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11.1 Induction and Deduction Revisited

Arguments are built on premises that are believed, or assumed, to be true.
Some premises we establish by deductive arguments that have preceded, but
very many of the premises on which we must rely cannot be established by
deduction. Our reasoning process usually begins with the accepted truth of
some matters of fact, in David Humes phrase. To establish matters of fact
we must rely on reasoning that is inductive.
Induction thus provides the starting pointsthe foundationfor the rea-
soning that concerns us most. We reason to establish truths in our everyday
lives, to learn facts about our society, to understand the natural world.
Deduction is certainly powerful in enabling us to move from known (or
assumed) propositions to other propositions that those premises entail, but in
the search for truths with which our reasoning must begin, it is insufficient.
The inductive arguments with which we establish matters of fact differ
fundamentally from the deductive arguments that were the concern in Part II
of this book. One essential contrast between the two families of argument
(noted much earlier in our discussion of basic logical concepts, Section 1.5) lies
in the relation of the premises to the conclusion in the arguments of the two
great families. In deductive arguments, the claim is made that conclusions follow
with certainty from their premises. That claim is appropriate because any
deductive argument, if it is good, brings to light in its conclusion what was
already buried in its premises. The relation between premises and conclusion,
in deduction, is one of logical necessity. In every deductive argument, if it is
valid and if its premises are true, its conclusion must be true.
In inductive argumentsthe concerns of this chapter and those that follow
the relations between premises and conclusion are not those of logical neces-
sity. The claim of certainty is not made. The terms valid and invalid simply do
not apply. This does not mean that inductive arguments are always weak;
sometimes they are very strong indeed, and fully deserve our confidence.
Anal ogi cal Reasoni ng
11.1 Induction and Deduction Revisited
11.2 Argument by Analogy
11.3 Appraising Analogical Arguments
11.4 Refutation by Logical Analogy
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Scientists now assert without reservation (for example) that smoking is a cause
of cancer. This is true, but it is a truth that cannot be known with the demon-
strative certainty of a valid syllogism. If p or q is true, and not p is true, we may
conclude that q must be the case, beyond all doubt. It is a truth we establish as
an inescapable consequence of the relations of the concepts involved. Empirical
truthsabout the consequences of smoking, or the causes of cancer, and all oth-
ers of that sortcannot satisfy the standard of deductive certainty. By that stan-
dard, as one distinguished medical investigator observes, no one will ever be
able to prove that smoking causes cancer, or that anything causes anything.
1
In the realm of induction, as we seek new knowledge of facts about the
world, nothing is beyond all doubt. We must rely on arguments that support
their conclusions only as probable, or probably true. Some such arguments are of
only moderate worth; others are very powerful, as we shall see. The strengths
and weaknesses of inductive arguments, and the techniques for the evaluation
of such arguments, are the focus of Part III of this book.
Arguments grounded on analogies, aiming to establish particular conclu-
sions, are examined first, in this chapter. Arguments that go beyond particulars,
aiming to establish generally applicable causal laws, are examined in the fol-
lowing chapter. The uses of hypotheses and their confirmation in developing
scientific theories follows in Chapter 13; and we conclude, in Chapter 14, with
an analysis of the concept of probability itself, the conceptual instrument with
which inductive conclusions are commonly expressed.
11.2 Argument by Analogy
The most common type of inductive argument relies on analogy. If I report that
I got very good service from a computer of a certain make and model, you
may infer that a new computer of the same make and model will serve you
well. That conclusion has some degree of probability, but the argument is far
from compelling. When a new book is called to my attention and I infer that I
will enjoy reading it because I have read and enjoyed other books by the same
author, I may have my confidence in that author strengthened when I read the
bookor I may be disappointed. Analogy is the common ground of our every
day inferences from past experience to what the future will hold.
Here follow two more carefully formulated analogical arguments. The first
concludes, on the basis of what we commonly think to be prudent and fair, that
it would be prudent and fair to adopt now a major change in public policy:
Some people look on preemployment testing of teachers as unfaira kind of
double jeopardy. Teachers are already college graduates, they say. Why
should they be tested? Thats easy. Lawyers are college graduates and gradu-
ates of professional school, too, but they have to take a bar exam. And a number
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