Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION A.C. No.

6155 March 14, 2006

After due trial, the Sandiganbayan2 found the accused guilty of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide. At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein respondent for the accused. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied in a Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration.3 Pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002. Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent telephone calls they made to his office. When respondent did not return their phone inquiries, complainants went to respondents last known address only to find out that he had moved out without any forwarding address. More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to personally verify the status of thead cautelam petition as they had neither news from respondent about the case nor knowledge of his whereabouts. They were shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a Resolution4 dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees. Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest5 had already been issued against the accused because respondent, whose whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from lapsing. In his Comment,6 respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes that he was not the original counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide. He was merely requested by the original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and be present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties. But only because of his sincere effort and in true spirit

MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M. JOAQUIN, Complainants, vs. ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL, Respondent. DECISION TINGA, J.: Complainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint1 on 15 August 2003 against Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal (respondent) for violation of the Lawyers Oath, gross misconduct, and gross negligence. Complainants are related to petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23 entitled SPO1 Ernest C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin v. People of the Philippines, in whose behalf respondent filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) in the case. The complaint against respondent originated from his alleged mishandling of the above-mentioned petition which eventually led to its denial with finality by this Court to the prejudice of petitioners therein. The facts are as follows: On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin (eventually petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to herein as the accused) were involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of two individuals and the serious injury of another. As a result, Informations were filed against them before the Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued.

of the Lawyers Oath did he file the Motion for Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly irregular character, respondent also made informal but urgent and personal representation with the members of the Division of the Sandiganbayan who promulgated the decision of conviction. He asserts that because of all the efforts he put into the case of the accused, his other professional obligations were neglected and that all these were done without proper and adequate remuneration. As to the ad cautelam petition, respondent maintains that it was filed on time. He stresses that the last day of filing of the petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he filed with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review,7 seeking an additional thirty (30) days to file the petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed the petition by registered mail and paid the corresponding docket fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed within the reglementary period. Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the "herculean" efforts he made in assisting the accused for almost a year after the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He considered the fact that it was a case he had just inherited from the original counsel; the effect of his handling the case on his other equally important professional obligations; the lack of adequate financial consideration for handling the case; and his plans to travel to the United States to explore further professional opportunities. He then decided to formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to PO3 Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact person between respondent and complainants, explaining his decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice to Withdraw which respondent instructed the accused to sign and file with the Court. He sent the letter through registered mail but unfortunately, he could not locate the registry receipt issued for the letter. Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be discharged from the case and endorsed the Notice of Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court. Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would be difficult to find a new counsel who would be as equally accommodating as respondent. Respondent suggests this might have been the reason for the several calls complainants made to his office.

On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.1awph!l.net The case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) who sent notices of hearing to the parties but of the three complainants, only complainant Carlos Joaquin appeared. Thus, in the mandatory conference held, the other two complainants were declared as having waived their rights to further participate in the IBP proceedings.8 The parties were directed to file their respective position papers and on 27 May 2005, Commissioner Villadolid submitted his Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility9 and recommended the imposition of penalty ranging from reprimand to suspension of six (6) months.1awph!l.net10 On 12 November 2005, the Board of Directors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve Commissioner Villadolids recommendation to find respondent guilty and specifically to recommend his suspension for six (6) months as penalty. The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is, considering all the facts presented, whether respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling G.R. No. 152621-23, which eventually led to the ad cautelam petitions dismissal with finality. After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds the suspension recommended by the IBP proper. In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused, respondent has a higher duty to be circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only the property of the accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their life and liberty. As held in Regala v. Sandiganbayan:11 Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest x xx.

It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other profession in society. x x x12 At the onset, the Court takes notice that the ad cautelam petition was actually filed out of time. Though respondent filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration, he should have known that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading13 and it rests on the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan to admit it or not. Thus, in effect, the motion did not toll the reglementary period to appeal. Having failed to do so, the accused had already lost their right to appeal long before respondent filed his motion for extension. Therefore, respondent cannot now say he filed the ad cautelam petition on time. Also important to note is the allegation of complainants that the Sandiganbayan denied the second motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated 7 February 2002. This respondent does not dispute. As to respondents conduct in dealing with the accused and complainants, he definitely fell short of the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights of his clients. As aptly observed by Commissioner Villadolid, respondent had not been quite candid in his dealings with the accused or complainants. The Court notes that though respondent represented to the accused that he had changed his office address, still, from the examination of the pleadings14 he filed, it can be gleaned that all of the pleadings have the same mailing address as that known to complainants. Presumably, at some point, respondents office would have received the Courts Resolution dismissing the petition. Of course, the prudent step to take in that situation was to at least inform the client of the adverse resolution since they had constantly called respondents office to check the status of the case. Even when he knew that complainants had been calling his office, he opted not to return their calls. Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls of complainants may have been about the letter he sent PO3 Joaquin regarding his desire to be discharged as counsel of the case. However, though aware of such likelihood, respondent still did not return their calls. Had he done so, he and complainants could have threshed out all unresolved matters between them.

Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer who is presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should have informed this Court through the appropriate manifestation that he had already given instructions to his clients on the proper way to go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as suggested by Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he was negligent in handling the case of the accused. Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave them instructions on how to go about respondents withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It should have been respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of his representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such was truly the case. Without the presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return card, which confirms the receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot lend credence to respondents naked claim, especially so that complainants have been resolute in their stand that they did not hear from respondent after the latter had filed the ad cautelam petition. He could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel only first by securing the written conformity of the accused and filing it with the court pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.15 The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the clients written consent or from a good cause.16 We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of the ad cautelam petition was primarily due to the gross negligence of respondent. The Court has stressed in Aromin v. Boncavil17 that:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of the his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.18 Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the endeavors he enumerated without adequate or proper remuneration. However, complainants have sufficiently disputed such claim when they attached in their position paper filed before the IBP a machine validated deposit slip in the amount of P15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings account of one Jaime Portugal with account number 7186509273.19 Respondent has neither admitted nor denied having claimed the deposited amount. The Court also rejects respondents claim that there was no formal engagement between the parties and that he made all his efforts for the case without adequate and proper consideration. In the words of then Justice Panganiban (presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta:20 After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration.21 Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus:

A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. x x x 22 Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration. Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation respondent called the shooting incident that the accused was engaged in. He described the incident, thus: "the accused police officers who had been convicted of [h]omicide for the salvage of Froilan G. Cabiling and Jose M. Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C. Macato."23 Rule 14.0124 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the latter. It is ironic that it is the defense counsel that actually branded his own clients as being the culprits that "salvaged" the victims. Though he might think of his clients as that, still it is unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when even the Sandiganbayan had not done so. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of respondent for six (6) months, the most severe penalty recommended by Commissioner Villadolid, but did not explain why such penalty was justified. In a fairly recent case where the lawyer failed to file an appeal brief which resulted to the dismissal of the appeal of his client in the Court of Appeals, the Court imposed upon the erring lawyer the penalty of three (3) months suspension.25The Court finds it fit to impose the same in the case at bar. WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. Let a copy of the Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of respondent. SO ORDERED. DANTE O. TINGA

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. Nos. 154297-300 February 15, 2008

hence, they are not qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO. On May 9, 2002, respondent Court found the reasons of the Chief Public Attorney to be plausible and relieved the Chief Public Attorney as counsel de oficio of former President Joseph Estrada and Mayor Jose Estrada. On May 14, 2002, the remaining eight PAO lawyers filed an ExParte Motion To Be Relieved As Court-Appointed Counsels with respondent Court on the ground that the accused, former President Joseph Estrada and Jose Estrada, are not indigents; therefore, they are not qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO. On May 28, 2002, respondent Court issued a Resolution denying the motion, but retaining two of the eight PAO lawyers, namely, the petitioners Atty. Usita, Jr. and Atty. Andres. The pertinent portion of the Resolution reads: . . . There being no compelling and sufficient reasons to abandon the Courts previous rulings, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. While it is true that a similar motion filed by the PAO Chief Public Attorney Persida Rueda-Acosta was granted per Courts Resolution of May 9, 2002, the rationalization advanced by Atty. Rueda was found meritorious by the Court in that there was unexpected upsurge in her administrative workload as head of the office including the administration and supervision of more or less 1,000 PAO lawyers and 700 staff nationwide and many other functions which require her immediate attention and undivided time. Nonetheless, considering that there are eight (8) de oficio counsels from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, deems it proper to reduce their number and retain only two (2) of them, namely: Atty. Wilfredo C. Andres and Atty. Maximo B. Usita to continue their duties and responsibilities as counsels de oficio for accused Joseph and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada.2 The retained lawyers of PAO joined the four Court-appointed counsels from the private sector, namely, Prospero Crescini, Justice Manuel Pamaran, Irene Jurado and Noel Malaya.

PUBLIC ATTORNEYS OFFICE, MAXIMO B. USITA, JR. and WILFREDO C. ANDRES, petitioners, vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, SPECIAL DIVISION, respondent. DECISION AZCUNA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari alleging that the Sandiganbayan, Special Division, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolutions dated May 28, 2002 and June 11, 2002 retaining petitioners, Atty. Maximo B. Usita, Jr. and Atty. Wilfredo C. Andres of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), as counsels de oficio of then accused President Joseph Estrada and his son, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada. The facts are as follows: On March 15 and 18, 2002, Atty. Persida V. Rueda-Acosta, Chief Public Attorney of PAO personally appeared before respondent Special Division of the Sandiganbayan1 to request the relief of the appearance of PAO as de oficio counsel for accused President Joseph Estrada and Jose Estrada in their criminal cases before the Sandigabayan. However, the request was denied. On May 8, 2002, the Chief Public Attorney filed an Urgent and ExParte Motion to be Relieved as Court-Appointed Counsel with the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, praying that she be relieved of her duties and responsibilities as counsel de oficio for the said accused on the ground that she had a swelling workload consisting of administrative matters and that the accused are not indigent persons;

On June 4, 2002, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 28, 2002. In a Resolution dated June 10, 2002, respondent denied the motion for reconsideration, thus: xxx xxx xxx It appearing that the ground raised by the movants PAO lawyers are mere rehashes/reiterations of their previous arguments which the Court finds to be not valid justification for them to be relieved, either temporarily or permanently of their duties and responsibilities as counsels de oficio in these cases, the instant motion in hereby DENIED.3 Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion by respondent in rendering the Resolutions dated May 28, 2002 and June 10, 2002. On September 21, 2004, PAO filed a Manifestation and Compliance which informed the Court that petitioners Atty. Usita and Atty. Andres were appointed as Assistant City Prosecutors of the Quezon City Prosecutors Office sometime in August 2002, and that PAO is left as the lone petitioner in this case. The issue is whether or not respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the subject Resolutions retaining two PAO lawyers to act as counsels de oficio for the accused who are not indigent persons. PAO contends that it is undeniable that in retaining its two PAO lawyers as counsels de oficio of former President Estrada and Jose Estrada, respondent Court relied upon the provisions of Sec. 7, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus: Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio.The Court, considering the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de oficio such members of the bar in good standing, who, by reason of their experience and ability, can competently defend the accused.

PAO, however, submits that the power of respondent to appoint and retain PAO lawyers as counsels de oficio is limited by Sec. 20 of Letter of Implementation (LOI) No. 20 dated December 31, 1972 and Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1725 dated September 26, 1980, thus: LOI No. 20 Sec. 20. The Citizens Legal Assistance Office shall represent, free of charge, indigent persons mentioned in Republic Act No. 6035, or the immediate members of their family, in all civil, administrative, and criminal cases where after due investigation the interest of justice will be served thereby, except agrarian reform cases as defined by Republic Act 3844, as amended, which shall be handled by the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and such cases as are now handled by the Department of Labor. PD No. 1725 WHEREAS, the Citizens Legal Assistance Office as the law office of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for indigent and low-income persons, performs a vital role in the implementation of the legal aid program of the State, in upholding the rule of law, in the protection and safeguarding of the institutional and statutory rights of the citizenry, and in the efficient and speedy administration of justice. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 renamed the Citizens Legal Assistance Office as the Public Attorneys Office and retained its powers and functions. Section 14, Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the said Code provides: Sec. 14. Public Attorneys Office (PAO). The Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) is renamed Public Attorneys Office (PAO). It shall exercise the powers and functions as are now provided by law for the Citizens Legal Assistance Office or may hereafter be provided by law. In the implementation of the foregoing provisions of law, PAO issued Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1997, as amended by

Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 2001, and subsequently by Memorandum Circular No. 18, Series of 2002, defining who are indigent persons qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO, thus: Section 3. Indigency Test. Taking into consideration recent surveys on the amount needed by an average Filipino to 1) buy its food consumption basket and b) pay for its household and personal expenses, the following shall be considered indigent persons: 1. Those residing in Metro Manila whose family income does not exceed P14,000.00 a month; 2. Those residing in other cities whose family income does not exceed P13,000.00 a month; 3. Those residing in all other places whose family income does not exceed P12,000.00 a month. The term "family income" as herein employed shall be understood to refer to the gross income of the litigant and that of his or her spouse, but shall not include the income of the other members of the family. PAO states that the Statement of Assets and Liabilities attached to the records of the cases of the accused show that they were not qualified to avail themselves of the services of PAO, since they could afford the services of private counsels of their own choice. It noted that the wife of former President Estrada had an income exceedingP14,000. PAO argues that the only exception when it can appear on behalf of a non-indigent client is when there is no available lawyer to assist such client in a particular stage of the case, that is, during arraignment or during the taking of the direct testimony of any prosecution witness subject to cross-examination by the private counsel on record. The appearance of PAO is only provisional in those instances. PAO asserts that the sole reliance of respondent on Sec. 7, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is improper. Respondent

should have not only considered the character of PAO lawyers as members of the Bar, but especially their mandate to serve only indigent persons. In so doing, the contradiction in the exercise of PAOs duties and responsibilities could have been avoided. PAO asserts that while its lawyers are also aware of their duties under Rule 14.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,4 PAO lawyers are limited by their mandate as government lawyers. Hence, PAO submits that the subject Resolutions of respondent are not in accordance with the mandate of PAO and affect the rendition of effective legal service to a large number of its deserving clients. In defense, respondent Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, stated that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion since it did not act in an arbitrary, capricious and whimsical manner in issuing the subject Resolutions. It explained that it was facing a crisis when respondent issued the subject Resolutions. At that time, the accused, former President Joseph Estrada, relieved the services of his counsels on nationwide television. Subsequently, the counsels of record of co-accused Jose Estrada withdrew, and both accused were adamant against hiring the services of new counsels because they allegedly did not believe in and trust the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan had the duty to decide the cases, but could not proceed with the trial since the accused were not assisted by counsel. Respondent stated that, bound by its duty to protect the constitutional right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, it exercised its prerogative under Sec. 7, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,5 and appointed Chief Public Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta of the PAO and eight other PAO lawyers, including petitioners, to act as counsels de oficio for the said accused. As noted earlier, the Chief Public Attorney and six PAO lawyers were later relieved from such duty, but respondent retained two PAO lawyers as counsels de oficiofor the accused. Considering the attendant situation at the time of the issuance of the subject Resolutions, respondent asserts that it did not act in an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical manner in issuing the

subject Resolutions. In appointing the PAO lawyers to act as counsels for the said accused, respondent merely acted within the prerogative granted to it by the Rules of Court in order to protect the constitutional right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel. Respondent also merely required petitioners to perform their duty as members of the Bar and officers of the court to assist the court in the efficient administration of justice. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, the exercise of the power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.6 The Court holds that respondent did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the subject Resolutions as the issuance is not characterized by caprice or arbitrariness. At the time of PAOs appointment, the accused did not want to avail themselves of any counsel; hence, respondent exercised a judgment call to protect the constitutional right of the accused to be heard by themselves and counsel during the trial of the cases. Subsequently, respondent reduced the number of PAO lawyers directed to represent the accused, in view of the engagement of new counsels de parte, but retained two of the eight PAO lawyers obviously to meet such possible exigency as the accused again relieving some or all of their private counsels. In any event, since these cases of the accused in the Sandiganbayan have been finally resolved, this petition seeking that PAO, the only remaining petitioner, be relieved as counsel de oficio therein has become moot. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 4724 April 30, 2003

