allo ed to proceed, such that if they are found to &e supported &y preponderance of e'idence, ad'erse findings may properly &e made against ?2EE and the corresponding reliefs granted in fa'or of Officeco.

AKC<CHO<C,

premises

considered,

the

instant

petition

is

9803800C9.

F9.

!,0"/"!

3S

AG2*++"

-A!$S:2O3CDC2 Cn @anc, its Da 9epartment filed an 8nformation against respondent 3a. Deonisa Eeno'ia, for 'iolation of 0ection 2J1 (z) (3) of the Omni&us Clection 2ode hich penalizes. !%ny person ho 'otes in su&stitution for another hether ith or ithout the latter#s )no ledge andOor consent.$<T2 9ismissed the case for lac) of .urisdiction, it citing 0ection 32(2) of @? &lg 124 reading: 0ec. 32. Iurisdiction of 3etropolitan Trial 2ourts, 3unicipal Trial 2ourts and 3unicipal 2ircuit Trial 2ourts in 2riminal 2ases. L C7cept in cases falling ithin the e7clusi'e .urisdiction of <egional Trial 2ourts and of the 0andigan&ayan, the 3etropolitan Trial 2ourts, 3unicipal Trial 2ourts and 3unicipal 2ircuit Trial 2ourts shall e7ercise: (2) C7clusi'e original .urisdiction o'er all offenses punisha&le ith imprisonment not e7ceeding si7 (J) years irrespecti'e of the amount of fine regardless of other imposa&le accessory penalties, including the ci'il lia&ility arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespecti'e of )ind, nature, or 'alue amount thereof. Kence this petition contending that the dismissal order is contrary to 0ection 2J5 of the Omni&us Clection 2ode, hich pro'ides that all criminal cases for 'iolation of the 2ode, e7cept those relating to failure to register or failure to 'ote hich shall &e under the e7clusi'e .urisdiction of inferior courts, fall under the e7clusi'e .urisdiction of regional trial courts. *SS2": hether or not an election offense punisha&le under the Omni&us Clection 2ode &y !imprisonment of not less than one year &ut not more than si7 years.$ 8s ithin the .urisdiction of the <T2

+2/*NG: Hrom the a&o'e-*uoted pro'ision of 0ection 32 of @? @lg. 124, .urisdiction of first-le'el courts L the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts L does not co'er criminal cases hich, &y specific pro'ision of la , fall ithin the e7clusi'e .urisdiction of regional trial courts (and of the 0andigan&ayan). %s correctly argued &y the 2O3CDC2, 0ection 2J5 of the Omni&us Clection 2ode specifically pro'ides, regional trial courts ha'e e7clusi'e .urisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for 'iolation of the 2ode !e7cept those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to 'ote.$ 8t &ears emphasis that 2ongress has the plenary po er to define, prescri&e and apportion the .urisdictions of 'arious courts. Kence, it may, &y la , pro'ide that a certain class of cases should &e e7clusi'ely heard and determined &y a specific court. 0ection 2J5 of Omni&us Clection 2ode is one such and must thus &e construed as an e7ception to @? @lg. 124, the general la on .urisdiction of courts.,48n fine, hile @? @lg. 124 lodges in municipal trial courts, metropolitan trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts .urisdiction o'er criminal cases carrying a penalty of imprisonment of less than one year &ut not e7ceeding si7 years, follo ing 0ection 2J5 of the Omni&us Clection 2ode, any criminal action or proceeding hich &ears the same penalty, ith the e7ception of the therein mentioned t o cases, falls ithin the e7clusi'e original .urisdiction of regional trial courts. AKC<CHO<C, the petition is E<%=TC9. The challenged orders of respondent Iudge Thelma 2anlas Trinided-?e %guirre, in 2riminal 2ase =o. 2-6366> are 0CT %089C. FF. )H*$" /*GH$ !,+P,+A$*,N, et al >anua&y 9?, 9??: s. !*$. ,- 0AN*/A R G+ 199;@6 R

*SS2"S: 1) Ahether or not, the o ners or managers of these esta&lishments ha'e legal standing to file the action+ 2) Ahether or not, the ordinance prohi&iting the short time admission in hotels, motesl, lodging houses, pension houses and similar esta&lishments in the 2ity of 3anila, constitutional+ +2/*NG: 18 .es R !on#e%t of standing o& lo#us standi: 8t is the a&ility of a party to demonstrate the court sufficient connection to

and harm from la or action challenged to support that party#s participation in the case. 98 .es R null S oid o&dinan#e: -o& an o&dinan#e to be a legitimate e5e&#ise of %oli#e %owe&, (1) 8t must appear that the interests of the pu&lic generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, re*uire an interference ith pri'ate rights and the means must &e reasona&ly necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressi'e of pri'ate rights. (2) 8t must also &e e'ident that no other alternati'e for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusi'e of pri'ate rights can or). (3) % reasona&le relation must e7ist &et een the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. Dac)ing a concurrence of these re*uisites, the police measure shall &e struc) do n as an ar&itrary intrusion into pri'ate rights. %s held in "orfe v. "utuc, the e7ercise of police po er is su&.ect to .udicial re'ie hen life, li&erty or property is affected. 8t cannot &e denied that the %&ima&y animus behind the o&dinan#e is the #u&tailment of se5ual beha io&. The 2ity asserts &efore this 2ourt that the su&.ect esta&lishments !ha'e gained notoriety as 'enue of "prostitution, adultery and fornications# in 3anila since they "pro'ide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and e7it and thus &ecame the "ideal ha'en for prostitutes and thrill-see)ers.#$ Ahether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of 'ice is accurate, it cannot &e denied that legitimate se5ual beha io& among willing ma&&ied o& #onsenting single adults whi#h is #onstitutionally %&ote#ted will be #u&tailed as well. )e #annot dis#ount othe& legitimate a#ti ities whi#h the ,&dinan#e would %&os#&ibe o& im%ai&. There are 'ery legitimate uses for a ash rate or renting the room out for more than t ice a day. Cntire families are )no n to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel hilst the po er is momentarily out in their homes. 8n transit passengers ho ish to ash up and rest &et een trips ha'e a legitimate purpose for a&&re'iated stays in motels or hotels. 8ndeed any person or groups of persons in need of comforta&le pri'ate spaces for a span of a fe hours ith purposes other than ha'ing se7 or using illegal drugs can legitimately loo) to staying in a motel or hotel as a con'enient alternati'e. The Ordinance ma)es no distinction &et een places fre*uented &y patrons engaged in illicit acti'ities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it pre'ents legitimate use of places here illicit acti'ities are rare or e'en unheard of. % plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance sho s it makes no #lassifi#ation of %la#es of lodging, thus deems them all sus#e%tible to illi#it %at&onage and subMe#t them without e5#e%tion to the unMustified %&ohibition.

$he beha io& whi#h the ,&dinan#e seeks to #u&tail is in fa#t al&eady %&ohibited and #ould in fa#t be diminished sim%ly by a%%lying e5isting laws. Dess intrusi'e measures such as cur&ing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through acti'e police or) ould &e more effecti'e in easing the situation. 0o ould the strict enforcement of e7isting la s and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures ould ha'e minimal intrusion on the &usinesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Hurther, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily &e circum'ented &y merely paying the hole day rate ithout any hindrance to those engaged in illicit acti'ities. 3oreo'er, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect ! ash rates$ from their clientele &y charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and e'en apartments. Ae reiterate that indi'idual rights may &e ad'ersely affected only to the e7tent that may fairly &e re*uired &y the legitimate demands of pu&lic interest or pu&lic elfare. The 0tate is a le'iathan that must &e restrained from needlessly intruding into the li'es of its citizens. Ko e'er ellintentioned the Ordinance may &e, it is in effect an ar&itrary and himsical intrusion into the rights of the esta&lishments as ell as their patrons. $he ,&dinan#e needlessly &est&ains the o%e&ation of the businesses of the %etitione&s as well as &est&i#ting the &ights of thei& %at&ons without suffi#ient Mustifi#ation. $he ,&dinan#e &ashly eDuates wash &ates and &enting out a &oom mo&e than twi#e a day with immo&ality without a##ommodating inno#uous intentions. The promotion of pu&lic elfare and a sense of morality among citizens deser'es the full endorsement of the .udiciary pro'ided that such measures do not trample rights this 2ourt is s orn to protect. W The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the co'ered esta&lishments for illicit se7, prostitution, drug use and the li)e. These goals, &y themsel'es, are unimpeacha&le and certainly fall ithin the am&it of the police po er of the 0tate. Tet the desira&ility of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achie'ement. Ko e'er ell-intentioned the Ordinance may &e, it is in effect an ar&itrary and himsical intrusion into the rights of the esta&lishments as ell as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the &usinesses of the petitioners as ell as restricts the rights of their patrons ithout sufficient .ustification. F@. AANA$ s !,0"/"! R 9??: 7same fa#ts wI Aayan 0una s !,0"/"!8 -(!o%ied in the net) -a#ts: This is a petition for ?rohi&ition ith a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a rit of preliminary in.unction filed &y petitioner @arangay %ssociation for =ational %d'ancement and Transparency (@%=%T) ?arty Dist (petitioner) assailing the constitutionality of <epu&lic %ct =o. 43J4 (<% 43J4)and

en.oining respondent 2ommission on Clections (2O3CDC2) from implementing the statute. <% 43J4 is a consolidation of 0enate @ill =o. 2231 and Kouse @ill =o. :3:2 passed &y the 0enate on 6 9ecem&er 2FFJ and the Kouse of <epresentati'es on 14 9ecem&er 2FFJ.On 23 Ianuary 2FF6, less than four months &efore the 1> 3ay 2FF6 local elections. On 6 3ay 2FF6, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition for prohi&ition alleging that <% 43J4 'iolated 0ection 2J(1), %rticle ;8 of the 2onstitution.?etitioner also assails the constitutionality of 0ections 3>, 36, 35, and >3 of <% 43J4.%ccording to petitioner, these pro'isions are of *uestiona&le application and dou&tful 'alidity for failing to comply ith the pro'isions of the 2onstitution. ?etitioner argues the follo ing:

