1 IN RESPONSE TO THE BOOK COVER UP BY JILL JOLLIFFE INTRODUCTION This piece is written in a number of parts to clarify a number of matters

in response to representations in the book Cover Up written by Jill Jolliffe. There are three sections to what follows. Part 1 is Andrew McNaughtan s defence against allegations by Jill Jolliffe in the book Cover Up of trickery and falsification . Part 2 outlines important matters concerning the credibility or otherwise of key witnesses whose testimony appears to have been misrepresented by Jolliffe. The (false) testimony of one of these witnesses had a significant impact on investigations of Balibo. I (Andrew McNaughtan) believe there is a need to balance the record about the background and testimony of these two significant witnesses who gave evidence to Tom Sherman and with whom Jolliffe and I were both involved. Jolliffe and I had diametrically opposing views of the credibility of these two witnesses. This background may be of wider interest and relevance to understanding the events at Balibo and how they were dealt with by Tom Sherman. I believe Jolliffe s book misrepresents these matters to the readers. Part 3 outlines some of the evidence relating to Indonesian foreknowledge of the journalists presence at Balibo and pre-meditated intentions towards them. As I was reading Cover Up I realised that it dealt poorly with these two important questions did the Indonesian led attacking force have foreknowledge of the presence of the journalists in Balibo? And if so, did they have any premeditated intentions towards them ? So the last 10 pages look at some of the evidence from various sources related to this question.

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PART 1 THE ALLEGATIONS MADE AGAINST McNAUGHTAN BY JOLLIFFE: The significant allegations are contained in paragraph 2 on page 176 in which Jolliffe writes : I spoke later to Adelino Gomes about the interview (with Lourenco Hornay). He said there had been no interview, and that McNaughtan had tricked him into having an oncamera talk with Hornay which was later presented in Australia as an interview conducted by him. Gomes is a prize-winning reporter of great prestige in Portugal with a reputation to defend for conducting rigorous interviews, hence his annoyance. Had he conducted a real interview it would certainly have involved hard questioning about the source. This was the first of two incidents of apparent falsification of Balibo material, and it marred the ICJ colloquium. The sad thing about such an approach was that it would not be difficult to expose by the Indonesian government, and would cast doubt on the credibility of those presenting seriously researched evidence. This was apart from the lack of respect it showed for the Timorese involved, who were seen as objects to be used (emphasis added). Jolliffe suggests that I tricked Adelino Gomes and that I was implicated in apparent falsification of Balibo evidence 1. She says that the cumulative effect of these actions was to marr the ICJ colloquium on Balibo (see above). Jolliffe went on to say in the same paragraph that this alleged falsification could be exposed by the Indonesian government and thus cast doubt on the credibility of those presenting seriously researched evidence . She says it also showed lack of respect for the Timorese involved who were seen as objects to be used . My responding to Jolliffe s accusations is made more difficult because what she says is somewhat illogical. There are ambiguities open to different interpretations. An example is the allegation of apparent falsification . This allegation would seem to be directed against me as it follows the allegation that I tricked Gomes and seems to be related to the alleged trickery. The additional comment that this showed lack of respect for the Timorese involved, who were seen as objects to be used indicates that the person responsible for the alleged falsification is not Timorese. That would indicate that the allegation must be against me. Yet I am now told by Jolliffe and her publisher that this allegation (of apparent falsification ) should not be read as against me, but should be interpreted as being against the witness Lourenco Hornay (who is Timorese, though living in Portugal). However those reading the book would think the allegation refers to me.

Middle paragraph, page 176, of Cover Up

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3 This problem of lack of clarity has been compounded because of Jolliffe s refusal to speak to me about these allegations making it impossible for me to determine exactly what she means. Therefore because off the slipperiness of some of the accusations, I have tried to respond to the differing possible interpretations. This necessitates a more complicated response which I apologise for.

1. THAT McNAUGHTAN TRICKED ADELINO GOMES I have provided an explanation of the sequence of these events under the heading Background to the Lourenco Hornay Interview - on page 7. It may be useful to read this sequence first. The essential background is that in mid 1997 I asked a friend in Lisbon (Amilcar Dias) to arrange for a man I had previously interviewed in Lisbon (Lourenco Hornay) to provide a recorded statement or interview about his knowledge relevant to the Indonesian attack on Balibo and the planning of this. Lourenco Hornay had been a UDT commander stationed in Batugade, where the Indonesian military intelligence was based during their attack on East Timor s western border in 1975. I was in Sydney and had learned that the ICJ would hold a colloquium on Balibo in October 1997. When interest was expressed in this man s testimony, I tried to arrange a recorded statement to be forwarded. I could not afford to return to Lisbon to conduct the interview myself. There was therefore some discussion between Amilcar Dias and myself about who could help make this recording. My communications with Amilcar mentioned that the interview would be for the Balibo Colloquium and that journalists might also be interested in the interview. After some discussion of options Amilcar confirmed that Adelino Gomes (a friend of his) had agreed to do the questioning. Adelino Gomes is a Portuguese journalist who was at Balibo around the time of the matters in question. I received the videotapes a couple of weeks later. These included a section of Adelino Gomes speaking in English at the beginning outlining the conditions for use of the tapes the stated condition was that the identity of Hornay not be revealed and that his face should be blacked out. Gomes himself referred to the discussion as an interview three times in this preface. No other conditions were mentioned and I was not aware of other conditions. The testimony was translated by Beatrice Miranda and presented to the ICJ Colloquium (unaltered) by myself. In response to Jolliffe s statement that (Gomes said) that McNaughtan had tricked him I make a number of points : A. Gomes did not say this to Jolliffe. In an email on 22nd November, 2001 Gomes wrote to me since I don t know your role in the events, I m not in a position to criticize you 2. In a later email he wrote, I didn t say that you tricted [sic] me because I was not aware of your participation in this 3. Gomes thus confirmed that he did NOT say McNaughtan
2 3

email from Adelino Gomes to McNaughtan 22 November 2001 email from Gomes to McNaughtan 26 November 2001

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4 had tricked him. Jolliffe apparently made this interpretation herself and then inaccurately ascribed the quote to Gomes. B. Furthermore Gomes does not believe that any trickery took place - although he is not entirely happy with the circumstances of his interview with Mr. Hornay. It would appear (from what I can glean from my subsequent email communications with Adelino Gomes) that he feels his communication with Mr. Hornay was a somewhat informal discussion rather than an interview (in spite of the fact that the discussion lasted a half hour with reasonably detailed questioning and occurred in front of two video cameras). Gomes has also indicated that he did not expect the video to be used publicly. However Gomes has commented by email he feel(s) that there has not been probably no intention by anyone to trick anyone or falsify anything 4. After Gomes and I corresponded by email he wrote Thank you for your explanation. Now I understand better what happened. Before answering to your questions let me tell you that I do not blame you neither Lourenco (Hornay) for this. And as I have good feelings about Amlcar [Dias] I consider all this a regrettable misunderstanding due to something that we in Portugal call nacional-porreirismo (a typical Portuguese way of solving problems counting on the good auspices of the gods...) 5. Gomes, though apparently somewhat unhappy about the circumstances of the interview added I don't see Amlcar (Dias) as a trickster . Furthermore Gomes noted I consider all this a regrettable misunderstanding 6. In other words Gomes does NOT believe that I or anyone else tricked him. C. Anyway there is an illogical jump from Jolliffe s allegation that the interview between Gomes and Hornay was obtained by trickery (which is an incorrect allegation) and the subsequent interpretation by Jolliffe that the alleged trickery may have led to or been a been a factor in apparent falsification of the evidence in the interview. Even (for argument s sake) if it was the case that the interview WAS obtained by tricking the interviewer somehow, it does not logically follow that the contents of the interview were falsified . Thus Jolliffe s interpretation is flawed. D. I was not present whilst the interview was arranged or recorded. Jolliffe does not point out (and may not have been aware) that I was in Sydney when the interview with Lourenco Hornay was arranged and done in Lisbon. I was communicating with Amilcar Dias in Lisbon who dealt with the witness and the interviewer and made all the arrangements for the recording. My capacity to influence events was therefore almost non-existent. As noted below I sent an email request via Amilcar Dias that Gomes call me if there was anything that needed clarification. E. My emails to Amilcar Dias (who arranged for the recorded interview between Adelino Gomes and Lourenco Hornay in Lisbon) and other sources of information show that I had no intention to trick Adelino Gomes in fact I took steps to enable communications
4 5

email from Gomes to McNaughtan 27 November 2001 email from Gomes to McNaughtan 26 November 2001 6 email from Gomes to McNaughtan 26 November 2001

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5 that would have clarified everything between Gomes and myself. I communicated with Amilcar Dias who arranged for the interview to be done and he communicated with Adelino Gomes. If I was aware of any conditions that might have affected the use of the interview, I would have asked that things be done differently. My purpose in obtaining the interview with Mr. Hornay was to use it and that was always clear. Emails between Amilcar Dias and myself show that : i. I had not asked that Gomes do the interview with Hornay 7, ii. Gomes s agreement to do the interview was the result of discussion between Gomes and Amilcar Dias 8, iii. I had made it clear in emails to Amilcar Dias that the purpose of the interview was to allow Hornay s testimony to be presented to the ICJ 9, iv. no discussion in the emails suggested any desire by me to mislead Gomes about the nature of what was being done v. on the contrary, I had asked Amilcar Dias to pass my phone number to Gomes so he could call me if he had any matters he wanted to discuss with me 10 From my own memory I am aware that : vi. Gomes didn t call me - which suggested to me that he was happy with arrangements vii. there were no conditions to the use of the interview (apart form the need to keep Hornay s identity private) communicated to me and there is no evidence that any communications of this sort were made to me The recorded interview between Gomes and Hornay shows that : viii. Gomes outlined his conditions for use of the tape on the tape at the beginning of his interview and these simply concerned the need to protect Hornay s privacy there was no mention of other conditions by Gomes even though this was the perfect opportunity for him to convey them to me 11 ix. Gomes himself considered that he was doing an interview because he described it as an interview three times in English at the beginning of the video 12 Additionally : x. From my perspective it wasn t important whether Gomes did the interview or not. The important thing was that appropriate questions be asked of Hornay by whoever interviewed him

7 8

email between Amilcar Dias and Andrew McNaughtan 18 September 1997 email between Amilcar Dias and Andrew McNaughtan 1 October 1997 9 email between Amilcar Dias and Andrew McNaughtan 18 September 1997 10 email between Amilcar Dias and Andrew McNaughtan 30 September 1997 11 introduction (in English) by Adelino Gomes before videoed interview with Hornay 12 introduction (in English) by Adelino Gomes before videoed interview with Hornay

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6 xi. if I was aware that there might be conditions precluding or limiting the use of the tape, I would have asked that the interview be done differently because the intention was always to do an interview that could be presented to the ICJ Colloquium (and as mentioned this purpose was spelt out) xii. In fact it was of little significance to me whether the interview was done by a wellknown Portuguese journalist such as Gomes or not as few people in Australia would know him anyway xiii. I did not believe that the interview would be more credible because Gomes asked the questions I believed (and still believe) that Hornay s evidence was the main issue and that its ultimate veracity should (like everyone else s evidence) be assessed in a proper inquiry. I did not attempt to trick Gomes and I believe the evidence supports this. 2. THAT McNAUGHTAN WAS GUILTY OF APPARENT FALSIFICATION OF EVIDENCE I believe this is a false conclusion no matter how one tries to interpret the events. It is evident from her words that Jolliffe is trying to link me to the alleged apparent falsification of evidence, yet I don t believe there is any logical basis for this. I also doubt that the allegation applies to anyone else involved. A. According to a recent letter from Jolliffe s publisher (Henry Rosenbloom), Jolliffe does NOT suggest that I was involved in any apparent falsification . Rosenbloom writes that Jolliffe made no statement or imputation that McNaughtan was responsible (for the apparent falsification) ; indeed the paragraphs immediately before this section of the book make it clear that Hornay was the one with the credibility problems 13. So the interpretation that most readers would make from Jolliffe s distorted writing - that I was involved in the falsification - is specifically refuted by Jolliffe s publisher. That issue would seem to have been cleared up. B. However most readers of this section of the book would probably assume that the person accused by Jolliffe of falsification is me : earlier in the same paragraph I am said to have tricked Gomes. Some lines later Jolliffe speaks of the apparent falsification that marred the ICJ colloquium and showed lack of respect for the Timorese involved, who were seen as objects to be used . Thus Jolliffe implies that the perpetrator of this apparent falsification was not Timorese. Her writing connects the alleged trickery sequentially to the apparent falsification suggesting they are linked. In this context most readers would believe Jolliffe is accusing me of falsification . Thus I feel I should rebut this implication in the book (in spite of the later claim made by the publisher that this is not an intentional implication). My response is that the following sequence of events resulting in Mr. Hornay s interview being put before the ICJ colloquium confirms that I could not be implicated in any apparent falsification
13

Letter from Jolliffe s publisher, Henry Rosenbloom, top paragraph of second page

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THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS The videotaped interview with Lourenco Hornay was done in Lisbon on 5th October, 1997 (whilst I was in Sydney) by Adelino Gomes and Amilcar Dias. The tapes (in Portuguese) were subsequently sent to Sydney and translated by Beatrice Miranda of SBS Portuguese radio in Sydney. The version presented to the ICJ was the translation made and typed by Miranda (with no input by me). Beatriz Miranda s hard copy of the interview was then given to Rodney Lewis at the Colloquium. Therefore it can be established at each step of the way that I could not have been involved in any falsification or apparent falsification . The exact sequence of events that resulted in Mr. Hornay s interview being presented to the ICJ is included in a section below ( Background to the Lourenco Hornay Interview on page 7). I reject that I had any intention to mislead the ICJ colloquium or that I did mislead the colloquium in any way. I reject the implication by Jolliffe that I was involved in apparent falsification whether connected to the colloquium or not.

3. IS IT CORRECT TO SUGGEST McNAUGHTAN S ACTIONS MARRED THE ICJ COLLOQUIUM ? The above material shows that Adelino Gomes did not say I tricked him, does not believe that I tricked him and that the evidence shows that I did not trick him and that I had absolutely no intention of tricking him, or anybody else. Furthermore I was not involved in any apparent falsification . In fact Jolliffe and her publisher now deny that her accusation of falsification is made against me. Yet these are the allegations that Jolliffe used to justify her accusation that my actions marred the ICJ Colloquium. Therefore I think it is fair to say my actions did not marr the ICJ colloquium. I certainly would be disappointed if they did because I had spent some time working voluntarily to help organise it and had then contributed a critique of the Sherman Report (which I believe has stood up well over time) as well as the Hornay interview in order to help make the Colloquium a success. The remaining issue is whether Hornay s actual interview might somehow justify Jolliffe s allegation of apparent falsification against him. Presumably only his actions could now explain this serious charge by Jolliffe. I deal with that possibility below (see section called Does Mr. Hornay Have Credibility Problems ? ) and believe I provide enough information to indicate that Jolliffe s accusation of apparent falsification against Lourenco Hornay is not justified either.

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8 If it is accepted that Hornay didn t engage in falsification I think it is reasonable to conclude that the assertion that the ICJ colloquium was marred by falsification is incorrect. BACKGROUND TO THE LOURENCO HORNAY INTERVIEW The first Sherman Report was released in June 1996 and concluded that the journalists at Balibo had died in circumstances of continuing fighting. This interpretation rested heavily on the testimony of a key witness from Lisbon Lisbon 1 witness, or L1 . I was curious about this man and had a chance to look for him during a visit to Portugal in 1997. It was in the course of searching for Sherman s witness L1 that I was introduced to Lourenco Hornay. After talking to Hornay about who L1 might be (and finding that he did not know), I asked him where he was in October 1975 and what his experiences had been. In the subsequent conversation he told me (through the translation of Amilcar Dias) some very significant things that he understood from his dealings with Indonesian commanders in Batugade at the time. I thought it was important to present his evidence to the ICJ Colloquium on Balibo later that year , as he had not been interviewed previously on this subject (and had not spoken to Tom Sherman when he was in Lisbon). However I had not recorded my original conversation with him and did not want to just rely on my memory and some notes I had taken at the time. Therefore I decided that a recorded interview should be done, so there could be no doubt about Mr. Hornay s evidence. This would also allow him to give his testimony more formally and allow him to drop any assertions previously made to me if he didn t want to stand by them. I was in Sydney and could not travel to Lisbon for this, so I communicated with Amilcar Dias (who had previously helped me look for L1 ) and asked if him to arrange for the interview to be recorded in Lisbon and sent to me in Sydney. He asked Mr. Hornay who agreed to do an interview that would be recorded. I was concerned only that Lourenco Hornay answer questions on tape (audio or video) so that I could quote him with confidence. I had felt what he had to say (about Indonesian foreknowledge about the journalists at Balibo, and intent to eliminate them) to be quite important. The person who would pose the questions to Mr. Hornay was not important to me in this context. I had originally envisioned Lourenco Hornay talking directly to a camera or recorder answering questions posed (quite possibly) by someone out of view. I simply wanted a recording of what he said. This would allow me to have the interview translated and quote directly from Hornay s statements to the 'Colloquium' on Balibo - to be held in Sydney in late 1997. I said to Amilcar Dias that we needed to get Lourenco Hornay's responses to questions recorded. I didn t realise at that time that Dias could video it adequately himself with a Hi8 video camera and so I suggested that Adelino Gomes or someone at LUSA might be willing to help him record an interview. I was simply referring to assistance with the

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9 technical aspects of videoing or audio recording. Amilcar Dias wrote back that he knew Adelino Gomes personally and subsequently Dias asked Gomes to do the interview with Hornay. Adelino Gomes is a Portuguese journalist who was at Balibo during October 1975. I did not initially imagine Adelino Gomes doing the interview. Nonetheless when Dias told me Gomes would do it I was pleased because I knew Gomes had an excellent grasp of the events of the time and would be ideally placed to interview Mr. Hornay about what had happened. My only concern was that questions be asked of Hornay and answered clearly by him and the questioner have sufficient understanding of events to do that. From my perspective the witness himself is / was responsible for the honesty of his answers (not the person asking the questions, whoever that might be). My communications to Amilcar repeatedly referred to an 'interview' being done for use by the ICJ and journalists and in the Colloquium. So when I heard Gomes would conduct the interview, I assumed that the purpose was understood by him. I had suggested by email to Amilcar Dias that Adelino Gomes ring me if he had any questions and provided my phone number. When I did not hear from him I assumed there were no problems. If I thought there were constraints to the use of the material, I would have directed that things be done in some other way. My objective was to make use of the material publicly at the Colloquium. The only conditions articulated to me (by Dias and Gomes) were that Mr. Hornay would need his identity suppressed. Adhering to Mr. Hornay s request was my main concern at the time. I have no memory (and can find no evidence) of any other conditions attached to the use of the recordings that Amilcar Dias sent over. The interview was done at Gomes house in Lisbon, with Gomes talking to Mr. Hornay on a patio as they sat in two chairs with a table between them. It lasted about a half-hour and was in Portuguese. Two video cameras recorded the event : one was fixed on a tripod and the other was mobile . I believe Amilcar Dias did the filming himself. The sound was quite clear and the discussion was in Portuguese. At the beginning Gomes spoke in English outlining the conditions for the use of the tape. He re-iterated that the condition was that Hornay s identity should be suppressed. Gomes himself referred to the interview as an interview three times (in English before beginning the interview) and there were no other conditions for the use of the interview mentioned. After the Hi8 tapes were couriered to Sydney, the tape was dubbed to VHS and I gave a copy to Beatriz Miranda to translate. Miranda is an experienced journalist with an interest in Timor who is a native Portuguese speaker (from Brazil). She has extensive experience teaching and practicing journalism and was working on the Portuguese language radio program for SBS in Sydney. I thought she was an ideal translator for this material. Beatriz Miranda produced a hard copy of the translation of the video and that was what I used. I never altered Miranda s translation in any way. I simply read from her translation at the Colloquium (having shown an excerpt on TV initially in Portuguese so people could briefly view the original interview). Miranda s original translation was then given

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10 to Rodney Lewis (who was documenting the Colloquium for the ICJ) in hard copy. No changes had been made to Miranda s original and independent translation. I believe the translation was ultimately put online with the full report on the Colloquium and linked to the Sydney Morning Herald website. I believe Hornay's statement was translated and presented accurately and in accordance with all conditions of which I was aware.

