1)LEON MATEO vs COURT OF APPEALS This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated April 26,

1988 of the respondent Court of Appeals 1 denying the petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction filed y the petitioners! The antecedent facts are as follows" virtual 1aw li rary #n $ovem er 9, 19%8, the private respondents &then plaintiffs' instituted an action for recovery of possession and(or ownership with damages against the petitioners &then defendants', of a two)hectare piece of land situated in Calamagoy, *agsaysay, +avao del ,ur, which land is covered y Transfer Certification of Title $o! 9-.9 in the name of private respondent &then plaintiff' /0ulia *ateo, married to 1rancisco del 2osario!/ 2 After protracted proceedings which lasted for almost nine years, the 2egional Trial Court of +igos, +avao del ,ur, - rendered a decision dated *arch 21, 198%, the decretal portion of which states"chanro 1es virtual 1aw li rary 345251#25, judgment is here y rendered"chanro 1es virtual 1aw li rary #rdering the defendants to vacate 6ot $o! 7.%2)A)2, 8sd)211682, situated in Calamagoy, *agsaysay, +avao del ,ur, covered y T!C!T! $o! 9-.9 in the name of plaintiff 0ulia *ateo, married to 1rancisco del 2osario9 to pay the plaintiffs 82,...!.. for and as attorney:s fees9 to pay the plaintiffs 8;,...!.. per year, commencing in the year 19%8 until they shall have vacated the land, for the income from the property that the plaintiffs failed to receive due to the refusal of the defendants to return the same to them9 and to pay the costs! A copy of the said decision was served on the petitioners, defendants in the trial court, on *arch -1, 198%, ut since no appeal from this judgment had een filed within the reglementary period, or up to April 17, 198%, the same ecame final and e<ecutory! ; #n April 2., 198%, the private respondents, plaintiffs in the court a =uo, filed a motion for e<ecution of the said final judgment and the trial court granted the same, which was unopposed, after proper hearing! >pon the issuance on *ay 1-, 198% of a writ of e<ecution, the deputy sheriff issued a /,heriffs $otice of ,ale/ and a /6evy on 5<ecution and(or Attachment/ on *ay 18, 198%! 7 #n 0une 8, 198%, the deputy sheriff attested in his delivery receipt the actual reconveyance of the land in =uestion to the private respondents! #n 0uly 16, 198%, or after the lapse of 1.% days from the time the petitioners received the said decision adverse to them, they filed a 8etition for 2elief from 0udgment in the same trial court, in the same cause, alleging e<cusa le negligence in their failure to appeal the said decision, and praying that the same e set aside! #n $ovem er 9, 198%, the trial court 6 denied the said 8etition for 2elief from 0udgment as well as the motion to reconsider the denial of the petitioners: notice of appeal on the grounds that there was no e<cusa le negligence to warrant relief from judgment and that the petition failed to show a valid and sufficient cause of action! The petitioners elevated the case to the respondent appellate court on a 8etition for *andamus

alleging that the denial of their appeal was unwarranted and that the granting of the notice of appeal was a ministerial duty enforcea le y mandamus! As adverted to at the outset, the respondent appellate court denied the said 8etition for *andamus in a decision dated April 26, 1988! 4ence, this recourse! ?n their 8etition, the petitioners su mit the following assignment of errors" 1aw li rary 1! That the instant petition is a concrete and specific e<ample of a violation of section one, article ?@, of the Constitution of the 8hilippines9 2! That the respondents violated section 2, 2ule ;1 of the 2ules of Court of the 8hilippines! The petition is not meritorious! Central to the controversy are the issues of whether or not the approval of a notice of appeal y the trial judge is a ministerial duty enforcea le y mandamus, and if it is, whether or not the appeal of the petitioners is meritorious! The petitioners assails the decision of the respondent appellate court affirming the trial court:s denial of oth their 8etition for 2elief from 0udgment and the notice of appeal! As regards the denial of the 8etition for 2elief from 0udgment, there is no =uestion that the same involved the e<ercise of discretion y the trial court and therefore, the granting thereof cannot e compelled y mandamus! A petition for mandamus lies /when any tri unal, corporation, oard or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully e<cludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no plain, speedy and ade=uate remedy in the ordinary course of law ! ! !/ % As the Court en anc recently held in CruA v! *ajor Beneral *ontano, 8 /mandamus is a remedy availa le only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined y law as a duty! ?t cannot compel the e<ercise of discretion one way or the other!/ ?ndeed, mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty! 9 ?n ,ymaco v! A=uino, 1. we had the occasion to clearly distinguish etween a ministerial duty and a discretionary duty! 3e e<plained x x x *inisterial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the e<ercise of discretion in its performance! #n the other hand, a discretionary duty is that which y its nature re=uires the e<ercise of judgment! A purely ministerial act or duty is one in which an officer or tri unal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescri ed manner, in o edience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the e<ercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act done! Cut if the law imposes a duty upon a pu lic officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall e performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial!

The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same re=uires neither the e<ercise of official discretion nor judgment! ! ! ! x x x

Applying the foregoing distinctions, we agree with the o servations made y the respondent appellate court when it stated thus" virtual 1aw li rary x x x

?n the present case, petitioner lost his right to appeal when he failed to perfect his appeal within the reglementary period! The 8etition for 2elief 1rom 0udgment granted y ,ection 2 of 2ule -8, does not confer on petitioner the right to appeal which had een lost! And the remedy of relief from judgment can only e resorted to on any of the grounds mentioned y said rules, namely" fraud, accident, mistaDe or e<cusa le negligence! The determination of whether the element of fraud, accident, mistaDe or e<cusa le negligence is present to warrant the granting of the relief prayed for, re=uires an e<ercise of judgment and discretion y the judge! And the writ of mandamus cannot e issued and is not availa le to control the discretion of the judge or compel him to decide a case in a particular way! &+iy v! Crossfield, -8 8hil! 9-;'! The trial court, in e<ercising its discretionary authority, denied the 8etition for 2elief from 0udgment on a finding that petitioners had no meritorious defense and that the failure to perfect the appeal on time was not due to e<cusa le negligence! This is clearly an e<ercise of power or authority which cannot e controlled y a writ of mandamus! 11 x x x

1urthermore, the petitioners do not dispute the fact that the 8etition for 2elief from 0udgment was not filed with the trial court within the reglementary period, i!e!, within si<ty &6.' days from the time the petitioners learned of the judgment in =uestion and not more than si< &6' months after such judgment was entered! 12 Although the petition was filed within si< &6' months, it was not within si<ty &6.' days from the time the petitioners learned of the judgment, ut only after 1.% days! The a sence of one of the two said periods which are concurring elements precludes the petitioners from availing of the 8etition for 2elief from 0udgment! ?n this instance, the remedy availa le to the petitioners is to appeal the denial of their 8etition for 2elief from 0udgment! As we held in +e 0esus v! +omingo, 1- an order denying a petition for relief, eing final, is appeala le and may not e corrected through the special civil action for certiorari and prohi ition! ,pecifically, ,ection 2, par! 2 of 2ule ;1 of the 2evised 2ules of Court, in part, states" virtual 1aw li rary A judgment denying relief under 2ule -8 is su ject to appeal, and in the course thereof, a party may also assail the judgment on the merits, upon the ground that it is not supported y the evidence or it is contrary to law! 4ence, we agree with the contention of the petitioners that it was the ministerial duty of the trial court to approve the notice of appeal! ?t must e o served that the petitioners had filed within

the prescri ed period a notice of appeal on +ecem er 1, 198% when the petition in =uestion was denied y the trial court in an order dated $ovem er 9, 198%, a copy of which was received y the petitioners on $ovem er 2%, 198%! The refusal of the trial court, therefore, to accept the said notice filed y petitioners in pursuance of their statutory right to appeal is clearly enforcea le y mandamus! Ce that as it may, to remand the instant case to the respondent appellate court for a review of its merits would e an e<ercise in futility! ?n its =uestioned decision, the respondent appellate court nonetheless ruled on the merits of the present controversy which we find to e ade=uately supported y the evidence on record! The petitioners, to e entitled to a 8etition for 2elief from 0udgment, must not only show e<cusa le negligence ut must liDewise assert the facts constituting their good and su stantial cause of action! ,till and all, considering the evidence adduced y the petitioners, we see no reason to depart from the well)grounded conclusion of the respondent appellate court finding the appeal not meritorious for failure to esta lish oth foregoing re=uisites! Thus" virtual 1aw li rary x x x

! ! ! As it is Dnown to them that their case was pending decision, a little diligence, a little e<ercise of prudence, a little attention here and there, a little haste made slowly ought to have alerted and urged them to see their lawyer a out their pending case efore leaving for *anila! At the very least, to leave instructions to their lawyer on what to do should the decision e adverse to them! Cut they did not! The decision was rendered on *arch 21, 198%! Cy the records their lawyer received it on *arch -1, 198%! They left on April 1, 198%! There was time enough to save their case! ?ndeed, had they seen their lawyer efore they left they would have Dnown that a decision adverse to them had een rendered! #r, having left instructions, their lawyer could have appealed! $egligence, to e 5EC>,AC65, must e one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against!c The affidavit of 6ina *ateo, 6eon *ateo and @irgilio Bomintong which are attached to the petition to show e<cusa le negligence are too apt! They invite serious dou t! Consider that @irgilio Bomintong, a distant neigh or, Dnew of the arrival of the petitioners on April 27, 198%! ?t is o vious that he learned of it only from a mem er of petitioners: household! ?t followed that 6ina *ateo, a daughter who lives with her parents, Dnew of it! 3hy then would she &6ina *ateo' leave for $orth Cota ato on April 2;, 198% for a vacation when her parents were supposed to arrive on April 27, 198% and leave the tasD of meeting her parents to @irgilio who is not even a relativeF 4er alleged return to Calamagoy on *ay 19, 198% appears to this Court to e so carefully tailored to fit the events! ?t has een said that evidence to e elieved must not only come from a credi le witness9 it must e elieva le in itself and must conform to o serva le human ehaviour! *oreover, despite the testimony of @irgilio Bomintong, it is reasona le to elieve that only 6eon *ateo left for *anila, no ticDet having een presented to show that petitioner Ana @iloria *ateo also made the trip!/ &2ollo, pp! 16)1%'! 3e agree with the trial court:s findings that the negligence is not e<cusa le to justify the granting of a relief from the judgment, ordering the defendants &petitioners' to vacate the premises! 1; x x x

*oreover, as the respondent court correctly o served, the petitioners did not present any valid and sufficient cause of action to justify any relief from judgment! Correctly the Court of Appeals ruled"chanro 1es virtual 1aw li rary x x x

! ! ! 8etitioners: defense rests mainly on their allegation of /continuous possession for 17 years!/ This is not a valid defense as against the plaintiffs: rights over the property or owner with an indefeasi le title! The land in =uestion is covered y Transfer Certificate of Title $o! 9-.9 in the name of plaintiff 0ulia *ateo, married to 1rancisco del 2osario! There can e no claim of rights ased on 17 years continuous possession if the land is registered under the Torrens ,ystem in the name of another ecause the latter:s rights are indefeasi le as against the whole world! The transfer certificate of title issued to the plaintiff is on 1e ruary 21, 1976, ringing the land under the operation of the Torrens ,ystem, confers on the plaintiffs an imprescripti le title over such land after the lapse of one year from issuance thereof! 17 x x x

?ndeed, the respondent court did not commit any reversi le error! 345251#25, the petition for review on certiorari is +5$?5+! Cost against the petitioners! ,# #2+525+! *elencio)4errera, 8aras, 8adilla and 2egalado, JJ., concur! 2)OLAMA vs PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

