+78

Chapter 5 Multiple Location and Single Location Resurrection Hud Hudson 1. The General Resurrection Thesis and Two Characterizations of a Human Person We look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come. So ends the Nicene Creed with a reference to one of the most central teachings of Christianit . Similarl ! the "postles#s and "thanasian Creeds e$plicitl and prominentl call

attention to the resurrection of the %od . &n the discussion to follow & will take this position to impl 'at the (er least) what & will call The General Resurrection Thesis* the (iew that e(er human person who has e(er died will rise again from the dead. William Shakespeare died in +,+,. -espite disagreements o(er precise criteria for personhood! we ma all safel acknowledge Shakespeare to ha(e en.o ed the status of %eing a person. /r! if that#s too permissi(e! at least Shakespeare manifested the propert of personhood at the time of his death. Moreo(er! he was not a di(ine! or angelic! or e$traterrestrial! or chimpan0ee person. &nstead! Shakespeare was a human person. 1ut what of the ad.ecti(e human in that conte$t2 What! e$actl ! does it signal2 3resuma%l it indicates that Shakespeare 'the person) %ore a special relation to a certain ph sical o%.ect4 more specificall ! that he %ore a special relation to a certain human %iological organism 'here% named Stratford). "greement usuall ends there! followed % discord arising in the attempt to answer the follow5up 6uestion4 "nd .ust which relation is that2

+7=

9wo rather prominent options ha(e had their share %oth of recent and traditional champions. Option I4 9he relation in 6uestion is Identity. Shakespeare 'the person) is identical either to Stratford 'the human %od ) or to one of Stratford#s material parts! such as his %rain. What .ustifies the description human of Shakespeare#s personhood is simpl such an identit with a human organism or a human organism part. Let#s call this a materialist option. Option II4 9he relation in 6uestion is Causality. Shakespeare 'the person) is identical to a non5material su%stance and has no material parts. "ccordingl ! Shakespeare is not identical to and is wholl mereologicall distinct from Stratford. Ne(ertheless! Shakespeare 'the person) en.o s a pri(ileged two5wa causal connection with Stratford 'the human %od ). What .ustifies the description human of Shakespeare#s personhood is the two5fold condition that he is uni6uel a%le to cause directl a (ariet of changes in a certain human organism and that (arious effects of which he is the sole su%.ect trace their immediate causal histor to e(ents in that (er same human organism. Let#s call this a dualist option. /f course! these alternati(es do not deser(e the titles the materialist option and the dualist option! since %oth characteri0ations are too restricti(e to represent ade6uatel the range of sophisticated twists and turns that mark out one kind of

materialism or dualism a%out human persons from another. Still! the are ser(icea%le enough! and we can %egin our in(estigation as the stand. 2. Three Questions, Two Arguments, and a Game Plan :ere are three 6uestions worth considering a%out 9he ;eneral Resurrection 9hesis4 '<+) &s 9he ;eneral Resurrection 9hesis true2

+7?

'<7) What are the %est arguments for and against 9he ;eneral Resurrection 9hesis2 '<>) What are the implications of 9he ;eneral Resurrection 9hesis for other contro(ersial and disputed issues2 " (er natural wa to attempt to answer <+ is first to answer <7! and similarl ! one route to pro(iding a promising answer to <7 comes from o%taining at least a partial answer to <>. -epending on one#s commitments concerning the other contro(ersial and disputed issues at stake! this procedure can 6uickl Resurrection 9hesis. Consider one increasingl popular argument against 9he ;eneral Resurrection 9hesis which can %e generated in .ust this fashion4 The Materialist Argument +) 9he ;eneral Resurrection 9hesis is true onl if human persons are non5 material %eings. 7) :uman persons are material %eings 'as /ption & rather than /ption && would ha(e it). '>) :ence! 9he ;eneral Resurrection 9hesis is not true. 3remise '+) in this argument ser(es as an alleged partial answer to <>. &n the hands of one also prepared to %ack 3remise '7)! the argument itself ma %e presented as a promising answer to <7. "nd finall ! its conclusion pro(ides an alleged answer to <+. -efenses of 3remise '7) in 9he Materialist "rgument are tremendousl popular nowada s. 3h sics! astronom ! chemistr ! %iolog ! and geolog all point to a picture of the origin of life and the emergence of consciousness 'and personhood) that is utterl grounded in the material. -ifferences of a%ilities %etween space fillers that are persons ield a (erdict on 9he ;eneral

+>D

and space fillers that are nonpersons need not %e e$plained % an m sterious reference to an immaterial mind or soul %ut rather are to %e cashed out in terms of microph sical parts! their t pes and arrangements! their en(ironments! and laws of nature. Shakespeare 'the person)! like the rest of the furniture of the world! was simpl a material o%.ect through and through. Moreo(er! this is not simpl the (erdict of a modern age that has turned awa from religious insights that would teach us otherwise. /n the contrar ! some of the most philosophicall sophisticated discussions and spirited defenses of materialism for

human persons ha(e come from philosophers who thoroughl identif with Christianit and who claim to find grounds for such a materialism in that tradition! philosophers including L nne Rudder 1aker! @e(in Corcoran! 9renton Merricks! 3eter (an &nwagen! and 'when he is suited up in his materialist uniform) -ean Aimmerman.+ Blsewhere! & also ha(e contri%uted what & can to the defense of 3remise '7)! and & will not consider that premise a target in the present discussion. 7 9oda & am wholl focused on the prospects for 3remise '+).

