LPG Safety Distance Guide

PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS
DESIGN AND ENGINEERING PRACTICE

MANUAL

GUIDELINE FOR CALCULATING
SAFETY DISTANCES IN LPG
STORAGE AND HANDLING
INSTALLATIONS
PTS 20.162
JANUARY 1988

PREFACE
PETRONAS Technical Standards (PTS) publications reflect the views, at the time of publication,
of PETRONAS OPUs/Divisions.
They are based on the experience acquired during the involvement with the design, construction,
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on, or reference is made to, national and international standards and codes of practice.
The objective is to set the recommended standard for good technical practice to be applied by
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GUIDELINES FOR CALCULATING SAFETY DISTANCES IN LPG STORAGE AND HANDLING
INSTALLATIONS
CONTENTS
1. Introduction
2. Assessment of Fire Situations
2.1 Audit of the Facilities
2.2 Selection of Leakage Scenarios and Assessment of their Consequences
2.3 Radiation Criteria for Personnel Protection
2.4 Vapour Cloud Explosion
2.5 Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)
2.6 Selection of Leak Reduction Measures and Methods to Mitigate the Effects
3. Consequence Assessments
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Calculation of Flow Rates
3.3 Vapour Jets - Dispersion and Fires
3.4 Two-phase Jets - Dispersion and Fires
4. Worked Example
4.1 Description of Facility
4.2 Audit of the Facility and Choice of Scenarios
4.3 Consequence Assessment, Analysis and Proposed Action
5. References
TABLES
1. Discharge Areas for 'REGO'. 'FISHER', and other pressure relief valves
2. Relief Valve Fire and Radiation Flux Data for Propane
3. Relief Valve Fire and Radiation Flux Data for Butane
FIGURES
1. Schematic of Model Facilities
2. Example PLUMEPATH Dispersion Profile for Butane
3. Distances to LFL for Propane and Butane Releases
4. Distances to 1.5 kW/m Radiation Flux for Vapour and Liquid Horizontal Butane Jet Fires
5. Distances to 5 kW/m Radiation Flux for Vapour and Liquid Horizontal Butane Jet Fires
10. Flame Lengths for Vapour and Liquid Horizontal Butane Jet Fires
11. Distances to 1.5 kW/m Radiation Flux for Vapour and Liquid Vertical Butane Jet Fires
12. Distances to 5 kW/m Radiation Flux for Vapour and Liquid Vertical Butane Jet Fires
17 . LPG Depot Layout - Worked Example
18. Flow scheme - Worked Example
19. Nozzle details of Propane Sphere Worked Example
20. Nozzle details of Butane Sphere Worked Example
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the main differences between the recently-issued Supply and Marketing (SM) LPG
Manual Par t 2 Sect i on 03 PTS 30. 06. 10. 12. LPG Bul k St or age
Installations (hereafter referred to as the Manual/PTS) and previous issues is the requirement
to relate siting of equipment to the radiation flux levels that would be experienced from fires in
the installation. This approach applies to LPG bulk storage installations with individual tanks
of 135 m
3

and above and is consistent with the Institute of Petroleum Model Code of Safe
Practice, Part 9, Liquefied Petroleum Gas, Volume 1, dated February 1987.
The covering letter which was sent to all companies with the Manual/PTS suggested
that all sites should compare the design of their facilities with the new standards and consider
whether any aspects should be modified. Site layout is one aspect that in many cases will
be difficult, if not impossible, to alter. Therefore, it will be important to examine whether a fire
could endanger human life, equipment or property, inside or outside the site. If this is recognized
as a possibility, it will be necessary to consider changes to the design to reduce the
probability of the incident and/or provide additional protection to people and equipment. In
a completely unacceptable situation it may be necessary to shut down the installation
and transfer the activities elsewhere.
Since the Manual/PTS does not indicate how the evaluation should be carried out, or provide
information on the calculation of thermal radiation levels, an inter-functional team has
produced this set of guide-lines with the assistance of Thornton Research Centre. It
has been written in three parts:
Section 2. Assessment of Fire Situations
Section 3. Consequence Assessments
Section 4. Worked Example
It should be noted that although these guide-lines have been produced as an aid for
evaluating the layout requirements for bulk storage installations with individual tanks of 135
m
3
and above, they are also in general applicable to layout aspects of all other sections of
plants handling pressurized LPG at Marketing and Manufacturing installations (e.g. loading/
unloading ships, bulk road vehicles or rail tank wagons and filling cylinders). As stated in the
Manual/PTS, operating companies may choose to apply these guidelines to installations with
individual tanks of less than 135 m
3
.
2. ASSESSMENT OF FIRE SITUATIONS
2.1 AUDIT OF THE FACILITIES
Section 03.02.01.02 of the Manual/PTS covers safety distances. It states that possible leak
sources should be identified and their rate of leakage and duration assessed. The first step is
the identification of such leak sources. This requires a systematic evaluation of the design
against the Manual/PTS and a review of the operating/maintenance procedures for the
installation.
The assessment should be carried out by a team of three or four people, who between them
have a good knowledge of the design, operation and maintenance of the facility. They should
have available up-to-date flow schemes and engineering information about the equipment
before they start.
The team should study the facility, line by line and piece of equipment by piece of equipment,
and consider whether there could be any circumstances which might lead to a leak of LPG.
This should be done in an imaginative way with the team considering the usual operating
conditions at the site and also any unusual conditions which they can conceive.
They would consider, for instance:
possible high or low temperatures
possible high or low pressures
overfilling of storage vessels, bulk lorries or rail tank wagons
the effect of impurities in the LPG (e.g. water)
the wrong grade of LPG (e.g. C3 instead of C4)
the effect of incorrect operation or maintenance
incorrect material selection or equipment fabrication
malfunctioning equipment
impact (e.g. vehicles)
The procedure outlined above is a simplified version of the more structured HAZOP study,
where the team leader takes the team through a series of guide words for each part of the
plant which they are examining.

