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THEORIA, 2012, 78, 128145 doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.2012.01128.x

Quine on Objects: Realism or Anti-Realism?

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ANTTI KESKINEN
University of Tampere, Academy of Finland

Abstract: W. V. Quine describes himself as a robust realist about physical objects in the external world. This realism about objects is due to Quines naturalism. On the other hand, Quines naturalistic epistemology involves a conception of objects as posits that we introduce in our theories about the world. This conception of objects can be seen as anti-realist rather than realist. In this article, I discuss the questions whether there is a tension between Quines realism and his epistemological conception of objects, and how Quines conception of objects should be understood if he is also to be regarded as a realist. I also address the question whether Quine should be placed on the realist or the anti-realist side of the current realism debate. I argue that Quines conception of objects as posits is a general account of the nature of objects, and that this account does not conict with Quines realism as long as this realism is properly understood. I also argue that Quine cannot be placed on either side of the contemporary realism debate, since his realism is not metaphysical realism and his conception of objects is not an anti-realist doctrine according to which objects would be less than real. Keywords: W. V. Quine, ontology, epistemology, realism, anti-realism, objects

1. Introduction AS A NATURALIST, W.V. Quine is also a realist about the external world and its objects. According to Quine, science tells us what there is, namely, what sorts of objects there are. He rejects the idea of a rst philosophy that would be able to tell us what there is independently of science. Quine takes a thoroughly realistic stance toward the objects to which existence is granted in our currently most successful theories in this vein, he describes his position as robust realism, unswerving belief in external things people, nerve endings, sticks, stones (1981/1999, p. 21). Such realism also underlies Quines epistemological investigations, which deal with esh-and-blood denizens of an antecedently acknowledged external world (1992a, p. 19). On the other hand, Quines epistemology involves a peculiar view about those very same objects in the external world that he has acknowledged antecedently to his epistemological pursuits, a view that cannot readily be described as realist. According to Quines epistemology, any object, concrete or abstract, is theoretical, posited by us through linguistic reference in our theories. The claim that all objects, including people, sticks, and stones, are theoretical posits that we introduce through our verbal behaviour might give the impression of an idealist or an anti-realist
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position, rather than of a realist one. And Quine has indeed created an anti-realist impression for some commentators on his philosophy, such as Robert J. Fogelin. It seems that Quines writings can be used to support a realist as well as an anti-realist reading. But would these really amount to two incompatible readings of Quines philosophy? At rst glance, it might be thought not: when Quine is speaking about ontology, he is a naturalistic realist, and it is only when he is engaged in epistemology that he speaks about objects being posits, constructed by us. I think this reaction does not in itself sufce to remove the unease one may feel about the coexistence of the realist and the anti-realist elements in Quines philosophy. This is because for Quine, philosophy, in particular epistemology, is not a pursuit separate from the rest of science. Epistemology studies the relation between theories and their sensory data by studying denizens of the same world that other branches of science study. Thus, Quines conclusion that any object talked about in any theory is a theoretical posit cannot be understood as some kind of extrascientic, peculiarly philosophical point that would not concern the objects to which existence is granted in the science to which the Quinean naturalist looks for an answer to the question what there is. Is the tension between these realist and anti-realist aspects of Quines philosophy merely apparent, a result of some misunderstanding or misinterpretation of Quine? How should we understand Quines epistemological account of objects as posits, if he is also to be regarded as a realist about objects in the external world? To what side of the current realism debate does Quine belong? In this article, I will address these questions. I shall conne my attention to Quines realism and anti-realism about physical objects, as opposed to abstract objects. Although Quine thinks that all sorts of objects to which existence is granted are posits, this view seems most controversial in the case of physical objects, especially bodies like sticks and stones. Roger F. Gibson has long stressed the importance of Quines naturalism as the key to interpreting Quine and to avoiding misinterpretations. In brief, Gibson argues that certain tensions or inconsistencies between Quines epistemology and his realistic take on the ontology of science turn out to be merely apparent if one pays attention to Quines naturalism. I shall argue that Gibsons strategy of saving Quines philosophy from internal tensions does not help in the case of Quines realism versus his epistemological conception of objects as posits. In my view, Quines conception of objects should be taken seriously as a general account of the nature of objects. But I shall also argue that this account of objects is not in tension with Quines robust realism, once we come to see that realism in the context of Quines philosophy, especially his view that we cannot help but occupy the point of view of some theory or another. As regards the realism debate, which concerns realism as a metaphysical view, I shall argue that Quine cannot be classied as either a realist or an anti-realist. In my view, Quine is a realist but not a metaphysi 2012 Stiftelsen Theoria.

