Labor finals cases MANUEL BELARMINO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.: This seven-year-old case involves a claim for benefits for the death of a lady school teacher which the public respondents disallowed on the ground that the cause of death was not workconnected. Before her death on February 19, 1982, petitioner's wife, Oania Belarmino, was a classroom teacher of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports assigned at the Buracan Elementary School in Dimasalang, Masbate (p. 13, Rollo). She had been a classroom teacher since October 18, 1971, or for eleven (11) years. Her husband, the petitioner, is also a public school teacher. On January 14, 1982, at nine o'clock in the morning, while performing her duties as a classroom teacher, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. Moments later, she complained of abdominal pain and stomach cramps. For several days, she continued to suffer from recurrent abdominal pain and a feeling of heaviness in her stomach, but, heedless of the advice of her female co-teachers to take a leave of absence, she continued to report to the school because there was much work to do. On January 25, 1982, eleven (11) days after her accident, she went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home (p. 8, Rollo). Her abdominal pains persisted even after the delivery, accompanied by high fever and headache. She was brought to the Alino Hospital in Dimasalang, Masbate on February 11, 1982. Dr. Alfonso Alino found that she was suffering from septicemia post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina. She was discharged from the hospital after five (5) days on February 16, 1982, apparently recovered but she died three (3) days later. The cause of death was septicemia post partum. She was 33 years old, survived by her husband and four (4) children, the oldest of whom was 11 years old and the youngest, her newborn infant (p. 9, Rollo). On April 21, 1983, a claim for death benefits was filed by her husband. On February 14, 1984, it was denied by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) which held that 'septicemia

post partum the cause of death, is not an occupational disease, and neither was there any showing that aforesaid ailment was contracted by reason of her employment. . . . The alleged accident mentioned could not have precipitated the death of the wife but rather the result of the infection of her lacerated wounds as a result of her delivery at home" (p. 14 Rollo). On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, the latter issued Resolution No. 3913 dated July 8, 1988 holding: We agree with the decision of the system, hence we dismiss this appeal. Postpartum septicemia is an acute infectious disease of the puerperium resulting from the entrance into the blood of bacteria usually streptococci and their toxins which cause dissolution of the blood, degenerative changes in the organs and the symptoms of intoxication. The cause of this condition in the instant case was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent's delivery of her child which took place at home. The alleged accident in school could not have been the cause of septicemia, which in this case is clearly caused by factors not inherent in employment or in the working conditions of the deceased. (pp. 14-15, Rollo.) Hence, this petition for review. After a careful consideration of the petition and the annexes thereof, as well as the comments of the public respondents, we are persuaded that the public respondents' peremptory denial of the petitioner's claim constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation enumerates the grounds for compensability of injury resulting in disability or death of an employee, as follows: Sec. 1. Grounds (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions: (1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; (2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and (3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer. (b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be

shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. (c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules. The illness, septicemia post partum which resulted in the death of Oania Belarmino, is admittedly not listed as an occupational disease in her particular line of work as a classroom teacher. However, as pointed out in the petition, her death from that ailment is compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the development of post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise. . . . what is termed in American cases the proximate cause, not implying however, as might be inferred from the word itself, the nearest in point of time or relation, but rather, [is] the efficient cause, which may be the most remote of an operative chain. It must be that which sets the others in motion and is to be distinguished from a mere preexisting condition upon which the effective cause operates, and must have been adequate to produce the resultant damage without the intervention of an independent cause. (Atlantic Gulf vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 166,171.) The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181.) Thus in Enriquez v. WCC, 93 SCRA 366, 372, this Court ruled: . . . Verily, the right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury (82 Am. Jur. 132). Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury

likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to complainants own negligence or misconduct ( I Larson Workmen's Compensation Law 3-279 [1972]). Simply stated, all the medical consequences and sequels that flow from the primary injury are compensable. (Ibid.) Mrs. Belarmino's fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and death, are compensable. There is no merit in the public respondents' argument that the cause of the decedent's post partum septicemia "was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent's delivery of her child at home" for the incident in school could not have caused septicemia post partum, . . . the necessary precautions to avoid infection during or after labor were (not) taken" (p. 29, Rollo). The argument is unconvincing. It overlooks the fact that septicemia post partum is a disease of childbirth, and premature childbirth would not have occurred if she did not accidentally fall in the classroom. It is true that if she had delivered her baby under sterile conditions in a hospital operating room instead of in the unsterile environment of her humble home, and if she had been attended by specially trained doctors and nurses, she probably would not have suffered lacerations of the vagina and she probably would not have contracted the fatal infection. Furthermore, if she had remained longer than five (5) days in the hospital to complete the treatment of the infection, she probably would not have died. But who is to blame for her inability to afford a hospital delivery and the services of trained doctors and nurses? The court may take judicial notice of the meager salaries that the Government pays its public school teachers. Forced to live on the margin of poverty, they are unable to afford expensive hospital care, nor the services of trained doctors and nurses when they or members of their families are in. Penury compelled the deceased to scrimp by delivering her baby at home instead of in a hospital. The Government is not entirely blameless for her death for it is not entirely blameless for her poverty. Government has yet to perform its declared policy "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all (Sec. 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution and Sec. 9, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). Social justice for the lowly and underpaid public school teachers will only be an empty shibboleth until Government adopts measures to ameliorate their economic condition and provides them with adequate medical care or the means to afford it. "Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society" (PLDT v. Bucay and NLRC, 164 SCRA 671, 673). By their denial of the petitioner's claim for benefits arising from the death of his wife, the public

respondents ignored this imperative of Government, and thereby committed a grave abuse of discretion. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The respondents Employees Compensation Commission and the Government Service Insurance System are ordered to pay death benefits to the petitioner and/or the dependents of the late Oania Belarmino, with legal rate of interest from the filing of the claim until it is fully paid, plus attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the award, and costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

2 G.R. No. 84307 April 17, 1989 CIRIACO HINOGUIN petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Armed Forces of the Philippines), respondents. Alexander A. Acain for petitioner.

FELICIANO, J.: This Petition for Review is directed against the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission ("ECC") in ECC Case No. 3275 (Ciriaco Hinoguin v. Government Service Insurance System [Armed Forces of the Philippines]) which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") denying petitioner's claim for compensation benefit on account of the death of petitioner's son, Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin The deceased, Sgt. Hinoguin started his military service in 1974, when he was called to military training by the Philippine Army. He later on enlisted in the Philippine Army as a private first class. At the time of his death on 7 August 1985, he was holding the rank of Sergeant per Special Order P-4200, HPA dated 15 October 1985, in "A" company 14th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division, PA. The Headquarters of the 14th Infantry Battalion was located at Bical, Muoz, Nueva Ecija. Sgt. Hinoguin was Detachment Non-Commissioned Officer at Capintalan, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, "A" Company being stationed at Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. On 1 August 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin and two (2) members of his Detachment, Cpl. Rogelio Clavo and Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog, sought permission from Captain Frankie Z. Besas, Commanding

Officer of "A" Company to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, "to settle [an] important matter thereat." 1 Captain Besas orally granted them permission to go to Aritao and to take their issued firearms with them, considering that Aritao was regarded as "a critical place " 2 that is, it had peace and order problems due to the presence of elements of the New People's Army ("NPA!') in or in the vicinity of Aritao. Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog left Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, about noon on 1 August 1985 and arrived in Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, about 1:30 o'clock P.M. on the same day. 3 They proceeded to the home of Dft. Alibuyog's parents where they had lunch. About 4:00 o'clock P.M., the three (3) soldiers with a fourth man, a civilian and relative of Dft. Alibuyog, had some gin and beer, finishing a bottle of gin and two (2) large bottles of beer. Three hours later, at about 7:00 o'clock P.M., the soldiers left the Alibuyog home to return to their Company Headquarters. They boarded a tricycle, presumably a motor-driven one, Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo seating themselves in the tricycle cab while Dft. Alibuyog occupied the seat behind the driver. Upon reaching the poblacion of Aritao, Dft. Alibuyog dismounted, walked towards and in front of the tricycle cab, holding his M-16 rifle in his right hand, not noticing that the rifle's safety lever was on semi automatic (and not on "safety"). He accidentally touched the trigger, firing a single shot in the process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin, then still sitting in the cab, in the left lower abdomen. The Sergeant did not apparently realize immediately that he had been hit; he took three (3) steps forward, cried that he had been hit and fell to the ground. His companions rushed Sgt. Hinoguin to a hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, for treatment. Their Company Commander, Capt. Besas, hurried to the hospital upon being notified of the shooting and there talked with the wounded Sergeant. The latter confirmed to Capt. Besas that he had indeed been accidentally shot by Dft. Alibuyog Sgt. Hinoguin was later moved to the AFP Medical Center in Quezon City and there he died on 7 August 1985. The Death Certificate lists "septic shock" as immediate cause of death, and "generalized septicemia of peritonitis" as antecedent cause, following his sustaining a gunshot wound. An investigation conducted by H.Q., 14th Infantry Battalion on 11 August 1985 concluded that the shooting of Sgt. Hinoguin was "purely accidental in nature." 4 On 19 November 1985, a "Line of Duty Board of Officers" was convened by H.Q. 14th Infantry Battalion, "to determine Line of Duty Status of [the] late Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA, a member of "A" Co., 14IB, 5 ID, PA who died ... due to Gun Shot Wound as a result of an accidental fire (sic) committed by Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog 085-5009 (Inf.) PA ... ." After receiving and deliberating . g on the Investigation Report dated 11 August 1985 together with the sworn statements of witnesses Alibuyog, Clavo and Besas, and after some further questioning of Capt. Besas, the Line of Duty Board reached the following conclusion and recommendation: Sgt. Hinoguin was then the designated Detachment Commander of Capintalan detachment. On or about 011300H August 1985 Dft. Alibuyog invited Sgt.

Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo to his home to celebrate at Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. They asked permission to go on overnight and to allow them to carry their firearms with them because the place where they were going is critical. They were given such permission verbally by their Commanding Officer. The death of Sgt. Hinoguin was purely accidental as the Investigation Report presented here proved beyond reasonable [doubt] the fact that Dft. Alibuyog had no grudge either [against] Cpl. Clavo or Sgt. Hinoguin RECOMMENDATION: The recommendation written by the Chairman and unanimously voted for by the members contain the following: The Board after a thorough deliberation on presented evidences declares that the Death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA is in Line of Duty. The Board recommend farther that all benefits due the legal dependents of the late Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin be given. 5 (Emphasis supplied) Sometime in March 1986, petitioner filed his claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 (as amended), claiming that the death of his son was work-connected and therefore compensable. This was denied 6 by the GSIS on the ground that petitioner's son was not at his work place nor performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army at the time of his death. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Motion was, however, denied by the GSIS. This denial was confirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Commission ("WCC") in a Decision dated 24 May 1988 which stated that: [F]rom the recital of the facts therein [we found it] very difficult for us to perceive where the work-connection of the events that led to appellant's son's death lies. Under the law, death resulting from injury is considered compensable if it arises out of and in the course of employment. Definitely, the death of Hinoguin did not arises out of employment. Clearly, the facts showed that he was not on his place of work nor was he performing official functions. On the contrary, he was on pass and had just came from a merrymaking when accidentally shot by his companion, 7 (Emphasis supplied) The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin is compensable under the applicable statute and regulations. Considering that Sgt. Hinoguin died on 7 August 1985, the applicable law is to be found in Book Four, Title III of the Labor Code, as amended. It may be noted at the outset that under Article 167 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended and Section 4 (b) (1) of Rule I of the Amended

(Implementing) Rules on Employees' Compensation, the term "employee" includes a "member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." Rule XIII entitled "Death", of the Amended (Implementing) Rules provides in part as follows: SECTION 1. Conditions to Entitlement. (a) The beneficiaries of a deceased employee shall be entitled to an income benefit if all of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) The employee had been duly reported to the System; (2) He died as a result of injury or sickness; and (3) The System has been duly notified of his death, as well as the injury or sickness which caused his death. His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such death occurred before the employee is duly reported for coverage of the System. xxx xxx xxx Article 167 (k) of the Labor Code as amended defines a compensable "injury" quite simply as "any harmful change in the human organism from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." The Amended (Implementing) Rules have, however, elaborated considerably on the simple and succinct statutory provision. Rule III, Section 1 (a) reads: SECTION 1. Grounds. (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following grounds: (1) The employee must have been injured at the place work requires him to be; (2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and (3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) It will be seen that because the Amended (Implementing) Rules are intended to apply to all kinds of employment, such rules must be read and applied with reasonable flexibility and comprehensiveness. The concept of a "work place" referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva

Viscaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. We note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They were noton vacation leave. Moreover, they were required or authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably they were to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them while en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the death a compensable one. Turning to the question of whether Sgt. Hinoguin was performing official functions at the time he sustained the gunshot wound, it has already been pointed out above that the Line of Duty Board of Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion Headquarters had already determined that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin had occurred "in line of duty." It may be noted in this connection that a soldier on active duty status is really on 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7 days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status (which Sgt. Hinoguin was not). 'Thus, we think that the work-connected character of Sgt. Hinoguins injury and death was not effectively precluded by the simple circumstance that he was on an overnight pass to go to the home of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier under his own command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not effectively cease performing "official functions" because he was granted a pass. While going to a fellow soldier's home for a few hours for a meal and some drinks was not a specific military duty, he was nonetheless in the course of performance of official functions. Indeed, it appears to us that a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an approved vacation leave. 8 Even vacation leave may, it should be remembered, be preterminated by superior orders. More generally, a soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain risks, for instance, that he will be fired upon by forces hostile to the State or the Government. That is not, of course, the only ask that he is compelled to accept by the very nature of his occupation or profession as a soldier. Most of the persons around him are necessarily also members of the Armed Forces who carry firearms, too. In other words, a soldier must also assume the risk of being accidentally fired upon by his fellow soldiers. This is reasonably regarded as a hazard or risk inherent in his employment as a soldier. We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by an accidental discharge of the M-16 of Dft. Alibuyog, in the circumstances of this case, arose out

of and in the course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and hence compensable. It may be well to add that what we have written above in respect of performance of official functions of members of the Armed Forces must be understood in the context of the specific purpose at hand, that is, the interpretation and application of the compensation provisions of the Labor Code and applicable related regulations. It is commonplace that those provisions should, to the extent possible, be given the interpretation most likely to effectuate the beneficient and humanitarian purposes infusing the Labor Code. ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the GSIS taken through its Claim Review Committee dated 20 November 1986 and the Decision dated 24 May 1988 of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 3275, are hereby REVERSED and the GSIS is hereby DIRECTED to award all applicable benefits in respect of the death of Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin, to petitioner. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 3. G.R. No. 128524 April 20, 1999 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE, respondents.

ROMERO, J May a moonlighting policeman's death be considered compensable? This is the crux of the controversy now at bar. The records 1 disclose that private respondent Felonila Alegre's deceased husband, SPO2 Florencio A.. Alegre, was a police officer assigned to the Philippine National Police station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On that fateful day of December 6, 1994, he was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk Officer of the Police Assistance Center located at said complex, confronted him regarding his tour of duty. SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even directed curse words upon the latter. A verbal tussle then ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting of the deceased police officer.1wphi1.nt On account of her husband's death, private respondent seasonably filed a claim for death benefits with petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to Presidential

Decree No. 626. In its decision on August 7, 1995, the GSIS, however, denied the claim on the ground that at the time of SPO2 Alegre's death, he was performing a personal activity which was not work-connected. Subsequent appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) proved futile as said body, in a decision dated May 9, 1996, merely affirmed the ruling of the GSIS. Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Appeals when on February 28, 1997, the appellate court reversed 2 the ECC's decision and ruled that SPO2 Alegre's death was work-connected and, therefore, compensable. Citing Nitura v. Employees' Compensation Commission 3 and Employees' Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, 4 the appellate court explained the conclusion arrived at thus: [T]he Supreme Court held that the concept of a "workplace" cannot always be literally applied to a person in active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factor or a clerk in a particular fixed office. It is our considered view that, as applied to a peace officer, his work place is not confined to the police precinct or station but to any place where his services, as a lawman, to maintain place and security, are required. At the time of his death, Alegre was driving a tricycle at the northeastern part of the Imelda Commercial Complex where the police assistance center is located. There can be no dispute therefore that he met his death literally in his place of work. It is true that the deceased was driving his tricycle, with passengers aboard, when he was accosted by another police officer. This would lend some semblance of viability to the argument that he was not in the performance of official duty at the time. However, the argument, though initially plausible, overlooks the fact that policemen, by the nature of their functions, are deemed to be on around-the-clock duty. Aggrieved, GSIS comes to us on petition for review on certiorari reiterating its position that SPO2 Alegre's death lacks the requisite element of compensability which is, that the activity being performed at the time of death must be work-connected. We grant the petition. As stated at the outset, the sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether the death of SPO2 Alegre is compensable pursuant to the applicable laws and regulations.

Under the pertinent guidelines of the ECC on compensability, it is provided that "for the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions: (1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; (2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and (3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer. 5 Actually, jurisprudence is rather scant with respect to the above rules' application in the case of police officers. Nevertheless, owing to the similarity of functions, that is, to keep peace and order, and the risks assumed, the Court has treated police officers similar to members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with regard to the compensability of their deaths. Thus, echoing Hinoguin v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 6 a case involving a soldier who was accidentally fired at by a fellow soldier, we held in Employees' Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, 7 that "members of the national police are by the nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day" because "policemen are subject to call at any time and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community." Upon examination of the Court of Appeals' reasoning, we believe that the appellate court committed reversible error in applying the precepts enunciated in the cited cases. While we agree that policemen, like soldiers, are at the beck and call of public duty as peace officers and technically on duty round-the-clock, the same does not justify the grant of compensation benefits for the death of SPO2 Alegre based on the facts disclosed by the records. For clarity, a review of the cases relevant to the matter at hand is in order. In Hinoguin, the deceased Philippine Army soldier, Sgt. Limec Hinoguin, together with two other members of his detachment, sought and were orally granted permission by the commanding officer of their company to leave their station in Carranglan, Nueva Ecija to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya. As they were returning to their headquarters, one of his companions, not knowing that his M-16 rifle was on "semi-automatic" mode, accidentally pulled the trigger and shot Sgt. Hinoguin who then died as a result thereof. Ruling for the grant of death compensation benefits, this Court held: The concept of a "workplace" referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the instant

case, Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. We note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They were not on vacation leave. Moreover, they were required or authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably they were to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them while en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the death a compensable one. Then came the case of Nitura, likewise involving a member of the Philippine Army, Pfc. Regino S. Natura, who was assigned at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. At the time he met his death, he was instructed by his battalion commander to check on several personnel of his command post who were then attending a dance party in Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. But on his way back to the camp, he passed, crossed and fell from hanging wooden bridge which accident caused his death. Reversing the ECC which earlier denied death benefits to the deceased's widow, the Court ruled: A soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the case at bar, Pfc. Nitura's station was at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. But then his presence at the site of the accident was with the permission of his superior officer having been directed to go to Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City: In carrying out said directive, he had to pass by the hanging bridge which connects the two places. As held in the Hinoguin case (supra.), a place where soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. As to the question of whether or not he was performing an official function at the time of the incident, it has been held that a soldier on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day of official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, seven (7) days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status. Thus, a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by going on approved vacation leave.

The more recent case which was cited by the appellate court in support of its decision is Employees'Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals. This time, the claim for death compensation benefits was made in behalf of a deceased police officer, P/Sgt. Wilfredo Alvaran, who, at the time of his death, was a member of the Mandaluyong Police Station but assigned to the Pasig Provincial Jail. Findings showed that the deceased brought his son to the Mandaluyong Police Station for interview because the latter was involved in a stabbing incident. While in front of the said station, the deceased was approached by another policeman and shot him to death. Both the GSIS and the ECC denied the claim by the deceased's widow on the ground that Sgt. Alvaran was plainly acting as a father to his son and that he was in a place where he was not required to be. The Court of Appeals reversed said denial which decision was affirmed by this Court, declaring that: But for clarity's sake and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold that members of the national police, like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are by the nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day. Except when they are on vacation leave, policemen are subject to call at anytime and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community. xxx xxx xxx We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under P.D. No. 626, as amended, policemen should be treated in the same manner as soldiers. While it is true that, "geographically" speaking, P/Sgt Alvaran was not actually at his assigned post at the Pasig Provincial Jail when he was attacked and killed, it could not also be denied that in bringing his son as a suspect in a case to the police station for questioning to shed light on a stabbing incident, he was not merely acting as father but as a peace officer. From the foregoing cases, it can be gleaned that the Court did not justify its grant of death benefits merely on account of the rule that soldiers or policemen, as the case may be, are virtually working round-the-clock. Note that the Court likewise attempted in each case to find a reasonable nexus between the absence of the deceased from his assigned place of work and the incident that led to his death. In Hinoguin, the connection between his absence from the camp where he was assigned and the place where he was accidentally shot was the permission duly given to him and his companions by the camp commander to go on overnight pass. According to the Court, "a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer" and hence, the deceased is to be considered as still in the performance of his official functions.

