IV. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ANNULMENT OR DECLARATION OF NULLITY Enrico case: PDF CARLOS v.

SANDOVAL

Teofilo and Felicidad got married in 1962. Thirty years after marriage, Teofilo died intestate leaving his wife and son Teofilo Carlos ll. In 1995, Teofilos brother Juan filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of Teofilo and Felicidad's marriage in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II. Can Juan file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage? SUGGESTED ANSWER In Carlos vs. Sandoval, although the marriage was celebrated before Aug. 3, 1988and the petition was filed before March, 15, 2003, Juan should first show that he is a real party-in interest before he may be allowed to file the said petition. "The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Elsewise stated, Juan must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-ininterest." Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action.

Is Juan a Real Party-in-Interest?

The SC ruled that "the case must be remanded to determine whether or not Juan is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.

It bears stressing that the legal personality of petitioner Juan to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo. In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs in Article 887, CC. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide: xxx xxx Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner Juan succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes Juan a real-partyinterest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate. However, If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then Juan has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate, [34] or even an adopted child [35] excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.(Carlos vs. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008) ISIDRO ABLAZA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010BERSAMIN, J. FACTS: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner, Isidro Ablaza filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) inCataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriagecontracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and LeonilaHonato. The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had beencelebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950,thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without anyissue entitled him to onehalf of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death,thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugnthe validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio. ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother. HELD: The Court Ruled that, being good for no legal purpose other than remarriage, a void marriageinvalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material,either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the factsrendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It isnot like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally

attacked except in direct proceedinginstituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot beimpeached, and is made good ab initio
Aurelio vs Aurelio, G. R. No. 175367, June 6, 2011 Facts: Petitioner Danilo Aurelio and respondent Vda. Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of their marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Issue: May the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to be waived pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10? Ruling: This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10 has modified the Molina guidelines, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor General required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

G.R. No. 175367

June 6, 2011

DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner, vs. VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO, Respondent. DECISION PERALTA, J.: Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the October 6, 2005 Decision2 and October 26, 2006 Resolution,3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238. The facts of the case are as follows: Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.4 In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with

their respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code which provides: Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. As succinctly summarized by the CA, contained in respondents petition are the following allegations, to wit: x x x The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife are psychologically incapable of performing and complying with their essential marital obligations. Said psychological incapacity was existing prior and at the time of the marriage. Said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the maintenance of the family. He refused to foot the household bills and provide for his familys needs. He exhibited arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the feelings of his wife. He liked to humiliate and embarrass his wife even in the presence of their children. Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings change very quickly from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-today experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage. Private respondent manifested psychological aversion to cohabit with her husband or to take care of him. The psychological make-up of private respondent was evaluated by a psychologist, who found that the psychological incapacity of both husband and wife to perform their marital obligations is grave, incorrigible and incurable. Private respondent suffers from a Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers from passive aggressive (negativistic) personality disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a marriage.5 On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss6 the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code. On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order7 denying petitioners motion. On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the RTC in an Order8 dated December 17, 2003. In denying petitioners motion, the

RTC ruled that respondents petition for declaration of nullity of marriage complied with the requirements of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the allegations are meritorious would depend upon the proofs presented by both parties during trial, to wit: A review of the petition shows that it observed the requirements in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (268 SCRA 198), otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. There was allegation of the root cause of the psychological incapacity of both the petitioner and the respondent contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition. The manifestation of juridical antecedence was alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition. The allegations constituting the gravity of psychological incapacity were alleged in paragraph 9 (a to l) of the petition. The incurability was alleged in paragraph 10 of the petition. Moreover, the clinical finding of incurability was quoted in paragraph 15 of the petition. There is a cause of action presented in the petition for the nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Whether or not the allegations are meritorious depends upon the proofs to be presented by both parties. This, in turn, will entail the presentation of evidence which can only be done in the hearing on the merits of the case. If the Court finds that there are (sic) preponderance of evidence to sustain a nullification, then the cause of the petition shall fail. Conversely, if it finds, through the evidence that will be presented during the hearing on the merits, that there are sufficient proofs to warrant nullification, the Court shall declare its nullity.9 On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via petition for certiorari10 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, [the] instant petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.11 In a Resolution dated October 26, 2004, the CA dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that respondents complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family Code and the Molina doctrine revealed the existence of a sufficient cause of action. Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising two issues for this Courts consideration, to wit: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF

MARRIAGE ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO DECLARE THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN VIDA AND DANILO. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS ACTION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO DISMISS BY THE TRIAL COURT IS PATENTLY AND UTTERLY TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION; AND THAT APPEAL IN DUE COURSE IS NOT A PLAIN, ADEQUATE OR SPEEDY REMEDY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 12 Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondents complaint been filed after March 15, 2003, this present petition would have been denied since Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-1013 prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss in actions for annulment of marriage. Be that as it may, after a circumspect review of the arguments raised by petitioner herein, this Court finds that the petition is not meritorious. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity, to wit: (1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.15 This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor General required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.16 Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondents petition are insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital obligation must be stated in the petition.17 First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes. Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder.lawph!1 The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable. Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondents allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that "the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines would show that the same contemplate a situation wherein the parties have presented their evidence, witnesses have testified, and that a decision has been reached by the court after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too burdensome

to ask this Court to resolve at first instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are sufficient to substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.18 It would thus be more prudent for this Court to remand the case to the RTC, as it would be in the best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the parties. Given the allegations in respondents petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.19 Even assuming arguendo that this Court were to agree with petitioner that the allegations contained in respondents petition are insufficient and that the RTC erred in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, the same is merely an error of judgment correctible by appeal and not an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.20 Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioners petition. As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss, which is an interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioners remedy is to reiterate the grounds in his motion to dismiss, as defenses in his answer to the petition for nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an adverse decision, appeal the decision in due time.21 The existence of that adequate remedy removed the underpinnings of his petition for certiorari in the CA.22 WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2005 Decision and October 26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Marriage; psychological incapacity; elements. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R. No. 159594. November 12, 2012.

