Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
The publication of this second issue for 2002 completes our commission as editors of the journal for now. Once again we were faced with the daunting prospect of selecting from a substantial number of papers submitted (21 in total) and we hope that the papers that we have chosen, in consultation with our referees, will be both interesting useful. As was the case with the previous issue, we have been fortunate in having a panel of eminent people from various countries to referee the papers in addition to the many staff of the Faculty of Design Architecture and Building at UTS who assisted in the refereeing process. In reviewing the contributions and selecting papers for publication we were faced with some fundamental questions, not the least of which was the question of exactly what criteria we would use in assessing papers. It may seem simple: separate the good papers from the bad papers (the wheat from the chaff) and print the former. There are, however, some other concerns that need to addressed before we even get to the point of thinking about what constitutes a good or bad paper. The most important of these is related to the nature of the journal itself: it is a refereed journal but one that serves two professional bodies, the AIB and the AIQS, and therefore we should give consideration to presenting papers that will be of interest to their members, and not only to academics. On the other hand, as both bodies have their own professional journals, in which practitioner papers and articles regularly appear, we have generally steered away from papers that we feel fall into that category. In assessing papers for publication we have always looked for those that have a clear objective and that then investigate or pursue that objective in a clear and logical manner. In keeping with our aim of publishing papers that will be of some interest to all our readers we have also looked for clarity in the writing and reporting of research outcomes. It is unfortunate that often what is good research (in our opinion and that of our referees) is devalued because the reporting of it is unclear or just simply difficult to read. The end result is a paper with content that makes it worthy of publication but an outcome that is, overall, too muddy for anyone but a dedicated editor, or perhaps another researcher, to plough through. It could be argued that writing papers for refereed journals is all about content and not about style, i.e., that it is the research and the conclusions drawn from the research that are important. Further it may be argued that it is not the purpose of serious research to produce light reading matter, however, construction is a practical business and if the people in the professions that serve the industry are to benefit from research then surely the research outcomes need to be communicated to those may make use of themotherwise what purpose does the research serve apart from looking good on academic resumes? This is not to say that we have rejected more than half of the papers submitted because we thought they were poorly writtenseveral were very well written but were basically literature reviews that will eventually form part of a thesis for the authors postgraduate degrees. Others did not clearly follow their stated objectives; a few were just not original enough or rigorous enough to displace papers that did report original research well. In any case we have tried to be fair and consistent, or at least fairly consistent. Our thanks must again go the Editorial Board plus the UTS referees who willingly donated their time and expertise, the contributors who accepted our decisions and suggestions with good grace, and Sally Beech, who has done her usual professional job of putting the issue into printable format. Producing the 2002 issues of the journal has been a challenging but edifying job, and we wish our colleagues at RMIT every success with Volume 3.
INDEX
Editorial Abstracts
Determining the Optimal Fee-Technical Proposal Combination in Two Envelope Fee Bidding Professor Derek S. Drew, Connie W.K. Kwong and Patrick X.W. Zou, University of New South Wales L.Y. Shen, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University Outdoor Workers and Sun Protection: Knowledge and Behaviour Dr Jane Cioffi, Professor Lesley Wilkes and Ms Jess Hartcher-OBrien The University of Western Sydney The Crisis Management Practices of Australian Construction Companies M. Loosemore, University of New South Wales M. M. M. Teo, Building Construction Authority, Singapore An Investigation into Factors Influencing Construction Costs Based on Japanese, UK and US Contractor Practice Hong Xiao and David Proverbs, University of Wolverhampton The Impact of Culture on International Management: A Survey of Project Communications in Singapore Duc Tran and Professor Martin Skitmore, Queensland University of Technology Perceptions of Time, Cost and Quality Management on Building Projects Professor P.A. Bowen and Associate Professor K.S. Cattel, University of Cape Town K.A. Hall, The University of New South Wales Associate Professor P.J. Edwards, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology Professor R.G. Pearl, University of Natal Building a House Prices Forecasting Model in Hong Kong Xin Janet Ge and Associate Professor Ka-Chi Lam, City University of Hong Kong. Barriers to the Development of SMEs in the Australian Construction Industry Anthony Mills and Jim Smith, University of Melbourne Associate Professor Peter Love, Edith Cowan University BOOK REVIEW Red Man Green Man by Jayne Cox, David Fell and Mark Thurstain-Goodwin Reviewer: Professor Craig Langston, Deakin University Instructions/guidelines for authors to the Australian Journal of Construction Economics and Building
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ABSTRACTS DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL FEE-TECHNICAL PROPOSAL COMBINATION IN TWO ENVELOPE FEE BIDDING
Professor Derek S. Drew, Connie W.K. Kwong and Patrick X.W. Zou, University of New South Wales L.Y. Shen, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Two envelope fee bidding is a mechanism used by construction clients to allocate commissions to willing consultants such as architects, engineers and surveyors. In two envelope fee bidding the client scores the competing consultants fees and technical proposals. The fee and technical proposal scores are weighted and aggregated and the consultant obtaining the highest aggregated score normally wins the commission. The consultants objective in bidding, therefore, is to obtain the highest aggregated score possible since this maximizes the chance of winning the commission. Given that fee and technical proposal scores are to some extent correlated, consultants can submit any one from a number of different feetechnical proposal combinations, ranging from a low feelow scored technical proposal combination to a high feehigh scored technical proposal combination. Only one possible combination will result in the highest aggregated score. Drew et al (2002b) offered consultants a model to determine this optimum fee-technical proposal combination for any given commission. This paper tests the proposed model using data collected from a leading Hong Kong consultant. The analysis, based on 51 bidding attempts, indicates that had the consultant adopted the proposed optimization model, the overall average improvement on the consultants original total scores was 7.07%. The optimum strategy was to aim for an absolute low feelow scored technical proposal on 20 occasions, absolute high scored technical proposalhigh fee on 21 occasions and somewhere between these two extremes on the remaining 10 occasions. The extent to which fees scores and technical scores vary relative to each other has an important influence on the optimum feetechnical proposal combination. However, the clients change from a 70/30 to a 50/50 predetermined weighting appears to have little effect on the consultants optimum bidding strategy.
