Violence in Social Life

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2002. 28:387415 doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.28.110601.140936 Copyright c 2002 by Annual Reviews.
All rights reserved
VIOLENCE IN SOCIAL LIFE

Mary R. Jackman
Department of Sociology, University of California, Davis, California 95616; e-mail: mrjackman@ucdavis.edu
Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2002.28:387-415. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org by Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico on 03/15/14. For personal use only.
Key Words ideology, deviance, intent, injury I Abstract Two features have marked the sociological analysis of violence: (a) disparate clusters of research on various forms of violence that have been the object of urgent social concern, and relatedly, (b) an overwhelming focus on forms of violence that are socially deviant and motivated by willful malice. The resulting literature is balkanized and disjointed, and yet narrowly focused. The systematic understanding of violence as a broad genus of social behavior has suffered accordingly. I examine the issues that have clouded the analysis of violence: the importance of physical injuries vs. psychological, social, and material injuries; the weight placed on physical vs. verbal and written actions; the role of force vs. victim complicity in the iniction of injuries; and the emphasis on interpersonal vs. corporate agents and victims. That discussion highlights the widely varying forms of violence in social life, including many instances that are neither driven by malicious intent nor socially repudiated. I consider the diverse motives that drive violent actions and the variant social acceptance or repudiation that they meet. I propose a generic denition of violence, freed of ad hoc restrictions, that encompasses the full population of violent social actions. This directs us to more systematic questions about violence in social life.
INTRODUCTION
The sociological analysis of violence has been driven by social and policy imperatives that have molded and warped our understanding of it. Most sociologists relegate violence to the domain of criminology and deviance, and, indeed, it is there that one nds most of the pertinent research. Those forms of contemporary violence that are illegal, socially deviant, popularly censured, or associated with social conict have elicited intense clusters of research, as have historical cases of violence now viewed censoriously or attached to an historical moment of high conict. Various forms of criminal violence (homicide, assault, and more recently, child abuse, intimate-partner violence against women, and sexual violence against women) have been the primary targets of attention among sociologists, with each inspiring disparate bodies of research. Other specialized bodies of research (primarily among historians and political scientists) have evolved on such topics as labor violence, violence in slavery, lynching, and urban civil violence. The result is a research literature that is both specialized and balkanized. As researchers have
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delved into the immediate demands of their respective domains of inquiry, gaping holes and inconsistencies have gone unnoticed. Much as some scholars have bemoaned the lack of cohesion in research on violence (see, e.g., Ohlin & Tonry 1989; Weis 1989; Reiss & Roth 1993), most scholars have proceeded without hesitation as though the conceptual tangle had been cleared. Researchers commonly refer to a phenomenon called violence that implies a clearly understood, generic class of behaviors, and yet no such concept exists. This research environment has spawned a conception of violence that is biased and morally charged at the same time as it is clouded and unwieldy. Two overarching assumptions have dominated the line of vision. First, violence is typically assumed to be motivated by hostility and the willful intent to cause harm. Second, it is usually assumed that violence is deviantlegally, socially, or morallyfrom the mainstream of human activity. Although these assumptions are rarely stated explicitly, that has not detracted from their inuence. Violence has come to be viewed as comprising eruptions of hostility that have bubbled over the normal boundaries of social intercourse. When violence is motivated by positive intentions, or is the incidental by-product of other goals, or is socially accepted or lauded, it escapes our attention. Beneath those framing assumptions lies a conceptual quicksand. Most researchers have slipped into a set of working conventions about the specic dening attributes of violence. Others have been silently pulled by the demands of their subject matter into incorporating variant criteria. Alternative approaches coexist without reconciliation. By these means, four issues have irresolutely shaped our understanding of violence. First, most analysts have restricted their attention to actions that result in physical (corporal) injuries, although psychological, material, and social injuries have been invoked on an ad hoc basis in some contexts. Second, conceptions of violence are usually restricted to physical behaviors and the threat of physical behaviors, although verbal and written actions have also been included on a sporadic basis. Third, the issue of victim compliance has led to uncertainty about the status of some injurious actions. When force has clearly been used (i.e., the victim is unwilling), actions are dened as violent, but ambiguity hangs over many injurious actions in which the resistance of the victim is unclear or in which s/he endures the injuries willingly. Is it violence when the recipient of the injury has complicity in the behavior, either tacitly (as when the victim fails to offer resistance or to leave a relationship or an environment in which injury is inicted) or actively (as when someone is masochistic or suicidal)? Fourth, our narrow, legalistic concept of agency has led scholars to highlight interpersonal violence. Such actions have individually identiable agents and victims and immediate and certain outcomes. By contrast, injurious actions with fragmented or corporate agency, amorphous or anonymous victims, and delayed or probabilistic injuries are included only intermittently in research on violence. In this conceptual quagmire, important questions about the dening attributes of violence and the human relationship with violence have slipped into the shadows. I begin with a brief discussion of some attempts that have been made to patch
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together a generic denition of violence. Those denitions reveal the forces that have shaped research on violence and the consequent biases, lapses, and inconsistencies in our understanding of it. I then discuss the four key dimensions that have nebulously shaped working conceptions of violence. That discussion reveals a variability in the human relationship with violence that belies the biases of most research and undermines the reigning assumptions that hostility and deviance are the hallmarks of violence. I turn to those next. Once we widen our eld of vision, it becomes apparent that the impetus to violence is not conned to episodes of deviant hostility. Instead, violent actions are a normal part of the human repertoire of strategic social behaviors. Violence incorporates a diverse array of actions that are an integral feature of social life. To capture this, we need a systematic, autonomous, generic conception of violence, freed from the biases and inconsistencies of past research. With that template in hand, we can begin to identify, differentiate, and assess systematically the full population of actions that fall within the family of violence. New questions then emerge about violence in social life.
EXISTING DEFINITIONS OF VIOLENCE