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cal realist, and his epistemological conception of objects does not entail that the posits of our best theories would be less than real, in a theory-internal sense of real that Quine is able to accommodate. This article is structured as follows. I begin by briey explaining the roots of Quines robust realism and his conception of objects as posits, and by clarifying what the debate between realism and anti-realism with respect to which Quines views will be discussed amounts to (section 2). Section 2 will not address the question how we should understand Quines robust realism; that question will be taken on later, in section 4. In section 3, I go into an exposition of some details of Quines epistemological model, details which are relevant to my discussion, in section 4, of the questions mentioned above. In section 4, I also argue for my own position on these questions, outlined in the previous paragraph. The article ends with a recapitulation of my main conclusions (section 5).

2. Realism and Anti-Realism about Objects The central thesis of Quines naturalism says that there is no rst philosophy: science determines what there is and how we come to know what there is. It is not the task of philosophy to accomplish this independently of science. The Quinean philosopher operates from within our current cluster of theories about the world, and hence accepts many of the ontological commitments of common sense and of the special sciences. As Susan Haack (1993) has argued, it is not entirely clear what science is supposed to mean in Quines description of his naturalistic position. Sometimes Quine explicitly uses the term natural science, as when he says: naturalism looks only to natural science [. . .] for an account of what there is and what what there is does (1992b, p. 9). It is fairly clear, however, that Quine sees science as involving ontological commitment not only to theoretical entities of physics such as electrons, but also to many kinds of material objects of common sense, namely bodies. Quines naturalistic commitment to science as the arbiter of what there is results in realism about objects in the external world, such as nerve endings, sticks, and stones. As already mentioned, this realism about objects also underlies Quines epistemology: Quine approaches the question about the relation of theories to sensory data as a question about esh-and-blood denizens of an antecedently acknowledged external world. But Quines unswerving belief in the existence of external things seems to be tempered with the conclusions of his epistemological investigations. From the perspective of Quines epistemology, any object, not just the unobservable ones of mathematics and science, is nothing but a theoretical assumption, a posit of one theory or another (1981/1999, p. 20). Quine connects the positing of objects to linguistic reference, more precisely to quantication in a theory expressed in the
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form of rst-order logic.1 The theoretical nature of objects arises from Quines account of the relation between theory and sensory evidence. Central to this account is Quines theory of observation sentences, observation categoricals, and the role of the quanticational apparatus of logic in the connections between theoretical sentences and the observation categoricals that serve as the test of theories.2 One of the aims of Quines study of the evidential relation is to clarify to what extent science is determined by sensory evidence, and how much of it transcends any available evidence (Quine, 1969, p. 83). For example, in Word and Object (1960/2001, p. 5) he speaks of getting mans net contribution to science by subtracting his cues from his world view; in The Roots of Reference he talks of seeing to what extent science is mans free creation, a put-up job (1974/ 1990, pp. 34). Quines conclusion with regard to objects is that they are part of our contribution they belong to the domain of our free creation. From the epistemological point of view, ontology is just a sort of by-product, a spin-off of our use of quantiers and predicates (1986, p. 115). Fogelin (2004, pp. 3839) calls Quines epistemological conception of objects anti-realist. The realist position that Fogelin contrasts with Quines anti-realism consists in the thesis that independently of us, the world contains all sorts of objects, while the anti-realist position consists in the view that objects are posits that we introduce as part of our theoretical activities. The anti-realist claims that objects are dependent on us, and that this dependence consists in objects being introduced through our theoretical activities. However, it is important to note that Quines view of objects as dependent on us does not mean that theories would not be answerable to the external world. The purpose of Quines theory of observation sentences and observation categoricals, to be discussed in the next section, is to show that there is a level of language at which a theory can be tested against the external world:
The objectivity of our knowledge of the external world remains rooted in our contact with the external world, hence in our neural intake and the observation sentences that respond to it. [. . .] Man proposes; the world disposes, but only by holophrastic yes-or-no verdicts on the observation sentences that embody mans predictions. (Quine, 1992a, p. 36)

So, the world does dispose of theories that conict with it. It is the qualication concerning holophrastic yes-or-no verdicts on observation sentences that leaves room for what Fogelin sees as Quines anti-realism about objects.
1 Quines way of tying the assuming of objects to language has to do with his empiricism. He complains that the assuming of objects is a mental act which is notoriously difcult to pin down. Quine concludes that the only way to study the assuming of objects is to study language and linguistic reference (1981/1999, p. 2). His preference for logically regimented theories derives from his view of the ontological unclarity of natural language (Quine, 1981/1999, pp. 910). 2 See the next section for more details on Quines epistemological theory.