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AN INVESTIGATION INTO FACTORS INFLUENCING CONSTRUCTION COSTS BASED ON JAPANESE, UK AND US CONTRACTOR PRACTICE
Hong Xiao and David Proverbs University of Wolverhampton
Construction cost is a major concern to both clients and contractors. Based on a hypothetical construction project (a six-storey concrete framed office building), cost and other related information was collected through a survey of contractors in Japan, the UK and the US. Using multiple regression analysis it was found that lower overheads, less prefabricated components, and fewer design variations could reduce construction cost. Overheads largely represent indirect costs to contractors and if reduced can lead to increased profit levels and improved competitiveness. The use of prefabricated components may be problematic where there are delays in production, insufficient coordination between design and construction, and congested transportation on site. Design variations during construction bring about uncertainties and are disruptive to the construction process. These factors have paramount impact on construction cost and demand close attention and consideration. Contractors are advised to reduce the costs of their overheads and utilise prefabrication appropriately, while clients and designers should minimise the number of design variations during construction if better cost performance is desired.
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DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL FEE-TECHNICAL PROPOSAL COMBINATION IN TWO ENVELOPE FEE BIDDING
DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL FEE-TECHNICAL PROPOSAL COMBINATION IN TWO ENVELOPE FEE BIDDING
Professor Derek S. Drew, Connie W.K. Kwong and Patrick X.W. Zou University of New South Wales L.Y. Shen, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University INTRODUCTION
Bid strategy modelling has traditionally been concerned with setting the mark up level to a value that is likely to provide the best pay off. Famous construction bid strategy models include those proposed by Friedman (1956), Gates (1961) and Carr (1982). More recently bid strategy modelling has expanded to encompass contracts awarded on a multi-criteria basis. For example, construction clients are increasingly calling for bids that require competing contractors to submit both bid price and contract time (Shen et al., 1999). In such cases contractors bid prices and proposed contract times are commonly assessed in accordance with the following equation (Herbsman et al., 1995): TCB = p + (UTV x t) where TCB = Total combined bid p = price UTV = unit time value specified by the client (such as liquidated damages rate) t = time The contractor with the lowest TCB is awarded the contract. Shen et al. (1999) have considered this from a contractors bid strategy viewpoint by relating the contractors price-time curve to the clients pricetime curve and from this they have developed a mathematical bid optimisation model. The rationale behind the model is illustrated in Figure 1. It is widely accepted (e.g. Callahan et al., 1991) that every competing contractor has an optimum pricetime point for each construction contract. The price-time curve of a contractor is shown in Figure 1 as being S1 with the optimum point as B1 and the corresponding bid price-time combination as p1, t1. The liquidated damages rate, commonly used to (1) represent UTV, is shown as a straight line (S2) since it is a constant rate. The total combined bid curve S (i.e. assessed cost to the client) becomes S1 + S2. The optimum point at which the contractor is most competitive from the clients viewpoint is B0. The contractor should, therefore, submit the bid price-time combination p0, t0 to the client. Consultants are faced with a similar problem in two envelope fee bidding given that the commission is awarded on the combined basis of price (i.e. fee) and quality (i.e. technical proposal). Consultants are required to submit to the client one envelope containing the technical proposal and a second envelope containing the fee. Each competing consultants technical proposal and fee is then converted by the client to a score and aggregated. The consultant with the highest overall score is then awarded the commission (see, for example, Construction Industry Board (1996) for a detailed explanation of two envelope fee bidding procedures). Bid strategy decision making is more complicated in price-time contracts and two envelope fee bidding. In addition to setting the mark up level to provide the best pay off, bidders need to make an additional decision with regard to the second criterion. For example, they must decide whether to submit a higher (or lower) tender price with a shorter (or longer) contract period, or in the case of two envelope fee bidding, on whether to aim for a higher technical score (which is likely to require a higher fee) or submit a lower fee (which is likely to result in a lower technical score). The objective of an optimum bid strategy model is to provide the bidder with an optimal solution, whether it be optimum mark-up (as with traditional price only models) or optimum price-time or fee-technical score combination (with biparameter models).
DEREK S. DREW, CONNIE W.K. KWONG, PATRICK X.W. ZOU AND L.Y. SHEN
Figure 1: The price-time relationship between the contractors price-time curve (S1) and the clients price-time curve (S) (Source: Shen et al. 1999)
Tender price P
t0
Based on the same logic proposed by Shen et al. (1999), Drew et al. (2002b) offered consultants an optimum bid strategy model for two envelope fee bidding. They show that consultants have a choice of aiming for a low scored technical proposal-low fee combination or a high scored technical proposal-high fee combination or a combination in between, and that only one of these combinations will result in the highest possible aggregated score. They claim that if consultants follow the modelling approach set out in their paper, they should be in a position to better identify their optimum feetechnical score combination, thereby increasing their chances of winning the commission. Drew et al. (2002b) introduced the modelling approach using hypothetical examples. This paper sets out to test the modelling approach using data supplied by a Hong Kong quantity surveying consultant.
t1
Construction time t
formulations. A commonly used formulation (Connaughton, 1994), also used by the Hong Kong Housing Authority (one of Hong Kongs largest public sector clients), is: CA = Wqq/qmax + Wf fmin/f where qmax q f fmin Wq Wf CA = = = = = = = highest technical score consultants technical score consultants fee lowest fee predetermined weighting for technical score predetermined weighting for fees total score (2)
The consultant with the highest CA value wins the contract. For example, suppose there were four competing consultants labelled A, B, C and D who submitted respective fees of $5.43, $5.14, $4.42 and $4.62 million and whose technical proposals were given scores of 82, 76, 69 and 73. Suppose also that the technical score/fee predetermined weightings were 70/30 respectively. Table 1 shows Consultant A winning the competition.
DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL FEE-TECHNICAL PROPOSAL COMBINATION IN TWO ENVELOPE FEE BIDDING
Table 1: Aggregating fee and technical score using Equation 2 Consultant Identities A B C D TM 82 76 69 73 F$M 5.43 5.14 4.42 4.62 TSc 70.0 65.1 58.8 62.3 FSc 24.3 25.8 30.0 28.7 TotSc 94.30 90.90 88.80 91.00 Rank 1 3 4 2
The example also shows that fees and technical scores are, to some extent, positively correlated (i.e. Consultant A submitted the highest fee and obtained the highest technical score, Consultant C submitted the lowest fee and obtained the lowest technical score and Consultants B and D somewhere in between). It can be seen that this becomes a negative correlation when converted to a ratio since the fee ratio is an inverse ratio. An important reason for such a correlation is that architectural, engineering and surveying commissions are regarded as a complex intellectual process (Construction Industry Board, 1996) and as such, in order to deliver a good quality service, two important variables are total time spent on the commission, and experience of the consultant. With a lower fee the consultant will not be able to spend so much time on the commission and/or use less experienced staff. Spending less time and/or using less experienced staff should result in the consultant receiving a lower raw technical score. On the other hand, greater experience and more involvement are likely to result in a consultant receiving a higher technical score. Since experienced staff are normally paid higher salaries this is likely to require a larger fee. A higher technical score therefore requires a larger fee, and fees are likely to go up at an increasing rate according to the technical score (because of the increased rate of salary differences between lower and higher paid staff). This suggests that there is a positive convex correlation between fee and raw technical score. The fee-raw technical score correlation that is often produced when consultants are in competition with one another will also occur with a particular consultant deciding on whether to aim for a low scored technical proposal-low fee combination or a high scored technical proposal-high fee combination or something in between. For example, suppose Consultant A had developed three technical proposals for the
commission just described. The three technical proposals may attract full fees of say $4.43, $5.43 and $6.43 million respectively. If all three technical proposals were scored it is quite likely that the raw technical scores and corresponding fees would, to some extent, be positively correlated.
DEREK S. DREW, CONNIE W.K. KWONG, PATRICK X.W. ZOU AND L.Y. SHEN
Case 36
Case 37
Total score
Fee ($)
5. Regress the three total scores against the fee to produce a total score continuum. Since the continuum, represented by a line, is regressed on three points it will almost certainly be curvilinear in shape, being either concave or convex. Figure 2 shows that there are three possible outcomes. If concave, the optimum fee will fall at the highest point along the continuum (i.e. Outcome 1). If, however, the continuum is convex, the optimum fee will fall at either the low end (i.e. Outcome 2) or high end (i.e. Outcome 3) of the continuum. 6. Determine the optimum fee for Outcome 1 using differentiation since the total score continuum, represented by a curvilinear regression line, is based on the equation: Y = a + bx +cx2 where Y = total score x = fee For Outcome 2 and 3 the optimum fee is simply that shown at either the low end (i.e. Outcome 2) or high end (i.e. Outcome 3) of the continuum. 7. Determine the optimum technical score for Outcome 1 by inserting the optimum fee and total score into the clients formulation to find the corresponding technical score. For Outcome 2 and 3 the optimum technical score is the one already estimated. The (3)
original technical proposal should then be adjusted to reflect the optimum technical score. This may involve including more/less staff with greater/less experience and/or spending more or less time on the commission. The optimum fee and the adjusted technical proposal should then be submitted to the procurer. In addition to illustrating the foregoing approach using hypothetical examples, Drew et al. (2002b) were able to show the effect of using the optimum bid strategy on bidding performance. They identified that this could be done by measuring the optimum total score percentage increase on the original total score. This seven step approach will be replicated and developed in this paper using data collected from a leading Hong Kong quantity surveying consultant.
DATA COLLECTION
The consultant, who regularly tenders for Hong Kong Housing Authority commissions, provided the following data for 51 bidding attempts: 1. Original fee 2. Estimated raw score 3. Absolute low fee 4. Corresponding estimated technical score 5. Absolute high estimated technical score 6. Corresponding fee
DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL FEE-TECHNICAL PROPOSAL COMBINATION IN TWO ENVELOPE FEE BIDDING
7. Fee/technical score predetermined weighting 8. Tender date The commissions were tendered for between September 1997 and April 2001. The Hong Kong Housing Authority used feetechnical score predetermined weightings of 30/70 for 14 cases and 50/50 for the remaining 37 cases. The fees submitted ranged from just under HK$1 million to just under HK$17 million. The Hong Kong Housing Authority uses Equation 2 to aggregate fees and technical scores.
ANALYSIS
The analysis is in three parts. Three representative cases are used in the first part of the analysis to illustrate each of the three possible outcomes (i.e. Outcome 1 = in between absolute low fee/absolute high technical score, Outcome 2 = absolute low fee/low technical score, Outcome 3 = absolute high technical score/high fee). The frequency of the three possible outcomes and the effect of the predetermined weightings are considered in the second part of the analysis. The last part considers the effect that the optimum bidding strategy has on the consultants original bidding performance.
Table 2: Technical Scores, Fee Scores and Total Scores for Competition Nos. 36, 37 and 38 using Equation 2 with a 50/50 predetermined weighting Case No. TM 45.00 46.95 50.00 F$M 3.20 3.24 3.50 Mean SD SD Ratio 5.40 6.06 6.50 Mean SD SD Ratio 4.00 6.23 7.00 Mean SD SD Ratio TSc 45.00 46.95 50.00 47.32 2.52 1.08 40.00 42.53 50.00 44.18 5.20 1.21 38.89 43.18 50.00 44.02 5.60 0.49 FSc 50.00 49.43 45.71 48.38 2.33 50.00 44.59 41.54 45.38 4.29 50.00 32.09 28.57 36.89 11.49 TotSc 95.00 96.38 95.71 Rank 3 1 2
36
37
2 3 1
38
1 3 2
DEREK S. DREW, CONNIE W.K. KWONG, PATRICK X.W. ZOU AND L.Y. SHEN
100.00 95.00 90.00 85.00 80.00 75.00 70.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00 5.50 6.00 6.50 7.00 7.50
Total Score
Fee $ M
Using differentiation the optimum fee becomes: Y1 = 890.84 265.20x x = 890.84/265.20 x = 3.359 (5) (6) (7)
With an optimum fee of $3.359 million, the optimum total score becomes: Y = -1397.81 + (890.84 x 3.359) (132.60 x 3.3592) (8) Y = -1397.81 + 2992.33 1496.11 Y = 98.41 (9) (10)
For Cases 37 and 38 the solution is much simpler since the highest score occurs at the either end of the continuum. For Case 37 the consultant should submit a fee of $6.5 million and adjust the technical proposal to obtain a raw score of 50.00. For Case 38 the consultant should put in a fee of $4.00 million and adjust the technical proposal to obtain a raw score of 35.00.
FREQUENCY OF THE THREE DIFFERENT OUTCOMES AND EFFECT OF THE PREDETERMINED WEIGHTINGS
The three cases illustrate each of the possible outcomes. The same approach was used to analyse all 51 cases. Interestingly Table 3 shows that in only 10 cases did the optimum total score fall in between absolute low fee and absolute high technical score (i.e. Outcome 1), while in 20 cases it aligned with absolute low fee (i.e. Outcome 2) and in 21 cases with absolute high technical score (i.e. Outcome 3). The results show that the optimum fee technical proposal combination will most likely occur at one end of the consultants continuum and there is an almost even chance of it occurring either at the low fee or high technical score end of the continuum.