DOES MR. HORNAY REALLY HAVE CREDIBILITY PROBLEMS ? When I began writing this response to the accusations in Jolliffe s book, it seemed to me that Jolliffe was stating I was responsible for the apparent falsification to which she referred. This was because my name appeared (in a very negative context) in the same paragraph as the allegation of apparent falsification and her wording indicated that the culprit was not Timorese (because it was suggested by Jolliffe that these actions showed lack of respect for the Timorese involved who were seen as objects to be used ). This seemed to rule out Lourenco Hornay as the culprit responsible for apparent falsification (as he is Timorese) and confirmed that I was being accused (as no other names were mentioned in this context). However I have subsequently received a letter from the publisher (Mr. Henry Rosenbloom) who assures me that Jolliffe made no statement or imputation that McNaughtan was responsible (for the alleged falsification). Rosenbloom continued that Hornay was the one with the credibility problems 14. So it seems the position now taken by the publisher is that it is Mr. Hornay who is guilty of the apparent falsification . I do not believe that this is the interpretation that would be made by most readers (who would assume that the allegation is being made against me).I have responded to this interpretation already and believe the evidence shows it is not true. I also doubt the accusation against Mr. Hornay is justified and I believe Jolliffe s portrayal of Hornay and his testimony is misleading and unfair. I think a few points should be made about this. Jolliffe s attempts to undermine Mr. Hornay s credibility by demeaning him. Jolliffe suggests that Hornay was not in a position to have known or understood the military significance of events at the border at that time. She says that Hornay was a UDT supporter (emphasis added) who had been at Rai Icu with the UDT leadership at the time of the Balibo attack 15. Later she states Gabriel ate with the Timorese refugees, and Hornay had gleaned scraps (emphasis added) of information over several meal time conversations with him, he said, information which Gabriel had allegedly obtained from the Indonesian officers 16. The distinct implication is that Hornay was in a lowly position within UDT and, as a Timorese refugee , was only in a position to glean second hand scraps of information from others about what was happening. Such a man would
14 15 16

top paragraph, second page of Henry Rosenbloom s letter line 8, page 175, Cover Up line 8, page 176, Cover Up

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11 presumably not have much of an understanding of the overall picture of events at the border in 1975. Jolliffe s interpretation is contradicted by Hornay s testimony - which is corroborated by another significant source. Hornay s testimony to Gomes indicates that he was not the insignificant refugee that Jolliffe suggests. Hornay testified (concerning the UDT flight from Timor after the civil war in Dili) I went to the command of the forces abandoned by Capt. Lino called the personal command of the UDT . These forces were abandoned and I assumed their command. I took nearly 10,000 people and placed them on the border . In response to the later question How many of you re men entered Batugade? He replied A company Q It was under your command wasn t it? A One was under my command, the other by Joao Carrascalao and the other by Manuel Carrascalao Q And who gave orders to the three commands A We received orders from Indonesia. 17 This exchange indicates that Hornay was in fact a rather significant individual within UDT, who would have reason to have been at the side of the (Indonesian) commander (Major Leo) just as he claimed. Hornay s description of his role at the time is corroborated by Joao Carrascalao. I have spoken with Carrascalao who noted that Hornay had been one of the senior UDT commanders . Furthermore Carrascalao noted that Hornay had previously been one of the highest-ranking Timorese in the Portuguese army having the rank of first sergeant which Carrascalao says would be equivalent to sergeant major in our army. It is worth noting that it was very difficult and rare for Timorese to rise to the rank of officers in the Portuguese army. This indicates that Hornay s testimony and insights about the military operations at the border were significantly better founded and more relevant than Jill Jolliffe suggests, and that his description of being present as the Indonesian commanders from Batugade discussed their planned assault is much more credible than she suggests. The circumstances suggest that Jolliffe interpreted Hornay s testimony selectively and in a manner which undermined the apparent credibility and significance of his testimony. Further efforts to discredit Hornay Jolliffe suggests Hornay was motivated by feeling offended Jolliffe then suggests that Hornay s willingness to talk to me about the events at Balibo is based upon his feeling of being offended because he had not been asked by Jolliffe to
17

page 3, Hornay testimony

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12 give evidence to Tom Sherman when he was in Lisbon in 1996. Jolliffe wrote I had heard that he was offended at not being consulted for the Sherman hearings 18. Elsewhere Jolliffe wrote that her approach to recommending witnesses to Sherman was to have some repercussions later, with some refugees feeling offended because they had been overlooked, and trumped up evidence being presented from other politically motivated sources 19. Thus she implies Hornay s testimony was inaccurate and driven by dubious motives. Hornay explained to me at the time that he was now willing to speak because he had recently retired from the Portuguese army and had previously felt, as a soldier, that it was inappropriate for him to speak. He also explained that he had been stationed away from Lisbon when Sherman was there. He still seemed concerned about the ramifications of speaking up for himself and his family and that was why he asked that his identity be shielded when he was interviewed later. It also seemed to me concern for his family previously could have constrained him from talking to a journalist (such as Jolliffe) about these matters - after all she might have put the allegations in a story which would have had consequences for his family. Hornay may also have had some reluctance to talk to Jolliffe about these matters because of her close association with individuals from other factions of Timorese politics. He may have previously felt that revelations about Balibo were futile (and possibly dangerous) but that circumstances were now changing. Or he may have felt that his evidence from Batugade was not relevant as he had not been an eyewitness in Balibo. There are a number of reasonable explanations for his prior silence on Balibo. Certainly I found the manner in which he gave his evidence was convincing. He did not seem at all embittered or concerned that his testimony had not been solicited by Sherman. I had asked him if he had any idea who Mr. L1 might be and he clearly indicated that he did not know. It was only after I asked him about his own experiences at the Timorese border at the time that he gave a very sober and credible description of what he had experienced and knew about. I feel that someone eager to tell a fabricated story to assuage a sense of feeling offended would have been more eager. Yet Mr. Hornay did not really volunteer information to me (let alone insist on telling me anything). He simply answered the questions I asked in a careful and thoughtful way. Hornay struck me as honest and straightforward. Amilcar Dias (who was translating for me) also considered him very honest. Subsequently Hornay agreed to be interviewed by Adelino Gomes (and what he told Gomes was almost identical to what he had told me previously). Gomes later described his testimony as honest and measured 20. Hornay later agreed to talk to Jolliffe (with Jonathan Holmes) and then Tom Sherman (when he was doing his second report). This openness does not suggest someone who was inventing or fabricating stories because he was feeling offended from not being approached previously.
18 19

line 10, page 175, Cover Up bottom of page 157 of Cover Up 20 Email from Gomes to McNaughtan, 27 November 2001

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13

Jolliffe pre-judges Hornay s testimony as all hearsay Jolliffe writes further that (upper page 175) she knew all he had to say about it (Balibo), which was all hearsay (emphasis added). She does not explain how she could be certain of this. Having impugned his motives for talking (suggesting it was because he was offended ) she attempts to pass a negative judgment on all that he might say (that it was all hearsay ). Yet clearly Hornay was present at Batugade and occupying a position of leadership that would of necessity have involved interacting with the Indonesian military command. This is confirmed by other UDT members such as Joao Carrascalao and Fernando Mariz. Thus it makes sense that he would have had interactions with Indonesian commanders (such as Major Leo ) as he claims. Whether these interactions were through interpreters or not, they would have been first hand experiences and thus (by definition) not simply hearsay . Jolliffe creates (then dismisses) a false argument - misrepresenting what the real crux of Hornay s testimony is Jolliffe writes the crux (emphasis added) of the supposed new evidence was that he had seen an Indonesian company with Timorese auxiliaries moving up the road from Batugade to Balibo the night of October 15-16 (although no troops had gone in that direction) 21. Yet this interpretation was certainly not the the crux of Hornay s statements. It was, at best, irrelevant to the thrust of what he had to say. In addition it seems unlikely that Hornay was actually saying what Jolliffe attributes to him. The true crux of Hornay s evidence was his allegation of the attacking force s foreknowledge of the journalists presence in Balibo and his suggestion of this force s premeditated intent to physically eliminate the journalists. It is hard to understand where Jolliffe has found a basis to conclude that Hornay was saying those attacking Balibo came up the road from Batugade to Balibo . Jolliffe was not at the ICJ Colloquium something she does not mention in her book. Her interpretation seems to have been based on Hornay s response to a question put by Gomes in his interview (which was posted with the Balibo Colloquium material on the internet) : Q. But did you see them leaving for Balibo? A. Yes I saw them leaving on the night of the 15th to 16th
22

21 22

Mid page 175, Cover Up Testimony of Hornay, page 5

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14 From this Jolliffe seems to have interpreted that Hornay said they were moving up the road from Batugade to Balibo which is not what Hornay said in the interview. In fact later in the same interview Hornay said : I ve heard that they attacked on 4 fronts: one front coming from AKIESAK (Haikessak) in Indonesia going in the direction of Maliana to cut the retreat from Balibo to Maliana: other front let me think about it after 20 years.. from another 2 Indonesian villages close to the border but I cant quite remember Question, From Batugade could you see what the operation involved? Answer, Helicopters and boats. From the sea, boats and helicopters flying over the area. 23 Thus Hornay makes it quite clear that he was not suggesting the attack on Balibo came up the road from Batugade in fact it seems he was well aware of the structure and positioning of the attacking force and provided quite an accurate description of it (although he did not claim to have been an eyewitness). The point is that the attack came across the border further south from Batugade and not up the Batugade-Balibo road. Hornay s testimony shows that he understood the real situation (and had outlined it in his interview). What Jolliffe does not seem (or chooses not) to understand is that troops leaving Batugade on the night of the 15th to 16th were not necessarily moving up the road from Batugade to Balibo . The troop movements from Batugade may have been connected to the imminent attack the next day and could have been to a number of other locations (after all Batugade was within 20 kilometers of where the attacks were launched from). And the next morning there was movement up the road from Batugade to Balibo, but it occurred after Balibo had fallen to the attacking forces. Jolliffe s quotes are selective and misleading. Jolliffe then debunks her own argument when she confirms that Hornay told her the attacking force didn t move off from Batugade (emphasis added), but moved in on four other fronts 24 - which is essentially correct. Thus it is odd that she asserts that he had claimed he had seen an Indonesian company with Timorese auxiliaries moving up the road from Batugade to Balibo the night of October 15-16 (although no troops had gone in that direction) . Jolliffe attributes an erroneous interpretation to Hornay in her book even though she knows he didn t mean it (because he subsequently clarified her misunderstanding of what he had said, when she questioned him later). Yet Jolliffe prints the misrepresentation of what Hornay said even though this is not what he had said in the Gomes interview she is supposedly quoting from and not what he subsequently said to her. She then implies Hornay was mistaken by writing no troops had gone in that direction . In fact it appears Jolliffe is mistaken, not Hornay.

23 24

Testimony of Hornay, page 13 bottom of page 175 - top of page 176, Cover Up

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15 What Hornay did say in the Gomes interview (and what he had told me in our initial conversation some months earlier) and what he then said to Jolliffe that the attacking force didn t move off from Batugade, but moved in on four other fronts was consistent and correct - and indicates that Hornay s understanding of the military actions at the border was quite clear. Jolliffe seemingly mis-construes (or chooses to misrepresent) what Hornay has said and instead makes an issue out of a non-issue. By creating and then refuting a straw argument Jolliffe apparently seeks to undermine Hornay s credibility. However Hornay s indication that there was increased military activity around Batugade before the attacks on Balibo and Maliana and that troops from round Batugade were mobilized for some sort of military involvement in the offensive of 16th October is supported by the evidence of others. It also seems logical that some of those who crossed the border from the various staging points on 16th October may have come from Batugade. The distances involved along the whole border are quite small and, as noted previously, troops leaving Batugade (or Rai Icu) going to Balibo need not necessarily be going directly up the road that links Batugade with Balibo they may well have been moving around to staging points in West Timor and moved across the border from elsewhere. The military operations launched on October 16 were part of a major general offensive that commenced the intended Indonesian invasion of East Timor (although the operation later bogged down). As the operation was large it would have been surprising if some of the troops stationed near Batugade were not moving the night before the attack on the border. Rogerio Lobato s report of the attacks on the morning of 16th October gives a sense of the size of the Indonesian operation (of which the attack on Balibo was one part) : Commandante Rogerio Lobato said that troops under cover of heavy artillery fire from Indonesian Timor had attacked the southern villages of Fohorem, Tilomar, Fatomean, and Fatolulic as well as the northern border towns reported earlier. This morning s report claimed that Indonesian regulars had launched a co-coordinated attack on the northern area at 5.00 AM today 25 . The northern border towns that had also been attacked included Lebos, Cova, Maliana, Memo, Nunura, and Tunibibi as well as Balibo. Clearly this was a major operation by the Indonesian attacking forces taking place in both the northern and southern border areas. In those circumstances, it would have been surprising if troops were not moving off from Batugade during the evening before. Jose Martins affidavit is summarized by Sherman and sheds further light on this matter : The Martins affidavit went on to state that on about 24 September 1975 there were about 200 Indonesian troops stationed at Batugade and the Commander was Colonel Dadin . Martins occupied the same room as the Colonel at the Batugade headquarters. Martins was an intelligence officer and he refers to the build up of Indonesian forces in the border
25

Rogerio Lobato s statement quoted at bottom of page 75, Cover Up

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16 area near Batugade, with regular troops, totaling about 3000, being landed from ships at Atapupu. He says in the affidavit that on 15 October 1975 Dading told him that tomorrow is D-day. We attack Balibo 26. It seems unlikely that such a large troop concentration as that reported by Martins to have been near Batugade would not have participated in the October 16th assault. In fact it seems very likely that troops would have moved out of Batugade in preparation for the assault (as Hornay had indicated in his evidence). In fact there is evidence to support the movement of troops from Batugade that night from at least one other witness Joaquim Estorninho. Estorninho was located at Rai Ico, a small place just outside Batugade, on the coast 27. Estorninho, who had been a Sergeant in the Portuguese Army in Guinea Bissau , had provided testimony to Sherman in 1996 that corroborated Hornay s comment that troops had left Batugade with the destination of Balibo that evening. Estorninho had told Sherman that he recollected on the same evening 15 October he saw troops passing from Indonesian Timor in the moonlight through Rai Ico going in the direction of Balibo 28. Although the exact details (of which roads the troops were moving along) are unclear, this is credible evidence that corroborates what Hornay said and indicates again that Jolliffe s discrediting of Hornay on this matter was unjustified. Jolliffe then tries to discredit Hornay s central evidence (concerning Indonesian foreknowledge of the journalists presence in Balibo) Jolliffe then says that Hornay s main evidence (that the Indonesian forces had foreknowledge of and malicious intentions towards the journalists) had come from an Indonesian interpreter called Gabriel, not from any specific conversation Hornay had had with an Indonesian officer or overheard 29. Jolliffe discounts Hornay s evidence apparently on the basis that the information was from an interpreter - and gives it no weight. A letter from Jolliffe s publisher has since confirmed that Jolliffe is accusing Hornay of apparent falsification 30 and this is the basis for that accusation. Jolliffe does not address at least one evident contradiction : if the above statement is true (and Jolliffe seems to accept that it is) it suggests that she did not know all he [Hornay] had to say 31 about Balibo as she asserts. It also indicates that her assertion that Hornay s knowledge of the border events was all hearsay 32 was not completely correct. Even if Hornay s information was derived solely from the Indonesian interpreter Gabriel this evidence warranted being added into the total evidence and assessed. Instead of acknowledging this Jolliffe chooses to portray Hornay s evidence as falsification .
26 27