As scholars have rushed to the analysis of specic forms of violence that have generated urgent social concern, the systematic denition of violence has languished. Those few analysts who have attempted to cast a broader conceptual net have generally restricted themselves to a subset of violent behaviors, such as domestic violence (itself subdivided into child abuse, intimate-partner violence, and elder abuse), gender violence, civil violence, criminal violence, or some selective combination of these (e.g., Bart & Moran 1993; Reiss & Roth 1993; Graham & Gurr 1969; Gurr 1989). The result has been a series of partially overlapping conceptual amalgams, with inconsistencies and gaps both within and among them. When definitions have reached over different domains of violence, they have been stretched and modied to accommodate inconsistent approaches, without attempting to reconcile them. One of the most ambitiousand precisedenitions of violence is that laid out by Reiss & Roth in the introduction to an important, four-volume compendium sponsored by the National Research Council, Understanding and Preventing Violence (Reiss & Roth 1993, p. 3537). The panel limited its consideration of violent behavior to interpersonal violence, which it dened as behavior by persons against persons that intentionally threatens, attempts, or actually inicts physical harm. The behaviors included in this denition are largely included in denitions of aggression. A great deal of what we believe about violence is based on psychosocial research on aggressive behaviors . . .. The panels denition deliberately excludes consideration of human behavior that inicts physical harm unintentionally . . . even when they occur as a result of corporate policies (e.g., to expose workers to toxic chemicals) that increase
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the risk of injury or death for some category of persons. Also excluded are certain behaviors that inict physical harm intentionally: violence against oneself, as in suicides and attempted suicides; and the use of violence by state authorities in the course of enforcing the law, imposing capital punishment, and providing collective defense . . .. Our denition of violence also excludes events such as verbal abuse, harassment, or humiliation, in which psychological trauma is the sole harm to the victim. However, especially in the context of violence in the family and sexual violence, we do attend to the psychological consequences of threatened physical injury.
Reiss & Roths formulation of a precise denition that spans the various bodies of research in their compendium highlights the emphasesas well as the inconsistenciesthat have marked that research. Their denition restricts violence to behaviors that are interpersonal, inict or threaten physical harm, and are motivated by harmful intent. These restrictive criteria are relaxed, however, on an ad hoc basis when they become inconvenient for the inclusion of features that have come under scrutiny in a specic line of research. For example, psychological injuries are selectively included in the context of family and sexual violence, and then only when they result from threats of physical injury. This ad hoc adjustment incorporates the emphasis on psychological harm made by many scholars of spousal violence and rape (e.g., Russell 1982; Finkelhor & Yllo 1983; Stanko 1985; Darke 1990), but it implies that is the only context in which psychological injuries result or are serious enough to warrant attention. Such an assumption is implausible on its face and is atly contradicted by the evidence (see section on The Range of Injurious Outcomes below). However, the denition simply incorporates past oversights and inconsistencies without trying to rectify them. In similar fashion, a variety of behaviors that meet the specied criteria of physical injury and harmful intent are specically excluded from the denition: those that are self-inicted, and those inicted by state authorities in the course of enforcing the law, punishment, or providing collective defense. The rst exclusion is consistent with the denitions restriction to interpersonal violence, although that restriction is itself arbitrary. The second exclusion conforms to the common focus on criminal or deviant behaviors found in extant research, but it is an ad hoc adjustment that summarily dismisses legitimized violence that otherwise meets the denitions criteria. Reiss & Roth draw explicitly on the term aggression, and this is in keeping with much of the literature on violence. Unfortunately, the denition of aggression is itself subject to many of the same restrictions and ambiguities (cf., Mazur 1983; Berkowitz 1993). However, some analysts have used a relatively clear denition of aggression as any form of behavior that is intended to injure someone physically or psychologically (Berkowitz 1993, p. 3; see also Eagly & Steffen 1986). As with violence, this denition restricts itself to injurious behaviors with harmful intent, but it gives equal weight to physical and psychological harm (while still excluding material and social harm).
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Now consider the denition of violence employed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Rosenberg 1994) and the California Policy Council on Violence Prevention (Final Report, August 1995): Violence is the threatened or actual use of physical force or power against another person, against oneself, or against a group or community that either results in, or has a high likelihood of resulting in, injury, death, or deprivation. This denition is much broader and more inclusive, but it is also less precise. Unlike Reiss & Roth (1993), it includes not only injuries inicted on another person, but also self-inicted injuries, as well as injuries inicted on groups and communities, and injuries that are either certain or probabilistic. Physical violence is emphasized, although apparently not exclusively, in the stipulation of physical force or power to inict the injury. If the denition does mean to include power as something separate from physical force, the range of pertinent actions is broadened, although with the addition of a complex and amorphous concept whose ambiguities have themselves spawned a huge literature and heated disagreement (see, e.g., Dahl 1968; Bachrach & Baratz 1970; Gramsci 1971; Lukes 1974; R. Jackman 1993; M. Jackman 1994). This denition also contains an internal inconsistency: Selfinicted injuries are included, thereby implying that victim complicity does not negate the denition of an injurious act as violent, but it also stipulates that all violent actions involve the use of physical force or other means of coercion. Another way to approach the conception of violence is through the lens of nonviolence, since the latter involves the self-conscious renunciation of the former. Here, too, the concept is both restricted and nebulous: Physical violence, which is what we most often have in mind when we speak about violence, is the use of physical force to cause harm, death, or destruction, as in rape, murder, or warfare. But some forms of mental or psychological harm are so severe as to warrant being called violence as well. People can be harmed mentally and emotionally in ways that are as bad as by physical violence . . .. Although physical violence often attends the iniction of psychological violence, it need not do so . . .. [People] can also be terrorized without being harmed physically . . .. An unlimited commitment to nonviolence will renounce psychological as well as physical violence (Holmes 1990, p. 12). This denition puts primary emphasis on coercive physical behaviors that result in physical injuries, but it also species that some forms of mental or psychological harm are sufciently severe to warrant inclusion. It remains unclear how to judge whether specic cases of psychological injury are sufciently severe for inclusion, and Holmess examplesverbal abuse of children, racism, and sexismare themselves ambiguous: When does a racial joke cross the line between mere tasteless remark and serious racial slur, and so on? Like denitions of violence and aggression, this denition also neglects material and social injuries. Some analysts have observed that the strong policy orientation of research on violence has driven scholars to conceive of the phenomenon in terms that are
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unduly inuenced by legal denitions of violent crime. For example, Fagan & Browne (1994, p. 131) note that many scholars working on domestic violence have been interested in informing legal policy and have thus relied primarily on denitions that stressed codied behaviors used in the criminal justice system. In this vein, Straus (1990, p. 58) argues that it is useful for empirical measures of marital violence to focus on specic acts that reect the legal distinction between simple and aggravated assault as well as the distinctions that are commonly made in normative standards of conduct. The motivation of most scholars of violence to address policy issues has been further encouraged by the fact that the funding for research on violence has overwhelmingly come from agencies with a strong interest in social policy. This slant has shaped both the kinds of violence that have been studied and the way in which they are conceptualized. Thus, acts such as emotional maltreatment, verbal harassment, and persistent denigration of spouses have had an uncertain status in family violence research because they produce little or no physical injury, even though scholars are increasingly recognizing the salience of psychological injuries when they spin off from the iniction or threat of physical injuries. Acts like marital rape that are not crimes in all American states have sometimes been excluded from examination (see Russell 1982). Concern for maintaining consistency with legal denitions has also steered researchers to focus overwhelmingly on interpersonal acts of violence (e.g., Stanko 1995) and to restrict attention to acts that are clearly premeditated with an intent to harm. In a parallel discussion of political violence three decades ago, Wolff (1971) complained that notions of illegitimate force are too central to conceptions of violence (Wolff 1971). Wolff summarized what he saw as the prevailing conception of violence as the illegitimate or unauthorized use of force to effect decisions against the will or desire of others (Wolff 1971, p. 59). In this schema, the killing of a police ofcer by a civilian is considered homicide (a.k.a. violence), whereas the killing of a civilian by a police ofcer in the line of duty is considered justiable homicide, outside the realm of violence. Similarly, when the state lawfully executes a convicted criminal, it is not usually treated as violence, but a lynch mob executing a convicted criminal is treated as violence. The exposure of workers to hazardous working conditions that result in death or injury is also not considered violence, either because the hazard level is within the law or because the motives of the employer are impossible to verify within legalistic notions of premeditated intent. Instead, the term labor violence is generally restricted to the deaths, injuries, and property damage associated with strikes and other challenges to the lawful authority of employers. Wolff was moved to conclude that, since the concept of legitimate authority is itself problematic and the identication of violence depends on distinguishing illegitimate from legitimate force, the concept of violence is inherently confused, as is the correlative concept of non-violence (Wolff 1971, p. 55). Indeed, Reiss & Roth (1993, p. 36) observe that their own denition of violence (quoted above) excludes from consideration the important question of why some violent behaviors are criminalized while others are not, and why this varies over time and across
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cultures. Although they feel bound to hew close to the vagaries of extant research in their own denition of violence, they recognize that understanding will be enhanced in future research by studying a broader range of violent behavior using classes based on behavioral rather than legal categories (1993, p. 36). This paper is an attempt to respond to that challenge. Urgent concerns about particular forms of criminal and socially deviant violence (especially homicide and assaults, and more recently, child abuse, rape, and intimate-partner violence) have dominated the research agenda. As a result, disparate clusters of research have erupted concerning specic forms of violence that are physical, interpersonal, forceful, harmfully intended, and socially/legally repudiated. Within that narrow set, the imperatives of each research cluster have produced specic working conventions and emphases. Current denitions of violence reect the biases, inconsistencies, and ambiguities that have thus arisen. We are overdue to cast a broader, more systematic conceptual net. The place to begin is with a brief assessment of the key sources of variation that have been glossed over, side-stepped, or summarily assumed away in most research on violence.
THE RANGE OF INJURIOUS OUTCOMES: PHYSICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, MATERIAL, AND SOCIAL