Given an optimum fee of $3.359 million and an optimum total score of 98.41, the corresponding technical score can be found by using Equation 2 i.e. 98.41 = 50 (q / 50) + 50 (3.00 / 3.359) (11) 98.41 = q + 44.66 q = 98.41 44.66 q = 53.75 (12) (13) (14)
The original technical proposal should be amended to achieve a raw score of 53.75. The amended technical proposal and a fee of $3.359 million should be submitted to the client.
DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL FEE-TECHNICAL PROPOSAL COMBINATION IN TWO ENVELOPE FEE BIDDING
The reason why there are only 10 cases that produce a result in between absolute low fee and absolute high technical score (i.e. Outcome 1) is because of the variability differences between fees and technical score. This can be explained by referring back to the three representative cases. Table 2 shows the respective fee and technical score standard deviations of 2.52 and 2.33 for Case 36. This produces a standard deviation ratio of 1.08 meaning that fee and technical scores are almost equal in terms of variability (see Drew et al. 2002a for adetailed treatment of this aspect). For Case 37 it can be seen that technical scores vary more than fee score meaning that technical score is more dominant in the aggregation and for Case 38 fee score varies more than technical score meaning that fees are more dominant in the aggregation. In other words, Outcome 1 (i.e. in between) will be most likely to occur where the fee/technical score variability is more or less equal. However, where fee score varies more than technical score, Outcome 2 (i.e. absolute low fee) is likely to occur and where technical score varies more than fee score, Outcome 3 (i.e. absolute high technical score) is likely to occur.
The even split of 15 low fee competitions to 15 high technical score competitions for 50/50 and corresponding 5 to 6 for 70/30 indicates that the change in weightings from 70/30 to 50/50 has very little effect on the proportion of competitions that require a low fee or high technical score.
Table 3: Effect of predetermined weightings on optimum bid strategy outcome Weightings 50 / 50 70 / 30 Total Absolute Low Fee 15 5 20 Absolute High Technical Score 15 6 21 In-between 7 3 10 Total 37 14 51
Table 4: Original total score/ optimum total score comparisons using 70/30 predetermined weightings Competition No 1 2 3 4 5 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 Average Optimal Score 88.00 88.20 88.36 85.83 88.24 95.00 94.00 95.00 93.64 95.45 95.92 95.00 93.99 94.00 92.19 Original Score 86.77 80.27 87.09 78.56 81.92 85.07 87.33 93.65 88.67 94.47 95.53 92.01 92.75 88.98 88.08 Actual Difference 1.23 7.93 1.27 7.27 6.32 9.93 6.67 1.35 4.96 0.98 0.39 2.99 1.24 5.03 4.11 Percentage change 1.41 9.88 1.46 9.25 7.71 11.67 7.64 1.45 5.60 1.04 0.41 3.25 1.34 5.65 4.84
DEREK S. DREW, CONNIE W.K. KWONG, PATRICK X.W. ZOU AND L.Y. SHEN
Table 5: Original total score/ optimum total score comparisons using 50/50 predetermined weightings Competition No 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 Average Optimal Score 85.63 78.69 80.25 80.00 80.19 84.68 84.87 90.83 91.55 86.84 99.74 87.50 95.65 86.96 86.96 88.64 87.56 86.96 86.96 86.96 89.47 86.96 90.80 86.96 88.46 88.89 92.94 86.96 87.50 91.82 98.41 91.54 88.89 88.89 96.43 96.43 95.00 88.74 Original Score 80.03 73.39 71.49 68.54 76.44 77.56 81.63 86.76 84.74 66.39 90.58 83.50 92.14 83.50 85.26 87.82 86.30 81.66 83.51 85.11 86.04 81.87 89.28 67.30 86.66 82.23 81.97 73.24 85.57 88.92 96.44 87.12 75.27 78.18 94.98 85.97 89.20 82.61 Actual Difference 5.60 5.30 8.76 11.46 3.75 7.11 3.24 4.07 6.81 20.45 9.16 4.00 3.51 3.46 1.70 0.82 1.27 5.29 3.44 1.85 3.43 5.09 1.52 19.66 1.81 6.66 10.97 13.71 1.93 2.89 1.97 4.42 13.62 10.71 1.45 10.46 5.80 6.13 Percentage change 7.00 7.22 12.26 16.72 4.90 9.17 3.97 4.70 8.04 30.80 10.12 4.80 3.81 4.15 1.99 0.94 1.47 6.48 4.12 2.17 3.99 6.21 1.71 29.21 2.08 8.10 13.38 18.72 2.25 3.25 2.05 5.07 18.09 13.70 1.53 12.17 6.50 7.90
CONCLUSIONS
Drew et al. (2002b) proposed an optimal two envelope fee bid strategy model using hypothetical examples. 51 bidding attempts, supplied by a Hong Kong quantity surveying consultant, were used in this paper to test the model. It was found that consultants could improve there total score by an average of 7.07%. The difference in total score improvement varies from just 0.41% to 30.80%. There are eleven competitions
where the consultants original total score could be improved by more than 10%. It was found that when fee scores vary more than technical scores, fees become the dominant variable. In such cases the optimum strategy is to aim for an absolute low feelow scored technical proposal combination. Where technical scores vary more than fees, the optimum strategy is to aim for an absolute high technical scorehigh fee combination. Where the variability of fee
DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL FEE-TECHNICAL PROPOSAL COMBINATION IN TWO ENVELOPE FEE BIDDING
scores and technical scores are more or less equal, the optimum strategy is to aim somewhere in between these two extremes. The optimum strategy was to aim for an absolute low feelow scored technical proposal on 21 occasions, absolute high scored technical proposalhigh fee on 20 occasions and somewhere between these two extremes on the remaining ten occasions. A key reason for the optimum bidding strategy being at the end of the consultants total score continuum for the vast majority of competitions is the differences in fee and technical score variability. A limitation of this model is that the consultants total score continuum is represented by three points, the minimum number required to produce a quadratic equation. In addition this model is based on the consultants best estimates of the clients technical score. Suggestions for further research are to improve the models reliability by (1) including additional combinations of fees and technical scores and measure the effect on the optimum total score and (2) measure the consultants accuracy of the consultants estimate of the clients technical score, determine the reasons for the inaccuracy and then attempt to improve the accuracy. The analysis could also be extended by comparing the competing consultants optimal fee/technical score with those of the successful consultants.