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Some clarications concerning the realismanti-realism debate with respect to which Quines views will be discussed are in order. First, the realism and antirealism at issue here should not be confused with the corresponding terms in Michael Dummetts discussions.3 By Dummetts semantic criterion, Quine would count as a realist since he accepts bivalence for sentences across the board. Second, the relevant notions of realism and anti-realism are connected to the question whether objects are independent or dependent on us. As already noted, Fogelin formulates the issue of realism and anti-realism about objects in terms of the independence and dependence of objects on our theoretical activities. This formulation is in keeping with the terms of the contemporary realism debate. For example, Michael Devitt (2010, p. 33) denes realism as a metaphysical doctrine according to which the tokens of most commonsense and scientic physical types objectively exist independently of the mental. The kind of dependence at issue in this debate is dependence for existence and nature on the cognitive activities and capacities of our minds (Devitt, 2010, p. 32). Against various kinds of anti-realists or idealists, as Devitt also calls them the realists insist that the physical world is not constituted by our knowledge, by our epistemic values, by the synthesizing power of the mind, nor by our imposition of concepts, theories, or languages (2010, p. 33). Thus, the cognitive activities and capacities of our minds can mean very different things depending on the particular anti-realist view in question. The anti-realist position that Fogelin attributes to Quine can be described as the view that objects are constituted by our imposition of theories, more precisely theories which utilize the referential idiom of quantiers, variables, and predicates. Quines view of objects as theory-dependent is based on his epistemological model of the evidence relation, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section. Third, the realism discussed in the present article is a view about objects, not about linguistic reference to objects. Benjamin Bayer (2010, p. 182, n. 8) argues that Quines thesis of the indeterminacy (or inscrutability) of reference can be seen as having sceptical consequences, at least from the point of view of traditional epistemology. The scepticism entailed by inscrutability concerns the determinacy of beliefs, namely whether our beliefs can determinately be about specic objects at all. Bayer sees Quines strategy of acquiescing in our mother tongue as a way to maintain a robust realism about the reference of our terms, and afrm an unswerving belief in external things people, nerve endings, sticks, stones (Bayer, 2010, pp. 186187). As I understand him, Bayer is here focusing on realism about reference, a realism which would rid us of the sceptical worry that our beliefs may never be determinately about specic (kinds of) objects such as sticks, as opposed to some proxies. I do not wish to contest anything Bayer says, only to point

3 See, for example, Dummett (1993).

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out that my present discussion of realism versus anti-realism in Quine does not directly concern the determinacy or indeterminacy of reference. Fogelin (2004, p. 38) points out, quite correctly in my view, that the inscrutability thesis is compatible with a realistic view according to which objects are independent of our theoretical activities. One could be a metaphysical realist about the objects over which one denes a proxy function that yields a reinterpretation of the terms of a theory, and also recognize that the proxy function argument applies to ones own home theory in which the proxy function and the reinterpretation of the object theory are stated. Realism in this case would amount to the view that the objects in the world exist independently of us and independently of whether or not we are able to determinately refer to these objects. Such realism would be independent of semantic or epistemological considerations about the reference of our terms or beliefs. Perhaps the inscrutability of reference can be established on the basis of Quines view of objects as theory-dependent; but the proxy function argument that Quine thinks establishes the inscrutability result4 does not depend on this view.

3. Quines View of the Theory-Dependence of Objects In his most detailed epistemological studies, Quine investigates the relation between sensory evidence and theory from a genetic point of view, by looking at how a theory of the world could be acquired starting from neural impingements and certain innate psychological endowments like standards of perceptual similarity between episodes of neural stimulation. Quine conceives the genetic strategy as a way to investigate the gap between our meagre input, namely, the stimulation of our receptor cells, and the torrential output, namely, our theory about the world.5 In this article, I will not go into the details of Quines genetic account as presented in, for example, The Roots of Reference (1974/1990) and From Stimulus to Science (1995/1999). For my present purposes, it is sufcient to focus on some features of Quines model of the evidence relation that arises out of his genetic speculations. Observation sentences, in Quines terminology, are occasion sentences on which members of the language community are disposed to give an agreeing verdict (assent or dissent) when jointly witnessing an occasion. They are sentences that report intersubjectively observable occasions, observable outright (Quine, 1995/ 1999, p. 22), and they are the linguistic expressions most directly associated with ranges of neural intake. However, observation sentences do not in themselves serve the empirical testing of theories, nor do they by themselves provide theories with
4 See, for example, Quine (1992a, pp. 3132, 50). 5 For Quines view of the epistemological question that his genetic investigation is meant to answer, see, for example, Quine (1974/1990, pp. 23; 1969, pp. 8283).

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empirical content. The reason for this is that you cannot logically derive an occasion sentence from a theory, which is expressed in eternal sentences. It is only as components of special sort of eternal sentences, called free observation categoricals, that observation sentences perform the above-mentioned feats. A free observation categorical is a sentence of the form (1) When F, G,

where F and G are observation sentences.6 On Quines model of the relation between theory and sensory intake, a theory is tested by logically deriving an observation categorical from it and checking whether the prediction the categorical expresses holds. What Quine calls the empirical content of a theory is the set of observation categoricals implied by the theory.7 According to Quines holistic model, the theory as a whole takes on empirical content in virtue of implying observation categoricals, and the sentences of the theory share in this content only as components of the theory, not in isolation (Quine, 1992a, pp. 1317). In a theory couched in Quines canonical notation, the implied observation categoricals come in the form (2) "x(FxGx)

which Quine calls focal in distinction to the free form (1), which can be logically represented as (3) FG.