3.29, page 32, Sherman Report 1 4.135, page 73, Sherman Report 1 28 4.138, page 73, Sherman Report 1 29 line 3, page 176, Cover Up 30 letter from Henry Rosenbloom of Scribe Publications, 17 January, 2002. 31 line 12, page 175, Cover Up 32 line 12, page 175 Cover Up

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17 As Jolliffe seemingly accepts that Hornay did hear of Indonesian foreknowledge of the journalists from an Indonesian interpreter called Gabriel 30, her allegation of falsification against Hornay is presumably based on the difference between his hearing of the foreknowledge from an interpreter and hearing of it from a specific conversation Hornay had had with an Indonesian officer or overheard 30. Even if this distinction is correct it seems somewhat uncharitable to conclude that the difference is the result of falsification rather than, for example, a slightly hazy memory of events more than 20 years earlier. One assumes that if Jolliffe knew that Hornay was able to offer evidence of Indonesian foreknowledge about the journalists presence at Balibo (even if it was from an Indonesian interpreter ) she would have felt that Hornay warranted being interviewed by Sherman. Yet her advise to Sherman was that he need not bother to interview Hornay (see section Jolliffe had advised Sherman not to interview Hornay on page 17). This indicates that she was unaware of Hornay s testimony of Indonesian foreknowledge (derived from the Indonesian interpreter Gabriel ) and thus did not actually know all he had to say about Balibo. The alternative that Jolliffe knew Hornay had evidence of foreknowledge from an Indonesian interpreter, but nonetheless advised Sherman Hornay was not worth interviewing seems unlikely and would suggest (at a minimum) poor judgment. Thus Jolliffe s advise to Sherman (that he need not interview Hornay) seems to have been founded on an incomplete understanding by Jolliffe of Hornay s evidence. However, contrary to Jolliffe s interpretation, there is evidence that Hornay did have first-hand experiences with Indonesian officers that had lead him to his conclusions of Indonesian foreknowledge and malicious intentions towards the journalists. This evidence (that could not be dismissed as hearsay ) is in Sherman s second report and is included in the section entitled IS MR. HORNAY S EVIDENCE WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION ? on pages 20-21 of this response. Certainly Hornay s testimony to Gomes (and to me some months earlier) that the attacking force expected journalists 33 appears to have been derived from Hornay s direct experience : Q A Q. A Q A Q A Q A What do you mean by expect the journalists? They expected to eliminate 8 journalists Did you hear about this? yes, I did. Who did you hear this from? I heard it because I was at the side of the commander What did the commander say that one of the objectives was was it major Leo? yes Major Leo

33

Transcript of interview Hornay with Gomes, page 7

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18 Q To whom did he say this to? A They were talking between themselves and I caught it A And what did he say? A That objectively it was to hunt the journalists so they wouldn t witness the case [invasion]. Later in that interview Hornay was asked by Gomes would you admit you could have been confused by not understanding what they said about the elimination of journalists and do you think you reached this conclusion after the events? A No I was (quasi) nearly sure they were going there to kill the journalists. Quasi sure. Hornay said he had heard directly from an Indonesian officer that the attacking force knew about the journalists presence in Balibo (something which is also confirmed by a number of other witnesses) and to have concluded that the attacking force intended to kill the journalists. It is also likely that a translator would have been translating the conversations between Indonesian commanding officers and UDT leadership, and thus such a translator (for example the Indonesian interpreter called Gabriel ) would have been privy to important and relevant conversations. It appears to me that Hornay had acquired his own understanding of what was happening (which would have been assisted by his background of being a military commander) and that may have been confirmed by his conversations with the translator. Even if Hornay s interpretation was simply based on his conversation with the translator (as Jolliffe claims) it appears that that Hornay s statement deserves to be added to the body of evidence to be assessed in a properly constituted inquiry which was what I was advocating in the ICJ Colloquium. I hope to have a chance to further clarify these matters with Mr. Hornay and gain a better understanding of what happened. But I feel that the distinction between the two descriptions (the one given to Gomes and Jolliffe s version) is not extremely great. There is certainly less variation between these two versions of Hornay s evidence than there is between different versions of the evidence of some other Balibo witnesses. My strong impression was that Mr. Hornay was an honest and credible witness and that the circumstances of his statements lent weight to the credibility of what he had to say. Gomes commented that Lourenco Hornay s testimony seemed to me honest and measured - although insufficient (in Gomes opinion) to establish intentional murder by the Indonesians. I believe that Hornay s evidence (even the minimalist version acknowledged by Jolliffe) has some weight and should be factored in to the overall picture. Yet there is evidence that he does have other direct evidence of Indonesian foreknowledge of the journalists presence at Balibo and this issue is dealt with in greater depth on pages 20-21. As far as I am concerned the jury is still out on the value of Mr. Hornay s testimony.

Jolliffe s allegation of falsification against Hornay

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19

Jolliffe s own assertions that Hornay s statements are unreliable (see above) appear to be the basis for her subsequent conclusion that this was apparent falsification of Balibo material 34. The letter from Jolliffe s publisher (Henry Rosenbloom) seemingly confirms that in Jolliffe s and Rosenbloom s view Hornay was the one with credibility problems 35 and thus the supposed source of the falsification . Yet the allegation of falsification implies some improper intention - rather than sincere but inadequate attempts to recollect events and interpretations that occurred quite some time ago. Many of the Balibo testimonies have contradictions and inconsistencies between them (and there are contradictions between the statements of the same individuals on different days). Time and memory lapses, language difficulties, social and political pressures and the lack of education of some witnesses are all factors in these variations. It is hard to think of another Balibo witness who has been unfortunate enough to be publicly accused of falsification under such circumstances. However this relatively slight variation in Hornay s testimony (under questioning from Jolliffe who had already formed conclusions that she knew all he had to say which was all hearsay 36) leads Jolliffe to consider that this is apparent falsification - though these variations are smaller and less significant than many backflips that have occurred in other testimonies on Balibo. It is this apparent falsification that Jolliffe argues has marred the ICJ colloquium . Jolliffe had advised Sherman not to interview Mr. Hornay in 1996 It appears Jolliffe s advice had convinced Sherman not to interview Hornay for his first report. Tom Sherman wrote Lorenco Hornai is a new witness but I was aware of his existence in the first evaluation. I recollect I decided not to interview him because Jill Jolliffe advised me then that she had known him and his family for many years and had never heard him mention the events at Balibo in a way that suggested he had any direct knowledge (page 74 second Sherman report, under heading Lorenco Hornai ). Sherman continued This recollection was confirmed by a statement from Jonathan Holmes in a letter to me dated 9th November 1998. Mr. Holmes referred to a claim by Mr. Hornai that he heard his commander in Batugade, Major Leo, state a day or two before the assault that there were eight journalists in Balibo who were to be killed during the assault. Mr. Holmes said Jill Jolliffe who has known Hornay for many years has never heard him make a similar claim . Sherman (page 137 in his second report) again uses Jolliffe s comment that she has never heard him make this claim to denigrate Hornay s credibility. So Jolliffe had apparently given advice that convinced Sherman that Hornay was not worth speaking to when he was doing his first report, then she had apparently helped convince (ABC journalist) Jonathan Holmes that Hornay was not credible because she
34 35 36

mid page, page 176, Cover Up letter from Jolliffe s publisher (Henry Rosenbloom), 17/1/2002 , top paragraph of page 2 2nd paragraph, page 175, Cover Up

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20 had never heard him say what he said to Gomes and myself. Holmes had then written to Sherman to reinforce Hornay s supposed lack of credibility based (again) on the assertions of Jill Jolliffe. Sherman then used Holmes letter to buttress his own reluctance to seriously countenance what Hornay was saying. It is clear that Jolliffe invested quite a lot of effort in demeaning Hornay s credibility as a witness and thus has a subsequent interest in trying to establish in her book that Hornay s statements lack substance. Lack of respect for the Timorese involved ? By whom ? The interpretation that there was a lack of respect for the Timorese involved who were seen as objects to be used 37 - again appears to be based on allegations that are not upheld by the evidence. Jolliffe appears to have derived this interpretation from her previous allegations of trickery and apparent falsification earlier in the same paragraph. As I hope I have established that I did not engage in either of these activities, I feel I cannot be construed as guilty of the interpretation derived ( lack of respect...for the Timorese involved ). The evidence suggests that this criticism might be better directed towards Jolliffe herself. The Timorese involved in this is one man Lourenco Hornay. Presumably Jolliffe is suggesting that the alleged lack of respect is directed towards him. The impression created is that I am the person not showing respect and treating Hornay as an object to be used . (If Jolliffe s allegation is not referring to Mr. Hornay then I am unable to understand what she is trying to say here). In fact I think the evidence suggests the opposite. I believe that I treated Mr. Hornay with respect. I believed (and still believe) Hornay s evidence (which I think was sincerely offered) to be useful and significant. I believed (and still believe) that he was honest and credible. After initially speaking with me he agreed to the interview that was conducted by Gomes, in which he gave evidence almost identical to that which he had previously given me. I diligently adhered to his wish to remain anonymous. I have not heard any suggestion that he feels I did not treat him with respect. It is Jill Jolliffe who sets herself up in judgment and makes such statements in her book. I am not alone in viewing his testimony as credible - Adelino Gomes wrote Lourenco s testimony seemed to me honest and measured . In fact it is Jill Jolliffe who publishes detrimental allegations that diminish Mr. Hornay. She writes, I knew all he had to say about (Balibo), which was all hearsay 38. She says he claimed troops had gone up the road from Balibo to Batugade (which I believe is a mis-representation), then writes no troops had gone in this direction 39 thus suggesting publicly that he is (at best) ill-informed on matters he speaks about. She writes she heard

37 38 39

end of second paragraph, page 176, Cover Up line 12, page 175, Cover Up line 20, page 175

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21 he was offended (emphasis added) at not being consulted for the Sherman hearings 40suggesting that his motivation for giving evidence was a sense of being offended and that his evidence was therefore dubious. She writes he had not seen anything of the attack [on Balibo] 41 implying this was a significant revelation when, in fact, Hornay had never claimed to have seen anything of the attack that was never part of his evidence. Jolliffe states, Why Hornay should make these claims now when he had never done so before was a mystery which Jolliffe then claims to have solved 42. She then suggests that his testimony to Gomes was wrong because this information had come form an Indonesian interpreter called Gabriel, not from any specific conversation Hornay had had with an Indonesian officer 43. The letter from Jolliffe s publisher, Henry Rosenbloom, seems to remove all doubt that Hornay is being discredited. He writes (top of page 2 in his letter) Hornay s claim was false, and Hornay has since retracted it (I don t believe Rosenbloom s statement is correct). Rosenbloom continues that certain paragraphs make it clear that Hornay was the one with the credibility problems . Further Rosenbloom says that Ms. Jolliffe is focusing on dubious evidence that had apparently been uttered to serve political ends alleging that Mr. Hornay is subverting the truth towards political ends. On the evidence above it would seem it is Jolliffe who is showing lack of respect for the Timorese involved Mr. Hornay. This could be because she is offended that in spite of Hornay being an old friend who she had known...for many years 44 he had not conveyed this evidence to her (Jolliffe has never heard him make a similar claim 45 Sherman s Second Report letter from Jonathan Holmes). Her interpretation was that she knew all he had to say about it, which was all hearsay 46 but his evidence has contradicted her assertion. Jolliffe had a vested interest in establishing Hornay s supposed lack of credibility because she had formed the opinion that he had no significant evidence to offer about Balibo and had advised this to Sherman resulting In Hornay not being interviewed by Sherman in 1996 (see section above: Jolliffe had advised Sherman not to interview Mr. Hornay in 1996 ).

That the Indonesian government could cast doubt on the credibility of those presenting seriously researched evidence Jolliffe suggests (later in the same paragraph page 176) that Indonesian government could expose the allegedly falsified evidence and thus cast doubt on the credibility of those presenting seriously researched evidence .
40 41 42 43 44 45 46

line 10, page 175 second last line, page 175 first line, last paragraph, page 175 line 3, page 176, Cover Up Sherman Report 2, 7.57, page 137 Sherman Report 2, page 74, 4.45 mid page 175

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22

As the underlying analysis is flawed, this interpretation is simply unjustified. More assertions based on the same incorrect premise do not add weight to Jolliffe s case.

IS MR. HORNAY S EVIDENCE WORTHY OF PROPER CONSIDERATION ? I believe that in spite of the consistent attack on Mr. Hornay s credibility mounted in Jill Jolliffe s book that the jury should still be out on the credibility of Hornay s evidence and that further checking is warranted. Apart from the testimony provided to Adelino Gomes and myself previously, Mr. Hornay spoke to Sherman and Jolliffe. Sherman s interview with Hornay raises some questions. Sherman s style of questioning in his reports results in leads that are not followed up adequately, ambiguities that are left un-clarified (then later subjected to selective interpretation) and crucial questions that are not even asked. For example Sherman leaves matters quite muddled by not distinguishing between Balibo and Maliana at a crucial point in his questioning of Hornay 47. Having asked his questions in a misleading and ambiguous way, Sherman then dismisses Hornay s testimony because Mr. Hornai had no knowledge of the Balibo 5 being in Balibo prior to the attack 48 - a finding totally at odds with Hornay s prior (clear) evidence. This is not the first time the outcome of one of Sherman s interviews has been perplexing. Nonetheless there are enough matters of interest in Sherman s interview with Hornay in his second report (pages 75 to 79 of Sherman s second report) to warrant a proper investigation. For instance whilst some of Hornay s information is said to have come via the interpreter Gabriel other material is clearly communicated directly to him. Hornay is quoted (page 76 Sherman Report 2) as saying I had some contacts with Indonesian officers ... I understood a bit of what they said and sometimes I communicated with them directly 49. Sherman then asks Which officers, if he can identify them, told him about the eight journalists ? Interpreter So I got the information mostly from two. A lieutenant from the unit of transmissions must be communications radio transmission, he cant remember his 50 name, and Captain Fernandes . Later Sherman notes (4.50 page 79) Mr. Hornai goes on to describe a conversation he had with Colonel Dading on 13 October through his interpreter where Dading expressed

47 48 49 50

bottom of page 78, Sherman Report 2 7.56, page 137, Sherman Report 2 Sherman interview with Hornay, page 76, Sherman Report 2 As above

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23 some concern about the journalists but the nature of that concern is not at all clear 51. Obviously this was not clarified by Sherman s interview, yet it indicates that Hornay was in the loop in that he was able to speak directly to Dading (the overall commander of Indonesian operations at the border). Sherman s interview (combined with Gomes s prior interview with Hornay) suggests that Hornay may have quite a lot of useful information based on his direct experiences to provide about the circumstances behind the Balibo killings. Hornay s mentioning of specific names, dates and details (regarding the foreknowledge of those planning the attack on Balibo of the journalists presence and the intention to physically eliminate them) and his position as a UDT commander located in Batugade at the time support the credibility of his testimony. Significant parts of his evidence are also corroborated by that of other witnesses - such as L1 (in his later version ), Joao Carrascalao and Fernando Mariz. Certainly what Hornay has said consistently appears substantial enough to warrant a proper assessment in a properly constituted inquiry.

OTHER MIS-STATEMENTS CONCERNING McNAUGHTAN IN JOLLIFFE S BOOK A. About the shielding of Mr. Hornay s identity : Jolliffe notes (mid page 175) that Hornay s identity was shielded in McNaughtan s Lisbon interview, although he said later he had not asked for this 52. What point is Jolliffe trying to make here ? In the context her comments seem to suggest that Hornay s identity was shielded by McNaughtan for some inappropriate reason. In fact it was made clear to me from two sources that Hornay s identity should be suppressed. The first source is the email communications between Amilcar Dias and myself, the second is the statement in English made by Gomes before commencing his interview with Hornay. In this Gomes made it very clear (twice) that Hornay s identity should not be revealed. I honoured this commitment. This was, in fact, the only condition to the use of Hornay s statements that I was (and am) aware of. Jolliffe s comments (in the context in which they occurred) seem to imply some dubious intention by me in suppressing Hornay s identity. In fact the opposite is the case. The emails between Amilcar Dias and myself show that I suggested that Hornay might be willing to be identified because a peer of his (Fernando Mariz) had already publicly made statements similar in nature to Hornay s. However it was relayed to me that Hornay wished to remain anonymous.

