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The
Great
Depression Problem
as Historical
Michael
A. Bernstein
It
is now the
well
1930s,
since
the Great
Depression crisis
of in
and
economic no
a return
although Those
there who
tends at the
to be time
regarding depression
Yet far from being resolved, the concerns and misgivings of the depression and war years simply faded from view. It has by now long been fashionable to claim that "Keynes is dead," and few
economists who struggled choose to engage with the ideas of an older events generation when to understand devastating at a time
symptomatic
of a profound
weakness
in the mecha
nisms of capitalism were only briefly heard. After World War II, their views appeared hysterical and exaggerated, as the industri alized nations sustained dramatic rates of growth and as the economics profession became increasingly preoccupied with the
development of Keynesian theory. As a result, the economic
orthodox theories and remedies no longer sufficed. Indeed, the vast majority of contemporary economists have grown decidedly
hostile focus have on to arguments the short the concerning run or on structural, the Great policy failure. Depression In this and that respect, do not they
slump of the interwar period came to be viewed as a policy problem rather than the outgrowth of fundamental tendencies of capital
ism. The be repeated presumption owing to was the that the Great Depression could of never increasing sophistication was economic
avoided
institutional,
long-run
perspec
com
the
a historical within framework Depression or more. so several decades spanned By doing, they have not some causes of of the appreciation simply possible
Depression
performance this reason approaches,
development
older
and
It is for
mid-century. of these
1980s and more recent challenges associated with globalization have made this notion itself obsolete. Entirely new 1970s and
varieties government exceptional Revolution" prominence In this ber that of economic cannot circumstances. has been shaken, thinking alter have levels Indeed, and of emerged, real output asserting except in the that the under
to persuade
afforded
analytical by an understand
as Historical
Problem."
confidence a new
"classicism"
has
"Keynesian come
to
of economic optimism
at a time
of dramatic
reconstruction
in the world
economy
in the Literature Trends in the The older literature concerning the Great Depression United States may be broadly classified into three categories. One set argued that the severity and length of the downturn was the direct result of the collapse of financial markets that began in 1929. Such work emphasized the causes of the 1929 crash and those factors that amplified its impact. Another school of thought concluded that the economic calamity of the 1930s was the direct result of poorly formulated and politically distorted actions under taken by the government. A third set of research took a broader
OAH Magazine of History Fall 2001 3
concomitant prosperity in the United States. Such hope had been absent in the decade of the Great Depression, and even during the
war years there had been apprehension that a return to depression
would
Bernstein/From
the Editor
some writers (such as Irving created by the Treaty of Versailles, Fisher and Lionel Robbins) argued that the depression was the
The
for those challenge of us who teach about this profound economic is to find crisis substantive ways to link the of years and of the with social the in
inevitable
consequence
of
the
chaotic
and
unstable
credit
struc
ture of the twenties. The principal irritant consisted of a dangerous circle of obligations and risks, epitomized by the Dawes Plan of 1924, in which the United States lent funds to Great Britain, France, and Germany, at the same time the Allies depended on German reparations to liquidate their American debts. By 1928 American banks were already quite wary of the situation, but their
predictable ments, merely response, made cutting the back on worse. loans to European govern situation
Moreover,
trade and
the demise
in international
payments in
demands
that Germany
States
once the
that led to a
arrange came, crash
which
unstable
credit
the collapse of the banking system was quick excessive credit and speculation, coupled with
network, Another immediate caused the Great of of the the crash Depression. short-run on consumer approach wealth version effects
severity of the downturn, itwas argued, resulted in a drastic in credit. devaluation of consumer wealth and a loss of confidence The resulting decreases in purchasing power left the economy saddled with excess capacity and inadequate demand. The
None ing. Because of these the short-run business arguments confidence were thesis convinc completely was it was subjective,
virtually impossible to evaluate in the light of historical evidence. There was also the objection that notions like these mistook effect for
cause; pessimism Later to analyze in a long-run the slump, the the economic and panic, circumstances rather than of the being thirties caused may by such excessive have generated feelings. credit too and boldly
perspective context.
and
attempted that
the the
depression origins of
It suggested
whatever
the rejected frequently on the grounds it abstracted that events in interwar the monetary
economy.
reasons
transcended
and
Indeed, business cycle indicators turned down before the stock market crashed. Indices of industrial production started to fall by
the summer of 1929, and a softness in construction activity was
All
mon
The Stock Market Crash as Cause short-run analyses of the Great Depression
They focused on the immediate causes
Galbraith
to been the
held
stock
attribute.