GORETTI ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOEL M. GRIJALDO, respondent. PER CURIAM: The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law profession in a unique position of trust and confidence, and distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and confidence is betrayed, the faith of the people not only in the individual lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are strictly required to at all times maintain the highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of their profession.1 In this administrative case for disbarment, respondent Atty. Joel M. Grijaldo failed to perform his sworn duty to preserve the dignity of the legal profession. Complainant Goretti Ong is a widow residing in Talayan Village, Quezon City. Sometime in the early part of 1996, she engaged the services of respondent, a practicing lawyer in Bacolod City, as private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 52843 before the Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities of Bacolod City, Branch 5, against Lemuel Sembrano and Arlene Villamil for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.2 During one of the hearings of the case, the accused offered to amicably settle their civil obligation to complainant by paying the amount of P180,000.00. Complainant accepted the offer on the condition that payment shall be made in cash. At the hearing held on July 17, 1996, respondent advised complainant to wait outside the courtroom. When he came out, he handed to complainant cash in the amount of P100,000.00 and Metrobank Check No. 0701263862 for P80,000.00, postdated August 16, 1996, drawn by Atty. Roger Reyes, counsel for the accused. Complainant

objected to the check payment and refused to settle the case, but he assured her that the check was drawn by a reputable lawyer. Complainant was prevailed upon by respondent into signing an affidavit of desistance, but she instructed him not to file it in court until the check is cleared. Upon presentment on its maturity date, the check was dishonored due to a stop-payment order from the drawer. Complainant immediately informed respondent of the dishonor, and the latter told her that he will talk to Atty. Reyes about it. Later, when complainant met with respondent in Manila, he relayed to her Atty. Reyes' offer to replace the check with cash. Several weeks passed without any payment of the proceeds of the check, despite complainant's repeated telephone calls to respondent. Sometime in December 1996, she suggested that respondent move for a hearing of the case, but he told her that courts are not inclined to set hearings near the Christmas season. On December 17, 1996, complainant personally went to Bacolod City to inquire about her case. She was surprised to learn that the same was dismissed as early as September 26, 1996.3 Apparently, respondent submitted her Affidavit of Desistance4 and, on the basis thereof, the public prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the case which was granted by the court. When complainant confronted respondent, he admitted to her that he had already received the amount of P80,000.00 from Atty. Reyes but he used the same to pay for his financial obligations. Thus, on April 2, 1997, complainant filed an Administrative Complaint against respondent for disbarment.5 Complainant further alleged in her complaint that respondent represented her in another case, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Norma Mondia," also for violation of B.P. 22, where she was the offended party. Respondent approached the accused, Norma Mondia, and offered to delay the hearing of the case in consideration of the amount of P10,000.00. However, Mondia did not have that amount of money. Attached to the complaint is the affidavit of Norma Mondia attesting to this fact.6 Furthermore, Henry Tiu, a former client of respondent, executed an affidavit, which is attached to the complaint, alleging that he gave respondent the amount of P3,000.00 for the purpose of posting his

bail bond, but respondent did not post his bail which resulted in Tiu's arrest.7 Likewise, a certain Luz Dimailig, whose affidavit is also attached to the complaint, averred that respondent represented her as counsel for plaintiff in a civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 52; that the case was dismissed by the trial court; that the appeal filed by respondent to the Court of Appeals was dismissed due to his failure to file the appellant's brief; and that the petition for review before the Supreme Court was denied for lack of proof of service on the Court of Appeals, late filing and late payment of docket fees. Moreover, Dimailig alleged that she gave respondent the amount of P10,000.00 for settling the said civil case, but she later learned that he did not remit the money to the defendants or their counsel.8 On June 25, 1997, respondent was required to file his comment within ten days from notice.9 Respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time, alleging that he has not received a copy of the complaint.10 On February 5, 1998,11complainant furnished respondent a copy of the complaint. However, despite receipt of a copy of the complaint, respondent still failed to file his comment. On October 19, 1998, respondent was required to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment.12 Respondent filed a Compliance, stating that the copy of the complaint he received from complainant was not legible. Complainant again furnished respondent with a clearer and more legible copy of the complaint including its annexes; but respondent still did not file his comment. Consequently, on June 14, 2000, another show cause order was issued against respondent.13 Respondent replied by stating that the quality of the copy furnished him by complainant was worse than the first one he received. Dissatisfied with respondent's explanation, respondent was ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00, which he complied with on November 27, 2000.14 However, he again failed to file his comment and, instead, moved for additional time to file said comment. On August 13, 2001, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.15 The records of the IBP show that respondent has

not filed his comment to the complaint. On January 18, 2002, the Investigating Commissioner, Manuel A. Tiuseco, submitted his report recommending the disbarment of respondent.16 However, in its Resolution No. XV-2002-553 dated October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors modified the penalty of disbarment and recommended instead respondent's indefinite suspension from the practice of law for grossly immoral conduct and deceit.17 After a careful review of the records of this case, we find the recommendation of Commissioner Manuel A. Tiuseco well-taken. It is clear that respondent gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client, the complainant. Were it not for complainant's vigilance in inquiring into the status of her case, she would not have known that the same had already been dismissed on September 26, 1996. Respondent deliberately withheld this fact from her, notwithstanding that she talked to him sometime in December 1996. Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. More specifically, Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 state: Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information. Respondent breached his duty to his client when he failed to inform complainant of the status of the criminal case. His negligence shows a glaring lack of the competence and diligence required of every lawyer.18 His infraction is rendered all the more deplorable by the fact that complainant is a resident of Quezon City and the case was filed in Bacolod City. It was precisely for this reason that complainant engaged the services of respondent, a Bacolod-based lawyer, so that her interests in the case may be amply protected in her absence. Respondent's failure to look after his client's welfare in the case was a gross betrayal of his fiduciary duty and a breach of the trust and confident which was reposed in him. In a similar case, we held:

It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as counsel for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment subject however, to the provision of Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed to him. Respondent Meneses, as counsel, had the obligation to inform his client of the status of the case and to respond within a reasonable time to his client's request for information. Respondent's failure to communicate with his client by deliberately disregarding its request for an audience or conference is an unjustifiable denial of its right to be fully informed of the developments in and the status of its case.19 Worse, when respondent used the money which he received from Atty. Reyes to pay for his own obligations, he violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "[a] lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Furthermore: Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. Respondent's misappropriation of the money entrusted to him and his refusal to account for it to his client despite repeated demands were competent proof of his unfitness for the confidence and trust reposed on him. His acts showed a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence. He held the money in trust for his client as settlement of the case he was handling.

Upon receipt thereof, he was under obligation to immediately turn it over, in the absence of a showing that he had a lien over it. As a lawyer, he should have been scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a high degree of fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted.20 A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his client that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purposes without his client's consent. Respondent, by converting the money of his client to his own personal use without her consent, was guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct. Not only did he degrade himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession.21 Aside from violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent's failure to promptly turn over the money to his client and his conversion of the same for his personal use rendered him liable for contempt under Rule 138, Section 25 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution. Furthermore, respondent violated his oath of office and duties as counsel when he approached his client's opponent and offered to delay the case in exchange for money. His offer to delay the case would have frustrated the interests of his client which he had sworn to protect. As a lawyer, respondent should avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent the speedy, efficient and impartial adjudication of cases.22 Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise

stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.23 Respondent's act of propositioning his client's opponent and offering to delay the case against her was intended to benefit the latter. Hence, such act amounted to double-dealing and conflict of interest, and was unethical practice of law. Attorneys, like Caesar's wife, must not only keep inviolate their client's confidence, but must also avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.24 Finally, respondent's cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the directives of this Court to file his comment constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. His conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A resolution of this Court is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.25 Respondent's obstinate refusal to comply therewith not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of our lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof. Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority. This is especially so, as in the instant case, where respondent even deliberately defied the lawful orders of the Court for him to file his comment on the complaint, thereby transgressing Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

which requires a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due the courts.26 All told, respondent's transgressions manifested dishonesty and amounted to grave misconduct and grossly unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not only to complainant, but to the noble profession to which he belongs, for it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.27 He has proved himself unworthy of membership in the legal profession and must, therefore, be disbarred. WHEREFORE, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and grossly unethical behavior, respondent ATTY. JOEL GRIJALDO is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is further directed to PAY complainant Goretti Ong the amount of P80,000.00 within ten (10) days from notice of this Decision. This Decision shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Office of the President; the Department of Justice; the Court of Appeals; the Sandiganbayan; the Philippines Judges Association; and all courts of the land for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, YnaresSantiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ ., concur. Quisumbing, J ., is on leave. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 5948 January 22, 2003 (Formerly A.M. No. CBD-354)

GAMALIEL ABAQUETA, complainant, vs. ATTY. BERNARDITO A. FLORIDO, respondent. RESOLUTION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This is an administrative complaint 1 against Atty. Bernardito A. Florido filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, praying that appropriate sanctions be imposed on respondent for representing conflicting interests. Complainant is a Filipino by birth who had acquired American citizenship. He resides at 15856 N. 15th Way, Phoenix, Arizona 85022, U.S.A. Respondent is a practicing lawyer based in Cebu City. On November 28, 1983, complainant engaged the professional services of respondent trough his attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Charito Y. Baclig, to represent him in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R, entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Deceased Bonifacia Abaqueta,2 Susana Uy Trazo, petitioner" before the Regional Trial court of Cebu.3 Accordingly, respondent entered his appearance in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R as counsel for herein complainant.4 Subsequently, he filed complainant's "Objections and Comments to Inventory and Accounting," registering complainant's objection . . . to the inclusion of the properties under Items 1 to 5 contained in the inventory of the administratrix dated November 9, 1983. These properties are the sole and exclusive properties of the oppositor per the latest tax declarations already marked as Exhibits "2", "3", "4", "5" and "6" in the Formal Offer of Exhibits by oppositor in writing dated August 17, 1983 x x x .5 Several years later, Milagros Yap Abaqueta filed an action for sum of money against complainant, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-11453 and entitled, "Milagros Yap Abaqueta vs. Gamaliel Abaqueta and

Casiano Gerona."6Respondent signed the Complaint as counsel for plaintiff Milagros Yap Abaqueta, averring, inter alia, that: Plaintiff and defendant Gamaliel Abaqueta are the conjugal owners of those certain parcels of land, more particularly as follows . . . The "parcels of land" referred to as conjugal property of complainant and Milagros Yap-Abaqueta are the very same parcels of land in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R which respondent, as lawyer of complainant, alleged as the "sole and exclusive properties" of complainant. In short, respondent lawyer made allegations in Civil Case No. CEB-11453 which were contrary to and in direct conflict with his averments as counsel for complainant in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R. Complainant further averred that respondent admitted he was never authorized by the former to appear as counsel for complainant's exwife in Civil Case No. CEB-11453; that respondent failed to indicate in the Complaint the true and correct address of herein complainant, which respondent knew as far back as August 2, 1990, when he wrote a letter to the complainant at the said address.7 Consequently, complainant failed to receive summons and was declared in default in Civil Case No. CEB-11453. While the order of default was eventually set aside, complainant incurred expenses to travel to the Philippines, which were conservatively estimated at $10,000.00. He argues that respondent's conduct constitute professional misconduct and malpractice as well as trifling with court processes. In his defense, respondent claims in his Answer8 that he always acted in good faith in his professional relationship with complainant in spite of the fact that they have not personally met. He based the matters he wrote in the Complaint on information and documents supplied by Mrs. Charito Y. Baclig, complainant's sister-in-law and attorney-infact, indicating that he was sole and exclusive owner of the properties. This was sometime in November 1983. No affidavit of adjudication was ever furnished respondent by complainant and this was apparently suppressed because it would show that the properties formed part of the estate. Eight years later, in November 1991, long after Special Proceedings No. 3971-R was settled and the attorney-client relationship between

complainant and respondent was terminated, Mrs. Milagros Abaqueta through Mrs. Baclig, engaged his services to file Civil Case No. CEB11453. Mrs. Baclig presented to him a deed of absolute sale dated July 7, 1975,9 showing that the properties subject hereof were not complainant's exclusive property but his conjugal property with his wife, the same having been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage. Thus, in all good faith, respondent alleged in the complaint that said properties were conjugal assets of the spouses. Respondent further pointed out that his law firm handles on the average eighty new court cases annually and personally interviews four or five clients, prospective clients and/or witnesses daily except Saturdays and Sundays. It regularly closes to the public at 7:00 p.m., but work continues sometimes until 8:30 p.m. This has been going on for the last twenty-five years out of respondent's thirty-three years of private practice. The absence of personal contact with complainant and the lapse of eight years resulted in the oversight of the respondent's memory that complainant was a former client. Furthermore, the caption of the Special Proceeding was not in the name of complainant but was entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Bonifacia Payahay Abaqueta." Respondent expressed regret over the oversight and averred that immediately after discovering that the formerly represented complainant in Special Proceeding No. 3971-R, he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff, which was granted by the trial court.10 He denied any malice in his acts and alleged that it is not in his character to do malice or falsehood particularly in the exercise of his profession. In his Comments/Observations on Respondent's Answer,11 complainant averred that respondent's conduct was geared towards insuring a court victory for Milagros Yap in Civil Case No. CEB-11453, wherein he deliberately stated that complainant's address was 9203 Riverside Lodge Drive, Houston, Texas 77083, U.S.A., when he knew fully well that complainant's true and correct address was c/o V.A. Hospital, 7th Street & Italian School Road, Phoenix, Arizona, 85013, U.S.A. By falsely stating and concealing his true and correct address, respondent eventually succeeded in obtaining a default judgment in favor of his client.