The same thing can be sad of Nitura where the deceased had to go outside of his station on permission and directive by his superior officer to check on several personnel of his command who were then attending a dance party. As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in the Employees' Compensation Commission case, although he was not given any directive or permission by a superior officer to be at the Mandaluyong Police Station, his presence there was nonetheless justified by the peacekeeping nature of the matter he was attending to at the time that he was attacked and shot to death, that is, bringing his son to the police station to answer for a crime, a basic duty which any policeman is expected and ought to perform. Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre's widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of the act attended to by the policeman at the time he died even without the explicit permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one pointing out that he had already complied with the duty detail. 8 At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42003 dated February 28, 1997, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.1wphi1.nt No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

4. G.R. No. 136200

June 8, 2000

CELERINO VALERIANO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.: To be compensable, an injury must have resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. It must be shown that it was sustained within the scope of employment while the claimant was performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto or while following the orders of a superior. Indeed, the standard of "work connection" must be satisfied even by one who invokes the 24-hour-duty doctrine; otherwise, the claim for compensability must be denied. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the January 30, 1998 Court of Appeals1 (CA) Decision,2as well as the September 25, 1998 Resolution3 in CA-GR SP No. 31141. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:4 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission dated April 1, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. The September 25, 1998 Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The facts The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are summarized in the assailed Decision as follows:5 Celerino S. Valeriano was employed as a fire truck driver assigned at the San Juan Fire Station. Sometime on the evening of July 3, 1985, petitioner was standing along Santolan Road, Quezon City, when he met a friend by the name of Alexander Agawin. They decided to proceed to Bonanza Restaurant in EDSA, Quezon City, for dinner. On their way home at around 9:30 PM, the owner-type jeepney they were riding in figured in a head-on collision with another vehicle at the intersection of N. Domingo and Broadway streets in Quezon City. Due to the strong impact of the collision, petitioner was thrown out of the vehicle and was severely injured. As a result of the mishap, petitioner was brought to several hospitals for treatment. On September 16, 1985, he filed a claim for income benefits under PD 626, with the Government Security Insurance Service. His claim for benefits was opposed on the

ground that the injuries he sustained did not directly arise or result from the nature of his work. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial by the System but the same was turned down on the ground that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied. Petitioner then interposed an appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC for short). In a decision dated April 1, 1993, the ECC ruled against herein appellant, the pertinent portions of which are stated in the following wise: After a study of the records of the case under consideration, we find the decision of the respondent System denying appellant's claim in order. Under the present compensation law, injury and the resulting disability or death is compensable if the injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. It means that the injury or death must be sustained while the employee is in the performance of his official duty; that the injury is sustained at the place where his work requires him to be; and if the injury is sustained elsewhere, that the employee is executing an order for the employer. The aforementioned conditions are found wanting in the instant case. The accident that the appellant met in the instant case occurred outside of his time and place of work. Neither was appellant performing his official duties as a fireman at the time of the accident. In fact, appellant just left the Bonanza Restaurant where he and his friends had dinner. Apparently, the injuries appellant sustained from the accident did not arise out of [and] in the course of his employment. Considering therefore the absence of a causal link between the contingency for which income benefits [are] being claimed and his occupation as fireman, his claim under PD 626, as amended, cannot be given due course. The CA Ruling The Court of Appeals agreed with the finding of the Employees' Compensation Commission that petitioner's injuries and disability were not compensable, emphasizing that they were not work-connected. Turning to the case before us, the evidence on record shows that herein petitioner was injured not at the place where his work required him to be. Neither was he executing an order from his superior, nor performing his official functions at the time of the accident. It must be recalled that at the time of the accident, petitioner was already dismissed from his regular 8-hour daily work. He was walking along Santolan Road when he met his friend and they decided to go to Bonanza Restaurant for dinner. Notwithstanding his claim that he can be called to report for work anytime in case there is a fire, or that his position is akin to that of a military man, a contention we cannot support, still the circumstances leading to the accident in which he was injured reveals that there is no causative connection between the injury he sustained and his work. Petitioner's invocation of the ruling in Hinoguin vs. ECC, 172 SCRA 350 is misplaced. In that case,

petitioner Sgt. Hinoguin was a member of the Armed Forces and soldiers are presumed to be on official duty 24 hours a day. In the case at bar, petitioner is a fireman with a specific tour of duty. To sustain petitioner's contention of compensability would, in effect, make the employer, in this case the State, the insurer against all perils. That is not the intendment of our lawmakers in enacting the Workmen's Compensation Act. 6 Hence, this Petition.7 The Issues In his Petition,8 Petitioner Celerino Valeriano urges the Court to resolve the following questions: I WHETHER PETITIONER'S INJURIES ARE WORK-CONNECTED. II WHETHER PETITIONER FIREMAN, LIKE SOLDIERS, CAN BE PRESUMED TO BE ON 24HOUR DUTY.9 These questions point to the sole issue of the compensability of Petitioner Valeriano's injuries and resulting disability. The Court's Ruling We find no merit in the Petition. Main Issue: Compensability of Valeriano's Injuries and Resulting Disability Disability benefits are granted an employee who sustains an injury or contracts a sickness resulting in temporary total, permanent total, or permanent partial, disability. 10 For the injury and the resulting disability to be compensable, they must have necessarily resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. 11 Were Petitioner's Injuries Work-Connected?

Citing Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 12 the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's claim on the ground that he had not been injured at his work place, executing an order of his superior, or performing official functions when he met the accident. We agree. In Iloilo, the Court explained the phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment" in this wise: The two components of the coverage formula "arising out of" and "in the course of employment" are said to be separate tests which must be independently satisfied; however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "work-connection, because an uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries. The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably . . . be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.13 Thus, for injury to be compensable, the standard of "work connection" must be substantially satisfied. The injury and the resulting disability sustained by reason of employment are compensable regardless of the place where the injured occurred, if it can be proven that at the time of the injury, the employee was acting within the purview of his or her employment and performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto. 14 Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a firetruck driver was related to the injuries he had suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal and social function having dinner with some friends is clear from the records of the case. His injuries were not acquired at his work place; nor were they sustained while he was performing an act within the scope of his employment or in pursuit of an order of his superior. Thus, we agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court that his injuries and consequent disability were not work-connected and thus not compensable. Applicability of Hinoguin and Nitura Petitioner debunks the importance given by the appellate court to the fact that he was not at his work place and had in fact been dismissed for the day when he met the accident. He

argues that his claim for disability benefits is anchored on the proposition that the exigency of his job as a fireman requires a constant observance of his duties as such; thus, he should be considered to have been "on call" when he met the accident. He underscores the applicability of Hinoguin v. ECC 15 and Nitura v. ECC 16 to his case. In Hinoguin and Nitura, the Court granted death compensation benefits to the heirs of Sgt. Limec Hinoguin and Pfc. Regino Nitura, both members of the Philippine Army. After having gone elsewhere on an overnight pass, Sgt. Hinoguin was accidentally shot by a fellow soldier during the former's return trip to their headquarters. Pfc. Nitura, on the other hand, died after falling from a bridge during his trip back to his camp. At the time of his death, he had just accomplished his commander's instruction to check on several personnel of his command post who were then at a dance party. Both cases espoused the position that the concept of "work place" cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status who, to all intents and purposes, is on a 24-hour official duty status, subject to military discipline and law and at the beck and call of his superior officers at all times, except when he is on vacation leave status. 17 This ratiocination, later applied to police officers in Employees' Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, 18was dissected in the more recent GSIS v. Court of Appeals. 19 In the latter case, the deceased police officer, SPO2 Florencio Alegre, was moonlighting as a tricycle driver at the time of his death. The Court reviewed Hinoguin, Nitura and ECC and noted that in each case death benefits were granted, not just because of the principle that soldiers or policemen were virtually working round the clock. More important, there was a finding of a reasonable nexus between the absence of the deceased from his assigned place of work and the incident causing his death. The Court explained: In Hinoguin, the connection between his absence from the camp where he was assigned and the place where he was accidentally shot was the permission duly given to him and his companions by the camp commander to go on overnight pass. According to the Court, "a place [where] soldiers have secured lawful permission cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer" and hence, the deceased is to be considered as still in the performance of his official functions. The same thing can be said of Nitura where the deceased had to go outside of his station on permission and directive by his superior officer to check on several personnel of his command who were then attending a dance party. As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in the Employees' Compensation Commission case, although he was not given any directive or permission by a superior officer to be at the Mandaluyong Police Station, his presence there was nonetheless justified by the peacekeeping nature of the matter he was attending to at the time . . . he was attacked

and shot to death, that is, [while] bringing his son to the police station to answer for a crime [] a basic duty which any policeman is expected and ought to perform. 20 Ruling that the death of SPO2 Alegre was not compensable, the Court pointed out that the 24hour-duty doctrine should not embrace all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer, but only those that can be categorized as police service in character. It further held: Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre's widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peace-keeping nature of the act attended to by the policeman at the time he died even without the explicit permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he may be called upon at anytime to render police work as he is considered to be on around-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at[,] considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one[,] pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail. At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than [as] a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character. 21 We recognize the importance and laud the efforts of firemen in our society. Indeed, the nature of their job requires them to be always on alert, like soldiers and police officers, and to respond to fire alarms which may occur anytime of the day. Be that as it may, the circumstances in the present case do not call for the application of Hinoguin and Nitura. Following the rationalization in GSIS, the 24-hour-duty doctrine cannot be applied to petitioner's case, because he was neither at his assigned work place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he met an accident. But the more important justification for the Court's stance is that he was not doing an act within his duty and authority as a firetruck

driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his injuries. We cannot find any reasonable connection between his injuries and his work as a firetruck driver. While we sympathize with petitioner's plight, we cannot grant his Petition.1awphi1 True, the policy is to extend the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 626 to as many qualified employees as possible, 22 but this must be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for compensation. 23 Considering the circumstances in petitioner's case, he cannot be deemed qualified for disability benefits under the law. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

5. G.R. No. L-26341 November 27, 1968

ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO, for herself and in behalf of her minor children EDWIN, EDGAR and EDNA, all surnamed PABLO, respondents. Luisito C. Hofilena for petitioner. Villavieja and Villanueva for respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission. Gualberto C. Opong for respondent Irenea M. Pablo and her minor children. CASTRO, J.: This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter referred to as the IDECO) from the decision dated February 28, 1966 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) affirming the decision of the Regional Office VII in Iloilo City, and ordering the IDECO to pay to the widow and children of Teodoro G. Pablo (Irenea M. Pablo and the minors Edwin, Edgar and Edna, all surnamed Pablo) the sum of P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as reimbursement for burial expenses and P300 as attorney's fees, and to pay to the Commission the amount of P46 as fees pursuant to section 55 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended. At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way home, was shot to death in front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard to say anything before or after the

killing. The motive for the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo's death. At the time of the killing, Pablo's companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like Pablo, had finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo was killed, there were four "carinderias" on the left side of the road and two "carinderias" and a residential house on the right side. The entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the record. According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death occurred in the course of employment and in presuming that it arose out of the employment; (2) in applying the "proximity rule;" and (3) in holding that Pablo's death was an accident within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The principal issue is whether Pablo's death comes within the meaning and intendment of that "deceptively simple and litigiously prolific",1 phrase The two components of the coverage formula "arising out of" and "in the course of employment."2 The two components of the coverage formula "arising out of" and "in the course of employment" are said to be separate tests which must be independently satisfied;3 however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "work-connection," because an uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly workconnected injuries.4 The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place.5 As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.6 The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the "going & coming rule," simply stated, is that "in the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in, going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen's compensation acts."7 This rule, however, admits of four well-recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer; (2) where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer by way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress; (3) where the employee is charged, while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home, or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected with his employment; and (4) where the employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment.8