fundamen
of the New York Stock Market collapse of 1929, and they asserted of wealth and disruption of the that the resulting devaluation the intensity of the crisis. The "business banking system explained confidence" thesis was perhaps the best example of this school of thought. collapse,
pessimistic confidence
tally sound in 1929 the effect of the great stock market crash and the loss the shock to confidence might have been small... of spending by those who were caught in the market might soon
have worn off."
that caused the It held that regardless of the mechanisms the dramatic slide of the stock market created intensely
expectations was so severe in the business and unexpected community. that The a dramatic shock panic to
the evidence did and spending hypothesis, not provide compelling proof. The dramatic decline in consump tion expenditures after 1929 may have been due to the stock As for the wealth
market debacle; it may have arisen once expectations had been
took hold,
A more
stifling
investment
comprehensive
formulation
dampened outgrowth
farm
by the events after 1929; or it may have been an trend in construction of a declining activity and in
during the twenties. But even recent investiga
the question of why financial markets col directly confronted to distortions and institutional the political lapsed. Looking
incomes
incapable of unambiguously
explaining
a large
Fall 2001
Bernstein/From
the Editor
portion
we cannot
of the decline
say for sure
in spending. We
why it happened.
Policy Errors as Cause Another the Great Depression approach to understanding evaluated the extent to which the slump was the result of system to this school of thought, inadequate atic policy errors. According information, and political pressures distorted theory, misleading the policy-making process. Such investigators asMelvin Brockie, Kenneth Roose, and Sumner Slichter maintained that from 1932
onward the American economy showed great potential for recov
in the crash of 1929 was less important than certain developments that had deleterious interwar the economy impacts throughout period. Some authors (for example, Seymour Harris and Paul Sweezy) argued that during the 1920s the distribution of national
income overall became propensity the skewed, increasingly lowering economy's to consume. as Charles such Others,
ery, only to be set back profoundly by the 1936 recession. They asserted that the New Deal's Industrial Codes raised labor costs
and material input prices, thus negating whatever monetary
fo Kindleberger, W. Arthur Lewis, and Vladimir Timoshenko, cused on a shift in the terms of trade between primary products and manufactured of the goods, due to the uneven development nations. in terms and industrial This the of agricultural change a in created credit crisis world markets trade, they argued, during the bad crop yields of 1929 and 1930. At the same time that
agricultural economies were losing revenue because of poor har
ideology of the Roosevelt to the downturn by Administration have further contributed may the confidence of the business community. Not jeopardizing several labeled the downturn of 1936 investigators surprisingly, 1937 the "Roosevelt Recession." It was not solely criticisms of actual government policy in which these writers indulged to explain the depression's unusual
severity. In some cases they also criticized the government for not
stimulus
existed. The
rhetoric
and
vests and declining world demand, the developed economies were contracting credit for the developing nations and imposing mas sive trade restrictions such as America's Hawley-Smoot Tariff of 1930. As the agricultural nations went into a slump, the industri alized countries (most notably the United States) lost a major market
more
the downturn
of 1929 became
Industrial organization
Means most prominent
economists
among them)
that the private sector moved too doing enough. They maintained in in the mid 1930s raising prices. As a result, by 1937 quickly consumers increasingly resisted higher prices as they sought to liquidate
maintain to consume
incurred earlier
times. and were a fell,
in the decade
The average took hold. but
and to
Pro
in the the depression in the trend toward imperfect competition American economy of the early twentieth century. After the crash of 1929, prices became increasingly inflexible, due to the concen trated structure of American industry and the impact of labor
in uncertain
propensity
competitive
presumably
govern
ment
Economic
action
of the Temporary
the Concentration
National
of Eco
Committee
nomic Power) was too little, too late, and was often inspired more
by political than economic concerns.
was essentially an the Great Depression was of failures outgrowth policy problematic at best. To be sure, one could with the benefit of hindsight engage in some forceful criticism of economic policy during the 1930s. But it seems a futile The notion that
exercise. After all, in many respects the Roosevelt Administration
(especially the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) did what many of its predecessors had done in the face of a cyclical
downturn. One must ask, therefore, how government officials
suddenly became
question remains:
the
seem
ingly worked
consensus
a theoretical
so per
among
suddenly
in the 1930s? What in the structure and had changed in of the interwar period that national the economy operation made orthodox economic and theory policy inadequate?