Drew, D.S., Ho, L.C.Y. and Skitmore, R.M. (2001) Analysing a consultants competitiveness in two envelope fee tendering. Construction Management and Economics, 19, 503510. Drew, D.S., Tang, S.L.Y. and Lo, H.P. (2002a) Developing a tendering strategy in two envelope fee tendering based on technical score fee variability. Construction Management and Economics, 20, 6781. Drew, D.S., Shen L.Y. and Zou, P.X.W. (2002b) Developing an optimal bidding strategy in two envelope fee bidding. Construction Management and Economics (accepted for publication). Friedman, L. (1956) A competitive bidding strategy. Operations Research, 1 (4), 104 112. Gates, M. (1967) Bidding strategies and probabilities. Journal of the Construction Division, American Society of Civil Engineers, 93, 75107. Herbsman, Z.J., Chen, W.T. and Epstien, W.C. (1995) Time is money: innovative contracting methods in highway construction. ASCE
REFERENCES
Callahan, M.T., Quackenbush, D.G. and Rowings, J.E. (1992) Construction Project Scheduling. McGraw-Hill, New York. Carr, R. I. (1982) General bidding model, Journal of the Construction Division. American Society of Civil Engineers, 108, 639650. Connaughton, J. (1994) Value by Competition. Construction Industry Research and Information Association, London. Construction Industry Board (1996) Select-
ing Consultants for the Team: Balancing Quality and Price. Construction Industry
Board, Thomas Telford Publishing, London. Drew, D.S., Li, H. and Shen, L.Y. (2000) Feedback in competitive fee tendering. Journal of Construction Procurement, 6 (2), 220230.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Some studies were found that addressed outdoor workers in Australia (Dobbinson and Knight, 2001; Parisi et al., 1999; Kimlin et al., 1998; Airey et al., 1997; Green et al., 1996; Wong et al., 1996; Girgis et al., 1994; Borland et al., 1991). These studies were carried out mostly in Queensland, with two in Victoria and another in NSW. Outdoor workers who participated included farmers, Telecom lines staff, and tradespersons. The focus of five of these studies was exposure to UVR (Parisi et al., 1999; Kimlin et al., 1998; Airey et al., 1997; Green et al. 1996; Wong et al., 1996) with the remaining studies focusing on the effects of an interventions on outdoor workers sun protective behaviour (Girgis et al., 1994; Borland et al., 1991) and organisational change (Dobbinson and Knight, 2001). No study was found that
sunglasses and sunscreen (The Cancer Council NSW and NSW Health Department, 2001). Organisations, therefore, have a responsibility to support workers sun protection. Over the last five years local government and the construction industry in NSW have been targeted with the development of policies and implementation of programs for sun protection (The Cancer Council NSW and NSW Health Department, 2001). No evaluation of these programs was found. However, an evaluation of a program in Victoria aimed at achieving positive policy and behavioural changes in workplace settings found 40% had a sun protection policy in place, 18% were developing a policy. Personal protective equipment was the most common strategy and changes to work schedules or training were less commonly provided. Problems were being experienced with compliance and policy implementation including resistance to the provision and use of protective clothing (especially in the heat), a sun culture and lack of awareness or denial of the risks of UV exposure (Dobbinson and Knight, 2001). This suggests changing workplace culture may meet resistance and may require careful strategic planning. However, in Australia two studies have shown the sun protection behaviour of outdoor workers can be significantly increased (Girgis et al., 1994; Borland et al., 1991). The interventions used in the randomised control trial (Girgis et al., 1994) was an individual skin screening by a dermatologist and an education session, and in the quasi experimental study, a campaign using marketing techniques (Borland et al., 1991). This suggests that health education programs of similar design would be effective in achieving changes in the sun protective behaviour of outdoor workers. Information about skin cancer and sun protection provides people with the opportunity to understand the value of sun protection. According to the Skin Cancer Prevention Strategic Plan for NSW 20012005, mass media, particularly television advertising, has played an important role in the last 20 years in raising and maintaining high levels of community awareness of the importance of sun protection (The Cancer Council NSW and NSW Health Department, 2001). WorkCover in NSW has been encouraging workplaces to adopt structures and practices to improve the safety and health of employees. A resultant acceptance and use of protective
clothing has been attributed to this intervention (The Cancer Council NSW and NSW Health Department, 2001). No study was found that reported outdoor workers level of awareness of the dangers of skin cancer as measured by knowledge and sun protective work behaviour.
METHOD
Design: A survey design using questionnaires was used to determine outdoor workers level of awareness of the dangers of skin cancer as measured by knowledge of and attitudes to skin cancer and sun protection behaviour.
Instrument: A short close-ended questionnaire was designed to address behaviour (nine items), shade equipment (one item), sources of information (two items) and knowledge (six items) to determine, respectively, use of protective measures and shade equipment available, sources of information and basic knowledge of skin cancer and sun protection. Some items were adapted from the 1997 NSW Health Survey Questionnaire (NSW Health Department, 2000) and others were developed based on study findings (Moehrle et al., 2000; Rosenthal et al., 1988). The questionnaire was deliberately designed to take no more than five minutes to administer to each worker on site.
RESULTS
Of the 142 outdoor construction workers who participated in the study, 139 were males and three were females. Respondents were from a variety of trades including bricklaying, plumbing and painting and most were in the 31 to 40 years age range.