Physical outcomes such as pain, injury, disgurement, bodily alteration, functional impairment, or death, as well as physical restraint or connement, have a wincing resonance that violates our basic desire for physical survival, avoidance of pain, and preservation of bodily integrity and autonomy. The apparent concreteness and immediacy of physical injuries heightens their visibility and ease of observation. They hardly encapsulate, however, the full assortment of injuries that humans nd consequential. Psychological outcomes such as fear, anxiety, anguish, shame, or diminished self-esteem; material outcomes such as the destruction, conscation, or defacement of property, or the loss of earnings; and social outcomes such as public humiliation, stigmatization, exclusion, imprisonment, banishment, or expulsion are all highly consequential and sometimes devastating for human welfare. The personal pain caused by some of these injuries may be more severe or prolonged than from many physical injuries. Indeed, the most profound effects of physical violence itself are often nonphysical. For example, among survivors of airplane hijackings, wars, prison camps, and concentration camps, the suffering caused by subsequent psychological distress (now medicalized as post-traumatic stress disorder) often endures long after any physical injuries have healed. More generally, a physically harrowing experience or a debilitating or mutilating bodily injury is often consequential for the victim in large part because of its long-term impact on his or her psychological, material, or social welfare. Indeed, the boundaries between different types of injury are fundamentally clouded. For example, is humiliation primarily a social or a psychological injury? Do its injurious effects hinge more on the loss of social status or of self-esteem? One
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type of injury spills over into another, as when material deprivation results in negative corporal outcomes (like starvation or lack of resistance to disease) and negative psychological outcomes (like anxiety, despair and feelings of powerlessness). Even more fundamentally, the relationships among different types of injury are not well understood. To what extent do psychological injuries like depression or stress increase peoples vulnerability to negative corporal outcomes like illness, harmful addictions, or propensity to harmful accidents? Medical research has demonstrated the negative impact of psychological states like stress and depression on physical health outcomes, through its effects on the autonomic nervous system, the endocrine system, the immune system, and poor health behaviors (e.g., Pennebaker et al. 1988; de Loos 1990; McFarlane et al. 1994; Resnick et al. 1997). Rape, which is typically seen as a physical injury, may actually be more signicant for the psychological and social injuries it inicts: Rape is fundamentally the violation of sexual autonomy, which is in large part a social and psychological injury, bringing in its trail personal humiliation, sense of violation, loss of control, anxiety, and frequently social shame (e.g., Burgess & Holstrom 1974; Finkelhor & Yllo 1983; Darke 1990; Von et al. 1991; Resick 1993). Finally, the sensation of physical pain itselfa key ingredient of what we understand as physical injuryis a complex intermixture of physiological and psychological stimuli: The precise causal contribution of each to peoples felt sensation of pain is still debated by medical researchers (Morris 1991). Authorities concerned with devising compelling human punishments have displayed a more sensitive appreciation of noncorporal injuries than have most scholars of violence. Such authorities have stocked their repertoires as much with actions that inict humiliation, stigmatization, material loss, and social isolation as with those inicting physical pain or mutilation, even in historical periods when there was a heavier reliance on corporal punishments [see, e.g., the punishments employed by slave-owners in the antebellum South (Stampp 1956; Elkins 1968; Crawford 1992) and by church and secular authorities in Europe in the Middle Ages, Renaissance, and early modern period (Russell 1972; Foucault 1977; Johnson 1987; Manchester 1992; Barstow 1994; Peters 1989, 1996)]. Human rights groups have drawn attention to the devastating psychological effects of solitary connement in prisons (perhaps the ultimate social punishment) (Human Rights Watch 1997, p. 6274). When thought has gone into the matter, human sensibilities are apparently just as nely attuned to psychological, social, and material injuries as to physical ones. Indeed, some human behaviors suggest there are certain social, psychological, and material injuries that are considered more daunting than physical injuries hardly surprising, given humans high sociability and manifest desire for material gain. For example, the millions of Chinese women who compelled their daughters to bind their feet (thereby inicting on them permanent physical injury, debilitating functional impairment, and chronic physical pain) might have reported that such physical injuries were preferable to the social isolation, material impoverishment, stigmatization, and crushed self-esteem that would have befallen their
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daughters had their feet not been bound (Levy 1966; Jackson 1990; Mann et al. 1990; Blake 1994; Dworkin 1994). A similar calculus motivates the painful and debilitating practice of genital cutting on an estimated 100132 million women in Africa today (El Dareer 1982; Lightfoot-Klein 1989, Economist 1999, World Health Organization 2001). Even when the stakes are less extreme, millions of Western women submit without hesitation to surgical pain (e.g., face lifts, liposuction, breast implants) or self-inicted calorie deprivation in order to promote their social or economic prospects and enhance their self-esteem. Research on violence has ridden roughshod over this complex territory, assigning overwhelming signicance to physical injuries (e.g., Graham & Gurr 1969; Reiss & Roth 1993; Utech 1994; Ruback & Weiner 1995). Despite the increasing amount of evidence on the pervasiveness and duration of psychological injuries such as PTSD resulting from a wide range of traumatic experiences (see, e.g., Figley 1985, 1986; Wilson & Raphael 1993; American Psychiatric Association 1994; Kilpatrick et al. 1998), the only violence research to have routinely incorporated psychological injuries is that on family or sexual violence. Many studies of child abuse, intimate-partner violence, and sexual assault have emphasized the importance of such negative psychological consequences as PTSD, depression, substance abuse, low self-esteem, sense of violation, and the inability to function independently (e.g., Dobash & Dobash 1979; Walker 1979; Lynch & Roberts 1982; Finkelhor & Yllo 1983; Frieze & Browne 1989; Tolman 1989; Darke 1990; Stark & Flitcraft 1991; Von et al. 1991; Evans 1992; Browne 1993; Laumann et al. 1994, pp. 338339). Even in that context, actions that inict solely psychological injuries are usually bypassed (for exceptions, see Tolman 1989; Evans 1992, 1993). Material injuries are also generally overlooked in formal denitions of violence and in discussions of interpersonal violence, even though acts like vandalism and the destruction of property are routinely acknowledged as some of the terrible costs of terrorism and war with profound material, psychological, and social repercussions. Social injuries are the least likely to be acknowledged in discussions of violence, although their signicance is highlighted sporadically, as when striking workers practice social exclusion against nonstriking workers, or when pornographic materials are alleged to commit violence against women by demeaning their social status. The inclusion of specic nonphysical injuries in one or another domain without acknowledging the general signicance of such injuries results in a patchy, ad hoc conception of violence. We need to be consistent about what kinds of injuries are consequential, and to develop more systematic criteria to assess the severity of various injuries.
INJURIOUS BEHAVIORS: PHYSICAL, VERBAL, WRITTEN