1. the title of <% 43J4 is misleading &ecause it spea)s of poll automation &ut contains su&stantial pro'isions dealing ith the manual can'assing of election returns.?etitioner also alleges that 0ections 3>, 36, 35, and >3are neither em&raced in the title nor germane to the su&.ect matter of <% 43J4. 2. 0ections 36 and 35 'iolate the 2onstitution &y impairing the po ers of the ?residential Clectoral Tri&unal (?CT) and the 0enate Clectoral Tri&unal (0CT).%ccording to petitioner, under the amended pro'isions, 2ongress as the =ational @oard of 2an'assers for the election of ?resident and ;ice ?resident (2ongress), and the 2O3CDC2en &anc as the =ational @oard of 2an'assers (2O3CDC2 en &anc), for the election of 0enatorsmay no entertain pre-proclamation cases in the election of the ?resident, ;ice ?resident, and 0enators.?etitioner concludes that in entertaining preproclamation cases, 2ongress and the 2O3CDC2 en &anc undermine the independence and encroach upon the .urisdiction of the ?CT and the 0CT. 3. 0ection >3 is unconstitutional &ecause it gi'es the other prosecuting arms of the go'ernment concurrent po er ith the 2O3CDC2 to in'estigate and prosecute election offenses. >. section 3> hich fi7es the per diem of poll atchers of the dominant ma.ority and dominant minority parties at ?on election day.?etitioner argues that this 'iolates the freedom of the parties to contract and their right to fi7 the terms and conditions of the contract they see as fair, e*uita&le and .ust. ?etitioner adds that this is a purely pri'ate contract using pri'ate funds hich cannot &e regulated &y la . *ssueIs:

Ahether

or

not

<%

43J4

is

unconstitutional.

-0ections 36 and 35 'iolate 0ection 16, %rticle ;8 and ?aragraph 6, 0ection >, %rticle ;88 of the 2onstitution( -0ection -0ection +uling:The >3 3> 'iolates 'iolates petition 0ection 0ection is 2(J), 1F, %rticle %rticle 8N-2 888 43J4 of of is the the 2onstitution 2onstitution constitutional.

denied.<%

1. <% 43J4 is an amendatory act entitled %n %ct %mending <epu&lic %ct =o. 5>3J, Cntitled %n %ct %uthorizing the 2ommission on Clections to Bse an %utomated Clection 0ystem in the 3ay 11, 1445 =ational or Docal Clections and in 0u&se*uent =ational and Docal Clectoral C7ercises, to Cncourage Transparency, 2redi&ility, Hairness and %ccuracy of Clections, %mending for the ?urpose @atas ?am&ansa @lg. 551, as %mended, <epu&lic %ct =o. 61JJ and Other <elated Clection Da s, ?ro'iding Hunds Therefor and Hor Other ?urposes.2learly, the su&.ect matter of <% 43J4 co'ers the amendments to <% 5>3J, @atas ?am&ansa @lg. 551 (@? 551),<epu&lic %ct =o. 61JJ (<% 61JJ),and other related election la s to achie'e its purpose of promoting transparency, credi&ility, fairness, and accuracy in the elections.The pro'isions of <% 43J4 assailed &y petitioner deal ith amendments to specific pro'isions of <% 61JJ and @? 551, specifically: (1) 0ections 3>, 36 and 35 amend 0ections 2J, 3F and 1: of <% 61JJ, respecti'ely( and(2) 0ection >3 of <% 43J4 amends 0ection 2J: of @? 551.Therefore, the assailed pro'isions are germane to the su&.ect matter of<% 43J4 hich is to amend <% 61JJ and @? 551, among others. 2. The 2O3CDC2 maintains that the amendments introduced &y 0ection 36 pertain only to the adoption and application of the procedures on pre-proclamation contro'ersies in case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration in the certificates of can'ass.The 2O3CDC2 adds that 0ection 36 does not pro'ide that 2ongress and the 2O3CDC2 en &ancmay no entertain pre-proclamation cases for national electi'e posts. 3. 0ection 2(J), %rticle 8N-2 of the 2onstitution 'ests in the 2O3CDC2 the po er to in'estigate and, here appropriate, prosecute cases of 'iolations of election la s, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.2O3CDC2 has the e7clusi'e po er to conduct preliminary in'estigations and prosecute election offenses, it li)e ise authorizes the 2O3CDC2 to a'ail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the go'ernment. 8n the 1443 2O3CDC2 <ules of ?rocedure, the authority of the 2O3CDC2 as su&se*uently *ualified and e7plained. >. The O0E argues that petitioner erroneously in'o)ed the non-impairment clause &ecause this only applies to pre'iously perfected contracts.8n this case, there is no

perfected contact and, therefore, no o&ligation ill &e impaired. @oth the 2O3CDC2 and the O0E argue that the la is a proper e7ercise of police po er and it ill pre'ail o'er a contract.%ccording to the 2O3CDC2, poll atching is not .ust an ordinary contract &ut is an agreement ith the solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of 'otes.The role of poll atchers is 'ested ith pu&lic interest hich can &e regulated &y 2ongress in the e7ercise of its police po er.The O0E further argues that the assurance that the poll atchers ill recei'e fair and e*uita&le compensation promotes the general elfare.The O0E also states that this as a reasona&le regulation considering that the dominant ma.ority and minority parties ill secure a copy of the election returns and are gi'en the right to assign poll atchers inside the polling precincts. NoteIs: 1. 0ection 3> hich pro'ides:

0C2. 3>. 0ec. 2J of <epu&lic %ct =o. 61JJ is here&y amended to crala read as follo s: 0C2. 2J. Official Aatchers. - C'ery registered political party or coalition of political parties, and e'ery candidate shall each &e entitled to one atcher in e'ery polling place and can'assing center: ?ro'ided That, candidates for the 0angguniang ?anlala igan, 0angguniang ?anlunsod, or 0angguniang @ayan &elonging to the same slate or tic)et shall collecti'ely &e entitled to only one atcher. The dominant ma.ority party and dominant minority party, hich the 2ommission shall determine in accordance ith la , shall each &e entitled to one official atcher ho shall &e paid a fi7ed per diem of four hundred pesos (>FF.FF) There shall also recognized si7 principal atchers, representing the si7 accredited ma.or political parties e7cluding the dominant ma.ority and minority parties, ho shall &e designated &y the 2ommission upon nomination of the said parties. These political parties shall &e determined &y the 2ommission upon notice and hearing on the &asis of the follo ing circumstances: (a) The esta&lished record of the said parties, coalition of groups that no composed them, ta)ing into account, among other things, their sho ing in past election( (&) The num&er of incum&ent electi'e officials &elonging to them ninety crala (4F) days &efore the date of election( (c) Their identifia&le political organizations and strengths as e'idenced &y their organizedOchapters( (d) The a&ility to fill a complete slate of candidates from the municipal le'el to the position of ?resident( and (e) Other analogous circumstances that may determine their relati'e organizations and strengths.

Se#tion F< whi#h %&o ides: 0C2. 36.0ection 3F of <epu&lic %ct =o. 61JJ is here&y amended to read as follo s: 0C2. 3F. 2ongress as the =ational @oard of 2an'assers for the Clection of ?resident and ;ice ?resident: The 2ommission en &anc as the =ational @oard of 2an'assers for the election of senators: 9etermination of %uthenticity and 9ue C7ecution of 2ertificates of 2an'ass. 2ongress and the 2ommission en &anc shall determine the authenticity and due e7ecution of the certificate of can'ass for president and 'ice president and senators, respecti'ely, as accomplished and transmitted to it &y the local &oards of can'assers, on a sho ing that: (1) each certificate of can'ass as e7ecuted, signed and thum&mar)ed &y the chairman and mem&ers of the &oard of can'assers and transmitted or caused to &e transmitted to 2ongress &y them( (2) each certificate of can'ass contains the names of all of the candidates for president and 'ice president or senator, as the case may &e, and their corresponding 'otes in ords and their corresponding 'otes in ords and in figures( (3) there e7its no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificates of can'ass or any of its supporting documents such as statement of 'otes &y cityOmunicipalityO&y precinct or discrepancy in the 'otes of any candidate in ords and figures in the certificate( and (>) there e7ist no discrepancy in the 'otes of any candidate in ords and figures in the certificates of can'ass against the aggregate num&er of 'otes appearing in the election returns of precincts co'ered &y the certificate of can'ass: ?ro'ided, That certified print copies of election returns or certificates of can'ass may &e used for the purpose of 'erifying the e7istence of the discrepancy. Ahen the certificate of can'ass, duly certified &y the &oard of can'assers of each pro'ince, city of district, appears to &e incomplete, the 0enate ?resident or the 2hairman of the 2ommission, as the case may &e, shall re*uire the &oard of can'assers concerned to transmit &y personal deli'ery, the election returns form polling places that ere not included in the certificate of can'ass and supporting statements. 0aid election returns shall &e su&mitted &y personal deli'ery ithin t o (2) days from receipt of notice. Ahen it appears that any certificate of can'ass or supporting statement of 'otes &y cityOmunicipality or &y precinct &ears erasures or alteration hich may cast dou&t as to the 'eracity of the num&er of 'otes stated herein and may affect the result of the election, upon re*uested of the presidential, 'ice presidential or senatorial candidate concerned or his party, 2ongress or the 2ommission en &anc, as the case may &e shall, for the sole purpose of 'erifying the actual num&er of 'otes cast for president, 'ice president or senator, count the 'otes as they appear in the copies of the election returns su&mitted to it. 8n case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration as mentioned a&o'e, the procedure on pre-proclamation contro'ersies shall &e adopted and applied as pro'ided in 0ection 16,15,14 and 2F. %ny person ho present in e'idence a simulated copy of an election return, certificate of

