Pratityasamutpada

Introduction The doctrine of pratityasamutpada is given great importance in Buddhism. It is seen as the causal law governing both the universe and the lives of individuals. It is important from two points of view. Firstly, it gives a very clear idea of the impermanent and conditioned nature of all phenomena. Secondly, it shows how birth, old age, death, and all the miseries of phenomenal existence arise in dependence upon conditions, and how all the miseries cease in the absence of these conditions. The two major schools of thought within Buddhism are inayana !literally, "the lower vehicle#$ also called the original doctrine% and &ahayana !literally "the higher vehicle#$ also called the developed doctrine%. The division "original and developed Buddhism# is based on the belief that &ahayana was only a gradual development of the original doctrine which was inayana. inayana was seen as an entirely intellectual discipline. The main concerns of the inayanists were to follow the eight'fold path chal(ed out by the Buddha. It was the human aspect of the Buddha which was emphasised. )n the contrary, for &ahayana, Buddha was the Supreme *eality itself that had descended on the +arth in human form for the good of man(ind.

Mahayana and Hinayana accounts of dharma The inayanists believed in certain ultimate reals, called dharmas. The word dharma is sometimes translated as "things.# It should be borne in mind that dharmas are not things in the sense of the crude data of common sense. "+lements of existence#, "ultimate reals#' these are better translations of dharma. inayana believes that the world is composed of an unceasing flow of certain ultimate dharmas which are simple, momentary and impersonal. &ost of them are samskrita !dharmas with signs%, and some are sasamskrita !dharmas without signs%. ,ccording to &ahayana, these dharmas are not ultimate realties at all, but only mental constructs. &ahayana pointed out that even the so called ultimate samskrita and sasamskrita dharmas are dependent upon conditions and are therefore relative. Being relative, they are sunya !devoid of reality%.

On Pratityasamutpada The inayanists interpret the word pratityasamutpada as the following' itya is a derivative derived from the noun iti, which means disappearance. The itya therefore means "fit to disappear# the affix prati is used in the sense of vipsa, ie, repetition$ implying continuous or successive action. Thus, according to them, pratityasamutpada means "prati prati ityanam vina inam samutpadah,# ie, appearance of everything bound to disappear or everything momentary. Their explanation comes to this' the evanescent momentary things appear. inayana understands soul into a stream of continuously flowing discrete moments of vijanana, vedana, samajhna, samskara etc. &atter !rupa% is also considered to be a flow of momentary flashes without any continuant stuff. It admits only the reality of sense'data and the elements of mind. The inayana conception of causality, vi-., pratityasamutpada is in consonance with its conception of reality which could neither move nor change, but could only appear and disappear. Pratityasamutpada can hardly be called causation in the sense in which it is usually understood. It really means dependently co'ordinated origination or dependent existence. ,ccording to it, every momentary entity springs into existence in co'ordination with other moments. Its formula is' there being this, that appears. ,ccording to this, there could be neither causa materialis nor causa efficiens. ,n entity is not really produced, it is simple co'ordinated. ,part from the momentary entities called namarupa, inayana believes in two unchanging entities vi-., space and nirvana. It is considered both samsara and nirvana as realities somehow interconnected in a whole. ,s .handra(irti, in his commentary on /agarjuna#s Madhyamaka Sastra puts it, pratityasamutpada means the manifestation of entities as relative to causes and conditions. The inayanists had interpreted pratityasamutpada as temporal se0uence of real entities between which there was a causal relation. ,ccording to the &adhyami(a then, pratityasamutpada does not mean the principle of temporal se0uence, but the principle of essential dependence of this on each other. The &adhyama(a teaches that all phenomenal existences, all entities in the world are conditioned$ are devoid of real, independent existence, !svabhava%. In one word, it is the principle of Relativity. Nis-svabhavattva !the absence of essence% is to be seen as synonymous with sunyata. Pratityasamutpada or interdependence means relativity, and relativity connotes the unreality !sunyata% of the separate elements. ,s 1r. + .on-e put it 2all the concrete content belongs to the interplay of countless conditions. The Mahayana Hinayana Dialogue

1. ,ccording to &ahayana, the real was that which possessed a reality of its own !svabhava% which was
not produced by causes, which was not dependent upon anything else.