Marriage; psychological incapacity; expert evidence; thorough and in-depth assessment required. The expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R. No. 159594. November 12, 2012. Marriage; psychological incapacity; proof of natal or disabling supervening factor required. It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations must be shown. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R. No. 159594. November 12, 2012. Marriage; psychological incapacity; Santos and Molina guidelines. The pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R. No. 159594. November 12, 2012. Marriage; psychological incapacity; three basic requirements. To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouses psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage. Arabelle Mendoza v. Republic of the Philippines and Dominic Mendoza, G.R. No. 157649. November 12, 2012. G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), AND EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS, .JR., Respondents. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: The State appeals the decision promulgated on July 30, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the declaration by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Lingayen, Pangasinan of the nullity of the marriage between respondent Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. (Eduardo) and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos (Catalina) based on the latter's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

We find the State's appeal to be meritorious. Hence, we uphold once again the validity of a marriage on the ground that the alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently established. Antecedents Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan.2 The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalinas hysterectomy following her second miscarriage.3 On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage,4 citing Catalinas psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.5 After conducting an investigation, the public prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between Eduardo and Catalina.6 Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the household chores and caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.7 Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on the tests she administered on Catalina,8 Dr. Reyes opined that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes found that Catalinas disorder was mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations.9 Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her Answer/Manifestation,10 whereby she admitted her psychological incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without Eduardos consent and flirting with different men. She insisted that she had only one live-in partner; and that she would not give up her share in the conjugal residence because she intended to live there or to receive her share should the residence be sold.11 Ruling of the RTC The RTC granted the petition on August 9, 2000, decreeing: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Honorable Court finds for the plaintiff and judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Declaring the marriage between Eduardo C. de Quintos and Catalina delos Santos de Quintos, a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.

2. Ordering the Municipal Civil Registrar of Lingayen,Pangasinan to cancel the marriage of the parties from the Civil Register of Lingayen, Pangasinan in accordance with this decision. SO ORDERED.12 The RTC ruled that Catalinas infidelity, her spending more time with friends rather than with her family, and her incessant gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected her duty to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It held that considering that the matter of determining whether a party was psychologically incapacitated was best left to experts like Dr. Reyes, the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes was the best evidence of Catalinas psychological incapacity.13 Ruling of the CA On appeal, the State raised the lone error that: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE PARTIES MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID, DEFENDANT CATALINA DELOS SANTOS-DE QUINTOS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST. On July 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the judgment of the RTC. The CA concluded that Eduardo proved Catalinas psychological incapacity, observing that the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes showed that Catalina had been "mentally or physically ill to the extent that she could not have known her marital obligations;" and that Catalinas psychological incapacity had been medically identified, sufficiently proven, duly alleged in the complaint and clearly explained by the trial court. Issue In this appeal, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), urges that the CA gravely erred because: I THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT CATALINAS ALLEGED PERSONALITY TRAITS ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY EXISTING AT THE TIME OF MARRIAGE CELEBRATION; NOR ARE THEY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE. II MARITAL UNFAITHFULNESS OF THE [sic] CATALINA WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE A SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. III

ABANDONMENT OF ONES FAMILY IS ONLY A GROUND FOR LEGAL SEPARATION. IV GAMBLING HABIT OF CATALINA NOT LIKEWISE ESTABLISHED TO BE A SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. V THE NEUROPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF DR. ANNABELLE REYES FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF CATALINAS INCAPACITY AND PROVE THAT IT EXISTED AT THE INCEPTION OF MARRIAGE, IS GRAVE AND INCURABLE.14 The OSG argues that the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA did not conform to the guidelines laid down by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals, (Molina);15 and that Catalinas refusal to do household chores, and her failure to take care of her husband and their adopted daughter were not "defects" of a psychological nature warranting the declaration of nullity of their marriage, but mere indications of her difficulty, refusal or neglect to perform her marital obligations. The OSG further argues that Catalinas infidelity, gambling habits and abandonment of the conjugal home were not grounds under Article 36 of the Family Code; that there was no proof that her infidelity and gambling had occurred prior to the marriage, while her abandonment would only be a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code; that the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes did not sufficiently establish Catalinas psychological incapacity; that Dr. Reyes was not shown to have exerted effort to look into Catalinas past life, attitudes, habits and character as to be able to explain her alleged psychological incapacity; that there was not even a finding of the root cause of her alleged psychological incapacity; and that there appeared to be a collusion between the parties inasmuch as Eduardo admitted during the trial that he had given P50,000.00 to Catalina in exchange for her non-appearance in the trial. The OSG postulated that Catalinas unsupportive in-laws and Eduardos overseas deployment that had required him to be away most of the time created the strain in the couples relationship and forced her to seek her friends emotional support and company; and that her ambivalent attitude towards their adopted daughter was attributable to her inability to bear children of her own. Issue The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity of Catalinas marriage to Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Ruling

We grant the petition for review. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.16 In Santos v. Court of Appeals,17 we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the confusion that may arise in deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, we then laid down the following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina,18 viz: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x. xxxx (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x. xxxx (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x. xxxx (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x x x. xxxx (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.

xxxx (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x. xxxx (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x.19 The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.20 Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial,21 making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological incapacity.22 Eduardo defends the rulings of the RTC and the CA, insisting that they thereby explained the gravity and severity of Catalinas psychological incapacity that had existed even prior to the celebration of their marriage.23 We are not convinced. Both lower courts did not exact a compliance with the requirement of sufficiently explaining the gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalinas purported psychological incapacity. Rather, they were liberal in their appreciation of the scanty evidence that Eduardo submitted to establish the incapacity. To start with, Catalinas supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent gossiping with neighbors, leaving the house without Eduardos consent, refusal to do the household chores and to take care of their adopted daughter, and gambling), were not even established. Eduardo presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on such behavior. At best, his testimony was self-serving and would have no serious value as evidence upon such a serious matter that was submitted to a court of law. Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr. Reyes despite the paucity of factual foundation to support the claim of Catalinas psychological incapacity. In particular, they relied on the following portion of the report of Dr. Reyes, to wit:

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Catalina is exhibiting traits of a borderline personality. This is characterized, mainly by immaturity in several aspects of the personality. One aspect is in the area of personal relationships, where a person cannot really come up with what is expected in a relationship that involves commitments. They are generally in and out of relationships, as they do not have the patience to sustain this [sic] ties. Their behavior is like that of a child who has to be attended to as they might end up doing things which are often regrettable. These people however usually do not feel remorse for their wrongdoings. They do not seem to learn from their mistakes, and they have the habit of repeating these mistakes to the detriment of their own lives and that of their families. Owing to these characteristics, people with these pattern of traits cannot be expected to have lasting and successful relationships as required in marriage. It is expected that even with future relationships, things will not work out. Families of these people usually reveal that parents relationship are not also that ideal. If this be the background of the developing child, it is likely that his or her relationships would also end up as such. xxxx With all these collateral information being considered and a longitudinal history of defendant made, it is being concluded that she was not able to come up with the minimum expected of her as a wife. Her behavior and attitude before and after the marriage is highly indicative of a very immature and childish person, rendering her psychologically incapacitated to live up and meet the responsibilities required in a commitment like marriage. Catalina miserably failed to fulfill her role as wife and mother, rendering her incapacitated to comply with her duties inherent in marriage. In the same vein, it cannot be expected that this attitude and behavior of defendant will still change because her traits have developed through the years and already ingrained within her.24 Yet, the report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of Catalinas supposed psychological incapacity. Nor was the testimony given in court by Dr. Reyes a source of vital information that the report missed out on. Aside from rendering a brief and general description of the symptoms of borderline personality disorder, both the report and court testimony of Dr. Reyes tendered no explanation on the root cause that could have brought about such behavior on the part of Catalina. They did not specify which of Catalinas various acts or omissions typified the conduct of a person with borderline personality, and did not also discuss the gravity of her behavior that translated to her inability to perform her basic marital duties. Dr. Reyes only established that Catalina was childish and immature, and that her childishness and immaturity could no longer be treated due to her having already reached an age "beyond maturity."25 Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and

incurable presence of psychological incapacity.26 We have explained this need in Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,27 stating: The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.28 But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and did not personally seek out and meet with other persons, aside from Eduardo, who could have shed light on and established the conduct of the spouses before and during the marriage. For that reason, Dr. Reyes report lacked depth and objectivity, a weakness that removed the necessary support for the conclusion that the RTC and the CA reached about Catalinas psychological incapacity to perform her marital duties. Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr. Reyes did not present the gravity and incurability of Catalinas psychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no evidence showing the root cause of her alleged borderline personality disorder and that such disorder had existed prior to her marriage. We have repeatedly pronounced that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, with its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial.29 What we can gather from the scant evidence that Eduardo adduced was Catalinas immaturity and apparent refusal to perform her marital obligations. However, her immaturity alone did not constitute psychological incapacity.30 To rule that such immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the immature acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, which inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity.31 Fourthly, we held in Suazo v. Suazo32 that there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the basic marital obligations, viz: It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in her Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal home to live with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, considering that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.33 Needless to state, Eduardo did not adduce such evidence, rendering even his claim of her infidelity bereft of factual and legal basis. Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that Eduardo colluded with Catalina. The assertion was based on his admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal home in order to convince her not to oppose his petition or to bring any action on her part,34 to wit: CROSS-EXAMINATION BY FISCAL MUERONG Q Mr. de Quintos, also during the first part of the hearing, your wife, the herein defendant, Catalina delos Santos-de Quintos, has been religiously attending the hearing, but lately, I noticed that she is no longer attending and represented by counsel, did you talk to your wife? A No, sir. Q And you find it more convenient that it would be better for both of you, if, she will not attend the hearing of this case you filed against her, is it not? A No, sir. I did not. Q But, am I correct, Mr. de Quintos, that you and your wife had an agreement regarding this case? A None, sir. Q And you were telling me something about an agreement that you will pay her an amount of P50,000.00, please tell us, what is that agreement that you have to pay her P50,000.00? A Regarding our conjugal properties, sir. Q Why, do you have conjugal properties that you both or acquired at the time of your marriage? A Yes, sir. Q And why did you agree that you have to give her P50,000.00? A It is because we bought a lot and constructed a house thereat, that is why I agreed, sir.

Q Is it not a fact, Mr. witness, that your wife does not oppose this petition for declaration of marriage which you filed against her? A She does not opposed [sic], sir. Q As a matter of fact, the only thing that she is concern [sic] about this case is the division of your conjugal properties? A Yes, sir. Q That is why you also agreed to give her P50,000.00 as her share of your conjugal properties, so that she will not pursue whatever she wanted to pursue with regards to the case you filed against her, is that correct? A Yes, sir. Q And you already gave her that amount of P50,000.00, Mr. witness? A Yes, sir. Q And because she has already gotten her share of P50,000.00 that is the reason why she is no longer around here? A Yes sir, it could be.35 Verily, the payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a collusion between her and Eduardo.1wphi1 To recall, she did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of conceding her psychological incapacity, but she nonetheless made it clear enough that she was unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The probability that Eduardo willingly gave her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement to such share was very high, so that whether or not he did so also to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance of not opposing the petition for nullity of the marriage should by no means be of any consequence in determining the issue of collusion between the spouses. In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of Catalina, we cannot but resolve in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.36 WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code for lack of merit. Costs to be paid by the respondent. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157649

November 12, 2012

ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C. MENDOZA, Respondents. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage. Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on March 19, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City (RTC) declaring her marriage with respondent Dominic C. Mendoza (Dominic) as null and void. Antecedents Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment in Papua New Guinea. They had been next-door neighbors in the appartelle they were renting while they were still in college she, at Assumption College while he, at San Beda College taking a business management course. After a month of courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy ultimately led to her pregnancy with their daughter whom they named Allysa Bianca. They got married on her eighth month of pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City on June 24, 1991,2 after which they moved to her place, although remaining dependent on their parents for support. When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow funds from petitioners best friend to settle the hospital bills. He remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he finished his college course in October 1993. She took on various jobs to meet the familys needs, first as a part-time aerobics instructor in 1992 and later, in 1993, as a full-time employee in Sanofi, a pharmaceutical company. Being the one with the fixed income, she shouldered all of the familys expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their childs educational needs). On his part, Dominic sold Colliers Encyclopedia for three months after his graduation from college before he started working as a car salesman for Toyota Motors in Bel-Air, Makati in 1994.3 Ironically, he spent his first sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends inasmuch as she shouldered all the household expenses and their childs schooling because his irregular income could not be depended upon. In September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication between them became rare until they started to sleep in separate rooms, thereby affecting their sexual relationship.4