51 52

As above line 16, page 175, Cover Up

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24 B An interview allegedly mistranslated by me Jolliffe has made other mis-statements in her descriptions of my activities concerning Balibo. Jolliffe writes (at the bottom of page 232) that an interview done by me with Paolo Martins in Dili and used by SBS TV news was mistranslated, rendering it nonsensical in parts . This may be true. She then links me to the alleged mistranslations by writing that according to the text presented originally by McNaughtan, Martins claimed the Indonesians had piled policias, policemen on top of the dead bodies before burning them, and named the field commander as Yunus Sophia . I have reviewed the translation that I used of this interview. I hand wrote the translation which had again been done by Beatriz Miranda and then typed it up. My translation clearly says that the perpetrators took a mattress and put on top of the bodies and burnt them . Later Miranda s translation of Martins states the man who commanded that operation was Commander Yunus Yosfiah who is now Minister of Information of Indonesia . So there were no such simplistic (and obviously absurd) mis-translations presented by McNaughtan . The documents in my files suggest that if I gave any translation of the Martins interview to Sherman it would have been the translation done by Beatrice Miranda which was correct. This was the translation I used and relied upon. I am not sure where the absurd translation quoted by Jolliffe came from. It might have been done by SBS TV who took the original interview (in Portuguese) and used it for their news piece. I agree with Jolliffe that the news piece screened by SBS TV was not very coherent 53. However, having handed over the interview and an outline of what I considered was relevant and important in this interview to SBS, it was out of my hands. Anyone with experience of dealing with the media would recognize that the resulting news stories can often be garbled and less than satisfactory. It is possible the mistranslated text she quotes was from SBS TV. I may have handed SBS s translation to Tom Sherman for his interest (or given him a copy of the taped TV news piece) I m not sure where the text that Jolliffe quotes is from (or whether Sherman did in fact receive such a translation). It might also have been a translation done by Foreign Correspondent at ABC TV (who held the tape of the original interview in their vault for a period of time and presumably had some sort of translation done by their own translation service). But the mis-translation cited by Jolliffe is certainly not the translation that I relied upon and Jolliffe again misrepresents me in a detrimental way by stating that the mistranslation was supplied by McNaughtan . C An interview that didn t take place / and other misrepresentations Another inaccuracy concerning me appears on pages 241 and is repeated on page 257. Jolliffe speaks of the witness Terrado and writes He had been interviewed by Australian reporter John Martinkus and Andrew McNaughtan in September 1998 for a story which appeared in The Australian 54. Although there are no negative inferences
53 54

Bottom paragraph, page 232, Cover Up Mid lower paragraph, page 241, Cover Up

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25 towards me in this statement - the statement is simply wrong. I did not interview Terrado only John Martinkus did. The statement is repeated on page 257 and is again wrong. This indicates (again) that Jolliffe did not check her information properly. Jolliffe s also writes misleadingly of the interview with Hornay as McNaughtan s Lisbon interview 55. In fact I was in Sydney when it was done - I did not do the interview or have any direct input into the interview. It seems likely that Jolliffe was not aware when she wrote the book that I was physically removed from the interview process. This may have skewed her interpretation of what occurred. If Jolliffe was aware how this interview was actually conducted, it would have been appropriate to describe it differently. Jolliffe again writes misleadingly about the process of the ICJ Colloquium when she notes In 1997 the Australian Section of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) decided to hold a colloquium on Balibo in Sydney on the twenty-first (sic) anniversary of the deaths, and to give priority to reviewing the Sherman findings. Andrew McNaughtan traveled to Lisbon to prepare evidence, and families of the journalists were invited to attend 56 (italics added). In fact my trip to Lisbon had preceded any decision by the ICJ to hold the Colloquium. That is why I was I had to request someone else to arrange that Mr. Hornay be interviewed in Lisbon by the time I realised that his testimony could be used at the ICJ Colloquium I was back in Australia. Jolliffe s allegations and interpretations concerning me have been made without checking the facts The inaccurate statements about me by Jolliffe could have been avoided if she had discussed these matters with me. She has not done so. Apart from our initial discussions (about Sherman s report and L1 ) she has refused to talk to me about these issues. This is in spite of the fact that I tried to clear up any misunderstandings with Jolliffe. We met by coincidence at the Timor border in late 1999 and Jolliffe (in the course of a brief and unfriendly conversation) accused me of mis-representations concerning Balibo (I don t remember her exact words and she did not make her point clear at all). I pointed out that there must be some mis-understanding and suggested we talk about it to get the facts straight but she refused any discussion. In 2001 I received strong advise from former Australian DF intelligence officer Andrew Plunkett (who had spoken to Jolliffe) that I should urgently speak to her before Cover Up was published as it would contain detrimental (and possibly incorrect) allegations about me. On Plunkett s advise I did ring Jolliffe however she continued her refusal to speak with me. Jolliffe later expressed anger towards Plunkett because he had suggested I ring her and had given me her number in order for me to do so. Sherman quotes Lord Denning (2.20, page 21, Sherman Report 1). Denning wrote:

55 56

. Line 16, page 175, Cover Up. Last paragraph, page 173, Cover Up.

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26 The inspectors can obtain information in any way they think best, but before they condemn or criticize a man, they must give him a fair opportunity for correcting or contradicting what is said against him . Jolliffe not only failed to give me the right to correct or contradict what she said against me, she actually rejected two initiatives I had made to clear up her apparent misunderstandings.

WAS GOMES TREATED UNFAIRLY ? Gomes confirms having said to Jill Jolliffe that there had been no interview 57. Gomes says that he explained in his conversations with Amilcar Dias (who arranged the recording of Hornay s testimony in Lisbon) that though we were talking in front of a camera, that was not a journalistic interview 58. Apparently Gomes felt that his discussion with Mr. Hornay was a conversation and not a journalistic interview (in spite of it entailing a half hour of detailed discussion in front of two video cameras). However if any conditions were placed on the on camera talk they were not passed on to me. As my interest was simply in what Lourenco Hornay said, it was not very relevant to me who did the interview, as long as the right questions were asked . By way of background to this, it needs to be understood that I was in Sydney and a friend, Amilcar Dias (who is also a friend of Adelino Gomes) had agreed to arrange a filmed interview between Gomes and Hornay about Balibo in Lisbon. Gomes wrote that if those who used the interview were not aware of any mencioned conditions [sic] then the only one to be blamed is me [Gomes]. Being a professional journalist, I should know that there are no innocent on-camera talks between a reporter and a source 59. It is worth noting that what took place involved a conversation between Gomes and Hornay, both sitting in chairs with a table between them and two video cameras (one on a tripod and one hand held) recording the interview that lasted over half an hour. This included some detailed questioning by Gomes of Hornay (although possibly less probing than might be Gomes normal style in a formal journalistic interview). At the beginning of the video, Gomes described what he was doing as an interview , repeating the word interview on three occasions in English and mentioned no conditions attached to its use (other than that Hornay s identity should be kept secret which he mentioned twice). I have gone over my communications at the time with Amilcar Dias in Lisbon and can t find (and have no memory of) any conditions of use that relate to Gomes s involvement. Obviously if I had been informed there were conditions that might, for example, have
57 58 59

Email from Adelino Gomes to McNaughtan, 22 November, 2001 As above As above

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27 precluded the interview being used at the ICJ Colloquium I would have found someone else to do the interview. After all the whole point of questioning Hornay (as the initial email communications show) was to present his evidence at the Colloquium. I was unaware of any restrictions to the use of the interview and am still unclear what any conditions to the use of the interview might have been. Gomes was unaware of (and I think surprised about) the publishing of Jolliffe s book and the inclusion of his supposed comments. After our communications he wrote to me Thank you for your explanation. Now I understand better what happened. Before answering your questions let me tell you that I do not blame you neither [sic] Lourenco [Hornay] for this. And as I have good feelings about Amilcar [Dias] I consider all this a regrettable misunderstanding due to something that we in Portugal call nacionalporreirismo (a typical Portuguese way of solving problems counting on the good auspices of the Gods ) 60. I should add that the email communications that had taken place between Amilcar Dias and myself show that I always made it clear that the recording of Hornay s interview was being done to present his testimony to the ICJ Colloquium on Balibo and Beyond and interested journalists. As I was actively helping ICJ members to organise the colloquium (along with Peter Cronau) I certainly did not want anything to marr the colloquium . My strong impression is that Gomes now regrets comments that he accepts he may have made to Jolliffe and certainly would have preferred that they were not published. He apparently accepts that these comments were made without a full understanding of how things had occurred and that now he understands the background he does not blame Mr. Hornay or myself but feels there was a regrettable misunderstanding . Unfortunately Jolliffe seems to have picked up a comment made privately, then misquoted it and then published it (to the surprise of Mr. Gomes). I reiterate that Jolliffe made no attempt to clarify these matters with me (in spite of having had opportunities to do so and my having made attempts to clarify these matters with her). There is a short post script to these matters : in Dili in June, 2002 I met and talked again with Adelino Gomes and he told me he had talked over these matters with Amilcar Dias. Dias had told Gomes he had no memory of any conditions imposed by Gomes on the use of his interview. This indicates that Dias would not have suggested to me that there were any conditions to the use of the interview. I was also able to ask Adelino Gomes about his perception of Lourenco Hornay s credibility. Gomes indicated that, though he found Hornay personally credible, he didn t believe Hornay s evidence about Indonesian foreknowledge of the journalists presence in Balibo could be correct, because Gomes understood that the Australian crews had only arrived in Balibo on the day before the attack in which they died (leaving no time for the Indonesians to have learned about their presence). I have since checked the evidence about this issue - which confirms the crews were there for a number of days before the
60

Email from Adelino Gomes to McNaughtan, 26 November, 2001

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28 attack and have sent this material to Gomes. This suggests that any doubts that Gomes may have about the credibility of Lourenco Hornay s testimony are based on a misconception of events at the border at that time. This issue is still being sorted out.

PART 2 THE BACKGROUND CONTEXT MATTERS CONCERNING THE CREDIBILITY OR OTHERWISE OF KEY WITNESSES It may be relevant and helpful to understand the context of these events, and so I have outlined the background below. The first Sherman Report The first Sherman report was released in June, 1996 and concluded that the deaths of the journalists at Balibo had probably occurred in circumstances of continuing fighting 61. Thus Sherman s findings endorsed the crossfire or accidental death scenario. Sherman s conclusions were founded almost exclusively on the testimony of one witness L1 (Lisbon 1 witness) who Sherman described as a witness of truth 62. L1 s critical role in justifying Sherman s conclusions was accepted by most observers including Jolliffe. She wrote that the conclusion that the journalists were killed while fighting was still taking place was a conclusion he (Sherman) reached largely from the testimony of L1 63. My search for L1 In early / mid 1997 I had a chance to visit Portugal as I attended the Oporto Conference on East Timor. I took the opportunity to go to Lisbon and try to track down L1, for the purpose of answering questions about his background and credibility. Circumstances were quite different in 1997 because the struggle for East Timorese self determination was very intense at that time. Balibo was then a thorny issue that both Jakarta and Canberra wished would disappear. If the first Sherman Report had been widely accepted as credible, the Australian and Indonesian governments would have been able to bury the Balibo issue and both would have been happy to do so. Canberra and Jakarta also believed that if Balibo would be resolved the Australian public support for and interest in East Timor would be significantly reduced. Thus there had to be a level of concern that (given the high stakes) some sort of influence or corrupt pressure might be brought to bear on the witnesses who Sherman interviewed - and thus his investigation. It was in this context that I felt it
61 62 63

9.10 , bottom of page 137, Sherman Report 1 5.37 page 100, Sherman Report 1 mid page 160, Cover Up

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29 relevant to go to Lisbon and try to find what I could about L1 - and hopefully interview him. Sherman relied heavily on L1 s testimony as he himself acknowledged. Yet L1 s evidence was at odds with nearly all other independent testimonies from 1975 onwards. It also bore a striking resemblance to the version propagated in 1975 in the statement by one of the pro-Indonesian Timorese. That statement had since been repudiated by its signatory, who revealed that it had been written by Indonesians who had subsequently forced him to sign it. The signatory (Guillerme Goncalves) had made a public recantation in 1995 - and this recantation was one of the factors resulting in the commissioning of the Sherman Report by Gareth Evans in the first place. I was aware that Jolliffe had found L1 for Tom Sherman (she had played a significant role in formulating and assisting Sherman s activities in Portugal). Therefore I first approached Jolliffe. We had an initially congenial conversation though I could sense hostility if I questioned her about aspects of Sherman s report. Sherman s report had been out for about a year at this time and (given her close association with it and interest in Balibo) I believe Jolliffe would have been sent a copy and read it. When I asked her about L1 and indicated some skepticism about the evidence he gave to Sherman she became quite hostile. She told me that she knew L1 and strongly indicated that she viewed him as a credible and significant witness and that she put faith in what he had told Sherman. She then offered her opinion that people such as myself were ideologues who had fixed perspectives because of political bias. She strongly implied that this attitude which she attributed to me was the basis of my questioning of the credibility of L1. I subsequently asked her if, even so, she would help me contact L1, or ask him if he would be willing to speak to me. She said that she would not assist me. She also told me (with what seemed to be some satisfaction) that she was sure I would not be able to find him. Although I don t remember our conversation word for word, I clearly recall the content. I then spent a week in Lisbon staying in the house of Pascoela Barreto who is from a well-known Timorese family. She worked as a type of social worker with the community in Lisbon and knew most of the Timorese community there. She and her husband Amilcar Dias helped me arrange meetings over the next week. At the end of the week, I had met a number of relevant witnesses (most of whom had spoken with Sherman) but none who had been able to help locate L1. As a last resort I phoned Jolliffe again before leaving and told her I had been unable to find L1. She seemed resentful of my activities in Lisbon. I asked if she would be willing to at least pass a message to L1, asking him if he would be willing to communicate with me. I pointed out that this could be done completely anonymously, and that any communications could be through an intermediary (such as Jolliffe) so that his identity could be protected. Jolliffe adamantly refused to pass on my message to L1. When I

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30 suggested that it should be the witness s prerogative to decide whether to communicate with anyone else and that L1 should at least be given the opportunity to refuse personally, she again became hostile. It was obvious Jolliffe would not help and the conversation ended. The odd circumstances in Lisbon During my time in Lisbon, I met and visited a number of Timorese, including Abilio Araujo. Araujo (considered probably the richest East Timorese individual) lived in a large villa above Lisbon. His lifestyle was relatively affluent and exclusive and he was very security conscious. Araujo told me about his involvement with Suharto s daughter Tutuk with whom he had collaborated in organizing intra-Timorese discussions in London. He showed me photos of himself with Tutuk. He also told me of his recent trip to Jakarta where he had met over lunch with Prabowo, the Suharto son-in-law (and Tutuk s brother in law). Araujo was involved in import-export between Indonesia and Portugal and dealt directly with the Suharto family in this. These deals had made him a rich man. The trip he had made to Jakarta probably coincided with the visit there of Jose Martins (I believe Araujo and Martins may have gone there together). Martins (the former leader of Kota party) had relevant information about Balibo but had refused to meet with Tom Sherman during his trip to Lisbon in spite of Sherman s requests. Sherman noted I endeavoured to interview Jose Martins during my visit to Portugal in April 1996, but he was unable to meet me. I did invite him to send me any material by mid May but no material came up to the date of this report 64. Martins had not made himself available to Sherman but had gone to Jakarta. Given the context (Sherman s inquiry taking place), Martins lack of cooperation raised questions. In Jakarta, Martins died suddenly of what was said to be a heart attack. There were rumours in the Timorese community that Martins had been poisoned. This odd background increased my concern about improper influence being brought to bear on those giving testimony to Sherman and about circumstances that might lead to misleading testimony being provided. It was certainly possible to imagine a number of scenarios in which a false witness could be inserted into Sherman s investigation to support the more palatable conclusion that the journalists deaths had been in crossfire . As mentioned this outcome (which would eliminate the much more troubling option of death as the result of murder ) would be popular with both the Indonesian and Australian governments. Clearly some Timorese in Lisbon were in contact with persons in Jakarta who might be interested in influencing Sherman s investigation towards the crossfire conclusion, if they could.

64

3.31, page 33, Sherman Report 1.

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31 Jill Jolliffe was a long-term confidante and associate of Abilio Araujo in Lisbon. However Jolliffe was adamant to me that she knew L1 personally and that she endorsed his evidence to Sherman. The ICJ Colloquium Some months after I returned from this trip the ICJ began planning the proposed Colloquium Balibo and Beyond . Rodney Lewis from the ICJ had responsibility for organizing it. Peter Cronau (from the Centre for Independent Journalism) and I (from the Australia East Timor Association) volunteered to assist with the organization as well as contribute content to the colloquium. At the Colloquium I presented the interview with Lourenco Hornay as well as my Critique of the Sherman Report . McNaughtan clearly articulated concerns he had about L1 s credibility at the ICJ Colloquium I also wrote and presented a Critique of the Sherman Report to the Colloquium. This included a fairly extensive questioning of the credibility of the witness L1 , based on my experiences in Lisbon and my own observations and analysis. I openly questioned whether his testimony was truthful or if it could have misled Sherman and skewed his report. Whether Sherman might have chosen to allow his report to be skewed is another consideration. The section concerning L1 from my Critique of the Sherman Report is copied below. A full copy of this Critique is available. I wrote: 8. THE (SHERMAN) REPORT S CONCLUSIONS ABOUT BALIBO ARE FUNDAMENTALLY LINKED TO THE CREDIBILITY OF SHERMAN S KEY WITNESS MR. L1 (LISBON 1 WITNESS). YET THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT QUESTION MARK OVER THIS MAN. THE TESTIMONY OF MR. L1 THAT ALLOWS SHERMAN TO CONCLUDE THAT FIGHTING TOOK PLACE FOR AT LEAST 2 HOURS IN BALIBO IS AT ODDS WITH ALMOST EVERY OTHER ACCOUNT OF THE TAKING OF BALIBO BY INDONESIAN LED FORCES YET SHERMAN MAKES LITTLE ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE THIS DISCREPANCY (AND IGNORES EVIDENCE THAT MAKES THIS CONCLUSION UNLIKELY) . I pointed out how much reliance Sherman had placed on L1 for his conclusions: Mr. Sherman makes it clear that L1 is his main witness and that he gives him a lot of credibility. He says that L1 impressed me as a witness of truth (5.37- page 100). Based on L1 s evidence Sherman observes that his account is strong circumstantial evidence that the Balibo Five were killed while fighting was still taking place. It is also direct evidence that hostile fire was coming from the house where the journalists bodies were located (5.36, page 100). In his conclusion he writes The evidence of L1 which was the

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32 only reliable evidence on this issue, leads me to the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the Balibo Five were killed in the heat of battle while fighting was continuing to occur . The evidence of L1 is absolutely crucial to the conclusions that Sherman draws about Balibo I noted I THINK A NUMBER OF DOUBTS AND INCONSISTENCIES EXIST WITH L1 - and outlined some of them. I concluded my comments about L1 as follows: To base the conclusions of a significant government investigation on the secret testimony of one unidentified witness, when it contradicts much other testimony that is offered publicly seems odd and raises doubts in my mind. The reason given for him not being identified is that he would be in danger from the Indonesians this seems odd considering it is his testimony that allows the conclusion that the journalists died in the heat of battle allowing the crossfire argument to be revived . 65