2. For inayana, the elements, although inter'dependent, were real. For &ahayana, all elements,
because they are interdependent, were unreal.

3. For inayana, every whole is regarded as a nominal existence and only the parts or ultimate
elements are real. For &ahayana, all parts or elements are unreal and only the whole of all wholes is real.

4. ,ccording to &ahayana, reality is un-cogni-able, 0uiescent, undifferentiated in words, unreali-able in

concepts, and non- plural. For inayana the individual !pudgala% is the self and aatama was resolved in its component elements$ there were no real personalities.

Sunyata Sunya has two implications

1. That nothing short of the whole possesses independent reality 2. That the whole forbids every formulation by concepts or speech. .oncept or speech !vikalpa% can give
us only a distorted view of reality$ it can never sei-e it. The principle of relativity is invo(ed to destroy all theories and to replace them by direct mystic intuition, not by a new theory. .handra(irti, the commentator on /agarjuna#s &adhya(ama'sastra puts it simply' 2*eality is here, the common characteristic of all the elements !dharma% of existence. But since there is no element which would be non'relative, relativity itself, for want of those objects with which it could be contrasted, becomes as inane as a mirage, as a garland of flowers in the s(y.3 *elativity may be used to understand that all existence is relative and when that is understood, the theory of relativity should be discarded. .ausation which is imagined in other systems !as a real production%, appears either as a new manifestation of the same !continual% stuff, or as an effect of separate factors or as a result of both or as proceeding at random. /agarjuna maintains that none of these theories is right.

The inayanists say that if the principle of dependent origination is to be interpreted only as a principle of relativity, and not real causality, how are the deliverances of Buddha to be explained, for they assume causality4 Buddha says that the forces of life are influenced in this world by illusion and desire. 5hen these are supressed in nirvana, they become extinct. This suggests the reality of the force of illusion and of nirvana. Similarly there are utterances of Buddha which go to show that he believed in real causality. The &ahayanist replies that it is for this very reason that /agarjuna had composed this treatise on relativity$ in order to show the real and conventional meaning of the scriptures. ,ll the utterances of Buddha mentioning the principle of dependent origination do not refer to the pure essence of the objects which reveals itself when the "dar(ness of our ignorance is dispelled.# There are other utterances of Buddha which refer to absolute reality. +.g. 2The permanent reality, brethren, is nirvana. ,ll the combined forces of phenomenal life are illusions3 etc. The direct and indirect meaning of Buddhas words It must be borne in mind that certain words of the Buddha are nitartha' they have a direct meaning, and certain words are neyartha' they have only indirect or conventional meaning. In general terms, it must be said that those discourses which have been delivered in order to teach the path of salvation are neyartha !conventional%. Those discourses which specify the entrance into that (ind of final deliverance which is relativity, where there is no separate object, no profound meditation, no volition, no birth, no causation, no existence, no ego, no living creature, no individual soul, no personality, and no lord are nitartha !having direct meaning%. 6articular characteristics of the so called real entities are also not real. Buddhist epistemologists maintain that they are only giving a scientific description of what happens in common life, in regard to the sources of (nowledge, and their respective objects. &adhyami(a instructs that if every cognition of an object depends