2.2 SELECTION OF LEAKAGE SCENARIOS AND ASSESSMENT OF THEIR
CONSEQUENCES
In section 03.02.01.02 (c) of the Manual/PTS it states that the evaluation of leak sources
should take into account failure modes, likelihood and consequences. It is not possible to give
detailed guidance on the likelihood of particular leak scenarios, because the probability that
an event will occur will depend on the design of the specific facility and the quality of its
operation and maintenance. However, a review of serious incidents that have occurred in the
LPG industry shows that they have usually been the result of the following situations:
Product discharge through a relief valve (including overfill).
The Manual/PTS requires in section 03.02.01.02 (a) that product discharge to atmosphere
through relief valves on LPG storage vessels should be considered as leakage scenarios in
all cases. This requirement is consistent with the Institute of Petroleum Model Code of Safe
Practice, Liquid Petroleum Gas, Volume 1. The rationale behind this requirement is that these
relief valves are the only devices in an LPG facility which are designed to be able to vent
large quantities of LPG to atmosphere.
Flange leak or other joint leak (see Section 4 for typical leakage hole sizes)
Pump seal leak (see Section 4 for typical leakage hole sizes)
Open drain valve
Rupture of small bore connections (e.g. breakage of an instrument line)
Hose leak or rupture (e.g. vehicle pullaway)
It is recommended that these failure modes should always be considered for consequence
calculations, unless the audit team has very good reasons to discount them. Other situations
will be possible on many installations. These could include the leak of a vessel or pipeline due
to internal or external corrosion, or the effect of an external incident such as vehicle impact.
Inclusion of these scenarios for consequence calculations will depend on the team's
judgement of whether their likelihood is greater or less than that of the failure modes listed
above.
Using the information given in Section 3 the team should next assess the flow rate of the
leaking liquid or vapour. Factors in the design which may control the flow should be taken into
account.
An assessment should also be made of the time that the release will last. This will depend on
the presence of operators, the accessibility of manually-operated isolating valves and the
existence of remotely-operated valves. The likelihood of ignition will depend in part on the
time that a flammable mixture persists.
When a leak or spill occurs the hydrocarbon vapour will disperse, forming a cloud. The
distances to the lower flammable limit can be obtained from Section 3. Should the cloud
extend beyond the site boundary or to another area where ignition sources are not controlled,
measures will be necessary to limit the size of the release.
Flash calculations for liquid butane and propane suggest that product leaks may form
significant liquid pools. However, experimental work and field trial studies by Thornton
Research Centre have established that the jet formed when these materials are released
entrains considerable amounts of air. Small droplets of liquid LPG are formed. These
evaporate rapidly and the result is a cold vapour cloud with no significant pool formation. The
only situation for which pool formation can be envisaged is with butane in cold climates when
its vapour pressure is low. At the same time the discharge velocity must be low, as in the
case of a leak in the discharge line from a storage vessel, when the driving force is provided
largely by the head in the vessel. Therefore, in nearly all leakage situations ignition of the leak
will result in a jet fire, rather than a pool fire.
Finally the distances to various levels of radiation intensity from ignited leaks can be read
from the tables associated with Section 3. The results should then be compared with the
criteria given in Figure 03.02.01.02 of the Manual/PTS, which are discussed in Section 2.3.
2.3 RADIATION CRITERIA FOR PERSONNEL PROTECTION
In Figure 03.02.01.02 of the Manual/PTS maximum radiation flux levels are given for
personnel inside the site boundary and for the situation at the site fence. The notes attached
to this figure only give brief guidance on the choice of type of area. In order to give additional
guidance the following amplified notes have been prepared.
The acceptability of maximum heat flux levels is based, in part, on the person's ability to
escape, since injury is a function of heat flux and exposure time. Employees engaged in the
location's activities should be trained in what to do in an emergency and will be healthy and
active. On the other hand, members of the public at or near a location are unlikely to know
what to do and may also include the full community age and health range.
2.3.1 Plant boundary situations
Remote Area. An area where there is a low likelihood of people. Those likely to be
present will be fit but may be lightly clothed. There is no shelter available but escape is
both easy and obvious.
Urban Area. An area where there is a strong possibility of people of full community age
and health range being present. They will be fully clothed. There is no shelter available
but escape is easy or only slightly hindered (e.g. need to cross a road).
In a situation where there is no site fence, such as an automotive LPG station, it may be
necessary to relate the size of the fire to the time needed to get away from the heat. For
instance, not more than 30 seconds should be required to move from a radiation intensity of 5
kilowatts/ metre (kW/sq.m) (second degree burns in ca. 30 secs) to an intensity of 3 kW/sq.m
(second degree burns in 60 secs) and a further 90 seconds to get to an intensity of 1.5
kW/sq.m.
Critical Area. This is the same as an urban area, but with hindered means of escape.
2.3.2 Plant areas
Process Area. Those likely to be present will be healthy and trained in emergency
procedures. They will be fully clothed and will be able to be clear of the area within one
minute.
Protected Work Area. This refers to permanent buildings where personnel are obliged to
remain in order to operate plant, but may be exposed through glass. It may also provide a
refuge for those escaping from the fire. The radiation level refers to the building exposure.
Work Area. There is minimal shelter from the fire and slightly hindered escape. Those
present will be healthy and be fully clothed.
Critical Area. This is one where an operator may have to be present for short times
occasionally, e.g. to check the state of equipment. He will be trained in what to do if a fire
starts, but escape routes may be hindered because of plant complexity.
2.3.3 Flash fires
When a cloud of hydrocarbon vapour ignites the initial flash fire will be of high intensity, but of
such a short duration that only people actually enveloped in it will be seriously burnt.
2.4 VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION
If an LPG installation is designed to the current Manual/PTS and other Group standards
for handling LPG, or has been adequately updated, the probability of a leak or spill being
large enough to result in an explosion will be very low. In addition, trials carried out by
research organizations have shown that vapour cloud explosions in an open situation are very
unlikely. If LPG vapour enters an area where equipment or pipework are closely spaced, or
enters a building, drainage system or another confined space, an explosion may well be
possible.
Vapour cloud explosion is a complicated subject, and is still an active research topic. If a
company considers that it is necessary to review the possibility of such an event, it should
consult CHSE for advice.
2.5 BOILING LIQUID EXPANDING VAPOUR EXPLOSION (BLEVE)
This type of explosion occurs when a ductile vessel, containing a liquid whose vapour
pressure is well above atmospheric, ruptures. Because the vessel is made of a ductile
material its shell tears, generating a relatively small number of large fragments. If the liquid in
the vessel is flammable and the rupture has been caused by heat from an external fire
weakening the wall of the vessel above liquid level, the BLEVE produces a buoyant fireball.
The size of the fireball, its duration and the intensity of its radiation are determined by the total
contents of the product in the vessel. The pieces of the vessel can travel several hundreds of
metres. This is the situation usually associated with the occurrence of a BLEVE.
In the past a BLEVE has been considered as an unrealistic event for an installation designed
to Group standards. However, it must be recognized that BLEVEs occur somewhere in
the world, either with transport tanks or in fixed installations, at the rate of about one every
two years. Therefore, the possibility has to be recognized, particularly by PETRONAS
companies with older installations .
If the installation meets the requirements of the Manual/PTS the probability of a BLEVE will
be low enough to be considered unrealistic, because these standards have been developed
specifically to eliminate the possibility of the vessel walls being overheated. However, if some
of the requirements are not met and/or if operating procedures are not strictly enforced, the
probability could be much higher. A critical review of the design, operation and maintenance
of the installation should be carried out if any concern is felt by a company. CHSE would
be prepared to assist in such a review.
Another possible cause of vessel failure is severe over pressurization, probably associated
with vessel imperfections due to faults in the material of construction, faults in its fabrication,
or possibly due to internal corrosion. Failure for these reasons is considered extremely
unlikely for a vessel installed to the requirements of the Manual/PTS and operated correctly. If
a source of ignition is also present a fireball similar to that produced by a BLEVE will occur.
2.6 SELECTION OF LEAK REDUCTION MEASURES AND METHODS TO MITIGATE THE
EFFECTS
If any of the leakage scenarios that have been examined are found to give unacceptable
radiation levels at the site boundary or within the facility it will be necessary to consider
measures that will either reduce the probability of the release, reduce its length of time, or
reduce the radiation level. In the first place the requirements of the Manual/PTS should be
applied. However, if these are not practicable other methods may be considered. The
suggestions given below are not exhaustive; some will be more suitable for Marketing
locations, while others may be preferred by Manufacturing locations. It must be recognized
that there may be occasions when it is not practicable to improve the installation to an
adequate level of safety. In that case it may be, necessary to shut down or relocate the
facilities.
Installing hydrocarbon gas detectors/alarms, possibly interconnected to emergency shut
down valves.
Incorporating fusible links in the actuating systems for emergency shut down valves.
Installing secondary emergency shut down valves with a mode of failure non-common to
the primary valves.
Welding more of the pipework and valves.
Connecting all relief valves to a flare or vent system.
Providing fire protection/tank cooling for small tanks as well as for large tanks.
Providing fire protection for adjacent equipment.
Pressurization or sealing of nearby buildings containing sources of ignition (e.g. an
electrical substation).
Using breakaway couplings or drive-away protection in road and rail tank filling/discharge
systems.
Installing vehicle impact barriers.
Using load cells/weigh bridge to reduce the chance of overfilling bulk lorries or rail tank
wagons.
Using computer controlled loading/unloading.
Replacing hoses with loading arms.
Using mounded storage at new sites.
3. CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENTS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This part of the Guide-lines provides a range of dispersion and fire hazard assessments to
complement the leakage scenarios described in Section 2. The structure which has been
adopted is intended to mirror the main classes of hazard which can arise, which are vapour
and two-phase jet releases. However, a prerequisite for carrying out dispersion and fire
hazard assessments is the calculation of the relevant mass flow rates. The three resulting
sections are headed:
Calculation of flow rates - vapour leakage flows
- liquid leakage flows
Vapour jets, dispersion and fires
Two-phase jets, dispersion and fires
3.2 CALCULATION OF FLOW RATES
The following sections provide calculation methods for most leakage situations. For a general
treatment of the calculation of leakage flows, the reader is referred to the review written by
Ramskill and entitled "Discharge rate calculation methods for use in plant safety
assessments" (Ref. 1).
The leakage from equipment at LPG installations will be of two types. It may come from the
vapour space of vessels or from lines handling LPG vapour. when only vapour flow has to be
considered. Alternatively, the leak may be from lines or equipment handling liquid LPG. In
these cases liquid flow or two-phase flow may occur. Vapour leakage flow calculations and
liquid/two-phase flow calculations are described in the following subsections.
3.2.1 Vapour leakage flows
Vapour leakage flows may be divided into two categories:
Flow through relief valves and other cases where choked flow occurs.
Flow through holes where choked flow does not occur.
Choked flow occurs where the ratio of upstream and down-stream pressure is greater than a
critical value. For propane and butane this occurs where:
Pr essure in pipe or vessel
Atmospheric pressure
1.8
In practice this will be the likely situation at many installations. For ease of calculation it is
recommended that all vapour leaks are treated as choked flow and handled as described
below, although this may be a conservative assumption. If required, calculation methods for
unchoked flow can be found in Reference 1.
These flows should be sufficiently accurate for most leakage situations. However, in complex
cases, e.g. where there is a large hole in a pipe which is more than, say, 20 m from the vessel
which is the source of pressure, pipe friction losses will reduce the flow rate. In these cases
reference should be made to the review by Ramskill (Ref. 1).
The calculation of choked flow is demonstrated by the operation of a relief valve. The relief
valve on a partly filled vessel of LPG will open as soon as the pressure in the vapour space of
the vessel has risen to the relief valve set pressure. This could for example be due to the
effect of a fire close to the vessel. The formula to be used for the flow calculation is that
derived from API RP 520 - "Recommended Practice for the Design and Installation of
Pressure Receiving Systems in Refineries" (Ref. 2). The equation is derived from a general
equation for conditions of critical flow and may be written:
W
KAP
C
M
T
(1)
where:
W is the flow rate (Kg/s),
C is the gas/vapour constant,
K is the discharge coefficient,
A is the discharge area (m),
P is the vessel design pressure x 1.2 (N/m),
(or upstream pressure for holes in equipment)
M is the molecular weight,
T is the relief valve inlet temperature (K).
The value of C is 145 for propane and butane.
The discharge coefficient (K) of a relief valve varies with the inlet and disc shape and also lift
characteristics. It should be taken as 0.9.
Tables 1(A), (B) and (C) give the discharge area (A) for typical relief valves.
Equation (1) may also be used for vapour flow through holes in equipment. In this case the
value for the discharge coefficient (K) should be 0.8.
For the case of tanks affected by fire, equation 1 reduces to the following working equations
(2) + (3):
For propane tanks:
W =
419
KAP
(Kg/s) (2)
For butane tanks:
W =
367
KAP
(Kg/s) (3)
In this case the relief valve inlet temperature (T) has been taken as 100C, not the equilibrium
temperature for the pressure at which the relief valve is blowing. The temperature of 100C is
based on experimental fire engulfment trials.
3.2.2 Liquid leakage flows
Simple liquid flows may generally be calculated by the use of Bernoulli's equation. Examples
include leaks at temperatures well below the boiling point, or orifice type leaks driven by the
product head. In general, however, leakage flows will be two phase in nature with varying
vapour to liquid ratios.
Propane and propane/butane mixtures are generally handled as liquids well above their
atmospheric boiling points, so that a large fraction will flash during emission. With butane,
however, it is more likely that on occasion the temperature may fall below its boiling point at
atmospheric pressure. Whilst this condition increases the likelihood that the leakage flow has
a higher liquid percentage, significant vapour emission will still arise. This may be understood
by examining Figure 01.02.08.01 of the Manual/PTS, which shows the absolute vapour
pressures of those light hydrocarbons which are the principal components of commercial
LPG.
In general terms, the calculation of flashing LPG flows from pressurized systems is complex
since rapid evaporation of the liquid can take place before, during and after emission. The
precise form of emission, pipe rupture, flange leak, valve leak, hose burst, etc., can play a
major part in conditioning the resultant flow.
For simplicity the equations presented in these Guidelines are adequate for nearly all leakage
situations that an assessment team could meet. More generally, however, the calculation of
two phase flows is complex so that where greater precision in calculation becomes important
the matter should be referred to PETRONAS.
Appendix 3 of the Institute of Petroleum Model Code of Safe Practice, Part 9, Liquefied
Petroleum Gas, Volume 1, describes the calculation of release rates based on the application
of a typical simple equation which assumes a homogeneous equilibrium two-phase flashing
liquid release from the orifice. The discharge coefficient has been taken as 1.0. These
assumptions will obviously produce leakage rates at variance with those calculated using the
equations set out herein.
3.2.2.1 Overflows through relief valve vents
This case can arise when the relief valve opens as a result of product being pumped into the
vessel after it is full. Maximum liquid flow rate into the vessel should be used for the
consequence calculations.
It is recommended that the capacity of the relief valve is checked for this flow, since changes to
the LPG handling system may have been made since the system was designed. The
recommended method is to be found in section 3.17 of API RP 521. The flow formulae to be
used are presented in Appendix C of API RP 520 (Ref. 3).
3.2.2.2 Flows from broken equipment
When pressurized LPG is released from containment the discharge is usually a two-phase
mixture of vapour and liquid. The behaviour of such a discharge is difficult to analyse and not
fully understood. There is a maximum discharge rate which exists for a two-phase mixture. This
occurs at some critical pressure ratio between the upstream pressure and the exit pressure.
Several methods have been proposed to evaluate the critical discharge rate of a two-phase
flow from a pipe. Here the simple equations described in Ramskill's review are used . The
equation to be used is dependent on the length/diameter ratio (L/D) of the leakage path. In all
the equations used here the discharge coefficient is taken as 0.6.
Three leakage path situations may be considered:
For L/D = 0
We have orifice flow and the flow rate is described by:
M = 0.6 A
) P P ( 2
o a