L nne Rudder 1aker! Persons and Bodies: A Constitution Vie

'Cam%ridge4 Cam%ridge Cni(ersit 3ress! 7DDD)E

L nne Rudder 1aker! FNeed a Christian 1e a MindG1od -ualist2#! !aith and Philosophy! +7 '+??5)4 pp. H=?55DHE @e(in Corcoran! Rethin"ing Human #ature: A Christian Materialist Alternati$e to the %oul ';rand Rapids4 1aker! 7DD,)E @e(in Corcoran! F3ersons and 1odies#! !aith and Philosophy! +5 '+??=)4 pp. >7H5HDE 9renton Merricks! F9he Resurrection of the 1od and the Life B(erlasting#! in Michael Murra 'ed.)! Reason &or the Hope 'ithin ';rand Rapids4 Berdmans +???)! pp. 7,+5=,E Merricks! FResurrection of the 1od #E 3eter (an &nwagen! F" Materialist /ntolog of the :uman 3erson#! in 3eter (an &nwagen and -ean Aimmerman 'eds)! Persons: Human and (i$ine '/$ford4 /$ford Cni(ersit 3ress! 7DD8)! pp. +??57+5E 3eter (an &nwagen! F-ualism and Materialism4 "thens and Ierusalem#! !aith and Philosophy! +7 '+??5)4 pp. H855==E (an &nwagen! Material BeingsE Aimmerman! FJalling Ble(ator#.
2

:udson! Materialist Metaphysics.

+>+

&mpressi(e and powerful defenses of 3remise '+) of the Materialist "rgument are also readil a(aila%le. :ere is an e$ample of one such plausi%le defense inspired % the e$cellent work of Bric /lson.> The Animalist Argument +) &f human persons are material %eings! then "nimalism is true of human persons. 7) &f "nimalism is true of human persons! then human persons satisf %iological criterion of persistence. >) &f human persons satisf a %iological criterion of persistence! then it is not the case that Shakespeare will %e present at some point in the future relati(e to now. H) &f it is not the case that Shakespeare will %e present at some point in the future relati(e to now! then 9he ;eneral Resurrection 9hesis is not true. '5) :ence! if human persons are material %eings! then 9he ;eneral Resurrection 9hesis is not true. & re.ect 3remise '+) of 9he Materialist "rgument! and thus & am committed to re.ecting the defense of that premise contained in 9he "nimalist "rgument. & will not make a general case against the Materialist "rgument here! howe(er. &nstead! & ha(e a modest two5fold aim in this paper! %oth aspects of which are narrowl focused on re.ecting 9he "nimalist "rgument alone*that is! narrowl focused on responding to onl one defense of one premise in one argument aimed against 9he ;eneral a

Resurrection 9hesis. "ccordingl ! for all & sa here! 9he Materialist "rgument against 9he ;eneral Resurrection 9hesis ma well %e sound. & would simpl like to in(estigate wa s to undercut the support it ma appear to recei(e from 9he "nimalist "rgument.

Bric /lson! The Human Animal '/$ford4 /$ford Cni(ersit 3ress! +??8).

+>7

&n what follows & will %riefl characteri0e and comment on fi(e strategies for opposing 9he "nimalist "rgument! each of which can %e offered % a theorist who accepts the second premise of 9he Materialist "rgument*namel ! that human persons are material %eings. & would then like to moti(ate and to present a new and related pair of wa s to oppose 9he "nimalist "rgument! which not onl are a(aila%le to the materialist a%out human persons! %ut which also can a(oid the schedule of costs and complaints fre6uentl associated with the pre(ious fi(e strategies. /f course! the new solutions come packaged with costs of their own! and & aim to indicate as fairl as & can where the are to %e found. &n the end! m own opinion is that the costs are prohi%iti(e and that the new strategies are ultimatel failures.

:owe(er! since so man theorists are s mpathetic with the general philosophical mo(es underl ing these final strategies! & think the ought to ha(e their rightful place at the ta%le in serious discussions of the metaph sics of the general resurrection. . !i"e Res#onses to The Animalist Argument Currentl$ A"aila%le 9he first of our fi(e strategies for response attempts to show that human persons are material %eings while den ing that the are human animals! and thus takes aim at the first premise of 9he "nimalist "rgument. Ba"er and Corcoran)s Constitutionalist Vie 4H Shakespeare*that is! the (er same person who died in +,+,*will rise again on the appointed da . 1ut how can Shakespeare rise! if Shakespeare 'the person) is a material o%.ect and thus identical to

1aker#s (ersion of constitutionalism can %e found in 1aker! FMetaph sics of Resurrection#E 1aker! Persons and

BodiesE L nne Rudder 1aker! FMaterial 3ersons and the -octrine of Resurrection#! !aith and Philosophy! += '7DD+)4 pp. +5+5,8E while Corcoran#s (ersion is a(aila%le in Corcoran! Rethin"ing Human #ature! and Corcoran! F3ersons and 1odies#.

