Exclusion: who decides and on what grounds?

Hizb ut-Tahrir and the HDIM

Edwin Bakker1

Introduction In 2006, the British wing of Hizb ut-Tahrir (Arabic for Party of Liberation) registered to attend the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw, organized by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. However, following objections from certain participating states the Belgian Chairmanship decided to exclude the NGO from the meeting. The delegation of the British Hizb ut-Tahrir, according to their press statement, had wanted to update participants on the deteriorating situation in Central Asia, where peaceful political dissent has become a justification for torture, arbitrary detention and even extrajudicial killing.2 In this part of the OSCE area, governments regard Hizb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organisation and have jailed hundreds of its (suspected) members and sympathisers. Reportedly, these countries and the Russian Federation sent their complaints about Hizb utTahrirs registration to the then Chairman of the OSCE Permanent Council and head of the permanent delegation of Belgium to the OSCE, Ambassador Bertrand de Crombrugghe.3 Without giving any details on the case, he decided to exclude Hizb ut-Tahrir from the HDIM. After a short overview of the criteria for access to the HDIM and the characteristics of the party in question, this article focuses on this decision and its wider implications. Against that background, it aims to answer the following basic question regarding the exclusion of NGOs from OSCE human dimension meetings: who decides and on what grounds? Access to the HDIM NGO access to human dimension meetings is addressed, inter alia, in the 1992 Helsinki Summit Document, The Challenges of Change under Chapter IV Relations with international organizations, relations with non-participating states, role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).4 This document states,
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Edwin Bakker is Head of the Security and Conflict Programme of the Clingendael Institute, The Hague. The author would like to thank Koen van Lieshout, Erik Schlager, Aaron Rhodes and Rob Zaagman for their valuable comments. Hizb ut-Tahrir, press statement, 5 October 2006, OSCE bows to pressure from Central Asian dictators by excluding Hizb ut-Tahrir from Warsaw meeting. Available at < http://www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/press-centre/press-release/osce-bows-to-pressure-from-centralasian-dictators-by-excluding-hizb-ut-tahrir-from-warsaw-meeting.html>. See The 2006 Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Report of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington 2007, pp. 3-4. CSCE Helsinki Document 1992. The challenges of change, pp. 25-27.

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The participating States will provide opportunities for the increased involvement of non-governmental organizations in CSCE activities. They will, accordingly: - apply to all CSCE meetings the guidelines previously agreed for NGO access to certain CSCE meetings; - make open to NGOs all plenary meetings of review conferences, ODIHR seminars, workshops and meetings, the CSO when meeting as the Economic Forum, and human rights implementation meetings, as well as other expert meetings. In addition, each meeting may decide to open some other sessions to attendance by NGOs.5 It further states, The above provisions will not be applied to persons or organizations which resort to the use of violence or publicly condone terrorism or the use of violence.6 The decision by the Belgian Chairman in Office not to allow entry to the HDIM to the British wing of Hizb ut-Tahrir raised two fundamental questions: first, should Hizb ut-Tahrir be regarded as an organization which resorts to the use of violence or publicly condones terrorism or the use of violence?; second, how does one deal with differences of opinion within the OSCE on the violent or terrorist nature of groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir who want to attend the HDIM? Hizb ut-Tahrir according to itself Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation) presents itself as a political party whose ideology is Islam, so politics is its work and Islam is its ideology. It works within the Ummah [the community of believers] and [] adopts Islam as her cause and is led to restore the Khilafah [Caliphate] and the ruling by what Allah (swt) revealed.7 In their own eyes, Hizb ut-Tahrir (for short) is a party that tries to achieve its political goals without the use of violence. In its publications and press releases Hizb ut-Tahrir is rather clear in its denunciation of violence and terrorism. It states that: Hizb-ut-Tahrir is convinced that the change we seek must start in the minds of people and we do not accept for people or societies to be forced to change by violence and terror. Consequently, Hizb ut-Tahrir does not advocate or engage in violence.8 Hizb ut-Tahrir is a transnational party and has branches in more than forty countries, both inside and outside the Islamic world. In the Islamic world they are active not only in the Middle East, but also in Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. Outside the Islamic world, Hizb ut-Tahrir has a presence in, among others, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Germany, Australia, the Russian Federation, the United States and Canada. In countries within the OSCE area, its membership varies between hundreds and thousands of members in Central Asia and Britain, to
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Ibid. p. 27. Ibid. p. 28. See <www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org>, accessed 10 April 2007. Hizb-ut Tahrir, Our Method, available at <http://www. hizb.org.uk/hizb/index.php?option =com_ content&task=view&id=124&Itemid=133>.