( 4 )
where
M is mass flow rate (kg/s)
P
o
is upstream pressure (N/m
2
)
P
a
is atmospheric pressure (N/m
2
)
A is area of hole (m
2
)
is density (kg/m
3
)
Examples of this situation are small holes in pipes or equipment, e.g. due to corrosion
For 0 < L/D <12
For this situation the flow rate will lie between that for orifice flow and that for two phase
equilibrium flow. For most flange leakage cases as well as pump seal failures, the L/D value
lies in this ranges. The conservative figure given for orifice flow should be used unless a more
accurate figure is required. In which case refer to Ramskill ( Ref.1)
In the scenarios that are listed in the in the worked example , orifice flow (i.e. L/D = 0 ) has
been used.
For L/D 12
The critical mass flow rate can be calculated using the two phase equilibrium flow model given
below. For more detail see Ramskill (Ref.1)
(1). Calculated the critical pressure P
c
at The pipe exit as :
P
c
= 0.55 P
0
(7)
(2) The critical temperature T
c
( K ) corresponding to the satured choke pressure
P
c
is then found using vapour pressure data.
(3) Assuming thermodynamic equilibrium, the vapour mass fraction which would flash off
from the liquid is calculated :
m = 1 exp (
c
(T
1
T
c
)) (8)
where
m = vapour mass fraction
c = liquid specific heat (j/Kg) at T
c
= latent heat of vaporization of liquid (J/Kg) at T
c
T
1
= reservoir storage temperature (K)
Note : If m is negative then liquid flow only will occur and equation (4) should be used
to calculated the flow rate.
(4) Assuming homogeneous mixing and so slip between the phases, the mixture density is
calculated as :

c
m
g
m
+

_
,
1
1
1
(9)
where

g
is the vapour density at T
c
and P
c
(kg/m
3
)

1
is the liquid density at T
c
and P
c
(kg/m
3
)
(5) The standard discharge formula is then used to calculate the critical flow rate :
M = 0.6 A
2
c o c
P P ( )
( 10 )
where M is the mass flow rate ( kg/s)
This calculation should be used for large leaks and ruptures of lines and hoses, where
two-phases flow will form upstream of the break. Note that if the leak is fed by a pump
the flow rate could be determine by the pump capacity rather than the flow regime.
In the case of a pipe rupture the escaping LPG will probably be fed from both sides of
the break, e.g. from the pump as well as from the receiving vessel.