+>>

Stratford 'the human %od ) whose parts ha(e long %een su%.ect to deca and dispersal2 9he mistake lies in the "nimalist mo(e from is a material o%.ect to is identical to Stratford 'the human %od ). Shakespeare was a human person! %ut the relation %etween that human person and the human %od that was %uried at :ol 9rinit Church in Stratford5upon5"(on was constitution not identit . Shakespeare is credited with %eing a material o%.ect in (irtue of %eing constituted % the material animal that is Stratford. So let the corpse of Shakespeare deca E he has need of it no more! for when he is resurrected he will %e constituted % a new and imperisha%le %od . 9hat is! one and the same person will %e constituted % two (er different %odies at two (er different times! and there is no threat from the transiti(it of identit ! for constitution is not identit . '"t least 1aker ma sa as muchE as & read him! Corcoran will insist on the same %od arising! as well.) An e*ceedingly +rie& critical response4 " constitutionalist metaph sics has its share of opponents who find the (iew#s method of dou%le5counting insufficientl moti(ated! its commitment to co5location an impossi%ilit ! and its constitution relation a m ster . "lso! it#s not clear on this proposal wh we should concede that Shakespeare will someda %e constituted % a new %od rather than %elie(e that some new person 'al%eit one with Shakespeare#s mental contents and capacities and character) will %e created on that da . What makes the person later constituted % a new and imperisha%le %od Shakespeare himself rather than a replica or stand5in for Shakespeare in the world to come25

Jor further criti6ue of the constitutionalist (iew see 9heodore Sider! FRe(iew of L nne Rudder 1aker! 3ersons and

1odies#! The ,ournal o& Philosophy! ?? '7DD+)4 pp. H5KH=! and :udson! Materialist Metaphysics! Ch. 8.

+>H

9he second of our fi(e strategies for response grants the "nimalist thesis while den ing the su%se6uent inference to a %iological criterion of persistence for human persons! and thus takes aim at the second premise of 9he "nimalist "rgument. Merric"s)s Anti-Criterialist Vie 4, Shakespeare*the same man and the same %od *will rise again on the appointed da ! and as a result he will %e among the fortunate! the temporall gapp . -espite the fact that Shakespeare 'the person) is

identical to Stratford 'the human %od )! we need not fear that some %iological criterion of personal identit ma %e %rought in to show that temporal gaps are impossi%le 'the surel are not)! or that this (er person and this (er %od might not %e found on either side of that temporal gapE the surprising reason for this is that there are no criteria of personal identit ! %iological or otherwise. Shakespeare will %e raised! and 'perhaps surprisingl ) there need %e no e$planation of this. An e*ceedingly +rie& critical response4 9o %e fair! this proposal has genuine ad(antages. &f there reall are no criteria of personal identit ! then the are hardl a threat to an one#s thesis a%out gappiness! and no one can %e properl faulted for not pro(iding an e$planation that appeals to them. Moreo(er! the anti5criterialist can claim to know that Shakespeare will %e resurrected 'on the %asis of re(elation) while conceding that there is no hope for 'and no need of) an e$planation regarding ho this miracle will occur. "gain! though! an anti5criterialist metaph sics has its share of opponents*with -ean Aimmerman#s insightful critical discussion of such identit 5 m stics! Bric /lson#s tempting case for a %iological criterion! and m own attempts to make a compelling case for a ps chological criterion. Whether one is mo(ed % Aimmerman#s criti6ue or opts for /lson#s or for m own %rand of criterialism ma well depend on one#s %ackground metaph sics of persistence! %ut an resurrection5account
6

9renton Merricks! F9here "re No Criteria of &dentit /(er 9ime#! #o.s! >7 '+??=)4 pp. +D,57H.

+>5

which %oasts ad(antages % %eing anti5criterialist is one & %elie(e we ha(e good reasons to re.ect.8 9he third and fourth of our fi(e strategies for response allow %oth the "nimalist thesis and the %iological criterion for persistence %ut den that this endangers our man Shakespeare#s resurrection 'e(en with the su%stantial temporal gap %etween his earl se(enteenth5centur death and the last da ) and thus take aim at the third premise of 9he "nimalist "rgument. Van In agen)s %imulacra Vie 4= Shakespeare! that %rilliant human animal that penned Hamlet! will rise again on the appointed da . 1ut there will %e no need to track down and call together all those parts of Stratford that ha(e gone their separate wa s throughout the %iosphere after the %od that was %uried at :ol 9rinit Church deca ed and was partiall rea%sor%ed into the en(ironment! for despite the headstone and

(iewing fees! Shakespeare#s %od was not in fact %uried there. &nstead ;od saw to it that a simulacrum was smuggled in to %e %uried and to decompose in place of Shakespeare#s corpse. Shakespeare#s genuine %od was spirited awa for safekeeping! to sleep*parts intact*until it shall %e reawakened and reanimated '%ut not reassem%led) on the resurrection da . An e*ceedingly +rie& critical response4 9his stor has the ad(antage of a(oiding the well5known pitfalls of resurrection % reassem%l E no decomposing! no

recomposing 'canni%al5st le) stands in the wa of resurrecting Shakespeare. Moreo(er! this (iew guarantees that it is the (er same animal %od that rises again. :owe(er! a
7

Jor his discussion of the identit m stics see -ean Aimmerman! FCriteria of &dentit and the &dentit M stics#!