Long-Run Factors as Cause
verse
literature that focused on long-run factors in the Ameri can depression was distinctive in holding that the stock market The
An
unemployed
worker
stands
outside
vacant
Photograph (Courtesy
by Dorothea Lange for the Farm Security of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential
Fall 2001
Bernstein/From
the Editor
annually averaged only a bit over 5 percent. A fall in export de mand, then, could not have played
a major role in worsening or pro
longing the Great Depression. Theories of Economic Stagnation Continued research on theGreat Depression necessarily relied upon the work of Joseph Schumpeter on
cyclical processes inmodern econo
States (and tivity reached Europe) coincidentally their nadir. These cycles were 1 ) the Kondratieffy a wave of fifty or more
years associated with the introduc
in the United
unions. On
already
alleled
Abramovitz
by those of Simon
and the Richard existence
Kuznets
Easterlin. of waves
and, more
Kuznets of some
recently, Moses
was fifteen successful to twenty in
constrained
in the capital goods sector, noncompetitive pricing predominated were to less meaning producers buy new plants and equip willing ment. Price inflexibility thus inhibited the recovery of both final product demand and investment demand.
There were several weaknesses in these theories. Those au
documenting
thors who
income
focused
on an increasingly
unambiguous
unequal
distribution
their
of
case,
evidence
to make
years in length. These periodic swings, according to Abramovitz, demonstrated that in the United States and other industrialized and early twenti countries, "development during the nineteenth eth centuries took the form of a series of surges in the growth of output and in capital and labor resources followed by periods of retarded growth." Significantly, "each period of retardation in the
rate of growth of output... culminated in a protracted depression
nor did they specify precisely how such factors came to life in the interwar economy. While Berle and Means claimed to have demon strated a relative price inflexibility in concentrated economic sectors during the 1930s, their critics were unconvinced. Given that the aggregate price level fell by one-third in the early thirties, they argued, how inflexible could the general price system have been? The "sticky prices" thesis also relied on an assumption of perfect competition in all markets other than those where the imperfections existed. If this assumption were relaxed, the thesis did not hold. The terms of trade argument similarly had a major flaw. The
major weaknesses in the American economy of the interwar
or in a period of stagnation inwhich business cycle recoveries were disappointing, failing to lift the economy to a condition of full or doing so only transiently." The specific behav employment ioral mechanisms that could account for the Kuznets phenom in the United States in the enon (and its precise manifestation were focus of continued debate. It is in the 1930s) necessarily
this context that we can understand the large literature on "secular In economic stagnation." general, maturity, stagnation as it was theorists sometimes agreed that stagnation, involved or a "de
called,
period were domestic, and the collapse of demand on the part of agricultural nations was not highly relevant. During the 1920s,
exports as a share of the nation's gross national product had
crease of the rate of growth of heavy industries and of building [and] the slowing down of the rate of growth of the total activity... of quantity production, of employment, and usually of population.
Fall 2001
Bernstein/From
the Editor
It [also involved] the rising relative importance of consumer goods." However, they differed in emphasis, falling into two defined groups: those who focused on the decline of new broadly
technologies and those who were more concerned with the shrink
markets
required
prevented
for an
the utilization
revival.
of excess
capacity
that
is
economic
in concentrated industries is intensified inflexibility an and this has important impact on the during depressions, Price
response to be sible. so of firms to economic fluctuations. price to sales. Firms' reduction raise For prices a given revenues seems tend unfea to jeopardized may for in a slump that even incentives be the reduction in
age of investment outlets as the rate of population growth fell. Followers of this second school held that as population growth in housing, clothing, fell off, and as major markets food, and
services consequently contracted, outlets for new investment
There
in order industry,
compensate
were
For one,
on
the
extent
arguments
population
where
each
growth conflated population with effective demand. As one critic put it: "[i]t is sometimes maintained that the increase in
population anticipate in this ing a context encourages broadening is not investment market. the increase in the What because the entrepreneurs however, in purchas does not is important, but paupers
the squeezing out of competitors is relatively easy, large declines in demand will result in the reduction of profit margins for
firm as prices are cut. By contrast, in a concentrated market,
profit margins will tend to be inelastic in the face of lowered demand. At the macroeconomic level the implications of inelastic
profit margins are most profound. In these circumstances, price
in population number of
power.