3.3 VAPOUR JETS DISPERSION AND FIRES
3.3.1 Relief valve vapour releases
Single phase (vapour only) emission is assumed from vessel relief valves, as generally
observed under fire engulfment conditions. The case of vessel overfill and subsequent two
phase emission through the pipe is taken as a special case of the two-phase jets and fires
dealt with in the next section.
For the discussions of relief valve dispersions and fires which follow ,dispersion and jet fire
radiation calculations have carried out for wide range of emitted vapour flow rates, which
cover all sizes of tanks in general use within Group operations. The selected flow rates
are:
Propane : 2.5, 5, 7.5,10,15, 20, 25, 30, 40 ( kg/s)
Butane : 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10,15, 20, 25, 30 ( kg/s)
In deriving the various consequences it is necessary to make various assumption in regard to
the particular facility and equipment. In order to carry out calculation to complete Tables 2 and
3,typical tanks sizes, valves sizes, vent stack height and length have been used (see Figure
1) . Where the facility under examination differs from this model facility, interpolation between
the calculated figures will be necessary.
3.3.1.1 Dispersion
As the source of emission under consideration in this section is vapour only, the
PLUMEPATH dispersion package has been used for emissions well above ground level. An
example is shown in Figure 2 for butane emitted from a vertical relief valve vent pipe.
Dispersion plumes have been calculated for the mass flow rates set out above. In all these
cases mixing with air occurs rapidly and it may be assumed that flammable plumes do not
reach down to the ground. Therefore no dispersion data is presented here for vapour
emission from relief valves.
3.3.1.2 Fires
The radiation fields generated by relief valve fires have been modeled with computer
packages which have been developed by Thornton Research Centre and validated by
experimental studies. Tables 2 and 3 present distances to the critical ground level fluxes of
1.5, 5, 8 and 13 kW/m and to the critical tank top level fluxes of 8, 32 and 44 kW/m, as
identified in the Manual/PTS.
A typical wind speed of 5 m/s has been assumed in all calculations. It should be noted that if
wind speeds are considerably higher radiation flux levels close to the stack can be
significantly higher. If this could be critical, further radiation calculations will be required for
higher wind speeds in which case PETRONAS should be consulted.
As may be seen from the Tables the higher flux levels are frequently not achieved. In addition
to the critical distance data, the Tables also present flame lengths, flame lift-off and stack
outlet height above grade.
3.3.2 Other vapour releases
For the dispersion of vapor releases from sources which do not behave as relief valve
releases, in that they may be horizontal and near the ground, dispersion calculations will be
very unreliable. This is because the presence of other equipment in the area will cause
unpredictable air movement. The distance to lower flammable limit (LFL) will be smaller than
the conservative estimates which can be obtained by using the data in Figure 3 for liquid
releases.
For the assessment of vapour fires reference should be made to the vapour fire curves shown
in Figures 4 to 16 (a description is given in section 3.4.2). As propane is less radiative than
butane these results may be used for propane as well.
3.4 TWO-PHASE JETS - DISPERSION AND FIRES
Two-phase jets may arise from a wide range of events in a facility and may lead to a variety of
consequences. As set out in Part One of these Guide-lines, the following situations have been
identified as having the potential for the creation of a serious incident.
flange (joint) leak
pump seal leak
open drain valve
small bore pipe rupture
hose leak or rupture
tank overfill/relief valve discharge
As may be seen from this list, a more disparate collection of release situations is possible in
comparison to the relief valve cases considered in the previous section. Again consequence
information is presented calculated for a wide range of mass flow rates at the source. The only
geometrical factor which has been introduced to help differentiate two phase discharge cases is
the division into horizontal and vertical emissions.
A wide range of flow rates to cover the range and scale of the principal incidents listed above
have been considered.
3.4.1 Dispersion
Before describing the dispersion calculations adopted and results obtained, some words of
caution are necessary. The calculation of highly-turbulent flashing two-phase flows is an active
and difficult research field. The guidance provided here is therefore subject to revision as better
models are developed and validated.
The principal purpose of the dispersion calculations is to assess the extent of the flammable
cloud which will be formed. The distance to the lower flammable limit (LFL) is thus the main
parameter calculated. This then enables a judgement to be made in regard to facilities engulfed
by the flammable plume and the proximity to the site boundary. As mentioned in Part One, the
initial consequence of ignition of this cloud will be a transient flash fire which although of high
intensity will only seriously affect people within it. The major effect of a flash fire will be to
initiate a jet fire or, much less likely, a pool fire.
Dispersion distances for dense gases, such as LPG vapours, are strongly dependent on the
nature of the surface over which the gas disperses. The relevant parameter used in the models,
called the surface roughness length, can be estimated. A reasonable conservative value
relevant to typical LPG facilities is 0.1 m.
The vertical temperature gradient in the atmosphere has a considerable effect on gas
dispersion. Strong surface cooling, under clear skies at night, and a low wind produce stable
conditions. Weather conditions are denoted by letters A to F (after Pasquill - discussed in Ref.
4). The most stable conditions are denoted by the letter F. Neutral conditions, under cloudy
skies or in higher winds, are most common, and are given the letter D. Strong sunshine in the
daytime, with low winds, produces unstable temperature gradients, the most extreme being
denoted by A. In these circumstances, gas will dilute in a shorter distance than for D stability.
The largest dispersion distances are found in F stability weather. Calculations are normally
performed for 5 m/s wind speed and D stability (5D) to give typical average results. 2 m/s wind
and F stability (2F) represents a typical worst case.
3.4.1.1 Horizontal dispersion
The source for the dispersion calculations was assumed to be a flashing jet of pressurized
liquid propane or butane. No dilution due to the jet has been assumed. For horizontal jets
directed downwind, this dilution is counteracted by the fact that the jet pushes the gas
further downwind. For other jet orientations, the results are conservative (predicted
dispersion distances greater than actual).
Figure 3 presents distances to LFL for the 5D and 2F atmospheric conditions for a surface
roughness factor of 0.1 metre.
3.4.1.2 Vertical dispersion
Calculation methods for two-phase vertical releases are still being developed. In the
meantime the horizontal dispersion calculations described above may be taken as a worst
case analysis of the vertical dispersion case. Where this failure mode is critical,
PETRONAS should be asked to advise.
3.4.2 Fires
The radiation fields generated by two-phase Jets have been calculated with computer models
which have now been partially validated by large-scale jet fire trials. A typical worst case wind
speed of 5 m/s has been assumed in all calculations.
Results for varying mass flow rates are presented for butane in Figures 4 to 16. As propane is
less radiative than butane, these results may be used for propane also.
3.4.2.1 Horizontal jet fires
Curves showing the distance to critical flux levels for a range of mass flow rates are
presented in Figures 4 to 9. These give radiation fluxes at ground level. The flame shapes
and lengths are different for liquid and vapour fires. Two limiting curves are shown, the
upper for liquid and the lower for vapour fires. Depending on the precise ratio of liquid to
vapour, actual cases will lie between the two extremes. In the high momentum jet fires
which these Figures represent, jet momentum decreases with increasing distance along
the jet until at a given point buoyancy forces become dominant and the flame lifts off the
ground. This phenomenon enables an effective jet impingement distance to be defined.
Figure 10 shows the horizontally projected flame lengths calculated for the range of flow
rates.
3.4.2.2 Vertical jet fires
In general, vertical jet fires may be expected to have a smaller radiative impact than the
corresponding horizontal jet fire. A set of curves showing the downwind distance to critical
flux levels for vertical jet fires with a wind speed of 5 m/s is presented in Figures 11 to 16.
These do not give exactly the same figures as Tables 2 and 3 because there is no stack
pipe and the emission conditions are different.
4. WORKED EXAMPLE
In order to demonstrate the application of Sections 2 and 3 of the Guidelines, a worked
example of a study at an existing facility has been completed. This part of the Guidelines
follows the assumptions, considerations and calculations involved in that example.
4.1 DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY
The facility is an LPG depot which is supplied by barge via the local river. It comprises a
barge unloading berth, bulk storage for both commercial propane and commercial butane,
and bulk road vehicle loading. The unloading berth is separated from the remainder of the
facility by a motorway. Figures 17 and 18 show the depot layout and a simplified flow scheme,
respectively.
4.1.1 Barge unloading berth
The unloading berth includes two 100 mm dia loading arms, one for liquid service, the
other for vapour. Barge unloading is performed using a shore-based compressor. The
loading arms are hydraulically operated from a control station at the berth. Each arm
contains several swivel joints and the connection with the barge is via a flanged joint. The
arms are not equipped with a breakaway coupling or other quick release device.
On the shore side of the loading arms, the line from each arm bifurcates for either
propane or butane service. The vapour line is equipped with an hydraulically-operated
ball valve before the line bifurcates. This valve is actuated electrically from the
compressor station. The liquid line has no such valve.
As soon as each line bifurcates the four lines (i.e. propane liquid, butane liquid, propane
vapour, butane vapour) are each fitted with two flanged manually-operated ball valves.
Each liquid line is then fitted with a flanged non-return valve. There are several small bore
fittings for instruments, draining and hydrostatic pressure relief in this area.
Once the pipelines are clear of the valve locations, the two vapour lines are lagged to
prevent vapour condensation.
Firefighting facilities at the barge berth consist of dry chemical fire extinguishers. A
hydrant is located on top of the river bank some 30 metres from the loading arms. This
hydrant is partially obstructed from the berth by a building housing fire pumps which take
suction from the river. A fire alarm is located on the berth.
There is no emergency shutdown or leak detection system in place on the berth apart
from the remote operated valve on the vapour line.
4.1.2 Bulk storage
The vapour pipelines to the barge berth are routed via a compressor which takes suction
either from the vapour space on one of four butane spheres (each of 1 025 m
3
capacity)
or from the vapour space of one propane sphere (1 750 m
3
capacity). The liquid filling line
into the bottom of each butane sphere also doubles as a liquid withdrawal pipe. The liquid
filling line into the propane sphere is directed into the top of the vessel.
The four butane spheres each have two flanged connections directly under the vessel.
These connections are liquid inlet/outlet and drain. The liquid inlet/outlet is fitted with a
flanged hydraulically-operated ball valve followed by a Shand and Jurs hydraulic valve.
The valve nearer the sphere includes a fusible link which is designed to cause the valve
to fail closed under fire engulfment conditions. The drain connection is equipped with a
flanged manually-operated ball valve followed by a spring-loaded dead-man ball valve.
The drain line then extends beyond the periphery of the sphere. This line is lagged as is
the liquid inlet/ outlet line.
The top connections into each butane sphere comprise vapour line, pressure relief
valves, Whessoe contents gauge and maximum fill level float gauge. All connections are
flanged. The vapour line is equipped with an hydraulically-operated ball valve, again
actuated electrically from the compressor station. The Whessoe contents gauge is local
readout only. The maximum fill level float gauge is linked to the compressor station such
that in the event of overfill the compressor will cut out.
The propane sphere has a welded line from the base of the sphere to the primary valve