/r"enntnis! H= '+??=)4 pp. 7=+5>D+E for a defense of a %iological criterion see /lson! Human AnimalE for a defense of a ps chological criterion see :udson! Materialist Metaphysics! Ch. H.
8

(an &nwagen! F3ossi%ilit #.

+>,

significant disad(antage looms large. /n this (iew ;od is engaged in deception on a monumental scale. "lso there are practical pro%lems a%out .ust where to hide all those sleeping animals in the meanwhile. 9o man materialist proponents of 9he ;eneral Resurrection 9hesis it seems clear that if we can disco(er a materialist account with the same ad(antages and without the deception of the simulacra! that account is to %e preferred.? 0immerman)s ,umping-Animals Vie 4+D Shakespeare will rise again on the appointed da em%arking on his new life with a %od 5stage that %ears immanent5causal relations to his %od 5stages at some moments immediatel prior to his death. Moreo(er! those (er pre5resurrection %od 5stages were likewise immanent5causall related to a corpse that suffered deca and decomposition at :ol 9rinit Church. 9hat is!

Shakespeare underwent a kind of fission! made possi%le % ;od#s endowing a particular animal %od with certain causal powers. "dmittedl ! Shakespeare will ha(e suffered a si0ea%le temporal gap. Jortunatel ! howe(er! the immanent5causal relations %etween the rele(ant stages of the %od found on either side of the gap were sufficient to preser(e Shakespeare#s identit . Nor need we worr that the corpse which also followed *and followed immediatel *upon the fission competes with or is in an wa an impediment to Shakespeare#s .ump to hea(en! for a corpse isn#t a thing at allE despite appearances! corpse is a plural referring e$pression which picks out suita%l arranged particles at a time at which the ne(ertheless immanent5causall do not compose an thing at all! %ut which are connected to a collection of particles which do

compose 'at an earlier time) an organism at its death. So! e(er thing is as it should %e4 Shakespeare#s so5called corpse was %uried and reassimilated into the en(ironment 'in
9

Jor further criti6ue of the simulacra (iew! see :udson! Materialist Metaphysics! Ch. 8. Aimmerman! FJalling Ble(ator#.

10

+>8

the same wa an one#s remains remain! whether the indi(idual whose remains the are is resurrected or not)E Shakespeare sur(i(es across a temporal gap on account of the fission which guarantees him a %od in the world to come immanent5causall related to the %od in the world left %ehindE and Shakespeare#s post5resurrection %od is

numericall identical to his pre5resurrection %od *its stages related causall .ust as were the stages immediatel %efore and immediatel after the moment he turned ten ears old. An e*ceedingly +rie& critical response4 9his e$planation 'offered as a friendl gesture to the materialist % the dualist -ean Aimmerman) strikes me as the %est of the lot thus far! and this despite Aimmerman#s working under a self5imposed handicap of in(oking no thesis in his e$planation that would %e o%.ectiona%le to a proponent of the rather restricti(e claims endorsed % (an &nwagen on materialism and composition. ++ 9hese di(inel 5grounded fissions % which human persons can .ump with numericall the same animal5%odies across temporal gaps into 3aradise 'while lea(ing their remains %ehindL) seem to pro(ide a %etter stor for the materialist to tell than an stor which is marred % replicas at the end! or simulacra at the %eginning! or co5location throughout! or no criterion of identit at all. Still! this da00ling stor is su%.ect to its own share of gra(e defects! as well. &n particular! Aimmerman acknowledges the most trou%lesome feature of his account is that his proposal re6uires a closest continuer theor of personal identit . Whether or not the man who appears in the world to come is Shakespeare depends on what happens in the other half of the +,+,5fission. &n other words! whether Shakespeare is indeed the man who rises on that last da depends entirel on the features manifested % indi(iduals occup ing regions where he is not to

11

"s detailed in (an &nwagen#s ground5%reaking Material Beings.