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just a few dozen in most of the other participating states. The organizational structure of Hizb ut-Tahrir is rather complex. Until his death in 1977, the leadership was in the hands of the founding father Muhammed Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, who was succeeded by Sheikh Abdul Qadim Zallum, also a Palestinian cleric and a former professor at Cairos Al-Azhar University. Zallums leadership ended with his death in 2003.9 The two leaders were responsible for the general political course of the party. Zallum was succeeded by the Palestinian-Jordanian Ata Khalil Abu Rashta as the global emir. At the level of the national branches, concrete issues and activities are in the hands of national leaders. As a result, the scope and content of the activities within the branches greatly differ. A general distinction can be made between countries in which the party is permitted to operate freely, and countries in which Hizb ut-Tahrir is prosecuted. In Uzbekistan, for instance, The HT [Hizb ut-Tahrir] is organized in a secretive and hierarchical pyramid structure made up of many five-person cells whose members, after they have completed training averaging about two months, form their own groups or halka also of five to six members.10 In EU member states, the branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir are organized like most political parties and have a hierarchical structure with a national leader, local groups and the possibility of membership for anyone who supports the partys ideas. In addition, the European branches of the party also consist of halkas that are also described as study groups. Allegations of links to terrorist organizations From the beginning, Hizb ut-Tahrirs leadership decreed that members should not participate in terrorist activities. This message has been continuously reverberated. There are, however, many allegations of links between the party and terrorist organisations. It should be stressed that none of these allegations are backed by concrete evidence. The Hizb ut-Tahrir presence in Central Asia has been accused of having ties with various terrorist groups. One that has been mentioned especially often is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a radical organization that is linked to Taliban religious militia with which Hizb utTahrir shares many broader aims, primarily the institution of an Islamist political order in the region.11 However, according to the International Crisis
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Baran, Z. (2004). The Challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology. Conference Report, pp.xii. September 2004. Complete text last accessed on 10 April 2007, available at <http://www.nixoncenter.org/Program%20Briefs/PB%202004/ confrephiztahrir.pdf>. International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 January 2002, The IMU and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign. Central Asia Briefing. Available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1760&l=1>, accessed 15 April 2007.; see also U.S. Department of State, 6 April 2006, Overview of Islamist Extremism in Europe, Washington D.C., available at <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/64192.htm>, accessed 10 April 2007. Global Security, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation), available at

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Group and human rights organisations there is no proof supporting these allegations.12 The opinions of the International Crisis Group are shared by various Western government officials who do not regard the Central Asian branches of the party as terrorist organisations. For instance, the US State Department, which included the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan on its list of terrorist organizations, did not list Hizb ut-Tahrir. There are, nonetheless, possible indirect links between Hizb ut-Tahrir and terrorist groups and individuals. In Britain, three men, who in 1995 were arrested and charged with conspiring to assassinate the Israeli ambassador, were reported to have been in possession of Hizb ut-Tahrir literature and to have helped organize Hizb ut-Tahrir meetings in Manchester.13 In the abovementioned case, as well as in most cases, those behind the allegations only point at involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir activities while studying, the possession of Hizb ut-Tahrir materials, and other rather indirect relations between suspects of terrorism and the party. Hizb ut-Tahrir in the EU For the EU member states, Hizb ut-Tahrir presents a particularly difficult challenge since the party holds extremist views, but advocates only peaceful change. In many EU countries, Hizb ut-Tahrir is regarded as holding antiSemitic sentiments and supporting the idea of violent jihad, albeit not openly.14 Some experts regard Hizb ut-Tahrir as a conveyer belt for terrorists, cheerleaders of the violent jihad, or as a springboard for individuals to more militant and violent groups, including groups that are inspired by Al Qaeda.15 This holds true for groups both inside and outside the Muslim world. Nonetheless, of the 27 EU member states, only Germany has outlawed Hizb utTahrir.
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<www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hizb-ut-tahrir.htm>. International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 January 2002, The IMU and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign. Central Asia Briefing. Available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1760&l=1>, last accessed 15 April 2007; International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir, ICG Asia Report N58. Available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1441&l=1>; Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2004, Opportunism in the face of tragedy. Repression in the name of antiterrorism. Uzbekistan 2004. Available at <http://www.hrw.org/ campaigns/ september11/ opportunismwatch.htm#Uzbekistan>. Whine, M. (2006). Is Hizb ut-Tahrir Changing Strategy or Tactics? The Hudson Institute, Center for Eurasian Policy Occasional Research Paper Series, No. 1. Available at <www.eurasianpolicy.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=4149>, last accessed 10 April 2007. Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (the Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service) (2004). Van Dawa tot jihad (From Dawa to Jihad), pp. 46. See for instance the publications by Zeyno Baran, a former Director of the International Security and Energy Programs at the Nixon Center, in Washington, D.C. and currently the Director of the Center for Eurasian Policy of the Hudson Institute.