During the pendency of these proceedings before the IBP, it appeared that respondent's son got married to the daughter of IBP National President Arthur D. Lim. Thus, Atty. Lim inhibited himself from participating in the resolution of the case.12 Subsequently, a Resolution was issued requiring the IBP to elevate the entire records of the case within thirty (30) days from notice.13 The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The investigating Commissioner found that respondent clearly violated the prohibition against representing conflicting interests and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months. We find the recommendation well-taken. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. There is a conflict of interest if there is an inconsistency in the interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client.14 In short, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.15 There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.16 As pointed out by the investigating commissioner, respondent does not deny that he represented complainant in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R. He also does not deny that he is the lawyer of Milagros Yap Abaqueta in Civil Case No. CEB-11453, filed against complainant and

involving the same properties which were litigated in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R. Respondent also admitted that he did not secure the consent of complainant before he agreed to act as Milagros Yap Abaqueta's lawyer in Civil Case No. CEB-11453. The reasons proffered by respondent are hardly persuasive to excuse his clear representation of conflicting interests in this case. First, the investigating commissioner observed that the name "Gamaliel Abaqueta" is not a common name. Once heard, it will surely ring a bell in one's mind if he came across the name again. In this case, respondent actively prosecuted the cause of complainant in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R, such that it would be impossible for respondent not to have recalled his name. Second, assuming arguendo that respondent's memory was indeed faulty, still it is incredible that he could not recall that complainant was his client, considering that Mrs. Charito Baclig, who was complainant's attorney-in-fact and the go-between of complainant and respondent in Special Proceedings No. 3971-R, was the same person who brought Milagros Yap Abaqueta to him. Even a person of average intelligence would have made the connection between Mrs. Baclig and complainant under such circumstances. Lastly, the fact that the subject matter of Civil Case No. CEB-11453 and Special Proceedings No. 3971-R are thesame properties could not have escaped the attention of respondent. With such an abundance of circumstances to aid respondent's memory, it simply strains credulity for him to have conveniently forgotten his past engagement as complainant's lawyer. What rather appears, given the prevailing facts of this case, is that he chose to ignore them on the assumption that the long period of time spanning his past and present engagement would effectively blur the memories of the parties to such a discrepancy. It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline such employment,17 subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.18 Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.19 He must serve the client with competence and diligence20 and

champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.21 A lawyer May not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his former client22 The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.23 Indeed, as we stated in Sibulo v. Cabrera,24 "The relation of attorney and client is based on trust, so that double dealing, which could sometimes lead to treachery, should be avoided."25 Credence cannot, however, be given to the charge that respondent fraudulently and maliciously falsified the true and correct address of the complainant notwithstanding respondent's knowledge thereof. Lawyers normally do not have knowledge of the personal circumstances of a party in a case and usually rely on the information supplied by their clients. The fact that respondent sent a letter to complainant at the latter's correct address26 sixteen months before the filing of Civil Case No. CEB-11453 does not by itself prove malice on the part of respondent. A new address was furnished by Milagros Yap Abaqueta days before the complaint was filed. Respondent had no reason to doubt the correctness of the address of the complainant given to him by Milagros Yap Abaqueta considering that she was complainant's wife. WHEREFORE, Atty. Bernardito A. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for Three (3) months. He is further ADMONISHED to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties towards his clients and the court. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City FIRST DIVISION A.C. No. 4354 April 22, 2002

LOLITA ARTEZUELA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO, respondent. PUNO, J.: For his failure to meet the exacting standards of professional ethics, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in its Resolution of May 2, 2000 recommended the suspension from the practice of law of respondent Atty. Ricarte B. Maderazo for the period of six (6) months, with a stern warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely. Respondent allegedly represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1 By way of a Motion for Reconsideration,2 respondent now comes before this Court to challenge the basis of the IBP's resolution, and prays for its reversal. The factual antecedents of the case are as follows: On or about 3:00 in the early morning of December 24, 1992, Allan Echavia had a vehicular accident at Caduman St., corner H. Abellana St., Mandaue City. At the time of the accident, Echavia was driving a Ford Telstar car owned by a Japanese national named Hirometsi Kiyami, but was registered in the name of his brother-in-law, Jun Anthony Villapez. The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by complainant Lolita Artezuela.3 The destruction of the complainant's carinderia caused the cessation of the operation of her small business, resulting to her financial dislocation. She incurred debts from her relatives and due to financial constraints, stopped sending her two children to college.4 Complainant engaged the services of the respondent in filing a damage suit against Echavia, Villapez and one Bernardo Sia.5 Docketed as Civil Case No. 13666, the case was assigned to Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. An Amended Complaint was thereafter filed, impleading Echavia, Kiyami and Villapez, and dropping Sia as a party-defendant.6 For his services, complainant paid the respondent the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorney's fees and Two Thousand Pesos

(P2,000.00) as filing fee.7 However, the case was dismissed on March 22, 1994, allegedly upon the instance of the complainant and her husband.8 Because of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, complainant filed a civil case for damages against the respondent. It was docketed as CEB-18552 and assigned to Branch 57, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. The case was dismissed on June 12, 2001.9 On November 24, 1994, Artezuela filed before this Court a verified complaint for disbarment against the respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly neglected his duties as a lawyer and failed to represent her interests with zeal and enthusiasm. According to her, when Civil Case No. 13666 was scheduled for pre-trial conference on August 20, 1993, respondent asked for its postponement although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding complainant's persistent and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do anything to keep the case moving. He withdrew as counsel without obtaining complainant's consent.10 Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests. While acting as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said document was even printed in respondent's office. Complainant further averred that it was respondent who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with her consent.11 Respondent denied the complainant's allegations and averred that he conscientiously did his part as the complainant's lawyer in Civil Case No. 13666. He withdrew as counsel because the complainant was uncooperative and refused to confer with him. He also gave several notices to the complainant and made known his intention before he filed his Manifestation to withdraw as counsel. Because of the severed relationship, the lower court, after holding a conference, decided to grant respondent's manifestation and advised the complainant to secure the services of a new lawyer. Complainant, however, refused and instead, sought the dismissal of the case.12 Respondent alleged that he sought the postponement of the Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on August 20, 1993 so that he could file the Amended Complaint. He admitted that Echavia's Answer to the

Amended Complaint was printed in his office but denied having prepared the document and having acted as counsel of Echavia. He claimed that complainant requested him to prepare Echavia's Answer but he declined. Echavia, however, went back to his office and asked respondent's secretary to print the document. Respondent intimated that the complainant and Echavia have fabricated the accusations against him to compel him to pay the amount of P500,000.00.13 This Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP-Visayas Regional Committee on Bar Discipline formed an Investigating Committee to hear the disbarment complaint. On October 6, 1999, Commissioner Gabriel T. Ingles issued a Report finding the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests, in violation of Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as, of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics. He recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.14 Commissioner Ingles did not rule on the other issues. As aforesaid, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upheld the findings of the Committee with modification only as to the penalty. Seeking reconsideration of the IBP's resolution, respondent contends that the Investigating Committee did not conduct trial; hence, he was not able to confront and examine the witnesses against him. He argues that the Investigating Committee's finding that he represented Echavia is contrary to court records and the complainant's own testimony in CEB-18552. He also casts doubt on the credibility of the Investigating Committee to render just and fair recommendations considering that the Investigating Commissioner and the respondent are counsel-adversaries in another case, Civil Case No. R-33277. Finally, he questions the imposition of a six-month suspension, which he claims to be harsh considering that his private practice is his only source of income.15 After carefully examining the records, as well as the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter, this Court is inclined to uphold the IBP's resolution.1wphi1.nt

In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial proceedings, as "actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies."16 Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments.17 In the case at bar, records show that respondent repeatedly sought the postponement of the hearings, prompting the Investigating Commissioner to receive complainant's evidence ex parte and to set the case for resolution after the parties have submitted their respective memorandum. Hence: "The records show that this is already the third postponement filed by respondent namely December 12, 1996 (sic), January 3, 1996 and April 1, 1996. The Commission for the last time, will cancel today's hearing and can no longer tolerate any further postponement. Notify respondent by telegram for the hearing for (sic) April 22, 1996 at 2:00 P.M. Said hearing is intransferable in character. In the meantime, complainant affirmed her complaint and likewise her witness, Allan Echavia, also affirmed the contents of his affidavit and further stated that he had executed the same and understood the contents thereof."18 It is by his own negligence that the respondent was deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine the complainant and her witness. He cannot belatedly ask this Court to grant new trial after he has squandered his opportunity to exercise his right. Respondent's contention that the finding of the Investigating Committee was contrary to the records and the complainant's own admission in CEB-18552 is without merit. It is true that Atty. Aviola was Echavia's counsel-of-record in Civil Case No. 13666 as evidenced by the certification from the clerk of court,19 and as admitted by the complainant in CEB-18552, viz: "ATTY. MADERAZO: (To witness- ON CROSS)

Q: Madam witness, you mentioned that the defendant in this case was the counsel of Allan Echavia as early as August 20, 1993, wherein you learned for the first time of this fact when you say he is counsel of Allan Echavia. (sic) You mean he is the counsel of record of Allan Echavia in the Civil Case before Judge Dacudao? Is that what you mean? A: What I learned was that Atty. Alviola was the counsel of Allan Echavia in the case before Judge Dacudao but I heard Atty. Maderazo telling Allan Echavia not to admit that Atty. Maderazo is appearing for me because he will be the one to coordinate with Allan's case. Q: So it is clear that the defendant in this case is not the counsel of record of Allan Echavia. It was Atty. Alviola stated by you now? A: Atty. Maderazo was not Allan Echavia's counsel but it was Atty. Alviola who was the counsel of record of Allan Echavia."20 Nevertheless, the issue in this case is not whether the respondent also acted as the counsel-of-record of Echavia. Rather, it is whether or not he had a direct hand in the preparation of Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint. To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse party's conflicting interests of record--- although these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:

"It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of the retainer to disclose to the client the circumstances of his relations to the parties and any interest in or in connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of the counsel. "It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this Canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when in behalf of one of the clients, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose." (emphasis supplied) An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. Indeed, good faith and honest intention on the part of the erring lawyer does not make this rule inoperative.21 The lawyer is an officer of the court and his actions are governed by the uncompromising rules of professional ethics. Thus: "The relations of attorney and client is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Ceasar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice."22 The professional obligation of the lawyer to give his undivided attention and zeal for his client's cause is likewise demanded in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Inherently disadvantageous to his client's cause, representation by the lawyer of conflicting interests requires disclosure of all facts and consent of all the parties involved. Thus:

"CANON 15- All lawyers shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients. xxx Rule 15.03- A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." While the Resolution of the IBP is purely recommendatory, we find no reason to reverse the same. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified.23 A perusal of Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint shows that it indeed conflicts with the complainant's claims. It reads: "1. The allegations (sic) in Paragraph One (1) of the Complaint is admitted in so far as it pertains to the personal circumstance and residence of the answering defendant. The rest of the allegations in Paragraph One (1), and all the allegations in Paragraph Two (2) , THREE (3), FOUR (4), FIVE (5), SIX (6), ELEVEN (11), TWELVE (12), and FOURTEEN (14), of the Complaint are DENIED for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations."24 By way of prayer, Echavia states: "WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint."25 Anent the authorship by the respondent of the document quoted above, the Investigating Committee found the testimonies of the complainant and Echavia credible as opposed to respondent's bare denial. As pointed out by Echavia, he was approached by Atty. Maderazo, introduced himself as his lawyer and after some sessions in the latter's office, asked him to return and sign a document which he later identified as the Answer to the Amended Complaint.

The Investigating Committee found respondent's defense weak. Respondent did not bother to present his secretary as witness, nor obtain her affidavit to prove his allegations. Instead, he offered a convenient excuse--- that he cannot anymore locate his secretary. Respondent argued that it was the complainant who asked him to prepare Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint, after reaching an agreement whereby Echavia would testify in favor of the complainant. After he declined the request, he claimed that it was the complainant who prepared the document and asked his secretary to print the same. But as shown, Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint was in no way favorable to the complainant. With the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, Echavia is practically off the hook. We cannot find any reason why Echavia would commit perjury and entangle himself, once again, with the law. He does not stand to profit at all by accusing the respondent falsely. Furthermore, considering complainant's stature and lack of legal education, we can not see how she could have prepared Echavia's Answer to the Amended Complaint and device a legal maneuver as complicated as the present case. Respondent's attack on the credibility of Investigating Commissioner Ingles to render an impartial decision, having been an adversary in Civil Case No. R-33277, does not convince us to grant new trial. This is the first time that respondent questions the membership of Commissioner Ingles in the Investigating Committee. If respondent really believed in good faith that Commissioner Ingles would be biased and prejudiced, he should have asked for the latter's inhibition at the first instance. Moreover, we could not find any hint of irregularity, bias or prejudice in the conduct of the investigation that would lead us to set it aside. Finally, we remind the respondent that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.26 The suspension of the respondent's privilege to practice law may result to financial woes. But as the guardian of the legal profession, we are constrained to balance this concern with the injury he caused to the very same profession he vowed to uphold with honesty and fairness.1wphi1.nt

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of the IBP finding the respondent guilty of violating Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is affirmed. Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months with a stern warning that a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 160445 February 16, 2006

JOSE TEOFILO T. MERCADO and MA. AGNES R. MERCADO, Petitioners, vs. SECURITY BANK CORPORATION, Respondent. RESOLUTION SANDOVAL GUTIERREZ, J.: The dignity of the Court can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith that a magistrate is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect.1 Incidental to the present petition for review on certiorari is the contempt proceedings against petitioner Jose Teofilo T. Mercado arising from his letter dated October 18, 2004, insinuating that: (1) the ponente succumbed to the "tremendous pressure" of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in denying his petition; (2) the Security Bank Corporation, respondent, financed the ponentes travel to the United States; and (3) the ponente gave respondent a "go signal" to sell his property.