+>=

%e found at all. Closest continuer theories of persistence aren#t new! %ut the aren#t popular either.+7 Like our first! the fifth and final strateg attempts to show that human persons are material %eings while den ing that the are human animals! and thus takes aim at the first premise of 9he "nimalist "rgument! %ut it does so % parting compan with the three5dimensionalist G endurantist metaph sics of persistence shared % the pre(ious four proposals and in(okes instead the four5dimensionalist G perdurantist or temporal5 parts metaph sics of persistence. Hudson)s Perdurantist Vie 4+> Shakespeare and Stratford are %oth material %eings! %ut the are related % mereological o(erlap rather than % identit . /n this proposal we ma identif two temporall e$tended material o%.ects that together

diachronicall compose Shakespeare 'the human person). 9he first such material o%.ect was present %etween +5,H and +,+, and was a mere proper part of Stratford! for Stratford 'the human animal) continued to e$ist after its death and spent the last stages of its career as a corpse decomposing in the gra(e. 9he second such material o%.ect will come into e$istence on the last da and will continue e(erafter in the world to come. Neither of these o%.ects is identical to Shakespeare an more than & am identical to m right or left half. Rather! the together compose Shakespeare! a temporall gapp

material %eing who o(erlaps a particular %iological organism and there% earns rights to the ad.ecti(e in his description as a human person. With this proposal#s recognition of temporall
12

e$tended composites! the relation of parthood is no longer temporall

Jor further criti6ue of the .umping5animals (iew! see Aimmerman#s frank critical e(aluation of his own proposal

on %ehalf of the materialists in his FJalling Ble(ator#! and :udson! Materialist Metaphysics! Ch. 8.
13

:ud :udson! F& am Not an "nimalL#! in 3eter (an &nwagen and -ean Aimmerman 'eds)! Persons: Human and

(i$ine '/$ford4 /$ford Cni(ersit 3ress! 7DD8)! pp.7+,5>H and :udson! Materialist Metaphysics! Ch. 8.

+>?

inde$ed! and the operati(e criterion of persistence %ecomes a ps chological gen5 identit relation uniting a collection of person5stages into our man Shakespeare.

:appil ! then! it is one and the same man and one and the same %od that rises again* .ust not one and the same animal! for Stratford 'the human animal) does not rise again. Moreo(er! it is precisel this com%ination of diachronic fusions and ps chological

relations %etween person5stages that permits the (iew to en.o the %est feature of Aimmerman#s metaph sics of .umping animals without %eing at all su%.ect to its associated cost. 9hat is! it can endorse a stor of fissioning material o%.ects and human persons who .ump temporal gaps while preser(ing appropriate immanent5causal relations %etween their temporal parts! without there% inheriting a commitment to the closest5continuer theor of personal identit . An e*ceedingly +rie& critical response4 9rue*% taking the route through the e$tra temporal dimension the perdurantist (iew successfull dodges the closest5

continuer criticism that worries its endurantist ri(al. /f course it does so at the price of temporal parts and claims of immanent5causal connectedness spanning temporal gaps! and whereas such perdurantism and causal h potheses are popular and well5defended! the are also a contro(ersial metaph sics. &n particular! the perdurantist (iew has %een the su%.ect of charges of incoherence! of insufficient moti(ation! and of %eing una%le to do the full range of work it was designed to do without the help of further and e(en less plausi%le metaph sical commitments 'such as a counterpart theor of de re modal predication)!+H while the rele(ant claims of immanent5causal connectedness ha(e %een

14

Jor an e$tended defense of different (ersions of a perdurantist (iew! see 9heodore Sider! !our1(imensionalism!

and :udson! Materialist Metaphysics. Jor influential criti6ues of that metaph sics! see 3eter (an &nwagen! FJour5 -imensional /%.ects#! #o.s! 7H '+??Da)4 pp. 7H5555! and Rea.

+HD

accused of metaph sical impossi%ilit immanence.+5

'in more than one wa ) and of insufficient

Jor the record*although it is admittedl

less promising as an aid to the

materialist who looks for the resurrection of the %od and the life of the world to come *e(en if temporal5parts theor is forfeited! the first premise of 9he "nimalist

"rgument remains threatened % other (er plausi%le %ackground metaph sical (iews on composition and decomposition! including the principle of unrestricted summation! the doctrine of ar%itrar undetached parts! and e(en an modest ontolog that admits the e$istence of %rains in addition to the e$istence of the human organisms that ha(e them.+, -espite the wealth of materialist tools on offer! then! it is not surprising that there are still man who will continue to %e mo(ed % 9he "nimalist "rgument and whose materialist commitments will then force them to re.ect 9he ;eneral Resurrection 9hesis % wa of 9he Materialist "rgument! as well. Cnsurprisingl ! & fa(or :udson#s solution and so am not to %e counted among these man . 1ut for those who remain uncon(inced % an of these fi(e materialist re.oinders! let me turn to a new and related pair of strategies that ma ha(e more appeal. &. 'ulti#le (ocation Resurrection and )ingle (ocation Resurrection "s with our second strateg a%o(e! these new responses to 9he "nimalist "rgument target its second premise in granting the "nimalist thesis while den ing the su%se6uent inference to a %iological criterion of persistence for human persons. '/r at least the #ll start out that wa . Whether we will ha(e to switch horses will depend on an o%.ection to
15

Aimmerman! FJalling Ble(ator#! and Aimmerman! F&mmanent Causation#. Jor a discussion of .ust how complicated and philosophicall e$pensi(e it turns out to %e to maintain the

16

apparentl intuiti(e "nimalist thesis see :udson! F& am Not an "nimalL#. &n m (iew! /lson 'and perhaps Merricks and (an &nwagen) are the onl "nimalists who ha(e the right constellation of metaph sical (iews to pa the costs.