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In January 2003, the German Federal Minister of the Interior placed a so-called Bettigungsverbot on Hizb ut-Tahrir, which prohibits all of the partys activities in Germany. Given the relative insignificance of the party in Germany, this restriction came as a surprise to many. Due to the international character of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the specific characteristics of German legislation, the government could not outlaw the organization as a whole, but its membership became illegal. According to the Minister of the Interior, the party was banned because its members could be classified as fundamentalist Islamists preaching hate and were conducting massive anti-Jewish propaganda.16 The restrictions were based on the perceived threat that Hizb ut-Tahrir posed to German democracy and the constitution. Following these measures, German police searched twenty-five buildings with links to the party or its members, but no arrests were made. Afterwards, the Minister admitted that the Bettigungsverbot first has a symbolic function, stating that it ought to warn every person or group that wants to violate the German constitution.17 It should be stressed that the Bettigungsverbot does not mean that the German wing of Hizb ut-Tahrir is regarded as a terrorist organization under German law. Some of the activities on the basis of which Hizb ut-Tahrir was banned in Germany also occurred in the United Kingdom. In fact, the party faced severe criticism from NGOs and political organisations in relation to its Islamist and alleged anti-Semitic ideas. In 2005, a 27-year-old British Muslim and trainee journalist with The Guardian lost his position with the newspaper when he was exposed as a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir.18 Following allegations that party members had spread anti-Semitic propaganda, in 2004 the British National Union of Students imposed a ban on alleged anti-Semitic student organisations, including Hizb ut-Tahrir.19 Nonetheless, the authorities in London never took concrete steps against Hizb ut-Tahrir. After the London bombings in July 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced the British governments intention to ban the organization under new anti-terrorism legislation that prohibits the glorification of terrorism.20 This intention, however, was never implemented. The Organization of Chief Police Officers, intelligence chiefs, and civil liberties groups reacted
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Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 26 October 2004. Germany: Court Appeal by Hizb ut-Tahrir Highlights Balancing Between Actions, Intentions. Available at <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/10/a9e085a9-a771-4e5cb41d16b3d7d1258f.html> , last accessed 10 April 2007. Het Parool, 20 January 2003. Duitsland: moslimextremisme in de ban. The Guardian online, 22 July 2005. Background: the Guardian and Dilpazier Aslam. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,1534499,00.html> National Union of Students (NUS), NUS representative addresses government committee on campus incitement. Available at <http://www.nusonline.co.uk/news/270231.aspx>, accessed 15 April 2007. The Guardian online, 21 November 2005. Lords threaten rough ride for anti-terror bill. Available at <www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,12780,1647283,00.html>

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by stating that Hizb ut-Tahrir is a non-violent group that is not involved in terrorism and is not tied to Al Qaeda.21 They also warned that a ban could backfire by forcing a non-violent group underground. As a result, the Prime Minister ultimately shelved the proposal to outlaw Hizb ut-Tahrir.22 In Denmark, the party came under fire on the personal level when the head of the Danish Hizb ut-Tahrir branch, Fadi Abdul-Latif, was found guilty of distributing anti-Semitic propaganda and was given a sixty-day suspended prison sentence in 2003.23 Abdul-Latif was arrested after handing out leaflets inciting violence against Jews on a square in Copenhagen. Reacting to the arrest, the Danish government expressed serious concerns about Copenhagen being one of the most important centres of Hizb ut-Tahrir within the EU. Moreover, the Danish Minister of Justice began his search for legally-based means to ban the organization.24 However, two years later, this had not resulted in any legal action against the party. In the Netherlands, a number of Members of Parliament also expressed their concerns about Hizb ut-Tahrirs presence and its influence among Muslim immigrant groups perceiving the party as a threat to democracy and the rule of law.25 Several right-wing politicians have asked for a ban on Hizb ut-Tahrirs activities in the Netherlands, but have not received significant political support for this idea, which resembles the situation in Great Britain and several other EU member states. Hizb ut-Tahrir in North America Similar to most cases in Europe, Hizb ut-Tahrir immigrated into North America in the 1980s through Hizb ut-Tahrir members from the Middle East who left countries such as Jordan and Syria for Canada and the US. This nucleus of committed immigrants was the starting point for the development of the Party. In the US, Hizb ut-Tahrirs growth has been comparatively slow in comparison to Europe and Central Asia. Nonetheless, the Party has made inroads, recruiting enough loyal followers to generate momentum for the partys growth in the US.26 As is the case in Europe, its activities often build on and exacerbate inter-ethnic or political tensions. In addition, Hizb ut-Tahrir in
21 22 23 24