which is located at the edge of the bunded area some ten metres from the periphery of
the tank. The primary valve is flanged and is remotely operated. It is followed again by a
Shand and Jurs valve. A catchpot is located downstream from these valves and a lagged
drain line connected to the pot. The drain line is fitted with a manual valve followed by a
spring loaded valve.
The top nozzles into the propane sphere are as for the butane spheres plus the liquid
inlet line. The liquid inlet line is fitted with an hydraulically-operated ball valve with
electrical actuation from the compressor station as above.
All pressure relief valves discharge direct to atmosphere. There is no flare or vent system.
All spheres are located in separate low-bunded areas. All are equipped with a water
spray sprinkler system.
The nozzle details for the propane and the butane spheres are indicated in the attached
Figures 19 and 20.
4.1.3 Bulk road vehicle loading
Product stored at the depot is pumped into bulk road vehicles. The bulk loading facility
includes a swivel-jointed loading arm for liquid transfer. There is no vapour return line.
Connection with the road vehicle is made using an Acme coupling. The loading arms are
equipped with a manually-operated valve adjacent to the Acme coupling. There is no
breakaway coupling fitted or other driveaway protection/prevention. A remotely-operated
valve is installed in the line upstream from the loading am. This valve is operated from an
emergency stop located directly adjacent to the loading point. Loading is performed using
a preset turbine meter. The loading area is protected from vehicular damage by highway
guard-railing.
Firefighting facilities at the loading area consist of hand held fire extinguishers plus
adjacent fire hydrants. There is no sprinkler system nor are there fire water monitors.
4.1.4 Depot operation
Barge unloading is completed under the control of a shore-based supervisor in
conjunction with barge crew. The supervisor does not stay at the barge berth during the
operation; he is mostly at the compressor station which is located over 100 metres away
from the berth and not in direct line of sight. The supervisor checks the pipelines and the
berth about once per hour during unloading operations. The unloading rates are
approximately 180 m
3
/hour for propane and 140 m
3
/hour for butane. At the completion of
unloading, liquid lines are blown clear of liquid as far as is possible, using the plant
compressor.
The compressor station is equipped with a control panel which enables the supervisor to
set the remotely operated valves on the storage tanks and on the vapour line at the barge
berth. The supervisor thus controls transfer of product into the spheres. As stated above,
there is no remote readout of product level in each tank, only a high level overfill cutout.
Filling level is controlled by observing the local readout from the Whessoe gauges.
The bulk road vehicle loading operation is controlled by the vehicle driver. The depot
supervisor is usually not present during loading operations. The driver does not have
access to storage tank valves, only to valves in the delivery pipework. Loading rate is
approximately 20 m
3
/hour.
4.2 AUDIT OF THE FACILITY AND CHOICE OF SCENARIOS
The audit of the facility was completed by a team of four people including the depot
operations superintendent, a company safety adviser and two LPG engineering specialists.
The team spent a day on site gathering information and inspecting the layout, operation and
maintenance of the facility. Depot staff were able to advise on operations and maintenance
procedures and engineering staff provided layout drawings, flow schemes and technical data
(i.e. pump curves, pressure relief valve data, etc.).
Having assembled all relevant information the team then studied the facility to determine
those situations which might result in leakage of LPG. The approach adopted was to
commence with the barge berth and then follow the pipe track to the compressor station, into
the storage vessels, and then out to the bulk vehicle loading point. Using the procedure set
out in Section 2.1 the team identified a number of leakage scenarios which they considered to
be credible and/or the consequences potentially severe.
4.2.1 Barge berth
4.2.1.1 Scenario 1
There are no protective devices on the loading arms (e.g. breakaway couplings etc.) to
prevent damage or rupture in the event of excessive barge movement. It was therefore
decided that loading arm rupture should be considered. There are no emergency
shutdown valves on the barge so full bore continuous flow driven by the pressure in the
barge tank was adopted. There are similarly no emergency shutdown valves on the liquid
lines to the storage tanks on shore. Although the non-return valve in these lines
decreases the probability of liquid flow from the pipelines, it cannot be relied upon for
emergency shutdown purposes. The pipeline must therefore also be included as an
additional leakage source.
Scenario 1: Loading am rupture. Leak fed by barge storage and lines on shore.
4.2.1.2 Scenario 2
The barge berth area contains many flanged joints, the loading arms contain several
swivel joints, and there are numerous small bore connections in the area. The number of
joints and connections warrants the consideration of a flange or joint leak.
As the liquid line is blown clear after each delivery, there is no need to consider the
effects of barge impact during berthing.
Scenario 2: Flange, swivel joint, or small bore connection leak during barge
discharge.
4.2.1.3 Scenario 3
The pipelines from the barge berth to the storage vessels run parallel and adjacent to the
motorway for some distance before crossing under the motorway. The pipe track is lower
than the motorway and it is conceivable that either a vehicle or goods from a vehicle
could leave the motorway and impact upon the pipelines.
Scenario 3: Damage to pipelines due to vehicular or vehicular goods impact.
4.2.2 Pipe track
4.2.2.1 Scenario 4
The pipelines from the barge berth to the storage tanks are flanged along the entire
length. Where the pipelines enter the depot after crossing under the motorway there are a
number of redundant valves and connections which, as above, warrant the consideration
of a flange leak in this area. The pipelines enter the depot at the south west corner of the
property. A concrete block wall in excess of two metres high separates the depot from the
neighbouring property.
Scenario 4: Flange leak on pipe track at entry point into depot.
4.2.3 Storage vessels
4.2.3.1 Scenario 5
The pipelines at the barge berth and throughout the depot are not clearly marked to
indicate product carried. There is no interlock in the valving system to prevent propane
being delivered into the butane pipework. Given the above, it is quite conceivable that
propane could be delivered into the butane spheres. The butane spheres are not
designed for propane vapour pressure.
Scenario 5: Propane delivered into butane rated spheres.
4.2.3.2 Scenario 6
The butane spheres are fitted with flanges on the sphere side of the primary valve on the
liquid inlet/outlet and on the drain line. Given the inability to control a leak from these
flanges and the sphere inventory, leaks from these flanges must be considered.
Scenario 6: Leaks from flanged joints on butane spheres on sphere side of
primary valve.
4.2.3.3 Scenario 7
Based on Scenario 6, a fire fed from a flange leak underneath the butane spheres must
be considered. This fire may in turn lead to overpressurisation of the vessel and
consequent vapour discharge through the vessel relief valve(s).
Scenario 7: Vapour release from butane sphere pressure relief valve due to fire
engulfment.
4.2.3.4 Scenario 8
The Whessoe level gauges on the butane and propane spheres are only of the local
indicator type. They are not equipped with alarm or emergency shutdown features. The
lack of a remote readout at the control point in the compressor station is likely to lead to
an estimation of ullage by the depot supervisor and the possibility of error.
The maximum fill level gauge can only be tested by exceeding the safe filling level. The
gauge is not tested and its reliability is therefore questionable.
The level instrumentation as described above on both the butane and propane spheres is
inadequate. Overfill of the spheres must therefore be considered.
In the event of overfill, liquid will flow through the vapour suction line to the compressor.
The knockout drum adjacent to the compressor is not equipped with any liquid level
alarms or trips. Liquid could therefore enter the compressor giving a liquid stroke. This
would cause a major leak.
Scenario 8: Overfill of propane/butane spheres leading to major leak at
compressor.
4.2.3.5 Scenario 9
The propane sphere is fitted with a flanged connection on the liquid outlet line on the
sphere side of the primary valve at the edge of the bunded area. As for the butane case a
leak from this flange must be considered.
Scenario 9: Leak from flanged joint on propane sphere on sphere side of primary
valve.
4.2.3.6 Scenario 10
A fire fed from the flanged joint leak on the propane sphere in Scenario 9 may lead to
overpressurisation of the vessel and consequent vapour discharge through the vessel
relief valve(s).
Scenario 10: Vapour release from propane sphere pressure relief valve due to
fire engulfment.
4.2.4 Product transfer
4.2.4.1 Scenario 11
The pumps for transfer of product from the storage spheres to the bulk vehicle loading
point are located at the edge of the bunded area approximately 10 metres from the tank
shell. Each pump is fitted with a mechanical seal but not with a throttle bush. Total failure
of a pump seal is not a common event but neither is it rare enough to discount.
Scenario 11: Leak from pump seal due to total failure of seal.
4.2.4.2 Scenario 12
The compressor station is an area of complicated pipework again with many flanged
joints and small-bore connections.
Scenario 12: Flange or small-bore connection leak at compressor station.
4.2.5 Bulk road vehicle loading
4.2.5.1 Scenario 13
As for the barge berth there are no protective devices on the loading am at the bulk road
vehicle loading point to prevent damage or rupture in the event of a driveaway. Loading
am rupture is therefore included. The only emergency stop button in this area is located
adjacent to the loading point. It would probably be inaccessible in the event of loading am
rupture.
The bulk vehicles are equipped with emergency stop buttons on each corner of the tank
frame. However, given that a positive action is required to activate these buttons and that
such action is required adjacent to a large leak. the vehicle should still be considered as a
leakage source.
Scenario 13: Loading arm rupture. Leak fed by delivery pump and bulk road
vehicle storage tank.
4.2.5.2 Scenario 14
The loading area also contains many flanged and swivel joints and small-bore fittings.
Scenario 14: Flange, swivel joint or small bore connection leak at bulk road
vehicle loading point.
4.2.5.3 Scenario 15
The coupling between delivery pipework and vehicle is a vulnerable area in that the driver
may not make the coupling correctly or a sealing ring may be damaged or missing. The
coupling must be made at each delivery. The frequency of connection warrants the
inclusion of possible leakage.
Scenario 15: Leak from incorrect or damaged coupling.
4.3 CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT, ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED ACTION
In this section each of the leakage scenarios is considered in turn and a consequence
assessment is completed as described in Section 3. The acceptability of the consequences are
then considered and possible actions suggested to reduce the probability of the scenarios,
reduce their impact by minimising the leakage rate, and/or provide additional protection to
people, property and equipment.
The possible actions suggested for this example should not be seen as 'correct answers' for
these scenarios. Neither are they exhaustive. They are merely typical of the types of action
which might be relevant to a particular situation. Actions should be selected according to
specific site requirements.
With the exception of vapour release from pressure relief valves, the consequence
assessments have only been completed for leaks from liquid pipelines since these leaks give
more severe consequences than for the vapour case.
If the proposed actions for offending scenarios in liquid lines are not to be also applied for the
vapour cases then these cases must be considered in their own right.
4.3.1 Scenario 1: Barge berth loading arm rupture
Calculations have only been completed for the propane case since the vapour pressure,
release rate and consequent hazards are higher than for butane.
Leak = Two phase leak from 100 mm dia hole
From Section 3.2.2.2
Adopt L/D >12
P
c
= 0.55 P
o
For P
o
choose equilibrium vapour pressure at 15C =
9 x 10
5
N/m
2
(Ref Fig 01.02.08.01 of Manual /PTS)
P
c
= 0.55 x 9 x10
5
= 4.9 x 10
5
N/m2
Tc = 268K
m = 1 exp [
c
( T
1
T
c
)]
with c = 2 407 J/kgK (Ref Fig 01.02.11.01 of Manual /PTS)
and = 383 000 J/Kg (Ref Fig 01.02.10.01 of Manual /PTS)
m = 1 - exp
1
]
1
2 407
383 000
288 268 ( )
= 0.12
Mixture density
c
=
m m
g