The petition for review assails the +ecision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 0une 22, 2..7, in CA) B!2! ,8 $o! 8;112, which reversed the +ecision2 of the 2egional Trial Court &2TC' of 6anao del ,ur, *arawi City, Cranch 1., in ,pl! Civil Action $o! 987).-, as well as the 2esolution- dated August 17, 2..7 denying petitioner:s motion for reconsideration! The antecedent facts are as follows" 8etitioners Banie 8! #lama, +atu *aDay Canto, +arim ang Antal ,ultan, Camad ,angcopan, 0amil A iden Tampugao, and A dulgafor Angindarat, alleged that they were the duly elected 8unong Carangay in Carangays Alog, Cita, Campo, *adaya, *indamudag and 2iantaran, respectively, all of the *unicipality of Tu aran, 6anao del ,ur, during the special arangay and ,angguniang Ga ataan elections held on August 1-, 2..2! 8etitioners further claimed that notwithstanding their election and despite repeated demands, they were denied y the respondent 8hilippine $ational CanD &8$C' of their ?nternal 2evenue Allotment &?2A' for the months of #cto er, $ovem er and +ecem er 2..2 and 0anuary 2..-! 8$C:s refusal to release their ?2A was allegedly anchored on the refusal of 6ocal Bovernment #perations #fficer &6B##' 4adji 4ussein Tugaya Ta ua &6B## Ta ua' to issue the certifications re=uested of him y the petitioners!;

Thus, petitioners filed a petition7 for mandamus and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and(or T2# with the 2TC of *arawi City which was docDeted as ,pl! Civil Action $o! 987).- and raffled to Cranch 1.! ?t seeDs the issuance of a judgment re=uiring 8$C to release the ?2A to the petitioners and their respective appointed Carangay Treasurers!6 ?nstead of an answer, 8$C filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lacD of cause of action which was denied y the trial court in its #rder dated *arch -1, 2..-!% The 2TC also ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing 8$C:s *arawi Cranch to /cease, desist and refrain from releasing the su ject ?2A:s for arangays Alog, *adaya, *indamudag and Campo, 2iantaran and Cita, e<cept to petitioners Bani #lama, +atu *aDay Canto, +arim ang Antal ,ultan, Camad ,angcopan, 0amil A iden Tampugao, and A dulgafor Angindarat!/8 ,u se=uently, several motions for leave of court to intervene were filed y herein intervenors A ol *! ,alim,9 5lias 2! +itucalan, 0alil A iden, *ustapha Cuat,1. 0amaloden +iator and Cato Adam!11 They alleged that each one is the incum ent punong arangay of the same arangays that herein petitioners are claiming to e, to wit" Cato Adam for Crgy! 2iantaran9 A ol *! ,alim for Crgy! Alog9 5lias 2! +itucalan for Crgy! Campo9 0alil A iden for Crgy! *adaya9 and *acay Cuat for Crgy! Cita, that they will e adversely affected if the petition is granted ecause they will e unlawfully and unwarrantedly ousted from their position as 8unong Carangay! According to the intervenors, there was a failure of election held on August 1-, 2..2 in arangays Alog, Cita, Campo, *adaya, *indamudag and 2iantaran ased on the report of the election officer assigned in Tu aran, 6anao del ,ur, to supervise the conduct of special arangay and ,G elections on August 1-, 2..2!12 Thus, they claimed that they are still the incum ent punong arangays of their respective arangays ased on the hold over provision of ,ection 7 of 2epu lic Act $o! 916;1- which provides that" ,ection 7! 4old #ver! H All incum ent arangay officials and sangguniang Da ataan officials shall remain in office unless sooner removed or suspended for cause until their successors shall have een elected and =ualified! The provisions of the #mni us 5lection Code relative to the failure of elections and special elections are here y reiterated in this Act! The court a quo granted the motions for intervention and thereafter issued an order1; re=uiring all the parties to su mit their respective memoranda pursuant to ,ection 817 of 2ule 67 of the 2ules of Court! #n $ovem er 21, 2..-, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, the dispositive portion of which states" 345251#25, premises considered, judgment is here y rendered in favor of petitioners and against respondent and intervenors" a! 2ecogniAing petitioners: legal rights to continue assuming the position as 8unong Carangay in si< &6' su ject arangay without prejudice to the outcome or resolution of the C#*565C 5$ CA$C of the pending &sic' etween the parties9 ! Commanding and ordering respondent 8hilippines $ational CanD of the 8hilippines, *arawi City Cranch, represented y Cai ,andorie T! +isomangcop oth in her official capacity as Cranch *anager or whoever is the Acting 4ead(5<ecutive officer or manager of the anD to release to petitioners the ?nternal 2evenue Allotment &?2A' for the month of 1e ruary 2..- and succeeding or su se=uent months corresponding to the si< &6' arangay units opposite their names as follows" Bani 8! #lama ))))))))) Crgy! alog, Tu aran, 6anao +el ,ur +atu *aDay ,! Canto H Crgy! Cita, Tu aran, 6anao del ,ur +arim ang Antal )))))) Crgy! Campo, Tu aran, 6anao del ,ur ,ultan Camad ,angcopan H Crgy! *adaya, Tu aran, 6anao del ,ur 0amil A iden Tampogao )))) Crgy! *indamudag, Tu aran, 6anao del ,ur! A dulgafor Angindarat )))))) Crgy! 2iantaran, Tu aran, 6anao +el ,ur!

c! #rdering intervenors to desist, refrain, and cease from e<ercising the powers and functions of petitioners as 8unong arangays of in &sic' their respective arangay aforestated! ,# #2+525+!16 #n appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court for want of factual and legal asis! 8etitioners: motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition! The petitioners argue that the findings of facts made y the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. @erily, the issue raised y the petitioners invite us to rule on =uestions of fact, contrary to the settled rule that only =uestions of law may e raised in a petition for review! 4owever, while it is an esta lished dictum that it is not the function of the ,upreme Court to analyAe or weigh evidence anew, the circumstances o taining in the present case re=uire us to disregard the general rule and to apply one of the recogniAed e<ceptions, i!e!, when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court!1% 8etitioners contend that the pieces of documentary evidence they presented efore the trial court clearly esta lished their right to the issuance of the writ of mandamus! 3e are not persuaded! A writ of mandamus is an e<traordinary legal remedy granted y courts of appellate jurisdiction, directed to some corporation, officer, or inferior court, re=uiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed from operation of some law!18 >nder the 2ules of Court, the writ of mandamus is availa le as a remedy only under these circumstances" 3hen any tri unal, corporation, oard, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully e<cludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there in no other plain, speedy and ade=uate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved there y may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment e rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to e specified y the court, to do the act re=uired to e done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained y the petitioner y reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent! < < < <!19 Thus, as an e<traordinary remedy, mandamus may e availed of only if the legal right to e enforced is well defined, clear and certain! ?t lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one! The duty is ministerial only when its discharge re=uires neither the e<ercise of official discretion nor judgment!2. 1urther, it is settled that in order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it is essential that, on the one hand, the person petitioning for it has a clear legal right to the claim that is sought and that, on the other hand, the respondent has an imperative duty to perform that which is demanded of him! *andamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is =uestiona le or over which a su stantial dou t e<ists! The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to e<pedite, not to in=uire and to adjudicate9 thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right ut to implement that which is already esta lished! >nless the right to the relief is unclouded, mandamus will not issue!21 3e have carefully reviewed the records of this case and we find that the arguments raised y the petitioners clearly fall elow the yardsticD of the clear legal right re=uired to e possessed y someone petitioning for the issuance of the writ of mandamus! Contrary to the contention of the petitioners that they have esta lished their legal right to the relief that they are seeDing, their claim rests on very dou tful grounds! 8etitioners allege that

they were the duly elected heads of their respective arangays ased on the Certificates of Canvass of @otes and 8roclamations of 3inning Candidates for 8unong Carangay and Gagawad ng ,angguniang Carangay y the Carangay Coard of Canvassers22 which showed that they garnered the highest num er of votes for punong arangay in their respective areas! 4owever, petitioners failed to e<plain why each of the said certificates ore identical serial num ers! As the Court of Appeals aptly o served" Appellees &herein petitioners' failed to esta lish that they have een elected and proclaimed as punong arangays! 3hat they su mitted were <ero< copies of supposedly certified copies of Certificates of Canvass of @otes and 8roclamation &hereafter Certificates' which curiously enough ear the same serial num er! $o evidence has een adduced to e<plain these patent irregularities and the non)production in the trial court of the original Certificates! 5# A6? who purportedly certified as true and correct the Certificates in =uestion does not appear to have any right to the custody of the records nor does he appear to have authority to furnish authenticated copies thereof! 3orse, 5# A6? was not even presented in court to attest to the said Certificates and the statements he made in his letter to 6B## which Appellees claimed will prove that they were elected and proclaimed as punong arangays! All these cast serious dou ts on the authenticity and admissi ility of the said documents! The authenticity of the Certificates was not esta lished in accordance with the 2ules of 5vidence! ,ection 2; of 2ule 1-2 of the 2evised 2ules of Court provides that an official record or entries therein may e proved y an official pu lication or y a copy attested y the officer having legal custody of the record or y his deputy! ,ection 27 of the same 2ule further states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in su stance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may e! The attestation must e under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there e any!2To our mind, the attitude manifested y the petitioners towards esta lishing the veracity of their respective Certificates of Canvass, a piece of evidence upon which they greatly anchor their petition efore us, is contrary to the ehavior of one who is convinced that his claim is valid! 8etitioners failed to offer any satisfactory e<planation on the patent irregularity that attended their Certificates of Canvass! 3orse, a perusal of the respective certificates of assumption of office2; of each petitioner will show that these documents were e<ecuted and certified y the petitioners themselves! 3e agree with the Court of Appeals that no pro ative value can thus e accorded to these certificates, they eing uncorro orated and evidently, self serving! 1rom the foregoing, it is not correct to say, as petitioners claimed, that the refusal of the respondent 8$C to release the ?2A is unjustified! 8$C has the right to re=uire petitioners to present the proper certification as duly elected punong arangays from the 6ocal Bovernment #perations #fficer of Tu aran, 6anao del ,ur! ,ince the latter did not issue the certifications to the petitioners, there must e compelling reasons for such refusal as shown in the foregoing discussion! To e given due course, a petition for mandamus must have een instituted y a party aggrieved y the alleged inaction of any tri unal, corporation, oard or person which unlawfully e<cludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right! The petitioner in every case must therefore e an aggrieved party in the sense that he possesses a clear right to e enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to e performed! The Court will e<ercise its power of judicial review only if the case is rought efore it y a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal =uestion! /6egal standing/ means a personal and su stantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act that is eing challenged!27Clearly, not only did the petitioners fail to esta lish a clear legal right to the relief they are seeDing, they also failed to maDe a case of locus standi for