Although a number of people had privately expressed scepticism about L1 s testimony I was (as far as I know) the only person to articulate this publicly in print. Jolliffe changes her stated position towards L1 just prior to the ICJ Colloquium

By the time of the ICJ colloquium Jill Jolliffe had changed her position on L1 (compared with what she had said to me in Lisbon). She now faxed Hamish McDonald saying, L1 was a new [emphasis added] and interesting witness whose testimony had not tallied (emphasis added) with her preliminary notes 66. This was a significant shift from the position she had adopted with me in Lisbon when she said she knew him and expressed confidence in his testimony. Jolliffe s change deepened my concern about LI and his evidence. Given Araujo s close and known association with the Suharto family there appeared to be at least one potential conduit for the insertion of false evidence. I was concerned about this and did mention it (in conversation) to some people. Subsequently L1 s reported testimony to Sherman has been shown to have been false (when he was re-interviewed for the ABC Foreign Correspondent program in late 1998) - as I had initially suspected. The concern I had articulated in my critique to the ICJ colloquium one year earlier was thus vindicated. L1 WAS SHERMAN S KEY WITNESS

65

From A Critique of the Sherman Report by Andrew McNaughtan - section 8 deals with L1. This was presented to the ICJ Colloquium in October 1997. 66 Fax from Jill Jolliffe to Hamish McDonald October 15th, 1997

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33 The first Sherman report was released in June 1996 and concluded that the deaths of the journalists at Balibo had probably occurred in the heat of battle while fighting was continuing to occur . Thus Sherman s findings endorsed the crossfire or accidental death scenario. Sherman acknowledged that his conclusions were founded almost exclusively on the testimony of one witness L1. Sherman noted L1 impressed me as a witness of truth (5.37 page 100 SR1). Sherman added his account is strong circumstantial evidence that the Balibo Five were killed while fighting was still taking place. It is also direct evidence that hostile fire was coming from the house where the journalists bodies were located (5.36, page 100 SR1). He concluded The evidence of L1, which was the only reliable evidence on this issue, leads me to the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the Balibo Five were killed in the heat of battle while fighting was continuing to occur (5.86 page 110 SR1). L1 s key role in justifying Sherman s conclusions was also accepted by Jolliffe. She wrote that the conclusion that the journalists were killed while fighting was still taking place was a conclusion he (Sherman) reached largely from the testimony of L1 67. Jonathan Holmes (then of ABC Foreign Correspondent ) noted in the feature on Balibo In his report Tom Sherman concluded that (the journalists) were killed in the heat of battle. He based that conclusion mainly on the evidence of that anonymous witness that he interviewed in Lisbon code-named L1 68. I had made similar observations in my Critique of the Sherman Report. It is clear that L1 s testimony was pivotal to Sherman s conclusion about the deaths of the journalists a conclusion that endorsed the crossfire scenario.

YET L1 s EVIDENCE UNDERWENT A COMPLETE REVERSAL L1 s evidence underwent a complete reversal from what he is reported to have said in Sherman s first report to what he is reported to have said when Jolliffe and Jonathan Holmes re-interviewed him some years later. The two key issues were whether or not the attacking force had foreknowledge of the journalists presence in Balibo (which would obviously be a vital factor in interpreting their actions) and whether or not the journalists died in the heat of battle . On the question of FOREKNOWLEDGE : VERSION 1 (from Sherman s first report, early 1996)

67 68

mid page 160, Cover Up. Quote from Jonathan Holmes from ABC Foreign Correspondent s TV special on Balibo

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34 L1 was convinced that the attacking troops in Balibo did not know the five Australians were there (Sherman Report 1, 4.141 bottom of page 74). L1 was not aware prior to the attack of any intelligence about Australian journalists in the area (4.142, page 75 Sherman Report 1). VERSION 2 (the subsequent interview for Foreign Correspondent , late 1998) It turned out that he was the second of the two Portuguese-speaking radio operators in the Batugade fort, and that he had information about pre-knowledge similar to that of the 1979 witness (Cover Up - 4th paragraph, page 188). Several days before the Balibo deaths L1 had monitored FRETILIN communications discussing the presence of the journalists in Balibo which he duly transcribed and passed on to Dading Kalbuadi (Cover Up - 5th paragraph, page 188).

On the question of DEATHS IN THE HEAT OF BATTLE / or otherwise : Version 1 (Sherman Report, early 1996) L1 told Sherman that when he arrived in Balibo the firing was still going on, so much so that he had to borrow a weapon from the driver. The fire hostile to the attacking force was coming from three directions including the house at 9 o clock where he saw the journalists bodies (meaning the house beside the Batugade road, as viewed from the aerial map supplied in Sherman s report) (4.142, page 75 SR). L1 s recollection is reinforced by the fact that he was wounded by an exploding grenade in the course of the fighting. I saw the scar of his wound (4.142, page 75 SR). In L1 s view the Fretilin deliberately let in the Indonesians, as it were, because they placed themselves surrounding the whole of Balibo with the intention of trapping the Indonesians and the Timorese who were on the Indonesians side, and he says that was a tactical manoeuvre. And he said it worked in as much as the Indonesians did go in and the Fretilin were surrounding the whole of Balibo (4.143, page 75 SR1). When the firing from the house at 9 o clock ceased he (L1) moved around to the front of that house and saw the five Europeans as well as Timorese bodies. The Timorese were in another part of the house and they had weapons with them (4.145, top of page 76, SR). The shooting as far as he could see, was coming from the FRETILIN. The hostile shooting was coming from the fort area (4.146, page 76 SR1). The interpreter So he is saying that the fire fight was still going on when he left because he was injured and it was still the fire fight was still in progress (4.146, page 76 SR1).

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35 Sherman commented L1 s evidence relating to the firing coming from the house where the journalists bodies were is worth setting out in full (4.147, page 77 SR1). The interpreter So he said that when the Indonesian troops arrived in the square, as soon as they arrived shots were being fired from this house. Mr. Sherman: And he saw that ? The interpreter : He says, yes he saw them. He says that the shots were knocking leaves off the trees. Mr. Sherman: So that the shots were being fired from the house .at the Indonesians?

The interpreter: he says, yes they were being fired at the Indonesian troops from the house . Mr. Sherman : So that by the time he came to look at the bodies of the Europeans that firing had stopped in that house. The interpreter : No, the firing from the window had stopped. So he says that when he went around to the front of that house and went up the steps to the verandah and saw the bodies he looked up, he saw the Australian flag drawn on the wall next to the FRETILIN so he saw the Australian and FRETILIN flags drawn side by side on the wall . Version 2 ( Foreign Correspondent , late 1998) L1 now said that he arrived in Balibo some time after the town had fallen to Indonesia. On 16 October he had worked the midnight-to-6.00AM monitoring shift, (in Batugade) and before he left it he heard FRETILIN commanders announce that Balibo had fallen and their soldiers had retreated .69 According to Jolliffe he now believed the only shots being fired from the square near the house were return fire from Indonesian soldiers digging in at various positions. He was adamant that no shots were fired from the house itself. He stressed there was no battle in progress which he said had finished before 6.00a.m. 70. Jolliffe herself notes that when revisiting L1 s testimony, we found his story was completely different . 71

JOLLIFFE S REVISIONISM ABOUT L1

69 70

last paragraph, page 188, Cover Up. mid 2nd paragraph, page 189, Cover Up 71 mid page 188, Cover Up

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36 L1 ? a known and credible witness / or a new witness whose testimony did not tally

The man (L1) whom Jolliffe told me she knew and trusted is now reported in the book Cover Up as a new witness, a man who had come to Lisbon with the other refugees in 1976 who was pointed out to me by a young Timorese friend just before Sherman arrived 72 (emphasis added). Why had Jolliffe told me something completely different ? How could Jolliffe have had the confidence she initially expressed to me in L1 if she didn t know him at all ? On the 15th October 1997 (as the ICJ Colloquium started), Jolliffe faxed Hamish McDonald a message in which she adopted another position that differed significantly from that which she had taken with me in Lisbon just a few months earlier. She now wrote that L1 s testimony did not tally with my (Jolliffe s) preliminary notes 73. Yet Jolliffe had told me she had faith in the credibility of L1 s testimony. Why the change ? Certainly the way Jolliffe writes about L1 now suggests he should not have been treated as reliable and should (at least) have been re-interviewed sooner. Presumably Jolliffe might explain these discrepancies by saying it was not of great concern to her to mislead someone like me whom she seemed to view as an unwelcome intruder onto her turf . She might also say that it would have been wrong to reveal the identity of someone (like L1) who requested that his identity be suppressed. However these issues could have been addressed without revealing L1 s identity. Contradictory evidence about Jolliffe s concern from the outset casts other doubts on her depiction In her book Jolliffe claims she was concerned about the accuracy of L1 s reported evidence from the outset Jolliffe says that she was concerned about how the L1 interview would be handled 74. She said that there had been no preliminary assessment the spadework had not been done . She also says she was concerned that the informant s cranky behaviour, accent and chaotic household might present challenges . Here she was emphasising points that she had already made: he was a difficult person to interview with a temperamental personality thick accent and could only be interviewed in his chaotic living room with a television set blaring 75. Later Jolliffe distanced herself even further from L1 s evidence to Sherman by writing My reservations about how the interview with L1 would transpire were borne out 76 citing Sherman s interviewing and translating techniques as a concern.
72 73

top of page 157, Cover Up fax from Jolliffe to McDonald on 15/10/97 74 midway down page 159, Cover Up 75 2nd paragraph, page 157, Cover Up 76 mid page 167, Cover Up

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37

Clearly Jolliffe is now claiming in her book to have had these doubts about L1 s reported evidence to Sherman from the outset. Yet Sherman s interviews were done in Lisbon from mid April 1996 77 and Sherman s report was released in June 199678. I visited Lisbon over a year later (July/August 1997)79. Given Jolliffe s close involvement in Sherman s activities in Portugal (she had helped to arrange and organise his visit 80) and her self confessed obsession with Balibo 81 , she must have been familiar with Sherman s report. When we met in Lisbon and discussed these matters, I expressed strong concerns to her about the credibility of L1 s testimony (and L1 was a witness Jolliffe had found for Sherman). Jolliffe would already have had doubts about L1 s testimony if the depiction in her book is accurate. Yet Jolliffe expressed no doubts at all to me at that time instead her response was to defend L1 s credibility and express faith in the veracity of what he had said to Sherman. She reinforced this impression by portraying L1 as credible and honourable and strongly suggested that my doubts about his testimony were unjustified and improperly motivated. It is difficult for me to reconcile the content of my conversation in Lisbon with Jolliffe with the position she now adopts in Cover Up that she had doubts about L1 s evidence from the outset . L1 s uncertain story and Jolliffe s changing explanations of it Jolliffe now claims that she originally didn t know L1 s complete evidence. She writes that when she met L1 she was not seeking to do a complete interview, merely a preliminary interview 82 then The witnesses description sounded authentic, and I decided I did not need to know more - it was up to Sherman to get the rest out of him. Besides I could do my own in-depth interview with him later 83. This does not support the level of confidence about the veracity of L1 s testimony that Jolliffe conveyed to me when I spoke to her over a year later in Lisbon. But in spite of the doubts and reservations about L1 s evidence that Jolliffe now claims to have had, and Jolliffe s subsequent comment that the outcome of Sherman s interview did not tally with my preliminary interview notes 84, she apparently made no effort at that time to resolve the contradiction by questioning L1. This is odd because Jolliffe is a professional journalist who is a self-styled expert on Balibo.
77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84

mid page 158, Cover Up front cover of Sherman Report 1, dated June 1996 from my own notes and records of this last paragraph page 157 to page 158, Cover Up quoted from a radio interview with Jolliffe top of page 157, Cover Up mid page 157, Cover Up fax from Jolliffe to Hamish McDonald on 15/10/97

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38

Instead Jolliffe s book is full of excuses explaining why L1 s interview with Sherman might have come out wrongly temperamental nature, thick accent, difficult domestic circumstances etc. Clearly there is a major discrepancy between the faith in L1 s testimony expressed by Jolliffe to me in Lisbon in 1997 and the attitude of doubt towards his evidence she now claims in her book to have adopted at that time. There is a further discrepancy : why if Jolliffe had concerns about the reliability of L1 s reported evidence to Sherman did she not take the simple steps that could have clarified these matters ? She recognised that Sherman s conclusions of death in circumstances of continuing fighting were reached largely from the testimony of L1 85 and she knew that at least one person (myself) had doubts about the credibility of L1 s evidence. She now claims she also had misgivings about his evidence and she was one of the very few people who was in a position to contact and re-interview him. Yet this did not happen till well over two years later. Who publicly articulated doubts about L1 and when ? The evidence clearly shows that I attempted to investigate the veracity of L1 s claims. Having been unable to do this (largely due to the uncooperative stance taken by Jolliffe herself) I put my doubts and misgivings about L1 s evidence (and how it could have been used to skew and mislead the Sherman Report into seriously flawed conclusions) into the public arena by writing and presenting my critique at the ICJ Colloquium. As mentioned, my critique dealt in some detail with doubts I had about L1 s testimony. Any fair depiction of these events should acknowledge these facts. Instead Jolliffe s book engages in a significant revision of the history. Jolliffe acknowledges that my critique of Sherman contained sound criticism of [the report s] structural limitations and acknowledged that I criticized Sherman s heavy reliance on L1 s statement 86. However Jolliffe does not acknowledge the critical fact that I also questioned the veracity of L1 s reported testimony not simply Sherman s heavy reliance on L1 (see McNaughtan clearly articulated concerns he had about L1 s credibility on page 28). This is something that is on the public record and something she was well aware of, as I had personally discussed the issue with her. Jolliffe fails to acknowledge in her book that when I met her in Lisbon in 1997 I raised my concerns about L1 with her. She neglects to mention that she would not assist my attempts to make contact with L1 (even when I suggested that could be done indirectly
85 86

mid page 160, Cover Up bottom of page 174, Cover Up

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39 and anonymously) and that she strongly argued to me in support of the credibility of his evidence to Sherman. Thus Jolliffe presents a selective version of events. This has the effect of altering the record significantly and not acknowledging that my concerns about L1 s credibility proved to be well founded and that her initial defense of L1 was subsequently shown to be flawed. The truth emerges belatedly and reluctantly

Jonathan Holmes and Jolliffe (working on the October, 1998 Foreign Correspondent piece) eventually re-approached and re-interviewed L1 in September 1998. This was about two and a half years after the original Sherman interview. The reason for this long delay was that Jolliffe continued to withhold his identity and yet had not taken any steps to clarify the record herself. This seems odd. Whilst it is not surprising that Jolliffe might fob off someone who she may have seen as an interloper or a competitor, it is hard to understand why she did not follow things up herself. Jolliffe now claims in her book to have had misgivings about L1 s testimony from the start. She points out that she didn t know him having only had him pointed out just before Sherman arrived . His personality and circumstances had caused her unease all along apparently and she was concerned about how the L1 interview would be handled 87 . Jolliffe s reservations about how the interview with L1 would transpire were borne out 88 apparently . She notes elsewhere that the outcome of Sherman s interview did not tally with my preliminary interview notes (section of fax from Jolliffe to Hamish McDonald on 15/10/97 - that is mentioned in the book on pages 160 and 161, though this bit of the fax is omitted). Jolliffe was clearly able to resolve all this uncertainty because she could do her own indepth interview with him (L1) later 89. Jolliffe was aware that Sherman s conclusion (which leant towards the deaths having occurred in crossfire ) was a conclusion reached largely from the testimony of L1 90 . Jolliffe was certainly aware of the misgivings of some people about the accuracy of L1 s testimony because I had raised concerns with her personally in Lisbon in late July 1997. She had also mentioned one of these concerns in her fax to Hamish McDonald in October 1997 in this fax Jolliffe denied that L1 could be an Indonesian plant which had been suggested in some quarters 91. Thus Jolliffe was aware of concerns about L1 s credibility.