can'ass or statement of 'otes, or a printed copy of an election return, certificate of can'ass or statement of 'otes &earing a simulated certification or a simulated image, shall &e guilty of an election offense shall &e penalized in accordance ith @atas ?am&ansa @lg. 551. crala Se#tion F; whi#h %&o ides: 35. 0ection 1: of <epu&lic %ct =o. 61JJ is here&y amended to read as follo s: 1:. ?re-proclamation 2ases in Clections for ?resident, ;ice ?resident, 0enator, and 3em&er of the Kouse of <epresentati'es. - Hor purposes of the elections for president, 'ice president, senator, and mem&er of the Kouse of <epresentati'es, no preproclamation cases shall &e allo ed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of can'ass, as the case may &e, e7cept as pro'ided for in 0ection 3F hereof.Ko e'er, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate can'assing &ody motu proprio or upon ritten complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of can'ass or election returns &efore it. 1uestions affecting the composition or proceedings of the &oard ofcan'assers may &e initiated in the &oard or directly ith the 2ommission in accordance ith 0ection 14 hereof. %ny o&.ection on the election returns &efore the city or municipal &oard of can'assers, or on the municipal certificates of can'ass &efore the pro'incial &oard of can'assers or district &oard of can'assers in 3etro 3anila %rea, shall &e specifically noticed in the minutes of the respecti'e proceedings. Se#tion @F whi#h %&o ides: @F. Se#tion 966 of Aatas Pambansa Alg. ;;1 is he&eby amended to &ead as follows: S"!. 966. P&ose#ution. The 2ommission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, ha'e the po er, concurrent ith the other prosecuting arms of the go'ernment, to conduct preliminary in'estigation of all election offenses punisha&le under this 2ode, and to prosecute the same.

F6. !/"0"N!*A P. !A/A+A, "$ A/., P"$*$*,N"+, 3S. $"+"S*$A -+AN!*S!,, "$ A/. +"SP,N("N$S. $he -a#ts ?etitioner 2lemencia 2alara etal. o n the Dophcal (2alara) 0u&di'ision in @rgy. %nos, Dos @aXYos. ?etitioner 2lemencia 2alara as named respondent in a letter-complaint for 'iolation of ?.9. 4:6,3- &y a group of &uyers, one Eaudencio =a'arro and

respondent Iesus Hrancisco among them, &efore the then Kuman 0ettlement <egulatory 2ommission (K0<2). 8ncorporating such grie'ances as a&sence of a drainage system, unfinished cur& and gutter, unde'eloped roads and a&andoned electrical facilities, the complaint as doc)eted &efore said office as K0<2 2ase =o. <C3-FJF>52-1F>3.,>The K0<2 ruled against 2alara. 2ontending that the portions sold in fa'or of the complaining &uyers resulted from the partitioning of the aforesaid parcel &y its co-o ners, petitioner 2lemencia 2alara filed an ans er dated 11 Iuly 1452 alleging that the su&di'ision as e7empt from ?.9. 4:6 and that complaints for e.ectment ere a&out to &e filed against said &uyers for not only refusing to e7ecute a contract to sell &ut also for failing to ma)e any further payments on the lot. ?etitioners conse*uently filed against respondents Hrancisco and =a'arro, complaints for unla ful detainer. 8n the e.ectment cases, the respondents =a'arro and Hrancisco called attention to the K0<2Qs decision a'erring that, despite the perfection of the sale o'er the lots respecti'ely occupied &y them, they ere constrained to stop paying the monthly amortizations thereon in 'ie of petitionersQ failure to comply ith their o&ligations as su&di'ision de'elopers. 0ignifying their illingness to continue paying their respecti'e amortizationsOinstallments upon the latterQs compliance ith the decision rendered &y the K0<2, the former prayed for the dismissal of the complaint as ell as the grant of their counterclaims for moral damages. ,1:The 3T2 discounted the e7istence of a contract of sale &et een petitioners and respondents and upheld its .urisdiction o'er the case. 9ecision affirmed &y <T2. The 2% re'ersed the decisions of the 3T2 and <T2 and ordering the dismissal of petitionersQ complaint for unla ful detainer saying that The action is not a simple case for unla ful detainer. The complaint focuses on ,respondentsQ- refusal to e7ecute the 2ontract to 0ell and to pay the monthly installments for Dot 23 in Dophcal 0u&di'ision. ,<espondents- claimed that they ere ithin their rights, as pro'ided &y ?.9. 4:6, to stop paying the monthly amortizations since the ,petitioners- failed to de'elop the su&di'ision.The issue, therefore, in'ol'es the rights and o&ligations of parties to a sale of real property, as regulated &y ?.9. 4:6. Ahen a complaint for unla ful detainer arises from the failure of a &uyer on installment &asis of real property to pay &ased on a right to stop paying monthly amortizations under ?9 4:6, the determinati'e *uestion is e7clusi'ely cogniza&le &y the Kousing and Dand Bse <egulatory @oard (KDB<@). Therefore, the *uestion of the right to collect the monthly amortization must &e determined &y said agency.

*ssue:1) AO= the KDB<@ has the has e7clusi'e original .urisdiction to determine hether there is a perfected contract to sell &et een petitioner and respondents and AO= the municipal trial court has .urisdiction o'er the su&.ect complaint for e.ectmentOunla ful detainer Held: Tes. The records sho that the 2% correctly ruled that the cause of action em&odied in the original and amended complaint petitioners filed a 0uo as not a simple cause of action for unla ful detainer against respondents. ?etitionerQs complaint is for unla ful detainer. Ahile generally spea)ing such action falls ithin the original and e7clusi'e .urisdiction of the 3T2, the determination of the ground for e.ectment re*uires a consideration of the rights of a &uyer on installment &asis of real property. 8ndeed pri'ate respondent claims that he has a right under ?.9. =o. 4:6, Z[ 23 to stop paying monthly amortizations after gi'ing due notice to the o ner or de'eloper of his decision to do so &ecause of petitionerQs alleged failure to de'elop the su&di'ision or condominium pro.ect according to the appro'ed plans and ithin the time for complying ith the same. The case thus in'ol'es a determination of the rights and o&ligations of parties in a sale of real estate under ?.9. =o. 4:6. ?ri'ate respondent has in fact filed a complaint against petitioner for unsound real estate &usiness practice ith the KDB<@. This is, therefore, not a simple case for unla ful detainer arising from the failure of the lessee to pay the rents, comply ith the conditions of a lease agreement or 'acate the premises after the e7piration of the lease. 0ince the determinati'e *uestion is e7clusi'ely cogniza&le &y the KDB<@, the *uestion of the right of petitioner must &e determined &y the agency. ?etitionerQs cause of action against pri'ate respondent should instead &e filed as a counterclaim in KDB<@. Ei'en the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents and the a&sence of sho ing that petitioner 2lemencia 2alara perfected an appeal from the foregoing decision, Ae find that the 2% correctly ruled that the case petitioners filed &efore the 3T2 fell ithin the .urisdiction of the KDB<@ hich, as a reconfiguration of the K0<2, ,>3- retained said officeQs regulatory and ad.udicatory functions under 0ection 5 of C.O. J>5. RAhen an administrati'e agency is conferred *uasi-.udicial functions, it has &een ruled that all contro'ersies relating to the su&.ect matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to &e included ithin its .urisdictionR since Rsplit .urisdiction is not fa'oured The mere relationship of the parties as a su&di'ision de'eloperOo ner and su&di'ision lot &uyer does not, concededly, 'est the KDB<@ automatic .urisdiction o'er a case. 8n the cases of Ro as vs. -ourt of &ppeals ,>5- and %ilar 9evelopment -orporation vs. Sps. :illar,,>4- this 2ourt upheld the 3T2Qs .urisdiction o'er the complaint for e.ectment commenced &y the su&di'ision de'eloper on account of the &uyerQs failure to pay the installments stipulated in the partyQs contract to sell. 8n said cases, ho e'er, the &uyers

had no .ustifia&le ground to stop payment of the stipulated installments andOor any of the causes of action cogniza&le &y the KDB<@ under 0ection 1 ,:F- of ?.9. 13>>. Kere, ho e'er, respondents ha'e not only instituted a complaint for 'iolation of ?.9. 4:6 against petitioner 2lemencia 2alara &ut had also already o&tained a definiti'e ruling on the latterQs failure to fully de'elop the su&di'ision hich they cited as .ustification for not ma)ing further payments on Dot =o. 23 of the Dophcal (2alara) 0u&di'ision.

F6. G.+. No. 1<:F<? No embe& 1:, 9??: "2G"N*, S. !APAA/AN!A, ?etitioner, 's. !,00*SS*,N, <espondent. -A!$S:

!*3*/

S"+3*!"