In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present. Later on, he asked her to issue two blank checks that he claimed would be for the cars insurance coverage. She soon found out, however, that the checks were not paid for the cars insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse, she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance of P120,000.00. To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. After petitioner and her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of whom were even threatening petitioner, her mother and her sister themselves.5 On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because petitioner asked him for "time and space to think things over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house to live in another place concealed from him. On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition. Ruling of the RTC In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and Professor Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during trial and presented no evidence. On August 18, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and Dominic an absolute nullity,6 holding in part: xxx. The result of Dr. Samsons clinical evaluation as testified to by her and per Psychiatric Report she issued together with one Dr. Doris Primero showed that petitioner appears to be mature, strong and responsible individual. Godly, childlike trust however, makes her vulnerable and easy to forgive and forget. Petitioner also believes that marriage was a partnership "for better and for worse", she gave all of herself unconditionally to respondent. Unfortunately, respondent cannot reciprocate. On the one hand, respondent was found to have a personality that can be characterized as inadequate, immature and irresponsible. His criminal acts in the present time are mere extensions of his misconduct established in childhood. His childhood experiences of separations and emotional deprivation largely contributed to this antisocial (sociopathic) attitude and lifestyle. She concluded that respondent had evidently failed to comply with what is required of him as a husband and father. Besides from his adulterous relationship and irresponsibility, his malevolent conduct and lack of true remorse indicate that he is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the role of a married man.7

The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity, i.e., gravity, antecedence and incurability, as set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina),8 were attendant, establishing Dominics psychological incapacity, viz: Gravity from the evidence adduced it can be said that respondent cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life and work. Respondent is totally incapable of observing mutual love, respect and fidelity as well as to provide support to his wife and child. Ever since the start of the marriage respondent had left all the household concerns and the care of their child to petitioner while he studied and indulged in night outs with friends. This continued even when he finished his studies and landed a job. He concealed his salary from the petitioner and worse, had the gall to engage in sexual infidelity. Likewise worthy of serious consideration is respondents propensity to borrow money, his deceitfulness and habitual and continuous evasion of his obligations which (sic) more often than not had led to the filing of criminal cases against him. Antecedence Before the marriage petitioner was not aware of respondents personality disorder and it was only after marriage that it begun to surface. Dr. Samson declared that respondents behavioral equilibrium started at a very early age of fifteen. His dishonesty and lack of remorse are mere extensions of his misconduct in childhood which generally attributable to respondents childhood experiences of separation and emotional deprivations. In fine, his psychological incapacity is but a product of some genetic causes, faulty parenting and influence of the environment although its over manifestation appear only after the wedding. Incurability Respondents personality disorder having existed in him long before he contracted marriage with petitioner, there appears no chance for respondent to recover any (sic) ordinary means from such incapacity. All told, the callous and irresponsible ways of respondent show that he does not possess the proper outlook, disposition and temperament necessary for marriage. Indeed, this ultimate recourse of nullity is the only way by which petitioner can be delivered from the bondage of a union that only proved to be a mockery and brought pain and dishonor to petitioner.9 Ruling of the CA The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that Dominics personality traits either constituted psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or were of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code; that the testimony of the expert witness, while persuasive, was not conclusive upon the court; and that the real reason for the parties separation had been their frequent quarrels over financial matters and the criminal cases brought against Dominic.10 On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.11 Specifically, it refused to be bound by the findings and conclusions of petitioners expert witness, holding:

It has not been established to our satisfaction as well that respondents condition, assuming it is serious enough, was present before or during the celebration of the marriage. Although petitioners expert witness concluded that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated even before the parties marriage, the Court refuses to be bound by such finding, in view of the fact that the witness findings, admittedly, were concluded only on the basis of information given by the petitioner herself, who, at the time of the examination, interview, was already head strong in her resolve to have her marriage with the respondent nullified, and harbored ill-feelings against respondent throughout her consultation with Dr. Samson.12 The CA held the testimonies of petitioners witnesses insufficient to establish Dominics psychological affliction to be of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. Relying on the pronouncements in Republic v. Dagdag,13 Hernandez v. Court of Appeals14 and Pesca v. Pesca,15 the CA observed: In her testimony, petitioner described her husband as immature, deceitful and without remorse for his dishonesty, and lack of affection. Such characteristics, however, do not necessarily constitute a case of psychological incapacity. A persons inability to share or take responsibility, or to feel remorse for his misbehavior, or even to share his earnings with family members, are indicative of an immature mind, but not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that cannot be cured. Even the respondents alleged sexual infidelity is not necessarily equivalent to psychological incapacity, although it may constitute adequate ground for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. Nor does the fact that the respondent is a criminal suspect for estafa or violation of the B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes a ground for the nullification of his marriage to petitioner. Again, it may constitute ground for legal separation provided the respondent is convicted by final judgment and sentenced to imprisonment of more than six (6) years.16 Hence, this appeal by petitioner. Issues Petitioner assails the CAs refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and psychiatric evaluation she had presented in the trial of the case, and the CAs reliance on the pronouncements in Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca, supra. She contends that the report on the psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Samson more than complied with the requirements prescribed in Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20) and Molina. She insists that the CA should have applied the ruling in Marcos v. Marcos (G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755) to the effect that personal medical or psychological examination was not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Ruling The appeal has no merit.