We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the second exception, i.e., injuries sustained off the premises of the employer, but while using a customary means of ingress and egress. This exception, known as the "proximity rule," was applied in Philippine Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil.9There, the employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while proceeding to his place of work and running to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch fronting the main gate of the employer's factory, as a result of which he died the next day. The sole question was whether or not the accident which caused the employee's death arose out of and in the course of his employment. This Court ruled in favor of the claimant thus: The very case of Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the petitioner intimated that "we do not of course mean to imply that an employee can never recover for injuries suffered while on his way to or from work. That depends on the nature of his employment." Considering the facts found by the Commission, namely, that the deceased Angel Ariar was not under any shift routine; that his assignment covered the entire working hours of the factory; that the first working hour starts at 6:00 o'clock in the morning; that it takes at least thirty minutes before the machine operates at full speed or load; that the spot where he fell (ditch fronting petitioner's factory or sidewalk of its premises), is immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof. In Salilig vs. Insular Lumber Co., G.R. No. 28951, September 10, 1928, referred to in the Comments on the Workmen's Compensation Commission Act by Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition, compensation was allowed for injury received by a laborer from an accident in going to his place of work, along a path or way owned by his employer and commonly used by the latter's laborers. In contrast is Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz,10 which concerned injuries sustained by a centrifugal operator. He had reported for work at 9:30 p.m. (March 7, 1958) and was dismissed at 5:30 the following morning. Soon "after he stepped out of the company gate, and while standing about 2- meters from it between the shoulder of the highway and a railroad that came from inside the compound and intersected the highway, waiting for a ride home, he was bumped by a jeepney, as a result of which he sustained" injuries. In holding that these injuries were "not produced by an accident "arising out of and in the course of employment," " this Court reasoned thus: The compensability of an injury suffered by an employee proceeding to or coming from his work depends upon whether or not it is "work-connected." As Chief Justice Kenison of New Hampshire has put it, "the fact that the employee is travelling to or from work on a public highway does not necessarily exclude coverage (Brousseau vs. Blackstone Mills, 130 A 2d 543, 545). Conversely, it is not enough to say that the employee would not have been on the public highway had it not been for his job, since the same can

usually be said of the general public (Payne & Dolan vs. Industrial Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The law, in effect, insures the employee against losses arising from the perils of his work. In other words, the Workmen's Compensation Act covers occupational injuries, which, as such, must have a causative connection with something, not merely in common with the public, but peculiar to the employment. In order to warrant recovery for off-the-premises injuries, it must be shown that there has been a very special danger, some particular risk whichthe employer could have caused or allowed to exist. Hence, It is significant that practically all successful off-the-premises cases have involved normal route of access to the plant, or an icy sidewalk adjacent to the premises and therefore identified with the premises in the sense that the employer should have removed the ice. (Emphasis ours.) It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L-8130 (June 30, 1956), we held the employer liable for an injury sustained by an employee who, as he was running to his place of work to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch in front of the factory's main gate and near the same. The ditch was, however, in itself an obvious hazard which, owing to its proximity to the gate, the employer should have taken measures to remove. Thus, thru his inaction, he had contributed, in a special way, to the occurrence of the accident. In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to exist. There is no particular causative connection between the injury sustained by the employee and either his work or his employer. Although, as stated in the decision appealed from, the record does not show that the company "had taken measures to make the waiting place safe for the employees," neither does the record show either that the accident occurred at the usual waiting place of the employees, or that said place was particularly unsafe. Our Workmen's Compensation Act being essentially American in origin and text, it is not amiss to pay deference to pertinent American jurisprudence. In the precise area of law here involved, we can draw guidance from an affluence of Federal and State precedents. From Samuel B. Horovitz' Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Laws (1944), pp. 159 to 165, we glean the following observations: Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to work or on the way home from work. Injuries going to or from work have caused many judicial upheavals. The question here is limited to whether the injuries are "in the course of" and not "out of" the employment. How the injury occurred is not in point. Street risks, whether the employee was walking or driving, and all other similar questions deal with the risk of

injury or "out of" the employment. "In the course of" deals mainly with the element of time and space, or "time, place and circumstances." Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working hours and within one hundred feet of the employer's premises, on sidewalks or public roads, the question of "in the course of" the employment is flatly raised. Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of "in the course of" to include these injuries. Most of the states will protect the employee from the moment his foot or person reaches the employer's premises, whether he arrives early or late. These states find something sacred about the employment premises and define "premises" very broadly, not only to include premises owned by the employer, but also premises leased, hired, supplied or used by him, even private alleyways merely used by the employer. Adjacent private premises are protected by many states, and a few protect the employee even on adjacent public sidewalks and streets. Where a city or any employer owns or controls an island, all its streets are protected premises. There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that it will not overturn any state decision that so enlarges the scope of its act. Hence, a deaf worker, trespassing on railroad tracks adjacent to his employer's brick-making premises (but shown by his superintendent the specific short crossing over the track), and killed by a train, was held to be in the course of his employment when hit by an oncoming train fifteen minutes before his day would have begun. So long as causal relation to the employment is discernible, no federal question arises. The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he crosses the employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. Off-premises injuries to or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the employer's street car) or private conveyance; (2) if the employee is subject to call at all hours or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is travelling for the employer, i.e., travelling workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employee's time from the moment he leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the employee is on his way to do further work at home, even though on a fixed salary; (6) where the employee is required to bring his automobile to his place of business for use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally justified, dependent on their own peculiar circumstances. Schneider (supra, at p. 117) makes this significant statement:

The proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an employee is generally considered to be in the course of his employment while coming to or going from his work, when, though off the actual premises of his employer, he is still in close proximity thereto, is proceeding diligently at an appropriate time, by reasonable means, over the natural, practical, customary, convenient and recognized way of ingress, or egress either on land under the control of the employer, or on adjacent property with the express or implied consent of the employer. On pp. 98 to 99 of 85 ALR, we find the following disquisition: The compensation acts have been very generally held not to authorize an award in case of an injury or death from a peril which is common to all mankind, or to which the public at large is exposed. 28 R.C. L. 804. And they do not as a general rule cover injuries received while going to or from work on public streets, where the employee has not reached, or has left the employer's premises. The question whether an injury arises out of and in the course of the employment, however, is one dependent upon the facts of each case, and in some cases, where an injury occured while the employee was going to or from work, but was in the street in front of the employer's premises, it has been held compensable. Thus, in the reported case (Barnett v. Brtiling Cafeteria Co., ante, 85) the injury was held to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, where the employee slipped on ice on the sidewalk immediately in front of the employer's place of business, while on her way to report for duty, and just before entering by the only entrance to her place of employment. The court here recognized the general rule that, if an employee is injured while going to or from his work to his house, or to or from some point not visited for the discharge of a duty arising out of the employment, or while in the use of a public highway, he does not come within the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but stated that there is an exception to this rule and that the employment is not limited by the actual time when the workman reaches the scene of his labor and begins it, or when he ceases, but includes a reasonable time and opportunity before and after, while he is at or near his place of employment. The court reasoned that in the case at bar, although the employee had not entered the employer's place of business, and the sidewalk was a public highway so much therefore as was in front of the employer's place of business was a necessary adjunct, used in connection with the business, and that the sidewalk was to a limited degree and purpose a part of the employer's premises. In Industrial Commission v. Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159 NE 363, the injury was held to have arisen in the course of the employment where an employee, about five minutes before the hour when he was to go on duty, was struck by an automobile owned and driven by another employee, within a short distance from the employer's

plant, which was located at the dead end of a street maintained by the employer from its plant to the intersection with another street, and, although the street was a public one, it led nowhere except to the employer's plant, and all of its employees were obliged to use it in going to and from their work. The court stated that where the conditions under the control of an industrial plant are such that the employee has no option but to pursue a given course with reference to such conditions and environments, the pursuance of such course is an implied obligation of the employer in his contract with such employee, and that when he, for the purpose of entering his employment, has entered into the sphere or zone controlled by his employer and is pursuing a course with reference to which he has no option, he is then not only within the conditions and environments of the plant of his employer, but is then in the course of his employment; and that, when he receives an injury attributable to such conditions and environments, there is a direct causal connection between his employment and his injury, and the injury falls within the class of industrial injuries for which compensation has been provided by the Workmen's Compensation Law. 99 C.J.S., at pp. 807-814, has this to say: It is laid down as a general rule, known as the "going and coming" rule, that, in the absence of special circumstances, and except in certain unusual circumstances, and where nothing else appears, harm or injury sustained by an employee while going to or from his work is not compensable. Such injury, or accident, is regarded by the weight of authority of many courts as not arising out of his employment, and as not being, or not occurring, in the course thereof. However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable application, and is subject to qualifications, and to exceptions which depend on the nature, circumstances, and conditions of the particular employment, the circumstances of the particular case, and the cause of the injury. Jaynes vs. Potlach Forests11 expresses with enlightening clarity the rationale for extending the scope of "course of employment" to certain "off-premises" injuries: We are urged here to again recognize and apply the distinction between off-premises injuries which occur on private property and those which occur on public streets and highways. The extension of the course of employment to off-premises injuries is not based upon the principle which would justify a distinction upon the narrow ground of private and public property; it is not sound to say that while an employee is on public highway he is always there as a member of the public and in nowise in the exercise of any right conferred by his contract to employment; nor is it a complete answer to say that while he is on his employer's premises his presence there is by contract right, otherwise he would be a trespasser. The question of whether or not one is a covered

employee should not be resolved by the application of the law relating to rights to enter upon lands, or by law of trespass, licensee, invitee or otherwise. A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the course of employment beyond the premises of the employer is to extend its scope to the necessary risks and hazards associated with the employment. These risks may or may not be on the premises of the employer and for this reason there is no justification to distinguish between extended risks on public highways and private pathways. In fact it is at most a distinction without a difference. Under the better reasoned cases the technical status as public or private is obviously of no moment or in any event in and of itself is not conclusive. Likewise enlightening is the following explanation of the premises rule exceptions: We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to the premises rule: it is not nearness, or reasonable distance, or even the identifying or surrounding areas with the premises; it is simply that, when a court has satisfied itself that there is a distinct "arising out of" or causal connection between the conditions under which claimant must approach and leave the premises and the occurrence of the injury, it may hold that the course of employment extends as far as those conditions extend. (Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, 1965 ed., vol. 1, pp. 210-211) We now direct our attention to the cause of the employee's death: assault. An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an "accident" within the meaning of sec. 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, since the word "accident" is intended to indicate that "the act causing the injury shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally responsible."12 In the cases where the assault was proven to have been work-connected, compensation was awarded. In Nava, supra, the helmsman of a boat was engaged in hauling the ship's cable and in coiling the cable partly occupied by a folding bed of one of the passengers. This passenger, upon being asked, declared his ownership of the bed. Nava expressed his intention of pushing it out of the way and proceeded to do so. Angered by this, the passenger exchanged hot words with Nava, and then, with a piece of wood, jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach. At this point, the passenger's brother ran up to Nava and stabbed him to death. The death was adjudged compensable. In Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Vda. de Mandaguit,13 the truck which Mandaguit was driving collided with a cyclist going in the opposite direction. The latter turned around and immediately pursued the bus. He overtook it a few minutes later when it stopped to take on passengers. The driver then disembarked from the bus to wash his hands at a drugstore