The facts are as follows: On December 12, 2003, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Ma. Agnes R. Mercado, petitioners, filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals (a) Decision2 dated May 27, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71570 dismissing their petition for annulment of judgment; and (b) its Resolution3 dated October 23, 2003 denying their motion for reconsideration. On January 12, 2004, we denied the petition because of petitioners failure to show that a reversible error had been committed by the Appellate Court.4 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the Court of Appeals, in dismissing their petition for annulment of judgment, merely relied on technical rules of procedure, thereby sacrificing the greater interest of justice and equity; and that their former counsels gross negligence constitutes extrinsic fraud, a ground for annulling the trial courts judgment. On March 24, 2004, we issued a Resolution granting petitioners motion for reconsideration and reinstating their petition. We likewise required Security Bank Corporation, respondent, to comment on the petition. In its comment, respondent averred that the issues raised in the present petition are mere rehash of the issues petitioners raised before the Appellate Court. As to the alleged negligence of their counsel, respondent pointed out that the same cannot be considered an extrinsic fraud since through the same counsel, they actively pursued and recovered moral damages and attorneys fees. Furthermore, assuming that petitioners counsel refused to file a motion for reconsideration with the trial court, still, they had the option to terminate his services and hire another; and that they should not have waited for four (4) years before filing the petition for annulment of judgment. On June 7, 2004, we issued a Resolution denying the petition on the ground that petitioners indeed failed to show that a reversible error had been committed by the Appellate Court.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but we dismissed the same in our Resolution dated September 15, 2004, thus: We find no compelling reason to grant petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that before a petition for annulment of judgment can prosper, petitioners must first file an appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief as required by the Revised Rules of Court. Having failed to do so, they cannot avail of an action for annulment of judgment, otherwise, they would benefit from their inaction or negligence. It bears emphasis at this point that an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Petitioners contention that their failure to appeal from the trial courts Decision was due to the negligence of their former counsel lacks merit. Records show that they participated actively, through their counsel, in the proceedings before the trial court. As party litigants, they were expected to be vigilant of their interests and, therefore, should monitor the progress of the case. Thus, they should have constantly communicated with their counsel to be advised of the status of their case. This way, they would not have lost their opportunity to appeal. Granting that petitioners petition for annulment of judgment is in order, still the same is dismissible. For the remedy of annulment of judgment to prosper, either one of the following grounds must be present: (1) extrinsic fraud or (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. Petitioner argues that their counsels negligence constitutes extrinsic fraud. We are not convinced. Extrinsic fraud can be committed by a counsel against his client when the latter is prevented from presenting his case to the court. This situation is not present in this case. We reiterate that in G.R. No. 151816, we ruled that the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error in dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the trial courts order of execution of its Decision in favor of respondent bank.

In fine, this Resolution should now write finis to the instant case.5 Petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration but was denied for being prohibited. On October 18, 2004, petitioner Mercado wrote Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. stating that: On March 24, 2004, the Third Division, in its Resolution, granted our Motion for Reconsideration and even gave due course and reinstated our petition. But when I received the Resolution dated June 7, 2004 denying my Petition for Review on July 12, 2004, I immediately called my counsel, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, on the phone. I asked him why on earth the ponente denied again my petition on the same ground for failure of petitioners to show that a reversible error had been committed by the appellate court? My counsel said, the ponente informed him that she has to deny our petition on the same ground because of the tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice to favor Security Bank Corporation (SBC). By the way, my counsel and the ponente are very close and long time friends to each other. When I heard the bad news, I was so shocked in disbelief. It is true, what you did is unthinkable, ungodly, and malicious. It is also very suspicious that after a few days after my conversation with Atty. Villanueva, he and his family left for London, leaving my case to the care of one of his Associates. Later on, the ponente herself left for the U.S.A. to visit her children. Is this a coincidence? As the saying goes, when there is smoke, there is fire. Another coincidence, before the receipt of the Resolution dated June 7, 2004, denying our petition on the basis of SBCs unsubstantiated Comment, SBC sold our property to M. Miranda Development Corporation and succeeded in getting a permit to demolish the four (4) building erected in our property from the Forbes Park Association, even if the case is still pending and we have not even filed our Motion for Reconsideration with the Supreme Court, not to mention the Lis Pendens annotated on the title of the property in the name of SBC. The person who bought our property from SBC for P120,000,000.00 is known to my nephew and us. While the buyer is drinking with my nephew and others, not knowing that one of them is my nephew, he bragged to them that he just bought the property of the Mercados in Forbes Park. The buyer said I paid already the property because SBC told me that they already have the go-signal from the ponente to

sell the property. Few days thereafter, all the improvements in our property were totally demolished by a construction company owned by my provincemate in Pampanga by the name of Mr. Bana, whom I personally met at the site while the demolition was being carried out. Have you no conscience at all? Are you not bothered of the final judgment after life? Is this the legacy you want to impart to your children and all the Filipino people? What you did to my family and I is unforgivable not only to God and to humanity. You have deprived us of our precious possession without due process. This is also the abode of my wife, my children, their respective spouses, and my 10 grandchildren, not to mention the several household members and their families. I would like to believe that the Supreme Court is the last bulwark of true justice. If you, the Chief Justice, himself, are the first person to make a mockery of our laws, no wonder why foreign investors do not want to invest in our country because they said, there is no justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in particular. This is in the highest degree of injustice. You have deprived us of our basic fundamental rights in the protection of our property without due process. There is no justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in particular. Do you think I will bring my case to the Supreme Court by mere question of facts? From our petition for Annulment of Judgment filed before the Court of Appeals and now the Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, my wife and I as petitioners-movants have clearly invoked LACK OF JURISDICTION on the part of the trial court to adjudicate respondent SBCs counterclaim for the payment of the loan. As I understand, when the ground invoked as basis for Annulment of Judgment is LACK OF JURISDICTION, the Petition may be filed at any time before it is barred by estoppel or laches, neither of which is obtaining in our case. Even in laymans legal point of view, this Petition of ours clearly and undoubtedly raises a question of law. Please I beg of you, have a last hard look on our Petition and the two (2) Motions for Reconsideration and let us focus and not evade on the real issue on LACK OF JURISDICTION on the part of the trial court and not concentrate on negligence of counsel and other trivial reasons, etc. Or better yet, please refrain from influencing the members of the Third Division. Let them deliberate regularly on our case or inhibit themselves on the case. Please let the Institution serve

justice, and not individual pecuniary interests. SBCs counsels are experts in fabrication of facts and in misleading the courts. I have a feeling that they might as well have led you to believe something, which is not true. Please dont be an instrument of their wicked schemes, lest the Supreme Court itself becomes their means to perpetrate injustice. This is the only Bank which is not interested in amicable settlement in spite of my several sincere offers of amicable settlement since the case was filed in 1995 up to 2003, and these are all in writing and duly received by SBC. Unfortunately, all my offers were rejected by them. I wrote you this letter as a last resort because my family and I looked up at you before as the most honest and upright Chief Justice. As we would like to know if you really had intervened and put pressure, as the Ponente said to Atty. Villanueva, (my counsel) to favor SBC because if you did, then we rest our case. Please enlighten us before we seek another forum to seek redress the injustices, sleepless nights, humiliation and embarrassment we suffered. If we are wrong about you, and I hope we really are wrong, please accept our appeal for forgiveness and apologies. GOD is my witness, that what I have told you is the truth. Mr. Chief Justice, the Filipino people know how religious you are. Please do what a religious man ought to do in serving justice. Please live up to our, as well as HIS expectations. (Emphasis supplied) On November 2, 2004, Chief Justice Davide required Mercados lawyer, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, to comment on the letter and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court.6 On November 17, 2004, the Courts Third Division ordered Mercado to personally appear on November 22, 2004 and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court.7 On the scheduled date, Mercado, together with Atty. Pablo G. Macapagal, his new counsel, appeared before the Third Division and swore to the truth of the letter he wrote.8 He manifested that he only stated therein what Atty. Villanueva told him that his petition was denied for the second time "because of the tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice." He further manifested that during the wake of Atty. Villanuevas mother, he (Atty. Villanueva) pointed to Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, bragging that she is "a very very good, close and

long time friend of his."9 However, while stating this, Mercado referred to Justice Conchita Carpio Morales as Justice Gutierrez.10 Forthwith, the Third Division issued in open court a Resolution11 directing Atty. Macapagal to submit a written explanation why Mercado should not be held in contempt of Court. For his part, Atty. Villanueva submitted a comment,12 strongly denying Mercados allegations in his letter. He denied having told petitioners that their petition had to be denied again "because there was a tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice in favor of Security Bank Corporation." He also stressed that there was no correlation between the ponentes trip to the United States and his trip to London. He explained that he and his family went to London to attend the graduation of his daughter, Cherriemaya Veloso Villanueva. To substantiate this, he submitted a photocopy of "London School of Economics (LSE) and Political Science Presentation Ceremonies" where the name of his daughter, Cherriemaya Veloso Villanueva, is listed as one of the successful graduates. He likewise submitted a photocopy of his passport indicating his departure for London on July 14, 2004 and his arrival in the Philippines on July 27, 2004. In addition, he said he never met anyone from respondent bank, including its lawyers, and that there is no truth to Mercados statement regarding his nephews alleged encounter with the new owners of the subject property. On December 13, 2004, Mercado submitted his explanation13 why he should not be punished for contempt of court. He claimed that the contemptuous statements in his letter merely reiterate the tenor of Atty. Villanuevas statements. He offered an apology, explaining that he wrote the letter while he was "under the impulse of personal stress" as he was losing his residential house. On January 26, 2005, the Third Division ordered both Mercado and Atty. Villanueva to appear on February 21, 2005 to elucidate their respective positions. Mercado testified that it was Atty. Villanueva who informed him that the ponente is Justice Gutierrez. Atty. Villanueva even bragged that she is his "very, very close friend."

For his part, Atty. Villanueva testified that it was Mercado who informed him that Justice Gutierrez is the ponente. He also confirmed that she attended the wake of his mother. But he denied Mercados claim that he pointed to Justice Gutierrez and said that she is his close friend.14 Thereafter, the Third Division designated Court of Appeals Justice Renato C. Dacudao as Commissioner to receive evidence on the factual issues involved in the contempt incident. 15 On May 18, 2005, Justice Dacudao submitted his Investigation, Report and Recommendation. He found Mercado "guilty of improper conduct tending to bring the authority and the administration of justice by the Court into disrespect when he openly belittled, degraded, and embarrassed the Highest Court of the land, particularly the Chief Justice x x x." However, he held that "there was no showing that he acted with malice and/or in bad faith or that he was properly motivated." Thus, he recommended that Mercado be fined in the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00). We cannot sustain Justice Dacudaos finding that Mercado did not act with malice or bad faith in imputing those derogatory and disrespectful remarks against Chief Justice Davide and the ponente. Bad faith imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong.16 It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of selfinterest or ill-will for ulterior purposes.17 Malice is of the same genre. It connotes a sinister motive. Mercados addressing such letter to Chief Justice Davide is a perfect illustration of bad faith and malice tending directly to degrade the administration of justice. It transgresses the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticisms bringing into disrepute, not only the authority and integrity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente, but also of the entire Judiciary. While feigning to be searching for truth on whether Chief Justice Davide indeed exerted "tremendous pressure" to the ponente, he repeatedly humiliated him and the Judiciary in the most loutish and insolent manner. He accused him of doing an "unthinkable, ungodly, and malicious" act and of depriving his (Mercados) family of their "basic fundamental rights in the protection of (their) property without due process." He concluded that what Chief

Justice Davide did to his family "is unforgivable not only to God and to humanity." In an insulting and insolent tenor, he stated that "if the Chief Justice, himself, is the first person to make a mockery of our laws," then there is "no wonder why foreign investors do not want to invest in our country." Furthermore, he alleged that an irregularity or bribery attended the denial of his petition for review. He insinuated that the travels of Atty. Villanueva and the ponente abroad were financed by respondent bank, stating that "when there is smoke, there is fire." He also recklessly accused the ponente of giving respondent bank a "gosignal" to sell his property. In this backdrop, he asked Chief Justice Davide to "refrain from influencing the members of the Third Division;" "let them deliberate regularly on the case or inhibit themselves on the case;" and "let the Institution serve justice, and not individual pecuniary interests." Finally, he condemned the entire Judiciary by saying "there is no justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in particular." And with impudence, he threatened Chief Justice Davide to enlighten him before he "seeks another forum to seek redress for the injustices, sleepless nights, humiliation and embarrassment" his family suffered. Without doubt, Mercados letter is marked with malice, bad faith, and gross disrespect. He committed a remarkable feat of character assassination and honor vilification. Contrary to his claim that he is just verifying the truth of Atty. Villanuevas statements, the words in his letter are more accusatory than inquisitorial. What is disconcerting is that his accusations have no basis in fact and in law. Obviously, they caused intense pain and humiliation on the part of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente. The Resolution of the Third Division of this Court dated September 15, 2004 denying Mercados motion for reconsideration is well explained. A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal." A party must have first availed of appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief before an action for annulment can prosper. Its obvious rationale is to prevent the party from benefiting from his inaction or negligence. Also, the action for annulment of judgment must be based either on (a) extrinsic fraud or (b) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.18 Having failed to avail of the

remedies and there being a clear showing that neither of the grounds was present, the petition must be dismissed. Only a disgruntled litigant would find such legal disposition unacceptable. Mercado bewails the denial by the Third Division of his petition through a mere Minute Resolution and afterreinstating the petition. Apparently, he finds the Courts manner of denial and change of heart unusual and casts sinister undertone to them. In In Re Laureta,19 we ruled that the Court is not "duty-bound" to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given depending on its evaluation of a case. In the same case, we held that "the recall of a due course Order after a review of the records of the case is a common occurrence in the Court." Like the respondents in the said case, Mercado should not think that it is only his petition which has been subjected to such recall. The Third Division initially denied Mercados petition because it is apparent on its face that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment. Considering his motion for reconsideration alleging that the Appellate Court merely relied on technical rules of procedure and that his former counsel committed gross negligence, the Third Division took the most prudent course by reinstating the petition. Now, after considering the petition and the comment thereon, the Third Division was convinced that, indeed, the Appellate Court did not commit any reversible error. Is this irregular? The answer is a resounding "no." The reinstatement of a petition does not guarantee that it will be subsequently granted. Otherwise, the filing of comment and subsequent pleadings would be an exercise in futility. Now, in a bid to escape liability for contempt, Mercado invokes freedom of speech and privacy of communication. We are not persuaded. A person charged with contempt of court for his utterances which clearly constitute contempt may not ordinarily escape liability by merely invoking the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. Liberty of speech must not be confused with abuse of such liberty. When he attributed those contemptuous remarks to Chief Justice