We consider the CAs refusal to accord credence and weight to the psychiatric report to be well taken and warranted. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards Dominic, which she admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson, furnished the basis to doubt the findings of her expert witness; that such findings were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioners expert; and that he also did not participate in the proceedings; and that the findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and characterizations of him rendered by petitioner and her witnesses. Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the need for her to resort to other people in order to verify the facts derived from petitioner about Dominics psychological profile considering the ill-feelings she harbored towards him. It turned out, however, that the only people she interviewed about Dominic were those whom petitioner herself referred, as the following testimony indicated: Fiscal Zalameda Q: So youre saying that the petitioner have an ill-feeling towards the respondent? At the time you interviewed? A: Yes, Sir, during the first interview. Q: How about during the subsequent interview? A: During the subsequent interview more or less the petitioner was able to talk regarding her marital problems which is uncomfort(able), so she was able to adapt, she was able to condition herself regarding her problems, Sir. Q: But the ill-feeling was still there? A: But the feeling was still there, Sir. Q: Now, considering that this ill feeling of the petitioner insofar as the respondent is concerned, would you say that the petitioner would only tell you information negative against the respondent? A: Yes, may be Sir. But I do try to conduct or verify other people the facts given to me by the petitioner, Sir. Q: And these other people were also people given to you or the name are given to you by the petitioner, Madame Witness? A: Yes, Sir.17 In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic himself naturally cast serious doubt on Dr. Samsons findings. The CA rightly refused to accord probative value to the testimony of such

expert for being avowedly given to show compliance with the requirements set in Santos and Molina for the establishment of Dominics psychological incapacity. The CAs reliance on Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca was not misplaced. It is easy to see why. In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband."18 But here, the experts testimony on Dominics psychological profile did not identify, much less prove, the root cause of his psychological incapacity because said expert did not examine Dominic in person before completing her report but simply relied on other peoples recollection and opinion for that purpose. In Hernandez, we ruminated that: xxx expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.19 but the expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause of the supposed psychological incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity existed at the inception of the marriage. The Court in Pesca observed that: At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.20 Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the absence of the medical experts testimony alone that was crucial but rather petitioners failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden of showing the existence of psychological incapacity at the inception of the marriage. In other words, the totality of the evidence proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage was the crucial consideration, as the Court has reminded in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21 By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of

marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings. Petitioners view that the Court in Marcos stated that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent spouse therein was not a requirement for the declaration of his psychological incapacity22 is not entirely accurate. To be clear, the statement in Marcos ran as follows: The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical examination of Dominic was to be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented was enough to support a finding of his psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological incapacity would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should emphasize herein, was the "presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition," as the Court said in Marcos. But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to present the professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity, then the opinions should be presented and be weighed by the trial courts in order to determine and decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the marriages. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.23 We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage. Accordingly, the CA did not err in dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

We have time and again held that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that must concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, to observe love, respect and fidelity, and to render help and support. We have also held that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. To qualify as psychological incapacity as a ground for nullification of marriage, a persons psychological affliction must be grave and serious as to indicate an utter incapacity to comprehend and comply with the essential objects of marriage, including the rights and obligations between husband and wife. The affliction must be shown to exist at the time of marriage, and must be incurable. Accordingly, the RTCs findings that Dominics psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity, antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny. The medical report failed to show that his actions indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse for his dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. His inability to share or to take responsibility or to feel remorse over his misbehavior or to share his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of immaturity, was not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that was incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not equate with psychological incapacity.24 Nor were his supposed sexual infidelity and criminal offenses manifestations of psychological incapacity. If at all, they would constitute a ground only for an action for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. Finally, petitioner contends that the Courts Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG no longer required, and that the appeal by the OSG was a mere superfluity that could be deemed to have become functus officio if not totally disregarded.25 The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by the OSG were no longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly required the OSG to actively participate in all stages of the proceedings, to wit: a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.26 b) The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.27

c) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.28 d) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties.1wphi1 Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.29 e) An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.30 The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in the capacity of a defensor vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity-those sufficiently evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-would succeed. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March 19, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68615. The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

V. FOREIGN MARRIAGES AND FOREIGN DIVORCES

G.R. No. L-6768 July 31, 1954

SALUD R. ARCA and ALFREDO JAVIER JR., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. ALFREDO JAVIER, defendant-appellant. David F. Barrera for appellant. Jose P. Santillan for appellees. BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite ordering him to give a monthly allowance of P60 to plaintiffs beginning March 31, 1953, and to pay them attorney's

fees in the amount of P150 defendant took the case directly to this Court attributing five errors to the court below. This implies that the facts are not disputed. The important facts which need to be considered in relation to the errors assigned appear well narrated in the decision of the court below which, for purposes of this appeal, are quoted hereunder: On November 19, 1937, plaintiff Salud R. Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier had their marriage solemnized by Judge Mariano Nable of the Municipal Court of Manila. At the time of their marriage, they had already begotten a son named Alfredo Javier, Junior who was born on December 2, 1931. Sometime in 1938, defendant Alfredo Javier left for the United States on board a ship of the United States Navy, for it appears that he had joined the United States Navy since 1927, such that at time of his marriage with plaintiff Salud R. Arca, defendant Alfredo Javier was already an enlisted man in the United States Navy. Because of defendant Alfredo Javier's departure for the United States in 1938, his wife, Salud R. Arca, who is from (Maragondon), Cavite, chose to live with defendant's parents at Naic, Cavite. But for certain incompatibility of character (frictions having occurred between plaintiff Salud R. Arca's and defendant's folks) plaintiff Salud R. Arca had found it necessary to leave defendant's parents' abode and transfer her residence to (Maragondon), Cavite her native place Since then the relation between plaintiff Salud R. Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier became strained such that on August 13, 1940 defendant Alfredo Javier brought an action for divorce against Salud R. Arca before the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA, docketed as civil case No. 14313 of that court and marked as Exhibit 2(c) in this case. Having received a copy of the complaint for divorce on September 23, 1940, plaintiff Salud R. Arca answering the complaint alleged in her answer that she received copy of the complaint on September 23, 1940 although she was directed to file her answer thereto on or before September 13, 1940. In that answer she filed, plaintiff Salud R. Arca averred among other things that defendant Alfredo Javier was not a resident of Mobile County, State of Alabama, for the period of twelve months preceding the institution of the complaint, but that he was a resident of Naic, Cavite, Philippines. Another averment of interest, which is essential to relate here, is that under paragraph 5 of her answer to the complaint for divorce, Salud R. Arca alleged that it was not true that the cause of their separation was desertion on her part but that if defendant Alfredo Javier was in the United States at that time and she was not with him then it was because he was in active duty as an enlisted man of the United States Navy, as a consequence of which he had to leave for the United States without her. She further alleged that since his departure from the Philippines for the United States, he had always supported her and her co-plaintiff Alfredo Javier Junior through allotments made by the Navy Department of the United States Government. She denied, furthermore, the allegation that she had abandoned defendant's home at Naic, Cavite, and their separation was due to physical impossibility for they were separated by about 10,000 miles from each other. At this juncture, under the old Civil Code the wife is not bound to live with her husband if the latter has gone to ultra-marine colonies. Plaintiff Salud R. Arca, in her answer to the complaint for divorce by defendant Alfredo Javier, prayed that the complaint for divorce be dismissed. However, notwithstanding Salud R. Arca's averments in her answer, contesting the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Mobile