+H+

%e considered %elow.) 1ut unlike Merricks#s (ersion of this strateg ! there is no commitment to anti5criterialism here. Moreo(er! unlike the third and fourth strategies discussed a%o(e that also accept the "nimalist thesis! this response does not depend on a decepti(e! %od 5snatching ;od or on last5minute! di(ine fissions. 9he positions & here% name Multiple 2ocation Resurrection and %ingle

2ocation Resurrection depend on certain (iews a%out how the occupation relation %eha(es. "lthough much of the current work on occupation has %een inspired % the desire to make metaph sical room for e$tended mereological simples! the resulting metaph sical framework ma turn out to %e of considera%le interest to those who look for the life of the world to come in the form of a new and composite %od . " su%stanti(alist dualist 'i.e.! one who acknowledges regions as entities in their own right %ut who does not identif material o%.ects with those regions) recogni0es at least one relation %etween regions and material o%.ects apart from distinctness* namel ! occupation or location. Moreo(er! man su%stanti(alists take occupation or location to %e a fundamental relation such that facts a%out location form part of the fundamental super(enience %ase of the world. -epending on their (iews a%out conceptual and metaph sical possi%ilities! a fair num%er of such su%stanti(alists ha(e de%ated a%out the features of this fundamental occupation relation and ha(e taken sides on whether regions and material o%.ects are monogamous 'alwa s matching up one5to5one)! on whether a single region can host man co5located o%.ects! and on whether a single o%.ect can %e the guest of man distinct regions.+8
17

See :ud :udson! F3rMcis of The Metaphysics o& Hyperspace#! Philosophy and Phenomenological Research! 8,G7

'7DD=)4 pp. H775,! and :ud :udson! FRepl to 3arsons! Repl to :eller! and Repl to Rea#! Philosophy and Phenomenological Research! 8,G7 '7DD=)4 pp. H5758D! and :ud :udson! The Metaphysics o& Hyperspace '/$ford4

+H7

/ne promising h pothesis ad(anced in these de%ates regarding the fundamental occupation relation maintains that it can indeed %e one*man in the single5o%.ect5to5 multiple5regions direction. Moreo(er! not merel is such a h pothesis alleged to %e conceptuall open! %ut a rather formida%le argument has %een put forth to esta%lish its metaph sical possi%ilit ! as well. 1riefl *if located at is a perfectl natural and fundamental relation! and if familiar! popular! and plausi%le recom%ination principles regarding modalit are true! then o%.ects! regions! and location can manifest a%solutel any pattern ou like. " single o%.ect! for e$ample! could %ear this relation to e$actl fort 5three different regions! each region displa ing a new (ariet of geometrical!

topological! and metrical features. Jor those who take the rele(ant recom%ination principles seriousl that line of reasoning should ha(e genuine force.+= Let us sa ! then! that when an o%.ect %ears this fundamental location relation to more than one region! it en.o s at least one kind of multiple location.+? Now as the should %e! discussions of the resurrection are 6uite naturall

constrained and guided % our (iews a%out persistence! and the standard de%ate o(er how things persist is carried out %etween the endurantist and the perdurantist. 1oth
/$ford Cni(ersit su%stanti(alists.
18

3ress! 7DD,) for more on these de%ates %etween more and less metaph sicall

li%eral

See 9heodore Sider! F3arthood#! Philosophical Re$ie ! ++, '7DD8)4 pp. 5+5?+! who argues in this fashion not onl

for the possi%ilit of a single o%.ect occup ing more than one region %ut also for the possi%ilit of a single region hosting more than one o%.ect. See also @ris Mc-aniel! FB$tended Simples#! Philosophical %tudies! +>> '7DD8)4 pp. +>+5H+! and Raul Saucedo#s e$cellent F3arthood and Location#! in -ean Aimmerman 'ed.)! O*&ord %tudies in Metaphysics H NforthcomingO.
19

"s it turns out! there are se(eral kinds. Jor a map of the territor and e$tended critical discussion of two of the

most prominent see :ud :udson! F/mnipresence#! in 9homas 3. Jlint and Michael C. Rea 'eds)! The O*&ord Hand+oo" o& Philosophical Theology '/$ford4 /$ford Cni(ersit 3ress! 7DD?)E :udson! F3rMcis#! :udson! FRepl #! and :udson! Hyperspace.

+H>

parties agree that to persist is to %e in some sense present at more than one time! and then promptl disagree a%out .ust how an o%.ect manages to pull this trick off.