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Ibid. The Independent, 18 July 2006. PM Forced to Shelve Islamist Group Ban. Available at<http://news.independent .co.uk/uk/politics/article1183364.ece>. BBC News, 28 August 2003. Hizb ut-Tahrir. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/programmes/newsnight/3182271.stm>. BBC News Europe, 18 August 2005. Denmark targets extremist media. Available at<http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4159220 .stm>. Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (Netherlands Ministry of the Interior), 8 September 2005. Antwoorden op Kamervragen over de organisatie Hizb utTahrir (Answers to questions in Parliament about the Hizb ut-Tahrir organisation). Available at<http://www.minbzk.nl/ actueel/kamerstukken?ActItmIdt=54908>. Accessed 15 April 2007. Madelein Gruen, Jamestown Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 16, August 2007.

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the US also discourages the participation of Muslims in Western social and political systems. Thus it poses a certain threat to society in general. This may bring it into conflict with the American authorities. However, until now, no legal actions have been taken to halt Hizb ut-Tahrirs activities in the US. Hizb ut-Tahrir in Russia and Central Asia In Russia, Hizb ut-Tahrir is regarded as a terrorist organisation and has been banned. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) has put Hizb ut-Tahrir on a terrorism list along with sixteen other alleged terrorist groups, who represent the greatest threat to the security of Russia.27 According to the fsb, Hizb utTahrir has links with separatist fighters combating Russian troops in Chechnya, and it claims that Hizb ut-Tahrir cooperates with the earlier mentioned Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.28 Most of the members of the Russian branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir are ethnic Uzbeks. The total membership is unclear. After a wave of arrests in 2003, when more than a hundred of its members were detained, the fsb stated that this was just the tip of the iceberg and claimed that Hizb utTahrir has a network of cells covering all of Russia.29 In the former Soviet republics in Central Asia, the party is believed to have tens of thousands of members and sympathizers. In 2002, Hizb ut-Tahrir itself spoke of more than one hundred thousand members.30 Within the region, Hizb ut-Tahrir has the largest following in Uzbekistan. This is also the country in which it is regarded as one of the most serious threats to the state and in which it is most fiercely persecuted. The authorities have jailed thousands of Hizb ut-Tahrir members and sympathisers. Some of them have been sentenced to long prison terms after being convicted of membership of an illegal party and attempting to overthrow the constitutional order, as well as having links to Osama bin Laden.31 Human rights observers often report ill-treatment and torture in jails where Hizb ut-Tahrir members are detained.32 These organizations also challenge the label terrorist organization. A report by the International Crisis Group on Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia concluded that
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Arab Times Kuwait, 13 May 2007. Terror list out; Russia tags two Kuwaiti groups. Available at <www.arabtimesonline.com/arabtimes/kuwait/Viewdet.asp?ID= 8534&cat=a>. Global Security, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation). Available at < www.globalsecurity.or Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty g/military/world/para/hizb-ut-tahrir.htm>. Ibid. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 30 May 2002. Bruce Pannier: How big a threat is Hizb ut-Tahrir? Available at <http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/05/30052002155920.asp>, accessed 10 April 2007. The Jamestown Foundation, Global Terrorism Analysis, Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan and Kazachstan: A Comparative Analysis (abstract). Available at <www.jamestown.org/ terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2368401>, accessed 12 August 2004. Amnesty International, Uzbekistan. Available at <http://web.amnesty.org/web/ ar2002.nsf/eur/uzbekistan!Open >, January December 2001.