+

_
,
1
1
1
c
=
012
93
088
535
1
.
.
.
+
_
,

(Ref Tables 01.02.04.01 and 01.02.0.03. of Manual /PTS.)
= 69kg/m
3
Critical flow rate
M = 0.6 A ) ( 2
c o c
P P
= 0.6 x
x
x x x
01
4
2 69 9 10 49 10
2
5 5
.
( . )
= 35.4 kg/sec
From Figure 3 estimate distance to LFL as follows:
5D conditions - 105 m
2F conditions - 190 m
Probability of early ignition is high. Vehicles on motorway most likely ignition source.
From Figures 4 to 16 distances to radiation flux levels from the ignited mixture are as follows:
Horizontal Jet Fires Vertical Jet Fires
1.5 kW/m 140 m 120 m
5 kW/m 110 m 65 m
13 kW/m 90 m 40 m
This scenario is clearly unacceptable, even though the leak considered above is fed by the
barge storage alone. The leakage rate would be much greater if the shore based pipelines
were also to contribute to the leak.
The consequences of this incident are so severe that the leakage rate and duration should be
reduced. The probability of the incident should also be reduced.
Possible means of achieving the above are:
Emergency release couplings on loading arms.
An inter-related system of remotely-operated fail-safe emergency shutdown valves at
the termination of the barge pipework and on the berth on the shore side of the loading
arms.
Inclusion of fusible links in emergency shutdown systems.
Supervision during entire unloading operation at the berth.
Improved fire protection/fire fighting and gas detection/ gas dispersion facilities.
Construction of a water curtain adjacent to the motorway.
4.3.2 Scenario 2: Flange., swivel joint, or small-bore connection leak at barge loading
berth
In this scenario, typically consider one segment of a flange gasket blown out. Based on a
number of pipe sizes from 50 mm to 300 mm diameter. the average leakage path area
equates to an effective hole diameter of 12 mm. A small-bore connection leak would give a
similar case. As above, the calculation is only completed for the propane case.
From Section 3.2.2.2
Adopt L/D = 0
M = 0.6A 2 ( ) P P
o a
= 0.6 x
x
x x x
0012
4
2 510 9 10 1 10
2
5 5
.
( )
= 2.0 kg/sec
2F conditions - 35 m.
The elevation of the barge berth is lower than the motorway and the berth is elevated above
the river. The above distances will therefore be conservative because LPG vapour is heavier
than air and the vapour will tend to fall to the river.
From Figs 4 to 16 distances to radiation flux levels from liquid fires are as follows:
1.5 kW/m 55 m 45 m
5 kW/m 40 m 30 m
8 kW/m 40 m 25 m
13 kW/m 35 m 20 m
The scenario is unacceptable. The radiation flux levels on the motorway particularly are
excessive.
The probability of leakage should be reduced.
The pipework in the barge berth area contains many joints and small bore connections.
Possible action to reduce the probability of leakage includes:
Rationalisation of pipework to reduce number of joints/ connections.
Replace flanged joints with welded joints.
In addition, possible action to prevent the vapour cloud reaching the motorway and/or to
protect the motorway from the effects of an ignited leak includes:
Construction of vapour barrier wall.
Installation of water curtain with or without automatic actuation triggered by gas detectors
on the berth.
4.3.3 Scenario 3: Damage to pipelines due to vehicular or vehicular goods impact
In this scenario the range of damage caused by impact could range from shearing the
pipelines to springing a flange. Typical leakage rates for these two extremes have already
been considered in the above two scenarios.
As both the above scenarios are unacceptable then this scenario is also unacceptable.
Possible actions are:
Install reinforced highway guard-railing adjacent to pipe track.
Bury pipelines in this area.
Install remote operated emergency shutdown valves at either end of vulnerable pipework.
4.3.4 Scenario 4: Flange leak on pipe track
The leakage rate in this scenario will be as for the similar case at the barge berth (i.e. M =
2.0 kg/sec). Where the pipelines enter the depot there is significant local confinement,
especially in a disused compressor shed. Confinement raises the possibility of vapour
cloud explosion in the event of ignition. The probability of ignition is high due to the
adjacent motorway and offices. This scenario is unacceptable.
Possible actions:
Reduce probability of leakage as for Scenario 2.
Examine need for disused building and demolish if possible and/or investigate other
means to reduce confinement.
4.3.5 Scenario 5: Propane delivered into butane rated spheres
In order to calculate the vapour pressure of a mixture created by delivering propane into
the butane spheres, a worst case of assuming 100 per cent propane at a receipt
temperature of 25C into an empty sphere has been adopted.
The vapour pressure of propane at 25C is 11.5 x 10
5
N/m which is higher than the
design pressure of the butane sphere of 7.3 x 10
5
N/m . This is also the start-to-
discharge pressure of the relief valves. The fully open pressure (accumulated pressure) is
8.0 x 10
5
N/m.
The scenario is unacceptable. If product contamination is a credible scenario, then the
relief valves should be sized to relieve sufficient propane vapour to avoid over-
pressurization of the vessel.
Possible actions to prevent product contamination are:
Clear and positive identification of pipelines throughout the depot and particularly at the
barge berth.
Introduction of a valve interlock system to ensure only one set of valves is open at the
barge berth.
Installation of in-line densitometers linked to an alarm/ shutdown system to detect
incorrect product in pipelines.
4.3.6 Scenario 6: Leaks from flanged Joints on butane spheres on sphere side of primary
valve
The leakage in this scenario will again be based on leakage from an equivalent hole
diameter of 12 mm.
From Scenario 2
M = 0.6A 2 ( ) P P
o a
= 0.6 x
x
x x x
0 012
4
2 577 31 10 1 10
2
5 5
.
( . )
= 1.1 kg/sec
From Figs 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 distances to radiation flux levels from liquid fires are:
Horizontal Jet Fires
1.5 kW/m 40 m
5 kW/m 30 m
8 kW/m 25 m
13 kW/m 25 m
44 kW/m 20 m
Vertical jet fires will impinge on the vessel shell in all cases. No radiation distances are
therefore given.
In the event of ignition the radiation effects on the sphere and on adjacent spheres exceed 44
kW/m and are therefore unacceptable.
Possible actions to reduce the probability of this scenario are:
Modification to sphere pipework and provision of correct valve to remove flanged joint
upstream of primary valve.
4.3.7 Scenario 7: Vapour release from butane sphere pressure relief valve
From Section 3.2.1, for fire-engulfed butane tanks
W =
367
KAP
kg/sec
Spheres are equipped with two pressure relief valves although only one valve is lined up at
any time. The valves are labelled as 6R10.
From Table 1c for R orifice,
Discharge area = 103.23 x 10
-4
m
W =
09 103 23 10 73 12 10
367
4 5
. . . . x x x x x
= 22.2 kg/sec.
Section 3.3.1.1 describes that flammable vapour plumes from vertical relief valves may be
assumed not to reach ground level. The distance to LFL is therefore not applicable in this
instance.
From Table 3, distance downwind to radiation flux levels are:
Tank Top Radiation Flux
8 kW/m - 45m
44 kW/m - -
Ground Level Radiation Flux
1.5 kW/m - 95 m
5 kW/m - 40 m
13 kW/m - -
The above flux levels indicate that the 5 kW/m radiation contour crosses the site boundary.
Whilst this boundary should probably be described as an urban area, the region adjacent to
the boundary is not developed and a higher radiation intensity could be tolerated. Given that
the flux level at the plant boundary is not much greater than 5 kW/m, this scenario is
considered to be acceptable and the existing location of the butane sphere closest to the
plant boundary does not warrant any action. Any future development outside the plant should
be monitored as construction of a hospital, school or other facility difficult to evacuate at short
notice would require a reappraisal of the situation.
4.3.8 Scenario 8: Overfill of propane/butane spheres
Overfill of the propane or butane spheres will not result in product leakage from the
spheres but will result in liquid flow through the suction line to the compressor.
A liquid stroke in the compressor is unacceptable.
Installation of remote readout level gauge in transfer control area.
Installation of level gauge capable of registering low level, high level and high-high level,
with alarms and inlet valve shutdown devices attached. Gauges should permit regular
testing to ensure satisfactory operation.
Regular testing of maximum fill level gauge.
Installation of liquid level emergency alarm on knockout drum with compressor trip.
4.3.9 Scenario 9: Leak from flanged joint on propane sphere on sphere side of primary
valve
This scenario as per Scenario 2:
M = 2.0 kg/sec.
Distances to LFL:
Distances to radiation flux levels from liquid fires are:
1.5 kW/m
5kW/m
8 kW/m
13 kW/m
44 kW/m
55 m
40 m
40 m
35 m
30 m
45 m
30 m
25 m
20 m
10 m
The radiation flux level on the propane sphere in the event of an ignited leak is excessive,
although the location of the primary valve remote from the sphere mitigates the impact on the
sphere. Possible actions are as for Scenario 6.
4.3.10 Scenario 10: Vapour release from propane sphere pressure relief valve due to fire
engulfment
From Section 3.2.1 for fire engulfed propane tanks:
W =
419
KAP
kg/sec
The propane sphere is equipped as per the butane spheres with two pressure relief valves
although only one is lined up at any time. The valve is labelled 6R10.
From Table 1C for R orifice:
Discharge area = 103.23 x 10
-4
m
W =
09 103 23 10 155 12 10
419
4 5
. . . . x x x x x
= 41.2 kg/sec
As for the butane case, the distance to LFL is not applicable as the flammable plume may be
assumed not to reach ground level.
From Table 2, distance downwind to radiation flux levels are:
Tank top Radiation flux
8 kW/m - 50 m
44 kW/m - -
Ground level radiation flux:
1.5 kW/m - 110
5 kW/m - 40
13 kW/m - -
As for the butane case, the 5 KW/m
2
radiation contour crosses the site boundary, The figures
are similar for both the propone and butane case and the points set out for the butane case are
therefore also applicable to this case.
4.3.11 Scenario 11: Leak from pump seal due to total failure of seal
Adopt L/D = 0
For pumps without throttle bushing, adopt effective diameter hole =17mm
M = 0.6A 2 ( ) P P )
o a
(a) For Propane