Table 1: Frequencies and percentages for sun protective behaviour at work Item Wore a brimmed hat Wore a baseball cap Wore sunglasses Wore a sleeved shirt# Used sun lotion# Used a shade device# # 1 non response present Twenty six percent reported getting sunburnt frequently/always, 48% occasionally and 25% never. Sun protective work behaviours reported by workers showed they frequently/always wore a brimmed hat (56%), a baseball cap (50%), sunglasses (61%), sleeved shirt (11%), sun lotion (34%) and used a shade device (5%) to protect themselves against UVR (See Table 1). Workers showed they did not exclusively use a brimmed hat or a cap at work but were inclined to use them interchangeably. Other protective behaviour reported was the use of machinery fitted with a shade device (14%), awareness of the UV index in the daily weather report (65%) and a skin check in the last 12 months (33%). Nineteen percent of the workers had previously had a skin lesion removed. Workers showed they knew working without sunglasses caused eye damage (85%), their risk of skin cancer was increased by working in middle of the day (94%), and important areas to cover are head and chest (82%). However, fewer workers knew sweating increased their risk of sunburn (43%). Forty four percent of workers considered a tanned body was healthy and 72% stated a tan improved appearance. Sources from which workers had received information about skin cancer were television (78%), radio (0%), newspaper (35%) with others being pamphlets (6%), local doctor (4%), parents (4%) and WorkCover (3%). However, only 44 % reported receiving information about skin cancer recently, that is during the last year. Never f = (%) 50 (35) 59 (41) 27 (19) 107 (75) 35 (25) 122 (86) Occasionally f = (%) 15 (11) 27 (19) 28 (20) 19 (13) 57 (40) 12 (9) Frequently f = (%) 17 (12) 18 (13) 30 (21) 4 (3) 19 (13) 6 (4) Always f = (%) 60 (42) 38 (27) 57 (40) 11 (8) 30 (21) 1 (1)
Discussion
The main findings showed some form of head apparel and sunglasses were the most common sun protection used by workers. However, their use was not as high as would be desirable. About a third applied sun lotion and there was only poor use of sleeved shirts and shade devices. The low use of sun lotion may be attributed to workers perception that it could be harmful. A comment from one worker reflects this view, Sunscreen is more unhealthy for you than skin damage accumulates in liver. So I wont wear it. Application of sunscreen by males was similar to that reported in NSW Health Survey (1997) with the use of a cap or hat being slightly below (NSW Health Department, 2000). This suggests male sun protection behaviour has altered little in the last five years. Personal strategies employed by outdoor workers need to be increased to reduce high cumulative exposure in the workplace. Workers knowledge of sun protection and risk was on the whole quite high which may reflect information they had received about skin cancer mostly from television, radio and the newspaper, respectively. The recency of receiving this information was less than desirable as just below half had received this information in the last year. Knowledge, however, did not directly translate into sun protective behaviour. In addition, nearly three-quarters of the workers reported some episodes of sunburn and a marked number of workers perceived a tan to be healthy and attractive. Workers commented for example that its healthy
cause when you look good, you feel good. and A tanned body is healthy. Were in Australia! This suggests there is some resistance to the acknowledgement of the importance of the information received. Worker resistance similar to this was previously found by Dobbinson and Knight (2001) and Borland et al. (1991). Such resistance may be due to factors such as a lack of motivation and a competing value or norm such as the bronze image culture. The receipt of skin checks by a third of the workers in the last year indicates some engagement in screening activities. Skin checks reported by workers were much lower than that reported by males in NSW in 1997 (NSW Health Department, 2000). A higher uptake of skin screening in these workers needs to be encouraged through health education programs in the workplace that are aimed at workers accepting responsibility for their own risk assessments. Accessing workers directly on site was found to be most successful. Prior to this an initial distribution approach was attempted through the head offices of main construction firms operating in the area, however, this was not successful, largely due to the subcontracting of work by these firms. The use of a short questionnaire was found to elicit strong participation from workers. Additional items to consider in future questionnaires could include the estimated period of time employed as outdoor worker, daily average working hours and details of time of day exposed to sun. This would provide insight into workers cumulative exposure risk. Items from other questionnaires and studies addressing sun protection were used; however, the validity and reliability of the questionnaire were not tested. The generalisability of the findings to all outdoor workers is restricted as a convenience sample and only one type of outdoor worker was included. Despite the limitations of this survey it can be considered that outdoor construction workers need to improve patterns of sun protective behaviour in the workplace. It is recommended that research needs to be planned to address issues that outdoor workers have with using sun protective strategies. Such studies need to provide further insight and understanding of outdoor workers and sun protection to inform future health promotion programs. Such programs
maybe more effective if they are implemented on actual construction sites and include strategies that actively coach workers to use better sun protective practices. Ethics approvals for this study were obtained from The University of Western Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
To the construction workers who took part in the study. To Ms Shantala Mohan for her support of the project.
REFERENCES
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Hill, D., White, V., Marks, R., Theobald, T., Borland, R. and Roy, C. (1992) Melanoma prevention: Behavioural and nonbehavioural factors in sunburn among an Australian urban population. Preventive Medicine, 21, 654669. Kimlin, M. G., Parisi, A.V. and Wong, J. C. (1998) Quantification of personal solar UV exposure of outdoor workers, indoor workers and adolescents at two locations in south-east Queensland. Photodermatology, Photoimmunology, Photomedicine, 14, 711. Marks, R., Staples, M., and Giles, G.G.(1993) Trends in non-melanocytic skin cancer treated in Australia: the second national survey. International Journal of Cancer, 53, 585590. Moehrle, M., Koehle, W., Dietz, K. and Lischka, G. (2000). Reduction of erythema dose by sweating. Photodermatology, Photoimmunology, Photomedicine, 16, 260262. NSW Health Department (2000) Public Health Division, Report on the 1997 and 1998 NSW Health Surveys. http://www.health.nsw/gov.au/publicnswhs/sun_intro.htm. Parisi, A. V., Meldrum, L.R., Wong, J.C., Aitken, J. and Fleming R. A. (1999) Lifetime ultraviolet exposure estimates for selected population groups in south-east Queensland. Physics in Medicine and Biology, 44, 294753. Rosenthal, F.S., Phoon, C., Bakaaalian, A. E. and Taylor, H. R. (1988) The ocular dose of ultraviolet radiation to outdoor workers. In-
Wong, J.C., Airey, D.K., and Fleming, R.A. (1996) Annual reduction of solar UV exposure to the facial area of outdoor workers in southeast Queensland by wearing a hat.
over other corporate goals. The mind-set that is nurtured is that crises are essentially negative in nature, that company size and past successes provide protection from future crises, that crises happen to others, that good management and hard work prevents crises and that desirable business ends justify the taking of high-risk business means. People in crisis-prone organisations also believe that crisis management is someone elses responsibility and that they have the power to offload risks onto other parties, thereby insulating themselves from their environment. For these organisations, crisis management plans are considered a sign of weakness because crises are seen as a sign of managerial failure. To a crisisprone organisation, there is little justification for the re-examination of existing organisational practices in the aftermath of a crisis, and rather than learning lessons for the future the priority is to maintain the organisations public image and to ensure that internal operations remain intact. In essence, crisis-prone organisations have an inappropriate structure and culture in relation to their risks and do not dedicate sufficient resources to proactive crisis management planning. Consequently, crisis management plans represent little more than a managerial faade and have minimal impact upon day-to-day organisational practices and attitudes. As Mitroff and Pearson (1993, xvii) point out, in such organisations, CM (crisis management sic) activities may be designed to fool everyone, but ultimately they fool no one at all.