themselves in this case! The principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may e enforced y mandamus only if those rights are well defined, clear and certain! *andamus never issues in dou tful cases!26 345251#25, the petition is DENIED! The assailed +ecision dated 0une 22, 2..7 and 2esolution dated August 17, 2..7 of the Court of Appeals in CA)B!2! ,8 $o! 8;112 are AFFIRMED! Costs against petitioners! ,# #2+525+! 3)LECAROZ VS SANDIGANBAYAN 12A$C?,C# *! 65CA2#I and 65$6?5 65CA2#I, father and son, were convicted y the ,andigan ayan of thirteen &1-' counts of estafa through falsification of pu lic documents! 1 They now seeD a review of their conviction as they insist on their innocence! 8etitioner 1rancisco *! 6ecaroA was the *unicipal *ayor of ,anta CruA, *arindu=ue, while his son, his co)petitioner 6enlie 6ecaroA, was the outgoing chairman of the Ga ataang Carangay &GC' of Carangay Cagong ,ilang, *unicipality of ,anta CruA, and concurrently a mem er of its ,angguniang Cayan &,C' representing the 1ederation of Ga ataang Carangays! ?n the 1987 election for the Ga ataang Carangay 0owil 2ed 2 won as GC Chairman of Carangay *atala a, ,anta CruA! 8arenthetically, 6enlie 6ecaroA, did not run as candidate in this electoral e<ercise as he was no longer =ualified for the position after having already passed the age limit fi<ed y law! ,ometime in $ovem er 1987 2ed was appointed y then 8resident 1erdinand *arcos as mem er of the ,angguniang Cayan of ,anta CruA representing the GCs of the municipality! ?mee *arcos)*anotoc, then the $ational Chairperson of the organiAation, sent a telegram to 2ed confirming his appointment and advising him further that copies of his appointment papers would e sent to him in due time through the GC 2egional #ffice! 32ed received the telegram on 2 0anuary 1986 and showed it immediately to *ayor 1rancisco *! 6ecaroA! #n % 0anuary 1986, armed with the telegram and intent on assuming the position of sectoral representative of the GCs to the ,C, 2ed attended the meeting of the ,anggunian upon the invitation of one of its mem ers, Gagawad 2ogato 6umawig! ?n that meeting, *ayor 1rancisco *! 6ecaroA informed 2ed that he could not yet sit as mem er of the municipal council until his appointment had een cleared y the Bovernor of *arindu=ue! $onetheless, the telegram was included in the agenda as one of the su jects discussed in the meeting! 2ed finally received his appointment papers sometime in 0anuary 1986! 4 Cut it was only on 2April 1986, when then 8resident CoraAon C! A=uino was already in power, 5 that he forwarded these documents to *ayor 6ecaroA! This notwithstanding, 2ed was still not allowed y the mayor to sit as sectoral representative in the ,anggunian! *eanwhile, *ayor 6ecaroA prepared and approved on different dates the payment to 6enlie 6ecaroA of twenty)si< &26' sets of payrolls for the twenty)si< &26' quincenas covering the period 16 0anuary 1986 to -. 0anuary 198%! 6enlie 6ecaroA signed the payroll for 1)17 0anuary 1986 and then authoriAed someone else to sign all the other payrolls for the succeeding quincenas and claim the corresponding salaries in his ehalf! #n 27 #cto er 1989, or three &-' years and nine &9' months from the date he received his appointment papers from 8resident *arcos, 2ed was finally a le to secure from the A=uino Administration a confirmation of his appointment as GC ,ectoral 2epresentative to the ,anggunian Cayan of ,anta CruA! ,u se=uently, 2ed filed with the #ffice of the #m udsman several criminal complaints against *ayor 1rancisco 6ecaroA and 6enlie 6ecaroA arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the position of GC sectoral representative! After preliminary investigation, the #m udsman filed with the ,andigan ayan thirteen &1-' ?nformations for estafa through falsification of pu lic documents against petitioners, and one &1' ?nformation for violation of ,ec!

-, par! &e', of 2A $o! -.19, the Anti)Braft and Corrupt 8ractices Act, against *ayor 6ecaroA alone! #n % #cto er 199; the ,andigan ayan rendered a decision finding the two &2' accused guilty on all counts of estafa through falsification of pu lic documents and sentenced each of them to J a' imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from a minimum of 1?@5 &7' K5A2,, 565@5$ &11' *#$T4, A$+ #$5 &1' +AK of prision correccional to a ma<imum of T5$ &1.' K5A2, A$+ #$5 &1' +AK of prison mayor 1#2 5AC4 #1 T45 AC#@5 CA,5,9 ' a fine in the amount of 1?@5 T4#>,A$+ 85,#, &87,...' 1#2 5AC4 #1 T45 AC#@5 CA,5, or a total of ,?ETK)1?@5 T4#>,A$+ 85,#, &867,...'9 and c' perpetual special dis=ualification from pu lic office in accordance with Art! 21; of the 2evised 8enal Code! ! ! ! &and' to pay jointly and severally the amount of T35$TK)T4255 T4#>,A$+ ,?E 4>$+25+ ,5@5$TK)1?@5 85,#, &82-,6%7', the amount unlawfully o tained, to the *unicipality of ,ta! CruA, *arindu=ue in restitution! The ,andigan ayan ruled that since 2ed was elected president of the GC and tooD his oath of office sometime in 1987 efore then Assem lywoman Carmencita #! 2eyes his assumption of the GC presidency upon the e<piration of the term of accused 6enlie 6ecaroA was valid! Conversely, the accused 6enlie 6ecaroA ceased to e a mem er of the GC on the last ,unday of $ovem er 1987 and, as such, was no longer the legitimate representative of the youth sector in the municipal council of ,ta! CruA, *arindu=ue! ?n convicting oth accused on the falsification charges, the ,andigan ayan elucidated J ! ! ! ! when, therefore, accused *AK#2 12A$C?,C# 65CA2#I entered the name of his son, the accused 65$6?5 65CA2#I, in the payroll of the municipality of ,ta! CruA for the payroll period starting 0anuary 17, 1986, reinstating accused 65$6?5 65CA2#I to his position in the ,angguniang Cayan, he was deli erately stating a falsity when he certified that 65$6?5 65CA2#I was a mem er of the ,angguniang Cayan! The fact is that even accused 65$6?5 65CA2#I himself no longer attended the sessions of the ,angguniang Cayan of ,ta! CruA, and starting with the payroll for 0anuary 16 to -1, 1986, did not personally picD up his salaries anymore! The accused *AK#2Ls acts would fall under Art! 1%1, par! ;, of The 2evised 8enal Code which reads" Art! 1%1! 1alsification y pu lic officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical minister! J The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to e<ceed 7,... pesos shall e imposed upon any pu lic officer, employee, or notary pu lic who, taDing advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document y committing any of the following acts" ! ! ! ! ;! *aDing untruthful statements in a narration of facts! <<< <<< <<< Clearly, falsification of pu lic documents has een committed y accused *AK#2 65CA2#I! 6iDewise from these acts of falsification, his son, accused 65$6?5 65CA2#I, was a le to draw salaries from the municipality to which he was not entitled for services he had admittedly not rendered! This constitutes 5stafa ! ! ! ! the deceit eing the falsification made, and the prejudice eing that caused to the

municipality of ,ta! CruA, *arindu=ue for having paid salaries to 65$6?5 65CA2#I who was not entitled thereto! Conspiracy was alleged in the ?nformations herein, and the Court found the allegation sufficiently su stantiated y the evidence presented! There is no justifia le reason why accused *AK#2 65CA2#I should have reinstated his son 65$6?5 in the municipal payrolls from 0anuary 16, 1986 to 0anuary -1, 198%, yet he did so! 4e could not have had any other purpose than to ena le his son 65$6?5 to draw salaries there y! This conclusion inescapa le considering that the very purpose of a payroll is precisely that J to authoriAe the payment of salaries! And 65$6?5 65CA2#I did his part y actually drawing the salaries during the periods covered, al eit through another person whom he had authoriAed! Cy the facts proven, there was conspiricy in the commission of 5stafa etween father and son! 4owever, with respect to the charge of violating ,ec! -, par! &e', of 2A $o! -.19, the ,andigan ayan ac=uitted *ayor 1rancisco 6ecaroA! ?t found that 2ed was neither authoriAed to sit as mem er of the ,C ecause he was not properly appointed thereto nor had he shown to the mayor sufficient asis for his alleged right to a seat in the municipal council! #n this asis, the court a quo concluded that *ayor 6ecaroA was legally justified in not allowing 2ed to assume the position of Gagawad! #n 1 #cto er 199; the ,andigan ayan denied the motion for reconsideration of its decision filed y the accused! This prompted herein petitioners to elevate their cause to us charging that the ,andigan ayan erred" First, in holding that 2ed had validly and effectively assumed the office of GC 1ederation 8resident y virtue of his oath taDen efore then Assem ly woman Carmencita 2eyes on 2% ,eptem er 1987, and in concluding that the tenure of accused 6enlie 6ecaroA as president of the GC and his coterminous term of office as GC representative to the ,C had accordingly e<pired9 Second, assuming arguendo that the term of office of the accused 6enlie 6ecaroA as youth representative to the ,C had e<pired, in holding that accused 6enlie 6ecaroA could no longer occupy the office, even in a holdover capacity, despite the vacancy therein9 Third, granting arguendo that the tenure of the accused 6enlie 6ecaroA as federation president had e<pired, in holding that y reason thereof accused 6enlie 6ecaroA ecame legally dis=ualified from continuing in office as GC ,ectoral 2epresentative to the ,C even in a holdover capacity9 Fourth, in not holding that under ,ec! 2 of the 1reedom Constitution and pursuant to the provisions of the pertinent *inistry of ?nterior and 6ocal Bovernments &*?6B' interpretative circulars, accused 6enlie 6ecaroA was legally entitled and even mandated to continue in office in a holdover capacity9 Fifth, in holding that the accused had committed the crime of falsification within the contemplation of Art! 1%1 of The 2evised 8enal Code, and in not holding that the crime of estafa of which they, had een convicted re=uired criminal intent and malice as essential elements9 Sixth, assuming arguendo that the accused 6enlie 6ecaroA was not legally entitled to hold over, still the trial court erred in not holding J considering the difficult legal =uestions involved J that the accused acted in good faith and committed merely an error of judgment, without malice and criminal intent9 and, Seventh, in convicting the accused for crimes committed in a manner different from that alleged in the ?nformation under which the accused were arraigned and tried!

The petition is meritorious! The asic propositions upon which the ,andigan ayan premised its conviction of the accused are" &a' although 0owil 2ed was duly elected GC Chairman he could not validly assume a seat in the ,anggunian as GC sectoral representative for failure to show a valid appointment9 and, & ' 6enlie 6ecaroA who was the incum ent GC representative could not hold over after his term e<pired ecause pertinent laws do not provide for holdover! To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on the terms of office of GC youth sectoral representatives to the ,C and of the GC 1ederation 8residents! ,ection % of C8 Clg! 71 and ,ec! 1 of the GC Constitution respectively provide J ,ec! %! Term of office! J >nless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereina ove mentioned shall hold office for a term of si< &6' years, which shall commence on the first *onday of *arch 198.! In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association of barangay councils and the president of the federation of kabataan barangay, their terms of office shall be coterminous ith their tenure as president fo their respective association and federation! <<< <<< <<< ,ec 1! All incum ent officers of the Ga ataang Carangay shall continue to hold office until the last ,unday of $ovem er 1987 or such time that the newly elected officers shall have =ualified and assumed office in accordance with this Constitution! The theory of petitioners is that 2ed failed to =ualify as GC sectoral representative to the ,C since he did not present an authenticated copy of his appointment papers9 neither did he taDe a valid oath of office! 2esultantly, this ena led petitioner 6enlie 6ecaroA to continue as mem er of the ,C although in a holdover capacity since his term had already e<pired! The ,andigan ayan however rejected this postulate declaring that the holdover provision under ,ec! 1 =uoted a ove pertains only to positions in the GC, clearly implying that since no similar provision is found in ,ec! % of C!8! Clg! 71, there can e no holdover with respect to positions in the ,C! 3e disagree with the ,andigan ayan! The concept of holdover when applied to a pu lic officer implies that the office has a fi<ed term and the incum ent is holding onto the succeeding term! ?t is usually provided y law that officers elected or appointed for a fi<ed term shall remain in office not only for that term ut until their successors have een elected and =ualified! 3here this provision is found, the office does not ecome vacant upon the e<piration of the term if there is no successor elected and =ualified to assume it, ut the present incum ent will carry over until his successor is elected and =ualified, even though it e eyond the term fi<ed y law! ! ?n the instant case, although C8 Clg! 71 does not say that a ,anggunian mem er can continue to occupy his post after the e<piration of his term in case his successor fails to =ualify, it does, not also say that he is proscri ed from holding over! A sent an e<press or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has =ualified! " The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must e clearly e<pressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment, # otherwise it is reasona le to assume that the law)maDing ody favors the same! ?ndeed, the law a hors a vacuum in pu lic offices, 1$ and courts generally indulge in the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, y statute, a condition which may result in an e<ecutive or administrative office ecoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied y one lawfully authoriAed to e<ercise its functions! 11 This is founded on o vious considerations of pu lic policy, for the principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent pu lic convenience from suffering ecause of a vacancy 12 and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions! 13