Davide and the ponente, Mercado abused such liberty. His statements cast aspersions to their reputation and integrity and create a distrust to the Judiciary. The fact that Mercados letter was addressed only to the Chief Justice does not rinse it of its contemptuous character. In In Re Laureta,20 we ruled that letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court. Accordingly, we hold Mercado guilty of indirect contempt of court. Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides: Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: xxxxxx d. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; xxxxxx As for Atty. Villanueva, while Justice Dacudao did not categorically state that he (Atty. Villanueva) told Mercado that Chief Justice Davide exerted "tremendous pressure" on the ponente, the reason why the petition was dismissed for the second time, however, we are inclined to believe that Atty. Villanueva gave such information to Mercado. Not only that, Atty. Villanueva also revealed the name of the ponente; that he and the ponente have known each other since 1964; and that the ponente would be at the wake of his mother, thus:

After a careful and conscientious examination of the evidence adduced in the instant case, the undersigned investigator is fully convinced that it was only through Atty. Villanueva that petitioner could have learned or known the name of the ponente in the case. As between petitioner and Atty. Villanueva, the undersigned investigator in inclined to give more credence to the testimony of petitioner. Not only was petitioner consistent, firm, and candid and detailed in his testimony, but he was also able to corroborate his claims, by submitting his diary which contained vital entries and by presenting the testimony of his nephew. x x x Moreover, it was admitted by Atty. Villanueva that he and Justice Gutierrez have known each other since 1964 and that Justice Gutierrez was in the wake of his mother. These admissions tend to strengthen the allegations of petitioner that Atty. Villanueva was the one who told him the name of the ponente; that Atty. Villanueva told him that he and the ponente are very close; and that when petitioner attended the wake of Atty. Villanuevas mother, he was told by Atty. Villanueva that Justice Gutierrez, the ponente, was coming. Rule 15.06 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body." Further, Rule 15.07 provides that "a lawyer must impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness." Atty. Villanueva took the forbidden course. In informing Mercado that he was "a very very good, close and long time friend" of the ponente, Atty. Villanueva impressed upon the former that he can obtain a favorable disposition of his case. However, when his petition was dismissed twice, Mercados expectation crumbled. This prompted him to hurl unfounded, malicious, and disrespectful accusations against Chief Justice Davide and the ponente. We have repeatedly admonished lawyers from making bold assurances to their clients. A lawyer who guarantees the successful outcome of a litigation will exert heavy pressure and employ any means to win the case at all costs. But when the case is lost, he will blame the courts, placing them under a cloud of suspicion. As what happened in this case, Atty. Villanuevas statements led Mercado, not only to suspect but also to believe, that the entire Court, together with

Chief Justice Davide and the ponente, could be pressured or influenced, Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to courts and the judicial officers.21 Atty. Villanuevas conduct, no doubt, degraded the integrity and dignity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente and this Court as well. Thus, we find Atty. Villanueva also guilty of indirect contempt of court. On the appropriate penalty, the general rule is that courts have inherent power to impose a penalty for contempt reasonably commensurate with the gravity of the offense. And that the degree of punishment for contempt is said to lie within the sound discretion of the court.22 Considering the circumstances obtaining herein, we believe that Mercado and Atty. Villanueva should be fined P50,000.00 each and warned that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty. One last word. The reason for the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without such guarantee, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.23 Thus, we must act to preserve its honor and integrity from assaults of disrespect. One reason why respect of the public for the Judiciary has diminished is because of unscrupulous lawyers who imply that judges and justices can be influenced or bribed. Such conduct has no place in the legal profession. WHEREFORE, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Atty. Jose P. Villanueva are declared GUILTY of indirect contempt of court. They are FINED P50,000.00 each and WARNED that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Villanuevas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

being brought against respondent judge in his capacity as an attorney does not help the cause of complainant, for the change in the form of action or remedy pursued does not bar the application of the rule of res judicata. 3 On the other hand, the record establishes that Atty. Lim was merely performing his duty as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3827 when he did what is now complained of. 4

A.C. No. 3695 February 24, 1992 DOMINGO C. GAMALINDA, complainant, vs. AYTYS. FERNANDO ALCANTARA and JOSELITO LIM, respondents. R E SO L U T I O N In Civil Case No. 3827 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch LXIII, Salud Balot and Felicidad Balot had sued the heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda 5 for reconveyance, with damages, of the eastern half of Lot No. 3217 of the cadastral survey of Victoria, Tarlac, which was allegedly inadvertently included in the original certificate of title of Apolinario Gamalinda. In the course of the trial, plaintiffs were able to secure a writ of preliminary injunction against the "defendants, their agents, representatives or other persons acting in their behalf, ordering them to desist from threshing and carting away the palay harvest on Lot No. 3217 of the Cadastral Survey of Victoria, . . . until further order of this Court. . . ." 6 This injunction was made permanent in the decision of the lower court rendered on July 26, 1977 in favor of the plaintiffs. Pending appeal to the Court of Appeals, complainant herein entered a portion of the area in dispute, in the belief that the whole of Lot No. 3217 belonged to him by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Quitclaim 7executed in his favor by the heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda on May 6, 1985. It must be noted that at that time title to Lot No. 3217 was still in the name of Apolinario Gamalinda. Thus, when Maximiano Tiburcio, Protacio Cabatino and Maximo Mateo, tenants of Salud Balot, entered the portion being cultivated by complainant, the latter reported the incident to the police. From Salud Balot's viewpoint, it was complainant who intruded into her land. Relying therefore on the injunction issued by the lower court, she filed through counsel, Atty. Lim, a motion to declare complainant Gamalinda in contempt of court. Complainant interposed the defense that the area in dispute in Civil Case No. 3827 was different from the area occupied by him. To resolve the issue, the lower court with his agreement, ordered a resurvey of Lot No. 3217. The result of the resurvey showed that

NARVASA, C.J.: In his verified letter-complaint dated June 19, 1991, 1 complainant Domingo Gamalinda charges retired Judge Fernando Alcantara and Atty. Joselito Lim with grave abuse of their profession ("labis nilang pag-abuso sa kanilang propesyon"), deception, threats, dishonoring and injuring the reputation of said complainant and bringing about the loss of his land. The Court finds the charges to be without basis and accordingly dismisses them. The administrative complaint against retired Judge Fernando Alcantara is a futile attempt to resurrect the charges filed against him in Adm. Matter No. MTJ-90-494, which were dismissed by this Court in its resolution of September 8, 1988 for having become moot and academic. Adm. Matter No. MTJ-90-494 was filed only on July 22, 1987, or five (5) months after the respondent judge's retirement from the service on February 3, 1987. No motion for reconsideration having been seasonably filed by complainant, that resolution has become final and executory. It serves as a bar to a relitigation of the same charges against respondent judge. 2 That those charges are now

contrary to complainant's claim, the lot occupied by him was the very same land involved in Civil Case No. 3827. Accordingly, the lower court declared complainant in contempt in an order dated July 24, 1986 which was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals in a decision rendered on March 21, 1998. 8 Considering that Tiburcio, Cabatino and Mateo are tenants of Salud Balot and complainant is the successor-in-interest of the heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda, the defendants in Civil Case No. 3827, it is clearly erroneous for complainant to claim that neither he nor Tiburcio, Cabatino and Mateo had anything to do with said civil case. Being privies to the parties, they are necessarily bound by the orders rendered in said case. On October 12, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, affirming in toto the judgment of the lower court in Civil Case No. 3827. 9 After the appellate court's decision had become final, Atty. Lim moved for the execution of the affirmed judgment, 10 and when the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied, filed an "Urgent Motion to Require Domingo Gamalinda to Surrender TCT 186299 to the Clerk of Court and to Authorize the Latter to Execute Reconveyance of Lot 3217-A in Favor of Plaintiffs." 11 That motion was granted by the lower court, but complainant refused to surrender the Owner's Copy of TCT No. 186299, prompting Atty. Lim to file the questioned "Motion to Declare Owner's Copy of TCT 186299 Null and Void," 12 which the lower court granted on July 31, 1989. It is clear from the foregoing that the questioned acts of Atty. Lim were all done in line with his duty to prosecute his clients' cause in Civil Case No. 3827. The first motion was filed to protect his clients' possessory rights over the property in dispute while the second motion was made to procure execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 3827. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 13He shall serve his client with competence and diligence, 14 and his duty of entire devotion to his client's cause not only requires, but entitles him to employ every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latter's cause to succeed. 15 An attorney's duty to safeguard the client's interests commences from his retainer until the effective release from the

case 16 or the final disposition of the whole subject matter of the litigation. 17 During that period, he is expected to take such reasonable steps and such ordinary care as his client's interests may require. This is precisely what Atty. Lim was doing when he filed the motions complained of. He should be commended, not condemned, for diligently and competently performing his duties as an attorney; With respect to the complainant's contention that the Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land relied upon by the lower and appellate courts in Civil Case No. 3827 is a forged or fake instrument, suffice it to say that this is a matter that should have been litigated in said case instead of being raised for the first time in these proceedings. In any case, there being no showing that Atty. Lim was aware of any defect in that deed, the charge of deception against him will not lie. Absent, too, is any showing that Atty. Lim had anything to do with the preparation of the criminal information, and for the same reason he cannot be called to account for it. ACCORDINGLY, the administrative charges against retired Judge Fernando Alcantara and Atty. Joselito Lim are DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 4380 October 13, 1995 NICANOR GONZALES and SALUD B. PANTANOSAS, complainants, vs. ATTY. MIGUEL SABACAJAN, respondent.

REGALADO, J.: This resolves the administrative case filed by Nicanor Gonzales and Salud B. Pantanosas against Atty. Miguel Sabacajan on February 14, 1995, 1 the verified complaint wherefor alleges: xxx xxx xxx 4. That sometime in October, 1994, complainants were informed by the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City that the complainants' owner's duplicate of title covering their lands, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-91736 and T-91735 were entrusted to the office secretary of the respondent who in torn entrusted the same to respondent; 5. That respondent admitted and confirmed to the complainants that their titles are in his custody and has even shown the same (to) the complainant Salud B. Pantanosas but when demanded (sic) to deliver the said titles to the complainant in a formal demand letter, marked as ANNEX "A," respondent refused and continues to refuse without any justification to give their titles (and) when confronted, respondent challenged the complainants to file any case in any court even in the Honorable Supreme Court; 6. That respondent's dare or challeng(e) is a manifestation of his arrogance taking undue advantage of his legal profession over the simplicity, innocence and ignorance of the complainants, one of whom is his blood relative, his aunt, for which complainants shudder with mental anguish; 7. That due to his challeng(e), the complainants sent a letter to the Honorable Supreme Court for enlightenment, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "B", for which the Honorable Supreme Court required 19 legible copies of a verified complaint;

8. That in spite of repeated demands, request(s) and pleas towards (sic) respondent, respondent still fail(ed) and stubbornly refused without justification to surrender the said titles to the rightful owners, the complainants here(in), which act is tantamount to willful and malicious defiance of legal and moral obligations emanating from his professional capacity as a lawyer who had sworn to uphold law and justice, to the prejudice and damage of the complainants; 2 xxx xxx xxx On March 22, 1995, the Court required respondent to comment on the foregoing complaint. In his unverified "Answer" thereto, respondent admitted having met Salud Pantanosas but claims that, to his recollection, "Nicanor Gonzales/Serdan" has never been to his office. Respondent likewise denied that he challenged anyone to file a case in any court, much less the Supreme Court. He also claims that he referred complainant Pantanosas to his client, Mr. Samto M. Uy of Iponan, Cagayan de Oro City, for whom he worked out the segregation of the titles, two of which are the subject of the instant case. 3 Respondent likewise denies complainants' allegation that he is arrogant, in contrast to the innocence, simplicity and ignorance of said complainants. He contends that the truth of the matter is that complainants have been charged with a number of criminal and civil complaints before different courts. He also asserts that he was holding the certificates of title in behalf of his client, Samto M. Uy. 4 Atty. Sabacajan stresses, by way of defense, that "the instant action was chosen precisely to browbeat him into delivering the Certificates of Title to them without said certificates passing the hands of Mr. Samto Uy with whom the complainants have some monetary obligations." 5 In its resolution dated June 26, 1995, 6 for internal administrative purposes the Court referred this case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the corresponding evaluation, report and recommendation.

From the foregoing proceedings taken on this matter, the Court finds that respondent admitted having taken possession of the certificates of title of complainants but refused to surrender the same despite demands made by the latter. It follows, therefore, that it was incumbent upon him to show that he was legally justified in doing so. Instead, all he did was to inform this Court that "his obligation to deliver the certificates to Mr. Samto Uy excludes the delivery of said certificates to anyone else." 7 Respondent attached some certifications to his "Answer" to support his contention that complainants are notorious characters. However, the certifications indicate that most of the cases stated therein, especially those involving fraud, have been dismissed. With respect to those still pending, there is no indication as to the identity of the party who instituted the same, aside from the consideration that the remedy thereon is judicial in nature. At any rate, these aspersions on the character of complainants have no bearing on the misconduct of respondent charged in the present case. Respondent likewise submitted xerox copies of certain certificates of title in an effort to explain why he kept the certificates of title of complainants, that is, supposedly for the purpose of subdividing the property. However, an examination of the same does not show any connection thereof to respondent's claim. In fact, the two sets of certificates of title appear to be entirely different from each other. As a lawyer, respondent should know that there are lawful remedies provided by law to protect the interests of his client. The records do not show that he or his client have availed of said remedies, instead of merely resorting to unexplained, if not curt, refusals to accommodate the requests of complainants. Also, he cannot be unaware of the imposable sanctions on a counsel who resorts to unlawful means that would cause injustice to the adversaries of his client. The Court accordingly finds that respondent has not exercised the good faith and diligence required of lawyers in handling the legal affairs of their clients. If complainants did have the alleged monetary obligations to his client, that does not warrant his summarily confiscating their certificates of title since there is no showing in the records that the same were given as collaterals to secure the payment of a debt. Neither is there any intimation that there is a court order authorizing him to take and retain custody of said certificates of title.