Quine describes the observation sentence as Janus-faced: it so to speak faces inward to a subjects neural intake in being keyed to a specic kind of stimulation of the subjects receptors, and outward to its subject matter, usually objects in the external world (Quine, 1993, pp. 109110). In its outward orientation toward the subject matter, the sentence is conceived as structured, as consisting of component expressions which recur in the theory to denote objects the very conception of which is pure theory (Quine, 1993, p. 110). From the point of view of neural intake, an observation sentence is an unstructured whole keyed to a range of sensory intake (1993, p. 109). In my view, the observation categorical can be described as in a similar way Janus-faced. Quine notes that there is a kind of difference in strength between the focal and the free aspects of an observation categorical, the focal being stronger (1995/1999, pp. 2528; 1992a, pp. 1011). In

6 The term observation categorical is introduced only in Quines later writings; in (1974/1990) it was called simply categorical. The qualications free and focal, which Quine uses in, for example, (1995/1999), p. 27 and (1992a), pp. 1011, correspond to the somewhat earlier primitive and objectual in (1990), p. 9. 7 More precisely, the set of synthetic observation categoricals it implies: see, for example, Quine (1992a, pp. 1617).

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its orientation toward the subject matter of theory, an observation categorical is focal, of the form (2). It contains predicate terms that recur in the theory and are true or false of n-tuples of objects. In its orientation toward neural intake, an observation categorical is free, of the form (3). It faces inward to the subjects neural intake, and is not refuted as long as each occasion on which the members of the linguistic community are disposed to assent to the antecedent F is an occasion on which they are disposed to assent to the consequent G. In a word, a categorical as free holds as long as each F-occasion is a G-occasion. In contrast, the categorical as focal requires for its truth that each F is a G, which is a stronger requirement.8 Considered as focal, the observation categorical is not associated with neural intake in the same direct way that it is as a free one. The reason is that the focal form contains no observation sentences as components (Quine, 1992a, pp. 1011). In his genetic account, Quine speculates on how the focal observation categorical construction could be learned in what he describes as an irreducible leap in language acquisition (Quine, 1974/1990, pp. 99101). Before this leap, the free observation categoricals merely assert the concomitance or close succession of separately specied phenomena (Quine, 1995/1999, pp. 2526), in the manner whenever this, that, with no ontological import, that is, with no reference to objects (Quine, 1992a, p. 10). The main learning-theoretic difference between the free and the focal observation categorical constructions is that the focal, unlike the free, cannot be learned by rst learning some of its instances on the basis of previous mastery of observation sentences. This learning-theoretic difference, of course, corresponds to an epistemological one. Considered as focal, an observation categorical is not composed of observational language. Its conditions of assent and dissent do not reduce to those of observation sentences. It is in this sense that all objects are theoretical constructions according to Quines epistemology. The contribution of ontology, reference to objects by the apparatus of quantication, predicates, and variables, is a purely structural one: by adding logical structure, this referential idiom establishes logical connections between conjunctions of theoretical sentences and observation categoricals.9 Through the implication of observation categoricals, empirical content is holistically distributed to the sentences of the theory. Because of this holistic feature, any change in the fund of implied observation categoricals affects the content of every sentence of the theory, and consequently the content of all predicate terms appearing in these sentences. The predicate terms, in turn, are used in describing objects and in differentiating them from each other: for example, some objects are planets, others are not; some object numbers the planets, and no other object does. All
8 See, for example, Quines raven example in (1995/1999, p. 27). See also the willow example in (1992a, pp. 1011). For a critical note on the raven example, see (2008a, p. 453). 9 See, for example, Quine (1992a, pp. 3136; 2008b, pp. 360361).