Primacy has usually been accorded to physically violent behaviors, but that is misleading on two main counts. First, verbal and written actions may also accomplish the iniction of physical injuries, either by directly initiating them (as in formal
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edicts or contracts) or by inciting others to acts of physical violence (as in newspaper or magazine articles or television programs that either directly advocate the iniction of injuries on an individual or group, or that encourage physical violence indirectly by portraying an individual or group as a moral or physical threat). Because of our legalistic concept of agency, our attention is drawn to the most obvious physical perpetrator of the deed, but the instigators of the action may lie discreetly elsewhere. Who is the responsible agent of violence: the lynch mob, the legal system and police who fail to prosecute the members of the mob, or the people who encourage lynchings by actively asserting white racial dominance or the heinousness of certain breaches of the moral order? Surely, it is a communal complicity made up of an accumulation of verbal and/or written actions that accomplishes the deed, even though only a small number of actors may be physically implicated. Second, verbal and written actions may directly accomplish a variety of nonphysical injuries. Verbal or written actions that derogate, defame, or humiliate an individual or group may inict substantial psychological, social, or material injuries without being as conspicuous or agrant as physical violence (see, e.g., Clark & Clark [1947] 1958; Tajfel 1969; Evans 1992). Our legal code recognizes the signicance of such actions against individuals (in permitting litigation for alleged slander or libel), although not against groups (as when stereotypes defame group members and diminish their self-esteem, social status, and material prospects) (Clark & Clark [1947] 1958; Tajfel 1969; Brigham 1971; Word et al. 1974; Snyder 1981; Jackman 1994; Farley et al. 1994; Feagin & Sikes 1994; Greenwald & Banaji 1995; Bobo & Smith 1996; Bobo & Johnson 2000; Jost & Major 2001; Sinclair et al. 2002). In many contexts (as in academia, where individuals stature is more dependent on their command of language than on their physical prowess), verbal and written assaults carry more credibilityand are therefore more damagingthan crude physical assaults. Perhaps for this reason, the aming email, the vituperative verbal attack, and back-biting gossip are more familiar features of departmental life than st-ghts. In short, there are diverse, and often quieter, ways of inicting injuries than by physical assault alone. Instead of disregarding verbal and written methods of violence, we should respect their potency and analyze the conditions under which agents of violence choose one or another method of delivery.
VICTIMHOOD AND COMPLIANCE

Violence is typically thought to involve force, that is, the victim is an unwilling recipient of the injury. Compliance or complicity from the recipient of the injury is usually thought to negate victimhood and thus to jeopardize the characterization of the event as violent (e.g., see denitions above). And yet certain injurious behaviors that do not involve force are occasionally included within the rubric of violence, or they are left hanging nebulously at the margins. Cases in which someone inicts an injury on himself (such as suicide or self-mutilation) are especially problematic. Suicides are usually excluded (as in Reiss & Roth 1993) but sometimes included
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(as in Holinger 1987). And some behaviors involving agent-to-victim injuries are subject to doubt because of ambiguity about the degree to which the victim is willing, compliant, or even has complicity. The high interpersonal injury rate in some sports, such as boxing or football, occasionally generates concern in the press, but such discussions are rarely couched in terms of violence because of the high degree of voluntarism among players. Spousal abuse, sexual harassment, and rape have increasingly been included within the umbrella of violence, but there is dissension about the status of individual cases in which battered wives fail to leave their husbands, sexually harassed women fail to le charges or quit their jobs, or women allege rape but are unable to produce convincing physical evidence of coercion. Victims are then confronted with the frustrating inconsistency of a society that expresses moral outrage about the category of behaviors, but difdence about particular cases (Jackman 1999). Indeed, the issue of victim compliance has haunted the literature on violence against women, threatening the very status of the most prominent forms of female victimization as bona de instances of violence (e.g., Burt 1980; Taylor 1981; Jackman 1999). In short, the criterion of force is a nebulous decision rule that has been inconsistently applied, giving some injurious behaviors an uncertain status in the family of violence. There are three main reasons why the force criterion should be abandoned. First, the compliance/noncompliance distinction is inherently ambiguous because people rarely act as free agents, but instead must usually make choices from a constrained set that has been predetermined by organizational or situational factors beyond their control (see, for example, Bachrach & Baratz 1970; Gramsci 1971; Lukes 1974; R. Jackman 1993; M. Jackman 1994, 1999). Given a constrained set of choices, the victims alternatives to compliance may be risky or futile. Depending on the agents and the victims relative control over resources, compliance may be the victims best survival strategy. Rape provides a particularly blatant example of the compliance dilemma. Police often advise women that if they are sexually assaulted, their best survival strategy is to offer no resistance, since resistance may result in more serious physical injury (given the attackers superior physical strength or the presence of a weapon), but if the woman offers no evidence of physical resistance, she automatically undermines her legal claim to victimhood. Poverty of resources and lack of access to information can also work to produce compliant victims. Take, for example, the victims who willingly consented to participate in the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment in Macon county, Alabama, from 1932 to 1972 (Jones 1993). These poor, rural, uneducated African-American men who were suffering from syphilis had no access to medical care at the onset of the experiment. Most of these victims did not have to be forced to participate because poverty and ignorance had already foreshortened their options sufciently to produce their participation. The examples of victimhood that confound notions of compliance are endless. Workers who willingly expose themselves to hazardous working conditions do so because they do not know of alternative opportunities for employment, they fear reprisals from management if they were to complain, or they are unaware of the gravity of the hazards to which they are being exposed. Workers
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who continue to work in settings where they are subject to sexual harassment may be unaware of alternative employment opportunities, or they may fear substantial economic or career losses if they led a grievance or moved to a new job. Second, the compliance/noncompliance distinction is also difcult to observe empirically. Peoples revealed behaviors do not always reect their preferences, especially in threatening situations. Added to this, peoples observation and recollection of events, especially volatile ones, are highly subject to bias and confusion. Injurious behaviors that take place without any outside witnesses, such as rape, intimate-partner assaults, and many instances of sexual harassment in the work place, are especially vulnerable to this ambiguity because the injurious event can only be reconstructed through the recollections of the two participants. Allegations of sexual assault or harassment are unusual in that they hinge intrinsically on evidence of force (non-consenting adult), and for this reason such allegations often fail. The agent has self-interested reasons for portraying the victim as an instigator or confederate. The victim may lack either the self-condence or the social credibility to counter the agents claims effectively, or she may be too shaken or humiliated by the event to formulate allegations with fortitude. Even when there are outside witnesses, those witnesses are rarely unbiased or free from perceptual error. For example, a number of studies have documented the common bias found among both bystanders and participants (including victims themselves) toward blaming the victim (Lerner & Simmons 1966; Bulman & Wortman 1977; Miller & Porter 1983; Stark & Flitcraft 1988). Finally, there is little a priori reason to exclude those injurious behaviors that do manifest relatively clear instances of voluntary submission to injury. These include suicide, masochistic self-mutilation, voluntary submission to hunger or injury on behalf of a political cause (as with protestors tactics such as hungerstriking or passive resistance), voluntary submission to painful or hazardous beauty practices (such as breast implants or face-lifts), religiously motivated abstinence from food, sexual gratication, or material possessions, or religiously motivated self-mutilation (such as the agellation practiced by some fervent Christian worshipers in Europe of the Middle Ages and in the Philippines today) (Kieckhefer 1974; Dickson 1989; Lambert 1992; Los Angeles Times 1993). In such instances, injuries are nonetheless sustained, and those injuries still affect the welfare of the victim. If injuries are sometimes endured willingly, inclusion of such instances may hold lessons about the myriad and sometimes turbid dynamics of violence in social life. Attributions of responsibility for violence need to assess the degree to which organizational arrangements frame peoples opportunities to commit or resist violence, and to recognize that the place of individual agency in submitting to violence is variable, complex, and subject to bias or confusion in its observation. To comprehend the human propensity for violence, we need to analyze not only the factors that cause people to inict injuries on others, but also the conditions and dispositions that lead people to tolerateor even to seekthe iniction of injuries on themselves.
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AGENTS AND VICTIMS: INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE

The legal/criminology impetus in violence research has led to an overwhelming focus on the iniction of injuries person-to-person, while ambiguity hovers over more corporate acts of violence (Jackman 2001). Some specic forms of collective violence have been the subject of inquiry, such as political violence, civil unrest, labor violence, and intergroup conict and violence. War, genocide, and armed conict arising from ethnic, racial, or religious differences are commonly recognized as corporate violence writ large. However, the analysis of such corporate actions is almost always disconnected from research on interpersonal violence. More mundane corporate actions with injurious outcomes are unlikely to be couched in terms of violence at all. Especially germane are the decrees, decisions, and activities of governmental agencies (such as the police, courts, prison systems, armed forces, legislative bodies, and governmental bureaucracies) that adversely affect the welfare of groups or individuals (see, e.g., Foucault 1977; Dworkin 1977; Cover 1986; Hughes 1987; Kelman & Hamilton 1989; Robertson & Judd 1989; Johnson 1990), and production and marketing decisions of corporations that endanger the health or safety of workers or consumers (see, e.g., Gitelman 1973; Pollack & Keimig 1987; Kelman & Hamilton 1989; Asch 1988; McGarity & Shapiro 1993, National Safe Workplace Institute 1990, National Safety Council 1995). Our legalistic concept of agency requires a plainly visible actor, and to be an agent of violence there must be a directly observable, deterministic connection between the behavior of one and the suffering of another. In the forms of collective violence that have been analyzed, corporate actors behave as an observable conglomerate, and there are plainly observable events with injurious effects on persons or property. Other forms of corporate violence have been harder to recognize specically, actions that result from the fragmented or cumulative activities of multiple actors, in which the agents or victims are faceless and/or amorphous, or in which there is either a temporal lag or a probabilistic relationship between the actions taken by agents and the outcomes experienced by victims. The net result is that our understanding of violence has not been informed by an analysis of corporate or institutional violence, despite the heavy toll of death and suffering that they cause. For example, although the term labor violence commonly denotes the violence that surrounds strikes and other collective labor actions, the death toll from such activities is minuscule compared to the deaths from injuries and diseases that are caused by the routine use of hazardous machinery, procedures, or substances in the workplace. A total of about 300 people were killed in strike-related violence in the United States in the twentieth century, almost all of them prior to 1950 (data from Fillippelli 1990), whereas a conservative estimate of the number of American workers killed by work-related injuries since 1930 exceeds 700,000 (National Safety Council, 1995; Pollack & Keimig 1987), and an estimated 50,000100,000 American workers continue to die annually from occupationally induced diseases (Ofce of Technology Assessment 1985, National Safe Workplace Institute 1990).
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The repeated spotlight on interpersonal violence fosters the impression, however inadvertently, that the institutional backdrop is nonviolent, thereby sustaining the view of violence as an individual-level, deviant behavior. The individual who practices violence against others or himself may not be, however, the anomaly that he appears. Instead, his violence may be consonant with the institutional or group settings in which he lives.
WHAT MOTIVATES VIOLENCE?