Apparently, respondent has disregarded Canon 15, Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall impress upon his client the need for compliance with the laws and principles of fairness. Instead, he unjustly refused to give to complainants their certificates of titles supposedly to enforce payment of their alleged financial obligations to his client and presumably to impress the latter of his power to do so. Canon 19, Rule 19.01 ordains that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present unfounded charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Respondent has closely skirted this proscription, if he has not in fact transgressed the same. On the foregoing considerations, the Court desires and directs that respondent should forthwith return the certificates of title of complainants. To ensure the same, he should be placed under suspension until he presents to the Court proof of receipt by complainants of their respective copies of Certificates of Title Nos. T91735 and T-91736 or a judicial order or document authorizing or justifying the retention of possession thereof by respondent or his aforenamed client. WHEREFORE, Atty. Miguel Sabacajan is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until he can duly show to this Court that the disputed certificates of title have been returned to and the receipt thereof duly acknowledged by complainants, or can present a judicial order or appropriate legal authority justifying the possession by him or his client of said certificates. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar or any other administrative misconduct will be punished more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the personal records of respondent and have copies thereof furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and duly circularized to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC A.C. No. 7418 October 9, 2007

and recommended that respondent be suspended for three years from the practice of law.4 In the Report, Commissioner Funa found that:

ANDREA BALCE CELAJE, complainant, vs. ATTY. SANTIAGO C. SORIANO, respondent. RESOLUTION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before this Court is a disbarment case filed against Atty. Santiago C. Soriano (respondent) for gross misconduct. In the Complaint dated June 1, 2005 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Andrea Balce Celaje (complainant) alleged that respondent asked for money to be put up as an injunction bond, which complainant found out later, however, to be unnecessary as the application for the writ was denied by the trial court. Respondent also asked for money on several occasions allegedly to spend for or to be given to the judge handling their case, Judge Milagros Quijano, of the Regional Trial Court, Iriga City, Branch 36. When complainant approached Judge Quijano and asked whether what respondent was saying was true, Judge Quijano outrightly denied the allegations and advised her to file an administrative case against respondent.1 In his Answer, respondent denied the charges against him and averred that the same were merely concocted by complainant to destroy his character. He also contended that it was complainant who boasted that she is a professional fixer in administrative agencies as well as in the judiciary; and that complainant promised to pay him large amounts of attorney's fees which complainant however did not keep.2 Both parties appeared in the Mandatory Conference and Hearing on January 18, 2006. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision.3 In the Report and Recommendation dated January 24, 2006, IBPCommission on Bar Discipline Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa found respondent guilty of Gross Misconduct in his relations with his client

During the hearing conducted, Complainant alleged that she has remitted to Respondent, on various dates, amounts of money totaling to more or less P270,000.00. According to Complainant the amounts given in several instances were all undocumented and not acknowledged in writing. However, for the alleged amount of P14,000.00 intended for an injunction bond, some documents in writing were made. xxxx While the amounts remitted by Complainant to Respondent were never acknowledged in writing and were not documented, due credence must be given to Complainant's allegations especially over the amount ofP14,800.00 intended for the injunction. Indeed, there is no ill-motive at all on the part of Complainant to fabricate charges against Respondent. Unfortunately, none of the P270,000.00 given by Complainant to Respondent was ever documented and therefore accuracy of the amounts could not be established and substantiated. What has been documented only pertains to the unpaid P5,800.00 intended for the injunction bond. However, it has been established that indeed an accumulated amount of P9,000.00 has been remitted by Respondent to Valentina Ramos and only the unpaid P5,800.00 remains unaccounted for by the Respondent. During the hearing conducted, Complainant reiterated her accusations against the Respondent and expressed that she has been aggrieved and misled by Respondent. According to Complainant, this was made possible because she was not aware of or knowledgeable on legal matters and practices.

Respondent has only offered denials to the charges. However, the circumstances gives credibility to herein Complainant in the absence of any evil motive on her part. Accordingly, Respondent is clearly guilty of misappropriating his client's funds in the amount of P5,800.00.While other amounts may have been misappropriated, Complainant alleges P270,000.00, the exactness of the amounts could not be established. Respondent is also guilty of deceiving his client and abusing his client's confidence in requesting for several amounts of money on the pretense that he had to spend for and pay the trial judge. Respondent is hereby ORDERED to immediately deliver the unaccounted for amount of Five Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P5,800.00) to Complainant, submitting a Compliance Report thereon.5 On September 8, 2006, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a Resolution thus: RESOLVED to ADOPT and Approve, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A-; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for misappropriating his client's funds, Atty. Santiago C. Soriano is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and likewise Ordered to immediately deliver that unaccounted amount of P5,800.00 to complainant.6 The IBP transmitted the Notice of Resolution issued by the IBP Board of Governors as well as the records of the case, pursuant to Rule 139B.7 Then in compliance with the Court's Resolution dated February 20, 2007, the IBP through Director for Discipline Rogelio Vinluan informed the Court that per records of the IBP, no Motion for Reconsideration was filed by either party.

The Court agrees with the IBP Resolution. The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), particularly Canon 16 thereof, mandates that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. He shall account for all money or property collected or received from his client8 and shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.9 As found by Commissioner Funa, it was established that respondent could not account for P5,800.00 which was part of the sum given by complainant to him for the purpose of filing an injunctive bond. Respondent admitted having received from complainant P17,800.00 on April 19, 2002 for the preliminary injunction10 and admitted to having a balance of P9,000.00 in his promissory note to the Manila Insurance Co., Inc. dated April 23, 2002, which was reduced to P5,800.00 by reason of an additional payment of P4,000.00,11 leaving an amount of P5,800.00 unaccounted for. The affidavit of the insurance agent, Valentina Ramos, dated December 8, 2005 also states that even up to said date, respondent had not yet paid the balance of P5,800.00.12 Respondent's failure to return the money to complainant upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.13 It is a gross violation of general morality and of professional ethics and impairs public confidence in the legal profession which deserves punishment.14 As the Court has pronounced, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client.15 The Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar who are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Indeed, membership in the legal profession is a privilege.16 The attorney-client relationship is highly fiduciary in nature.

As such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the lawyer.17 In Small v. Banares18 the respondent was suspended for two years for violating Canon 16 of the CPR, particularly for failing to file a case for which the amount of P80,000.00 was given him by his client, and for failing to return the said amount upon demand. Considering that similar circumstances are attendant in this case, the Court finds the Resolution of the IBP imposing on respondent a two-year suspension to be in order. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Santiago C. Soriano is found GUILTY of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent is further ordered to restitute to his clients through Andrea Balce Celaje, within 30 days from notice, the amount of P5,800.00. Respondent is directed to submit to the Court proof of payment within fifteen days from payment of the full amount. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's record in this Court. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City EN BANC A.C. No. 8159 April 23, 2010 (Formerly CBD 05-1452)

REYNARIA BARCENAS, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ANORLITO A. ALVERO, Respondent. DECISION PERALTA, J.: Before us is a Complaint1 dated May 17, 2005 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero filed by Reynaria Barcenas with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1452, now Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8159. The facts as culled from the records are as follows: On May 7, 2004, Barcenas, through her employee Rodolfo San Antonio (San Antonio), entrusted to Atty. Alvero the amount of P300,000.00, which the latter was supposed to give to a certain Amanda Gasta to redeem the rights of his deceased father as tenant of a ricefield located in Barangay San Benito, Victoria, Laguna. The receipt of the money was evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt2 dated May 7, 2004. In the said receipt, Atty. Alvero said that he would deposit the money in court because Amanda Gasta refused to accept the same.3 Later, Barcenas found out that Atty. Alvero was losing a lot of money in cockfights. To check if the money they gave Atty. Alvero was still intact, Barcenas pretended to borrow P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00 and promised to return the amount when needed or as soon as the case was set for hearing. However, Atty. Alvero allegedly replied, "Akala nyo ba ay madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte na?" Subsequently, Barcenas discovered that Atty. Alvero did not deposit the money in court, but instead converted and used the same for his personal needs. In his letters dated August 18, 20044 and August 25, 2004,5 Atty. Atty. Alvero admitted the receipt of theP300,000.00 and promised to return the money. The pertinent portions of said letters are quoted as follows:

Dahil sa kagustuhan ng iyong amo na maibalik ko ang perang tinanggap ko sa iyo, lumakad ako agad at pilit kong kinukuha kahit iyon man lang na hiniram sa akin na P80,000.00 pero hindi karakapraka ang lumikom ng gayong halaga. Pero tiniyak sa akin na sa Martes, ika-24 ng buwan ay ibibigay sa akin. Bukas ay tutungo ako sa amin upang lumikom pa ng karagdagang halaga upang maisauli ko ang buong P300,000.00. Nakikiusap ako sa iyo dahil sa ikaw ang nagbigay sa akin ng pera na bigyan mo ako ng kaunting panahon upang malikom ko ang pera na ipinagkatiwala mo sa akin, hanggang ika-25 ng Agosto, 2004. x x x"6 Maya-mayang alas nuwebe (9:00) titingnan ang lupang aking ipinagbibili ng Dalawang Milyon. Gustong-gusto ng bibili gusto lang makita ang lupa dahil malayo, nasa Cavinti. Kung ok na sa bibili pinakamatagal na ang Friday ang bayaran. Iyong aking sinisingil na isang P344,000.00 at isang P258,000.00 na utang ng taga-Liliw ay darating sa akin ngayong umaga bago mag alas otso. Kung maydala ng pambayad kahit magkano ay ibibigay ko sa iyo ngayong hapon. xxxx Lahat ng pagkakaperahan ko ay aking ginagawa, pati anak ko ay tinawagan ko na. Pakihintay muna lang ng kauting panahon pa, hindi matatapos ang linggong ito, tapos ang problema ko sa iyo. Pasensiya ka na."7 However, as of the filing of the instant complaint, despite repeated demands, Atty. Alvero failed to return the same. Thus, Barcenas prayed that Atty. Alvero be disbarred for being a disgrace to the legal profession. On March 30, 2005, the IBP-CBD ordered Atty. Alvero to submit his Answer to the complaint.8 In compliance, in his Answer9 dated April 18, 2005, Atty. Alvero claimed that he did not know Barcenas prior to the filing of the instant complaint nor did he know that San Antonio was an employee of

Barcenas. He alleged that he came to know Barcenas only when the latter went to him to borrow P60,000.00 "from the amount entrusted to Rodolfo San Antonio" who entrusted to respondent.ten.lihpwal At that time, Atty. Alvero claimed that San Antonio was reluctant to grant the request because it might jeopardize the main and principal cause of action of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) case. Atty. Alvero, however, admitted that he received an amount of P300,000.00 from San Antonio, though he claimed that said money was the principal cause of action in the reconveyance action.10 Atty. Alvero stressed that there was no lawyer-client relationship between him and Barcenas. He, however, insisted that the lawyerclient relationship between him and San Antonio still subsisted as his service was never severed by the latter. He further emphasized that he had not breached the trust of his client, since he had, in fact, manifested his willingness to return the said amount as long as his lawyer-client relationship with San Antonio subsisted. Finally, Atty. Alvero prayed that the instant complaint be dismissed. On June 20, 2005, the IBP-CBD notified the parties to appear for the mandatory conference.11 Meanwhile, in a separate Affidavit12 dated September 19, 2005, San Antonio narrated that he indeed sought Atty. Alveros professional services concerning an agricultural land dispute. He claimed that Atty. Alvero made him believe that he needed to provide an amount of P300,000.00 in order to file his complaint, as the same would be deposited in court. San Antonio quoted Atty. Alvero as saying: "Hindi pwedeng hindi kasabay ang pera sa pagpa-file ng papel dahil tubusan yan, kung sakaling ipatubos ay nasa korte na ang pera." Believing that it was the truth, San Antonio was forced to borrow money from Barcenas in the amount of P300,000.00. Subsequently, San Antonio gave the said amount to Atty. Alvero, in addition to the professional fees, as shown by an acknowledgment receipt.13 San Antonio further corroborated Barcenas allegation that they tried to borrow P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00 they gave to Atty. Alvero after they found out that the latter lost a big amount of money in cockfighting. He reiterated that Atty. Alvero declined and stated, "Akala nyo ba ay madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte na." Later on, they found out that Atty. Atty. Alvero lied to them since the money was

never deposited in court but was instead used for his personal needs. For several times, Atty. Alvero promised to return the money to them, but consistently failed to do so. San Antonio submitted Atty. Atty. Alveros letters dated August 18, 200414 and August 25, 200415 showing the latters promises to return the amount of P300,000.00. During the mandatory conference, Atty. Alvero failed to attend despite notice. Thus, he was deemed to have waived his right to participate in the mandatory conference. In its Report and Recommendation dated May 21, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Alvero be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for gross misconduct. Atty. Alvero was, likewise, ordered to immediately account for and return the amount of P300,000.00 to Barcenas and/or Rodolfo San Antonio. The pertinent portion thereof reads: The record does not show and no evidence was presented by respondent to prove that the amount ofP300,000 which was entrusted to him was already returned to complainant or Rodolfo San Antonio, by way of justifying his non-return of the money, respondent claims in his Answer that the P300,000 "was the source of the principal cause of action of the petitioner, Rodolfo San Antonio, in the above-cited DARAB Case No. R-0403-0011-04 as shown by a copy of the Amended Petition, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "1" and made an integral part hereof. A review of Annex 1, which in the Amended Petition dated October 31, 2004 and filed on November 3, 2004, will show that the Petitioner Rodolfo San Antonio is praying that he be allowed to cultivate the land after the P300,000 is consigned by Petitioner to the Honorable Adjudication Board. Up to the time of the filing of the instant complaint, no such deposit or consignment took place and no evidence was presented that respondent deposited the amount in court. The fact is respondent promised to return the amount (Annex "B" and "C" of the Complaint), but he failed to do so. The failure therefore of respondent to account for and return the amount of P300,000 entrusted or given to him by his client constitute

gross misconduct and would subject him to disciplinary action under the Code.16 In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification as to penalty the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it ordered that Atty. Alvero be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years and, likewise, ordered him to account for and return the amount of P300,000.00 to complainants within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice. The Office of the Bar Confidant redocketed the instant case as a regular administrative complaint against Atty. Alvero and, subsequently, recommended that this Court issue an extended resolution for the final disposition of the case. We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD. Undoubtedly, Atty. Alvero breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read: CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS. Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his unlawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. In the instant case, Atty. Alvero admitted to having received the amount of P300,000.00 from San Antonio, specifically for the purpose of depositing it in court. However, as found by the IBP-CBD, Atty. Alvero presented no evidence that he had indeed deposited the amount in or consigned it to the court. Neither was there any evidence that he had returned the amount to Barcenas or San Antonio. From the records of the case, there is likewise a clear breach of lawyer-client relations. When a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client.17 These, Atty. Alvero failed to do. Jurisprudence dictates that a lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and properties of his client in the course of his professional employment shall deliver the same to his client (a) when they become due, or (b) upon demand. In the instant case, respondent failed to account for and return the P300,000.00 despite complainants repeated demands.18 Atty. Alvero cannot take refuge in his claim that there existed no attorney-client relationship between him and Barcenas. Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed between them, case law has it that an attorney may be removed, or otherwise disciplined, not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.19

Atty. Alveros failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral soundness, and warranted the imposition of disciplinary action. It gave rise to the presumption that he converted the money for his own use, and this act constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.20They constitute gross misconduct and gross unethical behavior for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so. We come to the penalty imposable in this case. In Small v. Banares,21 the respondent was suspended for two years for violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for failing to file a case for which the amount of P80,000.00 was given him by the client, and for failing to return the said amount upon demand. Considering that similar circumstances are attendant in this case, the Court finds the Resolution of the IBP imposing on respondent a two-year suspension to be in order. As a final note, we reiterate: the practice of law is not a right, but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral character. The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.22 For the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character. Those who are unable or unwilling to comply with the responsibilities and meet the standards of the profession are unworthy of the privilege to practice law.23 WHEREFORE, Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008 of the IBP-CBD Board of Governors, which found respondent Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero GUILTY of gross misconduct,

is AFFIRMED. He is herebySUSPENDED for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Atty. Alvero as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance. This Decision shall be immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION A.C. No. 6651 February 27, 2006

complainants car from the Bureau of Customs. Respondent proposed to handle the case for a "package deal" of P60,000. Complainant agreed and initially gave respondent P10,000 for processing of the papers. In June 1993, respondent asked for P30,000 to expedite the release of the car. In both instances, respondent did not issue a receipt but promised to furnish complainant with a receipt from the Bureau of Customs. Since then, respondent failed to give complainant an update on the matter. Complainant repeatedly went to respondents house to inquire on the status of the release of the car. Complainant was always told that respondent was not around and to just return another day. This went on for more than a year. In April 1994, complainant went to the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") to file a complaint for estafa against respondent.1 The NBI set the complaint for investigation on 27 April 1994. Respondent wrote a letter2 to the NBI dated 26 April 1994, requesting for postponement of the investigation to 12 May 1994. Respondent stated in his letter that he would settle the matter amicably with complainant and return theP40,000. Respondent failed to appear for the investigation scheduled on 12 May 1994. Respondent sent another letter3 to the NBI dated 23 May 1994, requesting for the suspension of the proceedings because he had partially settled the case. Respondent attached the acknowledgment receipt4 signed by complainant representing the partial refund of P20,000. Respondent promised to pay the balance on or before 8 June 1994. However, respondent did not pay the balance. The NBI set the complaint for investigation twice and subpoenaed respondent but he failed to appear. On 22 January 1996, the NBI, through Director Mariano M. Mison, found insufficient evidence to prosecute respondent for estafa. Nevertheless, the NBI advised complainant to file a complaint for disbarment against respondent.5 On 30 April 1996, complainant filed a verified complaint6 for disbarment against respondent with the Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission") of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP").

EDUARDO P. MENESES, Complainant, vs. ATTY. RODOLFO P. MACALINO, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Eduardo P. Meneses ("complainant") against Atty. Rodolfo P. Macalino ("respondent") for violation of the lawyers oath. The Facts Complainant alleged that sometime in March 1993, respondent offered his legal services to complainant to help secure the release of

Complainant charged respondent with failure to render legal services, failure to refund balance of legal fees, and failure to apprise the complainant of the status of the case all in violation of the lawyers oath of office. In an Order7 dated 23 July 1998, Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("Commissioner Abbas") ordered respondent to submit his answer to the complaint. Respondent was also warned that if he failed to file an answer, the Commission would consider him in default and the case would be heard ex-parte. Although he received the Order, respondent failed to file an answer. The case was set for initial hearing on 7 May 2002. Despite receipt of the notice of hearing, respondent failed to appear. Complainant was present and he informed Commissioner Abbas that he had previously filed a complaint for estafa against respondent with the NBI. Commissioner Abbas then issued a subpoena duces tecum to Mr. Waldo Palattao, or his duly authorized representative, of the AntiFraud Action Division of the NBI for the case folder and all the documents pertaining to the complaint.8 Mr. Emil Rejano, a confidential agent of the NBI, submitted all the documents during the hearing on 29 July 2002.9 Further hearings were scheduled for 27 June 2002, 29 July 2002, 9 September 2002, 8 October 2002 and 5 November 2002. Despite due notice, respondent failed to appear on these dates. On 18 August 2004, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa ("Commissioner Funa"), who took over the investigation, issued an order submitting the case for decision based on the evidence on record. Respondents failure to file an answer and to attend the hearings were deemed a waiver of his right to participate in the proceedings and present evidence.10 The IBPs Report and Recommendationlavvph!1.net The IBP Board of Governors issued CBD Resolution No. XVI-2004414 ("IBP Resolution") dated 7 October 2004 adopting with modification11 Commissioner Funas Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP Board of Governors

recommended the imposition on respondent of a penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads: From the records of the case, there is clearly a breach of lawyerclient relations. Moreover, [r]espondent has continuously exhibited his adamant refusal to comply with his legal obligations to his client, despite many opportunities to settle the matter amicably. Aggravating this is [r]espondents utter disregard of the legal process before the NBI, choosing to ignore notices from the NBI in the middle of an investigation. In addition, [r]espondent has continuously disregarded the jurisdiction of this Commission. It is clear from the records of the case that [r]espondent has duly received the orders and notices from this Commission as evidenced by the [r]egistry [r]eturn [r]eceipts. In the absence of any counter-allegations from [r]espondent, which is by his own doing, the allegations of the [c]omplainant shall stand and be given its due credence.12 (Emphasis supplied) The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the instant case to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B13 of the Rules of Court. The Ruling of the Court The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 16,14 Rule 16.01,15 Rule 16.03,16 and Rule 18.0417 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"). Respondent Failed to Inform and to Respond to Inquiries of the Complainant Regarding the Status of the Case The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, it is the lawyers duty to keep the client regularly and fully updated on the developments of the clients case.18 The Code provides that "[a] lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information."19 The records show that after receiving P40,000, respondent was never heard of again. Respondent kept complainant in the dark about the status of the release of the car. Only after complainant filed a

complaint with the NBI did respondent communicate with complainant. Moreover, it appears that respondent failed to render any legal service to facilitate the cars release. In fact, respondent failed to secure the release of the car. Respondents failure to communicate with complainant was an unjustified denial of complainants right to be fully informed of the status of the case.20 Respondent Failed to Account and Return the Money He Received from Complainant The Code mandates that every "lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession."21 The Code further states that "[a] lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client."22 Furthermore, "[a] lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due and upon demand."23 When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.24 Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client.25 Respondent specifically received the P40,000 for his legal services and for the processing fee to facilitate the release of complainants car. Since respondent failed to render any legal service to complainant and he also failed to secure the cars release, respondent should have promptly accounted for and returned the money to complainant. But even after demand, respondent did not return the money. Again, respondent waited until complainant filed a complaint with the NBI before he refunded the P20,000. Even then, respondent failed to return the balance of P20,000 as he promised. Respondents failure to return the money to complainant upon demand is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety and a violation of the trust reposed on him.26 Respondents unjustified withholding of money belonging to the complainant warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.27 Respondent Failed to File an Answer and Attend the Hearings before the IBP

The Court notes that respondents actuation reveals a high degree of irresponsibility28 and shows his lack of respect for the IBP and its proceedings.29 Respondents attitude demonstrates a character which stains the nobility of the legal profession.30 On the Appropriate Penalty to be Imposed on Respondent The Court finds the penalty recommended by the IBP to suspend respondent from the practice of law for one year well-taken. Following the rulings of this Court, those found guilty of the same or similar acts were suspended for not less than six months from the practice of law.31 Considering respondents lack of prior administrative record, suspension from the practice of law for one year, and not disbarment as prayed for by complainant, serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the public and the legal profession. This Court will exercise its power to disbar only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.32 WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Rodolfo P. Macalino GUILTY of violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.03, and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Rodolfo P. Macalino from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this decision. Respondent isORDERED TO RETURN to complainant, within 30 days from notice of this decision, the full amount of P20,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of this decision until full payment. Respondent is furtherDIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment of the amount within 15 days from payment. Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 7021 February 21, 2007

Respondent was not able to present any document. This prompted complainant to demand for a full refund of the fees he had paid respondent.4 Complainant even hired the services of Atty. Rizalino Simbillo to recover the money from respondent. But respondent failed to return the money. Hence, complainant filed a case for disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against respondent. On 15 October 2004, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered respondent to submit his answer to the complaint. Respondent did not file an answer despite receipt of the order. On 21 January 2005, IBP Investigating Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes (IBP Commissioner Reyes) notified the parties to appear before him for a mandatory conference on 3 March 2005. Only complainant appeared at the conference. As there was no proof that respondent received the notice, IBP Commissioner Reyes reset the mandatory conference to 30 March 2005 and, later, to 14 April 2005. Respondent was warned that, if he fails to appear at the conference, the case will be considered submitted for resolution.1awphi1.net On the 14 April 2005 conference, only complainant appeared despite respondents receipt of the notice. The Commission on Bar Discipline considered the case submitted for resolution. The IBPs Report and Recommendation On 14 July 2005, IBP Commissioner Reyes submitted his Report and Recommendation (Report) with the finding that respondent failed to render any legal service to complainant despite having been paid for his services. The Report considered complainants evidence sufficient to find respondent guilty of violating Canons 16,5 18,6 and 197 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). IBP Commissioner Reyes recommended the imposition on respondent of a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years and that respondent be ordered to return complainants P80,000. In a Resolution dated 12 November 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report. The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the instant case to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.

MELVIN D. SMALL, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JERRY BANARES, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Melvin D. Small (complainant) against Atty. Jerry Banares1 (respondent) for failure to render legal services and to return the money received for his legal services. The Facts On 30 August 2001, complainant engaged the services of respondent in connection with several complaints to be filed against one Lyneth Amar (Amar). Complainant paid respondent P20,000 as acceptance fee.2 On 4 September 2001, complainant gave respondent P60,000 as filing fees for the cases against Amar.3Respondent then wrote a demand letter for Amar and talked to Amar on the phone. Respondent also informed complainant that he would be preparing the documents for the cases. Complainant consistently communicated with respondent regarding the status of the cases. But respondent repeatedly told complainant to wait as respondent was still preparing the documents. On 5 January 2002, complainant required respondent to present all the documents respondent had prepared for the cases against Amar.

The Courts Ruling We sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP. The Code provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.9 The Code states that a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.10 The records show that after receiving P80,000 respondent was never heard from again. Respondent failed to give complainant an update on the status of the cases. Moreover, it appears that respondent failed to file the appropriate cases against Amar. Respondents failure to communicate with complainant was an unjustified denial of complainants right to be fully informed of the status of the cases. When respondent agreed to be complainants counsel, respondent undertook to take all the necessary steps to safeguard complainants interests.11 By his inaction, respondent disregarded his duties as a lawyer. The Code also mandates that every lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys of his client that may come into his possession.12 Furthermore, a lawyer shall account for all money received from the client and shall deliver the funds of the client upon demand.13 In Meneses v. Macalino,14 the Court ruled that: When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client.15 Respondent specifically received P80,000 for his legal services and the filing fees for the cases against Amar. Since respondent failed to render any legal service to complainant and he failed to file a case against Amar, respondent should have promptly accounted for and returned the money to complainant. But even after demand, respondent did not return the money. Respondents failure to return

the money to complainant upon demand is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity.16 Moreover, respondents misconduct is aggravated by his failure to file an answer to the complaint and his refusal to appear at the mandatory conference. The IBP rescheduled the mandatory conference twice to give respondent a chance to answer the complaint. Still, respondent failed to appear, exhibiting his lack of respect for the IBP and its proceedings.17 The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary, requiring utmost good faith, loyalty, and fidelity on the part of the attorney. In this case, respondent clearly fell short of the demands required of him as a member of the Bar. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Jerry Banares GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 18 and Rules 16.01, 16.03, and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for two years effective upon finality of this Decision. We ORDER respondent to RETURN, within 30 days from notice of this decision, complainants P80,000, with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of this decision until full payment. We DIRECT respondent to submit to the Court proof of payment within fifteen days from payment of the full amount. Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION A.C. No. 7023 March 30, 2006

BUN SIONG YAO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LEONARDO A. AURELIO, Respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: On November 11, 2004, a complaint-affidavit1 was filed against Atty. Leonardo A. Aurelio by Bun Siong Yao before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking for his disbarment for alleged violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complainant alleged that since 1987 he retained the services of respondent as his personal lawyer; that respondent is a stockholder and the retained counsel of Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation and Solar Textile Finishing Corporation of which complainant is a majority stockholder; that complainant purchased several parcels of land using his personal funds but were registered in the name of the corporations upon the advice of respondent; that respondent, who was also the brother in-law of complainants wife, had in 1999 a disagreement with the latter and thereafter respondent demanded the return of his investment in the corporations but when complainant refused to pay, he filed eight charges for estafa and falsification of commercial documents against the complainant and his wife and the other officers of the corporation; that respondent also filed a complaint against complainant for alleged non-compliance with the reportorial requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City and another complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon City for alleged violation of Section 75 of the Corporation Code; that respondent also filed a similar complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. Complainant alleged that the series of suits filed against him and his wife is a form of harassment and constitutes an abuse of the confidential information which respondent obtained by virtue of his employment as counsel. Complainant argued that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he filed several suits not only against the complainant and the other officers of the corporation, but also against the two corporations of which he is both a stockholder and retained counsel.

Respondent claimed that he handled several labor cases in behalf of Solar Textile Finishing Corporation; that the funds used to purchase several parcels of land were not the personal funds of complainant but pertain to Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation; that since 1999 he was no longer the counsel for complainant or Solar Textile Finishing Corporation; that he never used any confidential information in pursuing the criminal cases he filed but only used those information which he obtained by virtue of his being a stockholder. He further alleged that his requests for copies of the financial statements were ignored by the complainant and his wife hence he was constrained to file criminal complaints for estafa thru concealment of documents; that when he was furnished copies of the financial statements, he discovered that several parcels of land were not included in the balance sheet of the corporations; that the financial statements indicated that the corporations suffered losses when in fact it paid cash dividends to its stockholders, hence, he filed additional complaints for falsification of commercial documents and violation of reportorial requirements of the SEC. On July 19, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner2 submitted a Report and Recommendation3 finding that from 1987 up to 1999, respondent had been the personal lawyer of the complainant and incorporator and counsel of Solar Farms & Livelihood Corporation. However, in 1999 complainant discontinued availing of the services of respondent in view of the admission of his (complainants) son to the bar; he also discontinued paying dividends to respondent and even concealed from him the corporations financial statements which compelled the respondent to file the multiple criminal and civil cases in the exercise of his rights as a stockholder. The investigating commissioner further noted that respondent is guilty of forum shopping when he filed identical charges against the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon City and in the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. It was also observed that respondent was remiss in his duty as counsel and incorporator of both corporations for failing to advise the officers of the corporation, which he was incidentally a member of the Board of Directors, to comply with the reportorial requirements of the SEC and the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Instead, he filed cases against his clients, thereby representing conflicting interests.