On Octo&er 3, 144J, the ?=?-<egional Office 1F appointed petitioner Cugenio 0. 2apa&lanca into the ?=? ser'ice ith the ran) of ?olice Officer 1 (?O1) ith a temporary status. On =o'em&er 24, 1445, petitioner too) the ?=? Cntrance C7amination conducted &y the =ational ?olice 2ommission (=%?OD2O3) and passed the same. On Iuly 25, 2FFF, he too) the 2areer 0er'ice ?rofessional C7amination2omputer %ssisted Test (20?-2%T) gi'en &y the 2i'il 0er'ice 2ommission (202) and li)e ise passed the same. Thereafter, or on Octo&er 3, 2FFF, the <egional 9irector of ?olice <egional Office N888 conferred upon petitioner the permanent status as ?O1. On Octo&er 1:, 2FF1, the 202 2araga <egional Office N888 (202 2araga informed ?O1 2apa&lanca a&out certain alleged irregularities relati'e to the 20?-2%T hich he too) on Iuly 25, 2FFF. %ccording to the 202, the Rperson in the picture pasted in the ?icture 0eat ?lan (?0-?) is different from the person hose picture is attached in the ?ersonal 9ata 0heet (?90)R and that the signature appearing in the ?0-? as different from the signature affi7ed to the ?90. The 202 further informed petitioner that such findings of alleged e7amination irregularities constituted the offense of dishonesty if prima facie e'idence as esta&lished. % ?reliminary 8n'estigation as scheduled on =o'em&er 1J, 2FF1, petitioner failed to appear &ut as represented &y counsel ho mo'ed to dismiss the proceedings. Ke argued that it is the =%?OD2O3 hich has sole authority to conduct entrance and promotional e7aminations for police officers to the e7clusion of the 202. Thus, the 20?-2%T conducted on Iuly 25, 2FFF as 'oid. 3oreo'er, he alleged that the administrati'e discipline o'er police officers falls under the .urisdiction of the ?=? andOor =%?OD2O3. The 202 2araga held that there as no dispute that it as the =%?OD2O3 hich had the sole authority to conduct the entrance and promotional e7aminations of police officers. Ko e'er, since petitioner su&mitted 202 2areer 0er'ice ?rofessional eligi&ility and not a =%?OD2O3 eligi&ility to support his appointment on a permanent status, then the 202 had .urisdiction to conduct the preliminary in'estigation.

The trial court held that the 202 had no .urisdiction to conduct the preliminary in'estigation, much less to prosecute ?O1 2apa&lanca. The 2ourt of %ppeals re'ersed the <T2 holding that ?O1 2apa&lanca prematurely resorted to court inter'ention hen the remedy of appeal to the 202 2entral Office as a'aila&le. Bpholding the .urisdiction of the 202 2araga, the appellate court declared that the su&.ect of the latter#s preliminary in'estigation as not ith respect to ?O1 2apa&lanca#s acts in the conduct of his duties as a police officer, &ut ith respect to the authenticity of the documents he su&mitted &efore the 202 2araga in support of his application for permanent status as ell as the 'eracity of its contents. 8t held that pursuant to the 202Qs constitutional duty to protect the integrity of the ci'il ser'ice system, it acted ithin its authority to in'estigate irregularities or anomalies in'ol'ing ci'il ser'ice e7aminations, and to ascertain hether a prospecti'e ci'il ser'ice appointee is *ualified in accordance ith all the legal re*uirements. *SS2"S: 1. Ahether the 202 2araga has .urisdiction to conduct the preliminary in'estigation of a possi&le administrati'e case of dishonesty against ?O1 2apa&lanca for alleged 20? e7amination irregularity. 2. Ahether or not 202 has only appellate .urisdiction o'er the case and it is the =%?OD2O3 hich has .urisdiction to conduct initiatory in'estigation of the case. H"/(: 1. Tes. The 202, as the central personnel agency of the Eo'ernment, is mandated to esta&lish a career ser'ice, to strengthen the merit and re ards system, and to adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the ci'il ser'ice. The ci'il ser'ice em&races all &ranches, su&di'isions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the go'ernment, including go'ernment-o ned or controlled corporations ith original charters. 0pecifically, 0ection 41 of <epu&lic %ct (<%) =o. J46: (144F) or the R9epartment of 8nterior and Docal Eo'ernment %ct of 144FR pro'ides that the R2i'il 0er'ice Da and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the 9epartment,R to hich herein petitioner &elongs. 0ection 12 of C7ecuti'e Order (CO) =o. 242 or the R%dministrati'e 2ode of 1456,R enumerates the po ers and functions of the 202, to it: (1) %dminister and enforce the constitutional and statutory pro'isions on the merit system for all le'els and ran)s in the 2i'il 0er'ice( (6) 2ontrol, super'ise and coordinate 2i'il 0er'ice e7aminations. (11) Kear and decide administrati'e cases instituted &y or &rought &efore it

directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and re'ie and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.

decisions

8n addition, 0ection 25, <ule N8; of the Omni&us 2i'il 0er'ice <ules and <egulations specifically confers upon the 202 the authority to ta)e cognizance o'er any irregularities or anomalies connected ith the e7aminations, thus: 0ec. 25. The 2ommission shall ha'e original disciplinary .urisdiction o'er all its officials and employees and o'er all cases in'ol'ing ci'il ser'ice e7amination anomalies or irregularities. @ased on the foregoing, it is clear that the 202 acted ithin its .urisdiction hen it initiated the conduct of a preliminary in'estigation on the alleged ci'il ser'ice e7amination irregularity committed &y the petitioner. 2. =o. 8t has already &een settled in -ru$ v. -ivil Service -ommission that the appellate po er of the 202 ill only apply hen the su&.ect of the administrati'e cases filed against erring employees is in connection ith the duties and functions of their office, and not in cases here the acts of complainant arose from cheating in the ci'il ser'ice e7aminations. Thus, petitioner#s in'ocation of the la is misplaced. The e7aminations ere under the direct control and super'ision of the 2i'il 0er'ice 2ommission. The culprits are go'ernment employees o'er hom the 2i'il 0er'ice 2ommission undenia&ly has .urisdiction. The present case parta)es of an act &y petitioner to protect the integrity of the ci'il ser'ice system, and does not fall under the pro'ision on disciplinary actions under 0ec. >6. 8t falls under the pro'isions of 0ec. 12, par. 11, on administrati'e cases instituted &y it directly. This is an integral part of its duty, authority and po er to administer the ci'il ser'ice system and protect its integrity, as pro'ided in %rticle 8N-@, 0ec. 3 of the 2onstitution, &y remo'ing from its list of eligi&les those ho falsified their *ualifications. This is to &e distinguished from ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a &ona fide mem&er of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute 'iolations of the la or the rules of the ser'ice. 8n fine, e find that 202 2araga acted ithin its po ers hen it instituted the conduct of a preliminary in'estigation against herein petitioner.

F<. "sDuillo s. Peo%le G.+ 1;9?1? August 96, 9?1? -a#ts: ?O1 2ruzin and ?O2 %guas ere sent to conduct sur'eillance on the acti'ities of an alleged notorious snatcher operating in the ?asay area )no n only as !<yan.$

%s ?O1 2ruzin alighted from the pri'ate 'ehicle that &rought him and ?O2 %guas to the target area, he glanced in the direction of petitioner ho as standing three meters a ay and seen placing inside a yello cigarette case hat appeared to &e a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing hite su&stance. Ahile ?O1 2ruz as not sure hat the plastic sachet contained, he &ecame suspicious hen petitioner started acting strangely as he &egan to approach her. Ke then introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner and in*uired a&out the plastic sachet she as placing inside her cigarette case. 8nstead of replying, ho e'er, petitioner attempted to flee to her house near&y &ut as timely restrained &y ?O1 2ruzin ho then re*uested her to ta)e out the transparent plastic sachet from the cigarette case and thereafter arrested her. <T2 found appellant guilty of illegal possession of 3ethylamphetamine Kydrochloride or shabu. @efore the 2ourt of %ppeals, appellant *uestioned as illegal her arrest ithout arrant to thus render any e'idence o&tained on the occasion thereof inadmissi&le. 0he assails the appellate court#s application of the !stop-and-fris)$ principle in light of ?O1 2ruzin#s failure to .ustify his suspicion that a crime as &eing committed, he ha'ing merely noticed her placing something inside a cigarette case hich could hardly &e deemed suspicious. To petitioner, such legal principle could only &e in'o)ed if there ere o'ert acts constituting unusual conduct that ould arouse the suspicion *ssue: Ahetheror not the stop-and-fris) principle as properly applied &y the 2%. Held: 8n a !stop-and-fris),$ it is essential is that a genuine reason must e7ist, in light of the police officer#s e7perience and surrounding conditions, to arrant the &elief that the person ho manifests unusual suspicious conduct has eapons or contra&and concealed a&out him. 0uch a !stop-and-fris)$ practice ser'es a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effecti'e crime pre'ention and detection, hich underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of in'estigating possi&le criminal &eha'ior e'en ithout pro&a&le cause( and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preser'ation hich permit the police officer to ta)e steps to assure himself that the person ith hom he deals is not armed ith a deadly eapon that could une7pectedly and fatally &e used against the police officer. The circumstances under hich petitioner as arrested indeed engender the &elief that a search on her person as arranted: The police officers ere on a sur'eillance operation as part of their la enforcement efforts hen ?O1 2ruzin sa petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing hite crystalline su&stance into her cigarette case. Ei'en his training as a la enforcement officer, it as instincti'e on his part to &e dra n to curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner reacted &y attempting to flee after he introduced himself as a police officer and in*uired a&out the contents of the plastic sachet all the more pric)ed his curiosity.