The ,andigan ayan maintained that y taDing his oath of office efore Assem ly woman 2eyes in 1987 2ed validly assumed the presidency of the GC upon the e<piration of the term of 6enlie 6ecaroA! ?t should e noted however that under the provisions of the Administrative Code then in force, specifically ,ec! 21, Art! @? thereof, mem ers of the then Catasang 8am ansa were not authoriAed to administer oaths! ?t was only after the approval of 2A $o! 6%-- 14 on 27 0uly 1989 and its su se=uent pu lication in a newspaper of general circulation that, mem ers of oth 4ouses of Congress were vested for the first time with the general authority to administer oaths! Clearly, under this circumstance, the oath of office taDen y 0owil 2ed efore a mem er of the Catasang 8am ansa who had no authority to administer oaths, was invalid and amounted to no oath at all! To e sure, an oath of office is a =ualifying re=uirement for a pu lic office9 a prere=uisite to the full investiture with the office! 15 #nly when the pu lic officer has satisfied the prere=uisite of oath that his right to enter into the position ecomes plenary and complete! >ntil then, he has none at all! And for as long as he has not =ualified, the holdover officer is the rightful occupant! ?t is thus clear in the present case that since 2ed never =ualified for the post, petitioner 6enlie 6ecaroA remained GC representative to the ,anggunian, al eit in a carry over capacity, and was in every aspect a de !ure officer, 1 or at least a de facto officer 1! entitled to receive the salaries and all the emoluments appertaining to the position! As such, he could not e considered an intruder and lia le for encroachment of pu lic office! 1" #n the issue of criminal lia ility of petitioners, clearly the offenses of which petitioners were convicted, i!e!, estafa through falsification of pu lic documents under Art! 1%1, par! ;, of The 2evised 8enal Code, are intentional felonies for which lia ility attaches only when it is shown that the malefactors acted with criminal intent or malice! 1#?f what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person committing the act, no malice or criminal intent can e rightfully imputed to him! 3as criminal intent then demonstrated to justify petitionersL convictionF ?t does not so appear in the case at ar! #rdinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to e<ist! "ctus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea! There can e no crime when the criminal mind is wanting! As a general rule, ignorance or mistaDe as to particular facts, honest and real, will e<empt the doer from felonious responsi ility! The e<ception of course is neglect in the discharge of a duty or indifference to conse=uences, which is e=uivalent to a criminal intent, for in this instance, the element of malicious intent is supplied y the element of negligence and imprudence! 2$ ?n the instant case, there are clear manifestations of good faith and lacD of criminal intent on the part of petitioners! First! 3hen 0owil 2ed showed up at the meeting of the ,anggunian on % 0anuary 1986, what he presented to *ayor 1rancisco 6ecaroA was a mere telegram purportedly sent y ?mee *arcos) *anotoc informing him of his supposed appointment to the ,C, together with a photocopy of a /*ass Appointment!/ 3ithout authenticated copies of the appointment papers, 2ed had no right to assume office as GC representative to the ,anggunian, and petitioner *ayor 6ecaroA had every right to withhold recognition, as he did, of 2ed as a mem er of the ,anggunian! Second! ?t appears from the records that although 2ed received his appointment papers signed y 8resident *arcos in 0anuary 1986, he forwarded the same to *ayor 1rancisco 6ecaroA only on 2- April 1986 during which time 8resident *arcos had already een deposed and 8resident A=uino had already taDen over the helm of government! #n 27 *arch 1986 the 1reedom Constitution came into eing providing in ,ec! 2 of Art! ??? thereof that J ,ec! 2! All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 19%Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise, provided y proclamation or e<ecutive order or upon the designation of their successors if such appointment is made within a period of one &1' year from 1e ruary 26, 1986! &emphasis supplied'!

+uty ound to o serve the constitutional mandate, petitioner 1rancisco 6ecaroA through the provincial governor forwarded the papers of 0owil 2ed to then *inister of ?nterior and 6ocal Bovernment A=uilino 8imentel, 0r!, re=uesting advice on the validity of the appointment signed y former 8resident *arcos! The response was the issuance of *?6B 8rovincial *emorandum) Circular $o! 86).2 21 and *emorandum)Circular $o! 86)1% 22 stating that J 82#@?$C?A6 *5*#2A$+>*)C?2C>6A2 $#! 86).2 2! That newly elected GC 1ederation 8residents, without their respective authenticated appointments from the president, cannot, in any way, represent their associations in any sangguniang ayan(sangguniang panlalawigan, as the case may e, although they are still considered presidents of their federations y virtue of the 0uly 1987 elections! *5*#2A$+>* C?2C>6A2 $#! 86)1% ?t is informed, however, that until replaced y the #ffice of the 8resident or y this *inistry the appointive mem ers of the various ,angguniang Cayan, ,angguniang 8anlunsod, and the ,angguniang 8anlalawigan shall continue to hold office and to receive compensation due them under e<isting laws, rules and regulations! The pertinent provisions of the 1reedom Constitution and the implementing *?6B Circulars virtually confirmed the right of incum ent GC 1ederation 8residents to hold and maintain their positions until duly replaced either y the 8resident herself or y the ?nterior *inistry! 5<plicit therein was the caveat that newly elected GC 1ederation 8residents could not assume the right to represent their respective associations in any ,anggunian unless their appointments were authenticated y then 8resident A=uino herself! Truly, prudence impelled *ayor 6ecaroA to taDe the necessary steps to verify the legitimacy of 2edLs appointment to the ,anggunian! Third! 8etitioners presented si< &6' certified copies of opinions of the ,ecretaries of 0ustice of 8residents *acapagal, *arcos and A=uino concerning the doctrine of holdover! These consistently e<pressed the view espoused y the e<ecutive ranch for more than thirty &-.' years that the mere fi<ing of the term of office in a statute without an e<press prohi ition against holdover is not indicative of a legislative intent to prohi it it, in light of the legal principle that just as nature a hors a vacuum so does the law a hor a vacancy in the government! 232eliance y petitioners on these opinions, as, well as on the pertinent directives of the then *inistry of ?nterior and 6ocal Bovernment, provided them with an unassaila le status of good faith in holding over and acting on such asis9 and, Fourth! ?t is difficult to accept that a person, particularly one who is highly regarded and respected in the community, would deli erately lemish his good name, and worse, involve his own son in a misconduct for a measly sum of 82-,6%7!.., such as this case efore us! As aptly deduced y 0ustice +el 2osario! 24 ?f ? were to commit a crime, would ? involve my son in itF And if ? were a town mayor, would ? ruin my name for the measly sum of 81,89;!.. a monthF *y natural instinct as a father to protect my own son and the desire, asic in every man, to preserve oneLs honor and reputation would suggest a resounding $# to oth =uestions! Cut the prosecution ventured to prove in these thirteen cases that precisely ecause they were father and son and despite the relatively small amount involved, accused *ayor 1rancisco 6ecaroA conspired with 6enlie 6ecaroA to falsify several municipal payrolls for the purpose of swindling their own town of the amount of 81,89;,.. a month, and the majority has found them guilty! ? find disconhfort with this verdict asically for the reason that there was no criminal intent on their part to falsify any document or to swindle the government! The rule is that any mistaDe on a dou tful or difficult =uestion of law may e the asis of good faith! 25 ?n #abungcal v! #ordova 2 we affirmed the doctrine that an erroneous interpretation of

the meaning of the provisions of an ordinance y a city mayor does not amount to ad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to damages against that official! 3e reiterated this principle in $abutol v! %ascual 2! which held that pu lic officials may not e lia le for damages in the discharge of their official functions a sent any ad faith! Sanders v! &eridiano II 2" e<panded the concept y declaring that under the law on pu lic officers, acts done in the performance of official duty are protected y the presumption of good faith! ?n ascri ing malice and ad faith to petitioner *ayor 6ecaroA, the ,andigan ayan cited two &2' circumstances which purportedly indicated criminal intent! ?t pointed out that the name of accused 6enlie 6ecaroA was not in the municipal payroll for the first quincena of 1986 which meant that his term had finally ended, and that the reinstatement of 6enlie 6ecaroA y *ayor 1rancisco 6ecaroA in the payroll periods from 17 0anuary 1986 and thereafter for the ne<t twelve and a half &12)1(2' months was for no other purpose than to ena le him to draw salaries from the municipality! 2# There is however no evidence, documentary or otherwise, that *ayor 1rancisco 6ecaroA himself caused the name of 6enlie 6ecaroA to e dropped from the payroll for the first quincena of 0anuary 1986! #n the contrary, it is significant that while 6enlie 6ecaroAL name did not appear in the payroll for the first quincena of 0anuary 1986, yet, in the payroll for the ne<t quincena accused 6enlie 6ecaroA was paid for oth the first and second quincenas, and not merely for the second half of the month which would have een the case if he was actually /dropped/ from the payroll for the first fifteen &17' days and then /reinstated/ in the succeeding payroll period, as held y the court a quo! 1rom all indications, it is possi le that the omission was due to the inade=uate documentation of 2edLs appointment to and assumption of office, or the result of a mere clerical error which was later rectified in the succeeding payroll! This however cannot e confirmed y the evidence at hand! Cut since a dou t is now created a out the import of such omission, the principle of e=uipoise should properly apply! This rule demands that all reasona le dou t intended to demonstrate error and not a crime should e resolved in favor of the accused! ?f the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capa le of two or more e<planations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction! 3$ 8etitioners have een convicted for falsification of pu lic documents through an untruthful narration of facts under Art! 1%1, par! ;, of The 2evised 8enal Code! 1or the offense to e esta lished, the following elements must concur" &a' the offender maDes in a document statements in a narration of facts9 & ' the offender has a legal o ligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated9 &c' the facts narrated y the offender are a solutely false9 and, &d' the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person! The first and third elements of the offense have not een esta lished in this case! ?n approving the payment of salaries to 6enlie 6ecaroA, *ayor 1rancisco 6ecaroA signed uniformly)worded certifications thus J ? here y certify on my official oath that the a ove payroll is correct, and that the services a ove stated have een duly rendered! 8ayment for such services is also here y approved from the appropriations indicated! 3hen *ayor 6ecaroA certified to the correctness of the payroll, he was maDing not a narration of facts ut a conclusion of law e<pressing his elief that 6enlie 6ecaroA was legally holding over as mem er of the ,anggunian and thus entitled to the emoluments attached to the position! This is an opinion undou tedly involving a legal matter, and any /misrepresentation/ of this Dind cannot constitute the crime of false pretenses! 31 ?n %eople v!'an(a 32 we ruled J $ow then, considering that when defendant certified she was eligi le for the position, she practically wrote a conclusion of law which turned out to e ine<act