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objects being posits, there simply are no objects in themselves in addition to objects-as-represented-in-a-theory. An object is like what the theory says it is like, and there is no room for the question what the object is like independently of the theory. Because the content of the predicate terms used in saying what an object is like depends on the whole theory, an object depends not only for its existence, but also for its identity, on the whole theory.10 Quine sees his epistemological discussion of objects as an extension of an older point about unobservable theoretical objects to all objects (Quine, 1981/1999, p. 20). The point is that what matters for theory is structure, not objects. Quine bases his acceptance of this point on his view of the semantic primacy of the sentence over the term. At the observational level where theories can be intersubjectively tested, it is observation sentences, not terms, that are keyed to episodes of neural stimulation and that are agreed or disagreed upon by speakers. To illustrate this point briey, consider two theories that both include the sentence There are dogs ($xDx), one of which tells us that dogs are mammals ("x(DxMx)) whereas the other says they are not ("x(Dx Mx)). Now, from the point of view of epistemology, it is an empty question whether these theories share the subject matter of dogs, and disagree about these objects (namely, mammal or not), or whether these theories do not share a subject matter in the rst place (namely, they are not both about dogs at all). The distinction between the objects a theory is about and what the theory says about them is not supported in Quines epistemology. The only epistemological importance of the term dog (the predicate Dx) consists in its structural contribution, its role in establishing relations of logical implication between sentences. The theories can be intersubjectively evaluated only in virtue of the observation categoricals they imply, considered as free, namely, as compounds of observation sentences. In this way, theories are not evidentially related to objects that would constitute a shared subject matter for divergent views. All talk about objects not just talk about unobservable objects like neutrinos11 is theoretical talk. 4. Quine, Realism, and Anti-Realism It seems that the view that objects depend for their existence and identity on our imposition of theories can be legitimately attributed to Quine. Hence, by the
10 According to Quine, some sentences of a theory may be such that they play no role in the implication of any observation categorical. This kind of sentence would be empty of empirical content, but it is no part of Quines programme to repudiate them on this score (Quine, 1995/1999, pp. 4849). As Panu Raatikainen (2003) points out, Quine does not impose his notion of empirical content as a positivist criterion of meaningfulness. So, to be more precise, according to Quines epistemology an object depends for its existence and identity on the whole empirically meaningful part of the theory. 11 See Quines example about the term neutrino (1960/2001, p. 16); this example is analogous to the present one about dog.

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standards of the contemporary realism debate as framed by Devitt, Quine would appear an anti-realist about objects, as Fogelin claims. But then the question arises what to make of his explicit adherence to robust realism about physical objects in the external world, and whether there is a tension between his epistemological views and his realism. Can Quine be justiably placed on either side of the realism debate? In this section, I will address these questions and offer my own answers to them. I will start with a discussion of one rather well-known strategy of showing that Quines epistemological views do not contradict his naturalistic acceptance of the science on which his epistemology is based. Roger F. Gibson argues that naturalism is the key to interpreting Quine correctly (Gibson, 1992, p. 21), especially with respect to Quines view of the relation between science and epistemology. Quine describes this relation as one of reciprocal containment (1969, p. 83). Firstly, science is contained in empiricist epistemology. As one of Quines two cardinal tenets of empiricism states, whatever evidence there is for science is sensory evidence (1969, p. 75), and epistemology studies the nature of this evidence, how and to what extent science rests on it. One conclusion of Quines epistemological studies is that theories are not evidentially related to theory-independent objects, but rather to observation categoricals conceived as free, as compounds of observation sentences. That theories treat of objects at all is due to the referential constructions of language, constructions whose sole function from the epistemological point of view is to form logical links between theoretical sentences and the observation categoricals. This conclusion is meant to cover any theory, Quines epistemology included. Secondly, epistemology is contained in science. It is this direction of containment that, according to Gibson, is useful in avoiding misinterpretations. The containment of epistemology by science consists in the point that Quines epistemology presupposes the existence of the external world of common sense and of science, which means that there is no exclusively epistemological perspective (Gibson, 1994, p. 451; 1992, pp. 24, 27). Gibson thinks this is the way in which Quines naturalism provides the key to correct interpretation of his philosophy. Naturalism dictates that Quines epistemologizing takes place within an accepted theory, and his epistemological ndings do not undermine or repudiate his acceptance of that theory (Gibson, 1992, p. 21). Quines rejection of rst philosophy extends to his own epistemology, which is not to be understood as a proposal for a piece of rst philosophy that would somehow be able to show that the objects assumed in science or in common sense do not really exist. One possible misinterpretation one might seek to expose by drawing attention to this direction of containment is the reading of Quine as an anti-realist about objects. Thus, one might conclude that Quines talk of objects as posits is to be understood as an epistemological account of theories, but not as an account of the nature of the objects in the external world. These objects are in no sense posited by us; they are
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independent of our theories and linguistic reference, since their existence is already granted in the naturalistic starting point. However, such a line of thought should make us wonder what the distinction between objects in the external world and objects from the perspective of one or another theory could amount to. Quine is famous for holding the view that there is no cosmic exile, that we have no choice but to occupy the standpoint of one theory or another (Quine, 1960/2001, pp. 22, 274275; 1981/1999, p. 22). Could Quine see any sense in the claim that although objects depend, epistemologically speaking, for their existence and identity on our theories and the empirical content holistically distributed to the sentences and predicates of these theories, this is only a point about our theories, not about the objects that exist in the world as described by the science that is presupposed in Quines epistemology?12 Consider the following statement about a theory T: (4) T has been predictively successful, not one of the observation categoricals implied by it has been falsied. Nevertheless it is false because it is wrong about the objects it talks about.