Hrom these standards, the 2ourt finds that the *uestioned act of the police officers constituted a 'alid !stop-and-fris)$ operation. The searchOseizure of the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioner#s possession - later 'oluntarily e7hi&ited,2>- to the police operati'e - as underta)en after she as interrogated on hat she placed inside a cigarette case, and after ?O1 2ruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. %nd, at the time of her arrest, petitioner as e7hi&iting suspicious &eha'ior and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer had identified himself. %&sent any proof of moti'e to falsely accuse petitioner of such a gra'e offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court ith respect to the credi&ility of itnesses pre'ail o'er that of petitioner

F;. Na a&&o s. "5e#uti e Se#&eta&y "&mita G.+. no. 1;??6? A%&il 19, 9?11 -a#ts: The =ational 0tatistics Office certified that 9inagat 8slands# population is 12F,513. 8ts land area is 5F2.12 s*uare )ilometers and its a'erage annual income is ?52,J4J,>33.23, as certified &y the @ureau of Docal Eo'ernment Hinance. On Octo&er 2, 2FFJ, the ?resident appro'ed into la <.%. 43:: creating the ?ro'ince of 9inagat 8slands. On 9ecem&er 3, 2FFJ, the 2O3CDC2 conducted the mandatory ple&iscite for the ratification of the creation of the pro'ince under the DE2 hich yielded J4,4>3 affirmati'e 'otes and J3,:F2 negati'e 'otes. Aith the appro'al of the people from &oth the mother pro'ince of 0urigao del =orte and the ?ro'ince of 9inagat 8slands (9inagat), the ?resident appointed the interim set of pro'incial officials ho too) their oath of office on Ianuary 2J, 2FF6. Dater, during the 3ay 1>, 2FF6 synchronized elections, the 9inagatnons elected their ne set of pro'incial officials ho assumed office on Iuly 1, 2FF6. 3ean hile, on =o'em&er 1F, 2FFJ, petitioners <odolfo E. =a'arro and other former political leaders of 0urigao del =orte, filed &efore the 02 a petition for certiorari and prohi&ition (E.<. =o. 16:1:5) challenging the constitutionality of <.%. =o. 43:: alleging that that the creation of 9inagat as a ne pro'ince, if uncorrected, ould perpetuate an illegal act of 2ongress, and ould un.ustly depri'e the people of 0urigao del =orte of a large chun) of the pro'incial territory, 8nternal <e'enue %llocation (8<%), and rich resources from the area. *ssue:AO= <.%. =o. 43:: is constitutional. Held: %ebruary 1;, <;1; Rulin!

=o. The 02 ruled that the population of 12F,513 is &elo the Docal Eo'ernment 2ode (DE2) minimum population re*uirement of 2:F,FFF inha&itants. =either did 9inagat 8slands, ith an appro7imate land area of 5F2.12 s*uare )ilometers meet the DE2 minimum land area re*uirement of 2,FFF s*uare )ilometers. The 2ourt reiterated its ruling that paragraph 2 of %rticle 4 of the <ules and <egulations 8mplementing the Docal Eo'ernment 2ode, hich e7empts proposed pro'inces composed of one or more islands from the land area re*uirement, as null and 'oid as the said e7emption is not found in 0ec. >J1 of the DE2. !There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy &et een the &asic la and the rules and regulations implementing the said la , the &asic la pre'ails, &ecause the rules and regulations cannot go &eyond the terms and pro'isions of the &asic la ,$ held the 2ourt. (E< =o. 15FF:F, =a'arro '. Crmita, 3ay 12, 2F1F) The <epu&lic, represented &y the Office of the 0olicitor Eeneral, and 9inagat filed their respecti'e motions for reconsideration of the 9ecision. 8n its <esolution dated 3ay 12, 2F1F, the 0upreme 2ourt denied the said motions.

A'3)( 12, 2B11 R2()+9 Tes. 8n =a'arro 's. C7ecuti'e 0ecretary (E.<. no. 15FF:F, %pril 12, 2F11), the Konora&le 0upreme 2ourt ruled that <epu&lic %ct =o. 43:: is as ;%D89 and 2O=0T8TBT8O=%D, and the proclamation of the ?ro'ince of 9inagat 8slands and the election of the officials thereof are declared ;%D89. The 02 also ruled that the pro'ision in %rticle 4(2) of the <ules and <egulations 8mplementing the Docal Eo'ernment 2ode of 1441 stating, !The land area re*uirement shall not apply here the proposed pro'ince is composed of one (1) or more islands,$ is declared ;%D89. %ccording to the 02, ! ith respect to the creation of &arangays, land area is not a re*uisite indicator of 'ia&ility. Ko e'er, ith respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and pro'inces, the three (3) indicators of 'ia&ility and pro.ected capacity to pro'ide ser'ices, i.e., income, population, and land area, are pro'ided for.$ !@ut it must &e pointed out that hen the local go'ernment unit to &e created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is e7empt from the land area re*uirement as e7pressly pro'ided in 0ection >>2 and 0ection >:F of the DE2 if the local go'ernment unit to &e created is a municipality or a component city, respecti'ely. This e7emption is a&sent in the enumeration of the re*uisites for the creation of a pro'ince under 0ection >J1 of the DE2, although it is e7pressly stated under %rticle 4(2) of the DE2-8<<.$ 777 !There appears neither rhyme nor reason hy this e7emption should apply to cities

and municipalities, &ut not to pro'inces.8n fact, considering the physical configuration of the ?hilippine archipelago, there is a greater li)elihood that islands or group of islands ould form part of the land area of a ne ly-created pro'ince than in most cities or municipalities. 8t is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislati'e policy decision as e7pressed in 0ection >>2 (for municipalities) and 0ection >:F (for component cities) of the DE2, &ut as inad'ertently omitted in 0ection >J1 (for pro'inces). Thus, hen the e7emption as e7pressly pro'ided in %rticle 4(2) of the DE2-8<<, the inclusion as intended to correct the congressional o'ersight in 0ection >J1 of the DE2 L and to reflect the true legislati'e intent. 8t ould, then, &e in order for the 2ourt to uphold the 'alidity of %rticle 4(2) of the DE2-8<<.$ 777 !Ahat is more, the land area, hile considered as an indicator of 'ia&ility of a local go'ernment unit, is not conclusi'e in sho ing that 9inagat cannot &ecome a pro'ince, ta)ing into account its a'erage annual income of ?52,J4J,>33.23 at the time of its creation, as certified &y the @ureau of Docal Eo'ernment Hinance, hich is four times more than the minimum re*uirement of ?2F,FFF,FFF.FF for the creation of a pro'ince. The deli'ery of &asic ser'ices to its constituents has &een pro'en possi&le and sustaina&le. <ather than loo)ing at the results of the ple&iscite and the 3ay 1F, 2F1F elections as mere fait accompli circumstances hich cannot operate in fa'or of 9inagat#s e7istence as a pro'ince, they must &e seen from the perspecti'e that 9inagat is ready and capa&le of &ecoming a pro'ince.$ F:. GA) G2. 3.*GNA!*,

-A!$S: The father of petitioners Eeraldine Ea Euy and Erace Euy 2heu &ecame a naturalized6 Hilipino citizen sometime in 14:4. The said petitioners, &eing minors at that time, ere also recognized5 as Hilipino citizens.

<espondent %tty. %l'in %gustin T. 8gnacio, filed a 2omplaint 4 dated 3arch :, 2FF> for &lac)listing and deportation against petitioners Eeraldine and Erace &efore the @ureau of 8mmigration (@8) on the &asis that the latter t o are 2anadian citizens ho are illegally or)ing in the ?hilippines, petitioners ha'ing &een issued 2anadian passports.

The trial court granted the application for preliminary in.unction en.oining pu&lic respondents from further continuing ith the deportation proceedings.

<espondent %tty. 8gnacio filed a ?etition for 2ertiorari,also ith the 2% hich the latter granted and annulled the rit of preliminary in.unction issued &y the trial court stating that the latter has no .urisdiction pending administrati'e proceeding in the @ureau of 8mmigration.

Kence, petitioners filed &efore this 2ourt a ?etition for <e'ie on 2ertiorari 31 dated 3arch 31, 2FF: praying for the re'ersal of the 9ecision rendered &y the 2%.

*SS2":AO= doctrine of primary .urisdiction, relied upon &y the 2% in its decision, does not apply in the present case &ecause it falls under an e7ception.

H"/(: 8n '*- v. 9ela Rosa, it is re*uired that &efore .udicial inter'ention is sought, the claim of citizenship of a respondent in a deportation proceeding must &e so su&stantial that there are reasona&le grounds to &elie'e that such claim is correct. 8n the said case, the proof adduced &y the respondent therein as so su&stantial and conclusi'e as to his citizenship that it arranted a .udicial inter'ention. 8n the present case, there is a su&stantial or conclusi'e e'idence that petitioners are Hilipino citizens. Aithout necessarily .udging the case on its merits, as to hether petitioners had lost their Hilipino citizenship &y ha'ing a 2anadian passport, the fact still remains, through the e'idence adduced and undisputed &y the respondents, that they are naturalized Hilipinos, unless pro'en other ise.