The
increase
for declines
their
broaden
the market."
to reduce
Much like the population theory, the variant of stagnation that focused on the decline of technological theory change em
bodied many inconsistencies and questionable assertions. Propo
tion. Reductions
national income
in capacity utilization
but also increases
in
the
presence
disinclined
of underutilized
to undertake any
capacity,
net
firms will
A
be
increasingly
pro
nents of this school claimed that the lower rate of technological innovation (said to be a primary cause of the economy's inability to recover from the depression) derived from the state of techno logical knowledge at the time, yet they offered little justification of this position. A further objection to the technology argument
was work were apparent contained always of to some an the their motor of economic forms of cars, of the implicit capital-using argument and stagnation assumption type, foundered. for given but theorists that if themselves. new Their innovations were (in earlier to
investment.
cumulative
cess is thereby established wherein a decline in the rate of growth, by generating reductions in the rate of capacity utilization, will lead to a further decline in the rate of expansion as net investment is reduced. Individual firms, by believing that decreases in their
own merely investment intensify will the alleviate problem their own burden of excess The capacity, greater the economy-wide.
growth investment
periods informa
in managerial
proportion of the nation's industry that is highly concentrated, the greater the tendency for a cyclical downturn to develop into a progressive (and seemingly endless) decline. A further consequence of the existence of highly concentrated sectors in the national economy is the impact it has on demand. The higher profit margins secured by large firms are indicative of
an increasingly skewed distribution of output that, when com
may have
their task of
bined with
their revenues,
the reluctance
generates
spend)
to
impact
propensity
systematic
save. Declining
capacity when a the intervention penetration
effective
slump of of
demand
The
is combined with
potential government is therefore greatly
rising excess
barring or spending, lessened.
occurs.
for recovery,
The Work of Josef Steindl Itwas the Austrian economist Josef Steindl who provided
most sophisticated version of the economy maturity idea.
shocks,
the
Not
the
What
alterations
is central to Steindl's
in industrial structure
surprisingly, he did so in part by explicitly situating the Great in the United States within a long-term development Depression framework. His work linked economic stagnation directly with the behavior of capitalist the enterprise, thereby avoiding
mechanistic qualities of many of the stagnation arguments as
whole
well
version toward ment and
as their
of the
frequent
maturity
appeals
thesis
to external
was that
factors.
Steindl's
tendencies
less capable both of recovering from cyclical instability and of generating continued growth. He assumed the emergence of oligopolistic market structure to be inherent in the process of capitalist development, because of capitalism's tendencies toward the development of large-scale manufacturing techniques and
financial concentration. Economic maturity and the threat of
long-run
in capitalist inherent concentration, capital develop over led to a lethargic attitude toward time, competition investment. the emergence of concentrated Specifically,
stagnation result because the growing incidence of "[oligopoly of funds by shifting profits to those brings about amaldistribution
industries which are reluctant to use them." In order to escape
OAH Magazine
of History
Fall 2001
Bernstein/From
the Editor
either
to more
competi
the
industry with
as a whole. The weaknesses
respect
in Steindl's
to the shifting
analysis
composition
of course,
of the
obscure
economy
some members of during the Great Depression, "Brain Trust," such as Rexford Tugwell, argued for the imposition of an "undistributed profits tax" to
accumulation of corporate surpluses. The incen
do not,
the importance
Great Depression
of his contribution
in particular, and
to an understanding
capitalist
of the
in
of mature
economies
the
tive of the tax, it was claimed, would lead firms to issue more or investment of their surpluses in the form of productive of capital resources dividends. As a result, the mobilization
would be more efficient and more likely to generate recovery.
general. That importance derives from the fact that Steindl at tempted to situate the decade of the thirties within a larger historical framework. In this context, he could view the Great Depression as the outcome of an interaction between cyclical forces dating from 1929
and more. tendencies In short, of long-run he was thus a spanning development half-century able to understand the Great Depression or
Embedded
profits tax
in the Revenue
proved to be one
Act
of
of
1936,
the undistributed
and contro
the most
unpopular
as a historical problem. The U.S. Economy Since the Great Depression Steindl had, of course, focused his work on the interwar economic crisis of the 1930s. His central theses regarding maturity
and stagnation in advanced capitalist economies seemed particu
to emerge
there exists
and
be
concentration
in American
during
of market
number a sector's some of
competitiveness.