nearby. The cyclist followed him there and knifed him to death. We affirmed the grant of compensation upon the finding that the death arose out of and in the course of employment. In Galicia vs. Dy Pac,14 the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to work in lieu of another employee who had been suspended from work upon request of his labor union; while Carla was working, the suspended employee asked him to intercede for him, but Carla refused; an altercation resulted; shortly thereafter the suspended employee stabbed Carla to death. The death was held compensable because "the injury sustained by the deceased was caused by an accident arising out of his employment since the evidence is clear that the fight which resulted in the killing of the deceased had its origin or cause in the fact that he was placed in the job previously occupied by the assailant." In the three cases above-cited, there was evidence as to the motive of the assailant. In A. P. Santos, Inc. vs. Dabacol,15 the death of an employee-driver who, while driving a cab, was killed by an unidentified passenger, was held compensable by the Commission. However, the question of whether the assault arose out of the employment, was not raised on appeal to this Court. In Batangas Transportation Company vs. Vda. de Rivera,16 that question was raised. While the employee-driver was driving a bus, a passenger boarded it and sat directly behind the driver. After about thirty minutes, during which the passenger and the driver never so much as exchanged a word, the passenger shot the driver to death and then fled. There was no competent proof as to the cause of the assault, although there were intimations that the incident arose from a personal grudge. The majority decision17 ruled the death compensable. The bases: (1) Once it is proved that the employee died in the course of the employment, the legal presumption, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, is that the claim "comes within the provisions of the compensation law" (sec. 43), in other words, that the incident arose out of the workman's employment. (2) Doubts as to rights to compensation are resolved in favor of the employee and his dependents. (3) The Commissioner's declaration on the work-connection might be binding on the Court. (4) There are employments which increase the risk of assault on the person of the employee and it is in that sense that an injury or harm sustained by the assaulted worker arises out of the employment, because the increased risk to assault supplies the link or connection between the injury and the employment. Among the jobs enumerated as increasing the risk of assault are (a) jobs having to do with keeping the peace or guarding property; (b) jobs having to do with keeping or carrying of money which subject to the employee to the risk of assault because of the increased temptation to robbery; (c) jobs which expose the employee to direct contact with lawless and irresponsible members of the community, like that of a bartender; and (d) work as bus driver, taxi driver or street car conductor. It has been said that an employment may either increase risk of assault because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault. The first kind of employment, the

so-called "increased risk" jobs comprehend (1) jobs involving dangerous duties, such as that of guarding the employer's property, that of carrying or keeping money, that where the employee is exposed to lawless or irresponsible members of the public, or that which subjects him to increased or indiscriminate contact with the public, such as the job of a street car conductor or taxi-driver;18 (2) jobs where the employee is placed in a dangerous environment;19 and (3) jobs of employees whose work takes them on the highway. On the other hand, the employment itself may be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault as where a supervisor is assaulted by workmen he has fired, or where the argument was over the performance of work or possession of tools or the like, or where the violence was due to labor disputes.20 In Rivera, supra, the unexplained assault on the employee was considered to have arisen out of the employment because it occurred in the course of employment. This Court relied on the presumption of law that in any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the claim is presumed to come within the provisions of the Act.21According to this Court, "this statutory presumption was copied from New York." Concerning the corresponding New York provision of law, Larson has this to say: In a few jurisdictions, notably New York and Massachusetts, a statutory presumption in favor of coverage has figured in unexplained-accident cases. The Massachusetts statute provides: In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed, or is physically or mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter, that sufficient notice of the injury has been given, and that the injury or death was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another. This provision was largely copied from the New York section on presumptions, except that the New York act creates the presumption in all cases, not merely those involving an employee's death or inability to testify. The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at first glance to mean that the mere making of a claim is also the making of a prima facie case, as long as death or injury is shown to have occurred. The New York and Massachusetts courts have not so interpreted these statutes, however. It seems to be necessary to establish some kind of preliminary link with the employment before the presumption can attach. Otherwise, the claimant widow would have merely to say, "My husband, who was one of your employee, has died, and I therefore claim death benefits," whereupon the affirmative burden would devolve upon the employer to prove that there was no connection between the death and the environment.

It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of employment-connection will give the presumption a foothold. Apparently, the idea is to rule out cases in which claimant can show neither that the injury occurred in the course of employment nor that it arose out of it, as where he contracted a disease but has no evidence to show where he got it. If there is evidence that the injury occurred in the course of employment, the presumption will usually supply the "arising-out-of-employment" factor." Larson's Workmen Compensation Law (1965) vol. 1, pp. 123-124. We also quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Daus vs. Gunderman & Sons:22 The statute is not intended to relieve completely an employee from the burden of showing that accidental injuries suffered by him actually were sustained in the course of his employment. "It is not the law that mere proof of an accident, without other evidence, creates the presumption under section 21 of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Law, c. 67) that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. On the contrary, it has been frequently held, directly and indirectly, that there must be some evidence from which the conclusion can be drawn that the injuries did arise out of and in the course of the employment." Proof of the accident will give rise to the statutory presumption only where some connection appears between the accident and the employment. Likewise of relevance is the following treatise: The discussion of the coverage formula, "arising out of and in the course of employment," was opened with the suggestion that, while "course" and "arising" were put under separate headings for convenience, some interplay between the two factors should be observed in the various categories discussed. A few examples may now be reviewed to show that the two tests, in practice, have not been kept in air-tight compartments, but have to some extent merged into a single concept of work-connection. One is almost tempted to formulate a sort of quantum theory of work-connection: that a certain minimum quantum of work-connection must be shown, and if the "course" quantity is very small, but the "arising" quantity is large, the quantum will add up to the necessary minimum, as it will also when the "arising" quantity is very small but the "course" quantity is relatively large. But if both the "course" and "arising" quantities are small, the minimum quantum will not be met. As an example of the first, a strong "arising" factor but weak "course" factor, one may cite the cases in which recoveries have been allowed off the employment premises, outside business hours, when an employee going to or coming from work is injured by a

hazard distinctly traceable to the employment, such as a traffic jam overflowing from the employment premises, or a rock flying through the air from a blast on the premises. Here, by normal course of employment standards, there would be no award, since the employee was not on the premises while coming or going. Yet the unmistakable character of the causal relation of the injury to the employment has been sufficient to make up for the weakness of the "course" factor. Another example of the same kind of balancing-out is seen in the line of cases dealing with injury to travelling men or loggers while sleeping in hotels or bunkhouses. It was shown in the analysis of these cases that, although the "course" factor is on the borderline when the employee is sound asleep at the time of injury, a strong causal relation of the injury to the conditions of employment as where a fellow-logger runs amok, or a straw falls into the bunkhouse-inmate's throat from the mattress above, or the employee is trapped in a burning hotel will boost the case over the line to success; while a weak causal connection, as where the salesman merely slips in a hotel bath, coupled with a weak "course" factor due to the absence of any direct service performed for the employer at the time, will under present decisions add up to a quantum of work-connection too small to support an award. It was also shown that when the "course" element is strengthened by the fact that the employee is at all times on call, the range of compensable sources of injury is broader than when the employee, although living on the premises is not on call. A somewhat similar balancing-out process is seen in the holding that a borderline course-of-employment activity like seeking personal comfort or going to and from work falls short of compensability if the method adopted is unusual, unreasonable and dangerous, while no such restriction applies to the direct performance of the work. As an example of the reverse situation, a strong "course" element and a weak "arising" element; one may recall the "positional" cases discussed in section 10, as well as the unexplained-fall and other "neutral-cause" cases. Here the course of employment test is satisfied beyond the slightest doubt: the employee is in the midst of performing the active duties of his job. But the causal connection is very weak, since the source of the injury whether a stray bullet, a wandering lunatic, and unexplained fall or death, or a mistaken assault by a stranger is not distinctly associated with employment conditions as such, and is tied to the employment only by the argument that the injury would not have occurred to this employee but for the obligation of the employment which placed him in the position to be hurt. Yet, since the "course" element is so strong, awards are becoming increasingly common on these facts. Incidentally, it may be observed that this "quantum" idea forms a useful yardstick for measuring just how generous a court has become in expanding compensation coverage; for if a court makes an award when a case, by the above standards, is weak both on course of employment and on causal connection, one can conclude that the court is capable of giving the act a broad construction. Thus, an award was made in Puffin v.

General Electric, where the course element was weak (rest period) and the causal element was weak (setting fire to own sweater while smoking). Both factors were likewise very weak in O'Leary v. Brown Pacific-Maxon Inc., where the course of employment consisted of a recreation period interrupted by a rescue of a stranger, and the arising factor consisted of drowning in a channel where decedent was prohibited from going. And, in Martin v. Plaut, the course of employment factor was weak (a cook dressing in the morning) and the causal factor was also weak (an unexplained fall); yet an award was made in New York. But another New York case shows that the simultaneous weakness of course and arising factors may reach the point where the requisite quantum is not found. In Shultz v. Nation Associates, compensation was denied to an employee who while combing her hair preparatory to going to lunch negligently struck her eye with the comb. Here we see thinness on all fronts: as to course of employment time factor, we have a lunch period; as to the course of employment activity factor, we have care of personal appearance; and as to the causal factor, we have negligence of the employee. Each weakness standing alone lunch period, care of appearance, negligence would not be fatal; there are many awards in which one or another of these is present. But when all are present, while an award is not impossible and could be defended on a point by point basis, it cannot be relied upon in most jurisdictions by the prudent lawyer. Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law 1965 ed. Vol. 1, pp. 452.97 to 452.100. In resume: 1. Workmen's compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which arise out of and in the course of employment. 2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be present. If one factor is weak and the other is strong, the injury is compensable, but not where both factors are weak. Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work-connected. 3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is presumed to come within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a preliminary link must first be shown to exist between the injury and the employment. Thus if the injury occurred in the course of employment, it is presumed to have arisen out of the employment. 4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is present if the injury takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto. 5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes from his place of work, is not of the employment.

6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the employee's premises, but while in close proximity thereto and while using a customary means of ingress and egress. The reason for extending the scope of "course of employment" to off-premises injuries is that there is a causal connection between the work and the hazard. 7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The employment may either increase risk of assault because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault. From the milestones, we now proceed to take our bearings in the case at bar, having in mind always that no cover-all formula can be spelled out with specificity, that the particular facts and circumstances of each case must be inquired into, and that in any perceptive inquiry, the question as to where the line should be drawn beyond which the liability of the employer cannot continue has been held to be usually one of fact. We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where Pablo was killed. In granting compensation, the Commission said that "the road where the deceased was shot was of private ownership, was called the IDECO road, and led straight to the main IDECO gate, thus raising the reasonable assumption that it belonged" to the IDECO. The Commission reasoned out that "even if the ownership of the road were open to question, there was no doubt that its private character was obviously exploited by the respondent for the purpose of its own business to such an extent as to make it to all intents and purposes an extension of its premises," so that the "shooting of the deceased may be considered to have taken place on the premises, and therefore within the employment;" and that "while respondent allowed its name to be used in connection with the private road for the ingress and egress of the employees it did not apparently take the necessary precaution to make it safe for its employees by employing security guards." But the IDECO denies ownership of the road. In its memorandum filed with the Regional Office, IDECO averred that Pablo's death did not originate from his work as to time, place and circumstances. This, in effect, is a denial of ownership of the road. The decision of the Regional Office does not state that the road belongs to the IDECO. All that it says is that Pablo was shot "barely two minutes after he was dismissed from work and while walking along the IDECO road about twenty (20) meters from the gate." In its "motion for reconsideration and/or review," the IDECO emphasized that "the place where the incident happened was a public road, not less than twenty (20) meters away from the main gate of the compound, and therefore not proximate to or in the immediate vicinity of the place of work." Again, the ownership of the road was implicitly denied. And in its "motion for reconsideration and/or appeal to the Commission en banc," the IDECO alleged outright that the "road where the incident took place, although of private ownership, does not belong to IDECO. There is absolutely no evidence on record that shows IDECO owns the road." If the road were owned by the IDECO, there would have been no question that the assault arose "in the course of