The general rule is that &efore a party may see) the inter'ention of the court, he should first a'ail of all the means afforded him &y administrati'e processes. :1 The issues hich administrati'e agencies are authorized to decide should not &e summarily ta)en from them and su&mitted to a court ithout first gi'ing such administrati'e agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deli&eration. :2 2orollary to the doctrine of e7haustion of administrati'e remedies is the doctrine of primary .urisdiction( that is, courts cannot or ill not determine a contro'ersy in'ol'ing a *uestion hich is ithin the .urisdiction of the administrati'e tri&unal prior to the resolution of that *uestion &y the administrati'e tri&unal, here the *uestion demands the e7ercise of sound administrati'e discretion re*uiring the special )no ledge, e7perience and ser'ices of the administrati'e tri&unal to determine technical and

intricate matters of fact.:3 =onetheless, the doctrine of e7haustion of administrati'e remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary .urisdiction, hich are &ased on sound pu&lic policy and practical considerations, are not infle7i&le rules. There are many accepted e7ceptions, such as: (a) here there is estoppel on the part of the party in'o)ing the doctrine( (&) here the challenged administrati'e act is patently illegal, amounting to lac) of .urisdiction( (c) here there is unreasona&le delay or official inaction that ill irretrie'a&ly pre.udice the complainant( (d) here the amount in'ol'ed is relati'ely small so as to ma)e the rule impractical and oppressi'e( (e) here the *uestion in'ol'ed is purely legal and ill ultimately ha'e to &e decided &y the courts of .ustice( :> (f) here .udicial inter'ention is urgent( (g) hen its application may cause great and irrepara&le damage( (h) here the contro'erted acts 'iolate due process( (i) hen the issue of non-e7haustion of administrati'e remedies has &een rendered moot( :: (.) hen there is no other plain, speedy and ade*uate remedy( ()) hen strong pu&lic interest is in'ol'ed( and, (l) in *uo arranto proceedings. 7 7 7:J petition is G+AN$"(. @?. NA3A++, 3. "+0*$A

is the la

creating 9inagat ?ro'ince is unconstitutional+ TC0

-A!$S: The =ational 0tatistics Office certified that 9inagat 8slands# population is 12F,513. 8ts land area is 5F2.12 s*uare )ilometers and its a'erage annual income is ?52,J4J,>33.23, as certified &y the @ureau of Docal Eo'ernment Hinance. On Octo&er 2, 2FFJ, the ?resident appro'ed into la <.%. 43:: creating the ?ro'ince of 9inagat 8slands. On 9ecem&er 3, 2FFJ, the 2O3CDC2 conducted the mandatory ple&iscite for the ratification of the creation of the pro'ince under the DE2 hich yielded J4,4>3 affirmati'e 'otes and J3,:F2 negati'e 'otes. Aith the appro'al of the people from &oth the mother pro'ince of 0urigao del =orte and the ?ro'ince of 9inagat 8slands (9inagat), the ?resident appointed the interim set of pro'incial officials ho too) their oath of office on Ianuary 2J, 2FF6.

?etitioners <odolfo E. =a'arro and other former political leaders of 0urigao del =orte,

filed &efore the 02 a petition for certiorari and prohi&ition challenging the constitutionality of <.%. =o. 43:: alleging that that the creation of 9inagat as a ne pro'ince, if uncorrected, ould perpetuate an illegal act of 2ongress, and ould un.ustly depri'e the people of 0urigao del =orte of a large chun) of the pro'incial territory, 8nternal <e'enue %llocation (8<%), and rich resources from the area.

*SS2":AO= <.%. 43:: creating the ?ro'ince of 9inagat 8slands is unconstitutional.

H"/(: 0C2. 6. -reation and -onversion. S %s a general rule, the creation of a local go'ernment unit or its con'ersion from one le'el to another le'el shall &e &ased on 'erifia&le indicators of 'ia&ility and pro.ected capacity to pro'ide ser'ices , to it: (a) 8ncome. S 8t must &e sufficient, &ased on accepta&le standards, to pro'ide for all essential go'ernment facilities and ser'ices and special functions commensurate ith the size of its population, as e7pected of the local go'ernment unit concerned( (&) ?opulation. S 8t shall &e determined as the total num&er of inha&itants ithin the territorial .urisdiction of the local go'ernment unit concerned( and (c) Dand area. S 8t must &e contiguous, unless it comprises t o (2) or more islands, or is separated &y a local go'ernment unit independent of the others( properly identified &y metes and &ounds ith technical descriptions( and sufficient to pro'ide for such &asic ser'ices and facilities to meet the re*uirements of its populace. Thus, 0ection >J1 of the Docal Eo'ernment 2ode, pro'iding the re*uisites for the creation of a pro'ince, specifically states the re*uirement of !a contiguous territory of at least t o thousand (2,FFF) s*uare )ilometers.$ Ko e'er, paragraph (&) of 0ection >J1 pro'ides t o instances of e7emption from the re*uirement of territorial contiguity, thus: (&) The territory need not &e contiguous if it comprises t o (2) or more islands, or is separated &y a chartered city or cities hich do not contri&ute to the income of the pro'ince.,4The 2onstitution clearly mandates that the criteria in the Docal Eo'ernment 2ode must &e follo ed in the creation of a pro'ince( hence, any derogation of or de'iation from the criteria prescri&ed in the Docal Eo'ernment 2ode 'iolates 0ection 1F, %rticle N of the

2onstitution.

8n this case, <.%. =o. 43:: as declared unconstitutional &ecause there as utter failure to comply ith either the population or territorial re*uirement for the creation of a pro'ince under 0ection >J1 of the Docal Eo'ernment 2ode. @1. PH*/*PP*N" -*SH"+*"S 's.!,2+$ ,- APP"A/S ("3"/,P0"N$ A2$H,+*$., petitioner,

-a#ts: Then ?resident Herdinand C. 3arcos issued ?residential 9ecree =o. 466 (?9 466) creating the %uthority and placing it under the direct control and super'ision of the 0ecretary of =atural <esources. and renaming the %uthority as the no R?hilippine Hisheries 9e'elopment %uthorityR. The 3inistry of ?u&lic Aor)s and Kigh ays reclaimed from the sea a 21-hectare parcel of land in @arangay Tanza, 8loilo 2ity, and constructed thereon the 8H?2(8loilo Hishing ?ort 2omple7 ), consisting of &rea) ater, a landing *uay, a refrigeration &uilding, a mar)et hall, a municipal shed, an administration &uilding, a ater and fuel oil supply system and other port related facilities and machineries. The %uthority thereafter leased portions of 8H?2 to pri'ate firms and indi'iduals engaged in fishing related &usinesses. The 2ity of 8loilo assessed the entire 8H?2 for real property ta7es. The %uthority filed an in.unction case ith the <egional Trial 2ourt. %t the pre-trial, the parties agreed to a'ail of administrati'e proceedings, i.e., for the %uthority to file a claim for ta7 e7emption ith the 8loilo 2ity %ssessor#s Office. The latter, ho e'er, denied the claim for e7emption, hence, the %uthority ele'ated the case to the 9epartment of Hinance (9OH). 9OH ruled that the %uthority is lia&le to pay real property ta7es to the 2ity of 8loilo &ecause it en.oys the &eneficial use of the 8H?2. On petition ith the 2ourt of %ppeals, the latter affirmed the decision of the Office of the ?resident. 8t opined, ho e'er, that the 8H?2 may &e sold at pu&lic auction to satisfy the ta7 delin*uency of the %uthority.

*SS2": To resol'e said issues, the 2ourt has to determine (1) hether the %uthority is a go'ernment o ned or controlled corporation (EO22) or an instrumentality of the national go'ernment( and (2) hether the 8H?2 is a property of pu&lic dominion.

H"/(: The 2ourt rules that the %uthority is not a EO22 &ut an instrumentality of the national go'ernment hich is generally e7empt from payment of real property ta7. Ko e'er, said e7emption does not apply to the portions of the 8H?2 hich the %uthority leased to pri'ate entities. Aith respect to these properties, the %uthority is lia&le to pay real property ta7. =onetheless, the 8H?2, &eing a property of pu&lic dominion cannot &e sold at pu&lic auction to satisfy the ta7 delin*uency.

8n the "=&& case, petitioner ?hilippine Hisheries 9e'elopment %uthority among the instrumentalities of the national go'ernment. Thus L

as cited as

Some of the national go e&nment inst&umentalities ested by law with Mu&idi#al %e&sonalities a&e: @ang)o 0entral ng ?ilipinas, ?hilippine <ice <esearch 8nstitute, Daguna Da)e 9e'elopment %uthority, F)40-3)-4 D-=-(%'&-+/ A2/0%3)/;, @ases 2on'ersion 9e'elopment %uthority, ?hilippine ?orts %uthority, 2agayan de Oro ?ort %uthority, 0an Hernando ?ort %uthority, 2e&u ?ort %uthority, and ?hilippine =ational <ail ays. 8ndeed, the %uthority is not a EO22 &ut an instrumentality of the go'ernment. The %uthority has a capital stoc) &ut it is not di'ided into shares of stoc)s. 12 %lso, it has no stoc)holders or 'oting shares. Kence, it is not a stoc) corporation. =either it is a nonstoc) corporation &ecause it has no mem&ers. 8n light of the foregoing, the %uthority should &e classified as an instrumentality of the national go'ernment hich is lia&le to pay ta7es only ith respect to the portions of the property, the &eneficial use of hich ere 'ested in pri'ate entities.

@9. NA=A+"N, 3S. !*$. ,- (20AG2"$" -A!$S : Then 9umaguete 2ity 3ayor Helipe %ntonio @. <emollo sought re-election in the 3ay 1>, 2FF1 elections, &ut lost to respondent 3ayor %gustin <. ?erdices. Thereafter, on Iune :, 6, and 11, 2FF1, outgoing 3ayor <emollo promoted 1: city hall employees, and regularized another 6> city hall employees, including the herein :2 petitioners.

On Iuly 2, 2FF1, 3ayor ?erdices pu&licly announced at the flag raising ceremony at the 9umaguete 2ity Kall grounds that he ould not honor the appointments made &y former 3ayor <emollo. On the same day, he instructed the 2ity %dministrator, respondent 9ominador 9umalag, Ir., to direct respondent 2ity %ssistant Treasurer Crlinda 2. Tumongha (no deceased), to refrain from ma)ing any cash dis&ursements for payments of petitionersQ salary differentials &ased on their ne positions. ?etitioners filed a ?etition for 3andamus ith 8n.unction and 9amages ith ?rayer for a Temporary <estraining Order against the 2ity of 9umaguete. <egional Trial 2ourt dismissed the petition. 202 Hield Office in 9umaguete 2ity, through 9irector 88 Ha&io <. %&uce.o, re'o)ed and in'alidated the appointments of the petitioners 202 Hield Office in 9umaguete 2ity, through 9irector 88 Ha&io <. %&uce.o, re'o)ed and in'alidated the appointments of the petitioners in 'iolation of 202 <esolution =o. F1F455. 2ourt of %ppeals denied the appeal and affirmed 202 <esolution =o. F>F432.