I discovered
research,
concentrated
industries were relatively vibrant during the others appeared virtually moribund. Clearly, the
market structure was a frail reed upon
concerning
larly compelling when viewed in terms of the long-run historical experience of the Great Depression. Yet both the postwar record, at least in the case of the United States, and some of the theoreti cal lacunae in his earlier claims, led Steindl to modify some of the the 1976 republication of his arguments of his 1952 book. With Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism, Steindl allowed that technical innovation, product development, public spend initiatives might provide the ing, and research and development
means tremely to escape from that investment most inertia. Even so, he was ex concerned accumulation strategies in mature
which
dynamic
Steindl
or not
based his
involves
theory. Whether
several issues
a given
to
industry
the number
is to of
unrelated
of capital
position
concentration
in the economy's
issues having
input-output
matrix,
the durability
of its output,
capitalist
nations would focus on military-industrial activity and war itself. Using both public and private invest ment funds for other purposes, while obviously desir able, would be "exceedingly hard" given "the workings institutions." of political The wisdom (not tomention
1976 veys observations the more becomes recent evolution
the prescience)
as soon of American
of Steindl's
as one capitalism. sur
apparent
American
century,
accumulation
on the one
suppositions regarding expansion in advanced industrial states. On the other, it demonstrated both the unique and abiding flexibility of capitalism in the face of contradic
tory tendencies toward underutilization, and the impor
tance
of political
to be history
and social
superfluous. reveals the
forces
In all conceptual
often
these
thought
respects, and
by
con im
economists temporary
power
portance of what Steindl had to saywhen he first examined the crisis of the 1930s. But it also reminds us of the and human agency in unyielding impacts of contingency
economic performance over time.
"Flood
Photograph Congress,
World War II achieved in the United States, of course, what the New Deal could not?economic recovery. With rate began the start of war in Europe, the unemployment to fall so that by the time of the Japanese naval offensive
Fall 2001
at Pearl Harbor, only 7 percent of the labor force remained idle. American entry into the
war brought almost instantaneous resolution
of the persistent economic difficulties of the interwar years. Between 1939 andl944 the
national product, measured in current dollars,
increased by almost 125 percent, ultimately rising to $212 billion by 1945. Yet asWorld War II came to a close many economists and businesspeople worried about the possibility of a drop in the level of prosperity But these apprehensions and employment. to In the first year after be unwarranted. proved the war, gross national product fell less than
the postwar reduction in government spend ;;'-%^^g|||:;^
did not even reach 4 per ing; unemployment consumer cent; spending did not fall at all, and eventually rose dramatically. Although recessions mid
year or
occurred between 1945 and the most of them lasted 1970s, only about a
less, and none of them remotely ap
built of
refuse."
(Courtesy
1939.
Photograph
by Arthur
LC-USF33-003000-M1.)
proached the severity of the Great Depres sion. During these three decades American output steadily to the Federal increased with only minor setbacks. According Reserve Board's index, manufacturing production doubled be tween 1945 and 1965, and tripled between 1945 and 1976. is hardly surprising in Such robust economic performance wartime especially when conflict is global and, with few excep ismost striking tions, kept outside of national boundaries. What about the American economic experience linked with World War II was the enduring growth and prosperity of the postwar years. and investment behavior played amajor part in this Consumption great prosperity of the late forties and fifties. As soon as Germany in the and Japan surrendered, private and foreign investment United States rose quickly. On the domestic side, reconversion was itself an investment stimulus. Modernization and deferred substantial replacement projects required deployments of funds. Profound scarcities of consumer goods, the production of which had been long postponed by wartime mobilization, necessitated efforts. and Even fear of expansion major retooling high inflation on of wartime the and wage controls brought by dismantling price move to firms and forward the date of ambitious prompted many investment On indi the both long-term projects. foreign side, viduals and governments were eager to find a refuge for capital that had been in virtual hiding during the war. Along with a jump in domestic investment, therefore, a large capital inflow began in late 1945 and early 1946.
Domestic consumption was the second major component of
income was bolstered by the rapid reduction in wartime surtaxes and excises. And the baby boom of the wartime generation in high levels of demand for signifi itself expressed economically cant items like appliances, automobiles, and housing. G.I. Bill benefits additionally served to increase the demand for housing and such things as educational services, with associated impact on
construction and other industrial sectors.