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there has never been a proven case of Hizb ut-Tahrir involvement in any violent or terrorist act in Central Asia, and none of the accusations of arms caches or violent activity stand up to scrutiny.33 An organisation that uses or condones violence or terrorism? Given the fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir has a presence in more than forty countries and given the fact that its wings appear to be rather autonomous, it is very difficult to answer the question of whether or not the party should be regarded as an organization which resorts to the use of violence or publicly condones terrorism or the use of violence. According to its own stated description of its purpose, Hizb ut-Tahrir denounces democracy as a way to achieve its goals. For instance, in many countries the party has called upon its members not to participate in elections. At the same time, Hizb ut-Tahrir both the overarching organization and its local branches explicitly rejects the idea of the use of violence, and in its tracks the concept of the violent jihad, to reach its goals. Most allegations of terrorist connections of the organisation or of some of its members point to rather indirect links. Moreover, they are often not based on solid sources. And the individual cases could, by their numbers, be assessed as mere coincidences. Against this background, Hizb ut-Tahrir cannot be regarded as a terrorist organization, which most within the OSCE seem to agree on, as the organization is not listed as such by all but 8 of the 56 participating states (the eight are Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and the five former Central Asian Soviet republics). The greatest difficulty in answering the question whether or not the party should be regarded as an organization which uses or condones violence or terrorism is related to the word condones. As mentioned earlier, in many EU member states the party is considered to hold anti-Semitic sentiments and to support the idea of violent jihad, albeit not openly. This holds true, for instance, for the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark. In addition, in particular at the level of the individual, Hizb ut-Tahrir may knowingly serve as a starting point in the radicalization process and a springboard to other violent groups. Nonetheless, from a legal perspective, this does not make Hizb ut-Tahrir a terrorist organization or one that uses or condones violence or terrorism. The partys anti-democratic attitude, however, does make it an organization whose practices are inconsistent with the democratic and human rights standards adopted by OSCE participating states, such as those contained in the 1990 Copenhagen Document or the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe.

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International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir, ICG Asia Report N58. Available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1441&l=1>.

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The exclusion from the 2006 HDIM Unfortunately, there was no formal (press) statement by the Belgian Chairman in Office stating on what grounds he had decided not to allow Hizb ut-Tahrir to have access to the 2006 HDIM.34 Neither did the OSCE disclose any information related to the objections it had received from some of the OSCE participating states. The ODIHR also did not provide any information on the issue. Nor were there any statements by participating states objecting to the exclusion. Or, in other words, there was a complete lack of transparency from the side of the OSCE. There was, however, the interpretation of the events by Hizb ut-Tahrir. Commenting on the OSCE decision, a representative of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain said, The governments of Central Asia and their allies were concerned that we would throw an embarrassing spotlight on their injustices through our participation at the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in Warsaw. In preventing our participation, the OSCE has effectively bowed to pressure from the repressive regimes of Central Asia and has sided with them in silencing political dissent.35 In a letter to Ambassador Bertrand de Crombrugghe, the Chairman of the OSCE Permanent Council, Hizb ut-Tahrir, wrote, We presumed the meeting was to facilitate dialogue on this subject and are surprised that the foremost voice of peaceful opposition to these repressive regimes has been denied a voice at this meeting. Your decision surely raises questions of legitimacy about the whole exercise. It is sad that some prefer censorship and myopia rather than debate and scrutiny but a telling sign, the implications of which will not be lost on observers, both Muslim and non-Muslim alike.36 It is however important to note that the difficulties that Hizb ut-Tahrir and its members and followers are facing in Central Asia has been the topic of debate at various OSCE meetings, in particular the HDIM. Different NGOs have described how hundreds of Hizb ut-Tahrir members have been arrested, tortured, and sentenced to lengthy prison terms for their religious practices and affiliations. The death of several Hizb ut-Tahrir members in custody in suspicious circumstances has also been widely commented upon at HDIM meetings, also at the meeting from which Hizb ut-Tahrir was banned.37 Accusing the OSCE of censorship and myopia should also be regarded as exaggerated given the fact that a delegation from Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain met
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See the overview of press statements by the Belgian Chairman in Office, <www.ovse2006.be/en/library/press%20releases/>. Hizb ut-Tahrir, press statement, 5 October 2006. OSCE bows to pressure from Central Asian dictators by excluding Hizb ut-Tahrir from Warsaw meeting. Available at < http: // www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/press-centre/press-release/osce-bows-to-pressure-from-central-asiandictators-by- excluding-hizb-ut-tahrir-from-warsaw-meeting.html>. Ibid. See, for instance, The 2006 Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Report of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington 2007.