*SS2": AO= 202 has authority to disappro'e appointments made &y outgoing local chief e7ecuti'es

+2/*NG: Ae find that the 2i'il 0er'ice 2ommission has the authority to issue 202 <esolution =o. F1F455 and that the in'alidation of petitioners# appointments as arranted. The 2ommission, as the central personnel agency of the go'ernment,,13has statutory authority to esta&lish rules and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the ci'il ser'ice. P&esidential (e#&ee No. ;?<,B1@C o& the !i il Se& i#e (e#&ee of the Phili%%ines, %&o ides fo& the %owe&s of the !ommission, in#luding the %owe& to issue &ules and &egulations and to &e iew a%%ointments . JA%%&o e all a%%ointments, hether o&iginal o& %&omotional, to %ositions in the #i il se& i#e, e7cept those of presidential appointees, mem&ers of the armed forces of the ?hilippines, police forces, firemen, and .ailguards, and disappro'e those here the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligi&ility or re*uired *ualifications.$ !inspect and audit the personnel actions and programs of the departments, agencies, &ureaus, offices, lo#al go e&nment units, and other instrumentalities of the go'ernment, including go'ernment o ned and controlled corporations$. 8t is true that there is no constitutional prohi&ition against the issuance of !mass appointments$ &y defeated local go'ernment officials prior to the e7piration of their terms, KOAC;C<, the %&ohibition is %&e#isely designed to dis#ou&age, nay, e en %&e#lude, losing #andidates f&om issuing a%%ointments me&ely fo& %a&tisan %u&%oses the&eby de%&i ing the

in#oming administ&ation of the o%%o&tunity to make the #o&&es%onding a%%ointments in line with its new %oli#ies . %fter the elections, appointments &y defeated candidates are prohi&ited, e7cept under the circumstances mentioned in 202 <esolution =o. F1F455, to a'oid animosities &et een outgoing and incoming officials, to allo the incoming administration a free hand in implementing its policies, and to ensure that appointments and promotions are not used as a tool for political patronage or as a re ard for ser'ices rendered to the outgoing local officials. 8ndeed, not all a%%ointments issued afte& the ele#tions by defeated offi#ials a&e in alid . 202 <esolution =o. F1F455 does not purport to nullify all !mass appointments.$ Howe e&, it must be shown that the a%%ointments ha e unde&gone the &egula& s#&eening %&o#ess, that the a%%ointee is Dualified, that the&e is a need to fill u% the a#an#y immediately, and that the a%%ointments a&e not in bulk. $he alidity of an a%%ointment issued immediately befo&e and afte& ele#tions by an outgoing lo#al #hief e5e#uti e is to be dete&mined on the &asis of the nature, character, and merit of the indi'idual appointment and the particular circumstances surrounding the same. %ppointees should &e screened and e'aluated &y the ?ersonnel 0election @oard (?0@), if applica&le. %s proof thereof, a certification signed &y the 2hairman of the @oard at the &ac) of the appointment or alternati'ely, a copy of the proceedingsO minutes of the @oard#s deli&eration shall &e su&mitted together ith the appointment. The issuance of the appointment shall not &e earlier than the date of the final screeningOdeli&eration of the ?0@. AKC<CHO<C, the petition is 9C=8C9 for lac) of merit.

@F. P"N"+A 3S. !,0"/"! -A!$S: On 2 %pril 2FF6, %ndanar filed &efore the Office of the <egional Clection 9irector (O<C9), 2araga <egion (<egion N888), a ?etition for 9is*ualification,>- against ?enera, as ell as the candidates for ;ice-3ayor and 0angguniang @ayan ho &elonged to her political party,,:- for unla fully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political acti'ity prior to the commencement of the campaign period. The petition as doc)eted as 0?% =o. F6-22>. %ndanar claimed that on 24 3arch 2FF6 L a day &efore the start of the authorized campaign period on 3F 3arch 2FF6 L ?enera and her partymates ent around the different &arangays in 0ta. 3onica, announcing their candidacies and re*uesting the people to 'ote for them on the day of the elections. ?enera alone filed an %ns er,6- to the ?etition on 14 %pril 2FF6, a'erring that the charge of premature campaigning as not true. %lthough ?enera admitted that a motorcade did ta)e place, she e7plained that it as simply in accordance ith the usual practice in near&y cities

and pro'inces, here the filing of certificates of candidacy (2O2s) as preceded &y a motorcade, hich dispersed soon after the completion of such filing. 8n fact, ?enera claimed, in the motorcade held &y her political party, no person made any speech, not e'en any of the candidates. 8nstead, there as only marching music in the &ac)ground and !a grand standing for the purpose of raising the hands of the candidates in the motorcade.$ Ahile 0?% =o. F6-22> as pending &efore the 2O3CDC2 0econd 9i'ision, the 1> 3ay 2FF6 elections too) place and, as a result thereof, ?enera as proclaimed the duly elected 3ayor of 0ta. 3onica. ?enera soon assumed office on 2 Iuly 2FF2. The 2O3CDC2 dis*ualified ?enera from continuing as a mayoralty candidate in 0ta. 3onica, for engaging in premature campaigning, in 'iolation of 0ections 5F and J5 of the Omni&us Clection 2ode. 2O3CDC2 en &anc denied ?enera#s 3otion for <econsideration.

*SS2": Ahether or not ,?enera- has engaged in an election campaign or partisan political acti'ity outside the campaign period. +2/*NG: ."S. 8n the case at &ar, it had &een sufficiently esta&lished, not .ust &y %ndanar#s e'idence, &ut also those of ?enera herself, that ?enera and her partymates, after filing their 2O2s on 24 3arch 2FF6, participated in a motorcade hich passed through the different &arangays of 0ta. 3onica, ai'ed their hands to the pu&lic, and thre candies to the onloo)ers. the #ondu#t of a moto&#ade is a fo&m of ele#tion #am%aign o& %a&tisan %oliti#al a#ti ity, falling sDua&ely within the ambit of Se#tion <:7b8798 of the ,mnibus "le#tion !ode, on JBhColding %oliti#al #au#uses, #onfe&en#es, meetings, &allies, %a&ades, o& othe& simila& assemblies, fo& the %u&%ose of soli#iting otes andIo& unde&taking any #am%aign o& %&o%aganda fo& o& against a #andidateB.CK % motorcade is a procession or parade of automo&iles or other motor 'ehicles.,31- The conduct thereof during election periods &y the candidates and their supporters is a fact that need not &e &ela&ored due to its idespread and per'asi'e practice. $he ob ious %u&%ose of the #ondu#t of moto&#ades is to int&odu#e the #andidates and the %ositions, to whi#h they seek to be ele#ted, to the oting %ubli#H o& to make them mo&e isible so as to fa#ilitate the &e#ognition and &e#olle#tion of thei& names in the minds of the ote&s #ome ele#tion time . Bnmista)a&ly, motorcades are underta)en for no other purpose than to promote the

election of a particular candidate or candidates. -o& iolating Se#tion ;? of the ,mnibus "le#tion !ode, !Se#tion ;? of the ,mnibus "le#tion !ode , on premature campaigning, e7plicitly pro'ides that JBiCt shall be unlawful fo& any %e&son, whethe& o& not a ote& o& #andidate, o& fo& any %a&ty, o& asso#iation of %e&sons, to engage in an ele#tion #am%aign o& %a&tisan %oliti#al a#ti ity, e5#e%t du&ing the #am%aign %e&iod.K ;ery simply, premature campaigning may &e committed e'en &y a person ho is not a candidate$ proscri&ing election campaign or partisan political acti'ity outside the campaign period, Pene&a must be disDualified from holding the office of 3ayor of 0ta. 3onica. Ahen the campaign period starts and said person proceeds ith hisOher candidacy, hisOher intent turning into actuality, e can already consider hisOher acts, after the filing of hisOher 2O2 and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of hisOher election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for hich heOshe may &e dis*ualified. % person, after filing hisOher 2O2 &ut prior to hisOher &ecoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts descri&ed under 0ection 64(&) of the Omni&us Clection 2ode as election campaign or partisan political acti'ity. Ko e'er, only after said person officially &ecomes a candidate, at the &eginning of the campaign period, can said acts &e gi'en effect as premature campaigning under 0ection 5F of the Omni&us Clection 2ode. it is only at the start of the campaign period, hen the person officially &ecomes a candidate, that the undue and ini*uitous ad'antages of hisOher prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to hisOher &enefit. 9espite the dis*ualification of ?enera, e cannot grant %ndanar#s prayer to &e allo ed to assume the position of 3ayor of 0ta. 3onica. The ell-esta&lished principle is that the ineligi&ility of a candidate recei'ing ma.ority 'otes does not entitle the candidate recei'ing the ne7t highest num&er of 'otes to &e declared elected.,:1AKC<CHO<C, premises considered, the instant ?etition for 2ertiorari is here&y 9803800C9

@@. 0"N(,=A 3S. !,0"/"! -A!$S: The petitioner and the respondent 'ied for the position of Eo'ernor of the ?ro'ince of @ulacan in the 3ay 1>, 2FF6 elections. The petitioner as proclaimed inning candidate and assumed the office of Eo'ernor. The respondent seasona&ly filed an election protest ith the 2O3CDC2, hich as raffled to the 0econd 9i'ision and doc)eted as C?2 =o. 2FF6->>. <e'ision of &allots in'ol'ing the protested and counterprotested precincts in %ngat, @ocaue, 2alumpit, 9oUa <emedios Trinidad, Euiginto, 3alolos, 3eycauayan, =orzagaray, ?andi, ?aom&ong, ?laridel, ?ulilan, 0an <afael and