:istoricall ! the primar difference %etween these two main competitors for the pri0e has re(ol(ed around whether or not an o%.ect has temporal parts*i.e.! around whether a thing is present at more than one time in (irtue of ha(ing different temporal parts at different times or in (irtue of %eing wholl present at each time. "nd with the

competing temporal parts and holly present slogans! the focus on mereolog has %een a%solutel central to this literature. Still! & think we can see how the focus might easil ha(e shifted elsewhere! how it might ha(e centered instead on differences in the location relations things manifest rather than on differences in the distri%ution of their parts. 9hat is! we can en(ision a de%ate regarding how things persist which is characteri0ed solel % differences in the num%er and t pes of regions occupied rather than % an appeal to mereological facts. 9hus! whereas an o%.ect en.o ing e*actly one location relation '%ut to an e$tended four5dimensional spacetime region) would persist in one manner! an o%.ect en.o ing e*actly t o location relations 'to a pair of three5dimensional regions separated % a centur ) would persist in another. "nd what#s more! one could then remain

a%solutel neutral on whether the former! singl located thing had an proper temporal parts at all! and thus show how 6uestions a%out the e$istence of temporal parts can come apart from 6uestions a%out the persistence of four5dimensional %eings 'and more generall ! show how 6uestions a%out the mereological structure of a hosting region can come apart from 6uestions a%out the mereological structure of its occupant).7D

20

Jor further discussion of this re(ision in the de%ate on persistence see :udson! FRepl # and :udson! Hyperspace!

+D=n.

+HH

"s a first and general pass! then! let us sa that one wa for an o%.ect to persist is % occup ing a single region with more than one temporal inde$ and that a distinct wa for an o%.ect to persist is % occup ing two or more regions with different temporal indices 'this last clause %eing necessar to separate those cases that entail persistence from those cases that furnish e$amples of simultaneous multi5location onl ). Multiple 2ocation Resurrection! then! is .ust the (iew that human persons are among the material o%.ects that %ear the fundamental location relation to two or more regions with appropriatel different temporal indices. More specificall and in the case of our pla wright! Shakespeare is located in at least two regions! one intersecting the +,+, time and another intersecting the time of the final da . Iust two2 3erhaps not ... ! perhaps Shakespeare is located at some three5dimensional region for e(er moment of time at which we are inclined to sa that he is present at all. 1ut if we sa that wouldn#t we simpl ha(e found our wa %ack to the endurantist or three5dimensionalist (iew of persistence2 Not so. 9he traditional endurantist (iew with its wholl present slogan has reall put the emphasis on holly*on mereolog ! whereas this (iew puts the emphasis on present*on location. '&n fact! the presumption of a mereological reading largel e$plains wh so much ink has %een spilt discussing whether the endurantist position is doomed to tri(ialit ! damned % its association with mereological

essentialism! or else parasitic upon the notion of a temporal part.7+) /nce again! though! one alleged ad(antage purchased with multi5location is the independence of claims a%out parthood and location. /n this (iew! a thing persists % %eing in at least two regions with different temporal indices regardless of its parthood5structure! and that#s difference enough.

21

See Sider! FRe(iew# for an interesting discussion of these challenges to the endurantist.

+H5

9o put pressure on the second premise of 9he "nimalist "rgument! howe(er! this (iew must permit its adherents %oth to endorse the "nimalist thesis and to re.ect the %iological criterion of identit . &nitiall ! the endorsement would seem to %e eas enough to put in their mouths4 Shakespeare*a material %eing located in some two5to5 continuum5man different regions*is a human animal. ;i(en this concession!

relin6uishing the %iological criterion would appear to %e the hard part. 3erhaps the most plausi%le mo(e a(aila%le to such a theorist in(ol(es taking a lesson from the "nimalist and adapting one of his strategies to a new end. Iust as the "nimalist often resists a ps chological criterion of personal identit on the grounds that %eing a person is a temporar propert or phase sortal of a human animal! the

Multiple Location Resurrection theorist might resist a %iological criterion of personal identit on the grounds that %eing an animal is a spatio5temporal propert or region sortal of our man Shakespeare. '& sa region sortal rather than phase sortal! since multiple location can %e simultaneous as well as diachronic! and thus it is unnecessaril restricti(e to relati(i0e propert instantiations to times alone.) &f so! then Shakespeare is a human animal %ecomes Shakespeare is a human animal at region R! or at regions R+5Rn! lea(ing room for and Shakespeare is a resurrected man at region RP. 1iological considerations will still ha(e some work to do! howe(er. Iust as what it takes to %e a person will determine for what inter(al an o%.ect remains in the personhood phase! so too! %iological considerations will determine which regions contain a human animal. 1ut*pro(ided that the indi(idual who is a human animal at R is multipl located and also occupies a region RP at which he is not a human animal*%iological criteria will not determine his persistence conditions simpliciterE instead the will %e determined % location relations and something 'who knows what) other than %iolog .