or erroneous J not entirely groundless J we are all of the opinion that she may not e declared guilty of falsification, specially ecause the law which she has allegedly violated &Art! 1%1, 2evised 8enal Code, in connection with other provisions', punishes the maDing of untruthful statements in a narration of facts J emphasis on facts ! ! ! ! >nfortunately, she made a mistaDe of judgment9 ut she could not e held there y to have intentionally made a false statement of fact in violation of Art! 1%1 a ove)mentioned! The third element re=uiring that the narration of facts e a solutely false is not even ade=uately satisfied as the elief of *ayor 1rancisco 6ecaroA that 6enlie 6ecaroA was a holdover mem er of the ,anggunian was not entirely ereft of asis, anchored as it was on the universally accepted doctrine of holdover! )a mera inexactitude no es bastante para integrar este delito! 33 ?f the statements are not altogether false, there eing some colora le truth in them, the crime of falsification is deemed not to have een committed! 1inally, contrary to the finding of the ,andigan ayan, we hold that conspiracy was not proved in this case! The court a quo used as indication of conspiracy the fact that the accused *ayor certified the payrolls authoriAing payment of compensation to his son 6enlie 6ecaroA and that as a conse=uence thereof the latter collected his salaries! These are not legally accepta le indicia, for they are the very same acts alleged in the ?nformation as constituting the crime of estafa through falsification! They cannot =ualify as proof of complicity or unity of criminal intent! Conspiracy must e esta lished separately from the crime itself and must meet the same degree of proof,i!e!, proof eyond reasona le dou t! 3hile conspiracy need not e esta lished y direct evidence, for it may e inferred from the conduct of the accused efore, during and after the commission of the crime, all taDen together however, the evidence must reasona ly e strong enough to show community of criminal design! 34 8erhaps su liminally aware of the paucity of evidence to support it, and if only to uttress its finding of conspiracy, the ,andigan ayan stressed that the two accused are father and son! Branting that this is not even ad hominem, we are unaware of any presumption in law that a conspiracy e<ists simply ecause the conspirators are father and son or related y lood! 345251#25, the petition is B2A$T5+! The assailed +ecision of % #cto er 199; and 2esolution of 1 #cto er 199% of the ,andigan ayan are 25@52,5+ and ,5T A,?+5, and petitioners 12A$C?,C# *! 65CA2#I and 65$6?5 65CA2#I are ACM>?TT5+ of all the thirteen &1-' counts of estafa through falsification of pu lic documents &Crim! Cases $os! 1-9.;)1-916'! The ail onds posted for their provisional li erty are cancelled and released! Costs de oficio! ,# #2+525+! 4)MAR%UEZ VS COMMISSION ON ELECTION The Court is called upon, in this petition for certiorari, to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the meaning of the term /fugitive from justice as that phrase is so used under the provisions of ,ection ;.&e' of the6ocal Bovernment Code &2epu lic Act $o! %16.'! That law states" ,ec! ;.! *isqualifications! The following persons are dis=ualified from running for any elective local position" <<< <<< <<< &e' 1ugitive from justice in criminal or non)political cases here or a road&!' Cienvenido *ar=ueA, a defeated candidate for the elective position for the elective position in the 8rovince of MueAon in the 11th *ay 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the resolution of the Commission on 5lections &/C#*565C/' which dismissed his petition for quo arranto against the winning candidate, herein private respondent 5duardo 2odrigueA, for eing allegedly a fugitive from justice! ?t is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten &1.' counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still

pending efore the *unicipal Court of 6os Angeles 0udicial +istrict, County of 6os Angeles, ,tate of California, >!,!A! A warrant issued y said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to e served on private respondent on account of his alleged /flight/ from that country! Cefore the 11th *ay 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation &,8A 92).67' of respondentLs certificate of candidacy, on the ground of the candidateLs dis=ualification under ,ection ;.&e' of the 6ocal Bovernment Code, was filed y petitioner with the C#*565C! #n .8 *ay 1992, the C#*565C dismissed the petition! 8etitionerLs su se=uent recourse to this Court &in B!2! $o! 1.7-1.' from the .8th *ay 1992 resolution of C#*565C was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a possi le post)election quo arranto proceeding against private respondent! The Court, in its resolution of .2 0une 1992, held" 5vidently, the matter elevated to this Court was a pre)proclamation controversy! ,ince the private respondent had already een proclaimed as the duly elected Bovernor of the 8rovince of MueAon, the petition elow for dis=ualification has ceased to e a pre)proclamation controversy! ?n #asimiro vs! #ommission on +lections, B!2! $os! 8;;62)6- and "ntonio vs! #ommission on +lections, B!2! $os! 8;6%8)%9, jointly decided on 29 *arch 1989, 1%1 ,C2A ;68, this court held that a pre)proclamation controversy is no longer via le at this point of time and should e dismissed! The proper remedy of the petitioner is to pursue the dis=ualification suit in a separate proceeding! ACC#2+?$B6K, the Court 2esolved to +?,*?,, the petition, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate proceedings in the proper forum, if so desired, within ten &1.' days from notice! 1 8rivate respondent was proclaimed Bovernor)elect of MueAon on 29 *ay 1992! 1orthwith, petitioner instituted quo arranto proceedings &58C 92)28' against private respondent efore the C#*565C! ?n its .2 1e ruary 199- resolution, the C#*565C &,econd +ivision' dismissed the petition! The C#*565C +n ,anc, on .2 +ecem er 199-, denied a reconsideration of the resolution! 4ence, this petition for certiorari, the core issue of which, such as to e e<pected, focuses on whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy &and to date', is said to e facing a criminal charge efore a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term /fugitive from justice/ contemplated y ,ection ;.&e' of the 6ocal Bovernment Code and, therefore, dis=ualified from eing a candidate for, and there y ineligi le from holding on to, an elective local office! 8etitionerLs position is perspicuous and to the point! The law, he asseverates, needs no further interpretation and construction! ,ection ;.&e' of 2epu lic Act $o! %16., is rather clear, he su mits, and it dis=ualifies /fugitive from justice/ includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment ut liDewise those who, after eing charged flee to avoid prosecution! This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence &8hilippine 6aw +ictionary, Third 5dition, p! -99, y 1!C! *oreno9 ClacDLs 6aw +ictionary, ,i<th 5dition, p! 6%19 Ging vs! $oe, 2;; ,!C! -;;, 1-% ,!5! 2d 1.2, 1.-9 4ughes vs! 81lanA, 1-8 1ederal 2eporter 98.9 To in vs! Casaus, 2%7 8acific 2eporter, 2d!, p! %92', and it may e so conceded as e<pressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term! ?n turn, private respondent would have the Court respect the conclusions of the -versight #ommittee which, conforma ly with ,ection 7-- 2 of 2!A! %16., was convened y the 8resident to /formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of the Code to ensure compliance with the principles of 6ocal Autonomy! 4ere are some e<cerpts from the committeeLs deli erations" C4A?2*A$ *52CA+#! ,ession is resumed! ,o, we are in agreement to retain 6ine 12, 8age -6, as is! ,o ne<t, 8age -9! C4A?2*A$ +5 85+2#! Gay Cenny *ar=ueA! 258! C>5$C#" 3hat does he wantF

C4A?2*A$ +5 85+2#! Gung puwede i)retain lang iyan! Cahala na Dung Duwestiyunin ang constitutionality nito efore the ,upreme Court later on! 258! C>5$C#! Anong naDalagay diyanF C4A?2*A$ +5 85+2#! ?yong dis=ualification to run for pu lic office! Any person who is a fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or a road! *a igat yung a road! #ne who is facing criminal charges with the warrant of arrest pending, unserved! ! ! 4#$#2AC65 ,AB>?,AB! ? thinD that is even a good point, ano J what is a fugitiveF ?t is not defined! 3e have loose understanding! ! ! C4A?2*A$ +5 85+2#! ,o isingit na rin sa definition of terms iyong fugitive! ,i Cenny umalis na, with the understanding na oDay na sa atin ito! T45 C4A?2*A$! 3hether we have this rule or not she can run! ,he is not a fugitive from justice! *rs! *arcos can run at this point and ? have held that for a long time ago! ,o can! ! ! *,! +#CT#2! *r! Chairman! ! ! T45 C4A?2*A$! Kes! *,! +#CT#2! 6etLs move to! ! ! T45 C4A?2*A$! 3ait, wait, wait! Can we just agree on the wording, this is very important! *anny, can you come upF *2! 25K5,! 6etLs use the word conviction y final judgment! T45 C4A?2*A$! 1ugitive means some ody who is convicted y final judgment! #Day,! 1ugitive means some ody who is convicted y final judgment! ?nsert that on 6ine ;- after the semi)colon! ?s that approvedF $o o jection, approved &T,$, #versight Committee, .% *ay 1991'! <<< <<< <<< T45 C4A?2*A$! Andy, saan a naman itong amendment on page 2F ,ino a ang gumawa nitoF #Day, on page 2, lines ;- and ;;, /fugitive from justice/! 3hat /fugitive/F ,ino a ang gumawa nito, haF *2! ,A$C45I! Kes, ? thinD, well, last time, *r! Chairman, we agree to clarify the word /fugitive/! T45 C4A?2*A$! /1ugitive from justice means a person/ a ito, haF *2! ,A$C45I! *eans a person!!! T45 C4A?2*A$! 4aF 4#$! 25K5,! A person who has een convicted! T45 C4A?2*A$9 Kes, fugitive from justice, oo! Fugitive from !ustice shall mean or means one ho has been convicted by final !udgment ! ?t means one who has een convicted y final judgment! 4#$! +5 85+2#! Gulang pa rin ang i ig sa ihin niyan! T45 C4A?2*A$! AnoF ,ige, tingnan natin! 4#$! +5 85+2#! Gung nasa loo ng presuhan, fugitive pa rin siyaF T45 C4A?2*A$! #, tama na yan, fugitive from justice! .e has been convicted by final !udgment, meaning that if he is simply in jail and ecause he put up, post ail, ut the case is still eing reviewed, that is not yet conviction y final judgment! 3 The #versight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possi le constitutional infirmity of ,ection ;.&e' of 2epu lic Act $o! %16. if the dis=ualification therein meant were to e so

taDen as to em race those who merely were facing criminal charges! A similar concern was e<pressed y ,enator 2! A! @! ,aguisag who, during the icameral conference committee of the ,enate and the 4ouse of 2epresentatives, made this reservation" ! ! ! de ipa/refine lang natin 0yung language especially 0yung, the scope of fugitive. $edyo bothered ako doon, a! 4 The #versight Committee finally came out with Article %- of the 2ules and 2egulations ?mplementing the 6ocal Bovernment Code of 1991! ?t provided" Art! %-! +is=ualifications! J The following persons shall e dis=ualified from running for any elective local position" &a' ! ! ! &e' 1ugitives from justice in criminal or non)political cases here or a road! Fugitive from !ustice refers to a person ho has been convicted by final !udgment ! 5 &5mphasis supplied' 8rivate respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law y the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considera le weight &Atlas Consolidated *ining and +evelopment Corp! vs! CA, 182 ,C2A 166, 181'! The Court certainly agrees9 however, when there clearly is no o scurity and am iguity in an ena ling law, it must merely e made to apply as it is so written! An administrative rule or regulation can neither e<pand nor constrict the law ut must remain congruent to it! The Court elieves and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente &e<pressed during the CourtLs en banc deli erations', that Article %- of the 2ules and 2egulations ?mplementing the 6ocal Bovernment Code of 1991, to the e<tent that it confines the term /fugitive from justice/ to refer only to a person &the fugitive' /who has een convicted y final judgment!/ is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law! >nfortunately, the C#*565C did not maDe any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is a /fugitive from justice/ as such term must e interpreted and applied in the light of the CourtLs opinion! The omission is understanda le since the C#*565C dismissed outrightly the petition for quo arranto on the asis instead of 2ule %- of the 2ules and 2egulations promulgated y the #versight Committee! The Court itself, not eing a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the C#*565C for a determination of this unresolved factual matter! 345251#25, the =uestioned resolutions of the Commission on 5lections are 25@52,5+ and ,5T A,?+5, and the case is here y 25*A$+5+ to the Commission which is +?25CT5+ to proceed and resolve the case with dispatch conforma ly with the foregoing opinion! $o special pronouncement on costs! ,# #2+525+! 5 )RE%UEST OF CLERK OF COURT TESSIE L&GATMAITAN At ar is a =uestion of utmost importance not only to retired Associate 0ustice 0orge ,! ?mperial of the Court of Appeals ut to the entire Court of Appeals, the second highest Court of this 2epu lic, as well! #n 0anuary 27, 1999, Atty! Tessie 6! Batmaitan, ClerD of Court of the Court of Appeals, addressed the following letter to the 4onora le Chief 0ustice, to wit" This letter refers to the forthcoming retirement of 1e ruary ;, 1999 of Acting 8residing 0ustice 0orge ,! ?mperial! >pon the promotion of 0ustice Arturo C! Cuena to the ,upreme Court on 0anuary 7, 1999, the most senior Associate 0ustice 0orge ,! ?mperial assumed the position of Acting 8residing 0ustice of this Court, y operation of law, pursuant to ,ection 8)a, 2ule 1 of the 2evised ?nternal 2ules of the Court of Appeals which provides" ,ec! 8! "pplication of the 1ule on %recedence! J The rule on precedence shall e o served and applied in the following instances" a! ?n case of vacancy in the office of the 8residing 0ustice or in the event of his a sence or ina ility to perform the powers, functions and duties of his office, the