employment."23 But if it did indeed own the road, then the IDECO would have fenced it, and place its main gate at the other end of the road where it meets the public highway. But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was using the same as the principal means of ingress and egress. The private road leads directly to its main gate.24 Its right to use the road must then perforce proceed from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right, therefore, is either a legal one or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and properly be charged with security control of the road. The IDECO owed its employees a safe passage to its premises. In compliance with such duty, the IDECO should have seen to it not only that road was properly paved and did not have holes or ditches, but should also have instituted measures for the proper policing of the immediate area. The point where Pablo was shot was barely twenty meters away from the main IDECO gate, certainly nearer than a stone's throw therefrom. The spot is immediately proximate to the IDECO's premises. Considering this fact, and the further facts that Pablo had just finished overtime work at the time, and was killed barely two minutes after dismissal from work, the Ampil case is squarely applicable here. We may say, as we did in Ampil, that the place where the employee was injured being "immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof." Our principal question is whether the injury was sustained in the course of employment. We find that it was, and so conclude that the assault arose out of the employment, even though the said assault is unexplained. American jurisprudence supports this view. In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles,25 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled: Employment includes both only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee to be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably, as a general rule, employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer's premises where the work is to be done; but it is clear that in some cases the rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress with the express or implied consent of the employer. The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal and twenty meters from the main IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in

passing to and from" the IDECO's premises. The IDECO employees used the private road with its consent, express or implied. Twenty meters on that road from the main gate is in close proximity to the IDECO's premises. It follows that Pablo's death was in the course of employment. In Carter vs. Lanzetta,26 it was held that "such statutes envision extension of coverage to employees from the time they reach the employer's premises until they depart therefrom and that hours of service include a period when this might be accomplished within a reasonable interval;" and that "under exceptional circumstances, a continuance of the course of employment may be extended by allowing the employee a reasonable time not only to enter or leave the premises but also to surmount certain hazards adjacent thereto." The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this description, it would appear that the road is a dead-end street. In Singer vs. Rich Marine Sales,27 it was held that, where the employee, while returning to work at the end of the lunch period, fell at the curb of the sidewalk immediately adjacent to the employer's premises and one other located thereon, and the general public used the street only in connection with those premises, and the employer actually stored boats on the sidewalk, the sidewalk was within the precincts of employment. In that case there were even two business establishments on the dead-end street. Here, it is exclusively the IDECO premises which appear to be at the end of the private road. We find in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation28 a meaningful statement of the obligation of the employer to its employees: "That the employer owes, so to speak, a duty of 'safe passage' to an employee to the point where he can reach the proper arrival or departure from his work seems without question." We next quote extensively from Kelty vs. Travellers Insurance Company:29 The rule has been repeatedly announced in Texas that an injury received by an employee while using the public streets and highways in going to or returning from the place of employment is not compensable, the rationale of the rule being that in most instances such an injury is suffered as a consequence of risk and hazards to which all members of the travelling public are subject rather than risk and hazards having to do with and originating in the work or business of the employer.... Another exception, however, which is applicable is found in the so-called "access" cases. In these cases a workman who has been injured at a plane intended by the employer for use as a means of ingress or egress to and from the actual place of the employee's work has been held to be in the course of his employment. The courts have said that these access areas are so closely related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises. We shall discuss the principal authorities dealing with this exception to the general rule.

The leading cases in Texas dealing with the "access" exception, and one which we think is controlling of this appeal, is Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72, 28 A.L.R. 1402. In that case the employee was employed by Hartburg Lumber Company, which company operated and owned a sawmill in Hartburg, Texas, which was a lumber town, consisting solely of the employer's facilities. A railroad track ran through the town and a part of the lumber company's facilities was situated on either side of the right-of-way. A public road ran parallel to the railroad tracks which led to the various buildings on the property of the lumber company. This crossing was used by any member of the public desiring to go to any part of the lumber company facilities. On the day in question the decedent quit work at noon, went home for lunch and while returning to the lumber company plant for the purpose of resuming his employment, was struck and killed by a train at the crossing in question. The insurance company contended (as it does here) that the decedent's death did not originate in the work or business of his employer and that at the time of his fatal injuries he was not in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer. The Supreme Court, in an extensive opinion, reviewed the authorities from other states and especially Latter's Case 238 Mass. 326, 130 N. E. 637, 638, and arrived at the conclusion that the injury and death under such circumstances were compensable under the Texas Act. The court held that the railroad crossing bore so intimate a relation to the lumber company's premises that it could hardly be treated otherwise than as a part of the premises. The Court pointed out that the lumber company had rights in and to the crossing which was used in connection with the lumber company's business, whether by employees or by members of the public. In announcing the "access" doctrine Justice Greenwood said: Was Behnken engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer when he received the injury causing his death? He was upon the crossing provided as the means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. He encountered the dangers incident to use of the crossing in order that he might perform the duties imposed by his contract of service. Without subjecting himself to such dangers he could not do what was required of him in the conduct of the lumber company's business. He had reached a place provided and used only as an adjunct to that business, and was injured from a risk created by the conditions under which the business was carried on. To hold that he was not acting in furtherance of the affairs or business of the lumber company would be to give a strict interpretation to this remedial statute, which should be liberally construed with a view to accomplish its purpose and to promote justice. xxx xxx xxx

In Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, Tex. Civ. App., 125 S. W. 2d 674, wr. ref., this court followed the rule announced in Behnken, supra. In that case the employee was

killed while crossing the railroad track near his place of employment. In discussing the question of the situs of the injury Justice Looney said: Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of work not only conduced his safety and convenience, but contributed to the promptness and efficiency with which he was enabled to discharge the duties owing his employer; hence the reason and necessity for his presence upon the railroad track (that portion of the pathway leading over the railroad right of way) when injured, in our opinion, had to do with, originated in and grew out of the work of the employer; and that, the injury received at the time, place and under the circumstances, necessarily was in furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer. Again, in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App. 53 S. W. 2d 327, err. ref., this court had occasion to follow the "access" doctrine. In that case Chief Justice Jones quoted from the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Bountiful Brisk Company, et al. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S. Ct. 221, 72 L. Ed. 507, 66 A. L. R. 1402, as follows: An employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached. The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the road where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the employer's premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises." That portion of the road bears "so intimate a relation" to the company's premises. It is the chief means of entering the IDECO premises, either for the public or for its employees. The IDECO uses it extensively in pursuit of its business. It has rights of passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one of these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper security measures over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death.

As therefore stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The murderer was himself killed before he could be brought to trial. It is true there is authority for the statement that before the "proximity" rule may be applied it must first be shown that there is a causal connection between the employment and the hazard which resulted in the injury.30 The following more modern view was expressed in Lewis Wood Preserving Company vs. Jones:31 While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood for the injuries to arise out of and in the course of the employment (see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557 [137 S.E. 121]; Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d 189), later cases have been somewhat more liberal, saying that, "to be compensable, injuries do not have to arise from something peculiar to the employment." Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Bardon, 79 Ga. App. 260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444. "Where the duties of an employee entail his presence (at a place and a time) the claim for an injury there occurring is not to be barred because it results from a risk common to all others ... unless it is also common to the general public without regard to such conditions, and independently of place, employment, or pursuit." New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786, cited in Globe Indemnity Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46, 47; McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App. 826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d 471, 473. But even without the foregoing pronouncement, the employer should still be held liable in view of our conclusion that that portion of the road where Pablo was killed, because of its proximity, should be considered part of the IDECO's premises. Hence, the injury was in the course of employment, and there automatically arises the presumption invoked in Rivera that the injury by assault arose out of the employment, i. e., there is a causal relation between the assault and the employment. We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal from overtime work, and space, twenty meters from the employer's main gate, bring Pablo's death within the scope of the course factor. But it may logically be asked: Suppose it were three minutes after and thirty meters from, or five minutes after and fifty meters from, would the "proximity" rule still apply? In answer, we need but quote that portion of the decision in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation, supra, which answered a question arising from an ingenious hypothetical question put forth by the defendant therein: We could, of course, say "this is not the case before us" and utilize the old saw, "that which is not before us we do not decide." Instead, we prefer to utilize the considerably older law: "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof" (Matthew 1:34), appending, however, this admonition: no statute is static; it must remain constantly viable to meet new challenges placed to it. Recovery in a proper case should not be suppressed

because of a conjectural posture which may never arise and which if it does, will be decided in the light of then existing law. Since the Workmen's Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to workmen, it must be liberally construed to attain the purpose for which it was enacted.32 Liberally construed, sec. 2 of the Act comprehends Pablo's death. The Commission did not err in granting compensation. ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner's cost. 6. G.R. No. L-48594 March 16, 1988 GENEROSO ALANO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.

GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.: The only issue in this case is whether or not the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is compensable under the law as an employment accident. The facts as found by the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission are as follows: Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. She is survived by her four sons and a daughter. On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano, brother of the deceased, filed the instant claim for in come benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedent's children. The claim was, however, denied on the same date on the ground that the "injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law." On July 19, 1977 appellant requested for a reconsideration of the system's decision, but the same was denied and the records of the case were elevated to this Commission for review. (Rollo, p. 12)

The respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System. It stated that Section I (a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation specifically provides that: "For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all the following conditions (1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours; (2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; and (3) The employee must have been performing his official functions." (Rollo, p. 13) According to the respondent Commission, the deceased's accident did not meet any of the aforementioned conditions. First, the accident occured at about 7:00 a.m. or thirty minutes before the deceased's working hours. Second, it happened not at her workplace but at the plaza where she usually waits for a ride to her work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions as school principal nor was she on a special errand for the school. The case, therefore, was dismissed. The petitioner then went to this Court on petition for review on certiorari. He alleges that the deceased's accident has "arisen out of or in the course of her employment." The respondent Commission reiterates its views and contends that the present provision of law on employment injury is different from that provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) and is "ategorical in that the injury must have been sustained at work while at the workplace, or elsewhere while executing an order from the employer." (Rollo, p. 44) The Government Service Insurance System which received a copy of the Court's resolution requiring the parties to submit their memoranda, however manifests that it does not appear to be a party to the case because it had not been impleaded as a party thereto. We rule in favor of the petitioner. This case does not come to us with a novel issue. In the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela v. Employees' Compensation Commission (96 SCRA 260,263,264) which has a similar factual background, this Court held: It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.

In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there. As to the Government Service Insurance System's manifestation, we hold that it is not fatal to this case that it was not impleaded as a party respondent. As early as the case of La O v. Employees' Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA 782) up to Cabanero v. Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413) and recently, Clemente v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. L-47521, August 31,1987), this Court has ruled that the Government Service Insurance System is a proper party in employees' compensation cases as the ultimate implementing agency of the Employees' Compensation Commission. We held in the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules refer to the said System in all aspects of employee compensation including enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules)." WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) as death benefit and the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees. SO ORDERED.