Violence is commonly associated with the intent to cause harm, and with anger, hostility, coercion or conict, but many of the examples raised in the discussion above belie such a narrow range of motivations for the human decision to inict injury on others or oneself. Once we step away from the legal and moral imperatives that have shaped research on violence, we are confronted with the diverse and sometimes complex motivations that shade the variegated practice of violence in social life. Our legal system has developed a network of rules to determine the willful intent of defendants (e.g., Emanuel 1987), but those rules necessarily entail arbitrary decisions in order to steer through an area that is intrinsically shaded and complex. Take, for example, husbands who remorsefully declare that they love their battered wives and did not mean to hurt them, or gun-shot assaults on victims on inner-city streets who were simply at the wrong place at the wrong time, or cigarette manufacturers who for many years disputed any causal link between their product and negative health outcomes. Similarly, many parents who use corporal punishments are following the dictates of a benevolent intent because they believe such punishments are benecial to childrens moral development (spare the rod and spoil the child). Motivations for violence are often complex admixtures, but in addition to the familiar motivation of hostile intent, we can identify at least four further types of motivation for violent actions: to benet the community, to benet the victim, to satisfy recreational or entertainment needs, or simply tolerating it because it is incidental to other goals. First, a variety of violent acts appear to be motivated by the desire to benet the community. For example, ritual human sacrice was practiced in a number of premodern societies in order to supplicate deities and thus bring benets to the community (Tierney 1989; Clendinnen 1991; Lincoln 1991; Levenson 1993). Modern nation-states have repeatedly sacriced highly valued young men in war in order to further expansionist or defensive goals of the community (Small & Singer 1982; Dunnigan 1993; Jackman 1999). The witch-hunts of early modern Europe and North America were motivated by the desire to rid communities of harmful elements believed to threaten the public welfare (Russell 1972; Kors & Peters 1972; Monter 1976; Levack 1993). The infamous Tuskegee Experiment, which deliberately withheld medical treatment from syphilis-infected, African-American men for forty years, was initially motivated by the desire to benet the studys subjects, but when funding for that goal was withdrawn, the investigators seamlessly shifted
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their goal to that of advancing science and benetting the practice of medicine (Jones 1993). The low racial and class status of the subjects made it easy to disregard their well-being (even though that had been the initial goal of the study), but the primary purpose was not to express hatred for African Americans or to kill them. Second, some violent acts are benevolently intended toward the victim, sometimes in self-inicted actions and sometimes inicted on others. The selfagellation practiced by some fervent Christians in the Middle Ages involved the prostration of oneself before God in order to protect oneself from future harm (Kieckhefer 1974; Dickson 1989; Lambert 1992). As noted earlier, many violent female beauty practices, such as foot binding, liposuction, breast implants, and face-lifts, are motivated by the desire to enhance the social or economic prospects of the victim. Western medicine routinely uses surgical or drug therapies that are painful, arduous, or debilitating in order to prolong the victims life: Historically, these methods of treating the sick have had variable efcacy, but they have been motivated by benevolent intentions. Third, sometimes actors seek violence for its intrinsic entertainment or recreational value. The prominence and success of physical violence in the organization of mass entertainment throughout historygladiator games, bull ghts, dog ghts, boxing matches,action moviessuggests a widespread attraction to violence, whether for catharsis, excitement, thrills, or sexual arousal. Malevolent feelings toward the victims may contribute to the audiences enjoyment (as when early Christians were publicly fed to lions), but more often the audience is merely indifferent to the victim (as was often the case with Roman gladiators) or even adulates the victim (as with boxing or wrestling stars and some Roman gladiators). Finally, violence often occurs because the iniction of injuries is simply incidental to other goals. In such instances, violence is neither deliberately sought nor a mere accident (i.e., with no expected probability of occurrence). Instead, it is knowingly tolerated as a by-product of ones actions. Spectators at auto races and other high-risk sports events are willing to tolerate the spectacle of injured drivers or players in order to serve their desire for excitement or entertainment (of course, if the injuries are an active part of the entertainment value, the violence is not incidental). The purpose of the Tuskegee Experiment was not to inict suffering on its victims, but the scientists who ran the Experiment were willing to subordinate the welfare of their low-status subjects to scientic goals they considered more important. Historically, manufacturers have placed a higher priority on maximizing prots than on the health and safety of either their workers or the consumers of their products (Berman 1978; Witt & Dotter 1979; Nelkin & Brown 1984; Pollack & Keimig 1987; Rosner & Markowitz 1987; Asch 1988; McGarity & Shapiro 1993; Dotter 1998). I have already commented on the large number of injuries and illnesses that result from employers labor practices; these do not stem from a deliberate desire of employers to injure their workers, but instead from their willingness to tolerate a given probability of worker injury or illness in their pursuit of prot. Acceptable tolerance levels for worker risk receded with rising levels of afuence over the course of the twentieth century in the United States and remain
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highly variant between afuent and poor nations in the world today. It is unlikely that American cigarette manufacturers are motivated by a deliberate intent to harm their customers (especially since they constitute the market for their product), but they have not been deterred from the aggressive marketing of cigarettes by the estimated 400,000 deaths that are caused annually in the United States by cigarette smoking (U.S. Dep. Health & Hum. Serv. 1990, Peto et al. 1992). Discussions of white racial violence usually focus on lynching, but the number of African Americans killed by lynching (estimated at 50006000; White [1929] 1969; Hair 1989) does not compare with the vast number of premature African-American deaths brought about by discriminatory racial practices that limited blacks access to life-enhancing goods and services such as food, housing, health care, education, and remunerative occupations (resulting in a 16-year gap in life expectancy between black and white males in 1900 and still an 8-year gap in the 1990s) (CDCP 1996, Farley 1996, pp. 22228). Whites may not have intended to cause the premature deaths of so many African Americans, but they were surely willing to tolerate that price in order to maintain their racial status prerogatives. Homicides, which have provoked intense attention from students of violence (e.g., Wolfgang 1967; Daly & Wilson 1988; Land et al. 1990; Phillips 1997; Blumstein & Wallman 2000), account for fewer than 25,000 deaths annually in the United States (FBI annual, Rosenfeld 2000), a very small number compared with the annual death toll from such incidental violence as harmful labor practices, the marketing of unsafe consumer products like cigarettes, guns, and poorly designed automobiles, and discriminatory group practices that restrict subordinates access to life-enhancing goods and services. The latter escape attention because they often have relatively faceless, corporate perpetrators, and the outcomes are probabilistic rather than certain; even more misleading is the absence of a deliberate harmful intent, which makes it easy to portray the injurious outcomes as accidents, despite documented evidence that the perpetrators actively resist attempts to rectify the practices that have caused injury (see, e.g., Asch 1988; Curran 1993; McGarity & Shapiro 1993). Surely, however, it is a measure of human callousness when social actors, despite the absence of a deliberate intent to harm, fail to be deterred from a course of action by the knowledge that injuries may or will be the by-product. The emphasis in violence research on acts that are motivated by willful malice is in keeping with legal imperatives, but it effects a drastic and arbitrary reduction in our awareness of the diverse range of injurious actions in social life. Humans are moved to use violent means in the pursuit of a broad array of personal, social, material, or political goals. Violence may be used to perform an instrumental service (such as to punish those one seeks to control, to make a political statement, or to transform ones body to meet the beauty standards of ones culture), or simply to satisfy expressive needs (such as anger, excitement, catharsis, or sexual arousal). Most signicantly, perhaps, humans also readily tolerate violence as an incidental outcome of their goals, as when whites tolerate a higher mortality rate among African Americans as the by-product of maintaining racial status prerogatives, or
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when employers choose to leave workers exposed to hazardous working conditions as a by-product of maximizing prots. Whether instrumental, expressive, or incidental, violence may be carried out with malice, good will, or indifference for the victim. Restriction of our eld of vision solely to those acts that are inspired by hostile intent is gravely misleading and undermines the endeavor to decipher the human relationship with violence.
VARYING INCIDENCE AND SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE OF VIOLENCE

We have liked to think that humans have a natural repugnance for violence and that such actions therefore deviate from the main impetus of social life. Gender relations constitute the only context in which a sustained argument has been made that violence is an integral part of social interaction. A number of feminist scholars have asserted the normality of violence against women (e.g., Mill [1869] 1970; Millett 1970; Rich 1980; French 1992; Radford & Russell 1992), although ironically as part of an argument that this feature of gender relations sets it apart from other social relations, indicative of a uniquely pervasive intergroup hostility (misogyny). However, a number of the examples of violence that I have discussed are neither rare nor repudiated in the cultures in which they occur (e.g., female genital cutting, the subjection of workers to hazardous working conditions, violence in spectator sports and other entertainment). There is wide variation in both the frequency of occurrence and the social acceptance of the diverse acts of violence that mark social life. Some injurious behaviors are socially identied as violent and are popularly vilied (as when parents murder their children) or feared (such as murder or assault by strangers or politically motivated terrorist violence). Others remain nestled, unrecognized, in the bosom of everyday life (such as beauty practices that are painful, conning, or hazardous). Still others are viewed differently in different historical periods or cultures (e.g., the physical beating of children has changed in the United States over the past 100 years from being stipulated parental behavior to being culturally chastised; denitions of lawfully acceptable hazard levels in the workplace have altered signicantly over time in the United States and continue to vary cross-nationally; female genital cutting is regarded as one of the leading human-rights issues in the world today by many Westerners, but it is culturally mandated and celebrated in the cultures that practice it). Our own culture, like others, lauds a number of violent practices as exemplary (such as organized boxing or valor in warfare). The connement of research to those injurious actions that are socially deviant truncates and distorts the observed variance in violence. It pushes aside important questions about historical and cultural variation in the criminalization of specic violent actions (as noted by Reiss & Roth 1993, p. 3637), and it subverts any attempt to understand why certain forms of violence are tolerated, accepted,
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endorsed, mandated, or gloried, while others are repudiated or even excoriated, or why some acts of violence erupt only in anger while others occur in tranquility or as an element of recreation. The behavioral properties of various forms of violence need to be divorced from the meaning attached to them legally and culturally. Once we acknowledge explicitly that the social response to violent actions or events is malleable, we can also recognize that not all acts of violence meet with uniform interpretations within the same culture (Jackman 2001). The perpetrators, victims, and third-party observers whose lives are entangled in violent acts often perceive and interpret them quite differently. Perpetrators and others from their group have an interest in denying or obscuring the violence, minimizing it, claiming it was an accident or anomaly, claiming the victim precipitated it, willfully desired it, or benetted from it, or glorifying it as altruistic or necessary for the common good (e.g., to maintain law and order, appease a deity, or enforce a moral code). Victims and their allies have an interest in emphasizing or exaggerating the incidence, frequency, or severity of injuries, attributing base motives to the perpetrator(s), claiming the victims innocence and lack of complicity, or claiming the violence is detrimental to communal goals or values. When perpetrators and victims make contested symbolic appeals, third party observers may join the fray or choose to look the other way. The most sustained investigation of this issue has been in research on violence against women. A number of scholars have explored legal and cultural judgments of rape and intimate-partner assault (e.g., May 1978; Burt 1980; Malamuth 1981; Greenblat 1983; LaFree et al. 1985; Pleck 1989; Bograd 1988; Scully 1990). This work has demonstrated the inventiveness of social actors in their responses to various kinds of violence against women, historically and in the contemporary United States. Public opinion data from the United States have also been used to explore popular denitions and moral evaluations of other violent events, primarily various forms of collective violence (Blumenthal et al. 1972, 1975). Cerulo (1998) examined how both the content and the structure (sequencing) of media reports affect peoples moral judgments of violent incidents; this research highlights the need for analysis of the sociological factors that shape the structure of media accounts. Research thus far on cultural responses to violent acts provides promising leads that need to be extended to a wider, representative range of injurious actions to address the varying social acceptance of violence.
GENERIC DEFINITION OF VIOLENCE