87 88 89 90 91

mid page 159, Cover Up mid page 167 mid page 157 mid page 160 fax quoted bottom of page 160

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40 Amazingly Jolliffe made no effort to clear up the confusion by interviewing L1 herself though this was something she acknowledged she could easily do. Whilst Jolliffe declined to take this simple step, the Australian and Indonesian governments and their apologists were able to cite the Sherman Report as the final word and declare the case closed . They thus endeavoured to dampen public concern in Australia about Balibo - and certainly hoped that closing the book on Balibo would also diminish public interest in East Timor at this crucial time. L1 was finally re-interviewed in September 1998 92 and it was prompted by the deadline for the Foreign Correspondent programme. Jolliffe wrote it had been decided to reinterview L1 93 - her choice of words suggesting that it was not her initiative to reinterview him. It turned out that what L1 had to say was totally different from the evidence he had reportedly given to Sherman in April 1996 - (see L1 s Testimony Underwent a Complete Reversal page 30). L1 s story now completely different Jolliffe writes : when revisiting L1 s testimony, we found his story was completely different 94. L1 s testimony at the second interview differed in two key aspects from Sherman s depiction of his 1996 testimony . He now confirmed Indonesian foreknowledge of the presence of the journalists at Balibo. Jolliffe writes that Several days before the Balibo deaths L1 had monitored FRETILIN communications discussing the presence of the journalists in Balibo which he duly transcribed and passed on to Dading Kalbuadi 95. L1 later debunked the crossfire picture that his prior testimony had created : He now said that when he arrived in Balibo after the journalists had died the only shots being fired from the square near the house were return fire from Indonesian soldiers digging in at various positions. He was adamant that no shots were fired from the house itself. He stressed there was no battle in progress which he said had finished before 6.00a.m. 96. This was a total reversal of the reporting of his initial testimony to Sherman in 1996 and showed that the foundation upon which Sherman s original conclusions were based was completely flawed. Some questions about this process

92 93 94 95 96

3rd paragraph, page 188 3rd paragraph, page 188 mid page 188 5th paragraph, page 188 mid 2nd paragraph, page 189

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41 The whole sequence of events from the initial way Jolliffe was brought into contact with L1, Jolliffe s provision of L1 to Sherman, the nature of L1 s original evidence to Sherman, the inordinate amount of time (two and a half years) it took to debunk his original misleading testimony (when the controversy could have been resolved at anytime by Jolliffe) - to the way the whole matter has been obfuscated in the book Cover Up raises some more questions. Given the concerns that Jolliffe acknowledges were raised that L1 could have been an Indonesian plant 97 it seems odd to have handled the issue of L1 s credibility in the way Jolliffe has. Certainly the way L1 appeared should raise reasonable concerns he was pointed out to Jolliffe just before Sherman arrived 98. Although Jolliffe lived closely with the community in Portugal 99 she didn t know L1 previously. There were Timorese in Lisbon with close links to the Indonesian state and military intelligence. Abilio Araujo was dealing with Suharto s daughter Tutuk (and showed me a photo of them together in London) and told me when I spoke to him in Lisbon in July 1997 that he had recently returned from Jakarta where he had had a meeting with Tutuk s brother-in-law Prabowo Subianto (who has headed both Kostrad and Kopassus). When I asked Jolliffe in 1997 whether Abilio Araujo had any connection with L1 she became defensive then terminated our conversation. It seemed a very sensitive point. Another question about Timorese in Lisbon the Martins case

Another member of the Timorese community in Lisbon, Jose Martins, had gone to Jakarta apparently on some sort of business in early 1996. Martins trip to Jakarta seems to have coincided with Sherman s trip to Lisbon to pursue his investigation. Sherman had requested that Martins meet him however Martins had declined to do so. Sherman wrote I endeavoured to interview Jose Martins during my visit to Portugal in April 1996, but he was unable to meet me. I did invite him to send me any material by mid May but no material came up to the date of this report 100. Martins died suddenly in Jakarta of a reported heart attack although some Timorese believe he did not die of natural causes. It has been reported that Abilio Araujo was in Jakarta with Martins. Such odd happenings amongst the Timorese community in Lisbon about the time of Sherman s visit should surely raise some questions.

97 98

fax quoted, bottom of page 160 top of page 157 99 mid page 154 100 3.31, page 33, Sherman Report 1

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42 Clearly the Jakarta government had an interest in facilitating the conclusion that the journalists had died in crossfire in order to put an embarrassing issue to rest. The Australian government equally would welcome such a conclusion. L1 s odd behaviour L1 s own behaviour certainly does not engender confidence. Apart from being temperamental , with a thick accent , and television set blaring etc, L1 was also fearful and reluctant 101 according to Jolliffe. He could have been subject to pressure because his wife still had family in Timor 102. He was nervous enough to agree only on condition of anonymity 103. Jolliffe explained in October 1997 that L1 sought anonymity because his testimony endangered him and relatives with the Indonesians 104. Jolliffe had said the same to me during our conversation in Lisbon some months earlier. Yet did L1 have any logical reason to fear the Indonesians because of the content of his evidence to Sherman ? His evidence clearly assisted those in Jakarta who wanted to rid themselves of the Balibo issue, by allowing Sherman to reach the crossfire interpretation. This was the most palatable conclusion Sherman could reach (from Jakarta s perspective) without stretching the credulity of the Australian public beyond breaking point. Hamish McDonald had recognized this when he wrote to Jolliffe asking about the credibility of L1, given that his account gives credence to the heat of battle notion and thus should be welcomed by the Indonesians 105. So if L1 had no logical reason to fear the Indonesians (because his testimony assisted them), why did he insist on anonymity ? When I asked Jolliffe about this inconsistency during our conversation in Lisbon she had no response. My own feelings at the time were that L1 did not want his identity protected from Indonesians so much as from others which, if true, raises more questions. L1 s testimony is Sherman s basis for the death in the heat of battle scenario According to Sherman L1 was convinced that the attacking troops in Balibo did not know the five Australians were there (Sherman Report 1, 4.141 bottom of page 74) this is the exact opposite of L1 s later testimony. Sherman s report continued that L1 was not aware prior to the attack of any intelligence about Australian journalists in the area (4.142, page 75 SR).

101 102 103 104 105

lower 2nd paragraph, page 157 lower 2nd paragraph, page 157 as above from 15/10/97 fax Jolliffe to McDonald bottom of page 160

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43 L1 reportedly told Sherman that when he arrived in Balibo the firing was still going on, so much so that he had to borrow a weapon from the driver. The fire hostile to the attacking force was coming from three directions including the house at 9 o clock where he saw the journalists bodies (4.142, page 75 SR). When the firing from the house at 9 o clock ceased he (L1) moved around to the front of that house and saw the five Europeans as well as Timorese bodies (4.145, top of page 76, SR). Sherman was sufficiently impressed to comment L1 s evidence relating to the firing coming from the house where the journalists bodies were is worth setting out in full (4.147, page 77 SR). So L1 s evidence presented in the first Sherman Report seemed unequivocal about death in the heat of battle and the absence of foreknowledge of the journalists presence by the attacking force.

L1 does a U-turn

Jolliffe asks no questions, but provides excuses

The statements from Sherman s first report quoted above are diametrically opposed to the statements that L1 later gave to Jonathan Holmes and Jill Jolliffe and it is inconceivable to me that such irreconcilable differences could have come about through simple confusion or misunderstanding. In her book Jolliffe seems to minimise concern about the discrepancies in L1 s different testimonies by implying the contradictions may be explained by L1 s temperament , accent and domestic situation and by defects in Sherman s interviewing technique. Jolliffe complains about a garbled quality to L1 s reported interview that she relates to a peculiarity of Sherman s method of registering interviews which was that he relied on the oral translations done at the time . This defect in Sherman s technique and the the special conditions that translating L1 presented 106 are suggested by Jolliffe to explain the discrepancies in L1 s evidence. It stretches credulity to explain L1 s complete reversal of the evidence in all crucial areas on the basis of his temperament and circumstances and the interviewing technique used. Yet this is what Jolliffe endeavours to do. Oddly Jolliffe does not suggest something more obvious L1 s evidence might be the result of real falsification . that the major discrepancies in

Certainly Jolliffe was not reluctant to describe Lourenco Hornay s evidence as apparent falsification on much more tenuous grounds. Yet Jolliffe has tried hard to justify and explain away the completely irreconcilable versions of L1 s evidence, for some unexplained reason. Perhaps it could be because she feels uncomfortable about her role in providing L1 to testify to Sherman and her subsequent defense of his original testimony ?
106

middle paragraph, page 167

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44 Certainly Jolliffe is reluctant to blame L1, but rather she shifts the blame towards Sherman noting, for example, Sherman had placed too much weight on the correctness of L1 s testimony about the shooting he claimed was underway 107. Elsewhere The government-commissioned investigator had failed to elicit the whole background of L1 s presence in Balibo 108 (emphasis added). It seems in Jolliffe s mind the discrepancies in L1 s evidence are mainly Sherman s fault, and L1 would have given correct answers if only Sherman s interviewing technique had been better - and adequate to overcome the special conditions that translating L1 presented 109. Jolliffe bends over backwards to excuse L1 s total reversal. Who is altering evidence Sherman or L1 ?

Yet it is L1 who apparently admitted that he had not been honest with Sherman. According to Sherman in his Second Report In his interview with Jill Jolliffe L1 gave evidence of his role in intercepting Fretilin radio communications. He stated in that interview he didn t tell me [Sherman] about this in April 1996 because he didn t trust me [Sherman] (7.43, page 135 SR2). I can t find reference to this important explanation in Jolliffe s book, though I may have missed it. If Sherman s quote of L1 is correct, then it is L1 who mislead Sherman, and did so intentionally. Why would L1 agree to be interviewed and then withhold the truth because of lack of trust ? Surely if L1 felt so uneasy it would have made more sense to refuse the interview altogether which he was clearly free to do under the conditions of Sherman s investigation. Yet L1 chose to do the interview with Sherman but then (apparently) not tell the truth certainly not the whole truth. A possibility must surely be that L1 knowingly misled Sherman and fed him a predetermined story. Yet Jolliffe does not countenance this possibility at all in her book. L1 s evidence to Sherman was eerily similar to old and discredited disinformation Aspects of L1 s testimony show a distinct resemblance to the original disinformation propagated by Indonesian intelligence : The statement signed by Guilherme Goncalves on 3 November, 1975110 referred to the falling of 15 victims . Among the victims were four white men found in the burned remains of the house used by Fretilin as their strongest resistance post .

107 108 109 110

3rd paragraph, page 172 end of 4th paragraph, page 188 mid page 167 a copy of the letter is available

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45 Sherman describes L1 s evidence as when the firing from the house at 9 o clock ceased he moved around to the front of that house and saw five Europeans as well as Timorese bodies. The Timorese were in another part of the house and they had weapons with them (4.145 top page 76, Sherman Report 1). L1 s evidence directly reflected the original story that the journalists bodies were found in a FRETILIN resistance point from which firing had come (as in the 1975 Goncalves letter). L1 also described the European and Timorese bodies together - as in the Goncalves letter. Yet Guilherme Gonsalves had publicly admitted in 1995 that the letter he had signed was false and had been written for him by Indonesian intelligence. This was one of the revelations that triggered the public concern that had led to Gareth Evans initiating the Sherman inquiry in the first place. It looks as if L1 could have been recycling a long discredited myth. Certainly it is hard to explain all the contradictions between the initial and subsequent versions of L1 s testimony simply on the basis of confused translation. L1 s subsequent behaviour raises more questions about motives and pressures L1 s subsequent behaviour does not enhance his credibility. When Sherman s subsequent (second) Report was initiated L1 refused to be interviewed again 111. Sherman wrote I infer he was a witness under a lot of pressure not to talk to me. I don t propose to speculate where the pressure was coming from and why (7.41 , page 134 SR2). According to Jolliffe, L1 had complained to one of the translators that after the Foreign Correspondent programme he had been identified by someone in Australia and threatened as a result 112. As his new evidence was now quite damaging to the Indonesian military (and had changed from his previous evidence that was not damaging to the Indonesian military) it is likely that these threats were emanating from the Indonesian military or their sympathisers. Clearly L1 was a man who was nervous and temperamental with family in Timor who could thus potentially be subject to Indonesian pressures. He was someone who had worked closely with the Indonesian attacking forces as a radio monitor and had thus been close to the command structure having passed transcribed intercepts on to Dading Kalbuadi 113 (the Indonesian commander on the border). Thus L1 must have been trusted by some high Indonesian officers in 1975 and was probably still known to some of them. Clearly L1 could be threatened and put under a lot of pressure as the threats and pressures after the Foreign Correspondent programme was aired apparently did frighten him and cause him to refuse [d] to be interviewed again .
111 112 113

last paragraph, page 196 last paragraph, page 196 second last paragraph, page 188

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46

Jolliffe had previously outlined how pressure could be brought to bear on Timorese in Portugal. She wrote Timorese abroad had families back in Timor subject to reprisals, and Indonesia had an active intelligence network in Europe which reached to Lisbon from embassies in Madrid and Holland, often working through Timorese informers 114. It is almost certain that L1 would have known Jose Martins (who was with him at the border in 1975, near Batugade, and lived in Lisbon for many years too) and he would probably have been familiar with Abilio Araujo. Both Araujo and Martins had gone to Jakarta about the time of Sherman s trip to Lisbon in 1996. Martins had died suddenly in Jakarta in questionable circumstances (see Another question about Timorese in Lisbon the Martins case on page 37) and it is very likely L1 was aware of that. If L1 was subject to threats and severe personal pressures which caused him to retreat and refuse to be interviewed again (in 1998 / 99), could that pressure not have been applied against him and his family to ensure his cooperation in 1996 ? It seems reasonable to ask this question and at least nave not to. Some questions arise about major discrepancies in the treatment of witnesses one is excused for a total reversal of testimony / whilst another is vilified for much less It is interesting to compare and contrast the treatment of two significant witnesses covered in some detail in Jill Jolliffe s book L1 and Lourenco Hornay. Jolliffe s approach has resulted in serious discrepancies in the standards applied to these two witnesses. An example is the treatment of L1 : this man had initially told Sherman the story that had allowed him to conclude the journalists died in circumstances of continuing fighting the crossfire scenario. Upon (eventually) being re-interviewed by Jolliffe and Holmes his story had changed profoundly and significantly. Revisiting L1 s testimony, we found his story was completely different 115 notes Jolliffe. His version no longer supported any crossfire conclusions and totally contradicted what he had previously been reported as saying about foreknowledge . L1 now included important information (previously withheld from Sherman) that L1 (a radio monitor) had monitored FRETILIN communications discussing the presence of the journalists in Balibo, which he duly transcribed and passed on . This is a man who seems to have totally reversed his evidence in ways that have led to serious misunderstandings about what actually happened at Balibo. Yet, even in this situation, Jolliffe does not suggest falsification is occurring. She offers many explanations for why his story could be wrong: such as that he was difficult to interview, with a temperamental personality with a thick accent who could only be interviewed in his chaotic living room with a television set blaring 116.

114 115 116

line 14, page 155, Cover Up mid page 188 top of mid paragraph, page 157

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47 L1 had made another statement to Sherman that was demonstrably false that he had arrived (in Balibo) with (Tomas) Gonsalves which, in the circumstances, could not have been true (because Gonsalves had entered much earlier with the initial attack). In this case Jolliffe offers further excuses for L1 writing that it is doubtful that L1 really said this intentionally 117 and noting further that this speaks volumes for the confusion in dealing with this material. For some reason L1 s demonstrably false (and seriously misleading) statements are dealt with sympathetically and explanations are offered by Jolliffe for this. On the other hand a relatively minor variation in the testimony of Mr. Hornay leads to the accusation that he is involved in apparent falsification . It is reasonable to ask - why are there such double-standards being applied ? I feel that the most adverse conclusion that could be drawn about Mr. Hornay is that he might have varied slightly in his recollection of exactly why he had concluded that the attacking force knew the journalists were there and intended to kill them - but that his essential conclusions were consistent and unchanged. Jolliffe s primary charge against him is that the information he provided came from the interpreter Gabriel but not directly from the Indonesian officers at Batugade. Whilst this discrepancy is significant (though not fully established as far as I am concerned) it hardly seems to justify Jolliffe s conclusion of falsification by Mr. Hornay. In the context of Balibo evidence this is a relatively minor change of testimony. The manner in which Hornay gave his evidence (see the translation of his interview which is available) and his willingness to speak to me, then Gomes, then Jonathan Holmes and Jolliffe, then Tom Sherman seems to indicate good faith and honest intentions on his behalf. I don t believe the openness of his behaviour (at least once he had decided to testify) is consistent with someone intentionally falsifying evidence. I also don t believe the evidence supports Jolliffe s contention that Hornay intentionally altered anything see Does Mr. Hornay Really Have Credibility Problems ? (on pages 9 to 17). Jolliffe s publisher Henry Rosenbloom s states clearly in his letter that Jolliffe is accusing Hornay of the alleged apparent falsification 118 yet I don t see credible evidence that this accusation against him is justified or correct. On the other hand L1 - whose story was central to Sherman s conclusions of death by misadventure, the basis of which has now been completely discredited seems to be excused for profound alterations to his evidence. These discrepancies in L1 s changing evidence are explained away and justified by Jolliffe. Why the double standards ? A possible explanation for the discrepancy between treatment of the two witnesses Jolliffe s book does clarify the circumstances of her involvement with these two witnesses and that may shed some light on the differing views she takes of them.