+H,

9his should feel a %it like a cheat*where#s the commitment to "nimalism2 9he natural response is to sa well! then he isn#t reall identical to a human animal! after all. 1ut it ma %e easier to appreciate the mo(e % first thinking of the s nchronic case. Calling upon the li%eral (iews on location noted a%o(e! consider an instantaneous o%.ect which is %i5located! appearing in a spherical region to our left and in a cu%ical region to our right. Significantl ! that#s not a wa of sa ing we ha(e a round thing with corners! for that wa of putting it would %e incomplete. Rather! our %i5located o%.ect is a sphere at R and a cu%e at R3. Cnused as we are to the region inde$ing! we would naturall sa 'when looking .ust to the left) that the o%.ect we see is a sphere. &t is onl after em%racing the multiple location metaph sic that we will %e careful to add the inde$. Similarl ! we would naturall sa 'when looking .ust to the past) that our

pla wright who died almost four centuries ago is a human animal. 1ut if we are inclined toward the multiple location metaph sic! we will regard that phrasing as incomplete and ma then suggest interpreting the standard formulation of the "nimalist thesis as an a%%re(iation of we are identical to human animals at R 'for some salient R). Since that condition is satisfied! we ha(e our claim %oth to "nimalism and to the re.ection of a %iological criterion! after all. 3erhaps! though! the committed "nimalist will %e inclined to respond that the proper reformulation of her thesis on that metaph sic is not that we are identical to human animals at R 'for some salient R) %ut rather that we are human animals at an region in which we are located at all. &f so! then new condition is! of course! not satisfied and the Multiple Location Resurrection theorist will ha(e to .oin with those who merel take aim at the first premise of 9he "nimalist "rgument after all.

+H8

%ingle 2ocation Resurrection: 3erhaps all this talk of multiple location seems too much to %ear. 9here is another and perhaps more promising (iew in the wings! howe(er. B(en if ou were con(inced that e(er material o%.ect en.o s e$actl one location relation to the one and onl region it e(er inha%its! the Single Location

Resurrection theorist ma claim that the region to %e paired with our man Shakespeare is a single! temporall e$tended! scattered region with two 'salient) temporall

connected parts*one spanning +5,H through +,+, and the other %eginning on the last da and suffering no end. 9his theorist tells us that Shakespeare is there*at that scattered region*and onl there. "nd what is the rele(ant criterion of personal identit on this proposal2 /ur answer can %e much more simple and straightforward than %efore. &nsofar as the Single Location Resurrection theorist sees occupation as a one5one relation! she is .ust as likel to endorse a %an on the co5location of distinct entities as she is to endorse a %an on %i5location in distinct regions. "ccordingl ! she ma sa at the time of

Shakespeare#s death4 "n o%.ect on the resurrection da is identical with Shakespeare* is the resurrected Shakespeare*if and onl if that o%.ect is located at e$actl one and the same scattered! four5dimensional region where this d ing man is located. Clearl ! it is crucial on this proposal that no two material su%stances coincide. 1ut armed with independent arguments for that su%stanti(e metaph sical thesis! the proponent of this criterion cannot .ustl %e accused of merel assuming the identit relation. 9hus! sa s our Single Location Resurrection theorist! such location properties are necessar ! sufficient! and illuminating with respect to identit . Moreo(er! such a theorist ma still 'and without 6ualification) endorse the claim that a human person is a human animalE it#s .ust that a human animal can sur(i(e the ac6uisition of whiche(er properties

+H=

properl characteri0e a resurrected %od and that a human animal 'like e(er thing else) has its persistence conditions fi$ed % location and not %iolog .77 *. Closing Remar+s Location5%ased (iews of persistence seem to ha(e their ad(antages*especiall from the point of (iew of those who would like to separate 6uestions of mereological structure from 6uestions of location 'and this %and of theorists is recruiting hea(il and on the rise). "s we ha(e .ust seen! location5%ased (iews of the resurrection ha(e their ad(antages! too! for unlike the fi(e (iews on offer in the literature discussed a%o(e! the are neither anti5criterialist! nor do the depend on a non5identit constitution relation! a decepti(e %od 5snatching ;od! ele(enth5hour di(ine fissions! or suspicious causal claims. /f course! our two new proposals will strike differentl minded theorists as philosophicall e$pensi(e in their own distincti(e wa s. Jor e$ample! a proper defense of Multiple Location Resurrection ma ultimatel depend on defending %oth the

fundamentalit of the location relation and contro(ersial principles of recom%ination go(erning modalit . -ifficulties for Single Location Resurrection include pro(iding independent and compelling reasons %oth for endorsing the semi5unpopular %an on the co5location of distinct material su%stances and for regarding facts a%out ps cholog as irrele(ant to the anal sis of persistence for human persons.

22

& should note that this is .ust one (ersion of what could %e called Single Location Resurrection! for the (iew & in

fact fa(or5an unorthodo$ perdurantism that la ers on a ps chological criterion of personal identit together with certain li%eral principles of composition and decomposition5could also march under that %anner. See :udson! Materialist Metaphysics! Chs 75H. What#s distincti(e a%out the (ersion of Single Location Resurrection on displa in the te$t a%o(e is the wedding of criteria of identit to location rather than ps cholog .

+H?

Still there is a lot of work to %e done on weighing up costs and gains on these matters! and the location5%ased (iews of the resurrection deser(e their turn on the scales.7>

23

Jor comments and criticism on earlier (ersions of this paper & thank -ean Aimmerman and the participants at the

&nternational Conference on 3ersonal &dentit and Resurrection at the Cni(ersit of &nns%ruck.