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FACTS: The appellants, both female, are seeking a review of a
judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court which held that they
were not entitled to marry each other.
They contend that they were deprived of their constitutional
right to marry, of association and to free exercise of religion
when they were refused the issuance of license.
ISSUE: W! two wom en can marry each other as protected
by the constitution.
HELD: !. There is no constitutional protection of the rights to
marry between couples of the same sex. "arriage has always
been considered the union between a man and a woman.
The appellants are prevented from marrying not by the statutes
of #entucky or the refusal to issue them a license, but rather by
their own incapability of entering into a marriage as it is
defined. $ license to enter into a status or relationship which
the parties are incapable of achieving is a nullity.
FACTS: %even couples of the same sex were not permitted by
the "assachusetts town clerks to ac&uire marriage licenses.
The couples then filed action for declaratory judgment against
the 'epartment and Commissioner of (ublic )ealth, asserting
that the denial of the 'epartment in providing marriage
licenses for them was again! !"#i$ #%&a' ($)!#*!i)n an+
+&# ($)*# $ig"! and that circumstances in which the
a,#n*# )- !"# -&'' '#ga' ($)!#*!i)n )- *ivi' .a$$iag# has
harmed not only the plaintiffs, but also their adopted children.
ISSUES: Whether or not the denial of marriage license to all
same*sex couples is against provisions of the "assachusetts
HELD: Court declared that barring an individual from the
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely
because that person would marry a person of the same sex
violates the "assachusetts Constitution.
RATIO: %tate interest+
1) Providing a favorable setting for procreation
2) Ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing
3) Preserving scarce State and financial resources
4) Avoid interstate conflict
1) Fertility is not a condition of marriage no privileged
form of intimacy or means of creating a family
2) !est interest of the child does not depend on parents"
se#ual orientation marital children reap a measure of
family stability and economic security
3) $ot true that same se# couples are more financially
independent benefits do not depend on %hether or
not couples are financially dependent on each other
4) Each state is independent
,arred access to the protections , benefits, and obligations of
civil marriage for same sex couples deprives them of
membership in community-s most rewarding and cherished
institutions ./amily0 1xclusion contradicts constitutional
principles of respect for individual autonomy and e&uality under
the law.
FACTS+ n !ovember 23, 2442, petitioner 5ommel Jacinto
'antes %ilverio filed a petition for the change of his first name
and sex in his birth certificate in the 5egional Trial Court of
"anila, ,ranch 6. )e alleged he had always identified himself
with girls since childhood.

/eeling trapped in a man-s body,
underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and
breast augmentation. )is attempts to transform himself to a
7woman7 culminated on January 28, 2449 when he underwent
sex reassignment surgery in ,angkok, Thailand. /rom then on,
petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
)e then sought to have his name in his birth
certificate changed from 75ommel Jacinto7 to 7"ely,7 and his
sex from 7male7 to 7female.7 $fter complying with the
re&uirement of publishing the petition in newspapers of general
circulation, no opposition to the petition was made.
RTC D#*ii)n )n J&n# 01 2334* 5endered a decision in favor
of petitioner
)owever, on $ugust 96, 244: the 5epublic of the (hilippines
.5epublic0, thru the %;, filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of $ppeals.
CA D#*ii)n )n F#,$&a$5 241 2336* 5endered a decision in
favor of the 5epublic
(etitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.
NATURE+ (etition for review on certiorari of a decision of the
ISSUES: 90 W! a person-s first name cannot be changed on
the ground of sex reassignment
< 20 W! the law allows the change of entry in the
birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment
:0 W! entries in the birth certificate can be
changed as to the first name or sex on the ground of e&uity
HELD: (etition is denied. Cost against petitioner.
RATIO: ./5" $'$(T0
7. A (#$)n8 -i$! na.# *ann)! ,# *"ang#+ )n !"#
g$)&n+ )- #9 $#aign.#n!.
* The %tate has an interest in the names borne by individuals
and entities for purposes of identification.
* $ change of name is a privilege, not a right.
* )ence, a petition for a change of name is controlled by
=$rt. :83 of the Civil Code states+ !o person can change his
name or surname without judicial authority.
=5.$. >4?6 .Clerical 1rror @aw0 amended $rt. :83, providing
an exception. Clerical or typographical errors and change of
first name or nickname can be made without undergoing
judicial process so long as the Amplementing 5ules and
5egulation of the said law is followed. This authority and power
is vested to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general concerned.
* An sum, the remedy and proceedings regulating change of
first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
* 5.$. >4?6, %ec. ?. ;rounds for Change of /irst !ame or
!ickname. B The petition for change of first name or nickname
may be allowed in any of the following cases+
.90 The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
.20 The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in the communityC or
.:0 The change will avoid confusion.
* (etitioner hinges his argument on the :rd ground. )owever,
the Court held that it would actually create confusion. )e was
unable to present compelling reasons for his claim.
* Technically, there were two reasons why the Court dismissed
the petition for a change of first name .not including sex0+ .a0 it
was outside the court-s jurisdiction as provided in 5.$. >4?6,
.b0 even if it was properly filed before the ffice of the Civil
5egistrar, the petition would still fail since there was no
compelling reason presented by the petitioner.
2. N) 'a: a''): !"# *"ang# )- #n!$5 in !"# ,i$!" *#$!i-i*a!#
a !) #9 )n !"# g$)&n+ )- #9 $#aign.#n!.
*Dnder 5.$. >4?6, no correction involving the change of
nationality, age, status, or sex is allowed, as stated in the
definition of what Eclerical or typographical error means.F
* $rt. ?48 and ?46 of the Civil Code provide for acts
.legitimiGation, adoption, etc.0, events .marriages,
naturaliGation, etc.0, and judicial decrees .legal separation,
annulment, etc.0 wherein errors may be corrected. )owever,
this doesn-t include the ground of sexual reassignment.
* "oreover, there is technically no error in the petitioner-s birth
certificate. What petitioner wants is simply to change the
* Dnder $rt. ?9: of the Civil Code, it states that+ $ll matters
pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws. Dnfortunately for the petitioner, there is no
special law.
4. N#i!"#$ .a5 #n!$i# in !"# ,i$!" *#$!i-i*a!# a !) -i$!
na.# )$ #9 ,# *"ang#+ )n !"# g$)&n+ )- #%&i!5.
*The 5TC erred when it stated that no harm may to others or to
society is made in allowing the correction of entries. At is noted
that one of the reasons why petitioner wanted to change his
birth certificate is to be able to marry. This poses serious public
issues. /irst is on the essential re&uisite of marriage that the
parties must be a man and a woman. %econd, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the @abor Code on employment of women,
certain felonies under the 5evised (enal Code

and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under 5ule
9:9 of the 5ules of Court.

Na!&$#+ $ppeal from a decision of the Court of /irst Anstance of
!ueva 1cija
Fa*!: /elipe %antiago invited /elicita "asilang, aged about
96 and his niece by his deceased wife, to accompany him to
an errand. $fter "asilang agreed, %antiago brought her to an
area hid from public view, and expressed his intention to have
sexual intercourse with her. When she refused to do so, he
raped her. $fterwards, he brought her to the house of his
uncle, $gaton %antiago, where a protestant minister wed the
defendant and "asilang. When she told his father what
happened, the latter initiated the prosecution for rape.
The Court of /irst Anstance of !ueva 1cija found the
defendant*appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
sentenced to prison .9?yrs 6mos 9day, with the accessories
prescribed by law0C also re&uired to endow the injured party
.(H440, to recogniGe and maintain the offspring, if
any .(9HImo0, and to pay the costs.
I&#: WI! Criminal liability of /elipe %antiago was
extinguished when he wed /elicita "asilang
D#*ii)n: !o it was not
Ra!i): The marriage between %antiago and "asilang was void
due to the fact that the latterJs consent was given under
duress. Consent to marry, being an essential re&uisite for the
validity, was not given voluntarily, thus renders the marriage
void. %antiago Js attitude towards "asilang also showed that
the motivation for the marriage was only to save him from
criminal prosecution and not to make her his wife.
FACTS: (laintiff ;odofredo ,uccat sought to annul his
marriage with respondent @uida "angonon de ,uccat. (laintiff
alleged that he consented to the marriage because the
respondent assured him that she was a virgin. )owever,
respondent gave birth to a nine*month old baby 6> days after
cohabiting. $s a result, plaintiff abandoned respondent.
ISSUE: W! the case at bar presents clear and irrefutable
evidence necessary for annulling the marriage.
HELD;RATIO: !. At is unbelievable that plaintiff did not
suspect the very advanced state of pregnancy of respondent.
There is no basis to consider the fraud in the case at bar.
DECISION: $ffirmed.
Ma5 771 7<60
P)n#n!#: ,engGon, J.
Fa*! an+ Ba*=g$)&n+ )- !"# Ca#: @ess than two years of being married, 1igenman re&uested for an annulment from his wive
;uerra. This is an appeal from the judgement of the Court of /irst Anstance dismissing 1igenman-s action.
L#ga' I&#;: W! the following issues annuls or voids the 1igenman*;uerra marriage+
a. 1igenman-s age and the lack of consent from his mother
b. 1igenman-s consent being obtained from intimidation
c. 1igenman*;uerra application for marriage license irregularity results to a lack of a valid license and therefore marriage void ab initio.
C)n!#n!i)n an+ R#)'&!i)n:
Eigenman Facts found by the Court Guerra
1igenman was more than sixteen
and less than twenty years of age at
the time of the marriage celebration.
An his application for marriage,
1igenman represented himself as 2H
years and 6 months of age.
)is marriage was solemniGed without
the consent of his mother.
1igenman-s mother discussed the
contemplated marriage with ;uerra-s
family. "other was also present at
the marriage ceremony. !ewlyweds
lived with the mother for :*? months.
(laintiff-s mother was present during
the marriage ceremony, they
)is consent was obtained through
the use of threat, intimidation and
force by ;uerra-s father
!o factual or legal basis. The
intimidation cited was merely an
admonition typical from concerned
The application for marriage license
was sworn before an officer not
legally authoriGed to administer oaths
resulting to a marriage license
without legal effect.
H#'+ an+ Ra!i): C/A ruling is affirmed.
!o, appellant is now estopped from denying. )e knowingly misrepresented himself and can therefore not claim for annulment. The
mother-s consent, although not in the written form only affects the issuance of the marriage license and is only a formal re&uisite, not
essential to the validity of a marriage solemniGed under a license with all other re&uisites valid.
!o, there was no reasonable and well grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon 1igenman-s person or property from the
alleged intimidating words.
!o, marriages may only become void ab initio if no marriage license exists, $ marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact
that it was wrongfully obtained.
Fa*!: "ayor !avarro is filing this administrative case against
Judge 'omagtoy for+
a. %olemniGing the marriage of "r. Tagadon K "s.
,orga, despite knowing that the former is only separated
from his first wife
b. (erforming a marriage ceremony for "r. %antiago K
"s. 'el 5osario outside his courtJs jurisdiction
An his defense 'omagtoy states that in the first case "r.
Tagadon had an affidavit stating that the latter has not seen his
wife for over seven years and is presumed to be dead and so
may remarry. Then in the other case "r. %umaylo he is
authoriGed by $rt. 8 of the /amily code .stating that as a
member of the judiciary he may solemniGe marriage0 and
applying $rt. 6 he may solemniGe it at any other place
re&uested by both parties in writing.
I&#?@: WI! the marriage of "r. Tagadon is validL
WI! a judge can solemniGe marriage outside his
jurisdiction upon written re&uest of the partiesL
H#'+: !o. The marriage of "r. Tagadon is void since he is only
separated from his wife and a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is re&uired before "r.
Tagadon can remarry.
!o. Judges appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and !T beyond. An a
jurisdiction beyond the judgesJ he has no authority and a formal
re&uisite is lacking.
N)!#: The marriage is valid but the officer may be subject to
administrative liability. An this case with other reasons showing
gross misconduct and ignorance of the law, he was suspended
for 3 months and given a stern warning.
P)n#n!#: (uno, J.
Fa*!: This case concerns an incident wherein cciano, the
respondent, who is an "TC judge, solemniGed the marriage of
the petitioner and 'ominador robia despite their lack of the
re&uired marriage license and the fact that said ceremony took
place outside his territorial jurisdiction. $raMes alleges that
when her husband died, she was unable to inherit the
properties he left as well his pension benefits because the
marriage was a nullity, hence, the filing of the $dministrative
Case against cciano. cciano, in his Comment, contended
that he only agreed to solemniGe the marriage despite it being
outside his jurisdiction because of the groom was not fit to
travel to his jurisdiction. )e adds that he refused to solemniGe
the marriage at first upon discovery of their lack of a marriage
license, but given the circumstances, he finally agreed to do so
Eout of human compassion.F $raMes, after reading said
Comment, subse&uently filed an $ffidavit of 'esistance,
admitting that cciano initially refused to solemniGe the
marriage because they didn-t have a marriage license, but
eventually agreed to do so because of her own insistence and
that she only filed the case out of rage. 'espite this, the ffice
of the Court $dministrator still decided against the respondent.
I&#: WI! cciano is guilty of solemniGing a marriage outside
his territorial jurisdiction and without a marriage license.
H#'+: 5espondent is guilty. NThe Court gave him a %T15!
W$5!A!; and fined him (H,444.O
Ra!i): 5e+ lack of jurisdiction+ $ccording to the %C, the
Judiciary 5eorganiGation $ct of 9>64 N,( 92>O states that the
authority of 5TC judges and those of inferior courts to
solemniGe judges is only within their territorial jurisdictions. The
Court reiterated its $avarro v& 'omagtoy decision, wherein it
held that judges appointed to specific jurisdictions Nunlike those
in the appellate courtsO may solemniGe weddings only within
those jurisdictions, and while it may not affect the marriage-s
validity, said judges will be open to administrative liability.
5e+ lack of a marriage license+ The marriage license gives the
solemniGing officer the authority to solemniGe, except in certain
cases provided by law. )ence, cciano did not have authority
when he solemniGed the marriage. $lso, in People v& (ara the
Court held that a marriage without a license is void, and even if
a license is subse&uently issued, it will still be void.
N)!#: 'espite the $ffidavit of 'esistance, cciano can-t
escape liability because the withdrawal of the complaint
doesn-t necessarily exonerate the respondent from disciplinary

(laintiff and defendant got married in 9>9>.
They freely cohabited as husband and wife and bear
? children.
'efendant had a very severe attack of madness on
9>23 and was admitted to %an @aGaro )ospital for
%ince then she had been admitted and discharged
from (sychopathic )ospital for three or four times
because of recurring malady attacks.
(laintiff then filed a case for annulment of their
marriage having as cause of action her wife-s insanity
during the time of their marriage.
)e contended that briefly after their marriage, he
noticed her derangement and hoped that she will get
back to reason but his hope did not come true.
'efendant-s mother and guardian claimed that the
defendant suffered from illness only after delivery on
her .defendant0 ?
Witness .90 for plaintiff discredited for being in no
normal condition to assess the mental condition of
defendant+ long before the wedding, defendant used
to utter incoherent words which amused her while she
was conceiving a baby.
)usbandIplaintiff admits that he did not notice
defendant-s insanity during marriage, the same
observation given by a witness .20 to the celebration.
I&#: CON !"# +#-#n+an! i inan# +&$ing !"# .a$$iag#
an+ !"& &(('i# g$)&n+ -)$ ann&'.#n!.
H#'+: N). Claim of defendant-s insanity during .and even
before0 marriage not supported by facts of the case.

Ra!i): (laintiff and witness .20 claimed that defendant
showed no sign of insanity during the celebration of
the marriage.
.DClaim of witness .90 for plaintiff, if not discredited,
could have given support to claim that insanity
continued to marriage and could be ground for
annulment .1ngle v. 'oe, ?8 (hil., 834*83900
"arriage was held valid because the applicable law
;eneral rder !o. 36, section 94.:0 .and even the
newer $ct :39:, section :4.c00 re&uired that the
insanity of a party should have occurred during the
celebration to have a ground for annulment.
.*"ore so, the defendant had lucid intervals and they
continued to cohabit which, in effect, ratified the
,y+ $boy ,ayalan
1milio and Asabel were married on J&'5 <1 7<EF. They
had three children all surnamed Cojuangco %untay.
Asabel filed a criminal case against her husband,
1milio. An retaliation, 1milio filed a complaint for legal
separation against his wife, charging her, among
others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and
care of their children who were living with their
The !$ia' *)&$! $#n+#$#+ a +#*ii)n regarding the
case filed by 1milio. The +i()i!iv# ()$!i)n of the
decision reads+
o W)151/51, the marriage
celebrated bet%een Emilio
Aguinaldo Suntay and )sabel
*o+uangco,Suntay on July >, 9>H6
is hereby declared null and void
and of no effect as bet%een the
$s a basis thereof, the C/A said+
o /rom /ebruary 9>3H thru 'ecember 9>3H
plaintiff was confined in the Peterans
"emorial )ospital Q Q Q At is the opinion of
'r. $ramil that the symptoms of the plaintiff-s
mental aberration classified as
*"iG)("$#nia has made themselves
manifest even as early as 9>HHC that the
disease was worsening with time, until 9>3H
when he was actually places under expert
neuro*psychiatrist treatmentC that even if the
subject has shown marked progress, !"#
$#.ain ,#$#-! )- a+#%&a!#
&n+#$!an+ing )- $ig"! an+ :$)ng.
o Q Q Q -his fact %ould +ustify a declaration of
nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of
the Civil Code %hich provides.
$rt 6H. $ marriage may be
ann&''#+ for the any of the
following causes after existing at
the time of the marriage+
.:0 That either party was of
unsound mind, unless
such party, after coming to
reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband
or wife.
1milio $guinaldo %untay predeceased his mother,
Cristina. The latter is respondent Asabel-s paternal
5espondent Asabel filed a petition for issuance in her
favor of @etters of $dministration of the i!testate
1state of her late grandmother. %he contents that "#
i )n# )- !"# '#gi!i.a!# g$an+*"i'+$#n )- !"#
+#*#+#n! an+ ($a5#+ !"a! "# ,# a(()in!#+ a
a+.ini!$a!i9 )- !"# #!a!#.
(etitioner, as the surviving spouse of the decedent,
claims otherwise. )e argues that under $rt >>2 of the
Civil Code, an i''#gi!i.a!# *"i'+ "a n) $ig"! !)
&**##+ ,5 $ig"! )- $#($##n!a!i)n. $s a
conse&uence of the court declaration rendering the
marriage of respondent Asabel-s parents Enull and
void,F Asabel is to be considered an illegitimate child.
7. C"#!"#$ !"# .a$$iag# ,#!:##n E.i'i) an+ Ia,#'
i Hn&'' an+ v)i+I OR .#$#'5 ann&''#+J
2. W! respondent Asabel is a legitimate child of 1milio,
therefore, has a right in the estate of her paternal
9. The marriage is merely annulled.
2. 5espondent Asabel is a legitimate child. )owever, her
rights to the estate of Cristina is to be determined
through another trial.
9. The marriage of 1milio and Asabel was ann&''#+ on
the basis of A$! FE1 (a$ 41 )- !"# Civi' C)+# which
refers to .a$$iag# :"i*" a$# *)ni+#$#+ v)i+a,'#.
2. (etitioner being conceived and born of a voidable
marriage before the decree of annulment, she is
considered legitimate. $ voidable marriage, is
considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until
it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court
in an action for ann&'.#n!.
;odofredo wants his marriage with @uida to be
)e argued that he gave his consent to their marriage
because @uida promised to hi that she was still a
They got married on !ovember 23, 244>.
$fter : months .6> days0 of cohabitation, @uida gave
birth to a baby. Thus, @uida is 3 months pregnant
when they got married.
C/A of ,aguio held that marriage could not be
I&#: CON !"# *a# a! ,a$ ($##n! #n)&g" *'#a$ an+
i$$#-&!a,'# #vi+#n*# n#*#a$5 -)$ !"# ann&'.#n!
)- .a$$iag#
H#'+: !. There is no enough evidence. 'ecision of C/A of
,aguio $//A5"1'.
At is impossible for the plaintiff to not suspect that his
wife .or wife*to*be then0 is not pregnant since he
married her during the 3
month of her pregnancy,
which is already an advanced state of pregnancy.
;iven that, case could not fly on the basis of fraud on
the part of the defendant*appellee.
The allegation that it is not strange to find people with
developed abdomen is considered was not
entertained. %aid argument is considered to be
puerile .immatureI juvenile0.
,y+ 5ichard ,eltran

(etitioner $&uino filed a complaint for annulment of
his marriage with respondent 'eliGo claiming that on
the date of their marriage on 'ec. 28, 9>H?, 'eliGo
had concealed from him her pregnancy by another
man and that four months after their marriage, 'eliGo
had given birth to the child.
'eliGo argues that the child had been conceived out
of lawful wedlock between her and $&uino
$t the trial, the $ssistant (rovincial /iscal was
ordered to represent the %tate and prevent collusion.
'eliGo neither appeared nor presented evidence
$&uino testified and presented only documentary
evidence in the form of the marriage contract
Trial Court ruling B dismissed the complaint noting
that no birth certificate of the child had been
presented and holding that concealment of pregnancy
cold not constitute as fraud which would annul the
C$ ruling B affirmed dismissal of the complaint
holding that petitioner-s inability to present birth
certificate was excusable neglect, however it was not
impossible for petitioner and respondent to have had
sexual intercourse during their engagement and it
seemed unbelievable that petitioner did not even
notice or suspect respondent was pregnant
(etitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and
presented the ff. affidavits+
9. from his brother stating that he and 'eliGo
had been living together and had begotten
three children including the one he and
'eliGo had endeavoured to conceal from
2. from 'eliGo admitting her pregnancy by
petitioner-s brother and that she had hidden
this pregnancy at the time her marriage to
:. from $lbert (owell stating that he knew that
'eliGo and petitioner-s brother had been
living together as husband and wife before
'eliGo-s the date of marriage with petitioner
?. birth certificates of three children of 'eliGo
with petitioner-s brother
H. pictures that showed 'eliGo-s Enatural
plumpnessF as early as 9>H2 and as late as
!ovember, 9>H?. 'eliGo-s pregnancy, which
would have been ? months at the time, did
not show in the photograph taken on
!ovember 9>H?
I&#: CON !"#$# a$# &--i*i#n! g$)&n+ -)$ .a$$iag# !)
,# ann&''#+

H#'+: Res. 'ecision complained of is set aside and the case
is remanded to the court a &uo for a new trial.

Dnder the new Civil Code, the concealment by the wife of the
fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband constitutes fraud. $t four months
pregnancy, it cannot be said that 'eliGo-s pregnancy was
apparent especially since she was Enaturally plumpF as alleged
by petitioner and also medical authorities agreed that even on
the H
month of pregnancy, the enlargement of the woman-s
abdomen is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it
is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat
formation. /urthermore, there could have been further difficulty
in ascertaining if she was pregnant or not if she had attempted
to conceal the true state of affairs.
Though C$ stated that it was not impossible for petitioner and
respondent to have had sexual intercourse before their
marriage and that the child could be their own, this was
dismissed by the %C as purely conjectural and with no support
or justification in the record.
@astly, failure of the defendant to file her answer cannot be
taken as evidence of collusion especially since a provincial
physical had been ordered by the ;overnment precisely to
prevent such collusion.
=!ote+ Case is similar to ,uccat v. ,uccat however in that
case, plaintiff-s claim that he did not suspect the pregnancy of
the defendant was held to be unbelievable because it was
proven that she had already been in an advanced stage of
pregnancy at the time of their marriage.
,y+ Welga Carrasco
Joel JimeneG seeks to have his marriage with 5emedios
CaMiGares annulled on the ground that her vagina was too
small to allow the penetration of a male organ for intercourse.
)e claims that her condition existed at the time of the marriage
and continues to exist. This is the reason why he left the
conjugal home 2 nights and 9 day after their marriage.
The city attorney was tasked to in&uire whether there was
collusion between the parties and to ensure that the evidence
presented is not fabricated.
5emedios did not file an answer to the summons served upon
her, nor did she comply with the municipal court-s order to
undergo a physical examination, nor did she attend the
hearings. ,ecause of this, the municipal court entered a
decree annulling their marriage.
The city attorney filed for a motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the defendant-s impotency has not been
satisfactorily established as re&uired by law. The court should
have punished her for contempt instead. )e avers that the
court-s act would encourage married couples who want to end
their marriages to collude and simply allege the impotency of
their spouse.
I&#: C;N a .a$$iag# .a5 ,# ann&''#+ )n !"# !$#ng!"
)- a ')n# !#!i.)n5 )- )n# ()&# a''#ging !"#i$
(a$!n#$8 i.()!#n*5.
H#'+: !o, it may not.
The state has a deep interest in "arriage because its security
and stability are largely dependent upon it. This is why the
state surrounds it with safeguards to maintain its purity,
continuity and permanence. Therefore, to prevent the bringing
about of a condition that would shake the foundation of
marriage or lead to its destruction, its incidents are governed
by law and not by will of the parties.
The law re&uires that legal grounds must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence to annul a marriage. The presumption is
for potency, not impotency which is an abnormal condition.
An the case at bar, whether the wife is impotent or not can not
be sufficiently determined due to her abstinence from taking
part in the proceedings. The lone testimony of a husband is
insufficient to annul a marriage.
,y+ "ickey Chatto
"arriage+ June :, 9>:3 in "anila
)usband tries to have sex with his wife but the latter
showed reluctance and begged him to wait until evening
An the evening, husband found the orifice of the vagina of
his wife sufficiently large for his organ but she
complained of painsC he also noticed some purulent
matter in her private parts
%ince the coitus is not a success, every attempt on
plaintiff-s part to have carnal act with his wife proved a
failure because she complained of pains and he did not
want her to suffer
The wife-s uterus and ovaries were surgically removed
since they are bound to be affected with the tumorC it did
render her incapable of procreation but not of copulation
)usband saw the operation and since then has lost his
desire to have sex with his wife
I&#+ Can !"#i$ .a$$iag# ,# ann&''#+ ,#*a&# )n# i
("5i*a''5 in*a(a,'# )- #n!#$ing in!) !"# .a$$i#+
H#'++ !. C/A decision is $//A5"1', marriage is not
The test of impotency is not the ability to procreate,
but the ability to copulate
The defect must be one of copulation, not
reproductionC must be permanent and lasting
The defendant was not impotent at the time of the
%he was not made unfit for sex by the removal of
ovaries and uterus
The plaintiff was not able to consummate the
marriage due to his own voluntary desistance
/raud was not alleged in the complaint and has not
been approved at the trial
,y+ Jiselle Compuestr
o /elipe %antiago invited his 96 year old niece by marriage,
/elicita "asilang, to accompany him to an errand.
o %antiago brought her to an area hidden from public view
and expressed his intention to have sexual intercourse with
her. /elicita refused, so /elipe raped her.
o /elipe brought /elicita to his uncle-s house .$gaton
%antiago0C a protestant minister came and went through the
ceremony of marrying the couple.
o /elipe gave /elicita a few pesos and sent her home.
/elicita told her father and thus the prosecution for rape was
o C/A+ sentence S prison .9?yrs,96mos,9day0, (H44,
recogniGe offspring if any .(9H per month0
I&#: C;N *$i.ina' 'ia,i'i!5 :a #9!ing&i"#+ :"#n
F#'i(# :#+ F#'i*i!a
H#'+: Judgment affirmed.
The marriage ceremony was not valid and was a mere ruse by
which the appellant hoped to escape from the criminal
conse&uences of his act. The marriage is void because the
manner in which /elipe dealt with the girl after the marriage, as
well as before, shows that he had no bona fide intention of
making her his wife, therefore there is no essential consent on
his part.
=no essential consent S voidC violenceIintimidation that vitiated
consent S voidable
,y+ ;ia Comsti
1lisea @aperal, petitioner v. 5epublic of the (hilippines, oppositor
Na!&$#: $ppeal from an order of the Court of
/irst Anstance of ,aguio City
Da!#: ctober :4, 9>32
P)n#n!#: ,arrera, /&
"arch :?, 9>:> B 1lisea
@aperal married 1nri&ue 5.
%antamaria and during her
marriage, she naturally used
1lisea @. %antamaria instead of
her maiden name
January 96, 9>H6 B 1nri&ue was given
a decree of legal separation from
"ay 94, 9>34 B @aperal filed in
the C/A of ,aguio a petition
praying that she be allowed to
change her name andIor
permitted to $#&.# &ing "#$
.ai+#n na.#+ 1@A%1$
@$(15$@ on the ground that
she has been legally separated
from 1nri&ue and likewise
ceased to live with him for
many years.
City attorney of ,aguio B
opposed the petition as this
violated article :84.should be
:820 of the civil code and that it
is not sanctioned by the 5ules
of Court
C/A B '1!A1' B $rticle :82
re&uires the wife, even after the
decree of legal separation, to
continue using the name and
surname she employed before
legal separation
C/A after motion of petitioner B
treats the petition as one for a
change of name * ;5$!T1'
o To allow petitioner, who is a
businesswoman decreed
legally separated from her
husband, to continue using
her married name would give
rise to *)n-&i)n in her
finances and the eventual
li&uidation of the conjugal
I&#: W! the petitioner be allowed to
resume using her maiden name
H#'+: !o. .petition is dismissed.0
The language of the statute .$rt :820 is
mandatory. This is so because married status
is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum 0a bond signifying
union or unityC tie).
P#!i!i)n#$ S&($#.# C)&$! R&'ing
The appellate court contends that
the petition is &,!an!ia''5 a
*"ang# )- na.#.
An @aperal-s petition the only reason relied upon for the
change of name is the fact that she is legally separated
from her husband and that she ceased to live with him for
many years.
5ule 94: which refer to change of name in general cannot
prevail over the specific provision of $rticle :82 of the Civil
1ven applying 5ule 94:, the fact that legal separation alone
is not a sufficient ground to justify the change of the name,
for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy
circumvention of the mandatory provisions of $rticle :82.
@aperal owns extensive business
interests ant that continued use of
her husband-s surname may cause
undue confusion in her finances
and eventual li&uidation of conjugal
Without basis
9. !ot the cause upon which petition was based and there-s
no evidence to this effect has been adduced.
2. Conjugal partnership between the petitioner and her
husband had automatically been dissolved and li&uidated
assets .$rt. 9430. Thus, there be no more occasion for an
eventual li&uidation of conjugal assets
B5: Ca.i''# U.a'i
$lice 5eyes is a /ilipino citiGen while 5ichard
Dpton is a D% citiGen. They were married in
)ongkong in 9>82 and after their marriage,
they resided in the (hilippines. An 9>62, they
divorced in !evada, D%. $lice remarried in
!evada to Theodore Pan 'orn. An June 6,
9>6:, 5ichard filed suit against $lice stating
that $liceJs business in "anila, The ;alleon
%hop, is conjugal property of the parties and
that he be declared with the right to manage
the conjugal property. $lice moved to dismiss
the case stating that the cause of action is
barred by the !evada divorce proceedings
because 5ichard had acknowledged that he
and $lice do not have community property as
of June 99, 9>62. The (asay 5TC denied the
"otion to 'ismiss on the ground that the
property involved is located in the (hilippines,
hence the divorce decree has no bearing in the
WI! the foreign divorce on the parties is valid
and binding in (hilippine jurisdiction.
Res, the divorce is valid.
The !evada divorce decree is binding on
5ichard .private respondent0 as he is an
$merican citiGen. The divorce decree released
5ichard from his marriage with $lice, therefore
he is no longer her husband. )e would have no
standing to sue in this case as petitionerJs
husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets
B5: Lia /#n#$a*i)n
/e Tuita and $rturo (adlan married
sometime in 9>?9. They did not have
any children. They filed a divorce in
%an /rancisco, California, D%$ which
was granted on July 2:, 9>H?. Three
weeks after she married /elix TupaG,
a marriage that also led to a divorce.
%he was married for the third time to
An 9>82, $rturo died intestate. $
certain @ino Anciong then filed a
petition praying that the (hilippine
Trust Company be the administrator
of $rturo-s estate. ,landina .saying
that she was the surviving spouse0,
together with 3 children filed for a
petition to be the heirs of $rturo.
$rturo-s brother, 5uperto intervened
prating that he be declared an heir.
The trial court invoked the ruling in
-enchave1 v& Escano which held that
a foreign divorce between /ilipino
citiGens sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the Civil Code was not
entitled to recognition was valid in this
jurisdiction, and discarded the divorce
between /e and $rturo. .$dapt, 244>0
n motion for reconsideration, the
petition was granted ruling that the
children were legitimate wI the
exception of one illegitimate, and
therefore entitled to one half of the
estate with the other half going to
n appeal, the court ruled that the
case was decided without a hearing,
and therefore violated %ec. 9 5ule >4
of the 5ules of Court.
WI! Tuita was still entitled to be an
heir of $rturo despite their divorce in the Dnited
H#'+; Ra!i):
!o. $ statement of hers proves that
she was no longer a /ilipino citiGen at the time
the divorce was issued. $fter a declaration that
she was no longer a /ilipino citiGen at that time,
the ruling in Pan 'orn saying that aliens may
obtain divorces abroad %hich may be
recogni1ed in the Philippines provided they
are valid according to their national la% should
be applicable& $ll her marital rights with $rturo
would then be dissolved.
B5: In*# A''a$#5
Fa*!+ @orenGo, a serviceman of the D%
!avy, visited his wife in the (hilippines .9>?H0
and discovered her pregnant and having an
adulterous relationship with his brother. Wife,
(aula, gave birth to a baby boy whose
certificate stated that the child was illegitimate
and the line of the father-s name was left blank.
@orenGo refused to forgive (aula and drew a
written agreement wherein+ 9.0 support for
(aula would be suspended, 2.0 marital union
would be dissolved in accordance with judicial
proceedings, :.0 a separate agreement would
be made re+ conjugal property, and ?.0 @orenGo
would not prosecute (aula for her adulterous
An 9>H9, @orenGo filed for divorce with
the %uperior Court of the %tate of California in
and for the County of %an 'iego. (aula was
represented by counsel, John 5iley, and
actively participated in the proceedings. $ year
later, the divorce decree became final.
@orenGo returned to the (hilippines
and married $licia /ortunato who had no
knowledge of his previous marriage. Their
marriage produced three children. n "arch
:9, 9>69, @orenGo drew his last will and
testament leaving all his properties to $licia
and the children. An 9>6:, @orenGo filed a
petition for the probate and allowance of his
last will and testament wherein he moved that
$licia be appointed %pecial $dministratix of his
estate. )owever, before the proceedings could
be terminated, @orenGo died.
Dpon his death, (aula filed in the
5egional Trial Court of Ariga a petition for letters
of administration over @orenGo-s estate in her
favor. $licia filed the same, but the court ruled
in favor of (aula. The court reasoned out that
@orenGo-s divorce to (aula was void and
inapplicable in the (hilippines, thus $licia-s
motion for reconsideration. The court modified
its decision declaring 5aul and @uG @lorente
illegitimate children of @orenGo as they were
not legally adopted by him. $licia further
appealed but was denied by the C$ , thus the
existence of current petition.
@orenGo became a D% citiGen in 9>?:.
$lmost 6 years prior to the filing of divorce.
I&#+ W! $licia is entitled to inherit from the
late @orenGo @lorente
H#'++ Res
Ra!i)+ The fact that @orenGo became an
$merican citiGen, procured a divorce from
(aula, married $licia, executed his will and
then died is duly established and undisputed.
The trial court and the C$ disregarded the will-s
disposition in favor of $licia because they
considered her a mere paramour. ,ut the
divorce should be recogniGed as a matter of
comity. The effect of such a divorce .as to the
succession to the estate of the deceased0 is
best determined by the trial court.
%ince @orenGo was a foreigner
.!ovember :4, 9>?:* Certificate of
!aturaliGation !o. HH8>6930, he was not
covered by (hilippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition and legal capacity.
B5: Ann#!i'')
)atima C. Rasin, represented by her $ttorney*
in*/act, )adji )asan %. Centi, petitioner vs.
The )onorable Judge %hari-a 'istrict Court,
Third %hari-a Judicial 'istrict, Uamboanga City,
Na!&$#: (etition for review of a decision of the
%hari-a 'istrict Court, Third %hari-a Judicial
'istrict, Uamboanga City
Da!#: /ebruary 2:, 9>>H
P)n#n!#: ,idin, /&
"ay H, 9>>4 B )atima C. Rasin filed in the
%hari-a 'istrict Court in Uamboanga City a
E(etition to resume the use of maiden
Rasin, a divorcee and "uslim /ilipino, was
formerly married to )adji Adris Rasin in
accordance with "uslim rites and customs
"ay 9:, 9>6? B they were granted a
decree of divorce in accordance with
Aslamic @awC former husband contracted
another marriage after the divorce
July ?, 9>>4 B respondent court held that
the petition is insufficient in form and
substance in accordance with 5ule 94: of
the 5ules of Court and ordered petitioner
to effect the necessary amendment
(etitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
alleging that petition filed is not covered by
the 5ules of Court but a petition to resume
the use of her maiden name and surname
after the dissolution of her marriage by
divorce and after subse&uent marriage of
her former husband
$ug. 94, 9>>4 B respondent court denied
motion on the ground that petition is
substantially for change of name and
compliance with 5ule 94: of the 5ules of
Court is necessary
90 W! a petition for resumption of maiden
name and surname is also a petition for
change of name
2@ CON (#!i!i)n#$8 +iv)$*# a''): "#$ !)
$#&.# "#$ .ai+#n na.# an+ &$na.#
90 !o
2@ Y#
90 The true and real name of a person is that
given to him and entered in the civil
register. Dnder $rt. :83 of the Civil Code,
the only name that may be changed is the
true or official name recorded in the civil
register. .$rt. :83+ no person can change
his name or surname without judicial
authority.0 Thus, the petition for the
resumption to her maiden name in view of
dissolution of her marriage by virtue of a
divorce decree granted in accordance with
"uslim law is not covered by the 5ules of
20 There is no law which provides that the
wife shall change her name to that of the
husband upon marriage. %imilarly, :"#n
!"# .a$$iag# !i# )$ vinculum n) ')ng#$
#9i!1 !"# +iv)$*## n##+ n)! ##=
K&+i*ia' *)n-i$.a!i)n )- !"# *"ang# in
"#$ *ivi' !a!& in )$+#$ !) $#v#$! !) "#$
.ai+#n na.# as the use of her former
husband-s name is optional and not
obligatory for her. 'ivorce .tala2 or fas3h0
severs the marriage bond, and the
spouses may contract another marriage in
accordance with the Code of "uslim
(ersonal @aws.
= This case recogniGes the effects of "uslim
B5: Ania" AGi

(rivate respondent 5ay is a doctor of
medicine practicing in Cebu while
petitioner !erissa is a registered
They got married on 'ecember 3,
9>63 and after six miscarriages,
!erissa finally gave birth to 5ay (ereG
AA on July 24, 9>>2 in !ew Rork.
An 9>>:, the couple and their baby
arrived in Cebu. ,ut after sometime
only !erissa returned to the D% and
5ay stayed in the (hilippines to take
care of his sick mother and promised
!erissa to follow her with the baby.
When !erissa came home a few days
before 5ay AA-s first birthday, the
couple was no longer in good terms.
The petitioner did not want to live near
her in*laws and rely solely on her
husband-s meager income of ( H,444.
%he longed to be with her only child
but he was being kept away from her
by her husband. Thus, she did not
want to leave 5ay (ereG AA with her
husband and in*laws.
n the other hand, 5ay wanted to
stay here, where he could raise his
son even as he practiced his
profession. )e maintained that it
would not be difficult to live here since
they have their own home and car.
They could live comfortably on his (
9H, 444 monthly income as they were
not burdened with having to pay any
'espite mediation by the priest who
solemniGed their marriage, the couple
failed to reconcile. T"#5 :#$#
#(a$a!#+ in -a*!.
n July 23, 9>>:, !erissa filed a
petition for habeas corpus asking the
respondent to surrender the custody
of their son to her.
The trial Court awarded the custody of
(ereG AA to !erissa citing the second
paragraph of $rticle 29: of the /amily
$rt. 29:. An case of separation of the
parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by
the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit. .n0
!o child under
seven years of age
shall be separated
from the mother,
unless the court
finds compelling
reasons to order
Dpon appeal of 5ay (ereG, C$
reversed the trial court-s order and
awarded the custody of the boy to his
father, saying that it would be for the
best interest and welfare of the child.
(etitioner-s motion for reconsideration
having been denied, she filed the
instant petition for review where !"#
)'# i&# i !"# *&!)+5 )- Ra5
P#$#G II1 n): !"$## 5#a$ )'+.
I A$!i*'# 274 )- !"# FC !"#
a(('i*a,'# 'a:J C"i*" )- !"#
(a$#n! ")&'+ !a=# !"#
*&!)+5 )- !"# *"i'+J
Res, $rticle 29: is the
applicable law because even
though the couples are only
separated in fact, the Code
does not &ualify the word
EseparationF to mean Elegal
separationF. An short, the
case of this couple is still
covered within the article-s
Custody over the minor 5ay
(ereG AA is awarded to his
mother, the petitioner. ,oth
the mother and the father
have ample means to
support the childC however, a
child under seven years of
age should not be separated
from his mother without
justifiable reason. %upreme
Court believes+
The mother would still be
able to raise a family well
despite the petitioner-s
unmanageable work
'elegating child care
temporarily to &ualified
persons .e.g. day care
centers, own mother,
relative0 would not detract
from being a good mother,
as long as the latter
exercises supervision.
5espondent-s flexible
schedule on the other hand
is not well*founded.
The fact that private
respondent lives near his
parents or sister is not crucial
in this case.
(etitioner, despite work
schedule in hospital, may be
expected to arrange her
schedule in such a way as to
allocate time for her son.
At does not follow that
petitioner values her career
more than her family simply
because she wants to work
in the Dnited %tates.
*arla !adi
$lejandro 1strada re&uested Judge
Jose /. Caoibes, Jr. to inv#!iga!#
%oledad %. 1scritor, a court interpreter
in the 5egional Trial Court of @as
(iMas City, who is 'iving :i!" a .an
n)! "#$ "&,an+ and having borne a
child within this live*in arrangement.
1strada believes that 1scritor is
committing an i..)$a' a*! that
tarnishes the image of the court, thus
she should not be allowed to remain
1scritor was already a widow when
she entered the judiciary. %he
admitted that she started living with
@uciano Tuilapio, Jr. without the
benefit of marriage more than 24
years ago when her husband was still
alive but living with another woman.
,oth Tuilapio and 1scritor are
members of the religious sect
Jehovah-s Witnesses
They asserted that their conjugal
arrangement conforms to their
religious beliefs and has approval of
her congregation in the execution of
the HD#*'a$a!i)n )- P'#+ging
Fai!"-&'n#I after 94 years of living
together, and this 'eclaration, if
approved by the elders of the
congregation, allows members of the
sect who have been abandoned by
their spouses enter into marital
relations. Ansofar as the congregation
is concerned, there is nothing immoral
about this conjugal arrangement
between 1scritor and Tuilapio.
$t the time of the execution of the
pledge 1scritor-s husband was still
alive but living with another woman.
Tuilapio was also married but had
separated in fact from his wife.
'eclaration of (ledging /aithfulness
$llows members of the JW
congregation who have been
abandoned by their spouses to
enter into marital relations.
"akes the resulting union binding
in congregations around the world
1QC1(T in countries where
divorce is legal.
ConditionsI re&uirements for the
o Couple could not secure
the civil authorities-
approval of the marital
relationship because of
legal impediments.
o nly couples who have
been baptiGed and in
good standing may
execute the declaration
with the approval of the
elders of the
nce the legal impediments are
lifted, the validity of the
declarations ceases and the
couple should legali1e their
WI! respondent 1scritor is guilty of
the administrative charge of
disgraceful and immoral conduct,
given that she was practicing an
arrangement that is approved by her
religious sect.
5espondent-s 1scritor is not guilty of
disgraceful and immoral conduct. )er
conjugal arrangement cannot be
penaliGed as she has made out a
case for exemption from the law
based on her fundamental right to
freedom of religion.
An resolving claims involving religious
freedom, two things should be put into
.90 ,enevolent neutrality or
accommodation, which is the
spirit, intent and framework
underlying the religious
clauses in our ConstitutionC
,enevolent neutrality theory
believes that with respect to
governmental actions,
accommodation of religion
may be allowed, not to
promote the government-s
favored form of religion, but
to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. At
allows accommodation of
religion under certain
.20 The compelling state interest
test, which must be applied
in deciding respondent-s plea
of exemption based on the
/ree 1xercise Clause .this
Clause prohibits government
from inhibiting religious
beliefs with penalties for
religious beliefs and practice0
The compelling state interest
test is needed to prove that
the state interest sough to be
promoted must be so
paramount and compelling
as to override the free
exercise claim. Three
conditions of the test+
.a0 a statute or government
action has burdened
claimant-s free exercise of
religion, and there is no
doubt as to the sincerity of
the religious beliefC
.b0 the state has failed to
demonstrate a particularly
important or compelling
governmental goal in
preventing an exemptionC
.c0 the state has failed to
demonstrate that it used the
least restrictive means. ./ree
exercise is a fundamental
right and that laws burdening
it should be subject to strict
%ubjecting the case to the compelling
state interest test+
.90 The law or government
practice inhibits the free
exercise of respondent-s
religious beliefsC
.20 There is no doubt as to the
sincerity and centrality of the
respondent-s faith to claim
the exemption based on the
free exercise clauseC
.:0 The %; has failed to
demonstrate that there was a
grave abuse which
endangered paramount
interests which could limit or
override respondent-s
fundamental right to religious
.?0 The government was not
able to show that the means
it seeks to use to achieve its
legitimate state objective is
the least intrusive means.
The state has not evinced any
concrete interest in enforcing the
concubinage or bigamy charges
against respondent or her partner.
$lso, to deny the exemption would
effectively break up a union of two
individuals who have managed to stay
together as husband and wife and
have the effect of defeating the very
substance of marriage and the family.
The sole justification for a prior
restraint or limitation on the exercise
of religious freedom is the existence of
a clear and present danger of
substantive evil which the state has
the right to prevent.
(ublic morality expressed in law is
secular. There is a distinction between
public K secular morality and religious
morality. ,enevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not
offend compelling state interests.
$lso, the jurisdiction of the court
extends only to public K secular
morality. There is no jurisprudence in
(hilippine jurisdiction holding that the
defense of religious freedom of a
member of the Jehovah-s Witnesses
under the same circumstances as
respondent will not prevail over the
laws on adultery, concubinage or
some other law.
The government-s conduct may
appear innocent and non*
discriminatory but in effect, it is
oppressive to the minority.
%trains of jurisprudence on the religious
$. %eparation B wall of separation must exist
between the state and the Church to protect
the state from the Church in real life, church
and state are not and cannot be totally
9. %trict %eparation B protect
state from church and there must be
no interaction between the two
2. %trict !eutralityI%eparation
.aka governmental neutrality0 B wall of
separation does not re&uire the state
to be their adversary, rather the state
must be neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non*
believers only secular criteria may
be the basis of government action
,. ,enevolent !eutrality .aka $ccommodation0
B wall of separation is meant to protect the
church from the stateC recogniGes that religion
plays an important role in public life
9. "andatory accommodation B the
Court finds that accommodation is
re&uired by the free exercise clauseC
occurs when all three conditions of the
compelling interest test are met
2. (ermissive accommodation B the
Court finds that the state may, but is
not re&uired to, accommodate
religious interests
:. (rohibited accommodation B
establishment concerns prevail over
potential accommodation interests
The Catholic Church worries
about probable abuse of religious
rights in relation to dissolution of
9. 1ven before 1scritor, the
(hilippines already has
laws on the dissolution
of marriage i.e. $rt. :3
/C .psychological
incapacity0, $rt. 23 /C
.foreign divorces0 and
$rt 9H .by nationality
principle, the /ilipino
who has ac&uired new
citiGenship or has been
naturaliGed can file for
divorce if hisI her
adoptive adopted county
allows it0.
2. The declaration gives a
sense of normalcy and
veneer of legality
however this does not
change laws on
marriage. 1scritor still
needs to validate her
marriage because there
are benefits that are only
available to those who
are legally married.
/oie !a+o
Complainant filed administrative complaint for g$) i..)$a'i!5 for husband-s courting his
former student .;ina 1spita0 and eventually '#aving "#$ an+ "#$ *"i'+$#n to cohabit with the
ComplainantIwife then sought dismissal of the administrative case on the following grounds+ .90
she fabricated allegations on the complaint to humiliate her husbandC .20 letters from alleged
paramour were forgeriesC .:0 she suffered from emotional confusion from extreme jealousy and
claimed her husband to be responsible and faithful. A,( then dismissed complaint for failure to
Wife filed disbarment case again stating that she dropped the former disbarment case because
she was threatened by respondent.
5espondent prayed for A,( to affirm its decision .dismissal0 and alleged that the first case was
dropped by complainant on her own will.
)usband professed his love for his wife and children and alleged that his wife is an incurably
jealous woman.
)e tried to exculpate himself and claimed that his wife-s allegations are not true.
Complainant presented witnesses, among them are
o Charlie 1spita
,rother of alleged paramour of respondent ;ina 1spita.
Testified that respondent lives in and had two children with his sister
o ,ienvenido 1ugenio
/ather*in*law of Charlie 1spita
%trengthened Charlie-s statement that respondent and ;ina 1spita live in as
husband and wife
o !ieves 5eyes
/riend of complainant and respondent
@earned from couple-s children that $tty. !arag left their family
Convinced, together with her own husband, complainant to accept
respondent back
)owever, the couple parted ways again where the respondent maltreated his
wife first then returned to his paramour
o Jervis !arag
%on of complainant and respondent
Claimed that he did not feel much from his father who was always away from
o 'ominador !arag, Jr.
%on of complainant and respondent
Claimed that his wife left him for being ashamed of what happened to his
family .where respondent left them for his paramour0 and her sister was
adversely affected by the same happening
Complainant also presented respondent-s love '#!!#$ !) "i (a$a.)&$ proclaiming his love
for the latter and claiming her .;ina-s0 children as his own. The handwriting on these letters
was compared to *a$+ giv#n ,5 !"# $#()n+#n! !) !"# (#!i!i)n#$. The court affirmed that
the letters and cards were :$i!!#n ,5 )n# an+ !"# a.# (#$)n.
CON $#()n+#n! A!!5. D).ina+)$ Na$ag :a g&i'!5 )- g$) .i*)n+&*! an+ !"&
+##$v#+ !) ,# +i,a$$#+.
YES. 5espondent was DISBARRED and his name ORDERED STRICBEN of the 5oll of
The testimonies provided by witnesses for the complainant regarding his abandonment of his
family and living in with another woman were strong. /urthermore, the :i!n## 'a*=#+ !"#
i'' .)!iv# !) !#!i-5 -a'#'5 again! "i..
5espondent did not present any evidence to counter the allegation that he wrote the letters that
complainant claims he wrote for his paramour.
The evidence and witnesses presented by respondent failed to debunk the claim of
complainant that he had an illicit relationship with ;ina 1spita. $lso, some of the witnesses he
presented relied only on information fed by him or other people but actually do not have actual
knowledge of the issue.
,eing a,'# !) ($)vi+# :#'' for the family, being a &**#-&' 'a:5#$ an+ a ()'i!i*ian are
in&--i*i#n! proofs for his .)$a' -i!n# to the legal profession.
1vidence show that he indeed a,an+)n#+ "i -a.i'5 and thus removed him from the position
of being a good husband and father. The Court reminded him of his +&!i# a a -a!"#$ an+ a
a "&,an+ .see assigned provision below0.
FC A$!. 6F. The husband and wife are obliged to 'iv# !)g#!"#$, observe mutual love, respect
and -i+#'i!5, and render mutual help and support.
'igest. Aboy !ayalan
The parties were legally married an
lived together for about a month.
Within the period of their cohabitation,
the defendant, Jose, demanded that
1loisa should (#$-)$. &n*"a!# an+
'a*ivi)& a*! )n "i g#ni!a'
(laintiff*appellant $#-&#+ to perform
any act other than legal and valid
cohabitation. D#-#n+an!1 !"#n1
.a'!$#a!#+ "#$ by word and deed.
%ubse&uently, she was ),'ig#+ to
leave the conjugal abode and live with
her parents.
%he filed this action against her
husband for support outside their
conjugal domicile.
W! a spouse .in this case, the
husband0 is %TA@@ obliged to support
the other when the latter is living
EoutsideF their conjugal domicile.
Res. .C!CD55A!; (A!A!+ The
wife is legally still within the conjugal
D#-#n+an!Da((#''## C)&$!
'efendant cites a ruling of the %upreme Court of
%pain stating that the obligation of the spouse to
give support even without cohabition is limited to
cases wherein there is a legal decree of
separation 5 a judgement of divorce.
%ince in the case at bar, the wife merely left the
conjugal abode in the absence of any judicial
decree, the husband is not obliged to give support
to the wife.
%uch doctrine would not control this jurisdiction
because the substantive law of the (hilippines is
different from that of %pain.
The doctrine is also NOT APPLICABLE to cases
wherein )n# )- !"# ()&# :a *).(#''#+ !)
'#av# !"# *)nK&ga' a,)+# ,5 !"# )!"#$ or where
the husband voluntarily abandons such abode and
the wife seeks to force him to furnish support.
"oreover, should the doctrine cited by the
defendant prevail, it would allow married persons
to disregard the marriage bond and separate from
each other of their own free will.
4-he mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his %ife&
5 5 5 -he la% %ill not permit him to terminate it by his o%n %rongful acts in driving a%ay his
%ife to see3 protection in the parental home&6
'igest. 7ary !eley
DANIEL STE/EN CARREN1 a((#''an!1 v. THE STATE1 a((#''##. LS&($#.# C)&$! )- G#)$gia. N).
02E0E. N)v#.,#$ 61 7<FEM
'aniel %teven Warren was indicted for the rape and aggravated sodomy of his wife.
)is pre*trial general demurrer and motion to dismiss had been denied. )ence, this interlocutory
9. W! within the $a(# !a!&!#, there exists an i.('i*i! .a$i!a' #9*'&i)n that makes it legally
impossible for a husband to be guilty of raping his wife
2. W! within the agg$ava!#+ )+).5 !a!&!#, there exists an i.('i*i! .a$i!a' #9*'&i)n that
makes it legally impossible for a husband to be guilty of raping his wife
:. W! there will be a deprivation of due process rights by interpreting that the criminal law has
no marital exemptions.
9. There is ! implicit marital exclusion in the rape statute
2. There is ! implicit marital exclusion in the aggravated sodomy statute
:. There is ! deprivation of due process
9. The theories by which the idea of a marital exclusion to the rape statute are hinged on are no
longer valid given that there have been dramatic changes already when it comes to women-s
rights and the status of women and marriage.
The Three theories which are the basis of marital exclusion are the following+
a. L)$+ Ha'#8 *)n!$a*!&a' !"#)$5* a husband is not guilty of raping his wife
because the wife have given up herself already unto her husband upon marriage
b. That the wife is the propertyI chattel of the husband
c. Uni!5 )- (#$)n !"#)$5D That the vey being or legal existence of a woman was
suspended during marriage
/urthermore, it is incredible to think that any state would allow women to consent to marriage if by
entering into that contract, they are making themselves unprotected under the law from the Eultimate
violation of the selfF, which occurs in rape. 5ape is recogniGed as Ehighly reprehensible, both in a moral
sense and in its almost total contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of the female victimF.
@astly, the ;eorgia rape statute did not expressly stated that it includes marital exemption. The old
statutory rape law, which may contain the common law marital exemption has already been repealed in
2. At is clear in the aggravated sodomy state, enacted in 9>36, that there was no marital
exemption for sodomy based on EconsentF. %odomy is Ethe carnal knowledge and connection
against the order of nature by man with man, or in the same unnatural manner with womanF.
1ven in common law, consent of the other party is not a defense for sodomy. Consent only
shows the other party-s guilt.
:. 'ue process only re&uires that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct
themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden. An this case, the rape and aggravated
statutes, which are broadly written, had just been applied for the first time.
'igest. 8ichard !eltran
Wife and son brought civil rights
action against city and police officers alleging
that constitutional rights were violated by non*
performance or malperformance of official
duties by the officers in regard to threats and
assaults by the wife-s estranged husband
At was alleged that there was a
violation of the e&ual protection clause
because city and police officers used an
administrative classification of assault
complaints that manifested itself in
discriminatory treatment violative of e&ual
protection or in other words, police power was
fully provided to persons abused by someone
whom the victim had no domestic relationship
with, but police consistently afforded less
protection when the victim was a woman
abused or assaulted by a spouse or boyfriend
or when a child was abused by the father or
Charles and Tracey Thurman were
married but became estranged after some
time. Tracey lived separately from the husband
with their only child Charles, Jr, in the %t.
)ilaire*,entley residence.
/or a period of 6 months, Tracey had
repeatedly notified the defendant police officers
of the city of repeated threats upon her life and
the life of her child by her estranged husband
Charles but her attempts to file complaints
against him in response to his threats of death
and maiming were repeatedly ignored or
rejected by defendants. The following occurred
in those months+
Charles attacked Tracey at the home
of Judy ,entley K 5ichard %t. )ilaire. Judy K
5ichard filed complaint K re&uested efforts to
keep Charles off their property. Charles
repeatedly threatened Tracey and son but
police made no attempt to arrest or look for him
An one incident, Charles forcefully took
their son. Tracey K 5ichard filed complaint but
was not accepted even on ground of
trespassing. Charles threatened Tracey while
she was in her car K she even broke her
windshield. )e was arrested K convicted of
breach of peace. $llowed conditional discharge
with conditions to+ 90 stay completely
away from Tracey %t. )ilaire*,entley residence
and 20 to commit no more crimes
Tracey re&uested for arrest warrant
for her husband due to threats that he would
shoot them. Complaint was refused. Told to
return after : weeks for warrant. Tracey kept
going back to the police department to obtain a
warrant of arrest and to re&uest police
protection from her husband but she kept being
told to come back at a later time for reasons
such as the
officer who issued warrant of arrests was on
vacation !o warrant was issued, Charles still
not arrested
CD@"A!$TA! / T)51$T%+
Charles returned to the %t. )ilaire*,entley
residence one afternoon and demanded to
speak to Tracey. Tracey called police
department to pick him up. Tracey spoke to
husband but she was stabbed repeatedly in the
chest, neck K throat. 2H minutes after Tracey-s
call, one police officer arrived while Charles
was still holding the bloody knife. )e dropped
the knife, went into the house and brought
Charles Jr. and dropped the child on the
wounded mother and thereafter kicked Tracey
for the second time. /our more police arrived,
and still Charles was permitted to wander
about the crowd and threaten Tracey. At was
only when he approached Tracy while she was
lying on a stretcher that they arrested him.
Tracey alleged that+
Charles worked as a counterman in a
diner where he served members of the police
department K he bragged to them that he
would get Tracey K kill her.
(olice consistently afforded less
protection when victim is a woman abused or
assaulted by a spouse or boyfriend, or a child
abused by father or stepfather.
W! there is a violation of the e&ual protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
$ man is not allowed to physically abuse or
endanger a woman merely because he is her
husband. $ police officer may not knowingly
refrain from interference in such violence and
may not automatically decline to make an
arrest simply because assaulter and victim are
married to each other. /ailure of city officials
and police officers to perform their duty of
taking reasonable measures to protect safety
of persons whom they know may be attacked is
a denial of e&ual protection laws.
1&ual protection of laws is not
restricted to racial discriminationsC it also
involves alien*based classifications,
discriminatory legislative actions and
discriminatory administration K enforcement of
law by the government. Classifications can only
be justified by a compelling or overriding state
interest. Thus, police action is subject to this.
(olice officers are expected to preserve the law
and order and to protect the personal safety of
everyone in the community including women
assaulted by people wIwhom they have a
domestic relation. The inaction of the police
during all those times that Tracey has
complained is proof that this has been a
practice and is tantamount to an administrative
classification employing discriminatory
application of law. %tate failed to present a
compelling interest in applying such
)owever, Charles Jr. can-t claim that
he was denied e&ual protection of the laws. )e
was rarely present during assaults thus he
didn-t suffer from police inaction unlike his
mom. )e was not part of the court orders.
'igest. 9elga
FACTS 'efendant "ario @iberta was married
to 'enise @iberta. $fter the birth of
their son, defendant began to beat
'enise brought a proceeding to the
court seeking protection from the
defendant. 'efendant was ordered to
move out and stay away from the
family home and from 'enise.
'efendant may visit his son each
'efendant did not visit his son one
weekend. Anstead, on a weekday, he
called 'enise to ask if he could visit
his son.
'enise allowed defendant to fetch her
and their son and to take them to the
motel where defendant was staying,
after being assured that a friend of
defendant would be with them at all
times. When they arrived at the motel,
the friend left.
'efendant attacked 'enise,
threatened to kill her, forced her to
perform fellatio on him, to engage in
sexual intercourse, and to tell their
son to watch.
'efendant allowed them to leave after
the incident. 'enise went to the
hospital to be treated of scratches and
bruises inflicted by her husband, then
to the police station to complain the
defendant for rape in the first degree
and sodomy in the first degree.
Sec 13:&3; of the Penal (a%.
$ male is guilty of rape of the first
degree when he engages in sexual
intercourse with a female by forcible
/emale S any female person who is
not married to the actor
$ person is guilty of sodomy in the
first degree when he engages in
deviate sexual intercourse with
another person by forcible
'eviate sexual intercourse S sexual
conduct between unmarried persons
consisting of contact between penis
and anus, mouth and penis, or mouth
and vulva
Enot marriedF in the definitions of both
EfemaleF and Edeviate sexual
intercourseF S marital exemption for
both rape and sodomy
1xception to the marital exemption S
husband and wife are considered Enot
marriedF if at the time of the sexual
assault they are living apart pursuant
o $ court order
o $ decree or judgment of
o $ written agreement of
/acts .continuation0+
'efendant moved to dismiss
indictment, asserting that he was still
married to 'enise so he came within
the marital exemption. Trial court
granted defendant-s motion.
n appeal by the (eople, the
$ppellate 'ivision held that a /amily
Court order of protection is a type of
court order which re&uires living apart.
Thus, defendant and 'enise were Enot
marriedF for purposes of statute at the
time of the incident. 'efendant was
convicted of rape in the first degree
and sodomy in the first degree.
n appeal by defendant, he asserts+
o rder of protection is not a
type of court order which
re&uires living apart and thus
he is within the marital
o )e cannot be convicted of
either rape in the first degree
or sodomy in the first degree
because both statutes are
unconstitutional being in
violation of the e&ual
protection clause.
,oth statutes
burden some
.unmarried0 but not
other .married0
5ape statute
burdens only men,
but not women
9. As the /amily Court order of protection
the type of court order which re&uires
living apartL YES
2. $re the rape and sodomy statutes
unconstitutional for violating the e&ual
protection clause in that they burden
unmarried but not married malesL
:. As the forcible rape statute
unconstitutional for violating the e&ual
protection clause in that it burdens
men but not womenL YES
?. As the defendant guilty of rape in the
first degree and sodomy in the first
degreeL YES
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
9. ,efore, the marital exemption applied as long as the marriage legally existed. An 9>86, the legislature expanded Enot marriedF to
include husbands and wives not living together pursuant to a court order, a decree of separation, or a written agreement of separation.
An addition to this clear statement of legislative intent, the plain language of the statute indicates that the /amily Court order of
protection is a type of court order which re&uires husband and wife to live apart.
2. 'ebunking arguments for marital exemption+
The marital exemption is based on the mutual .a!$i.)nia' *)n#n!1 that the wife had given up herself to the husband. This
classifies unmarried men differently from married men because married men are exempted from prosecution for rape. %tatute may
draw a distinction based upon marital status provided that the classification is based on a ground of difference which rationally explains
different treatment. This classification has no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape. %tatute is
therefore unconstitutional.
5ape is not simply a sexual act to which one party does not consent. At is a degrading violent act which violates the bodily
integrity of the victim and fre&uently causes severe lasting physical and psychic harm. To ever imply consent to such an act is irrational.
"arriage has never been viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse.
The traditional views, that the :i-# i ($)(#$!5 )- !"# "&,an+1 an+ !"a! "#$ '#ga' #9i!#n*# i in*)$()$a!#+ in!) !"a! )-
!"# "&,an+, are no longer recogniGed today because a woman is recogniGed as a whole human being.
There is also the argument that marital exemption protects against government intrusion into .a$i!a' ($iva*5 and promotes
reconciliation of the spouses, so that the elimination of the exemption would be disruptive to marriages. )owever, marital exemption
does not further marital privacy because right of privacy protects consensual acts, not violent sexual assaults. 1limination of the marital
exemption would not disrupt the marriage by discouraging $#*)n*i'ia!i)n. At is actually the act of rape which disrupts the marriage.
"arital rape is said to be a +i--i*&'! *$i.# !) ($)v# because lack of consent has to be shown. $ related argument is that such
prosecutions could lead to -a,$i*a!#+ *).('ain! by vindictive wives. )owever, in most rape cases, proving lack of consent is always
difficult. %imilarly, there is no greater possibility of married women fabricating complaints than unmarried women doing so.
/inal argument for marital exemption is that .a$i!a' $a(# i n)! a #$i)& a )!"#$ $a(# *a#, and so it should be dealt
with less severely such as in assault statutes. )owever, the fact that a rape statute exists is evidence of its being different from and
more severe than assault. %tudies also show that marital rape is generally more severe and traumatic than other rape cases.
:. 'ebunking arguments for gender exemption+
The statute applies to males who rape females but not to females who rape males. 5ape statutes historically apply to conduct
of males because the purpose was to ($)!#*! !"# *"a!i!5 )- !"# -#.a'# an+ !"& !"#i$ ($)(#$!5 va'&#. The same is no longer true
today. $ statute which treats males and females differently violates e&ual protection unless the classification is based on the
achievement of an important government objective. therwise, gender exemption renders the statute unconstitutional.
,ecause only females can become pregnant, the %tate constitutionally differentiates between rape of females and rape of males. The
primary purpose behind the statutory rape
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
N. P$)(#$!5 R#'a!i)n
A. G#n#$a' P$)vii)n
C)''#*!)$ v. Fi"#$
The C@@1CT5 of Anternal 5evenue, petitioner v. 'ouglas /A%)15 and ,ettina, /isher, and the Court of Tax $ppeals, respondents
2F Jan&a$5 7<67
Ba$$#$a1 J.:
968?+ %tevenson was born in the (hilippines to ,ritish
9>4>+ he married a ,ritish woman, ,eatrice, in "anila.
9>?H+ he and his wife moved and established their
permanent residence in %an /rancisco, California, D%$.
9>?8+ in %an /rancisco, he executed his will wherein he
made his wife sole heiress to the real and personal
properties ac&uired while in the (hilippines.
9>H9+ he died in %an /rancisco.
9>H9+ administration proceedings were instituted for the
settlement of the estate in the (hilippines. $ certain %cott
was appointed administrator of the estate. )e filed a
preliminary estate and tax return with the reservation of
having the estates appraised at their values 3 months after
the death of %tevenson. Collector of Anternal 5evenue
accepted the valuation in the said estate and tax return.
9>H2+ ,eatrice assigned all her rights and interests in the
estate to spouses /isher.
9>H:+ %cott filed a second amended estate and
inheritance tax return which contained claims for additional
exemptions and deductions pursuant to the !ational
Anternal 5evenue Code of the (hilippines and the D%
Anternal 5evenue Code. The estate claimed that, it had
overpaid the government. The Collector denied a refund of
the amount allegedly overpaid.
%pouses /isher, as assignees of ,eatrice, filed an action
for the recovery of said amount.
$fter the decision of the Court of Tax $ppeals, both parties
P#$!in#n! I&#: What law governs the property relations of
the spousesL
P#$!in#n! H#'+;Ra!i)
@ower court applied the doctrine in our civil law that in
the absence of any ante*nuptial agreement, contracting parties
are presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal
partnership. This is being disputed by the Collector who
contends that the property relations ought to be determined by
the national law of the decedent husband, the law of 1ngland.
,oth parties adhere to the nationality theory. Court held that
the national law of the husband becomes the dominant law in
determining property relation of the spouses.
,oth spouses are foreigners who married in the
(hilippines. The 1nglish law applies. ,ut the pertinent 1nglish
law has not been proven by the petitioner. An the absence of
proof, the Court is justified in indulging in Eprocessual
presumption,F in presuming that the law of 1ngland on this
matter is the same as our law .presumption of adoption of the
system of conjugal partnership0.
An the (hilippines, upon the death of any citiGen or
resident, or non*resident with properties therein, there are
imposed upon his estate and its settlement, both estate and
inheritance tax. Dnder the laws of California, only inheritance
tax is imposed. The D% Anternal 5evenue Code imposes an
estate tax on non*residents not citiGens of D%, but does not
provide for any exemption on the basis of reciprocity. Af we
exempt the Californian from paying the estate tax, we do not
entitle a /ilipino to be exempt from a similar estate tax in
California. The /ilipino is disadvantaged. The lower court erred
in exempting the estate in &uestion. Court held that the estate
should be exempted from neither estate nor inheritance tax.
7. R#%&ii!# -)$ +)na!i)n
D).a'agan v. B)'i-#$
Jorge '"$@;$!, plaintiff*appellee Persus Carlos ,@A/15, defendant*appellant
F F#,$&a$5 7<76
J)"n)n1 J.
!ature+ $((1$@ from judgment of C/A ordering defendant
,olifer to return the money paid to him in consideration of the
promise of marriage, together with the interest
(laintiff Jorge 'omalagan and defendant Carlos ,olifer
entered into a contract agreeing that plaintiff 'omalagan
was to pay defendant ,olifer the sum of ( H44 upon the
marriage of the son of the former and the daughter of the
'omalagan paid ,olifer ( H44 and an additional (93
which is a token of future marriage
,olifer-s daughter married another man.
Dpon learning of the marriage of the defendant ,olifer-s
daughter, 'omalagan demanded for the return of (H93
together with the interest and damages .resulting from the
fact that in order to raise the said money, he was obliged
to sell his real property at a great sacrifice0
C/A ruled that 'omalagan is entitled to the sum of (H93
with interests but not the damages because no evidence
was sufficiently shown that 'omalagan suffered additional
damages. )ence, the appeal.
9. Whether plaintiff 'omalagan delivered the sum of (H93 to
2. Whether the contract in regard to the delivery of money by
reason of prospective marriage is valid and effective
considering that it is a verbal contract
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
9. R1%. The lower court found a large preponderance of
evidence showing that the plaintiff had delivered to the
defendant the sum of (H93 in substantially the manner
alleged in the complaint. There is an abundance of
uncontradicted proof supporting the findings of the lower
2. R1%. (aragraph : of section ::H of the Code of
(rocedure in Civil $ctions states that+
EAn the following cases an agreement hereafter made
shall be unenforceable by action unless the same, or
).# n)!# )$ .#.)$an+&. !"#$#)- ,# in :$i!ing, and
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agentC
evidence, therefore of the agreement cannot be received
without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents+
:. $n agreement made upon the consideration of
marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry.F
%ection ::H does not render oral contracts invalid but
merely unenforceable. $ contract may be valid and yet, by
virtue of section ::H, the parties will be unable to prove it.
,ut, if the parties to an action during the trial do not object
to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts
and permit the contract to be proved by evidence other
than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as
if it had been reduced to writing.
(H93 A% !T $ '!$TA! (5(T15 !D(TA$% %A!C1 AT
W$% !T ;AP1! T 1AT)15 5 ,T) / T)1 /DTD51
%(D%1%. T)1 %D" / "!1R ;AP1! T '1/1!'$!T
,@A/15 /$A@% T %$TA%/R T)1 T)A5' 51TDA%AT1 /
'!$TA! (5(T15 !D(TA$%, A.1., E$5T. 62. QQQ A!
/$P5 / !1 5 ,T) / T)1 /DTD51 %(D%1%.F
S#$$an) v. S)').)n
1stanislao %155$!, plaintiff*appellant Persus "elchor %@"!, defendant*appellee
2< J&n# 7<E<
M)n!#.a5)$1 J.
"elchor %olomon desired to marry $lejandria
/eliciano, the ward of 1stanislao %errano. ,ecause of this, he
wrote a Edeed of donation proper nuptiasF where he stipulated
that he shall donate all of his exclusive properties to their
children who would be born out of their marriage. ,ut if their
union be childless, then V of all %olomon-s properties .as well
as conjugal property0 will be given to his brothers, sisters, or
their heirs, if %olomon shall die before his wife. Af, however, his
wife dies first, then V of his properties shall be given to those
who raised $lejandria.
!ine months later, $lejandria died without issue.
%errano then filed an action to enforce the supposed donation
in his favour .as the one who raised $lejandria0 since she died
The trial court ruled that there was no donation
propter nuptias since it was not made in consideration of the
marriage and it was not in favour of either of the spouses but to
a third person.
WI! the donation was made in consideration of the marriage
or in consideration of the death of either spouse in the absence
of any children.
At was made in consideration of the latter, hence it was not a
donation proper nuptias.
"arriage was not the only consideration or condition
in this case, but that either spouse shall have to die before the
other and that the marriage would be childless. )ence, it could
not be said that it was Ein consideration of the marriageF $lso,
the donation being made was not in favour of $lejandria but to
The law .$rt 9:28 Civil Code0 re&uires that donations
propter nuptias must be a.0 made only before the marriage, b.0
in consideration of the marriage, and c.0 in favour of either or
both spouses. %ince the latter two re&uirements were
unsatisfied, it is not a donation propter nuptias&
<< =biter. At is not a donation inter vivos because the
donee never accepted it in a form re&uired by law. !either can
it be a donation mortis causa because the donor is still alive.
S)'i v. Ba$$))
/ortunata %@A%, plaintiff*appelle Persus "axima ,$55% et al., defendants*appellants
43 O*!),#$ 7<2F
Avan*#Oa1 C. J.
Na!&$#+ $ppeal from a judgment of the C/A of (angasinan
Da!#+ ctober :4, 9>26
P)n#n!#+ $vacena, C.J.
%pouses Juan @ambino and "axima ,arroso made a
donation propter nuptias of some lands in favour of their
son $lejo @ambino and /ortuna %olis .$lejo-s fiancWe0 in
a private document in consideration of their marriage.
ne of the conditions of this donation is that in case of
death of one of the donees, one*half of those lands would
revert to the donors while the surviving done would retain
the other half.
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
n June 6, 9>9>, $lejo and /ortunata were married and
the donors delivered the possession of the donated lands
to them. n $ug. :, 9>9>, $lejo @ambino died. An the
same year, donor Juan @ambino also died. $fter the
latter-s death, his wife "axima ,arroso recovered
possession of the donated lands.
/ortunata %olis filed an action against "axima ,arroso
and the other heirs of Juan @ambino, demanding that
they execute the proper deed of donation, transferring
one*half of the donated property, and moreover, to
proceed to the partition of the donated property and its
fruits. The court in accordance with $rt. 928> ordered
defendants to execute such deeds of donation.
9. Was the donation propter nuptias validL
2. As marriage a consideration in donation propter
H#'++ Judgment of C/A is 51P15%1'C defendants are
absolved from the complaint
9. An this case, the donation propter nuptias did not become
valid neither did it create any right because it was not
made in a public instrument. $lso, $rt. 298> of CC is not
applicable because it refers to contracts valid in
themselves, and not to the form re&uired for their validity,
which they already have, but it simply refers to the
essential re&uisite to make them effective.
2. An donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a
consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to
give birth to the obligation. $ valid donation not revoked if
the marriage did not take place will forever be valid. This
is so because the marriage in a donation propter nuptias is
rather a resolutory condition which, as such, presupposes
the existence of the obligation which may be resolved or
revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of
the obligation.
%treet, J., dissenting
$ donation propter nuptias is made for a valuable
consideration within the meaning of $rt. 322 of CC.
Ma!#) v. Lag&a
,onifacia "$T1, et al., petitioners, Persus ;ervasio @$;D$, et al., respondents
24 O*!),#$ 7<6< R#5#1 J. B. L.
o Cipriano @agua was the original owner of three
parcels of land.
o .9>980 @agua and his wife, in a public instrument,
donated two lots to their son $lejandro in consideration of
his marriage to ,onifacia "ateo, and the couple then took
possession of the property but the Certificates of Title
remained in the donor-s name.
o .9>2:0 $lejandro died, ,onifacia and daughter lived
with father*in*law Cipriano who undertook farming of the
o .9>230 Cipriano refused t deliver owner-s share of
harvest to ,onifacia.
o Justice of (eace Court+ awarded possession of two
lots to ,onifacia.
o .9>?90 Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the two
lots in favor of ;ervasio, his younger son.
o .9>H30 ,onifacia stopped receiving owner-s share of
harvest and learned of the sale of lots to ;ervasio.
o C/A+ ,onifacia was seeking annulment of deed of sale
and recovery of possession of property and the court
declared the sale null and void, ordered the 5egister of
'eeds to cancel the TCTs, ordered ;ervasio and Cipriano
to vacate and deliver the possession of land to ,onifacia
o .9>H80 Justice of (eace Court+ ;ervasio wants
reimbursement for improvements made by them on the
lots but was dismissed by the Justice of (eace.
o ;ervasio appealed to C/A and filed another case for
annulment of donation of the two lots, because the two
lots were all that Cipriano owned, thus neglected leaving
something for his own support and prejudiced the legitime
of ;ervasio. .,oth cases heard jointly0
o .9>H60 Cipriano died
o C/A+ dismissed first case because of lack of cause of
action since ;ervasio has been declared as possessor in
bad faith, therefore not entitled to reimbursement for
improvementsC second suit was dismissed on ground of
prescription since action to annul was brought after ?9
o C$+ affirmed ruling of C/A in first suitC in the second
suit, court said that the donation to $lejandro exceeded his
legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could
have freely given will prejudice the legitime of ;ervasio,
thus the donation is inofficious and ,onifacia was ordered
to reconvey ?>?.8H s&.m. to be taken from any convenient
part of the lots
o WI! C$ acted correctly in ordering the reduction of
the donation for being inofficious
o WI! C$ is correct in ordering herein petitioners to
reconvey to respondent ;ervasio an unidentified ?>?.8H
s&.m. potion of the donated lots
o Res. The appealed case was not exclusively for
annulment of the entire donation, but merely the portion
which infringes upon the legitime of ;ervasio. This was
not barred because marriage is merely an occasion or
motive of the donation propter nuptias .not its causa0, and
the action to enforce ;ervasio-s legitime only accrued
upon the death of his father in 9>H6. The court also ruled
that such donation of property may be reduced for being
inofficious. ,eing liberalities, they remain subject to
reduction for inofficiousness upon the donor-s death, if
they should infringe the legitime of a forced heir.
o !o. The C$ acted on unsupported assumptions+ 90 :
lots were the only properties of composing net hereditary
estate of the deceased Cipriano, 20 $lejandro and
;ervasio were Cipriano-s only legal heirs, :0 that Cipriano
left no unpaid debts, charges, taxes, etc. ?0 that in the
computation of heirs legitime, the area and not the value,
would be considered. $rt.>46
of Civil Code must be
To determine the legitime, the value of the property left
at the death of the testator shall be considered,
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
followed. Thus, before any conclusion about legal share
may be reached the ff must be done+ 90 net estate of
decedent must be ascertained, 20 deduct all payable
obligations from value of property at time of his death, :0
all donations subject to collation would be added to it, ?0
with partible estate determined, compulsory heirs can be
established, H0 ascertain whether donation had prejudiced
!T1+ di ko na sinama yung $nnotation part, yung case lang
deducting all debts, and charges, hich shall not include
those imposed in the ill. To the net value of the
hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all
donation by the testator that are sub!ect to collation, at
the time he made them.
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
2. /)i+ D)na!i)n
NaGa$#n) v. Bi$)g
!onifacio $A>A8E$= plaintiff,appellant ?ersus Francisco !)8=@ and Apoloniano Ariola defendants,appellee
FACTS: $ndrea 5odrigueG and Juan $ben were married and
had a daughter named $lberta $ben. Their daughter $lberta
later got married to "ariano "eleno !aGareno and had a child
named ,onifacio !aGareno .plaintiff0. When Juan $ben died,
$ndrea got married to Cirilo ,raganGa. $ndrea and her second
husband Cirilo had no offspring.
An "arch 9>98, Cirilo executed a deed of donation of land to
his then six*year old step*grandson ,onifacio. The donation
was accepted in the same deed by $lberta and "ariano,
parents of ,onifacio. Cirilo continued to possess and enjoy the
,eginning in 9>:4, Cirilo sold portions of the land+
9>:4 89 acres and :4 centares to ,irog for 9, 944
9>:: 2 hectares to ,irog for 2, 244 .initially with
remaining balance of :44, later paid 28H,
wrote promissory note for 2H0
9>:? 9 hectare and 84 ares to $riola for 9, 344
.balance of 344, promissory note for that
sum payable at end of /eb or "arch 9>:H0
These two buyers immediately took possession of the land and
cultivated them. Cirilo died on 'ec.9>:? and since $riola had
not paid by /eb9>:H, plaintiff wrote him a letter demanding the
payment. (edro ,raganGa .brother of Cirilo0 collected balance
of 2H from ,irog in "arch 9>:H0.
ISSUE: CON plaintiff, !aGareno, may recover title and
possession of a parcel of land described here.
HELD;RATIO: !o. !ot only did he lose ownership of the two
portions of the land that the ,irogs and $riolas possess, he
signed a deed in favor of $riola on the third and last portionC
therefore, he is estopped from claiming the land.
"ore importantly, appeal must be dismissed since plaintiff has
no cause of action. The deed of donation upon which he bases
his claim to land is n&'' an+ v)i+ in*# i! i .a+# ,5 !"#
+)n)$ !) a g$an+*"i'+ )- "i :i-# ,5 !"# :i-#8 ($#vi)&
.a$$iag#. The donation falls under the prohibition in A$!.744E1
CC. !either has the plaintiff ac&uired the land by prescription
for there is no evidence that he ever possessed it or claimed it
against his grandfather .as evident in deed in favor of $riola,
signed by !aGareno as witness0.
Judgement affirmed.
Ma!a,&#na v. C#$van!#
Cornelia "$T$,D1!$, plaintiff*appellant Persus (etronila C15P$!T1%, defendant*appellee
47 Ma$*" 7<P7
F#$nan+)1 J.
/elix "atabuena and (etronila Cervantes are in a
common*law relationship as husband and wife. ,efore getting
married in "arch of 9>32, "atabuena donated a piece of land
to (etronila Cervantes in 9>H3. $fter about six months from the
date of marriage .%eptember0, "atabuena died intestate.
The sister of /elix "atabuena, Cornelia "atabuena,
claims that the donation in "arch of 9>32 is void. The lower
court ruled that since the donation was made at the time before
the marriage, it is valid.
I&#: W! the donation made is valid .To answer this, the
court must answer W! $rt. 9:: of the !CC should also apply
to common*law relationships.0
E$rt. 9::. 1very donation between the spouses during
the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply
when the donation takes effect after the death of the donor.
!either does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the
spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family
H#'+: The donation is void. $rt. 9:: of the !CC apply to
common*law relationships as well.
Ra!i): (olicy considerations of the most exigent character as
well as the dictates of morality re&uire that the same prohibition
should apply to a common law relationship. An relation to this, a
9>H? C$ decision ,uenaventura vs. ,autista, interpreting a
similar provision of the old CC ruled that if the policy of law is
to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure
and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to
apply the same to persons living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of nuptials. The spirit of the law is as much
part of it as what is written.
Ha$+ing v. C)..#$*ia' Uni)n
"rs. )enry 1. )$5'A!; and her husband, plaintiffs*appellees Persus C""15CA$@ D!A! $ssurance Co., defendant*appellant
73 A&g&! 7<7F
Fi"#$1 J.
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
$ppeal from a judgment of C/A of "anila .granting action by
plaintiffs to recover from defendants (:444Xinterest due them
from an insurance policy0
49Jan9>93 )enry )arding gave his wife a %tudebaker
automobile as a present.
o (revious owners+ Canson )arding J.
,rannigan JC ;raham )enry )arding
At was repaired and repainted at @uneta ;arage at a
cost of (>44. @uneta ;arage, as an agent, offered
"rs. )arding an insurance policy of the defendant.
(roposal was made specifying (:H44 as the E(rice
paid by proposerF and (:444 as E(resent PalueF. "r.
%erver, ;" of @uneta ;arage and an agent of
defendant examined automobile and attested to its
estimated value.
$ policy was thereafter issued, with the premium at
(9H4 or HY of the estimated value. (olicy specifies
that it shall indemnify the insured against loss or
damage to any motor car described in the policy,
among others.
2?"ar9>93 automobile was totally destroyed by fire.
'efendant did not pay "rs. )arding for the losses
despite her compliance with all the necessary
conditions .proofs of loss and interest0.
)ardings instituted action to recover from defendants
the sum of (:444Xinterest due them from the
insurance policy. C/A granted amount demanded plus
interest and costs.
9. WI! automobile was owned by plaintiff, and WI! she had
insurable interest. Res. Res.
2. C;N !"# a&!).),i'# -a'' &n+#$ !"# ($)"i,i!i)n )- gi-!
,#!:##n ()&# a**)$+ing !) CC A$!. 7440. !o.
Art& 1334 All gifts bet%een spouses during the marriage shall
be void& 7oderate gifts %hich the spouses besto% on each
other on festive days of the family are not included in this rule&
a@ D#-#n+an! *ann)! %&#!i)n !"# va'i+i!5 )- !"# !$an-#$.
On'5 ()&# )$ )!"#$ in!#$#!#+ (#$)n a--#*!#+ ,5
&*" .a5 +) ).
,@ B&$+#n )- ($))- i )n (a$!5 a''#ging !"a! !"# !$an-#$ i
n)! :i!"in !"# #9*#(!i)n. T"i +#(#n+ a') )n !"#
*i$*&.!an*# an+ )*ia' !an+ing )- !"# (a$!i#.
:. WI! plaintiff is guilty of fraud. !o. There was good faith
belief in "rs. )aridng representation as to the cost of the
automobile, based on information given to her by her husband
and "r. %erver. ,esides, the proposal, even through an agent,
must be considered as acts of the insurer and not of the
,ased on 9 and :, C/A decision affirmed.
S&.,a+ v.CA
1milie T. %D",$' and ,eatrice,. Tait, petitioners Persus The CD5T / $((1$@%, et al., respondents
27 J&n# 7<<<
M#n+)Ga1 J.
$fter the death of his wife, $gata ,. Tait, in $pril :4, 9>:3,
;eorge #. Tait, %r. lived in common*law relationship with "aria
/. Tait to whom on $pril 2, 9>8? he donated a certain parcel of
unregistered land in %itio %um*at, ,ontoc. ;eorge himself
passed away on 'ecember 2?, 9>88. /rom 9>62 to 9>6:,
"aria /. Tait sold lots included within the %um*at property in
favor of private respondents. (rivate respondents purchased
the lots on the strength of a Tax 'eclaration over the %um*at
property showing the seller, "aria /. Tait, to be the owner of
the property in &uestion and thereafter planted different kinds
of fruit trees and plants on the lots purchased by them.
n July 2?, 9>6>, petitioners 1milie T. %umbad and ,eatrice
,. Tait brought an action for &uieting of title, nullification of
deeds of sale, and recovery of possession with damages
against private respondents. They alleged that they are the
children and compulsory heirs of the spouses ;eorge and
$gataC and that after the death of their mother, their father sold
the tucan property owned by the spouses and used the
proceeds thereof to purchase a residential lot in %um*at.
(etitioners further alleged that from 9>62 to 9>6:, "aria,
without their knowledge and consent, sold lots included within
the %um*at property to private respondentsC that prior to the
sales transactions, private respondents were warned that the
%um*at property did not belong to "aria but to the heirs of
;eorgeC that this notwithstanding, private respondents
proceeded to purchase the lots in &uestion from "ariaC that
"aria had no right to sell the %um*at propertyC that the deeds
of sale are null and void and did not transfer title to private
respondentsC that petitioners discovered the transactions only
in 9>66 but, as soon as they learned of the same, they lost no
time in communicating with private respondentsC and that
private respondents refused petitioners- re&uest for a meeting,
leaving the latter no other alternative but to file the case in
(rivate respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, but their
motion was denied by the trial court in its rder, dated
%eptember 23, 9>6>. An their answer, they denied that .90 they
had been informed of petitioners- claim of ownership of the lots
and .20 that petitioners learned of the sales to them only in
9>66. They alleged that the %um*at property, covered by Tax
'eclaration !o. :>>, did not belong to the conjugal partnership
of ;eorge and $gata for the reason that $gata died more than
thirty .:40 years before the issuance of Tax 'eclaration !o.
:>> in 9>8:C that the late "aria, second wife of ;eorge, did not
need the consent of petitioners to be able to sell the %um*at
property to private respondentsC that private respondents were
purchasers in good faith and for valueC that the action was
barred by lachesC that they were in possession of the lots and
had introduced improvements thereonC and that they had
separate tax declarations covering their respective lots.
An her deposition, %hirley 1illenger stated that she and 5a&uel
Tait, ;eorge-s ward, were boardmates in a dormitory. %hirley
stated that she saw and read the contents of the 'eed of
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
'onation regarding the %um*at property with ;eorge-s
signature. %he further testified that in 9>8> or 9>64 she saw
5a&uel type the 'eed of 'onation at the dormitory and forge
the signature of ;eorge who was already dead at the time. n
cross*examination, %hirley stated that it took 5a&uel about 24
to :4 minutes to type the 'eed of 'onationC that 5a&uel Tait
had a form from which she copied the 'eed of 'onationC that
5a&uel Tait did not refer to a tax declaration in preparing the
'eed of 'onationC and that it took the male boarders the entire
morning, from 6 o-clock until 99 o-clock, to copy the signature
of ;eorge.
.90 W! the deed of donation inter vivos is null and void on
the ground that it is a forgery, as testified by %hirley 1illenger.
.20 W! the deed of donation is invalid under $rt. 8?> of the
Civil Code, which re&uires a public instrument as a re&uisite for
the validity of donations of immovable property.
.:0 W! the deed of donation contravenes $rt. 9:: of the Civil
Code, and $rt. 68 which extends the prohibition to common*
law relations.
.?0 W! petitioners are guilty of laches.
.90 NO. The testimony of 1illenger is Evague and incredibleF.
5a&uel Tait, who must have been a young girl about 24 years
of age in 9>8> or 9>64 .she gave her age as :4 on $pril 99,
9>>40, could !T have, in 24 to :4 minutes, prepared the
document in all its legal form supposedly copying only from a
EformatF. At also taxes the mind to believe that 5a&uel Tait had
called the boys in the boarding house and, within the view of
every one, asked them to forge the signature of ;eorge #.
Tait, %r. and, with the boys failing to accomplish the task,
herself forged the signature not only of ;eorge but also of
"aria Tait in that one sitting and in that short span of time.
(etitioners should have presented handwriting experts to
support their claim that ;eorge-s signature on the deed of
donation was indeed a forgery.
.20 NO. (etitioners contend that the person who notariGed the
deed had no authority to do so. )owever, petitioners have not
shown this to be the case. The acknowledgment clause states
that the person who notariGed it was the deputy clerk of court,
;onGalo 5eyes, who acted E/or and in the absence of the
Clerk of Court.F %ec. 29 of the 5evised $dministrative Code of
9>98, as amended by C.$. !os. 284 and 3?9 states, among
others, that Ea person who by authority of law shall act in the
capacity of the officers mentioned above shall possess the
same power.F
.:0 NO. This point is being raised for the first time in the
N%upremeO Court. @itigants cannot raise an issue for the first
time on appeal as it would contravene basic rules of fair play
and justice. $ssuming, however, that they are not thus
precluded, there was no evidence to show that ;eorge and
"aria continuously maintained common*law relations until $pril
2, 9>8? when the donation was made.
.?0 YES. (etitioners waited for 92 years before claiming their
inheritance, having brought their present action only on July
2?, 9>6>. @aches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
length of time to do that which, by exerting due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier. ,eing guilty of laches,
petitioners are precluded from assailing the donation made by
their father in favor of "aria.
The C$ observed that, assuming that the plaintiffs were not
aware of the existence of said document, as they now claim,
they could not have failed to notice that the land in &uestion
had been occupied by "aria /. Tait and later by defendants
who bought portions thereof and that said defendants,
numbering nine .>0, and their families, had built their respective
houses and introduced other improvements on the portions
they had purchased from "aria /. Tait and had resided therein
since 9>62 and 9>6:. $s stated by the trial court, the plaintiffs
offered no plausible excuse for their failure to assert their rights
sooner. They apparently waited until "aria /. Tait died in 9>66
before assailing the validity of the sales made by the latter in
favor of the defendants.
C$ decision affirmed.
C"ing v. G)5an=)
"aria ,. C)A!;, petitioner Persus Joseph C. ;R$!#, et al., respondents
73 N)v#.,#$ 2336
Ca$(i)DM)$a'# J.
Na!&$#: (etition for review on certiorari of a decision of the
Court of $ppeals.
- Joseph ;oyanko %r. and 1pifania dela CruG were
married and had seven children .respondents0.
Joseph %r. and 1pifania purchased a property but the
property was registered to their aunt %ulpicia Pentura
as Joseph %r. and 1pifania were Chinese citiGens at
that time.
- 1pifania and Joseph %r. became estranged. Joseph
starts living together with "aria Ching .petitioner0.
%ulpicia executed a deed of sale to Joseph %r. and
then Joseph executed a deed of sale to Ching.
- When Joseph %r. died, his children with 1pifania filed
a complaint for recovery of property, prayer of
nullification of deed of sale and issuance of a new
deed in favore of their father. They claimed that Ching
forged their father-s signature.
- 5TC dismissied petition.
o They believed the signature on the deed was
genuine as there was a witness when it was
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
o (roperty was not part of conjugal property of
1pifania and Joseph %r.
o The property has been registered to "aria
Ching. $s a Torrens title, it is not subject to
collateral attack.
- C$ reversed 5TC decision. Therefore, petitioner
appealed to %C.
I&#: WI! the deed of sale to Ching is PA'.
H#'+: (etition is denied for lack of merit. T"# *)n!$a*! )- a'#
i n&'' an+ v)i+ for being contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order and public policy.
90 Res, it is a violation. $rt. 9?>4 states, EThe husband
and wife cannot sell property to each other, exceptZF
!"i a(('i# #v#n !) *)..)n 'a: $#'a!i)n"i(. $s
it is contrary to morals and public policy. The
prohibition applies to couple living as husband and
wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise, Ethe
condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to
be better than those in legal unionF.
20 @aw prohibits spouses from selling property to each
other .subject to certain exemptions0. 'onations
between spouses during marriage are also prohibited.
5easons+ !) ($#v#n! &n+&# in-'&#n*# ,5 )n#
()&# )v#$ !"# )!"#$.
:0 9?4> of Civil Code E contracts whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law, morals and good customs,
public order, and policy are void and inexistent from
the beginning.F The sale was made by the husband in
favor of a concubine after he abandoned his family
and left the conjugal home. T"# a'# :a &,v#$iv#
)- !"# !a,i'i!5 )- !"# -a.i'5. 9:H2 also states that
contracts without cause or with unlawful cause,
produce no effect whatsoever.
B. S5!#. )- A,)'&!# C)..&ni!5
/+a. +# D#'iG) v. D#'iG)
Da!#: January :4, 9>83
Na!&$#: (etition for 5eview of the 'ecision of the
Court of $ppeals.
P)n#n!#+ $ntonio
This concerns the partition of the conjugal
partnership properties of two marriages contracted by
one !icolas 'eliGo. !icolas- first marriage was to
5osa Pillafer, and it lasted from 96>9 to 9>4> when
5osa died. )e got married again to 'orotea de
campo, and their marriage lasted from 9>99 to
9>H8, when !icolas died. $n action for partition of the
conjugal properties involved in the two marriages was
then instituted by !icolas- 2 children from the first
marriage as well as the heirs of the :
child from the
first marriage, given that the :
child had already
passed away, against their father, his 2
wife, and
their > children.
To be able to properly partition the
properties, one must first determine which of the
properties go to the first marriage, and which go to the
second. An this case, most of the properties have
been found
to go to the C(; of the 2
)owever, the point of contention is the 33*
hectare parcel of land in ,arrio Caanawan, %an Jose.
The Court of $ppeals held that said land belonged to
the C(; of the 9
marriage, having found that !icolas
had ac&uired the said parcel of land as homestead
from various people N(edro %alvador, "auricio
%alvador, !icolas 'ac&uel, "ariano $ntolin, and
/rancisco (ascuaO during the time when he was still
married to 5osa. The C$ only disagreed with the trial
court-s holding that the C(; was converted to a co*
ownership between !icolas and his children upon
5osa-s death, which would mean that all the fruits of
the properties shall belong to said co*ownership. The
C$ said that it was through the labor and industry of
!icolas and 'orotea that the Caanawan property had
flourished, hence, the fruits should go to them.
Dnsatisfied with such judgment, 'orotea et
al., now elevate this case to the %C, contending that
the Canaawan properties could not have been part of
the 9
marriage-s C(; because given that said lands
were homesteads, they only had possessory rights
over such during the first marriage and it was only
during the second marriage that the exclusive right to
the lands was confirmed.
WI! the Caanawan homesteads belong to the C(;
of the 9
The property belongs to the second marriage.
$ccording to $ct >23 NThe )omestead $ctO,
the right of the homesteader to the homestead patent
does not become absolute until he complies with all
the re&uirements of the law, namely+ that the person
filing the application shall prove by 2 credible
witnesses that he has resided upon and cultivated the
land for the term of H years immediately after filing the
application and shall make an affidavit attesting that
such land is not encumbered or alienated.
;iven that the cabecillas .(edro and
"auricio %alvador0 only started distributing lands to
homesteaders only on 9>4H, the same year 5osa and
!icolas arrived in ,arrio Canaawan, and given that
the homesteads he purchased from 'ac&uel, $ntolin,
and (ascua had only been in their possession
approximately since 9>4H as well, then when the :
conveyed such to !icolas, not one of them could have
complied with the previously mentioned re&uirements
Nspecifically the H*year re&uirementO. They themselves
had no legal or e&uitable title regarding the said
lands, so what they transferred to !icolas were only
inchoate rights as applicants for homesteads, not
ownership rights.
The principle then is that the deciding factor
in determining to which martial C(; the homestead
belongs is not necessarily the time of the issuance of
the homestead patent but the time of registration Nthe
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
time of the fulfillment of the re&uirements of the public
land law for the ac&uisition of such right to patentO.
At was only during the 2
marriage that the
land was registered. )ence, the Canaawan
homestead is part of the C(; of the 2
Ona v. Javi'')
5osario nas, oppositor and appellant vs. Consolacion Javillo et al., petitioners and appellees
Da!#: "arch 24, 9>:?
Na!&$#: $ppeal from an order of the C/A approving
the partition of property belonging to the state of the
deceased Crispulo Javillo.
P)n#n!#: ;oddard
Crispulo Javillo had two marriage. The first with
5amona @ewis with whom he had had H children
.$ppellees0 and the 2
.after the death of @ewis0 with
5osario nas .appellant0 with whom he had four
children. Crispulo died and an administrator was
appointed B %antiago $ndrada. )e submitted two
projects of partition, the first denied by the court and
the second being the one involved in the case right
now. There was an agreement entered between the
parties as to property ac&uired during the first and
second marriages. The appellant contests that the
lower court erred in stating that all the properties of
the second marriage was ac&uired with the products
of the properties of the first marriage and therefore
allowing the distribution of the estates of the heirs of
both marriages based on such wrong assumption.
$ppellant also argues that the lower court erred in
approving such partition despite it not containing all
the properties of the deceased Crispulo Javillo.
*WI! the lower court erred in holding that all the
properties of the 2
marriage came from the products
of the 9
*WI! the second partition should be approved.
H#'+; Ra!i):
*!o. /irst of all it is absurd to think that all the
properties ac&uired in the second marriage .24
parcels of land0 was the product of the properties of
the 9
marriage. Then upon the death of the first
spouse, the conjugal community would automatically
cease to exist and the dissolution of such community
property would mean that not all the property of the
first marriage may be brought into the second since
the share of the wife would be inherited by the H
children of the 9
marriage and therefore cannot be
the sole capital of the properties in the 2
That half also ceases to be owned by the husband
and cannot be claimed by even his heirs .like his heirs
from the 2
marriage0 and therefore it cannot be held
that the properties of the 2
marriage came solely
from the properties of the 9
*!o. The %upreme Court reversed the judgment of the
lower court. The partition is not in conformity with the
law since no li&uidation of the partnership property or
conjugal property of the first marriage occurred. V of
all the conjugal property of both marriages belongs to
the deceased and therefore should be shared. The
other V of the first marriage should go to the H
children of that marriage and the other V of the 2
marriage should go to widow or second spouse.
"oreover the second spouse has a right of usufruct
over the property of her deceased husband e&ual to
9I> of the 2I: of that property which constitutes the
legitimes of the children of both marriages which is
2I28 of the property belonging to her husband. .The
legitime of a spouse in an intestate succession is
e&ual to that of 9 child. %o in this case there being
nine children 9I> is the share of the widow, 9I: cause
husbandJs estate is divided between children of the 9
marriage, widow and all his children from both
C. C)nK&ga' Pa$!n#$"i( Gain
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Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
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Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
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mc@mo@mm m_@o oomooo@
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. 2 _e_x:_oq__eox_oco:q_oq.
%The ife shall have the management of
the paraphernal property unless she has delivered the
same to her husband before a notary, for the purpose
of conferring its management upon him. &n such
cases it shall be the duty of the husband to e'ecute a
mortgage for the value of any personalty hich may
be so delivered to him or otherise secure it in the
manner prescribed ith respect to dory property.(
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
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Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
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Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
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Art. 153. The folloing are con!ugal
partnership property)
*1+That hich is ac,uired by onerous title
during the marriage at the e'pense of the
common fund, hether the
ac,uisition be for the partnership, or for
only one of the spouses.
Art. 160. -ll property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the con!ugal partnership,
unless it be proved that
it pertains e'clusively to the husband or to the
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
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Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
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Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
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Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
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Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
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92Y interest per annum, 9HY of any amount included in
_eoo.ooqo:_xo_ex : eooooo
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Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009

$s held in Javier v. smena.
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
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Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
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Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
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Administration and Disposition of the CPG
F#'i(# v. H#i$ )- Ma9i.) A'+)n ?7<F4@
1duardo /elipe, )ermogena /elipe and Picente /elipe, petitioners vs. )eirs of "aximo $ldon, respondents
"aximo $ldon married ;imena $lmosara
the $ldons ,)&g"! #v#$a' (i#*# )- 'an+
the lands were +ivi+#+ into three lots
7<E7: ;imena $lmosara )'+ !"# ')! to the
/elipe spouses :i!")&! !"# *)n#n! of her
husband, "aximo.
7<P6+ the heirs of "aximo $ldon, .widow
;imena K their children %ofia and %alvador
$ldon0 filed a complaint in C/A*"asbate
against the /elipes.
The $ldons alleged that they are the owners
of the lots involved and that they had orally
mortgaged the same to the defendantsC and
an offer to redeem the mortgage had been
refused so they filed the complaint in order to
recover the three parcels of land.
The /elipes possessed the land since 9>H9,
action was filed in 9>83. An the meantime,
"aximo $ldon died.
/ather-s share in the land is V of the lands
and the children-s share is 2I: thereof, 9I: is
for the widow.
The /elipes assert that they had ac&uired
the lots from the $ldons by purchase and
subse&uent delivery to them.
TC+ declared /elipes the owner of the lots.
C$+ reversed TC decision+ the $ldons are
the owners of the lots in &uestion.
1. Whether the conveyance or transaction is an
oral contract of mortgage or a contract of
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
2. CON a a'# )- 'an+ ,#')nging !) !"#
*)nK&ga' (a$!n#$"i( .a+# ,5 !"# :i-#
CITHOUT !"# *)n#n! )- !"# "&,an+ i
3. CON !"# *"i'+$#n "av# !"# $ig"! )- a*!i)n.
Shares of the lands awarded to the Aldon
children. Felipes are possessors in bad faith and
are commanded to make accounting of the fruits
of the corresponding shares and pay their value
to the Aldon children.
7. Fa*!&a' i&#1 n)! #n!#$!ain#+ ,5 SC
*not entertained by the %C because factual
issues are not to be passed upon by the %C
in an appeal thru petition.
2. NO. Sa'# i v)i+a,'#.
CC 93H+ the husband is the administrator of
con+ugal partnership&
CC 933+ sub+ect to certain e#ceptions the
husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the con+ugal partnership %Ao
the %ife"s consent&
CC 982+ the %ife cannot bind the con+ugal
partnership %Ao the husband"s consent
e#cept in cases provided by la%&
The sale does not fall under the
exception in CC $rt 982.
The sale made by ;imena is a
v)i+a,'# .as distinguished from
being invalid as declared by C$0
Gi.#na "a n)
*a(a*i!5 !) giv#
*)n#n! !) !"#
*)n!$a*! )- a'#.
T"# *a(a*i!5 !)
giv# *)n#n!
,#')ng !) ,)!"
,ased on legal
provision that a
contract is
annullable if
entered into by )
wIo W-s consent
when it is
The v)i+a,'# *)n!$a*! by ;imena
is &,K#*! !) ann&'.#n! ,5 "#$
"&,an+ )n'5 +&$ing !"#
.a$$iag# because the husband is
the victim who has interest in the
Gi.#na *ann)! a= -)$ i!
ann&'.#n! because she is the one
responsible for the defect.
1P1! $/T15 T15"A!$TA! /
"$55A$;1 $!' T)1
'A%%@DTA! / C(; ,R )-s
."$QA" $@'!-s0 '1$T)+
Gi.#na !i'' *ann)! ##=
:. BEFORE T15"A!$TA! / ($51!T%-
"$55A$;1 $!' 'A%%@DTA! / C(;.
Children have inchoate right to the lands
sold when the marriage of their parents
still subsist so they cannot seek the
AFTER T15"A!$TA! / ($51!T%-
"$55A$;1 $!' 'A%%@DTA! / C(;. YES.
The children ac&uired the right to
&uestion the defect since it deprived
them of their hereditary rights in their
father-s share in the lands.
o Children-s cause of action
accrued upon their father-s
death in 9>H> so action
has not yet prescribed
.(51%C5A(TA! A% :4
yrs0 upon filing in 9>83.
,y+ "s. Joei
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
Tini!igan v. Tini!igan1 S$. ?7<F3@
Teofista (. Tinitgan, 1fren Tinitigan, 1lsa Tinitigan and %everino Tinitgan, Jr., petitioners vs. %everino Tinitigan, %r.
and the Court of $ppeals, respondents (entel "erchandising Co., Anc. $and Teofista (ayuran Tinitigan, petitioners,
vs. the Court of $ppeals, )onorable (edro C. !avarro, Chiu Chin %iong and %everino Tinitigan, %r., respondents.
Na!&$#: (etition for certiorari of the decision of the
Court of $ppeals.
Da!#: :4 ctober 9>64
P)n#n!#: "akasiar, J.
Teofista (ayuran .(ayuran0 and her children
entered into a contract with (entel .without
husband-s consent0 leasing a house and lot
property in @oring %t., (asay City .@oring
(ayuran and her children also entered into a
contract with Dnited 1lectronics Corporation
.D1C0 leasing a factory building with the land
where such building was erected .also
without husband-s consent0.
)usband %everino Tinitigan, %r. .Tinitigan0
filed a complaing seeking to annul the
contract entered into by (ayuran, et al with
D1C. At was later amended to include the
Ex x 2. to restrain the defendant*
relatives of the plaintiff from
encumbering or disposing
properties in the name of the
"olave 'evelopment Corporation
or those in the name of %everino
Tinitigan %r. and Teofista (ayuranC
x x x.F
The said case was amicably settled. Then
Tinitigan sought judicial approval of sale for
(hp:44 444 of property leased by (ayuran
to (entel. )e said that this was necessary to
pay for outstanding conjugal obligations.
Tinitgan-s prayer was granted.
(ayuran filed a motion for reconsideration
regarding the judicial approval of sale
awarded to the husband alleging that such
property is a suitable condominiumIhotel site
and thus selling it at (hp:44 444 will incur
them substantial loss. This motion was
dismissed for lack of merit .dismissed after
next bullet0.
%he filed for legal separation and C(;
dissolution two days after the filing of the
motion for reconsideration. The wife (ayuran
was appointed administratrix of the conjugal
property subject to three conditions. The
most pertinent is+
E:0 that the disposition of the
property located at @oring %t.,
(asay City shall be subject to the
decision of the Court of /irst
Anstance of 5iGal, ,ranch AA, (asig,
Tinitigan then sold @oring property to Chiu
and not to @im .(entel president and
lesseeIpreferred buyer under contract with
(ayuran0. This sale was approved by C/A
5iGal ,r. AA.
Wife appealed the judicial order approving
the sale executed by husband. This was
denied by the same court for such order was
interlocutory and thus not subject to appeal.
(ayuran and her children filed a petition for
certiorari to C$. C$ upheld C/A orders.
$ppealed to %C. C(; dissolved during case
pendency. @oring property adjudicated in
favor of (ayuran.
9. W! husband Tinitigan may sell property
under wife (ayuran-s administration.
2. W! C/A judge-s order giving husband the
authority to sell @oring property is void for
lack of jurisdiction over such property.
:. W! the sale executed by Tinitgan in favor
of Chiu is valid.
?. W! the order granting husband authority to
sell @oring property valid even if there is a
standing contract between the wife and
(entel where the latter-s president leases the
premises and was granted the option to buy
said property.
H#'+ an+ Ra!i):
9. R1%. The time Tinitgan obtained the judicial
order authoriGing him to sell the property in
&uestion was before the court granted
(ayuran administration over conjugal
property. ,efore such grant of
administration, the husband was the legal
conjugal property administrator .!CC $rt.
93H0. 1ven if she was in fact the one
administering their conjugal property, the law
re&uires that she be authoriGed by the
husband to be administratrix and such
authoriGation should be in a public
instrument .!CC $rt. 9360 for her
administration to be legally recogniGed.
2. 5'15 P$@A'. The judge ac&uired
jurisdiction over the @oring property because
the original complaint .which was limited to
the property leased to D1C0 was amended
to include all properties under their
corporation and under the spouses- names
.see bullet [:0.
:. %$@1 T C)AD P$@A'. The judicial order
granted by the court in favor of Tinitigan was
for the law-s re&uirement of wife-s consent
.which he was not able to secure from her0
and not to give @im the exclusive right to buy
the property in &uestion.
?. 5'15 ;5$!TA!; )D%,$!'
$DT)5ATR T %1@@ @5A!;
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
(5(15TR P$@A'. Contract between wife
.and children0 and (entel was executed
without husband-s consent .re&uired by !CC
$r. 9820. 1ven if she was administratrix
during the time of the execution of the
contract, it still would be violative of !CC $rt.
:66 for her failure to obtain judicial authority
to encumber or alienate conjugal property or
her husband-s property.
,y+ "r. $boy
G&iang v. CA ?7<<F@
%pouses $ntonio and @uGviminda ;uiang, defendants,petitioners v. Court of $ppeals and ;ilda CorpuG, plaintiff,
Na!&$#: (etition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of $ppeals
P)n#n!#: (anganiban, /&
Da!#: June 23, 9>>6
%pouses ;ilda and Judie CorpuG bought a lot in %outh Cotabato. $fter several years, the couple sold one*
half of their lot to defendants*spouses ;uiang. When ;ilda .wife0 went to "anila to look for a job, she learned through
their daughter that her husband intended to sell the remaining one*half portion of their lot. ;ilda objected to this,
however, her husband still pushed through the sale.
(laintiff*respondent ;ilda then found the petitioners staying at their house. %he filed a barangay case
against petitioners herein for trespassing. The parties agreed to sign a document known as Eamicable settlementF
which states that plaintiff*respondent ;ilda would leave voluntarily the house of spouses ;uiang.
'efendants*petitioners contend that the .90 contract of sale was merely voidabe, and .20 such contract was
ratified by private respondent when she entered into an amicable settlement with them.
ISSUE: W! the sale of their property .which is part of the conjugal property0 by the husband without the consent of
the wife is voidL
HELD: Res. T"# a'# i /OID.
(etitioners Court
9. The absence of private respondent-s consent merely
rendered the sale voidable under $rt. 9:>4 of the
Civil Code, which provides+
o $rt. 9:>4. The following contracts are voidbale
or annullable x x x
i. Those where the consent is vitiated by
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.
$rt. 9:>4 refers to contracts vitiated by vices of consent.
An this case, private respondent-s *)n#n! to the contract
of sale of their conjugal property :a !)!a''5 in#9i!#n!
)$ a,#n!.
The applicable provision is $rt. 92? of the /C.
2. (etitioners contend that the sale was duly ratified by
the contending parties through the Eamicable
The Eamicable settlementF is a direct offshoot of the 'eed
of Transfer of 5ights. Dnder $rt. 9?22, Ea contract which
is the direct result of a previous illegal contract. As also
void and inexistent.F
T"# #!!'#.#n! +)# n)! .#n!i)n a *)n!in&ing )--#$
!) #'' !"# ($)(#$!5 )$ an a**#(!an*# )- &*" a
*)n!in&ing )--#$. Ats tenor was to the effect that private
respondent would vacate the property. %uch document is
n)! !"# Ha**#(!an*#I in!#n+#+ in A$! 720.
,y+ "s. "ary ,.
R#'&*i) v. L)(#G ?2337@
Amelda 5elucio, petitioner vs. $ngelina "ejia @opeG, respondent
Na!&$#: (etition for review on certiorari seeking to
set aside a C$ decision to deny a petition of certiorari
that assails the trial court-s order denying petitioner-s
motion to dismiss the case against her inclusion as
party defendant.
Da!#: January 93, 2442
P)n#n!#: (ardo, J.
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
$ngelina "ejia @opeG filed a petition for
appointment as sole administratix of conjugal
partnership of properties, forfeiture, etc.
against $lberto @opeG and the petitioner,
Amelda 5elucio.
$lberto is the husband of the respondent,
who abandoned her and her four children.
Dpon abandonment, $lberto arrogated upon
himself full and exclusive control and
administration of the conjugal properties,
spending and using it for his own gain and
benefit to the exclusion of $ngelina and their
four children.
$lberto had an illicit relationship with Amelda
and the two cohabited since 9>83. At was
alleged that the two amassed the properties
that belong to the conjugal partnership of
$ngelina and $lberto. The proceeds of the
amassed properties are allegedly being
spent for the benefit of Amelda and the two
illegitimate children.
An order for $lberto-s properties to avoid
being charged of its share in the conjugal
partnership, he concealed it to the private
respondent by not placing them under his
name. )e even removed and transferred the
ownership of some of them under the name
of other people.
I.#'+a -i'#+ a .)!i)n !) +i.i !"#
(#!i!i)n -i'#+ ,5 Ang#'ina )n !"# g$)&n+
!"a! !"# a*!i)n "a n) *a&# again! "#$.
)owever, the trial court judge denied her
motion on the ground that "# i a
n#*#a$5 )$ in+i(#na,'# (a$!5 because
some of the subject properties are registered
in her name and $lberto. When she assailed
the trial court decision at the Court of
$ppeals, the court also denied her petition.
)ence, this appeal.
1. W! respondent-s petition as sole
administratix of the conjugal partnership etc.
against her husband established a *a&# )-
against petitioner.
2. W! petitioner-s inclusion as party
defendant is essential in the proceedings for
a complete adjudication of the controversy.
H#'+; Ra!i):
9. !o. /or a motion to dismiss a cause of
action to be sustained, the complaint must
show that the claim for relief does not exist.
An this case, the complaint is by an aggrieved
wife against her husband. !owhere in the
allegations does it appear that relief is
sought against petitioner. )ence, a *a&# )-
a*!i)n again! I.#'+a "a n)! ,##n
/ause of action. an act or omission of one party, the
defendant, in violation of the legal right of the other.
0lements) 1.+ a right in favour of the plaintiff 2.+ an obligation
on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right ".+ an act or omission on the part of such
defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff
#!a,'i"#+. $ real party in interest is one
who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgement of the suit. Af the petitioner is not a
real party*in*interest, she cannot be an
indispensable party.
2. !o. An the three causes of action raised by
$ngelina, all controversies could be
adjudicated even if Amelda is not a party
defendant. The only indispensable party is
a. An the +udicial appointment of
Angelina as sole administrati# of
the conjugal partnership or $C(
arising from her marriage to
$lberto, Amelda is an indispensible
party. An fact, Amelda is a complete
stranger to this cause of action. The
administration of property of the
marriage is only between $lberto
and $ngelina, to the exclusion of all
other persons.
b. An the accounting of con+ugal
partnership arising from their
marriage Amelda again has nothing
to do with the @opeG-s conjugal
property. )ence, the cause of
action is only against $lberto.
c. An the forfeiture of Alberto"s share in
property co,o%ned by him and
)melda $ngelina-s asserted right to
forfeit only extends to $lberto-s
share alone. At does not cover the
share of Amelda. )ence, Amelda
again is an indispensable party.
d. Claims for moral damages and
support could only come from
$lberto. %upport could not be
compelled from a stranger.
The court grants the petition and reverses
the decision of the court of appeals.
,y+ "r. 5ichard
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
Ja+#$DMana') v. Ca.aia ?2332@
Thelma $. Jader*"analo, petitioner, vs. !orma /ernandeG Camaisa and 1dilberto Camaisa, respondents
(etitioner Thelma Jader*"analo allegedly
saw an advertisement in the newspaper
placed by the respondent spouses, 1dilberto
and !orma Camaisa, for the sale of two of
their properties
(etitioner negotiated with a real estate
broker authoriGed by the respondents
%he visually inspected the properties and
was shown its documents
%he made a definite offer to buy properties
to respondent 1dilberto with the knowledge
and conformity of his wife !orma and in the
presence of the broker
They agreed upon the price and mode of
payment and the agreement was
handwritten and signed by respondent
/ormal typewritten Contracts to %ell were
thereafter prepared and was formally signed
by 1dilberto and thereafter two checks were
delivered to him in the presence of the
broker and an employee in 1dilberto-s office
The next day, petitioner received a call from
respondent !orma re&uesting a meeting to
clarify some provisions of the contracts.
(etitioner was accompanied by her lawyer
when she and the spouses met. !otations
on the on the contract were handwritten and
they agreed to meet again for the formal
signing of the contracts
When they met again for the affixing of
!orma-s signature, respondent spouses
informed petitioner that they were backing
out of the agreement because they needed
Espot cashF for the full amount of the
(etitioner reminded respondents that
contracts to sell had already been perfected
and !orma-s refusal to sign the same would
unduly prejudice the petitioner
(etitioner filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages in the 5TC
5espondents claim that checks issued were
returned to her by 1dilberto and petitioner
accepted the same without any objection
5espondent !orma denied that she ever
participated in the negotiations
TC and C$ decided against petitioner
I&#+ W! the husband may validly dispose of
conjugal property without the wife-s written consent
H#'++ !o.
Ra!i)+ ,oth parties admitted that there had been
negotiations, an agreement and a downpayment and
also that respondent !orma refused to sign contract
to sell. The law re&uires that the disposition of
conjugal property by the husband as administrator in
appropriate cases re&uires the written consent of the
wife, otherwise, disposition is void. $rt. 92? of the /C
provides QQQ These powers do not include powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written consent of the
spouse. An the absence of such authority or consent,
the disposition shall be void QQQ. The properties were
conjugal and hence for the contracts to be effective,
consent of both husband and wife must concur.
5espondent !orma never gave her written consent to
the sale and being merely aware of the transaction is
not consent.
The argument of petitioner that because !orma
unjustly refused to affix her signature and thus the
court authoriGation was warranted under $rt. 92? is
without merit. Af written consent of the other spouse
cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the matter
may be brought to court which will give authority if the
same is warranted by the circumstances. )owever it
should be stressed that under $rt. 92?, court
authoriGation is only resorted to in cases where the
spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated.
(etitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent
was incapacitated to give consent to the contract.
,y+ "s. Welga
/i''an&#va v. C"i)ng ?233F@
Walter Pillanueva and $urora Pillanueva, petitioners, vs. /lorentino Chiong and 1lisera Chiong, respondents
5espondents /lorentino and 1lisera Chiong were
married in January 9>34 but have been
separated in fact since 9>8H.
'uring their marriage, they ac&uired a lot in
'ipolog City, covered by Transfer Certificate of
9>6H, /lorentino sold the one*half western
portion of the lot to petitioners for (6,444,
payable in instalments. /lorentino allowed
petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store and
a house thereon.
$fter their last instalment payment on 'ecember
9>63, petitioners demanded from respondents
the execution of a deed of sale in their favour, but
1lisera, refused to sign a deed of sale.
July 9>>9, 1lisera filed with the 5TC a Complaint
for Tuieting of Title with 'amages. /ebruary
9>>2, petitioners filed with the 5TC a Complaint
for %pecific (erformance with 'amages. The
5TC consolidated these two cases.
"ay 9>>2, /lorentino executed the &uestioned
'eed of $bsolute %ale in favor of petitioners.
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
July 2444, the 5TC, in its Joint 'ecision,
annulled the deed of absolute sale and ordered
petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all
improvements therein. 5TC likewise ordered
/lorentino to return to petitioners the
consideration of the sale with interest from "ay
The Court of $ppeals affirmed the 5TCJs
As the land in &uestion exclusive property of
/lorentino Chiong or a conjugal property of
respondentsL C!JD;$@ (5(15TR
Was the sale of land by /lorentino Chiong
without 1lisera Chiong-s consent validL !
(etitioners contend that the lot belongs
exclusively to /lorentino because .90
respondents were already separated in fact at the
time of sale and .20 the share of 1lisera, the
eastern part of the lot, had previously been sold.
(etitioners aver that while there was no formal
li&uidation of respondentsJ properties, their
separation in fact resulted in its actual li&uidation.
/urther, assuming arguendo that the lot is
conjugal, the transaction should not be voided as
/lorentino had one*half share over it.
1lisera counters that the sale of the lot to
petitioners without her knowledge, consent or
authority, was void because the lot is conjugal.
%he adds that the sale was neither authoriGed by
any competent court nor did it redound to her or
their childrenJs benefit. $s proof of the lotJs
conjugal nature, she presented a transfer
certificate of title, a real property tax declaration,
and a "emorandum of $greement which she and
her husband had executed for the administration
of their conjugal properties.
(etitioners- contention that the lot belongs
exclusively to /lorentino, because his separation
in fact from his wife 1lisera at the time of sale
dissolved their property relations, is bereft of
merit. 5espondentsJ separation in fact neither
affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor
prejudiced 1liseraJs interest over it. Dnder $rticle
986 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact
between husband and wife without judicial
approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership.
Dnder $rticle 934 of the Civil Code, all property
ac&uired by the spouses during the marriage is
presumed to belong to the C(;, unless it is
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife. (etitionersJ mere insistence as to
the supposed exclusive nature of the lot is
insufficient to overcome such presumption when
taken against all the evidence for respondents.
n the basis alone of the certificate of title, it
cannot be presumed that the lot was ac&uired
during the marriage and that it is conjugal
property since it was registered 7in the name of
/lorentino Chiong, married to 1lisera ChiongZ7
,ut 1lisera also presented a real property tax
declaration acknowledging her and /lorentino as
owners of the lot. An addition, /lorentino and
1lisera categorically declared in the
"emorandum of $greement they executed that
the lot is a conjugal property. "oreover, the
conjugal nature of the lot was admitted by
/lorentino in the 'eed of $bsolute %ale, where
he declared his capacity to sell as a co*owner of
the lot.
)owever, the sale by /lorentino without 1liseraJs
consent is not void ab initio. Without the wifeJs
consent, the husbandJs alienation or
encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the
effectivity of the /amily Code is not void, but
merely voidable. $rticles 933 and 98: of the Civil
Code provide+
$5T. 933. Dnless the wife has been declared a
non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under
civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium,
the husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without
the wifeJs consentZ
$5T. 98:. The wife may, during the marriage,
and within ten years from the transaction
&uestioned, ask the courts for the annulment of
any contract of the husband entered into without
her consent, when such consent is re&uired, or
any act or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal
partnership property. %hould the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the
value of property fraudulently alienated by the
$pplying $rticle 933, the consent of both 1lisera
and /lorentino is necessary for the sale of a
conjugal property to be valid. An this case, the
re&uisite consent of 1lisera was not obtained
when /lorentino verbally sold the lot and
executed the 'eed of $bsolute %ale. $ccordingly,
the contract entered by /lorentino is voidable
conformably with $rticle 98:.
(etitioners finally contend that, assuming
arguendo the property is conjugal, the transaction
should not be entirely voided as /lorentino had
one*half share over the lot. This lacks merit. The
plain meaning attached to the plain language of
the law is that the contract, in its entirety,
executed by the husband without the wifeJs
consent, may be annulled by the wife. )ad
Congress intended to limit such annulment in so
far as the contract shall 7prejudice7 the wife, such
limitation should have been spelled out in the
!ow, if a voidable contract is annulled, the
restoration of what has been given is proper.
$rticle 9:>6 of the Civil Code provides+ $n
obligation having been annulled, the contracting
parties shall restore to each other the things
which have been the subject matter of the
contract, with their fruits, and the price with its
interest, except in cases provided by law.
The effect of annulment of the contract is to wipe
it out of existence, and to restore the parties,
insofar as legally and e2uitably possible, to their
original situation before the contract was entered
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
,y+ "s. /aye
Li%&i+a!i)n )- A#! an+ Lia,i'i!i#
San!#$) v. CFI )- Cavi!# ?7<FP@
(5A!C1%AT$ %$!T15, /1'15AC %$!T15 and WA@@A1 %$!T15, petitioners, vs. )!. CD5T / /A5%T
A!%T$!C1 / C$PAT1, $!%1@"$ 'A$U, PACT5, 5'5A;, $!%1@"A!$, "A;D1@, all surnamed %$!T15,
and 51R!$@' 1P$5A%T, in his capacity as $dministrator of the Antestate 1state of ($,@ %$!T15,
'ate+ %eptember 9?, 9>68
(onente+ (aras, J.
$nselma 'iaG filed a "otion for $llowance for the
support of her four children with the late (ablo
%antero. The support included educational
expenses, clothing and medical necessities.
(rincesita, /ederico and Willie, children of (ablo
%antero by another woman, opposed the motion
on the ground that the wards for whom allowance
is sought are no longer schooling and have
attained majority age so that they are no longer
under guardianship.
An reply, $nselma 'iaG admitted some of the
children are of age and are not enrolled due to
lack of funds but they will resume schooling as
soon as they are given the re&uested allowances.
%he cited the following+
$rt. 2>4. %upport is everything that is
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing and medical attendance, according
to the social position of the family.
%upport also includes the education of the
person entitled to be supported until he
completes his education or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond
the age of majority.
5ule 6: %ec. :, 5ules of Court. $llowance to
widow and family. The widow and minor or
incapacitated children of a deceased person,
during the settlement of estate, shall receive
therefrom, under the direction of the Court,
such allowance as provided by law.
C/A granted the "otion.
'iaG filed another "otion for $llowance praying
that support be given to all of her seven children
with (ablo %antero. C/A granted the motion but
later ordered the administrator of %antero-s
estate to retrieve the allowance of the three
additional recipients.
(rincesita, /ederico and Willie filed a petition
arguing that private respondents are not entitled
to allowance since they have already attained
majority age, two are gainfully employed, and
one is married. $lso, they are no longer under
guardianship. (etitioners further alleged that the
administrator of %antero-s estate does not have
sufficient funds to cover the allowance because
whatever funds are handled by the administrator
constitute funds held in trust for the benefit of
whoever will be adjudged as owners of the #awit
properties from where these funds held by the
administrator are derived.
9. W)1T)15 the four children of $nselma 'iaG can
inherit from the estates of the (ablo %antero-s parents
2. W)1T)15 the four children of $nselma 'iaG are
entitled to allowance despite being of age, being
gainfully employed, and married
9. !.
The four children may not inherit from the intestate
estate of (ablo %antero-s parents because they are
illegitimate children. $ccording to $rt. >>2 of !CC, \$n
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother QQQ.F
2. R1%. The four children of $nselma are entitled to
The controlling provisions are $rts. 2>4 and 966 of
!CC and not 5ule 6: %ec. : of the !ew 5ules of
$rt. 966. /rom the common mass of property
support shall be given to the surviving
spouse and to the children during the
li&uidation of the inventoried property and
until what belongs to them is deliveredC but
from this shall be deducted that amount
received for support which exceeds the fruits
or rents pertaining to them. .9?:40
The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully
employed or married is of no moment and should not
be regarded as the determining factor of their right to
allowance under $rt. 966. While the 5ules of Court
gives allowance only to the widow and minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased, !CC gives
the surviving spouse and hisIher children without
distinction. $lso, since the provision of !CC is a
substantive law, it cannot be impaired by 5ule 6:
%ec. : of the 5ules of Court which is a procedural
rule. )owever, EspouseF refers to legitimate spouse
.not common*law spouses who are mothers of the
children in this case0.
,y+ "s. $rianne
E. S#(a$a!i)n )- P$)(#$!5 an+ A+.ini!$a!i)n )- C)..)n P$)(#$!5 ,5 On# S()&#
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
7. J&+i*ia' #(a$a!i)n )- ($)(#$!5 -)$ S&--i*i#n! Ca&#
Ga$*ia v. ManGan) ?7<EF@
;onGalo ;arcia, plaintiff*appellant vs. Consolacion "anGano, defendant*appellee
P)n#n!#: 5eyes, J. ,. @., J.
;arcia and his wife "anGano have been living
separately from each other .for almost 94 years0 and
all attempts for reconciliation have failed. 'uring their
marriage, they jointly accumulated real and personal
)owever, upon separation, "anGano assumed
complete management and administration of the
conjugal partnership property as well as the sole
enjoyment to it and its fruits, to the prejudice of
;arcia, and even fictitiously alienated majority of the
property to third persons. %he had allegedly neglected
to file any income tax return, and refused to turn over
;arcia-s rightful share and participation in the
conjugal property.
;arcia now files an action against "anGano for the
judicial declaration of the separation of their conjugal
"anGano seeks to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that it did not allege any of the grounds
recogniGed in $rticle 9>9 of the new Civil Code for a
judicial decree of separation of properties.
WI! judicial decree of separation of conjugal property
is the proper remedy.
!o, it is not. (etition dismissed without prejudice to
proper proceedings.
Ra!i)na'#: The separation of property shall not
prevail unless it is expressly stipulated in the marriage
settlement or by judicial decree, which may only be
ordered by the causes in A$!. 7<7 )- !"# Civi' C)+#.
$rt. 9>9 includes+
9. (enalty carrying with it civil interdiction
2. 'eclared absence
:. @egal separation
0. A,&# )- ():#$ )- a+.ini!$a!i)n )- !"#
*)nK&ga' ($)(#$!5 ,5 !"# "&,an+
H. $bandonment by the husband
3. $greement to dissolve subject to judicial
The enumeration is limitive in view of the Code-s
restrictive policy.
$lthough ;arcia contends that husband should be
entitled to the same remedy as the wife, the
philosophy espoused by the Civil Code is that it is the
husband who is the administrator of the conjugal
property by express provision of law. Therefore, the
wife can not legally mismanage conjugal property
without the consent of the husband or the courts.
The Civil Code contemplates remedies that are
avai'a,'# #9*'&iv#'5 !) !"# :i-# against the abuses
of the husband, who is the legal administrator.
The proper remedy for ;arcia, then, is not a judicial
separation of property but to revoke the power
granted to the wife and to resume the administration
of the community property.
,y+ "r. "ickey
/ourt to 1arcia) %2e a man3(
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
Pa$!)aDJ) v. CA ?7<<2@
(rima (artosa*Jo, petitioner, vs. C$ and )o )ang .with aliases Jose Jo and Consing0
Jose Jo admits to having cohabited with three
women and fathered 9H children.
An 9>64, (rima .first wife0 filed for judicial
separation of conjugal property.
The 5TC ruled in favour of (rima. )owever, the
dispositive portion was incomplete insofar as it
carried no ruling on the complaint for judicial
separation of conjugal property although it was
extensively discussed in the body of the decision.
(enultimate paragraph of the decision .argued by
the plaintiff on the disposition re separation of
conjugal properties0+
At is, therefore, hereby ordered that all
properties in &uestion are considered properties
of Jose Jo, the defendant in this case, subject to
separation of property under $rticle 986, third
paragraph of the Civil Code, which is subject of
separate proceedings as enunciated herein.
As a decree of judicial separation on this case
Res. n the grounds of physical separation
coupled with husband-s refusal to support the wife
7. A,an+)n.#n!
!ow, $rt. 926 of /C.
NCCO $rt. 986. The separation in fact between
husband and wife without judicial approval, shall
not affect the conjugal partnership, except that+
xxx xxx xxx
.:0 Af the husband has abandoned the wife
without just cause for at least one year, she may
petition the court for a receivership, or
administration by her of the conjugal partnership
property or separation of property.
The record shows that as early as 9>?2, the
private respondent had already rejected the
petitioner, whom he denied admission to their
conjugal home in 'umaguete City when she
returned from Uamboanguita. The fact that she
was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too
clearly that he had no intention of resuming their
conjugal relationship. "oreover, beginning 9>36
until the determination by this Court of the action
for support in 9>66, the private respondent
refused to give financial support to the petitioner.
The physical separation of the parties, coupled
with the refusal by the private respondent to give
support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute
abandonment as a ground for the judicial
separation of their conjugal property.
2. An addition, the petitioner may also invoke the
second ground allowed by $rticle 926, for the fact
is that "# "a -ai'#+ :i!")&! K&! *a&# !)
*).('5 :i!" "i ),'iga!i)n !) !"# -a.i'5 a
"&,an+ )$ (a$#n!. $part from refusing to admit
his lawful wife to their conjugal home in
'umaguete City, Jo has freely admitted to
cohabiting with other women and siring many
children by them. At was his refusal to provide for
the petitioner and their daughter that prompted her
to file the actions against him for support and later
for separation of the conjugal property, in which
actions, significantly, he even denied being
married to her. The private respondent has not
established any just cause for his refusal to
comply with his obligations to his wife as dutiful
Their separation thus falls also s&uarely under A$!i*'#
74E )- !"# Fa.i'5 C)+#, providing as follows+
$rt. 9:H. $ny of the following shall be considered
sufficient cause for judicial separation of property+
xxx xxx xxx
.30 That at the time of the petition, the spouse have
been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
Whether /C is applicable+
Ra.i$#G v. CA: The greater weight of authority is
inclined to the view that an appellate court, in
reviewing a judgment on appeal, will dispose of a
&uestion according to the law prevailing at the term of
such disposition, and not according to the law
prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed
The conjugal property of the petitioner and the
private respondent is hereby ordered divided
between them, share and share alike. This division
shall be implemented by the trial court after
determination of all the properties pertaining to the
said conjugal partnership, including those that may
have been illegally registered in the name of the
,y+ "s. Jiselle
D#'a C$&G v. D#'a C$&G
1strella dela CruG, plaintiff*appellee vs. %everino dela CruG, defendant*appellant
'ate+ January :4, 9>36 !ature+ $ppeal from a judgment of C/A !egros
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
(onente+ Castro, J.
o 1strella and %everino were married on /eb.
9, 9>:6 and had 3 children. They ac&uired 8
parcels of land of ,acolod Cadastre, : parcels of
%ilay Cadastre and varied business ventures.
o An 9>?>, 1strella suspected the existence of
illicit relations between %everino and !enita .she
found a note from !enita, %everino admitted
amorous relation but said he would forsake his
mistress, she found another letter from !enita
telling %everino to meet her in ,aguio0
o An 9>HH, %everino had not slept in the
conjugal dwelling and had short visits wherein the
couple engaged in brief conversations. $fter
9>HH, %everino never visited the conjugal abode
and denied communication with 1strella.
o %everino denied abandoning his wife and
children saying that his intention was not to
abandon his wife and children but only to teach
1strella a lesson as she was &uarrelsome and
extremely jealous and he could not concentrate
on work because she always &uarreled with him.
o )e never failed, even for a single month to
give his family financial support.
9. WI! the separation of %everino from 1strella
constitutes abandonment in law that would justify a
separation of conjugal partnership properties
2. WI! %everino-s failure andIor refusal to inform
1strella of the state of their business enterprises such
an abuse of his powers of administration of the
conjugal partnership as to warrant a division of the
matrimonial assets
9. !o. $bandonment is the act of the husband in
voluntarily leaving his wife with intention to forsake
her entirely, never to return to her, and never to
resume marital duties or claim marital rightsC such
neglect as either leaves the wife destitute of the
common necessaries of life or would leave her
destitute but for charity of others. An this case, there
was no abandonment because it was only physical
separation and not financial desertion. %everino still
continued to make contributions at intervals for the
support of his wife and children. $lso, there was no
credible evidence that an illicit relation existed
between !enita and %everino. /urthermore, there is
no evidence that shows that %everino has
s&uandered the conjugal assets since at the time f the
trial the assets- value increased to over a million
2acolod /adastre lands at 4$5,$295 6ilay /adastre lands
at 4$",58#5 hacienda in 6ilay ith net profit of 4","9#.$9 for
year 19575 7arious business ventures ith fi'ed assets of
4$96,##6.92 and net profit of 475,655.78 for year 19565
4rincipal business *4hil. Te'board 8actory+ ith net gain of
49#,$5$.$8 for year 19575 7arious enterprises of con!ugal
partnership ith total assets at 41,#21,$#7.68 not including
those of the Top 6ervice &nc of hich firm 6everino has been
president since 1959 ith a paid up capital of 45#,###
*1#,### of hich as contributed by him+
2. !o. /or abuse to exist, it is not enough that the
husband perform an act prejudicial to the wife, nor is it
sufficient that he commits acts injurious to the
partnership .may be because of mere inefficiency in
administration0. $buse connotes willful and utter
disregard of the interests of the partnership. Af there is
only physical separation between spouses, and the
husband continues to manage the conjugal properties
with the same Geal, industry, and efficiency and
religiously gives support to his wife and children, the
court is not disposed to grant the wife-s petition for
separation of property. The court-s decision does not
imply condonation of the separation but it is designed
to protect the conjugal partnership from waste and
shield the wife from want. $lso, the court says that a
judgment ordering the division of conjugal assets
where there has been no real abandonment, the
separation not being wanton and absolute, may
altogether slam shut the door for possible
,y+ "s. ;uia
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
2. /)'&n!a$5 S#(a$a!i)n )- P$)(#$!5
In $# /)'&n!a$5 Di)'&!i)n )- !"# C)nK&ga' Pa$!n#$"i( )- J)# B#$.a1 S$. an+ Pi'a$ Man&#' B#$.a ?7<6E@
J)# B#$.a S$. an+ Pi'a$ Man&#' B#$.a1 (#!i!i)n#$Da((#''an!
22 June 9>3H
Concepcion, J.
Jose and (ilar ,ermas executed an E$greement for
'issolution of Conjugal (artnership and %eparation of
(ropertyF in order to preserve peace and harmony in
their family, as well as prevent friction and confusion,
since Jose has two sets of children, one by a former
marriage and one with (ilar. The agreement states
that during their marriage, they ac&uired 92 parcels of
land and 2 buildings. At also enumerates their
exclusive properties and also provides that any
property ac&uired by any or both of the spouses shall
be his or hers exclusively or to both of them, as the
case may be. They allege that under CC $rt. 9>9, the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership
during the marriage is allowed, subject to judicial
approval, that they have no outstanding debts and
that the separation of properties would not prejudice
any creditor or third person.
)owever, the lower court denied the petition on the
ground that CC $rt. 9>2 states that a conjugal
partnership shall only be dissolved once legal
separation has been ordered, and this cannot take
place, pursuant to $rticle 9>9 except upon civil
interdiction, declaration of absence or abandonment.
)ence, this appeal.
WI! the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of the
,ermas couple is allowed.
H#'+ an+ Ra!i):
!. The C(; of first marriage must first be li&uidated
before the li&uidation of C(; of second marriage.
"oreover, there was no evidence that the children
from previous marriage were mentioned in the petition
neither where both sets of children notified regarding
the dissolution of C(;.
NThis li&uidation should not and cannot be effected
without a li&uidation of the conjugal partnership
between Jose and his first wife, in which the children
by the first marriage have an interest. %aid dissolution
could adversely affect the rights of said children by
first marriage, for, Ein case of doubt, the partnership
property shall be divided between the different
.conjugal0 partnerships in proportion to the duration of
each and to the property belonging to the respective
spouses .CC 96>0.O
5emanded for further proceedings in conformity with
%C decision.
,y+ "s. Crystal
NI. Fa.i'5
B. Fa.i'5 H).#
(etitioner+ %iari Palley 1states Anc v. 5espondent+ /ilomeno @ucasan
(onente+ ,autista $ngelo, J.
C/A ordered @ucasan to deliver to the %iari Palley
1states Anc. the cattle inside his pasture or pay
(?4,444 for the value of the cattle and another
(?4,444 for damages.
%C affirmed the decision and thus made it final.
The sheriff then levied the lands belonging to the
defendant and auctioned to the said corporation.
@ucasan failed to redeem the land within one year
and thus issued to the corporation, the final
certificate of sale. Dpon petition of the corporation, a
writ of possession was issued directing the sheriff to
place said corporation in possession of the lands,
but they failed to take possession of it. They then
filed another petition for its- possession
5espondent filed an opposition stating that he owns
one of the parcels of land in the auction and in this
land, he built his family home.
5TC ruled in favour of petitioner. $ motion for
reconsideration was filed by respondent which was
at first denied, but soon afterwards, ordered
possession of all the lands to the petitioner except
for one parcel of land where the family home of
@ucasan was built.
(etitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari
9.0 W! the levy of the sheriff regarding the one parcel
of land was in accordance with the law.
2.0 W! the family home extra judicially established by
respondent on the lot and house in &uestion is
exempt from execution ?TOPICAL ISSUE@
9.0 !o, the notice of levy merely described the property
as unregistered land and the same was registered
under $ct ::?? in the office of the register of deeds.
%ection 8 5ule ?> states that EWhere the property
has been brought under the operation of the @and
5egistration $ct, the notice shall contain a reference
to the number of the certificate of title and the
volume and page in the registration boo3 %here the
certificate is registered7 %ince the notice of the levy
contains no reference number of its certificate and
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
the volume and page in the registry book where the
title is registered, it follows that the said notice is
legally ineffective and did not have the effect of
binding the property for purposes of execution.
)ence, levy is invalid and has no legal effect.
2.0 !o, $rticle 2?: .:0 of !CC provides that 7The family
home extra judicially formed shall be exempt from
execution7 except 7for debts incurred before the
declaration was recorded in the 5egistry of
(roperty.7 An this case, the family home was
constituted after the debts had been incurred and
this provision will not apply. The reason why a
family home constituted after a debt had been
incurred is not exempt from execution is to protect
the creditor against a debtor who may act in bad
faith by resorting to such declaration just to defeat
the claim against him.
Jose "ode&uillo, petitioner, vs& )on. $ugusto P. ,reva, /rancisco %alinas, /loriper $bellan*%alinas, Juanito Culan*Culan and
'eputy %heriff /ernando (lata, respondents.
'ate+ "ay :9, 9>>4
(onente+ ;ancayco, J.
Jose "ode&uillo and ,enito "alubay have been adjudged to
be jointly and severally liable to pay the %alinas spouses for
the death of their son, as well as to pay 5enato Culan*Culan
for his hospitaliGation expenses moral damages .there was a
vehicular accident0. They also had to pay the attorney-s fees
and litigation expenses of the said parties.
The 5TC of 'avao issued a writ of execution to satisfy the
said judgment on the goods and chattels of "ode&uillo and
"alubay. The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land
and a parcel of agricultural land, both located in 'avao del
Jose "ode&uillo filed a "otion to Tuash the levy of execution
on the ground that !"# $#i+#n!ia' ')! i :"#$# !"# -a.i'5
").# i ,&i'! in*# 7<6< prior to the commencement of this
case .accident took place in 7<P6 and the decision pertaining
to damages became final on 7<FF0 and is therefore exempt
from execution, forced sale, or attachment under $rticles 9H2
and 9H: of the /amily Code and that the judgment debt is not
one of the exceptions enumerated under $rticle 9HH of the
/amily Code.
5TC denied the motion. $ motion for 5econsideration was
filed and was also denied.
I&#: W! the said residential house is exempt from
execution of the money judgment
!o. Dnlike in the Civil Code, there is no need to constitute
the family home judicially or extrajudicially under the /amily
Code. Af the family actually resides in the premises, it is a
family home as contemplated by law. At is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except+
$rt 9HH. The family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment #9*#(!:
.90 /or nonpayment of taxesC
?2@ F)$ +#,! in*&$$#+ ($i)$ !) !"# *)n!i!&!i)n )-
!"# -a.i'5 ").#;
.:0 /or debts secured by mortgages on the premises
before or after such constitutionC and
.?0 /or debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects,
builders, materialmen and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for the construction of the
building. .2?:a0
The residential house of petitioner became a family home by
operation of law only on $ugust :, 9>66, upon effectivity of
the /amily Code. The contention of the petitioner that it
should be considered as a family home since 9>3> is not well
taken. Dnder $rticle 932 of /C, EThe provisions in this
Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar
as said provisions are applicable.F At does not mean that all
existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation
prior to the effectivity of the /C and therefore are exempt
from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before
the effectivity of the /C.
The home of the petitioner is not exempt from execution for
the payment of his liabilities. The vehicular accident
happened on "arch 93, 9>83. The money judgment was
rendered on January 2>, 9>66. ,oth preceded the effectivity
of the /C.
Tan#) v. CA
(ablito Taneo, jr. Jose Taneo, !ena Catubig and )usband, Cilia "oring and )usband, petitioners vs. C$ and $ndon ;ilig,
(roperty in &uestion is house and lot, alleged to be the family home of the petitioners.
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
$s a result of a judgment in a civil case, two properties were levied to satisfy the judgment. ne of the properties is the
alleged family home of the petitioners.
Amportant dates+
%eptember 96 9>?9* @and ac&uired by (ablo Taneo, father of petitioners
"arch 8 9>3?* )ouse was erected on land
June 2? 9>3?* Judgment obligation of the petitioners against $bdon ;ilig
January 2? 9>33* 5egistration of instrument on constitution of family home
/ebruary 92 9>33* (roperties were auctionedC $bdon ;ilig was highest bidder
ctober 9> 9>8:* $pproval of Taneo-s application for free patent for homestead
'ecember 94 9>64* /ree patent was issued
9. W! conveyance by public auction is prohibited by homestead law .%ec 996 of Commonwealth $ct 9?90
2. W! the family home is exempt from execution
9. !
1ven before application for homestead had been approved, (ablo Taneo was no longer the owner of the land.
(rohibition does not apply since the judgment debt and execution sale took place prior approval for free patent.
2. !
/$"A@R )"1 is the dwelling place of a person and his family. At is said, however, that the family home is a real right,
which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it
is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the
person constituting it and his heirs. At cannot be seiGed by creditors except in special cases.
CAPA@ C'1 P% /$"A@R C'1
i. Civil Code* a family home may be constituted judicially .court order0 or extra*judicially .registration in
5egistry of (roperty0.
ii. /amily Code* registration no longer necessaryC family home deemed constituted from time it is occupied
as family residence.
Case falls under Civil CodeC /amily Code is not retroactive* all existing residences at time of
effectivity of /C are considered family homes and (5%(1CTAP1@R entitled to benefits
accorded thereto
CAPA@ C'1* January 2?, 9>>3* registration as family home* not exempt since debt was
incurred before the declaration was recorded in the 5egistry of (roperty
!T ,DA@T ! W! @$!'* family home is the dwelling house where a person and his family reside and the @$!' it
is situated on. At is understood that the house should be built on a land not belonging to another.
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
/#$)'a v. C)&$! )- A((#a'
%pouses 1duardo and 1lsa Persola, petitioner v. )on. Court of $ppeals , %heriff 5eynaldo "adolaria, Judge @ydia @ayosa, 5TC of
TueGon City ,ranch 298, 5egistry of 'eeds of TC and 'r. Pictoria T. ng h, respondents
Na!&$#: (etition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of $ppeals
Da!#: July :9, 2443
P)n#n!#: Chico*!aGario, /&
D)')$# L#+#.a #n!#$#+ in!) a ')an !$ana*!i)n :i!" D$. /i*!)$ia Ong O" where the latter granted (9 "illion loan to
the former. $s security, @edesma issued a check of the same amount and promised to execute a deed of real estate
mortgage over her house and lot. "ortgage did not materialiGe. @edesma only delivered the duplicate copy of the TCT of
the property to 'r. ng.
L#+#.a )'+ !"# ")&# an+ ')! !) (#!i!i)n#$ -)$ P2.EM. %pouses Persola paid a downpayment of (9" with the
remaining balance payable in monthly instalments but before the instalments come due, @edesma asked spouses to pay
the remaining.
P#!i!i)n#$ a(('i#+ -)$ a ')an :i!" Aia!$&! Ban= In*. An the course of application, $siatrust convened the petitioners,
'r. ng h and @edesma. They arrived at a scheme such that 'r. ng granted @edesma an additional loan, @edesma
executed the %ale transferring the title to spouses Persola, 'r. ng delivered the title to $siatrust and $siatrust approved
the loan application of the petitioners.
)owever, when $siatrust tried to register the property, a notice of levy was annotated on the title in connection with
@edesma-s obligation to a certain "iladay-s Jewels, Anc. C"#n D$. Ong !$i#+ !) ($##n! !"# *"#*= i&#+ ,5 L#+#.a1
!"# a.# :a +i")n)$#+ -)$ !"# a**)&n! :a a'$#a+5 *')#+.
D$. Ong -i'#+ a *).('ain! again! L#+#.a1 ()&# /#$)'a an+ Aia!$&!.
RTC: in favor of 'r. ng
CA: affirms the decision of 5TC with modification as to the amount payable.
'r. ng filed a motion for 1xecution and was granted. The property in the name of petitioners was levied upon. The sheriff
set the sale of the property at a public auction.
%pouses Persola objected but the sheriff still sold the property and awarded price to 'r. ng.
(etitioners failed to redeem the property within the redemption period. Thus, the sheriff issued a /inal 'eed of %ale.
Two years later, petitioner file a motion on the following grounds+
9. property sold is the family home of the petitioners which is exempted from execution under A$!. 7EE
2. no application was made by 'r. ng for the determination of the value of their family home to be subjected to
execution, as re&uired by A$!. 763
I&#: W! petitioners timely raisedIproved that the property is exempt from execution .i.e. that it is their family home.0 * NO
P#!i!i)n#$ C)&$!
The property was their family home 5ight to exemption or forced sale under $rt. 9H: of /C is personal privilege
granted to the debtor and as such, it .&! ,# *'ai.#+ n)! ,5 !"# "#$i--
,&! ,5 !"# +#,!)$ "i.#'- ($i)$ !) a'# a! a&*!i)n.
At is not sufficient that person claiming exemption alleges that such is a
family home B .&! ,# #! an+ ($)v#+ !) S"#$i--. /ailure to do so would
estop the party from later claiming exception.
Anstead of substantiating their claim, spouses presupposed that the sheriff
had prior knowledge that such property was their family home.
P#!i!i)n#$8 a#$!i)n )- #9#.(!i)n :a a .#$# a-!#$!")&g"!1 "##$
a$!i-i*# !) +#($iv# $#()n+#n! )- -$&i! )- !"# v#$+i*! )- "#$ *a#.
They registered their opposition prior to the
auction sale but such was treated as a
mere scrap of paper and is deemed not
Anaction of sheriff was justified. (etitioners never filed any motion before the
court to hold the auction sale.
%aid motion was treated by court as scrap of paper presumably because it
doesn-t contain a notice of hearing.
There was no order of clearance from trial
court for the sheriff to proceed with the
auction sale, in violation of $rt. 934
At was correct for sheriff to continue the auction sale as there was no order
forthcoming to suspend the sale absent any motion from petitioner.
There were serious defects in the conduct
of execution sale B sheriff based execution
on decision of 5TC not C$.
Un-)&n+#+ B although sheriff &uoted decision of 5TC in the /inal deed of
sale, the statement of accounts submitted by respondent and computation
of sheriff showed that the sale was based on the decision of the C$.
Pa!$i*i) v. Da$i) III
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
Da!#: !ovember 24, 2443
P#!i!i)n#$: (erla ;. (atricio
R#()n+#n!: "arcelino ;. 'ario AAA and The )onorable
Court of $ppeals
An July 9>68, "arcelino P. 'ario died intestate. )e
was survived by his wife, petitioner (erla, and their
two sons, "arcelino "arc and "arcelino ;. 'ario
AAA, private respondent. $mong the properties he left
was a parcel of land with a residential house and a
preschool building built thereon.
An $ugust 9>68, the three extrajudicially settled the
estate of the deceased. (etitioner and "arcelino
"arc formally advised private respondent of their
intention to partition the subject property and
terminate the co*ownership. )owever, private
respondent refused to partition the property on the
ground that his 92 year*old son, who is the
grandson of spouses "arcelino and (erla, was a
minor beneficiary of the family home.
WI! "arcelino @orenGo 5. 'ario AP, the grandson of
petitioner, is a minor beneficiary of the family home. Af he is
not, the partition of the family home is proper.
"arcelino @orenGo AP is not a minor beneficiary of the family
home, therefore, since there is no legal impediment to
partition the subject property, the partition of the property is
$rt. 9H> of the /C provides that the family home
shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a
period of 94 years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. Af
there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in
the family home, it will continue for 94 years, unless
at the expiration of 94 years, there is still a minor
beneficiary, in which case the family home
continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
There are three re&uisites in order to be considered
as a beneficiary of the family home+ .90 they must
be among the relationships enumerated in $rt. 9H?
of the /CC .20 they live in the family homeC and .:0
they are dependent for legal support upon the head
of the family.
The grandson satisfies the 9st and 2nd re&uisite+ he
is a grandchild of the deceased and has been living
in the family home since 9>>?, within 94 years from
the death of the decedent. )owever, he does not
satisfy the :rd re&uisite because a grandson cannot
demand support from his paternal grandmother if he
has parents who are capable of supporting him. The
liability of legal support falls on his parents,
especially his father, the head of his immediate
family. The law first imposes the obligation upon the
parents, and only in their default is the obligation
imposed on the grandparents. .refer to $rt. 9>>,
order of support0
/#n#$a*i)n v. Man*i''a
July 24, 2443
(onente+ Callejo, %r. J.
1liGabeth "andinueta , married to ;eronimo
Peneracion loaned ()(9,244,444.44 from Charlie
"ancilla. To secure the loan, she issued a real
estate mortgage over "#$ residential house and lot.
1liGabeth failed to pay the loan. "ancilla then filed
for the foreclosure of the mortgaged property. The
5TC ruled in favor of "ancilla. 1liGabeth appealed
to C$ wherein she failed to file her appeal brief. C$
dismissed the appeal. $fter which, she filed a
manifestation stating that she would not file a brief
but she prayed that the accrued interest be reduced.
When case was remanded to the trial court, the
property was ordered to be executed and it was
auctioned wherein the heirs of "ancilla were the
winning bidders.
Dpon the death of ;eronimo, his children filed a
petition alleging that their parents were common law
spouses that was why 1liGabeth-s status was single
when she mortgaged the property. $nd that even
though 1liGabeth was the only registered owner of
the mortgaged property, ;eronimo contributed to its
ac&uisition. They alleged, therefore that the property
was conjugal and that it being the family home,
under A$!. 7EE1 it should be exempted from forced
WI! the mortgaged property was conjugal in nature
and could be considered a family home.
H#'+; Ra!i):
NO. An the case at bar petitioners failed to prove
that the said property was conjugal and that ;eronimo
contributed to the ac&uisition of the property. .$dapt+ They
failed to append to their petition copies of the receipts for the
installment of the property allegedly paid by their father
;eronimo which will support their assertion.0 Their allegation
that for them proves the contribution of ;eronimo .1liGabeth
had no source of income0 was easily rebutted by 1liGabeth-s
claim that she had loaned from ,anco /ilipino the sum of
()(9,244,444.44 to pay "ancilla. /urthermore, in
1liGabeth-s plea that that the accrued interest she was
ordered to pay by 5TC was ine&uitable, she impliedly
admitted the correctness of 5TC-s decision.
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
Na!&$#: (etition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of $ppeals
Pa$!i# Inv)'v#+: Pilma ;. $rriola and $nthony 5onald ;. $rriola, petitioners, vs. John !abor $rriola, respondent
P)n#n!#: $ustria* "artineG, J.
Da!#: January 26, 2446
/idel $rriola and Pictoria Calabia .first wife0 S John
/idel $rriola and Pilma ;. $rriola .second wife0 S $nthony
When /idel $rriola died, he left a parcel of land. 5TC ordered the partition thereof among his heirs namely Pilma, $nthony, and
John, in e&ual shares of 9I: each.
The said parties failed to agree on how to partition the land, thus, respondent John sought its sale through a public auction
which the petitioners acceded to. $ccordingly, the 5TC ordered the public auction of the said land.
(etitioners, Pilma and $nthony, opposed to include the house standing on the subject land.
This prompted respondent to file with the 5TC an Drgent "anifestation and "otion for Contempt of Court, praying that
petitioners be declared in contempt. 5TC denied the motion.
5espondent filed with the C$ a petition for certiorari praying that he be allowed to proceed with the auction. C$ granted
I&#: W! the public auction should include the subject house.
R#gi)na' T$ia' C)&$! C)&$! )- A((#a'
T"# ")&# ")&'+ n)! ,# in*'&+#+ because
respondent never alleged its existence in his complaint
for partition or established his co*ownership thereof
T"# ")&# ")&'+ ,# in*'&+#+ because it is a mere
accessory to the subject land owned by the deceased.
,oth properties form part of the estate of the deceased
and are held in co*ownership by his heirs, the parties
)ence, the partition of said estate should cover not only
the land but the house as well
H#'+: !o
1xamining the !$TD51 of the subject house+ (etitioners claim that said house has been their residence for 24 years.
A$!. 7E41 FC+ The /amily )ome is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence xxx
NitO is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by
A$!. 7E<1 FC+ The /amily )ome shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses- xxx for a period of 94 years xxx.
T"&1 !"# Fa.i'5 H).# Q *)ni!ing )- !"# &,K#*! ")&# an+ ')! )n :"i*" i! !an+ Q *ann)! ,# (a$!i!i)n#+ a! !"i
!i.#1 #v#n i- i! "a (a#+ !) !"# *)D):n#$"i( )- !"# (a$!i#1 "#$#in. /idel $rriola died on "arch 94, 244:. Thus for 94
years from said date .until "arch 94, 249:0, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family
home he constituted cannot be partitioned, "DC) @1%% when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside
the restriction and order the partition of the property.
Purpose of Article 1;B.
1& Avert the disintegration of the family unit follo%ing the death of its head
2& Preserve the family home as the physical symbol of family love security and unity
DISPOSITI/E: (etition is partly granted. The house standing on the subject land is exempted from partition by public auction within
the period provided in $rticle 9H>.
An the meantime, there is no obstacle to the immediate public auction of the portion of the subject land, which falls DT%A'1 the
specific area of the /amily )ome.
B#''#5 v. P'an!#$ P$)+&*!1 In*.
%(D%1% $DT)15 ;. #1@@1R, J5. and '5A% $. #1@@1R, complainants v. (lanters (roducts, Anc. and Jorge $. 5agutana,
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
Na!&$#+ (etition for review on certiorari contending that the
C$ erred in upholding the dismissal of Civil Case !o. 2444*
4966 by the 5TC !aga City.
Da!#: July >, 2446
P)n#n#!#: Corona, J

(etitioner $uther ;. #elley, Jr. .$uther0 ac&uired
agricultural chemical products on consignment from
respondent (lanters (roducts, Anc. .((A0 in 9>6>. 'ue to
$uther-s failure to pay despite demand, ((A filed an action for
sum of money against him.
$fter trial on the merits, the Trial court decided in
favor of ((A and issued a writ of execution. (ursuant thereto,
respondent sheriff Jorge $. 5agutana sold on execution real
property covered by TCT N). 7E3P< located in !aga City. $
certificate of sale was issued in favor of ((A as the highest
$fter being belatedly informed of the said sale,
petitioners $uther and his wife 'oris $. #elley .'oris0 filed a
motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the Trial
court on !"# g$)&n+ !"a! !"# &,K#*! ($)(#$!5 :a !"#i$
-a.i'5 ").# :"i*" :a #9#.(! -$). #9#*&!i)n.

%ubse&uently, petitioners filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of levy and sale of the alleged family
home with damages against 5agutana and ((A. The case
was, however, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and lack of
cause of action. The dismissal was upheld by the C$.

W! a duly constituted family home is exempt
from execution.
Res, a duly constituted family home is exempt from
execution. The case should be remanded for further

T"#$# .&! ,# ($))- !"a! !"# a''#g#+ -a.i'5
").# :a *)n!i!&!#+ K)in!'5 ,5 !"# "&,an+ an+ :i-# )$
,5 an &n.a$$i#+ "#a+ )- a -a.i'5. At must be the house
where they and their family actually reside and the lot on
which it is situated. The family home must be part of the
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse
with the latter-s consent, or on the property of the unmarried
head of the family. The actual value of the family home shall
not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of
(:44,444 in urban areas and (244,444 in rural areas.

Un+#$ !"# Fa.i'5 C)+#1 !"#$# i n) n##+ !)
*)n!i!&!# !"# -a.i'5 ").# K&+i*ia''5 )$ #9!$aK&+i*ia''5.
A'' -a.i'5 ").# *)n!$&*!#+ a-!#$ !"# #--#*!ivi!5 )- !"#
Fa.i'5 C)+# ?A&g&! 41 7<FF@ a$# *)n!i!&!#+ a &*" ,5
)(#$a!i)n )- 'a:. $ll existing family residences as of $ugust
:, 9>66 are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
/amily Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the
constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. .T"# C)&$!
*i!#+ a$!. 7EE1 !"# #9*#(!i)n !) !"# #9#.(!i)n0
$rticle 934. When a creditor whose claim is not among those
mentioned in $rticle 9HH obtains a judgment in his favor, and
he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is
actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in
$rticle 9H8, he may apply to the court which rendered the
judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under
execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual
value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount
allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. Af the
increased actual value exceeds the maximum amount
allowed by law in $rticle 9H8 and results from subse&uent
voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons
constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the
property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and
procedure shall apply.
T"# C)&$! g$an!#+ !"# (#!i!i)n )n'5 !) !"# #9!#n!
)- a''):ing (#!i!i)n#$ !) a++&*# #vi+#n*# in !"# !$ia'
*)&$! !"a! TCT N). 7E3P< i in -a*! !"#i$ -a.i'5 ").# a
*)n!i!&!#+ in a**)$+an*# :i!" !"# $#%&i$#.#n! )- 'a:.

$ote. prior to elevation to S* the lo%er court did not ta3e
into consideration the contention of the petitioner that the
involved property is their family home and rendered its
decision despite the allegation of such&
A',in) J)#- v. San!)
$lbino Josef, petitioner, vs. telio %antos, respondent
Da!#: !ovember 28, 2446
P)n#n!#: Rnares*%antiago, /&
(etitioner was found to be liable to respondent for failing
to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from
respondent on various dates in 9>>?.
July 93, 244: B 5TC granted respondent-s motion for
issuance of writ of execution.
$ug. 2>, 244: B certain personal properties were
auctioned off.
ct. 26, 244: B a real property located at "arikina City
was sold through public auction.
(etitioner claims that the personal properties belong to
his children, and that the real property was his family
home, thus exempt from execution.
C$ dismissed petitioner-s motion for reconsideration,
hence this case.
I&#: W! 5TC rder dated July 93, 244: is valid.
H#'+: !.
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
5TC did not take into account petitioner-s allegations in
his opposition that the house and lot in which he was
residing at the time was his family home thus exempt
from execution.
The court should have made an earnest determination of
the truth to petitioner-s claim that the house and lot in
which he and his children resided was their duly
constituted family homeC thus, the order is null and void.
5TC should have observed the following procedure+
90 'etermine if petitioner-s obligation to
respondent falls under either of the
exceptions under $rticle 9HH of the /amily
20 "ake an in&uiry into the veracity of
petitioner-s claim that the property was his
family homeC conduct an ocular inspection
of the premisesC an examination of the titleC
an interview of members of the community
where the alleged family home is located,
in order to determine if petitioner actually
resided within the premises of the claimed
family homeC order a submission of
photographs of the premises, depositions,
andIor affidavits of proper
individualsIpartiesC or a solemn
examination of the petitioner, his children
and other witnesses. $t the same time, the
respondent is given the opportunity to
cross*examine and present evidence to the
:0 Af the property is accordingly found to
constitute petitioner-s family home, the
court should determine+
a0 if the obligation sued upon was
contracted or incurred prior to, or after,
the effectivity of the /amily CodeC
b0 if petitioner-s spouse is still alive, as
well as if there are other beneficiaries
of the family homeC
c0 if the petitioner has more than one
residence for the purpose of
determining which of them, if any, is
his family homeC and
d0 its actual location and value, for the
purpose of applying the provisions of
$rticles 9H8 and 934 of the /amily
The same is true with respect to personal properties.
5TC had enough time to conduct the crucial in&uiry. The
court-s inaction on petitioner-s plea resulted in serious
injustice to the latter, not to mention that its failure to
conduct an in&uiry based on the latter-s claim bordered
on gross ignorance of the law.
(etitioner claimed exemption from execution of his
family home soon after respondent filed the motion for
issuance of a writ of execution, thus giving notice to the
trial court and respondent that a property exempt from
execution may be in danger of being subjected to levy
and sale. Thereupon, the trial court is called to observe
the procedure as herein laid outC on the other hand, the
respondent should observe the procedure prescribed in
$rticle 934 of the /amily Code, that is, to obtain an order
for the sale on execution of the petitioner-s family home,
if so, and apply the proceeds B less the maximum
amount allowed by law under $rticle 9H8 of the Code
which should remain with the petitioner for the rebuilding
of his family home B to his judgment credit. Anstead,
both the trial court and respondent completely ignored
petitioner-s argument that the properties subject of the
writ are exempt from execution.
NII.Pa!#$ni!5 an+ Fi'ia!i)n
P#$i+) v. P#$i+) ?7<PE@
@eonora (erido, joined by husband "anuel (irote, Anocencia (erido, $lbenio (erido, (aulino (erido, @etia (erido, joined by
husband ,ienvenido ,alyao, @eticia (erido, joined by husband /elix PillaruG, 1ufemia, Consolacion, $lfredo, ;eorge, $mparo,
Wilfredo, "argarita, .all surnamed (erido0C 5olando %alde and 1duardo %alde, petitioners vs. "aria, %ofronio, Juan, ;onGalo,
(acita, "agdalena, $licia, Josefina, /e, Teresa and @uG .all surnamed (erido0, respondents
P)n#n!#: "akalintal, *&/.+
Na!&$#: $ppeal by Certiorari from the decision of Court of
$ppeals affirming the decision of the Court of /irst Anstance
of !egros ccidental that the children of @ucio (erido with
his second wife are legitimate.
* @ucio (erido contracted two marriages during his lifetime.
)is -i$! :i-# :a B#ni!a Talorong. They had three children
.and 9: grandchildren and : great grandchildren0.
D A-!#$ !"# +#a!" )- B#ni!a, he contracted an)!"#$
.a$$iag# :i!" Ma$*#'ina ,alinguat and they had five
children .and 6 grandchildren0. @ucio died in 9>?2, while
"arcelina died in 9>?:.
* An $ugust 9>34, the children and grandchildren of the first
and second marriages of @ucio (erido #9#*&!#+ a
+)*&.#n! +#n).ina!#+ a HD#*'a$a!i)n )- H#i$"i( an+
E9!$aDJ&+i*ia' Pa$!i!i)n1I whereby they partitioned among
themselves eight lots, all of the Cadastral %urvey of
)imamaylan, !egros ccidental.
* The *"i'+$#n )- "i -i$! .a$$iag# have second thoughts
about the partition and so they filed a complaint in the C/A of
!egros ccidental again! !"# *"i'+$#n )- !"# #*)n+
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
.a$$iag#. They were praying for the annulment of the
'eclaration of )eirship and 1xtra*Judicial (artition.
P#!i!i)n#$ a''#g#+, among other things, !"a! !"# -iv#
*"i'+$#n )- L&*i) :i!" "i #*)n+ :i-# Ma$*#'ina a$# a''
i''#gi!i.a!# an+ !"#$#-)$# n) &**#i)na' $ig"! !) !"#
#!a!# )- L&*i) P#$i+).
* ,oth C/A and C$ held that the children are legitimate.
)ence appeal.
I&#: W! the children of @ucio in his second marriage are
legitimateL .Topical0
Y#1 !"#5 a$# '#gi!i.a!#. The Court concluded that the five
children of @ucio (erido and "arcelina ,alinguat :#$# ,)$n
+&$ing !"#i$ .a$$iag#, and therefore legitimate.
The petitioners insisted that said children were illegitimate on
the theory that the first three were born out of wedlock even
before the death of @ucio (erido-s first wife, while the last two
were also born out of wedlock and were not recogniGed by
their parents before or after their marriage. (etitioners also
contended that @ucio was still a widower, as late as 9>2:, as
shown on the face of certificates of title issued to him in said
)owever, #vi+#n*# "): !"a! L&*i) P#$i+)8 -i$! :i-#
+i#+ +&$ing S(ani" $#gi.# and under such circumstance
L&*i) P#$i+) "a+ n) '#ga' i.(#+i.#n! !) .a$$5 Ma$*#'ina
Ba'ig&a! ,#-)$# !"# ,i$!" )- !"#i$ -i$! *"i'+ in 7<33. With
regard to the civil status of @ucio (erido as stated in the
*#$!i-i*a!# )- !i!'# issued to him in 9>2:, the C$ correctly
held that the statement was n)! *)n*'&iv# !) "): !"a! "#
:a n)! a*!&a''5 .a$$i#+ !) Ma$*#'ina. /urthermore, it is
:#a= an+ in&--i*i#n! !) $#,&! !"# ($#&.(!i)n !"a!
(#$)n 'iving !)g#!"#$ a "&,an+ an+ :i-# a$# .a$$i#+
!) #a*" )!"#$. This ($#&.(!i)n1 especially where the
legitimacy of the issue is involved .like in this case0 .a5 ,#
)v#$*).# )n'5 ,5 *)g#n! ($))- )n !"# (a$! )- !")# :")
a''#g# !"# i''#gi!i.a*5.
S)*ia' S#*&$i!5 S5!#. v. Ag&a
Social Security System petitioner vs& 8osanna C& Aguas /anet C& Aguas and minor /eylnn C& Aguas represented by her (egal
@uardian 8osanna C& Aguas respondents&
Na!&$#: (etition for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of $ppeals.
Da!#: 28 /ebruary 2443
P)n#n!#: Callejo, %r., J.
(ablo $guas .(ablo0 died and his surviving spouse
5osanna $guas .5osanna0, was claiming from %%%
for death benefits. Ancluded in the claim was that the
deceased had a minor child with her, Jeylnn $guas
The deceased-s sister contended to the %%% that
5osanna left the family abode for another man for
more than six years and that her brother did not
have a legitimate child with the respondent child.
The %%% then conducted an investigation regarding
the statement of (ablo-s sister.
%%%-s investigation turned out to be consistent with
the allegation of (ablo-s sister* 5osanna left (ablo
more than 3 years before the latter-s deathC she was
living with another man named 5omeo dela (eMaC
she has children with 5omeo, including Jeylnn, aka
Jenelyn .by another birth certificate, born before
(ablo-s deathC (ablo was incapable of having a
child with 5osanna. $ccordingly, %%% advised
5osanna to refund the pension that she already
They then re&uested %%% for reconsideration which
was denied. They also petitioned to the %ocial
%ecurity Commission .%%C0 for the restoration and
repayment of the pension, where they were joined
by Janet $guas .Janet0 claiming that she was an
adopted child of the deceased (ablo. The backed
their petition with the following+ marriage certificate
of 5osanna and (ablo, Janet-s and Jeylnn-s
certificates of live birth, and (ablo-s death
The %%C ruled against this case-s respondents on
the following findings+ 5osanna committed adulteryC
Jeylnn $guas and Jenelyn dela (eMa are one and
the same and evidence show that she was
5osanna-s child by 5omeo and not by (ablo.
5osanna, et al then appealed to C$ which ruled in
their favour on the following grounds+ birth
certificates of Janet and Jeylnn show that they were
(ablo-s children and it was not shown that 5osanna
ceased to receive support from the deceased and
that her alleged adultery was not proven. $nd even
if 5osanna was married to 5omeo, such marriage
will be void which thus will not make her not
dependent to (ablo-s support
9. 5osanna,
2. J#5'nn, and
4. Jan#!
are entitled to the death benefits by virtue of (ablo-s
H#'+ an+ Ra!i):
H. !o. 1ven though 5osanna had proven that she was
(ablo-s legitimate spouse .by marriage certificate0,
she was not able to prove that she was his
dependent before his death. 'ependency must be
shown and cannot be presumed with the fact of
marriage alone. Wife who left her husband for more
than 3 years cannot be said to be dependent upon
the support of the latter. They separated because of
the commotion brought by 5omeo claiming that
Jeylnn should be named after him because he, and
not (ablo, is the father of the child. The child was
registered and baptiGed .again after doing both
under the name of Jeylnn $guas0 with the name
Jenelyn dela (eMa and with mother the same as
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
Jeylnn, 5osanna. Jenelyn-s and Jeylln-s date of
birth were only three months apart, an impossibility
given that they have the same mother. Thus, Jeylln
and Jenelyn are one and the same.
3. Y#. )er ,i$!" *#$!i-i*a!# :i!" Pa,')8 igna!&$#
a -a!"#$ is *).(#!#n! #vi+#n*# )- (a!#$ni!5.
/urthermore, the +#*#a#+ +i+ n)! #9#$*i# "i
(#$)na' $ig"! !) aai' J#5'nn8 '#gi!i.a*5.
8. N). (resumption of legitimacy under /C $rt. 93?
cannot stand for Janet because her date of birth
was not substantially proven. $rt. 93? presumption
re&uisites+ .90 child-s parent legally married, .20
child-s birth occurred during subsistence of
mentioned marriage. The record of birth she
presented was not verified by the civil register.
/urther, Jan#!8 a+)(!i)n +i+ n)! &n+#$g) an5
'#ga' ($)*##+ing which should have yielded
documents that she was indeed legally adopted by
the deceased .!"& n)! '#ga''5 a+)(!#+0. nly
legally adopted, and not merely EadoptedF children
are considered dependent children .of course, aside
from legitimate children0 by %ec. 6 .e0 of 5$ 9939.
R#: Ba,5 M
Na!&$#: $ppeal A the %upreme Court of !ew Jersey
Da!#: /ebruary :, 9>6
P)n#n!#: WilentG, */
William %tern .natural father of ,aby "0 and "ary ,eth Whitehead .surrogate mother0 entered into a &$$)ga*5 *)n!$a*! for a -##
)- R731333. At provides that %tern-s wife, was infertile, that they wanted a child, and that "rs. Whitehead was willing to provide that
child as the mother through a$!i-i*ia' in#.ina!i)n )- S!#$n8 (#$..
"rs. Whitehead- husband was also a party to the contractC "rs %tern was not.
The Anfertility Center of !ew Rork ?ICNY@ arranged for the surrogacy contract.
5eason of spouses %tern+
9. "rs. %tern has multiple sclerosis, rendering pregnancy a serious health risk
2. "r. %tern-s family had been killed in the )olocaust. Thus, he wanted to continue his bloodline.
5eason of "rs. Whitehead+
9. %he feels sorry with families who could have no children
2. %he also wanted the ]94,444 to help her family
C"#n M$. C"i!#"#a+ gav# ,i$!" to ,aby ", she turned over the child to the %terns. )owever, she felt +##('5 +i!&$,#+ :i!"
&n,#a$a,'# a+n#.
,$%AC$@@R, there was a struggle between the %terns and Whiteheads. This commotion even resulted to the Whiteheads fleeing to
/lorida and hiding from the %terns in order to keep .sort of kidnapping0 ,aby ".
T$ia' C)&$!:
%urrogacy contract is P$@A'.
The trial court devoted the major portion of its opinion to the &uestion of the ,a,58 ,#! in!#$#!.
At awarded the custody to "r. %tern based on the same kind of evidence and analysis as might be expected had no
surrogacy contract existed.
M$. C"i!#8 *)n!#n!i)n:
9. The surrogacy contract conflicts with public policy
2. %he asserts Etender yearsF doctrine, wherein the child should be place with the mother absent a showing of unfitness.
S!#$n8 *)n!#n!i)n:
9. The spouses invoke their *)n!i!&!i)na' $ig"! )- ($iva*5 B right of procreation, and the right of consentin adults to deal
with matters of reproduction as they see fit.
2. Child-s best interest would be ensured if custody is given to them
G&a$+ian a+ 'i!#.:
9. ,ased on her role .to protect the child-s best interest0, she believed that the %terns should have primary custody, with no
visitation rights for "rs. Whitehead at least until ,aby " reaches maturity
2. A"(T+ This position does not rest on the validity of the surrogacy contract
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
The surrogacy contract is IN/ALID. )owever,
C&!)+5 was granted to the S!#$n, with visitation rights for "rs. Whitehead.
9. At is in +i$#*! *)n-'i*! :i!" #9i!ing !a!&!#, specifically+
a. @aws prohibiting the use of money in connection with adoptions
b. @aws re&uiring proof of parental unfitness or abandonment before termination of parental rights is ordered or an
adoption is granted
c. @aws that make surrender of custody and consent to adoption revocable in private placement adoptions
2. At is in *)n-'i*! :i!" (&,'i* ()'i*i# )- !"# S!a!#, specifically+
a. (rotection of the child from unnecessary separation from his natural parents
b. 5ights of natural parents should be e&ual concerning the child
7. I! i in +i$#*! *)n-'i*! :i!" #9i!ing !a!&!#
S!i(&'a!i)n in !"# *)n!$a*! In vi)'a!i)n )-:
"r. %tern paid AC!R ]8,H44
while "rs. Whitehead
received ]94, 444 for her
@aws prohibiting the use of money in connection with adoptions
Evil in baby bartering.
a. Child is sold without regard for whether the purchasers will be suitable parent
b. !atural mother does not receive the benefit of counselling and guidance to
assist her in making the decision
c. $doptive parents may not be fully informed of the natural parents- medical
The termination of "rs.
Whitehead-s parental rights
was n)! a(($)v#+ ,5 !"#
DFYS. There was also n)
"):ing )- a,an+)n.#n!
)$ n#g'#*! )n "#$ (a$!.
@aws re&uiring proof of parental unfitness or abandonment before termination of
parental rights is ordered or an adoption is granted
-hree forms of termination.
o $n action by an approved agency
o $n action by the 'ivision of Routh and /amily %ervices .'/R%0
o $n action in connection with a private placement adoption
The surrogacy contract +i+
n)! *)n!ain a *'a&# giving
her a $ig"! !) $#*in+. At
was intended to be an
i$$#v)*a,'# *)n#n!
@aws that make surrender of custody and consent to adoption revocable in private
placement adoptions
There is only one irrevocable consent+ a consent to surrender of custody and
placement with an approved agency or with 'R/%
2. I! i in *)n-'i*! :i!" (&,'i* ()'i*i# )- !"# S!a!#
(rotection of the child from unnecessary separation from
his natural parents
E$ child, instead of starting off its life with as much peace
and security as possible, finds itself immediately in a tug*
of*war between contending mother and father.
5ights of natural parents should be e&ual concerning the
An contrast, the surrogacy contract-s purpose is to give
the father the exclusive right to the child by destroying
the rights of the mother
Di--#$#n*# ,#!:##n an a+)(!i)n an+ a &$$)ga*5 *)n!$a*!
A+)(!i)n S&$$)ga*5 C)n!$a*!
9. $doption actually relieves the natural mother of
supporting an infant, which is in some sense the
e&uivalent payment
Cannot survive without money
2. The use of money '1% !T (5'DC1 T)1
Conception *^ ,irth *^ F&n+ a$# )--#$#+
The (5,@1" is the purchase of the woman-s
procreative capacity, at the risk of her life
F&n+;M)n#5 )--#$#+ *^ Conception *^ ,irth
:. 'oes not lead to the highest paying, ill suited,
adoptive parents
The "ig"#! ,i++#$ will presumably become the
adoptive parents
?. "other-s *)n#n! to surrender her child is
Consent occurs so early that no amount of advice would
satisfy the potential mother-s need, yet the *)n#n! is
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
The difference that the &n:an!#+ ($#gnan*5 i &nin!#n+#+ while the i!&a!i)n )- !"# &$$)ga!# .)!"#$ i
v)'&n!a$5 an+ in!#n+#+ is 51$@@R !T %A;!A/AC$!T.
CD%T'R W$% ;AP1! T T)1 %T15!%
The best interests of ,aby " calls for the custody in the %terns.
Whiteheads- household+
o 'oubtful stability of their household due to #$i)& -inan*ia' !$)&,'#
o "r. Whitehead-s employment was always at risk due to his alcoholism
o "rs. Whitehead had not worked for &uite some time
o "rs. Whitehead perceived herself as omnipotent and omniscient. .%he says that she knows what her children are
thinkingC she knows what ,aby "-s cries mean0
%terns- household+
o /inances are more than ade&uate. )ousehold is stable.
o 'uring the 9 V years of custody, ,aby " has done very well
B#! in!#$#! does not contain within it any idealiGed lifestyle. $ll other factors must be considered.
"5%. W)AT1)1$' W$% 1!TAT@1' T PA%AT$TA!
The nature of this visitation right is to be determined by the court. Case remanded.
J)"n)n v. Ca'v#$!
$nna Johnson .(laintiff and $ppellant0, v. "ark Calvert et al. .'efendants and 5espondents0
"ay 24, 9>>:
(onente+ (anelli, J.
"ark and Crispina Calvert are married and wants to have a
child. )owever, Crispina was forced to undergo a
hysterectomy .surgical removal of the uterus0 in 9>6?. )er
ovaries still remain capable of producing eggs. An light with
that, the couple considered surrogacy. An 9>6>, upon hearing
about the plight of Crispina, $nna Johnson offered to serve
as a surrogate for the Calverts.
$nna and the couple signed a contract agreeing that an
embryo created by the sperm of "ark and the egg of
Crispina would be implanted in $nna. The child born would
be taken into "ark and CrispinaJs home as their child and
that $nna would relin&uish Eall parental rightsF to the child in
favor of "ark and Crispina. An return, $nna will be paid
]94,444 in a series of instalments and will get a life
n January 9>, 9>>4, the Gygote was implanted on January
9>, 9>>4 and $nna has been confirmed pregnant in less than
a month.
The relations between the two parties deteriorated. "ark
learned that $nna had not disclosed she had suffered several
stillbirths and miscarriages. $nna felt the Calverts did not do
enough to obtain the re&uired insurance policy, felt
abandoned during an onset of premature labor in June.
$nna sent the Calverts a letter demanding the balance of the
payments due her or else she would refuse to give up the
child to which the Calverts responded with a lawsuit, seeking
a declaration they were the legal parents of the unborn child.
An conse&uence, $nna filed her own action to be declared the
mother of the child.

The child was born. An the blood test results, $nna was
excluded as the genetic mother. The parties agreed to a
court order providing that the child would remain with "ark
and Crispina on a temporary basis with visits by $nna.
The trial court ruled that "ark and Crispina were the childJs
genetic, biological and natural parents and that $nna had no
parental rights to the child. The court also terminated the
order allowing visitation. With this judgment, $nna appeals.
Main I&#:
Who is the child-s natural mother under the California @awL
Crispina .the wife, whose ovaries were used to form the
Gygote0 or $nna .the gestating woman0L
H#'+; Ra!i):
At is Crispina. %he who intended to procreate the child *that
is, she who intended to
bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as
her own* is the natural mother under California law
Dnder the Dniform (arentage $ct
, maternity could be
established either by presentation of blood test evidence
9niform 2rigandage -ct. its purpose as to eliminate the
legal distinction beteen legitimate and illegitimate children.
&t bases parent and child rights on the e'istence of a parent
and child relationship rather than on the marital status of the
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
.used by Crispina0 or by a woman-s proof of her giving birth
to the child .used by $nna0. The said act does not give
preference to which evidence will be given more weight such
that the one who uses that evidence will be the one that will
be favoured as the mother of the child. ;iven this deadlock,
the court then resorted to considering the intent of the parties
in the surrogacy agreement. At is not legally possible to rule
that both are the child-s natural mother since for any child,
California law recogniGes only one natural mother despite
advances in reproductive technology.
An this case, it was Crispina, together with "ark, who
intended the birth of the child and took the steps necessary
to effect in vitro fertiliGation. Af not for their intention, the child
would not exist. $nna is just a mere instrument in the
procreation of the Calverts- child. Dpon entering the contract
with the Calverts, $nna intended to bring Crispina-s child. At
was not the interest of the parties to donate a Gygote to
$nna. )ad the parties known that $nna would be intending to
claim marital rights over their children, the Calverts would
probably not permit $nna to carry the Gygote. $s such,
$nnaJs later change of heart should vitiate the determination
that Crispina is the childJs natural mother.
'rawing an analogy to artificial insemination, $nna argues
that "ark and Crispina were mere genetic donors. Thus, they
are not entitled to any constitutional protection. )owever, the
analogy is inaccurate. An artificial insemination one intends to
donate genetic material to someone. The Calverts did not
intend to donate their Gygote to $nna when they resorted to
surrogacy. 5ather, they intended to procreate a child
genetically related to them.
Persons and Family Relations- September 1, 2009
In R# A+)(!i)n )- An)n5.)&
(reliminary Anformation+
2 types of artificial insemination
9. )omologous $A .$A)0 *wife is impregnated with husband-s
2. )eterologus $A .$A'0 *artificial insemination of wife by
anonymous third*party.
*may be consensual .with
husband-s consent0 or
nonconsensual .wIo husband-s
'uring the marriage, the child was born out of
consensual $A'. )usband was listed as the EfatherF
in the birth certificate.
The couple separated and later divorced. ,oth the
separation agreement and the divorce decree
declared the child to be the EdaughterF and EchildF of
the couple. Wife was granted support and the
husband visitation rights. )e faithfully supported and
visited child.
Wife remarried and new husband wanted to adopt
the child. Dnder the law, for the adoption to be valid,
consent of both parents are re&uired. 9
refused to give his consent.
(etitioner wife claimed his consent was not re&uired
because he was not the EparentF of the child.
9. W! father of child born out of consensual $A' by wife is
a EparentF whose consent is re&uire for adoption of such child
by anotherR1%
2. W! a child born after consensual $A' during the
marriage is a legitimate child entitled to rights and privileges
of naturally conceived child of same marriageR1%
9. Term EfatherF is not limited to a biologic or natural father.
The determinative factor is whether the legal relationship of
father and child exists. The ($in*i('# )- #%&i!a,'# #!)((#'
was cited in the case of (eope v. %orensen where it was held
that+ a reasonable man who, because of his inability to
procreate, actively participates and C!%1!T% to his wife-s
artificial insemination in hope that a child will be produced
whom they will treat as their own, #!W% that such
behavior carries with it @1;$@ 51%(!%A,A@ATA1%. ne
who C!%1!T% to the production of a child cannot create
temporary relation to be assumed and disclaimed at will, but
the arrangement must be of character as to impose an
obligation of supporting those for whose existence he is
directly responsible.
2. An ;ursky v. ;ursky, it was held that a child born from
consensual $A' was an illegitimate child. Court did not find
this ruling as persuasive because the donor is anonymous
and the wife does not actually have sexual intercourse or
commit adultery with him. $lso, the husband himself gave his
consent so that there can be no marital infidelity. Child is not
born Eout of wedlockF but in and during wedlock.
$lso !ew Rork has a strong policy in favor of legitimacy
wherein children born out of void and voidable marriages are
legitimate. An the face of such policy, it would seem absurd to
hold illegitimate a child born during a valid marriage, of
parents desiring but unable to conceive a child, and both
consenting and agreeing to the impregnation of the mother
by a carefully and medically selected anonymous donor.
D) N#: R#($)+&*!iv# T#*"ni%&# T"$#a!#n !"# Fa.i'5J
What about surrogate motherhood disturbs peopleL /ears about commercialiGation of childbearing K childrearing.
/ears of exploitation of women K of the poor. /ear that surrogacy involves an attack on our concept of the family.
The picture of a mother handing over her child K getting paid for it does not fit easily with current values or with
conventional notions of family. %urrogacy must also inevitably harm the older children whom most surrogates have.
The surrogate-s parents K even her in*laws are also very upset that their grandchild is being given away or sold. The
conflict can cause a permanent rift in the family. ther new reproductive techni&ues are like surrogacy in this respect,
K they also tend to undermine our concept of family.
%urrogacy arrangements usually use artificial insemination. $rtificial insemination is the oldest K simplest of the
reproductive techni&ues other than sexual intercourse. At has been in use for more than a century. At involves
depositing ejaculated sperm in a woman-s uterus with a needleless syringe. At is usually performed by a doctor, but it
is simple enough that individuals can perform it themselves. $ woman may be inseminated with her husband-s sperm
.$A)0 or a donor-s sperm .$A'0 when the husband is sterile or does not want to pass on his genes. %ingle women
who want children also use $A'. Dsually, when doctor performs $A', the woman K the donor remain anonymous.
%ome raise moral objections to artificial insemination. To beget without the possibility of a continuing father*child
relationship would be to withdraw biological potential from personal potential. The donor-s action, made possible by
human science, is anti*human. ,ut artificial insemination is legal. 'ifficult &uestion common to modern reproductive
techni&ues such as artificial insemination+ whether artificial insemination should be available to facilitate parenthood
for anyone other than married couples. $nalogous to conventional sexual intercourse+ state policy to limit to married
couples sexual intercourse K childbearing resulting from it, but anti*fornication laws have limited effectiveness.
An vitro fertiliGation .AP/0 refers to the process by which a doctor stimulates a woman-s ovaries, removes several eggs
in a procedure called a laparoscopy, K fertiliGes them in a (etri dish. When each egg has divided a few times, the
doctor can transfer the eggs to the uterus of the woman, with the hope of producing a test*tube baby. The success
rate is low B less than 24Y. $nother use of AP/ is to transfer the fertiliGed ova to the uterus of a woman other than the
donor B ovum donation. vum donation may also be done by fertiliGing the ovum in the donor for a short time, then
washing it out K transferring it to the uterus of the gestational mother.
These procedures raise &uestions about the meaning of the genetic tie. When the egg is donated by one woman K
incubated in another, the intention might be either .90 that the gestational mother would be the mother to the child, or
.20 that the egg donor, perhaps unable to bear the child herself, would be the mother to the child after the gestational
mother gives birth. The gestational mother is a surrogate.
9>68+ a gestational surrogate in %outh $frica gave birth to her own grandchildren. This illustrates the complications
which surrogacy can bring to traditional family structure. Why not welcome these new developmentsL They are used
to create families for couples who could not procreate. The Catholic Church, which objects to separating sex from
procreation, says it threatens the sanctity of the traditional family unit, for a third party to have any role in donating or
gestating the child. ,ut this objection does not explain why it is important that the childrearing function not be
separated from childbearing. K the practice of adoption, which the Catholic Church supports, similarly involves
separation of childbearing K childrearing. thers, conscious of the injustices K ine&uities in the traditional family
structure, laud the change in social structure that new reproductive approaches would entail.
We lack the technology to fully develop a baby outside the womb. ,asic issue+ whether there is a legal obligation to
transfer all fertiliGed ova to a receptive uterus. Case for transfer+ each fertiliGed ova represents life. Those who
oppose abortion would predictably also oppose death for these embryos.
AP/ raises abortion issues. An a case where a mother gave birth to &uintuplets out of AP/ .which is an unusually high
survival ratio0, some doctors advise the abortion of Ethe excessesF taking into consideration the health risks. n moral
grounds, they believe that these selective abortions are unassailable, because their purpose is to preserve life B to
enable the remaining fetuses to survive. At is possible to avoid the abortion debate K the ethical issues by having a
mandatory transfer policy. (roblems with this policy+ .90 when a mother becomes ill or dies, K .20 restricting research
K experimentation.
%hould we allow embryos to be the subjects of research K experimentationL This will contribute to medical advances
B brain tissue transplant from aborted fetuses has contributed dramatically to the treatment of (arkinson-s disease.
1thicists+ such uses of fetuses could create personal K commercial motives for women to conceive K abortC fetuses
would become Eorgan farms.F ther related issue+ how long researchers should be entitled to keep the embryos alive
.experts+ only 9? days after conception0. 5ationale for 9? days+ about that long for a fertiliGed egg to implant naturally
in the uterine wall.
Conse&uence of removing embryo from woman-s body+ possibility of genetic experimentation K manipulation. ption
not to transfer EdefectiveF eggs B small step from diagnosing hereditary disease before implantation or even allowing
parents to select gender of their offspring. Af society is to allow research, it must decide for what purpose it will allow
embryos to be created. To enhance opportunity of pregnancyL To superovulate .to produce K retrieve more eggs
than to be used0 to avoid subse&uent laparoscopyL To facilitate researchL To arrange for egg donation from women
not seeking pregnancyL This may create a profitable occupation for women willing to sell their eggs. $s regards the
preservation K storage of fertiliGed ova, time may come when there is a commercial market for froGen embryos
created from genes of celebrities B an example of a fundamental social change.
Tuestions raised as regards froGen embryos+ .90 As it permissible to transfer the embryo after the parents have diedL
.20 As the froGen embryo a person who can inherit when her genetic parents dieL .:0 %hould the gestational mother be
considered the sole legal parent in the event of transferL
(arents entirely capable of producing their own biological child by themselves could ac&uire the option of producing a
child who is genetically linked to both parents without the necessity of undergoing pregnancy or childbirth. 'emand
increases for surrogates. (ossible exploitation of poor K Third World women. With or without regulation, modern
reproductive technology may sharply transform our views about the family, even human life. (rofessor %chultG+ from
a time when parenting is determined by fate to a time when it will be determined by decision*making is a positive
development. %he suggests that mutually binding contracts are appropriate media for decision*making concerning
childbearing K childrearing.
D. L#gi!i.a!#+ C"i'+$#n

E!a!# )- D# L) San!) v. L&*ian)
Antestate estate of the deceased $ntonio 1scobar. T)1 ,$!# / T)1 ()A@A((A!1 A%@$!'%, administrator.
1%T$T1 / T)1 '1C1$%1' @DCA$!$ '1 @% %$!T%, represented by the executor J%1 %$!T%, claimant*
vs. "$5A$ @DCA$!, claimant*appellant.
Da!#: $ugust 99, 9>:?
P)n#n!#: Pillareal, J.
Na!&$#: $ppeal from an order of the Court of /irst
Anstance of "anila declaring @uciana de los %antos,
wife of deceased $ntonio 1scobar, as his sole heir,
succeeded by her heirs when she died.
n January 9, 96:8, a girl four days old,
alleged to be a natural daughter of @eon
1scobar and Josefa 1sguerra, was baptiGed
in the 1rmita church and given the name of
Tomasa 1scobar.
@eon 1scobar and Josefa 1sguerra were
married on $ugust 2, 96:6, and
subse&uently had legitimate children named
$ntonio and /ortunato.
Tomasa 1scobar grew up and lived under
the care of the spouses @eon and Josefa
1scobar until she married. %aid spouses
supported her, treated and presented her as
their daughter.
When Tomasa 1scobar became a widow,
she went back to live with said spouses,
together with her only daughter, "aria
@uciano who was born on 'ecember 98,
@eon 1scobar built a house for Tomasa
1scobar and her daughter and the two lived
there. )e visited them in said house
fre&uently and sent $ntonio and /ortunato
to keep them company at night.
Dpon TomasaJs death, @eon took said "aria
@uciano into his home until she married and
was taken by her husband to the province.
@eon died on /ebruary 92, 9668. When
/ortunato became ill, his brother $ntonio
asked "aria @uciano to come to "anila to
nurse him, sending her money for passage.
Dpon /ortunatoJs death, $ntonio took "aria
@uciano into his home where she lived
$ntonioJs death.
"aria @uciano claims to be the legitimate
niece of the deceased $ntonio 1scobar,
alleging that she is the legitimate daughter of
Tomasa 1scobar, a legitimated sister of said
deceased $ntonio 1scobar by the
subse&uent marriage of their parents, and
therefore the only heir to the estate of her
said uncle.
I&#: .90WI! Tomasa 1scobar was a natural
daughter of the spouses @eon 1scobar and Josefa
1sguerra, legitimated by subse&uent marriage of the
.20WI! "aria @uciano, as legitimate
daughter, born under the prior legislation, of Tomasa
1scobar .a child legitimated by subse&uent marriage0
is entitled to inherit from the intestate estate of her
uncle, who is a legitimate son of her motherJs parents,
and who died on July 29, 9>:2, under the new law
.Civil Code0
.90 Y#. Tomasa 1scobar was born on 'ecember 2>,
96:3, and her alleged parents @eon 1scobar and
Josefa 1sguerra were married on $ugust 2, 96:6,
that is under the prior legislation which is @aw A, Title
QAAA, (artida AP. )er status as a legitimated daughter
should therefore be determined by said law which
reads as follows+
(a% ) -itle 5))) Partida )?._M)$#)v#$1 !"#
*"i'+$#n :"i*" a .an "a ,5 a :).an
:"). "# =##( a a *)n*&,in# :i'' ,#
'#gi!i.a!#1 i- "# .a$$i# "#$ a-!#$:a$+;
-)$ a'!")&g" *"i'+$#n )- !"i =in+ a$# n)!
'#gi!i.a!# :"#n !"#5 a$# ,)$n1 .a$$iag#
"a &*" -)$*# !"a!1 a ))n a !"# -a!"#$
an+ .)!"#$ a$# .a$$i#+1 !"# *"i'+$#n
,#*).# -)$ !"a! $#a)n1 '#gi!i.a!#.NNN
At is a well*established doctrine that a child is
considered natural when at the time of its conception
or birth its parents could have married without
dispensation and when the father has expressly or
tacitly acknowledged it.
The fact that before and after their marriage
the spouses @eon 1scobar and Josefa 1sguerra had
Tomasa 1scobar with them and their legitimate
children and that they supported her, took care of her,
and treated and presented her to society as their
daughter, and the fact that they built a house for her
and her daughter, all show that said spouses @eon
1scobar and Josefa 1sguerra acknowledged her as
their daughter.
%uch acknowledgment, in addition to the
freedom of her parents to marry without dispensation
at the time of her conception or birth, gave Tomasa
1scobar the status of a natural child of @eon 1scobar
and Josefa 1sguerra, the subse&uent marriage of the
latter legitimated her.
.20Y#. CFI +#*ii)n $#v#$#+. C'!Da((#''an!
Ma$ia L&*ian) i +#*'a$#+ !) ,# !"# )'# "#i$ !)
!"# in!#!a!# #!a!# )- An!)ni) E*),a$.
$pplying the twelfth transitory provision of
the Civil Code, inasmuch as $ntonio 1scobar died
after the Civil Code took effect, his inheritance should
be allotted and divided in accordance with said Code.
The *F), in rejecting "ariaJs claim to her
uncleJs estate, based its opinion on a$!i*'# <04 )- !"#
Civi' C)+# which provides that 7a natural the
legitimate child had no right to succeed ab intestate
the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother who has acknowledged itC nor shall such
children or relatives so inherit from the natural or
legitimated child,7 interpreting the word 7legitimated7
to mean a child legitimated by royal concession as
well as one legitimated by subse&uent marriage.
)owever, such interpretation could not have been the
intention of the legislator because children legitimate
by subse&uent marriage have the same rights as
legitimate children, and those legitimated by royal
concession only have the same rights as
acknowledged natural children. The word
7legitimated7 as employed in article >?: of the Civil
Code, has the same meaning as 7natural7, and thus
refers only to a child legitimated by royal concession
and not to one legitimated by subse&uent marriage.
Thus, article >?: is not applicable in "ariaJs case but
$rticle >H:.
A(('5ing A$! <E4 )- !"# Civi' C)+#1 :"#n
An!)ni) E*),a$ +i#+ in!#!a!# )n J&'5 271 7<421
"i ni#*#1 !"# "#$#in *'!Da((#''an! Ma$ia
L&*ian)1 +a&g"!#$ )- "i i!#$ '#gi!i.a!#+ ,5
&,#%&#n! .a$$iag# )- !"#i$ (a$#n!1 :a #n!i!'#+
!) in"#$i! !"# -&'' ):n#$"i( )- !"# )!"#$ "a'-1 !"#
&&-$&*! )- :"i*" ,#')ng#+ !) !"# &$viving
()&#. H):#v#$1 !"# &&-$&*!&a$5 $ig"! )- !"#
:i+): L&*iana +#') San!) :a #9!ing&i"#+
&()n "#$ +#a!" :"i*" !))= ('a*# )n D#*#.,#$ 2P1
7<421 !"#$#,5 *)n)'i+a!ing !"# na=#+ ):n#$"i(
:i!" !"# &-$&*! )- !"# )!"#$ "a'- in !"# "#$#in
*'!Da((#''an! Ma$ia L&*ian).
*"s. "ilaor*
Ra.i$#G v. G.&$
An the matter of the estate of %amuel ,ischoff Werthmuller. $na ". 5$"A51U, executrix K appellant,
tto ;"D5, as guardian of minors 1sther 5enate, Carmen "aria K @eontina 1liGabeth
all surnamed "ory, claimant K appellant
Da!#: $ug. H, 9>96
Na!&$#: $ppeal from C/A Aloilo judgment
%amuel ,ischoff Werthmuller, a %witGerland
native, resided in the (hilippine Aslands. )e
married 'oMa $na ". 5amireG. They had no
%amuel died in Aloilo on June 2>, 9>9:. )e left a
valuable estate wIc he disposed by will.
Will was probated $ug. 9>9:. )is widow, $na,
was appointed executrix K letters testamentary
were issued to her.
$ll properties were given to the widow except
%wiss properties wIc were given to his brothers
and sister. %amuel, in making the will, ignored
the possible claims of 2 sets of children born to
his natural daughter, @eona Castro.
,iographical facts regarding @eona
9. born in ,acolod on $pril 99, 968H to /elisa
Castro .mother0 K unknown father. Dpon the
margin of her original baptismal entry had an
annotation wIc provides that %amuel
recogniGed @eona in a public document K
such was authenticated by signature of /r.
/errero. /r. /errero attested to this fact.
2. @eona was taken into %amuel-s family K she
was brought up as a member of the family.
%amuel tacitly recogniGed K treated @eona
as his daughter.
:. 96>H+ @eona married /rederick von
#auffman, ,ritish born in )# who lived in
Aloilo. They had : children.
?. $pril 96>>+ /rederick brought @eona to
%witGerland to recuperate where she was
placed in a sanatorium .hospital. Allness not
specified.0 /rederick went back to the (hil
while @eona was left in %witGerland.
H. @eona informed ) that she wanted to remain
free K did not want to resume common life
wIhim. %o in 9>4?, /rederick went to (aris to
obtain divorce under /rench laws. 'ivorce
was decreed on Jan. H, 9>4H in favor of ) K
W was in default. @eona was then staying in
(aris but no evidence that she was
permanently domiciled there.
3. @eona became attracted to 'r. 1rnest 1mil
"ory, physician in %wiss sanatorium. )e
was previously married to but now divorced
from )elena Wolpman. 1rnest K @eona had
a daughter named @eontina 1liGabeth born
on July 29, 9>44. They got married in
@ondon on "ay H, 9>4H. Two more
daughters were born after the marriage
.Carmen "aria K 1sther0.
8. @eona died ct. 3, 9>94.
$round /eb. 24, 9>9?+ tto ;mur appeared as
guardian of : "ory claimants.
$na insists that W5T "ory claimants, %amuel did
not recogniGe @eona. %he further claims that
@eontina, the eldest of the "ory children should
be considered as the legitimate child of the 9
marriage since she was born while the marriage
was still subsisting. %C finds last argument
untenable. Current contention is that she was
legitimated by 1rnest K @eona-s subse&uent
marriage. With regards to the 2 younger "ory
children, it-s argued that they-re legitimate being
born after the marriage of their parents wIc is
claimed to be valid.
'ec. 2>, 9>9H+ C/A concluded that @eona was
%amuel-s recogniGed natural daughter K if she
were alive, she-d be his forced heir entitled to 9I:
of his estate. @eontina 1liGabeth was declared a
legit daughter whereas Carmen K 1sther are
illegitimate. @eontina entitled to 9I: of the estate
and remaining 2I: to $na. ,oth ;mur K $na
/rederick appeared as guardian of his own
children in the proceedings. (etition was granted
on "arch 2?, 9>93. )e then filed a petition on
$pril 9, 9>93 setting forth rts of his children to
share in the estate. n $pril 23, 9>93, ;mur
complained that matter has been decided already
on 'ec. 2>, 9>9H, $na denied /rederick-s
allegations. /rederick insists that the decree of
divorce was invalid K that all : "ory children are
offspring of adulterous relations K that his
children, being the legitimate offspring, are alone
entitled to participate in the proceedings.
C/A decided on !ov. 9?, 9>93 that @eona was the
acknowledged natural daughter of %amuel K that
the : kids from her 9
marriage were legitimate
and were entitled to share in %amuel-s estate.
'ecision excluded "ory claimants. ;mur
,oth appeals were consolidated.
7. CON L#)na i a $#*)gniG#+ na!&$a' +a&g"!#$ )-
Sa.&#'. .
2. CON !"# M)$5 *"i'+$#n a$# #n!i!'#+ !) in"#$i!.
:. W! the probate of a will affects the rights of
forced heirs who don-t appear to contest the
?. W! an order for the distribution of an estate
is conclusive K final as against persons who are
not before the court.
H#'+: C/A decision admitting @eontina to participate in
the estate is reversed. /rederick-s children admitted
to share e&ually in 9I: of estate. An other respects,
!ov. 9?, 9>93 decision affirmed. ?7. YES. 2. NO. 4.
NO. 0. NO.@
?)n i&# 7@YES. "# i a $#*)gniG#+ +a&g"!#$ )-
(rior to her first marriage, she was in an
uninterrupted enjoyment of de facto status of
natural child K treated as such by %amuel.
'ocument presented by /r. /errero admissible
since he-s the custodian of church records.
riginal document not needed since they have
shown that diligent search was made to find it, to
no avail. Thus, secondary evidence presented by
the priest is sufficient.
$pplicable provision+ @aw 99 of Toro wIc became
@aw 9, title H, book 94 of the !ovisima
5ecopilacion wIc provides that recognition could
be established by proof of acts on part of the
parent une&uivocally recogniGing the status of his
child. This is different from CC $rt. 9:9 provision
wIc provides that acknowledgment must be made
in the record of birth, by will or in other public
instrument. 5egardless of what provision is
applied, it-s sufficiently shown that @eona was
n $na-s contention that only children born of
persons free to marry may possess status of
recogniGed natural child+ There being no
evidence to show /elisa Castro-s status at the
time @eona was born, she will be presumed
single or widow. Court can-t entertain contrary
presumption that /elisa-s guilty of adultery.
$s a recogniGed natural daughter, had she
survived her dad, she would have been his
forced heir .CC $rt. 648 .:0 K >:>0 K entitled to
9I: of the inheritance .CC $rt. 6?20.
?)n i&# 2@NO. T"# M)$5 *"i'+$#n a$# n)! #n!i!'#+
!) in"#$i!.
/rederick-s children are legitimate K entitled to
inherit, thus no need to discuss.
With respect to @eontina .eldest0 of "ory
children+ first marriage was still subsisting when
she was born thus she-s an offspring of an
adulterous intercourse wIc is not capable of
legitimation .CC $rt. 99>0.
'ivorce is invalid K can-t be recogniGed in courts
of the 5epublic of the (hilippines. /rench tribunal
has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for
dissolution of marriage contracted in the (hil by
persons domiciled here esp since such marriage
is indissoluble under (hil laws. $lthough the
spouses .first marriage0 have traveled to different
places, all those stays were limited K thus we
can-t say that they have established their
domicile elsewhere. At has been established that
court of a country in wIc neither spouse is
domiciled K wIc oneIboth spouses may resort
merely for the purpose of obtaining divorce has
no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial
status K a divorce granted by such court is not
entitled to recognition anywhere. ;oing to one
place for the sole purpose of obtaining divorce
wIo intention to remain in that place is not
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on courts of that
state esp if cause of divorce is not recogniGed by
the laws of the state of that person-s own
domicile. 'uring the time they obtained divorce
decree, the (hil law provided that a valid
marriage can only be dissolved by death of one
of the parties. The law invoked in obtaining the
divorce allowed divorce where wife has been
guilty of adulteryIhusband guilty of concubinage.
1vidently, this should not be upheld since it is
repugnant to the moral sensibilities of our people
K it-s contrary to law.
The divorce being invalid, the claims of the "ory
children should then be rejected. The right to
inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated K
acknowledged natural children, excluding kids of
adulterous relations. E'escendantsF under CC
$rt. >?9 can-t include illegitimates born of
adulterous relations.
?)n i&# 4@ NO. T"# ($),a!# )- a :i'' +)# n)!
a--#*! !"# $ig"! )- -)$*#+ "#i$ :") +)n8! a((#a$
!) *)n!#! !"# ($),a!#.
5ights of forced heirs to their legitime are not
divested by decree admitting a will to probate,
regardless of fact that no provision has been
made for them in the will. 'ecree of probate is
conclusive only as regards due execution of will.
Code of Civil (rocedure %ec. 8H:+ forced heirs
can-t be prejudiced by failure of testator to
provide for them in his will. $nd even if testator
intended to leave everything to his wife, will is
intrinsically invalid if it would cut off the rights of
his forced heirs.
?)n i&# 0@ NO. An )$+#$ -)$ !"# +i!$i,&!i)n )- an
#!a!# i n)! *)n*'&iv# S -ina' a again! (#$)n
:") a$# n)! ,#-)$# !"# *)&$!
(roceedings involving ;mur K $na did not
involve /rederick-s children. Court was unaware
of their existence. They were not notified nor
were they represented in the proceedings. ,ut
not that their right to participate was vested
immediately upon %amuel-s death to the extent to
wIc their mom would have been entitled to
participate had she survived %amuel. The
decision under these proceedings was not
published nor were persons entitled to participate
personally informed.
Code of Civil (rocedure %ec. 8H:+ after payment
of debts K expenses of administration, court shall
distribute residue of estate among persons
entitled to receive it whether by terms of will or by
operation of law.
@aw does not provide for notice by publication or
otherwise of application for order of distribution to
person-s estate. $ purely ex parte proceeding wIo
notice by personal serviceIpublication by wIc
court undertakes to distribute property of
deceased persons can be conclusive upon minor
heirs who are not represented.
Code of Civ (rocedure %ec. ?9+ 94 yrs actual
adverse possession by Eoccupancy, grant,
descent or otherwiseF shall vest title in the
possessor. This indicates that decree of
distribution under wIc one may be placed in
possession by descent is not conclusive. $ction
of revindication may be brought by heir against
persons put in possession by decree at any time
wIin period allowed by gen statute of limitations
.@ayre vs. (asco0.
$pplication of /rederick-s children was presented
in proper time K judgment in their favor is correct.
"ory claimants are barred from participating.
*"s. "ilaor*
In R# J&'ian Cang
An 5e+ (etition for Change of !ame andIor CorrectionICancellation of 1ntry in Civil 5egistry of Julian @in Carulasan
Wang also known as Julian @in Wang, to be amendedIcorrected as Julian @in Wang, Julian Wang, duly represented
by his mother $nna @isa Wang, petitioner vs& Cebu City Civil 5egistry, duly represented by the 5egistrar scar ,.
"olo, respondent.
Na!&$#: (etition for review on certiorari of a decision
of the 5TC of Cebu City ,r. H8
Da!#: "arch :4, 244H
P)n#n!#: Tinga, J.
4) %ill not blot out his name from the boo3 of life6 ,
8evelations 3.;
Julian @in Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu
City on /ebruary 24, 9>>6 to $nna @isa Wang
and %ing*/oe Wang who were then not yet
married to each other. They got married on
%eptember 22, 9>>6 and after which they
executed a deed of legitimation of their son. The
child-s name was changed from Julian @in
Carulasan to Julian @in Carulasan Wang.
(arents of Julian plan to stay in %ingapore for a
long time because they will let him study there
together with his sister named Wang "ei
Jasmine who was also born there. An %ingapore,
middle names or maiden surname of the mother
are not carried in a person-s name. They
anticipated that Julian will be discriminated
against because of his current registered name.
Julian and his sister might also ask whether they
are brother and sister since they have different
surnames. $lso, "andarin doesn-t have the letter
E5F, but if there is, they pronounce it as E@F.
These were the reasons given for the name
n %eptember 22, 2442, Julian, represented by
his mother, filed a petition for change of name in
the Civil 5egistry of Cebu.
n $pril :4 244:, 5TC rendered a decision
denying the petition. The trial court found that the
reasons given for the change of name did not fall
within the grounds recogniGed by law. The
change sought is merely for the convenience of
the child.
Dnder $rticle 98? of the /C, legitimate children
have the right to bear the surnames of the father
and mother, and there is no reason why this right
should be taken from Julian, considering that he
is still a minor. Trial court added that when Julian
reaches the age of majority, he could then decide
whether he will change his name by dropping the
middle name.
"ay 24,244?* trial court denied the petitioner-s
motion for reconsideration. Trial court maintained
that %ingaporean practice does not justify the
dropping of the middle name of a /ilipino child.
(etitioner then filed this (etition for 5eview on
Certiorari, &uestioning whether the dropping of
the middle name is contrary to $rticle 98?.
(etitioners also argued that the %C should take
into consideration the best interests of the child
and that the middle name would undermine the
child-s social acceptance and integration into the
%ingaporean society.
%C re&uired the %olicitor ;eneral to comment on
the petition of which the %ol;en agreed that the
trial court correctly denied the petition for name
change. At has not been shown that the use of
middle names is actually proscribed by
%ingaporean law.
I&#: Whether or not the petition for change of name
as regards to the reasons adduced should be
H#'+: !o. (etition for 5eview on Certiorari is denied.
The change of name is a privilege and not a
right, so that before a person can be authoriGed to
change his name, he must show proper or reasonable
cause, or any compelling reason to justify the change.
$mong the grounds for name change which have
been held valid are+ 90 when name is ridiculous,
dishonourable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounceC 20 when the change results as a legal
conse&uenceC :0 when change will avoid confusionC ?0
when one has continuously used and been known by
a /ilipino name, and is unaware of an alien
parentageC H0 sincere desire to adopt /ilipino name to
erase signs of former alienageC 30 when the surname
causes embarrassment and no fraudulent causes
were established. An denying or granting petitions for
such, the &uestion of proper and reasonable cause is
left to the sound discretion of the court.
This case is novel in the sense that only the
middle name is re&uested to be removed. "iddle
names serve to identify the lineage or filiation of a
person as well as further distinguish him from others
bearing the same name.
(etitioner cites three cases to support his
cause. These are =shita v 8epublic Alfon v 8epublic
and *alderon v 8epublic& These cases do not apply
because they are not analogous to the present case.
An =shita the court recogniGed the tangible animosity
most /ilipinos had during the time against the
Japanese so they allowed the name change. An Alfon
the court granted the petition since the petitioner had
been known since childhood with that name and to
avoid confusion. An *alderon the court granted the
petition filed by a mother on behalf of her illegitimate
child on the ground of the best interests of the child to
avoid the stigma of illegitimacy. An the case at bar, the
only reason advanced by petitioner for the name
change is convenience which is clearly insufficient.
$lso, petitioner is still a minor and it is best that the
matter of name change is best left to his judgment
when he reaches the age of majority.
*"r. "islang*
NIII. A+)(!i)n
A. C") .a5 a+)(!;,# a+)(!#+
In R#: A+)(!i)n )- E+:in /i''a
An the "atter of the $doption of the "inor, 1dwin Pilla y "endoGa. @uis 1. %antos, Jr. $nd 1dipola P. %antos,
petitioners*appellants, vs& The 5epublic of the (hilippines, oppositor*appellee.
Na!&$#: $n appeal from a decision of the Juvenile
and 'omestic 5elations Court, dismissing the petition
instituted by spouses @uis %antos and 1dipola %antos
for the adoption of 1dwin Pilla.
Da!#: %eptember 2>, 9>38
P)n#n!#: $ngeles, J.
January 6, 9>3:* $bove*named spouses filed
petition before the court a &uo praying that the
minor 1dwin Pilla y "endoGa, ? years old, be
declared their son by adoption.
(etitioners are both :2 years old, residing in
"anila. They do not have children, and neither of
them has been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude.
C$i!i*a' Fa*!: 1dwin Pilla is a child of /rancisco
Pilla and /lorencia "endoGa who are also the
common parents of the petitioner wife, therefore,
1dipola and 1dwin are siblings.
,oth spouses are financially stable, @uis being a
lawyer and successful businessman while
1dipola is a nurse by profession.
%pouses instituted action because after 1dwin
was born, they were the ones who took care of
him and there developed a deep and profound
love for each other. The natural parents also
gave their consent and conformity to the adoption
and that they fully understood the legal
conse&uences of the adoption of their child.
The trial court dismissed the petition reasoning
that the adoption will result in an incongruous
situation where the minor 1dwin, brother of
petitioner*wife, will also be her son.
Thus this petition. %olicitor ;eneral argued for
the %tate.
I&#: Whether or not an elder sister may adopt a
younger brother.
H#'+: Res. 'ecision appealed from is set aside.
$doption granted.
An the absence of provisions that relatives by
blood or by affinity are prohibited from adopting one
another, the adoption should be allowed. The theory
advanced by the trial court is that adoption among
people who are related by nature should not be
allowed because dual relationship will result. $rticle
::H of the CC enumerates persons who may not
adopt, and petitioner*appellants herein are not among
those prohibited from adopting. $rticle ::> names
those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child is
not one of those. The interest and welfare of the child
to be adopted is the paramount consideration.
$doption statutes are designed to provide homes,
care and education for unfortunate children, and
should also be construed to encourage adoption of
such children by persons who can properly rear and
educate them.
With respect to the fact that this adoption
would result in a dual relationship between parties,
that fact should not prevent the adoption. %imilar dual
relationships also result under our law on marriage
when persons who are already related by blood or
affinity, marry each other. ,ut as long as such
marriages are not within the relationships prohibited
by law, they are allowed.
*"r. "islang*
R#(&,'i* v. CA S B),i'#
5epublic of the (hilippines, petitioner vs. Court of $ppeals, ,obiles, respondents
Na!&$#: (etition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of $ppeals.
Da!#: January 2?, 9>>2
P)n#n!#: 5egalado, J.
"rs. Uenaida ,obiles filed a petition to adopt Jason
Condat on /eb. 2, 9>66. The 5TC finding the petition
sufficient in form and substance granted the adoption.
The law at time of filing was (residential 'ecree 34:
B the Child and Routh Welfare Code, which states
that a petition for adoption may be filed by either
spouse or by both of them. While the case was
pending in the Court of $ppeals, the /amily Code
took effect on $ugust :, 9>66, which states that a joint
adoption by husband and wife is mandatory .$rt.
(etitioner now contends that the petition for adoption
should be dismissed outright as it was filed solely by
"rs. ,oiles without joining her husband, in violation of
$rt. 96H of the /amily Code. At also argues that the
/amily Code should be applied retroactively to the
petition for adoption as the latter did not ac&uire a
vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing
of her petition for adoption.
7. C;N !"# Fa.i'5 C)+# ")&'+ ,# a(('i#+
2. WI! the petition is in violation of $rt. 96H
7. !. $rt. 2?3 of the /amily Code provides for
retroactive effect of appropriate relevant
provisions thereof, subject to the &ualification
that such retrospective application will not
prejudice or impair vested or ac&uired rights
in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws. /amily Code cannot be made to apply
retroactively especially when it impairs
vested rights. "rs. ,oiles upon filing, her
right to file such petition alone was already
vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired
by the enactment of a new law. $ petition
cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to
comply with a law which was not yet in force
and effect at the time.
2. !. $lthough the husband 'ioscoro was not
named as one of the petitioners in the
petition for adoption filed by his wife, his
affidavit of consent attached to the petition
shows that he himself actually joined his wife
in adopting the child. This and his
subse&uent confirmatory testimony in open
court are sufficient to make him a co*
*"s. "o*
R#(&,'i* v. T)'#+an)
5epublic of the (hilippines, petitioner vs. Toledano, et al, respondents
Na!&$#: (etition for review on certiorari of a decision
of the 5TC of Aba, Uambales
Da!#: June 6, 9>>?
P)n#n!#: (uno, J.
)usband $lvin Clouse is a natural born $merican
citiGen who married a 1velyn, a /ilipino who became
a naturaliGed $merican CitiGen in ;uam. The spouses
sought to adopt the minor, %olomon Joseph $lcala,
the younger brother of one of the wife 1velyn $.
Clouse. !ery $lcala, the mother of %olomon and
1velyn also consented to the adoption due to poverty
and inability to support and educate her son. The
social worker assigned to this case also favorably
recommended the granting of the petition for
When the 5TC granted the petition for adoption, the
petitioner through the ffice of the %olicitor ;eneral
appealed that under $rticles 96? and 96H of the
/amily Code, the spouses are clearly barred from
adopting %olomon $lcala.
(aragraph : of $rticle 96? expressly enumerates the
persons not &ualified to adopt+
:. $n alien, except+
a. $ former /ilipino citiGen who seeks to adopt a
relative by consanguinityC
b. ne who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his
or her /ilipino spouseC
c. ne who is married to a /ilipino citiGen and seeks
to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.
$liens not included in the foregoing exceptions may
adopt /ilipino children in accordance with the rules on
inter*country adoption as may be provided by law.
$rticle 96H. )usband and wife must jointly adopt,
except in the ff. cases+
9. When one spouse seeks to adopt his own
illegitimate childC
2. When one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of the other.
WI! the Clouses are &ualified to adopt %olomon
The husband is not &ualified to adopt as in relation to
$rt. 96?, he is not a former /ilipino citiGen, %olomon
$lcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the
legitimate child of his spouse, and when the spouses
jointly filed their petition to adopt, the wife was also no
longer a /ilipino citiGen.
The wife 1velyn is &ualified to adopt, as she was a
former /ilipino citiGen who seeks to adopt her younger
brother. )owever, the petition for adoption cannot be
granted in her favor alone without violating $rt. 96H
that re&uires a joint adoption by husband and wife, a
condition that must be read along together with $rt.

*"s. "o*
R#(&,'i* v. Mi''#$
51(D,@AC / T)1 ()A@A((A!1%, petitioner, vs. C@$D'1 $. "A@@15 and JD"5D% %. "A@@15, respondents
Na!&$#: (1TATA! for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of $ppeals.
P)n#n!#: (ardo, /&
The spouses "iller are both $merican citiGens
residing in the (hilippines who cannot have a child of
their own because of the wife-s medical problems. n
J&'5 2<1 7<FF, they filed with the 5TC of $ngeles City
a v#$i-i#+ (#!i!i)n !) a+)(! the minor "ichael
"agno "adayag, the legitimate son of the spouses
"adayag, who has been in the custody of the "illers
since the first week of $ugust 9>68 or barely a month
after he was born. "ichael-s parents, who had no
visible means of livelihood, consented to the adoption
because of poverty and deep concern for the child-s
future. They executed affidavits giving their
irrevocable consent to the adoption by the "illers.
The '%W' recommended approval of the petition on
the basis of its evaluation that the "illers were
morally, emotionally and financially fit to be adoptive
parents and that the adoption would be to "ichael-s
best interest and welfare. n Ma5 721 7<F<, the !$ia'
*)&$! $#n+#$#+ a +#*ii)n g$an!ing !"# (#!i!i)n -)$
a+)(!i)n which the %olicitor ;eneral, in behalf of the
5epublic, appealed to the Court of $ppeals on the
ground that under the /amily Code .effective $ugust
:, 9>660, aliens were prohibited from adopting a
/ilipino child.
WI! the court may allow aliens to adopt a /ilipino
child despite the prohibition under the /amily Code
Res. $doption statues hold the interests and welfare
of the child to be of paramount consideration. They
are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children
and give them the protection of society and family in
the person of the adopter, as well as for childless
couples or persons to experience the joy of
parenthood. Ev#$5 $#a)na,'# in!#n+.#n! ")&'+
,# &!ain#+ !) ($).)!# an+ -&'-i'' !"## n),'#
an+ *).(ai)na!# ),K#*!iv# )- !"# 'a:.
The petition for adoption was filed on July 2>, 9>66
under the provisions of the Child and Routh Welfare
Code .effective 'ecember 94, 9>8?0 which allowed
aliens to adopt. An a'i#n %&a'i-i#+ !) a+)(! &n+#$
!"# C"i'+ an+ Y)&!" C#'-a$# C)+# a*%&i$#+ a
v#!#+ $ig"! ?$ Evested rightF is one whose
#9i!#n*#1 #--#*!ivi!51 an+ #9!#n! +)# n)! +#(#n+
)n #v#n! -)$#ign !) !"# :i'' )- !"# ")'+#$. At
expresses the concept of ($##n! -i9#+ in!#$#!
which should be ($)!#*!#+ again! a$,i!$a$5 S!a!#
a*!i)n, or an innately just and imperative right which
enlightened free society cannot deny. T"# !#$.
in*'&+# not only legal or e&uitable title to the
enforcement of a demand, but a') an #9#.(!i)n
-$). n#: ),'iga!i)n *$#a!#+ a-!#$ !"# $ig"! "a
,##n v#!#+.@ :"i*" *)&'+ n)! ,# a--#*!#+ ,5 !"#
&,#%&#n! #na*!.#n! )- a n#: 'a: +i%&a'i-5ing
"i.. The enactment of the /amily Code will not
impair the right of the "illers, who are aliens, to adopt
a /ilipino child because the right has become vested
a! !"# !i.# )- -i'ing )- !"# (#!i!i)n -)$ a+)(!i)n and
is !) ,# g)v#$n#+ ,5 !"# 'a: !"#n in -)$*#.
The K&$i+i*!i)n )- !"# *)&$! is +#!#$.in#+ ,5 !"#
!a!&!# in -)$*# a! !"# !i.# )- !"# commencement
)- !"# a*!i)n. nce jurisdiction attaches, it cannot be
ousted by a subse&uent happening or event, even if it
is of a character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.
An a'i#n :") -i'#+ a (#!i!i)n -)$ a+)(!i)n ,#-)$#
!"# #--#*!ivi!5 )- !"# Fa.i'5 C)+#1 a'!")&g" +#ni#+
!"# $ig"! !) a+)(! &n+#$ A$!. 7F0 )- !"# ai+ C)+#1
.a5 *)n!in&# :i!" "i (#!i!i)n &n+#$ !"# 'a:
($#vai'ing ,#-)$# !"# Fa.i'5 C)+#.
*"s. "opia*
In R#: P#!i!i)n -)$ A+)(!i)n )- Mi*"#''# P. Li.
P#!i!i)n#$: "onina (. @im
Na!&$#: (etition for review on certiorari filed by
"onina (. @im .petitioner0
P)n#n!#: Carpio, J.
Short version. (#!i!i)n#$ an+ P$i.) Li.
:#$# .a$$i#+. T"#5 :#$# a *"i'+'# *)&('#. T:)
*"i'+$#n :#$# #n!$&!#+ !) !"#. ,5 a *#$!ain L&*ia
A5&,an. Sin*# ()&# a$# #ag#$ !) "av# a *"i'+1
!"#5 $#gi!#$#+ an+ na.#+ !"# *"i'+$#n a
Mi*"#''# P. Li. an+ Mi*"a#' J&+# P. 'i.. S()&#
$#a$#+ an+ *a$#+ -)$ !"# *"i'+$#n a i- !"#i$ ):n.
H&,an+ +i#+1 an+ (#!i!i)n#$ .a$$i#+ Ang#' Li.1
an A.#$i*an *i!iG#n. P#!i!i)n#$ -i'#+ #(a$a!#
(#!i!i)n -)$ !"# a+)(!i)n )- !"# !:) *"i'+$#n. A!
!"# !i.# )- !"# -i'ing )- !"# (#!i!i)n -)$ a+)(!i)n1
Mi*"#''# :a 2E 5#a$ )'+ an+ a'$#a+5 .a$$i#+1
:"i'# Mi*"a#' :a 7F 5#a$ an+ #v#n .)n!"
)'+. B)!" a+)(!## gav# !"#i$ *)n#n!. T$ia' C)&$!
+#ni#+ !"# (#!i!i)n.
(ong version. petitioner is an optometrist by
profession. n 2: June 9>8?, "onina .petitioner0
married (rimo @im .@im0. They were childless. "inor
children, whose parents were unknown, were
entrusted to them by a certain @ucia $yuban
.$yuban0. ,eing so eager to have a child of their own,
petitioner and @im registered the children to make it
appear that they were the children-s parents. The
children were named "ichelle (. @im ."ichelle0 and
"ichael Jude (. @im ."ichael0. "ichelle was barely
eleven days old when brought to the clinic of
petitioner. %he was born on 9H "arch 9>88. "ichael
was 99 days old when $yuban brought him to
petitioner-s clinic. )is date of birth is 9 $ugust 9>6:.
The spouses reared and cared for the
children as if they were their own. They sent the
children to exclusive schools. They used the surname
E@imF in all their school records and documents.
Dnfortunately, on 26 !ovember 9>>6, @im died. n
28 'ecember 2444, petitioner married $ngel lario
.lario0, an $merican citiGen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the
children by availing of the amnesty given under
5epublic $ct !o. 6HH2N3O .5$ 6HH20 to those
individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on
2? $pril 2442, petitioner filed separate petitions for the
adoption of "ichelle and "ichael before the trial court
docketed as %(@ (5C. Case !os. 92H6 and 92H>,
respectively. $t the time of the filing of the petitions for
adoption, "ichelle was 2H years old and already
married, while "ichael was 96 years and seven
months old.
"ichelle and her husband gave their consent
to the adoption as evidenced by their $ffidavits of
Consent.N8O "ichael also gave his consent to his
adoption as shown in his $ffidavit of Consent.
(etitioner-s husband lario likewise executed an
$ffidavit of Consent for the adoption of "ichelle and
An the Certification issued by the 'epartment
of %ocial Welfare and 'evelopment .'%W'0, "ichelle
was considered as an abandoned child and the
whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown.
The '%W' issued a similar Certification for "ichael.
W! petitioner, who has remarried, can
singly adopt.
At is undisputed that, at the time the petitions
for adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. %he filed the petitions by herself, without
being joined by her husband. 'ura lex sed lex. The
law is explicit. %ection 8, $rticle AAA of 5$ 6HH2 reads+
Exxx %1C. 8. Who "ay $dopt. * The following may
H&,an+ an+ :i-# "a'' K)in!'5 a+)(!1
#9*#(! in !"# -)''):ing *a#:
.i0 if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
sonIdaughter of the otherC or
.ii0 if one spouse seeks to adopt hisIher own
illegitimate sonIdaughter+ (rovided, however, That the
other spouse has signified hisIher consent theretoC or
.iii0 if the spouses are legally separated from
each other.F
An case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one
spouse adopts the illegitimate sonIdaughter of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the
The use of the word EshallF in the above*
&uoted provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal situation. $s
the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to re&uire the spouses
to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses.
(etitioner, having remarried at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt
with her husband. !either does petitioner fall under
any of the three exceptions enumerated in %ection 8.
The fact that lario gave his consent to the
adoption as shown in his $ffidavit of Consent does
not suffice. There are certain re&uirements that lario
must comply being an $merican citiGen. )e must
meet the &ualifications set forth in %ection 8 of 5$
6HH2 such as+ .90 he must prove that his country has
diplomatic relations with the 5epublic of the
(hilippinesC .20 he must have been living in the
(hilippines for at least three continuous years prior to
the filing of the application for adoptionC .:0 he must
maintain such residency until the adoption decree is
enteredC .?0 he has legal capacity to adopt in his own
countryC and .H0 the adoptee is allowed to enter the
adopter-s country as the latter-s adopted child. !one
of these &ualifications were shown and proved during
the trial.
!ote+ 1//1CT% / $'(TA!
$doption has the following effects+
.90 sever all legal ties between the biological
parent.s0 and the adoptee, except when the biological
parent is the spouse of the adopterC
.20 deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of
the adopterC and
.:0 give adopter and adoptee reciprocal
rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including but
not limited to+
.i0 the right of the adopter to choose
the name the child is to be knownC and
.ii0 the right of the adopter and
adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of
each other.
Therefore, even if emancipation
terminates parental authority, the adoptee is
still considered a legitimate child of the
adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child
such as+
.90 to bear the surname of the father
and the motherC
.20 to receive support from their
parentsC and
.:0 to be entitled to the legitime and
other successional rights.
Conversely, the adoptive parents
shall, with respect to the adopted
child, enjoy all the benefits to which
biological parents are entitled such
as support and successional rights.
*"r. $rnesto*
B. Na!&$# )- A+)(!i)n P$)*##+ing
LaGa!in v. Ca.() ?7<P<@
51!$T @$U$TA! alias 51!$T %T$. C@$5$, petitioner, vs. )!5$,@1 JD';1 J%1 C. C$"(%, J5.,
!5$ @. '1 @1!, ,15!$5' '1 @1!, $5@1!1 '1 @1! and A5"$ @. P1@%, respondents
Na!&$#: (1TATA! for certiorari from an order of the
Court of /irst Anstance of 5iGal .(asay branch0.
P)n#n!#: Teehankee, /&
Fa*!: 'r. "ariano @aGatin died intestate. )e was
survived by his wife, "argarita de $sis, and his
adopted twin daughters, respondents !ora @. de @eon
and Arma @aGatin. Three months after his death,
"argarita also died, leaving a holographic will
providing, among others, for a legacy of cash, jewelry,
and stocks to respondent $rlene de @eon, a
granddaughter and a legacy of education to 5amon
%ta. Clara, son of petitioner 5enato @aGatin alias
5enato %ta. Clara.
'uring her lifetime, "argarita kept a safety deposit
box at a bank which either she or respondent !ora
could open. /ive days after "argarita-s death,
respondent !ora opened the safety deposit box and
removed its contents to get her stock certificates and
other small items deposited therein. 1ventually,
private respondents filed a petition to probate the will
of "argarita. 'ays after having learned that
respondent !ora had opened this box, petitioner-s
son, 5amon, filed a motion in the probate court,
claiming that the deceased had executed a will
subse&uent to that submitted for probate.
5espondent !ora admitted that she opened the box
but there was no will or any document resembling a
will inside.
%even months after the death of "argarita, petitioner
intervened for the first time in the proceedings to
settle the estate of the late Ma$ian), as an a+.i!!#+
i''#gi!i.a!# ?n)! na!&$a'@ *"i'+. )e also filed a
motion to intervene in the estate of Ma$ga$i!a as an
a+)(!#+ *"i'+ on the basis of an affidavit executed
by "ariano-s brother that petitioner was an
Eillegitimate sonF and was later adopted by "ariano.
The affidavit was later modified to state that petitioner
was adopted by both "ariano and "argarita.
(etitioner attempted to prove that he had recogniGed
the deceased spouses as his parents, that he had
been supported by them until their death, and that he
was formerly known as E5enato @aGatinF but was
compelled to change his surname to E%ta. ClaraF
when the deceased spouses refused to give consent
to his marriage to his present wife. )e also presented
photographs where respondent Arma addressed
herself as his sister and of deceased "argarita and
petitioner when he was a boy.
I&#: WI! petitioner is an adopted child of the
spouses "ariano and "argarita
H#'+;Ra!i): )e is not. $doption is a juridical act
which creates between two persons a relationship
similar to that which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation. nly an adoption made through the
court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down
under 5ule >> of the 5C is valid in the (hilippines.
,ecause a+)(!i)n is not of natural law but is #n!i$#'5
a$!i-i*ia', the !a!&!)$5 $#%&i$#.#n! .&! !$i*!'5
,# *a$$i#+ )&!C otherwise, the adoption is an absolute
nullity. T"# -a*! )- a+)(!i)n i NE/ER ($#&.#+1
,&! .&! ,# a--i$.a!iv#'5 ($)v#+ ,5 !"# (#$)n
*' i #9i!#n*#. The evidence petitioner
presented does not show or tend to show that a
specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered an
order approving his adoption as a child of the spouses
"ariano and "argarita in an adoption proceeding
initiated by the latter, specifically+
)e did not manifest, much less show by
what particular court was the adoption
decreed or by whom was the petition heard.
There are no witnesses cited to that adoption
proceeding or to the adoption decree.
The C/A of "anila reported that after diligent
search there was no record found regarding
the adoption of 5enato allegedly filed
sometime between 9>26 and 9>:9 by the
deceased spouses.
The certification of the @C5 of "anila that
their pre*war records relative to decisions of
the C/A were either destroyed or burned
during the @iberation of the City of "anila
does not furnish any legal basis for a
presumption of adoption in favor of petitioner
since there was no proof that petitioner was
really adopted in "anila or that an adoption
petition was indeed filed in the C/A of "anila
by the deceased spouses where a judgment
of approval was rendered by said court.
)e did not secure a copy of the newspaper
publication of the adoption as re&uired under
%ec. ?, 5ule >> of the 5C or a certification
of the publishing house to that effect.
The identity of the one who gave written
consent to the adoption, whether the parents
or the orphanage, as re&uired by %ec. :,
5ule >> of the 5C is absent.
(arol evidence that a child has lived with a person not
his parent and has been treated as a child to establish
such adoption cannot substitute in the absence of
proof of such order of adoption by the court.
(etitioner-s attempts to prove his adoption by acts
and declarations of the deceased do not discharge
!"# .an+a!)$5 ($##n!a!i)n )- !"# K&+i*ia' +#*$##
)- a+)(!i)n. 5ather, the thrust of petitioner-s
evidence is to establish his status as an admitted
illegitimate child which was the very basis of his
petition for intervention in the estate proceedings of
the late "ariano, not an adopted child. $lthough
declarations in regard to pedigree are admitted since
they are natural expressions of persons who must
know the truth, there is ,#!!#$ ($))- avai'a,'# in
($)ving an a+)(!i)n and it should be produced.
%econdary evidence is also admissible where the
records of adoption proceedings were actually lost or
destroyed. )owever, prior to the introduction of such
secondary evidence, the proponent must first
establish the former existence of the instrument. The
correct order of proof is+ existence execution
loss contents, although this order may be changed
if necessary in the discretion of the court. %ince
petitioner failed to #!a,'i" !"# -)$.#$ #9i!#n*# )-
!"# a+)(!i)n (a(#$ an+ i! &,#%&#n! ') )$
+#!$&*!i)n, he cannot introduce secondary
evidence. T"# .#$# -a*! !"a! !"# +#*#a#+
()&# !$#a!#+ (#!i!i)n#$ a !"#i$ *"i'+ +)# n)!
*)n!i!&!# a+.ii,'# ($))- )- a+)(!i)n.
Conse&uently, he cannot intervene in the settlement
of "argarita-s estate. /or one to intervene in an
estate proceeding, it is a re&uisite that he has an
interest in the estate, either as one who would be
benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against
the estate, like a creditor. A *"i'+ ,5 a+)(!i)n
*ann)! in"#$i! -$). !"# (a$#n! ,5 a+)(!i)n &n'#
!"# a*! )- a+)(!i)n "a ,##n +)n# in !$i*! a**)$+
:i!" !"# !a!&!#. The burden of proof in establishing
adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship. )e must prove compliance with the
statutes relating to adoption in the jurisdiction where
the adoption occurred. %ince petitioner failed to
submit proof of his hereditary interest in the estate,
his intervention in the probate proceedings should be
denied as it would merely result in unnecessary
(etitioner will have to decide whether he will pursue
his theory of having the status of an admitted
illegitimate child of the deceased "ariano at the
continuation of the proceedings for declaration of
heirship and for probate of the alleged holographic will
of the deceased "argarita where he failed to
establish his status as an alleged adopted child.
*"s. "opia*
San!) v. A$anGan)
Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos petitioners v& @regoris Aran1anoand 'emetria ?entura respondents&
Na!&$# )- !"# Ca#. (1TATA! for review by way of
certiorari of the decision of the Court of $ppeals
.(enned by ,engGon, J.(., J.0
Fa*! )- !"# Ca#: $ petition for adoption of (aulita
%antos and $urora %antos was filed by %implicio
%antos and Juliana 5eyes in the Court of /irst
Anstance of "anila on June ?, 9>?>. (aulina %antos
was then 98yrs old and $urora %antos was 6yrs old.
The petition alleged inter alia that the whereabouts of
the minorsJ nearest kin even their parents was
unknown and that the minors have been abandoned
by their parents since the outbreak of the war. $
guardian ad litem was appointed by the court which
gave his written consent to the adoption. (aulina
being 98yrs old, likewise gave her written consent
thereto. $fter due publication and hearing, the court
granted the petition for adoption.
At was rather unfortunate that eight years
later, on ctober 29, 9>H8, Juliana 5eyes died
intestate. n !ovember 2H, 9>H8 %implicio %antos
filed in the C/A of "anila a petition for the settlement
of the intestate estate of Juliana 5eyes. An said
petition he stated that the surviving heirs of the
deceased are+ he, as a surviving spouse, (aulina
%antos and $urora %antos. )e also prayed that he be
declared the administrator of the estate. ;regoria
$ranGano, hereon respondent, alleging that she is the
first cousin of the deceased, filed an opposition to the
petition for the appointment of administrator. %he also
asserted that the %antos*5eyes marriage was void for
being bigamous and that the adoption of (aulina
%antos and $urora %antos was void for want of
parental consent. 'emetria Pentura, alleging that she
is a first cousin of the deceased and the mother of
(aulina filed a concurring opposition. (acita and
Consuelo (assion, also intervened in the estate
proceedings contending they are first cousins of the
The C/A decided the point in dispute, ruling
that the validity of the adoption could not be assailed
collaterally in the intestate proceedings. $ggrieved,
respondents appealed to the Court of $ppeals, which
reversed the decision of the C/A. The appellate court
contended that absence of consent is a jurisdictional
defect subject to collateral attack.
(etitioners, then filed a petition for review to
the %upreme Court.
P$in*i(a' I&#:
.90Whether parental consent is an absolute re&uisite
in an adoption proceeding considering the
circumstances of the case.
.20Whether the validity of an adoption could be
collaterally assailed in an estate settlement
.90 Dnder our law it is !T an $,%@DT1 re&uisite.
At is true that the consent of parents is a jurisdictional
re&uisite to the validity of a decree on adoption.
)owever, it is not absolute. The court grounded its
ratio on %ection :, 5ule >>, 5evised 5ules of Court,
of which the pertinent line runs this way+
%ection :. Consent to $doption. There shall be filed
with the petition a written consent to the adoption
signed by the child if over 9? yrs of age and not
incompetent, and by each of its known living parents
who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has
not abandoned such child, or if there is no such
parents by the general guardian or guardian ad litem
of the child...
%tated simply, if the natural parents have abandoned
their children the consent of the guardian ad litem will
suffice. What is abandonment then in this contextL
$bandonment, under $merican rulings, imports any
conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a
settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and
relin&uish all parental claims to the child. At means
refusal or neglect to perform legal and natural
obligations of care and support. At is a fact that the
adopted children were living with petitioners since
they were infants. $lso, for several years the parents
of the adopted children were unheard of despite
diligent effort of petitioner.
.20 The Court of $ppeals cannot review the findings of
abandonment made by the adoption court. At is a well
settled rule that even when the jurisdiction of an
inferior or special tribunal depends upon the existence
of a fact established before it, the determination of
that fact cannot be &uestioned in a collateral attack.
$nent the alleged lack of notice of the adoption
proceedings on the natural parents, suffice it to mark
that publication was sufficiently made. !otice,
moreover, is not re&uired in adoption cases in regard
to the abandoning parent.
.:0 5egarding the side issue that the %antos*5eyes
marriage was not valid, even if we assume for
purposes of argument that it was not valid as alleged,
it will not make any difference as far as the right of
respondents to intervene in the intestate proceedings.
Juliana would then be deemed to have filed the
adoption as a person whose status is single. The
defect would only lie on %implicio. $urora and Juliana
have successional rights to the estate as adopted
children to the exclusion of respondents.
*"r. yales*
DSCD v. B#'#n
'epartment of %ocial Welfare and 'evelopment, represented by CoraGon ". @ayug, complainant, versus Judge
$natonio ,elen and 1lma Pedana, respondents.
Na!&$# )- !"# *a#: $dministrative matter initiated by
complainant against respondents for alleged anomaly
in an adoption proceeding.
P#nn#+ ,5: 5egalado, J.
Fa*! )- !"# *a#: An this complaint, CoraGon ".
@apug in behalf of '%W' charged Judge $ntonio
,elen for an erroneous decree of adoption in violation
of $rticle :: of (' 34: otherwise known as The Child
and youth Welfare Code and the corresponding
%upreme Court Circular !o. 92. 5espondent 1lma
Pedana, on the other hand, is charged with
disregarding the provisions of the same circular.
%pouses 'esiderio %oriano and $urora ,ernardo
%oriano, both of whom are naturaliGed $merican
citiGens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their
niece, Uhedell ,ernardo Abea in the 5TC. Judge
,elen granted the petition after finding that petitioner
spouses were highly &ualified to adopt the child as
their own. 5espondent based his decree primarily on
the findings of the E$doptive home %tudy 5eportF and
EChild %tudy 5eportF .prepared by 1lma Pedana,
herein respondent0 that the adopting parents and the
adoptee have already developed love and emotional
attachment. n these considerations, respondent
judge decided and proceeded to dispense with trial
When Uhedell sought to obtain the re&uisite travel
clearance from the '%W' in order to join her
adoptive parents in the Dnited %tates, the department
uncovered what it considered as an anomalous
adoption decree regarding said minor. The '%W'
have not any record in its files regarding the adoption
and that there was never any order from respondent
judge to conduct a E)ome and Child %tudy 5eportF. At
was also alleged that respondent 1lma Pedana asked
for an undisclosed sum of money. $fter investigation,
the ffice of the Court $dministrator, recommended
that respondent judge be reprimanded.
I&#: .90Whether the respondent judge followed
the proper course when he failed to notify the '%W'
of the proceedings.
.20Whether a %ocial Welfare fficer of the
5TC could arrogate unto himself the function of the
preparation of the case study
H#'+: .90 !o, he did not. The law is very clear and
simple. Andeed, $rticle :: of the Child and Routh
Welfare Code provides in no certain terms that+
!o petition for adoption shall be granted unless the
'epartment of %ocial Welfare, or the %ocial Work
counseling 'ivision, in case of Juvenile and 'omestic
5elations Courts, has made a case study of the child
to be adopted, his natural parents as well as
prospective adopting parents, and has submitted its
report and recommendations on the matter to the
court hearing such petitionZ
An the same token, Circular 92 directs 5TC hearing
adoption cases+
a. to !TA/R the "inistry of %ocial %ervices
and 'evelopment, thru its local agency, of
the filing of adoption cases or the pendency
thereof with respect to those cases already
b. to strictly C"(@R with the re&uirements in
$rticle ::.
The respondent-s failure to do so, he may have
wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy the welfare
and future of the adoptee. The respondent judge was
sternly censured.
.20 !o she could not. )er task being to coordinate
with the '%W' in the preparation and submission of
the relevant case study reports and not to make the
same and recommend by herself the facts on which
the court was to act.
*"r. yales*
C. C)n#n! N#*#a$5 -)$ A+)(!i)n
D&n*an v. CFI
5obin 'uncan and "aria Christensen v. C/A*5iGal, presided over by )on. )erminio "ariano
Esguerra D1BEFG& Petition for revie% on certiorari of *F) decision&
)usband is a ,ritish national residing in the 5( for the
last 98 years. Wife is an $merican born in .and a
resident of0 the 5(. T"# *)&('# )&g"! !) a+)(! a
*"i'+ previously baptiGed and named by them as
Colin ,erry Christensen 'uncan. ,ut the CFI +#ni#+
!"# (#!i!i)n -)$ a+)(!i)n, saying that the consent
given in 1xhibit EJF is improper and falls short of the
express re&uirement of the law, which says that+
$rt. :?4 .CC0 B EThe written consent of the
following to the adoption %)$@@ be necessary... N2O
The parents, guardian, or person in charge of the
person to be adopted.F
%o, the proper person supposed to give
consent should first be .in the order of preference0 the
parent or mother herself. The couple-s principal
witness, A!!5. /#'a%&#G1 &n+#$ :")# *a$# !"#
,a,5 :a #n!$&!#+ ,5 !"# &n:#++#+ .)!"#$,
claims to know the natural mother-s identity.
,ut divulging it .to have the written consent0 would
violate the client*attorney relationship, especially
since the mother didn-t want her identity revealed. %o
as a de facto guardian, A!!5. /#'a%&#G ign#+ !"#
*)n#n!1 in!#a+ )- !"# .)!"#$.
Whether $tty. Pelas&ueG is the proper person
re&uired by law to give such consent.
Res. ,aby Colin ,erry is declared as the adopted
child and heir of the petitioners*couple.
nly one of two persons described by law
may be considered as legally capable of giving the
written consent+
N9O $rt. :?4 .CC0 B Ethe parent, guardian, or
person in charge of the person to be adoptedFC
N2O 5ule >> .5C0 B Eeach of the known
living parents...who has !T abandoned such child.F
The unwedded mother has not bothered to
in&uire into the condition of the child, much less
contribute to the livelihood, maintenance, and care of
the same. T"# *)&$! i *)nvin*#+ !"a! !"# .)!"#$
"a+ *).('#!#'5 an+ a,)'&!#'5 a,an+)n#+ "#$
*"i'+, and can be declared as such.
On'5 A!!5. /#'a%&#G a((#a$ !) ,# !"#
(#$)n :") *)&'+ ,# *)ni+#$#+ a !"# g&a$+ian
#9#$*iing (a!$ia ()!#!a ?La!in -)$ H():#$ )- a
-a!"#$I@ )v#$ &*" a,an+)n#+ *"i'+. Child was not
under the custody of an orphan asylum, and no
guardian ad litem was assigned by the court.
1ven with dura le# sed le#, the law .re&uiring
that the natural parents shall give consent first and
foremost0 should be softened with less severity in
cases of adoption, out of compassion and humane
understanding especially for children born out of
wedlock. The texts and intendments of the law should
be construed so as to give all chances for human life
to exist. The spirit of the law is to uphold, encourage,
and give life and meaning to the existence of family
The adoptive spouses are not only &ualified
but also have extended much love and care for the
child, who is now about > years old. )indering legal
adoption would do an injustice not only for the child
and adoptive spouses, but all persons who will be
similarly situated.
*"r. (unongbayan*
Cang v. CA
)erbert Cang v. C$ and spouses 5onald and "aria Clavano
8omero D1BBHG& Petition for revie% on certiorari of *A decision&
(etitioner )erbert and wife $nna ,#g)! 4
*"i'+$#n. @ater, wife learned of husband-s
extramarital affair, and filed a petititon for legal
separation. The Juvenile and 'omestic 5elations
Court granted it, and the spouses agreed in a joint
manifestation that, among others+ N9O The children
shall be entitled to supportC and N2O the wife shall be
entitled to enter into any contract or agreement with
any personIs without the written consent of the
H&,an+ '#-! -)$ US, sought divorce from
wife in the %econd Judicial 'istrict Court of !evada,
which issued the divorce decree and granted sole
custody of the : minor children to the wife. While in
the D%, husband married then divorced again, and
ultimately never remarried. )e continued remitting
money for the children-s expenses.
"eanwhile, :i-# Anna8 ,$)!"#$ an+
i!#$DinD'a:1 a *"i'+'# *)&('#1 -i'#+ ($)*##+ing
-)$ !"# a+)(!i)n )- !"# 4 .in)$ children before
5TC*Cebu, and petition bears the signature of the
eldest child consenting to his adoption. $nna also files
affidavit of consent alleging that+
N9O husband )erbert evaded his legal
obligation to support the childrenC N2O her brothers and
sisters had been helping her in taking care of the
childrenC N:O Anna :)&'+ ,# g)ing !) !"# US !)
a!!#n+ !) a -a.i'5 ,&in#1 an+ '#aving !"#
*"i'+$#n :)&'+ ,# a ($),'#. !"a! :)&'+ "a.(#$
"#$ K),D##=ing v#n!&$# a,$)a+.
)usband immediately returned to the 5(
and filed an opposition, saying that although wife-s
brother and sister*in*law were financially capable,
their finances are Etoo meagerF compared to theirs,
and wouldn-t allow anybody to strip him of his parental
authority over his beloved children.
5TC*Cebu issued an order that wife $nna in
effect relin&uished custody over the children, and
custody should be transferred to the father. An)!"#$
,$an*" )- !"# RTCDC#,& !"#n i&#+ a +#*$## )-
a+)(!i)n !) Anna8 ,$)!"#$ an+ i!#$DinD'a:.
H&,an+ H#$,#$!, before the C$, )(()#+
an+ *)n!#n+#+ !"a! !"# '):#$ *)&$! #$$#+ in !"a!
"# +i+n8! "av# a :$i!!#n *)n#n! !) !"# a+)(!i)n,
and 2 children didn-t properly give their written
consent. The C$ affirmed the decree of adoption,
saying that the court has held that the consent of the
parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary
.as in 'ayrit v& Piccio, Santos v& Anan1anso0. )erbert
has not been performing his duties as a father,
contrary to his protestations.
Can minor children be legally adopted
without the written consent of a natural parent.
,ecause the husband didn-t really abandon
the children, his consent was necessary. %ince it was
not obtained, the petition for adoption of the : children
is denied. (etition is ;5$!T1', and the C$ decision
is set aside.
$s clearly inferred from $rt. 966 of the /C,
and 5ule >> of the 5C, the written consent of the
natural parent is indispensible for the validity of the
decree of adoption. ,ut !"# $#%&i$#.#n! *an ,#
+i(#n#+ :i!" i- !"# (a$#n! "a a,an+)n#+ !"#
*"i'+, or is Einsane or hopelessly intemperate.F
$lthough not a trier of facts, the %C finds that
the 5TC and the C$ failed to appreciate facts and
circumstances that should-ve elicited a different
conclusion on whether the petitioner*father has so
abandoned his children.
T) Ha,an+)nI i !) -)$a=# #n!i$#'51
$#n)&n*# &!!#$'51 )$ -)$g) a'' (a$#n!a' +&!i# and
relin&uish all parental claims to the childC to neglect or
refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of
care and support which parents owe their children.
)ere, the husband-s conduct didn-t manifest
a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and
relin&uish all parental claims over his children.
P"5i*a' #!$ang#.#n! a')n#1 :i!")&! -inan*ia'
an+ .)$a' +##$!i)n1 i NOT !an!a.)&n! !)
a,an+)n.#n!. While physically absent, he was not
remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love,
care, and support.
There were several pieces of evidence not only on
financial support, but also the emotional exchange of
sentiments between petitioner and his family, via
letters. T"# '):#$ *)&$! a!!a*"#+ !)) "ig" a
($#.i&. !) !"# ($)(#*!iv# a+)(!#$8 -inan*ia'
!a!&, but totally brushed aside the possible
repercussion of the adoption on the emotional and
psychological well*being of the children.
The %C has previously decided that parental authority
cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he
could give the child a larger measure of material
comfort than his natural parent. The lower courts-
conclusion that petitioner abandoned his family needs
more evidentiary support than his inability to provide
them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent
in*laws could provide.
There should be proof that he had so emotionally
abandoned them, that his children would not miss
guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting
parents. T"# *"i'+$#n n##+#+ "i. n)! )n'5
,#*a&# "# *)&'+ *a!#$ !) !"#i$ :"i. ,&! a')
,#*a&# "# :a a (#$)n !"#5 *)&'+ "a$# :i!"
!"#i$ +ai'5 a*!ivi!i#1 ($),'#.1 an+ !$i&.(".
That the mother $nna went abroad as well to find
better employment worsened the scenario for the
kids. While $nna-s brother and sister*in*law were
capable of providing to the children, the brother was
commuting to and fro "anila, while the sister*in*law
was an international flight stewardess. $ closer look
into their testimonies reveals that they merely wanted
to keep the children away from their father, stemming
from the notion that he was an inveterate womaniGer.
T"a! !"# (#!i!i)n#$ "a+ an a--ai$ :i!" a (a$a.)&$
*an8! ,# !a=#n a &--i*i#n! ,ai !"a! "#8 an &n-i!
-a!"#$. A ,a+ "&,an+ i n)! n#*#a$i'5 a ,a+
*"r. (unongbayan*
Lan+ingin v. R#(&,'i*
'AW$T$ 5$"% @$!'A!;A! (etitioner, vs. 51(D,@AC / T)1 ()A@A((A!1%, 5espondent.
Na!&$#: petition for review on certiorari of a decision
by the Court of $ppeals .C$0 reversing decision by
the 5egional Trial Court .5TC0 of Tarlac
Da!#: June 28, 2443
P)n#n!#: Callejo %r., /.
'iwata @andingin, a H8*y.o. widow, D.%. citiGen of
/ilipino parentage and resident of ;uam,
employed there as a restaurant server, filed a
petition for the adoption of minors 1laine 'iGon
5amos, 1lma 'iGon 5amos, and 1ugene 'iGon
5amos, children of @andingin-s brother .'0, and
$melia 5amos.
o 9>>4 B "anuel 5amos, father of the
children, died. The children-s mother went
to Ataly to work in order to provide support
for herself, her parents, and her children.
"eanwhile, the children were left in the
care of their paternal grandmother, and
were supported primarily by their paternal
relatives, including herein petitioner
o 9>>H B An Ataly, $melia 5amos became the
live*in partner of Jun Tayag, a married
man. The two had a son. The three are
considered Atalian residents .but not
citiGens0. $melia continued to send
support to her parents and her children,
though the amount she sent to the latter
was much less than what her affluent in*
laws provided. 1laine, eldest of her
children by her deceased husband,
consulted her for serious personal
o 2444 B The guardian of the children, their
paternal grandmother, died. @andingin
then sought to adopt her nieces and
The '%W' conducted a case study prior to the
adoption hearing. The social welfare officer in
charge submitted a child study report with the
following recommendation+
An view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors
1laine, 1lma K 1ugene all surnamed 5amos,
eligible for adoption because of the following
9. "inors- surviving parent, the mother
has voluntarily consented to their
adoption by the paternal aunt, 'iwata
@andingin this is in view of her inability
to provide the parental care, guidance
and support they need. $n $ffidavit of
Consent was executed by the mother
which is hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption
have also expressed their willingness to
be adopted and joins the petitioners in
;uam, D%$ in the future. $ joint
$ffidavit of consent is hereto attached.
The minors developed close attachment
to the petitioners and they regarded her
as second parent.
:. The minors are present under the
care of a temporary guardian who has
also family to look after. $s young
adolescents they really need parental
love, care, guidance and support to
ensure their protection and well being.
An view of the foregoing, it is hereby
respectfully recommended that minors
1laine '. 5amos, 1lma '. 5amos and
1ugene '. 5amos be adopted by their
maternal aunt 'iwata @andingin.
o %aid consent of the mother was based on
an interview conducted by the social worker
when she was fortuitously able to meet
$melia 5amos when the latter visited the
(hilippines with her .adulterous0 son. An
said interview, $melia allegedly stated her
opinion that her children in the (hilippines
need what she cannot provide, herself
having another family in Ataly.
o Consent of the petitioner-s .adult0 children,
re&uired by law .according to %ec. > of 5.$,
was provided through a document executed
in ;uam
5TC approved adoption. The ffice of the
%olicitor ;eneral appealed. ,ased on the
lack of written consent of the mother, the
lack of the written consent of the petitioner-s
children, and the petitioner-s failure to
establish that she would be able to support
the children should they be placed in her
custody, the 5TC decision was reversed.
$ccording to petitioner, the consent of the
mother was not necessary, as by her actions
of establishing another family in Ataly, she
has abandoned her children by her
deceased husband.
9. WI! consent was given in the appropriate form
HELD+ !o
2. WI! the consent of the mother is not necessary
HELD+ !o
:. WI! the petitioner is capable of supporting the
children HELD+ !o
Consent has to be written, i.e. in the proper form.
The document was executed in ;uam. At does not
follow the re&uirements for recognition in the
(hilippines of a legal document executed abroad,
as stated in %ection 2 of $ct !o. 294:, which
$n instrument or document acknowledged and
authenticated in a foreign country shall be
considered authentic if the acknowledgment and
authentication are made in accordance with the
following re&uirements+
.a0 The acknowledgment shall be made
before .90 an ambassador, minister,
secretary of legation, chargW d affaires,
consul, vice*consul, or consular agent of
the 5epublic of the (hilippines, acting
within the country or place to which he is
accredited, or .20 a notary public or
officer duly authoriGed by law of the
country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place
where the act is done.
.b0 Na lengthy provision stating further
authentication proceduresO
The mother did not abandon her children, as the
petitioner contends. %he continued to support
them, and remains in contact with her children,
even providing her eldest child advice on serious
personal matters, advice that the same child
sought out. "erely permitting a child to remain for
a time undisturbed in the care of others is not
abandonment as contemplated by law. The Court
noted that if the children were abandoned, the
petitioner should have sought the consent of their
legal guardian.
(etitioner is a part*time waitress living in a house
that is still being amortiGed. The Court found it
doubtful that the petitioner could sufficiently handle
the financial aspect of rearing three minors in the
D.%. The records do not prove nor support
petitioner-s allegation that her siblings and her
children are financially able and that they are
willing to support the children.
9hile the *ourt recogni1es that petitioner has only
the best of intentions for her nieces and nephe%
there are legal infirmities that militate against
reversing the ruling of the *A& )n any case
petitioner is not prevented from filing a ne%
petition for adoption of the herein minors&
*"r. 5eyes*
Ra!!#$.an1 HA+)(!i)n an+ !"# Rig"! )- P&!a!iv# Fa!"#$: A R#vi#: )- N#: Y)$= La:
The legal rights of unmarried fathers have changed dramatically since 9>84. ,oth in society and in the law,
there has been an increased concern and respect for the involvement of fathers in the lives of their nonmarital
children. P&!a!iv# -a!"#$ :") "av# #!a,'i"#+ a $#'a!i)n"i( :i!" !"#i$ *"i'+$#n Nby definition, out of
wedlockO a$# *)ni+#$#+ !) "av# (a$#n!a' $ig"! #%&a' !) !")# )- !"# .)!"#$. H):#v#$1 in $#*)gni!i)n
!"a! ).# &n:#+ -a!"#$ .a5 "av# n) *)nn#*!i)n !) !"#i$ *"i'+$#n ,#5)n+ g#n#!i* (a$#n!"))+1 !"#
#9!#ni)n )- (a$#n!a' $ig"! !) (&!a!iv# -a!"#$ "a ,##n 'i.i!#+ ,5 !"# *)&$!.
An !ew Rork, the legislature has adopted specific statutory guidelines for identifying unwed fathers who have
a constitutionally protected parental right which must be surrendered or terminated before their child can be
adopted. An addition, !ew Rork law identifies fathers who have some lesser connection with their child which
entitles them to notice of adoption proceedings. Af a father does not meet the criteria for either of these
categories, the child may be adopted without the putative father-s consent or notice. !ew Rork-s statutory
scheme, which has survived constitutional scrutiny by the D.%. %upreme Court, provides clear criteria for
identifying and protecting the rights of nonmarital fathers.
Constitutional ights
An Stanley v& )llinois .9>820, the D.%. %upreme Court held that an &n.a$$i#+ -a!"#$ :") "a+ a $#'a!i)n"i(
:i!" "i *"i'+$#n "a a $ig"! !) (a$!i*i(a!# in a "#a$ing $#ga$+ing !"# ,#! in!#$#! )- !"# *"i'+$#n ($i)$
!) "aving "i (a$#n!a' $ig"! !#$.ina!#+. An *aban v& 7ohammed .9>8>0, the %upreme Court held that a !ew
Rork 'a: :"i*" gav# n) $ig"! !) an &n:#+ -a!"#$ i &n*)n!i!&!i)na'. The father in said case provided his
children support while he lived with their mother Nin unwedded cohabitationO and had regular contact with them
after he lived apart from them. $s a result of *aban, the aforesaid !ew Rork law was amended to specify when a
father of a nonmarital child must consent to an adoption.
An (ehr v& 8obinson .9>6:0, where the father seemed to have no interest in the child and filed a paternity
claim only two years after the child-s birth, the %upreme Court held that a -a!"#$ :") "a n#v#$ #!a,'i"#+ a
&,!an!ia' $#'a!i)n"i( :i!" !"# *"i'+ i n)! #n!i!'#+ !) n)!i*# )- an a+)(!i)n. The Court stated that+
EC"#n an &n:#+ -a!"#$ +#.)n!$a!# a -&'' *)..i!.#n! !) !"# $#()ni,i'i!i# )- (a$#n!"))+ ,5 *).ing
-)$:a$+ !) (a$!i*i(a!# in !"# $#a$ing )- "i *"i'+1 "i in!#$#! in (#$)na' *)n!a*! :i!" "i *"i'+ a*%&i$#
&,!an!ia' ($)!#*!i)n &n+#$ !"# D&# P$)*# C'a&# N9?
$mendmentO...B&! !"# .#$# #9i!#n*# )- a
,i)')gi*a' 'in= +)# n)! .#$i! #%&iva'#n! *)n!i!&!i)na' ($)!#*!i)n.F
EI- )n# (a$#n! "a an #!a,'i"#+ *&!)+ia' $#'a!i)n"i( :i!" !"# *"i'+ an+ !"# )!"#$ (a$#n! "a #i!"#$
a,an+)n#+ )$ n#v#$ #!a,'i"#+ a $#'a!i)n"i(1 !"# E%&a' P$)!#*!i)n C'a&# +)# n)! ($#v#n! a S!a!#
-$). a**)$+ing !"# !:) (a$#n! +i--#$#n! '#ga' $ig"!.F
Fathers with Full Substantive ights
N$s previously stated,O Dnwed fathers who have maintained substantial and continuous or repeated contact
with the child have the same rights as unmarried mothers with respect to their children, and must execute a
voluntary surrender or have their parental rights terminated before the child can be adopted.
Af the father of a child under six months old openly lived with the child continuously for six months, held himself
to be the father of the child during the same period, and provided financial assistance for the mother-s pregnancy
or the birth of the child, the child cannot be adopted without his consent. Af the child is over six months old, if
there is proof of regular support and contact by the putative father Nvisited monthly or maintains regular
communication with the child or the person in custody of the childO, said child cannot be adopted without the
father-s consent.
Fathers with !ue "rocess ights
(utative fathers who do not meet the statutory criteria which would re&uire their consent to adoption may still
&ualify to be Enotice fathersF under !ew Rork law. %pecial notice provisions give these fathers due process rights
with respect to voluntary surrenders and termination of parental rights involving their nonmarital children. These
($)vii)n L-)$ n)!i*# )- a+)(!i)n ($)*##+ingM +) n)! in*'&+# .#n *)nvi*!#+ )- -i$! +#g$## $a(# :"#n
!"# *"i'+ :") i !"# &,K#*! )- !"# !#$.ina!i)n :a *)n*#iv#+ a !"# $#&'! )- !"# $a(#. $ll other fathers
who have been legally recogniGed as the child-s father and have shown interest in the child-s welfare prior to
adoption proceedings are &ualified. T"# )'# (&$()# )- n)!i-i*a!i)n !) !"## -a!"#$ i !) #na,'# "i. !)
($##n! #vi+#n*# !) !"# *)&$! $#'#van! !) !"# ,#! in!#$#! )- !"# *"i'+. T"# (&!a!iv# -a!"#$ :i'' )n'5 ,#
giv#n *&!)+5 )- !"# *"i'+ )$ ,# a,'# !) ,')*= !"# a+)(!i)n i- i! i in !"# *"i'+8 ,#! in!#$#!. The right to
notice may be waived by the putative father.
Fathers #ithout ights
Fa!"#$ :") "av# n)! .a+# #--)$! !) #!a,'i" a $#'a!i)n"i( :i!" a n)n.a$i!a' *"i'+ +) n)! "av# a
$ig"! !) ,# in*'&+#+ in !"# *)&$! +#*ii)n !) a(($)v# a .)!"#$8 &$$#n+#$1 !) !#$.ina!# !"# .)!"#$8
$ig"!1 )$ !) a(($)v# !"# a+)(!i)n )- !"# *"i'+.
Fathers $nable to %eet ights Criteria
/athers who are kept away from their children because of a court order to protect the mother from domestic
violence, are not Econsent fathersF, as it was by their violent behaviour, not the mother-s actions to protect herself
from violence, that prevents the father from establishing a relationship with his children .)n the 7atter of 8a2uel
7arie 5, 9>6>0.
Ancarcerated fathers, if they meet the criteria, are entitled to either substantive of due process rights, e.g. a
father who has regular contact with his child, though he is behind bars, is a consent father.
$ father who voluntarily took drugs, thus rarely visited nor provided support to his child, cannot be a consent
nor a notice father .)n the 7atter of (eah 7&(&, 9>6>0.
Af the mother concealed her pregnancy, the father, upon learning of his parenthood, can, should he be
shown to be the father of the child, can be allowed to intervene in adoption proceedings, if it was the mother who
unjustly denied him the opportunity to be part of the child-s life. There is, however, n) !a!&!)$5 ),'iga!i)n
i.()#+ &()n !"# .)!"#$ !) ai! !"# -a!"#$ in #i!"#$ #!a,'i"ing )$ .ain!aining *)n!a*! :i!" !"#i$
*"i'+ .)n the 7atter of Adoption of Emily Ann, 9>680.
The courts have tended to be more sympathetic to fathers who allege that interference by a relative
prevented them from establishing a parental relationship with the child, as long as the father shows earnest
interest in the child-s welfare as evidenced by effort.
D#'a5 in A+)(!i)n
NAn conclusion,O the statutory scheme for putative fathers in adoption in practice in !ew Rork sets up an
e&uitable balance between the rights of a nonmarital father to maintain a parental relationship with the child and
the child-s right to an expeditious adoption decision consistent with the best interests.
*"r. 5eyes*
D. E--#*! )- A+)(!i)n
Ta.a$g) v. CA
"acario Tamargo, Celso Tamargo and $urelia Tamargo, petitioners vs. The )on. Court of $ppeals, The )on.
$riston @. 5ubio, 5TC Judge, ,ranch 24, Pigan, Alocos %ur, Pictor ,undoc, and Clara ,undoc, respondents&
Na!&$#+ (etition for review of the decision of the Court
of $ppeals
Da!#+ June :, 9>>2
P)n#n!#+ /eliciano, /.
ctober 24, 9>62 B 94*year old $delberto
,undoc shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle
causing injuries which resulted in her death
(etitioners "acario Tamargo, Jennifer-s adopting
parent and spouses Celso and $urelia Tamargo,
Jennifer-s natural parents, filed a civil complaint
for damages against respondent spouses Pictor
and Clara ,undoc, $delberto-s natural parents
with whom he was living at the time of the tragic
$ criminal case was filed against $delberto for
)omicide through 5eckless Amprudence but he
was ac&uitted and exempted from criminal
liability on the ground that he had acted without
'ecember 94, 9>69 .($i)$ !) !"# in*i+#n!0 B
spouses %abas and /elisa 5apisura had filed a
petition to adopt the minor $delberto ,undoc
!ovember 96, 9>62 B the petition for adoption of
$delberto was granted .a-!#$ A+#',#$!) "a+
")! an+ =i''#+ J#nni-#$0
5espondent spouses ,undoc .natural parents of
$delberto0 claimed that the 5apisura spouses
.adopting parents of $delberto0 were the
indispensable parties in the suit since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from
the moment the successful petition for adoption
was filed
(etitioners contend that since $delberto was then
actually living with his natural parents, parental
authority had not ceased by the mere filing and
granting of a petition for adoption
Trial Court+ dismissed the complaint after ruling
that the ,undoc spouses were not the
indispensable parties to the action. The
Tamargos filed a motion for reconsideration and
a supplemental motion for reconsideration but
both were denied because of their failure to give
copies to all the parties concerned : days before
the hearing
Court of $ppeals+ dismissed the petition ruling
that the petitioners had lost their right to appeal
9. Whether or not the petitioners, notwithstanding
loss of their right to appeal, may still file the
instant petition
2. C"#!"#$ )$ n)! !"# #--#*! )- a+)(!i)n1
in)-a$ a (a$#n!a' a&!")$i!5 i *)n*#$n#+1
.a5 ,# giv#n $#!$)a*!iv# #--#*! ) a !) .a=#
!"# a+)(!ing (a$#n! !"# in+i(#na,'#
(a$!i# in a *a# -i'#+ again! !"#i$
a+)(!#+ *"i'+ :"#n a*!&a' *&!)+5 :a !i''
')+g#+ :i!" !"# ,i)')gi*a' (a$#n! .T)(i*a'
9. R1%. $lthough the petitioners- motion for
reconsideration did not comply with the
re&uirements of %ection 9: 5ule ?9 and %ection
? 5ule 9H of the 5evised 5ules of Court .that
notice of the motion shall be given to all parties
concerned at least : days before the hearing and
that the said notice shall state the time and place
of hearing0, they were considered pro forma 0Eas
a matter of formF) and hence did not interrupt and
suspend the reglementary period to appeal.
An view of the nature of the issue raised in
this petition and in order that substantial justice
may be served, the Court invoked its right to
suspend the application of technical rules to
prevent manifest injustice. Andeed, the rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid
technical sense, rules of procedure are used only
to help secure, not override, substantial justice. Af
a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is
made, their aim would be defeated.
2. NO.
At is not disputed that A+#',#$!) B&n+)*8
v)'&n!a$5 a*! )- "))!ing Jennifer
Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a
*a&# )- a*!i)n )n %&aiD+#'i*! against
him. A$!. 27P6 )- !"# CC provides+
EWhoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. %uch fault or negligence, if there is no
pre*existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a %&aiD+#'i*! x x x E.
%ince A+#',#$!) :a a .in)$ when he shot
Jennifer, A$!. 27F3 )- !"# CC will apply+ The
),'iga!i)n i.()#+ ,5 A$!i*'# 27P6 i,'# not only for oneJs own acts or
omissions, but also for !")# )- (#$)n -)$
:"). )n# i $#()ni,'#. The -a!"#$ and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the
.)!"#$, are responsible for the damages
caused by the .in)$ *"i'+$#n :") 'iv# in
!"#i$ *).(an5. Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q. The
responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed a'' !"# +i'ig#n*#
)- a g))+ -a!"#$ )- a -a.i'5 !) ($#v#n!
The *ivi' 'ia,i'i!5 i.()#+ &()n (a$#n!
for the torts of their minor children living with
them is based upon the (a$#n!a' a&!")$i!5
vested by the Civil Code upon such parents.
The civil law assumes that when an
unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortious act, the (a$#n! :#$#
n#g'ig#n! in the performance of their legal
and natural +&!5 !) &(#$vi# !"# *"i'+
who is in their *&!)+5 an+ *)n!$)'. The
presumption can be overturned by proof that
the parents exercised all diligence to prevent
B&n+)* ()&# "a+ (a$#n!a' a&!")$i!5
)v#$ A+#',#$!) :"#n !"# "))!ing
)**&$$#+. At would thus follow that the
natural parents who had actual custody of
the minor $delberto are the indispensable
parties to the suit for damages.
)owever, the B&n+)* ()&# rely on A$!.
46 of the C"i'+ an+ Y)&!" C#'-a$# C)+#
which provides that a +#*$## )- a+)(!i)n
"a'' ,# #--#*!iv# a )- !"# +a!# !"#
)$igina' (#!i!i)n :a -i'#+. $side from this,
they rely on A$!. 4< of the same code which
states that a+)(!i)n "a'' +i)'v# !"#
a&!")$i!5 v#!#+ in !"# na!&$a' (a$#n!,
except where the adopter is the spouse of
the surviving natural parent.
The Court is not convinced by the arguments
of the ,undoc spouses. The Civil Code
states that the ,ai )- (a$#n!a' 'ia,i'i!5 for
the torts of a minor child is the $#'a!i)n"i(
#9i!ing ,#!:##n !"# (a$#n! an+ !"#
.in)$ *"i'+ 'iving :i!" !"#. and over
whom, the law presumes, the parents
exercise supervision and control. A$!. 227 )-
!"# FC reiterates this by providing that
parents who have actual custody of the child
shall be held liable for the damages ensued
by the child living in their company and
under their parental authority.
5etroactivity may be allowed if it will permit
the accrual of benefits or advantages in favor
of the adopted child. )owever, $#!$)a*!iv#
#--#*! may n)! be given so as !) i.()# a
'ia,i'i!5 &()n !"# a+)(!ing (a$#n!
accruing at a time when !"# a+)(!ing
(a$#n! "a+ n) a*!&a' )$ ("5i*a'
*&!)+5 )v#$ !"# a+)(!#+ *"i'+. An this
case, it will be unfair to burden the 5apisura
spouses with the liability for a tortious act
that they could not have foreseen or
prevented .since they were in the Dnited
%tates at that time and did not have physical
custody of $delberto0.
A$!. 4E )- !"# C"i'+ an+ Y)&!" C#'-a$#
C)+# provides that no petition for adoption
shall be finally granted unless adopting
parents are given a &(#$vi#+ !$ia'
*&!)+5 (#$i)+ )- a! '#a! 6 .)n!" to
asses their readiness. 'uring the period of
trial custody, parental authority shall be
vested in the adopting parents. An this case,
the trial custody period either had not yet
begun or had already been completed at the
time of the incident. An any case, !"# a*!&a'
*&!)+5 )- A+#',#$!) :a :i!" "i na!&$a'
(a$#n!1 n)! !"# a+)(!ing (a$#n!.
Di()i!iv#: (etition granted due course. The C$
'ecision is reversed K set aside. (etitioners-
complaint reinstated K remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings.
*"s. 5eyes*
Sa5)n v. CA
"auricio %ayson, 5osario %ayson*"alonda, ,asilisa %ayson*@irio, 5emedios %ayson*5eyes and Juana C. ,autista,
petitioners vs. The )onarable Court of $ppeals, 'elia %ayson, assisted by her husband, Cirilo Cedo, Jr., 1dmundo
%ayson and 'oribel %ayson, respondents&
Na!&$#+ (etition for review by certiorari from the decision of the Court of $ppeals
Da!#+ January 2:, 9>>2
P)n#n!#+ CruG, /.

1leno and 5afaela begot five children+ "auricio,
5osario, ,asilisa, 5emedios, and Teodoro. 1leno
died on !ovember 94, 9>H2 while 5afaela died
on "ay 9H, 9>83. Teodoro married Asabel
,autista. Teodoro died on "arch 2:, 9>82 while
Asabel died on "arch 23, 9>69. Their properties
were left in the possession of 'elia, 1dmundo,
and 'oribel, all surnamed %ayson, who claim to
be their children .see diagram above0.
$pril 2H, 9>6: * "auricio, 5osario, ,asilisa, and
5emedios, together with Juana C. ,autista
.Asabel-s mother0, filed a complaint for partition
and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro
and Asabel %ayson. The action was resisted by
'elia, 1dmundo, and 'oribel %ayson, who
alleged successional rights to the disputed estate
as the decedent-s lawful descendants .Civil Case
!o. 94:40.
July 99, 9>6: B 'elia, 1dmundo, and 'oribel
%ayson filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of
1leno and 5afaela %ayson, against the couple-s
four surviving children. Their complaint asserted
that 'elia and 1dmundo were the adopted
children and 'oribel was the legitimate daughter
of Teodoro and Asabel. $s such, they claim to be
entitled to inherit Teodoro-s share in his parents-
estate by right of representation .Civil Case !o.
,oth cases were decided in favor of the herein
respondents on the basis of practically the same
An the second case .Civil Case !o. 94?20, the
court held that 'elia and 1dmundo were the
legally adopted children of Teodoro and Asabel
%ayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated
"arch >, 9>38. 'oribel was their legitimate
daughter as proven by her birth certificate dated
/ebruary 28, 9>38. Conse&uently, the three
children were entitled to inherit from 1leno and
5afaela by right of representation.
An the first case .Civil Case !o. 94:40, the court
held that the defendants, being the legitimate
heirs of Teodoro and Asabel, excluded the
plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
C$ 5uling+ 'ecision in Civil Case !o. 94:4 is
affirmed. n the other hand, decision in Civil
Case !o. 94?2 is modified in that 'elia and
1dmundo %ayson are 'A%TD$@A/A1' from
inheriting from the estate of 1leno and 5afaela.
The petitioners contend that+
9. 'elia and 1dmundo were not legally adopted
because 'oribel had already been born on
/ebruary 2H, 9>38, when the decree of
adoption was issued on "arch >, 9>38. The
birth of 'oribel dis&ualified her parents from
adopting based on $rticle ::H of the Civil
Code which names among those who cannot
adopt Ethose who have legitimate,
0leno *died
:afaela *died
;auricio :osario 2asilisa :emedio
legitimated, acknowledged natural children,
or natural children by legal fictionF.
2. 'oribel is not the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Asabel but was in fact born to
one 1dita $bila, who manifested in a petition
for guardianship of the child that she was her
natural mother.
9. Whether or not 'elia and 1dmundo were
legally adopted children of Teodoro and
2. Whether or not 'oribel is a legitimate child of
Teodoro and Asabel
:. Whether or not 'elia, 1dmundo, and 'oribel
are entitled to inherit from Teodoro and
?. Whether or not 'elia and 1dmundo are
entitled to inherit from 1leno and 5afaela
?T)(i*a' I&#@

9. YES. At is !)) 'a!# n): !) *"a''#ng# !"#
+#*$## )- a+)(!i)n. At was issued in 9>38,
therefore i! "a ,#*).# -ina' an+
#9#*&!)$5. $ssuming that the petitioners
were the proper parties, what they should
have done was seasonably appeal the
decree of adoption on the basis of 'oribel-s
birth which dis&ualified Teodoro and Asabel
from adopting. ,ut they never made this
appeal even though "auricio claimed he had
personal knowledge of such birth. $side from
this, the *"a''#ng# !) !"# va'i+i!5 )- !"#
a+)(!i)n *ann)! ,# .a+# *)''a!#$a''5 but
in a +i$#*! ($)*##+ing frontally addressing
the issue. An the case of Santos v.
Aran&anso, the Court held that an adoption
order implies the finding of the necessary
facts and the ,&$+#n )- ($))- is on the
party attacking it.

2. YES. D)$i,#'8 ,i$!" *#$!i-i*a!# is a
-)$.i+a,'# (i#*# )- #vi+#n*#. At is one of
the prescribed means of recognition under
A$!. 26E )- !"# CC and A$!. 7P2 )- !"# FC.
$lthough the birth certificate offers only
prima facie evidence of filiation and may be
refuted by contrary evidence, no such
evidence is provided by the petitioners.
"auricio-s testimony that he was present
when 'oribel was born to 1dita $bila is
suspicious as it comes from an interested
party. $bila-s affidavit denying her earlier
statement in the petition for the guardianship
of 'oribel is hearsay, and was never offered
as evidence in the lower courts. 1ven
without $bila-s affidavit, the ,i$!" *#$!i-i*a!#
.&! ,# &("#'+ in line with the decision in
'egaspi v. Court of Appeals where it was
held that Ethe evidentiary nature of public
documents must be sustained in the
absence of strong, complete, and conclusive
proof of its falsity or nullityF. An addition,
'oribel-s legitimacy cannot be &uestioned in
a complaint for partition and accountingC it
")&'+ ,# %&#!i)n#+ in a +i$#*! a*!i)n
seasonably filed by the proper party.
:. YES. D)$i,#'1 a !"# '#gi!i.a!# +a&g"!#$
of Teodoro and Asabel %ayson, and D#'ia
an+ E+.&n+)1 a !"#i$ a+)(!#+ *"i'+$#n,
are the #9*'&iv# "#i$ to the intestate
estate of the deceased couple based on A$!.
<P< )- !"# CC which states the legitimate
children, which includes adopted children,
succeed their parents. The underlying
philosophy of the article is that a (#$)n8
')v# +#*#n+ -i$! !) "i *"i'+$#n and
grandchildren before it ascends to his
parents and thereafter spreads among his
collateral relatives. $side from this, it is also
supposed that a one of a person-s purposes
in ac&uiring properties is to leave them
eventually to his children as a !)=#n )- "i
')v# -)$ !"#. and as a ($)vii)n -)$ !"#i$
*)n!in&#+ *a$# after his death.
?. NO. $s the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
and thus the granddaughter of 1leno and
5afaela, 'oribel has a right to represent her
deceased father in the distribution of the
intestate estate of her grandparents.
H):#v#$1 !"i i n)! !"# *a# -)$ D#'ia
an+ E+.&n+). An the case of 'elia and
1dmundo, !"# g$an+(a$#n! ?E'#n) an+
Ra-a#'a@ :#$# !)!a' !$ang#$. While it is
true that an adopted child is deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as
the latter, these rights +) n)! in*'&+# !"#
$ig"! )- $#($##n!a!i)n. The $#'a!i)n"i(
*$#a!#+ ,5 a+)(!i)n is ,#!:##n )n'5 !"#
a+)(!ing (a$#n! an+ !"# a+)(!#+ *"i'+
and +)# n)! #9!#n+ !) !"# ,'))+ $#'a!iv#
)- #i!"#$ (a$!5.
Di()i!iv#: (etition denied. Court of $ppeals
decision is affirmed with costs against the petitioners.
J)"n!)n v. R#(&,'i*
A! T)1 "$TT15 / T)1 $'(TA! / T)1 "A!5, $!$ A%$,1@ )1!5A1TT1 $!T!A$ C!C1(CA!
;15;A$!$, A%$,1@ P$@'1% J)!%T!, petitioner*appellant,
51(D,@AC / T)1 ()A@A((A!1%, oppositor*appellee.
Da!#: $pril :4, 9>3:
P)n#n!#: @abrador, J
Fa*!: (etitioner Asabel Paldes Johnston is married to
5aymund Jonhstion.
. %he filed a petition adopting $na Asabel )enriette
$ntonio Concepcion ;eorgiana.
. The lower court granted her petition but gave $na
Asabel the surname P$@'1%.
. (etitioner filed a motion to change the surname
given to P$@'1% J)!%T!.
. %he argues that+
o since she is married, her adopted daughter
should be allowed to use the surname she is
o ;iving the daughter her maiden name would
imply that she was begotten out of wedlock
which would be embarrassing and humiliating to
both of them.
. The 5espondent %olicitor ;eneral argued that the
child should use the surname of the petitioner alone
and not the surname of her husband.
o At will create more confusion because it creates
the impression that she was adopted by the
petitioner-s husband also. An this case, it is not
true. Child was adopted without husband-s
%hould the adopted child be allowed to use the
surname of adopter-s husband .Paldes Johnston0L
!o. (etition denied.
. $rt. :?9 of the Civil Code entitles minors to
use adopter-s surname. %urname being her
surname and not the one she ac&uired by
virtue of marriage.
. (etitioner made the adoption singly, without
the concurrence of her husband.
. Consent of husband to the adoption by her
individually did not have the effect of making
him an adopting father so as to entitle
adopted child to use his name .While he
consented, did not join the adoption0.
. To allow the minor to adopt the surname of
the husband of the adopter, would mislead
the public into believing that he had also
been adopted by the husband, which is not
the case.
. Tuestions of successional rights may arise.
*"r. 5imban*
R#(&,'i* v. CA an+ C)ng
Da!#: "ay 29, 9>>2
P)n#n!#: 5egalado, J.
. "aximo Wong was the natural child of
"aximo %r. and %egundina $lcala.
. )e was later adopted by spouses )oong
Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong.
. Dpon reaching the age of 22, "aximo Wong
filed a petition to change his name to
"aximo $lacala on the following grounds+
o having a Chinese name isolated
him because the name suggests
Chinese ancestry when in fact he is
a /ilipino "uslim living in a "uslim
o )e is being ridiculed because of his
Chinese name hampering his
business and social life.
. )is adoptive mother did not oppose his
desire to use his former surname.
. )e is now emancipated and can decide what
is in his best interest.
. %olicitor general opposed the petition on the
following grounds+
o $llegations of ridicule andIor
isolation from family and friends
were unsubstantiated and cannot
justify the petition for change of
o /or private respondent to cast aside
the name of his adoptive father is
crass ingratitude to adoptive
Whether the reasons given by "aximo for changing
his name are valid, sufficient and proper.
(etition denied. Court granted change of name.
. "aximo-s argument of being ridiculed and
embarrassed because of his name is
o )e receives few customers in his
furniture business because nobody
believes he is "uslim.
. )e did not disrespect his adoptive parents as
evidenced by his securing her adoptive
mother-s consent before filing his petition.
. While the law says that the adopted child
shall bear the surname of the adopter, the
change to the adoptive surname is a mere
incident that accompanies adoption. At is not
the object of adoption. The object of
adoption is to take into one-s family the child
of another as a son or daughter, giving it the
title, rights and privileges of such.
. Change of surname does not affect his
status as an adopted child and legal heir
o Changing one-s surname does not
change the effects of adoption on
the child. The adoptive mother also
made it clear in her affidavit that
she consents without affecting the
legal adoption granted which
makes "aximo her legal heir.
. Change of name does not affect family
relations, rights and duties , civil status, legal
capacity or citiGenship.
. The court does not believe that by reverting
to his old name, private respondent would
then be using a name which he is prohibited
by law from using. True, the law prescribes
the surname that a person may employC but
the law does not go so far as to un&ualifiedly
prohibit the use of any other surname, and
only subjects such recourse to the obtention
of the re&uisite judicial sanction. What the
law does not prohibit, it permits.
$rticle 96> gives the adopted child the right to
use the surname of the adopter. At is not to be
imposed on the child especially if it is detrimental
to his welfare.
*"r. 5imban*
R#(&,'i* v. CA an+ Ca$an!)
Da!#: "arch 9H 9>>3
P)n#n!#: M#n+)Ga1 J.
Jaime and Uenaida Carnato filed a petition
for the adoption of "idael "anGon, 9H years
old, who has been living since he was seven
years old. The petition prayed for+
o "idael to become the child of
Uenaida and Jaime.
o 'issolution of the authority vested
in the natural parents of the child,
o %urname of child be legally
changed to that of the petitioners
and his first name which was
mistakenly registered as 7"A'$1@7
be corrected to 7"AC)$1@.7
%olicitor ;eneral opposed the petition for the
change of name because the petition was
mainly for adoption purposes
5TC dismissed opposition of %olicitor
;eneral and granted the petition of the
%olicitor ;eneral appealed in the C$. )e
further argued that 5TC did not ac&uire
jurisdiction over the case for adoption
because in the notice published in the
newspaper, the name given was 7"ichael,7
instead of 7"idaelF. )e argued that the
notive ny publication should have stated the
true name of the child.
C$ affirmed the 5TC-s decision. $ petition
for review was then filed in %C
W!, 5TC ac&uired jurisdiction over the private
respondentsJ petition for adoption.
W! both the C$ and 5TC erred in granting private
respondentsJ prayer for the correction of the name of
the child in the civil registry.
9.0 Res.
2.0 Res,
9.0 The error in the name in the notice of
publication is not a substantial defect but
merely a clerical one and thus does not
re&uire a separate petition to be applied for
the change of name to prevent multiplicity of
actions. E"idaelF and E"ichaelF 7can be read
and pronounced with the same rhyme and
tone and thus could not possibly cause
confusion. The purpose of publication
re&uirement is to notify those who have an
objection to the adoption and this was
served in this case sufficiently despite the
clerical error.
2.0 5TC erred when it failed to apply 5ule 946 of
the 5ules of Court in the case. 5ule 946 also
includes correction of entries in the civil
registrar when there is a change of name.
The 5TC not applying 946 when it should be
applicable in this case was not able tom
comply with its re&uirements. These are 9.0
"aking the local civil registrar a party in the
proceeding and 20 publication of the order
once a week for three consecutive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. "oreover, the notice that was
published was only with regard to the
adoption and not the change of name.
*"r. %antiago*
R#(&,'i* v. H#$nan+#G
5epublic of the (hilippines, petitioner, vs, )on. Jose )ernandex, in his capacity as (residing Judge, 5TC, ,ranch
9H6, (asig City and %pouses Pan "unson y !avarro and 5egina "unson y $ndrade, respondents.
Da!#: /ebruary >, 9>>3
P)n#n!#: 5egalado, J.
(rivate respondents filed a petition to adopt the minor
#evin 1arl ,artolome "oran. An the same petition, they
prayed for the change of name of said minor adoptee to
$aron Joseph, the same being the name with which he
was baptised in keeping with religious tradition. They
added that it is the name by which he has been called by
his adoptive family, relatives and friends.
(etitioner opposed the inclusion for the relief for change
of name in the same petition for adoption, arguing that
these petitions should be conducted and pursued as two
separate proceedings. (rivate respondents, on the other
hand, argued that a permissive joinder of causes of
action is allowable to avoid multiplicity of suits.
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents,
approving the petition for adoption and the petition for
change of name. At adopted a liberal stance and held that
no one will be prejudiced by the change of name of the
9. W! the trial court erred in granting the prayer
for the change of name of the adoptee
embodied in the petition for adoption
2. W! there was a lawful ground for the change
of name.
9. !. What the law allows, as a matter of right
and obligation, is the use of the surname of the
adopter by the adoptee upon issuance of the
decree of adoption. )owever, the first name of
the adoptee must remain as it was originally
registered in the civil register. The creation of
the adoptive relationship does not confer upon
the adopter a license to change the adoptee-s
first name. Changing the given or proper name
of a person cannot be done without judicial
order. Af a change of name is desired, it can only
be done by filing and strictly complying with the
substantive and procedural re&uirement for a
special proceeding for change of name under
5ule 94: of the 5ules of Court. $ proceeding for
change of name is governed by its own set of
rules. At cannot be granted by means of any
other proceeding.
!either can the allowance of the subject petition
be justified under the rule allowing permissive
joinder of causes of action. The joinder of
causes of action is the uniting of two or more
demands or rights of action in one action. At can
only be done if .a0 it will not violate the rules on
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of partiesC and .b0
the causes of action arise out of the same
contract, transaction, or relation between the
parties, or are for demands for money or are of
the same nature and character. !either of the
said re&uirements are present in the case at
2. !. Jurisprudence has recogniGed the
following grounds to justify change of name+ .a0
when the name is ridiculous, dishonourable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounceC .b0
when the change results as a legal
conse&uence of legitimation or adoptionC .c0
when the change will avoid confusionC .d0 when
one has continuously used and been known
since childhood by a /ilipino name and is
unaware of alien parentageC .e0 when the
change is based on sincere desire to adopt a
/ilipino name to erase signs of former alienage,
all in good faith and without prejudice to
anybodyC .f0 when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest. The only justification
advanced for the change of name was the fact
that adoptee-s baptism under the name $aron
Joseph and by which he has been known since
he came to live with the private respondents.
These grounds cannot be recogniGed. The
change of surname of the adoptee as a result of
the adoption does not lawfully extend to his
given name.
This decision does not entirely foreclose and is
without prejudice to private respondents-
privilege to legally change the name of their
adopted child, provided the same is exercised
via a proper petition for change of name.
*"s. Tiu*
E. A+)(!i)n D#*$##
R#5# v. S)!#$)
$na Joyce 5eyes, petitioner, vs. )on. Cesar ". %otero, (residing Judge, 5TC of (ani&ui, Tarlac, ,ranch 38, $tty.
(aulino %aguyod, the Clerk of Court of ,ranch 38 of the 5TC at (ani&ui, Tarlac in his capacity as %pecial
$dministrator, CoraGon Chichioco, $ngelito @ising, 1rlinda 1spacio, ;onGalo UalGos, and 1rnesto @ising,
Da!#: /ebruary 93, 2443
5espondent CoraGon Chichioco filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor and
settlement of estate of the late 1lena @ising, claiming
that she was the niece and heir of @ising who died
intestate. The deceased left real properties and
assorted pieces of jewelry and money allegedly in the
possession of petitioner $na Joyce 5eyes,
grandniece of the deceased.
5eyes filed an opposition claiming that she was an
adopted child of @ising and her late husband, %erafin
delos %antos. %he asserted that the issuance of
letters of administration is unnecessary as she was
the only heir of @ising. %he further alleged that
Chicioco is unfit to be the administrator because of
her antagonistic interests against decedent.
%he also presented proofs that she was legally
adopted by the deceased and her late husband. %he
presented the following+
Certification issued by the "unicipal Civil
5egistrar of (ani&ui, Tarlac stating that on
5egister of Court 'ecrees, she was adopted
by 1lena @ising and %erafin delos %antos
pursuant to a decision rendered in %pec.
(roceeding !o. 9?94 by Judge Julian @ustre
at the C/A of Tarlac, ,ranch :
Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of
the 5TC*Tarlac City stating that a judgment
was rendered decreeing petitioner-s adoption
by 1lena @ising and %erafin delos %antos
$ copy of Judicial /orm !o. ?: indicating
that the adoption decree was on file in the
;eneral 'ocket of the 5TC*Tarlac City
$ 'ecree of /inal 'istribution issued by the
(hilippine Peterans $ffairs ffice showing
that upon the death of %erafin delos %antos,
death benefits were to be paid to his widow,
1lena @ising, and his EdaughterF $na Joyce
delos %antos.
Chichioco filed a petition for the annulment of the
adoption decree claiming that no proceedings for
adoption of petitioner took place since the (rovincial
(rosecutor of Tarlac and the ffice of the %olicitor
;eneral had no records of the adoption case. The C$
dismissed this case for procedural reasons.
5espondents claimed that reasonable doubts have
been cast on petitioner-s claim that she was legally
adopted. They have also filed a criminal complaint
against petitioner for falsification of adoption decree,
which was eventually dismissed.
An the meantime, parties were enjoined from
dissipating and disposing any or all of 1lena @ising-s
properties. Dpon re&uest of Chichioco, $tty. (aulino
%aguyod was appointed as the special administrator.
Chichioco filed a motion before the 5TC to enjoin
petitioner from conducting business in the property
belonging to the estate. (etitioner allegedly converted
the basement of @ising-s residence into a billiard hall
without authority of the special administrator.
(etitioner, on the other had, argued that as the sole
heir, she had the right to possess and use the
decedent-s property.
An due course, the C$ held that the presiding judge
%otero gravely abused his discretion in appointing his
clerk of court as the special administrator. %uch act
could engender a suspicion that the Judge and his
clerk are in cahoots in milking the decedent-s estate.
"oreover, $tty. %aguyod failed to comply with the
bond re&uirement. The C$ also held that it was
incumbent for petitioner to prove that she was legally
adopted by the deceased.
I&#: W! petitioner still had to prove the validity of
her adoption due to imputations of irregularities
!o. (etitioner need not prove her legal adoption by
any evidence other than those which she already
presented before the trial court. These documents are
presumed to have been regularly issued as part of the
official duties of that said public officers perform. The
adoption decree is a public document re&uired by law
to be entered into public records. %uch public
documents are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. The certifications suffice as proof of
the fact of petitioner-s adoption until contradicted or
overcome by sufficient evidence.
%uch contrary proof can be presented only in a
separate action brought principally for nullifying the
adoption decree. At cannot be attacked collaterally in a
proceeding for the settlement of a decedent-s estate.
(etitioner-s status as an adopted child of the
decedent remains unrebutted and no serious
challenge has been brought against her standing as
such. /or as long as petitioner-s adoption is
considered valid, respondents cannot claim any
interest in the decedent-s estate.
*"s. Tiu*
F. In!#$ C)&n!$5 A+)(!i)n
A+)(!i)n I&#
Uiegler+ Anternational $doption in the ,est Anterest of the Child
'eclaration on %ocial and @egal (rinciples relating to the (rotection and Welfare of Children* EConcerned at
the large number of children who are abandoned or become orphans owing to violence, internal disturbance,
armed conflicts, natural disasters, economic crisis or social problems,F attempted to formulate guidelines for
countries to follow in child placement problems.
9. %ection 9* /amily as the cornerstone of child welfare
Child welfare depends upon family welfare
/irst priority for a child is to be cared for by his or her parents
2. %ection 2* ;uidelines for foster placement
:. %ection :* !ational and international adoption
Af a child cannot be placed in a foster or adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner
be cared for in the country of origin, inter*country adoption "$R be considered as an
alternative. .'"1%TAC $'(TA! is (51/1551'0
C)n!$aDa$g&.#n!: Li-# :i!" an a+)(!iv# -a.i'5 in a +#v#')(#+ *)&n!$5 i
igni-i*an!'5 .)$# 'i=#'5 !) ($)vi+# !"# .a!#$ia' #*&$i!5 an+ a--#*!i)n *a''#+ -)$1
:"i*" a$# !"# (a$a.)&n! *)ni+#$a!i)n.
9. !ational (ride* maintain status and sense of dignity in the world community .e.g., %outh #orea restricted
number of international adoptions permitted, with total abolition as long*run goalC reversed however in 9>69
because of economic difficulties0
i. A.#$i*a a .#'!ing ()! )- *&'!&$#; N&$!&$# *&'!&$a' +iv#$i!5; A'' A.#$i*an "a$#
an HA.#$*ian *&'!&$#I
ii. R#a'i!5 i !"# *&'!&$# !"## *"i'+$#n :i'' ,# #9(#$i#n*ing in !"#i$ ").# *)&n!$5 i
()v#$!5 an+ +#*a5.
iii. In!#$na!i)na''5 a+)(!#+ *"i'+$#n +) n)! g$): &( :i!")&! a *&'!&$#; !"#5 g$):D&(
:i!" !"# *&'!&$# )- !"#i$ a+)(!iv# *)&n!$5. M)$#)v#$1 a+)(!iv# (a$#n! a$# ),#$v#+
!) #9#$! #--)$! !) -a.i'ia$iG# !"#i$ a+)(!iv# *"i'+ !) *&'!&$# )- !"# *)&n!$5 )- !"#i$
2. Dnacceptable form of international charity
:. 'ifferent conception of national pride* They believe their country and heritage is special, and that their
children would be deprived of something valuable if they were removed from it.
?. @oss of human resources
H. $nti*$mericanI $nti*Western feelings* poignant example of exploitation and expropriation of less developed
countries- valued resources
3. ,est interest of the child
A. At would be best interest of child to remain with family of at least at the country of origin
a0 'eprivation of cultural identity
b0 5acial discrimination
C)&n!#$Da$g&.#n!: E9(#$i#n*# )- $a*ia' +i*$i.ina!i)n i #9!$#.#'5
'i.i!#+. S!&+i# in+i*a!# a+)(!#+ *"i'+$#n "av# g#n#$a''5 #9(#$i#n*#+
()i!iv# a+K&!.#n! in !"#i$ a+)(!iv# ").#.
c0 Dnnecessary separation from family
C)&n!#$Da$g&.#n!: N)! -inan*ia''5 -#ai,'#
AA. A$ acts as Eescape valveF for less developed countries and as Econscience*savingF mechanism for
developed countries, at the expense of the best interest of the child.
i. In!#$na!i)na' *)..&ni!5 :i'' n)! ## !"#i$ .)$a' ),'iga!i)n a
*).('#!#'5 $#'i#v#+ i.('5 ,#*a&# !"#5 &(()$! )$ #ngag# in
in!#$na!i)na' a+)(!i)n.
ii. D&# !) -inan*ia' an+ )*i#!a' *)n!$ain! in '# +#v#')(#+ *)&n!$i#1
igni-i*an! n&.,#$ )- *"i'+$#n ,# a,an+)n#+.
AAA. A$ is dictated by demands of adoptive parents, rather than needs of children involved* creation of
adoption EmarketF*
AP. A$ facilitates child trafficking
C)&n!#$Da$g&.#n!D *an ,# a++$##+ ,5 #!!ing !an+a$+ an+ g&i+#'in#.
*"s. Torres*
P#=in+: D#!#$.ining !"# Un+#!#$.ina,'#: T"# B#! In!#$#! )- !"# C"i'+ S!an+a$+ a an I.(#$-#*! ,&!
N#*#a$5 G&i+#()! !) D#!#$.in# C"i'+ C&!)+5
A. )istory of $llocation of Child Custody
The history of the legal standards governing custody disputes between a child-s parents reveal a
dramatic movement from rules to a highly discretionary principle gradually shorn of narrowing
i. Dntil late 9>
B 1nglish law automatically mandated that children be placed with their
father. 'erived from ancient 5ome where the pater*familias ruled and dominated all
aspects of domestic and public life. Children were considered as property of their father,
which resulted to total control by their father.
ii. Colonial $merican era* /ather, as economic head of the household, was awarded custody
due largely to the child-s importance as an asset in an economy with a deficient labor
iii. 5evolutionary $merican* erosion of patriarchal preference. The family, rather than an
organic whole with the patriarch as its head, gave way to a collectivity of individuals, each
with his or her own rights and interests.
iv. 9>
Century $merican jurisprudence* reject the rule of the absolute paternal preference.
While the father still dominated as the head of the family, individual rights of the other
members were started to be protected.
i. 5ules based on fault emerged+ The children will be best taken care of and instructed by
the innocent party.
ii. rigination of maternal preference* The wife typically filed for divorce, necessarily
re&uiring her to plead and prove fault in order to prevail.
i. 24
Century* @aw more formally evolved in favor of a maternal preference for custody.
ii. $s women began to obtain greater social and economic power, their ability to provide for
their children-s maintenance and education increased proportionately. At was also during
this period that women came to be recogniGed as being better able to care for their
children as a result of Ematernal instincts.F
iii. ETender years doctrineF B came to accept women as having superior morals and nurturing
skills, better suiting then for the care and rearing of children
+. FAMILY LAC TRANSFORMEDD -a*!)$ a--#*!ing !$an-)$.a!i)n
i. 1mergence of feminism as a political force* also largely contributed to the demise of
maternal preferences for custody
ii. /ederalism in family laws
iii. Turmoil of the 9>34-s and the 9>84-s* An the wake of rising divorce rates, challenges to
women-s traditional roles, and men-s claims of sex discrimination in custody awards, most
states abandoned the maternal presumption in favor of a more gender neutral Ebest
interestsF standard.
T"$## ($i.a$5 ),K#*!i)n:
7@ T"# !an+a$+ i in+#!#$.ina!# an+ &n($#+i*!a,'#
2@ T"# !an+a$+ i i.()i,'# !) a+K&+i*a!#
4@ T"# !an+a$+ i &nK&!
,est interest standard must necessarily be open ended because each individual child and
family situation is uni&ue. ,y having an open*ended standard, judges can exercise their
discretion so broadly as to neutraliGe any effective standard.
The courts seem not only to accept psychological expert testimony on complex family
issues, but to demand it to effect what they see as a reasonable resolution to problems
with no single correct solution.
The court-s reliance has A!)151!T (5,@1"%+ (sychology is an undeveloped and
controversial discipline.
There is re&uirement for the court to make predictions of future conditions affecting a
child-s welfare.
,est interest standard is people oriented instead of act oriented. $cts are determinate and
are a concrete basis for courts to rely on.
Compromise expose children to a Esplit the babyF shared custody arrangement that may
be deleterious to their emotional welfare, forcing them to commute between two fre&uently
warring homes.
'ue to uncertainty of outcome, litigation costs increase and the role of lawyers become
more significant.
9. S#9D,a#+ !an+a$+* %tandard that relies on sex of the parent has been universally rejectedC
outdated and unfair way to adjudicate child placement.
2. P$i.a$5 *a$#!a=#$ ($#-#$#n*#* 5elies predominantly on the past allocation of parenting
Courts consider+ .90 parental planning and agreement about the child-s custodial
arrangements and upbringingC and .20 continuity of existing parent*child attachments.
:. L#a! +#!$i.#n!a' a'!#$na!iv# !an+a$+* acknowledge that child is already a victim of his
environmental circumstances, that he is greatly at risk, and that speedy action is necessary to
avoid further harm being done to his chances of healthy psychological development.
0. C).(a$i)n )- va$i)& !an+a$+D
Li!iga!i)n *)n!$)'
i. E9(i+i!#+ 'i!iga!i)nD
a0 $llocate responsibility to the trial court to assure that custody proceedings
conclude within one year from the filing of the petition for dissolution of marriage.
b0 /inancial issues are separated from custody issues.
ii. L# $#'ian*# )n *)n*'&i)n )- *&!)+5 #va'&a!)$ $#ga$+ing *"i'+$#n8 ,#!
in!#$#!D court should exercise greater control over custody experts. There should be
enhanced scrutiny of credibility of supposed experts. Their testimony should also be
limited to the objective indicia they are trained to evaluate.
iii. B#!!#$ a((#''a!# $#vi#:D There needs to be a record for all contested custody litigation.
iv. En"an*#+ !$ia' =i'' )- ($a*!i!i)n#$ an+ K&$i!D Courts should certify a lawyer to
engage in such litigation or, alternatively, re&uire mandatory minimum experience to
ensure full and ade&uate representation.
*"s. Torres*
7. C&!)+5
i. G#n+#$ an+ T#n+#$ Y#a$ P$#&.(!i)n
E9 Pa$!# D#vin#
5e+ Christopher (. 'evine v. $lice ,eth Clark 'evine
Na!&$#: (etition for certiorari to review decision of
Court of Civil $ppeals
Da!#: "arch 28, 9>69
P)n#n!#: "addox, J.
$lice and Christopher were married in 9>33 and got
separated in 9>8>.
They have two children, "athew (atrick .born in
9>820 and Timothy Clark .born in 9>8H0.
The children are of Etender yearsF as contemplated
by the Etender yearsF doctrine or presumption.
The mother was a teacher and currently employed
at the D% $rmy as 1ducational %pecialist. The
father was a member of the faculty and head of the
;uidance and Counselling 'epartment at a
university. B)!" a$# +##.#+ -i! an+ ($)(#r
persons to be vested with care, custody and control
of the minor children. !o evidence was presented
that they were unfit.
%ince there-s a presumption in $labama that when
dealing with minors, !"# na!&$a' .)!"#$ i
($#&.#+ in !"# a,#n*# )- #vi+#n*# !) !"#
*)n!$a$5 !) ,# !"# ($)(#$ (#$)n !) ,# v#!#+
:i!" *&!)+5, the custody was a:a$+#+ !) A'i*#.
C$+ tender years presumption is not a classification
based upon gender, but merely a factual
presumption based upon the historic role of the
I&#: W! the tender years presumption is
Court-s reliance on the tender years presumption
deprived the father of his constitutional
entitlement to the e&ual protection of the law
H#'+: !o. At violates the 9?
amendment to the D%
Constitution. C$ decision reversed and remanded
with directions.
$ny statutory scheme which imposes obligations on
husbands, but not on wives, establishes a
classification based upon sex which is subject to
scrutiny under the 9?
5eed, /rontiero, rr and Caban+ !#n+#$ 5#a$
($#&.(!i)n $#($##n! an &n*)n!i!&!i)na'
g#n+#$D,a#+ *'ai-i*a!i)n :"i*"
+i*$i.ina!# ,#!:##n -a!"#$ an+ .)!"#$ in
*"i'+ *&!)+5 ($)*##+ing )'#'5 )n !"# ,ai
)- #9
o Tender years presumption rejects the
fundamental proposition that maternal and
paternal roles are not invariably different in
o 1ven if mothers as a class were closer than
fathers to young children, this parent*child
relation becomes less acceptable as age of
child increases.
1ven though procedure for presumption is always
cheaper and easier than individualiGed
determination, in view of the fact that the :#'-a$# )-
*"i'+$#n an+ *).(#!ing *'ai. )- (a$#n! a$# a!
!a=#1 &*" .#an )- +#!#$.ina!i)n *ann)! ,#
DIRECTIONS )- *)&$!: *)&$! ")&'+ *)ni+#$
!"# in+ivi+&a' -a*! )- !"# *a# in )$+#$ !) !$&'5
*)ni+#$ !"# ,#! in!#$#! )- !"# *"i'+$#n:
o %ex and age of children
o 1motional, social, moral, material and
educational needs
o )ome environments of parties
o Characteristics of the parties+ age, character,
stability, mental and physical health, capacity
and interest for emotional, social, moral,
material and educational needs of children
o Anterpersonal relationships+ child to parent and
between children
o 1ffect on child of disrupting or continuing an
existing custodial status
o (reference of child, if of sufficient age and
o 5ecommendation of expert witnesses or
independent investigator
o $vailable alternatives
N)!# -)$ Di*&i)n ?Hi!)$5 )- !"# T#n+#$ Y#a$
7. C)..)n La:
/ather rather than the mother has the virtual
absolute right to the custody of the minors
,ase on the feudalistic notions concerning the
EnaturalF responsibilities of the husband at
common law
o )usband is the head or master of his
family, and as such has the responsibility
for the care, maintenance, education and
religious training of the children.
o 5ight is not given to him for his own
gratification but because nature and law
o ,y marriage, husband and wife becomes
one person with legal identity. $s a result,
wife-s rights were often subordinated to
those of her husband.
o ,lackstone+ mother was entitled to no
power over children, but not only to
reverence and respect.
2. 7<
C#n!&$5 Eng'an+
,egan to &uestion the paternal preference rule+
hardship inflicted upon unoffending mothers by
a state of law which took little into account of
their claims or feelings
4. US: H#'. v. F$an*i*&
At would violate the law of nature to snatch an
infant from the care of its mother
E)old nature in contempt and snatch helpless,
puling infancy from the bosom of an affectionate
mother, and place it in the coarse hands of the
father. The "other is the softest and safest nurse
of infancyF
,egan the process of evolution, reflecting a
change in social attitudes
0. R#*#n! 5#a$
CriticiGed by legal commentators as an
outmoded means of resolving child custody
%ee ratio
*"s. Dmali*
C#$van!# v. FaKa$+)
An the matter of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus of minor $ngelie $nne C. Cervantes
!elson Cervantes and Uenaida Cervantes, petitioner v. ;ina /ajardo and Conrado /ajardo, respondents
Na!&$#: (etition for a writ of )abeas Corpus re+
$ngelie $nne Cervantes Da!#: January 28, 9>6>
P)n#n!#: (adilla /&
$ngelie was born in 9>68 to respondents
Conrado and ;ina, common*law husband and
5espondents )--#$#+ !"# *"i'+ -)$ a+)(!i)n to
;ina-s sister and brother*in*law, the spouses
Cervantes, who took care and custody of the
child since she was barely 2 weeks old.
$n affidavit of consent to the adoption of child
was executed by respondent.
RTC: a(($)v#+ !"# (#!i!i)n -)$ a+)(!i)n
o /reed from parental authority of her
natural parents as well as from legal
obligation and maintenance to them and
that the child will be known as $ngelie
$nne Cervantes rather than $ngelie $nne
P#!i!i)n#$ $#*#iv#+ a -$).
$#()n+#n! !) (a5 !"# 'a!!#$ P7E31333 )$
!"#5 :)&'+ g#! ,a*= !"# *"i'+. P#!i!i)n#$
$#-&# !) a**#+#.
While petitioners were at work1 $#()n+#n!
!))= !"# *"i'+ an+ ,$)&g"! Ang#'i# !) "#$
(etitioner demanded that ;ina return the child
but ;ina refused saying that she had no desire
to give up her child for adoption and that it
wasn-t fully explained to her. )owever, she
sent a word to the petitioners that "# :i''
$#!&$n !"# *"i'+ i- !"# -)$.#$ :i'' (a5 "#$ !"#
a.)&n! "# a=#+ -)$.
The social worker who had conducted the study
and submitted the report thereon testified that
she had interviewed ;ina and the respondent
manifested her desire to have the child
adopted by petitioners.
I&#: Who should have the custody of the childL
H#'+: %pouses Cervantes should have the custody of
the child.
An all cases involving custody, care, education and
property of children, !"# *"i'+8 :#'-a$# i
The provision that the child under H shall not be
taken away from the mother will not apply if the
court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise.
/oremost consideration is+ moral, physical, and
social welfare of the child taking into consideration
the resources, moral and social standing of the
contending parents.
T"# na!&$a' (a$#n! a$# n)! &i!a,'# ,#*a&#:
9. Conrado was legally married to another
woman. )is open cohabitation with ;ina will
not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere
to develop into an upright and moral*minded
2. ;ina also has a child with another married
man. This could affect the moral outlook and
values of the minor.
:. ;ina was jobless and maintains illicit
relationship with married man.
P#!i!i)n#$ a$# ")&'+ ,# g$an!#+ !"# *&!)+5
9. They were legally married.
2. They were morally, physically, financially, and
socially capable of supporting the child
:. They could giver her a future better than the
natural mother.
?. "inor was legally adopted with full knowledge
and consent of the natural parents.
$ decree of adoption has the effect of
dissolving authority vested in natural
$dopting parent has the right to the
care and custody of the adopted child
and exercise parental authority and
responsibility over the child.
*"s. Dmali*
E(i$i!& v. CA
Da!#: "arch 9H, 9>>H
P#!i!i)n#$: 5eynaldo 1spiritu and ;uillerma @ayug
R#()n+#n!: Court of $ppeals and Teresita
5eynaldo and Teresita met in 9>83. Teresita
left for California and eventually, 5eynaldo
was also sent to the D% .(ennsylvania0 for
work. They maintained a common*law
relationship and in 9>63, 5osalind was born.
They got married in 9>68, while they were on
a brief vacation in the (hilippines. Dpon their
return to the D% in 9>66, Teresita gave birth
to 5eginald.
The couple separated in 9>>4. Teresita left
5eynaldo and the children, and went back to
California. 5eynaldo brought his children
home to the (hilippines but since his work in
the D% was not yet completed, he was sent
back by his company to (ittsburgh. )e had
to leave his children with his sister
.;uillerma0 and her family.
5eynaldo also filed a criminal case of
bigamy against Teresita.
An 9>>:, the trial court declared 5eynaldo to
have sole parental authority. An 9>>?,
Teresita appealedC the C$ then gave her
custody of the children.
I&#: Who is more suitable and better &ualified to
have custody of the childrenL
H#'+: 5eynaldo, the father, is more suitable and
better &ualified to have custody of the children.
There is nothing to show that 5eynaldo is an
7unfit7 parent. $lso, it was Teresita who left
the conjugal home and the children, to go to
Whether the child is under or over 8 years of
age, the paramount criterion must always be
the childJs interests. An the present case,
both children are now over 8 years of age
and their clear choice is the father.
Considerations involving the choice made by
a child must be ascertained at the time that
either parent is given custody over the child.
"oreover, the illicitIimmoral activities of the
mother had already caused emotional
disturbances, personality conflicts, and
exposure to conflicting moral values in
;iven the findings of the trial court+
o Cer morality is 2uestionable as sho%n by
her marrying 8eynaldo at the time she
had a subsisting marriage %ith another
**^ $pparently, Teresita was already
married to 5oberto @ustado .9>6?0 when
she married 5eynaldo .9>680.
o She is guilty of grave indiscretion in
carrying on a love affair %ith one of
8eynaldoIs fello% $S* employees&
**^ When 5osalind was a little over H
years old, she was referred to a child
psychologist to determine the effects of
uprooting her from the school where she
was studying. The responses of 5osalind
about her mother were very negative.
5osalind suffered from emotional
disturbance because, as she revealed,
she saw hew mother hugging and kissing
a 7bad7 man .(erdencio ;onGales0 who
lived in their house and worked for her
father. 5osalind also refused to go back to
the D% and be reunited with her mother.
o She is incapable of providing the children
%ith necessities and conveniences
commensurate to their social standing
because she does not even o%n any
home in the Philippines&
o She is emotionally unstable %ith ebullient
**^ )er conduct and demeanor in the
courtroom demonstrated her ebullient
temper that tended to corroborate the
alleged violence of her physical
punishment of the children .even if only for
ordinary disciplinary purposes0 and
emotional instability, typified by her failure
.or refusalL0 to show deference and
respect to the Court and the other parties.
*"s. Peneracion*
C#'i v. Ca-&i$
Da!#: June 92, 9>H4
P#!i!i)n#$: Aleana $. Celis
R#()n+#n!: %oledad Cafuir
An 9>?3, Aleana gave birth to Joel .John0
Cafuir. 'ue to the anger and extreme
displeasure of her father and because of her
fatherJs objection to having her son in their
home, nine days after the babyJs delivery,
Joel was given to the custody of %oledad.
Aleana spent several days in %oledadJs
house while recuperatingC later, she returned
to her own home leaving her child to the care
of %oledad. Aleane visited her child every
An 9>?6, Aleana married $gustin C. 5ivera.
The couple then decided to get back Joel.
,ut respondent refused to give up the child.
I&#: Who has the right to the custody of JoelL
H#'+: Aleana must be given custody of the child.
Aleana did not renounce her custody of and
patria potestas .parental authority0 over her
The documents wherein the boyJs mother is
supposed to have definitely renounced
custody over the child cannot be reasonably
interpreted as having contemplated such
o /irst document+ merely entrusted
her son to %oledad because she did
not have the means to bring him up.
The word 7entrusted7 cannot
convey the idea of definite and
permanent renunciation of the
motherJs custody of her child.
o %econd document+ merely
designated %oledad as the 7real
guardian7 of the child. This does not
mean that said guardian will always
assume and discharge the duties of
the office or position. ;uardianship
is temporary.
o 7no one has the right to claim for
adoption except "rs. %oledad
Cafuir7 **^ future actC does not
mean that she has already adopted
Aleana is now married to a man who with her
is ready and willing to assume the
responsibility of support and educationC the
couple is now able to discharge and cope
with said responsibility.
*"s. Peneracion*
Ga.,)a v. CA
Da!#: July 99 2448
P)n#n!#: Pelasco J.
/ranklin and $gnes were married on
'ecember 2:, 2444 and established their
conjugal dwelling in 'iniwid, ,oracay Asland.
n 'ecember 2442, %imone, their child was
An 244H, the couple started to have marital
problems regarding $gnes insistencethat
they should stay in "akati while /ranklin
would rather have it if they stay in ,oracay.
n "arch 2443, $gnes asked for money and
/ranklin-s permission to bring their daughter
to "akati for a brief vacation. /ranklin
agreed but they never came back.
/ranklin filed a petition for habeas corpus
before the C$ for $gnes to produce %imone
n "ay 9>, 2443 C$ issued a resolution to
granting the petition and ordering that
%imone be brought before the said Court on
"ay 23, 2443.
n June 6, 2443, after a series of hearings
and presentation of evidence, C$
promulgated a decision that granted /ranklin
joint custody with $gnes. ?Aai'#+
$gnes filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied for lack of merit.
W! the C$ commited grave abuse of discretion in
granting custody of the minor child to both parents.
Res, the sole custody of the child should have been
awarded to the mother.
The Convention on the 5ights of the Child and the
The Child and Routh Welfare Code, provides that in
actions concerning children, the best interests of the
child must be of primary consideration. The tender*
age presumption provided in $rticle 29: of the /C
may be overcome only by *).(#''ing #vi+#n*#
showing the mother-s unfitness. The mother is
declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in
one or more of the following instances+ neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the
child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable
disease. $gnes did not fall under any of these
circumstances. Thus the sole custody of the child
must be awarded to her mother $gnes ;amboa.
*"r. %antiago*
S5 v. CA
Wilson %y, petitioner, vs. Court of $ppeals, 5TC "anila, "ercedes Tan Dy*%y, respondents
Da!#: 28 'ec 2448
Na!&$#: (etition for review on certiorari the decision
and resolution of C$
P)n#n!#: Tinga, J.
9>Jan>? "ercedes Tan Dy*%y filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus against Wison Dy and for
custody of their minor children Panessa and
Jeremiah. Wilson argued against it alleging
"ercedes- abandonment, mental instability and
inability to care for the children.
9?'ec>? 5TC+ Custody of children to "ercedes.
Wilson should provide monthly support of
Wilson appealed to C$ re custody and amount of
9. Wilson was unable to prove "ercedes was
unfit to have custody.
o $bandonment+ "ercedes was driven away
by Wilson-s family due to religious
differencesC her going to Taiwan was
motivated by her desire to earn money to
reclaim her children
o Ansanity+ "ercedes- praying outdoors in the
rain is an expression of her faith, and not
evidence of insanity as Wilson claims
o Anability to care for her children+ "ercedes
has enough financial ability to provide
necessities for her children
2. Assue of support may be raised in
proceedings for writ of habeas corpus.
o )is ability to give support was determined
by his answers on his sources of income.
o Judgment of support is never final and
Wilson is free to seek its modification.
I&#; H#'+; Ra!i):
C;N CA #$$#+ in a:a$+ing )'# *&!)+5 !)
M#$*#+#. I! +i+ n)!. An de facto separation, the
court shall award the care, custody and control of
each child as will be for his best interest. The law
prefers the mother if she is a fit and proper person,
particularly since the minors involved in this case are
below age 8.
/C %ec. 29: An case of separation of the parents,
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless
the parent chosen is unfit.
!o children under 8 years of age shall be separated
from the mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise.
5ules of Court %ec. 3 5ule >> Custody and $doption
of "inors
%ec. 3. (roceedings as to child whose parents are
separatedC $ppeal. * When husband and wife are
divorced or living separately and apart from each
other, and the &uestion as to the care, custody, and
control of a child or children of their marriage is
brought before a 5egional Trial Court ,5 (#!i!i)n )$
a an in*i+#n! !) an5 )!"#$ ($)*##+ing1 !"# *)&$!1
&()n "#a$ing !"# !#!i.)n5 a .a5 ,# (#$!in#n!1
"a'' a:a$+ !"# *a$#1 *&!)+51 an+ *)n!$)' )- #a*"
&*" *"i'+ as will be for its best interest, permitting
the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with
if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent so
chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason
of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity,
or poverty. Af, upon such hearing, it appears that both
parents are improper persons to have the care,
custody, and control of the child, the court may either
designate the paternal or maternal grandparent of the
child, or his oldest brother or sister, or some reputable
and discreet person to take charge of such child, or
commit it to any suitable asylum, childrenJs home, or
benevolent society. The court may in conformity with
the provisions of the Civil Code order either or both
parents to support or help support said child,
irrespective of who may be its custodian, and may
make any order that is just and reasonable permitting
the parent who is deprived of its care and custody to
visit the child or have temporary custody thereof.
1ither parent may appeal from an order made in
accordance with the provisions of this section. !o
child under seven years of age shall be separated
from its mother, unless the court finds there are
compelling reasons therefore.
C;N CA "a+ K&$i+i*!i)n !) a:a$+ &(()$! in a
"a,#a *)$(& *a#. I! +i+. $lthough /C $rt. 24:
provides that support would be paid only upon
demand of same, the issue may be treated as though
it were raised. There was implied consent from the
parties based on testimonies of Wilson and
"ercedes, regarding the need and ability to support,
%ec. H. $mendment to conform to or authoriGe
presentation of evidence. When issues not raised by
the pleadings are tried with the express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings x
x x
C;N !"# a:a$+ )- PE31333 &(()$! i a$,i!$a$51
&nK&!1 &n$#a)na,'# an+ !an!a.)&n! !) a *'#a$
+#($iva!i)n )- ($)(#$!5 :i!")&! +&# ($)*# )-
'a:. I! :a n)!. ,oth 5TC and C$ based the amount
on Wilson-s representations regarding his family-s
wealth and ability to provide for the children. An any
case, the amount may be modified according to the
needs of the other party and his means to provide
*by "s. )ernandeG*
ii. Pa$#n!a' Un-i!n#
F#' v. F#'
(hilip /eldman, respondent v "ady /eldman, appellant
(onente+ ,enjamin, J.
!ature+ $ppeal by wife from an order transferring custody of two children from her to his ex*husband
July 9H, 9>8?
The lower court transferred from the mother
to the unmarried father the custody of their
two children ages six and nine who
previously had continuously resided with
their mother since birth.
(arties were married in $pril, 9>32
Ci-#."ady /eldman0 ),!ain#+ a +iv)$*#
+#*$## based upon the cruel and inhuman
treatment of the husband, and was awarded
custody of the children
%ubse&uent to the divorce, :i-# !a$!#+
+a!ing an in+ivi+&a' which she later found
to be married but nevertheless continued to
socialiGe with
The former husband.(hilip /eldman0 on a
visit to his former wife-s home had observed
on her night table a *)(5 )- SCREC
.agaGin# . a publication of dubious social
values0 and found letters .som# :i!"
#9('i*i! (")!)g$a(" attached0
An the lower court it was established that+
o !"# .)!"#$8 ($iva!# #9 'i-# in
n) :a5 inv)'v#+ )$ a--#*!#+ !"#
*"i'+$#n.father acknowledged that
the children never saw or
commented upon the offensive
o At was also established that the
children were well provided for both
emotionally and physically
o The atmosphere of the mother-s
home was happy and cheerful,
premises are well*kept and
o That the mother was sincerely
concerned and devoted to the
children and bestowed upon them
an abundance of love and care
W! the ex*wife is an unfit parent thus
custody of the children be transferred to the ex*
!o. Custody should remain to the ex*wife
A.)$a'i!51 i..)$a'i!51 #9&a' +#via!i)n
an+ a,#$$an! #9&a' ($a*!i*# +)# n)!
i() -a*!) *)n!i!&!# &n-i!n# -)$
o An the instant case sexually oriented
literature should not be considered
as a determining factor against the
wife for the custody of the children
$lthough the contents of %C51W magaGine
may be offensive to some, the courts are
constitutionally prohibited taking any punitive
measure to inhibit or restrict an individual
from reading any matter in !"# ($iva*5 )-
"i ):n ").#
The right of a divorced woman to engage in
private sexual activities, which in no way
involve or affect her minor children, is :i!"in
!"# (#n&.,$a )- !"# $ig"! !) ($iva*5
Courts should decide on the basis of H,#!
in!#$#! )- !"# *"i'+$#nI and not on a
subjective evaluation of the lifestyle of the
a change of custody should be made only i-
!"#$# i a "):ing )- !"# &n-i!n# !)
*)n!in&# as the custodial parent, which in
this case was not proven
/urther, the traumatic psychological
dislocation which the two children of tender
years would suffer from the change of
custody ordered by the trial court would
render tragic casualties
*"r. $rnesto*
,. R)'# )- !"# C"i'+8 P$#-#$#n*#
PiGa$$) /. /a%&#G ?7<4F@
#eywords+ Wife-s adultery not proven, wins custody
This is a case of a wife whose commission of adultery
was not proven but her husband-s cruelty and
infidelity were proven instead, entitling the wife for
separate maintenance and custody of her : minor
children while living separately from her husband.
9>26 B Wife and )usband got married and separated
Wife .W0 "aria (iGarro filed an action for support,
together with her : minor children against )usband
.)0 "ario Pas&ueG due to his infidelity and cruelty.
The ) argues however that they have a contract of
separation and it was his wife who committed adultery
after such separation.
@ower Court found for the husband on issue on
adultery and ordered custody of : minor children to be
placed with the husband-s parents considering their
right to support.
Wife appeals.
ISSUE: W! W is guilty of adultery and therefore has
no right to separate maintenance and custody over
/acts show to the %upreme Court that+
9>26 B they got married
%eptember 93, 9>2: B they executed contract of
separation .due to )-s infidelity and cruelty0
$ugust 9>:6 .99 months after separation0 B youngest
third child @orenGo was born. At is this due to this fact
that ) contends that wife committed adultery for they
have been living separately since 9>:: and had never
had intercourse with his wife. W contends that they
has a short*lived marital reunion after they met in a
town fiesta in !ovember 9>:: when husband
promised to behave in the future.
"arital reunion of )KW is not impossible or
improbable in !ovember 9>::. W therefore has
prima facie presumption of not committing adultery
and @orenGo therefore has the presumption of
legitimacy being born in wedlock since parents were
merely separated.
There were inconsistency in )-s allegations that he
discovered unchastity of wife only after birth of
@orenGo but in his $nswer ."arch 9>:?0 filed 3
months before the birth of @orenGo, he already
pointed out on his wife-s adultery. Court finds that he
attempted to conceal such knowledge to avoid
inconsistency between his knowledge of adultery in
"arch 9>:? and his act of providing support in
%eptember and ctober the same year. Wife-s
adultery therefore is not sufficiently established.
$ssertions of )-s cruelty and infidelity are also not
contradicted .despite allegation of his infidelity is only
based on wife-s testimony0.
HELD: W is entitled to separate maintenance and
custody of the children .and since such custody was
also stipulated in their contract of separation0.
*"s. CorpuG*
G)'+!#in /. G)'+!#in ?7<PE@
#eywords+ ,oth parents are fit to have custody,
child-s preference considered
This is a case 2 parents who are fit to have
custody over their child but since circumstances are
nearly in state of e&uipoise .Webster-s definition+
balance, e&uilibrium0 as to make it difficult for the
judge to decide, %C of 5hode Asland considers the
child-s preference.
9>84 B /amily Court denied petition of wife
Claire ;oldstein .W0 for divorce and custody over
child against husband 1dward ;oldstein .)0. ) won
custody rights and W was granted visitation rights.
)owever, ) with > y.o daughter left 5hode Asland to
reside in Asrael.
Wife appeals to Trial Court .particularly due
to their leaving for Asrael0.
9>8: B : years later after the decision of
family court was rendered, proceedings for the appeal
started .during pendency of appeal, wife was given
custody to reestablish mother and child relationship0.
$t the trial court hearing the ff. among
others transpired+ that both parents are fit to have
custody and care for child-s needs, psychiatric
evidence shows that child was intelligent and was
able to cope with burdens not usual to children her
age without giving her emotional damage.
An open court B the child had difficulty
revealing her preference . Anside the chambers with
the judge however B she revealed she loved her
father more and wanted to go to Asrael with him. %he
also doesn-t desire visitation from her mother. The
judge agreed with child though with urgings thru Efair
bargainF conditioned that she be allowed to stay with
her father but with visitation of her mother during each
Trial Court B therefore ruled custody in favor
of ), hence W appeals.
ISSUE: W! custody must be give to ) and not W.
Wife contends B that TC allowed child-s
preference to control its decision ignoring policy that
mother are preferred for custody on young children
especially girls, preference usually given to resident
parent when both e&ually fit and policy that minor can
only elect a guardian if atleast 9? y.o., and even
needs (robate court approval
%upreme Court of 5hode Asland looked into
events that transpired in the @ower Court that it
%C says though TC failed to consider those
factors, such oversight is not controlling. ther
considerations by TC are also as relevant if placed on
the same scale i.e.+ parties- e&ual suitability,
psychiatric evidence of child-s emotional stability and
intelligence, TC-s opportunity to observe her
demeanor, appearance, attitude, and therefore
arriving at the conclusion that her preference on her
father is not a mere whim and given substantial
%C also noted TC judge-s solicitude B that
child be a willing participant of her mother-s visitation
rights and custody and visitation will be reevaluated
on the same year TC gave the decision.
%ince circumstances are nearly in state of
e&uipoise .Webster-s definition+ balance, e&uilibrium0
where both parents are fit to have custody and care
fore the child-s needs as to make it difficult for the
judge to decide, %C considers the child-s preference.
*"s. CorpuG*
La9a.ana v. La9a.ana
5eymond @axamana, petitioner vs. "a. @ourdes @axamana, respondent
P)n#n!#: Rnares*%antiago, /.
Da!#: %eptember :, 2442
Na!&$#: (etition for review on certiorari of a decision of the
5TC of TC
(etitioner 5eymond @axamana and 5espondent
"a. @ordes @axamana fights )v#$ !"# *&!)+5
)- !"#i$ !"$## .in)$ *"i'+$#n.
'uring their marriage, (#!i!i)n#$ ?"&,an+@
became a +$&g +#(#n+#n!. )e underwent
several treatment and rehabilitation programs.
n 9>>8, the court issued an order declaring
petitioner Ealready drug*free.F
'espite several confinements, respondent .wife0
still claimed that petitioner was not fully
n 9>>>, respondent .wife0 filed a petition for
annulment of marriage. %ubse&uently, petitioner
.husband0 filed a motion seeking visitation rights
over his children. A-!#$ !"# (a$!i# $#a*"#+ an
ag$##.#n!, the court issued an order g$an!ing
vii!a!i)n $ig"! !) (#!i!i)n#$ and directing the
parties to &n+#$g) (5*"ia!$i* an+
(5*")')gi*a' #9a.ina!i)n.
/A!'A!;% / T)1 (%RC) 1Q$"+
o E5eymond @axamana Nis not yetO
completely cured even though his drug
urine test at "edical City for EshabuF
was negative.F
,asing its decision on the psych exam findings,
the RTC ruled+
o The children Q Q Q are hereby ordered
to remain under the custody of the
respondent. The visitation arrangement
as per rder of 'ec 8, 9>>> is hereby
incorporated and forms part of this
'ecision. Q Q Q
I&#: W! the trial court considered the paramount
interest and welfare of the children in awarding their
custody to respondent .wife0
Anstant case is 51"$!'1' to the 5TC for the
purpose of $#*#iving #vi+#n*# !) +#!#$.in#
!"# -i!n# )- (#!i!i)n#$ an+ $#()n+#n! !)
!a=# *&!)+5 )- !"#i$ *"i'+$#n.
(ending the final disposition of the case,
*&!)+5 "a'' $#.ain :i!" $#()n+#n! but
subject to petitioner-s visitation rights.
$ child if )v#$ #v#n 5#a$ )- ag# may be
permitted to *"))# :"i*" (a$#n! "#;"#
($#-#$ !) 'iv# :i!"1 but the court is not bound
by such choice i- !"# (a$#n! ) *")#n i &n-i!.
/actors to be considered by the court+ physical,
educational, social and moral welfare of the childC
resources as well as social and moral situations
of the opposing parents
While petitioner has a history of drug
dependence, there is n) #vi+#n*# !) "): !"a!
$#()n+#n! i &n-i! !) ($)vi+# !"# *"i'+$#n
with ade&uate support, education, as well as
moral and intellectual training and development.
R#: C")i*# )- *"i'+$#n .T(AC$@ A%%D10
The trial court merely stated that+ EThe children
were asked as to whether they would like to be
with petitioner but there are indications that they
entertain fears in their hearts and want to be sure
that their father is no longer a drug dependent.F
The :#'-a$# )- !"# *"i'+$#n SHOULD NOT BE
&,K#*! !) !"# (a$#n!8 a5D) )$ .&!&a'
ag$##.#n! a')n#.
*"s. ,eley*
*. P$#&.(!i)n -)$ P$i.a$5 Ca$#!a=#$
"ichael ;arska vs. ;wendolyn "cCoy
P)n#n!#: !eely, J.
Na!&$#: $ppellant "cCoy, mother, appeals from an
order of the Circuit Court which gave the custody of
her son, Jonathan "cCoy, to the appellee, "ichael
;arska, the natural father.
Da!#: "ay 23, 9>69
$ppellant "cCoy moved from her
grandparents- house to live with her mother.
"cCoy was 9H years old and her mother shared
a trailer with appellee, ;arska. "cCoy became
pregnant by ;arska. $fter : months, she
returned to her grandparents- home.
"cCoy received no support from ;arska
during her pregnancy. $fter she gave birth to
Jonathan, ;arska sent a package of baby food
and diapers.
Jonathan developed a chronic respiratory
infection which re&uired hospitaliGation. "cCoy-s
grandfather attempted to have the hospitaliGation
paid by his medical insurance but he was
informed that Jonathan was ineligible unless
adopted by the grandfather.
"cCoy signed a consent to the adoption of
Jonathan by her grandparents. Dpon learning of
the adoption plan, ;arska visited the baby for the
first time and sent money weekly.
;randparents filed a petition for adoption
and ;arska filed a petition for habeas corpus to
secure custody of his son. The proceedings were
consolidated for hearing. Circuit court dismissed
adoption petition upon finding that Jonathan has
not resided with his great grandparents for the
re&uisite 3 months before filing the petition.
Circuit Court awarded the custody to the
father for the ff. reasons+ natural father, relatively
better education, relatively more intelligence,
relatively better ability to provide financial
support, relatively better socio*economic
environment, relatively better command of the
1nglish language, relatively better appearance
and demeanor, and father-s motivation in his
desire to have custody while the mother had
previously executed an adoption consent.
9. To whom should the custody of Jonathan be
givenL "other S "cCoy
2. %hould the tender year presumption be
considered in favor of the motherL !o.
(resumption in favor of primary caretaker parent
for children of tender years
:. 'id the circuit court apply inappropriate
standards to determine relative fitness for
custodyL Res.
9. $ward of custody should be based on the best
interest of the child and not on a presumption of
as regards the fitness of the parents. The father,
by providing 9H dollars a week child support,
probably showed enough interest to have
standing to object to adoption. ,ut there is no
evidence that the mother was an unfit parent. An
this case, there is no justification to remove
custody from the primary caretaker parent B the
mother. %he mobiliGed all resources at her
command i.e., the regard of her grandparents, to
provide Jonathan with medical attention. /ather-s
educational and economic position pale in
comparison to the mother-s love, tolerance, and
willingness to sacrifice.
2. @oss of child is particularly terrifying to the
primary caretaker parent who was closest to the
child. %ex roles are becoming more flexible.
(rimary caretaker parent may also be the father.
;ender neutrality. (arent who is not the primary
caretaker is usually financially superior. Child and
primary caretaker parent are entitled to support
from the financially superior parent.
". (ractical considerations in setting child custody
a. (revent issue of custody from being an
abusive weapon to affect level of support
payments %olomon syndrome+ parent
who is most attached to the child will be
most willing to accept an inferior bargain
b. 5elative degrees of fitness re&uires precision
of measurementC judges cannot measure
minute gradations of psychological capacity
presumption in favor of primary caretaker
parent if heIshe meets the minimum
standard of being a fit parent regardless of
sex Ncaring and nurturing duties of a parent+
meals, grooming, clothing, medical care,
arranging for social interaction, alternative
care such as babysitting, putting child to
sleep, disciplining, and educationO
c. Drgent need in contemporary divorce law for
a legal structure upon which divorcing couple
may rely on to reach a settlement which
was used by the court as basis here in
settling issues of custody and support
*"s. Celso*
+. F'i( )- !"# C)in
"nookin, Child Custody $djudication Judicial /unctions in the /ace of Andeterminacy
B5 R),#$! H. Mn))=in
T"#.# )- !"# Pa(#$:
9. The determination of what is best or least detrimental for a particular child is usually in+#!#$.ina!# and
(#*&'a!iv#. There is no clear*cut consensus on the standards to be used in determining what is best or least
2. Courts perform two very different functions in the resolution of custody disputes+ private dispute settlement and
child protection.
PRI/ATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT FUNCTIOND involved when the court must choose between two or more private
individuals, each of whom claim an associational interest with the child.
CHILD PROTECTION FUNCTION* involves the judicial enforcement of standards of paternal behavior believed
necessary to protect the child. This function is consistent with the parens patriae power of the state to empower
courts to remove children from parental custody if necessary for their protection
7. Div)$*# C&!)+5 La:
- The winner usually has less than all the rights included in custody with the ongoing two parent family
- There can be joint custody with the child living periodically with each of the parents but more typically, only
one parent has custody, subject to the other-s right of visitation
- 'uty of support is often separated from the right of custody
- (ermits courts great flexibility in dividing the various legal elements of the parent*child relationship
- "aternal preference standards are being displaced by neutral application of the ,#! in!#$#! !an+a$+
.deciding according to the best interests of the child0
2. G&a$+ian"i( C&!)+5 'a:
- Who should be appointed as guardian of a child-s personL
- Contemporary legal standards reveal considerable judicial discretion and less automatic deference paid to
the claims of natural parents. The law in most .D%0 jurisdictions today permits the court to appoint some
other person if the welfare of the child would thereby be better served.
- There is a trend towards more discretionary standards on the part of the court deciding.
4. J&v#ni'# C)&$!DC"i'+ N#g'#*! La:
- There are statutes today allowing a court to assume jurisdiction over a neglected or abused child and to
remove the child from parental custody under broad and vague standards.
- An neglect cases, juvenile courts today use highly individualiGed, discretionary standards to decide whether a
child should be removed from parental custody.
0. Inv)'&n!a$5 T#$.ina!i)n )- Pa$#n!a' Rig"!D A+)(!i)n
- Af the natural parents withhold consent, state laws provide for adoption without such consent under specified
- Termination cases often involve child protection function+ the state may initiate termination proceedings to
free for adoption a child already dependent of the juvenile system on the basis of allegations that the child
has been neglected or abandoned by his natural parents.
- The legal standard for abandonment is becoming more discretionary and more child*centered+ permitting
children to be freed for adoption when their parents manifest their disinterest or inattention, regardless of
subjective attention to abandon child
Sin*# !"#$# a$# +i.ini"#+ +i--#$#n*# a.)ng !"# +i--#$#n! !an+a$+ &#+ !) +#!#$.in# *&!)+51 !"#$# a$#
*a'' a'$#a+5 -)$ !"# &ni-)$.i!5 )- !an+a$+. T"#$# a$# !"$## g#n#$a'iGa!i)n ,a#+ )n !"# !&+5 )- !"##
9. %ubstantial discretion is given to the courts. Controlling legal standards have become less specific
2. %tandards are becoming neutral in applying the allegedly neutral application of the best*interests*of*the*child
:. The four strands of custody law are not doctrinally pure.
- $ny intervenor .state, natural parents or others0 who wishes to alter a child-s placement would have the burden
of establishing that the child is unwanted, and if so, that his current placement is not the least detrimental
alternative. The focus would be exclusively on the interests of the child and no preference would be given to the
natural parent as such.
7. H): a$# *&!)+5 +i(&!# +#*i+#+ !)+a5J H): i i! +i--#$#n! -$). !$a+i!i)na' a+K&+i*a!i)nJ
- C&!)+5 Di(&!#: P#$)n QO$i#n!#+1 n)! A*!DO$i#n!#+ D#!#$.ina!i)n. An determining custody based on
the best interests of the child principle, a court must evaluate the attitudes, dispositions, capacities and
shortcomings of each parent. An&uiry centers on what kind of person each parent is, and what the child is like
- C&!)+5 Di(&!#D P$#+i*!i)n n)! D#!#$.ina!i)n )- Pa! A*!. An granting the custody of children to a
parent or a guardian, the court must consider with whom the child will be better*off in the near*future. ,ut the
problem is that in practice, instead of making individualiGed predictions, courts formulate rules of thumb based on
ascertainable facts of the past.
- In!#$+#(#n+#n*# )- O&!*).#DA--#*!ing Fa*!)$. The probable interaction among the parties involved even
after the divorce and granting of custody must be taken into consideration because even as it may end the legal
relationship, the social and psychological relationship continue
- Fin+ing1 P$#*#+#n! an+ A((#''a!# R#vi#:. $ppellate courts are more hesitant to muddle with the decisions of
the lower courts since in the lower courts- decisions, the character and disposition of the parties are ascertained
by the judge and these become factors on his decision as to who should be given custody. 1stimates of
character cannot be made by those who have not seen or heard the parties. These estimates cannot be made
solely on the basis of transcripts from the lower court.
- Pa$!i*i(a!i)n ,5 A'' A--#*!#+ Pa$!i#. While the issue in a child custody case is what will become of the child,
ordinarily the child is not a true participant in the process. The child does not ordinarily define the interests
2. In+#!#$.ina*5 )- P$##n!DDa5 S!an+a$+
- The judge should decide based on what he thinks will maximiGe what is best for the child. )ow he makes the
decision can be seen as a problem of rational choice. )owever, decision making under this model re&uires that
90 the decision maker can determine possible outcomes for each course of action, 20 the utility measure that
integrates his values and allows comparisons among alternative outcomes, and :0 that the decision maker be
able to specify the probability of an outcome resulting from an action. The decision*maker should also be aware
of the new information which can alter his calculations
- $pplying rational choice on the custody determination based on the best interests of the child principle, the judge
should be aware of the behavior of each parent in the past and how this behavior affected the child, and of the
child-s present condition. An terms of prediction however, the task becomes difficult because more than one
outcome is possible for each course of judicial action and even psychiatrists and psychoanalysts conceded that
their theories provide no reliable guide in predicting what is likely to happen to a child. The judge must also
determine what is in a child-s best interests which would be basis of determining the utility of each outcome. An
some cases, the preference of the child is given weight but people often lack confidence on the judgment of the
child considering his capacity and level of maturity to determine his own utility.
- Af there are decisions easily made, it is because while there is no consensus on what is best for the child, there is
much consensus on what is bad for the child. Thus, the judge can make short term predictions on the welfare of
the child if custody is to be granted to a parent
* ,efore analyGing policies concerning children, there are three basic starting points+
9. S!a!# (a!#$na'i.: %tate has primary responsibility for children and ought to exercise full control over their lives,
except where delegation to the family is justified
2. Fa.i'5 A&!)n).5: (ower and responsibility for children rests on private hands*the family, except in cases where
government rule can be justified
:. Agn)!i*i.: !o preference and instead approaches individual policy issues on their own merits
* Andeterminacy flows from our inability to predict accurately human behavior and from a lack of social consensus
about the values that should inform the decision.
*C)&'+ R&'# B# B#!!#$J YES. $djudication by a more determinate rule would confront the fundamental problems
posed by an indeterminate principle. The problem with and indeterminate standard is that+
.90 There is a risk of retroactive application of a norm of which the parties affected will have no noticeC
.20 There is an obviously greater risk of violating the principle that like cases should be decided alike.
.:0 'ecision would depend much on who has the authority to decide what is best for a particular child and under
what circumstances.
*C)n#%&#n*# )- In+#!#$.ina*5:
.90 There is little guidance for the identification of cases where state intervention to protect children is appropriate,
giving broad discretion to the judge. This is wrong because+
.a0 the use of an indeterminate standard is inconsistent with the proper allocation of responsibility between the
family and the stateC
.b0 an indeterminate standard allows a court to evaluate parental attitudes and behavior on the basis of the
personal valuesC
.c0 courts may underestimate the risks of removal, i.e., the psychological damage that may occur to the child in
bring himIher to foster careC and
.d0 present legal standards fail to re&uire judicial evaluation of alternatives to removal.
.20 There is also the risk that children after removal may never be able to come back to their families. r, if they are
put in foster care, they may be destined to remain in limbo until adulthood, wards of a largely indifferent state. When
under the care of foster parents, they may find themselves in an awkward position, unable to locate themselves within
the family set*up.
*There should be standards for the decision to remove. Judicial discretion for the child*protection function should be
made much more limited. The standard should be made more objective and determinate.
*T"#$# ")&'+ ,# !"$## in!#$.#+ia!# $&'# -)$ ($iva!# +i(&!# #!!'#.#n!:
9. custody should never be awarded to a claimant whose limitations or conduct would endanger the health of the
child under the minimum standards for child protection described above
2. the court should prefer a psychological parent, i.e., an adult who has a psychological relationship with the child
from the child-s perspective
:. natural parents should be preferred over others
9. N#g)!ia!i)n an+ M#+ia!i)n: The child-s existing and future relationship with his parents will be less damaged by
a negotiated settlement than by a court order where there is a winner and a loser
2. In-)$.a' A+K&+i*a!i)n: At is a more intimate form of adjudication or arbitration that is highly desirable. An closely
knit communities, the adjudicator may be the patriarch, the matriarch, or the leader known to and respected by
both parties. The problem is this community set*up may be scarce by now and there is the possibility that the
chosen adjudicator will decline the task.
:. Ran+). S#'#*!i)n: What if you already resorted to informal adjudication but the problem of custody is still not
settledL The solution is to /@A( $ CA!. This would mean an acknowledgment of our ignorance and the e&uality
of both parents. $ coin flip symbolically abdicates government responsibility for the child and symbolically denies
the importance of human differences and distinctiveness. )owever, many would disagree with this alternative
because it would mean an abdication for the search of wisdom. The repulsion of this suggestion by the people
reflects an intuitive appreciation of the importance of the educational, participatory, and symbolic values of
adjudication as a mode of dispute settlement.
*"s. CereGo*
2. O!"#$ Rig"! an+ D&!i# in E9#$*i# )- Pa$#n!a' A&!")$i!5
Sa'i#n!# v. A,ani''a
"arie $ntoinette, rlando, 5osario %alientes, petitioner vs. @oran $banilla, Judge %abundayo, 5TC, respondent
Da!#+ $ugust 2>, 2443
Na!&$#+ (etition for review on certiorari decision and
resolution of C$
(etitioner "arie and respondent @oran are
the parents of the 2*year*old minor @orenGo
and they lived with "arie-s parents. )owever
due to problems with the in*laws, @oran
suggested that they transfer to their own
house. "arie refused and so @oran left. )e
was thereafter prevented from seeing his
@oran filed for )abeas Corpus and Custody.
Trial court gave order to petitioner "arie and
her parents to produce and bring before the
court the body of the minor @orenGo and to
show cause why said child should not be
discharged from restraint.
(etitioners filed for certiorari but C$
dismissed petition stating that the order of
the trial court did not award the custody of
the child to anyone but was simply a
standard order issued for the production of
restrained persons and that a summary
proceeding was still going to be conducted.
(etitioners relied on $rt. 29: of /C .no child
under 8 shall be separated from the mother
unless there is compelling reason to do so0
and contend that proper remedy was simply
an action for custody and not habeas corpus
since it is unavailable against the mother
who under the law has the right of custody of
the minor.
5espondent contends that $rt. 29: applies
only to the second part of his petition
regarding custody and that said article does
not apply to a petition for habeas corpus
which pertains to his right as a father to see
his son. )e asserts that habeas corpus is
available against any person who restrains
the minors rights to see his father and vice
)e also contends that he and the petitioner
have a shared custody and parental
authority over their son.
I&#+ W! habeas corpus is the proper remedy to
be resorted to by the father
H#'++ R1%.
)abeas corpus may be resorted to in cases
where rightful custody is withheld from a
person entitled thereto. Dnder $rt. 299 of the
/C, @oran and "arie have joint parental
authority over their son and conse&uently
joint custody.
$lthough the parents are separated de facto,
since the issue of custody has yet to be
adjudicated by the court and in the absence
of a judicial grant of custody to one parent,
,T) parents are still entitled to the right to
the custody of their child. An the present
case, respondent-s cause of action is the
deprivation of his right to see his child as
alleged in the petition and thus the remedy of
habeas corpus is available to him.
/urthermore, $rt. 29: deals with judicial
adjudication of custody and serves as a
guideline for the proper award of custody by
the court. At is not a basis for preventing
father to see his own child. !othing in the
said provision disallows father from seeing or
visiting his own child under 8 years of age.
*"s. Carrasco*
"elchora Cabanas, plaintiff,appellee vs. /rancisco (ilapil, defendant,appellant
Na!&$#: $ppeal from a decision of the C/A of Cebu
Da!#: July 2H, 9>8?
P)n#n!#: /ernando, J.
'isputants in this appeal are the mother and the
uncle of a minor beneficiary of the insurance
policy of her deceased father.
/lorentino (ilapil, single, and petitioner "elchora
Cabanas, married, are the parents of "illian
"illian was 94 years old at the time the complaint
was filed.
/lorentino (ilapil insured himself and instituted
"illian as beneficiary with his brother, defendant
/rancisco (ilapil, as trustee during "illian-s
$fter /lorentino-s death, the proceeds were paid
to /rancisco.
"elchora filed this complaint for the delivery of
such sum.
As it the rightIduty of the mother to act as trustee of the
minor beneficiaryL R1%
CC :24+ The father, or in his absence the mother,
is the legal administrator of the property of the
property pertaining to the child under parental
authority. Af the property is worth more than 2
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a
bond subject to the approval of the C/A.
CC:29+ The property which the unemancipated
child has ac&uired or may ac&uire with his work
or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to
the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the
father or mother under whom he is under
parental authority and whose company he lives.
The insurance proceeds belong to the
beneficiary. The minor beneficiary is under the
custody of the mother. The minor ac&uired the
property through lucrative title. (ursuant to the
above provisions, the property belongs to the
minor and plaintiff is entitled to the possession of
said insurance proceeds.
The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above
&uoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void.
To protect the rights of the minor, the plaintiff
should file an additional bond in the guardianship
9. The paramount consideration is the welfare of the
child. The law recogniGes the deep ties that bind
the parent and the child. The wording of the law
is clear and the intendment of the law is the
protection of the interests of the minor. Anfidelity
to the trust imposed by the deceased is much
less in the case of a mother than in the case of
an uncle.
2. The appealed decision is buttressed by its
adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as
agency of the %tate is acting as parens patriae. At
would be more in consonance with the natural
order of things and the (hilippine tradition for a
parent to be preferred. EThe %tate shall
strengthen the family as a basic social
*"s. Celso*
(etitioners+ Cresencio @ibi and $melia Rap @ibi v. 5espondents+ )on. Antermediate $ppelate Court .A$C0, /elipe
;otiong, %hirley ;otiong
(onente+ 5egalado, J.
'ate+ %eptember 96, 9>>2
(etitioners Cresencio @ibi and $melia Rap @ibi
are the parents of Wendell @ibi
5espondents /elipe ;otiong and %hirley ;otiong
are the parents of Julie $nn ;otiong
/or more than 2 years before the deaths of
Wendell and Julie $nn, they were sweethearts
until they broke up their relationship. This is
because Julie $nn found Wendell to be sadistic
and irresponsible.
$ few weeks before their deaths, Wendell #ept
on pestering Julie $nn for them to reconcile but
Julie $nn refused. This prompted the former to
resort to threats against her.
An 9>8>, they both died, each from a single
gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm.
Julie $nn was 96 years old. Wendel was between
96 and 9> years of age.
The parents of Julie $nn believed that it was
Wendell who caused Julie $nn-s and his own
death using the said firearm. Conse&uently, they
filed a civil case at the C/A against Wendell-s
parents .spouses @ibi0 to recover damages
arising from the parent-s vicarious liability under
$rticle 2964 of the Civil Code.
An the testimony of "rs. @ibi, Wendell-s mother,
she said that the spouses kept a gun in the safety
deposit box. %he always had the key in her bag
and that these facts are known to Wendell. n
the night of the killing, the gun was no longer in
the safety deposit box.
C/A dismissed the case. A$C reversed C/A
decision and sentenced the defendants @ibi
spouses as jointly and solidarily liable to pay to
the plaintiffs ;otiong spouses moral and
exemplary damages, etc. )encem the petition.
9. Whether it was Wendell who killed Julie $nn and
himself, and if in the affirmative. YES
2. Whether the spouse @ibi exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family re&uired by law in a parent
and child relationship. NO
:. Whether Wendell-s parents are &,i+ia$i'5 'ia,'#
or +i$#*!'5 an+ ($i.a$i'5 'ia,'# for the crime
committed by their minor son. DIRECTLY AND
9. I! :a C#n+#'' :") =i''#+ J&'i# Ann an+
The Court did not sustain the theory that Wendell @ibi
did not die by his own hand because of the
overwhelming evidence*testimonial, documentary and
pictorial*the confluence of which point to Wendell as
the assailant of Julie $nn, his motive being revenge
for her rejection of his persistent pleas for
An terms of testimonial evidence, the (olice "edico*
@egal fficer submitted his findings and opinions on
whether or not it was Wendell who killed himself. )e
admitted that as far as the entrance of the wound, the
trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound are
concerned, it is possible that Wendell @ibi shot
himself. )e further clarified that the absence of black
residue or tattooing on the forehead of Wendell does
not rule out the possibility that he killed himself
because there are certain guns which are so made
that would prevent tattooing and they are called
smokeless powder.
2. T"# C)&$! *ann)! a**#(! !"a! !"# (#!i!i)n#$
()&# Li,i #9#$*i#+ !"# +i'ig#n*# )- a g))+
-a!"#$ )- a -a.i'5 ,5 a-#'5 ')*=ing !"# -a!a' g&n
a:a5. The diligence of a good father of a family
re&uired by law in a parent and child relationship
consists of the instruction and supervision of the child.
(etitioners were remiss in their duties as parents and
not diligently supervising the activities of their son
despite his minority and immaturity such that it was
only during Wendell-s death that they discovered that
the gun was not in the safety deposit box and that
their son was a narcotics informer of the Constabulary
$nti*!arcotics Dnit
:. C#n+#''8 (a$#n! a$# +i$#*!'5 an+ ($i.a$i'5
'ia,'# -)$ !"# *$i.# *)..i!!#+ ,5 !"#i$ .in)$ )n.
%C has no objection to the doctrinal rule holding the
parents liable but the %C digressed from the
respondent A$C Court on its ratiocination of how the
parents became civilly liable for the crime committed
by their son Wendell. A$C stated that the parents were
subsidiarily liable for the natural conse&uence of the
criminal act of the minor Wendell who was living in
their company. A$C further ratiocinated that the said
subsidiary liability determined and imposed by $rticle
2964 of the !CC and $rticle 949 of 5(C covers
obligations from both &uasi*delicts and criminal
offenses because to hold that $rt. 2964 refers only to
&uasi*delicts would result in the absurdity that while
for an act where mere negligence intervenes, the
father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable, no
liability would attach if the damage is with criminal
intent. /or %C, the said liability of parents is direct and
Af the liability of the parents for crimes or &uasi*delicts
of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents
can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on
the defense that they acted with diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damages. I- !"# 'ia,i'i!5
i +i$#*! an+ ($i.a$51 !"# g$)&n+ )- +i'ig#n*#
:)&'+ *)n!i!&!# a va'i+ an+ &,!an!ia' +#-#n#.
The *ivi' 'ia,i'i!5 )- !"# (a$#n! -)$ %&aiD+#'i*! of
their minor children are +i$#*! an+ ($i.a$5 as
contemplated in $rt, 2964. $pplying $rt. 29>?, the
said article provides for the solidary liability of join
tortfeasors, the minor and the father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother. This indicates that
parental liability is primary and not subisidiary. $lso,
the last paragraph of $rt. 2964 indicates that Ethe
responsibility treated on this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.
T"# 'ia,i'i!5 )- (a$#n! -)$ !"# -#')ni# *)..i!!#+
,5 !"#i$ .in)$ *"i'+$#n i 'i=#:i# ($i.a$51 n)!
&,i+ia$5. This is shown by $rt. 949 of 5(C
provides that the civil liability for acts committed by
minors shall devolve upon those having such person
under their legal authority or control unless it appears
that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
This is further buttressed by $rt. 2962 of !CC which
states that if the minor has no parents or guardian,
the minor shall be answerable with his own property
in an action against him where a a guardian ad litem
shall be appointed.
T"# (a$#n! a$# an+ ")&'+ ,# ,# "#'+ ($i.a$i'5
'ia,'# -)$ !"# *ivi' 'ia,i'i!5 a$iing -$). *$i.ina'
)--#n# *)..i!!#+ ,5 !"#i$ .in)$ *"i'+$#n &n+#$
!"#i$ '#ga' a&!")$i!5 )$ *)n!$)'1 )$ :") 'iv# in !"#i$
*).(an5 &n'# i! i ($)v#n !"a! !"# -)$.#$ a*!#+
:i!" +i'ig#n*# )- a g))+ -a!"#$ )- a -a.i'5 !)
($#v#n! &*"
The primary liability in $rticle 949 of 5(C shall be
imposed pursuant to $rt. 2964 of !CC which states
that liability shall be effected against the father and in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother. $rt. 2964
was further amplified by the Child and Routh Welfare
Code which added the guardian in case of death or
incapacity of the mother but the liability may also be
voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of
the youthful offender. )owever, under /C, this civil
liability is now to be executed against both parents or
those who exercise parental authority over the minor
/or civil liability arising from &uasi*delicts committed
by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance
with $rticles 2964 and 2962 of the Civil Code, as
The instant petition is denied. The assailed judgment
of A$CIC$ is affirmed.
*"s. CereGo*
Lin+ain v. CA
1lena, Celia, scar, Teresita, and Pirgilio, all surnamed @indain, petitioners vs. The )on. Court of $ppeals, spouses
$polina Paliente and /ederico Ala, respondents
P)n#n!#: ;riMo*$&uino, J.
Da!#: $ugust 24, 9>>2
T"# Fa*! )- !"# Ca#
'olores @ulu&usin, mother and guardian of
the petitioners, sold a piece of land owned
by the petitioners when they were still minors
to respondent spouses Paliente and Ala.
(etitioners contend that sale is null and void
because it needed judicial approval.
@ulu&usin and the defendants- attorneys
notariGed the deed of sale, stating that the
land could be sold without judicial
authoriGation because it was less than (hp
2444. The right of petitioners to rescind the
contract had also already expired since they
should have exercised their right ? years
after attaining age of majority. The youngest
of the plaintiffs is now :9 y.o.
The C$ found in favour of the defendants,
applying the ruling in =rtaJe1 vs& 'ela *ru1
.$ father or mother acting as legal
administrator of the property of a child acting
under parental authority cannot dispose of
the child-s property without judicial authority
if it is worth more than (hp 2444. ,ut when
under (hp 2444, the court-s permission for
the alienation may be dispensed with.0
T"# I&# a! "an+
WI! judicial approval was necessary for the sale of
the minors- property by their mother.
T"# R&'ing
The (etition is granted.
n the Assue at hand+
Un+#$ A$! 423 )- !"# N#: Civi' C)+#1 a
(a$#n! a*!ing a a '#ga' a+.ini!$a!)$ )-
!"# ($)(#$!5 )- "i .in)$ *"i'+$#n +)#
n)! "av# !"# ():#$ !) a'i#na!# &*"
($)(#$!5 :i!")&! K&+i*ia' a(($)va'. T"#5
)n'5 "av# !"# ():#$ )- ()#i)n an+
An ?isayas et al& vs& Suguitan et al& it was
held that in compromises entered into by
parents as legal administrators, Court
approval is indispensible regardless of the
amount involved.
An !adillo vs& Ferrer, it was held that the
surviving spouse had no authority to convey
the undivided share of her minor children as
she should have first secured approval of the
An )nton vs& Kuintana it was held
n the alleged prescription+
The action has not yet prescribed because
$rt. 99?9 Civil Code states that real actions
over immovable objects prescribe after :4
years. At had only been 29 years.
Art ()*+ ,ew Civil Code- 4Art& 32:& -he father or in
his absence the mother is the legal administrator of
the property pertaining to the child under parental
authority& )f the property is %orth more than t%o
thousand pesos the father or mother shall give a
bond sub+ect to the approval of the *ourt of First
*"r. Chatto*
(eople of the (hilippines, plaintiff*appellee vs 'avid %ilvano, accused*appellant
Da!#: June 2>,9>>>
Na!&$#: $utomatic review of a description of 5TC
P)n#n!#: (er curiam
o 'avid entered 93 yr. old %heryl-s .his
daughter0 room, woke her up to scold her for being
late and as punishment, 'avid raped %heryl. .The
punishment given by 'avid since %heryl was 9: yrs
o %heryl ran away, lived with her maternal
grandmother, and when asked to come back home,
she eventually told her mother and grandmother
about the rape .thus they filed a case against
o 'avid-s defense+ 7@ victim offered only a
token resistance when sexual acts were being done
0rebuttal. the failure to shout or offer tenacious
resistance cannot be construed as voluntary
submission to 'avid"s desire) 2@ he couldn-t have
possibly raped her in the room because that room
was too small 0rebuttal. rape could occur
any%here) 4@ if he did rape her, her two brothers
.who were sleeping in the same room0 would have
been awakened 0rebuttal. it %as already nighttime
and they could have been sound asleep already
and one of the brothers %as deafL also 'avid
started out by scolding Sheryl so they might thin3
that %hatever noise that came after %as +ust part of
the parental sanction and discipline) 0@ rape is
implausible, improbable if not impossible
considering that the series of acts lasted for ?4
minutes 0rebuttal. trivial matter %hich doesn"t deal
%ith %hy"s and %herefore"s of the crime) E@ claims
that this is only a plot by his wife to sever their
marital relationship 0rebuttal. no mom %ould use
her daughter for something li3e thatL also Sheryl
being a Filipina %ould publicly admit to being
ravished unless that is the truth for it is her natural
instinct to protect her honor&)
WI! 'avid is guilty of raping his own daughter
R1%. )e is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The
following elements of rape were present+ 90 sexual
congress, 20 with a woman, :0 by force and without
consent. An order to warrant the imposition of death
penalty, the additional elements were also found+ 90
that the victim was below 96 yrs. old at the time the
rape was committed, and 20 the offender is a parent
.whether legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted0.
When he was charged before the court, 'avid denied
the accusation and prefaced the denial with the
assertion that he is giving her financial, material and
educational support. The fact that he supports her
does not give him license to rape her. At is his
obligation to support her as provided in $rt.9>H and
224 /C.
$lthough $rt.224 /C recogniGes the parent-s right to
impose discipline on their children, it does not
authoriGe them to force their offspring to copulate with
them under the mask of discipline, or invade their
honor and violate their dignity nor does it give them
the license to ravish the product of their marital union.
At seems that 'avid-s act is not in the form of
correction but of an insane sexual gratification. %ex
with one-s child is per se abhorrent and can never be
justified as parental punishment.
*"s. Comsti*
S"i#'+ v. G$)
,rooke %hields, respondent*appellant v. ;arry ;ross, appellant*respondent
%imons, J.
2> "arch 9>6:
Court of $ppeals of !ew Rork
An 9>8H, ,rooke %hields was just 94 years
old when she obtained several modeling jobs
with ;arry ;ross, a photographer.
ne of these jobs was a series of
photographs financed by (layboy (ress and
had %hields posing nude in a bathtub.
The photos were intended for publication in
E(ortfolio 6F .later named E%ugar and %piceF0
Teri %hields, ,rooke-s mother and legal
guardian executed two consents in favor of
o A hereby give the photographerZ
the right and permission to
copyright andIor use, reuse, andIor
publish, and republish photographic
pictures or portraits of meZ A
hereby waive any right to inspect or
approve the finished photographZ
or to the eventual use that it might
be applied.
(hotos were used in other publications and
printed matter other than E%ugar and %piceF
An 9>64, said photos appeared in a /rench
magaGine and it seemed ;ross intended to
use it in other publications, too.
An 9>69, a 98 year*old ,rooke %hields
commenced action in tort and contract and
seeking compensatory and punitive
damages and an injunction to permanently
enjoin ;ross from further used of the photos.
Whether a minor .infant model0 may disaffirm a prior
unrestricted consent executed on her behalf by her
parent pursuant to sec. H9 of the Civil 5ights @aw.
%ec. H9 .remedial law0 creates a cause of
action on behalf of injured party permitting relief by
injunction or damages in $#'a!i)n !) %ec. H4 .penal0
which provides that Ea personZ that uses for
advertising purposes, of for purposes of trade, the
name, portrait or picture of any living person %ithout
first having obtained the %ritten consent of such
person or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian
is guilty of a misdemeanor&F "eaning, written consent
must be obtained before publication and as permitted
by terms of contract.
1ven though common law allows a minor to
disaffirm written consent, @egislature may abrogate
this common law right to disaffirm. )ere, %ec. H4
provides for a method of obtaining consent from a
minor. Thus, Terri %hields- consent is binding on the
minor ,rooke %hields.
%ec. :*94H of the ;eneral bligations @aw
re&uires court approval of infants- contracts of
performing artists, such as actors, musicians, dancers
and professional athletes. Child models are not
recogniGed as child performers. This law is
inapplicable, however, as it is only to provide
assurance to those re&uired to deal with infants that
later, the infants will not disaffirm executory contracts
to the other party-s disadvantage. "oreover, this
would be impractical for a child model who works from
session to session, sometimes for different
photographers. )eIshe can-t possibly have all
contracts for such sessions be approved by the
$ parent who wishes to limit the publicity and
exposure of her child need only limit the use
authoriGed in the consent. /udgment modified stri3ing
in+unction against the use of the photographs for uses
of advertising and trade and as so modified&
= ,rooke %hields did not contend that the photos were
obscene or pornographic. They only embarrassed
her. The court did not deem to discuss the
unenforceability of certain contracts which violate
public policy. "oreover, the court did not find that they
were obscene or pornographic. $ contract held to be
unenforceable because it violates public policy is void
ab initio and, thus, there is no need to consider
whether or not it may be disaffirmed.
Jasen, J., dissenting&
- T"# in!#$#! )- )*i#!5
an+ !"# S!a!# in ($)!#*!ing i! *"i'+$#n .&!
,# ('a*#+ a,)v# an5 *)n*#$n -)$ !$a+# )$
*)..#$*ia'i.. The statute in &uestion does
not abrogate the child-s right to disaffirm a
contract entered into by the minor or by the
minor-s parent on his behalf. The right is founded
in the legal concept that an infant is incapable of
contracting because he does not understand the
scope of his rights and he cannot appreciate the
conse&uences and ramifications of his decisions.
This also to afford protection against exploitation
by adults.
- %ections H4 and H9 did not
intend to abrogate this right. The re&uirement of
parental consent was granted in order to afford
the minor as much protection from exploitation as
possible. The assumption, of course, is that the
adult has the minor-s best interests at heart. ,ut
otherwise, the child should be given the right to
disaffirm the parent-s consent. "oreover, there
was no reference of the common law right to
disaffirm a contract indicates that @egislature did
not intend to affect that right.
- Terri %hields failed to put
the restrictions on the consent and thus failed to
protect her child-s future interests. There is no
reason that the child must continue to bear the
burden of her mother-s bad judgment.
- Af parents fail to protect
their child, the %tate retains its long*standing role
of parens patriae in order to be able to intervene
by allowing the child to exercise hisIher right to
*"s. 'unuan*
Si'va v. CA
Carlitos %ilva, petitioner, vs. C$ and %uGanne ;onGales
FACTS: Carlitos, a married businessman, and
%uGanne, an unmarried actress, cohabited .wIo
marriage0 which resulted to them having 2 children.
They Eparted waysF soon after. %uGanne refused to
allow Carlitos to have the children during weekends.
Carlitos filed a case for custody of the children, which
was opposed by %uGanne, alleging that Carlitos often
engaged in gambling and womaniGing which she
feared could affect the moral and social values of the
children. 5TC ruled in favor of Carlitos, %uGanne
appealed. An the meantime, she got married to a
'utch national and moved to )olland along with the
children. C$ ruled in favor of %uGanne, hence this
ISSUE: W! Carlitos should be granted visitation
$rt ?> of the A provides for appropriate visitation rights
to parents who are not given custody of their children.
$ few hours spent by Carlitos with the children could
not at all be that detrimental to the children.
The allegations of respondent against the character of
petitioner, even assuming as true, cannot be taken as
sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father. The
fears expressed by respondent to the effect that
petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their
children once allowed to even temporarily associate
with petitioner is but the product of respondent-s
unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of all moral
persuasions and goodness, would ever take the
trouble and expense in instituting a legal action for the
purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. At can just
be imagined the deep sorrows of a father who is
deprived of his children of tender ages.
The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private
respondent and their well*meant concern for the
childrenC nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner
would have ulterior motives or undue designs more
than a parent-s natural desire to be able to call on,
even if it were only on brief visits, his own children.
The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to
understandably provide this precautionary measure,
i&e&, Ein no case Ncan petitionerO take out the children
without the written consent of the mother.F
*"r. ;alon*
A$# Pa$#n! M)$a''5 O,'ig#+ !) Ca$# -)$ T"#i$ C"i'+$#nJ
,5 J)"n E#=#'aa$
.,ody of the article rephrased the &uestion to+ Whether there are moral justifications for imposing social obligations
on parents to care for their childrenL0
%ources of duty to care for children+
90 (riori duty to promote human flourishing
. 1xist independently of the actual organiGation of any society
. "oral duty binds everyone and is not specifically directed towards parents .although it will fre&uently fall
primarily on them for no other reason than their physical proximity to their children0
20 %ocial practices
. 'erivative from society itself
. 'oes not create itself the duties towards children
When the duty to provide for the children falls back on all individuals, through the communal means constructed, or
which ought to be constructed, how then should the community deal with defaultersL
.90 $ttempt to maintain the responsibility* compel the defaulter to be responsible
.20 $ttempt to reinforce the rules of allocation of responsibility B compel defaulter to contribute
.:0 $ttempt to redress the imbalance
o !ot essential to fulfill duty to the children
o This is for the other parent who fulfilled the role of the defaulter B the community can endeavor
to produce the mix of social rules which best fulfills the obligation, remembering always that
the goods of the adults must be respected as well
P$#'i.ina$5 I&#
.90 $n attempt may be made to derive an obligation to care for children from other duties
.20 The article is not concerned with the empirical truth or otherwise of the claim that parents feel that they have
the duty to care for their children
John ,oswell B testifies from his investigation of the abandonment of children from late anti&uity to the
$bandonment was an informal method of transferring responsibility for the child care from the parents to others
in the community.
T"# Fai'&$# )- C)n!$a*!a$ian an+ Q&aiD*)n!$a*!a$ian T"#)$i#
H),# an+ H&.#
*their ethical theories are grounded either in the idea that people should act with mutual restraint one towards another
as a basis for constituting a safer society or in the moral obligations generated by assumed agreements
*.The failureIcriticism0
$uthor* The problem arises because these theories ultimately ground moral justifications in self*interest
J.@. "ackie * The approach .)obbes and )ume0 would provide no duties towards non*participants, and to
assign no rights to beings who do no need to be brought into a &uasi*contractual scheme
*"ackie + "oral precepts of self*interest are not confined merely to restraining one-s actions towards others,
but include general human well*being or the flourishing of human life
*.The failureIcriticism0
$uthor* This is not sufficient. (arents could simply hand their children over to the collectivity which
might deem that human life would continue to flourish if only a selected group of children were
nurtured into a full life
*finds a basis for ethics in the rationaliGation of altruism .may make rational sense for the good of community0
E(rinciple of 1&ual Consideration of the Anterest of $llF
*.The failureIcriticism0
$uthor* At is evident that the actors in these constructions are self*interested adults, capable of inflicting
harm on others and of accepting restraints upon their own actions where this benefits the association of
which they are part
J)"n Ra:' T"#)$5 )- J&!i*#
* (rinciples of justice are to be found by deducing those principles which a community of free and rational persons
would agree should govern their social life and institutions if they had to choose them from behind \a veil of ignorance-
*.The failureIcriticism0
. $uthor+ %till grounded on self*interest. 5awl assumes that the contractors would consent to a degree of
paternalism which would protect their interest
A N)nD*)n!$a*!&a' Bai -)$ M)$a'i!5
J)"n Finni8 P$#*)n!$a*!&a' T$a+i!i)n
*developed $ristotles concept of human flourishing
*We are held to be capable of grasping the basic human goods+ life, friendship, play, knowledge, aesthetic
experience, religion and practical reasonableness . (!+ These are the reasons for moving from self*interest to the
respect for the well*being of others0
*/innis-s assertion that the parenthood may justify or even re&uire the direction of duty towards certain persons
seems to rest upon the premise that parenthood implies dependence by another .the child0 on the parent. %pecific
involvement in the goods of another adult might arise through the dependence .emotional, economic0 of the other.
'ependency therefore may arise from the operation of social norms as much as from brute fact.
*"r. )ajim*
T"# D)*!$in# )- Fa.i'5 In!#g$i!5: P$)!#*!ing !"# Pa$#n!a' Rig"! )- Un:#+ Fa!"#$ :") "av# S&,!an!ia'
R#'a!i)n"i( :i!" !"#i$ C"i'+$#n.
I. In!$)+&*!i)n
"ain point+ $uthor argues for unwed fathers with substantial relationship with their children to be accorded parental
rights. Dnwed fathers should not be given rights just because they legitimated their children or because they have
e&ual rights as women, they should be given rights because they have been recogniGed as capable of good parent*
child relationships and that presuming they are not committed is contrary to the doctrine of family integrity.
II. T"# Fa.i'5 In!#g$i!5 D)*!$in#
In g#n#$a':
This chapter showcases how court decisions recogniGe that the state cannot substitute for family as primary nurturer
of children. The court would only intervene if statutes would weaken the family. Dltimately, the interest protected by
the court is of the a special bond+
,'))+D!i# T .#aning-&' (5*")')gi*a' $#'a!i)n"i( U &,!an!ia' ,)n+
This bond should be the basis of court decisions on family related statutes.
'efinition of /amily Antegrity doctrine+
At is the principle that limits the power of the states to regulate various aspects of family affairs. The doctrine seeks to
protect the substantial bond of mutual affection, care and concern formed between parents and children in day*to day
interaction. (arental rights, the right to raise children comes from the private sphere.
%tatutes and how court decided+
- 7oore v& *ity of East *leveland. $n ordinance that limited the degree of relations that can stay in a house
was deemed a violation of due process. Court stated that enforcement of the ordinance would threaten day*
to*day interaction which is important in family integrity. .1x. you can live in same roof as your son but not
your first cousin0
- Statues bias against illegitimate children. rdinances that make legitimacy a basis for welfare benefits,
intestate succession and cause of action for mother-s wrongful death have been held by the court as
violative of e&ual protection. Court has seen that family protection should extend to families not formed
under marriage.
AAA. 5ights of Dnwed /athers
$rticle showed how there are certain presumptions on which kinds parents are committed to a child+
Wed and unwed mothers+ (resumed and $ctual Commitment
Actual M she carried and bore the child
Presumed M after birth remains committed in welfare of child
Wed /athers+ (resumed Commitment
(resumed+ living together with kids so he has day*to*day interaction.
9. %tanley vs Allinois+
- %tate %tatue that presumed the unfitness as parent of an unwed father was violative of due process and
e&ual protection. Court said that meaningful parent*child bonds can exist between an unwed dad and his
- ,ut it didn-t say that unwed fathers were given e&ual presumption. They still had to prove that they had a
substantial bond with the children
2. Tuilloin v. Walcott
- Couple were unmarried and had a child. When they separated, the woman wanted the child to be adopted
by her new spouse. The "an protested. The court allowed for the adoption to take place.
- The court argued that the unwed father did not present meaningful bond with the child. )e barely visited and
gave few gifts.
:. (arham v. )ughes
- /ather had not legitimated a child so court denied him the right to sue for wrongful death. Court said that
%tatute made a distinction on legitimate and illegitimate children parental relations.
- $uthor argued that statutes do not showcase actual commitment of unwed fathers to their kids. (arental
relations should be based on the substantial commitment to the child. The father should-ve been allowed to
give proof of meaningful relation.
?. Caban v. "ohammed
- %tatute that only re&uired consent of unwed mother for the adoption of the child.
- Court held it unconstitutional due to e&ual protection based on gender. At also focused on acknowledging
that the unwed father has substantial bond with the child and therefore should also have the right to give or
not give consent.
- %tature also didn-t give chance for unwed fathers an opportunity to show commitment, court should have
said it violated due process.
*"s. @im*
B. S&,!i!&!# an+ S(#*ia' Pa$#n!a' A&!")$i!5
Topic+ %ubstitute and %pecial (arental $uthority
Case+ ;.5. !o. @*?88?H N1n ,ancO
'ate+ $pril 9H, 9>66
(onente+ CruG
$lfredo $madora, 98*years old, had gone to
school after the end of the semester .Colegio 'e %an
Jose*5ecoletos0 to present his physics experiment as
a prere&uisite to graduation. While in the auditorium
to do so, he was shot dead by a classmate, (ablito
'affon. $madora-s parents are now asking for
damages against the high school principal, the dean
of boys, the physics teacher, and the school itself, on
the ground that the incident had happened while the
deceased was under their custody, and that they are
responsible and liable for the acts committed by
'amon, who is also a student under their custody.
WI! the private respondents exercise
substitute parental authority over 'amon by virtue of
$rt. 2964 of the Civil Code, and thus, should be held
liable for damages because of his wrongdoings.
They cannot be held liable for damages.
Ra!i): NThe ones underlined are the important parts.
/orgive the excessive length. At-s just to help those
who do not have time to read the case itself anymore.
$rt. 2964. @astly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices as long as they remain in their custody.
The Court-s evolving deliberations on this
article can be traced in : previous cases+ .90 1xconde
v. CapunoC .20 "ercado v. Court of $ppealsC and .:0
(alisoc v. ,rillantes. $lthough the school in E#conde
was not a party to the case, in an obiter the Court
held that it cannot be liable because it is not a school
of arts and trades. Justice J,@ 5eyes dissented,
arguing that school authorities should be held liable,
as $rt. 2964 should be construed such that the
&ualifying phrase \of establishments of arts and
trades- should apply only to heads, and not to
teachers. )ence, .90 teachers in generalC and .20
heads of schools of arts and trades in particular may
be held liable under $rt. 2964.
An 7ercado E#conde was reiterated,
although given that the school was not impleaded, the
pronouncement that the school was not liable
because it was not for the arts and trades was only
obiter& The Court also held that the \custody
re&uirement- was also not proved because the
situation in $rt. 2964 apparently contemplated a
situation where Ethe student lives and boards with the
teacher such that the control, direction, and influences
on the pupil supersede those of the parents.
An Palisoc Nwhere the school was one for arts
and tradesO the head and the teacher*in*charge were
held solidarily liable with the wrongdoer Nwho was of
age and was not boarding in the schoolO. The Court
also clarified that \custody- in $rt. 2964 meant the
\protective and supervisory custody that the school
and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils
and students for as long as they are in attendance in
the school. 'issents urged for the rule to apply only to
torts committed by minor students as the school
would be acting only in loco parentis while Justice
J,@ 5eyes stressed in his concurring opinion that it
should cover even students already of age since they
were e&ually under the custody and discipline of the
An this case, however, the Colegio is an
academic institution of learning, not a school of arts
and trades. !evertheless, the Court concluded that
the provision should apply to all schools, such that
where the school is academic, responsibility for the
tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher
in charge of that studentC while if it is vocational or
technical, it will be the head who is held liable, as an
exception to the general rule that it is the teacher who
is liable. This is in conformity with Justice J,@ 5eyes-
dissent in E#conde& %till, there seems to be a certain
degree of unfairness here because as long as a
teacher can show that it is a vocational school, the
head will automatically be liable and the teacher is
automatically absolved. The Court thus explained the
rationale for $rt. 2964, which was that historically, the
head of the school of arts and trades was very
involved in teaching the students, who usually
boarded with him and was under his direct control and
supervision. )ence, he has great influence over them
and is liable in part for their actions. $nd while it is
true that the situation in these modern times is
different, because the Court has to uphold the original
mandate of the legislature.
$s for the duration of this responsibility, the
Court held that it is not coterminous with the
semester, but rather, exists as long as it is shown that
the student is in school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a
legitimate student right, and in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student privilege. 'uring these, the teacher*
in*charge must answer for his students- torts, in the
same way that parents are responsible for a child in
their custody. At is not even re&uired that at the time of
the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a
position to prevent it, because custody does not mean
immediate and actual physical control but rather, the
influence exerted on the child and the discipline
instilled in him as a result of such influence.
)owever, the responsibility ceases if it can
be proven that the persons cited here prove that they
exerted the diligence of a good father of the family to
prevent damages. $lso, with regard to the school, it
may be held to answer only for the acts of the
teachers or even the head as the respondeat
superior but can be exonerated if it proves that it
exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias&
$lso, the teacher may invoke the defense
that it is unfair to hold him liable for damages as long
as students are in school premises and presumably
under his influence. $ teacher cannot be held e&ually
responsible as a parent because their influence over
the child is not e&ual. $ parent can expect more
obedience from the child because the child is more
dependent on a parent than on a teacher Nre+ support
and sustenanceO. $lso, it seems unfair that the
teacher or head be liable for a student or apprentice if
the latter is of legal age, because if a parent is no
longer liable for a student-s acts upon reaching
majority, why should a teacher be liable thenL
Thus, none of the private respondents can
be held liable. The rector, high school principal, and
dean of boys were not the teacher*in*charge. There
was also no showing that Celestino 'icon, the
teacher in charge over the wrongdoer, was negligent
in enforcing discipline. $nd as previously established,
the school itself cannot be held directly liable.
The dean of boys had previously confiscated a gun
from one of 'affon-s friends, but returned it afterwards
and did not report the incident. The gun might have
been the same used to kill $madora. )owever, in the
absence of proof that it was the same gun which killed
$madora, the dean cannot be held liable for the
$madora-s death.
%eparate pinions N"elencio*)erreraO+
This Justice concurred, except re+ the restricted
meaning given the term \teacher- in $rt. 2964 as
\teacher*in*charge,- for the reason that this would limit
liability to those times where there are classes under
the teacher. The philosophy of the law is that whoever
stands in loco parentis will have the same duties and
obligations as parents whenever in such standing.
Dnder the Civil Code, N$rt. :?>, (ar. 2 and ?O,
teachers and professors and directors of trade
establishments with regard to apprentices, exercise
substitute parental authority.
*"s. "endoGa, @oraine*
S!. Ma$58 A*a+#.5 v. Ca$(i!an)
%t. "ary-s $cademy, petitioner vs. William Carpitanos and @ucia %. Carpitanos, ;uada 'aniel, James 'aniel AA,
James 'aniel %r., Pivencio Pillanueva, respondents.
P)n#n!#: (ardo J.

Da!#: /eb. 3, 2442
%t. "ary conducted an enrollment campaign,
the campaign included visitation of the
schools were the prospective enrollees are
%herwin Carpitanos a student of %t. "ary
was part of the campaigning team.
Chad Pillanueva, grandson of the owner of
the jeep was originally driving the jeep,
allowed James 'aniel AA, 9H yr old student of
%t. "ary, to drive the jeep. %herwin and
other students are passengers of that jeep
going to another school for the campaign.
The steering wheel detached causing the
accident. The jeep turned turtle, %herwin
died as a result of the accident.
(arents of %herwin filed a case against the
school. 5TC held the school liable and
ordered to indemnify the Carpitanos, while
%herwin and the owner of the jeep were
absolved. The school filed an appeal hence
this case.
I&# S H#'+:
7. CON S!. Ma$58 ")&'+ ,# "#'+ 'ia,'# -)$
!"# +#a!" )- S"#$:inJ NO
2. W! award for moral damages is
9. Dnder $rt 296 /C the school shall have the
parental authority and responsibility over
minor under their custody whether inside or
outside school while $rt 29> /C states that
those exercising parental authority over
minors shall be held principally and solidarily
liable for the damages caused by the acts of
minor. )owever, for %t. "ary to be liable, it
must be shown that the act or omission of
the person exercising parental authority
considered as negligent was the proximate
cause of the injury caused. There was no
evidence that %t. "ary allowed the minor to
drive the jeep rather it was Chad that
allowed the minor to drive. /urthermore the
proximate cause of the accident was the
detachment of the steering wheel, hence %t.
"ary can-t be held liable.
2. "oral damages can only be recovered to the
party that the proximate cause is attributable.
$s held in $guilar vs. Comm. %avings bank
Ethe registered owner of the vehicle would
primarily be responsible to the public or :
persons for injuries caused while the vehicle
was being driven on highways or streetsF.
*"s. "endoGa, "ary*
/an*i' v. B#'.#
,onifacia (. Pancil, petitioner vs. )elen ;. ,elmes, respondent
P)n#n!#: Pitug, J.
Da!#: June 9>, 2449
(etitioner ,onifacia is the mother of 5eeder
5eeder is a D% !avy serviceman who had two
children by his common*law wife, )elen. When he
died, he left them .the children0 with his death
pension benefits with a probable value of (
,onifacia commenced guardianship proceedings
before the 5TC of Cebu, over the person and
properties of the two children .her grandchildren0,
Palerie and Pincent.
%he was appointed as their guardian.
!atural mother of minors, )elen ,elmes opposed
appointment, asserting that she is the natural
mother in actual custody of and exercising
parental authority over the said minors.
C$ reversed decision of 5TC on the grounds that
the Civil Code considers parents as natural
guardians of their minor children. (rovision in the
Civil Code and subse&uently the /amily Code, art
22H, confirms the designation of parents as ipso
facto guardian of their minor children without need
of a court appointment.
Palerie reached the age of majority, thus
guardianship proceedings proceeded only with
respect to her younger brother, Pincent.
I&#: Who should be the guardian of .the minor0
Pincent+ his grandmother or his natural motherL
MOTHER. C$ decision should be upheld
because $rt. 299 of the /amily Code states
clearly that the E-a!"#$ an+ .)!"#$ "a''
K)in!'5 #9#$*i# a&!")$i!5 )v#$ !"# (#$)n
)- !"#i$ *)..)n *"i'+$#n. An case of
disagreement, the father-s decision shall
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
contrary, xxx.F
(etitioner at the most, can only exercise
substitute parental authority in case of death,
absence or unsuitability of respondent.
Considering the present circumstances, the
respondent is very much alive and exercising
parental authority over the minors. (etitioner
has not proffered convincing evidence showing
that respondent is not suited to be the guardian
of Pincent .as Palerie is already of legal age0.
/urthermore, petitioner ,onifacia lives
outside the country and her coming back just to
fulfill guardian duties is not certain. %he is an
$merican citiGen and a resident of Colorado
and would obviously not be able to perform the
responsibilities and obligations re&uired of a
guardian. The court also opines that she %ill
merely delegate those duties to someone else
%ho may not 2ualify as a guardian& .he Court
has consistently held in the past that the
courts should not grant guardianship to
persons who are not within our /urisdiction
for they will find it difficult to protect the
@astly, in Justice Pitug-s concurring
opinion, he said that the law and jurisprudence
recogniGes the deep ties that bind parent and
child and that (a$#n! a$# !"& ('a*#+ -i$! in
$an= in .a!!#$ )- (a$#n!a' a&!")$i!5 and
that substitute parental authority may only be
exercised by grandparents in case parents
have died or are absent or declared unfit and
this order of priority in the exercise of parental
authority is not in any way affected by the
child-s legitimacy. An fact1 A$!i*'# 7P6 )- !"#
Fa.i'5 C)+# !a!# !"a! an i''#gi!i.a!# *"i'+
"a'' ,# under the parental authority of his
mother who+ conse0uentially+ should also
be entitled to the custody of the child.
*"s. "ilaor*
C. S&(#ni)n )$ T#$.ina!i)n )- Pa$#n!a' A&!")$i!5
C"&a v. Ca,ang,ang
($CAT$ C)D$, petitioner*appellant vs "5. K"5%. ,$5T@"1 C$,$!;,$!; 1T $@., respondents*appellees.
A! T)1 "$TT15 / T)1 (1TATA! /5 ,1TTR C)D$ %R $@A$% E;5$C1 C$,$!;,$!;F /5 T)1
A%%D$!C1 / $ W5AT / )$,1$% C5(D%.
Na!&$#: $ppeal from a decision of the Court of /irst
Anstance of 5iGal dismissing (acita Chua-s petition for
habeas corpus&
Da!#: "arch 26, 9>3>
P)n#n!#: Castro, J.
'uring her youth, (acita Chua supported herself
by working in nightclubs as a hostess.
$fter sexual liaisons with a lot of men, she lived
with Chua ,en with whom she begot a child who
died in infancy. %he then cohabited with %y %ia
@ay with whom she had two children named
5obert and ,etty Chua %y. ,etty was born on
'ec. 9H, 9>H38.
$fter separating from %y, she became the
mistress of Pictor Tan Pillareal with whom she
begot another girl. They separated as well.
Without means to support the child, (acita gave
,etty away to a comadre in Cebu.
An "ay 9>H6, "r. and "rs. Cabangbang, a
childless couple, ac&uired custody of the child
who was then barely four months old. They had
her christened as ;race Cabangbang and raised
her as their own.
(acita avers that sometime in ctober of that
same year, Pillareal took the child away and gave
her to the Cabangbangs in recompense for
favors received. At was only : years later when
she learned of the whereabouts of ,etty. "rs.
Cabangbang rebutted said claim by saying that
she found the child wrapped in a bundle at the
gate of their residence.
n June 3, 9>3:, (acita demanded the surrender
of the custody of the child to her. $fter failing to
ac&uire the same, she filed a petition for habeas
corpus with the C/A of 5iGal which dismissed her
petition and awarded custody to the
%he appealed directly to the %C and tenders for
the resolution of two issues namely 90 the C/
erred when it awarded custody to the
Cabangbangs considering ;raceI,etty was
below seven years of age and 20 it deprived her
of parental authority over her child.
I&#: Whether the C/A erred in not awarding the
custody of ,ettyI;race to (acita Chua.
H#'+: !o, it did not. The decision of the court a 2uo is
(acita-s contention with regard to $rt. :3:
which mandates that a child below seven years of age
cannot be separated from her mother is now moot
and academic due to the fact that ,ettyI;race is now
99 years of age. )owever, her contention that the
reasons relied upon by the C/A_that she is not an
upright woman, among others_are not grounds in
law to deprive a mother of her child , is correct.
The lower court found that the child was
given to the Cabangbangs by Pillareal with the
knowledge and consent of the petitioner. At cited that
the petitioner did not do anything at all to see the child
or to secure its custody.
$bandonment is one of the grounds for
depriving parents of the parental authority over their
children as stated by $rticle ::2 of the Civil Code.
(acita surrendered her custody of the child in 9>H6
and waited until 9>3: before she brought action. A
mother %ho really loves her child %ould go to any
e#tent to be reunited %ith her& Cer normal reaction
should have been to move heaven and earth in order
to recover her& Net she lifted not a finger&
)er inconsistent demands reveal that her
motives do not flow from the wellsprings of a loving
mother-s heart. /irstly, she wanted the child back so
that %y %ia @ay would resume giving her support and
secondly, she expressed to the Cabangbangs her
willingness to forego action on recovery provided that
the latter %ould in e#change give her a +eepney and
some money&
@astly, the petition for the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty or by which the rightful custody of any person
is withheld from the person entitled thereto. (etitioner
failed to prove that she is entitled to the rightful
custody of ,ettyI;race. Dpon shunning her legal and
moral obligations towards the child, she is deemed to
have forfeited all her legitimate moral and legal claim
to her custody.
*"r. "islang*
A,i#$a v O$in
Na!&$#: $ppeal from a judgment of the C/A of $mbos Camarines
Da!#: "arch 28, 9>48
P)n#n!#: "apa, J.
Picenta Cacao, "ariano Cacao, and (etra Cacao are
siblings. When Picenta died, her husband "iguel
rin, "ariano Cacao .her brother0, and Juan $biera
.husband of (etra0 entered into an agreement to
dispose the properties and animals ac&uired during
the marriage of "iguel rin and Picenta Cacao.
"ariano Cacao and Juan $biera are acting as
representatives of their children, who are the only
heirs as well as the natural nephews of Picenta
The agreement is that "iguel rin obligates himself o
deliver to his brothers*in*law, as guardians and
fathers of the heirs of (etra Cacao, the value of their
(laintiff %ebastian $biera who is the special
administrator of the estate of the now deceased Juan
$biera filed a complaint alleging that defendant
"iguel rin failed to comply with the agreement and
prays for the court to compel his compliance.
WI! plaintiff as administrator of the deceased Juan
$biera has the right to ask for the compliance of
"iguel rin with said obligation.
!o. The true interested parties in the obligation
contracted by the defendant are the children of Juan
$biera for the simple reason that the obligation was
executed in their favor as the legal heirs of Picenta
and not in favor of Juan $biera who is simply
representing them.
$n administrator has only the right to institute actions
pertaining to the estates he is administering, and no
other action dealing with those contracted in favor of
third persons. The right of representation is attached
to parental authority or guardianship. At is
extinguished with Juan-s death together with the
parental authority. $s an exclusively personal right, it
could not survive him nor could it be transferred to his
*"s. "o*
C)$!# v. Ca!i'') an+ H#$$#$a ?7<27@
"$5A$ C5T1%, petitioner,appellant, vs. C$!'A'$ C$%TA@@ and $'5A$! )15515$, respondents,appellees
P)n#n!#: "alcolm, /&
Na!&$#: $((1$@ from a judgment of the Court of
/irst Anstance of "anila.
Fa*!: "aria Cortes and $lejandro )errera are
legally married spouses blessed with 2 children,
$cardio .3 years old0 and ,ernardo .? years old0.
$lejandro brought an action against his wife for
adultery for which she was sentenced to : years 3
months and 29 days of imprisonment. )e later
condoned "aria, secured her pardon, and went to live
with her a second time. )owever, not long after their
reconciliation, $lejandro again became suspicious of
his wife-s conduct which led him to take with him their
children when he went to live in his mother-s house.
$lejandro instituted an action for divorce.
Dnfortunately, his untimely death in the line of duty
terminated the proceedings. Candida Castillo, the
children-s paternal grandmother, continued to have
custody of the children.
The mother, through habeas corpus proceedings,
sought to obtain the return of her children but the trial
court dismissed the petition and named the
grandmother as guardian of the minors.
I&#: WI! the courts can deprive a mother of
parental authority over her children
Res. A$!. 7P7 )- !"# ?O'+@ Civi' C)+# ($)vi+# !"a!
(a$#n! :")1 ,5 !"# #9a.('# #! ,5 !"#.1 !#n+ !)
*)$$&(! !"#i$ )--($ing1 .a5 ,# +#($iv#+ ,5 !"#
*)&$! )- !"#i$ (a$#n!a' a&!")$i!5. The law imposes
a discretionary power on the courts, which should be
made use of, with a primary regard for the welfare of
the minor. B)!" &n+#$ *ivi' 'a: an+ *)..)n 'a:1
!"# ,#! in!#$#! )- !"# *"i'+ i THE (a$a.)&n!
5espondent-s counsel insinuates that although the
mother may have instituted the action because of
maternal affection for her children, she might as well
have instituted it because of the sum of money
gathered for the support of the children .WT)L`0.
Testimony was also introduced to show that the
mother had in&--i*i#n! .#an !) &(()$! !"#
*"i'+$#n. )owever all of this may be, one fact
remains and this is+ that !"# .)!"#$ "a ,##n -)&n+
g&i'!5 )- a+&'!#$5. %uch unfitness on the part of the
mother has been shown so as to warrant the trial
court, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, to render judgment which placed the children in the
custody of their grandmother.
*"s. "opia*
E. Pa$#n! v. C"i'+$#nD C"#n Rig"! C'a"
Jerry %trunk, an incompetent represented through his guardian ad litem "orris ,urton v. $va %trunk, committee and
mother of Jerry
=sborne D1BFBG&
$rthur and $va have 2 sons, Tommy and Jerry.
Tommy is suffering from chronic glomerulus
nephritis, a fatal kidney disease. )e-s being kept
alive by fre&uent treatment on an artificial kidney,
but such procedure cannot be continued much
Jerry meanwhile is an incompetent and has
a speech defect, committed to the /rankfort %tate
)ospital and %chool for the feebleminded. Jerry-s
AT is :H, corresponding to a 3*year old .he-s
already 280. 'ue to the speech defect, his parents
are not well ac&uainted with him.
Tommy needed a kidney transplant in order
to survive. $ cadaver source was hard to come by
and probably ineffective, so a live donation was
indispensible. ,ut no one in the entire family was
compatible as live donors, except his brother Jerry.
What legal recourse can the parents use to procure
a transplant from Jerry to TommyL
"other $va petitioned the county court to
proceed with the operation. The court found that the
operation was necessary, especially since the
losses from the removal of a kidney would be much
less than the damage Jerry will incur from the
possible death of his brother, for Jerry was greatly
dependent on his brother emotionally and
psychologically. $s found by the 'epartment of
"ental )ealth in its recommendation to commence
the operation, Tommy-s life was vital to the
continuity of Jerry-s improvement in the /rankfort
%tate )ospital and %chool.
The county court gave its approval, and the
circuit court affirmed. ,ut Jerry was represented by
a guardian ad litem who continually &uestioned the
power of the state to authoriGe the removal of an
organ from an incompetent who is a ward of the
I&#: 'oes a court have the power to permit a
kidney to be removed from an incompetent
ward of the state, upon the petition of the
mother, to transplant it into body of
incompetent-s brother dying of a fatal kidney
H#'+: Res. Circuit court judgment affirmed.
The doctrine recogniGing the right to act on behalf of
incompetents .aka the Edoctrine of substituted
judgmentF0 has been recogniGed in $merican courts
since 96??. An #entucky, substantial powers have
been delegated to committees of persons with
unsound mind.
$ court of e&uity '1% have sufficient inherent
power to authoriGe the operation, and has full and
complete jurisdiction over the persons of those who
labor under any legal disability. .5eminiscent of
parens patriae.0
)aving found that the operation would be in the best
interest not only of Tommy but also of Jerry based
on substantial evidence, the circuit court judgment
should be affirmed.
/*"s notes 0the ratio %as 2uite short so )"ll try to
e#pound and fit it %ith the topic) _ The EclashF
between the interests of the parent .over her child0
and the child*incompetent .as forwarded by the
guardian ad litem0 can be reconciled by the county
court .reminiscent of parens patriae0 for as long as
the decision is for the child-s best interest.
'issent by Steinfeld _ The life of the
incompetent is not in danger, but the surgical
procedure proposed creates some peril. $s in Prince
v& 7assachusetts, Eparents may be free to become
martyrs themselvesZbut it does not follow they are
freeZto make martyrs of their children before they
have reached the age of full and legal discretionZ.F
The power give to a committee would !T
extend so far as to allow a committee to subject his
ward to the serious surgical techni&ue, D!@1%% the
life of his ward be in jeopardy. !or would the powers
delegated to the county court reach so far as to
permit the procedure in this case.
(erhaps we should not permit the removal of the
incompetent-s kidney, until it-s shown une&uivocally
that it will really benefit the incompetent .which the
evidence at hand does not prove0.
*"r. (unongbayan*
C)n#$va!)$"i( )- !"# P#$)n )- /ALERIE N. MILDRED G.1 a C)n#$va!)$1 #!*.1 #! a'.1 P#!i!i)n#$ an+
A((#''an!1 v. /ALERIE N.1 O,K#*!)$ an+ R#()n+#n!
P)n#n!#+ ;rodin, /.
Na!&$#+ appeal from a judgment of the %ta. Clara County %uperior Court NCaliforniaO
Da!#+ ctober 29, 9>6H
Palerie !., 2> years old during the time of
trial, has 'own-s %yndrome, as a result of
which she is severely developmentally
disabled. $lthough she has an approximate
AT of :4, she has expressed her wish for her
parents, "ildred and 1ugene ;. .stepfather0,
to continue caring for her.
%he is exceedingly sexually aggressive
toward men N* she was not sexually active,
but she would masturbateC she approached
men on the street, hugging and kissing them,
climbing on top of them, wanting to sit on
their lapsO, which caused Palerie-s parents to
fear that she might one day have a
psychologically*harmful unwanted
pregnancy. ,ecause of this, realiGing that
they will not always be around to keep
Palerie from indulging her uncontrollable
passions, they sought to be named Palerie-s
conservators in the %ta. Clara County
%uperior Court, re&uesting that they be given
additional powers to have her undergo Ea
%alpingectomy Ntubal ligationO or any other
operation that will permanently steriliGeF
!amed conservators of their daughter, they
could make her get an abortion should she
get pregnant, or make her take .e.g. ingest0
birth control medication Nwhich Palerie-s
parents already did, but discontinued
because they made Palerie illO, or take away
her children from an unwanted pregnancy B
in other words, have control over many of
Palerie-s reproductive rights. The probate
court, however, stated that they do not have
the authority to grant conservators the right
to re&uest that a non*therapeutic steriliGation
procedure be performed on a conservatee
who could not herself consent to such action.
%uch steriliGation without direct consent was
barred by a statute enacted to prevent
Eeugenic steriliGationF, i.e. Nin this caseO
steriliGing people with hereditary mental
defects so as to prevent them from bearing
children with the same disability. %uch
steriliGation used to be performed in state
mental institutions, under the discretion of
the hospital with the consent of the patient
.or her guardiansIconservators0, in
accordance with law, so as to prevent those
who are committed therein from bearing
mentally*impaired children. With greater
understanding of the nature of mental and
psychological deficiencies, the authority to
consent to steriliGation was placed s&uarely
in the hands of the person that others wish to
be steriliGed.
The guardianshipIconservatorship law of
California empowers guardiansIconservators
to have their charges undergo medical
treatment should it be found that such
treatment is necessary, and that said
charges are unable to give consent to such
treatment. The court was not convinced that
steriliGation was necessary in Palerie-s case.

I&#+ WI! Palerie-s parents should be given the right
to determine if Palerie should undergo a non*
therapeutic steriliGation procedure, or, WI! the
California statute barring them from having Palerie
undergo tubal ligation violates their .Palerie-s0 9?
$mendment rights

H#'+: judgment remanded to lower courtC facts
insufficient for judgment
The right to privacy as enshrined in the
Constitution via the 9?
$mendment protects
the right to steriliGation .i.e. a woman-s right
not to bear children0.
At is within the police power of the state to
enact legislation designed to protect the
liberties of its residents. The statute barring
proxy consent to steriliGation restricts the
exercise of other fundamental rights by or on
behalf of the incompetent. The state has not
asserted an interest in protecting the right of
the incompetent to bear children. !either the
Einvoluntary impositionF of other forms of
contraception, nor abortion, has been
banned. $ conservator is permitted to
exercise his or her own judgment as to the
best interests of the conservatee in these
matters, excepting only the election of
steriliGation as a means of preventing
conception. ;iving such power to authoriGe
steriliGation has been subject to abuse in the
'enying a developmentally*disabled woman
the choice B made on her behalf by her
conservators, as she cannot do so herself B
to undergo tubal ligation is the same as
denying women not so disabled the right to
make that choice. There is no compelling
state interest to restrict this right. The Court
found that the statute is overbroad.
The parents need to definitively establish
that Palerie is capable of procreation and
that tubal ligation is necessary, i.e. if it is
indeed the appropriate remedy for Palerie-s
case, not other available means of
*"r. 5eyes*
Pictoria ;illick, petitioner vs. West !orfolk and Wisbech $rea )ealth $uthority and 'epartment of )ealth and %ocial
%ecurity, respondents&
Na!&$#+ $ppeal from the Court of $ppeal by the
'epartment of )ealth and %ocial %ecurity
Da!#+ ctober 98, 9>6H
Pan#': @ord /raser of Tullybelton, @ord %carman,
@ord ,ridge of )arwich, @ord ,randon of akbrook,
and @ord Templeman
MaK)$i!5: @ord /raser of Tullybelton, @ord
%carman, @ord ,ridge of )arwich
Di#n!: @ord ,randon of akbrook, @ord
,y S#*!i)n 7 of the Na!i)na' H#a'!" S#$vi*#
?Fa.i'5 P'anning@ A*! 7<6P, the (arliament
empowered ')*a' "#a'!" a&!")$i!i# in 1ngland
and Wales to make arrangements for+ .90 the
giving )- a+vi*# on contraceptionC .20 the
.#+i*a' #9a.ina!i)n of persons seeking advice
on contraception for the purpose of determining
what advice to giveC and .:0 the &(('5 )-
*)n!$a*#(!iv# substances and contraceptive
The $ct of 9>38 was repealed by the Na!i)na'
H#a'!" S#$vi*# R#)$gania!i)n A*! 7<P4 which
replaced the power of local health authorities and
conferred !"# +&!5 -)$ a+vi*# an+ !$#a!.#n! to
the S#*$#!a$5 )- S!a!#. At is important to note
that the contraceptive advice and treatment
provided by these laws was n)! &,K#*! !) an5
'i.i!a!i)n &()n !"# ag# of the persons to whom
such service was to be accorded.
"ay 9>8? B The %ecretary of %tate made
arrangements in pursuance of his duty. The
D#(a$!.#n! )- H#a'!" an+ S)*ia' S#*&$i!5
issued an explanatory circular concerning such
arrangements, attached to it was a
M#.)$an+&. )- G&i+an*#. S#*!i)n G .entitled
EThe RoungF0 of the "emorandum explains+
9. ,ecause of the fact that there were 9,?>4
births and 2,64? induced abortions among
girls under 93, there was a *'#a$ n##+ -)$
*)n!$a*#(!iv# #$vi*# to be made
available and accessible to young people at
the risk of pregnancy i$$#(#*!iv# )- ag#
2. I! :a -)$ !"# +)*!)$ !) +#*i+# whether to
provide contraceptive advice and treatment
:. The "edical 'efense Dnion had advised that
!"# (a$#n! )- a *"i'+1 )- :"a!#v#$ ag#1
")&'+ n)! ,# *)n!a*!#+ by any staff
without his or her permission .($in*i('# )-
*)n-i+#n!ia'i!5+ abandoning this principle
might cause some not to seek professional
advice at all, exposing them to immediate
risks of pregnancy and %T' as well as long*
term physical, psychological, and emotional
An a $#vi#+ !#9! of the "emorandum of
;uidance, it provides that in H#9*#(!i)na'
*a#I1 the nature of any counseling must be a
matter for the doctor or other professional worker
concerned and the decision whether or not to
prescribe contraception must be for the *'ini*a'
K&+g.#n! )- a +)*!)$. This implies that a +)*!)$
*an 'a:-&''5 ($#*$i,# *)n!$a*#(!i)n !) gi$'
&n+#$ 76 #v#n :i!")&! !"#i$ (a$#n!8 *)n#n!.
January 29, 9>69 B M$. /i*!)$ia Gi''i*=, a
5oman Catholic who has -iv# +a&g"!#$, a''
&n+#$ !"# ag# )- 76, wrote to the local health
authority asking for a :$i!!#n a&$an*# that in
no circumstances will any of her daughters, while
they are under 93, be given contraceptive or
abortion treatment without her knowledge or
January 28, 9>69 B An $#()n# !) M$.
Gi''i*=8 '#!!#$, the "inister of )ealth thru the
local health authorities, emphasiGed that it would
be most unusual to provide advice about
contraception without parental consent. At even
goes on to say that the -ina' +#*ii)n .&! ,#
-)$ !"# +)*!)$8 *'ini*a' K&+g.#n!.
"arch :, 9>69 B the previous response as well
as further correspondence with the local health
authority +i+ n)! a!i-5 M$. Gi''i*=. An her -ina'
'#!!#$, she formally FORBADE any medical staff
employed by !orfolk $rea )ealth $uthority .$)$0
to give any contraception or abortion advice or
treatment to any of her daughters without her
consent. %he asked the !orfolk $)$ to
acknowledge her letter but they never did.
$ugust H, 9>62 B M$. Gi''i*= *)..#n*#+
($)*##+ing against the !orfolk $)$ and the
'epartment of )ealth and %ocial %ecurity
.')%%0, claiming+
9. A +#*'a$a!i)n again! !"# +#-#n+an!,
stating that the notice ."emorandum of
;uidance0 had no authority in law and gives
advice which is unlawful and wrong, and
which adversely affects the welfare of her
children and her rights as a
parentIcustodian, and her ability to properly
and effectively discharge her duties as
2. A +#*'a$a!i)n again! !"# N)$-)'= AHA
that no doctor might give any contraceptive
andIor abortion advice andIor treatment to
any of her children below the age of 93
without her knowledge and consent
The said action was +i.i#+. "rs. ;illick then
appealed to the C)&$! )- A((#a'. )er a((#a'
:a a''):#+1 stating that a girl under 93 was
incapable of giving a valid consent to medical
treatment or of validly prohibiting a doctor from
asking the consent of her parents. $side from
this, the M#.)$an+&. )- G&i+an*# :a "#'+
!) ,# *)n!$a$5 !) 'a: because it would be an
infringement on the inalienable rights of parents
as regards to the custody and upbringing of their
)ence, this appeal by the 'epartment of )ealth
and %ocial %ecurity.
7. C"#!"#$ )$ n)! a gi$' &n+#$ !"# ag# )- 76
"a !"# '#ga' *a(a*i!5 !) giv# va'i+
*)n#n! !) *)n!$a*#(!iv# a+vi*# an+
!$#a!.#n! in*'&+ing .#+i*a' #9a.ina!i)n
2. C"#!"#$ )$ n)! a +)*!)$ giving &*"
a+vi*# an+ !$#a!.#n! !) a gi$' &n+#$ 76
:i!")&! "#$ (a$#n!8 *)n#n! in-$ing# )n
!"# (a$#n!8 $ig"!
:. Whether or not a doctor who gives such
advice or treatment to a girl under 93 without
her parents- consent incurs criminal liability
9. YES. The !ational )ealth %ervice
@egislation indicated that (arliament
regarded contraceptive advice and treatment
as essentially medical matters. There is n)
!a!&!)$5 ($)vii)n which states that a girl
under 93 lacks the legal capacity to consent
to contraceptive advice, examination, and
treatment ($)vi+#+ !"a! "# "a &--i*i#n!
.a!&$i!51 &n+#$!an+ing an+ in!#''ig#n*#
!) =n): :"a! !"#5 inv)'v#. The parental
right to determine whether or not their minor
child below the age of 93 will have medical
treatment terminates if and when the child
achieves a sufficient understanding and
intelligence to enable him or her to -&''5
&n+#$!an+ !"# na!&$# an+ i.('i*a!i)n )-
!"# ($)()#+ !$#a!.#nt. At will be a
&uestion of fact whether a child seeking
advice has sufficient understanding of what
is involved to give consent that is valid in
law. Dntil the child achieves the capacity to
consent, !"# (a$#n!a' $ig"! !) .a=# !"#
+#*ii)n *)n!in&# av# )n'5 in
#9*#(!i)na' *i$*&.!an*# .emergency,
parental neglect, abandonment of the child,
inability to find the parent0. An these
#9*#(!i)na' i!&a!i)n1 !"# +)*!)$ i
K&!i-i#+ !) ($)*##+ :i!" !"# !$#a!.#n! )-
!"# *"i'+ #v#n :i!")&! (a$#n!a'
=n):'#+g# an+ *)n#n!.
2. NO. Pa$#n!a' $ig"! !) *)n!$)' a *"i'+ +)
n)! #9i! -)$ !"# ,#n#-i! )- !"# (a$#n!.
They exist for the ,#n#-i! )- !"# *"i'+ and
they are justified only in so far as they
enable the parent to perform his duties
towards the child. $side from this, it is a
common practice that (a$#n! $#'a9 !"#i$
*)n!$)' )v#$ !"#i$ *"i'+ a "# )$ "#
+#v#')( an+ ,#*).# in+#(#n+#n!. The
degree of parental control actually exercised
over a particular child varies according to his
or her level of understanding and
intelligence. Andeed, it can be said that a
(a$#n!8 *)n!$)' )v#$ a *"i'+ +:in+'#.
The extent and the duration of parental rights
cannot be ascertained by a fixed age, but it
is +#(#n+#n! )n !"# +#g$## )- in!#''ig#n*#
an+ &n+#$!an+ing of the child, and his or
her welfare and best interests.
In #9*#(!i)na' *a#1 a +)*!)$
:i'' ,# #n!i!'#+ !) giv# *)n!$a*#(!iv#
a+vi*# an+ !$#a!.#n! !) a gi$' &n+#$ 76
:i!")&! "#$ (a$#n!8 =n):'#+g# an+
*)n#n! if he is satisfied that+ .a0 the girl will
understand the adviceC .b0 he cannot
persuade her to inform her parents or to
allow him to inform her parents that she is
seeking contraceptive adviceC .c0 she is very
likely to begin or to continue having sexual
intercourse with or without contraceptive
treatmentC .d0 unless she receives
contraceptive advice or treatment, her
physical or mental health or both are likely to
sufferC and .e0 her best interests re&uire him
to give her contraceptive advice, treatment,
or both without the parental consent.
:. NO. $ doctor who gives contraceptive advice
or treatment with the in!#n!i)n !) a*! in the
best interest of the girl is unlikely to commit
an offense. The ,)na -i+# #9#$*i# ,5 a
+)*!)$ )- "i *'ini*a' K&+g.#n! must be a
*).('#!# n#ga!i)n )- !"# g&i'!5 .in+
which is essential in criminal offenses.
Di()i!iv#: Judgment of the Court of $ppeal set
aside. There is no infringement on parental rights.
Di#n!ing O(ini)n+
L)$+ B$an+)n )- Oa=,$))=+
"aking contraception available to girls under 93
is unlawful, whether their parent know of and
consent to it or not
"oves to uphold the decision of the Court of
'ismisses the appeal of the ')%%, with costs
L)$+ T#.('
$n unmarried girl under the age of 93 does not
possess the power in law to decide for herself to
practice contraception. %uch a girl cannot be
regarded as sufficiently mature to be allowed to
decide for herself that she will practice
contraception for the purpose of fre&uent or
regular or casual sexual intercourse.
'ifficulties may arise when parent and doctor
differ the best interests of the girl should be
$ doctor is not entitled to decide whether a girl
under the age of 93 shall be provided with
contraceptive facilities if a parent who is in
charge of the girl is ready and willing to make that
decision in exercise of parental rights.
"oves to grant the relief indicated by the
declarations made by the Court of $ppeal and
would order that "rs. ;illick-s costs be paid by
the ')%%.
*"s. 5eyes*
C&$!i v. S*"))' C)..i!!## )- Fa'.)&!"
'ate+ July 98, 9>>H
(onente+ @iacos, CJ.
. @awrence Junior )igh %chool established a
C)n+). Avai'a,i'i!5 P$)g$a..
. Dnder this program, students could re&uest free
condoms from the school nurse.
. They could also get free counseling and
)API$A'% instructional pamphlets.
. (arents opposed the program because it violates
their constitutional rights to -a.i'5 ($iva*5,
*)n!$)' )- !"# #+&*a!i)n and uprbringing of their
children and -$## #9#$*i# )- $#'igi)n.
. An other words, they want to be the ones to teach
their children these things, in the manner that is
appropriate for them or their religion.
. (arents also argue that being in the compulsory
setting a public school, their kids are compelled
to join the program.
I&#: Whether the Condom $vailability program
violates parental rights.
!o. The condom availability progam does not violate
parental rights.
. The condoms, counseling and )API$A'%
information pamphlets are available to students
:") $#%&#! !"#..
. %tudents are n)! re&uired to seek out and accept
condoms, counseling or read the literature.
. (arents are free to instruct their children not to
. "ere exposure to programs offered at school
does not amount to state intrusion.
. n being compulsory+ while the parents are
re&uired to send their children to school, it does
not mean that they are re&uired to make their
children participate in the program.
. The program does not conflict with parents-
religious teachings regarding premarital sex. The
government is not re&uired to create programs in
ways that conform to religious beliefs of particular
. $lso, the distribution of condoms is not a medical
service that re&uires parental consent.
While it is the right and duty of parents to send their
children to school and direct their education, the
children also have the right to information regarding
sex, contraception and %T's and it is the school-s
duty to provide them with the necessary information
and contraception materials.
*"r. 5imban*
July 8, 9>89
P)n#n!#: %CA@1((A, Judge.
"ary 5oe is a student of Dniversity of
@ouisville of age 24.
)er family history was not good. )er mother
died when she was :. )er father then
remarried for several times and the problems
in the family made her fall into academic
probation, trying @%' and marijuana.
)is father is a prominent attorney who
despite everything that has happened
generously supports her.
Dpon entering the Dniversity of @ouisville,
her father decided that she should live in a
college dormitory which she did.
)owever, in $pril 9>84, her father cut off all
financial support to her daughter upon
learning that she had been living with
another female classmate in an off*campus
)e ignored what her father did and sold her
automobile, whose proceeds she used for
her daily living and studies.
%he then enrolled for summer classes and
afterwards, stayed with the family of her
%he then sued for support alleging that the
respondent has refused and neglected to
provide fair and reasonable support.
the trial court rendered two separate orders,
one order that the father is re&uired to remit
a tuition payment for the then*pending
semester and to provide for reasonable
medical, dental, eye and psychiatric care
and a final order of support re&uiring the
father to pay ]2H4 per month in support for
the period from the time he cut her off until
she turned 29.
The following year, it was found out that the
father failed to comply with the first ordes
and thus was committed to be imprisoned for
:4 days
)e then appealed and the $ppellate 'ivision
directed that the father pay only those
university and health bills actually rendered
prior to !ovember :4, 9>84 and regarding
the final order, it was reversed.
W! there is a duty to support when a child wilfully
leaves the parental home with the purpose of avoiding
parental control.
Res, though the right to custody of the parents and
right to support of the child are reciprocal, the parents
may still impose reasonable regulations for his child.
)olding otherwise would allow a child to go against
the legitimate mandate of his parents but
nevertheless demanding for support in her decision to
go against her parent-s effective control. The reason
of the father for demanding his daughter to live in
campus is not unwarranted. )is daughter has the
prerogative to disagree and disobey her father but in
doing so, she opens herself to the lawful wrath of her
father. ,y doing so, she forfeits her right to support
from the father.
/inally, the intrusion made by the family
court was unwarranted considering that it interfered
with the exercise of the delicate responsibility of the
parents for parental control.
*"r. %antiago*
In $# E+:a$+ C.1 a P#$)n C).ing Un+#$ !"# J&v#ni'# C)&$! La:
%ta. Clara County 'epartment of %ocial %ervices, (laintiff and 5espondent, vs. 1dmond C, et al., 'efendants and
'ate+ !ovember :4, 9>69
$ppelants .the parents0 have three children+ 1ric,
"arlee, and 1dward.
'ependency proceedings were instituted for "arlee
when she was 99 months old because she was
malnourished and had suffered probable concussion
of &uestionable origin. %he was placed in the home of
"rs. 5., the maternal grandmother, who legally
adopted her later on.
1ric and 1dward were placed in a protective custody
because there was no food in the home, the home
was in a disheveled condition, and 1ric had received
marks due to excessive discipline by the father. The
boys were adjudged as dependents and were placed
in a foster home.
$ppellants refused counseling and offered minimal
cooperation, and failed to maintain contact with the
probation department.
@ater on, the maternal grandmother, believing that the
father had left home and hoping that the children
could be reac&uainted, allowed "arlee to visit with
her mother and two brothers. When she came back,
she observed the father disciplining the three children
by hitting them with a leather strap. The father
explained to the children that he was doing it because
;od wanted him to and that it was ,iblically ordained.
The grandmother testified that "arlee was once
beaten during the night for wetting the bed. %he was
also made to sleep in her underwear on a plastic
sheet on the floor with no bedding. The children were
made to stand in a corner for long periods and were
lectured about ;od at mealtime. %ometimes the
children fell asleep without eating. $fter school they
were not allowed to go out.
$fter one severe beating when she wasn-t able to
recall what she learned in church, the grandmother
observed blood on "arlee-s underpants. This
prompted her to remove the child from appellants-
household. "arlee had numerous abrasions, bruises,
and lacerations on her buttocks, legs, and arms. %he
was taken into protective custody. (etitions were also
filed for 1ric and 1dward after the probation officer
observed the father strike 1ric while they were sitting
on the lobby of the probation department.
Dpon interview, 1ric and 1dward told the investigating
deputy that they did not want to return to their parents-
home because their father whipped them too much
and too hard.
The father admitted spanking the children, but denied
causing the said injuries. The mother did not testify
but informed the investigating officer that she
supported her husband-s manner of discipline.
$fter the conclusion of the dependency hearing, the
children were adjudged to be dependents of the court
and were committed to the custody of the probation
officer for suitable foster or relative home placement.
The parents were also ordered to undergo
7. CON !"#$# i &,!an!ia' #vi+#n*# )- a*!&a'
)$! "a$. !) E$i* an+ E+:a$+ !)
K&!i-5 in!$&i)n in!) !"# a((#''an!8
*)n!i!&!i)na''5 ($)!#*!#+ -&n+a.#n!a' $ig"!
!) (a$#n!ing.
2. W! the parents can justify the manner of
upbringing of their children using the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion.
9. YES. The appellants- contend that
evidence is insufficient to support a finding
that 1dward and 1ric suffered any physical
or psychological injury. To prove the
dependency of a child, preponderance of
evidence is needed.
The evidence at hand overwhelmingly
supports the findings that appellants- home
was an unfit place for "arlee by reason of
the father-s cruel and inhuman corporal
punishment of her. %uch evidence is
admissible on appellants- exercise of
proper and effective control of 1ric and
1dward. The court could reasonably infer
that the father, with "arlee removed, would
turn his excessive discipline measures to
1ric and 1dward instead. The testimonies
of the two boys also supported this
conclusion. At is also reasonable to infer
that continued exposure to the threat of
physical force will inhibit the healthy
emotional development necessary to a
progression from childhood to independent
The parental preference and the child-s
best interests standards are usually
compatible, but :"#n !"# $ig"! )- !"#
(a$#n! *)n-'i*! :i!" !")# )- !"# *"i'+1
!"# '#ga' 5!#. ")&'+ ($)!#*! !"#
*"i'+8 in!#$#!. !ot only is the child a
helpless party but the parents should suffer
the conse&uences of their inade&uacy
rather than the child.
2. NO. "istreatment of a child is not
privileged because it is imposed in the
guise of freedom of religious expression.
Whether discipline is excessive or a
lifestyle is harmful to the child must be
measured in the light if an objective
standard of reasonableness under all
==There was also a discussion on reunification
plan for the family. )owever, due to the father-s
absence of remorse and denial of abuse of
children after three dependency proceedings,
and the support of the mother on the father-s
beliefs, as well as the refusal to participate in
any plan for counseling, a detailed plan for
reunification would have been useless.
!T1+ D#(#n+#n! C"i'++ This term generally
refers to a child who has been placed in the
legal custody of either the state or the county
foster care system by the courts, usually due to
the abandonment, abuse or neglect of the child
by its parents or other caregivers.
*"s. Tiu*
B#!!5 M. Si..)n, a girl of nine years of
age, is under the legal custody of his aunt
M$. P$in*#. ,oth are members of the
religious group Jehovah-s Witnesses.
ne night, "rs. (rince permitted the children
.her 2 sons and ,etty0 Eto engage in the
preaching work with her upon the sidewalk.F
With specific reference to ,etty, she and
,etty took position about 24 feet apart near a
street intersection to "an+D)&! *)(i# )-
$#'igi)& +)*&.#n! ?HCa!*" T):#$I an+
HC)n)'a!i)nI@ -)$ E *#n! (#$ *)(5.
!o one accepted a copy from ,etty that
evening, but in other nights, ,etty had
received funds and had given out copies.
"r. (erkins, the school attendance officer,
approached "rs. (rince regarding the
activity that ,etty was engaged in. $n
argument ensued regarding constitutional
right of freedom of religion.
T"# S!a!# C)&$! +#!#$.in#+ !"a! B#!!5
:a #ngag#+ in a Ha'#I )$ an H)--#$ !)
#''I :i!"in #* 6< ?*i!#+ ,#'):@ )$ :a
H:)$=I :i!"in #* F7 ?*i!#+ ,#'):@.
%ec 3>+
o !o boy under twelve and no girl
under eighteen shall sell, expose,
or offer for sale any newspapers,
magaGines, periodicals or any other
articles of merchandise of any
description, or exercise the trade of
bootblack or scavenger, or any
other trade, in any street or public
%ec 69+
o E$ny parent, guardian or custodian
having a minor under his control
who compels or permits such minor
to work in violation of any provision
of sections 34 to 8? shall for first
offense be punished by a fineZ, or
by imprisonmentZ, or bothZF
ISSUE: CON !"# !a!&!#1 a a(('i#+ in !"i *a#1 i
in vi)'a!i)n )- +&# ($)*# ?)n (a$#n!a' $ig"!@1
-$##+). )- $#'igi)n1 an+ #%&a' ($)!#*!i)n.
N#i!"#$ $ig"! )- $#'igi)n n)$ $ig"!
(a$#n!"))+ a$# ,#5)n+ 'i.i!a!i)n. The
state, as parens patriae, may restrict the
parents- control by re&uiring school
attendance, regulating the child-s labor and
in many other ways. Ats authority is not
nullified merely because the parent grounds
his claim to control the child-s course of
conduct on religion or conscience.
The state has a wide range of power limiting
parental freedom and authority in things
affecting the child-s welfare. This includes, to
some extent, matters of conscience and
religious conviction.
T"# !a!#8 a&!")$i!5 )v#$ *"i'+$#n8
a*!ivi!i# i ,$)a+#$ !"a! )v#$ 'i=# a*!i)n
)- a+&'!D (#*&'ia$'5 !$&# in .a!!#$ )-
#.(')5.#n!. A.)ng #vi' .)!
a(($)($ia!# -)$ &*" a*!i)n a$# !"#
*$i(('ing #--#*! )- *"i'+
'a,)$;#.(')5.#n!1 .)$# #(#*ia''5 in
(&,'i* ('a*#1 an+ !"# ()i,'# "a$.
a$iing -$). )!"#$ a*!ivi!i# &,K#*! !) a''
+iv#$# in-'&#n*# in !"# !$##!1 #v#n i- in
!"# ($##n*# )- !"# (a$#n! )$ !"#
There is no denial of 1(C in excluding the
children of Jehovah-s witness from doing in
the streets what no other children may do.
J&!i*# M&$("51 +i#n!ing: 5eligious training and
activity are protected by the 9?
amendment. The
great interest of state in shielding minors from the
evils of early life does not warrant every limitation on
their religious training and activities. The
reasonableness that justifies the prohibition of the
ordinary distribution of literature in public streets by
children is not necessarily the reasonableness that
justifies such a drastic restriction when the distribution
is part of their religious faith.
J&!i*# Ja*=)n1 +i#n!ing: @imits begin to
operate only when the activities collide with liberties of
others or of the public. 5eligious activities which
concern only members of the faith are and ought to
be free as anything can be.
*"s. Torres*
Pa$#n!a' C)n#n! R#%&i$#.#n! an+ P$iva*5 Rig"! )- Min)$: C)n!$a*#(!iv# C)n!$)v#$5
C).('#9 i&#:
9. %cope of the constitutional right of adults to obtain contraceptives remains somewhat uncertain
2. Courts have not yet articulated the special factors that determine how existing frameworks for analyGing the rights
of adults are to be applied to minors
:. The &uestion of minors- access to contraceptive involves a particularly complex mixture of the interests of minors,
parents, and the state.
I. Ba$$i#$ Fa*ing Min)$ S##=ing C)n!$a*#(!iv#
;eneral 5ule+ (arental consent was re&uired at common law as a substitute for the child-s consent
51$%!+ increasing sensitivity to the child as a person
o /ocus shifted from bodily integrity ?#.#$g#n*5@ to judicial recognition of de facto majority
?*i(a!i)n@ to concern over the characteristics and mental capabilities of the minor ?.a!&$i!5@
o 1mergency exception+
9. E.#$g#n*5 #9*#(!i)n B a situation in which immediate steps are necessary to effect life saving measures or to
begin with medication in severe cases
o Courts construe this narrowly and it is doubtful that a minor-s need for contraceptive services could
&ualify as an emergency situation
2.*i(a!#+ .in)$ B effectively consent to medical treatment if he is fully informed and capable of
understanding the conse&uences of treatment
o Andications+
failure of parents to meet legal responsibilities
living apart from parents, financial self*support
:. Ma!&$# .in)$ B understanding of the ramifications of treatment is sufficient
o /actors+
i. Dndertaken for minor-s own benefit rather than for that of :
ii. $t least 9H years old and had sufficient mental capacity to understand completely the nature
and importance of the treatment
iii. (rocedure was thought not to be major
II. A(('i*a,i'i!5 )- P$iva*5 Rig"! !) .in)$
(rivacy 5ights jurisprudence+
9. ;riswold v Connecticut B forbidding use of contraceptives by married adults violated right to marital
2. 1isenstadt v ,aird B unmarried adults must be granted the same right to access
:. 5oe v Wade B privacy right is sufficiently broad to embrace both access and use
o $,5TA! v C!T5$C1(TA!+
Af state-s interest during early gestation in safeguarding maternal health and protecting the fetus are not
sufficient to justify abortion, it seems even less likely that restraints on access to contraceptive can be
)ealth risks in contraception are less than those of abortion
'ecision is made prior to the conception of potential life
o C)A@'51! in C""! @$W
'id not distinguish between infant and the mature teenager, categoriGed both as minors and treated as
the Eproperty if their parentsF who could make the decisions affecting them
Court has recogniGed that minors are persons under the Constitution B they possessed fundamental
rights which the %tate must respect
,ut no %C decision has explicitly held that the right of privacy is applicable to minors
o $5;D"1!T% A! /$P5 / $CC1%% T C!T5$C1(TAP1%
There is high incidence of teenage sexual activity and pregnancy, and liberaliGing access to
contraceptive could reduce the number of undesired pregnancies
$ccess to contraception could also reduce problems accompanying forced marriage of immature
couples and the often acute anxieties involved in deciding whether to secure an abortion
o $5;D"1!T% $;$A!%T $CC1%% T C!T5$C1(TAP1%
/or the child-s best interest
At has some deterrent effect on sexual conduct.
o )owever, substantial number of minors will engage in sexual activities despite bans
/ostering a particular moral climate
o )owever, depriving minors does not appear significantly to alter sexual attitudes
'eter sexual activity to reduce the fiscal burden of supporting unwed mothers and illegitimate children,
and protecting minor from the increased risks of teenage childbearing
o $rgument is misleading+ it is unlikely that the number of unwanted pregnancies that would be
prevented when sex is deterred by unavailability of birth control would substantially be greater
than the number of illegitimate births that would be prevented by easy access to
III. C"i'+8 In!#$#! In C)n!$a*#(!iv# an+ T"# Fa.i'58 In!#$#! in A&!)n).5
o 1ven if it is true that states have no right to ban access of minors under the 9?
amendment, it does not
necessarily follow that the state may not enforce parental choices with regard to such access
o The %tate-s regulation of access to contraceptives is not an instance of the state imposing its will on the children,
%tate is neutral as to whether the children ultimately obtain contraceptives
)owever, it is not neutral as to who makes the choice.
o The state-s grant to parents of legal control over minor-s access to contraceptives constitutes state action
o (arent-s interests should prevail are two implicit decisions underlying state choice+
9. The state must have decided that the family is an important social unit, support of which is a proper legal
2. At must have determined that permitting children
C!%TATDTA!$@ P$@A'ATR under 9?
o W! the state-s interest in the maintenance of the family structure outweighs the child-s
fundamental interest in access to contraceptives.
o W! state-s decision B that enforcing parental choice as to contraceptives helps maintain the
family structure * a compelling interest.
o %trong %tate and parental interest in maintaining the family+
9. maintaining family structure is a normative goalC its preservation is a goal that the state may legitimately
2. family yields a variety of practical social benefit
o Traditional analysis of family+
/amily integrity S parental control
(arents view parental consent re&uirements as justifiable or even legal reinforcement of a natural
right to make fundamental decision on their children-s behalf.
o )owever, it is a misconception to e&uate the preservation of family structure with reinforcement of parental
"aintaining the integrity of the family is not only a reflection of interests of parents
At mirrors a distinguishable, relational privacy interest
%afeguard from state encroachment the intimacy and autonomy of the family relationship
$((@AC$TA! T C!T5$C1(TAP1 A%%D1+
o Andividual interests of parent and child are likely to collide
o (rotection of their shared relational interest assumes independent importance and should be directed at
reinforcing the values of parents alone, which results when a parental consent re&uirement is imposed, but rather
at fostering autonomous intrafamilial resolution of controversies
o There-s a conflict between+ adolescent-s struggle for independence and guardianship of parents
o Af a minor already developed a sense of responsibility or where the family has established informal patterns of
resolving conflicts+ the state policy may undermine viable dispute resolution
o Af the parent is placed in a very dominant position+ they may exacerbate parent*child disagreement and induce
exaggerated response from minors
o Amportance of minor-s right to access of contraceptives and interest of family unit in freedom form state
interference appear to outweigh any state interests in restricting access.
o %hould be declared D!C!%TATDTA!$@
*"s. Dmali*
R#*)gniGing a+)'#*#n!8 H#v)'ving *a(a*i!i#I !) #9#$*i# *")i*# in $#($)+&*!iv# "#a'!"*a$#
D R. C))=1 B.M. Di*=#n
(urpose of the paper+ To explain governments- legal duties to observe adolescents- rights to healthcare services, and
to relate services to adolescents- evolving capacities to make critical choices for themselves.
The D! Convention on the 5ights of the Child re&uires governments to respect the responsibilities, rights and duties
of parents or others acting as parentsZ in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child. At sets a legal
limit on parental power to deny capable adolescents reproductive and sexual health services. Whether an adolescent
is a Emature minorF must be decided by health service providers independently of parental judgment.
9. Antroduction
The widespread failure of national healthcare services to address the issue of adolescent pregnancy,
childbirth and %TA-s results from+ .90 healthcare providers- fears that local laws restrict their capacity to give
contraceptives and other services to adolescents who come to them unless they have parental consentC and .20
countries default in living up to the international legal commitments they have made under human rights treaties to
ensure that no child is deprived of hisIher right of access to healthcare services. ;overnments must+ .90 determine
whether their domestic law recogniGes that mature minors can obtain confidential services to protect their
reproductive healthC and .20 be encouraged to comply with the international human rights commitments their
countries have made to afford adolescents access to appropriate healthcare services.
2. The Children-s Convention
$ child is Eevery human being below the age of 96 years unless, under the law applicable to the child,
majority is attained earlier.F These persons are entitled to the Convention-s protections. %ome articles of the
Convention provide that+ .90 %tates parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and
religionC and .20 %tates parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when applicable, legal
guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of hisIher right in a manner consistent with the evolving
capacities of the child.
:. @egal limits to parentalism
(arentalism regards mothers and father e&ually. At is also a policy of practice of acting to limit children-s
freedom and responsibility by well*intended regulations. The Convention re&uires that parents and other legal
guardians of children act consistently with the evolving capacities of persons under 96. At limits parental powers when
adolescents develop their own capacities, not only to make decisions, but also reasonably to anticipate and to bear
responsibility for the conse&uences of their decisions. At sets legal limits to inappropriate, obstructive and
dysfunctional parentalism.
?. 5eproductive healthcare decisions
5eproductive healthcare decisions affect others too+ the child born of adolescents, the adolescents- parents
.may reflect badly on their upbringing and jeopardiGe their child-s future, termination of pregnancy may be shameful
or unacceptable0, the adolescents themselves .abortion may endanger their lives or alienate them from their family
and religious traditions0, and healthcare providers .adolescents may want to share their problems but do not want to
disclose these to their parent, posing problems of ethical and legal concerns for healthcare providersC also posing a
problem is when professional codes and local laws are in conflict with more liberal provisions countries have legally
H. $dolescent patients- confidentiality
)ealthcare providers have to inform parents about services to their children for which the parents are asked
to pay fees. ;overnmental and private health insurance plans should include provisions for payments for
adolescents- services that preserve their confidentiality.
3. 5eproductive health services
$dolescents should not be subjected to parental pressure either to forgo medically*conducted abortions they
favor or to terminate pregnancies that want to bring to term. Judges usually accept that parents cannot override
competent adolescent refusals of abortion.
)ealthcare providers must be aware that, unless assured of their confidentiality, adolescents may choose to
forgo contraceptive protection, and risk pregnancy and the dangers of unskilled abortion. 'enial of services or of
confidentiality may be a matter of an adolescent\s death, or severe and enduring injury.
$dolescents- evolving capacities to cope with their own and their peers- sexuality are often hampered by
their lack of reproductive and sexual health information and education. Therefore, there is a need for adolescents to
be educated in reproductive and sexual health. %tates should remove legal haGards that dissuade healthcare
providers from educating young couples in reproductive and sexual prudence and safety .also since states have
accepted a duty under the Convention to ensure that such education is available0.
8. %tates- duties to implement reproductive rights
a. The duty to respect rights of adolescents B prohibits states from interfering with the protection and
promotion of reproductive rightsC there is also the legal duty to ensure confidentiality
b. The duty to protect rights of adolescents B re&uires states to prevent conduct by third parties that results
in violations of reproductive rightsC re&uires that adolescents be spoken to and informed about all aspects of
sexualityC duty to ensure adolescent-s access to information necessary for protection of their reproductive
health, and a related duty to remove legal, regulatory and social barriers to essential information and care
c. The duty to fulfill rights of adolescents B re&uires states to take appropriate legislative, administrative,
budgetary, judicial and other measures toward the realiGation of reproductive rights, consistent with their
evolving capacitiesC states should ensure that healthcare providers recogniGe their duty to assess whether
adolescents who re&uest assistance in reproductive healthcare are capable of exercising reasonable
judgment, and recogniGe their legal duty to treat those who are capable as adults regarding both treatment
and confidentialityC general rule+ adolescents capable of freely choosing to be sexually active without
parental control are e&ually capable of receiving reproductive health counseling and care without parental
6. $dolescent reproductive health programs B the (rofamilia model
Colombia-s (rofamilia runs youth centers and provides some services for adolescents. At provides
adolescent reproductive and sexual health information and services, provide sexuality education in schools, and train
youth in advocacy for adolescent reproductive rights.
*"s. Peneracion*
F. S&..a$5 P$)*#+&$#
R#5#DTa,&Ka$a v. CA
July 24, 2443
(onente+ Chico*!aGario
Avy and 1rnesto were married and had a son,
Carlos Anigo.

Their relationship soured which led Avy and their
son to stay with the former-s sister.
ne day, 1rnesto fetched the child from where Avy
was staying and from then on he never returned
the child. )e even hit Avy while the latter tried to
get the child back.
Avy filed a petition for )abeas Corpus in the 5TC
basing the petition on $rt 29: .custody of children
below 8years old0. The said court granted the
petition and ordered 1rnesto to produce the child
on the day of the hearing. 1rnesto failed to show
Avy then filed for an Drgent 1x*parte motion to
)ear Writ of )abeas Corpus before the 5TC.
Judge ,ay-s resolution however, stated that
Carlos should stay with 1rnesto while the court
was resolving the custody of the child.
Judge ,ay of 5TC then was about to go on a
leave, the case was referred to Judge ;onGales*
$sdala which ruled that the child should be
produced by 1rnesto. When 1rnesto failed to do
so, he was in contempt of court and a warrant of
arrest was issued.
Dpon appeal, the C$ ruled to restrain the
implementation of Judge ;onGales*$sdala-s
decision .which in effect affirmed Judge ,ay-s
decision0. )ence, the petition of Avy to the %C for
its reversal of C$ decision allowing Carlos to stay
with 1rnesto.
C;N The %C can reverse the decisions of 5TC and
C$ and order the said courts to compel 1rnesto to
show Carlos. NO.
/irstly, the %C discussed its jurisdiction over
habeas corpus cases+
o The rule with regard to jurisdiction over habeas
corpus was settled in )n re 7atter of Application
for the )ssuance of a 9rit of Cabeas *orpus
8ichard !rian -hornton for and in behalf of
minor child Se2uiera /ennifer which ruled that
the %C and C$ retained their jurisdiction over
habeas corpus cases despite the (assage of
5$ 6:36 ./amily Courts $ct0 which conferred
upon family courts the exclusive jurisdiction over
habeas corpus cases.
o This was so because conferring exclusive
jurisdiction over /amily Courts would leave the
families of people who are seeking for their child
to be helpless since they cannot seek redress
from family courts whose writs are enforceable
only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. ,y
saying %c has jurisdiction over the habeas
corpus, the court can therefore decide upon the
%econdly, on reversal of 5TC and C$ decision+
o The 5TC ac&uired jurisdiction over the petition
which excluded all the other courts. )ence, the
decision over the writ of )abeas Corpus should
be resolved by the 5TC, for once a jurisdiction
has been ac&uired by a court, it is not lost upon
the instance of the parties but continues until the
case is terminated.
o Af %C would decide upon the matter, it would
overstep the boundary laid down by law with
respect to jurisdiction over habeas corpus.
o $lso, to reverse the decision of the C$ would be
to risk instances where courts of concurrent
jurisdiction might have conflicting orders.
*"s. $llarey*
Ma+$inan v. Ma+$inan

Na!&$#:(etition for review on certiorari of a decision
of the Court of $ppeals
Pa$!i# Inv)'v#+: /elipe "adrinan, petitioner, vs.
/rancisca "adrinan, respondent
P)n#n!#: Corona, J.
Da!#: July 92, 2448

(etitioner /elipe "adrinan and respondent /rancisca
"adrinan were married and had four children. $fter a
bitter &uarrel, petitioner alledgedly left the conjugal
abode and took their three sons . 2 of which are
minors0 with him. 'espite respondentJs efforts to bring
the family back togethre, such efforts proved futile.

5espondent then filed a petition for habeas corpus of
the three children alleging that petitionerJs acts of
leaving their home disrupted the ducation of the
children and deprived them of their motherJs care. The
Court of $ppeals decided in favor of the respondent.

)ence, petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the C$
oer the petition for habeas corpus and insists that
jurisdiction over the case is lodeged in the family
courts under 5$ 6:3>.

W! the Court of $ppeals has jurisdiction over the
petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors

Res, it has jurisdiction

5$ 6:3> did not divest the C$ and the %C of their
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the
custody of minor children. The provisions of 6:3>
must be read in harmony with 5$ 842> . $n $ct
1xpanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of $ppeals0
and ,( 92>
.The Judiciary 5eorganiGation $ct of 9>640*that the
family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the C$
and the %C in petitions for habeas corpus where the
custody of minor is at issue.

/urthermore, %ection 24 on the 5ule on Custody of
"inors and Writ of )abeas Corpus in 5elation to
Custody of "inors states that J the petition may
likewise be filed with the %C, C$ xxx the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the (hilippines.

At must also be noted that petitioner moved from one
place to another covered by different judicial regions.
An this case, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case
will be left with no legal remedy if 5$ 6:3> is to be
applied strictly.

$ careful reading of %ection H.b0 of 5$ 6:3> reveals
that family courts are vested with original exlusive
jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus
cases. An other words, the issuance of the writ is
merely ancillary to the custody pending before the
family court.

5$ 6:3>+
%ection H. Jurisdiction of /amily Courts* the family
courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear
and decide the ff. cases+

b0 petitions for xxx habeas corpus in relation to the
latter .custody of children0
*"s. $mantillo*