often have a permanent crisis management team, charged with the responsibility of creating a comprehensive crisis management plan and to continuously communicate, coordinate and review crisis management efforts. As Osborne (1991) argues, centrally co-ordinated guidance is critical in creating corporate attitudes and managerial inclinations that are able to unite an organisation in a decisive and immediate crisis response at a time of strong divisive and procrastinating forces. Another characteristic of crisis-prepared organisations is their flexibility and willingness to let go of formal, standardised systems and procedures which serve them well in normal times but which become restrictive and counter-productive during a crisis (Mintzberg, 1976; Sagan, 1991). However, total flexibility may result in a loss of managerial control and a disjointed crisis response, meaning that a delicate balance between formality and informality is necessary. Such a balance facilitates effective horizontal and vertical communications with external and internal stakeholders at a time when existing information systems are stressed to the limit. During a crisis, effective communication is essential but difficult and companies with a track record of effective communication as an intrinsic part of their day-to-day life are most likely to survive (Mindszenthy et al., 1988; Aspery and Woodhouse, 1992; Sikich, 1993). Effective communication systems are particularly important in dealing with external stakeholders such as emergency services, the public, the media and existing and potential customers. The media, in particular, play an important role in constructing the publics image of events, and poor communications can result in distortions of the truth, unjustified mistrust, suspicion and irrevocable damage to customer relations. In essence, a crisis-prepared organisation has well developed and widely understood crisis management plans which keep them in constant touch with what type of crisis it faces, when they begin, why they occur and who they affect (Mitroff and Pearson, 1993). It is the state of knowledge in these areas which represents the fundamental difference between crisis-prone and crisis-prepared organisations.
Crisis-prepared organisations
In contrast to crisis-prone organisations, those which are prepared have a culture of openness, awareness and sensitivity to organisational risks and of their social and financial responsibilities to stakeholders and the wider environment (Ginn, 1989; Lerbinger, 1997; Pearson et al., 1997). Proactive risk management is systematically incorporated into strategic planning processes and championed by senior executives so that it is an integral part of organisational life at all levels (More, 1995). In this sense, senior executives provide the drive and support for crisis management by providing sufficient resources and clear statements of fundamentally held core beliefs and attitudes relating to organisational priorities. For example, crisis-prepared organisations
activities, technology, infrastructure, and culture that need to be addressed to improve its crisis preparedness (Mitroff and Pearson, 1993). The first stage in this process should be to develop a working definition of a crisis from the organisations viewpoint and to then identify and rank, in probability and consequence terms, the types of crises the organisation is vulnerable to. This involves learning from past events, looking into the future and exploring unusual combinations of events that may seem unlikely, but could combine to produce a serious crisis. Ranking allows appropriate judgments to be made about the relative costs and benefits of constructing a crisis management plan in each case because planning for every possible crisis is not economically rational. Establishing monitoring systems and standard operating procedures One aspect of the disaster committees job is to establish monitoring systems to detect potential crises. The disaster committee should also develop standard procedures that define precisely who should be involved in a crisis response, what they should be doing, when they should be doing it, and how they should be doing it. These procedures, in effect, establish a pre-defined emergency communication network that needs to be followed during a crisis early but critical phases, when people are disorientated by events. The intention is to buy the organisation some time to come to terms with events, to allow people to re-orientate themselves, and to ensure that appropriate resources are mobilised quickly and that they are commensurate with a crisis scale. To do this, the procedures should be achievable, simple, flexible, and understandable by all internal and external stakeholders. For example, in Australia and Singapore, construction sites have many migrant workers and this may require the production of manuals in a range of different languages. Creating a command centre During a crisis, information is constantly being generated from a multitude of sources and it is critical that it is supplied live to the correct place, at the correct time, and in an understandable format (Davis, 1995). In this sense, a key aspect of a disaster committees job during a crisis is to identify a clear command centre that represents a single point of responsibility for
decision-making and information management. Such centres are a critical coordination mechanism that helps facilitate a unified crisis management effort since one of the greatest problems that can emerge during a crisis is the tendency for people to act independently. For example, in the case of a fire emergency, the command centre should have the sole responsibility for contacting emergency services and to coordinate individual supervisors who are charged with clearing certain areas of the site. In the case of an economic crisis, such as the bankruptcy of a major subcontractor, the command centre should be responsible for re-organizing work and employing another sub-contractor. In addition to being of practical importance during a crisis, command centres also play an important symbolic role. Nicodemus (1997) provides an example of a company that faced a crisis and named their command centre the war room, where they declared war on the problem. Security Security is another important issue for a disaster committee to consider since interference from unwanted elements can exacerbate a crisis or, at the very least, interfere with its management. This involves identifying external constituencies who feel that they have a stake in a crisis outcome but who cannot contribute to its solution. While all stakeholders must be managed and kept informed, those involved in crisis management efforts should be insulated from these disruptive elements so they can develop a strong focus on the problem. In some situations, it is also important that the site of a crisis is physically cut off from these elements, particularly when it continues to represent a danger to the public. In such situations, evacuation procedures may need implementing and it is essential that they are clearly communicated to everyone on a project and reinforced by regular training and mock drills. For example, public address systems, sirens and horns can be used to notify people of an incident if they are placed at strategic locations so everyone can hear them. Whatever signal is used, it must be as simple and as unequivocal as possible. Responsibilities for using them must be clear, as should appropriate back up if, as Murphys Law dictates, key people are away on the day of an incident or if
essential equipment malfunctions. An important part of evacuation is the clear labelling of exit routes from all parts of the site. In particular, people should know that mechanical hoists cannot not be used in an evacuation and that all potentially dangerous machinery in the vicinity of escape routes must be switched off. Since a construction site is a constantly changing physical environment, the positions of notices and their maintenance needs constant monitoring. Furthermore, all evacuation routes should follow the shortest possible route to checkpoints where roll calls can be taken in safety. They should also be wide enough to facilitate an orderly evacuation of the building. On inner city sites this may be the street, and the hazards to the public, to traffic, and to site workers must be assessed in association with public services such as the police. The potential danger of not having adequately thought out evacuation plans and well-marked evacuation routes was demonstrated in the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire in May 1977 which killed 164 people. The official investigation report reveals that the club had no evacuation plan and that employees were not schooled or drilled in the duties they were to perform in the case of fire. Furthermore, means of egress were not marked and the escape route itself was too narrow to take the number of people who were in the building at that particular point in time (Best, 1977). Developing a culture of collective responsibility The need to insulate a disaster response team from unwanted elements does not mean it should be allowed to become introverted. Consideration also needs to be given to the re-organisation of non-crisis management activities so the remainder of an organisation can function as normally as possible. Crises inevitably drain a considerable amount of energy from other functional areas within an organisation, demanding special efforts from the people who operate there. Clearly, without a considerable degree of peripheral goodwill and a sense of collective responsibility, the impact of a crisis can spread to other parts of an organisation. Such goodwill cannot be expected if it did not exist before a crisis, and in this sense the crisis management process needs to be continuous.