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with Ambassador Bertrand de Crombrugghe about a month after the HDIM in November 2006. On this occasion, the delegation delivered a letter from Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan outlining the current situation in Uzbekistans prisons, the increased persecution of independent Muslims, men and women, by the regime, and news of recent extrajudicial deaths.38 Besides countering the accusations of censorship and myopia, the meeting between Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Belgian OSCE Chairmanship raised one important new question: How is it possible that, one the one hand, Hizb utTahrir was excluded from the HDIM, and, on the other, was given an audience at the Hofburg, the OSCE premises in Vienna? In addition, it raises the basic question of who decides and on what grounds on access to or exclusion from the HDIM? Exclusion: who decides and on what grounds? The best answer to the first of the above-mentioned questions probably includes the idea of diplomatic flexibility on a case-by-case basis or something similar. More interesting is to answer the basic question as for various reasons it can be expected that the unusual events with regard to Hizb ut-Tahrirs exclusion from the HDIM in 2006 could become less unusual in the future.39 In a way, the OSCE participating states that complained to the Chairman in Office have managed to censor the list of participating NGO s in Warsaw. This success may lead to a repetition at future HDIM s and similar meetings where the OSCE and NGOs meet. At the same time, Hizb ut-Tahrir can also claim success as they managed to get some media attention for their case, and may try to make even better use of the possibility of being excluded in the future. The same holds true for other organizations that can legally operate in one country and that are banned in others, and who may want to create a row for political purposes. In order to avoid the HDIM becoming a battlefield for certain NGOs and governments, and to avoid that the OSCE and the meeting itself become the first victims, it is important to set clear criteria for the possibility to exclude organisations (or individuals) from the Implementation Meeting. The current criterion, as formulated in the CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, is clear if one person has to decide, but not clear enough when 56 participating states could have different answers to the question whether or not organization X uses or condones violence or terrorism. This is for instance expressed in the many
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Hizb ut-Tahrir, press statement, 28 November 2006. Hizb ut-Tahrir Delegation meets Chairman of the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna. Available at < http://www. hizb. org.uk/hizb/press-centre/press-release/hizb-ut-tahrir-delegation-meets-chairman-of-the-oscepermanent-council-in-vienna.html>. Comparable incidents have also occurred in the past, for instance with NGOs related to the conflict in Chechnya. For instance, at the same HDIM in 2006, a Chechen NGO was only allowed to attend side-events during the meeting in Warsaw. (Helsinki Monitor, vol. 18, no. 1, Chronicle, Arie Bloed, p. 91).

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different lists of terrorist organizations used by governments or international organisations. Against this background, perhaps a guideline to deal with the complicated question of how to deal with the different answers to the abovementioned question could be the legislation or policies of the host country, Poland that allows Hizb ut-Tahrir to be active on its territory. If the Polish authorities label an organization as a terrorist one or have banned it for other reasons (hate speech, anti-Semitism, etc.) the NGO will not be allowed access to Poland and, as a consequence, cannot and also should not attend the HDIM. Of course, such a simple answer to a highly complex and sensitive question has its flaws: what about universality and what about OSCE events that might be held in undemocratic and repressive countries such as Uzbekistan? Moreover, such a solution does not address the other problem related to the decision to exclude Hizb ut-Tahrir from the HDIM: the lack of transparency about this decision. Nonetheless, besides this option it seems that any other approach to the question to exclude or not to exclude? would lead to hefty debates within the OSCE with little or no chance of reaching consensus. Simply ignoring the question or using diplomatic flexibility on a case-by-case basis is not an option. Continuing to give room to certain participating states to determine the entry of NGOs would harm the credibility of the HDIM and the OSCE as a whole. Moreover, such a practice undermines one of the key ideas behind the HDIM: inviting civil society to the table, which is invaluable in reminding governmental bodies and institutions of their duties, [as they are] less inhibited about raising uncomfortable truths than are some participating States.40 For the sake of the invaluable uncomfortable truths, the question exclusion: who decides and on what grounds? requires a clear and practical answer, which does not give any room to certain participating states to limit NGO participation in the HDIM and other OSCE human dimension meetings.

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OSCE-ODIHR, The Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, quote by ODIHR Director Ambassador Strohal, p. 2, available at <http://www.osce.org/publications/odihr/2006/ 09/20658_ 674_en.pdf>.

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