on reliable sources of (nowledge, and these sources being objects cognised by us in their turn, depend on other sources of (nowledge, we shall land into an infinite regress. ausation There are four accounts that have been propounded regarding causation7 8. That entities cannot arise out of themselves 9. That they cannot arise out of some pre'existing stuff or separate agents :. That they cannot come into being at random, i.e., without any cause. ;. That they cannot arise from something separate from them. The inayanists say that he cannot agree with the fourth alternative. They argue that the Buddha himself said that existing things are produced by causes and that the causes are different from the things produced. There are only four conditions or pratyayas, which bring about anything 8. Its causes 9. Its objective condition :. The immediately forgoing condition for the production of the result ;. The decisive or predominant condition which is efficient to bring about the result. There is not fifth condition li(e god, time etc. +ntities arise under these conditions which are not identical with the thing produced. The &adhyama(a says that entities are not produced out of conditions which separate from them. If the produced entities have any pre'existence in the causes, and conditions which are separate from them, then alone could they appear out of them. But they are not perceived to be pre'existing. Therefore the conditions of an entity do not contain any real existence of the result. If the effect is different from the cause, there would be lac( of relation between the two. In that case, anything may produce anything whatsoever. Some maintain that entities may not be produced out of other entities$ they may originate through special energies. The organ of vision, colours etc., may not be producing visual sensations there may be some energy inherent in them that may be producing this sensation. Similar is the case with physical energy' heat producing coo(ed rice etc. The &adhyami(a says that the plea of energy also will not do. If the supposed energy appears when the sensation already exists, it is useless. /or can the existence of be assumed in the causes previous to the sensation produced$ for the energy cannot ta(e shape as long as the result is absent. /or can the existence of energy be possible at the moment of production, for a thing is either produced or not produced. There is no existence between these two moments. Therefore no such energy productive of effects exists. The inayanaist says that whether causes possess energy or not, the fact remains that entities, such as sensation, arise in co'ordination with other entities, example, the organ of vision. This is all that is meant by saying that the existence of an organ of vision etc., are the conditions under which visual sensation etc. can arise. /agarjuna says that up to the moment when the so called result e.g. visual sensation arises, the organ of vision etc. will be only non'causes, and nothing can be produced out of non'causes. /agarjuna advances a further argument. ,n organ of vision etc., is supposed to be the cause of visual sensation etc, but the 0uestion that arises is < whether there are causes of existing sensation or of a sensation not yet existing. If a sensation is already existing, it is useless to assume some cause producing it. If it is non'existing, how can it have a cause4 If it is said that it is called "cause in anticipation#, for the

present it is only a latent force, the reply of the &adhyami(a is that the assumption of latent energy has already examined and shown to be hollow.

ause

onditions

The inayanist says that the notion of a cause condition is very well established. It is agreed on all hands that a cause condition is that which produces or "effects# something. Therefore cause must be accepted. &adhyami(a says that the existence !+ns% is not produced, because it exists. The non'existent !non'+ns% cannot be produced, because it does not exist. The two together cannot be produced because they are mutually contradictory. Since, there is no production of effects$ there is no sense in accepting causes. The second condition' factor advanced by the inayanist is alambana prataya or objective counterpart. /agarjuna says that pure, indefinite sensation !citta%, and definite mental phenomena !caitta% are said to have an objective counterpart or objective condition !of the mental element%. &adhyami(a 0uestions them on whether the objective condition is assumed for sensation already existing or for sensation not yet produced. If the sensation is already existing, the objective condition is useless. If the sensation is not yet existing, it would be absurd to imagine that combines with an object. It may be as(ed how it is then, that a sensation or mental phenomenon refers to an object. /agarjuna replies that these refrences are only samvratta or empirical, not paramarphika or absolute. It is maintained by the inayanists that the disappearance of the immediately preceding condition is the cause of the following effect, e.g., when the seed is destroyed, i.e., when the seed disappears, then does the sprout appear. /agarjuna says that if the seed disappears, it becomes non'existent. ow then can a non'existent factor be the cause of anything whatsoever4 The fourth condition factor of the inayanists is adhipati pratyaya or pre dominant or special condition. ,ccording to inayana, an adhipati pratyaya is that special factor which being present, the effect inevitably follows. The inayanists say that it is a matter of common (nowledge that a piece of cloth is produced out of threads, so the existence of threads is a necessary condition for the existence of a piece of cloth. The cloth exists neither in the threads nor in the weavers brush, nor in his loom, nor in the pins nor other causes ta(en singly$ and from a plurality of causes, would a plurality of effects be expected. Since the cloth does not exist in any one of its parts singly, it does not exist in all of them ta(en together. Since there is no such thing as an effect in the strict sense of the word, the existence of causes as separate entities cannot be admitted. The inayanist says that the result is not something outside its causes$ the presence of the whole complex of the cause of a given event is e0uivalent to the production of the event. The &adhyami(a says that the so' called causes are themselves not independent realities. They have no svabhava. So there is no such thing as a cause possessing result. The inayanist says that it is admitted by all that there is regularity in the world, according to which certain facts are co'ordinated and others are not so co' ordinated. The cloth is co'ordinated with threads, and the mat is co'ordinated with straw, not with threads. The &ahayanist says that from the transcendental point of view, neither the event, nor the cause has an independent reality of its own. ,ll things in the world are only relative.