117 118

mid top paragraph, page 170 see letter from Henry Rosenbloom on 17/1/2002, which is appended

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48 The case of L1: Jolliffe now says in her book L1 was an individual who was pointed out to her just before Sherman arrived, who she did not know and whose testimony she did not really become familiar with. However Jolliffe selected him to be interviewed by Sherman as part of her activities in support of Sherman s investigation in Lisbon in 1996. In a sense Jolliffe had given L1 her imprimateur by advising Sherman to interview him. Jolliffe then staunchly defended his credibility to me in discussions over a year later, long after Sherman s report was published and L1 s key role in establishing Sherman s crossfire conclusions were on the public record. Jolliffe then affirmed that L1 had no axe to grind and was not an Indonesian plant 119 as she said some were suggesting and suggested people who were raising these issues were doing so because they were bringing all sorts of ideological baggage to the story 120. Jolliffe was personally aware that I had questioned L1 s veracity because I had spoken to her about this exact issue when I was in Lisbon. Jolliffe had evidently read the proceedings of the ICJ Colloquium in detail and had therefore also read that I had openly questioned in print the veracity of L1 s story. In spite of this Jolliffe did not set the record straight by going back to reinterview L1, even though she had acknowledged that the outcome of Sherman s interview did not tally 121 with her own notes and also acknowledged that she could easily have done her own in-depth interview with L1122. When L1 was belatedly reinterviewed two and a half years later (seemingly not at Jolliffe s initiative) it turned out that he completely reversed his original story. It seems to me that if Jolliffe acknowledged the above she would be obliged to admit that her original approach to L1 was not correct and that I was subsequently shown to have been correct when I raised the issue of L1 s credibility in 1997. A possible interpretation of the obfuscation in the book is that Jolliffe does not want to acknowledge that I was right - and so has completely omitted the relevant facts that prove it from her book. Instead she has created a mire of half-truths and confusion in order to suggest that she was suspicious all along about the outcome of Sherman s interview with L1 and always doubted the veracity of L1 s testimony. She steers the blame for the mix-up towards Sherman yet (in this case at least) it is not clear that Sherman is the culpable party. Instead Jolliffe weaves a web of excuses and rationalizations to explain L1 s suspicious reversal. Why is Jolliffe simply refusing to acknowledge that L1 may have initially lied to Sherman? Could it be because to acknowledge this would show that her defense of him had been ill-founded and my questioning of his credibility had been correct ? Jolliffe might be concerned that if the facts were clear they might reflect poorly on her judgment and actions: she had been the conduit for L1 s provision to Sherman, she had defended L1 s credibility and she had failed to act for some years to rectify L1 s distortions. In addition Jolliffe had staunchly refused to assist my attempts to speak to L1 and had denigrated me for making them. To put the record straight might have led to some sort of
119 120 121 122

second last line, page160, Cover Up line 2, page 161, Cover Up fax from Jolliffe to McDonald on 15/10/97 line 23, page 157, Cover Up

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49 fair reckoning. Could it be that Jolliffe has subtly reworked the record and provided copious excuses for L1 to avoid just such an honest reckoning ? Could it also be that an honest appraisal of L1 s evidence that would lead to the conclusion he had lied to Sherman might raise questions about why he did that and what might lie behind his actions ? There seems to be the converse case with Lourenco Hornay: Jolliffe had staked quite a lot of her own credibility on the assessment that Hornay did not have anything to offer Sherman s investigation. She goes to great lengths to explain that she was an old friend of Hornay s who had had long discussions with him on the subject of Balibo, that she knew all he had to say about Balibo , which was all hearsay 123. When Sherman arrived in Lisbon, Jolliffe played an important role defining the witnesses Sherman would interview. She apparently decided that Hornay s evidence was not sufficiently hard to warrant inclusion and that Hornay was one of those who did not merit a hearing 124. She advocated this to Sherman who consequently did not interview Hornay even though Sherman was aware of his [Hornay s] existence in the first evaluation 125. This was in spite of the fact that Sherman had interviewed other people for his first report whose evidence was much more peripheral that Hornay s. Jolliffe had played a clear role in defining Hornay s evidence as not meriting a hearing. Thus Jolliffe may have again felt her own credibility attached to the testimony (or in this case lack of worthy testimony) of this witness. If it turned out that Hornay did have something useful to say about Balibo, Jolliffe may have felt it would reflect adversely on her actions and judgment. I had encountered Mr. Hornay simply because I wanted to find L1. It was only by chance that I came across his evidence about Balibo which seemed relevant and important to me. I was not aware when I interviewed Hornay that Jolliffe had advised Sherman not to interview him - and only became aware of this when I began to research my response to the accusations in her book. Hornay s testimony was brought out at the ICJ Colloquium and shown to be primafacie of some importance. Jolliffe seems subsequently to have devoted considerable effort in her book to discrediting him, by methods that I do not believe are balanced or fair. She certainly never approached me to get any clarification of my perspective on this. Now she presents in her book a phalanx of attacks on the credibility of Mr. Hornay some of which are themselves internally inconsistent. For instance Jolliffe had prejudged Hornay s evidence as all hearsay and was sure she knew all he had to say . Yet that is
123 124 125

lines 9 and 12, page 175, Cover Up last paragraph, page 157, Cover Up Sherman Report 2, 4.45, page 74

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50 seemingly not true because Hornay did have more to say. Jolliffe acknowledged this when she responded to new evidence that Hornay has offered that she had never heard him make a similar claim 126. Jolliffe doesn t acknowledge that there might have been good reasons why Hornay would now choose to reveal things he had not previously spoken of. Instead she suggests that he has done this because he is feeling offended . She portrays his testimony as inaccurate based on dubious evidence (see section DOES MR. HORNAY REALLY HAVE CREDIBILITY PROBLEMS? from page 9 to16). Yet some of Jolliffe s complaints against him seem simplistic, superficial and unnecessarily unsympathetic. It seems as if she is trying too hard to discredit Hornay s evidence whilst contradictions in the evidence of others are brushed over. Jolliffe then somehow lurches to the conclusion that Hornay s evidence amounts to apparent falsification . Yet clearly any alleged inconsistencies in Hornay s evidence are minor - especially if compared with the complete reversal that took place in L1 s evidence. Could the explanation for all this be that Jolliffe has invested a great deal of her own credibility in the idea that Lourenco Hornay does not have any useful evidence to contribute about Balibo ? She had previously concluded that he did not, had told Sherman he did not and as a result Hornay was not interviewed. After it appeared that Lourenco Hornay indeed did have some useful insights into what happened at Balibo, Jolliffe worked to discredit that testimony. Having got Sherman not to interview him back in 1996, Jolliffe convinced Jonathan Holmes in 1998 that Hornay s claims were not credible. Holmes apparently reached this conclusion because Jill Jolliffe told Holmes she had never heard him make a similar claim 127. Holmes then wrote to Sherman on 9th November 1998 128 to intercede with Sherman and argue Hornay s lack of credibility again based apparently on Jolliffe s assertion that Hornay had never told her these things. Jolliffe had discredited Hornay s value as a witness with Holmes and Sherman before she wrote her book (in which she made more efforts towards the same end). The evidence that Hornay s testimony is unworthy comes mostly from one source from Jolliffe who asserts continually that what he says can t be true because he had never told her that before. McNaughtan s position in all of this Jolliffe has taken a negative view of me in her book. I am described as a fundamentalist who speaks sententiously 129.She claims that I am someone who has tricked a prizewining reporter 130, seemingly causing apparent falsification of important evidence. My actions thus marred the activities of an important legal body and undermined the good work of those presenting seriously researched evidence 131. In addition I have apparently showed lack of respect for some people who deserve respect and seen them
126 127 128 129 130 131

quote from letter Holmes to Sherman, 4.45 page 74, Sherman Report 2 4.45, page 75, Sherman report 2 as above bottom of page 159 and top of page 160, Cover Up mid paragraph, page 176, Cover Up all from mid paragraph, page 176, Cover Up

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51 as objects to be used 132. As if that was not enough - I was responsible for presenting an interview that had been mistranslated, rendering it nonsensical in parts . The text of the interview I had allegedly presented included the translation the Indonesians had piled .. policemen 133 on top of the journalists dead bodies before burning them ! I assure the reader that I never suggested the Indonesians piled policemen onto the journalists bodies before burning them !! I believe most, if not all, of the above accusations are inaccurate them earlier. and have dealt with

However there are certainly some things Jolliffe has not mentioned in her book. For instance that I had correctly recognised that L1 was not the witness of truth as Tom Sherman described him134. I had gone to Lisbon and taken steps to identify and try to interview L1. I had met and talked to Jolliffe who made it clear to me that she did not approve of my actions. Jolliffe refused to even pass a message on to L1. She supported L1 s credibility and did nothing to clear up any doubts about his testimony. I went on the record recording my doubts. When the truth came out my doubts were vindicated and Jolliffe assurances (after she had sat on the issue for two and a half years) were shown to be ill-founded. She has now written a book revising all this and portraying this all in an entirely different (and misleading) light. She now portrays herself as someone who had doubts about L1 from the beginning (which is not supported by the evidence and which raises the question why she did not then act to clear up such doubts in a timely way). Meanwhile Jolliffe has omitted my role in articulating doubts about L1 although it is something she is well aware of. On the other hand I had inadvertently stumbled (whilst looking for L1) onto Mr. Lourenco Hornay. I was unaware that Jolliffe had told Sherman a year earlier that Hornay was not worth interviewing and that Jolliffe had thus adopted the position that Hornay had nothing of substance to contribute to an inquiry about the Balibo deaths. As previously outlined I found Hornay a credible witness with useful evidence that seemed significant in the overall picture. Obviously this brought me (unknowingly) again onto a collision course with Jolliffe over another issue about the value and credibility of a witness. However in the Hornay case things were reversed compared with the L1 case I doubted L1 and found Hornay credible, whilst Jolliffe endorsed L1 and had already adopted the position that Hornay had no credible evidence to offer. Could it be that Jolliffe s adverse position towards me has been influenced by the fact that we had taken up completely opposing positions on these two witnesses?

132 133 134

as above bottom of page 232, Cover Up 5.37, page 100, Sherman Report 1

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52 My initial suspicion about L1 s testimony has been shown to have been correct. In spite of Jolliffe s efforts to discredit Lourenco Hornay s testimony, I believe the jury should still be out on the credibility of that testimony and I hope to look into the matter further. I may unfortunately have made my inquiries in a location that Jolliffe considered her private territory Lisbon. I had originally expected Jolliffe and myself to be on the same side as far as resolving the L1 issue. However as things developed it became clear that was not the case. I had no idea that Jolliffe had already taken an adverse position about the value of Hornay s testimony when I interviewed him. It was something that I was oblivious of till I began to work on this response. Could it be that Jolliffe s attack on me is at least partly motivated by a desire to discredit me in order to discredit my version of events (which would contradict much of what she has written in her book) ?

PART 3 DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF FOREKNOWLEDGE / OR NOT ? The crucial aspect of Hornay s testimony is about the issue of foreknowledge. His evidence is of the foreknowledge of the Indonesian commanders about the presence of the journalists at Balibo and their pre-meditated intentions to kill them. Jolliffe does not seem to place much weight on this aspect of the Balibo investigation, yet I believe it is some of the most important evidence. When Sherman came to Lisbon, Jolliffe s says her decisions about who she suggested Sherman interview were guided by the general rule that only people who had entered Balibo on 16 or 17 October should be interviewed unless they had some other key information that was first-hand 135. How it could be decided if someone actually did have such key information without properly interviewing them is not explained. Jolliffe made much of her finding that Hornay s information had come from an Indonesian interpreter called Gabriel, not from any specific conversation Hornay had had with an Indonesian officer or overheard 136. Jolliffe goes on to label this information as apparent falsification because it was said not to have been first hand from the Indonesian officer to Hornay. I am not sure I fully accept Jolliffe s version without having the chance to check again with Hornay but even if one accepts Jolliffe s record there seems to be a discrepancy. Jolliffe writes Hornay had heard talk in his camp about the presence of Portuguese and Australian journalists in Balibo around 12 or 14 October 137 apparently from the Indonesian interpreter called Gabriel (according to Jolliffe). Jolliffe seems to dismiss this evidence as irrelevant but it seems to me that if those in the camp, including
135 136 137

last paragraph, page 157, Cover Up line 3, page 176, Cover Up line 1, page 176, Cover Up

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53 interpreters, knew about the presence of Portuguese and Australian journalists in Balibo, it seems reasonable to deduce that their superiors (the Indonesian officers) did too. Yet Jolliffe gives little weight to this in her analysis. To know whether there was foreknowledge (or not) of the presence of the journalists in Balibo (and especially whether there was any evidence of premeditated intentions toward them) could be vital evidence when attempting to interpret the actions of the attacking forces. Foreknowledge of the journalists presence in this context the context of a covert international invasion in which the attacking force would want their actions to remain secret would doubtless result in some planning and strategising by the commanders of the attacking force. The journalists were not just bystanders to the action, they were obviously a potential thorn in the side of the Indonesian armed forces who were undertaking illegal international incursions which they hoped to mis-represent to the outside world as part of a civil war . Foreknowledge of the presence of the journalists would doubtlessly result in planning by the invading force how to deal with these journalists if they were encountered during the advance. Evidence of some premeditated intention towards the journalists could be absolutely vital to interpreting what subsequently occurred. These distinctions are potential differentiators between manslaughter and murder. Thus the most important witnesses are not necessarily those who entered Balibo on the 16 or 17 October . Witnesses who were in contact with those planning the assault, especially those located where the intelligence gathering took place, might have some of the most vital evidence, even if they never entered Balibo. In fact the intelligence gathering through radio interception was done in the old fort in Batugade which was close to where the UDT forces were located. So even though the UDT forces mostly did not participate in the assault on Balibo, they may in fact be some of the most relevant witnesses. If foreknowledge could be reasonably established, then some deductions could be made about other verified events. For example if the Indonesians knew journalists were in Balibo and began shelling the town during the night before the attack (as they did) simple deduction indicates that the Indonesians could not have been too concerned at that point about whether their actions might kill the journalists. That would be an indicator to the attitude of the attacking force to the journalists on the day they died. And if the attacking force had foreknowledge of the presence of the journalists it is unlikely that they would have been taken by surprise if they encountered white men dressed in civilian clothes who were carrying cameras. It is very unlikely that in these circumstances the attacking force would have any misapprehensions about who these men were. If the journalists were killed in these circumstances, it is likely that the killing was intentional not accidental. Jolliffe seems to acknowledge the importance of dealing with the foreknowledge issue. She criticizes Sherman because he had not examined the evidence on pre-knowledge of

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54 the journalists presence in Balibo with sufficient rigour 138. She also quotes the criticism in my critique for the ICJ of Sherman s failure to investigate the pre-knowledge issue more deeply 139. Yet in practice Jolliffe s approach to the issue of possible foreknowledge by the Indonesian attacking force of the journalists presence in Balibo seems very erratic. She seems to make no effort in her book to pull all this evidence together into a coherent analysis, and leaves references to foreknowledge that are made by many witnesses scattered randomly throughout the book. This seems to be why Jolliffe appears ambivalent about the issue even as she comes to the conclusion of her book. Five pages form the end (as she describes the Indonesian military invasion of Balibo) Jolliffe writes there is no proof they knew that journalists were also present 140. She does acknowledge there is a strong probability they did, and that their brief was to finish off [sic] them as well but her conclusion is rather ambiguous. This conclusion is odd because there is a lot of evidence on the issue, in her book and elsewhere. Perhaps Jolliffe has concluded that there is no proof about foreknowledge because she has made little effort to systematically analyse the evidence. It is strange to have written a book about Balibo that apparently does not address an issue so central to understanding what actually occurred there. Some of the evidence that is available In fact if one puts together the references to foreknowledge by various witnesses in Jolliffe s book and from other sources a fairly strong and consistent picture emerges. Evidence from the two Timorese radio monitors in Batugade It has been established that Indonesian intelligence was monitoring FRETILIN radio transmissions from the old fort in Batugade, using Timorese (presumably because they would understand the language). This is established from the testimony of the two Portuguese speaking radio operators in the Batugade fort 141. When Holmes and Jolliffe re-interviewed L1 it turned out he was the second of the two Portuguese speaking radio operators in the Batugade fort and Jolliffe mentions L1 had information about pre-knowledge similar to that of the 1979 witness, who had refused to testify to Sherman . From this oblique reference it seems reasonably clear that the 1979

138 139 140 141

mid page 172, Cover Up 5 lines form the bottom of page 174 top of page 311, in Epilogue, Cover Up line 21, page 188, Cover Up

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55 witness was the first radio operator in the Batugade fort and he had also spoken of Indonesian foreknowledge of the journalists. L1 turned out to be the second of the two radio monitors involved in that Indonesian intelligence gathering operation at Batugade. L1 now confirmed what he knew Several days before the Balibo deaths L1 had monitored FRETILIN communications discussing the presence of the journalists in Balibo, which he duly transcribed and passed on to Dading Kalbuadi, just as his colleague who testified previously had done 142. This is transcribed in the Second Sherman Report where L1 states they (FRETILIN radio) said that the Australian journalists ..were already in Balibo 143. L1 then said he wrote it down. I handed it in written form to Dading Kalbuadi when I finished my shift. The service was always in written form 144 . So both radio operators (whose job was to spy on FRETILIN) claim independently that they had passed on written communications as the fruits of their spying work to their Indonesian commanders about the presence of the journalists in Balibo. This alone would seem to found a credible argument that the Indonesian commanders knew about the journalists at Balibo. However there is significantly more evidence than this. UDT witnesses near Batugade Fernando Mariz was a UDT soldier located near Batugade close to the Indonesian headquarters. He stated to Jonathan Holmes (and had previously stated to another ABC journalist) that he was listening to FRETLIN radio (presumably public broadcasts in this case) one or two days before the Balibo attack and on the news they say the five Australian journalists was [sic] in Balibo to film the movement of the war . Mariz says he then went to the Indonesian command compound and talked to Major Leo who told him Oh, don t worry, we know this a few days ago. We have medicine for them. We have everything ready for them . When asked what this meant Mariz said Indonesian mentality on this stuff, this-no other way, only killing. This is only killing 145. Jolliffe mentions Mariz in her book but does not include his significant testimony. Lourenco Hornay was a UDT commander based near Batugade at the time. He was part of a battalion commanded by Major Leo (which was a code name) and Fernando Mariz was in his group 146. Hornay said he overheard a conversation because I was at the side of the commander - Major Leo - who made it clear that they [Indonesian forces] expected to eliminate 8 journalists . Hornay quotes Major Leo as saying objectively it was to hunt journalists so they wouldn t witness the case (invasion) 147. Later when challenged he repeated I was nearly sure they were going to kill the journalists, Quasi

142 143 144 145 146 147

5th paragraph, page 188, Cover Up page 29, Sherman Report 2 page 30, SR2 Sherman Report 2, 3.27, pages 34 and 35. Details in Sherman Report 2, top of page 75 page 7, translation of Gomes-Hornay interview