M = 0.6 x
x
x x x
0017
4
2 510 9 10 1 10 )
2
5 5
.
( )
= 4.0 kg/sec
From Figure 3 estimate distance to radiation flux levels from liquid fires are :
5D condition 35m
2F condition 55m
From Figures 4 to 16 distances to radiation flux levels from liquid fires are:
1.5 kW/m
5 kW/m
8 kW/m
13 kW/m
44 kW/m
80 m
60 m
55 m
50 m
45m
65 m
45 m
40 m
30 m
15 m
(b) For butane
M = 0.6 x
x
x x x
0017
4
2 577 31 10 1 10
2
5 5
.
( . )
= 2.2 kg/sec
5D condition 25m
2F condition 35m
1.5 kW/m
5 kW/m
8 kW/m
13 kW/m
44 kW/m
60 m
45 m
40 m
35 m
30 m
50 m
30 m
25 m
20 m
10 m
The transfer pumps are positioned at three locations in the depot. The propane pump
has the greatest potential for impact outside the depot whereas the butane pumps
have greater potential for internal impact. The vapour cloud from the propane pump
seal failure extends well beyond the depot boundary. Ignition of this leak gives
radiation flux levels which are unacceptable beyond the plant boundary. The flux
levels from the butane pump seal failure within the depot are also unacceptable for
process, protected work and work areas.
Installation of throttle bushes. This has the effect of reducing effective hole
diameter from 17 mm to 10 mm.
Installation of improved integrity seals (e.g. double mechanical seals).
Review of operating and maintenance procedures to ensure rotating
equipment is regularly inspected and serviced.
4.3.12 Scenario 12: Flange, small bore connection leak at compressor station
This consequences of this scenario are similar to those of Scenario 2.
A leak in this area could well see the vapour cloud extend into the residential area where
the probability of ignition is high. The flux levels from an ignited release impinging on the
residential area are excessive and action is required to reduce the probability of leakage
and/or reduce flux levels in the residential area.
Reduce probability of leakage as for Scenario 2.
Construction of fire wall or water curtain at property boundary to limit flux levels beyond
the boundary.
4.3.13 Scenario 13: Bulk road vehicle loading am rupture
As in Scenario 1 this situation has only been calculated for propane.
From typical vehicle loading pump performance chart, the maximum discharge rate against
zero pump differential is approximately 4 kg/sec. This rate is clearly the limiting factor in this
scenario for leakage fed from the depot pipelines. However the leak can also be fed from
the bulk vehicle and there is no such limiting factor from this source.
Leak = Two-phase leak from 76 mm dia hole
Conditions for this scenario are similar to Scenario 1 thus
c
= 69 kg/m3
Critical flow rate
M = 0.6A 2c( ) P P
o c
= 0.6 x
x
x x x
0076
4
2 69 9 10 49 10
2
5 5
.
( . )
= 20.5 kg/sec
From Figure 3 estimate distance to LFL:
Probability of ignition is high as LFL extends well beyond site boundary and into housing area
on eastern side of depot.
From Figures 4 to 16 distances to radiation flux levels from the ignited mixture are:
1.5 kW/m
5 kW/m
13 kW/m
110 m
85 m
70 m
95 m
55 m
30 m
This scenario is unacceptable. As for Scenario 1, the probability of the incident and also the
leakage rate from the incident should be reduced.
Possible means of achieving the above are:
Breakaway couplings.
Driveaway prevention device(s) on the bulk road vehicle or installed as part of fixed
facility (e.g. boom).
Remote-operated emergency shutdown system capable of operating valves on both
delivery pipeline and bulk road vehicle.
Fusible links in emergency shutdown system.
Increased supervision during loading.
Improved fire-fighting/fire protection and gas detection/ dispersion facilities (e.g.
automatic sprinkler system over loading bay).
4.3.14 Scenario 14: Flange, swivel joint, or small bore connection leak at bulk vehicle
loading point
This consequences of this scenario are similar to those of Scenario 2.
The distances to LFL for this scenario maintain the flammable vapour cloud from a
leakage mostly within the site boundary. The probability of ignition is therefore low.
However, in the event of ignition, the radiation flux on the store to the west is
unacceptable.
Possible actions include:
Reduce probability of leakage as per Scenario 2.
Install improved fire-fighting/fire protection and gas detection/gas dispersion facilities.
Construct fire wall on store wall adjacent to loading point.
Install water curtain on store wall.
4.3.15 Scenario 15 : Leak from incorrect or damaged coupling at bulk road vehicle loading point
Assume equivalent hole diameter = 25 mm
Adopt L/D = 0
M = 0.6A 2 ( ) P P
o a
As for Scenario 13 choose P