0an Iose del 3onte soon follo ed. The re'ision as conducted at the 2O3CDC2#s office in 8ntramuros. %fter re'ision, the parties presented their other e'idence, leading to the parties# formal offer of their respecti'e e'idence. 2O3CDC2 transferred the @ulacan &allot &o7es, including those in'ol'ed in the pro'incial election contest, to the 0enate Clectoral Tri&unal (0CT) in connection ith the protest filed &y %*uilino ?imentel 888 against Iuan 3iguel Mu&iri. The 2O3CDC2#s 0econd 9i'ision denied the petitioner#s motion in its Order of %pril 24, 2FF4, ruling that the 2O3CDC2 has plenary po ers to find alternati'e methods to facilitate the resolution of the election protest( thus, it concluded that it ould continue the proceedings after proper coordination ith the 0CT. %llegedly alarmed &y information on 2O3CDC2 action on the pro'incial election contest ithin the 0CT premises ithout notice to him and ithout his participation, the petitioner#s counsel rote the 0CT 0ecretary, %tty. 8rene Eue'arra, a letter dated Iune 1F, 2FF4 to confirm the 'eracity of the reported conduct of proceedings., *SS2": AKCTKC< O< =OT TKC 2O3CDC2 ;8OD%TC9 9BC ?<O2C00 @T 2O=9B2T8=E ?<O2CC98=E0 A8TKOBT E8;8=E 9BC =OT82C TO TKC ?CT8T8O=C< +2/*NG: N,. Ae see no factual and legal &asis for the petitioner to complain of denial of his hearing stage rights. 8n the first place, he does not dispute that he fully participated in the proceedings of the election protest until the case as deemed su&mitted for resolution( he had representation at the re'ision of the &allots, duly presented his e'idence, and summed up his case through a memorandum. 8n these proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head ith the respondent in an ad'ersarial contest here &oth sides ere gi'en their respecti'e rights to spea), ma)e their presentations, and contro'ert each other#s su&mission, su&.ect only to esta&lished 2O3CDC2 rules of procedures. Bnder these undisputed facts, &oth parties had their day in court, so to spea), and neither one can complain of any denial of notice or of the right to &e heard. The contested proceedings at the 0CT (!contested proceedings) are no longer part of the ad'ersarial aspects of the election contest that ould re*uire notice of hearing and the participation of the parties. The 2O3CDC2 is under no legal o&ligation to notify either party of the steps it is ta)ing in the course of deli&erating on the merits of the pro'incial election contest. 8n the conte7t of our standard of re'ie for the petition, e see no gra'e a&use of discretion amounting to lac) or e7cess of .urisdiction committed &y the 2O3CDC2 in its deli&eration on the @ulacan election contest and the appreciation of &allots this deli&eration entailed. +esolution No. 9;19, to J#oo&dinate and make a&&angements with ea#h othe& so as not to delay o& inte&&u%t the &e ision of ballots being #ondu#ted,Kall fo& the %u&%ose of the

e5%editious dis%osition of thei& &es%e#ti e %&otest #ases. $he S"$ itself hono&ed this a&&angement as shown by the lette& of the S"$ Se#&eta&y that the !,0"/"! #ould J#ondu#t %&o#eedingsK ithin the Tri&unal premises as authorized &y the %cting 2hairman of the Tri&unal, Iustice %ntonio T. 2arpio.,2J- This arrangement recognized the 2O3CDC2#s effecti'e authority o'er the @ulacan &allots and other election materials, although these ere temporarily located at the 0CT premises. This arrangement, too, together ith the side &y side and non-conflicting e7istence of the 2O3CDC2 and 0CT .urisdictions, negate the 'alidity of the petitioner#s argument that the 2O3CDC2 transgressed the rule on separation of po ers hen it acted on the @ulacan pro'incial election contest hile the &allot &o7es ere at the 0CT premises. The appreciation of the @ulacan &allots that the 2O3CDC2 undertoo) side &y side ith the 0CT#s o n re'ision of &allots, constitutes an e7ercise of discretion made under the authority of the a&o'e-cited 2O3CDC2 rule of procedure. AKC<CHO<C, premises considered, e 9803800 the petition for certiorar

0ame( 0ame( Tests for <estraints on Hreedom of 0peech and C7pression.SEenerally, restraints on freedom of speech and e7pression are e'aluated &y either or a com&ination of three tests, i.e., 7a8 the dange&ous tenden#y do#t&ine whi#h %e&mits limitations on s%ee#h on#e a &ational #onne#tion has been established between the s%ee#h &est&ained and the dange& #ontem%lated( 7b8 the balan#ing of inte&ests tests, used as a standa&d when #ou&ts need to balan#e #onfli#ting so#ial alues and indi idual inte&ests, and &eDui&es a #ons#ious and detailed #onside&ation of the inte&%lay of inte&ests obse& able in a gi en situation of ty%e of situationH and 7#8 the #lea& and %&esent dange& &ule whi#h &ests on the %&emise that s%ee#h may be &est&ained be#ause the&e is substantial dange& that the s%ee#h will likely lead to an e il the go e&nment has a &ight to %&e ent. $his &ule &eDui&es that the e il #onseDuen#es sought to be %&e ented must be substanti e, Je5t&emely se&ious and the deg&ee of imminen#e e5t&emely high.KAs a&ti#ulated in ou& Mu&is%&uden#e, we ha e a%%lied eithe& the dange&ous tenden#y do#t&ine o& #lea& and %&esent dange& test to &esol e f&ee s%ee#h #hallenges. 0o&e &e#ently, we ha e #on#luded that we ha e gene&ally adhe&ed to the #lea& and %&esent dange& test.

0ame( 0ame( Hour %spects of Hreedom of the ?ress.S?hilippine .urisprudence, e'en as early as the period under the 143: 2onstitution, has recognized four aspects of freedom of the press. These are 718 f&eedom f&om %&io& &est&aintH 798 f&eedom f&om %unishment subseDuent to %ubli#ationH 7F8 f&eedom of a##ess to info&mationHand 7@8 f&eedom of #i&#ulation.

J!ontent'Neut&alK and J!ontent'AasedK +egulations, (istinguished.E 8t is not enough to determine hether the challenged act constitutes some form of restraint on freedom of speech. % distinction has to &e made hether the restraint is (1) a contentneutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned ith the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under ell defined standards( or (2) a content-&ased restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is &ased on the su&.ect matter of the utterance or speech. The cast of the restriction determines the test &y hich the challenged act is assayed ith.

0ame( 0ame( 0ame( 2ontent-@ased and 2ontent-=eutral <egulations( 0tandards of <e'ie ( Ahen the speech restraints ta)e the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a su&stantial go'ernmental interest is re*uired for its 'alidity.

A go e&nmental a#tion that &est&i#ts f&eedom of s%ee#h o& of the %&ess based on #ontent is gi en the st&i#test s#&utiny in light of its inhe&ent and in asi e im%a#t, and only when the #hallenged a#t has o e&#ome the #lea& and %&esent dange& &ule will it %ass #onstitutional muste&, with the go e&nment ha ing the bu&den of o e&#oming the %&esumed un#onstitutionality. S

SameH SameH !ou&t is of the iew and so holds that the %&o isions of +A :166 &eDui&ing mandato&y, &andom, and sus%i#ionless d&ug testing of students a&e #onstitutional.E 8ndeed, it is ithin the prerogati'e of educational institutions to re*uire, as a condition for admission, compliance ith reasona&le school rules and regulations and policies. To &e sure, the right to enroll is not a&solute( it is su&.ect to fair, reasona&le, and e*uita&le re*uirements. 0ame( 0ame( The mandatory &ut random drug test prescri&ed &y 0ec. 3J of <% 41J: for officers and employees of pu&lic and pri'ate offices is .ustifia&le, al&eit not e7actly

for the same reason.S The 2ourt notes in this regard that petitioner 0I0, other than saying that !su&.ecting almost e'ery&ody to drug testing, ithout pro&a&le cause, is unreasona&le, an un arranted intrusion of the indi'idual right to pri'acy,$ has failed to sho ho the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under 0ec. 3J(c) and (d) of <% 41J: 'iolates the right to pri'acy and constitutes unla ful andOor unconsented search under %rt. 888, 0ecs. 1 and 2 of the 2onstitution. ?etitioner Daserna#s lament is .ust as simplistic, s eeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. 6<. G.+. No. 169F1; A%&il 16, 9??:

61. /eague of !ities of the Phili%%ines &e%&esented by /!P National P&esident >e&&y P. $&enas, et al. s. !ommission on "le#tions, et al. G.+. No.

O'-3*/)=- 5*,/ 6%,/3)+-# Bnder the operati'e fact doctrine, the la is recognized as unconstitutional &ut the effects of the unconstitutional la , prior to its declaration of nullity, may &e left undistur&ed as a matter of e*uity and fair play. $he o%e&ati e fa#t do#t&ine is a &ule of eDuity. As su#h, it must be a%%lied as an e5#e%tion to the gene&al &ule that an un#onstitutional law %&odu#es no effe#ts. 8t can ne'er &e in'o)ed to 'alidate as constitutional an unconstitutional act. The operati'e fact doctrine ne'er 'alidates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional la . The unconstitutional la remains unconstitutional, &ut its effects, prior to its .udicial declaration of nullity, may &e left undistur&ed as a matter of e*uity and fair play.