In an attempt to introduce a more systematic, comprehensive analysis of violence, Jackman (1999, 2001, in preparation) has proposed a generic denition that focuses unequivocally on the injuriousness of actions, detached from their social, moral, or legal standing. We need to recognize that violence is a genus of behaviors, made up of a diverse class of injurious actions, involving a variety of behaviors, injuries, motivations, agents, victims, and observers. The sole thread connecting them is the threat or outcome of injury.
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VIOLENCE: Actions that inict, threaten, or cause injury. Actions may be corporal, written, or verbal. Injuries may be corporal, psychological, material, or social. This denition includes all actions that directly inict injury as well as those that either threaten or result in injury. It species that injurious actions and outcomes may take many forms. The language also permits the injurious outcomes to be immediate or delayed, certain or probabilistic. It further permits both agents and victims to be either identiable individuals or more amorphous corporate entities. More signicantly, this denition sets no constraints on the motivations of either the victim or the agent, and is agnostic about whether the behavior is unusual or commonplace and whether it meets with societal repudiation, disinterest, acceptance, or admiration. It thus provides a stripped-down template to identify all behaviors that inict, threaten, or cause injury. This provides a consistent, autonomous basis for identifying the full population of injurious social behaviors, purely on the basis of their indigenous behavioral attributes. Like other generic nominations (e.g., chair, building, university), there is no implication that all phenomena falling within the genus are to be equated. To the contrary, the application of autonomous and consistent rules for the identication of violent actions forces us to confront the diverse forms of violence in social life. Only then may we begin to differentiate the character and severity of those actions systematically. By enlarging the eld of violent actions, my denition also points to the limitations of claims of nonviolence. Activists who refrain from the use of physical or psychological violence may still engage in tactics that inict (intentionally) social or material harm on their targets, as in economic boycotts or media campaigns decrying the targets actions. The choice to refrain from physically violent tactics is made strategically within a political context or because of personal moral aversion to physical violence (e.g., King 1963, p. 3640). Much as their ideological positions may try to obscure it, political actors must often nd effective ways to weaken (i.e., harm) their opponents if they are to prevail. It is more productive to observe the types of tactics they select without imposing a moral ordering on those tactics. Violence may appear (in some guise) in many unexpected places. Violence is not a constant: It varies in its presence, its character, and its severity but the human propensity for violence is certainly more pervasive than the current reigning conception implies. Humans do not have to inict injuries on others or themselves, and many human behaviors are indeed benign. However, one does not have to assert that violence is a dominant human strategy to recognize that it is a pervasive part of the normal social repertoire. Most humans do choose at least sometimes to engage in various actions that inict some sort of injury. The interesting assessment is not whether some individuals employ violence: It is not a dichotomous yes-or-no category. Instead, violence is a multifaceted genus of behaviors whose component elements vary on continua. The productive questions are the degree to which various social actors use violent means (on a continuum
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from never or rarely to frequently), what methods they use, what type of injury they inict, what their purpose is, who the targets are, and the severity of the injuries.
NEW RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Once we conceive of violence as a genus of social behaviors, new questions can be pursued about violence in social life. Jackman (1999, 2001, in preparation) posits that social actors, far from being averse to actions that inict injuries on others or themselves, instead incorporate such actions routinely when they seem like feasible, efcacious strategies for the attainment of their goals. Individuals vary in their personal propensity for violenceas agents, victims, and observersbut most neither seek out nor shrink from it. Cursory evidence suggests that the human capacity to commit, endure, and observe violence is elastic. It expands and shrinks in accordance with such factors as: the actors goals and the presumed efcacy of the violence in delivering those goals; the immunity or vulnerability of the actor to sanctions or negative repercussions stemming from the behavior; the relative status and group afliations of agents, victims, and observers (which bears on the previous consideration); the spatial, temporal, or organizational insulation of actors from the victims; and the availability and relative efcacy of other strategies. Decisions to take actions that will result in injuries to others or oneself, the type of injuries that are sought or tolerated, the type of behavior that is employed, and the social construction placed on those actions, are all made within a strategic political context. This approach suggests three key steps in building a systematic understanding of violence in social life. First, we must dene and measure the myriad components of violence. This is a difcult undertaking, in view of the many dimensions that shade the practice of violence, but it is essential if we are to have a clear road map through this highly charged territory. By developing a consistent set of criteria to measure the severity and character of all injurious actions, we can be clearer about where to situate any specic act in the family of violence. Measures like the Conict Tactics Scales (Gelles & Straus 1988; Straus & Gelles 1990; Brush 1993; Straus et al. 1996) and the National Survey of Crime Severity (Wolfgang et al. 1985; Warr 1994) are productive models: The measures themselves, the questions they reveal, and the ensuing debates force us to grapple with the precise meaning of violent acts. To start, we need to build systematic, autonomous rules to assess the severity of violent acts. Our legal code judges severity of crimes with a complex admixture of multiple criteria, including the intent of the offender and the victim (e.g., manslaughter and victim-precipitated homicide are both less severe than homicide), the seriousness of the injury that results (e.g., attempted homicide is less severe than homicide), and the status of the victim and the offender (e.g., homicide
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is more severe when the victim is a police ofcer or an elected political ofcial, less severe when the offender is a youth) (Emanuel 1987). This code compounds societal values with factors indigenous to the act itself, and their relative weights in specic cases are often resolved only by invoking arbitrary decision rules. I suggest, instead, a cleaner assessment of the severity of violence that attends to attributes of the violence itself [as the CTS attempts to do (Straus & Gelles 1990; Straus et al. 1996)], and/or to explicit measures of the social judgments of severity [as does the NSCS (Wolfgang et al. 1985; Warr 1994)]. The former model invokes such factors as the number, frequency, and duration of violent acts, and/or the extent, duration, certainty, and irreversibility of injury, whereas the latter model relies on peoples opinions about the severity of specic violent acts (either hypothetical or experiential). Both sets of factors may be relevant, but we should be clear about which elements contribute to a specic assessment. Beyond assessments of severity, we need to focus systematically on other elements that dene the character of violent acts. A wide array of factors is pertinent, e.g., what type of behavior is used by the perpetrator/s, what type of injury results, what is the apparent motivation of the agent and the victim, are the agents and victims individual, multiple, or corporate, what are the status attributes of the agent and victim, is the injury immediate or delayed, are there witnesses and what is their relationship to the agent and the victim, is