Foreign
immediate
demand
postwar
for American
years. In part
exports
the needs
grew rapidly
of devastated
in the
areas
could only be met by the one industrial base that had been nearly untouched by war-related destruction. Explicit policy commit ments to the rebuilding of allied and occupied territories, such as the Marshall Plan in Europe, also served to increase the foreign market for the output of American industry. American postwar prosperity and the benefits of world eco nomic leadership continued throughout most of the 1950s. But
the prosperity of the decade, while robust and impressive, never
theless weakened by 195 7. This set the stage for the arrival of a new in Washington, brand of economics (and self-con explicitly imbued with the of doctrines Keynesianism. sciously) to the From the "New Frontier" policies of John F. Kennedy, successor "Great Society" his of Johnson, agenda Lyndon of a "New Federalism" by Richard through the declaration
Nixon, intervention there ensued in the an nation's era of sustained central life. The government goal of many economic
savings due
with a dramatic the
acceptable
recently
inflation?has
shattered.
jump in disposable
the sixties and much of the seventies (and for some even during to secure the eighties) the perceived obligation of government
OAH Magazine
of History
Fall 2001
THEEDITOR BERNSTEIN/FROM
overall
remained century
economic
one American of
instability
the more economic
was not
important history.
seriously questioned
changes of twentieth
and
economic American specificity notwithstanding, seems to in the of half the twentieth latter century performance in many respects with the general analytical -. have conformed propositions derived from interwar economics. The ability to Historical
forestall and/or overcome tendencies toward economic stagna
Easterlin, Richard A. Population, Labor Force, and Long Swings in Economic Growth: The American Experience, New York: Na tional Bureau of Economic Research, 1968. Fisher, Irving. Booms and Depressions: Some First Principles. New York: Adelphi, 1932. The StockMarket Crash And After. New York: Macmillan, 1930. Galbraith, John Kenneth. The Great Crash, 1929. 3d ed. Boston: 1972. Houghton Mifflin, Harris, Seymour. Saving American Capitalism: A Liberal Economic Program. New York: Knopf, 1948. Keynes, John Maynard. The General Theory of Employment, Inter 1964. est, andMoney. New York: Harcourt, Brace andWorld, in Charles Poor. 1929-1939. The World Depression: Kindleberger, of California Press, 1973. Berkeley: University Kuznets, Simon. "Long Swings in the Growth of Population and in Related Economic Variables." Proceedings of theAmerican Philosophical Society 102 (1958): 25-52. Lewis, W. Arthur. Economic Survey, 1919-1939. Philadelphia: 1950. Blakiston, Means, Gardiner C, and Adolf A. Berle. The Modem Corporation and Private Property. New York: Harcourt, Brace andWorld, 1968. Roose, Kenneth D. The Economics of Recession and Revival: An Interpretation of 1937-1938. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954. Schumpeter, Joseph A. Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process. New York: 1939. McGraw-Hill, Slichter, Sumner. "The Downturn of 1937." Review of Economics and Statistics 20 (1938): 103-15. Steindl, Josef. Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism. 1945. Reprint, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976. In Problems of in Capitalist Economies." "On Maturity Economic Dynamics and Planning: Essays inHonour ofMichal Kalecki, 423-32. New York: Pergamon, 1966.
"Reflections on the Present State of Economics." Banca
both global
existence is
in apparently no longer possible. Josef Steindl himself noted, 1976, that "the cheerful extroverted era of [postwar] growth has
apparently come to an end." And, in words that today seem as
relevant
reasons superpowers countries and energy
that the
the
of environment,
In the midst of a return to the unstable growth of earlier of fiscal and decades, an altogether reactionary (re)orientation monetary policy has occurred. A resurgence of general equilib to cyclical phenomena rium approaches has prompted the
formupoignancy strikingly clear of when this we state reflect of contemporary upon the Great affairs are made as a Depression
significant
and coherent
historical
problem.
on Note consideration
necessarily
this Issue: As this article amply demonstrates, of the economic history of the Great Depression
on both quantitative and aggregate data that
focuses
tend to obscure
challenge for
of the event.
this profound
Indeed, the
economic
those
crisis is to find substantive ways inwhich to link the economics of -. the interwar years with the personal and social experience of its It is for this reason that the inspired work of the contemporaries. contributors to this special issue of the OAH Magazine of History should prove so useful to all of us in our work with students. In the-. pages that follow, readers will find visual and textual examination
of the many ways in which Americans endured, understood, and
ultimately overcame the burdens of the Great Depression. These to articles and lesson plans will assist us all in our determination
convey interwar to students era and the the singular remarkable nature of the economic of crisis the of the genera accomplishments
it.
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