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56 sure 148. He repeats later in the interview You can be sure that they knew the journalists were there 149. Hornay also confirms hearing Portuguese radio broadcasts from Kupang (in Indonesian Timor) to East Timor in which he remembers them talking about the arrival of the Australian and Portuguese journalists 150. He also noted they had their thing very well organised. They spied on every step taken by Fretilin 151. Hornay stated to Sherman (when Sherman was preparing his second report) that the Indonesian secret service by then knew that there were of the presence of eight journalists . Hornay got this information mostly from two. A lieutenant from the unit of transmissions and Captain Fernandes 152. Later, according to Sherman, Mr. Hornai goes on to describe a conversation he had with Colonel Dading on 13 October through his interpreter where Dading expressed some concern about the journalists 153 . At least one other senior UDT figure confirms the foreknowledge by the Indonesians of the journalists at Balibo Joao Carrascalao (who is quoted as telling Tom Sherman in his first report that the Indonesians didn t know the journalists were in Balibo) has since told Beatriz Miranda at SBS radio that the Indonesians did know the journalists were in Balibo 154. Clear reporting of foreknowledge by the East Timorese military commander In 1975 Rogerio Lobato held the position of overall commander of the Fretilin armed forces (known as Falintil) . He provided extremely lucid and coherent evidence about Indonesian foreknowledge of the journalist presence in Balibo and outlined the mechanisms by which the Indonesians had obtained this information and also proof that they knew the journalists were there. Given that he was the commander of the Timorese military at the time, it is hard to understand why his evidence (having been provided) was ignored by Sherman and Jolliffe. Rogerio Lobato said The main objective of the Indonesians was Balibo because they knew by the information, they knew, that the Australians were there. I presumed that the main threat for the Indonesians at that time was the evidence of the invasion because we did announce that many times by the radio, the television, that there was a violation of East Timor territory by Indonesian troops Sherman continued When I asked Rogerio Lobato how the Indonesians would have known the Australian journalists were at Balibo, his response was that Radio Loro Sa e based at Kupang (Indonesian Timor) was broadcasting every night to East Timor talking
148 149 150 151 152 153 154

page 9, as above page 11, as above page 15, as above bottom of page 6 and top of page 7, as above page 76, Sherman Report 2 page 79, 4.50, Sherman Report 2 interview of Joao Carrascalao by Beatriz Miranda for SBS radio

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57 about the presence of the Communists, the Australian Communists, in Balibo helping the Fretilin soldiers Rogerio Lobato also said that the attacking forces at Balibo [the Indonesian forces] had the capacity to infiltrate Fretilin ranks with informants. He said that the main communication between Dili and the border area was a military radio network controlled by Falintil and a civil telephone connection between Dili and Atabai. He knew that the Indonesians listened into Fretilin radio communications and he therefore tended to use the telephone for communications with Atabai 155. Even the Indonesian commander acknowledged he knew the journalists were in Balibo. David Jenkins had written in the Sydney Morning Herald 14th October, 1995 In an interview a highly placed Indonesian military source [later confirmed as General Benny Murdani] told the Herald that Jakarta was well aware that there were journalists in Balibo . Later Murdani claimed they viewed the journalists as enemies suggesting they were helping Fretilin by conveying information of a military nature 156. Jenkins same article quotes Dading Kalbuadi as denying foreknowledge of the journalists presence at Balibo. Kalbuadi said to Jenkins We didn t know from where the white men came 157 and we didn t know at the time they were journalists 158. However Kalbuadi s denials of foreknowledge are discredited by the testimony of both radio monitors in Batugade who report intercepting evidence of the journalists at Balibo and transcribing it and passing it on to Dading Kalbuadi . L1 had done this - just as his colleague who testified previously said he had done 159. Ball and McDonald report (in their book Death in Balibo, Lies in Canberra ) that there was a conversation intercepted between Murdani and Kalbuadi. They report Murdani said: We can t have any witnesses . Dading [Kalbuadi] replied in words to the effect of: Don t worry, we already have them under control 160. This particular piece of evidence is not absolutely confirmed at present. However it is consistent with the other evidence that the Indonesian commanders knew the journalists were in Balibo and had already adopted a hostile policy towards them. The Balibo deaths occurred against a background of suspicion and hostility. The Indonesian military and their commanders were inherently hostile towards white foreigners, particularly Portuguese (who were perceived as colonialists ). Any association with FRETILIN led the Indonesian military to suspect people of being communists and the approach to suspected communists had been made clear in the massive pogroms in Indonesia after the New Order came to power. Additionally Suharto s New Order military government was hostile towards independent media
155 156 157 158 159 160

Rogerio Lobato s testimony from 4.127, 4.128, 4.129, page 72, Sherman Report 1 taken from pages 85 and 86, Sherman Report 1 quoted at 4.174, page 86, Sherman Report 1 top of page 87, Sherman Report 1 5th paragraph, page 188, Cover Up page 115, Death in Balibo, Lies in Canberra

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58 which had also been made clear after Suharto s seizure of power. Thus theoretically, if (as some witnesses report) the Indonesian commanders of the attacking force believed there were Portuguese and Australian-based journalists alongside FRETILIN at the border, it is almost certain the Indonesian military would have been hostile towards them. Practical evidence of this hostile stance towards foreign journalists has been provided by the Indonesian military s execution of Roger East in Dili on December 8th 1975. Circumstantial evidence supports this. For example Jolliffe has reported On 20 October Timorese in Dili reported hearing a broadcast from Radio Kupang quoting Lopez da Cruz as saying the Australians were Communists who were integrated with FRETILIN forces and deserved to be killed . Later on the night of 21 October Radio Kupang was monitored and a similar statement was recorded This included The Australian communists were supporting and aside FRETILIN to fight against our forces We are 161 not afraid of FRETILIN, nor the Australian communists . Other Timorese reports of foreknowledge There are other references to foreknowledge in Cover Up and elsewhere: In the The National Times articles of 1979 - it was stressed that three witnesses had claimed that Indonesian authorities knew before the attack that some journalists were based in the town 162. Jim Dunn is quoted (apparently from a letter in 1979) - radio Dili had given considerable prominence to the movements of the newsmen, and, according to a well placed source who was in Indonesian Timor at the time, their presence in the border area was communicated to the Indonesians who had been following the Dili broadcasts closely 163. Jolliffe writes of the evidence concerning Indonesian pre-knowledge of the Australians presence in Balibo which had come from the scouts sent from Rai Icu at their (Indonesian) bidding and the (previously mentioned) written reports of the radio intercepts at Batugade 164. Joaquim Estorninho had testified that scouts had seen the journalists in Balibo and reported the fact to the Indonesian commander 165. Joaquim Estorninho had also told Sherman that Lopez da Cruz had told him there were white foreigners in Balibo prior to the attack. Sherman writes On the afternoon before the attack on Balibo he recollected Lopez da Cruz saying in Rai Ico that some foreigners
161 162 163 164 165

Jill Jolliffe quoted in Sherman Report 1, page 28 2nd paragraph, page 131, Cover Up quote from letter from Jim Dunn, page 132, Cover Up 4th paragraph, page 131, Cover Up line 4, page 155, Cover Up

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59 were in Balibo . .. he remembers that they were white and foreigners . Later that Lopez da Cruz said that they were white foreigners who were in Balibo to help the Fretilin 166 Manuel dos Santos also spoke of foreknowledge They heard FRETILIN radio broadcast stating that there were five journalists in Balibo, yes, they did hear that 167. Earlier in the same interview he said three days before they attacked Balibo Indonesian radio told the border population to flee to Indonesia and not to remain. If they were to find anyone on the border it was to be considered a person belonging to FRETILIN, they would be put down, whoever they may be. However, they knew very well there were some Portuguese journalists, Adelino Gomes there were secretly eight names that were established . Five journalists five Australian journalists and a journalist Adelino Gomes. That makes up for eight, right? . Although dos Santos seems to ramble in this interview it is possible to pick up the thread of his meaning. Jolliffe quotes Witness 2 interview (presumably from 1979) This witness also said that before he left Atambua for Batugade, he had heard persistent stories that there were Australian journalists in Balibo 168. An interview with Timorese police officer Paulo Martins done in Dili in 1998 included his comment And it appears that the Indonesian troops already knew of the existence of the 5 journalists at Balibo, because during one week Indonesia had done a search by helicopter. It appears by doing this they knew the journalists were doing their activities there in Balibo 169 . Martins also reported that after taking Balibo the Indonesians tortured Timorese associated with the journalists to force them to answer questions such as Are they (the journalists) Communists ? . This is certainly not a comprehensive collection of all the evidence of the attacking force s foreknowledge of the journalists presence in Balibo. It is almost certain that if there was a systematic investigation more would be found.

Sources of information that support foreknowledge The reports of foreknowledge therefore come from a number of different sources. There are at least three reported radio sources : 1. FRETILIN military radio that was being systematically spied on by Indonesian interceptors based in the fort at Batugade. Both known Timorese radio monitors working for Indonesian intelligence in Batugade now confirm hearing transmissions about the journalists being in Balibo and passing this information to their Indonesian superiors. Benny Murdani confirms his foreknowledge came form the radio intercepts They had a
166 167 168 169

4.136 and 4.137, page 73, Sherman Report 1 page 44, Sherman Report 2 line 13, page 127, Cover Up interview with Paulo Martins by Andrew McNaughtan 10/10/98 in Dili

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60 radio and we had a monitoring system 170. Rogerio Lobato the then commander of the East Timorese forces acknowledges that FALINTIL was using radios and that they were aware the Indonesians were intercepting their transmissions. 2. Publicly broadcast radio from Dili by FRETILIN. I understand this is what Fernando Mariz picked up public broadcasts in which he heard that journalists were in Balibo. Mariz reported this to Indonesian commander Major Leo. Rogerio Lobato (the former commander of FALINTIL) confirmed these broadcasts were occurring. Jim Dunn s 1979 letter refers to evidence that the Indonesians monitored Dili radio - which was referring to the presence of the journalists on the border.171 3. Radio Kupang (apparently called Radio Loro Sa'e ) was broadcasting pro-Indonesian propaganda from West Timor 172. Hornay confirmed hearing Portuguese radio broadcasts from Kupang to East Timor in which he remembers them talking about the arrival of the Australian and Portuguese journalists . Rogerio Lobato also confirms Radio Loro Sa e based at Kupang was broadcasting every night to East Timor talking about the presence of the Communists, the Australian Communists, in Balibo helping the Fretilin soldiers . I believe Portuguese journalist Adelino Gomes also remembers similar broadcasts by Radio Kupang. Other sources of information Foreknowledge of the journalists presence in Balibo was also derived form other sources such as direct (on the ground) spying, interrogation of those who came from or passed through Balibo and elsewhere, and spying from the air, i.e. from helicopters. Direct spying: There is significant evidence for this: Jolliffe interviewed a witness who spoke about the scouts sent from Rai Icu at their (Indonesian) bidding 173. Joaquim Estorninho testified that scouts had seen the journalists in Balibo and reported the fact to the Indonesian commander 174. Rogerio Lobato told Sherman that the attacking forces had the capacity to infiltrate Fretilin ranks with informants 175. Spies were seen to be entering Portuguese Timor for example in the film shot by Shackleton and crew before their deaths they record the capture of an alleged spy who has returned from West Timor.

170 171

Murdani interviewed by David Jenkins, page 86, Sherman Report 1 letter from Jim Dunn, quoted second paragraph, page 132, Cover Up 172 the TV footage from Greg Shackleton includes a segment where propaganda from Radio Kupang is being listened to in East Timor prior to the invasion 173 4th paragraph, page 131, Cover Up 174 line 3, page 155, Cover Up 175 4.129, page 72, Sherman Report 1

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61 The Indonesian special forces were reported to have entered Portuguese Timor in plain clothes for many months prior to the actual military assault. The Indonesian special forces had been conducting operations inside Portuguese Timor prior to the Balibo attack. For example As early as 4 September [the CIA] reported that : Communications intelligence indicates that two Indonesian special forces groups, consisting of about 100 men each, entered Portuguese Timor on the evening of September 3-4 176. (quoted in Indonesia s Forgotten War by John Taylor). Other CIA reports indicated further Indonesian activity across the border throughout September 1975. Lourenco Hornay reported Indonesian spying in his interview with Adelino Gomes. He said the Indonesians were expecting maybe one platoon. They had their thing very well organised. They spied on every step taken by FRETILIN and didn t expect much resistance in Balibo, but did expect journalists 177. He continued They waited for the right moment to invade ... When they received some information from a guy they put inside there ... This is what they said to me in Batugade 178. Spying from helicopter over-flights Timorese police officer Paulo Martins reported Indonesian spying form helicopter. He said the Indonesian troops already knew of the existence of the 5 journalists at Balibo, because during one week Indonesia had done a search by helicopter . 179 Shackleton s TV crew filmed Indonesian helicopter activity over the border area in the days prior to the attack on Balibo. Interrogation of Timorese witnesses by Indonesian intelligence Timorese were held and interrogated:

An example is Manuel dos Santos who was jailed from 3-6 September. During his imprisonment, because they knew he was the village policeman, the Indonesians sought information about Balibo: The Indonesians interrogated me about the lay-out of the town, asking: Where is the military headquarters, where the police post? 180. Summary concerning the foreknowledge issue

176 177 178 179 180

mid page 58, Indonesia s Forgotten war by John Taylor Interview Lourenco Hornay , bottom page 6 to top page 7 Interview Lourenco Hornay, top of page 12 testimony of Paulo Martins in interview by Andrew McNaughtan Manuel dos Santos, bottom page 127 and top of page 128, Cover Up

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62 The evidence is that the Indonesians were accessing reliable intelligence that the journalists were in Balibo from many sources radio intercepts, public radio broadcasts, interrogation of Timorese, insertion of spies and informants and over-flights. The people who can confirm this include the men charged by the Indonesians with spying on FRETILIN radio communications, their peers stationed nearby who clearly report conversations that confirm foreknowledge by the Indonesian commanders of the journalists presence in Balibo and also other Timorese who were there at the time. Most importantly foreknowledge has been confirmed from the mouth of the Indonesian commander and corroborated (reportedly) by signals intercepts of his conversation with his deputy on this issue. It has also been confirmed by his Timorese opposite number the military commander of the FRETILIN forces as well. Additionally broadcasts from Indonesian Timor referred to the known presence of journalists in Balibo before the attack. I find it surprising that it could be claimed the issue is in doubt. It would seem that the evidence for this has already been established beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence of premeditated intention to harm the journalists is also convincing General Benny Murdani claims that they viewed the journalists more or less as adversaries who were helping Fretilin by conveying information of a military nature and indicates that he believed the journalists reported to their chief in Dili or Darwin 181. His depiction indicates the Indonesian attacking force would have regarded the journalists as adversaries or enemies. This suggests there would have been negative premeditated intentions towards the journalists - according to the view articulated by the Indonesian commander, Benny Murdani. This is corroborated by the signals intercept quoted in the McDonald /Ball book in which it is alleged Murdani said We cant have any witnesses and Kalbuadi responds Don t worry we already have them under control 182. Rogerio Lobato s comments to Sherman were The main objective of the Indonesians was Balibo because they knew by the information, they knew, that the Australians were there. I presumed that the main threat for the Indonesians at that time was the evidence of the invasion . (emphasis added). Lobato suggests that that the journalists were, in his estimation, specifically targeted by the attacking forces 183. UDT commander Lourenco Hornay who was on the opposite side in Batugade had the same opinion from overhearing conversations with Indonesian military officers (or at the least hearing this from an Indonesian interpreter). He understood that the Indonesian

181 182 183

paragraphs 2 and 3, page 86, Sherman Report 1 bottom of page 115, Death in Balibo, Lies in Canberra . 4.127, page 72, Sherman Report 1

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63 attacking force expected to eliminate 8 journalists . Later he clarified that objectively it was to hunt the journalists so they wouldn t witness the case (invasion) 184. The notes of my original conversation with Hornay in Lisbon in 1997 (translated by Amilcar Dias) record : the witness said that there was great concern [amongst the Indonesian command] about the journalists presence [in Balibo] and asserted that the attack on Balibo was done to eliminate the journalists. I asked him how he justified this and he said that it was his opinion because of the interest expressed in them, his feeling about the attack, the relatively large numbers deployed against an objective that was known to be barely defended (he said that Indonesian intelligence was that only about 25 or less Fretilin troops were defending Balibo - and 600 or more were involved in the attack), the way he was told they were killed and the fact that, on returning, the Indonesian troops bragged that they had now cleaned 5 [journalists] and only three are left . He made the observation that the Indonesians clearly knew ahead of time that the Australians were there, they had plenty of time to plan how they might respond - and the fact that they were killed indicated to him that that was an intended outcome. I asked him if it was possible that he and others in UDT could know about the presence of the journalists in Balibo from Indonesian intelligence without the Indonesian leaders knowing and he said impossible 185 . Fernando Mariz (another UDT member located in Batugade at the time) said that when Major Leo was told about the journalists in Balibo he said Oh, don t worry, we know this a few days ago. Oh don t worry. We have medicine for them. We have everything ready for them 186. Mariz had previously spoken to the ABC 7.30 Report on 25/10/95 and reported Major Leo had said (when told about the journalists in Balibo) Don t worry we already know this. We re going to give a lesson and finish up with them 187 . It seems to me on balance that the evidence supporting a pre-meditated intention by the commanders of the attacking force to eliminate the journalists is strong. The motive the elimination of unwanted witnesses to an officially denied and illegal military operation is self-evident. Any genuine investigation should pursue the sources mentioned and others available to further define this matter. It is centrally important to understanding the motivations and actions of those entering the hamlet of Balibo early on the morning of the 16th October 1975. Jolliffe criticises Sherman saying he had not examined the evidence on pre-knowledge of the journalists presence in Balibo with sufficient rigour 188 yet Jolliffe seems to have made the same omission herself. Somehow Jolliffe concludes (5 pages from the end
184 185

bottom of page 7, interview between Gomes and Hornay taken form my own notes summarizing my conversation with Hornay in Lisbon. These were written within days of speaking to him. 186 Page 35, Sherman Report 2 187 quoted in my Critique of the Sherman Report in Foreknowledge section. 188 mid page 172, Cover Up

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64 of her book) that [concerning the operation to take Balibo] There is no proof they [the Indonesian-led invading force] knew that journalists were also present, but there is a strong probability they did, and that their brief was to finish off [sic] them as well 189. Yet she has made no real effort that I could find in her book to look systematically at this important issue. Nonetheless Jolliffe has pulled together a lot of information in Cover Up , and in that sense the book is a contribution to understanding Balibo. END.

189

top of page 311, in Epilogue, Cover Up

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