o
= 9 x 10
5
N/m
2
M = 0.6 x
x
x x
0025
4
2 510 9 10 1 10
2
5 5
.
( )
= 8.4 kg/sec
From Figure 3 estimated distances to LFL are
1.5 kW/m
5 kW/m
8 kW/m
13 KW/m
44 kW/m
110 m
80 m
75 m
70 m
60m
95 m
60 m
50 m
40 m
20 m
The distances to LFL for this scenario extend well beyond the site boundary. The probability
of ignition of leakage is quite high. The radiation flux levels exceed allowable limits at the site
boundaries and at buildings within the depot.
Possible actions:
Remote-operated emergency shutdown system as per Scenario 13.
Fusible links in emergency shutdown system.
Regular training of drivers to ensure correct operating procedures.
Improved fire-fighting/fire protection and gas detection/ gas dispersion.
5. REFERENCES
(1) Discharge Rate Calculation Methods For Use In Plant Safety Assessments. P.K.
Ramskill, UKAEA Safety and Reliability
Directorate. Report SRD R352, February 1986.
(2) API Recommended Practice 520. Recommended Practice for the Design of
Pressure-Relieving Systems in Refineries. Part I - Design.
(3) API Recommended Practice 521, Guide For Pressure Relief and Depressuring
Systems.
(4) Loss Prevention In The Process Industries, Frank P. Lees Chapter 15. Butterworths
1980.
TABLE 1(A) : DISCHARGE AREAS FOR REGO PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES
Relief Valve
Part No/Series
Orifice dia
(D) (in)
Discharge Area
(A) (in
2
)
Discharge Area (m
2
)
(A) (x 10-4)
A8434 GN
A8436 GN
A8534 FGN
7534 B
7583 G
8684 G
8685 G
7534 G
A3149 L050
3149 L200
3127 G
3129 G
3131 G
W3132 G
3132 G
T3132 G
MV3132 G
3135 G
AA3135 UA 250
3133 G
A3149 G
AA3135 UA 265
3127 K
3129 K
1.015
1.766
1.015
1.843
0.795
0.921
1.218
1.843
1.641
1.641
0.274
0.386
0.736
0.937
1.032
1.032
1.032
1.156
1.156
1.218
1.641
1.156
0.274
0.386
0.809
2.449
0.809
2.668
0.496
0.666
1.165
2.668
2.115
2.115
0.059
0.117
0.425
0.689
0.836
0.836
0.836
1.049
1.049
1.165
2.115
1.049
0.059
0.117
5.22
15.80
5.22
17.21
3.20
4.30
7.52
17.21
13.64
13.64
0.38
0.75
2.74
4.44
5.39
5.39
5.39
6.77
6.77
7.52
13.64
6.77
0.38
0.75
TABLE 1(B) : DISCHARGE AREAS FOR FISHER PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES
Relief Valve
Part No/Series
Orifice dia
(D) (in)
Discharge Area
(A) (in
2
)
Discharge Area (m
2
)
(A) (x 10-4)
H 280 SERIES
H 5110 SERIES
H 110 SERIES
H 135-250
H 160 SERIES
H 185 SERIES
H 148
H 173
H 225 SERIES
H 250 SERIES
H 275 SERIES
H 365 SERIES
H 385 SERIES
1.844
1.844
0.283
0.390
0.390
0.742
0.390
0.390
0.784
1.006
1.230
0.523
0.581
2.67
2.67
0.06
0.12
0.12
0.43
0.12
0.12
0.48
0.79
1.19
0.21
0.26
17.23
17.23
0.39
0.78
0.78
2.77
0.78
0.78
3.10
5.10
7.68
1.35
1.68
TABLE 1 (C) : DISCHARGE AREAS FOR OTHER PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES
( As used on Manufacturing sites )
Inlet/Orifice/Outlet Discharge Area (in
2
)
(A)
Discharge Area (m
2
)
(A) (x 10-4)
1D2
1E2
1F2
2H3
3K4
4L6
4P6
6Q8
6R10
8T10
0.110
0.196
0.307
0.785
1.838
2.853
6.380
11.040
16.000
26.000
0.71
1.26
1.98
5.05
11.86
18.41
41.16
71.23
103.23
167.75
TABLE 2 : RELIEF VALVE FIRE & RADIATION FLUX DATA FOR PROPANE
Mass Stack Stack Stack Flame Flame Distance downwind
Flow Dia. Output Length Length Lift Tank Top Level Ground Level
Height Radiation Flux Radiation Flux
kg/s ins m m m m 8 32 44 1.5 5 8 13
kW/m
2
kW/m
2
kW/m
2
kW/m
2
kW/m
2
kW/m
2
kW/m
2
2.5 1.25 1.65 0.2 10.3 1.8 12 - - 30 15.5 10.5 6
5.0 1.77 4.6 2.0 13.9 2.5 15 - - 40 19 11 -
7.5 3.0 4.6 2.0 17.1 3.1 19.5 - - 50 25.5 16.5 -
10.0 6.0 15.4 2.0 17.1 3.8 26.5 - - 60 10.5 - -
15.0 6.0 9.0 2.0 24.2 4.3 30 - - 73 35.5 21.5 -
20.0 8.0 21.0 2.0 28.0 5.0 36.5 - - 82 23 - -
25.0 8.0 23.0 2.0 30.3 5.4 39.5 - - 89 - - -
30.0 8.0 23.0 2.0 32.4 5.8 42.5 - - 95 31 - -
40.0 8.0 23.0 2.0 36.1 6.4 47.5 - - 109 42 - -
Notes : 1. For layout see Figure 1
2. All calculations for windspeed 5 m/s
3. Mass flows of 2.5, 5.0, 7.5 and 15 kg/s refer to propane in bullets.
4. Mass flows of 10, 20 kg/s, and greater refer to propane in spheres.
TABLE 3 : RELIEF VALVE FIRE & RADIATION FLUX DATA FOR BUTANE
Mass Stack Stack Stack Flame Flame Distance downwind (m)
Flow Dia. Output Length Length Lift
Height Off Tank Top Level Ground level
Radiation Flux Radiation Flux
kg/s ins m m m m 8 32 44 1.5 5 8 13
kW/m
2
kW/m
2
kW/m
2
kW/m
2
kW/m
2
kW/m
2
kW/m
2
2.5 1.25 1.65 0.2 10.6 1.9 12.5 - - 30 16 11.5 6.5
5.0 1.77 4.6 2.0 14.4 2.6 16 - - 42 20 12 -
7.5 3.0 4.6 2.0 17.7 3.2 21.5 - - 52 27 18 -
10.0 6.0 9.0 2.0 21.9 3.9 28 - - 65 32 19 -
15.0 8.0 21.0 2.0 26.7 4.8 35.5 - - 77 23 - -
20.0 10.0 23.0 2.0 33.2 3.0 44 6 - 93 38 - -
25.0 10.0 23.0 2.0 32.9 5.9 45 - - 98 39 - -
30.0 10.0 23.0 2.0 34.8 6.2 48 - - 105 43 - -
Notes : 1. For layout see Figure 1
2. All calculations for windspeed 5 m/s
3. Mass flows of up to 10 kg/s refer to butane in bullets.
4. Mass flows of 15 kg/s, and greater refer to butane in spheres.
FIGURE 1 : SCHEMATIC OF MODEL FACILITIES (at windspeed 5m/s)
FIGURE 2 : EXAMPLE PLUMEPATH DISPERSION PROFILE FOR BUTANE
FIGURE 3 : DISPERSION DISTANCE TO LFL FOR HORIZONTAL PROPANE & BUTANE
RELEASES
WEATHER 2F = WIND SPEED 2 m/s. WEATHER STABILITY F
WEATHER 5D = WIND SPEED 5 m/s. WEATHER STABILITY D
SURFACE ROUGHNESS = 0.1 m
FIGURE 4 : DISTANCE TO 1.5 Kw/M2 RADIATON FLUX FOR VAPOUR AND LIQUID HORIZONTAL BUTANE JET FIRES
FIGURE 5 : DISTANCE TO 5 Kw/m2 RADIATON FLUX FOR VAPOUR AND LIQUID HORIZONTAL BUTANE JET FIRES
FIGURE 10 : FLAME LENGTHS FOR HORIZONTAL BUTANE JET FIRES
FIGURE 11 : DISTANCE TO 1.5 Kw/m2 RADIATON FLUX FOR VAPOUR AND LIQUID VERTICAL BUTANE JET FIRES
FIGURE 12 : DISTANCE TO 5 Kw/m2 RADIATON FLUX FOR VAPOUR AND LIQUID VERTICAL BUTANE JET FIRES
FIGURE 17 : LPG DEPOT LAYOUT WORKED EXAMPLE
FIGURE 18 : FLOWSCHEME WORKED EXAMPLE
FIGURE 19 : NOZZLE DETAILS OF PROPANE SPHERE WORKED EXAMPLE
FIGURE 20 : NOZZLE DETAILS OF BUTANE SPHERE WORKED EXAMPLE

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PETRONAS TECHNICAL STANDARDS

DESIGN AND ENGINEERING PRACTICE

(a) For Propane

As for Scenario 13 choose P

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