Quines view of objects as theory-dependent is quite compatible with the admission of a claim like (4) as a meaningful statement. Theories are of course fallible. T may come to conict with experience, despite its remarkable predictive success. Some day an observation categorical it implies may turn out false. In that case, we may say that T was wrong about the objects it talked about or purported to talk about. T had to be revised some of its sentences had to be repudiated, perhaps others added to it. From the point of view of the theory that results from the revision of T, call it T, we may say, for example, that T assumed objects that do not exist, or that T was wrong about some objects that do exist. Or, we may want to say that T failed to concede existence to objects of some sort that we have come to recognize as existing after the replacement of T with T. However, according to Quines account of theory revision, theories are not tested against theory-independent objects. A theorys conict with sensory evidence consists in failed observational prediction, more precisely, the falsity of an observation categorical implied by the theory, which in turn means that the conict consists in speakers being disposed to assent to the antecedent observation sentence of the categorical, but to dissent from the consequent one, when witnessing an occasion. It is only as a free one, a compound of observation sentences, that an

12 Paul A. Gregorys book Quines Naturalism contains an illuminating discussion of this question (Gregory, 2008, section 5.5). My account in the present article repeats some of the points Gregory makes; the difference between my discussion and Gregorys is that I connect these points to the realism anti-realism debate and to the question about the tension between Quines realism and his epistemological conception of objects.

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observation categorical connects its theory to the theory-independent world. And, as a free one, it involves no reference to objects. If we assume that the revised version of T, T, happens to be a perfect predictor, there is no further meaningful standard we could invoke that T would still have to meet in order to be right about the objects it talks about (Quine, 1981/1999, p. 22). We can still meaningfully say that T is a correct description of reality, that it is right about the objects it talks about. It is just that according to Quine, the very notions of reality and of object are always part of some theory or another. In Structure and Nature, Quine puts this point as follows:
The very notion of object, or of one and many, is indeed as parochially human as the parts of speech; to ask what reality is really like, however, apart from human categories, is self-stultifying. It is like asking how long the Nile really is, apart from parochial matters of miles or meters. Positivists were right in branding such metaphysics as meaningless. (1992b, p. 9)13

It may be objected that in this passage Quine is talking only about the notion of object, and says that this notion is parochially human. So, it might be thought, Quine is making a point only about the term object and its equivalents, and the use we make of these terms in our theories, not a point about the objects we talk about in our theories. However, I think Quines way of speaking of the notion of object cannot be understood as limiting his point in this way. For he goes on to link this talk about the notion of object to the issue whether the idea of reality apart from human categories makes sense. He concludes that asking what reality is really like apart from our categorization is meaningless. The notion of object belongs with our means of categorization, and a distinction between reality as categorized by us and reality as independent of our categorization is declared meaningless metaphysics. So, I do not see that Quines talk of the notion of object here would leave room for the idea that his point about parochiality would not concern objects.14 However, Quines view of objects as dependent on our theories does not involve any claim to the effect that our parochially human reality of objects would be less than real:
[W]e are now seeing ontology as more utterly a human option than we used to. [. . .] Must we then conclude that true reality is beyond our ken? No, that would be to forsake naturalism. Rather, the notion of reality is itself part of the apparatus; and sticks, stones, atoms, quarks, numbers, and classes all are utterly real denizens of an ultimate real world, except insofar as our science may prove false on further testing. (1995, p. 260)

13 See also Quine (1993, p. 113). 14 I am grateful to Michael Devitt for raising this objection in a comment on an early version of this article.

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Since we refer to objects in the statements of our science, there are objects, and Quines epistemological view about the theory-dependence of objects does not mean that the objects referred to would not be real. Quines point about meaningless metaphysics, in the passage from Structure and Nature quoted above, concerns an insistence on the question whether a theory, no matter how predictively successful, gets the objects that really exist right. This question is totally confused from Quines perspective. For him, the objectivity, or better, the intersubjectivity, that our theories can have consists in the implication of observational predictions, in the form of observation categoricals. So, Quines conception of objects as theoretical posits does undermine a view according to which objectivity would derive from our theories measuring up to theory-independent objects. If the theory, or cluster of theories, that is presupposed by Quinean naturalistic epistemology contained this kind of view about objectivity, then Quines epistemology would undermine the epistemologists acceptance of that theory or cluster of theories. But assuming that the advancing of views about the nature of objectivity is left to the epistemologist, it seems that Quines naturalism supports his robust realism about objects. However, Quine makes it clear that empiricism too, especially his own conception of it, is a nding of science. Thus, his commitment to naturalism commits him to the cardinal tenet of empiricism that whatever evidence there is for science is sensory evidence, and also to certain more specic views about the nature of this evidence.15 These more specic views concern the nature of our meagre channels of contact with the external world, namely the action potentials in receptor cells caused by the impact of light rays and molecules upon our sensory surfaces. According to Quine, science itself tells us that objects in the external world are not given to us in the sensory intake that is our only source of information about the external world (Quine, 1975, p. 68). In Structure and Nature Quine puts this point clearly:
Natural science tells us that our ongoing cognitive access to the world around us is limited to meager channels. There is the triggering of our sensory receptors by the impact of molecules and light rays. [. . .] Even the notion of a cat, let alone a class or number, is a human artifact, rooted in innate predisposition and cultural tradition. The very notion of an object at all, concrete or abstract, is a human contribution[.] (1992b, p. 6)