The investigating commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months4 which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors. We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP. We find that the professional relationship between the complainant and the respondent is more extensive than his protestations that he only handled isolated labor cases for the complainants corporations. Aside from being the brother-in-law of complainants wife, it appears that even before the inception of the companies, respondent was already providing legal services to the complainant, thus: COMM. NAVARRO:

Was he not also the lawyer at that time of complainant when he incorporated the second corporation in 1992? ATTY. AURELIO: Well, I was the one submitted the corporate papers and I think after that I have nothing to do with the SEC requirements regarding this corporation. Just to submit the incorporation papers to the SEC and anyway they have already done that before. They have already created or established the first corporation way back before the second corporation started and there was no instance where I dealt with the Financial Statement of the corporation with respect to its filing with the SEC. ATTY. OLEDAN:

Was there a formal designation or you where only called upon to do so? ATTY. AURELIO:

My only question is whether he incorporated and therefore was aware of the corporate matters involving Solar Farms? ATTY. AURELIO:

Well, I understand in order to show to the employees that they have labor lawyer and at that time I went to the office at least half day every week but that was cut short. And so when there are cases that cropup involving labor then they called me up. xxxx ATTY. OLEDAN: Will counsel deny that he was the personal lawyer of the complainant long before he joined the company? ATTY. AURELIO:

As a stockholder Im aware. ATTY. OLEDAN: As a lawyer? ATTY. AURELIO: Well, as a stockholder Im aware. xxxx ATTY. OLEDAN:

Yes, with respect to the boundary dispute between his land and his neighbor but the subject matter of all the cases I filed they all revolved around the Financial Statement of the 2 corporations. I never devolves any information with respect to labor cases and the MERALCO case with respect to boundary dispute, nothing I used. ATTY. OLEDAN:

You are not the one who filed. ATTY. AURELIO:

I was the one who filed the corporate paper but thats all the participation I had with respect to the requirement of the SEC with respect to the corporation. COMM. NAVARRO: So, you acted as legal counsel of the corporation even before the initial stage of the incorporation? ATTY. AURELIO: There are two (2) corporations involving in this case, Your Honor, and the first was I think Solar Textile and this was. COMM. NAVARRO: You were already the legal counsel? ATTY. AURELIO: No, this was created before I became a stockholder. COMM. NAVARRO: Who was then the legal counsel before of Solar? MR. YAO: Siya pa rin pero hindi pa siya stockholder. ATTY. OLEDAN: Because, Your Honor, he happens to be the brother-in-law of the wife of the complainant and he is the husband of the wife of her sister so thats why he was (inaudible) other legal matters even before the corporation that was formed and he became also a stockholder and in fact he charge the corporation certain amounts for professional service rendered it is part of the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon as annex to the complaint so he cannot say that he only presented, that he only filed the papers at SEC and aside from that when the corporation, the Solar Farms was already formed

and the property which he is now questioning was purchased by complainant. He was the one who negotiated with the buyer, he was always with the complainant and precisely acted as complainants personal lawyer. The truth of the matter he is questioning the boundary and in fact complainant had survey conducted in said parcel of land which he bought with the assistance and legal advice of respondent and in fact complainant gave him only a copy of that survey. Him alone. And he used this particular copy to insists that this property allegedly belong to the corporation when in truth and in fact he was fully aware that it was the complainants personal funds that were used to pay for the whole area and this was supported by the stockholders who admitted that they were aware that the parcel of land which he claims does not appear in the Financial Statement of the corporation was purchased by the complainant subject to reimbursement by the Board and should the corporation finally have sufficient fund to cover the payment advance by complainant then the property will be transferred to the corporation. All of these facts he was privy to it, Your Honor, so he cannot say that and he is also a stockholder but the fact is, prior to the incorporation and during the negotiation he was the personal counsel of the complainant.5 It appears that the parties relationship was not just professional, but they are also related by affinity. The disagreement between complainants wife and the respondent affected their professional relationship. Complainants refusal to disclose certain financial records prompted respondent to retaliate by filing several suits. It is essential to note that the relationship between an attorney and his client is a fiduciary one.6 Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.7

Notwithstanding the veracity of his allegations, respondents act of filing multiple suits on similar causes of action in different venues constitutes forum-shopping, as correctly found by the investigating commissioner. This highlights his motives rather than his cause of action. Respondent took advantage of his being a lawyer in order to get back at the complainant. In doing so, he has inevitably utilized information he has obtained from his dealings with complainant and complainants companies for his own end. Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.8 Lawyers cannot be allowed to exploit their profession for the purpose of exacting vengeance or as a tool for instigating hostility against any personmost especially against a client or former client. As we stated in Marcelo v. Javier, Sr.:9 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.10 (Emphasis supplied) In sum, we find that respondent's actuations amount to a breach of his duty to uphold good faith and fairness, sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonardo A. Aurelio is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this order of suspension to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.C. No. 5162 March 20, 2003

EMILIANO COURT TOWNHOUSES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, complainant, vs. ATTY. MICHAEL DIONEDA, respondent. BELLOSILLO, J.: A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY to the cause of his client mindful always of the trust and confidence reposed in him.1An attorney-at-law must serve his client with competence and diligence at all times,2 and never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,3 for it is his sworn duty to delay no man for money or malice and to conduct himself in a proper manner not just to his client, but also to the court, the legal profession and society at large. This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by the EMILIANO COURT TOWNHOUSES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION (ECTHA) against ATTY. MICHAEL DIONEDA. On 29 September 1997 ECTHA and respondent Dioneda entered into a Retainers Agreement wherein respondent lawyer agreed to handle the case of the complainant against LVF Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family Savings Bank by way of filing a Complaint-in-Intervention in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 4890-V-96, for P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and P1,000.00 as appearance fee per hearing.4 It was further agreed that respondent lawyer would update the complaint and work on the development of the case.5

In its Complaint ECTHA alleged that Atty. Dioneda, after receiving the amount of P20,000.00, did nothing for the development of the case and to update the complaint on the status of ECTHAs intended Complaint-in-Intervention. Due to the insistence of the members of the Association, Mr. Fernando Garcia, ECTHA President, was compelled to check the records of the case in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 75, and secured a certification from the Branch Clerk of Court dated 5 July 1999 that there was no motion for intervention filed in the case.6 On behalf of ECTHA Mr. Garcia repeatedly made oral demands for respondent to return the amount of P20,000.00 because he did not do anything to protect the rights and interests of the Association. Respondent Dioneda only made oral promises to pay, and in August 1999 he could no longer be contacted and the personnel in his office simply made excuses to Mr. Garcia.7 Through Mr. Garcia ECTHA referred the matter to Atty. Antonio L. Umali, who contacted respondent by telephone. Still, no response was made by respondent. On 18 August 1999 a letter dated 17 August 1999 was sent to Dioneda, but again there was no response.8 In his Comment filed before this Court, respondent Dioneda admitted that he and ECTHA entered into a Retainers Agreement; however, he averred that the Agreement did not cover only the Complaint-inIntervention as adverted to by the complainant. It also included the case before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) that the complainant filed against the developer of Emiliano Court Townhouses who refused to release to the members of the ECTHA their respective Deeds of Sale. At the time his legal services were engaged, Atty. Dioneda alleged that there was already a decision in favor of the complainant. Thereafter, respondent entered his appearance and filed a Motion for Execution with the HLURB. According to respondent Mr. Garcia would go with him and follow up the issuance of the Writ of Execution with the HLURB National Office. Respondent Dioneda further alleged that he wanted to pursue the Writ of Execution since he would attach it to the Complaint-in-Intervention, and that this was explained to the members of ECTHA. Respondent claimed that there was delay in the filing of the Complaint-in-Intervention because there was delay in the issuance by the HLURB of the Writ of Execution.

Respondent further averred that Mr. Garcia would call him at his residence and "spew invectives" at him. There would be no day that Mr. Garcia would not call respondent and hurl expletives at him and his parents. Respondent denied the allegation that ECTHA had made several demands on him and that he promised to pay sometime August 1999. After receiving the demand letter of ECTHA respondent immediately called up the residence of Mr. Garcia and informed him that he could get the money and the records of the case at his office. However, respondent informed ECTHA that a portion of the amount to be returned would be deducted as a reasonable fee for the efforts exerted by him. According to respondent, no representative of the complainant showed up at his law office. Respondent Dioneda denied the charge that he never attended to the case of the complainant and that he did nothing to protect the interest of its members. He asserted that there was no intention on his part to defraud them. The matter was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation. Hearings were set on at least five (5) separate dates. Despite due notice, respondent never attended the IBP administrative hearings. Thus the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline allowed the presentation of complainants evidence ex-parte against respondent on the 14 December 2001 hearing.9 On 13 February 2002 the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), through the designated Commissioner, recommended that respondent be found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Canons 17 and 18.10 The IBP held that the act of receiving professional fees and thereafter failing to render the corresponding legal service is a violation of the Canons. The penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law and an order for Dioneda to return the amount of P20,000.00 to his client in the interest of justice were recommended. On 29 June 2002, Resolution No. XV-2002-252 was passed by the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The sole issue in this case is whether Atty. Dioneda violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Admittedly

respondent received the amount of P20,000.00 as acceptance fee for handling a case to be filed in behalf of ECTHA. Despite receipt of the aforementioned fee, respondent allegedly failed to render the corresponding legal services to the complainant. We agree with the Report of IBP Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. The Complaint-in-Intervention was never filed and despite the pronouncement of respondent that he would return the attorneys fees to complainant, he never did. The issuance of the Writ of Execution in the HLURB should never have been a requirement imposed by respondent before a Complaint-in-Intervention could be filed. Before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, respondent Dioneda did not attend a single hearing to defend himself. Despite due notice, he did not attend the hearings scheduled on 19 March, 9 May, 20 June, 8 August and 14 December 2001. The parties were ordered to submit their respective position papers in the Order of 9 May 2001 of the CBD-IBP. Respondent never complied with the Order. Respondents lamentable attitude towards his clients case is clearly evident from his apparent disinterest in his own case for disbarment. Dioneda never bothered to present evidence in his defense. He disregarded all notices sent to him by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, which were personally served at his office address. He never appeared before the Commission despite several opportunities to do so and explain his side. It is reasonable to conclude that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, respondent committed an infringement of ethical standards. The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling the case of complainant ECTHA against LVF Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family Bank and subsequently failing to render such service is a clear violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Not only that. The acts of inexcusable negligence in legal matters entrusted to him and disloyalty to his client constitute major breaches of respondents oath as a lawyer.11 These acts that are inimical to his clients interests render respondent liable. A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his

rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability.12 Public interest demands that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability to preserve his clients cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyers inability to properly discharge his duty to his client may also mean a violation of his correlative obligations to the court, to his profession and to the general public. The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his clients interests commences from his retainer until his effective discharge from the case or the final disposition of the entire subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. The canons of the legal profession require that once an attorney agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion. Indeed, respondent neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by failing to file theComplaint-in-Intervention he undertook to handle, thus making him liable under Rule 18.03 of Canon 18. In Santos v. Lazaro this Court recognized Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a basic postulate in legal ethics stating that when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights.13 The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.14 However, the recommended penalty by the IBP is not commensurate to the acts complained of. Jurisprudence shows that heavier sanctions have been imposed for ethical violations of this nature, taking into consideration the gravity of the offense and the necessity of preserving the integrity of the legal profession. Following the latest rulings of this Court on disciplinary proceedings against erring attorneys, those found guilty of the same or similar acts were suspended for not less than six (6) months from the practice of law.

The facts of Sencio v. Calvadores bear a striking similarity to the present case.15 The respondent lawyer in Senciodid not return the money to the complainant after a demand therefor was made following his failure to file the case. This Court took to task the respondents attitude of not answering the complaint and in deliberately disregarding the orders and notices of the IBP on many occasions, holding that this attitude showed a character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession as he chose not to appear at the scheduled hearings despite due notice and warnings given.16 The IBP-appointed Commissioner had no other recourse but to receive the evidence of the complainant ex-parte.17 Accordingly, the respondent in Sencio was found guilty of violation of the lawyers oath, malpractice and gross misconduct, suspended for six (6) months, and ordered to return to his client the amount of P12,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of the resolution until the return of the amount.18 This Court in Garcia v. Manuel suspended the respondent lawyer from the practice of law for six (6) months and ordered him to render an accounting of all monies he received from the complainant.19 The counselor-at-law was found guilty of gross misconduct, especially for ineffectively handling the case of his client and failing to return the money given by that same client. In Rabanal v. Tugade20 and Galen v. Paguirigan,21 the respondent lawyers who failed to file a brief to the detriment of their respective clients were suspended by this Court for six (6) months on the first offense. The respondent attorney in Aromin v. Boncavil was found to have violated Canons 15, 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.22 He was suspended for six (6) months and warned that a repetition of a similar offense would be dealt with more severely. As to the amount of Atty. Dionedas compensation for his legal services, the general rule as to the conclusiveness of a valid written contract fixing attorneys fees cannot find application in the case at bar. This is due largely to the complainants request for a full refund of the attorneys fees given, and the respondents counter-proposal that a portion of the amount be deducted as a reasonable fee for the

efforts exerted by him. In a situation where both parties are deemed to have impliedly disregarded the contract and placed themselves in the position as though there was no express stipulation as to the attorneys fees, the lawyers compensation shall be determined on the basis of quantum meruit.23 Despite this settled principle of law on the compensation of an attorney for legal services, we rule against respondent lawyer in the present case. To deserve compensation for his legal services based on quantum meruit, respondent Dioneda must prove by substantial evidence that he is entitled to a reasonable fee for his efforts in pursuing the complainants case with the Court taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of his fees.24 However, due to respondents conspicuous absence at the administrative hearings for his disbarment set by the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline on at least five (5) different occasions, and the apparent lack of findings of fact to support the position of respondent, evidence required to establish attorneys fees was never adduced. For having missed several opportunities to present evidence in his favor without any satisfactory explanation as to his non-appearance, we are constrained to deny him compensation for his legal services on the basis of quantum meruit due to the lack of any factual basis to determine the value of his work as complainants counsel. Finally, Rivera v. Corral25 reiterates the purpose of administrative cases against lawyers in this manner The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer's oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

It must be stressed that the power to discipline advocates of the law should be exercised with extreme care, primarily on the notion of preserving the nobility of the law as a profession rather than on the incidental purpose of vindicating the rights of private parties against erring lawyers. The indispensable duty of this Court as the guardian of the bench and bar remains that of maintaining the peoples respect for the rule of law and the efficient administration of justice, while at the same time restoring the communitys faith in the legal profession. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Michael Dioneda is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months, which shall take effect from the date of notice of receipt of the finality of this Decision, with a WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty, and is ORDERED to RETURN to complainant Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of promulgation of this Decision until the full amount as directed, is returned. Let copy of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and entered into respondents personal records as an attorney and as a member of the Philippine Bar. SO ORDERED.