Associate 0ustice who is first in precedence shall perform his powers, functions, and duties until such disa ility is removed or another 8residing 0ustice is appointed and has =ualified! Conse=uently, Acting 8residing 0ustice ?mperial now receives the salary and allowance of the 8residing 0ustice! *oreover, ,ec! -, 8residential +ecree 1;-8 amending 2!A! 91. as amended y 2!A! 7.97 states that upon retirement, a justice of the Court of Appeals /! ! ! shall e automatically entitled to a lump sum of five years gratuity computed on the asis of the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances he was receiving on the date of his retirement ! ! ! !/ Considering the foregoing, advice is therefore respectfully re=uested on the propriety(validity of computing 0ustice ?mperialLs compulsory retirement enefits ased on the salary and allowances of a 8residing 0ustice! <<< <<< <<< #n 1e ruary 1, 1999, there was received y the Court from Court Administrator Alfredo 6! Cenipayo a memorandum for the Chief 0ustice, recommending that the aforesaid re=uest of Atty! Tessie 6! Batmaitan on the /propriety(validity of computing the compulsory retirement enefits of 0ustice 0orge ,! ?mperial on the asis of the salary and allowances of a 8residing 0ustice/, e denied! ?n the same memorandum, the Court Administrator =uoted in part ,ection 9 of 5<ecutive #rder $o! 96; dated 0une 22, 198;, thus" ,ec! 9 J 4?B45,T CA,?C ,A6A2K 2AT5 The compensation of salary or pay which may e used in computing retirement enefits shall e limited to the highest asic salary rate actually received y an official(employee as fi<ed y law and(or indicated in his duly approved appointment ! ! !! and ,ection 279 of Bovernment Auditing 2ules and 2egulations which reads" ,ec! 279! 1etirement J Bovernment employees holding two or more positions retire only from his regular or main position and not from his additional position or positions and conse=uently, the salaries attached to the additional positions will not e included in the computation of the gratuity or annuity of the employee &C,C *C ;., s! 1989'! After a careful study, it is su mitted that the provisions of law cited y the Court Administrator are not applica le to the case under consideration! To egin with, it is undisputed that on 0anuary 7, 1999, upon the promotion of the then Acting 8residing 0ustice Arturo C! Cuena to this Court, 0ustice ?mperial ecame the Acting 8residing 0ustice of the Court of Appeals, performed the duties and received the salary of 8residing 0ustice of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to ,ection 7 of C8 Clg! 129 otherwise Dnown as The 0udiciary 2eorganiAation Act of 198., and ,ection 8&a', 2ule 1 of the 2evised ?nternal 2ules of the Court of Appeals &2?2CA'! ,ec! 7 of C8 129 reads" ,ec! 7! Succession to -ffice of %residing Justice! J ?n case of a vacancy in the #ffice of the 8residing 0ustice or in the event of his a sence or ina ility to perform the powers, functions, and duties of his office, the Associate 0ustice who is first in precedence shall perform his powers, functions, and duties until such disa ility is removed, or another 8residing 0ustice is appointed and has =ualified! ,ec! 8 &a' of the 2?2CA provides" ,ec! 8! "pplication of the 1ule on %recedence J The rule on precedence shall e o served and applied in the following instances" a! ?n case of vacancy in the office of the 8residing 0ustice or in the event of his a sence or ina ility to perform the powers, functions, and duties of his office the Associate 0ustice who is first in precedence shall perform his powers, functions, and duties until such disa ility is removed or another 8residing 0ustice is appointed and has =ualified!

?t ears stressing, in this connection, that the said 2?2CA was adopted y the Court of Appeals in a session +n ,anc, pursuant to the pertinent provision of ,ection 12 of C8 Clg! 129 and ecame effective on August 18, 1988, fifteen &17' days after su mission thereof to this ,upreme Court! ?t is therefore decisively clear that 0ustice ?mperial ecame Acting 8residing 0ustice of the Court of Appeals y operation of law, at a time hen the position of %residing Justice of the #ourt of "ppeals as vacant! 4e served, as such, from 0anuary 7 to 1e ruary ;, 1999, upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of seventy years, and after serving the judiciary for a period of -6 years, - months and 29 days, as City 0udge of 6egaspi City, 0udge of the Court of 1irst ?nstance of Al ay, 0udge of the 2egional Trial Court of *anila and Associate 0ustice of the Court of Appeals, respectively! 1rom 0anuary 7 to 1e ruary ;, 1999, he received the full salary, emolument and allowances of a 8residing 0ustice, which the C#A allowed in audit! 0ustice ?mperial was not the only Acting 8residing 0ustice of the Court of Appeals who was paid the salary, emolument and allowances of a 8residing 0ustice! 2ecords of the Court of Appeals, as certified to y the Chief of the 1iscal *anagement and Cudget +ivision and Chief of *anagement Audit +ivision, indu ita ly show that the following justices also served as Acting 8residing 0ustice and were paid the salary, emolument and allowances of a 8residing 0ustice, namely"
23 phi2.n4t

1! 0ustice 2amon B! Baviola, 0r! ) .;)22)8. to .1)1%)82! 0ustice #scar 2! @ictoriano ) -! 0ustice 0ose A!2! *elo ) ;! 0ustice ,antiago *! Gapunan ) 7! 0ustice @icente @! *endoAa ) 6! 0ustice 1idel 8! 8urisima ) %! 0ustice Arturo C! Cuena ) .2).2)88 to .;)19)88 12).-)91 to .8).9)92 .8)1.)99 to .9).6)9.1)11)9; to .-)21)9; .8).;)9% to .1)26)98 .1)2%)98 to .1).;)99

?ndeed, from 198. to the present, the Commission on Audit has consistently allowed in audit the payment of the salary, emolument and allowances of a 8residing 0ustice to the a ove)named justices while serving as acting 8residing 0ustice of the Court of Appeals! Then, too, under 2ep! Act $o! 91. otherwise Dnown as A$ ACT T# 82#@?+5 1#2 T45 25T?25*5$T #1 0>,T?C5, #1 T45 ,>825*5 C#>2T A$+ #1 T45 C#>2T #1 A885A6,, 1#2 T45 5$1#2C5*5$T #1 T45 82#@?,?#$, 4525#1 CK T45 B#@52$*5$T ,52@?C5 ?$,>2A$C5 ,K,T5*, A$+ T# 2585A6 C#**#$35A6T4 ACT $>*C525+ 1?@5 4>$+25+ A$+ T4?2TK),?E, it is e<pressly provided that a retiring justice of the ,upreme Court or of the Court of Appeals is entitled to computation of his retirement pay on the asis of his salary, at the time of retirement! And to repeat, under ,ection - of 8+ 1;-8, amending 2ep! Act 91., as amended y 2A 7.97, a justice of the Court of Appeals" ! ! ! shall e automatically entitled to a lump sum payment of five years gratuity computed on the asis of the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances he was receiving on the date of his retirement ! ! ! ! ?t is thus eyond cavil that the right of 0ustice ?mperial and the other justices a ove)mentioned as Acting 8residing 0ustice of the Court of Appeals, to receive the salary, emolument and allowances of a 8residing 0ustice during their acting incum ency, as such, is of statutory origin and not y mere designation, as contended y the Court Administrator! *emorandum Circular $o! -)9% issued on 0uly %, 199% y the Bovernment ,ervice ?nsurance ,ystem &B,?,' also uttress the su mission that a retiring justice of the Court of Appeals, liDe former 0ustice 0orge ,! ?mperial, is entitled to retirement enefits computed on the asis of the highest salary, emolument and allowances received! The said B,?, *emorandum Circular succinctly directs that in the processing and adjudication of retirement claims under ,ection 12 &c' of 2A 1616, as

further amended y 2A ;968, the computation of the gratuity paya le to a retiring government official or employee shall e on the asis of highest salary received! @erily, retirement enefits, gratuity and separation pay in the government service are invaria ly computed on the asis of the highest salary, emolument and allowances received! There is no valid reason why the retirement enefits of 0ustice 0orge ,! ?mperial who, as earlier mentioned, spent more than thirty)si< &-6' years of the est years of his life in the judiciary, should not e computed on the asis of the highest salary, emolument and allowances he received as Acting 8residing 0ustice of the Court of Appeals! ?t is well)settled that" ! ! ! 2etirement laws are li erally interpreted in favor of the retiree ecause their intention is to provide for his sustenance and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood! The li eral approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security and well) eing of government employees may e enhanced!1 345251#25, the Court here y grants the re=uest of Atty! Tessie 6! Batmaitan, ClerD of Court of the Court of Appeals, to compute and pay the retirement enefits of former 0ustice 0orge ,! ?mperial on the asis of the highest salary, emolument and allowances received y him, as of the time of his retirement from the judiciary on 1e ruary ;, 1999! ,# #2+525+! ) DE LA VICTORIA VS BURGOS
23 phi2.n4t

2A>6 4! ,5,C25N# filed a complaint for damages against Assistant City 1iscals Cienvenido $! *a anto, 0r!, and +ario +! 2ama, 0r!, efore the 2egional Trial Court of Ce u City! After trial judgment was rendered ordering the defendants to pay 811,...!.. to the plaintiff, private respondent herein! The decision having ecome final and e<ecutory, on motion of the latter, the trial court ordered its e<ecution! This order was =uestioned y the defendants efore the Court of Appeals! 4owever, on 17 0anuary 1992 a writ of e<ecution was issued! #n ; 1e ruary 1992 a notice of garnishment was served on petitioner 6oreto +! de la @ictoria as City 1iscal of *andaue City where defendant *a anto, 0r!, was then detailed! The notice directed petitioner not to dis urse, transfer, release or convey to any other person e<cept to the deputy sheriff concerned the salary checDs or other checDs, monies, or cash due or elonging to *a anto, 0r!, under penalty of law! 1 #n 1. *arch 1992 private respondent filed a motion efore the trial court for e<amination of the garnishees! #n 27 *ay 1992 the petition pending efore the Court of Appeals was dismissed! Thus the trial court, finding no more legal o stacle to act on the motion for e<amination of the garnishees, directed petitioner on ; $ovem er 1992 to su mit his report showing the amount of the garnished salaries of *a anto, 0r!, within fifteen &17' days from receipt 2 taDing into consideration the provisions of ,ec! 12, pars! &f' and &i', 2ule -9 of the 2ules of Court! #n 2; $ovem er 1992 private respondent filed a motion to re=uire petitioner to e<plain why he should not e cited in contempt of court for failing to comply with the order of ; $ovem er 1992! #n the other hand, on 19 0anuary 199- petitioner moved to =uash the notice of garnishment claiming that he was not in possession of any money, funds, credit, property or anything of value elonging to *a anto, 0r!, e<cept his salary and 2ATA checDs, ut that said checDs were not yet properties of *a anto, 0r!, until delivered to him! 4e further claimed that, as such, they were still pu lic funds which could not e su ject to garnishment! #n 9 *arch 199- the trial court denied oth motions and ordered petitioner to immediately comply with its order of ; $ovem er 1992! 3 ?t opined that the checDs of *a anto, 0r!, had already een released through petitioner y the+epartment of 0ustice duly signed y the officer concerned! >pon service of the writ of garnishment, petitioner as custodian of the checDs was under o ligation to hold them for the judgment creditor! 8etitioner ecame a virtual party to, or a forced intervenor in, the case and the trial court there y ac=uired jurisdiction to ind him to its orders and processes with a view to the complete satisfaction of the judgment! Additionally, there was no sufficient reason for petitioner to hold the checDs

ecause they were no longer government funds and presuma ly delivered to the payee, conforma ly with the last sentence of ,ec! 16 of the $egotia le ?nstruments 6aw!