County, State of Alabama, to take cognizance of the divorce proceeding filed by defendant Alfredo Javier, as shown by her answer marked Exhibit 2(d), nevertheless the Circuit Court of Mobile County rendered judgment decreeing dissolution of the marriage of Salud R. Arca and Alfredo Javier, and granting the latter a decree of divorce dated April 9, 1941, a certified copy of which is marked Exhibit 2(f). Thereupon, the evidence discloses that some time in 1946 defendant Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines but went back to the United States. In July, 1941 that is after securing a divorce from plaintiff Salud R. Arca on April 9, 1941 defendant Alfredo Javier married Thelma Francis, an American citizen, and bought a house and lot at 248 Brooklyn, New York City. In 1949, Thelma Francis, defendant's American wife, obtained a divorce from him for reasons not disclosed by the evidence, and, later on, having retired from the United States Navy, defendant Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines, arriving here on February 13, 1950. After his arrival in the Philippines, armed with two decrees of divorce one against his first wife Salud R. Arca and the other against him by his second wife Thelma Francis issued by the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA, defendant Alfredo Javier married Maria Odvina before Judge Natividad Almeda-Lopez of the Municipal Court of Manila on April 19, 1950, marked Exhibit 2(b). At the instance of plaintiff Salud R. Arca an information for bigamy was filed by the City Fiscal of Manila on July 25, 1950 against defendant Alfredo Javier with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13310 and marked Exhibit 2(a). However, defendant Alfredo Javier was acquitted of the charge of Bigamy in a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila through Judge Alejandro J. Panlilio, dated August 10, 1951, predicated on the proposition that the marriage of defendant Alfredo Javier with Maria Odvina was made in all good faith and in the honest belief that his marriage with plaintiff Salud R. Arca had been legally dissolved by the decree of divorce obtained by him from the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA which had the legal effect of dissolving the marital ties between defendant Alfredo Javier and plaintiff Salud R. Arca. At this juncture, again, it is this court's opinion that defendant Alfredo Javier's acquittal in that Criminal Case No. 13310 of the Court of First Instance of Manila by Judge Panlilio was due to the fact that the accused had no criminal intent in contracting a second or subsequent marriage while his first marriage was still subsisting. Appellant was a native born citizen of the Philippines who, in 1937, married Salud R. Arca, another Filipino citizen. Before their marriage they had already a child, Alfredo Javier, Jr., who thereby became legitimated. In 1927 appellant enlisted in the U.S. Navy and in 1938 sailed for the United States aboard a navy ship in connection with his service leaving behind his wife and child, and on August 13, 1940, he filed an action for divorce in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, U.S.A., alleging as ground abandonment by his wife. Having received a copy of the complaint, Salud R. Arca filed an answer alleging, among other things, that appellant was not a resident of Mobile County, but of Naic, Cavite, Philippines, and that it was not true that the cause of their separation was abandonment on her part but that appellant was in the United States, without her, because he was then enlisted in the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, the Circuit

Court of Mobile County rendered judgment granting appellant a decree of divorce on April 9, 1941. The issue now to be determined is: Does this decree have a valid effect in this jurisdiction? The issue is not new. This court has had already occasion to pass upon questions of similar nature in a number of cases and its ruling has invariably been to deny validity to the decree. In essence, it was held that one of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is that the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this may be acquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, 856). Most recent of such cases is Sikat vs. Canson, 67 Phil., 207, which involves a case of divorce also based on the ground of desertion. In that case, John Canson claimed not only that he had legal residence in the State of Nevada, where the action was brought, but he was an American citizen, although it was proven that his wife never accompanied him there but has always remained in the Philippines, and so it has been held that "it is not ... the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court, but his legal residence within the State." The court further said: "And assuming that John Canson acquired legal residence in the State of Nevada through the approval of his citizenship papers, this would not confer jurisdiction on the Nevada court to grant divorce that would be valid in this jurisdiction, nor jurisdiction that could determine their matrimonial status, because the wife was still domiciled in the Philippines. The Nevada court never acquired jurisdiction over her person." It is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the Mobile County in view of the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this action cannot be interpreted as placing her under the jurisdiction of the court because its only purpose was to impugn the claim of appellant that his domicile or legal residence at that time was Mobile County, and to show that the ground of desertion imputed to her was baseless and false. Such answer should be considered as a special appearance the purpose of which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over the case. In deciding the Canson case, this court did not overlook the other cases previously decided on the matter, but precisely took good note of them. Among the cases invoked are Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, and Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67. In the cases just mentioned, this court laid down the following doctrines: It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. (See Note to Succession of Benton, 59 L. R. A., 143) The voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with jurisdiction. (Andrews vs. Andrews, 188 U. S., 14; 47 L. ed., 366.) It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in the State or country of the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce,