the action legal or illegal, socially condoned, admired, or repudiated, and what are the rewards or penalties for committing or resisting the act? We need systematic, empirical measurement of the constituent elements that are conjoined in diverse congurations of violence. Second, we must examine the way in which institutional arrangements facilitate or obstruct the practice of various types of violence, that is, the social organization of violence. For example, a systematic examination of the relationship between gender and violence (Jackman 1999) suggests that, contrary to the emphasis of much research on misogyny and violence against women (e.g., Millett 1970; Brownmiller 1975; Dobash & Dobash 1979; Stark & Flitcraft 1988; Scully 1990; French 1992; Radford & Russell 1992), mens quest for proprietary control over women leads them to commit considerably more interpersonal, physical violence against other males than against females, to shelter women routinely from many of the more violence-prone corporate environments (e.g., the battleeld, the blue-collar workplace), and to establish institutionalized incentives and punishments that goad women to carry out violence against their own bodies without any direct intervention by men. In a broader investigation of the social organization of violence in race, class, and gender relations, Jackman (2001) explored the institutional arrangements in systems of expropriation that facilitate and veil dominants practice of violence against subordinates, by providing organizational niches that screen interpersonal violence from third-party observation, or by using chains of command or selective incentives to make subordinate-group members the visible henchmen. Institutions grant subordinates few opportunities to practice violence
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either on their own initiative or against dominants, thus channeling their violence into interpersonal and extraorganizational forms that are directed primarily against members of their own group. This fosters the illusion that it is subordinate group members (e.g., blacks, the lower class) who are more violence-prone, but their violence is simply more visible because it is committed by and against individuals without the benet of organizational cover. Third, we must analyze the ideology of violence, to try to assess how and why various acts of violence are repudiated, ignored, denied, praised, or gloried. In keeping with theory on the dynamics of social construction and ideology (e.g., Gramsci 1971; Goffman 1959, 1970; Jones & Nisbett 1971; Stryker & Serpe 1982; Jackman 1994; Hardin & Higgins 1996), I propose that the social denition of a violent act emerges out of a cultural contest between the motivated perceptions of the agent and the victim as well as of third parties. This suggests we should examine the social, economic and political goalsand resourcesof the agents, victims, and third-party observers of violent actions, and the signicance of the violence in furthering or obstructing their respective goals. The characteristics of the act (the number of agents, the method of injury, the type and severity of injury, the motivation for the act, and so on) and the organizational context within which it occurs may provide opportunities alternately to deny it, claim it was an accident, claim it was an exception, displace blame, justify it, glorify it, exaggerate its severity or incidence, or vilify the motives of the perpetrator. We must break away from the preoccupation with violent acts that are socially repudiated. Instead, we should try to determine why only a small proportion of social violence meets such a negative social judgment, and what the factors are that drive the symbolic manipulation of violent social acts. None of these suggestions should be taken as a call to end more specialized research on particular forms of violence. Detailed attention to specic types of violence is invaluable to the cumulation of information about violence (whether specic empirical forms such as homicides or female genital cutting, or subsets such as physical violence or social violence). However, such work will contribute more to our understanding of the specic type itself and of the genus as a whole if it is situated in a consistent, systematic framework that reaches comprehensively across the family of violence. To that end, specialized research needs to be supplemented with work that compares alternative forms of violence and advances a more generic frame. Without the full population of violent actions held coherently in view, we impoverish the quest to understand the place of violence in social life. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author thanks Robert W. Jackman, Bill McCarthy, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on this paper, as well as many other colleagues and students who have argued with me about the ideas expressed herein. Their comments have helped me formulate the ideas, and they have made life more fun.
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The Annual Review of Sociology is online at http://soc.annualreviews.org
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Annual Review of Sociology Volume 28, 2002
CONTENTS
FrontispieceStanley Lieberson
PREFATORY CHAPTER Barking Up the Wrong Branch: Scientic Alternatives to the Current Model of Sociological Science, Stanley Lieberson and Freda B. Lynn THEORY AND METHODS From Factors to Actors: Computational Sociology and Agent-Based Modeling, Michael W. Macy and Robert Willer Mathematics in Sociology, Christofer R. Edling Riain Global Ethnography, Zsuzsa Gille and Se an O Integrating Models of Diffusion of Innovations: A Conceptual Framework, Barbara Wejnert Assessing Neighborhood Effects: Social Processes and New Directions in Research, Robert J. Sampson, Jeffrey D. Morenoff, and Thomas Gannon-Rowley The Changing Faces of Methodological Individualism, Lars Udehn SOCIAL PROCESSES Violence in Social Life, Mary R. Jackman INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE Welfare Reform: How Do We Measure Success? Daniel T. Lichter and Rukamalie Jayakody The Study of Islamic Culture and Politics: An Overview and Assessment, Mansoor Moaddel POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY Financial Markets, Money, and Banking, Lisa A. Keister Comparative Research on Womens Employment, Tanja van der Lippe and Liset van Dijk DIFFERENTIATION AND STRATIFICATION Chinese Social Stratication and Social Mobility, Yanjie Bian 91 39 221 117 359 387 143 197 271 297 1
443 479
vi
CONTENTS
The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences, Mich` ele Lamont and Vir ag Moln ar Race, Gender, and Authority in the Workplace: Theory and Research, Ryan A. Smith INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY Reconsidering the Effects of Sibling Conguration: Recent Advances and Challenges, Lala Carr Steelman, Brian Powell, Regina Werum, and Scott Carter Ethnic Boundaries and Identity in Plural Societies, Jimy M. Sanders
167 509
243 327 21 417 63
POLICY Ideas, Politics, and Public Policy, John L. Campbell New Economics of Sociological Criminology, Bill McCarthy HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY The Sociology of Intellectuals, Charles Kurzman and Lynn Owens INDEXES Subject Index Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 1928 Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 1928 ERRATA An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Sociology chapters (if any, 1997 to the present) may be found at http://soc.annualreviews.org/
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Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2002. 28:387415 doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.28.110601.140936 Copyright c 2002 by Annual Reviews.

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VIOLENCE IN SOCIAL LIFE

EXISTING DEFINITIONS OF VIOLENCE

THE RANGE OF INJURIOUS OUTCOMES: PHYSICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, MATERIAL, AND SOCIAL

INJURIOUS BEHAVIORS: PHYSICAL, VERBAL, WRITTEN

VICTIMHOOD AND COMPLIANCE

AGENTS AND VICTIMS: INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE

WHAT MOTIVATES VIOLENCE?

VARYING INCIDENCE AND SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE OF VIOLENCE

GENERIC DEFINITION OF VIOLENCE

NEW RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The Annual Review of Sociology is online at http://soc.annualreviews.org

Annual Review of Sociology Volume 28, 2002

243 327 21 417 63

543 565 568

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