Quines empiricist position in epistemology is as much a consequence of his naturalism as his acceptance of ontological commitments of science and of common sense. And it is Quines empiricist epistemology that produces the view of

15 Which should not properly be called evidence, as Quine notes. For Quine (1992a, p. 2), evidence is not a technical term of epistemology. In particular, Quine does not want to claim that we would be generally aware of our neural intake, as the equating of neural intake with evidence might suggest.

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objects as theoretical. Consequently, I do not think that naturalism could serve as the key to interpreting Quine in this case, that it could alleviate the tension one may see between Quines realism and his epistemological conception of objects. Since naturalism supports Quines empiricist epistemology, which in turn supports his view of objects as posits, I do not think naturalism allows us to put any more stress on the containment of epistemology in science, and hence on the realistic side of Quines philosophy, than on the reverse containment. Because of the containment of science in empiricist epistemology, and because of Quines view that we must conceive the world from the point of view of one theory or another, Quines epistemological account of objects as theory-dependent cannot be seen as only an account of theories, not an account of what objects in general are like. If Quines epistemological conception of objects is seen as threatening to undermine the acceptance of the theory (or cluster of theories) on which Quines epistemology rests, then I do not see how Quines naturalism could rescue the situation. Thus, Gibsons way of dissolving tensions within Quines philosophy does not work with regard to the question about the compatibility of Quines realism and his epistemological conception of objects. Because of the reciprocity of the containment between epistemology and science, Quines epistemological account of objects must be seen as applying to all theories. Hence, I think that Quines account should be taken seriously as an account of the nature of objects in general. But does this mean that the tension that can be seen between Quines robust realism about physical objects and his view of objects as posits is real and unresolvable? I do not think so. It is important to bear in mind that Quines account of objects as posits does not mean that the objects assumed by our best science, whatever that encompasses, would somehow be less than real. The notion of reality is itself always part of some theory or another. The notion of reality apart from human categories, as separate from the parochial point of view of one or another theory, is from Quines perspective meaningless. The idea of an object somehow more real than a posit of a theory included in our best current science is nonsensical. The assumption that realism about objects must involve the view that such an idea is not nonsensical, gives rise to the appearance of the tension within Quines philosophy. If we occupy, as we presumably do, the standpoint of a theory in which sticks and stones are referred to, then sticks and stones are utterly real denizens of an ultimate real world. And sticks and stones have this status not because they would possess some special kind of reality apart from being posited in our theory, but because we have no choice but to occupy the standpoint of some theory or another and hence take on the ontological commitments of that theory. We are still left with the question where Quine stands in terms of the current realism debate. In this debate, realism is understood as a metaphysical view that is distinguished from epistemological issues. Clearly, Quine cannot straightforwardly
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be associated with the realist camp because of his view that objects depend for their existence and identity on our theories. This is a kind of dependence that Devitt considers characteristic of anti-realism (see section 2). But someone who wishes to save Quine from anti-realism could perhaps argue as follows. Even though Quines view of the nature of objects is completely general, as I have argued in the last two paragraphs, this is strictly an epistemological view. Hence, Quine could also accommodate realism about objects as a metaphysical view. In fact, Quine could be argued to proceed in exactly the way Devitt (2010, pp. 6465) recommends, by starting with a realist metaphysics and basing a naturalistic epistemology on this metaphysics. In Devitts words, this means putting metaphysics rst, giving it priority over epistemology. We accept the existence of external objects, and their independence of our theories, prior to any detailed study of epistemology, which is just another theory about some of those theory-independent objects.16 In a sense, Quines naturalistic epistemology does start with metaphysics, in that it is based on certain theories about us as denizens of the physical world. But this is not the sort of primacy of metaphysics over epistemology that would support the thesis that objects are independent of us in the sense that they are not theoretical posits. This is because Quines epistemological view of objects as posits applies also to the theories presupposed in Quinean epistemology. We are again reminded of the reciprocity of the containment between science and epistemology. Hence, Quine cannot accommodate metaphysical realism as a view about the theoryindependence of objects that would have a kind of priority over epistemology, a priority that would make such realism compatible with his epistemological view of the theory-dependence of objects. For Quine, the notion of reality is always part of a theory, and the real objects in the real world are always objects of some theory or another, hence, according to Quines epistemology, theoretical posits. In my view, Quine is indeed a realist about objects, as he insists he is, but not a metaphysical realist, since his realism does not involve the view that objects are independent of our imposition of theories. As regards anti-realism, his epistemological conception of objects entails nothing with respect to the question whether there are objects which are real in some further sense than being posits of a theory included in our best current science. Such a question is rejected as meaningless by Quine.17 And neither does this conception