7. G.R. No. L-48488 April 25, 1980 GLORIA D. MENEZ, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION & CULTURE), respondents. Gloria D. Menez in her own behalf. Manuel M. Lazaro for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari from the decision en banc dated March 1, 1978 of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0462, affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of the claim of petitioner for benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 (now Title II the New Labor Code) and dismissing said claim. The records disclose that petitioner Gloria D. Menez was employed by the Department (now Ministry) of Education & Culture as a school teacher. She retired on August 31, 1975 under the disability retirement plan at the age of 54 years after 32 years of teaching, due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. Before her retirement, she was assigned at Raja Soliman High School in Tondo-Binondo, Manila near a dirty creek. On October 21, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with respondent Government Service Insurance System (p. 1, ECC rec.). On October 25, 1976, respondent GSIS denied said claim on the ground that petitioner's ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis, are not occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of her particular work. In denying aforesaid claim, respondent GSIS thus resolved: Upon evaluation based on general accepted medical authorities, your ailments are found to be the least causally related to your duties and conditions of work. We believe that our ailments are principally traceable to factors which are definitely not work-connected. Moreover, the evidences you have, submitted have not shown that the said ailments directly resulted from your occupation as Teacher IV of Raja Soliman High School, Manila (Letter-Resolution, p. 4, ECC Case No. 0462). On November 24, 1976, petitioner filed a letter-request for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial of her claim, which request was denied by the GSIS in its letter-resolution of November 28, 1976 therein reiterating that on the basis of the evidence on record, it appears that petitioner has not established that her employment had any causal relationship with the contraction of the ailments (p. 6, ECC rec.). On March 7, 1977, petitioner again requested for reconsideration of the second denial of said claim, still alleging that her ailments arose out of and in the course of employment (p. 11, ECC rec.). On March 11, 1977, respondent GSIS reaffirmed its stand on the case and elevated the entire records thereof to the Employees' Compensation Commission for review (p. 12, ECC rec.). On March 1, 1978, respondent Commission issued a decision en banc thus stating:

... Despite assertions to the contrary by herein appellant, this Commission fully agrees with the respondent system that appellant's employment has nothing to do with the development of her disabling illnesses. Appellant's ailments are not listed as occupational diseases for the employment she was engaged in as to merit compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended (p. 13, rec.). On July 7, 1978, petitioner filed this petition seeking a review of aforesaid decision of respondent Commission (p. 2, rec.). Petitioner claims she contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27, 1975 after wetting and chilling during the course of employment which are permanent and recurring in nature and work-connected (p. 2, rec.). She specifically alleged that ... said sickness and/or disabilities arose out of or in the course of employment and is aggravated by the condition and nature of the work in school, that appellant belonged to the afternoon and night shifts as shown by her time record, Annex D, subjecting her to varying climatic (sic) temperature at noon and night time; and that the place of work, Raja Soliman High School, is surrounded by the Divisoria market at the north, Sta. Helena Bridge and Creek which is heavily polluted; in the Northeast, is the presence of many squatter houses too, and in the south gasoline stations, bakery, Textile market as stated before and a fact. That as a teacher of social studies handling 250 students more or less a day, she is subjected to infections from students who have flu, colds and other respiratory infections which aggravated her ailments (p. 3, rec.). Petitioner now maintains that her ailments arose in the course of employment and were aggravated by the condition and nature of her work. Specifically, she asserts that "pneumonitis or baby pneumonia which has become chronic that led to bronchiectasis which is irreversible and permanent in nature is compensable under No. 21 of compensable diseases (Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977) as conditions were present as attested to by doctor's affidavits and certifications." Respondents Commission and System contend that petitioner's ailments of rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not among the occupational diseases listed as compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, or under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation; and, that respondent Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the form of accepted medical findings thus making said decision final and conclusive on the matter (p. 33 & 68, rec.). Article 167 (1) of the new Labor Code provides that

(1) 'Sickness' means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. ... Rule 111, Section 1 (b) of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation thus provides: xx xx xx (b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by working conditions. Rule III, Section 1 (c) of said Rules states: (c) Only inqiury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules. The aforequoted provisions clearly establish that for an illness to be compensable, it must either be: 1. An illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease; or 2. An illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. An occupational disease is one "which results from the nature of the employment, and by nature is meant conditions to which all employees of a class are subject and which produce the disease as a natural incident of a particular occupation, and attach to that occupation a hazard which distinguishes it from the usual run of occupations and is in excess of the hazard attending the employment in general" (Goldberg vs. 954 Mancy Corp., 12 N. E. 2d 311; Emphasis supplied). To be occupational, the disease must be one "due wholly to causes and conditions which are normal and constantly present and characteristic of the particular occupation; that is, those things which science and industry have not yet learned how to eliminate. Every worker in every plant of the same industry is alike constantly exposed to the danger of contracting a particular occupational disease" (Seattle Can Co. vs. Dept. of Labor, 265, p. 741; Emphasis supplied). An occupational disease is one which develops as a result of hazards peculiar to certain occupations, due to toxic substances (as in the organic solvents industry), radiation (as in

television repairmen), repeated mechanical injury, emotional strain, etc. (Schmidts Attorneys' Dictionary of Medicine, p. 561). From the foregoing definitions of occupational diseases or ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis can be considered as such occupational diseases. All public high school teachers, like herein petitioner, admittedly the most underpaid but overworked employees of the government, are subject to emotional strains and stresses, dealing as they do with intractable teenagers especially young boys, and harassed as they are by various extra-curricular or nonacademic assignments, aside from preparing lesson plans until late at night, if they are not badgered by very demanding superiors. In the case of the petitioner, her emotional tension is heightened by the fact that the high school in which she teaches is situated in a tough area Binondo district, which is inhabited by thugs and other criminal elements and further aggravated by the heavy pollution and congestion therein as well as the stinking smell of the dirty Estero de la Reina nearby. Women, like herein petitioner, are most vulnerable to such unhealthy conditions. The pitiful situation of all public school teachers is further accentuated by poor diet for they can ill-afford nutritious food. In her work, petitioner also has to contend with the natural elements, like the inclement weather heavy rains, typhoons as well as dust and disease-ridden surroundings peculiar to an insanitary slum area. These unwholesome conditions are "normal and consistently present in" or are the "hazards peculiar to" the occupation of a public high school teacher. It is therefore evident that rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are the "natural incidents" of petitioner's occupation as such public high school teacher. But even if rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not occupational diseases, there is ample proof that petitioner contracted such ailments by reason of her occupation as a public high school teacher due to her exposure to the adverse working conditions above-mentioned. Indisputably, petitioner contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27, 1975 after being drenched and the consequent "chilling during the course of employment which are permanent and recurring in nature and workconnected." Undoubtedly, petitioner's ailments thus become compensable under the New Labor Code since under Rule 111, Section 1 (c) of its Implementing Rules, "only sickness or injury which occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules." It must be borne in mind that petitioner was a teacher of the Raja Soliman High School which is located in the heart of Binondo District. She was constantly exposed to the heavily polluted air and congestion (squatter's area) characteristic of the area. She was not only exposed to the elements - varying degrees of temperature throughout the day and night - but also had to withstand long hours of standing while performing her teaching job. Likewise, she had to

regularly negotiate long trips from her home in Project 2, Quirino District, Quezon City (her residence) to said high school in Binondo, scampering from one ride to another, rain or shine, and sweating in the process. Furthermore, judicial notice should be taken of the fact that our country is in a typhoon belt and that yearly we experience torrential rains and storms. Needless to say, in her daily rides from Quezon City to Binondo and back, she had to go through the ordeal of perspiring and getting wet from downpours or heavy rains, thus making her susceptible to contracting her ailments. Moreover, petitioner was always in contact with 250 students who might have been carriers of contagious respiratory diseases like flu and colds and who were themselves inadequately nourished, residing as they do in a depressed and congested area. And adding to the unhygienic working atmosphere was her malnutrition or undernourishment. More often than not, a teacher who has no other source of income takes to aside from the poor man's staple diet of tuyo, daing and rice legumes like mongo, vegetables and fruits with edible seeds which contain much uric and. Acute arthritis is inflammation of a joint marked by pain, swelling, heat and redness; the result of rheumatism or gout (p. 56, The Simplified Medical Dictionary for Lawyers). Gout is a disease characterized by painful inflammation of the joints, in excessive amount of uric acid in the blood Poor man's gout is caused by hard work, poor food and exposure (p. 268, supra). It may thus be seen that uric acid eventually causes arthritis, aside from excessive mental and physical stresses to which teachers are subject of reason of their duties. Consequently, this Court finds petitioner to have substantially shown that the risk of contracting her ailments had been increased by unfavorable working conditions. In Dimaano vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission (78 SCRA 510 [1977]), WE ruled that illnesses of rheumatic arthritis with sub-acute exacerbation and hypertension of therein petitioner, who was herself a teacher, as service-connected, after WE considered her working conditions and nature of employment which are substantially the same as those of herein petitioner. Significantly, also, the Employees' Compensation Commission, in its Resolutions Nos. 233 and 432, respectively dated March 16, 1977 and July 20, 1977, adopted a more realistic construction of the provisions of the New Labor Code by including in the list of compensable ailments and diseases, cardiovascular disease which comprehends myocardial infarction, pneumonitis and bronchial asthma (Sepulveda vs. WCC, et al., L-46290, Aug. 25,1978). Furthermore, it must be stressed that "the approval of petitioner's application for retirement is a clear indication that she was physically incapacitated to render efficient service (Sudario vs. Republic, L-44088, Oct. 6, 1977; Dimaano vs. WCC, et al., supra). Petitioner was allowed to retire under the disability retirement plan on August 31, 1975 at the age of 54 which is way below the compulsory retirement age of 65. Under Memorandum Circular No. 133 issued by

the retirement shall be recommended for approval only when "the employee applicant is below 65 years of age and is physically incapacitated to render further efficient service." Obviously, petitioner thus retired by reason of her ailments. Finally, Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers, recognized the enervating effects of these factors (duties and activities of a school teacher certainly involve physical, mental and emotional stresses) on the health of school teachers when it directed in one of its provisions that "Teachers shall be protected against the consequences of employment injury in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain on the teachers's health shall be recognized as compensable occupational diseases in accordance with laws" (Pantoja vs. Republic, et al.. L-43317, December 29, 1978). WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE IS HEREBY ORDERED 1) TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND [P 6,000.00] PESOS AS DISABILITY INCOME BENEFITS; AND 2) TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY RECEIPTS. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-47521 July 31, 1987

CAROLINA CLEMENTE, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM Department of Health (Dagupan City) and EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0509 which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and denied the claim for death benefits filed by Carolina Clemente, widow of the late Pedro Clemente, The undisputed facts of the case are summarized in the memorandum for the respondent Government Service Insurance System, as follows: Petitioner's husband, the late Pedro Clemente, was for ten (10) years a janitor in the Department of Health (Dagupan City), assigned at the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, Laoag

City. He was hospitalized from November 3 to 14, 1976 at the Central Luzon Sanitarium, Tala Sanitarium, Tala, Caloocan City, due to his ailment of "nephritis," as per medical certification of his attending physician, Dr. Winifredo Samson. He was also found to be suffering from such ailments as portal cirrhosis and leprosy, otherwise known as Hansen's Disease. On November 14, 1976, Pedro Clemente died of uremia due to nephritis. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the GSIS a claim for employees' compensation under the Labor Code, as amended. On February 4, 1977, the GSIS denied the claim of the petitioner because the ailments of her husband are not occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of his work and/or (sic) or were not in the least causally related to his duties and conditions of work. On March 9, 1977, petitioner requested for reconsideration of the GSIS' denial of her claim, stating that the ailments of her husband were contracted in the course of employment and were aggravated by the nature of his work. Petitioner alleged that her husband, as janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic (Laoag City), worked in direct contact with persons suffering from different skin diseases and was exposed to obnoxious dusts and other dirt which contributed to his ailment of Hansen's disease. Citing further the cases of Seven-Up Bottling Co., of the Phil. v. Rimerata, L-24349, December 24, 1968 and Avana v. Quisumbing, L-23489, March 27, 1968. Petitioner stated that her husband's ailment recurred in the course of employment presumably due to his direct contact with persons suffering from this ailment. Acting upon petitioner's request for reconsideration, the GSIS, on April 11, 1977, reiterated its previous denial of her claim. On April 14, 1977, treating the request for reconsideration as an appeal, the GSIS forwarded the records of the petitioner' claim for review by the ECC. On October 26, 1977, respondent ECC affirmed the GSIS' action of denial and rendered its own decision dismissing petitioner's claim (ECC Case No. 0509). Respondent ECC's decision was anchored upon the findings that the ailments are not listed as occupational diseases; that there was no substantial evidence of causal connection; and that, in fact, the evidence was that the deceased had already contracted the Hansen's disease before his employment. In the exact words of the ECC: In the case at bar, since the deceased's ailments are not listed as occupational diseases, appellant herein must prove that such ailments were caused by

deceased's employment and that the risk of contracting the same was increased by his working conditions in order to be compensable. A mere cursory reading of the evidences on record, however, will disclose that appellant failed to submit the required proof of causation. There is no substantial proof in the record from which we could draw the conclusion that indeed the nature of deceased's employment as Janitor of Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic could be traced as the direct cause of his ailment. Hence, in the absence of such evidence, we are not disposed to disturb on appeal the findings of the respondent System. On the contrary, we find the records that the deceased, prior to his employment in this office, was already suffering from his ailment of Hansen's disease. This proves that his working conditions did not increase the risk of his contracting the same. If at all, his employment merely aggravated his ailments. Unfortunately, however, aggravation of a preexisting illness, a rule under the old law, is not anymore a ground for compensation under the new law. Thus, the cases cited by the appellant cannot be raised as authorities to support her claim. Petitioner now seeks a review of the ECC decision. (pp. 76-78, Rollo) There is no question that the claim falls under the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended. Under Article 167(L) of the Labor Code and Section 1 (b) Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules with the conditions therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92, 96). As the illnesses of the deceased are admittedly, not listed under Annex "A" of the Rules as occupational diseases, the petitioner bases her claim under the theory of increased risk. She alleges that the deceased, as janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, was exposed to patients suffering from various kinds of skin diseases, including Hansen's disease or leprosy. She avers that for ten years, the deceased had to clean the clinic and its surroundings and to freely mix with its patients. She claims that it was during this time that he was attacked by other dreadful diseases such as uremia, cancer of the liver, and nephritis. On the other hand, the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission contends that the petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that the deceased's ailments were indeed caused by his employment. It maintains that the deceased merely had a recurrence of a preexisting illness aggravated possibly by the nature of his employment and that there is no evidence on record showing that the nature of the deceased's employment was the direct cause of any of his illnesses.

The respondent Government Service Insurance System concurs with the views of the respondent Commission. It, however, argues that it should be dropped as a party respondent in this case. It claims that the petitioner has no cause of action against it, the subject of judicial review being the adverse decision of the respondent Commission. We rule for the petitioner. In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (144 SCRA 421, 46) we held that: Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation (San Valentin v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 118 SCRA 160; Better Building, Inc., v. Puncan, 135 SCRA 62). There are no stringent criteria to follow. The degree of proof required under P.D. 626; is merely substantial evidence, which means, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra, citing Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635; and Acosta v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 109 SCRA 209). The claimant must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the development of the disease is brought largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable workconnection and not a direct causal relation (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra; Sagliba v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 128 SCRA 723; Neri v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 127 SCRA 672; Juala v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 128 SCRA 462; and De Vera v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 133 SCRA 685). It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection (Delegente v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 118 SCRA 67; and Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra). Probability not certainty is the touchstone (San Valentin v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra). In this case, we find sufficient evidence on record to sustain the petitioner's view. The records disclose that in resisting the petitioner's claim, the respondent Commission cited the following medical authorities: Uremia refers to the toxic clinical condition associated with renal insufficiency and retention in the blood of nitrogenous urinary waste products (azotemia). Renal insufficiency may be due to (1) nephritis, bilateral pyelonephritis, polycystic kidney disease, uretral or bladder obstruction, SLE, polyarteritis, amyloid disease, or bilateral cortical necrosis; (2) acute tubular necrosis resulting from transfusion reaction, shock, burns, crushing injuries, or poisons; (3) sulfonamides precipitated in the kidneys or ureters; (4) nephrocalcinosis resulting from extreme alkalosis, diabetic acidosis, dehydration, or congestive heart failure may result in azotemia, or may predipitate (sic) severe uremia in the presence of already damages kidneys.

Reference: Lyght, Charles E.: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy; M.S. & D. Research Lab.; 11th Edition, 1966, pp. 257-258. Portal Cirrhosis: A chronic disease characterized by incresed connective tissue that spreads from the portal spaces, distorting liver architecture and impairing liver functions. Etiology, Incidence and pathology: Portal cirrhosis occurs chiefly in males in late middle life. Malnutrition is believed to be a predisposing if not a primary etiology factor. The role of alcohol is not clearly established. Alcohol probably exerts a direct toxic effect on the liver, and also increases malnutrition by providing calories without essential nutrients. Cirrhosis has been produced in animals by diets low in protein and specifically low in choline. The addition of choline to these diets prevents cirrhosis. Chronic poisoning with carbon tetrachloride or phosphorus produces changes similar to those from portal cirrhosis. The liver is diffusely nodular, scarred and dense. Microscopic section shows parenchymal degeneration cellular infiltration, proliferation or scar tissue and areas of regeneration. Fatty changes are present in the early states. Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy: M.S. & D. N.J. 11th Edition, 1966, p. 928. Hepatoma (Liver cancer) refers to malignant primary tumor of the liver destroying the parenchyma arise (sic) from both liver cell and bile duct elements. It develops most frequently in the previous cirrhosis liver. A higher fraction of patients with post necrotic cirrhosis develop hepatoma than those with portal alcoholic cirrhosis. This may reflect the more active necrotic and regenerative processes in the post necrotic cirrhosis liver. Most large series indicate that 60% or more of hepatomas develop in a previously cirrhotic liver. The cirrhosis of hemochromatosis seems particularly liable to hepatomas as high a fraction as 20% of patients with hemochromatosis die from this cause. Reference: Harrison, T.R.: Principles of Internal Medicine; McGraw Hill; N.Y., 5th Ed.; 1966, p. 1072. Leprosy is a chronic, mildly contagious, infectious disease characterized by both cutaneous and constitutional symptoms and the production of various deformities and mutilations. The causative organism is an acid fast rod. Mycobacterium leprae, first described by Hansen in 1874. The mode of transmission is obscure, although infection by direct contact appears likely. The disease is found predominantly in tropical and subtropical Asia, Africa, and South America. It is endemic in the Gulf States of the USA, Hawaii, the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merk Manuel of Diagnosis and Therapy; " M.S. & D.; 11th Ed.; 1966, p. 847.

The nature of nephritis, however, was discussed by Mr. Daniel Mijares, GSIS Manager, Employees' Compensation Department, in his letter dated February 4, 1977, denying petitioner's claim, as follows: Nephritis is an acute, diffuse inflammation of the glomeruli or kidneys. It usually follows previous streptoccocal infection mostly in the upper respiratory tract. Because of this, it is always thought that nephritis is the result of an auto-immune or allergic reaction to infection, usually streptococcal. (Rollo, p. 20) The foregoing discussions support rather than negate the theory of increased risk. We note that the major ailments of the deceased, i.e. nephritis, leprosy, etc., could be traced from bacterial and viral infections. In the case of leprosy, it is known that the source of infection is the discharge from lesions of persons with active cases. It is believed that the bacillus enters the body through the skin or through the mucous membrane of the nose and throat (Miller and Keane, Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, (1972), p. 530). On the other hand, infectious diseases which give rise to nephritis are believed to be as follows: Table 294-1 Causes of acute glomerulonephritis Infectious diseases A. Post streptococcal glumerulonephritis B. Non-Post streptococcal glumerulonephritis 1. Bacterial: Infective endocarditis, "Shunt nephritis," sepsis, pneumococcal pneumonia, typhoid fever, secondary syphilis, meningococcemia 2. Viral: Hepatitis B, infectious menoneucleosis, mumps, measles, varicella, vaccinia, echovirus, and coxsackievirus 3. Parasitic: Malaria, taxoplasmosis (Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 10th edition, p. 1633) The husband of the petitioner worked in a skin clinic. As janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, Mr. Clemente was exposed to different carriers of viral and bacterial diseases. He had to clean the clinic itself where patients with different illnesses come and go. He had to put in order the hospital equipments that had been used. He had to dispose of garbage and wastes that accumulated in the course of each working day. He was the employee most exposed to the

dangerous concentration of infected materials, and not being a medical practitioner, least likely to know how to avoid infection. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Clemente's working conditions definitely increased the risk of his contracting the aforementioned ailments. This Court has held in appropriate cases that the conservative posture of the respondents is not consistent with the liberal interpretation of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee embodied in the Constitution in favor of the workers (Cabanes v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., L-50255, January 30, 1982; and Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., supra). It clashes with the injunction in the Labor Code (Article 4, New Labor Code) that, as a rule, doubts should be resolved in favor of the claimant-employee (Mercado, Jr., v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 139 SCRA 270, 277). The respondents admit there may have been aggravation of an existing ailment but point out that aggravating is no longer a ground for compensation under the present law. They contend that the compensable factor of increased risks of contracting the disease is not present in this case. The fallacy in this theory lies in the failure to explain how a sick person was able to enter the government service more than ten years before he became too ill to work and at a time when aggravation of a disease was compensable. There is no evidence to show that Mr. Clemente was hired inspite of having an existing disease liable to become worse. The petitioner's arguments of recurrence of an already cured disease or the contracting of the disease due to increased risks become more plausible. When there are two or more possible explanations regarding an issue of compensability that which favors the claimant must be chosen.1avvphi1 We also do not find merit in the respondent GSIS' contention that it should be dropped as a party in this case. This Court has passed upon this issue on several occasions. Thus, in the case of Cabanero v. Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413, 419), this Court citing Lao v. Employees' Compensation Commission (97 SCRA 782), held: xxx xxx xxx

... This Court is of the opinion that respondent System, as the ultimate implementing agency of the ECC's decision, is a proper party in this case. The fact that this Court chose to require respondent GSIS to comment is an indication that it is a necessary party. It must be noted that the law and the rules refer to the said System in all aspects of employee compensation (including enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules.) (at p. 793). WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the respondent Government Service Insurance System is hereby ordered to pay the petitioner:

1) The sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00) as death benefits; and 2) The sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees. SO ORDERED.