and with no intention of remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of the State. This is especially true where the cause of divorce is one not recognized by the laws of the State of his own domicile. (14 Cyc. 817, 181.)" (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 82 Phil., 855.) But even if his residence had been taken up is good faith, and the court had acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit, the decree issued in his favor is not binding upon the appellant; for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the City of Manila, and no new domicile having been acquired in West Virginia, the summons made by publication, she not having entered an appearance in the case, either personally or by counsel, did not confer jurisdiction upon said court over her person. (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851.) At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband for the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the court of the State to dissolve the bonds of matrimony in which he had entered in 1919. (Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.) In the light of the foregoing authorities, it cannot therefore be said that the Mobile County Court of Alabama had acquired jurisdiction over the case for the simple reason that at the time it was filed appellant's legal residence was then in the Philippines. He could not have acquired legal residence or domicile at Mobile County when he moved to that place in 1938 because at that time he was still in the service of the U.S. Navy and merely rented a room where he used to stay during his occasional shore leave for shift duty. That he never intended to live there permanently is shown by the fact that after his marriage to Thelma Francis in 1941, he moved to New York where he bought a house and a lot, and after his divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his retirement from the U.S. Navy, he returned to the Philippines and married Maria Odvina of Naic, Cavite, where he lived ever since. It may therefore be said that appellant went to Mobile County, not with the intention of permanently residing there, or of considering that place as his permanent abode, but for the sole purpose of obtaining divorce from his wife. Such residence is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. It is claimed that the Canson case cannot be invoked as authority or precedent in the present case for the reason that the Haddeck case which was cited by the court in the course of the decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Williams vs. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287. This claim is not quite correct, for the Haddeck case was merely cited as authority for the statement that a divorce case is not a proceeding in rem, and the reversal did not necessarily overrule the ruling laid down therein that before a court may acquire jurisdiction over a divorce case, it is necessary that plaintiff be domiciled in the State in which it is filed. (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, supra.) At any rate, the applicability of the ruling in the Canson case may be justified on another ground: The courts in the Philippines can grant divorce only on the ground of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband, and if the decree is predicated on another ground, that decree cannot be enforced in this jurisdiction. Said the Court in the Canson case:

. . . In Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales (55 Phil., 67), we observed: . . . While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity of foreign divorce has usually been expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now enforced in these Islands. Article 9 thereof reads as follows: "The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country." "And Article 11, the last part of which reads ". . . prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended to promote public order and good morals shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign country." "It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce." The courts in the Philippines can grant a divorce only on the ground of "adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband" as provided for under section 1 of Act No. 2710. The divorce decree in question was granted on the ground of desertion, clearly not a cause for divorce under our laws. That our divorce law, Act No. 2710, is too strict or too liberal is not for this court decide. (Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, supra). The allotment of powers between the different governmental agencies restricts the judiciary within the confines of interpretation, not of legislation. The legislative policy on the matter of divorce in this jurisdiction is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710 and has been upheld by this court (Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252; Garcia Valdez vs. Soterana Tuazon, 40 Phil., 943-952; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855; Chereau vs. Fuentebella, 43 Phil., 216; Fernandez vs. De Castro, 48 Phil., 123; Gorayeb vs. Hashim, supra; Francisco vs. Tayao, 50 Phil., 42; Alkuino Lim Pang vs. Uy Pian Ng Shun and Lim Tingco, 52 Phil., 571; Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, supra; and Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, supra). The above pronouncement is sound as it is in keeping with the well known principle of Private International Law which prohibits the extension of a foreign judgment, or the law affecting the same, if it is contrary to the law or fundamental policy of the State of the forum. (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 8-14). It is also in keeping with our concept or moral values which has always looked upon marriage as an institution. And such concept has actually crystallized in a more tangible manner when in the new Civil Code our people, through Congress, decided to eliminate altogether our law relative to divorce. Because of such concept we cannot but react adversely to any attempt to extend here the effect of a decree which is not in consonance with our customs,

morals, and traditions. (Article 11, old Civil Code; Articles 15 and 17, new Civil Code; Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.) With regard to the plea of appellant that Salud R. Arca had accused him of the crime of bigamy and consequently she forfeited her right to support, and that her child Alfredo Javier, Jr. is not also entitled to support because he has already reached his age of majority, we do not need to consider it here, it appearing that these questions have already been passed upon in G. R. No. L6706.1 These questions were resolved against the pretense of appellant. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

ENCHAVEZ VS. ESCAO Case Digest

TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCAO FACTS: In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of course without the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American. In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence hes asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaos. ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar. Whether or not the divorce and the second marriage of Escao were valid. Whether or not sexual infidelity of Escao may beinvoked by Tenchavez as a ground for legal separation. HELD: Yes. On the part of Tenchavez: His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escao filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorneys fees to be paid by Escao and not her parents.

On the part of Escaos parents: It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaos is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only. The Supreme Court held that the divorce is notvalid, making the second marriage void since marriageties of Escao and Tenchaves is existing.Tenchavez can file a petition for legal separationbecause Escao committed sexual infidelity because ofthe fact that she had children with the American.Sexual infidelity of a spouse is one of thegrounds for legal separation.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. Case Digest

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. 139 SCRA 139 Facts: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with a right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no community property. Issue: Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the latter. Ruling: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state of the United States. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.

PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA174 SCRA 653FACTS: On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and therespondent to the case, and Erich Geiling, a German national, were married atFriedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germanyin January 1983 while Pilapil filed an action for legal separation, support andseparation of property before RTC of Manila in January 23, 1983 where it is stillpending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the local Court of Germanypromulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child,Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was granted to petitioner.On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that,while still married to respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chiaand Jesus Chua sometime in 1982 and 1983 respectively. The respondent city fiscalapproved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery againstpetitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer herarraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. Respondent judge merelyreset the date of the arraignment but before such scheduled date, petitioner movedfor the suspension of proceedings. On September 8, 1987, respondent judge deniedthe motion to quash and also directed the arraignment of both accused. Petitionerrefused to be arraigned and thus charged with direct contempt and fined. ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents adultery charges against thepetitioner is still valid given the fact that both had been divorced prior to the filingof charges. HELD: The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage theperson who can legally file the complaint should only be the offended spouse. Thefact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country in 1983, isadmitted. According to Article 15 of the Civil Code, with relation to the status of Filipino citizens both here and abroad, since the legal separation of the petitionerand respondent has been finalized through the courts in Germany and the RTC inManila, the marriage of the couple were already finished, thus giving no merit to thecharges the respondent filed against the petitioner. Private respondent, being nolonger married to petitioner holds no legal merit to commence the adultery case asthe offended spouse at the time he filed suit in 1986. The temporary restrainingorder issued in this case was made permanent.

PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989 FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera. A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree? HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case is hereby made permanent. NO Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison detre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.

Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Quita case on PDF

LORENTE vs COURT OF APPEALS Case Digest
LLORENTE vs COURT OF APPEALS 345 SCRA 592 (November 23, 2000) FACTS: Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted serviceman Lorenzo Llorente, in Nabua, Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the US and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo became an American citizen on November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of the Philippines (1945), Lorenzo was granted by the US Navy to visit his wife in the Philippines and found out that Paula was living in with Lorenzos brother Ceferino. In December 1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo with the birth certificate saying that the child was illegitimate, and the fathers name was left blank. On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written agreement, dissolving their marital union, suspending his support upon her, and waiving his authority to file a case of adultery against her. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for a divorce in 1951 which was granted in 1952. On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno, in the Philippines; afterwhich, they bore three children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a will, bequeathing all his property to Alicia and three children. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died in 1985. On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate, contending that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse. In 1987, the RTC granted her petition, stating that Lorenzos divorce decree was void and inapplicable in the Philippines and therefore his marriage to Alicia was void. The RTC entitled Paula to one-half of their conjugal properties, and one-third of the

estate the two-thirds would be divided equally among the illegitimate children. Paula was appointed as legal administratix of the estate. ISSUE: Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate of Lorenzo Llorente. HELD: Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case are governed by foreign law. The CA and RTC called to the fore ther en voi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, in this case, the Philippine law. Most US laws follow the domiciliary theory. Thus, the Philippine law applies when determinging the validity of Lorenzos will. The case was remanded to the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.

Llorente vs CA On November 5, 2010

345 scra 592 Nationality Principle Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo was naturalized by the United State. After the liberation of the Philippines he went home and visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente; they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzos estate. The RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they have acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court. ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente? HELD: In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided that they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzos will and determine the successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. The deceased is not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity since he was a foreigner.

Garcia-Recio vs. Recio

TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437 FACTS: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989. On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD: The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either: (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

Garcia vs Recio On November 5, 2010

366 scra 437 Foreign Law Divorce Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the Australian Family Court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen. Subsequently, respondent entered into marriage with petitioner a Filipina on January 12, 1994. Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Responded contended that his prior marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry petitioner. The trial court rendered the decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent dissolved and both parties can now remarry. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated him to remarry. HELD: The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on the records, the court cannot conclude that respondent who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Neither can the court grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under Australian law he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid down the following basic legal principles; a marriage between two Filipino cannot be dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.

Republic vs. Orbecido Case Digest

Republic vs. Orbecido 472 SCRA 114 Facts:

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was living with his wife in the States that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code. Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry. The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case. Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2). Ruling: Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wifes naturalization he is still barred from remarrying. Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. GERBERT CORPUZ VS. DAISYLYN STO. TOMAS G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010 FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on Nov. 2000. On, Jan. 18 2005, he married a Filipina named Daisylyn Sto. Tomas. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert

left for Canada soon after their wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise her wife but was shocked to discover that Daisylyn was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted. Two years after, Gerbert fell in love with another Filipina. In his desire to marry his new Filipina fiance, Gerbert went to Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on their marriage certificate. Despite its registration, an NSO official informed Gerbert that their marriage still exists under Philippine Law; and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must be judicially recognized by a Philippine court. Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved, with the RTC. Daisylyn offered no opposition and requested for the same prayer. RTC denied Gerberts petition contending that Art. 26 (2) applies only to Filipinos and not to aliens. Gerbert appealed by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. ISSUE: Whether the registration of the foreign divorce decree was properly made. HELD: Supreme Court held in the negative. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry.

Civil Law: Bigamy; Legal Standing

[G. R. No. 169766, March 30 : 2011] ESTRELLITA JULIAJVOLLAVE, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC

OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRIZORAYD A A. TAMANO AND ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO, RESPONDENTS.

Facts: Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the Islamiclaws and tradition on May

27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by anRTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2,

1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano's civil statusw a s i n d i c a t e d a s ' d i v o r c e d . ' Sinc

e then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano's wife, and uponhis death, his widow.On

November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son AdibAhmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own

behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano's legitimate childrenwith Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the

declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged,
inter alia

, that Sen. Tamano marriedZorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when

he marriedEstrellita in 1993.Summons was then served on Estrellita. She then asked from the court for an extension of 30 days to fileher

answer, and again, another 15 days, both of which the court granted. Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss

where she declared thatSen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in

the latter's disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano. Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to takecognizance of the case because

under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Lawsof the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving

Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari'a courts. The trial court denied Estrellita's motion and asserted its

jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity. Thus, Estrellita filed a
certiorari

petition with the SC questioning the denial of her

Motion to Dismiss.The SC referred the petition to the CA. During the pendency of the petition before the CA, the RTC continued to try

the case since there can beno default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellitawas

allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented their evidence. When it was Estrellita's turn to adduce evidence,

the hearings set for such purpose were postponed mostly at her instanceuntil the trial court, suspended the proceedings in view of the CA's

temporary restraining order enjoining it fromhearing the case.Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita. She then

elevated the appellatec o u r t ' s judgment to the Court by way of a petition for review on
certiorari.

Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for decision, reasoning that Estrellita had long

been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she hasnot yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of GR. No. 126603.

On June 29, 1998, the SC upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC. Also, the Court denied Estrellita's motionfor reconsideration with finality. The

RTC rendered judgment declaring Estrellita's marriage with Sen. Tamano as void
ab initio

.The CA upheld the RTCs decision. Issue: Whether or not Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita's

marriage declared void

abinitio.

Ruling: Yes.Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines, "Estrellita relies

on A.M. No. 0211-10-SCwhich took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a) thereof, only the husband or the wife, tothe

exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she and Sen.Tamano may directly attack the validity of

their own marriage.Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of

marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.In the Rationale of the Rules on

Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullityo f V o i d Marriages, Legal Separation

and Provisional Orders, only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or

declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spousesor by the State. The

Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights

prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence canonly question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse

in a proceeding for thesettlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the

State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.The Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC

refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellita's interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from filing

ana c t i o n . Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplat e d . The subsequent spouse may only be

expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during theconnubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the

conjugal bliss had already vanished.Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would

not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" whoshould be

given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only

threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior

spouse. The subsequent marriage willalways be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage

which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.Indee d, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-1110-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequentmarria

ge. But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for nullity.Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution

governs marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospectivein application and does not apply to cases already

commenced before March 15, 2003.

Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita's marriage in November 1994.While the Family Code is

silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-1110-SC, it has

been held that in a void marriage, in which nomarriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack

the marriagedirectly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to

themarriage. Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is

likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother hadfiled since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the

judgment in the suit.Since the Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a way that would preserve

their respective rights which include striking down bigamous marriages.