16 Devitt (2010, p. 62) thinks that we already come to believe in both the existence and the independence aspects of realism in childhood. 17 In some passages Quine uses Kantian terminology to express the rejection of attempts to talk about a theory-independent reality. He says, for example, that asking after the thing itself, apart from human conceptualization, is like asking how long the Nile really is, apart from our parochial miles or kilometers (Quine, 1993, p. 113), and rejects the question whether or in how far our science measures up to the Ding an sich (1981/1999, p. 22). It could be interesting to compare Quines view of the meaninglessness of attempts to speak about objects apart from human conceptualization with Kants view on objects of our

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entail that these objects would not be real in the admissible theory-internal sense of real. As Quine reminds us in Word and Object (1960/2001, p. 22), to call a posit a posit is not to patronize it, and we should not look down on the standpoint of a theory as make-believe, for we can never do better than occupy the standpoint of one theory or another.

5. Conclusion Quines naturalism entails a realistic take on the existence claims of science, and the rejection of any extra-scientic tribunal that could rule on what there is hence Quines robust realism about physical objects. Moreover, science is not only the arbiter of what there is, but of how we come to know what there is hence Quines view of his empiricism as a consequence of naturalism. In his empiricist epistemology, Quine comes to the view that objects are posited by us in the course of our theoretical activities. Fogelin thinks this epistemological view merits the classication of Quine as an anti-realist about objects. He conceives of the realism/antirealism distinction in terms of independence/dependence with respect to our theoretical activities. This conception of the distinction comports with the current realism debate as framed by Devitt. I have argued that Quines naturalism does not remove the tension one may see between Quines realism and his epistemological conception of objects. The containment between science and epistemology is genuinely reciprocal. Naturalism cannot be used to give primacy to either direction of containment. Quines epistemological conception of objects should in my view be taken seriously as a general account of the nature of objects because of the science-in-epistemology containment and Quines view that there is no cosmic exile, this conception cannot be understood as being only about our theories and not about the objects that we discuss in our theories. I argued that there is no tension between Quines robust realism and his epistemological conception of objects, because for Quine the notion of reality is itself always part of a theory. The notion of reality divorced from the point of view of one or another theory is from Quines perspective meaningless. Hence the conception that objects can be real in some further sense than being posits of a theory included in our best current science is nonsensical. The appearance of the tension within Quines philosophy arises, if it is assumed that realism about objects must involve the view that such a conception is not nonsensical.

cognition versus things-in-themselves (or rather with different interpretations of Kants view). While there may be interesting analogies between Kants view on objects and Quines, there are also important differences, the most obvious being Quines naturalism.

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As regards Quines stance on the realism debate, I have argued that his position cannot be justiably classied as either realist or anti-realist. On one hand, Quine cannot accommodate realism as a metaphysical view that has primacy over epistemology and hence is not contradicted by his epistemological view of objects as theory-dependent. On the other hand, Quines epistemological conception of objects does not entail that the objects talked about in our best current science would be less than real, in the admissible theory-internal sense of real. With regard to the reality of objects in some further sense than being posits of our science, Quines epistemology does not entail anything, since he rejects such a further sense of reality as meaningless. In my view, we should take Quine for his word and consider him a realist about objects, but not a metaphysical realist. According to his naturalistic view, there are objects in the external world, and science tells us what objects there are and what these objects are like. But the real objects in the real world are always objects of some theory or another, and hence posits of that theory. References
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Q UINE , W. V. (1990) Three Indeterminacies. In R. B. Barrett and R. F. Gibson (eds), Perspectives on Quine, pp. 117. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. Q UINE , W. V. (1992a) Pursuit of Truth (rev. edn). Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. Q UINE , W. V. (1992b) Structure and Nature. Journal of Philosophy 89(1): 59. Q UINE , W. V. (1993) In Praise of Observation Sentences. Journal of Philosophy 90(3): 107116. Q UINE , W. V. (1995) Naturalism; Or, Living Within Ones Means. Dialectica 49(24): 251261. Q UINE , W. V. (1995/1999) From Stimulus to Science. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. Q UINE , W. V. (2008a) Assuming Objects. In Confessions of a Conrmed Extensionalist and Other Essays, pp. 449461. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. Q UINE , W. V. (2008b) The Elusiveness of Reference. In Confessions of a Conrmed Extensionalist and Other Essays, pp. 352364. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. R AATIKAINEN , P. (2003) Is Quine a Vericationist? Southern Journal of Philosophy 41(3): 399410.

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