3ith regard to the contempt charge, the trial court was not morally convinced of petitionerLs guilt! 1or, while his e<planation suffered from procedural infirmities nevertheless he tooD pains in enlightening the court y sending a written e<planation dated 22 0uly 1992 re=uesting for the lifting of the notice of garnishment on the ground that the notice should have een sent to the 1inance #fficer of the +epartment of 0ustice! 8etitioner insists that he had no authority to segregate a portion of the salary of *a anto, 0r! The e<planation however was not su mitted to the trial court for action since the stenographic reporter failed to attach it to the record! 4 #n 2. April 199- the motion for reconsideration was denied! The trial court e<plained that it was not the duty of the garnishee to in=uire or judge for himself whether the issuance of the order of e<ecution, writ of e<ecution and notice of garnishment was justified! 4is only duty was to turn over the garnished checDs to the trial court which issued the order of e<ecution! 5 8etitioner raises the following relevant issues" &1' whether a checD still in the hands of the maDer or its duly authoriAed representative is owned y the payee efore physical delivery to the latter" and, &2' whether the salary checD of a government official or employee funded with pu lic funds can e su ject to garnishment! 8etitioner reiterates his position that the salary checDs were not owned y *a anto, 0r!, ecause they were not yet delivered to him, and that petitioner as garnishee has no legal o ligation to hold and deliver them to the trial court to e applied to *a anto, 0r!Ls judgment de t! The thesis of petitioner is that the salary checDs still formed part of pu lic funds and therefore eyond the reach of garnishment proceedings! 8etitioner has well argued his case! Barnishment is considered as a species of attachment for reaching credits elonging to the judgment de tor owing to him from a stranger to the litigation! 5mphasis is laid on the phrase / elonging to the judgment de tor/ since it is the focal point in resolving the issues raised! As Assistant City 1iscal, the source of the salary of *a anto, 0r!, is pu lic funds! 4e receives his compensation in the form of checDs from the +epartment of 0ustice through petitioner as City 1iscal of *andaue City and head of office! >nder ,ec! 16 of the $egotia le ?nstruments 6aw, every contract on a negotia le instrument is incomplete and revoca le until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto! As ordinarily understood, delivery means the transfer of the possession of the instrument y the maDer or drawer ith intent to transfer title to the payee and recogni(e him as the holder thereof. ! According to the trial court, the checDs of *a anto, 0r!, were already released y the +epartment of 0ustice duly signed y the officer concerned through petitioner and upon service of the writ of garnishment y the sheriff petitioner was under o ligation to hold them for the judgment creditor! ?t recogniAed the role of petitioner ascustodian of the checDs! At the same time however it considered the checDs as no longer government funds and presumed delivered to the payee ased on the last sentence of ,ec! 16 of the $egotia le ?nstruments 6aw which states" /And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery y him is presumed!/ Ket, the presumption is not conclusive ecause the last portion of the provision says /until the contrary is proved!/ 4owever this phrase was deleted y the trial court for no apparent reason! 8roof to the contrary is its own finding that the checDs were in the custody of petitioner! ?nasmuch as said checDs had not yet een delivered to *a anto, 0r!, they did not belong to him and still had the character of pu lic funds! ?n Tiro v! .ontanosas " we ruled that J The salary checD of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not elong to him efore it is physically delivered to him! >ntil that time the checD elongs to the government! Accordingly, efore there is actual delivery of the checD, the payee has no power over it9 he cannot assign it without the consent of the Bovernment!

As a necessary conse=uence of eing pu lic fund, the checDs may not e garnished to satisfy the judgment! # The rationale ehind this doctrine is o vious consideration of pu lic policy! The Court succinctly stated in #ommissioner of %ublic .igh ays v. San *iego 1$ that J The functions and pu lic services rendered y the ,tate cannot e allowed to e paralyAed or disrupted y the diversion of pu lic funds from their legitimate and specific o jects, as appropriated y law! ?n denying petitionerLs motion for reconsideration, the trial court e<pressed the additional ratiocination that it was not the duty of the garnishee to in=uire or judge for himself whether the issuance of the order of e<ecution, the writ of e<ecution, and the notice of garnishment was justified, citing our ruling in %hilippine #ommercial Industrial ,ank v. #ourt of "ppeals! 11 #ur precise ruling in that case was that /O?Pt is not incum ent upon the garnishee to in=uire or to judge for itself whether or not the order for the advance e<ecution of a judgment is valid!/ Cut that is invoDing only the general rule! 3e have also esta lished therein the compelling reasons, as e<ceptions thereto, which were not taDen into account y the trial court, e!g!, a defect on the face of the writ or actual Dnowledge y the garnishee of lacD of entitlement on the part of the garnisher! ?t is worth to note that the ruling referred to the validity of advance e<ecution of judgments, ut a careful scrutiny of that case and similar cases reveals that it was applica le to a notice of garnishment as well! ?n the case at ench, it was incum ent upon petitioner to in=uire into the validity of the notice of garnishment as he had actual Dnowledge of the non)entitlement of private respondent to the checDs in =uestion! Conse=uently, we find no difficulty concluding that the trial court e<ceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the notice of garnishment concerning the salary checDs of *a anto, 0r!, in the possession of petitioner! 345251#25, the petition is B2A$T5+! The orders of 9 *arch 199- and 2. April 199- of the 2egional Trial Court of Ce u City, Cr! 1%, su ject of the petition are ,5T A,?+5! The notice of garnishment served on petitioner dated - 1e ruary 1992 is ordered +?,C4A2B5+! ,# #2+525+! !) PERALTA VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 8etitioner was appointed Trade),pecialist ?? on 27 ,eptem er 1989 in the +epartment of Trade and ?ndustry &+T?'! 4is appointment was classified as /2einstatement(8ermanent/! Cefore said appointment, he was worDing at the 8hilippine Cotton Corporation, a government)owned and controlled corporation under the +epartment of Agriculture! #n 8 +ecem er 1989, petitioner received his initial salary, covering the period from 27 ,eptem er to -1 #cto er 1989! ,ince he had no accumulated leave credits, +T? deducted from his salary the amount corresponding to his a sences during the covered period, namely, 29 ,eptem er 1989 and 2. #cto er 1989, inclusive of Saturdays and Sundays! *ore specifically, the dates of said a sences for which salary deductions were made, are as follows" 1! 29 ,eptem er 1989 J 1riday 2! -. ,eptem er 1989 J ,aturday -! .1 #cto er 1989 J ,unday ;! 2. #cto er 1989 J 1riday 7! 21 #cto er 1989 J ,aturday 6! 22 #cto er 1989 J ,unday 8etitioner sent a memorandum to Amando T! Alvis &Chief, Beneral Administrative ,ervice' on 17 +ecem er 1989 in=uiring as to the law on salary deductions, if the employee has no leave credits! Amando T! Alvis answered petitionerLs =uery in a memorandum dated -. 0anuary 199. citing Chapter 7!;9 of the 4and ooD of ?nformation on the 8hilippine Civil ,ervice which states that /when an employee is on leave without pay on a day efore or on a day immediately preceding a ,aturday, ,unday or 4oliday, such ,aturday, ,unday, or 4oliday shall also e without pay &C,C, 2nd ?nd!, 1e ruary 12, 1967'!/ 8etitioner then sent a latter dated 2. 1e ruary 199. addressed to Civil ,ervice Commission &C,C' Chairman 8atricia A! ,to! Tomas raising the following =uestion"

?s an employee who was on leave of a sence without pay on a day efore or on a day time immediately preceding a ,aturday, ,unday or 4oliday, also considered on leave of a sence without pay on such ,aturday, ,unday or 4olidayF 1 8etitioner in his said letter to the C,C Chairman argued that a reading of the Beneral 6eave 6aw as contained in the 2evised Administrative Code, as well as the old Civil ,ervice 6aw &2epu lic Act $o! 226.', the Civil ,ervice +ecree &8residential +ecree $o! 8.%', and the Civil ,ervice 2ules and 2egulation fails to disclose a specific provision which supports the C,C rule at issue! That eing the case, the petitioner contented that he cannot e deprived of his pay or salary corresponding to the intervening ,aturdays, ,undays or 4olidays &in the factual situation posed', and that the withholding &or deduction' of the same is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law! #n 27 *ay 199., respondent Commission promulgated 2esolution $o! 9.);9%, ruling that the action of the +T? in deducting from the salary of petitioner, a part thereof corresponding to si< &6' days &,eptem er 29, -., #cto er 1, 2., 21, 22, 1989' is in order! 2 The C,C stated that" ?n a 2nd ?ndorsement dated 1e ruary 12, 1967 of this Commission, which em odies the policy on leave of a sence without pay incurred on a 1riday and *onday, reads" *rs! 2osalinda BonAales is not entitled to payment of salary corresponding to 0anuary 2- and 2;, 1967, ,aturday and ,unday, respectively, it appearing that she was present on 1riday, 0anuary 22, 1967 ut was on leave without pay eginning 0anuary 27, the succeeding *onday! It is the vie of this -ffice that an employee ho has no more leave credit in his favor is not entitled to the payment of salary on Saturdays, Sundays or holidays unless such non/ orking days occur ithin the period of service actually rendered! &5mphasis supplied' The rationale for the a ove ruling which applies only to those employees who are eing paid on monthly asis, rests on the assumption that having een a sent on either *onday or 1riday, one who has no leave credits, could not e favora ly credited with intervening days had the same een worDing days! 4ence, the a ove policy that for an employee on leave without pay to e entitled to salary on ,aturdays, ,undays or holidays, the same must occur etween the dates where the said employee actually renders service! To rule otherwise would allow an employee who is on leave of a sent &sic' without pay for a long period of time to e entitled to payment of his salary corresponding to ,aturdays, ,undays or holidays! ?t also discourages the employees who have e<hausted their leave credits from a senting themselves on a 1riday or *onday in order to have a prolonged weeDend, resulting in the prejudice of the government and the pu lic in general! 3 8etitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and in 2esolution $o! 9.)%9%, the respondent Commission denied said motion for lacD of merit! The respondent Commission in e<plaining its action held" The %rimer on the #ivil Service dated February 52, 2678, embodies the #ivil Service #ommission rulings to be observed henever an employee of the government ho has no more leave credits, is absent on a Friday and9or a $onday is enough basis for the deduction of his salaries corresponding to the intervening Saturdays and Sundays! 3hat the Commission perceived to e without asis is the demand of 8eralta for the payment of his salaries corresponding to ,aturdays and ,undays when he was in fact on leave of a sence ithout pay on a 1riday prior to the said days! A reading of 2epu lic Act $o! 226. &sic' does not show that a government employee who is on leave of a sence without pay on a day efore or immediately preceding ,aturdays, ,unday or legal holiday is entitled to payment of his salary for said days! 1urther, a reading of ,enate 0ournal $o! 6% dated *ay ;, 196. of 4ouse Cill $o! ;1 &2epu lic Act $o! 2627' reveals that while the law e<cludes ,aturdays, ,undays and holidays in the computation of leave credits, it does not, however,

include a case where the leave of a sence is without pay! 4ence, applying the principle of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the claim of 8eralta has no merit! *oreover, to taDe a different posture would e in effect giving more premium to employees who are fre=uently on leave of a sence without pay, instead of discouraging them from incurring further a sence without pay! 4 8etitionerLs motion for reconsideration having een denied, petitioner filed the present petition! 3hat is primarily =uestioned y the petitioner is the validity of the respondent CommissionLs policy mandating salary deductions corresponding to the intervening ,aturdays, ,undays or 4olidays where an employee without leave credits was a sent on the immediately preceding worDing day! +uring the pendency of this petition, the respondent Commission promulgated 2esolution $o! 91) 7;. dated 2- April 1991 amending the =uestioned policy, considering that employees paid on a monthly asis are not re=uired to worD on ,aturdays, ,unday or 4olidays! ?n said amendatory 2esolution, the respondent Commission resolved /to adopt the policy that when an employee, regardless of whether he has leave credits or not, is a sent without pay on day immediately preceding or succeeding ,aturday, ,unday or holiday, he shall not e considered a sent on those days!/ *emorandum Circular $o! 16 ,eries of 1991 dated 26 April 1991, was also issued y C,C Chairman ,to! Tomas adopting and promulgating the new policy and directing the 4eads of +epartments, Cureaus and Agencies in the national and local governments, including government) owned or controlled corporations with original charters, to oversee the strict implementation of the circular! Cecause of these developments, it would seem at first lush that this petition has ecome moot and academic since the very C,C policy eing =uestioned has already een amended and, in effect, 2esolutions $o! 9.);9% and 9.)%9%, su ject of this petition for certiorari, have already een set aside and superseded! ,ut the issue of hether or not the policy that had been adopted and in force since 26:; is valid or not, remains unresolved! Thus, for reasons of pu lic interest and pu lic policy, it is the duty of the Court to maDe a formal ruling on the validity or invalidity of such =uestioned policy! The Civil ,ervice Act of 1979 &2!A! $o! 226.' conferred upon the Commissioner of Civil ,ervice the following powers and duties" ,ec! 16 &e' with the approval y the 8resident to prescri e, amend and enforce suita le rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of this Civil ,ervice 6aw, and the rules prescri ed pursuant to the provisions of this law shall ecome effective thirty days after pu lication in the #fficial BaAette9 <<< <<< <<< &D' To perform other functions that properly elong to a central personnel agency! 5 8ursuant to the foregoing provisions, the Commission promulgated the herein challenged policy! ,aid policy was em odied in a 2nd ?ndorsement dated 12 1e ruary 1967 of the respondent Commission involving the case of a *rs! 2osalinda BonAales! The respondent Commission ruled that an employee who has no leave credits in his favor is not entitled to the payment of salary on ,aturdays, ,undays or 4olidays unless such non)worDing days occur within the period of service actually rendered! The same policy is reiterated in the 4and ooD of ?nformation on the 8hilippine Civil ,ervice! Chapter 1ive on leave of a sence provides that" 7!71! 3hen intervening ,aturday, ,unday or holiday considered as leave without pay J when an employee is on leave without pay on a day efore or on a day immediately preceding a ,aturday, ,unday or holiday, such ,aturday, ,unday or holiday shall also e without pay! &C,C, 2nd ?nd!, 1e ! 12, 1967'! ?t is liDewise illustrated in the 8rimer on the Civil ,ervice ! in the section referring to Muestions and Answers on 6eave of A sences, which states the following" 2%! 4ow is leave of an employee who has no more leave credits computed if" &1' he is a sent on a 1riday and the following *ondayF

&2' if he is a sent on 1riday ut reports to worD the following *ondayF &-' if he is a sent on a *onday ut present the preceding 1ridayF ) &1' 4e is considered on leave without pay for ; days covering 1riday to *onday9 ) &2' 4e is considered on leave without pay for - days from 1riday to ,unday9 ) &-' 4e is considered on leave without pay for - days from ,aturday to *onday! 3hen an administrative or e<ecutive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre)e<isting law9 and the administrative interpretation of the law is at est advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means! " ?t has also een held that interpretative
regulations need not e pu lished!
#

?n promulgating as early as 12 1e ruary 1967 the =uestioned policy, the Civil ,ervice Commission interpreted the provisions of 2epu lic Act $o! 2627 &which tooD effect on 1% 0une 196.' amending the 2evised Administrative Code, and which stated as follows" ,ec! 1! ,ections two hundred eighty)four and two hundred eighty)five)A of the Administrative Code, as amended, are further amended to read as follows" ,ec! 28;! After at least si< monthsL continues &sic' faithful, and satisfactory service, the 8resident or proper head of department, or the chief of office in the case of municipal employees may, in his discretion, grant to an employee or la orer, whether permanent or temporary, of the national government, the provincial government, the government of a chartered city, of a municipality, of a municipal district or of government)owned or controlled corporations other than those mentioned in ,ection two hundred si<ty)eight, two hundred seventy)one and two hundred seventy)four hereof, fifteen days vacation leave of a sence with full pay, e<clusive of ,aturdays, ,undays and holidays, for each calendar year of service! ,ec! 287)A! ?n addition to the vacation leave provided in the two preceding sections each employee or la orer, whether permanent or temporary, of the national government, the provincial government, the government of a chartered city, of a municipality or municipal district in any regularly and specially organiAed province, other than those mentioned in ,ection two hundred si<ty)eight, two hundred seventy) one and two hundred seventy)four hereof, shall e entitled to fifteen days of sicD leave for each year of service with full pay, e<clusive of ,aturdays, ,undays and holidays" %rovided, That such sicD leave will e granted y the 8resident, 4ead of +epartment or independent office concerned, or the chief of office in case of municipal employees, only on account of sicDness on the part of the employee or la orer concerned or of any mem er of his immediate family! The Civil ,ervice Commission in its here =uestioned 2esolution $o! 9.)%9% construed 2!A! 2627 as referring only to government employees who have earned leave credits against which their a sences may e charged with pay, as its letters speaD only of leaves of absence ith full pay! The respondent Commission ruled that a reading of 2!A! 2627 does not show that a government employee who is on leave of a sence ithout pay on a day efore or immediately preceding a ,aturday, ,unday or legal holiday is entitled to payment of his salary for said days!

Administrative construction, if we may repeat, is not necessarily inding upon the courts! Action of an administrative agency may e distur ed or set aside y the judicial department if there is an error of law, or a use of power or lacD of jurisdiction or grave a use of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment! 1$ 3e find this petition to e impressed with merit! As held in .idalgo vs! .idalgo" 11 ! ! ! ! where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for the application of the cardinal rule of statutory construction that such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in a surdity, injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute! The intention of the legislature in the enactment of 2!A! 2627 may e gleaned from, among others, the sponsorship speech of ,enator Arturo *! Tolentino during the second reading of 4ouse Cill $o! ;1 &which ecame 2!A! 2627'! 4e said" The law actually provides for sicD leave and vacation leave of 17 days each year of service to e with full pay! Cut under the present law, in computing these periods of leaves, ,aturday, ,unday and holidays are included in the computation so that if an employee should ecome sicD and a sent himself on a 1riday and then he reports for worD on a Tuesday, in the computation of the leave the ,aturday and ,unday will e included, so that he will e considered as having had a leave of 1riday, ,aturday, ,unday and *onday, or four days! The purpose of the present ill is to e<clude from the computation of the leave those days, ,aturdays and ,undays, as well as holidays, ecause actually the employee is entitled not to go to office during those days! And it is unfair and unjust to him that those days should e counted in the computation of leaves! 12 3ith this in mind, the construction y the respondent Commission of 2!A! 2627 is not in accordance with the legislative intent! 2!A! 2627 specifically provides that government employees are entitled to fifteen &17' days vacation leave of a sence with full pay and fifteen &17' days sicD leave with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and .olidays in both cases ! Thus, the law speaDs of the granting of a right and the law does not provide for a distinction etween those who have accumulated leave credits and those who have e<hausted their leave credits in order to enjoy such right! <bi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. The fact remains that government employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits, are not re=uired y law to worD on ,aturdays, ,undays and 4olidays and thus they can not e declared a sent on such non)worDing days! They cannot e or are not considered a sent on non)worDing days9 they cannot and should not e deprived of their salary corresponding to said non)worDing days just ecause they were a sent without pay on the day immediately prior to, or after said non)worDing days! A different rule would constitute a deprivation of property without due process! 1urthermore, efore their amendment y 2!A! 2627, ,ections 28; and 287)A of the 2evised Administrative Code applied to all government employee without any distinction! ?t follows that the effect of the amendment similarly applies to all employees enumerated in ,ections 28; and 287)A, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits! As the =uestioned C,C policy is here declared invalid, we are ne<t confronted with the =uestion of what effect such invalidity will have! 3ill all government employees on a monthly salary asis, deprived of their salaries corresponding to ,aturdays, ,undays or legal holidays &as herein petitioner was so deprived' since 12 1e ruary 1967, e entitled to recover the amounts corresponding to such non)worDing daysF The general rule vis/a/vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a law9 it confers no rights9 it imposes no duties9 it affords no protection9 it creates no office9 it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never een passed! 13 Cut, as held in #hicot #ounty *rainage *istrict vs! ,axter State ,ank" 14

! ! ! ! ?t is =uite clear, however, that such road statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must e taDen with =ualifications! The actual e<istence of a statute, prior to such determination is an operative fact and may have conse=uences which cannot always e ignored! The past cannot always e erased y a new judicial declaration! The effect of the su se=uent ruling as to invalidity may have to e considered in various aspects J with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate9 and particular conduct, private and official! To allow all the affected government employees, similarly situated as petitioner herein, to claim their deducted salaries resulting from the past enforcement of the herein invalidated C,C policy, would cause =uite a heavy financial urden on the national and local governments considering the length of time that such policy has een effective! Also, administrative and practical considerations must e taDen into account if this ruling will have a strict restrospective application! The Court, in this connection, calls upon the respondent Commission and the Congress of the 8hilippines, if necessary, to handle this pro lem with justice and e=uity to all affected government employees! ?t must e pointed out, however, that after C,C *emorandum Circular $o! 16 ,eries of 1991 J amending the herein invalidated policy J was promulgated on 26 April 1991, deductions from salaries made after said date in contravention of the new C,C policy must e restored to the government employees concerned! 345251#25, the petition is B2A$T5+, C,C 2esolutions $o! 9.);9% and 9.)%9% are declared $>66 and @#?+! The respondent Commission is directed to taDe the appropriate action so that petitioner shall e paid the amounts previously ut unlawfully deducted from his monthly salary as a ove indicated! $o costs! ,# #2+525+!