One way of developing a culture of collective responsibility is to communicate everyones interdependency during a crisis and to clarify and, ideally, share project risks as much as possible. Most crises demand an injection of extra resources into a project and if the disaster committee does not identify their source in advance, then a crisis will stimulate negotiations and potential conflicts that will delay a response. Decisions concerning risk distribution are particularly relevant to economic crises, and earlier we provided evidence to suggest that they have been a major cause of conflict within construction projects. We also identified a series of principles to guide risk decision-making. These principles apply at all points along the contractual chain, and to consultants as well as contractors. It is also important to realise that the clients initial risk management practices are inevitably transferred along the contractual chain. For example, if a contractor is employed under a high-risk contract and has not been given the opportunity to price for those risks, then it is likely that they will attempt to transfer those risks along the chain by using backto-back contracts and similar employment practices with their sub-contractors. Indeed, sub-contractors may do the same and so on, until all project risks have been dissipated to the end of the contractual chain. Unfortunately, it is here that the most vulnerable, crisis-prone organisations exist, and when problems begin to occur that demand extra resources, the end result of this risk-cascade is inevitably a backlash of conflict up the contractual chain as parties deny any responsibility for them. Public relations Public relations are an essential aspect of crisis management since most types of crises have implications beyond an organisations boundaries. In essence, the three publics that need to be involved in a crisis are employees not directly affected by it, external and quasi-external interest groups and the general public. We have already discussed the first two publics and it would be foolish to ignore the third. As Aspery (1993, p. 18) argues, crisis communications built on well-established relationships with key audiences stand a better chance of protecting, even enhancing your reputation during difficult times. A company which decides to start communicating during a crisis will have little credibility.
Unfortunately, construction companies tend to attach little importance to the building of sound relationships with the media, seeing it as a non value-adding activity and perceiving most journalists as dangerous, untrustworthy, and irresponsible (Moodely and Preece, 1996). This rejection of the media tends to be particularly strong during a crisis when organisations look inward and consciously hide from the public, seeing them as an unnecessary distraction to rescue efforts. However, this is precisely the time when it is most dangerous to ignore the media, since in the aftermath of a crisis, the public has a tendency to embark on a process of ritual damnation. This is particularly true of high-profile, publicly financed projects in which people may feel a greater right to recrimination as a result of having paid their taxes to finance it. As HorlickJones (1996, p. 61) notes, since the abolition of capital punishment, the British public has turned to those in charge during lurid disasters to satisfy its lust for retribution. Find someone to blame, cries the mob, and off runs Whitehall to offer up someone for lynching. Poor public relations have been the downfall of many organisations that have underestimated the power of the media in shaping public opinion of how a crisis is being handled. The media The construction industry is particularly vulnerable to poor media coverage because of its very negative public image. Furthermore, there is increasing scrutiny of the industry as a result of the ever-greater appreciation of its impact on the built and natural environment (Moodley and Preece, 1996). This, coupled with growing sympathies with the environmental movement amongst the general population, has resulted in increasing numbers of confrontations with the public, particularly on large infrastructure, mining and housing projects. Notably, in many of these increasingly common and public confrontations, the media has portrayed construction companies in a heavy-handed and unsympathetic way and there is little doubt that the future viability of many projects will have been affected by this coverage. In this sense, media relations is an area of traditional neglect to which companies operating in the construction industry must turn their attention. Construction managers cannot rely upon the media to put their case and a continued reluctance to communicate with
the media will almost certainly lead to negative reporting of the industrys activities. In contrast, open relationships with the press and more sensitivity to environmental issues will enable managers to better shape the publics attitudes and thereby obtain a more balanced presentation of the facts from the media during a crisis. One way of ensuring open communication with the press during a crisis is to establish a 24-hour-a-day press office, which has the responsibility of providing factual and up-todate information to the media and to employees. If managed well, such an office should be able to turn media inquiries into opportunities rather than problems by initiating, rather than reacting to, press, radio, and TV coverage. Public relations are best handled by one trained person who is named as an official spokesperson and who has skills in dealing with the media. TV interviews with untrained staff who appear uncaring, flustered and unsure of the facts are damaging to the publics perception of competence whereas a trained person with experience of such events can portray a positive image. The importance of identifying such a person was illustrated during the aftermath of the TWA flight 800 crash when the rush of distraught families, an eager press, and an interested public were left to the management of one chief ticket agent who, through no fault of his own, released inaccurate information which fuelled uncertainty, anxiety and false speculation about the handling of the affair (Bobo, 1997). This was a primary reason for TWA being widely criticised afterward by public relations counsellors, crash victims families and the media for having an uncaring attitude. Post-crisis management After a crisis, a disaster committee should organise follow-up meetings so lessons can be learned and fed into subsequent crisis management efforts. Everyone affected by a crisis must be involved in this process. In addition to managing the learning process, the disaster committee should also turn its attention to the recovery. This can be a
lengthy and sensitive process that is likely to be influenced by how well a crisis was managed. For example, it may involve delicate challenges such as conducting investigations into causes, mending damaged relationships, re-organizing the project program, settling on-going disputes and reassessing project requirements. At the same time, attention must be given to the long-term consequences of a crisis such as rectifying damage to the environment, or dealing with government or legal investigations. Clearly, the less effectively a crisis is managed, the more arduous is the recovery process.
Research method
Mitroff and Pearson (1993) provided a conceptual framework for investigating crisisproneness and understanding the major factors which contribute to effective crisis management. Essentially, they argued that effective crisis management is determined by: