Book ASR2013

ASIAN STRATEGIC REVIEW
2014
US Pivot and Asian Security
ASIAN STRATEGIC REVIEW
2014
US Pivot and Asian Security
Editors
S.D. MUNI
VIVEK CHADHA
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES & ANALYSES
NEW DELHI
2 - 6 ) / 2 4 - 5 5
Asian Strategic Review 2014: US Pivot and Asian Security
S.D. Muni, Vivek Chadha (Eds)
First Published in 2014
Copyright Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi
ISBN 978-81-8274-769-2
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without first obtaining written permission of
the copyright owner.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, or the
Government of India.
Published by
PENTAGON PRESS
206, Peacock Lane, Shahpur Jat,
New Delhi-110049
Phones: 011-64706243, 26491568
Telefax: 011-26490600
email: rajan@pentagonpress.in
website: www.pentagonpress.in
Branch:
Prime Arcade
Office #11
1154 Saifee Street
Opp. M.G. Road, Camp
Pune-411001
Email: pentagonpresspune@gmail.com
In association with
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
No. 1, Development Enclave,
New Delhi-110010
Phone: +91-11-26717983
Website: www.idsa.in
Printed at Avantika Printers Private Limited.
Contents
Foreword vii
List of Contributors ix
US P|vOT AND AS|AN SLCUP|TY
1. Introduction 3
S.D. Muni
LvOLUT|ON OP US PL8ALANC|NG
2. Evolution of US Rebalancing Strategy:
Implications for India 15
Arvind Gupta and Sanjeev K Shrivastav
M|L|TAPY |MPL|CAT|ONS OP US PL8ALANC|NG
3. Military Implications of the US Rebalancing Strategy 31
Vivek Chadha
4. Restructuring the Maritime PivotLatest Developments
in the US Rebalance to Asia 48
Abhijit Singh
5. Military Dimensions of US Pivot and Its Implications 69
P.K. Gautam
PLG|ONAL AND COUNTPY PLPSPLCT|vLS
6. US Pivot to the Asia-Pacific: Impact and Implications for
West Asia 85
Rajeev Agarwal and Prasanta Kumar Pradhan
7. US Pivot to Asia and China: Rhetoric, Responses
and Repercussions 105
Rukmani Gupta
Asian Strategic Review 2014
vi
8. Chinese Military Response to US Rebalancing Strategy 114
Mandip Singh
9. US Pivot to Asia-Pacific: Implications for the Indian
Ocean Region 131
Sarabjeet Singh Parmar
10. The US Rebalancing Strategy: Responses from Southeast Asia 149
Rahul Mishra
11. Japans Response to the US Pivot to Asia 175
Shamshad A. Khan
NUCLLAP D|MLNS|ONS
12. Pivot to Asia and Nuclearisation 189
Rajiv Nayan
|ND|AN PLPSPLCT|vL
13. Indias Approach to the Asia-Pacific 211
Arvind Gupta
14. Americas Pivot to Asia and Indias Nuanced Approach 218
Rup Narayan Das
APPLND|CLS
I. Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament 235
II. Americas Engagement in the Asia-Pacific 243
Index 253
Foreword
The US pivot policy, which was subsequently rechristened as a rebalance is
possibly the most important foreign policy guideline emanating from the power
corridors of Washington in the recent past. It will undoubtedly influence the
strategic contours of the Asia Pacific region in the coming decade. The policy,
which is still evolving, despite having received most attention as a result of its
military component, is a comprehensive plan to step up US engagement, influence
and impact on economic, diplomatic, ideological and strategic affairs of the region.
There has been an attempt to play down the China factor in the rebalance.
However, China is and will remain a major factor in not only the military sphere,
but also every other facet which defines the US rebalance. This reality becomes
evident from the assessment of contributors of this years Asian Strategic Review
(ASR).
India is widely seen as a major constituent of the Asia Pacific region. The
strategic flux being witnessed in the Asia Pacific accentuates the complexity
involved in pursuing the countrys interests. The readjustment to changing realities
is fast exposing the redundancy of seemingly well established norms. India must
therefore reaffirm its commitment to this important region and play a constructive
role in shaping every aspect of the regions emergence as a peaceful, stable and
economically dynamic region. It must not only reorient its outlook to the Asia
Pacific region, but also evolve to the shifting dynamics.
The ASR takes a wide analytical sweep to bring together one of the most
comprehensive assessments of the US rebalancing strategy. It not only assesses
the origins of the strategy, but also its implications in every sphere of influence.
The impact of rebalancing on the region is assessed in light of US drawdown
from Iraq and Afghanistan, a simultaneous refocus on Asia Pacific and the ongoing
sequestration policy. The volume connects these dots in an attempt to provide a
cogent picture of the strategy as well as its implications.
The scholars of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) have
contributed to this volume, under the guidance of Prof S.D. Muni, Distinguished
Fellow, IDSA. I hope the papers in this volume will further the debate on US
policy of rebalancing to Asia.
New Delhi Arvind Gupta
February 2014 Director General, IDSA
List of Contributors
Cdr Abhijit Singh is a Research Fellow at the IDSA. He looks at maritime strategic
issues in the broader Indo-Pacific region, and littoral security in the Indian
Ocean.
Dr Arvind Gupta is the Director General IDSA. He specialises on a number of
international and national security issues.
Brig Mandip Singh, VSM is a Senior Fellow and Centre Coordinator for East
Asia Centre at IDSA. He lectures and writes extensively on security and
defence matters related to Sino-Indian relations and the PLA.
Col P.K. Gautam (Retd) is a Research Fellow at IDSA. He has a number of
books, chapters and articles on military matters, non-traditional security and
Tibet to his credit.
Dr Prasanta Kumar Pradhan is an Associate Fellow at IDSA. His areas of research
interests include domestic, foreign policy and security issues in the Gulf region
and the Arab world.
Col Rajeev Agarwal is a Research Fellow at IDSA. His research focuses on foreign
policy, regional security and strategic issues in West Asia.
Dr Rahul Mishra is a Research Fellow at Indian Council of World Affairs, New
Delhi. He specialises on political, economic, foreign policy and security aspects
of countries and regional groupings of Southeast Asia. He was a researcher
at IDSA from 2009-2013.
Dr Rajiv Nayan is a Senior Research Associate at IDSA. He specialises in nuclear
issues and export controls.
Ms Rukmani Gupta was formerly an associate fellow at the IDSA. She is currently
the Armed Forces Analyst for APAC with IHS Janes. The views expressed
in this chapter are the authors alone and are not endorsed by IHS.
Dr Rup Narayan Das is a Senior Fellow at IDSA. He is presently on deputation
from the Lok Sabha Secretariat of Indian Parliament, where he is the Director
(Research).
x
Mr Sanjeev K. Shrivastav is a researcher at IDSA. He specialises in India-US
strategic partnership, foreign policy as well as domestic politics in the US.
Cdr Sarabjeet Singh Parmar is a serving naval officer, presently working as a
Research Fellow at IDSA. He looks at maritime security issues.
Dr Shamshad A. Khan is a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World
Affairs, New Delhi. He focuses on various aspects of Japanese affairs.
Previously, he was a researcher at IDSA.
Col Vivek Chadha (Retd) is a Research Fellow at IDSA. His research areas include
defence studies, countering the finance of terrorism and Indo-US relations.
US PIVOT AND
ASIAN SECURITY
1
Introduction
S.D. Muni
There are two significant developments in Asia that are recasting Asias strategic
contours and its security concerns. One is Chinas rise and its strategic assertion
in the Asia-Pacific region, and the other is the US response to that in Asia under
the Obama administration. The Obama administration took two landmark
strategic policy decisions that may radically recast not only the US engagement
with Asia but also the Asian strategic dynamics. The first decision was the
withdrawal from Afghanistan by July 2014, and the second was the US strategic
pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. Both these policy moves are related: the latter,
in many significant ways, conditioned by the former. They will evolve and unfold
in the due course of time depending upon a number of related variables.
The Pivot Strategy
The announcement of the pivot to Asia strategy was such that it qualifies to
be called Obama Doctrine: a part of Obamas grand strategy.
1
President Obama
in his address to the Australian Parliament on November 17, 2011 termed it as
a broader shift for the US. He said: After a decade in which we fought two
wars that cost us dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States is turning our
attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region...As the worlds fastest-
growing regionand home to more than half the global economythe Asia
Pacific is critical to achieving my highest priority and that is creating jobs and
opportunity for the American people. With most of the worlds nuclear powers
and some half of humanity, Asia will largely define whether the century ahead
will be marked by conflict or cooperation, needless suffering or human progress.
As president, I have therefore made a deliberate and strategic decisionas a Pacific
nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this
region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with
allies and friends....As we end todays wars, I have directed my national security
team to make our presence and mission in Asia Pacific a top priority.
2
The pivot to Asia strategy has been elaborately explained and articulated
4
by a number of President Obamas former associates, including the Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton, Defence Secretary Panetta and the National Security Adviser
to the President Tom Donilon. Almost at the time when President Obama was
announcing his Asia doctrine in the Australian Parliament, Hillary Clinton wrote
in Foreign Policy: As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw
from Afghanistan, the United States stands at a pivot point. Over the last 10
years, we have allocated immense resources to those two theatres. In the next
10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and
energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership,
secure our interests and advance our values. One of the most important tasks of
American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially
increased investmentdiplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwisein the
Asia-Pacific region.
3
Not through words alone, Secretary Clinton started throwing indications
from early on, even before the formal announcement of the pivot strategy by
the President, through her actions. Her very first foreign visit was to the Asia-
Pacific region undertaken in the second month of her assuming office. The
significance of her diplomatic movements so described was noted by the US
foreign policy analysts and commentators outside the administration. Rodger
Baker writing for Stratfor said: U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is making
her first official overseas visit with scheduled stops in Tokyo; Jakarta, Indonesia;
Seoul, South Korea; and Beijing. The choice of Asia as her first destination is
intended to signal a more global focus for U.S. President Barack Obamas
administration, as opposed to the heavy emphasis on the Middle East and South
Asia seen in the last years of the Bush administration.
4
Preparing for the Asia Pivot
The Asia-Pacific pivot strategy was announced by President Obama towards the
end of the third year of his first term in office, but the work for crafting this
strategy had already begun during his election campaign in 2008. Anthony Lake,
who served as former President Clintons National Security Adviser during 1993-
1997, and Susan Rice, an academic at the Brookings Institution, who later on
was appointed US Permanent Representative at the UN and now has taken charge
as President Obamas National Security Adviser in his second term, led his foreign
policy campaign team.
To prepare the ground for his foreign policy strategy, President Obama ordered
a thorough review of the prevailing situation and the strategic assets and liabilities
that his government inherited. Thomas Donilon, former National Security Adviser,
disclosed that the process of formulating the strategy started right after Obamas
election. The strategy was the outcome of a cool and careful assessment of the
US presence in the world and its strategic assets and liabilities. The assessment,
Donilon said, Resulted in a set of key determinations. It was clear to us that
there was an imbalance in the projection of focus of Americas power around the
Introduction
5
world...As a result of these determinations, the president ended the war in Iraq,
refocused and re-energized [sic] our counter-terrorism efforts and has charted a
path for transition in Afghanistan. In doing soand this is an important strategic
concept as wellin doing so, the president had dramatically improved Americas
strategic freedom of maneuver [sic] so that our troops posture aligns with our
interests in a changing world...and a dynamic region...As a part of this and
geographic aspect of this, the president made a critical decision...to increase our
focus on the Asia-Pacific in terms of resources, diplomatic effort, engagement
both with nations and with regional institutions, and in terms of policy.
5
In a number of initial official statements made, there was some confusion
about the terms usedbetween pivot and rebalancing. The word pivot
was used by Clinton and her associates in the Department of State like Kurt
Campbell, Assistant secretary for East Asia and the Pacific. However, President
Obama and other US officials generally used the word rebalancing. This was
to avoid the impression that the US was pivoting or shifting away from its
traditional regions of stakes in Europe and the Middle East (West Asia) and
fixating itself in the Asia-Pacific region, much to the irritation of China.
Rebalancing connotes just a readjustment and repositioning of the US presence
and interests.
6
Therefore, rebalancing has firmed up in official discourse, while
pivot continues to remain more attractive to media and policy analysts.
Pivot as Continuity and Change
The statements of Clinton, Donilon and others suggest that the policy of pivot
to Asia was a well-considered, thoughtful move and not just a knee-jerk reaction
to the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. This policy move in fact is a
continuation of Americas long-term strategic and economic stakes in the Asia-
Pacific region. Explaining the pivot strategy, the then National Security Adviser
Donilon publicly accepted that the Asia-Pacific region supported some 2.4 million
US jobs through trade.
7
Besides economic stakes, the previous administrations
of Clinton and Bush had also started getting concerned about the rise and
assertion of China in the Asia-Pacific region and its implications for the US
leadership and security. The concern arising out of China was also a bipartisan
issue though the Republicans and the Democrats differed on dealing with this
concern.
By the time the George H.W. Bush (I) administration was concluding its
term, the indications of Chinas rise had started emerging unmistakably. In its last
National Security Strategy statement in 1993, the Bush-I administration wondered
if the US should support, contain or balance Chinas rise.
8
Clinton administration
answered this question by seeking and encouraging Chinas integration and active
participation in regional security mechanisms to reassure its neighbours and
assuage its own security concerns. For this, the Clinton administration aimed
at building a New Pacific Community based on strong US presence in the
region, capable of deterring regional aggression.
9
Clintons succeeding
6
administration, led by George W. Bush (II) identified a broad arc of instability
that stretches from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, the region contains a
volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers.
10
The active regional security
role brought the Bush-II administration in direct conflict with China on the
question of a mid-air standoff between the US spy plane EP-3E ARIES-II with
a Chinese fighter (J-811) over the Chinese Hainan province in April 2001. Both
the preceding administrations could not afford to ignore the Asia-Pacific region.
The Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 during the Clinton administration and the Korean
crisis during the Bush administration may be recalled. The underlying fact for
both the administrations was that the US presence and role in the Asia-Pacific
region was shaped by the increasing realisation of Chinas rise as a formidable
power and the challenge it posed to the US interests and stakes in the region. In
its second term, President Bushs (II) Secretary of state Condoleezza Rice envisaged
creating a regional balance in the Asia-Pacific based on the prospects of major
Asian players being supported by the US to deter China from playing a negative
role. Rice in her answer to a question on China at Sophia University in Japan
in March 2005 said: So knowing that China is a new factor, knowing that China
has the potential for good or for bad, knowing that it will one way or the other
be an influence, it is our responsibility to try and push and prod and persuade
China towards the more positive course...So as we look to Chinas life, I really
do believe that the U.S.-Japan relationship, the U.S.-South Korean relationship,
the U.S.-Indian relationship all are important in creating an environment in
which China more likely to play a positive than a negative role.
11
The two critical issues underlined in the above-mentioned statement, and
many others with a similar tone, were, first, China must be handled carefully
and, second, through a regional balance in the Asia-Pacific region, based on
mobilisation of US allies and strategic partners, it could be done. These issues
also echoed strongly in Obamas pivot strategy.
Obamas pivot or rebalancing strategy may also be seen primarily as an attempt
to address the China challenge, or call it the China dilemma. This dilemma is
built around the fact that on the one hand, China could play a critical role in a
number of global issues of importance to the US, such as nuclear non-proliferation
involving North Korea and Iran, global economic recovery and climate change,
and countering terrorism and rebellion in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan and
Sudan (Darfur rebels).
12
On the other, Chinas fast growing military modernisation
was causing concern and discomfort not only among its Asia-Pacific neighbours
but also in the US strategic community. Chinas fast and formidable rise as an
economic and military power in the Asia-Pacific region, is also invoking mixed,
and at times mutually conflicting responses, from the countries of the region.
Towards addressing this dilemma, Obamas Asia team tried to learn from the
mistakes of their predecessors and avoid downturns in relations with China.
Accordingly, the Obama administration evolved a broad framework of dealing
with China based on three premises, namely:
Introduction
7
1. First China should not be considered an inevitable adversary, but rather
potential partner in resolving critical global issues...there were competitive
elements in its (Chinas) relationship with the United Statessome quite
significantin both economic and security areas, but...cooperative
elements could and should outweigh those. Washington did not seek
the containment of China...because of the hopelessness of pursuing such
a policy towards a country that was much more profoundly integrated
into the global system...
2. Second, while welcoming Chinas rise...it was essential that it occur within
the context of international law and norms. That meant China should
not resort to force or intimidation in resolving international disputes...
3. Third, the administration sought to ensure that Chinas rise served to
stabilize, not destabilize, the Asia-Pacific region which included five US
allies and other partners in whose security Americans had an interest.
13
Obamas pivot to Asia strategy distinguishes itself in two notable ways,
from the approaches of the two previous administrations, towards the Asia-Pacific
region. First, it has been packaged comprehensively and has all the necessary
components of a strategy, namely military, political, economic and ideological.
(The key components of the strategy have been identified in the subsequent
paras.)
The second distinguishing feature of the pivot strategy is that it encompasses
a much wider geo-strategic space: what is traditionally known as the Asia-Pacific
region comprising of East and Southeast Asia. There is an attempt to see the
Pacific (especially western Pacific) and Indian Oceans linked as one region by the
inclusion of South Asia, particularly India, as one single strategic theatre. In the
US official articulation of the pivot policy, the concept of Indo-Pacific was
first used by Secretary Clinton in 2010 as an imperative of emerging geo-strategic
reality of the region. Explaining Americas Engagement in the Asia-Pacific at
Honolulu, Hawaii, on October 28, 2010, she said: Our military presence must
evolve to reflect an evolving world. The Pentagon is now engaged in a
comprehensive Global Posture Review, which will lay out a plan for the continued
forward presence of US forces in the region. That plan will reflect three principles:
Our defense [sic] posture will become more politically sustainable, operationally
resilient, and geographically dispersed...And we are expanding our work with
the Indian navy in the Pacific, because we understand how important the Indo-
Pacific basin is to the global trade and commerce.
14
(Emphasis added).
Explaining the salience of an integrated view of the Indian and Pacific Oceans
and redefining the Asia-Pacific in the Indo-Pacific terms, she again wrote in her
Foreign Policy article: Asia-pacific has become a key driver of global politics.
Stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas,
the region spans two oceansthe Pacific and Indianthat are increasingly linked
by shipping and strategy. It boasts almost half of the worlds population. It includes
many of the key engines of the global economy, as well as the largest emitters of
8
greenhouse gases. It is home to several of our key allies and important emerging
powers like China, India and Indonesia.
The idea of Indo-Pacific has a long and interesting background and a complex
evolution. Space and time constraints do not permit us to digress into explaining
it here. The extended regional strategic perspective has led the US to bring in
countries like India as significant players in the rebalance strategy.
Principal Drivers of the Pivot
One of the core motives of the US policy in the post-Second World War period
has been to preserve and promote its global hegemony. A key precondition to
preserving this hegemony is to ensure that there is no other hegemon emerging
anywhere in the world. The well-known US neo-realist John Mearsheimer writing
in a newspaper article says: My theory of international politics says that the
mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their own region while making
sure that no rival great power dominates another region. The ultimate goal of
every great power is to maximize [sic] its share of world power and eventually
dominate the system.
15
The play of this motive of preserving and promoting its global leadership
can be clearly discerned behind the Obama administrations Pivot to Asia
strategy. The message of leadership was clearly underlined by President Obama
in his Canberra address announcing the rebalancing strategy when he said:
The United States will play a larger and a long-term role in shaping this region
and its future...A secure and peaceful Asia is the foundation for the second area
in which America is leading againand thats advancing our shared
prosperity...This is the future we seek in the Asia-pacific security, prosperity and
dignity for all. Thats what we stand for. Thats who we are. Thats the future we
will pursue, in partnership with allies and friends, and with every element of
American power. So let there be no doubt; in the Asia-pacific in the 21
st
century,
the United States of America is all in.
16
The reassertion of leadership through the articulation of pivot strategy was
in some ways a conscious effort to address the questions raised both within the
US and from outside. Within the US, there was criticism that the prevailing
extensive involvement of the US in world affairs, symbolised by wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, was unsustainable and unnecessary in view of its domestic economic
and social costs. Outside the US, there were questions hanging on Americas
willingness and capabilities to continue to play its leading role. Answering these
questions, Secretary Clinton wrote in her Foreign Policy article, Americas Pacific
Century: With Iraq and Afghanistan still in transition and serious economic
challenges in our own country, there are those...who are calling for us not to
reposition, but to come home. They seek a downsizing of our foreign policy
engagement in favor [sic] of our pressing domestic priorities. These impulses are
understandable, but they are misguided. Those who say that we can no longer
afford to engage with the world have it exactly backwardwe cannot afford not
Introduction
9
to. Beyond our borders, people are also wondering about Americas intentions
our willingness to remain engaged and to lead. In Asia they ask whether we are
really there to stay, whether we are likely to be distracted again by events elsewhere,
whether we can make and keepcredible economic and strategic commitments,
and whether we can back those commitments with action. The answer is: We
can and we will.
In view of this, the US leadership felt that the region is eager for our leadership
and our businessperhaps more so at any time in modern history.
17
In former
National Security Adviser Thomas Donilons perception, Our renewed
commitment to Asiaand this is an important pointalso flows from the demand
for US leadership from nations across the region. There are a lot of reasons for
this and this could take a long discussion as well. But the fact is today is (sick)
that there is tremendous demand and expectation of US leadership in the region.
Indeed the demand signals, I think, at this point today are unprecedented.
18
The rise and assertion of China was a factor not only behind the regions
welcome to the US leadership, but also behind the US concern for preserving
and reinforcing its leadership. While the US has been trying to come to terms
with Chinas economic rise during the previous Bush and Clinton administrations,
as already noted, the faster pace of its military modernisation witnessed during
the early years of the Obama administration was making Pentagon and US security
community feel increasingly uneasy. The gradually building up perception that
the US engagement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and availability of
abundance of economic resources was making China emerge as a challenge to
US security and leadership was getting reinforced by the strides made by China
in military modernisation and its assertion of territorial claims in relation to
Japan and South China Sea neighbours. The concern for the Chinese challenge
was adequately reflected in a series of Pentagon documents and studies. It was in
the 2010 Annual Report to Congress of the Department of Defence that sounded
a serious alert on the security implications of military modernisation of China
for the US. The Report underlined Chinas strategy of Offense as Defense [sic]
and drew attention to its Anti-Access/Area Denial Capabilities enabling it to
counter third party intervention, including by the United States, in any future
cross-Strait crisis.
Commenting on the military dimension of the pivot in the context of
Chinas military rise, The Economist (London) wrote on April 07, 2012:
According to senior American diplomats, China has the ambitionand
increasingly the powerto become regional hegemon; it is engaged in a
determined effort to lock America out of a region that has been declared a vital
security interest by every administration since Teddy Roosevelts; and it is pulling
countries in South-east Asia into its orbit of influence by default. America has
to respond. As an early sign of that response. Mr. Obama announced on November
11 that 2500 US marines would soon be stationed in Australia. Talks about an
increased American military presence in the Philippines began in February this
year.
19
10
The challenge to American leadership in the Asia-Pacific from China was
not limited to the military field, howsoever critical it was. The challenge was also
economic and had its politico-diplomatic implications. An economically
prosperous China had vastly improved its economic engagement with the countries
of the Asia-Pacific region while the US appeared diffident and confusing. Chinas
trade and investments in the region had soared impressively, and it had also
increased its developmental assistance to many of the developing Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) members including Indonesia. Chinas
economic clout was not only effective in the ASEAN countries but also in the
close allies of the US. Acknowledging it impliedly, President Obama had
mentioned in his Canberra speech: All of our nationsAustralia, and the United
States, all of our nationshave a profound interest in the rise of a peaceful and
prosperous Chinaand that is why the United States welcomes it. Above all,
it is a widely acknowledged fact that China is closely integrated with the US and
the US-led global economy. The pivot strategy therefore aims at balancing without
containment of China.
20
Key Components of the Pivot
The components of the pivot strategy have been described differently by various
US leaders and commentators. In essence however they fall under the following
five categories:
1. Military re-deployment in the Asia-Pacific: This seeks to shift the US
military assets released from Afghanistan and Iraq. It is proposed that by
2020, 60 per cent of US naval strength will be deployed in this region
leaving the remaining 40 per cent for other regions. It has been promised
that US sequestration will not be adversely affecting the rebalance
strategy. There would be clear emphasis on technology upgradation and
rotating US military presence would be preferred over traditional
permanent bases.
2. Strengthening alliances and building strategic partnerships: There is a
serious attempt under the pivot strategy to reinforce and, wherever
required, even redefine traditional alliance relations in the region with
countries like Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, Philippines and
Thailand. This is in the hope of undoing the threatened US isolation in
the region and building confidence and capabilities of the allies in
supporting US moves towards the Asia-Pacific security. In addition to
the traditional allies, much attention is also devoted to strengthening
existing strategic partnerships in the region with countries like India
and Singapore, and seeking new such partnerships with countries like
Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia. Attempts are also discernible under
the US rebalancing strategy to bring its allies and strategic partners closer
for security cooperation in the region. The proposals like the US-Japan-
India strategic triangle or US-Japan-India-Australia strategic quadrangle
Introduction
11
speculated upon by a number of US analysts fall into this category: aimed
at putting in place a strategically viable united front in case of any
adverse security situation in the region. Strengthening defence capabilities
of the allies and strategic partners is also opening opportunities for the
US arms sales in the region that will keep US jobs intact and help boost
the US economy.
3. Strategic architecture: The US wants to ensure that any strategic
architecture in the region, like the East Asia Summit and ASEAN-related
organisations, neither isolates the US nor falls under the Chinese
dominance. The US also seeks to make these regional organisations take
meaningful and effective decisions rather than becoming talking forums.
4. Economic resurgence: The US pivot strategy also seeks to help revive
and expand its economic stakes in the region. Trans Pacific Partnership
(TPP) is envisaged to boost the US trade and investment prospects in
the region. The objective is to inject new life in the sagging US economy
as also to compete with China for economic space and opportunities in
the region.
5. Ideological assertion: The pivot strategy also has an ideological front
where significance of human rights and democracy are emphasised and
diplomatically pursued to the discomfort of the countries that violate
these norms or are seen to be lacking in them like China.
All these components of the US strategy are expected to take a firm shape
only by 2020. In the meanwhile, questions are continuing to be raised and doubts
expressed on the sustainability of these components and the will and the capability
(including financial resources) of the Obama administration to pursue them
sincerely and seriously.
21
The US strategy has strongly stirred the security situation
in Asia, both on the count of US withdrawal from Iraq, Afghanistan and West
Asia as well as reassertion in the Asia-Pacific region. While China has strongly
been resenting the US strategy, both the US allies and strategic partners look
towards the strategy with mixed feeling: seeking limits on Chinas growing military
capabilities and assertion with the US support, but ensuring that the region is
not pushed into any conflict through Chinas isolation or containment.
The present volume seeks to explore various dimensions of the US pivot/
rebalancing strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and its implications for regional
and global security. This is done keeping in mind Indias response to the US
strategy and how it affects Indias security concerns. Hopefully, the essays in the
volume by experts and scholars would be able to generate a lively debate among
Asias security watchers and policymakers on the questions related to the US
rebalance strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.
NOTES
1. Daniel W. Drezner, Does Obama have a Grand Strategy? Why We Need Doctrines in
Uncertain Times, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2011, pp. 57-68.
12
2. Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament, Parliament House, Canberra,
Australia, November 17, 2012, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/
remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament.
3. Hillary Clinton, Americas Pacific Century, Foreign Policy, November 2011.
4. Rodger Baker, The Emerging Obama Foreign Policy, Stratfor, February 17, 2009, at
www.stratfor.com (Accessed February 17, 2009). For a detailed account of Hillary Clintons
travels, see: Kim Ghattas, The Secretary: A Journey with Hillary Clinton from Beirut to the
Heart of American Power, Times Books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2013.
5. Speech by Thomas Donilon, President Obamas Asia Policy and Upcoming Trip to the
Region, at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC,
November 15, 2012, at csis.org/files/attachments/121511_Donilon_Statesmens_Forum_
TS.pdf.
6. Richard Weitz, Pivot Out, Rebalance In, The Diplomat, May 03, 2012, at http://
thediplomat.com/2012/05/03/pivot-out-rebalance-in/?print=yes (Accessed April 01, 2013).
Wen liu, From Pivot to Rebalance: the Weight of Words in U.S. Asia Policy, contextChina,
March 22, 2013, at http://contextchina.com/2013/03/from-pivot-to-rebalance-the weight-
of-words-in-u-s-asia (Accessed April 02, 2013).
7. Speech by Thomas Donilon, No. 4.
8. The White House, National security Strategy of the United States, Washington DC, January
1993, p. 8.
9. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Washington
DC, July 1994, pp. 23-24.
10. US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington DC, September
30, 2001. p. 4.
11. Statement by Condoleezza Rice, issued in Tokyo, March 15, 2005, at http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary /rm/2005/43655.htm (Accessed June 25, 2013).
12. Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and Chinas Rise: An Insiders Account of Americas Asia Strategy,
Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2012, Chapter 3, China Getting Started,
p. 21.
13. Ibid., pp. 69-70.
14. Hillary Clinton, Americas Engagement in the Asia-Pacific, at Honolulu, October 28, 2010,
US Department of State website, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/150141.htm
(Accessed January 23, 2013).
15. John Mearsheimer, The Rise of China Will Not Be peaceful at All, The Australian,
November 18, 2005.
For the details of his theory on the rise of the great powers, see: John Mearsheimer, The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2001.
16. Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament, No. 2.
17. Hillary Clinton, No. 2.
18. Speech by Thomas Donilon, No. 4.
19. The Dragons New Teeth: A Rare Look inside the Worlds Biggest Military Expansion;
The Economist, London, April 07, 2012. The US concern for Chinas growing military
capabilities has continued to persist. For the latest expression of such concern, see: David
Alexander, China Challenging US Military Technological Edge- Pentagon, Reuters News
Agency, January 29, 2014, at http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/346018/scitech/
technology/china- challenging-us-militart-technological-edge-pentagon (Accessed January 29,
2014).
20. Ashley J. Tellis, Balancing Without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2014, Washington DC.
21. John Feffer, The Myth of the United States Pivot to Asia, January 28, 2014, at http://
www.motherjones.com/print/244251 (Accessed January 29, 2014). Also, see: Lawmakers
Doubt Obamas Pivot to Asia, at http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/01/28/lawmakers-doubt-
obamas-pivot-to-asia (Accessed January 29, 2014).
EVOLUTION OF
US REBALANCING
2
Evolution of US Rebalancing Strategy:
Implications for India
Arvind Gupta and Sanjeev K. Shrivastav
Recognising the Asia-Pacific region as the most rapidly growing and dynamic
region in the world, the Obama administration pronounced numerous policy
statements during 2011-13. These statements clearly indicate that the United
States (US) is now proactively preparing to enhance the levels of its political,
economic, military as well as socio-cultural engagements with the Asia-Pacific
region in the years and decades to come. This shift in the US foreign policy is
being referred as United States policy of rebalancing towards Asia-Pacific. Such
a shift in the US policy is likely to create a zone of contestation among the nations
in the Asia-Pacific region.
This chapter attempts to examine the following three questions:
1. What is the US rebalancing policy?
2. What are the reactions to this rebalancing policy among the nations in
the Asia-Pacific region?
3. What implications will it have on Indias security and foreign policy?
The main argument of this chapter is that the US policy towards the Asia-pacific
is in an evolving state and currently in a flux. It has created many uncertainties
in this region. India should watch the trajectory of the US rebalancing policy
and cautiously engage with the United States in areas of convergence while avoid
getting involved in unfolding entanglements.
Understanding US Policy of Rebalancing
To understand the rebalancing policy of the US, it is useful to see how it began
and evolved. During late 2011 and early 2012, the Obama administration
announced that it would be intensifying the role of the US in the Asia-Pacific
region. This was at the time when the US was showing signs of war weariness
and its economy was under considerable stress. Moreover, during this time,
China was showing signs of political, military and economic resurgence, and
16
many of Chinas neighbours were becoming uncomfortable with its growing
assertiveness.
The US policy of rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific appears to have been
driven by the economic as well as political rise of nations in the Asia-Pacific
region, and in particular by the rise of China. The United States has already
ended its combat mission in Iraq and is now planning to withdraw its combat
troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Now, with this new strategy, the
Obama administration appears to be focussing on the Asia-Pacific region. In
December 2011, the then US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, while writing
in Foreign Policy summed up the emerging geo-political landscape in Asia and
set the grounds for a shift in the US foreign policy. She wrote: As the war in Iraq
winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the
US stands at a pivot point. Over the last 10 years, we have allocated immense
resources to those two theatres. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and
systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in
the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our
values. One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next
decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment
diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwisein the Asia-Pacific region.
1
In her article, Secretary Clinton attempted to point out that the Asia-Pacific
region was in the process of building a mature security as well as economic
architecture; therefore, given its interests in the region, it was essential for the
United States to get engaged with the Asia-Pacific region more closely. Clinton
also argued for taking lessons from the post-World War II era when the US
engaged with transatlantic nations substantially, which in turn helped the US to
maintain its power and influence during the Cold War period. She insisted that
it was time for the US to engage with the Asia-Pacific region, which is the most
rapidly growing and dynamic regions of the world; therefore, according to her,
it was absolutely essential for the US to do so in the 21
st
century.
2
In her
assessment, wars in the Middle East were winding down. So, for the US to
maintain its global leadership, it was necessary to invest in the Asia-Pacific where
a new security and economic architecture was shaping up. In her opinion, the
United States must show greater commitment to this region.
3
It would be worth
noting that earlier, in November 2009, during his visit to Japan, President Obama
had termed himself as the first Pacific President of the United States.
4
In November
2011, President Obama visited the Asia-Pacific region for ten days and attended
the East Asia Summit in Bali, Indonesia. This comprehensive visit by President
Obama to the region was a clear indication that his administration would give
greater salience to the Asia-Pacific region.
5
Hillary Clintons article, in Foreign Policy, amplified what President Obama
had already stated in his speech in the Australian Parliament at Canberra on
November 17, 2011. President Obama stated: For the United States, this reflects
a broader shift. After a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly,
in blood and treasure, the Unites States is turning our attention to the vast potential
Evolution of US Rebalancing Strategy
17
of the Asia Pacific region ... Our new focus on this region reflects a fundamental
truththe United States has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation...As the
worlds fastest-growing regionand home to more than half the global economy
the Asia Pacific is critical to achieving my highest priority, and thats creating
jobs and opportunity for the American people...Indeed, we are already modernizing
Americas defense posture across the Asia Pacific. It will be more broadly
distributedmaintaining our strong presence in Japan and the Korean Peninsula,
while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia. Our posture will be more
flexiblewith new capabilities to ensure that our forces can operate freely. And
our posture will be more sustainable, by helping allies and partners build their
capacity, with more training and exercises.
6
Rapid growth and dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region is one of the key
reasons why the US is willing to enhance its levels of engagement with this region.
During the last two years of her tenure as the US Secretary of State, Hillary
Clinton made regular visits to the Asia-Pacific region and attended the meetings
of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well.
7
In recent times,
too, the current US Secretary of State John Kerry, US Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hegal and other top US officials have visited the Asia Pacific region a substantial
number of times. In November, 2012 immediately, after his re-election for the
second term, President Obama visited Thailand, Myanmar and Cambodia and
attended the East Asia Summit in Phnom Penh.
8
This indicated the continuation
of US priorities to the Asia-pacific region during Obamas second term as well.
The White House Press Secretary Jay Carney, while announcing this trip in
November 2012, acknowledged: The Presidents trip to Asia will be an
opportunity to build on our successful efforts to refocus on the Asia Pacific as the
most rapidly growing and dynamic region in the world.
9
Realising the importance of the economic aspect of the rebalancing policy
for its success over the long term, President Obama pushed forward the US efforts
to join and establish a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with nations of Asia-
Pacific region. The TPP has emerged out of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
Partnership (TPSEP) agreement between Singapore, Brunei, Chile and New
Zealand, signed in 2005.
10
As far as US engagement with the TPP negotiations
is concerned, this process had begun in September 2008 itself during George W.
Bush administration, when the US showed its interest for negotiations of a Free
Trade Agreement (FTA) with TPSEP member countries. During the first term
of the Obama administration, formal negotiations began in March 2010.
11
On
November 12, 2011, the nine nations i.e. Chile, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia,
New Zealand, Peru, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Vietnam, Singapore
and the US declared broad outlines of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement
with a common vision to establish a comprehensive, next-generation regional
agreement that liberalizes trade and investment and addresses new and traditional
trade issues and 21st-century challenges. The TPP has emerged as the defining
feature of the US economic engagements in the Asia Pacific region under the
Obama administration. The Asia-Pacific region has become a key destination for
18
US exports as total export of goods by the US to the region in 2012, has been
worth $942 billion. This constitutes 61 per cent of the total exports of US goods
in that year. As of August 2013, nineteen rounds of TPP negotiations have taken
place among twelve countries, and this negotiation process is still ongoing.
12
The rapid growth, dynamism and future prospects of Asia-Pacific region
have been clearly highlighted in the US National Intelligence Council Report
2012 as well. The report noted: The diffusion of power among countries will
have a dramatic impact by 2030. Asia will have surpassed North America and
Europe combined in terms of global power, based upon GDP, population size,
military spending, and technological investment. China alone will probably have
the largest economy, surpassing that of the United States a few years before 2030.
In a tectonic shift, the health of the global economy increasingly will be linked
to how well the developing world doesmore so than the traditional West. In
addition to China, India, and Brazil, regional players such as Colombia, Indonesia,
Nigeria, South Africa, and Turkey will become especially important to the global
economy. Meanwhile, the economies of Europe, Japan, and Russia are likely to
continue their slow relative declines.
13
Given the rapid social and economic growth as well as military modernisation,
China is likely to emerge as the major challenger to the US in years and decades
to come. In view of this scenario, the US would be putting its best efforts to
maintain its strategic influence in the Asia-Pacific region. It would be imperative
for the US to maintain this strategic influence in the region in order to provide
security assurances to its allies such as Japan, South Korea Philippines, Australia
etc. and also to secure it own interests in this region. The non-democratic nature
of Chinas governance as well as its aspirations and assertive behaviour to attain
supremacy in the world order, makes it an uncertain power. In view of a rising
China as well as emerging regional strategic scenarios in the region, the US appears
to be forging closer ties with nations of the Asia-Pacific. In this process, the US
is strengthening its old alliances as well as making efforts to establish closer
partnerships with other nations of the Asia-Pacific region which have critical
influence.
14
Meanwhile, it would be worth noting that over sixty one per cent of total
world population resides in the Asia-Pacific region. Along with China, other
nations in this region are also rising with higher economic growth and prosperity
levels.
15
China has grown significantly and modernised all its critical sectors over
the last four decades. With its rising power status, China has been successfully
enhancing its strategic influence in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. At the
same time, India and the South East Asian nations have also risen, economically
as well as militarily. The US realises that it is essential to be part of this dynamism
and growth to maintain its strategic influence in this region and ultimately secure
its vital interests as well as protect its alliesJapan and South Korea, Philippines,
Australia etc.in future. The rebalancing policy of the US may be viewed as
strategic signalling as well which is aimed at indicating US preparedness for
19
dealing with any challenges emerging out of the dynamic strategic scenarios in
the region as and when they arise.
16
In recent times, China has been showing assertive as well as aggressive
behaviour vis--vis its neighbours such as towards Japan relating to the Senkaku
Islands dispute and also towards Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines etc.
relating to South China Sea territorial disputes. More recently, in November
2013, China suddenly announced an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ)
over the Senkakau/Diayou Islands in the East China Sea. According to notification,
all planes which are to pass through the Air Defence Identification Zone should
provide prior information to the authorities in China regarding their flight. This
assertive and aggressive move by China generated concern among the US and its
allies Japan and South Korea as well as other Asia-Pacific nations.
17
It may be
noted that Chinas economic and military capabilities as well as its increasingly
assertive and aggressive behaviour vis--vis its neighbours might have prompted
the US to take on greater efforts to raise the levels of cooperation with its allies
and partners in the Asia-Pacific region to successfully implement its rebalancing
strategy in the region.
Meanwhile, it would be worth considering whether there is any ideological
component in the US rebalancing policy. In this regard, Prof. S. D. Muni has
pointed out: There is a strong and asserted ideological component in the
rebalancing strategy relating to democracy and human rights. This component
is hopefully aimed, besides strategic mobilisation of the like-minded regional
countries, to generate internal pressures within China in favour of opening the
society, polity and economy. The values of democracy, freedom and human rights
are underlined by US diplomats in almost every interaction they have with China.
No wonder China is so uneasy and opposed to the rebalancing strategy.
18
Asia-Pacific nations are rapidly rising while the United States has been
confronted with major internal problems such slow economic growth and recent
economic crisis, high unemployment rate, need for healthcare reforms, etc. In
this regard, it would be essential for the US to enhance internal strengths of its
economy and society i.e. levels of economic growth as well as key national
capabilities in order successfully implement the rebalancing strategy in years and
decades to come. It appears that realising this imperative, the second Obama
administration has been focussing more closely on enhancing the internal strengths
of the US.
19
Now, it is clear that this US rebalancing strategy towards the Asia-
Pacific region is a military as well as an economic strategy. The economic
component of this strategy would be more critical over the long term because the
economic aspect would influence the military posture of the United States in
times ahead. Also, as the China and other nations in the Asia-Pacific region rise,
it is likely that there would be a relative decline of power and influence of the
US. This realization might also be propelling the US to enhance its presence as
well as engagements in the Asia-Pacific region.
20
20
Key Features of US Rebalancing Strategy
The US Department of Defense (DoD) released the strategic guidance document
on January 3, 2012 which noted: While the US military will continue to
contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-
Pacific region.
21
This guidance document further noted that the US strategy
would be focussing its attention on the following key areas: A shift in overall
focus from winning todays wars to preparing for future challenges; a shift in
geographical priorities toward the Asia and the Pacific region while retaining
emphasis on the Middle East; a shift in the balance of missions toward more
emphasis on projecting power in areas in which U.S. access and freedom to
operate are challenged by asymmetric means (anti-access) and less emphasis on
stabilisation operations, while retaining a full-spectrum force; a corresponding
shift in force structure, including reductions in Army and Marine Corps end
strength, toward a smaller, more agile force including the ability to mobilise
quickly; and a corresponding shift toward advanced capabilities including Special
Operations Forces, new technologies such as intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) and unmanned systems, and cyberspace capabilities.
22
While delivering an address on Indo-US Defence Relations at the Institute
for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) on June 6, 2012, then US Secretary of
Defense, Leon E. Panetta stated: America is at a turning point. After a decade
of war, we are developing a new defence strategy - a central feature of which is
a rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, we will expand our
military partnerships and our presence in the arc extending from the Western
Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia.
23
According to the new strategy, the US has planned to deploy 60 per cent of
its naval force into the Asia-Pacific region by the year 2020. Earlier, US naval
forces were divided in equal proportion between the Atlantic and Asia-Pacific
regions. While delivering an address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on
June 2, 2012, Leon Panetta had stated: By 2020 the Navy will reposture its
forces from todays roughly 50/50 percent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic
to about a 60/40 split between those oceans. That will include six aircraft carriers
in this region, a majority of our cruisers, destroyers, Littoral Combat Ships, and
submarines. Our forward-deployed forces are the core of our commitment to
this region and we will, as I said, sharpen the technological edge of our forces.
These forces are also backed up by our ability to rapidly project military power
if needed to meet our security commitments.
24
According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, published
on March 28, 2013, the following steps, among others, have been taken by the
US with regards to its rebalancing strategy: Announcement of new troop
deployments to Australia, new naval deployments in Singapore, and new areas
for military-to-military cooperation with Philippines; efforts to strengthen and
21
enhance the US military presence in East Asia and making it more broadly
distributed, more flexible, and more politically sustainable even if there is a
decrease in the total US defence budget; release of the defense guidance document
for this new strategy of the US; United States joining of the East Asia Summit
(EAS) and also negotiating a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.
25
The CRS
report further notes that enhanced focus of the US on the Asia-Pacific region
appears to have been driven by four major developments: the growing significance
of the Asia-Pacific region for the future of US economy, in particular the rise of
China; Chinas enhanced military capabilities as well as its assertive behaviour in
the maritime domain; the end of military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan: and
efforts towards reducing the US federal budget, in particular the defence budget.
26
Later, then US National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon, in a significant
speech on The United States and the Asia Pacific in 2013 at the Asia Society
on March 11, 2013 stated: To pursue this vision, the United States is
implementing a comprehensive, multidimensional strategy: strengthening
alliances; deepening partnerships with emerging powers; building a stable,
productive, and constructive relationship with China; empowering regional
institutions; and helping to build a regional economic architecture that can sustain
shared prosperity. These are the pillars of the U.S. strategy, and rebalancing means
devoting the time, effort and resources necessary to get each one right.
27
During
this speech, Donilon clarified: Heres what rebalancing does not mean. It doesnt
mean diminishing ties to important partners in any other region. It does not
mean containing China or seeking to dictate terms to Asia. And it isnt just a
matter of our military presence. It is an effort that harnesses all elements of US
powermilitary, political, trade and investment, development and our values.
28
On June 1, 2013, the US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel while delivering
his address during the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore stated: America and
other nations of the Asia-Pacific must continue to strengthen existing alliances,
forge new partnerships, and build coalitions based on common interests to ensure
this regions future is peaceful and prosperous. In support of this goal, America
is implementing a rebalance which is primarily a diplomatic, economic and
cultural strategy.
29
In his remarks, Hagel acknowledged that as the US
implements this strategy, the US Department of Defense will have lesser resources
as compare to the past. Meanwhile, he pointed out that it is always a matter of
the wise, judicious and strategic use of those resources that matters the most and
has the most lasting impact.
30
Reactions by the Major Asia-Pacific Nations on the US
Rebalancing Strategy
There have been varied reactions on the US policy of rebalancing policy among
the Asia-Pacific nations.
22
China has been viewing this strategy as a comprehensive attempt to prevent
its rise. As the United States increases its military engagements with enhanced
alliances and partnerships in the region, China is concerned about it.
31
Similarly,
as the United States pushes forward the Trans-Pacific Partnership in the Asia-
Pacific region, China is viewing it as an attempt to balance its efforts to enhance
its ties with ASEAN states as well as to integrate economies of this region through
establishment of a mechanism for regional economic cooperation.
32
In this regard,
a Peoples Daily editorial in early 2012 titled Obama, Not Afraid of Breaking
Your Back Pivoting to Asia? pointed out that as China emerges on world stage
the United States would not like to lose its number one position in the existing
international order in general and in the Asia-Pacific region in particular.
33
However, Japan has welcomed this US shift towards the Asia-Pacific region.
The announcement by the US that it would rotate marines through Darwin in
northern Australia was welcomed by Japan.
34
Similarly, Australia has welcomed
this US policy. The US and Australia, in November 2011, announced the Force
Posture Initiatives, which were aimed at enhancing access of the US to the bases
and facilities in Australia.
35
Meanwhile, it would be worth noting that Japan has
been engaged in enhancing its ties with South Korea, Philippines and Australia.
36
In view of increased volatile situation in the maritime domain in East Asian
region, Japan, South Korea and the United States are willing to establish closer
cooperation with each other.
37
It may be noted that Japan has been expressing its
concerns about Chinas long-term intentions.
38
South Korea has expressed it
support for the US rebalancing strategy.
39
In the Southeast Asian region, this
new US strategy has been welcomed by most of the ASEAN members as these
states have been viewing it as a preventive tool vis--vis China and its rising
military assertiveness.
40
However, some nations have voiced caution or concern
over how China might respond to these strategic moves by the US. In his initial
comment about this strategy, the Indonesian Foreign Minister pointed about the
danger of a vicious cycle of tensions and mistrust in the region as an implication
of this strategic move by the United States.
41
The Malaysian Prime Minister
expressed concern about the likelihood of increased tensions in the region.
42
Cambodia appears to be aligning itself with Chinese positions.
43
Despite these concerns, remarks made by Lee Hsien Loong, the Prime
Minister of Singapore during an interview at the World Economic Forum in
Davos on February 6, 2012 welcomed the enhanced US engagements with the
Asia-Pacific region. According to Loong, the influence of the United States on
East Asia has been benign and for the long term. Loong welcomed the US
engagement with the region despite recognising the fact that China is worried
about US intensions. At the same time, he expressed hope that this new policy
of the United States to Asia Pacific region shall continue for long period of time.
44
Therefore, regional dynamics will be significant in determining the outcome
of this US rebalancing policy.
23
Implications for India
The United States has been considering Indias role in this rebalancing strategy
as critical. In this regard, the US strategic guidance document stated: The United
States is also investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support
its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the
broader Indian Ocean region.
45
India appears to have been carefully and deeply
observing various developments regarding the US rebalancing strategy towards
Asia Pacific while keeping its national interests at the core of its considerations.
Indias Defence Minister A K Antony, during his meeting with then US Secretary
of Defence Leon Panetta in New Delhi in June 2012, indicated the need for
strengthening multilateral security architecture in the Asia Pacific, but also pointed
out that it should be undertaken at a pace comfortable to all the countries
concerned.
46
Meanwhile, on February 5, 2013, welcoming this enhanced US engagement
processes with the Asia Pacific region, the then Indias Ambassador to the United
States Nirupama Rao while delivering an address on Americas Asian Pivot:
The View from India at the Brown-India Initiative Seminar Series in Rhode
Island on February 5, 2013 stated: Indias vision is to create a web of inter-
linkages for our shared prosperity and security. We want the Indian Ocean and
Asia-Pacific regions to develop into a zone of cooperation rather than one of
competition and domination. We would like to work for an open, inclusive and
transparent architecture of regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, where
all major powers in Asia and beyond work together to address the traditional and
non-traditional challenges and to create a basis for a stable and prosperous Asia.
These are the challenges that cut across national boundaries and require cooperative
responses. Based on this vision, we welcome the U.S. engagement in the Asia of
the Indo-Pacific. The continuance of economic growth and prosperity in both
our countries is in many ways linked to the opportunities for growth and prosperity
in this region. It is a space that impacts our destinies, whose security and prosperity
is vital to both of us, and where we have an increasing convergence of interests.
We believe that India and the United States are stakeholders in the creation of
an inclusive, participatory network of interdependence, cooperative trade,
economic development, security and stability in the Asia of the Indo-Pacific.
47
The India-US joint statement released after the third summit meeting between
the US President Obama and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Washington
DC on September 27, 2013 noted: Consistent with the U.S. rebalance to Asia
and Indias Look East policy, the Leaders expressed a desire to partner more closely
with other Asia-Pacific countries, including greater coordination with Japan, China
and ASEAN, among others, including through the evolving institutional
architecture of the region. The Leaders share a commitment to support regional
multilateral institutions as they continue to develop into effective bodies built on
international rules and norms that can address shared challenges.
48
24
As the new strategic scenarios unfold in the Asia -Pacific region, it may be
suggested that India must continue building and strengthening its national
capabilities and securing its national interests while moving towards engaging
with other nations in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. It would be essential
for India to maintain a balanced position and posture with regards to its responses
to this US rebalancing strategy. India should refrain from giving its responses in
reaction to any policy pronouncements and should avoid itself putting into
conflicting situations in the Asia-Pacific region. Ultimately, it is Indias national
interest which must guide Indias engagements in the Asia-Pacific region and
same approach may be applied with regard to other regions as well. India-US
strategic partnership has been constantly growing over the years despite facing
occasional challenges. Meanwhile, it would be essential to ensure that no third
country should perceive this partnership as a challenge or threat to itself. Therefore,
it would be essential for India to constantly work on maintaining and enhancing
friendly relationship with China based on mutual trust and mutual interests. As
US further enhances its engagement processes in the Asia Pacific region, there
may be increased efforts by the US to establish closer cooperation with India
which includes defence cooperation. In this regard, it would be worth suggesting
that Indias decision to any such proposal for closer cooperation by the US should
be guided by its own national interests and deeper considerations of current
geostrategic realities as well as in pursuance of the vision for establishing an
environment for sustained peace, stability, growth and prosperity in the region.
49
It would be essential for India to evolve a long-term strategy to utilize various
opportunities which are arising in the Asia-Pacific region while at the same time,
it would also be essential to deeply consider security related challenges as well.
Several political, economic, security as well as socio-cultural factors have made
the Asia-Pacific area a highly dynamic region which include the rise of China,
the United States rebalancing strategy, efforts being made to evolve a regional
security architecture, recurring tense situations in South China Sea and East
China Sea and on the Korean peninsula, the growing significance of the Indian
Ocean region and maritime related issues as well as the emergence of various
issues related non-traditional security.
50
In view of rising China, India and other nations of the Asia-Pacific region,
the United States appears to be forging closer partnership with India to ensure
its strategic influence in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, the US is
making efforts to forge closer relations with other nations in South Asia and
South East Asia. The United States is constantly making efforts to strengthen its
existing ties with its traditional allies like Japan and South Korea, Philippines
and Australia. Meanwhile, it would worth considering that despite having a sense
of competition between United States and China, both the sides have been making
attempts to forge a better relationship considering their mutual economic interests
as well as to imperatives to maintain peace and stability in the region.
51
25
With the implementation of US rebalancing strategy in the Asia-pacific region,
there is likelihood of occurrences of tense situations from time to time however
it is unlikely that this would lead to a conflict between major powers in the
region. Chinas connectedness with the world economy and the existence of nuclear
weapons are some of the major factors which would prevent any friction to escalate
into bigger conflict. But it is likely that Asia-Pacific region would be a zone of
contestation particularly between the United States and China. It may be suggested
that in view of emerging strategic scenario in the Asia-Pacific region, it would be
essential to enhance the levels of communication mechanisms between the major
powers in the regions and in particular between United States and China. An
enhanced level of communication mechanism will help in perception management
between major powers in the region which will ultimately help in peacefully
dealing with various issues as and when they arise in times ahead.
In the overall analysis, the success of US rebalancing strategy would ultimately
be determined by factors such as higher levels of US economic growth, its enhanced
levels of capability building processes, and its success in forging deeper cooperative
relationships with nations the Asia-Pacific region. These are some key factors
which are likely to determine the power and strategic influence of the United
States in the Asia-Pacific in years and decades ahead. Realising these imperatives,
the second Obama administration appears to be deeply focussed on enhancing
internal strengths of the United States, i.e. economic growth and national capability
building processes in key sectors such as health, education, defence and
infrastructure etc.
52
At the same time, Obama administration appears to be
making consistent efforts in establishing deeper relationships with various nations
of the Asia-Pacific region which include China. India has also been making
sustained efforts in achieving higher economic growth and strengthening and
enhancing capability building processes in critical sectors such as health, education,
infrastructure, research and development etc. In view of strategic partnership
between India and the United States based on shared values and shared interests
53
and as they remain engaged in their nation building processes, it may be suggested
that India and the United States must closely cooperate and collaborate with
each other in enhancing their key capabilities in various key sectors. Enhanced
levels of their internal strengths would certainly help both India and the United
States in efficiently utilizing various opportunities as well as successfully dealing
with various challenges in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
26
NOTES
1. Hillary Clinton, Americas Pacific Century, Foreign Policy, November 2011, at http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century?page=full (Accessed
March 20, 2013).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Obama Calls Himself Americas First Pacific President & Hails Expanded US Engagement
in Asia, Daily News, November 14, 2009, at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/
obama-calls-america-pacific-president-hails-expanded-engagement-asia-article-1.414495.
(Accessed September 9, 2012).
5. Rebalancing Americas Ties to Asia: An Assessment of the Obama Initiative, at http://
carnegieendowment.org/files/120611_transcript_RebalancingAsiaTies.pdf (Accessed April 21,
2013).
6. Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament, The White House, November
17, 2011, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-
obama -australian-parliament (Accessed September 16, 2012).
7. Sanjeev K Shrivastav, US Rebalancing Strategy towards Asia-Pacific: Understanding Reasons
and Implications, in S D Muni and Vivek Chadha (eds.), Asian Strategic Review, Pentagon
Press, 2013, p.215-226.
APPENDIX
Figure 1: Map of the Asia-Pacific Region
54
27
8. Americas Pacific President? Obama Opens First Post-Election Trip with Visit to Thailand,
NBC News, November 18, 2012, at http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news /2012/11/18/
152525 70-americas-pacificpresident-obama-opens-first-post-election-trip-with-visit-to-
thailand?lite. (Accessed November 20, 2013).
9. Asia Trip to Refocus on the Most Rapidly Growing Region: US, The Hindu, November
10, 2012, at http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/asia-trip-to-refocus-on-the-most-
rapidly-growing-region-us/article4084441.ece. (Accessed December 20, 2013).
10. Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, 2005, at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/
downloads/trade-agreement/transpacific/main-agreement.pdf. (Accessed December 1, 2012).
11. On-going Negotiations at a Glance: Singapore Government, at http://www.fta.gov.sg/
fta_ongoingneg_tpp.asp?hl=16 (Accessed December 15, 2012).
12. Trans-Pacific Partnership Leaders Statement Office of the United States Trade Representative,
November 12, 2011 available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/
november/trans-pacific-partnership-leaders-statement
13. Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, National Intelligence Council, December 2012,
at http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/global_trends_2030.pdf. (Accessed March 31, 2013).
14. See, note 7.
15. Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2011, United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), at http://www.unescap.org/stat/data/
syb2011/I-People/Population.asp. (Accessed April 5, 2013).
16. See, note 7.
17. Dr. Arvind Gupta, Chinese ADIZ in East China Sea: Posers for India, IDSA Comment,
December 2, 2013, at http://idsa.in/system/files/agupta_021213.pdf. (Accessed December
20, 2013).
18. S D Muni, Rebalancing-Obama 2.0: Indias Democratic Differential, ISAS Insight, 191,
November 26, 2012, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, at
http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISASInsight_191-Rebalancing
-Obama_2.0_26112012164407.pdf. (Accessed March 31, 2013).
19. See note 7.
20. Ibid.
21. US DoD Strategic Guidance Document, US DoD, January 3, 2012.
22. In Brief: Assessing DODs New Strategic Guidance, Congressional Service Report, January
2012.
23. Partners in the 21st Century, Address by Leon E. Panetta, Defence Secretary, US on June
6, 2012, at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, at http://idsa.in/
keyspeeches/LeonEPanettaonPartnersinthe21stcentury. (Accessed January 6, 2013).
24. The US Rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific, Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defence, US, at
the 11th IISS Asian Security Summit - the Shangri-la Dialogue, June 2, 2012, at http://
www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2012/speeches/first-
plenary-session/leon-panetta/. (Accessed February 12, 2013).
25. Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administrations Rebalancing towards Asia, The
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, March 28, 2013, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/natsec/R42448.pdf (Accessed September 16, 2013).
26. Ibid.
27. The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013, Remarks By Tom Donilon, National
Security Advisor to the President, The Asia Society, New York, March 11, 2013, at http:
//www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-
advisory-president-united-states-a. (Accessed November 18, 2013).
28. Ibid.
29. Remarks by Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel, Shangri-La Dialogue, International Institute
for Strategic Studies, Singapore, June 01, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid=1785 (Accessed December 14, 2013).
30. Ibid.
31. Yun Sun, March West: Chinas Response to the U.S. Rebalancing, Brookings, January 31,
2013 available at http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/01/31-china-us-sun
(Accessed March 31, 2013).
28
32. Ibid.
33. Wen Liu, From Pivot to Rebalance: The Weight of Words in U.S. Asia Policy, ContextChina,
available at http://contextchina.com/2013/03/from-pivot-to-rebalance-the-weight-of-words-
in-u-s-asia-policy/ (Accessed December 9, 2013).
34. Richard C. Bush III, The Response of Chinas Neighbors to the U.S. Pivot to Asia,
Brookings, January 31, 2012 available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2012/
01/31-us-pivot-bush (Accessed March 2, 2012).
35. David J. Berteau and Michael J. Green, U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific
Region: An Independent Assessment, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August
2012 available at http://csis.org/files/publication/120814_FINAL_PACOM_optimized.pdf
(Accessed October 20, 2012).
36. Executive Summary: East Asian Strategic Review 2013 available at http://www.iadb.org/
intal/intalcdi/PE/2013/12520.pdf (Accessed October 2, 2013).
37. John Harpar, SECURITY FOCUS: U.S. military pivot will have little effect on Japan,
South Korea, The Aashi Shimbun, April 26, 2012 available at http://ajw.asahi.com/article/
behind_news/politics/AJ201204260090 (Accessed on May 25, 2012).
38. Takao Kawakami,The Obama Administrations Security Strategy and the Japan-US Alliance,
World Security Network, November 20, 2010 available at http://www.worldsecuritynet
work.com/United-States-Japan/Kawakami-Takao/The-Obama-Administrations-Security-
Strategy-and-the-Japan-US-Alliance (Accessed September 10, 2011).
39. See note 34.
40. Chapter 6: Southeast Asia: ASEAN and Greater US Engagement, East Asian Strategic Review
2013, available at http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/pdf/2013/east-
asian_e2013_06.pdf (Accessed on September 21, 2012).
41. Indonesia fears US marines will bring tensions and mistrust to region, ABC News, November
17, 2011 available at http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2011/s3368518.htm (Accessed on
October 20, 2011).
42. See, No. 25.
43. Ibid.
44. See note 34.
45. Ibid.
46. India and US Hold Defence Talks Asia-Pacific Countries Should Settle Bilateral Disputes
as Per International Law: Antony, Press Information Bureau (PIB), June 6, 2012, at http:/
/pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=84715. (Accessed September 1, 2013).
47. Americas Asian Pivot: the View from India, Remarks by Ambassador Nirupama Rao, at
the opening seminar of the Spring 2013 Brown-India Initiative Seminar Series, February
5, 2013, Embassy of India, Washington D.C., at http://www.indianembassy.org/prdetail2097/
remarks-by-ambassador-nirupama-rao-on-andquot%3Bamericaandrsquo%3Bs-andlsquo%3B
asian-pivotandrsquo%3B%3A-the-view-from-india%2Candquot%3B-at-the-opening-
seminar -of-the-spring-2013-brown-india-initiative-seminar-series (Accessed on February 6,
2013).
48. U.S.-India Joint Statement, The White House, September 27, 2013 available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/27/us-india-joint-statement (Accessed October
20, 2013).
49. See, note 7
50. Indias approach to the Asia Pacific, Seminar with Dr. Arvind Gupta, Director General,
IDSA, PRIO, August 8, 2013 available at http://www.prio.no/News/Item/?x=1757 (Accessed
September 4, 2013).
51. See, no. 7.
52. Ibid.
53. Sanjeev K Shrivastav, Inherent Values and Substance Bind India and the United States,
IDSA Comment, August 24, 2010 at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Inherentvalues
andsubstancebindIndiaandtheUnitedStates_skshrivastava_240810. (Accessed March 2, 2012).
54. Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administrations Rebalancing towards Asia, The
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, March 28, 2013, no. 25, p.3.
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS
OF US REBALANCING
3
Military Implications of the
US Rebalancing Strategy
Vivek Chadha
Introduction
The US rebalance or the pivot to the Asia-Pacific is not merely a military move
aimed at readjusting the deployment of platforms in light of the withdrawal from
Iraq and drawdown from Afghanistan. It is the fulcrum of the US efforts to
retain its economic growth, strategic influence and competitive edge in all spheres.
It is also about the often unsaid China factora factor that has the potential to
impact every domain of undeniable US leadership.
It would be an overstatement to classify the rebalance as a paradigm shift in
the US strategy for the region. The US has been and is likely to remain a Pacific
power in the foreseeable future. In the past, the pillars of its association with the
region have been similar to the ones proposed. Since the beginning of the Cold
War, the US has remained a pre-eminent power in the Asia-Pacific, through its
economic and military strength and network of alliances with countries like Japan,
South Korea and Australia. It has also maintained a substantial forward presence
in Japan and South Korea. This coupled with a generational lead in military
technology has kept the US ahead of its rivals. It is through these salient pillars
of its strategy that the US has maintained a favourable environment in the Asia-
Pacific region.
It therefore emerges that the pivot or rebalance is not entirely a fresh
perspective, nor is it aimed at achieving anything substantially different. It does,
however, reinforce the importance of the region, in light of the emergence of
China as the greatest threat to US supremacy and a desire to move away from
nation building, which was a by-product of the war on terror. Rebalancing rather
than being a new strategy can be described as a readjustment of priorities and
focus, backed by military capability. This capability will mirror the policy through
asset reallocation both between theatres and within the Asia-Pacific.
32
In addition to the China factor, the readjustment is likely to be impacted for
the first time in the last five decades by the cloud of severe budgetary constraints.
When these two factors are viewed in concert, the challenges posed become evident.
China is emerging as the largest trading partner in the area of focus of the pivot.
1
Its strategic influence is on the rise and it is competing with the US in all spheres
for leadership, including military modernisation. Simultaneously, the US Armed
Forces are threatened by a $ 500 billion budget cut over the next decade. Therefore,
the rebalance should be seen as a larger strategy of the US to maintain its slipping
position as the strategic prime mover in the Asia-Pacific and by co-relation the
world. In doing so, it will deter the ability of China to disturb the regional status
quo within the financial constraints of depleting financial outlays. This will
demand of the US both ingenuity and resilient partnerships for it to remain a
pre-eminent power in the region.
The US is likely to pursue this goal through the following objectives:
Establish a military posture, which has both deterrence and punitive
capability in the region within its reducing means.
Maintain a generational lead in military technology over China, to achieve
its strategic objectives.
Create and strengthen a network of allies and partners, who have vested
interests in building their economies in an environment of peace and
security.
Strike a balance between credibility of alliances with partner countries in
the region and simultaneously discourage any temptation on their part to
use this as a leverage for escalating military tensions in bilateral disputes.
The paper briefly traces the trajectory of events leading to the announcement
of rebalance by the US. It further analyses the factors that have forced a more
proactive and vocal enunciation of the policy. This is followed up by a focus on
the military shift as a result of the rebalance strategy, its implications and finally
the impact of sequestration.
Events Leading to the US Rebalance
The US Pivot to the Asia-Pacific or the rebalancing, as it was subsequently
christened, was a shift waiting to happen after the end of the Cold War. With
the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the US as the pre-
eminent power, the strategic significance of both Europe and the Atlantic
diminished. This intervening period witnessed the US in a state of strategic stall,
with the absence of a potential adversary, which could challenge the brief phase
of unipolarity in world politics. Referring to this period, Condoleezza Rice, wrote:
That we did not know how to think about what follows the US-Soviet
confrontation is clear from the continued references to the post Cold-War
period.
2
It was not until the rise of China was finally acknowledged as a threat
to US influence in the world in general and the Asia-Pacific region in particular
Military Implications of the US Rebalancing Strategy
33
that the need for a shift was realised. Rice identifying the threat from China
wrote in the year 2000: What we do know is that China is a great power with
unresolved vital interests, particularly concerning Taiwan and the South China
Sea. China resents the role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. This
means that China is not a status-quo power but one that would like to alter
Asias balance of power in its favor [sic].
3
However, the open admission of a definitive threat from China during the
initial years of the Bush administrations first tenure in the White House faded
after the launch of the war on terror. The shift in focus towards terrorism led
to a softening of US focus on China, given the need for wide ranging cooperation
against a common threat and the inability to focus militarily on two major fronts.
Thus, despite the threat perceptions enunciated by senior officials in the Bush
administration, the pivot did happen, but it tuned towards Iraq and Afghanistan.
This preoccupation with the war on terrorism and a simultaneous economic
slowdown, opened a window of opportunity for China to enlarge its area of
influence. Its core interests increased in rapid succession from Taiwan to Tibet
and then the South and East China Seas
4
, bringing into focus the disputes with
Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia.
5
Chinese activism raised concerns amongst the US allies and partners about
the ability and lack of will of the sole superpower to assert its influence in the
region. This was reinforced after the slowdown of the US and European economy
in 2008. Joseph S. Nye felt that this very assessment led to an increase in Chinese
activism and a desire to take a more proactive stance in the South China Sea
dispute.
6
The withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq and the impending drawdown
from Afghanistan facilitated the desire to correct the imbalance that had crept in
over a decade of intense involvement in the region. In an address to the Australian
Parliament at Canberra on November 17, 2011, President Barack Obama
announced the necessary recalibration of US focus. He emphasised the
determination of the US to remain a key player in the Pacific region. Our new
focus on this region reflects a fundamental truththe United States has been,
and always will be, a Pacific nation.
7
He also went on to reinforce his intent for
the consumption of US allies and potential adversaries: The United States is a
Pacific Power and we are here to stay.
8
Reflecting on this strategic direction, the US clearly signalled its intent to
enlarge its role in the region in concert with its allies and partners.
9
The
amplification of this intent aimed at ensuring security in the region,
international order, which would guarantee the rights of countries and adherence
to international law, thereby safeguarding freedom of navigation.
The specific contours of the US rebalance from the overall strategic perspective
were outlined by the former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton when she said:
Our work will proceed along six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral
security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers,
34
including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding
trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing
democracy and human rights.
10
Factors Influencing US Rebalancing
The strategic guidance laid down by the Department of Defense outlines the
shifting contours of priorities for the US. It aims at a smaller footprint while
countering terrorism through surgical strikes, maintaining presence and influence
to shape events in the Middle East, reducing presence in Europe, Africa and
Latin America and providing an impetus to its presence and focus on the Asia-
Pacific.
11
Amongst the areas of interest outlined, the Asia-Pacific has emerged
as a priority for the US in the foreseeable future. Given this reassessment of
interests, a rebalance of strategic focus became inevitable. The US rebalancing
has been influenced by a number of factors. This paper will consider three, as a
prelude to an assessment of its military implications.
Calibration of the US Influence in the Asia-Pacific
The visual aspect of the US rebalancing, has been the redeployment of its military
hardware, which became the focus of world attention. However, the shift is not
merely military in nature and more importantly it represents a strategic rebalance.
This includes enhancing economic ties in the region, strengthening and building
partnerships with allies and friendly countries and finally ensuring that a stable
environment can be ensured by deterring the disturbance of status quo.
12
The
US decision to join the East Asia Summit indicated its willingness to increase
its influence at the multilateral level.
13
Similarly, an impetus to bilateral ties,
with specific focus on military engagement, is also evident. This is evident through
stronger military ties with Australia, India, Japan, Singapore and other countries
of the region, as will be dealt with later in the paper. On the economic front,
the US initiative to establish a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with countries
like Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore
and Vietnam on November 12, 2011 was seen as an attempt to enhance trade,
investment and influence.
14
There is broad consensus on ensuring that the
United States plays a key role in shaping Asian economic architecture will also
affect its influence in the region.
15
This is seen in the US as the economic lever
of the pivot to the Asia-Pacific.
16
Rise of China
The feeling that the Asia-Pacific region had not received adequate attention in
the recent past was accentuated most by the rise of China. This was especially in
light of Chinas growing assertiveness as well as its enhanced capability. It is
evident from the article written by Condoleezza Rice in 2000 that China was
firmly on the US radar. However, the rapidity of its rise and growing assertiveness
was a catalyst in the ensuring shift. This assertiveness has been most pronounced
35
amongst the US partners and allies in Southeast and East Asia, who have
territorial disputes with China. The decision to include some of these disputes
as core issues by China, by implication, could lead to the use of force in case of
a showdown. Chinas state-owned Global Times in a blunt warning wrote, If
these countries dont want to change their ways with China, they will need to
prepare for the sound of cannons. We need to be ready for that, as it may be the
only way for the disputes in the sea to be resolved.
17
Chinas military capability
gives it the ability to take pre-emptive action to assert its territorial claims and
simultaneously deter US intervention. This could become an important factor
in the capacity of the US to retain its influence in the region.
Chinas ability to use force and its qualitative enhancement has been a subject
of debate in the past. However, recent advances have greatly augmented its
capability. This is increasingly becoming a cause for concern in the US. In its
assessment, the US Department of Defense (DoD) China Report for 2012, says:
Chinas approach to dealing with this challenge is manifested in a sustained
effort to develop the capability to attack, at long ranges, military forces that
might deploy and or operate within the western Pacific, which the DoD
characterizes [sic] as anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
18
Some noteworthy capability enhancements by China will provide a backdrop
for increasing US concerns in the region are:
Chinas policy of A2/AD has raised serious concerns within the US
establishment, in terms of their ability to retain the initiative in the region.
A2/AD has received a fillip through improving Chinese capability to target
both ground and seaborne targets as a result of fresh induction of weapon
systems. These provide China with the ability to interdict potential threats
in their bases and at standoff distances, thereby allowing it greater freedom
of action in its area of interest.
19
This, when seen in the perspective of
Taiwan and disputes in the South China Sea, brings into focus the concerns
of the US.
Chinas strategic deterrence will improve as a result of recent advances in
Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicle (MIRV) and
penetration aids.
20
The induction of JIN based SSBN launched nuclear capable JL-2 will give
the Chinese a range of 7,400 km, and thereby a potent sea based nuclear
capability.
21
The launch of the Luyang III class guided missile destroyers will further
enhance the capability of the previous generation, which were equipped
with phase array radars, giving capability at par with US vessels of a similar
class. This will include multipurpose vertical launch systems, capable of
launching Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM), Land Attack Cruise Missiles
(LACM), surface to air missiles and anti-submarine rockets.
22
The development and likely deployment of the fifth generation fighter
aircraft by 2018 is likely to bridge the existing capability gap in this vital
36
aspect of war fighting. This will be augmented by a long-range bomber
fleet and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to enhance surveillance and
strike capabilities.
23
Chinas doctrinal shift towards fighting in an informationalised
environment, includes the use of its cyber warriors to achieve information
dominance on the battlefield and beyond. The last few years have witnessed
a rapid rise in Chinas ability to gain access and exploit information by any
means necessary.
24
This is likely to reinforce Chinas ability to achieve A2/
AD capabilities.
The ambiguity in the no first use policy clearly enunciated by China has
raised doubts regarding its policy on the issue. This enhances the level of
threat to US assets and its partner countries in the region.
25
While there has been a reluctance to make direct references to each other by
the US and China, however, mutual discomfort between them remains clearly
evident. The China White Paper of 2013 makes an indirect reference to US
attempts to contain China. It says: Some country has strengthened its Asia-
Pacific military alliances, expanding its military presence in the region, and
frequently makes the situation there tenser...Major powers are vigorously
developing new and more sophisticated military technologies so as to ensure that
they can maintain strategic superiorities in international competition in such
areas as outer space and cyber space.
26
Therefore, the China factor was and remains a key determinant of the US
strategy in a bid to safeguard its interests in the region, given that China has
both the potential and reason to challenge the status quo maintained under the
US security umbrella.
The US rebalance strategy has also witnessed an increasingly uneasy Russia
enhance its own focus towards the region. Russia stepped up its military
cooperation with China and July 2013 witnessed Joint Sea 2013, the largest
joint naval exercise between the two countries.
27
The competition in the region
has also forced Russia to increase its engagement in spheres beyond military.
This includes energy supply to China in a mutually beneficial situation.
28
Pull-out and Drawdown
The pull-out from Iraq and the drawdown from Afghanistan is likely to release
forces, which will be available for deployment elsewhere.
29
Given the shift in
focus towards the Asia-Pacific, this surplus is likely to find its way into the region.
The large financial allocations for countering insurgency in the past, could also
find its way into conventional forays in priority areas like the Asia-Pacific. This
could potentially release funds, which will not only offset budgetary constraints
as a result of sequestration but also provide the additional outlay for force accretion
and modernisation. However, there are contradictory views on the subject, which
will be analysed later in the paper.
A concerted decision was taken to move away from stability operations, which
37
were manpower and resource intensive.
30
These, as events of the past decade
indicate, took place in the Middle East and Afghanistan. The decision has been
supported by a strategic shift, which focuses more on the strategy to operate
forward, and provides offshore options to deter aggression, influence events
abroad, and win conflicts in an era of uncertainty.
31
Military Implications of Rebalance
The military rebalancing was outlined by the US Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta. He indicated that the US Military assets would be shared in a ratio of
60:40 between the Pacific and the Atlantic theatres. This was a departure from
the existing 50:50 ratio. However, the US rebalancing effort is not merely a
reflection of military numbers.
The US strategy to implement the rebalance from the military perspective
follows a long term approach. This is evident from recent policy statements and
actions initiated to build upon the existing capabilities in the region.
The US announced its determination to ensure peace and stability in the
region. This aspect indicates strengthening of security parameters at different
levels. First, the US wanted to maintain the salience of accepted guidelines in the
region, which govern the approach of individual countries in an international
environment. This has been emphasised by reinforcing the need to play by rules,
norms and order.
32
There is little doubt about the US intentions to caution
China through these repeated messages, given its growing concerns as also of a
number of Southeast and East Asian countries about Chinas assertiveness. Second,
it was also aimed at allying the concerns of partners and allies, which had
increasingly started doubting the willingness of the US to support them, if China
decided to flex its military muscle.
With China as the most obvious competitor for the US and its allies in the
Asia-Pacific, indicators suggest that the US has a three-pronged strategy, which
will guide its rebalance in the region. The first stage is likely to witness attempts
to integrate China into the regional dynamics. This would imply elevation of
China as a stakeholder with added responsibility and accountability. It would
also demand greater transparency. Bilateral and regional disputes would be
addressed through negotiation rather than change in status quo by use of force.
This may be accompanied by bilateral and multilateral military engagement to
build trust and confidence between both countries. The US decision to invite
China for the 2014 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise is a step in the
direction.
33
The second stage involves proactive deterrence through a network of
alliances and partnerships. It also includes deployment of forces and military
assets with the aim of addressing principle concerns like freedom of navigation
through international waters, deterring change of status quo on the basis of
proactive military action by China and North Korea and security to trade and
energy supplies. The third stage involves building capacities for operational
superiority in the eventuality of a conflict. This will be ensured by strengthening
38
defensive capability against envisaged threats, which include long range missiles,
submarines and cyberattacks, as also amphibious assaults on disputed territories.
The offensive capacity will aim to defeat the A2/AD capabilities of China, to
include breaching the defensive network, countering fast improving electronic
warfare capabilities, cyber threats, air defence systems, Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance (ISR) networks in order to achieve battlefield superiority.
While these options are listed as three different stages, action for all options is
likely to progress simultaneously.
The US Deputy Secretary of State Ashton B. Carter, without referring to
any specific threats, gives indication of a four-pronged strategy. This includes
changes in presence and posture, investments, innovations in operational planning
and building alliances and partnerships.
34
If these are analysed from the perspective
of a possible threat from China, it reinforces the argument of integration, proactive
deterrence and operational superiority as a basis of the US approach to an emerging
China in the Asia-Pacific region.
Presence and Posture
The presence of US forces as envisaged emphasises the physical aspect of the
rebalance since it is the easiest to translate into military terms. The redeployment
is as much a reflection of increased force levels in the Asia-Pacific, as it is of the
nature of deployment envisaged. The posturing indicates both evidence of
reshuffling of forces within the region and improving their efficiency to undertake
responsibilities they are best suited for.
The first aspect which has facilitated the rebalance is a more efficient
employment of assets by the US. In the past, a large quantum of military hardware
was employed on duties it was not designed for, resulting in inefficiency. As an
example, naval vessels like destroyers and amphibious ships were deployed for
humanitarian duties. This will be reversed by allocating Joint High Speed Vessels
(JHSV) and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) instead for such duties.
35
Second, the
concept of forward basing has also been strengthened. This will lead to limiting
the earlier practice of repeated to and from shuttling movement of ships from the
US mainland. The assets relieved as a result will be available for alternate
deployment. Forward deployment would be augmented with specialist naval assets
like the JHSVs and LCSs. Singapore is one of the countries which will witness
the forward location of LCSs.
The US Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan W. Greenert elaborates on the
concept of forward deployment, which is one of the three tenets of the navys
overall approach.
36
He argues that forward deployment will deter aggression,
influence events beyond the US shores and better deal with uncertainty. This
deployment is centred on bases provided by allies like Japan and South Korea
and places leased by partner countries like Singapore. In addition to the
advantages of a forward presence, the policy also helps retain initiative and
maintains presence at global hot spots, which would have otherwise required the
39
maintenance of large standing fleets. This is also one of the measures undertaken
for cost-cutting, as a result of sequestration.
Even as the US plans for deployment around its traditional bases in the
region, with a degree of readjustment, the possibility of local resentment against
these, as has happened in the past cannot be ruled out. While the concept of
rotation of troops can partially address this limitation, however, contingencies to
further reduce permanent presence could be seen in future.
37
This could have an
impact on the deployment of troops, air assets as well as missile defence platforms.
The US Navy has 285 ships at present and these are likely to go up to 300
by 2019.
38
This will be augmented by forward deployment of assets in the Asia-
Pacific region. Presently, the US Navy has approximately 50 ships deployed in
the region on any given day. These operate from its bases in Japan, South Korea,
Guam and Singapore. Of these 50 per cent are part of its policy of Forward
Deployed Naval Force (FDNF). This includes the carrier USS George Washington,
nine cruisers and destroyers, four amphibious ships and three SSNs.
39
The redeployment of naval assets will be supported by relocation of troops
in the region. The decision to rotate 2500 marines in Australia over six years and
increase the presence of ships and aircrafts, is one of the major changes that have
brought about.
40
Similarly, stepping up of ties with Singapore, the Philippines,
Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia has witnessed an impetus in the
recent past. While the US decided to rotate four LCS progressively into the future
in Singapore, Philippines is likely to witness enhancement in the rotational policy,
along with efforts to improve the capacity of its armed forces.
41
A summary of
changes in deployment that are likely to take place are listed as follows (Table 1):
42
Table 1: Deployment Changes in the US Military Forces
US Mil Mil Platform Present New Remarks
Component Deployment Location
US Navy EP-3 Signals Afghanistan PACOM Move completed.
Reconnaissance Unspecified numbers
Aircraft
Firescout Unmanned Afghanistan PACOM Unspecified numbers
Vehicle
Electronic Surveillance
Aircraft Afghanistan PACOM Unspecified numbers
P-3 Maritime Middle East PACOM Unspecified numbers
Surveillance Aircraft
4th Forward Deployed Guam 2015
Naval Force SSN
Two guided missile Western Threat from N Korea
destroyers Pacific (moved)
Six destroyers Rota, Spain Asia-Pacific From 10 in rotation to
4 at Rota, Spain
40
Destroyers and Used for Asia-Pacific Number not specified.
amphibious ships HADR Replaced by Joint High
Speed Vessels and Littoral
Combat Ships
Mobile Landing To increase forward
Platforms, Afloat presence, with troops in
Forward Staging rotation. Will offset
Ships, JHSV, LSC reductions due to budget
Air Force 14 ground based Alaska Against threat from
interceptors N Korea (moved)
TYP 2 Radar Japan Threat from N Korea
(planned)
Terminal High Guam Ballistic missile defense
Altitude Area system against N Korea
Defense System
B-1 aircraft Afghanistan Asia-Pacific
B-2 aircraft Afghanistan Asia-Pacific
MV-22 Osprey Japan
Army Troops Afghanistan Asia-Pacific Strength of 60,000 will be
maintained, some of which
was earlier with
CENTCOM
22,500 troops South Korea South Korea No cut as a result of
sequestration
Marines 18,000 Asia Pacific Asia-Pacific Will remain based out of
Iwakuni, Okinawa, Darwin
and Hawaii
Military Guam Infrastructure development
Infra- as strategic hub
structure
Marianas, Saipan, Infrastructure development
Tinian
The above data provides certain clear indicators regarding the rebalance
envisaged for the US forces. A brief summation of the same reinforces the
following:
First, it is evident that there is indeed a shift which is taking place in terms
of US military assets. However, it is also clear that this is likely to be
facilitated in large measure by the withdrawal and drawdown in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Even as assets are planned to be transferred from these theatres,
their final move will be contingent upon the residual military assets required
US Mil Mil Platform Present New Remarks
Component Deployment Location
41
in the region and second, their battle worthiness after a decade of intensive
deployment.
Second, the shift is also accompanied by an intra-Asia-Pacific rebalance.
This will entail a larger presence of assets in Guam, Australia, Philippines
and Singapore, thereby spreading them in proximity of potential hot spots.
Third, core military assets like cruisers and destroyers will be relieved by
non-traditional security assets like littoral combat ships. This will enhance
the conventional war fighting capability of the US and simultaneously
enhance its footprint against sub-conventional threats and in pursuance of
humanitarian initiatives.
Fourth, the rebalance will be facilitated by a forward posture that will increase
efficiency, cut costs and maintain presence in critical areas of interest of
the US.
Investments
The US rebalancing is likely to receive an impetus as a result of technologies
and inductions, which will facilitate achievement of region specific objectives.
This will include the Virginia class submarines and modules for cruise missiles.
This nuclear powered deep ocean submarine has anti-submarine and shallow
littoral capability.
43
The P-8 Maritime Surveillance Aircraft and MH-60 anti-
submarine helicopters will further enhance the ability to counter envisaged
submarine based threats. The surveillance and electronic warfare capability will
be increased through the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance sensors on board
the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles and EA-18G electronic aircraft with
strong jamming capability. The US Air force will deploy its fifth generation aircraft
in the region to ensure capability accretion. The Army will improve upon the
ballistic missile defence capability, with the initial deployments already having
begun. The forces will enhance their cyber capabilities, given the increasing
importance of the same in recent times. The decision to build upon the capacity
of Guam as a strategic base, as also in Marianas, Saipan and Tinian will be a
part of infrastructure development in the region.
Partnerships
The US derives strength in the Asia Pacific region through its network of allies
and partners. Though the alliances have a Cold War history, yet their relevance
has been reinforced in the recent past. These have also been augmented through
partnerships, which aim at cooperation for common interests and concerns. A
summary of the same is given as follows (Table 2).
Impact of Sequestration on Rebalance
The announcement of the rebalance was almost simultaneously accompanied
by warning signs of deep cuts in US defence expenditure. Available indicators
suggest a negative impact of cost-cutting on defence preparedness and the very
effectiveness of rebalance as envisaged.
42
Table 2: Major US Alliances and Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific
44
Country/ Nature of Numbers Military Relationship
Grouping partnership deployed
Australia Ally Existing193. Contributed to conflict in Afghanistan.
Will increase to Bilateral exercise: Talisman Saber.
2500 on rotation
Japan Ally 36,763 Key ally in region.
Largest troop location in Asia Pacific.
Joint exercise: Keen Sword and Keen Edge.
South Korea Ally Approx. 28,500 Approx. 28,500 soldiers deployed.
Thailand Ally 139 Joint exercise: Cobra Gold.
Philippines Ally 162 Increase in rotational presence envisaged.
Joint exercise: Balikatan.
Vietnam Partnership 21 Increasing defence cooperation.
Singapore Partnership 150 US employs air and port facilities.
Four LCS will be deployed.
Taiwan Partnership ? Largest contributor of arms to Taiwan.
Helps maintain status quo.
New Zealand Partnership 12 Washington Declaration will enhance
security cooperation.
Indonesia Partnership 28 Increase in defence cooperation.
140 exercises conducted in 2011.
India Partnership 33 Key provider of arms and technology.
Substantial increase in defence cooperation
in recent past. A variety of exercises like
annual Malabar series, Shatrujeet, Cope
Thunder, Yudh Abhyas. Defence sales to
India more than $ 8 billion.
Myanmar Partnership Military to military relations have
commenced.
With President Obama signing the Sequester Bill, March 2013 brought home
the full impact of budget cuts, especially for the US defence forces. The new law
could result in cuts to the tune of $ 500 billion over the next decade.
45
Despite
the obvious impact of budget cuts, there have been categorical statements
reinforcing the determination of the administration to go ahead with the rebalance
and protect it from the negative fallout of sequestration. Speaking at Seoul, Ashton
Carter said: In the United States, our commitment to the alliance is part of our
Asia-Pacific rebalance and we will ensure that all the pieces of our defense [sic]
relationship continue to move forward, and I should say this will occur despite
the budgetary pressures in the United States. The Asia-Pacific rebalance is a priority.
Its a historic priority. We have the resources to accomplish it and no matter what
happens in the budget debates that go on in the United States, our commitment
43
to the Asia-Pacific rebalance and our commitment to the United States-ROK
Alliance will remain firm.
46
However, this confidence has been belied by the concerns voiced by a number
of key functionaries both within the government and armed forces. Carter himself
in a statement before the Senate Armed Forces Committee, on February 12,
2013 outlined the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific as one of the pillars of the US
defence strategy. He went on to point out that if the plan for sequestration was
to go ahead, we (the US) will need to make substantial changes to out strategy
that will directly diminish our military strength.
47
Ash Carter suggested that
the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 will lead to a nine per cent budget cut
for the financial year 2013, adversely impacting all military activities, including
operational effectiveness.
48
He categorically informed the House Armed Forces
Committee that one of the ways our strategy would need to change is we couldnt
do what we wanted to do in the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific theatre...All that
is put in doubt and put in jeopardy if these further budgets cuts go on.
49
As per
Carter, some of the short term impacts of sequestration are as follows:
50
Most flying units will be below acceptable levels of readiness.
One-third reduction in operations of Navy ships and aircraft in the Asia-
Pacific and gaps in availability of Marine Amphibious Readiness Groups.
Sequestration could witness $ 50-55 billion reduction in annual budgets till
2021, which in turn is likely to adversely impact modernisation efforts.
51
The impact of the sequestration has already begun on individual services of
the US Armed Forces and warnings have come regarding the fallout of
sequestration on the rebalance strategy. Admiral Samuel J. Locklear said that the
budget cuts limited our flexibility to manage and have the potential to undermine
our strategic rebalance momentum.
52
Locklear described the immediate impact
as a mere 50 per cent effectiveness and the long term as an avalanche.
The US Air Force has begun grounding a third of its fleet. Air Force General
Mike Hostage said this would be done on a rotating basis.
53
The US Marine
Corps voiced similar sentiments with General Jim Amos saying that every
reduction that we make from this point forward will cut into bonewe are beyond
muscle.
54
In addition to the ongoing operations in Afghanistan, this is likely to have
an impact on future deployments in the Asia Pacific as well. Admiral Greenert
of the US Navy indicated that they had already cancelled the deployment of a
ship to the Asia-Pacific as a result of the cuts. He added, Overall, due to reduced
training and maintenance, about two-thirds of the fleet will be less than fully
mission capable and not certified for major combat operations.
55
Sequestration is also likely to dent the credibility of the US amongst its allies
and partners, especially given its focus on the war on terror during the last decade,
which saw its influence recede in the Asia-Pacific region.
44
Conclusion
The process of rebalance or the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific has started taking
shape, and it will undoubtedly remain the cornerstone of US strategy. It will
reinforce focus on the region for the forceable future. However, while this paper
focuses attention on the military aspects of the rebalance, it needs to be
emphasised that the tendency to equate economic and military strength in
figurative terms tends to confuse numbers with the ability to influence events.
US rebalancing is not as much about increasing its numbers in the region as the
desire to shape the course of events to its advantage and protection of the security
architecture created by it. For the US, besides its qualitative edge in technology
and proven military capability, the network of alliances and partnerships is the
most important factor to lead the rebalance.
On the other hand, in addition to building military capability, Chinas
inability to effectively influence events is dictated by a heavy reliance on foreign
trade, especially with Southeast and East Asia. However, the lack of allies who
can help further its desire to dominate the region is in stark contrast to the US.
What the US will lose in relative military terms to China as an individual country,
it will more than make up for it through its system of alliances and partnerships
military as well as diplomaticwhich is bound to impact its ability to influence
events. A smart-power narrative for the twenty-first century is not about
maximizing power or preserving hegemony. It is about finding ways to combine
resources in successful strategies in the new context of power diffusion and the
rise of the rest.
56
This, as the rebalancing approach suggests, will form the basis
of the US strategy for the region.
NOTES
1. Michael Auslin, Assessing the US Rebalance to Asia: Trends and Prospects for American
Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
February 7, 2013, at http://www.aei.org/files/2013/02/08/-assessing-the-us-rebalance-to-
asia_085943192571.pdf (Accessed June 06, 2013).
2. Condoleezza Rice, Campaign 2000: Promoting National Interest, Foreign Affairs, January/
February 2000, at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55630/condoleezza-rice/campaign-
2000-promoting-the-national-interest (Accessed May 23, 2013).
3. Ibid.
4. China Officially Labels Senkakus a Core Interest, The Japan Times, April 27, 2013, at
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/27/national/china-officially-labels-senkakus-a-
core-interest/#.UZxncJUbIRw (Accessed May 22, 2013).
5. Chinas Evolving Core Interests, International Herald Tribune, May 11, 2013, at http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/opinion/sunday/chinas-evolving-core-interests.html?_r=0
(Accessed May 22, 2013).
Sanjaya Baru, Indias Five Thoughts on China, Project Syndicate, March 24, 2013, at
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/india-and-china-at-the-brics-summit-by-
sanjaya-baru (Accessed May 22, 2013).
6. Joseph S. Nye, Obamas Pacific Pivot, Project Syndicate, December 6, 2011, at http://
www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/obama-s-pacific-pivot (Accessed May 22, 2013).
7. Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament, The While House, November
45
17, 2011, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-
obama-australian-parliament (Accessed May 22, 2013).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Hillary Clinton, Asias Pacific Century, Foreign Policy, November 2011, at http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century?page=0,1 (Accessed
July 08, 2013).
11. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense, pp. 1-3, US
Department of Defense, January 2012, at http://www.defense.gov/news/
Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf (Accessed May 28, 2013),.
12. Leon E Panetta, Speech at Shangri-La Security Dialogue US Department of Defense,
June 02, 2012, at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1681 (Accessed
May 30, 2013).
13. Fact Sheet: East Asia Summit Outcomes, The White House, November 20, 2012, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/20/fact-sheet-east-asia-summit-
outcomes (Accessed May 30, 2013).
14. The United States in a Trans-Pacific Partnership, Office of the United States Trade
Representative, at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/
united-states-trans-pacific-partnership (Accessed July 05, 2013).
15. Joshua Meltzer, The Trans-Pacific PartnershipIts Economic and Strategic Implications,
Brookings, September 30, 2011, at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/09/
30-trans-pacific-partnership-meltzer (Accessed July 05, 2013).
16. Ian F. Fergusson, William H. Cooper, Remy Jurenas and Brock R. Williams, The Trans-
Pacific Partnership and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, p. 9, June 17,
2013, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42694.pdf (Accessed July 05, 2013).
17. The Dragons New Teeth, The Economist, April 7, 2012, at http://www.economist.com/
node/21552193 (Accessed July 10, 2013).
18. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples
Republic of China 2013, Office of Secretary of Defense, p. 32, 2013, at http://
www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf (Accessed May 27, 2013).
19. The Dragons New Teeth, no. 17.
20. Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China, Annual
Report to Congress, p. 30, US Department of Defense, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/
pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf (Accessed June 07, 2013).
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., p. 7.
23. Ibid., p. 35.
24. Byran Krekel, Capability of the Peoples Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare
and Computer Network Exploitation, U.S. China Economic and Security Review
Commission, October 9, 2009, at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/
docs/Cyber-030.pdf (Accessed July 04, 2013).
25. Arvind Gupta, Chinas Defence White Paper 2013: Lessons for India, IDSA, April 25,
2013, at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/
ChinasDefenceWhitePaper2013LessonsforIndia_agupta_250413 (Accessed July 04, 2013).
26. Diversified Employment of Chinas Armed Forces, The Peoples Republic of China, April
2013, Xinhuanet, April 16, 2013, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/
c_132312681.htm (Accessed May 27, 2013).
27. Tom Phillips and Julian Ryall, The Telegraph, July 5, 2013, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/asia/china/10162193/China-and-Russia-send-joint-force-of-19-warships-to-
Sea-of-Japan-in-largest-ever-naval-exercise.html (Accessed November 21, 2013).
28. Ben Winkley, Russia Also Pivots to Asia, The Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2013, at
46
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/10/21/russia-also-pivots-to-asia/ (Accessed November
21, 2013).
29. Ashton B. Carter, Deputy Secretary of Defense, The U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia: A
Defense Perspective, U.S. Department of Defense, at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid=1715 (Accessed May 28, 2013).
30. Defense Budget Priority and Choices, Department of Defense, p. 12, August 01, 2012,
at http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Budget_Priorities.pdf (Accessed May 28, 2013).
31. Jonathan W. Greenert, Operating Forward, Strengthening Partnerships, JFQ, Issue 65,
2nd quarter, 2012, at http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/jfq-65/JFQ-65_68-74_Greenert.pdf
32. Leon E Panetta, no. 12.
Fact Sheet: East Asia Summit Outcomes, no. 13.
Ben Packham, 2500 US marines on Australian soil to increase defence ties, The Australian,
November 17, 2011, at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/obama-in-australia/
us-president-touches-down-at-fairbairn-airforce-base/story-fnb0o39u-1226197111255
33. Cheryl Pellerin, Partnerships Highlights U.S. Rebalance within Asia-Pacific Region, U.S.
Department of Defense, April 9, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=119733 (Accessed July 11, 2013).
34. Ashton B. Carter, no. 29.
35. Ibid. The shift in deployment has been witnessed in Africa.
36. Jonathan W. Greenert, no. 31 (Accessed July 06, 2013).
37. Helicopter crash stirs resentment, The Japan Times, August 8, 2013, at http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/08/08/editorials/helicopter-crash-stirs-resentment/
#.Uo2B0pH9f0A (Accessed November 21, 2013).
38. Jonathan W. Greenert, no. 31 (Accessed July 06, 2013).
39. Ibid.
40. Ben Packham, no. 32.
42. Data derived from speech by Ashton B. Carter, The U.S. Defense Rebalance to Asia,
April 8, 2013, US Department of Defense, at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid=1765 (Accessed June 03, 2013).
43. For a technical evaluation, see: NSSN Virginia Class Attack Submarine, United States of
America, at http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/nssn/ (Accessed July 10, 2013).
44. https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/getfile.do?...milRegionCountry. However, the link
disables on opening the document. Alternatively, the document is available on a google
search for Department of Defense: Active Personnel Strength by Regional Area and by
Country, Mar 31, 2012.
The 2011 report is available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2011/
hst1103.pdf (Accessed July 12, 2013).
Exercises and Engagements: USPACOM, http://www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/exercises-
engagements.shtml (Accessed July 11. 2013).
Vivek Chadha, Indo-US Defence Relationship, in S D Muni and Vivek Chadha (eds.),
Asian Strategic Review, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2013, pp 234-242.
45. Obama signs sequester bill, RT, March 02, 2013, http://rt.com/usa/obama-signs-sequester-
bill-697/ (Accessed July 12, 2013).
46. Ashton B. Carter, Statement by Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter at U.S.
Embassy Seoul U.S. Department of Defense, March 18, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/
speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1760 (Accessed July 09, 2013).
47. Ashton B. Carter, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Testimony Before US Senate Committee
on the Armed Forces, February 12, 2013, at https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=731795
(Accessed July 09, 2013).
47
48. Ibid.
49. Dustin Walker, DOD Having it Both Ways on Sequester, Asia-Pacific Balance Real Clear
Defense, March 20, 2013, at http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/03/20/
dod_having_it_both_ways_on_sequester_asia-pacific_rebalance_106485.html (Accessed July
10, 2013).
51. Ibid.
52. Donna Miles, Locklear: Budget Uncertainty Threatens Asia-Pacific Rebalance, US
Department of Defense, March 05, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=119447 (Accessed July 10, 2013).
53. Sequester: US Air Force grounds combat planes, BBC, April 9, 2013, at http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22082928#sa-ns_mchannel=rss&ns_source
=PublicRSS20-sa (Accessed July 10, 2013).
54. Amos: With sequester, USMC will cut into bone Marine Corps Times, March 03, 2013,
at http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20130303/NEWS/303030303/Amos-sequester-
USMC-will-8216-cut-into-bone- (Accessed July 10, 2013).
55. Nick Simeone, Navy, Marine Corps Leadership Warm about Sequester, Americas Navy,
April 16, 2013, at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=73419 (Accessed July
10, 2013).
56. Joseph S. Nye, The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective,
Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66796/joseph-s-nye-
jr/the-future-of-american-power?page=show (Accessed May 22, 2013).
4
Restructuring the Maritime PivotLatest
Developments in the US Rebalance to Asia
Abhijit Singh
Abstract: Recent developments in Asia are testing the foundational features of
the US maritime Pivot. With political instability in West Asia drawing
American attention and resources, Washington has been forced to confront its
deepest fears: its inability to adequately meet the challenge of China growing
maritime power that now threatens the US dominance of the Asia-Pacific. Despite
the fast-altering dynamics, however, there has been some innovative thinking at
work to ensure that the Pivot is appropriately adjusted to address the emerging
challenges. This paper highlights some of the latest developments in the US
maritime rebalance to Asia. It charts out the evolving contours of a new strategy
that appears to be rebalancing the Pivot to Asia.
Introduction
In light of the recent political events in Asia, speculation is rife that the US may
be forced to slow down its Pivot to the Asia-Pacific.
1
With the crisis in Syria still
unresolved and tensions persisting in the Middle East over Irans nuclear program,
Americas rebalancing strategy seems to have been somewhat undermined. To
complicate matters, an increasingly assertive Chinese Navy in the Western Pacific
is making the US traditional allies in Southeast Asia deeply anxious. The slow
realisation that its strategic manoeuvre to East Asia may not follow a planned
trajectory seems to have induced a degree of caution in Washington, under
growing pressure to bring the strategy to fruition without provoking China.
2
Notwithstanding the rigours of the challenge, however, the US has been
trying to re-align the fundamentals of the strategy to help achieve its broader
strategic objectives. To protect its vital interests, Washington seems to be in the
process of formulating a hedging strategy, wherein it is taking the necessary
steps to be relevant in the Middle East, while continuing to wield decisive influence
in the Asia-Pacific.
3
The new strategy accords equal importance to the military,
Restructuring the Maritime Pivot
49
diplomatic and economic components of the Pivot, and is driven not only by the
need to preserve Americas institutional primacy and financial monopoly but also
to ensure that the US Military has a regional opponent worth dominating.
4
To be sure, the thrust of the US Pivot, so far, has primarily been on its
military dimension.
5
While the Obama administration has striven to project the
rebalance to Asia as a whole of government endeavourwith a significant
economic and diplomatic facetit is the maritime Pivot that has received the
lions share of official attention.
6
In part, this is on account of the transformational
elements in the military plan involving new deployments of troops and equipment
in the Asia-Pacific.
7
Equally, however, this is the result of a perception of US
ineffectiveness in dealing with Chinese aggression in Southeast and Northeast
Asia. To add to Americas woes, the adverse fiscal climate is making the rebalance
strategy appear more vulnerable than ever.
8
At the heart of the prevailing ambiguity about the maritime Pivot are issues
about its usefulness and essential sustainability. As a strategic construct, analysts
have constantly wondered if the US rebalance has a viable and practical end
objective. Is it a comprehensive and coherent plan for strategic dominance? Or
just a tactical manoeuvre, hurriedly planned and implemented, which now runs
the risk of crumbling under the weight of political and logistical dissonances?
Does the US have a plan to firmly deal with Chinese assertion in East Asia? Or
will an American strategy aimed at keeping China in check, paradoxically, need
Beijings support to be successful?
In many ways, these are fundamental issues that predate Americas present
predicament. In light of the current impediments, however, they raise new doubts
about the Pivots strategic coherence. This, in turn, has created a stark imperative
for the Obama administration to bring greater clarity to the policys essential
premises and purposes.
To begin with, the US administration officials reiterate the Pivots status as
a long-term national strategy. Not only, they aver, are its strategic fundamentals
sound, it isby its inherent naturedurable and sustainable. Americas political
functionaries emphasise the policys achievable end objectives, not least because
it has been meticulously planned and judiciously implemented.
9
By their
assessment, plans are well on track and gaining in momentum.
In order to assess the credibility of these assertions, a reassessment of the
operational viability of the maritime rebalance is in order. In military operational
terms, the Pivots two principal military end objectives are as follows:
10
Shifting of military capacitiesespecially naval and air capabilities involving
surface ships, including eventually aircraft carriers, intelligence and
surveillance capabilities and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)from the
Afghanistan conflict and other theatres of operation to the Asia-Pacific.
Deployment of 60 percent of US naval capabilities in the broad Asia-Pacific/
Indo-Pacific region, instead of 50 percent as in the past. This will involve
50
a net increase of one carrier, seven destroyers, 10 Littoral Combat Ships
(LCSs) and two submarines.
US defence officials believe substantive progress has been made in the pursuit
of these objectives. Indeed, recent US Military moves in the Asia-Pacific have
significantly advanced American interests. In Australia, a company-size unit of
200-250 US marines has been rotated to an existing Australian military facility
at Darwin.
11
Washington and Canberra are also said to be discussing greater US
Navy access to Australias Indian Ocean naval bases, with an agreement arrived
at to deploy an Australian warship in a US carrier strike group in the Western
Pacific. Meanwhile, the first of four littoral combat ships have arrived at Singapore,
and the Philippines and the US are discussing new military cooperation options.
This includes the rotation of American surveillance aircraft in the Philippines,
regular deployment of rotational troops and staging frequent joint exercises.
12
The US Navys significant technology advancements too seem to foreshadow a
reinvigorated maritime Pivot. These include the recent launch of a remotely-
piloted aircraft from an aircraft carrier and the successful trails of a directed energy
weapon (a solid-state laser) to be installed aboard ships in 2014.
13
The US Navy isnt the only agency to have undertaken concrete initiatives
in operationalising the maritime Pivot. The US Air Force has made its own
contribution by reaching an agreement with the Royal Australian Air Force to
position US Military aircraft at the latters facilities. To service its additional
commitments, the US Air Force has allocated 60 percent of its overseas-based
forces to the Asia-Pacific regionincluding lethal and surveillance UAVs, new
fighters and bombers and reconnaissance cyber and space capabilities,
14
and even
announced plans to deploy 60 percent of its space and cyber capabilities on the
15
Even so, there is no detracting from the many difficulties that the US has
been facing in sustaining the Pivot. Since the Strategic Guidance on January
2012,
16
the US has faced structural and logistical impediments in executing the
rebalance. These include increased political disagreement with China, inability
to conclude an agreement on shifting marines from Okinawa to Guam
17
and a
plethora of safety issues with expensive American assets such as the Osprey aircraft
resulting in reduced operational efficiency.
18
The enduring nature of the constraints
appears to have convinced US Military planners that the rebalance cannot succeed
without a more focused approach that enlists the support and assistance of regional
players.
19
Regional Responses to the Pivot
To co-opt other stakeholders into the broader Pivot strategy, the US needs a
practical and effective plan. The nature of cooperation it expects from regional
states, however, appears premised on their initial responses to the Pivot. Since
its announcement, the rebalance has elicited fundamentally dissimilar reactions
51
from regional states.
20
These can be broadly classified into three distinct
categories:
The first is one of staunch opposition exemplified by Chinas response to
what it sees as a clear example of a China-containment strategy.
21
Beijings
strident criticism of the US strategy in the Asia-Pacific appears driven by
fears of a reduction of its own strategic influence in the regiona reflection
of the Peoples Liberation Army-Navys (PLA-Ns) growing maritime
ambitions.
22
China has adopted a novel strategy of nuancing its disapproval
of the rebalance in a manner to appear rational and objective. To deny the
US a ready-made justification for increasing its strategic presence in the
Pacific, Chinese media and government agencies have alternated between
caustic criticism and measured disapproval in opposing the US maritime
strategy in the region.
23
In the second category are those states that explicitly support the rebalance.
The Philippines, Japan and South Koreaembroiled in protracted maritime
territorial disputes with Chinahave officially come out in favour of the policy,
24
and lead the clamour for greater American security presence in the Pacific. An
exception to this general description of states fully supporting the Pivot has been
Singapore that has qualified its embrace of close strategic cooperation with the
US as premised on the latters stabilizing [sic] influence in the region.
25
More
broadly, however, all such states believe that the rebalance is a strategic necessity
in restoring the security balance in the Pacific.
Finally, there are states that were ambivalent about the rebalance. Spanning
the vast expanse of the Asia-Pacific and South Asia, this rather substantial bunch
despite close individual ties with the UShas been more circumspect in offering
their unqualified support to the policy. Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and India
are examples of such states. Wary of having to choose between Washington and
Beijing these states have expressed their reluctance to be seen to be siding with
the former.
26
Paradoxically, in their strategic deliberations with the US, most of
these nations have expressed satisfaction at the improvement shown by Washington
in its commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. While publicly empathising with
them, the US has sought to enlist the support of these swing states, whose
cooperation is deemed critical for the success of the Pivot.
The Air-Sea Battle Concept
Central to the Pivots coherence has been the enunciation of the Air Sea Battle
(ASB) concepta military operational measure that has for some time been
causing China great anxiety. With the aim of protecting US allies against
aggressive Chinese posturing, Washington had formalised a Joint Operational
Access Concept (JOAC) for the Asia-Pacific.
27
At the heart of the concept, lies
the ASB, which is essentially a method of improving the joint operating
effectiveness of the U.S. Navy and Air Force units, with the final objective of
counterbalancing Chinas anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) strategies in
52
Northeast and Southeast Asia. Since its initial announcement,
28
however, the
ASB has been perceived as a dangerous idea with the potential of sparking a
full-fledged war with China.
29
In order to clarify misperceptions about the original
JOAC, the US Military in May 2013released the new Air-Sea Battle document
that shows the concept as a much-evolved idea since its original articulation.
30
The new document validates the ASBs objective as preserving access to global
commons and breaking the enemys kill chain, dispellingin some measure
the pervasive notion of it being a punitive measure aimed solely at destroying
enemy core capabilities.
31
The new approach emphasises attacks on the sensors and weapons that an
adversary would need for a successful area-denial strategy.
32
It seeks to take
advantage of the adversarys vulnerabilities as it tries to detect and target US
Military assets by: disrupting command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems; destroying weapon launchers
(including aircraft, ships and missile sites) and defeating any weapons and
adversary launches.
33
China, however, continues to see the ASB as a provocative
ideademonstrative of the US Militarys change of adversary from international
terrorists to the PLA.
34
New Deployments and Agreements
After the US released its Strategic Guidance Document in January 2012,which
pledged minimal cuts in the size of the Navy, a plan was drawn up to redeploy
American forces freed from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Under the plan,
the US Armys 25
th
Infantry Division and the 1
st
and 3
rd
Marine Expeditionary
Force are to return to their home stations in the Pacific theatre.
35
In the wake
of the massive cutbacks to the defence budget, however, the US seems to have
reworked the original plan. The US Military presence is now likely to be more
focused on the southern part of the Western Pacific, and will have amore
distributed presence. Also, US troop deployments will now be more flexible in
formsmaller, more agile, expeditionary, self-sustaining and self-contained forces
that would carry out specific operational missions.
36
The security arrangements
with regional partners will emphasise greater military integration.
In contrast to the earlier reliance on large permanent bases in Japan and
South Korea, the US forces in the South will now be employed mainly through
rotational deployments of military units to different parts of the region. The
idea is to have a leaner and more effective military presence and avoid large
expenditures on maintaining permanent new bases. In keeping with the new
plan, the forthcoming deployments will have a strong rotational component.
This would apply to the four LCSs in Singapore (with the first crew change on
USS Freedomthe first LCS in East Asiahaving occurred in September 2013);
37
the US marines planned to be positioned in to Darwin, Australia
38
and the first
Army attack helicopter reconnaissance squadron deployed to South Korea.
39
Additionally, efforts are being made to upgrade an airfield for P-8 surveillance
53
aircraft and Global Hawk drones on the Cocos Islands of Australia.
40
The US
Navy is also looking at a possible expansion of HMAS Stirling, the Royal
Australian Navys primary base in Western Australiato accommodate US
warships and attack submarines, and a new Australian fleet base in Brisbane
(Australia) to accommodate US ships and submarines.
41
The bulk of US efforts are aimed at achieving greater operational support
from its partners and allies in the Asia-Pacific.
42
These include discussions to
substantially expand naval access agreements, increase training exercises and
diversify engagement with foreign militaries. Recent developments also indicate
that the US is reinvigorating its formal US alliancesparticularly with Australia,
Japan, the Philippines and South Koreaas well as the relationship with
Singapore. Through alliances and formal arrangements in Northeast and Southeast
Asia, the US seeks to broaden its presence and gain better control of its operational
areas, as well as greater leverage over the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs).
The network of bilateral military partnerships and alliances on its periphery also
acts as a potential counterweight to China.
43
Besides regular allies and supporters, Washington is working to co-opt other
partners like India, New Zealand, Vietnam and Indonesia.
44
While the first three
states have a developing military relationship with the US, Indonesia has lately
developed a closer convergence with US political and maritime interests in the
region. Manila has recently been actively involved in regional diplomacyreflected
amply in its leading role in fora like the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) plus and the East
Asia Summit (EAS)and its prominent role in maritime cooperation in the
region.
45
Indonesia has led the discussions during the ASEAN Maritime Forum
(AMF) and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) that have supported
a composite dialogue on addressing maritime disputes in the South China Sea
and Eastern Pacific. In April 2014, Indonesia is due to host a multilateral naval
exercise between ASEAN and eight of its dialogue partners,
46
and a Counter-
Terrorism Exercise (CTX) under the aegis of the ADMM plus.
47
Expectedly, Americas strategic endeavours have caused deep concern in China.
US efforts to strengthen its military force posture in Asia by reinforcing security
ties with allies and partners and enhancing the role of regional institutions are
viewed by many in Beijing as strategic moves aimed at constraining Chinas orbit
of influence, and as the principal cause of regional instability and insecurity.
48
Rebalancing the Maritime Pivot to Asia
While some of Americas Southeast Asian allies have been critical of its security
commitment as being inconsistent with the political promise of confronting
Chinese aggression, Washington has been emphasising the need for a balanced
relationship with Beijing.
49
The US efforts to keep the peace have taken on
added urgency with the growing number of provocative incidents in the East
Sea and the South China Sea.
54
The US now appears to be shaping a narrative that detracts from geopolitical
competition and emphasises cooperation with China. Accordingly, Pivot plans
are being carefully adjusted to manoeuvre America into a position from where it
can exert control over strategic spaces in the Pacific without aggravating Chinese
sensibilities. In operational terms, however, the new maritime initiative appears
to be a tactical counter-balancing move, where the US has signalled its willingness
to cooperate with the PLA-N in areas to lower tensions and where it may be
absolutely necessary to do so in mutual interest.
50
In keeping with the balanced posture template, the US Navy has been
promoting a maritime convergence of sorts with the PLA-N. Since September
2013, there have been a series of interactions between the US and China aimed
at forming a working relationship. In early September, an operational interaction
was arranged between three PLA-N and US Navy ships at Hawaii.
51
Three
Chinese naval shipsQingdao, a Luhu-class destroyer; Linyi, a Jiangkai-class
frigate, and Hongzehu, a Fuqing-class fleet oiler, carried out coordinated exercises
with the American guided missile cruiser, USS Lake Erie, close to the Hawaii
coast
52
a rare, if not unprecedented interaction.
Concurrently, the US sent out an invitation to Wu Shengli, the Commander-
in-Chief of the PLA-N to visit Washington
53
significantly, only three weeks
after Chinas new Minister of Defence, Chang Wanquan, toured both the Pacific
Command in Hawaii. During the discussions that followed, both China and the
US expressed the need for more interactions and exercises to strengthen their
maritime relationship.
54
The developing bonhomie seemed borne out by exercises
a few days later between the USS Mason, a guided missile cruiser, and PLA-N
ships Harbin (destroyer) and Weishanhu (replenishment oiler). The ships
conducted evolutions requiring a high degree of coordination, including combined
Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) operations, live-fire drills and cross-
deck landings.
55
Despite realising the importance of cooperation in the nautical domain,
however, China and the US still appear wary of fully trusting each other. Chinas
continuing assertiveness in Southeast and Northeast Asia suggests that it remains
apprehensive of Washingtons attempts to expand the scope and intensity of its
military engagement in the Asia-Pacific.
56
It has good reason to be suspicious,
as the past twelve months have witnessed a noticeable rise in high level military
exchanges and exercises involving the US and Southeast Asian states.
An illustration of the expansion of military exercises is the annual Cooperation
Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Exercise with Malaysia. For many years,
CARAT has included limited exercises between the US and Malaysia, which
rarely involved other nations. In July 2013, however, when the two nations
participated in the 19
th
CARAT exercise, they were joined by eight other Asia-
Pacific countries.
57
Significantly, the exercise included USS Freedom, a new LCS
deployed in Singapore.
58
Another instance of the persistent efforts of the US to
include more regional countries in joint exercises is the recent Cobra Gold
55
exercise, which brought together 13,000 personnel from Thailand, Indonesia,
Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea.
59
But the US is keen to not let
regional endeavours appear like an anti-China strategy. Therefore, in its largest
multilateral exercise, RIMPAC, to be held in 2014, China has been invited to
join as a first time participant.
60
A Tailored Accommodation
In the event, the emerging alignment between the US and China in the Asia-
Pacific has taken the form of a tailored strategic accommodation in the far-
Eastern Pacific and Indian Ocean regionsareas that arent mutually contested,
and where it would augur well for both to combine resources and assets.
61
The
US Navy is expanding its presence in large pockets of Southeast and Northeast
Asia where Chinese territorial claims are contested by other states, and focusing
on improving its maritime relationships with friendly nations.
The most interesting aspect of the reworked strategy is the rebalance within
Asia.
62
In order to make up for shortage of resources and personnel, the US
plans to undertake a redistribution of assets within the Asia-Pacificboth by
stationing more American ships and troops in the Southern Pacific, and by
mobilising greater regional support in terms of resource commitments and basing
arrangements. The plan is to get US allies to offer basing and material support
for maritime security endeavours in the region, in exchange for greater financial
assistance from the US.
63
Over the past few months, top US political functionaries have visited
Southeast Asia in an endeavour to put the new plan into motion. In a visit to
Kuala Lumpur in August 2013, Chuck Hagel, the US Defence Secretary, proposed
a potential 50 per cent increase in the Pentagons funding to support foreign
militaries and training in Southeast Asia.
64
A few weeks later, John Kerry, the
US Secretary of State, visited the region to participate in the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum, ASEAN and EAS meetings.
65
For their part, despite
the disappointment of not finding President Obama attend the regional meets,
Americas Southeast Asian partners seemed reassured by US offers of greater
military expertise and weapons salesa material incentive to share the burden
of regional maritime security efforts.
66
New Basing Facilities
While the US alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia remain the
cornerstone of security in the Asia-Pacific, the US realises the importance of
expanding its basing facilities in the region. Bases abroad have always held a
special appeal for the US, and despite being somewhat diminished by domestic
opposition, they are still important manifestations of US foreign policy. For
America, not only is a base a useful way of demonstrating the depth of solidarity
between itself and the host country, it is an ideal platform to project US power
56
and influence.
67
Bases therefore have the potential to deter the US adversaries in
a way that occasional force deployments cannot. More importantly, because of
the effort and expense needed in building and sustaining bases, they are reflective
of the real intentions of the US security policy in the Asia-Pacific.
The Southeast Asian state that may arguably be considered the focal point
of the US rebalance is the Philippines.
68
In July 2013, Washington began serious
consultations with Manila for long-term military bases in the country, pushing
for a 20-year basing agreement.
69
The US proposal is to have rotational presence
in the Philippines. After the unsavoury experience of running long-term bases in
South Korea and Japan, where its military presence led to heightened domestic
unrest, the US is looking for access only on a semi-permanent rotational basis
(rather than a full-fledged military base). But while the US offer to base its own
troops is an attractive one, Manila is said to be weighing the legal implications
of such a decision very carefully.
The US has also been increasing its military presence in Australia. Americas
force posture initiativeannounced during President Obamas trip to Canberra
in Nov. 2011has already resulted in the rotation of two companies of Marines
through Darwin. The size of the rotation will expand to 1,100 Marine Corps
personnel by 2014 and to 2,500 by 2016 (a full Marine Air Ground Task Force).
70
Significantly, the US and Australia have agreed to plans for greater access by
American military aircraft to the Royal Australian Air Force facilities. The two
militaries are also in talks to allow greater US Navy access to Australias Indian
Ocean naval bases, and Canberra has agreed to deploy an Australian warship in
a US carrier strike group in the Western Pacific. In Nov. 2012, during the annual
AUSMIN meeting in Washington, Australia reaffirmed its commitment to the
US force posture in the Asia-Pacific by accepting increased basing of US forces
and a promise to operate more closely with the US across Asia.
71
Given the
significance of Southeast Asia to the rebalance, the US has also been increasing
its military engagement with Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand,
and Brunei. The US Pacific Fleet has been playing an important role in leveraging
its partners military expertise and capabilities.
It is, however, JapanAmericas most dependablethat has contributed most
significantly to the Pivot. Tokyo has been strident in its desire to expand security
cooperation with Southeast Asian nations involved in territorial standoffs with
China. It has actively provided military aid and played a key role in coordinating
territorial issues and ocean policies with other regional states.
72
In August 2013,
Japan agreed to host a US X-band missile defence radar near Kyotoa move
likely to lessens the burden on US Aegis ships.
73
Tokyo has announced the
formation of an American-style national security council, a precursor to a more
proactive security posture and a possible decision to send Japanese troops
overseasmuch to the chagrin of China.
74
For its part, the US has been extremely supportive of Japans security
endeavours. Washington has promised to strengthen Tokyos security posture by
57
positioning two squadrons of MV-22 aircraft and P-8 maritime patrol aircraft,
and rotationally deploying Global Hawk UAVs in Japan.
75
By 2017, the US also
plans to position a squadron of F-35B Joint Strike Fightersthe aircrafts first
deployment outside American territory.
Developing strategic hubs in the Pacific
With its focus firmly on an offshore maritime role, Washington is now
attempting a dispersed military presence in the Pacific. This involves a shift of
defence resources from the Northwest Pacific (Japan, South Korea) towards the
Southwest Pacific. The announcement of the relocation of 4,500 US Marines to
Guam, the rotation of Marines through Darwin and the basing of at least four
LCSs in Singapore and the rotation of troops through the Philippines are all
part of the larger game plan of a spreading out military presence and assets in
the Pacific.
The end objective of the rebalance is for the US to have a geographically
distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable presence.
76
A key
element of the strategy is to develop the US territory of Guam as an alternate
strategic hub to Okinawa that hosts a bulk of the US marine troops in Japan.
In keeping with the plan, the US Military has been building up forward-deployed
forces in Guam to increase operational presence, deterrence and power projection
for potential responses to crises and contingencies in support of US allies in the
Asia-Pacific. But the development of Guam has also been catalysed by domestic
discontent in Okinawa that has necessitated the shifting out of the US marine
forces.
77
Following years of protests by the local population in Okinawa, which saw
the US occupation of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station as an abiding hazard,
the US and Japan settled on a Realignment Roadmap which included a build-
up of Guam as a facility for hosting marines. Japan had agreed to contribute 60
per cent of the cost in an endeavour planned to relocate 8,000 marines from
Okinawa to Guam by 2014, including the III Marine Expeditionary Force at
Futenma Air Station.
78
The eventual relocation of marines to Guam was however
held up because of lack of agreement between Japan and the US on the relocation
of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)an equally important component
of the broader plan for repositioning marines at Okinawa.
In February 2013, the US and Japan agreed to adjust the Roadmap and
separate the move of marines from the plan for the FRF, in order to make progress
separately. A US-Japan Joint Statement of April 2012 specified that out of about
9,000 marines to be relocated from Okinawa, about 5,000 marines would move
to Guam.
79
As per the new agreement, Japan has agreed to contribute $3.1 billion
of the revised estimated cost of $8.6 billion.
80
This ends the stalemate over moving
marines to Guam and represents a significant step forward in bringing Pivot
plans to an early and effective culmination.
58
A robust Marine Corps Presence
For the US, a key variable of the rebalance is the presence of marine forces and
heavy-lift aviation assets in the Asia-Pacific. Latest developments indicate that
the tactics of the rebalance is increasingly being structured around the Marine
Corps. While the only permanently forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Unit
(MEU) of the Marine Corps in the Pacific is the US 31
st
MEU, plans have been
put in motion to increase the marine deployments in Guam and Australia.
81
An increased deployment of the Osprey-F-35B aircraft is an integral part of
the plan for enhanced marine forces presence. Since the plan envisages basing
rotational forces, there is a need for airlift with greater reach and speedkey
aspects of the Osprey aircraft.
82
With its superior lift capacity and increased
operating ranges, the F-35B is likely to play an important role in future
contingencies in the region. The US has already deployed 24 of these aircraft to
Futenma Base in Okinawa.
83
Reportedly, in June 2013, during the US-Japan
joint exercise Dawn Blitz, which was held off the California coast, the MV-22
Osprey was successfully landed on a Japanese helicopter destroyer.
84
The joint
exercises, which included US marines and personnel from the Japanese Maritime
Self-Defence Force (JMSDF), were specifically aimed at practising amphibious
assaults on occupied islands. China was supposed to have been so alarmed by the
exercises that it held a counter manoeuvre with Russia a month later.
China, meanwhile, has been developing its own sealift capabilities. In May
2013, the PLA-N took delivery of the first of the Ukrainian-built Zubr large
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) vehicle.
85
Developed by the former Soviet
Union, the Zubris a hovercraft that can lift about 500 troops or up to 150 tons
of armour, weapons and material up to speeds of 66 miles per hour. At least three
more are expected initially, but some reports suggest China may build many
more of an indigenous version.
86
Increased US Marine Corps deployment in the
Pacific may have, in-fact, served as a trigger for the PLA-N to improve its sealift
and anti-access capabilities, hoping to deter any aggressive moves by the US and
Japan in the East China Sea.
Responding to an Aggressive Chinese Military Posture
Concerned about the US rebalance, China has also been hardening its military
posture in the Western Pacific.
87
Following President Xi Jinpings assent to power
in 2012, Beijing has been stressing maritime operations that strengthen Chinas
sovereignty claims over contested maritime territory.
88
As a result, the PLA-N
has become more assertive in its claims, especially in its dispute with Japan over
the Senkaku islands. In addition, Beijing has rationalised the maritime
organisational structure with the intension of streamlining command-and-control,
developing synergy and coordination and maintaining an effective hold over its
perceived maritime zones. In February 2013, Beijing passed a law that brought
the various maritime agencies under a single administrative authority with the
59
aim of improving efficiency in undertaking coastal operations. Chinas neighbours
saw the measure as a political move meant to demonstrate Chinese jurisdiction
over contested maritime territory.
89
For the US and its Southeast Asian allies, the more worrying development
has been the PLA-Ns growing attempts at strengthening its operational posture
in the Asia-Pacific region. For long, the Chinese Navy has withstood the US
attempts to contain it within the so-called first Island chain.
90
The PLA-N
leadership now seems intent on developing the capability to break out of the US
Navy strategic grip over the Pacific littorals. In late-October, Chinese warships
and submarines sliced through passages in the Japanese archipelago and out
into the Western Pacific for 15 days of war games.
91
The drills, named Manoeuvre
5, were apparently the biggest exercises held in recent years, and reportedly included
land-based bombers and surveillance aircraft which flew missions past Japan to
support the navy units.
92
In official commentaries, senior PLA officers are said to have boasted the
dismemberment of the so-called first island chain.
93
Beijings military strategists
saw the exercises as a message to Japan and the United States that they will no
longer be able to contain China within the first island chain.
94
The rapid
expansion of the PLA-Ns area of operations is, however, nothing less than a
seismic shift in Asias military balance.
To nullify Chinese moves, Japan recently announced that it is conducting an
exercise that places Type-88 surface-to-ship missiles on Miyako Island.
95
It is the
first time Japan has conducted such an exercise, centred on the strait between
Okinawa and Miyakoa common access route to the Pacific by the Chinese
Navy. The development also supports analysis that the US and its allies may be
on the course to exercising a form of offshore control that enables the enforcement
of a distant blockade on China in the event of conflict.
96
Amphibious Assault Ships and Exercises
The efficacy of the US Pivot is, in significant part, being assisted by the JMSDF
now being cast in the mould of a dynamic defence force with growing
capabilities to counter Chinas A2/AD strategies in maritime Asia.
97
In 2013,
for the first time in many years, Tokyo increased its military outlay (albeit
marginally), while announcing plans to reposition and re-equip its military.
98
Reports suggest that the SDF, which until recently emphasised defence of the
northern islands, is now said to be in the early stages of redeploying its forces to
the West to counter the sharply increased tempo of Chinese naval operations
near the Senkaku islands.
99
Significantly, there are plans to introduce an amphibious landing force, akin
to the US marines, for the defence and recovery of outlying islands being assaulted
or captured by adversarial forces.
100
Japans Defence Ministry is reportedly
considering the creation of a special Island Assault Unit to help it deal with the
China threat to its Southern Islands.
101
According to a recent announcement,
60
the first 700 members of the 3,000-strong force will be drawn from the army
and would supplement the SDF Western Army Infantry Regiment. The latter
comprises Special Forces modelled on the US Marine Corps that are presently
responsible for the protection of the Senkakus. To augment the Island assault
capability, there are plans to purchase four amphibious assault vehicles.
102
While Japans military inductions and marine force plans have been known
for some time, what has come as a surprise for China is the pro-activism in the
SDFs security role.
103
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abes announcement of
a new National Security Strategy and a review of the National Defence Guidelines
has Beijing deeply worried.
104
Many in China see this as a measure aimed at
revising the Constitution and positioning the SDF as a full militarywith total
freedom to engage in offensive operations, presently prohibited under the Japanese
Constitution. China is also concerned about Abes declaration in July 2013 that
his government was studying the possibility of giving the SDF the authority to
mount offensive attacks on enemy bases.
105
Worried by Japans moves to improve territorial defence in the East Sea, China
is now attempting to build its first amphibious assault ship capable of carrying
multiple hovercraft and helicopters.
106
Reports suggest that construction of the
35,000 tonnes ship has begun, and that it may be in commission as early as
2015.
107
China already has three Type 071amphibious warfare ships, and is
currently building another one, but it has not yet had such a large-scale ship
designed to carry many helicopters and landing vessels. By all accounts, the new
ship could be used to assert Chinas territorial claims over the disputed Senkaku
islands.
India and the US Rebalance
The establishment of a long-term partnership between Washington and New
Delhi is widely perceived as a crucial imperative for the success of the Pivot.
The US sees India as an economic and security anchor in the region, and has
for some time now been urging the latter to Look East, Engage East and Act
East.
108
Indeed, Washington perceives strong complementarities between its Pivot
strategy and New Delhis Look East policy, and has been urging a joint India-
US security approach in the Indo-Pacific region.
109
In all recent high-level visits
to New Delhi US political functionaries have made a mention of Indias Look
East and a security role for New Delhi in the broader Indo-Pacific.
For its part, Indiaafter a prolonged phase of strategic hedging on the issue
appears to be developing some internal consensus on supporting the US Pivot.
Speaking during the Joint Commanders Conference in November 2013, Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh flagged concerns over instability around India
following redeployment of military assets.
110
These anxieties, he mentioned, were
a result of the US Pivot to the Asia-Pacific and territorial disputes over the South
China Sea. The Prime Ministers pitch for maritime security in the Indo-Pacific
was more than evident in his emphasis of the need for Indian strategists to chart
61
a steady course through a fluid and uncertain strategic situation in Indias
neighbourhood.
111
But while New Delhi is willing to back the US on its Pivot strategy, it has
made it clear that it is not open to the idea of becoming an American ally.
112
Indias essential strategic orientation precludes such a possibility. Similarly, India
is willing to consider a strategic partnership with China, but only after developing
a good working relationship with Beijing.
Conclusion
The eventual purpose of the Pivot is to establish US pre-eminence in the Asia-
Pacific without having to resort to any outward display of strength. In essence,
the long-term strategic plan is aimed at facilitating an American economic revival
and a reassertion of its flagging dominance in the Asia-Pacific. While this entails
blunting Chinas growing assertiveness, the US realises its aims must be achieved
without causing conflict. Given the enormous pressure from other Southeast
Asian states, Washington can ill-afford a strategic accommodation with Beijing
(neither a G-2 nor a great-power relationship). Nor can it afford to radically
alter the pivots essential trajectory. Its efforts are, therefore, focused on finessing
the existing plan to make it more effective, yet less aggressive. In that sense, the
new Pivot appears to be an attempt to walk a cautious line between China and
American allies in the Asia-Pacific.
The new Pivot, it appears, is being used as a metaphorical enabler to forge
a narrative that the US firmly controls and uses to its utmost advantage. Its end
objective, apparently, is to maintain the status quo in the Asia-Pacific and get
ASEAN nations to collectively apply pressure on China to sign up to a code-of-
conduct in the South China Sea.
113
Until then, US security assurances against
growing Chinese power might not be diluted. At the same time, Washington is
being careful to not openly bait Beijing, whose cooperation may prove crucial in
establishing a credible and sustainable security order in Asia.
The re-worked plan signals the US determination to maintain force levels
and defence capabilities in the Asia-Pacific regionno matter how substantial
the challenges confronting the US might be. The re-adjusted Pivot may eventually
turn out to be more of a political and diplomatic balancing act than a strictly
military manoeuvre.
NOTES
1. Steven Metz, A U.S. Strategic Pivot to Nowhere, World Politics Review, Oct 9, 2013, at
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13286/strategic-horizons-a-u-s-strategic-pivot-
to-nowhere (Accessed Nov 5, 2013).
2. Steven Robles, Is the US Pivot to Asia in Danger?, The International, Sept 23, 2013,
at http://www.theinternational.org/articles/473-is-the-us-pivot-to-asia-in-danger (Accessed
Nov 30, 2013).
3. David Barno, Nora Bensahel and Travis Sharp, Pivot but Hedge: A Strategy for Pivoting
62
to Asia While Hedging in the Middle East, Journal of World Affairs, Foreign Policy Research
Institute, Spring 2012, pp. 158-159.
4. John Hemmings, Hedging: The Real U.S. Policy Towards China?, The Diplomat, May
13, 2013, at http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/hedging-the-real-u-s-policy-towards-china/
(Accessed Dec 15, 2013).
5. Robert G. Sutter, Michael E. Brown and Timothy J. A. Adamson, Balancing Acts: The
U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability, Elliott School of International Affairs, George
Washington University, August 2013, p. 4, at http://www.gwu.edu/~sigur/assets/docs/
BalancingActs_Compiled1.pdf.
6. Trefor Moss, Military the Weakest Link in US Pivot to Asia, South China Morning Post,
Dec 17, 2012, at http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1106840/
military-weakest-link-us-pivot-asia.
7. Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administrations Rebalancing Toward Asia, Congress
Research Service Report, Mar 28, 2012, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf.
8. Greg Chaffin, Sustaining Rebalancing in an Era of Fiscal Restraint, National Bureau of
Asian Research, July 30, 2012, at http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=265#.
Ur0u5Pu956Y.
9. The Defence Rebalance to Asia, Remarks by the Deputy Secretary of Defence Ashton
Carter, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Apr 8, 2013, at http://
www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1765 (Accessed Sept 10, 2013).
10. Ernest Z. Bower, Victor Cha, Karl F. Inderfurth, Christopher K. Johnson, Gary A. Powell
and Stephanie Sanok, US Force Posture Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region, Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, August 2012, at http://csis.org/files/
publication/120814 _FINAL_PACOM_optimized.pdf (Accessed Sep 20, 2013).
11. Ibid., p, 13.
12. Ibid.
13. The first US Navy laser weapon will be deployed on USS Ponce in 2014. See: Navy Leaders
Announce Plans for Deploying Cost-Saving Laser Technology, Office of US Naval
Research, Apr 8, 2013, at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=73234
(Accessed Sept 20, 2013).
14. Robert G. Sutter et al., No. 6, p. 4.
15. Ibid.
16. Sustaining Global LeadershipPriorities for 21st Century Defence, US Department of
Defence, Jan 2012, athttp://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf (Accessed
Nov 15, 2013).
17. Travis J Tritten, Realignment of Marines Stalls as Okinawans Outrage Grows, Stars and
Stripes, Dec 5, 2012, at http://www.stripes.com/news/realignment-of-marines-stalls-as-
okinawans-outrage-grows-1.199535 (Accessed Nov 20, 2013).
18. In 2012, there were two major accidents involving the Osprey Aircraftone in Florida,
and the other in Moroccoraising fundamental questions about the aircrafts safety features
and avionics. See: Kosuke Takahashi, Is the Osprey safe?, Asia Times Online, June 10,
2012, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan /NG10Dh01.html.
19. Abhijit Singh, No. 1.
20. Robert G. Sutter et al., No. 6, p. 2
21. Lanxin Xiang, China and the Pivot, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, OctNov 2012,
pp. 13-128.
22. Shen Dingli, US Should Rethink Rebalance, China Daily, Jan 25, 2013, at http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-01/25/content_16173095.htm (Accessed Nov 10,
2013).
23. Breaking Out of US Containment, Peoples Daily Online, Aug 5, 2010, at http://
63
english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91343/7093554.html.
China-U.S. Relations Need More Cooperation, Less Containment after Spring Chill:
Chinese Advisory Body, Xinhua Global Edition, Mar 2, 2010, at http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-03/02/c_13194503.htm. Bonnie S. Glaser,
Pivot to Asia: Prepare for Unintended Consequences, Global Forecast 2012, Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, at http://csis.org/files/publication/ 120413_gf_glaser.pdf
(Accessed Nov 10, 2013).
25. U.S. and China Need Strategic Trust, An interview with Singapore Prime Minister Lee
Hsien Loong, USNI News, Apr 3, 2013, at http://news.usni.org/2013/04/03/singapore-
pm-u-s-and-china-need-strategic-trust (Accessed Nov 20, 2013).
26. Simon Denyer and Rama Lakshmi, India Appears Ambivalent about Role as U.S. Strategy
Pivots toward Asia, The Washington Post, October 13, 2012, at http://
articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-13/world/35501927_1_asia-pacific-senior-indian-
officials-indian-media (Accessed Nov 15, 2013).
27. Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), US Department of Defence, Jan 17, 2012,
athttp://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/joac_jan%202012_signed.pdf (Accessed Nov 20, 2013).
28. The ASB was first proposed in the Obamas administrations 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review.
29. Wang Jingguo and Hao Yalin, Guofangbu Jiu Mei Zai Ao Zhu Jun Da Jizhe Wen, Chai
Konghai Yiti Zhan Lilun (Ministry of National Defense Answers Reporters Questions
about U.S. Forces in Australia, Denounces the Air-Sea Battle Theory), Xinhua, Nov 30,
2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2011-11/30/c_ 111206902.htm. William Yale, Air-
Sea Battle: A Dangerous, Unaffordable Threat, The Diplomat, Nov 9, 2013, at http://
thediplomat.com/2013/11/air-sea-battle-a-dangerous-unaffordable-threat/ (Accessed Nov 15,
2013).
30. Air Sea Battle, US Department of Defence, May 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/
ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf (Accessed Nov 10, 2013).
31. Rear Adm. Foggo Discusses Air-Sea Battle Concept, Navy Live, US Navy Official blog,
Oct 10, 2013, at http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2013/10/10/rear-adm-foggo-discusses-air-sea-
battle-concept/ (Accessed Nov 15, 2013).
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Senior Colonel Gaoyue Fan, PLA Navy, On Air Sea Battle, PacNet, 17,Pacific Forum
CSIS, Honolulu, Mar 17, 2013, at http://csis.org/files/publication/pac1117.pdf.
35. The US Approach to Regional Security, Remarks by Chuck Hagel, US Secretary of
Defence, at the 12thInternational Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security
Summit, June 1, 2013, at https://www.iiss.org/-/media/.../Shangri-La%20Dialogue/.../
Hagel.pdf (Accessed Oct 1, 2013).
36. Defence Budget Priorities and ChoicesFiscal Year 2014, US Department of Defence, Apr
2013, p. 5, at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/DefenseBudgetPrioritiesChoicesFiscalYear
2014.pdf (Accessed Nov 20, 2013).
37. Littoral Combat Ship Crew 102 Returns to San Diego, US Department of Navy, Aug
6, 2013, at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=75798 (Accessed Nov 10,
2013).
38. Matt Siegel, U.S. Marines Arrive in Australia, in Chinas Strategic Backyard, The New
York Times, Apr 4, 2013, at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/world/asia/us-marines-
arrive-darwin-australia.html?_r=0 (Accessed Nov 15, 2013).
39. Donna Miles, First Rotational U.S. Army Unit to Deploy to South Korea, American
Forces Press Service, US Department of Defence, Sept 18, 2013, at http://
64
www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=120810 (Accessed Nov 15, 2013).
40. US/Australia Cocos Islands Spy Plan, StratRisks, May 16, 2012, at http://stratrisks.com/
geostrat/6096 (Accessed Nov 15, 2013).
41. Ely Ratner, Rebalancing to Asia with an Insecure China, The Washington Quarterly, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Spring 2013, p. 26.
42. Christian Le Mire, Rebalancing the Burden in East Asia, Survival: Global Politics and
Strategy, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), AprMay 2013, p. 31.
43. James Catfield, Is Obamas Pivot to Asia Really a Hedge Against China?, The Atlantic,
June 8, 2012, at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/is-obamas-pivot-
to-asia-really-a-hedge-against-china/258279/ (Accessed Nov 10, 2013).
44. C. Raja Mohan, Chinas Rise, Americas Pivot, and Indias Asian Ambiguity, Paper
presented at Symposium India 2012, Jan 2013, at http://www.india-seminar.com/2013/
641/641_c_raja_mohan.htm (Accessed Nov 15, 2013).
45. Gregory Poling, Dynamic Equilibrium: Indonesias Blueprint for a 21st Century Asia
Pacific, Mar 8, 2013, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), at https://
csis.org/publication/ southeast-asia-corner-18th-and-k-streets-dynamic-equilibrium-
indonesias-blueprint-21st-c.
46. During the sixth ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting in Brunei in September 2012, Admiral
Agus Suhartono, the Indonesian chief of naval staff and Armed Forces chief, proposed to
host the first-ever joint exercise among ASEAN navies.See: Amarulla Octavian, Its Time
for Joint ASEAN Naval Exercises, STRATFOR Global Intelligence, Aug 8, 2013, at http:/
/www.stratfor.com/the-hub/it%E2%80%99s-time-joint-asean-naval-exercises (Accessed Nov
20, 2013).
47. Ibid.
48. Ratner, No. 42, p. 22.
49. Joan Johnson-Freese, The Need for a Consistent, Balanced US-China Policy, China-US
Focus, Sep 28, 2013, at http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-need-for-a-
consistent-balanced-us-china-policy/ (Accessed Nov 30, 2013).
50. From DC to Pearl, China-US Military Ties Deepen, China Daily, Sept 9, 2013, at http:/
/usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2013-09/09/content_16954306.htm (Accessed Nov 10,
2013).
51. Chinese Naval Vessels in Rare Visit to Hawaii for Exercises with US, South China Morning
Post, Sept 14, 2013, at http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1305464/chinese-naval-
vessels-rare-visit-hawaii-exercises-us (Accessed Nov 18, 2013).
52. Chinese Navy Ships Arrive in Hawaii for Joint Drill, China Daily, Sep 8, 2013, at http:/
/europe.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-09/08/content_16952123.htm (Accessed Nov 10,
2013).
53. Chinese Admiral Visits US Navy in San Diego, San Francisco Chronicle, Sept 9, 2013,
at http://www.sfgate.com/news/us/article/Chinese-admiral-visits-US-Navy-in-San-Diego-
4799046.php (Accessed Nov 15, 2013).
54. Ryan McClure, A New Type of US-China Military Relationship, The Diplomat, Sept
11, 2013, at http://thediplomat.com/china-power/a-new-type-of-us-china-military-
relationship/?utm _source (Accessed Nov 5, 2013).
55. US, Chinese Sailors Participate in Anti-Piracy Exercise, Stars and Stripes, Aug 25, 2013,
at http://www.stripes.com/news/us-chinese-sailors-participate-in-anti-piracy-exercise-
1.237271 (Accessed Nov 5, 2013).
56. Scott W. Harold, Expanding Contacts to Enhance Durability: A Strategy for Improving
U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relations, Asia Policy (No.6), The National Bureau of
Asian Research, Washington, p. 4-5, at http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/Free /
AP16/Asia_Policy_16_ Harold_ advance.pdf (Accessed Nov 10, 2013).
65
57. CARAT Malaysia Wraps Up after Nine Days of Exercises, US Department of Navy, June
24, 2013, at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=75001 (Accessed Nov 10,
2013).
58. Ibid.
59. Donna Miles, Exercise Cobra Gold 2013 Kicks Off in Thailand, American Forces Press
Service, Feb 11, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?
id=119256(Accessed Nov 15, 2013).
60. Zachary Keck, China, RIMPAC and Containment, The Diplomat, at http://
thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/04/03/china-rimpac-and-containment/.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
64. Signs of a New Push in US Pivot to the Asia-Pacific, The Straits Times, Sept 11, 2013,
at http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Signs-of-a-new-push-in-US-pivot-to-the-Asia-
Pacifi-30214568.html.
65. Kerry, in Asia, Urges Focus on Law in China Disputes, The New York Times, Oct 13,
2013, at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/10/world/asia/kerry-asean-china.html?_r=0
66. U.S. Focus on Security at Asian Summits, Wall Street Journal, Oct 8, 2013, http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304171804579123220745311650
67. For a detailed assessment of the US new military basing strategy, see: Overseas Basing of
U.S. Military ForcesAn Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, RAND Corporation, Washington DC, 2013, at http://
www.rand.org/content/dam/ rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR201/RAND_RR201.
pdf (Accessed Oct 15, 2013).
68. Sheldon Simon, Philippines An Exemplar of the US Rebalance, CSIS, at http://csis.org/
files/publication/1302qus_seasia.pdf.
69. More US boots on Philippine soil, Asia Times Online, Sept 9, 2013, at http://
www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-01-090913.html.
70. US Increasing Number of Marines on Rotation to Australia, Stars and Stripes, June 14,
2013, at http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/us-increasing-number-of-marines-on-rotation-
to-australia-1.225843.
Joint Press Conference with Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Australian Foreign Minister
Julie Bishop, and Australian Defence Minister David Johnston, Nov 20, 2013, at http://
www.worldaffairsjournal.org/ content/kerry-hagel-speak-diplomatic-and-military-cooperation-
australia.
71. Press Release by US Department of State, Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations
(AUSMIN), Nov 20, 2013, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217794.htm
72. Japans most significant recent contribution has been the offer of ten Coast Guard ships
to Philippines. See: Japan aid to the Philippines a warning to China, East Asia Forum,
Aug 29, 2013, at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/29/japan-aid-to-the-philippines-
a-warning-to-china/..
73. US Military to Set Up X-Band Radar in Kyoto to Monitor Missile Launches, Japan Daily
Press, Aug 2, 2013, at http://japandailypress.com/us-military-to-set-up-x-band-radar-in-
kyoto-to-monitor-missile-launches-0233282/ (Accessed Nov 12, 2013).
74. Japan Launches Security Council, China Daily, Dec 05, 2013, at http://
usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-12/05/content_17152573.htm (Accessed Dec 08, 2013).
75. US to Rotate Global Hawks through Japan, IHS Janes Defence Weekly, Oct 3, 2013, at
66
http://www.janes.com/article/27959/us-to-rotate-global-hawks-through-japan (Accessed Dec
5, 2013).
76. The US Approach to Regional Security, Address by US Secretary of Defence, Chuck
Hagel, Shangri-La Dialogue, International Institute of Strategic Studies, June 2012, at http:/
/www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri% 20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2013-c890/
first-plenary-session-ee9e/chuck-hagel-862d (Accessed Nov 10, 2013).
77. Travis J Tritten, No. 18.
78. Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and
the Futenma Base Controversy, Congressional Research Service Report, Aug 3, 2012, at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42645.pdf (Accessed Nov 5, 2013).
79. Shirley A. Kan, Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments, Congressional Research Service
Report, Nov 15, 2013, p. 3, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22570.pdf (Accessed
Nov 30, 2013).
80. Ibid.
81. Budget Cuts Havent Slowed Marine Corps Pacific Shift, Defence News, Sept 23, 2013,
at http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130923/SHOWSCOUT/309230018/ (Accessed
Dec 5, 2013).
82. The Osprey is unique in that it has twin tilt rotors that make it take off like a helicopter,
and then cruise at about 280 miles per hour, carrying up to 24 troops or about six tons of
cargo to a range sufficient to reach the Senkaku islands.
83. The 24 MV-22Bs at Futenma could potentially put about 500 troops or about 140 tons
of weapons and material on the Senkakus in about one hour.
84. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Complete Successful Dawn Blitz, US Department of Navy
Report, June 28, 2013, at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=75095
85. James Hardy, Ukraine Hands Over First Zubr-Class LCAC to China, IHS Janes 360,
Apr 26, 2013, at http://www.janes.com/article/12182/ukraine-hands-over-first-zubr-class-
lcac-to-china (Accessed Nov 5, 2013).
86. Ibid.
87. Shen Ding Li, China Strikes Balance between Sovereignty and Stability, Nov 29, 2013,
CNN, at http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/28/opinion/opinion-shen-dingli-china/ (Accessed
Dec 5, 2013).
88. Chinas strongly nationalistic Communist Party leader, Xi Jinping, has thrown his personal
weight behind the maritime strategy. In a speech to the Politburo in the summer, Xi said
the oceans would play an increasingly important role this century in Chinas economic
development, according to accounts of his remarks published in the state-controlled media.
89. China to Restructure Oceanic Administration, Enhance Maritime Law Enforcement,
Xinhua, Mar 10, 2013, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/10/
c_132221768.htm.
90. The first island chain is the arc of islands enclosing Chinas coastal waters, stretching
from the Kuril Islands southward through the Japanese archipelago, Taiwan, the Northern
Philippines and down to Borneo.
91. Chinas Navy Breaks Out to the High Seas, Taipei Times, Dec 2, 2013, at http://
www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2013/12/02/2003578110 (Accessed Dec 15,
2013).
92. David Lague, Special Report: Chinas Navy Breaks Out to the High Seas, Reuters, Nov
23, 2013, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/27/us-china-navy-specialreport-
idUSBRE9AQ04220131127 (Accessed Dec 1, 2013).
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
67
95. Pacific Gateway Isles Get SDF Surface-to-Ship Missiles in Drill, The Japan Times, Nov
9, 2013, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/11/09/national/pacific-gateway-isles-
get-sdf-surface-to-ship-missiles-in-drill/#.UpjXhdIW0ac (Accessed Dec 1, 2013).
96. The concept of offshore control aims to invalidate Chinas A2/AD capabilities by denying
it use of the sea inside the first island chain, defending the sea and air space of the first
island chain and dominating the air and maritime space outside the island chain. See: T.X.
Hammes, Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict, Strategic
Forum, The National Defence University, June 2012 (Accessed Nov 15, 2013).
97. Japan has now acquired large Izumo class helicopter carrier, new Aegis destroyers and
ISR capabilities, meant to counter Chinas A2/AD strategy. The Japanese Navy has also
introduced the P-1 maritime patrol aircraft, upgraded SH-60K sub-hunting helicopters
and next-generation 3,300-ton Soryu-class submarinesthe first Japanese submarines to
be equipped with air-independent propulsion systems. See: Japan Quietly Builds Limited
Counter-A2/AD Capabilities, Defence News, Sept 17, 2013, at http://www.defensenews.
com/article /20130917/DEFREG03/309170019/ (Accessed Nov 10, 2013).
98. Tokyo this year halted a decade of declining military outlays with a 0.8 per cent increase
to 4.9 trillion ($48 billion). See: Japan Pivots to Counter Chinese Navy, The Asahi
Shimbun, at http://ajw.asahi.com/article /behind_news/politics/AJ201311270093.
99. Zachary Keck, Japan Might Create Island Assault Unit, The Diplomat, June 15, 2013,
at http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/japan-might-create-island-assault-unit/ (Accessed Nov
10, 2013).
100. Japans Amphibious Build-up, USNI News, Oct 9, 2013, at http://news.usni.org/2013/
10/09/japans-amphibious-buildup (Accessed Nov 10, 2013).
101. Japans New Defense Guidelines to Stipulate Amphibious Force, The Asahi Shimbun, Oct
13, 2013, at http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201310120038 (Accessed
Nov 15, 2013)
102. Ibid.
103. Japan Passes New Defense Policy Package amid Regional Concerns, Global Times, Dec
17. 2013, at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/832621.shtml#.Urvy4Pu956Y (Accessed
Dec 20, 2013).
104. Japanese Self-Defense Force Launches Charm Offensive, China Daily, Oct 30, 2013, at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-10/30/content_17067597.htm (Accessed Dec 05,
2013).
105. Defense Ministry to Fortify SDF with a Special Island Assault Unit, Japan Daily Press,
June 13, 2013, at http://japandailypress.com/defense-ministry-to-fortify-sdf-with-a-special-
island-assault-unit-1330524/ (Accessed Nov 10, 2013).
106. China Building 1st Amphibious Assault Ship in Shanghai, Kyodo News International,
August 26, 2013, at http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/
130826/china-building-1st-amphibious-assault-ship-shanghai (Accessed Nov 5, 2013).
107. Ibid.
108. India and the United States: A Vision for the 21st Century, Remarks by Former US
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, July 11, 2011, US Department of State, at http://
www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/07/ 168840.htm (Accessed Nov 15, 2013).
109. Sourabh Gupta, The US Pivot and Indias Look East, East Asia Forum, June 20, 2012,
at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/06/20/the-us-pivot-and-india-s-look-east/ (Accessed
Dec 15, 2013).
110. PM Glare on US PivotNudge to Military on Rebalancing in Asia-Pacific, The
Telegraph, Nov 23, 2013, at http://www.telegraphindia.com/1131123/jsp/nation/
story_17603684.jsp#.UrvT4fu956Y (Accessed Dec 15, 2013).
111. Ibid.
68
112. Indias Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid recently noted the following: New Delhi has
independent ties with China and the US. We will never be allies of the US; we will be
friends, strategic partners, not allies. And similarly we will be strategic partners with China;
hopefully, we will become friends with China when all our issues are resolved; we have a
very good working relationship with them, but we have things to resolve with them. See:
Not part of US Asia Pivot, The BRICS Post, Nov 20, 2013, at http://thebricspost.com/
not-part-of-us-asia-pivot-india-fm/#.UrvT6Pu956Y 9 (Accessed Dec 15, 2013).
113. Kerry to Push China, SE Asia to Discuss Sea Dispute, Reuters, Oct 9, 2013, at http:/
/www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/09/us-asia-summit-idUSBRE9980A320131009 (Accessed
Dec 5, 2013).
5
Military Dimensions of US Pivot
and Its Implications
P.K. Gautam
Introduction
The paper begins with the deployment pattern of the US Military in the region.
It lists the main military instruments for implementation of the pivot policy
followed by evolution of the key concept of Air Sea Battle (ASB) at the core of
the US Military posturing. The response of China is followed by implications
and further areas of research and debate including a brief mention of relating
ancient Indian strategic thought to explain the current situation.
Deployment Pattern
The US pivot to the Asia-Pacific was announced as the future defence strategy
in January 2012: US President Barrack Obama travelled to Australia and
launched the military component of the US pivot with great fanfare.
1
The
President explained that after 10 years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
military would shift focus to the Asia-Pacific. This change was motivated by the
need to respond to the growing sophistication of Chinas military inventory and
reassure its allies in the region. Key features being: (a) Naval deployment in Pacific
and Atlantic from the present ratio of 50:50 to become 60:40 by the year 2020,
(b) US Forces in Korea to remain at 20,000 army, 8,000 air force and 500 navy/
marines, (c) Greater access in the deep-water port in Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam,
(d) Docking of four Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore where a naval repair
facility exists to support US Navys 5
th
and 7
th
Fleets, (e) Reopening of US logistic
base in Subic Bay and Joint Special Operation Task Force Headquarters at
Zamboanga City in the Philippines, (f ) Redeployment of 9,000 marines from
Okinawa in Japan to Guam, Hawai, US mainland and Australia. A further
10,000 marines will remain along with 4,000 army/navy and 7,700 air force
personnel.
70
In all, the US Pacific Fleet consists of 180 ships, nearly 2,000 aircraft, 140,000
naval and civil personnel and 2,700 marines redeployed from Okinawa.
2
Since
the 1950s, Washington has regional Defence Treaty Obligations with Australia,
Japan, the Philippines and Thailand. With Taiwan there is strategic ambiguity,
as the 1954 Treaty on mutual defence was repudiated in 1980s due to diplomatic
recognition of mainland China.
3
Main Military Instruments of the Pivot Policy
This new concept has brought back the role of technology and innovation to
the forefront. It can be said that for the US Military, with the announcement of
the pivot, it is back to the future. Force on Force or state versus state warfare
of high-end war is like music to the US Military. Preference of firepower and
technologies has been the New American Way of War. And now it improves
the old. Over and above the pivot and its various manifestations, one capacity
that the US is developing is the Prompt Global Strike (PGS), which includes
hypersonic technology vehicle, advanced hypersonic weapon, and the strike missile
of the air force. Costing about US$ 240 billion, the PGS relies on an extensive
and costly intelligence, command and control support.
4
The logic of PGS is a
non-nuclear capacity to deter proliferating actors. Yet it is debatable whether
this logic is flawed. While this chapter is not on PGS, however, this capacity
looms large as an emerging US capacity, and needs to be watched.
With regard to the pivot, in 2012, the plan to locate 60 per cent of Americas
warships in the Pacific by 2020 was announced. As of 2013, the US navy has
283 warships: of which 101 are deployed, 52 of them in the Pacific and Indian
Ocean including five aircraft carriers. There will be 62 warships in the region by
2020.
5
In other words, by 2020, the US Navy will relocate its forces from the present
50-50 split in the Pacific and the Atlantic to a 60-40 spilt in these oceans. US
Pacific Command (USPACOM) is at the core of the pivot policy; its Area of
Operations (USPACOMAOR) is Indo-Asia-Pacificfrom the coast of California
to the India-Pakistan border. Further, 3.6 billion people inhabit the region, and
American economic interests are at stake. Moreover, the region includes countries
with large armies/militaries. In addition, enough historical experience of the
Second World War and the Vietnam era remains in military memory and various
academic studies. Therefore, there has been continued US troop presence in the
region since the end of World War II. Thus, the terrain or military geography is
well known to the Americans. And the main feature here is in the maritime
security domain with logistic bases. As in the case of cyberspace and air domain,
distance is no longer very significant.
China has a growing missile force, submarines, space-based capabilities and
nuclear assets including anti-satellite systems. Main areas of concern appear to
be Chinas new conventional capabilities like hundreds of new, accurate, mobile,
solid-fuelled ballistic missiles capacity of the Second Artillery against Taiwan and
Military Dimensions of US Pivot and Its Implications
71
anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs)DF-21D.
6
Few years ago, a RAND study
had alerted the US to Chinas large and modern missile and air force as an
insurmountable challenge. It was shown that Chinas arsenal of short-range ballistic
missiles would overwhelm every runway in Taiwan.
7
Chinas ASBM similarly
invited much attention. The case had been well made. Now with pivot in the
discourse, the most innovative outcome is that of the ASB described as follows:
Concepts and Ideas in Evolution of Thinking in the US Military
Leading to the ASB Concept
One important feature of the US Military has been that ideas and concepts
precede implementation. Combine this with the American Way of War where
technology is the key and the outcome by new ideas is evident. Jeremy Black is
right when he says that the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) meets the
American need to believe in the possibility of High Intensity Conflict and of
total victory.
8
This cultural industry of ideas and concepts is driven by the stakes
and the strong influence of defence industrial lobby to remain in lead in all aspects
of combat at land, air, sea, space and cyberspace. Setting the agenda for strategic
and military theories and concepts of war runs parallel in not only political
hegemony but also military intellectual hegemony. The agenda and stage, so
to speak, is set, and the environment is shaped.
This has been one defining feature of the US Military. Briefly, some
benchmarks are as follows:
(a) Star Wars programme of 1980s,
(b) Air Land Battles series against Warsaw Pact in Europe leading to deep
strike and Follow On Force Attack (FOFA),
(c) Borrowing military technical revolution (MTR) from Soviet thinkers,
combining it with cybernetic and then creating:
(i) System of system and platform independent ideas,
(ii) RMA, Network Centric Warfare (NCW),
(d) Studies on transformations, adaptation and innovation,
(e) Command of the Commons including ocean, space and cyberspace,
(f ) Chinas ASBM and other developments such as anti-access and area-
denial capabilities (A2/AD) under the rubric Assassins Maze resulting
in Pentagons new Air Sea Battle (ASB) conceptnow juxtaposed on
the military dimension of US Pivot towards Asia
ASB. ASB is in response to A2/AD threats. Washington has taken special note
of Chinas development of A2/AD including kinetic and non-kinetic anti-satellite
systems, conventional cruise and ballistic missiles, submarines, and increasingly
sophisticated cyber-warfare capabilities.
9
In open literature, there has been very
little analysis and information on A2/AD and ASB. A new office has been created,
and in 2011, it was included in the 2010 National Military Strategy of the US.
10
The main services for ASB concept are the US Air Force (USAF) and US
72
Navy (USN). The logic is that in regions where access is constrained, there is a
need to reduce traditional emphasis on expeditionary land warfare. To find some
usefulness for the army that had termed ASB as equivalent of medieval siege
warfare
11
, it is being suggested that the army should get into the business of
surface-to-surface missilean expertise it had lost to strike targets further than
300 km including absence of any anti-ship missile capability. Mirroring China
or Iran, it is argued that US should have its own A2/AD against regional hegemons
by deploying missiles (surface-to-surface and for missile defence) on strings of
islands and coasts to Japan and South China Sea.
12
The US may rely more on
non-kinetic means like cyber war to cause kinetic impacts on chosen target(s).
Reduce manned aircraft is already underway by way of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs). Camouflage, stealth and deception may gain in relative importance due
to cost factors.
It needs to be noted that the US had taken an early lead in precision strike
capabilities. Now its edge is reported to have eroded, as weapons technology has
spread rapidly to other countries. As a result, the capacity/ability of the US to
project power has diminished.
13
Budget. According to estimates, during 2010 and 2016, Department of Defence
will spend $ 267.9 billion on ASB: of which aircraft will account for 61.7 per
cent.
14
The 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA), also known as sequester expects,
cuts off $ 500 billion over the next nine years, on top of $ 487 billion already
underway. The impact of $ 52 billion worth of cuts at the beginning of fiscal
year October 2013 is yet to be seen.
15
How will the ambition of pivot be achieved
with more and more budget cuts? Plans are underway to have a smaller, leaner,
agile, flexible, ready and technologically advanced military, which includes about
one lakh (100,000) troop cut.
16
Nevertheless, in spite of the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganisation Act of 1986 for jointmanship, inter-
service rivalry will increase over the budget. The army it seems will be the last
priority.
Energy Self Sufficiency. Due to shale oil and gas boom, the US will be energy
independent. For the US, energy self-sufficiency is the perfect excuse for a phased
withdrawal from the Middle East; freed from energy dependency, America should
be able to concentrate on the Pacific.
17
Response of China
The Chinese, like all professional militaries, have observed the US Militarys
performance with respect. The wars that the US has undertaken employing high
technology and communication technology have spawned the idea of
informationalisation of warfare. The idea of information, which is similar to
what is also called strategic communication, has led to the Peoples Liberation
Armys (PLAs) concept of three warfares: psychological warfare, public opinion
73
warfare and legal warfare.
18
[The Chinese in 2008 created the Ministry of
National Defence Press Affairs Office (also known as Ministry of National
Defence Information Office) for this purpose.] In particular, legal warfare
encompasses the use of both domestic and international law, as well as the laws
of armed conflict to garner international and domestic support by presenting
oneself as the more just or virtuous side in legal terms.
But what is the Chinese response to the concept of pivot? Scholars of China
in India argue that to contain China the US promotes the China threat. The
USs relations with Japan and South Korea, military engagements with South
East Asian countries and growing relations with India are all seen as a part of a
larger strategy to reduce Chinas strategic space. Chinas rapid development has
unsettled the US. This is seen by the Chinese as the reason behind the US pivot
in Asia.
19
When the US project began in 2012, Zheng Xiwen from China noted
that US has further advanced in Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy and has used
DPRKs satellite launch to adjust its military deployment in northeast Asia and
expressed its intention to build a missile defense [sic] system in Asia similar to
the one in Europe.
20
In specific terms, Chinese scholars have noticed the strategic
military dimension of the USs: (a) deployment of 2,500 troops in rotation, and
basing powerful C-band radar and space telescope in Australia, (b) deployment
of Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore, (c) relocation of 8,000 marines from
Okinawa to Guam and deployment of new F-35 stealth fighters to Kadena Air
Force Base in Japan, the MV-22 Osprey transport plain to the Futenma Base
and suggestion to amend Japan-US cooperation Defence Guidelines and refine
the defence guidelines to protect Japan against Chinas threat to southwest islands
of Japan, (d) redeployment of naval warships to Pacific Ocean from status quo
of 50:50 (Pacific-Atlantic) to ration of 60:40 to include six aircraft carriers and
(e) deployment of two other stealth aircraft, B-2 and F-22, to military bases in
the Pacific by 2017, in addition to the new F-35 stealth aircraft, to mount a
strategic blockade against China.
21
The US signals after the conclusion of the Iraq War and the plan for relieving
the military in Afghanistan in future gave a new set of early indication of the
military dimension to the Chinese. The main highlights are as follows:
(a) Development of new Virginia class submarine, new refuelling aircraft
and new stealth bombers.
(b) Readjusting the layout in the three island chains: first chain of mainland
Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan; second island chain of Guam,
Australia and the adjacent islands and the third chain of Hawaii. The
intention of the readjustments is to perfect the three line deployment
and shift the centre of gravity to Guam. While reinforcing Northeast
Asia, the US forces plan to strengthen military presence in Southeast
Asia, and South China sea in particular. The next reason is to enhance
the status and role of Australia as a double anchor that works in concert
with Japan. Tightening control of Malacca is another purpose.
22
74
(c) The emphasis that US forces must acquire the capability to cope with
the PLAs A2/AD capabilities as given in the release of the ASB concept,
which is the basis of the US document Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21
st
Century Defense released on January 5, 2012.
(d) Developing the Asian version of missile defence system in Asia from
bilateral to trilateral systems in two directions:
(i) Northeast direction among the US, Japan and South Korea.
(ii) Southeast direction among the US, Japan and Australia.
(e) Rearming allies in the Asia-Pacific.
23
In Tang Yinchus analysis, two views exist in China. First is that although
the US may say that the concept is not to contain China, it is in fact clear
containment. The second is that the US rebalancing in all-directional redeployment
is not solely targeted at China. According to Yinchu, the second view makes
more sense. The reasons are as follows: First, 65 per cent of worlds raw materials
are found in the Asia-Pacifica symbol of hope for the world economy. Second,
the US is afraid of the rapid rise of China that may challenge and endanger US
hegemony. US rebalancing is to contain Chinas development. Third, in the past
10 years, some US allies have revealed a tendency to break away. This prompts
the US to stage the rebalancing, which it expects would reshape the alliances and
reinforce unity within them. It may be concluded that due to interdependence
in economic and financial sectors, common interests may not tilt towards an all-
round confrontation. China thus needs to enhance crisis awareness and military
readiness and internal balancing by way of its ability to stay stable, unified and
strong and do its own affairs well.
24
One important philosophy noted by Chinese observers is the idea of RMA.
They stress that in the series of strategic, military and diplomatic initiatives in
rebalancing by the US depend more on military revolutions to maintain its
military hegemony as seen in its integrated air-sea battle, space war and
network space war.
25
There is no ambiguity in pointing out that the Air Sea
Battle is directed at China.
26
Kai Liao sees it as a strategy to exploit Chinese
vulnerabilities and compete in areas where the US is strong.
27
Lanxin Xiang
argues that as a result of these developments by the US, China will give top
priority to offensive defence doctrine.
28
Tang Yongsheng from the National
Defense University invites attention to the targeting philosophy of ASB: It is
aimed at attacking Chinas land based strategic targets from sea and air using the
US Air Force and navy as well as support from important allies. There should
be no doubt that a new innovative arms race is in the offing. Tang Yongsheng
points out that China must develop an effective strategy to counter Washingtons
aggression and maintain strategic balance with the US.
29
This is the beginning of a new struggle for military balancing with technology.
However, the Chinese do not seem to view the US-China relations as analogous
to the US-Soviet Union relations during the Cold War period though structural
75
contradictions and challenges of strategic competition exist.
30
Characteristically,
in this regard, the Chinese often quote their ancient and re-emerging sage
Confucius, Confucius has always stressed moral adjustment to the world, not
rational domination of the world.
31
Implications
The US has identified India as the key partner.
32
In this regard, it is important
to note that India is not an ally of any country or military block. It maintains
good relations with all major powers. It has its own set of friends such as Vietnam,
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. It supports unhindered freedom of navigation
in the international waters and stresses that contentious issues be settled in
accordance with international law.
33
In addition, India and the US have a number
of agreements on defence cooperation. At operational levels, they cooperate like
in the US-India Disaster Response Initiative (DSI), security of US ships
transmitting the narrow and vulnerable choke point of the Strait of Malacca
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Tsunami disaster of 2004-05, non-
combatant evacuation operations in Lebanon in 2006 and anti-piracy operations
in Gulf of Aden. Joint training exercises are now a regular feature. Defence sales
are also picking up and diversifying.
34
Watching the unfolding drama of pivot, military modernisation and concepts
such as ABM and A2/AD is not an easy job. Why it is a complex issue is because
it is both a conceptual idea and the matching weapon technology is not fully
deployed. It also is an overlap of strategy and concepts. Much of its weapon
systems are theoretical ideas or have not been tested or proofed like the land
based anti ship surface to surface missiles. It has been argued that the core of
ASB is termed the scouting campaign or blinding campaign during which
both sides conduct lightning strikes on each others Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Command and Control (C2) and sensors networks
to deny the adversary information. This campaign will take place in space and
cyber domains, and involve kinetic and non-kinetic Anti-Satellite (ASAT) warfare
through ballistic missile strikes or directed-energy weapons.
35
There is no dearth
of such ideas, but each capacity and capability involves high cost. Nevertheless,
missile and its counter will grow with precision accuracy. Thus, both offensive
and defensive aspects need more focus. Capacities cannot be just for strategic
weapons under Strategic Force Command, but would need to go down to
formation levels such as divisions and equivalent tactical groups in the navy and
air force.
Unlike the US, India does not have an institution or a tradition of publishing
any security strategy.
36
Much has to be assumed or inferred from speeches. But
absence of an official document does not mean absence of studies on trends or
changes on means of military instruments and technologies. This is an ongoing
76
exercise, and requires professionalism in the military, political leadership,
bureaucracy and technocracy. Determining the contribution of technology, system
integration and material and non-material factors is an important dimension of
this challenge. With this high-end technology intensive warfare, India will have
to gear up, enhance the capacities of Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) and increase defence production with a matching
conceptual base with the services as active partners in all phases of the emerging
technologies. This will demand a new integrated period of civil-military relations
at another plane. It is about knowledge and technology, and of not only doing
fundamental research but also getting involved in production. The reliance on
legacy-based equipment may lessen as technological advancement accelerates.
Unlike Moores law, where the price of computer halves as computing capacity
doubles, in this case, an increase in price runs parallel to technological
advancement.
Will India continue to be a consumer of foreign ideas and foreign weapons?
Here, it needs to be mentioned that as far as ideas are concerned certain ancient
Indian concepts such as those in the Arthasastra have been practised by the US
in the recent past. (The Appendix briefly describes in Kautilyan vocabulary the
use of indigenous knowledge in the geopolitical game.) For Indian civil and
military leadership, this is an important implication. Can we shape the military
dimension for our own national interests? For one, in India, we need to watch
out against picking up fancy foreign jargon from the US. (Lt Gen R. Nanavatis
latest book,
37
and my monograph have already sounded a warning to this effect.
38
)
Although picking up fancy foreign jargon is related to counter insurgency, the
same can be said about this new arena of technology-driven competition. For
example, the confusion over RMA and use of American terms like kinetic/non-
kinetic, hard and soft power, and ignoring our own simpler military glossary,
which can be grasped by all ranks. It is clear that there is too much jargon in the
military dimensions of the US pivot, as in ASB. So much is the confusion that
a concept has been confused with strategy. In fact, even the commander of the
USPACOM warns that ASB has been misinterpreted, particularly, by US allies
and partners, as a strategy rather than a concept: ASB is not a secret weapon.
39
It may be unfair to expect foreign writings being jargon free. So much of
rhetoric and ideas are floated by academics and think tanks. For an example even
in the case of India, the standalone Indian Army concept of cold start elicited
different responses not only from within India but also Pakistan, where it led to
the justification of deployment of nuclear weapons for tactical use by way of its
short-range tactical missile called Nasr. Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan (Retd) from
Pakistan mentions that Nasr pours cold water to cold startthus this is a weapon
of peace. It resorts the balance; it should convince India to think long before
deciding to attack.
40
77
This unfolding debate on pivot, technology, budget and new character of
war demands a very high degree of sustainable study of modern war. Further, it
needs to be institutionalised. Institutionalisation cannot be purchased by defence
off sets, or expected to be delivered by market forces of supply and demand or
some inspirational writings of gifted amateurs. A conscious decision needs to be
taken to internalise the military dimension in all its facets. So far to the best of
my knowledge, there is no academic institute or university in India studying
this. System analysis in developing new weapon systems using computerised war-
gaming techniques and structure analysis is another area where history is a handy
tool. A study in 2006 had suggested that a more enlightened approach can bring
together military officers, historians, technologists and quantitative analysts.
41
For trend and technology forecasting, there is need for a history of science and
technology, and how it has influenced research, development, production and
absorption by users. This type of work will provide better answers to questions
such as: What was the historical process in initiation and finalisation of qualitative
requirement? What was the outcome of the many project management
organisation? Ive already highlighted this serious gap in professionalism in an
earlier paper.
42
Some additional points are as follows:
Areas for further research and open academic debate in India
(a) High-end warfare including scenarios like Malacca blockage and
international law of armed conflict including ideas of just war and
legitimate use of force such as drones and cyber weapons.
(b) ASB and how China is adapting to it: How will the new arms race
unfold including the development and deployment of missile defence
and PGS?
(c) In the absence of a central agency in India to study theories of war,
which should be the lead agency with maximum stakes? To my mind,
it should be the Indian Navy, followed by the Indian Air Force and the
Indian Army. Their training institutes should become centres of
excellence. Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) may think
of National Defense University (NDU) tackling this aspect, and must
earmark an institute which may become the hub. Academics need to
be recruited to follow the topic. This study needs to be truly joint.
(d) Defence Production. The need and balance between adequate self-
sufficiency versus continued imports.
(e) Training and education of not only military and DRDO personnel but
also civil servants who may serve the Ministry of Defence or External
Affairs and have to deal with or negotiate issues on arms and
disarmament.
78
Appendix
Concept of Hub and Spoke in Kautilyas Arthasastra
Clearly in the present US policy, without the US even being conscious of it,
ancient ideas from Indian traditions, such as alliances systems of the hub and
spoke, have been used for contemporary times.
Ancient Indian strategic thought can now be deployed to understand concepts
and issues of power politics. In ancient indigenous knowledge on statecraft, as
given in Kautilyas Arthasastra, there are a number of types and variations of
alliances and treaties in the circle of kings (mandala). Kamandaka (origin varies
from 5
th
to

7
th
AD), the great follower of Kautilyan school of diplomacy, likens
the mandala to the outer rim of the wheel connecting to the spokes radiating
from the axle.
43
In Book Six: The Circle (of Kings) as the Basis under Chapter Two: sutras
39-40 (6.2.39-40), it is mentioned:
39. Making the kings separated by one (intervening territory) the felly and
those immediately proximate the spokes, the leader should stretch himself
out as the hub in the circle of constituents. 40. For, the enemy situated
between the two, the leader and the ally, becomes easy to exterminate or to
harass, even if strong.
44
Interestingly, the manifestation of the hub and spoke is very clear in the
US policy on the Asia-Pacific. Major General Ashok Joshi has observed this
Kautilyan formulation: The US policy in the Far East is termed as the Hub and
Spoke system, wherein the US is the hub, and Australia, Japan, the Philippines,
South Korea and Thailand are the spokes.
45
Princetons G. John Ikenberry has identified the hub and spoke multilateral
network that the US created after World War II, which allowed it to guide the
liberal, international order and reap its benefits simultaneously.
46
David
Shambaugh refers to the alliance system being followed by the US as the hub
and spoke model. But he does not attribute it to Kautilya.
47
Be that as it may,
there is evidence of the use of this Kautilyan concept of Hub and spoke in US
strategy unconsciously. Let us see the case of James L.Cooks work. According to
his cogent text (like Kautilyas aphorisms or sutras): strategy is designed to link
ends (national interests), ways (concepts that describe how something might be
done) and means (resources that are employed as capabilities). In his conception
of ways, he shows the pivot-but hedge approach focused on the Asia-Pacific.
He adds, that although US bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia,
Thailand and the Philippines will remain the corner stone of US commitment
in Asia-Pacific region (the so called hub and spoke approach), there has been
more deliberate effort to work with regional organisations like Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP).
48
79
Christian Le Miere argues that a transformation of the hub-and-spoke
alliance system that existed since the end of the Second World War is both a part
and consequence of the US rebalancing strategy. At the heart of the hub and
spoke system is a series of mutual defence treaties drawn up at the height of the
Cold War from the 1950s with defeated powers or key allies. According to
Christian Le Miere, now the system is being labelled as a spoke-to-spoke system
like offshore balancing.
49
Patrick Olivelle in his work on Kautilyas Arthasastra has interpreted and
refined the concept of Vigraha (the policy of hostility) to mean a political strategy
rather than actual war. It is a part of foreign policy. A king may use the policy
of vigraha against another king, and then remain at one place without actually
waging war (vigrahyasita). In Kautilyan conception, what the US is attempting
is vigraha as interpreted by Patrick Olivelle.
50
This gives the perception of an
enemy to the allies, or spokes, and the hub is virtually present in their heart and
mind though physically it may be separated by a long distance.
Importantly, the spokes or allies need to have some attributes. Kautilya
provides the perfect answer. In Book 7 (The Six Measures of Foreign Policy), Chapter
9 on Pact for (securing) an Ally, money, land and an Undertaking, Sutra 38
says: A perfect ally is said to have six qualities, namely, constant, under control,
quickly mobilising, hereditary, great and not given to double dealing. If we
leave heredity aside from the text (since monarchies were the norm then), it is
unlikely that the qualities will not be similar now.
The US pivot towards Asia ultimately depends on its partners.
51
Partners are
the spokes and the US the hub. Kautiyan thinking can again be clearly seen
in the idea of Forward Partnering, as proposed by F.G. Hoffman. It is argued
that forward partnering is the best option with allies for C2, ISR and access to
bases and airfields.
52
The US allies and partners tacitly welcome the US military
presence, which entails various joint exercises and trainings including use of
territory as launch pads for offensive weapons.
The intellectual property of ancient and enduring Indian concepts now needs
to be reclaimed by the people of the Indian subcontinent and must be
acknowledged by scholars. It is time that students of International Relations (IR)
understand the behaviour of a hegemon (vijigisu or would be conqueror), as in
the text of Arthsasatra with its military dimensions. The US pivot is just one
manifestation in the modern context. Concepts, vocabulary and ideas enduring
from ancient Indian traditions clearly seem to apply in the way states behave in
contemporary times.
NOTES
1. Asia Pacific, Strategic Survey 2012: The Annual Review of World Affairs, London, The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, 2012, Chapter 9, p. 335.
2. Strategic Geography, Strategic Survey 2012: The Annual Review of World Affairs, London,
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, 2012, pp. IV-V.
80
3. Ibid.
4. Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala, Advanced US Conventional Weapons and Nuclear
Disarmament: Why the Obama Plan Wont Work, The Nonproliferation Review, 20 (1),
March 2013, pp. 107-122. The authors argue that with 30 long-range interceptor missiles
in Western USA and 12 Aegis capable ships in US Pacific Fleet combined with some of
the Japanese assets may compel China to increase its nuclear capability.
5. Pivot concerns, The Economist, May 11, 2013, p. 34.
6. Thomas J. Christensen, The Meaning of Nuclear Evolution: Chinas Strategic
Modernization and US-China Security Relations, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 35 (4),
August 2012, pp. 447-487.
7. David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, Toy I. Ried, Murry Scot Tanner and Barry Wilson,
A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute,
Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2009.
8. Jeremy Black, War, Past, Present and Future, Gloucestershire, Sutton Publishers Ltd, 2000,
p. 284.
9. Douglas Stuart, San Francisco 2.0: Military Aspects of the U.S. Pivot towards Asia, Asian
Affairs: An American Review, 39, 2012, pp. 202-218.
10. Douglas Stuart, Leading from Behind: Towards a New U.S. Strategy for the Asia Pacific,
The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 24 (2), June 2012, pp. 141-155.
11. Series of articles in Armed Forces Journal quoted by Douglas Stuart, no. 9.
12. Jim Thomas, Why the U.S. Army Needs Missiles: A New Mission to Save the Service,
Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2013, pp. 137-144.
13. Thomas G. Mahnken, Weapons: The Growth & Spread of the Precision-Strike Regime,
Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, Summer 2011, pp. 45-57.
14. Douglas Stuart, no. 9.
15. Squeezing the Pentagon, The Economist, July 6, 2013, pp. 34-35.
16. James L. Cook, 2012 Defense Strategy Review and Financial Year 2013 Defense Budget
Request: Strategy and Fiscal Constraints, Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, 57 (1), Winter
2013, pp. 41-58.
17. Javier Solana, Americas Perilous Pivot, Oxford Energy Forum, February 2013, p. 3.
18. Dean Cheng, Chinese Lessons from Gulf Wars, in Andrew Scobell, David Lai and Roy
Kamphausen (eds.), Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples Wars, Lancer, New Delhi, 2012,
pp. 153-199.
19. Rukmani Gupta, National Interests and Threat Perceptions: Exploring the Chinese Discourse,
IDSA Monograph Series No.17, April 2013, p. 73.
20. Zheng Xiwen, Feature of the International Landscape in 2012, Foreign Affairs Journal,
106
th
Issue, Winter 2012, pp. 51-62.
21. Tang Yinchu, translated by Zhou Renhua, US Strategic Rebalancing in Asia-Pacific and
Its Impact, International Strategic Studies, 1
st
Issue, 2013, pp. 97-104. Tang Yinchu is Senior
Advisor, Chinese Institute of International Strategic Studies.
22. Ibid., p.100.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., pp.103-104.
25. Shi Yinhong, Global Politics and the International Power Configuration, Contemporary
International Relations, 23 (3), May/June 2013, pp. 13-17.
26. Tang Yongsheng, The Impact of the U.S. Asia-Pacific Alliance on Chinas Security,
Contemporary International Relations, 23 (3), May-June 2013, pp. 30-33.
27. Kai Liao, The Pentagon and the Pivot, Survival, 55 (3), June-July 2013, pp. 95-114.
28. Lanxin Xiang, China and the Pivot, Survival, 54 (5), October-November 2012, pp.
113-128.
29. Tang Yongsheng, no. 26, p. 31.
81
30. Chen Yonglong, Strategic Confrontation and Avoidable Option for China and US, Foreign
Affairs Journal, 106
th
Issue, Winter 2012, pp. 63-67.
31. Lanxin Xiang, no. 28.
32. Gp Capt (Retd), G.D. Sharma, VSM, Indo-U.S. Defence Cooperation, Centre for Joint
Warfare Studies (CENJOWS), Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, New Delhi, p. 20.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid, pp. 30-45.
35. Iskandar Rehman, Deflecting the Assassins Mace: The Pentagons New AirSea Battle
Concept and Its Strategic Relevance to India, IDSA Issue Brief, July 7, 2010.
36. Documents of interest from the US are: 2009 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review (first issue), 2010 National Security Strategy and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
(next due in 2014).
37. Lt Gen Rostum K Nanavatty, Internal Armed Conflict in India: Forging a Joint Civil-Military
Approach, Centre for Land Warfare Studies/Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2013, p. xvii.
38. P.K. Gautam, Operational Lessons of the Wars of 21
st
Century, IDSA Monograph. January
12, 2013, pp. 51, 83-84.
39. Willima T. Eliason, An interview with Samuel J. Locklear III, Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ),
Issue 69, 2
nd
Quarter 2013, pp. 64-70. Samuel J. Locklear III, USN, is the Commander of
U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii.
40. Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, Stanford University
Press/Foundation Books, Stanford, 2013, pp. 395-396.
41. General V.P. Malik and Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, Defence Planning in India: Concluding
Observations, in General V.P. Malik and Brig Vinod Anand (eds.), Defence Planning:
Problems & Prospects, Manas Publications, New Delhi, 2006, p. 192.
42. P.K. Gautam, The Need for Renaissance of Military History and Modern War Studies in
India, IDSA Occasional Paper No. 21, November 2011.
43. M.V. Krishna Rao, Studies in Kautilya, Munshi Ram Manohar Lal, Delhi, 1958, p. 104.
44. R.P. Kangle, The Kautilyan Arthasastra, Part II, Translation with Critical and Explanatory
Notes, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, Delhi, Second Edition, Bombay University, 7
th
Reprint,
2010, p. 320.
45. Major General Ashok Joshi, VSM (Retd), The Enemy Within, The Journal of the United
Service Institution of India, CXL (579), January-March 2010, pp. 122-123. For this idea of
hub and spoke, Maj Gen Joshi in his end note refers to Alyssa Ayres and C Raja Mohan
(eds.), Power Realignment in Asia: China, India and the United States, Sage Publication,
2009.
46. Arun Mohan Sukumar, When Interests and Principles Collide, Book Review, Shashi
Tharoor, Pax Indica: India and the World of 21
st
Century, Penguin Books, New Delhi, 2012
47. David Shambaugh, The Evolving Security Order in Asia: Implications for US-India
Relations, in Alyssa Ayres and C Raja Mohan (eds.), Power Realignment in Asia: China,
India and the United States, Sage Publication, 2009, p. 138.
48. James L. Cook, no. 16.
49. Christian Le Miere, Rebalancing the Burden in East Asia, Survival, 55 (2), April-May
2013, pp. 31-41.
50. Patrick Olivelle, War and Peace: Semantics of Samadhi and Vigraha in the Arthasastra, in
Bertil Tikkanen and Albion M. Butlers (eds.), Purvaparaprajnaabhinandanam, East and
West, Past and Present: Indological and Other Essays in Honour of Klaus Karttunene, Studia
Oreintalia 110 (2011), Finnish Oriental Society, c/o Department of World Cultures,
Helsinki, 2011, pp. 131-139.
51. Lanxin Xiang, no. 28.
52. F.G. Hoffman, Forward Partnership: A Sustainable American Strategy, Orbis: A Journal
of World Affairs, 57(1), Winter 2013, pp. 20-40.
REGIONAL AND COUNTRY
PERSPECTIVES
6
US Pivot to the Asia-Pacific: Impact and
Implications for West Asia
Rajeev Agarwal and Prasanta Kumar Pradhan
It is becoming increasingly clear that in the 21
st
century, the worlds strategic
and economic center [sic] of gravity will be the Asia Pacific, from the Indian
subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas. And one of the most
important tasks of American statecraft over the next decades will be to lock
in a substantially increased investmentdiplomatic, economic, strategic, and
otherwisein this region.
Hillary Clinton at the East West Centre, Honolulu on
November 1, 2011.
As the worlds fastest-growing region and home to more than half the global
economythe Asia Pacific is critical to achieving my highest priority...As
President, I have, therefore, made a deliberate and strategic decisionas a
Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in
shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close
partnership with our allies and friends.
President Barack Obama to the Australian Parliament on
November 17, 2011.
Introduction
The above statements by Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton are amongst the
most important policy pronouncements by the US in recent times. Pursued
rigorously, this policy of focusing towards the Asia-Pacific could prove to be a
game changer in the global political scenario. Already, there is an intense
international debate on US future foreign policy alignments, the pivot to the
Asia-Pacific and its dynamics, reasons for these announcements and the possible
effect of this shift on the rest of the world. Among the regions of the world, the
West Asian region is perhaps the most apprehensive amidst worries of the US
abandoning the region
1
and leaving them prone to grave intra-regional and
transnational security threats. Moreover, the Arab Spring protests that began
86
in late 2010 have put the West Asian region in a difficult position. On one
hand, the region grapples with internal turmoil, regime changes and changing
geo-political dynamics in the region, and on the other, it prepares to fend for
itself, as the US, its security guarantor, rebalances towards the Asia-Pacific region.
As the US pivots towards the Asia-Pacific, it is important to examine the
necessity of adopting such a policy at this point of time. It is also crucial to
examine the possibilities of the policy having any adverse effect on the existing
equilibrium in the West Asian region, and whether the pivot towards the Asia-
Pacific will come at the cost of presence and influence of the US in West Asia.
Besides, it is also important to understand the perspective of countries in West
Asia on the policy. This paper examines such relevant issues under the following
headings:
Why Pivot, Why Now
Extent of the US Presence in West Asia
US Interests in the region
Likely Impact of the Pivot on the West Asian Region
West Asian Perceptions on the Asia-Pacific Pivot
Why Pivot, Why Now
For more than four decades (starting soon after the withdrawal of the British
Empires military engagement from the Gulf region in December 1971), the US
has ensured security in the West Asian region. The Carter Doctrine in January
1980 stated that the US would use force if necessary to defend its interests in
the Gulf.
2
It almost coincided with the establishment of Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) as a political and security arrangement with an immediate
objective to protect themselves from the threat posed by the Iran-Iraq War and
to contain the spread of Ayatollahs brand of Islam. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
in 1991 further legitimised and prolonged the presence of American troops in
the GCC countries.
3
Since then, the US has ensured, continued and expanded
military presence in the region. Through separate bilateral security arrangements
with all the GCC countries, it has ensured that no intra-regional military conflict
breaks out. The region has also served its strategic interests including oil and
gas, role in the Cold War era and, of course, the concern towards the security of
Israel.
However, since the onset of the Arab Spring in 2010-11, there is a sense
of discomfort and mistrust in the regions relationship with the US. Commencing
from Libya, where the US refused to take the lead role, to the current Syria crisis,
there is a feeling that the US is losing interest in the region.
4
Also, with its one
time allies like Egypts Hosni Mubarak and Tunisias Ben Ali overthrown, there
is a fear that the US will not be able to exercise the same influence on popularly
elected governments in the region, especially the ones with Islamic leanings.
5
The
US Central Commands (CENTCOMs) 2013 posture statement to protect the
US Pivot to the Asia-Pacific
87
nations interests in the Middle East is to work by, with and through key regional
partners to bolster regional security and promote stability, while minimizing [sic]
a permanent US military footprint
6
has further raised apprehensions in the
region regarding security guarantees by the US in a time where it is focusing on
reducing its military footprint.
There is a feeling in the US, with regards to West Asia, that it needs to move
on and that the region should learn to solve its own problems. The sentiment
was echoed by former US Defence Secretary at Emirates Centre for Strategic
Studies Research (ECSSR) in Abu Dhabi: It is our hope that the Gulf
Cooperation Council, the GCC, can play an important role in the future providing
security for this region...Thats what were doing for the UAE and thats what
were doing with other countries. Yes, we give them the help they need, we give
them assistance, but the fact is that they have to help provide for their security.
7
Also, with the Iraq war wound up and the war in Afghanistan winding down,
the US would be quite reluctant in getting embroiled in any other avoidable
military engagement in the region. This has been quite clear from its stance on
Libya and even Syria. With Iran too, despite Israeli threats of military strikes and
crossing of red lines, the US has managed to ensure restraint and has indicated
towards giving dialogue an extended opportunity over military strikes. There is
also a growing perception that the threat of global terrorism has been reasonably
contained, especially with reference to the US mainland.
8
The growing might of
China and the global economic opportunities in the Asia-Pacific, presence of
major US allies (Japan, South Korea and Australia) have also compelled the US
to look towards the Asia-Pacific. Coupled with it is the most important
development in recent times in the USthe discovery of shale gas, which is
predicted to virtually free the US of the burden of oil imports and catapult it into
a leading oil producer by the end of the decade.
9
This singular major development
is projected to reduce the US dependence of oil imports from West Asia, and in
conjunction with emerging trends in the Asia-Pacific, as mentioned above,
facilitate its focus towards the Asia-Pacific region.
Following on from President Obamas speech to the Australian Parliament,
the issues prompting the transition towards Asia Pivot were adequately
documented in the Strategic Guidance, January 2012,
10
which stated that the
process was prompted due to the following compulsions:
The Budget Control Act, 2011, which mandates reductions in federal
spending including defence.
Drawing down of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the resultant reduced
requirement of active military engagement in West Asia.
Realisation that the US economic and security interests are inextricably
linked to developments in Western Pacific, East Asia and the Indian Ocean
region.
Chinas emergence as a regional power with the potential to effect US
economy and security in a variety of ways.
88
Growth of Chinas military power and need to ensure better clarity of Chinas
strategic intentions.
Arab awakenings in West Asia resulting in governments that are more
responsive to legitimate aspirations of their people.
Despite the compulsions, a critical look at US interests in the West Asian region
and their possible future trajectory may allay the fears in the region and lead to
some conclusions, as also point towards the magnitude and intensity of the US
footprint and engagement with the region.
Extent of the US Presence in West Asia
For the past four decades, the American presence in the West Asian region has
strengthened day by day. Today, the US is deeply entrenched into the politics
and security of the region. It has both allies and adversaries in the region with
Israel being the strongest partner of the US in the region. The US has not only
been vital in establishing the state of Israel and maintaining its security in the
turbulent decades following its establishment by providing financial aid and
military technology but has also always supported Israel in its fight against the
Arabs. The oil-rich GCC countries are also a strong and wealthy set of political
allies of the US in the region. The authoritarian Gulf Arab Sheikhdoms have
proven to be loyal and reliable friends of the US, and they rely upon the US for
their security. Besides, other countries such as Yemen, Iraq and Egypt, which
are going through severe internal turmoil, are dependent on the US either for
security or for financial aid. The regional political and strategic situation helps
the US to continue its presence in the region.
As regards security, it has been the US which has primarily served as the
security guarantor for the Arab Gulf States. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in
1991 led to the establishment of a strong military presence in the Gulf region.
The Iran threat is another important reason for the Gulf monarchies to remain
under the US security umbrella. Similarly, the threat of Hizbollah to Israels security
ensures continued US presence in the region. Apart from these threats, the GCC
countries have used the US military presence as a bulwark for ensuring their
regimes survival.
Presently, the US has significant number of troops and military assets like
aircraft carrier-based naval task forces and Fighter aircraft squadrons in the Gulf
region. Oman has five US military bases:
11
Masir, Omolghanam, Khazab, Samarit
and Beitolfalaj bases. Most of these bases have landing strips of adequate length
to enable operation of modern long-range fighter aircraft. Saudi Arabia hosts
major land and naval bases: Zahran Aerial Naval Base, Asaafanie Naval Base,
Hafrolbaten AWACs aerial base and a naval facility in Jebel Island. Qatar hosts
Al Udeid Air Base, west of Doha, which hosts forward headquarters of United
States Central Command, headquarters of United States Air Forces Central, No.
83 Expeditionary Air Group RAF and the 379
th
Air Expeditionary Wing of the
89
USAF.
12
Kuwait hosts up to 15,000 US troops stationed at Camp Arifjan, Ali
Al Salem Air Base and Camp Buehring, using them primarily as staging hubs,
training ranges and bases to provide logistical support. UAE does not permit
permanent bases on its soil although Al Minhad Air Base located approximately
24 km South of Dubai has been used often by the US Air Force. Bahrain hosts
the most important and strategic military presence in the Gulf Region with the
Naval Support Activity Bahrain, a US Navy base, and is home to United States
Naval Forces Central Command and United States Fifth Fleet. It is the primary
base in the region for the naval and marine activities. Normally, there are two
aircraft carrier strike groups operating in the United States Fifth Fleet area of
responsibility (AOR).
13
Apart from this, around the region, the United States
Armed Forces are stationed in Turkey and Israel. In addition, the US has close
military partnerships with Georgia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus. Because of
the war in Afghanistan, the US has significant military presence in that country,
in Pakistan and in some of the Central Asian Republics.
US Interests in the Region
US interests in the region are defined by multiple core interests which range
from geo-strategic interests to oil, Iran nuclear issue and terrorism, besides
obviously its declared objective of securing Israel, its ally in the region. Elucidating
them, President Obama said, For decades, the United States has pursued a set
of core interests in the region: countering terrorism and stopping the spread of
nuclear weapons; securing the free flow of commerce and safe-guarding the
security of the region; standing up for Israels security and pursuing Arab-Israeli
peace.
14
It is therefore necessary to look into US core interests in the region to
examine whether and how, the Asia-Pacific pivot will impact the West Asian
region.
Geo-strategic Interests
West Asia is important for the US for its strategic geographic location. The region
occupies a central position connecting to South Asia, Central Asia, Africa and
Europe. The close relationship of the US with the countries of the region and
its strong military presence gives it leverage to keep a tab on the developments
in the neighbouring region such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, South Asia, Central
Asia and Africa. As any problem in the region can quickly spread to the
neighbourhood in a very short span of time, it is therefore important for the US
to maintain its presence in the region. Also, the safety of the Strait of Hormuz
is important for international navigation. It is the most important choke point
in the world, which had oil flow of about 17 million barrels per day in 2011.
15
Iran has in the past threatened to close the Strait in case of any conflict emerging
in the region. This may lead to a triggering international crisis and spike in oil
prices.
16
90
Regional Security and Stability in West Asia
At present, the US is the most important player in the regional security of West
Asia, as it provides security to the GCC countries and maintains balance of power
among the countries of the region. The three major players in the regionIran,
Saudi Arabia and Israelhave severe differences among themselves in their
respective perceptions and thinking about the regional politics and security. For
instance, Iran and Saudi Arabia have ideological differences as they tend to claim
their leadership among the Shias and Sunnis, respectively. Both these countries
slam Israel over the Palestine issue. Israel and Iran share animosity not only over
the Iran nuclear issue but also over Irans support to terrorists groups like
Hizbollah, as also Irans occasional rhetoric over non-recognition of Israelsright
toexistence as a nation state. Threats of use of force among them are not very
uncommon. In such a situation, it is quite comprehensible that the US is acting
as a balancer of security in the region. In case of any dilution in the US presence
or stance, the security situation as it exists today in the region could deteriorate.
Thus, for this important reason, the US likes to maintain its security vigil in the
region.
Today, and for the foreseeable future, the West Asia faces a host of risks and
challenges. In the near term, there is the possibility of military conflict stemming
from the unresolved dispute over Irans nuclear program. The possibility that
either a collapse of the regime or a political transition in Syria might destabilise
the surrounding states cannot be ruled out. Conditions in those Arab countries
which have already experienced revolutions such as Tunisia and Egypt could further
deteriorate, while in countries such as Jordan or the GCC states, the pace of
reform might falter, triggering political upheaval. These are but a few of the
security challenges facing the region. Were any of these scenarios to materialise,
they may not necessarily constitute a threat to the US homeland, but would
nonetheless negatively affect its strategic interests as well as the interests of its
allies and partners in the region.
Trade and Energy
West Asia remains vital for the US economic interests. From the American
perspective, trade with the region is very limited as it contributes only 5 percent
of the US total trade.
17
Out of that, oil accounts for 73 per cent of all US imports
from the region. The region is the second-largest oil supplier for the US with 21
percent of total US oil imports.
18
The US mainly exports items such as motor
vehicles, machinery, aircraft and diamond and imports crude oil.
As West Asias economy is closely linked to the global economy through oil,
gas and other trade and investments, any downturn in their economy would
affect the global economy, thus, indirectly affecting the US. In May 2003, the
US proposed the Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) Initiative which intended
to increase the regions trade and investment with the US and the rest of the
world.
19
It also intended to establish regional trade agreements. As of now, the
91
US has signed bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Israel, Jordan, Bahrain
and Oman. The desire of the US to engage the region economically reflects its
broader policy of engagement with this important region. This initiative is
intended to add further stimulus to the current geopolitical and security
dimensions of the relationship.
20
As regards oil, the International Energy Agency (IEA) in its annual report
World Energy Outlook 2012 projects that the US will overtake Russia as the
worlds top gas producer by 2015 and will pass Saudi Arabia as the top global oil
producer by 2017. By 2035, the US is likely to be energy self-sufficient and an
exporter of oil and liquefied natural gas. The IEA notes that unconventional oil,
which is primarily located in Americas, stands at 3.19 trillion barrels, exceeding
West Asia-dominated conventional oil of 2.67 trillion barrels. Even if the US
achieves its desired goal of energy independence, the global economy would be
tied to the energy markets in the Gulf. US is now moving in the direction of
achieving energy self-sufficiency. At present, the US imports 52 per cent oil from
the Western Hemisphere, while only 22 percent from the Gulf region. The top
five suppliers of oil to the US are Canada (29 percent) followed by Saudi Arabia
(14 percent), Venezuela (11 percent), Nigeria (10 percent) and Mexico (8
percent).
21
But this should not be understood as the US losing interest in the
region. In fact, in view of the primary interest of the US to maintain a secure and
stable oil market and supply routes, it is highly unlikely that the US will lose
interest in the region.
22
In addition, Asian allies of the US import large amount
of energy from the region and use it to manufacture goods exported to the US.
In this way, the US is indirectly importing oil from the Gulf region.
23
Further,
as oil and gas are globally traded commodities, increase in prices in one place
affects prices globally.
Protecting Israel
Ever since the establishment of the state of Israel, the US-Israel partnership has
continued to strengthen. The US has been the main force behind the
establishment of Israel, and during the subsequent decades of war and conflict
against the Arab neighbours, Israel has received enormous political, military and
economic support. Reiterating his support for Israel, the US President Barak
Obama stated, As for Israel, our friendship is rooted deeply in a shared history
and shared values. Our commitment to Israels security is unshakeable.
24
For
the US, protecting Israeli interests in the conflict-ridden West Asian region is a
priority. Continued presence of the US in the region would provide security to
Israel in a turbulent neighbourhood. Besides, there has always been a strong
domestic Jewish lobby in the US which pushes for stronger US relationship with
Israel in every respect.
25
That lobby is strong both politically as well as
economically. Even the new US envoy to the United Nations (UN) Samantha
Power has stated that she will defend Israel at the UN: Israels legitimacy should
be beyond dispute, and its security must be beyond doubt. I will stand up for
92
Israel and work tirelessly to defend it.
26
Such a statement from a top US official
reflects the centrality of Israel for the US and the depth of the ties between the
two countries.
Also, for the US, Israel is a permanent foothold in the region and remains
the most important strategic partner. Both the countries share intelligence and
combat doctrines, and are involved in joint military and defence cooperation.
27
Israels national missile defence would help protect American interests in Europe,
the eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf region. There are also a number of Israeli-
developed defence equipment which have been used by the US forces.
28
Iran
Iran is an important country to be dealt with immediately for the US and its
allies in the region. The Iranian nuclear controversy still continues to haunt the
Gulf Arab monarchies as the US and the EU are still negotiating with Iran. For
the Gulf Arab monarchies, the important US allies in the region, Iranian nuclear
programme is the principal threat to their security which they find extremely
difficult to tackle.
29
The GCC countries have time and again reiterated their
fears and apprehensions of a nuclear-armed Iran to the world. In the wake of
the Arab Spring, the GCC-Iran relationship has further degraded and aggravated
as war of words have continued between them.
30
GCC and Iran differ on political,
ideological and strategic matters. The US is the net security provider for the
Gulf monarchies, and has military bases in all the GCC countries. Without the
US security cover, it will be difficult for the Gulf monarchies to defend themselves
in case of an Iranian aggression.
Threat of Terrorism
In the current phase of instability in the region amidst the protests and regime
changes in some countries, a number of radical elements are seeking to capitalise
on the situation created during last couple of years. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsulas expansion of operations in Yemen
31
and al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat
al-Nusras presence in Syria
32
are a few examples. They illustrate the extent to
which the post-revolutionary transition period has increased the threat posed by
al-Qaeda, its affiliates and supporters in the region.
Dealing with the threat of terrorism is a priority area for the US in West
Asia. The 9/11 attacks on the US have clearly manifested the involvement of
terrorists from the region, and this has clearly altered the US strategies in the
region.
33
The recent experiences have shown that tackling terrorism demands
coordinated efforts from all the countries concerned as it is difficult to wipe out
terrorists militarily. The growth and activities of terrorists in Iraq and Yemen
during last few years have shown that it is difficult to cleanse these elements
completely from a country or a region; they can, though, be successfully suppressed
and their activities be tracked. Anti-US and anti-West sentiments are usually
high among the Islamic terrorist groups, and they tend to condemn the policies
93
of the US or other western countries. US has been targeted by the terrorists in
the region as well. They have attacked the US embassy in Saana and US
installations in Saudi Arabia in the past. Fearing al-Qaeda attack, the US ordered
closure of its 22 embassies throughout North Africa and West Asia on August 4,
2013 including embassies in the capitals of its trusted allies such as Saudi Arabia
and other GCC countries.
34
The countries of the region themselves will not be
able to contain the terrorist activities and break their network. They need the
support of the US intelligence, weapons, training and finance without which it
will be difficult for any country in West Asia to successfully tackle the menace
of terrorism. In such a situation, it would not be easy for the US to reduce its
priorities in the region.
Syria
The situation in Syria continues to worsen day by day as the regimes forces and
the opposition forces are involved in killing each other. The UN has estimated
that around 93,000 people have been killed in Syria between March 2011 and
April 2013.
35
As the situation continues to aggravate, it has posed a challenge
for the US policy towards Syria. The most important American goals of preserving
regional peace, ending state sponsorship of terrorism, limiting the spread of
weapons of mass destruction and supporting human rights and development
36
have been affected by the aggravating conflict in Syria. Clearly, the US is against
the regime of Bashar al-Assad who is an ally of Iran. So, it would be prudent for
the US to contain him in the present situation where civil warlike condition has
led to death and destruction of lives and property. A Libya-like solution to the
conflict by backing the opposition forces has not been successful in Syria till
now. The other major powers such as Russia and China have vetoed the UN
Security Council (UNSC) resolution seeking external military intervention in
Syria as they have appealed for a political and diplomatic solution to the conflict.
The principal concern for the US in Syria at present is the increase in infiltration
of terrorists into Syria and the formation and activities of the Syrian Islamist
groups.
If Syria is left to itself it will lead to further damage. Assad in power also
keeps the Iranian influence in the region intact, as Assad acts as an Iranian force
in the Levant. Also, the instability in Syria poses a threat to Israel. Israel has in
turn in the recent past launched rockets into Syria. Thus, it is important for the
US to remain engaged in Syria and take a lead in providing a political and
diplomatic solution to the conflict.
The above-mentioned US interests in the region have not only been strategic
in nature but also have ensured its preeminent position in the region for the past
four decades. However, in the past decade, events and developments in the region
and elsewhere in the world have forced the US to relook at its engagements and
policies in the region. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, continuing conflicts in
the region and the developments post the onset of Arab Spring have clearly
94
indicated to the US policymakers that this region could get messier in the coming
years with no long-term prospects for peace. Coupled with this, the current
economic down turn in the US, the discovery of shale gas and the reduced
dependence of the US on the oil from the region has further contributed to the
changing American perception. On the other hand, the rise of China as a major
global power challenging the American hegemony and the concerns expressed by
the US allies in the Asia-Pacific on the threat posed by China has also contributed
to the changing American thought.
Likely Impact of the Pivot on the West Asian Region
How will the Asia Pivot impact the West Asian region? If indeed the US interests
and resources do pivot away from the region in significant amounts, what will
be the implications on this region? All such questions will be answered during
the course of the next decade, as the detailed contours of the US policies unfold
and get implemented. But irrespective of the turn of events and evolving policies,
it is clear that the days of free riding on US guarantees in the region are going
to be soon over. As Leon Panetta told an audience at the ECSSR, It is our hope
that the GCC, can play an important role in the future providing security for
this region. Across the board, he said, Washington is urging allies to build local
capacity: Thats what were doing for the UAE and thats what were doing with
other countries. Yes, we give them the help they need, we give them assistance,
but the fact is that they have to help provide for their security.
37
There are indications already that countries in the region, while attempting
to convince the US to stay focused in the region, have started hedging against
the worst-case scenario. An example of this thought process was visible during
the GCC summit in Bahrain when in December 2012 the GCC decided to
strengthen its regional security framework possibly in the shape of Gulf Union.
38
Increase in import of weapons and equipment by countries of the region is yet
another indication of the region looking for self-sufficient alternatives. In
December 2011, the US signed a massive US$30 billion sale of 84 F-15 fighter
jets to Saudi Arabia.
39
In April 2013, it announced another massive defence deal
worth US$ 10 billion of arms sale to Saudi Arabia, Israel and United Arab Emirates
which includes sale of 26 F-16s to the United Arab Emirates and advanced missiles
to both Gulf states capable of being launched in friendly territory and penetrating
with great accuracy far behind an opponents borders. In the case of Israel, there
is also substantial US financial assistance, topping US$3 billion in military aid
in the fiscal year 2012-13. Israel is likely to buy new missiles designed to take out
an adversarys air-defence radars, as well as advanced radars for its own warplanes,
new refuelling tanker planes andin the first sale to any foreign militarythe
V-22 Osprey troop transport aircraft.
40
Former US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta talked of increasing ratio of
military deployment in the Asia-Pacific during his address at the Shangri-La
Security Dialogue in June 2012: By 2020 the Navy will reposture its forces
95
from todays roughly 50/50 percent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to
about a 60/40 split between those oceans. That will include six aircraft carriers
in this region, a majority of our cruisers, destroyers, Littoral Combat Ships, and
submarines.
41
Obviously, the increase in ratio can only happen once rebalancing
and re-prioritisation takes place from other regions which include West Asia.
The US Navy has already cut the deployment of aircraft carriers in the Gulf
region from two to one when it cancelled the deployment of USS Truman in
February 2013.
42
US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel at the Shangri-La
Dialogue on May 31,2013 too highlighted the rebalancing of forces from West
Asia: The United States is adding to the capacity of our ground forces in the
Pacific after Iraq and as we unwind from Afghanistan. The 1st and 3
rd
Marine
Expeditionary Forces and the Armys 25th Infantry Division are all returning to
their home stations in the Pacific theater [sic]. The United States Army is also
designating 1st Corps as regionally aligned to the Asia-Pacific region. In addition
to our decision to forward base 60 percent of our naval assets in the Pacific by
2020, the U.S. Air Force has allocated 60 percent of its overseas-based forces to
the Asia-Pacificincluding tactical aircraft and bomber forces from the continental
United States. The Air Force is focusing a similar percentage of its space and
cyber capabilities on this region. These assets enable us to capitalize [sic] on the
Air Forces inherent speed, range, and flexibility.
43
One of the issues which would gravely impact the region is the threat of
proliferation of nuclear weapons. There has been hardly any forward movement
on talks with Iran on the nuclear issue in the past decade, and despite concerns
expressed by Israel as well as the GCC, the US is still intent on dialogue with
Iran. Election of Rohani as the Iranian President has offered some hope on the
issue, not from the point of Iran abandoning the programme but from the point
of reaching a viable understanding which allows face-saving exit to all parties in
the process. Speaking at his oath taking ceremony in Tehran on August 04,2013,
Iranian President Hassan Rohani pledged to shun extremism and take a moderate
approach to governing the Islamic Republic: The government of hope and
prudence will have moderation as a basis of its management for running the
country.
44
On the nuclear programme and the resultant sanctions, he added,
The only way for interaction with Iran is dialogue on equal footing, with mutual
respect and mutual confidence building...if you want the right response it should
not be through the language of sanctions, but through discourse and respect.
The US too responded via a statement by the White House press secretary stating
that Rohanis inauguration presents an opportunity for Iran to act quickly to
resolve the international communitys deep concerns over Irans nuclear program.
45
The results are already being witnessed when the talks between P5+1 and Iran
commenced in October 2013. The interim deal reached on November 24
46
is a
welcome step in the path towards the resolution of this very critical issue in the
region. The deal would be valid for six months initially and could lay the
framework fora permanent deal later. The interim deal stipulates that Iran will
96
stop enriching uranium beyond 5 percent. In return, there will be no new nuclear-
related sanctions for six months if Iran sticks by the accord. Iran will also receive
sanctions relief worth about US$ 7 billion (4.3bn) including US$ 4.2 billion
from oil sales and the rest from other sectors including precious metals. The deal
has been largely welcomed despite concerns raised by Israel and some Gulf nations
(even prior to the deal).
Israel-Palestine peace talks is another major issue likely to be impacted by
the US shift of focus. In this case, the US has indicated clearly in recent times
its frustration both with Israel as well as the Palestine leadership on their rigid
stance and suggested that its interest in being the key interlocutor may diminish
if both the parties do not cooperate. Israels insistence on continuing to build
settlements in disputed areas has often drawn the ire of the US administration.
However, the resolution of this issue may not require US presence in significant
numbers in the region, as Israel, in conjunction with its military technological
cooperation with US, would be enough to ward of any immediate security threat
before the situation escalates beyond a point which requires US military
intervention. Also, the Arab nations, while denouncing any Israeli aggression
against Palestinians are unlikely to get involved in any military flare-up directly
unless Israel intends annexation of Palestinian territory, an unlikely proposition.
Oil and natural gas is the next issue impacted by reduced US reliance. While
it may be true that in the coming decade, the US may not require Gulf oil and
gas, but its availability and pricing will have to remain a US concern. Any
disruption in the supplies due to worsening security situation or terrorist threat
is likely to impact global economy adversely having indirect and direct impact
on the US economy. Here, the US may cede some space to emerging nations like
China and India who have been virtually free loaders on the security provided
by the US in the region while rapidly emerging as the largest consumers of oil
from the region. There are increasing indications in the region that China and
India are being goaded to take a larger role towards energy security in the region.
For long, West Asia has been strategically the most important region for the
US. Not only did it serve as its energy basket but it was also the key outpost
against the USSR during the Cold War and the hub of operations thereafter in
its Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In geopolitical terms, the US feels that
with the emergence of China as the competing global power and the interests of
its key allies in the Asia-Pacific, it might be ready to dilute its strategic interests
in West Asia at the expense of strengthening its posture in the Asia-Pacific. While
this may be prompted by hard choices put before the US policymakers due to
economic situations and tightening defence budgets, the US would be well aware
that not only China but even Russia would be only too keen to fill in any
prospective strategic space vacated by the US in West Asia. Russia has been slowly
building ties with Turkey, Iran, Syria, Iraq and even Saudi Arabia in its quest not
only to have a larger say in regional issues but also to increase its access to warm
waters across the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean region. China, over
97
the past two decades has virtually bridged its homeland with West Asia across
Central Asia with ambitious oil and gas pipelines, as also rail-road projects, with
a singular intent of circumventing the vulnerable areas through the sea routes.
In case the US dilutes its hold on the region, the West Asian region could see
major re-alignments in balance of power equations in the region.
West Asian region along with North and Central Africa has been the hub of
global terrorism for over past decade. With Osama Bin Laden dead, war in Iraq
over and the one in Afghanistan winding down, the US feels that the threat of
terrorism may not be as well pronounced as earlier, especially in context of attacks
on its homeland. Former US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta alluded to it during
his address at the Shangri-La Security Dialogue in June 2012: We have
significantly weakened al-Qaedas leadership and ability to attack other nations.
We have sent a very clear message that nobody attacks the United States and gets
away with it.
47
Also, developments in military technology like drones, UAV,
surveillance mechanisms may prompt the US to think that prerequisite of boots
on ground may not be necessary to tackle this threat anymore. This may be a
serious miscalculation on its part as is being witnessed across the region. Despite
the use of technology, terrorist threats continue to increase in intensity and cope.
The attack on the US embassy in Libya in September 2012, attack in Algeria in
January 2013, attack on the French embassy in Libya in April 2013 and continuing
strikes in Afghanistan and Iraq are a grim reminder of the adverse impact on
security if the US pivots away from the region.
West Asian Perceptions on the Asia-Pacific Pivot
I made clear that America is notand never will beat war with Islam...
Israelis must acknowledge that just as Israels right to exist cannot be denied,
neither can Palestines. The United States does not accept the legitimacy of
continued Israeli settlements.
48
US President Obama at Al Azar University
in Cairo in June 2009.
The above-mentioned speech set hopes soaring on renewed American-Arab
relationship for the future. But all that has happened thereafter has sown seeds
of doubt and apprehension in the region on US future engagements and interests
in the West Asian region.
The onset of Arab Spring, ouster of trusted allies in Mubarak and Ben Ali,
US response in Libya, its present stance of not getting directly engaged in Syria,
its reluctance to stop Irans nuclear programme through military threats or actions
and the announcement of Asia Pivot have set serious doubts in the minds of
policymakers in the region on the future intentions of the US with respect tothe
region.
There is also a perception that the US is no longer interested or even capable
of shaping the geopolitical canvas of the region, especially post the Arab Spring,
a concern even acknowledged in US CENTCOMs 2013 posture statement:
98
Perhaps the greatest risk to US interests in the region is a perceived lack of an
enduring US commitment to collective interests and the security of our regional
partners. This impression, if not actively and often countered, and any lack of
clarity regarding US intentions in the region, particularly with respect to
Afghanistans future, Middle East Peace, and shaping an acceptable outcome in
Syria, could reduce our partners commitment to stand with us and leave space
for other actors to assume less benign leadership roles.
49
This perception is further
boosted by the US drawing down its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, reduced reliance
on the regions oil and gas due to its own home-grown discoveries, as also the
feeling that with the current economic downturn, the US will be forced to look
inwards more than any other region in the world.
Scholars and policymakers in West Asia are viewing the Asia Pivot with
concern and anxiety and see it as a sign of faltering resolve and diminishing
ability of the US to maintain its presence in the region despite the political turmoil
throughout the region post the Arab Spring.
50
There is also a perception that
the US is no longer shaping the strategic balance in the region, a concern even
echoed recently by a former Gulf commander, I need some kind of assurance
from the Americans should things in the Middle East fall apart. We need to
know how we will protect ourselves. Joint exercises are great, but we need to be
clear during moments of real crisis.
51
The current issue of concern in the region is the crisis in Syria. With every
passing day that the Assad regime survives, the threat of the spill over effect of
civil war and terrorist influence in the region including neighbouring countries
such as Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq is growing. Even the fragile peace on borders
with Israel is threatened. Whereas the entire GCC led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar
is funding and supporting the Syrian opposition, the US has so far been non-
committal on any military intervention in Syria. Turkey and Egypt too have
called for the ouster of the Assad regime, and even Israel is on alert from the
threat of spill over, but the US has so far exercised restraint and even vetoed the
possibility of supplying weaponry to the opposition forces.
Next are the regions concerns about the Iranian nuclear program. While the
region, especially the GCC and Israel, is concerned that the clock is ticking by
and that Iran is taking advantage of the time in negotiations, the US is still
inclined towards a negotiated solution. The GCC is worried that Iran could reach
the critical capability after which there will be no other option but to accept Iran
as a de facto nuclear power. The May 2013 International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) report has reported that Iran has 8960 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5 percent
U-235 and 324 kg enriched up to 20 percent U-235. 20 percent U-235 is 44 kg
more than the figure mentioned in the last IAEA report of February 2013.
52
Of
this, U-235, 182 kg (+15 kg since the previous IAEA report) remain in the form
of UF6 enriched up to 20 percent U-235 while the rest 142 kg has been further
processed into uranium fuel pellets. Assuming that Iran would need approximately
240 kg of UF6 enriched to 20 percent U-235 to produce weapons grade uranium
99
(enriched to above 90 percent) for one nuclear device, if required Iran could then
get the required quantity in a matter of few months. This is a cause for alarm in
the region, a fear which could trigger off a nuclear race in the already volatile
region. There is also a perception that the US, by hurriedly withdrawing from
Iraq, handed over Iraq on a platter to Iran which has led to an increase in Irans
influence across the region.
As regards the Israel-Palestine Peace Process, there is a feeling in the region
that the US has not pressurised Israel enough and that the process is drifting into
insignificance. There is however some hope with the announcement of the peace
process resuming, initiated by the US Secretary of State John Kerry in August
2013, wherein he was successful in bringing together the negotiators from Israel
and Palestine in Washington after a gap of almost three years.
53
It is a conflict in
which the US still has considerable leverage with both parties. It has also been
one of the personal priorities of President Obama. Failure to reach a satisfactory
resolution till now inhibits its ability to achieve its future goals in the region.
Former US CENTCOM, Chief Gen. James Mattis described the impact the
lack of a solution has had on his work and why it underscores the importance
of Kerrys efforts: I paid a military security price every day as a commander of
CENTCOM because the Americans were seen as biased in support of
Israel....Moderate Arabs who want to be with us cant come out publicly in support
of people who dont want to show respect for the Arab Palestinians. So [Kerry]
is right on target with what hes doing.
54
Apart from the core issues reflected above, there are a number of issues wherein
the region is at conflict with the US policies. These include the crisis in Yemen,
Bahrain and the current turmoil in Egypt post the ouster of President Morsi or
even calls by the US upon the GCC nations to be more participative and
responsible for their own security. In all these, there is a consistent feeling in the
region that the US is failing to see the lurking threats in the region and the
turbulent strategic landscape. This has led to a situation where the GCC and
others in the region may have to look at alternate structures to ensure stability
in the region.
Perhaps echoing concerns of the region, Abdulaziz Sager, Chairman of the
Gulf Research Center wrote in Arab News, The US-GCC relationship appears
to be at a crossroads. Despite a long history of relations and a clear common
and mutual interest in the stability and security of the Gulf region, the GCC
states and the United States look as if they are growing apart on an almost daily
basis...the prevailing mood appears to be that the terms are beginning to change
to such a degree that the GCC states have no choice but to act on their own
and without consideration of US interests and concerns. This is bound to have
consequences, real and unintended, for both sides, and the question should be
asked whether such increased separation will not come back to haunt the region
as a whole.
55
100
Conclusion
The announcement of the Asia Pivot policy is, certainly, an important landmark
for the US foreign policy. But the apprehension that the US may abandon the
crucial West Asian region for the Asia-Pacific at present seems misplaced. The
US has a number of interests which are crucial for its interests both in the short
term as well as in the long run. Thus, it seems unlikely that focus on the Asia
Pivot policy would come at the cost of withdrawal from the West Asian region.
So, while the Asia-Pacific region beckons the attention of the US, it cannot simply
abandon West Asia. There are multiple issues where only US has the leverage
which it cannot afford to lose or surrender for the simple fear of irreparable
damage to the region and the globe at large it might cause. William Burns, the
Deputy US Secretary of State, at a security conference in Bahrain in December
2012 too emphasised on the continuing importance of West Asia even as other
pivots beckon the US: For all the logical focus on pivots in other directions,
however, the fact remains that the United States cannot afford to neglect whats
at stake in the Middle East....Its a region that demands continued American
leadership, despite the pull of other challenges and the natural policy fatigue
that comes after a decade in which our national security strategy was dominated
by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
56
The longest festering dispute between Israel and Palestine can only move
ahead with US initiatives, Irans nuclear issue requires constant and active US
involvement. Gulf States still look for US security guarantees due to lack of
robust regional security architecture. Even Syria crisis demands more proactive
participation from the US. The fight against global terror with deep-seated roots
in West Asia cannot be left to itself or to the countries in the region without
active collaboration with the US. Therefore, the US would have to evolve an
integrated and coordinated roadmap securing its national interests around the
globe, especially in the Asia-Pacific and West Asia. It may be pointed out in this
context that much of the Asia-Pacifics growth is mentored on the regular and
steady supply of oil and gas from West Asian region, with China and India being
the largest importers besides Japan and South Korea. Also, the security of sea
lanes through the Indian Ocean connecting these regions would demand relative
security in the West Asian region. Thus, while rebalancing towards Asia Pacific,
the US would not be able to divorce itself from the West Asian region.
The Asia-Pacific Pivot and interests in West Asia therefore cannot be a zero-
sum game for the US. One does not come at the cost of another. Also, owing to
the contiguity of the regions (both bridged across the Indian Ocean), overpowering
economic and geopolitical interests and the capability to address concerns in
either of the regions in near real time owing to technological advances in
communications, surveillance and increased ranges of military platforms, the US
can afford to concentrate on the Asia-Pacific without ignoring West Asia.
101
NOTES
1. The US Has a Trust Problem in the Persian Gulf , CNBC News, December 10, 2012, at
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100294511 (Accessed August 06, 2013).
2. President Jimmy Carter, The State of the Union Address Delivered before a Joint Session
of the Congress, January 23, 1980, at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33079
(Accessed August 06, 2013).
3. Gulf Cooperation Council, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/gcc.htm
4. US Oil Boom Fuels Security Fears in the Middle East, at http://www.platts.com/latest-
news/oil/Washington/FEATURE-US-oil-boom-fuels-security-fears-in-the-6024736 (Accessed
August 06, 2013).
5. Based on interaction with scholars and officials during the Asian Security Conference held
at IDSA, New Delhi in February 2013 and during the Field trip undertaken by a team
from IDSA to Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE in April 2013.
6. 2013 Posture Statement, Statement of U.S. Marine Corps General James N. Mattis,
Commander, U.S. Central Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 5
March, 2013 about the posture of U.S. Central Command, at http://
centcom.ahp.us.army.mil/en/about-centcom/posture-statement/ (Accessed July13, 2013).
7. US Looks to Allies to Secure Arabian Gulf , The National, April 24, 2013, at http://
www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/us-looks-to-allies-to-secure-arabian-gulf (Accessed August
06, 2013).
8. Today, the Organization that Attacked US on 9/11 Is a Shadow of Its Former Self ,
President Obama in State of Union address, February 12, 2013, at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address
9. Will the U.S. abandon the Middle East?, Al Arabiya News, December 06, 2012, at http:/
/www.alarabiya.net/views/2012/12/06/253599.html.
10. Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21
st
Century Defense, January 2012, US
Department of Defense Publication (Accessed July12, 2013).
11. Military Position of Persian Gulf , Persian Gulf Studies Centre, at http://
www.persiangulfstudies.com/en/index.asp?p=pages&ID=218 (Accessed August 25, 2013).
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Remarks by the US President on the Middle East and North Africa at the State Department,
May 19,2011, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-
middle-east-and-north-africa (Accessed July 15, 2013).
15. World Oil Transit Chokepoints, US Energy Information Administration, August 22, 2012,
at http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=wotc&trk=p3(Accessed July 23,
2013).
16. Walter Posch and Sascha Albrecht, Sabre-rattling in the Persian Gulf , German Institute
for International and Security Affairs, SWP Comments, April 2012, at http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2012C14_alr_poc.pdf(Accessed July 1,
2013).
17. Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, Mary Jane Bolle and Rebecca M. Nelson, U.S. Trade and Investment
in the Middle East and North Africa: Overview and Issues for Congress, Congressional
Research Service, March 4, 2013, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42153.pdf (Accessed
July 20, 2013).
18. Ibid.
19. Middle East Free Trade Area Initiative (MEFTA), Office of the United States Trade
Representative, at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/other-initiatives/middle-east-free-
trade-area-initiative-mefta (Accessed July 15, 2013).
102
20. Robert Z. Lawrence, Recent US Free Trade Initiatives in the Middle East: Opportunities
but No Guarantees, available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Global_Competitiveness_
Reports/Reports/chapters/1_2.pdf (Accessed July 12, 2013).
21. Tom Gjelten, U.S. Rethinks Security as Mideast Oil Imports Drop, November 14, 2012,
at http://www.npr.org/2012/11/14/165052133/u-s-rethinks-security-as-mideast-oil-imports-
drop (Accessed June 23, 2013).
22. Stormy-Annika Mildner and Kirsten Westphal, The U.S. Energy Revolution: Retreat from
the Middle East?, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, February 26,
2013, at http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/kurz-gesagt/point-of-view-the-us-energy-
revolution-retreat-from-the-middle-east.html (Accessed May 21, 2013).
23. Jon B. Alterman, The Asia Pivot, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, January
2013, at http://csis.org/files/publication/0113_MENC.pdf (Accessed June 12, 2013).
24. Remarks by the US President on the Middle East and North Africa at the State Department,
May 19, 2011, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-
president-middle-east-and-north-africa (Accessed July 15, 2013).
25. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign policy,
March 2006, at http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0040.pdf (Accessed June 13, 2013).
David Verbeeten, How Important Is the Israel Lobby?, Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2006,
at http://www.meforum.org/1004/how-important-is-the-israel-lobby (Accessed July 2, 2013).
26. New US Envoy Says Shell Defend Israel at the UN, Times of Israel, July 17, 2013, at
http://www.timesofisrael.com/new-us-envoy-says-she-will-defend-israel-at-un (Accessed July
22, 2013).
27. Yoel Guzansky and Miriam Goldman, America Cant Abandon the Middle East, The
National Interest, March 18, 2013, at http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/america-
cant-abandon-the-middle-east-8232 (Accessed June 30, 2013).
28. Robert D. Blackwill and Walter B. Slocombe, Israel: A true ally in the Middle East, Los
Angeles Times, October 31, 2011, at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/31/opinion/la-oe-
blackwill-israel-20111031 (Accessed June 20, 2013).
29. George Perkovich, Brian Radzinsky and Jaclyn Tandler, The Iranian Nuclear Challenge
and the GCC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 31, 2012, at http://
carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/31/iranian-nuclear-challenge-and-gcc/b67p (Accessed June
3, 2013).
30. Shahram Chubin, Iran and the Arab Spring: Ascendancy Frustrated, GRC Gulf Papers,
September 2012, at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Iran_and_Arab_Spring_2873.pdf
(Accessed July 21, 2013).
31. Suzane Mneimneh, Yemen: The Forgotten Front, Geopolitical Monitor, July 29, 2013, at
http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/yemen-the-forgotten-front-4841/ (Accessed August 8,
2013).
32. Syrias al-Nusra Front part of al-Qaeda, BBC News, April 10, 2013, at http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22078022 (Accessed August 8, 2013).
33. Christopher L. Brown and Alyssa Smith, Middle East in Transition: US interests in the
Middle East, Southern Centre for International Studies, 2008, at http://
www.southerncenter.org/me_sept08_lesson1.pdf (Accessed June 11, 2013).
34. Full list of embassies and consulates closed is available at http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/
03/politics/embassies-list/index.html (Accessed August 4, 2013).
35. Nearly 93,000 people killed in vicious Syria conflictUN human rights chief , UN
News Centre, June 13, 2013, at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45162#.
Uf4u1TjrZjo (Accessed June 15, 2013).
36. Christopher M. Blanchard, Change in the Middle East: Implications for U.S. Policy,
Congressional Research Service, March 7, 2012, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/
R42393.pdf (Accessed June 11, 2013).
103
37. US Looks to Allies to Secure Arabian Gulf , The National, April 24, 2013, at http://
www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/us-looks-to-allies-to-secure-arabian-gulf (Accessed July 14,
2013).
38. Saudi Arabia Calls for Strong and Solid Gulf Union, Al Arabiya News, at http://
english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/24/256782.html (Accessed July 14, 2013).
39. U.S., Saudi Arabia Strike $30 Billion Arms Deal, The Washington Post, 29 December
2011, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/us-saudi-arabia-
strike-30-billion-arms-deal/2011/12/29/gIQAjZmhOP_blog.html (Accessed August 06,
2013).
40. U.S. Arms Deal with Israel and 2 Arab Nations Is Near, The New York Times, 18 April
2013, at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/world/middleeast/us-selling-arms-to-israel-
saudi-arabia-and-emirates.html?_r=0 (Accessed August 2, 2013).
41. Shangri-La Security Dialogue, Speech by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta, Shangri-
La Hotel, Singapore, June 02, 2012, at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid=1681 (Accessed August 11, 2013).
42. Pentagon to Cut Aircraft Carrier Presence in Persian Gulf to 1 due to Budget Strains,
Fox News, February 06, 2013, at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/02/06/pentagon-
to-cut-aircraft-carrier-presence-in-persian-gulf-to-1-due-to-budget/ (Accessed August 11,
2013).
43. Speech by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel at the Shangri-La Dialogue, May 31, 2013,
at http://jakarta.usembassy.gov/news/embnews_130604en.html (Accessed August11, 2013).
44. Rohani Pledges Moderation as He Takes Iran Oath of Office, Bloomberg News, August
04, 2013, at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-03/iran-s-rohani-endorsed-by-leader-
says-seeks-moderate-approach-.html (Accessed August 26, 2013).
45. Ibid.
46. Interim Nuclear Agreement between Iran and Six Powers, Reuters News, November 24,
2013, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/24/us-iran-nuclear-agreement-text-
idUSBRE9AN0BQ20131124 (Accessed November 26, 2013).
47. Shangri-La Security Dialogue, Speech by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta, Shangri-
La Hotel, Singapore, June 02, 2012, at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid=1681 (Accessed August 11, 2013).
48. An extract from President Obamas speech at Cairo on June 04, 2009, full text available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-
6-04-09 (Accessed July 14, 2013).
49. CENTCOMs 2013 Posture Statement, at http://centcom.ahp.us.army.mil/en/about-
centcom/posture-statement/ (Accessed August 26, 2013).
Also based on interaction with Scholars and officials during the Asian Security Conference
held at IDSA, New Delhi in February 2013 and during the field trip undertaken by a
team from IDSA to Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE in April 2013.
50. Naofumi Hashimoto, The US Pivot to the Asia-Pacific and US Middle East Policy:
Towards an Integrated Approach, Middle East Institute (MEI)Washington DC, March15,
2013, at http://www.mei.edu/content/us-pivot-asia-pacific-and-us-middle-east-policy-
towards-integrated-approach (Accessed August 26, 2013).
51. Bilal Y. Saab, Asia Pivot, Step One: Ease Gulf Worries, The National Interest, June 20,
2013, at http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/asia-pivot-step-one-ease-gulf-worries-8626
(Accessed August 26, 2013). Also based on interaction with Scholars and officials during
the Asian Security Conference held at IDSA, New Delhi in February 2013 and during the
field trip undertaken by a team from IDSA to Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE in
April 2013.
52. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Report, May 22, 2013, at http:/
104
/www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-27.pdf (Accessed August 26,
2013).
53. Anne Gearan, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks Set to Begin in Washington under Kerrys
Watch, The Washington Post, July 29,2013, at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-
07-29/world/40887965_1_israeli-palestinian-peace-talks-preconditions-state-john-f (Accessed
August 26, 2013).
54. Matthew Duss, Creating an Environment Conducive to Progress in Israeli-Palestinian Peace
Talks, Centre for American Progress, August 5, 2013, at http://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/security/report/2013/08/05/71422/creating-an-environment-conducive-to-progress-in-
israeli-palestinian-peace-talks/ (Accessed August 07, 2013).
55. Whither GCC-US relations? Arab News, March 29, 2013, at http://www.arabnews.com/
news/446395 (Accessed July 14, 2013).
56. William J. Burns, Remarks at Manama Dialogue, December 8, 2012, at http://
www.state.gov/s/d/2012/201701.htm (Accessed July 14, 2013).
7
US Pivot to Asia and China: Rhetoric,
Responses and Repercussions
Rukmani Gupta
Since the US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton first announced an American
national interest in the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea at the
ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2010, Chinese officials have been wary of
American involvement in maritime and territorial disputes along Chinas
periphery. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the fleshing out of the pivot or
rebalance to Asia espoused by the Obama administration has raised concerns
in China.
The US pivot or rebalance, as it has come to be known during the second
Obama administration, has essentially three elementsmilitary, diplomatic and
economic. Collectively, these are aimed at reinforcing American leadership in
matters of regional security and ensuring American economic prosperity through
deeper engagement with economies of the Asia-Pacific. Even though the focus of
the pivot is American national interest, and US officials have been at pains to
emphasise stable relations with China as part and parcel of this policy, there is
little doubt that the US pivot to Asia has strained bilateral relations between the
US and China. This relationship, conceivably the most important bilateral
relationship for both countries, covers a broad range of issuesbilateral, regional
and global. However, despite the 90-odd modes of engagement between the two
governments at various levels, contentious differences between the two countries
persist. The professed will of leaders from both countries to deepen cooperation
notwithstanding, the recent past saw growing tensions between the US and China
over the US relations across Asia, maritime disputes in South and East China
Seas and human rightsall issues that fall under the rubric of the pivot.
This article attempts to understand the rationale behind Chinese rhetoric on
the US pivot to Asia, identifies Chinese responses to it and proposes possible
repercussions for the region.
106
Chinese Rhetoric on the US pivot
Chinese pronouncements on the US pivot to Asia can be divided into types
a) official statements, and b) writings in official and semi-official media including
newspapers and journals.
In the first category fall statements and remarks made by Chinese government
officials and spokespersons. With regard to the US pivot policy itself, the rhetoric
is far more muted than may have been expected. The tone of official
pronouncements regarding the US role in the Asia-Pacific was set early on and
is reflected in a speech made by Assistant Foreign Minister Le Yucheng in
December 2011.
1
With reference to the US pivot, Le said, Recently, the United
States has adjusted its policies toward the Asia-Pacific and increased its input in
this region. Some people are thus worried and doubt if China and the US can
coexist peacefully in the Asia-Pacific. Some even believe that Chinas surrounding
environment has deteriorated. In my view, the US has never left the Asia-Pacific,
so there is no return to speak of. China does not want to and cannot push the
United States out of the Asia-Pacific. We hope the US can play a constructive
role in this region, and that includes respecting Chinas major concerns and core
interests. The Pacific Ocean is vast enough to accommodate the coexistence and
cooperation between these two big countries.
Statements by officials thus highlight the ability of the US and China to
work together and betray little apprehension of American motives on the Chinese
side. Similarly, replies to questions by spokespersons of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs about the US role in the Asia-Pacific have generally highlighted
cooperation and the standard response has been: We welcome the US
constructive participation in the Asia-pacific affairs and stand ready to engage in
positive interactions with the US in Asia-Pacific so as to jointly safeguard regional
peace, stability and prosperity.
2
This positive spin on the US Asia policy does not necessarily extend to the
official media. Even as the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Liu
Weimin displayed no alarm at the prospect of increased American military presence
in Australia,
3
Xinhua, the official news agency of China, carried an opinion piece
that reflected Chinese apprehensions over US military activities. Titled, U.S.
Return to Asia Raises More Questions than It Can Answer, this piece questioned
the reliability of the US as a partner of Asian countries and cautioned against
American Cold War mentality.
4
Opinion pieces picked by editors in official
publications thus reflect antipathy towards American designs in Asia, which the
rhetoric of government officials seeks to downplay. Thus, the struggle between
the demands of growing Chinese power and nationalism on one hand and the
need to maintain stable relations with the US on the other hand is evident even
in official rhetoric when it refers to specific developments.
Semi-official media and commentators free from the constraints of diplomatic
finesse have largely been quite negative in their assessment of the motive and
purpose of the US pivot. Writings in the Peoples Daily and PLA Dailyboth of
US Pivot to Asia and China
107
which are known for close ties to the civilian and defence establishments of
Chinaview the US pivot policy as part of a zero-sum game.
Soon after Hilary Clintons article announcing Americas Pacific Century,
a commentary in the Peoples Daily decried US attempts to hedge against a
rising China.
5
Across the semi-official media, commentators usually see the pivot
as having one of three aims, which seem to link closely with the three elements
of the pivot policy. First, it is aimed at establishing the containment of China
through reinforced US military presence.
6
Second, it seeks to wrest regional
leadership away from China. In particular, American engagement with Association
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is seen as a precursor to US leadership of
ASEAN. Third, the US seeks to establish economic links in the region that need
not necessarily include China; thus establishing its economic centrality in a region
that has prospered through Chinas economic rise.
The Military Dimension
The military component of the rebalancing strategy was outlined in the Defense
Strategic Guidance document released by the US Department of Defence in
January 2012.
7
This document highlights American plans to strengthen existing
alliances in Asia and to seek greater cooperation with emerging partners. India
is identified as a linchpin in this strategy. The American relationship with India,
the document avers, is aimed at supporting its ability to serve as a regional
economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.
Given Chinese apprehensions of an evolving US-India partnership for the
containment of China
8
and the outstanding border dispute between China and
India, it cannot be wondered that Chinese threat perceptions have only been
exacerbated.
In addition, the document seemingly lays blame for regional tensions on the
Chinese doorstep by stating that the growth of Chinas military power must be
accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing
friction in the region. Both Iran and China are mentioned in the document as
countries that will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter American
power projection capabilities. It would thus suggest that the US clubs China, a
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, with Iran, which
had been identified as a rogue state by some American officials in the past.
Chinese commentators have seen the pivot to Asia as a clear signal of US
intentions to intervene in Chinas relations with its neighbours.
9
Commentators such as Huang Renwei of the Shanghai Academy of Social
Science believe that the US pivot poses largely a military challenge to China.
10
In this regard, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has continued acquisition of
military hardware and sought to improve skill development.
11
However, the
involvement of the US in Chinas maritime disputes in the recent past has only
deepened suspicions about America intentions. Japan-China tensions over
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea are seen as indicative of military
108
pressures the US may come to bear on China through the rebalance policy. The
Japanese government purchased three of five Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East
China Sea, which are also claimed by China, from private owners in September
2012. This nationalisation [sic] of the islands is viewed by China as an attempt
to change the existing status quo on the issue. US officials have refrained from
taking a position on the issue of sovereignty over the disputed territory, but have
reaffirmed that they recognise Okinawas administrative control of the islands
and as such these would fall within the ambit of the US-Japan security treaty.
12
The US would thus come to the aid of Japan in the event of external aggression
on the islands. Chinese commentaries have decried the US-Japan Security Alliance
as a remnant of the past and unreliable.
13
In addition, the US also held military
exercises with the Philippines (April 2012) and Japan (November 2012). The
reinvigoration of military relationships between the US and countries of the region,
particularly those which have territorial disputes with China, is unlikely to mitigate
Chinese threat perceptions. As regards issues in the East China Sea, Chinese
maritime vessels and planes have been aggressively patrolling the region around
the islands, American reassurances to Japan notwithstanding. The Chinese military
response to the Japanese purchase of the disputed islands seems to point to a
dangerous possibility of military escalation in the region. This development
suggests that a China that feels contained by the US and its military allies is
more likely to respond aggressively than seek dialogue.
The Diplomatic Dimension
An important component of the US pivot is bringing to bear the full force of
American diplomatic experience and strength to deepen diplomatic engagement
with countries of the region. Maintaining a good relationship with China has
been highlighted by US government officials as an integral part of the pivot
policy. First Hilary Clinton and later Thomas Donilon both underlined the
inclusion of China in the pivot policy. To this end, Vice President Xi Jinpings
high profile visit to the US in February 2012 was seen by some as laying the
groundwork for a stable relationship. Xi during the trip remarked that the two
countries would establish a new path of cooperative partnership between major
countries featuring harmonious coexistence, sound interactions and win-win
cooperation.
14
During this trip, Xi also made an unusual visit to the Pentagon.
This was taken as a good sign for increased military to military engagement
between the two sides. The Xi-Obama 2013 summit in California too seemed
to suggest that the two leaders had reached an understanding about respective
interests in the region. However, the rhetoric of new type of great power relations
aside, little headway seemed to have been made regarding American diplomatic
irritants for China in the region. Beginning with Hilary Clintons participation
in ASEAN-led forums, the US has only upgraded its participation in regional
organisations. There has been a concurrent deepening of bilateral relations in
109
the region. American diplomatic engagement of Philippines, Vietnam and
Myanmar, in particular, are viewed with suspicion by Chinese commentators.
American diplomatic engagement of countries in the region is often seen by
Chinese commentators as an excuse to foment trouble for China. An example of
this is found in US involvement in the disputes of the South China Sea. A stand-
off between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal began on
April 10, 2012. Manilas attempt to intercept a group of Chinese fishing vessels
that it claimed were fishing illegally in the waters around the shoal was prevented
by two Chinese maritime surveillance vessels. Even as the stand-off continued,
the US and Philippines held the first ever 2+2 meeting in April 2012. This
meeting, intended as a consultation for defence, security, political, and economic
policies between the two countries, follows the format of other such meetings
held between the US and key Asian alliesJapan and the Republic of Korea. It
is hardly surprising then that US diplomatic engagement in the region is viewed
as duplicitous by Chinese commentators.
15
On July 24, 2012, the Chinese government announced the creation of Sansha
city to strengthen administrative control over the Paracel islands, the Spratly island
chain as well as Macclesfield Bank, all of which are disputed regions in the South
China Sea. Subsequently, on August 3, 2012, the US Department of State, released
a statement on the South China Sea expressing concerns over Chinas unilateral
moves regarding the upgradation of Sansha city to a prefecture-level city and
plans to establish a military garrison there. The statement also made references
to Chinas coercive economic actions (restrictions on import of fruits from the
Philippines) and use of barriers to deny access (preventing Filipino fishing vessels
access to waters around the shoal) related to the dispute with the Philippines.
16
Chinese reaction to the statement was far from muted. Chinese Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Qin Gang while commenting on the American statement said,
The US statement ignored the facts and sent a totally inaccurate signal. Chinese
media too was replete with statements of outrage at biased American perceptions
of the situation.
17
Apart from responding to perceived American misrepresentation of issues,
the Chinese government has seemingly stepped up its efforts to woo Southeast
Asia. After the criticism faced by China in the wake of the 21
st
ASEAN Summit
in November 2012 at Phnom Penh, Chinese leaders have been at pains to allay
fears of ASEAN countries that do not have significant territorial disputes with
China. US President Obamas inability to participate in ASEAN-led forums in
October 2013 provided Chinese leaders with a distinct opportunity to gain the
initiative in regional forums. Xi Jinping undertook state visits to Indonesia and
Malaysia during this time announcing new initiatives to mitigate misgivings
among Southeast Asian countries. These included the Treaty of Good
Neighbourliness, Friendship, and Cooperation between China and ASEAN
proposed by Xi in his address to the Indonesian Parliament on October 3, 2013.
18
With both Indonesia and Malaysia, Xi secured agreements to raise bilateral
110
relations to comprehensive strategic partnerships including defence and security
cooperation. At the 16
th
ASEAN leaders Summit in Brunei on October 9, 2013,
Xi while praising the state of China-ASEAN relations in the last decade made a
seven-pronged proposal on the framework of bilateral cooperation for the coming
10 years.
19
Economic Dimension
In the Chinese view, the US pivots economic goal is to stimulate the American
economy and hasten its recovery. Even though statements by Chinese officials
underline that China remains open to joining the Trans Pacific Partnership
20
(TPP), which is the primary economic element of the US pivot, commentaries
in semi-official publications suggest otherwise. American assessments of regional
economic integration processes are believed by Chinese scholars to be negative,
seen as jeopardising Chinese economic interests.
21
An important element of this
assessment is believed to be Chinese centrality in regional economic gatherings.
Therefore, the TPP is viewed not only as a means to gain economic benefits by
the US but also as an attempt to undermine Chinas economic relations in Asia.
After all, free trade agreements such as the China-ASEAN (CAFTA), China-
Taiwan (ECFA) and ASEAN+3 economic arrangements have been the impetus
for regional integration in the past few years. Apart from wresting economic
initiative from China, the TPP and American championing of this trade pact
are viewed as an attempt to deny China political clout.
22
Hence, Chinese
commentators and scholars propose a two-pronged approach to the economic
aspect of the US pivot: a deepening of Chinese institutional engagement in the
region and strengthening the internationalisation of the Chinese Renminbi
(RMB). China has made steady progress in both these directions. Xi Jinping in
his engagement with ASEAN leaders in October 2013 announced major
economic initiatives, including the establishment of an Asian infrastructure
development bank and a new RMB 100 billion (US$ 16.3 billion) currency
swap agreement between the Chinese and Indonesian central banks. China has
also permitted Singapore-based investors to buy RMB denominated securities,
paving the way for direct trading between the two countries currencies.
23
This
comes at the heels of a similar deal during the British Chancellor George
Osbornes visit to China in October 2013. These developments suggest that China
is steadily though cautiously moving towards internationalisation of its currency.
24
Conclusion
It is evident that though rhetoric on the US pivot by Chinese officials has been
relatively bland, emphasising the positive prospects of stability in the region,
popular discourse as reflected in semi-official publications does not view the US
pivot as benign. Across military, diplomatic and economic realms, China has
sought to mitigate the ability of the US to squeeze Chinese influence and options.
Along with increased military acquisitions and exercises, a less compromising
111
rhetoric on territorial issues that may involve the US military has been adopted
by China. In this regard, the US pivot can be seen as forcing Chinas hand to
react more aggressively. On the diplomatic front, China considers US involvement
in maritime issues of Southeast Asia as a direct provocation. In this sphere, even
as it heightens military preparedness, China has sought to soothe apprehensions
of neighbouring countries and actively participate in regional forums. Economics
is increasingly being used by China as both a stick (in the case of the Philippines
during the stand-off over Scarborough Shoal) and as a carrot (proposals of an
ASEAN infrastructure bank). There is little doubt that China will fight to keep
the economic initiative in regional integration. Even as its neighbours in Southeast
Asia welcome US engagement in the region, it is clear that no country wants to
have to pick between China and the US. By engaging diplomatically and
economically, China seems to reassure its neighbours that they would not have
to make such a choice.
Both China and the US have a great interest in maintaining stable bilateral
relations; however, the threat perceptions shaping their world views continue to
pose a challenge to stability in their relationship. For China, the concerns centre
on the seeming inability and unwillingness of the US to accept Chinas emergence
as a global power centre. The US, at the same time, continues to remain wary
of the future trajectory of Chinas growth and its implications for American pre-
eminence in the world order. This is evident even in the apparently symbiotic
economic relationship. 2012 was marred by trade disputes between the two at
the WTO
25
and allegations from the US Department of Defence regarding
Chinese cyber espionage and theft of intellectual property.
26
It is thus hardly
surprising that the Pew Research Centers Global Attitudes Project
27
on American
and Chinese perceptions of each other found that the people in both countries
were increasingly wary of each other. 68 per cent of Americans surveyed said that
China could not be trusted too much, while the number of Chinese who regard
the US favourably has fallen 15 percentage points since 2010 to 43 per cent. It
can be expected that economic and strategic tensions between the two countries
will only increase in the coming years. Although each seeks to avoid confrontation,
especially in the military realm, the imperatives of domestic political discourse as
well as international obligations and aspirations can be expected to deepen
competition between the two countries in military, diplomatic and economic
realms.
NOTES
1. Le Yucheng, The Rapid Development of Chinas Diplomacy in a Volatile World, Seminar
on Chinas Diplomacy in 2011 and its Prospect, December 27, 2011, at http://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t890675.shtml.
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua
Chunyings Regular Press Conference on April 16, 2013, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/
xwfw/s2510/t1032142.shtml.
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu
112
Weimins Regular Press Conference on November 17, 2011, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t879769.shtml.
4. Wei Jianhua, U.S. Return to Asia Raises More Questions than It Can Answer, Xinhua,
November 19, 2011, at http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2011-11/19/content_23959449.
htm.
5. Wang Tian, US Uses Hedging Strategy to Deal with Chinas Rise, Peoples Daily, December
26, 2011, at http://english.people.com.cn/90780/7688310.html.
6. Shi Yinhong, Meiguo zai Dongbei Ya: quanshi zhendi de suiji gonggu (The US in Northeast
Asia), Contemporary International Relations, no. 1, 2012 and Ruhe kandai meiguo
chongfan yatai (How Should US Return to Asia Pacific be Perceived?), China Youth Daily,
February 27, 2012.
7. US Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense, Washington, DC, January 2012, at http://www.defense.gov/news/
defense_strategic_guidance.pdf (Accessed January 30, 2012).
8. Wang Aijun, Yindu yinying meiguo yatai junshi zhanlue zai pingheng de jucuo (Indias
Response to the US Military Strategy in Asia Pacific Rebalancing), Journal of PLA Nanjing
Institute of Politics, No 5, 2012, pp. 68-72.
9. Cui Tiankai and Pang Hanzhao, China-US Relations in Chinas Overall Diplomacy in
the New EraOn China and US Working Together to Build a New-Type Relationship
Between Major Countries, China International Strategy Review 2012, July 20, 2012, at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t953682.htm (Accessed July 22, 2012).
10. Huang Renwei, Meiguo yazhou zhanlue de zai pingheng yu zhongguo zhanlue you shi zai
pinggu (US. Asia Strategy Rebalancing and Re-evaluation of Chinas Strategic Advantage),
Contemporary International Relations, No 8, 2012, pp. 35-36.
11. These aspects focused on the PLA are covered in the chapter on Chinas Military Response
to US Rebalancing Strategy by Brig Mandeep Singh of this compendium.
12. Panetta Tells China that Senkakus under Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, The Asahi Shimbun,
September 21, 2012, at http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201209210061 (Accessed
September 29, 2012).
13. Commentary: U.S. Move on Diaoyu Islands to Backfire against Itself , Xinhua, December
2, 2012, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-12/02/c_132013955.htm
(Accessed December 12, 2012). Also see: Luo Yuan, China Will Never Yield on Issues of
Territory and Sovereignty, PLA Daily, September 12, 2012, at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/
Opinion/2012-09/12/content_4399069.htm (Accessed September 12, 2012).
14. The White House, Remarks by Vice President Biden and Chinese Vice President Xi at
the State Department Luncheon, press release, February 14, 2012, at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/14/remarks-president-obama-and-vice-
president-xi-peoples-republic-china-bil (Accessed February 21, 2012).
15. Liu Chang, Washington Needs to Take Concrete Steps to Promote China-U.S. Ties,
Xinhua, August 4, 2012, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/04/
c_131825846.htm (Accessed August 7, 2012).
16. US Department of State, Patrick Ventrell, Acting Deputy Spokesperson, Office of Press
Relations: Statement on the South China Sea, press statement, August 3, 2012, at http:/
/www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/08/196022.htm (Accessed August 25, 2012).
17. Yang Jinghao, China Hits Back US over Sansha Claim, Global Times, August 6, 2012, at
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/725320.shtml (Accessed August 25, 2012).
18. China Proposes Treaty with ASEAN Countries over South China Sea Dispute, Firstpost,
October 9, 2013, at http://www.firstpost.com/world/china-proposes-treaty-with-asean-
countries-over-south-china-sea-dispute-1162197.html.
19. China Flags Setting Up Infrastructure Funding Bank to Boost Links with ASEAN, Xinhua,
October 11, 2013, at http://www.travel-impact-newswire.com/2013/10/china-flags-setting-
113
up-infrastructure-funding-bank-to-boost-links-with-asean/#axzz2kUi88lGC.
20. China Holds an Open Attitude to Trans-Pacific Partnership Pact: Official, Xinhua,
November 15, 2011, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-11/15/
c_131248604.htm.
21. Hong Zuo, Meiguo chongfan yatai de zhanlue kaolu (Considerations about the US Return
to AsiaPacific Strategy), Study Times, May 28, 2012, p. 2.
22. Zhang Yuanan, Chen Lixiong and Chen Qin, Closer Look: How Agreements Like the
TPP Press China to Reform, Caixin Online, October 30, 2013, at http://english.caixin.com/
2013-10-30/100597450.html.
23. New Initiatives to Strengthen China-Singapore Financial Cooperation, Press release by
the Monetary Authority of Singapore, October 22, 2013, at http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-
and-Publications/Press-Releases/2013/New-Initiatives-to-Strengthen-China-Singapore-
Financial-Cooperation.aspx.
24. John Sudworth, Osborne China Visit: Business Deal Cuts Both Ways, BBC News, October
15, 2013, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24535722.
25. Chris Isidore,

US vs. China: The

Trade Battles,

CNN Money, March 13, 2012, at
http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/13/news/international/china-trade/index.htm (Accessed
March 15, 2012).
26. Paul Eckert and Phil Stewart, Chinese Entities Worlds Biggest Economic Spies: Pentagon,
Reuters, May 19, 2012, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/19/us-usa-china-military-
idUSBRE84I06X20120519 (Accessed May 19, 2012).
27. Bruce Drake, American, Chinese Publics Increasingly Wary of the Other, Pew Research
Center, November 1, 2012, at http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/11/01/american-chinese-
publics-increasingly-wary-of-the-other/ (Accessed November 21, 2012).
8
Chinese Military Response to
Mandip Singh
Writing in the classic The History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides, the famed
historian and military thinker, wrote: The growth of the power of Athens, and
the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable.
1
He went
on to add that it was not just the fear caused to Sparta by Athens, even the state
of Corinth blamed Athens for aiding Corcyra. This raised the additional danger
of entangling alliances. This phenomenon, also called the Thucydides Trap, is
what the world is witnessing today. Simply put, a rising power is bound to
challenge the established power, and to meet the responses of the established
power, the rising power will invariably compete if not confront the established
power. Thus, China, the rising power, views the US rebalancing strategy towards
the Asia-Pacific as a strategy to contain China, while the US, the established
power, believes China is positioning itself to overthrow the US as the undisputed
leader of the international world order.
The numbers speak for themselves. China, the second largest economy in
the world, has $ 3.2 trillion in reserves to back its economy riding at an astounding
GDP growth of over 10 per cent over the better part of the last two decades and
a massive military modernisation programme supported by a steady 10 per cent
increase in its military budget over the same period. From here onwards, the
figures only get better. According to the US National Intelligence Council report
titled Global Trends 2030, economically, China is projected to become the
worlds leading economy surpassing the US; militarily, US ability to depend on
its historic alliance partnerships will diminish even further; technologically, while
still remaining the world leader, Chinas large, sustained investments could make
it close to a peer competitor by 2030.
2
The World Bank report of 2009 stated:
In 2020 Chinas GDP per capita would be broadly comparable to the current
level in Latin America, Turkey and Malaysia. Adjusted for purchasing power, in
2020 Chinas GDP per capita would be one-fourth of the US level and Chinas
Chinese Military Response to US Rebalancing Strategy
115
total economy larger than that of the US.
3
All in all, the ominous signs of
declining US power and a determined China marching towards, and seeking, a
new type of great power relation,
4
a phrase that is increasingly gaining currency
in the Chinese lexicon in describing its future relations with the US.
The US rebalancing strategy has been explained in detail by several office
bearers of the Obama administration over a period of time, and it is now clear
that the strategy has an all-encompassing aim of enlarging the US footprint in
the Asia-Pacific in the diplomatic, economic, social and military dimensions.
The Chinese reactions to this strategy are also all-encompassing. This paper looks
at just one facet of the Chinese response, viz. the military dimension, and seeks
to review Chinas military strategies to challenge the US in the Asia-Pacific. The
paper looks at doctrinal, military diplomacy, weapon acquisitions and
reorganisation in force structures underway in the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)
as a part of this military strategy.
Counter Intervention Strategy
The US administration has termed Chinas response strategy as Anti-Access,
Area Denial or A2AD. Chinese authors have been using the term Counter
Intervention (CI). Its two components are: anti-accessdenying the enemy
access to territorial boundariesand area denialpreventing the enemy
unhindered or unchallenged freedom of operations in the proximity to its
territorial boundaries.
In a broader context, anti-access imposes caution on the enemy by presenting
a threat to its bases, installations and assets using an array of missiles
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles/Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (ICBM/
IRBMs)and aircraft at long ranges. Nearer home, the freedom of unhindered
use of the common spaces is denied using a mix of nuclear powered submarines,
Carrier Strike Groups (CGSs), stealth fighter aircraft and Short-Range Ballistic
Missiles (SRBMs). In the Chinese context, this is best explained by the Map 1.
China is geographically gifted: Its land boundaries are largely along natural
terrain features, which do not lend itself to easy access. In the North and North
East lies the cold Siberian Tundra, while in the North West lies the hostile Gobi
desert. The West is isolated by the high mountains that emanate from the Pamirs,
and the South and South West is bounded by the Himalayas. Thus, it is only the
seas to its East that afford the easiest routes to mainland China. These have been
identified by two strategic lines: the first island chain along the line Sasebo-
Okinawa-Taiwan-Philippines-Sarawak that include the East China Sea (ECS)
and South China Sea (SCS), and the second island chain along the line Yokosuka-
Guam-Papua-New Guinea that includes the Western Pacific Ocean and the
Philippine Sea. Chinese counter intervention strategy aims to prevent the US
and its allies access to the first island chain by use of a combination of ASBMs/
ASCMs in the area between the two island chains, and deny them freedom of
operation in the SCS and ECS using a combination of SRBMs, CSGs, nuclear
116
submarines and Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) systems. The entire
strategy hinges on a robust, reliable and survivable Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) platform comprising of information warfare, cyber warfare
and space warfare capabilities.
The strategy is discussed in the following subsections:
Doctrinal shiftextension of the active defence.
Increased military diplomacy.
Rightsizing, reorganisation and restructuring.
Weapons acquisition and development programme.
Doctrinal Shift
While China maintains that its basic doctrine remains active defence and its
intentions are purely defensive, the manifestation of this doctrine has seen a steady
shift in goalposts. According to Yarosh and Cordesman, it is defensive but
specifically states that a strategic defensive posture is only viable if mated with
an offensive operational posture.
5
In the early Mao years, the PLA Navy (PLAN)
was a coastal brown navy with a role limited to patrolling its coast, while the
PLA had a continental mindset, limiting itself to exerting influence and force in

Fig. 1
Map courtesy: http://luckybogey.wordpress.com/2010/12/30/hair-of-the-dog/
117
the immediate neighbourhood. After Jiang Zemins enunciation of the Two
Transformations, the PLA began to look outward in the early 1990s. In recent
years, the PLA has expanded its interests exponentially by extending its outreach
to as far as the Gulf of Aden in anti-piracy duties, contributing the largest
contingents to UN peacekeeping operations worldwide and undertaking fleet
patrols beyond the first island chain in the western Pacific Ocean.
6
In recent
years, there have been reports of Chinese submarines carrying out patrols in the
Pacific and Indian oceans with increased periodicity. A news report in Hindustan
Times quoting a classified document by the Indian defence ministry said that
at least 22 contacts were recorded with vessels suspected to be Chinese attack
submarines patrolling outside Beijings territorial waters last year,
7
while The
Diplomat quoted an extract from a US government report on China that the
PLA Navy has begun to conduct military activities within the Exclusive Economic
Zones (EEZs) of other nations, without the permission of those coastal states.
Of note, the United States has observed over the past year several instances of
Chinese naval activities in the EEZs around Guam and Hawaii ... While the
United States considers the PLA Navy activities in its EEZ to be lawful, the
activity undercuts Chinas decades-old position that similar foreign military
activities in Chinas EEZ are unlawful.
8
In April 2013, the PLA released a paper titled Diversified Employment of
Chinas Armed Forces. This paper replaced the biennial National Defence Paper
that was traditionally a roundup of the PLAs policies and employment of its
main services. The new paper is shorter by half, has done away with foreign
policy and nuclear issues altogether and makes no mention of Chinas military
budget. However, the paper gives a fair idea of the PLA direction in the coming
future. Without mentioning the US, it clearly identifies US as having expanded
its military presence in the Asia-Pacific and making the situation there tenser.
The roles for the four services as enumerated in the paper define the PLAs doctrine
shift as follows:
In line with strategic requirements of mobile operations and multi-
dimensional offense and defense [sic], the PLAA has been reoriented from
theater defense [sic] to trans-theater [sic] mobility.
9
(Italics for emphasis)
This gives the PLA ground forces flexibility and strategic mobility to
concentrate large forces at the point of decision in minimum time with
dedicated effort.
The PLAN develops blue-water capabilities of conducting mobile operations,
carrying out international cooperation and countering non-traditional security
threats, and enhances its capabilities of strategic deterrence and counter
attack.
10
(Italics for emphasis) While the newly inducted carrier Liaoning
has already been on patrol, its fleets have been active in international waters.
PLAN maintains a flotilla of 3-4 ships combating piracy in the Gulf of
Aden. On March 19, 2013, a flotilla consisting of four principal warships
and other auxiliaries led by the Jinggangshan, an amphibious Landing
118
Platform Dock (LPD) warship of the South China fleet, carried out a
5000-nautical-mile voyage in the SCS and the Western Pacific Ocean.
The flotilla followed the general alignment of the nine-dash line in a
demonstration of Chinas claim in the region.
11
The flotilla was at sea for
16 days and crossed through the Bashi Straits (between Taiwan and the
Philippines) into the Western Pacific Ocean beyond the traditional first
island chain, indicating its capability to operate and project naval power
in the Western Pacific. It also visited James Shoal, the southernmost point
of the nine-dash line, almost 1,800 km from the mainland and just 80
km from Sarawak, an area claimed by Malaysia and China. At James Shoal,
an elaborate oath ceremony was held by the sailors fuelling jingoism and
instilling nationalist fervour in the rank and file. According to Strait Times,
the crew vowed to defend the South China Sea, maintain national
sovereignty and strive towards the dream of a strong China, among other
pledges.
12
The fleet commander, Admiral Jiang Weillie, acknowledged that
in recent times this training has increased in frequency from once every
few years and nowadays several times every year,
13
confirming an active
presence of the PLAN in the SCS in recent days.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is strengthening the development of a combat
force structure that focuses on reconnaissance and early warning, air strike,
air and missile defence and strategic projection.
14
The recent unveiling of three major aircraftthe J-20 FGFA, the J-31
FGFA and the Y-20 transportis a manifestation of the PLAAFs air strike
and strategic projection capabilities.
The PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) is a core force for Chinas
strategic deterrence and its capabilities of strategic deterrence, nuclear
counterattack and convention precision strike are being steadily
elevated.
15
Military Diplomacy
Military diplomacy has emerged as a key component of Chinas CI strategy. China
conducted its first ever joint exercise with a foreign army in 2002. Ever since,
the PLA has embarked on a comprehensive and institutionalised programme of
joint exercises with over 30 countries in the last decade. While the PLA Army
has played a predominant role in as much as 50 per cent of the 60 joint exercises
conducted so far, the PLAN and PLAAF have also increased their interaction
with foreign armies. However, as the powerful militaries of the US and allies
enlarge their footprints in the Asia-Pacific, China has reached out to the two
most powerful militaries that have a profound influence on the Asia-Pacific
Russia and India.
Russia
President Xi Jinping decided to make Russia his first overseas visit destination,
119
signalling a huge shift in China-Russia relations. For the first time ever, a Head
of State was accorded a ceremonial welcome by the Russian Defence Ministry at
the Russian Armed Forces Operational Command Centre. Xi was briefed by
Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation, in the presence of the Russian Defence Minister Sergey Kuzhugetovich
Shoygu and Chinese Defence Minster Chang Wanquan and State Councillor
for Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi. From the Centre he was shown alternately real-
time images of the Russian land force, navy and air force, strategic missile forces
and special forces on duty and at drills. Xi listened, through the control systems,
to the reports from generals of Russian fleets on marine escort missions,
commanding officers of relevant regions on duty and heads of military industry
enterprises that have cooperation with China.
16
Undoubtedly, the Russians had
sent a strong signal that they retained the technological superiority and the
capability to be a strong contender for military power in the changing global
order in the Asia-Pacific.
China has a large inventory of Soviet and Russian weapons. From 1990-
2007, Russia sold China almost $ 25 billion of weapons. These include some of
the front-line systems that are in service in the PLA todayover 200 SU-27 and
SU-30 air superiority fighter aircraft, 20-50 IL-76 heavy lift transports, four
Sovremenny Class destroyers, 12 kilo class diesel submarines and 16 battalions
of S-300 PMU-1 and S-300 PMU-2 air defence regiments that form the backbone
of missile defence cover to the Chinese mainland. In 2007, Russia accused China
of reverse engineering its aircraftthe J-11 copied from the SU-27and cut
off all arms transfers.
17
This choked the supply of spares affecting maintenance
and operability of these systems. While the PLA has embarked on an ambitious
weapons indigenisation programme, it needs to ensure that in the interim period,
till these weapon systems reach serial production, its security and defence needs
are not jeopardised. More so when tensions with Japan in the ECS and its
assertiveness in the SCS has the potential for conflagration in the near future.
Chinas military industrial complex has already demonstrated that its technology
and innovation capabilities compare with that of the Russians, and it does not
require Russian weaponry, yet till its major weapon systems are fielded, like the
Carrier Strike Battle Groups (three-five CSBGs by 2020 ), nuclear powered
submarines (three under construction), J-20 and J-31 fifth generation fighter
aircraft (likely to be inducted by 2018 and 2020, respectively), Y-20 heavy lift
aircraft (likely induction by 2014) and Type-071 LPDs (two under construction)
and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), China needs Russia. Russia, in contrast,
has vast military industrial complex urgently in need of orders and rejuvenation.
Its a win-win for both nations. The $ 3.5 billion order for 24 SU-35 fighters and
four Amur (some reports suggest Lada Class although both are conventional
type) class diesel submarines
18
need to be seen in this perspective. In fact, this is
not all, there are reports that China and Russia were expected to co-operate
further in developing military technology, including S-400 long-range anti-aircraft
120
missiles, IL-76 transport aircraft and IL-78 air-refuelling tankers.
19
Some of
these are renewed contracts that halted when Russia pulled the plug on arms
transfers in 2007.
In April 2012, China and Russia held the largest ever naval exercise in the
western Pacific in which Russia fielded seven ships and China exercised 18 of its
state-of-the-art naval vessels together over a period of five days in the Yellow Sea
of the port of Qingdao.
20
In its list of 10 most important exercises in the world
in 2012, PLA Daily listed this joint exercise right on top, hinting perhaps to the
US the importance China gives to its growing naval cooperation with Russia in
the Western Pacific.
This feat was soon overtaken when from July 5-12, 2013, the Chinese and
Russian navies held their largest-ever joint naval exercise off the Bay of Peter the
Great in the Sea of Japan. Called Joint Sea 2013/Naval Interaction 2013, the
PLAN sent four destroyers, two missile frigates and a support ship, while 12
ships including with one submarine, three fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and
special warfare units represented Russia. This exercise saw the two navies fire live
munitions, practise anti-piracy drills and conduct joint patrols.
The Peace Mission series of anti-terrorism exercises is another initiative
where China and Russia are the biggest contributors and the militaries cooperate
closely. These exercises bear important significance in promoting the established
mechanism of joint exercises under the SCO framework, deterring and striking
the three evil forces (terrorism, separatism and extremism) and maintaining
regional security and stability.
21
China would like to continue these exercises as
it serves its interests in the controlling the restive Xinjiang region bordering the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) member nations. China also
purchased 50 Russian Mi-171 helicopters and AL-31F engines in deals worth
$ 1.3 billion in 2012. Russias Federal Military-Technical Cooperation Service is
quoted as saying that in 2012 alone arms sales to China rose to $ 2 billion
amounting to 15 per cent of total arms sales by Russia in 2012.
22
Clearly, China
needs Russia to put its counter intervention strategy into place.
India
There are two distinct schools of thought on dealing with India in China. The
hawks, largely PLA driven, are wary of the growing military relations between
India and the US. Strategically, they view India as a part of the growing concert
of democracies comprising Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and
the US, which intend to contain China. They cite the Indo-US nuclear deal
and the $ 10 billion arms sales to India in recent years as examples of the growing
US-India relations. The more conservative foreign ministry sees hope in engaging
India and weaning it away from the US. They quote, Indias policy of strategic
autonomy and historical precedent of never joining an alliance as indicators of
Indias ability to maintain a balance in relations with both China and US.
Chinese Defence Minister Li Guanglies visit to India in September 2012 set
121
the stage for a thaw in military exchanges between China and India post the
denial of visa to a senior Indian military commander. Among other issues, China
realised the sensitivity of the border dispute in the Indian mindset especially after
the commemoration of the 60
th
year of the 1962 war with China in 2012, which
invigorated a serious debate across India on our relations with China. The new
Peoples Republic of China (PRC) leadership sent the right signals: In his first
meeting with PM Manmohan Singh, President Xi Jinping said: China and India
should improve and make good use of the mechanism of special representatives
to strive for a fair, rational solution framework acceptable to both sides as soon
as possible (on the border issue).
23
In addition, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang
surprised the Indian leadership by selecting India as its first destination of his
first ever overseas visit. In what is termed as a handshake across the Himalayas,
he said in an op-ed in The Hindu, Chinas development promises opportunities
for India, and Indias development promises opportunities for China. Our
common development will benefit people of the two countries and offer the world
more and better opportunities,
24
alluding to a new beginning in India-China
relations. Writing a piece in a leading Indian newspaper prior to Li Keqiangs
visit to India, Chinese ambassador to India Wei Wei wrote that it is Chinas
strategic choice and established policy to strengthen good-neighborly [sic] and
friendly cooperation with India, and that will not change
25
a far different tone
from the one made by one of his predecessors who laid claim to the entire state
of Arunachal Pradesh just prior to the commencement of Hu Jintaos visit to
India in 2006.
In January 2012, both sides set up the Agreement on a Working Mechanism
for Consultation and Coordination on Boundary Affairs, a Confidence Building
Measure (CBM) to reduce tensions on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). At the
fifth Annual Defence Dialogue (ADD) in Beijing in January 2013, two sides
agreed to expand and enhance bilateral exchanges covering the Armies, Navies
and Air Forces of the two countries. They agreed to advance mutual strategic
trust and enhance mutually beneficial practical cooperation.
26
This also paved
the way for a reciprocal visit of Indias Defence Minister to China from July 4-
7, 2013. The visit was salvaged by the Chinese after an unconditional withdrawal
of its troops, which had transgressed the LAC at Depsang in Ladakh and set
camp inside Indian territory for almost 20 days from April 15 to May 5, 2013.
Realising the gravity of the situation and the adverse impact on the budding
relationship, the PLA relented and reverted to status quo ante. During the
Indian Defence Ministers visit, both sides discussed the Border Defence
Cooperation Agreement (BDCA), a far reaching CBM that seeks to further cement
the military ties and mitigate tension across the 4,057 km-long LAC.
The coming year would see the two armies participate in a joint anti-terrorism
exercise in China, while the navies would increase ship visits, conduct joint
maritime search and rescue and joint counter piracy operations. As a first, the
two air forces will also conduct functional exercises in flight safety, aviation
medicine and training.
122
Rightsizing, Reorganisation and Restructuring
The 2.3 million-strong PLA
27
appears to have undergone further downsizing
and reorganisation. According to the 2013 Defence paper, the strength of PLA
Army (PLAA) is 850,000 while the PLAN and PLAAF are 235,000 and 398,000,
respectively totalling 1.48 million (about 1.5 million). This total of 1.5 million
does not include the PLASAF whose last known strength was 100,000. Thus, it
can be assessed that almost 800,000 troops have been reorganised and absorbed
into various organisations like the PLASAF, which is undergoing an expansion
in conventional missile capability, possible raising of cyber warfare and space
warfare units.
28
In addition to intensify [ing] the strategic administration
29
of the Central
Military Commission (CMC), the PLA has established the Department of
Strategic Planning, reorganised the Communications Department as the General
Staff Headquarters (GSH) Infomationisation Department and the Training and
Arms Department as the Training Department in the GSH. These three
departments are responsible for integrating the four services of the PLA and
coordinating the operations, communications and training of all components of
the PLA as a part of its doctrine of Integrated Joint Operations (IJOs).
The PLA has also expanded and operationalised the PLA Marine Corps,
which has been trained in undertaking amphibious operations and actions against
hostile vessels at sea.
30
This force is mandated to undertake sea landed operations
by effecting capture of island territories at sea giving the PLA the capability of
transporting, supporting and executing amphibious operations. Interestingly, both
the marine brigades are presently known to be under the Southern Fleet responsible
for expansion of interests in the SCS.
31
The PLA established the Sansha Garrison Command on the Sansha islands,
a part of Hainan Province, in May 2012. The garrison is responsible for national
defense mobilisation [sic] and the militia and reserve forces in Sansha City. This
was earlier part of Xisha Maritime Garrison Command directly under the PLA
Navy.
32
Peoples Daily reports that its national defense [sic] function will become
more complete, its comprehensive defensive capabilities more strengthened, and
its joint combat capabilities more enhanced by setting up this division size
command. Located on Yongxing Island, this 1.9 km-long island is devoid of
fresh water and depends on the mainland for sustenance. According to Global
Times, Top priority of the work of the Sansha City is to maintain the sovereignty
over the islands (Xisha, Zhongsha and Nansha), reefs and waters, and it needs
a matched garrison command that integrates island, sea and air garrison
capabilities.
33
The Sansha Military Area Command (MAC) gives the PLAN the
capability to deny freedom of operation to hostile forces in the SCS.
The most important restructuring has been effected in Chinas coastal and
maritime defence forces. The uncoordinated and often disjointed actions by the
five dragons, the various maritime agencies functioning under different
ministries, during the incidents at Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and Scarborough shoal
123
necessitated a central body to control maritime law enforcement and protect and
use its oceanic resources. Accordingly, a new agency, named National Oceanic
Administration (NOA) has been created and will have under its control the coast
guard forces of the Public Security Ministry, the fisheries law enforcement
command of the Agriculture Ministry, and the maritime anti-smuggling police
of the General Administration of Customs. Earlier, the NOA had just one
maritime law enforcement department, China Marine Surveillance (CMS) under
its command. The proposed administration, under the Ministry of Land and
Resources, will carry out law enforcement activities in the name of China maritime
police bureau and under the operational direction of the Ministry of Public
Security.
34
Weapon Acquisition and Development
Anti-Access
The mainstay of Chinas anti-access arsenal are the long range Anti-Ship Ballistic
Missiles (ASBMs) and the Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs). These missiles
aim at destruction of US bases, logistics and support echelons and CSGs. The
US bases in South Korea, Japan, Singapore and the Philippines are well within
Chinas SRBMs/IRBMs forcing the US to provide for extended deterrence
including nuclear deterrence to its allies in East Asia. The DF-21D ASBM has
been nicknamed carrier killer because of its unique ability to generate hypersonic
speeds on the end of its trajectory and by a system of control fins, evade
countermeasures and home in on a moving target. This makes an ASBM different
from most ballistic missiles, which have a ?xed trajectory during the terminal
phase of flight making it extremely difficult to intercept and destroy in a short
reaction time frame. The DF-21D is based on a variant of the CSS-5 Medium-
Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) with a range in excess of 1,500 km, is armed
with a manoeuvrable warhead, and when integrated with appropriate command
and control systems, is intended to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships,
including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean.
35
The other weapon of denying access is the nuclear-powered submarine. China
continues production of its newest Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN) and is likely to produce five new SSBNs of the Type
094 class. In addition, it is known to have two Shang-class (Type 093) nuclear-
powered attack submarines (SSN), four older Han-class SSNs and Chinas single
Xia-class SSBN (although the Xia-class never undertook an operational patrol).
According to the US Department of Defence report of 2010, China is further
expanding its current force of nuclear-powered attack submarines and may add
up to five advanced Type 095 SSNs to the inventory in the coming years.
36
Area-Denial
The PLA has developed a combination of new generation missiles, aircraft and
124
sea borne combatants to deny unimpeded and uncontested use of Chinas near
seas. The PLASAF has been developing a potent conventional missile capability
after it realised that its No First Use (NFU) nuclear policy may jeopardise its
second strike capability by use of precision conventional weapons. The thrust
has been on Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) like the 1,500 km DH-10
and mobile solid fuelled SRBMs. In fact, PLASAFs changing force structure
during 1985-2012 indicates that the PLASAF has as many as 46.96 per cent
SRBM and 11.74 per cent LACMs in its total inventory of missile launchers.
37
In addition, the Second Artillerys inventory of Short-Range Ballistic Missiles
(SRBM) deployed to units opposite Taiwan stood at more than 1,100.
38
To
improve the lethality of this force, the PLA is also introducing new SRBM variants
with improved ranges, accuracies and payloads. This lends credibility to Chinas
focus on areadenial capabilities in the coastal, littoral and near seas.
On July 24, there were reports that China tested the DF-41, a three-stage
solid propellant ICBM with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle
(MIRV) capability. Test fired from Wuzhai test centre, the DF-41 has a range of
12,000-14,000 km and can carry three to 11 warheads with a CEP of 100-500
m. It is capable of rail and road transportation and can be fired from rail cars or
Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) vehicles and is likely to be stored in caves.
39
The most important technological achievement of this missile is its ability to
defeat the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Shield of the US and its allies by its
MIRV capability.
The PLAAF got a shot in the arm with the maiden flight of the J-31, the
new stealth fighter prototype developed by AVIC Shenyang Aircraft Corporation
(SAC) on October 31, 2012. The J-31 is a fifth-generation stealth fighter which
looks like the F-35 of the US. A Taiwan-based report suggests that Russian
Yakovlev Aircraft Corporation sold the Yak-141 engine to China sometime early
last decade, which was used by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group to develop the
J-20, the countrys first stealth fighter, while Shenyang Aircraft Corporation
developed the J-31.
40
The J-31 being smaller and more technologically superior
is likely to replace the J-15 for service on the aircraft carriers in future. This
coupled with the J-20, which was unveiled in 2011, will form the main stay of
the of air defence of Chinas coastal defences and interests up to the second island
chain.
Among the surface combatants in the PLAN are the Type 052D guided
missile destroyers, under construction at the China State Shipbuilding Corp,
Jiangnan Changxing shipyard near Shanghai. As many as 10 Type 052D DDGs
could currently be under construction. At 160 m long and 18 m wide, the Type
052D is slightly larger than its predecessor, the Type 052C, and is believed to
weigh in at just over 6,000 tonnes.
41
Reports indicate the vessel will use a Type
346 Active Phased Array Radar System and Type 518 L-band long-range radar.
The main 100 mm gun on the Type 052C appears to have been replaced by a
new PJ-38 130 mm gun in addition to a helicopter-landing platform and close-
125
in weapon system. According to China Military News, the new destroyers are
equipped with two 32-unit vertical launch systems capable of launching HQ-9B
air-defence missiles, anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles (range 7-125 km).
42
The other major production is the Type 022 Houbei class Fast attack boats which
have been constructed in large numbers. The Houbei Class are wave piercing
catamarans, equipped with eight YJ-82/83 series of missiles with a range of 200
km and at 38 knots present a formidable target to an adversary when operating
in large numbers off the coastal and littoral waters. When operating with 16
Song class (Type 039) and 12 Kilo class (Type EKM 636/877) submarines, they
can sanitise Chinas vast coastal waters.
Space and Cyber Warfare
The success of the CI strategy hinges on Chinas ISR capabilitiesreal time,
reliable, robust with inherent redundancyto support its weapon systems and
deployment. The two main components of the ISR capabilities are space and
cyber domains. China has made great strides in the development of its space
capabilitiesoffensive space capability demonstrated by the ASAT test in 2007
by downing a satellite using rockets and defensive space capability by putting in
place its own 35 satellite Beidou navigation system for guidance, navigation and
communications. With as many as 18 space launches in 2012 alone, Chinas
ambitious space programme reflects its importance to space-based intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, meteorological and communications.
Of the 18 satellites, 11 were remote sensing satellites, which serve dual
applications supporting military and civil requirements. China also launched
three communications satellites, five experimental small satellites, one
meteorological satellite, one relay satellite and a manned space mission in 2012.
43
China uses two types of satellites for secure military communicationsthe
Fenghuo and the Shentong. The Fenghuo provides secure digital data and voice
communication to Chinese military forces, while the Shentong provides secured
voice and data communications services for ground users using Ku-band. On
May 27, 2012, China launched the Zhongxing-2A (Chinasat-2A) by a Chang
Zheng-3B (Y17) (Long March 3B) rocket from the Xichang Satellite Launch
Centre. The Chinasat-2A satellite was built on the DFH-4 platform, with a launch
mass around 5,200 kg and is the first of a second-generation DFH-4-based
Shentong-2 satellite in operation. This will greatly enhance the PLAs voice and
data usage capabilities as it gets informationalised. This was the 163
rd
successful
Chinese orbital launch, 163
rd
launch of a Chang Zheng launch vehicle, fifth
launch from Xichang in 2011 (73
rd
overall from Xichang) and eighth successful
orbital launch for China in 2012.
44
Among the other space-based programmes
are plans to launch the Tiangong-2 space lab in 2014 and the Hard X-ray
Modulation Telescope (HXMT), the countrys first astronomy satellite, around
2015.
45
The PLA cyber warfare responsibility lies with General Staff Departments
126
(GSD) Fourth Department (Electronic Countermeasures), while the Computer
Network Defence (CND) and intelligence gathering responsibilities are with the
GSD Third Department (Signals Intelligence). They have been integrated to
launch the Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW) strategy which aims
at a combined application of electronic warfare and computer network operations
against an adversarys command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks. Unconfirmed
reports indicate that the Third Department could have as many as 130,000
personnel working in general headquarters staff positions, 12 operational bureaus
and three research institutes.
46
PLA campaign doctrine identifies the early
establishment of information dominance over an enemy as one of the highest
operational priorities in a conflict; INEW appears designed to support this
objective.
47
There is adequate evidence to suggest that the PLA has been reaching
out to the civilian sector including commercial sources for such operations.
Since the US logistic and supply lines are long and vulnerable, they offer a
prime target for PLAs cyber operations. A 2012 Northrop Grumman report for
the US Government states:
PLA analysts consistently identify logistics and C4ISR infrastructure as US
strategic centers of gravity suggesting that PLA commanders will almost
certainly attempt to target these system with both electronic countermeasures
weapons and network attack and exploitation tools, likely in advance of actual
combat to delay US entry or degrade capabilities in a conflict
48
Analysis
Having seen the four-pronged Chinese military response to the US rebalancing
strategy, the obvious question that needs an answer is: Are the Chinese are
adequately prepared to challenge the US in the Asia-Pacific? It may be recalled
that the doctrinal shift in Chinese military thinking and its weapon acquisition
programme commenced much earlier when Jiang Zemin pushed for transforming
the military in the 1990s. It was a result of a long-term plan based on national
interests and threat assessment supported by the Communist Party of China
(CPC). The US rebalancing strategy is a more recent policy initiative. Has the
US reacted to the Chinese expanding national interests or have the Chinese
responded to the US rebalancing strategy? The answer lies somewhere in between.
Chinas expanding interests and rising aspirations became evident in its quest
for energy security in Africa and Latin America, expanding trade and markets in
Central Asia and South East Asia and growing assertiveness on its maritime and
land frontiers. These drew the attention of the Bush administration, which first
propounded the pivot to Asia-Pacific policy, but was unable to implement owing
to its commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan.
49
It was the Obama administration
that realised the need to reassure its allies in the Asia-Pacific, as also reassert its
position as the worlds paramount power that dictated the rationale for its
rebalancing strategy.
127
It is unlikely that China will challenge the US in the near future. At one-
sixth the budget, one-third the naval size, low technology and innovation base,
nascent space and cyber capability and a yet-to-be-tested nuclear triad, China
has a long way to match up to the US. But an aggressive military doctrine, ever-
increasing military budget, robust military industrial base and successful education,
science and innovation programme is driving China in the right direction and
could tip the balance against the US in the coming decades.
Conclusion
Chinas counter intervention strategy is still unfolding. China realises that it is
still a long way from matching the US in technology and capability. However,
a generous defence budget maintained at over 10 per cent growth every year for
over a decade and the PLAs growing muscle in foreign policy will ensure that
Chinas aim of fighting local wars under conditions of informationalisation
will be realised by 2020. The A2AD capability, coupled with adroit military
diplomacy and greater international commitment, will enable the PLA to confront
the US rebalancing strategy, militarily across the full spectrum of conflict in the
coming decade. Thucydides Trap is very much a reality.
The US has slowly but steadily begun to rejuvenate its relations with its
allies in East Asia. The confidence building measures have an all-round appeal
active diplomacy, as was evident in the North Korean crisis; economic engagement,
by pushing its agenda in the TPP and military diplomacy, including joint exercises
with Japan, Korea and the Philippines. In sum, the US is redrawing the equations
in the Asia-Pacific. As Chinas counter intervention strategy gains more credibility,
the future will witness greater power play by the US and its allies in the region.
NOTES
1. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Richard Crawley, Project
Gutenberg, e-book released on May 01, 2009, at www.gutenberg.org (Accessed July 30, 2013).
2. Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, National Intelligence Council Report, December
2012, p. 100.
3. Louis Kuijs, China through 2020A Macroeconomic Scenario, Research Working Paper
No. 9, June 2009, p. 1, World Bank China Office.
4. Chinese FM Calls for Active, Comprehensive Efforts to Build New Type of Great Power
Relations between China, U.S., Xinhuanet, Jul 01, 2013, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/china/2013-07/01/c_132502499.htm (Accessed August 01, 2013).
5. Anthony H. Cordesman and Nicholas S. Yarosh, Chinese Military Modernization and
Force Development: A Western Perspective, CSIS Report, June 22, 2012, p. 32.
6. PLA Navy Maritime Drills Are Routine: Spokesman, Xinhua, June 03, 2013, at http://
english.people.com.cn/90786/8268003.html, (Accessed August 01, 2013).
7. Rahul Singh, Chinas submarines in Indian Ocean worry Indian Navy, Hindustan Times,
New Delhi, April 07, 2013. Also see: J. Michael Cole, Red Star over the Indian Ocean?,
The Diplomat, April 09, 2013.
8. Rory Medcalf, Maritime Game-Changer Revealed at Shangri-La Dialogue, The Diplomat,
June 2, 2013.
128
9. Diversified Employment of Chinas Armed Forces, April 2013, Part II, pp. 3-4, Information
Office of the State Council, The Peoples Republic of China,.
10. Ibid.
11. Chinese Navy Fleet Heads for Training in W Pacific, Xinhua, March 29, 2013, at http:/
/english.people.com.cn/90786/8188800.html (Accessed April 12, 2013).
12. Kor Kian Beng, Chinas Navy Flexes Muscles in South China Sea, Straits Times, March
28, 2013.
13. Qian Xiaohu and Song Xin, Special Interview with Commander of South China Sea Fleet,
China Military Online, April 10, 2013, at http://english.people.com.cn/90786/8201923.html
14. Diversified Employment of Chinas Armed Forces, no. 10, p. 4.
15. Ibid.
16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, Xi Visits Russian Defence
Ministry, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1025197.shtml (Accessed March 29,
2013).
17. David Lague, China Eyes $3.5 Billion Russian Arms Deal Despite Ire over Sukhoi Copy,
Reuters, March 24, 2013, at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/27/us-china-russia-arms-
idUKBRE92Q0PE20130327 (Accessed March 30, 2013).
18. Russian Arms Industry Welcomes Chinese President Xi Jinping Eyeing Big Deals, PTI,
March 24, 2013, at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-03-24/china/
37980537_1_russian-defence-minister-defence-ministry-china-russian (Accessed March 29,
2013).
19. Choi chi-yuk, China to Buy Lada-Class Subs, Su-35 Fighters from Russia, South China
Morning Post, March 28, 2013, at http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1199448/china-
buy-russian-fighters-submarines (Accessed March 30, 2013).
20. Sino-Russian Drills Enter Live-Fire Stage Xinhua, April 26, 2012, at http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-04/25/c_131549771.htm (Accessed March 30,
2013).
21. Peace Mission 2012 Joint Anti-Terrorism Military Exercise of SCO Member Countries
Start, PLA Daily, June 09, 2012, at http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/
714168/Peace-Mission-2012-joint-anti-terrorism-military-exercise-of-SCO-member-
countries-start.aspx (Accessed April 02, 2013).
22. China Eyes Purchase of Russias Su-35 Fighter, November 14, 2012, at http://rt.com/
business/china-su-35-purchase-653/ (Accessed March 30, 2013).
23. President Xi Jinping Says World Needs Common Development of China and India when
Meeting with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Xinhuanet, March 28, 2013, at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1026809.shtml (Accessed August 03, 2013).
24. Li Keqiang, op-ed, The Hindu, May 20, 2013.
25. Wei Wei, op-ed, The Hindu, May 10, 2013.
26. Ministry of Defence, Press Release5th Annual Defence Dialogue, January 14, 2013,
Embassy of India, Beijing, China, at http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/EventsDetails.aspx?
NewsId=390 (Accessed August 03, 2013).
27. China National Defense in 2006, Information Office of the State Council, The Peoples
Republic of China, at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2006.htm (Accessed
August 01, 2013).
28. While it is impossible to find out the exact numbers of such units, the existence of one
such unit, APT1, is believed to be the Second Bureau of the Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA) General Staff Departments (GSD) Third Department, which is most commonly
known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. See Mandiant
Intelligence Center Report, at http://intelreport.mandiant.com/.
29. Diversified Employment of Chinas Armed Forces, no. 10, p. 4.
129
30. Zhao Lei, Vote of Confidence for PLA Marine Corps, China Daily, April 01, 2013.
31. James C Bussert, China Builds Modern Marine Corps Force, Signal Online, available at
http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/1115 (Accessed August 05, 2013).
32. Commentary: Sansha Garrison Command is Established to Deter Countries Coveting for
National Sovereignty of China, China Military Online, July 25, 2012, at http://
eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2012-07/25/content_4387094.htm (Accessed August 05,
2013).
33. Cheng Gang, Analysis: Troop Deployment on Islands and Reefs of Sansha City is Nearing
Saturation, China Military Online, July 25, 2012, at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/
2012-07/25/content_4387095.htm (Accessed July 26, 2012).
34. China to Restructure Oceanic Administration, Enhance Maritime Law Enforcement,
CCTV Special Report: 2013, NPC & CPPCC Sessions,March 10, 2013, at http://
english.cntv.cn/20130310/101412.shtml (Accessed August 04, 2013).
35. Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2010,
Annual Report to Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, at http://www.defense.gov/
pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf (Accessed August 02, 2013).
36. Ibid.
37. Anthony H. Cordesman and Nicholas S. Yarosh, no. 6, p. 159.
38. Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2013,
Annual Report to US Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 5.
39. Janes Strategic Weapon Systems, 53, 2010, pp. 28-29.
40. J-31 Stealth Fighter May Be Deployed to PLA Aircraft Carriers, Want China Times,
December 12, 2012. Also see: Vladimir Karnozov, Russian Officials Reveal J-31 Engine
and Describe Sales to China, AIN Defense Perspective, November 23, 2012.
41. J. Michael Cole, China Building New Type 052D Guided Missile Destroyer, Taipei Times,
August 29, 2012.
42. China Building New Type 052D Destroyer, China.org.cn, August 31, 2012, at http://
www.china.org.cn/china/2012-08/31/content_26390048.htm (Accessed July 30, 2013).
43. Leonard David, China Space Program Ramping Up Capabilities, Pentagon Says, Space
Insider, May 21, 2013.
44. China Launches Chinasat-2A Military Satellite By LM-3B, China Military News, May
27, 2012, at http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/china-launches-chinasat-2a-military-
satelite-by-lm-3b.html/2 (Accessed August 8 2012).
45. China Focus: Timeline for Chinas space research revealed , Xinhua, August 31, 2012, at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-08/31/c_131820230.htm (Accessed August
06, 2013).
46. Alok Vijayanth, Chinas Cyber Capabilities, Indian Defence Review, February 21, 2013,
at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/chinas-cyber-capabilities/ (Accessed August
5, 2013).
47. Capability of the Peoples Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer
Network Exploitation, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report,
2009, pp. 6-7.
48. Bryan Krekel et al., Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese Capabilities for
Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage, Northrop Grumman Report,
prepared for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 7, 2012,
p. 8.
49. Some aspects of President Barack Obamas Asia strategy have built on the policies of previous
administrations. Washington has been devoting more resources to the region since at least
1997, when it first moved a submarine from Europe to Guam. The Clinton and George
W. Bush administrations then deployed every type of major naval and air weapons system
to Guam and Japan, cooperated with Singapore to build an aircraft carrier facility at the
130
Changi Naval Base and strengthened U.S. defence cooperation with Japan and the
Philippines. The Bush administration assigned an additional aircraft carrier to the Pacific
theatre, and the Pentagon announced in 2005 that it would deploy 60 per cent of U.S.
submarines to Asia.
See Robert S Ross, The Problem with the Pivot: Obamas New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary
and Counterproductive, December 06, 2012, at http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-
policy/the-problem-with-the-pivot-obamas-new-asia-policy-is-unnecessary-and-
counterproductive/ (Accessed October 12, 2013).
9
US Pivot to Asia-Pacific:
Implications for the Indian Ocean Region
Sarabjeet Singh Parmar
In November 2011, Hillary Clinton, the then Secretary of State, in herForeign
Policyarticle Americas Pacific Century defined the Asia-Pacific as stretching
from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas, the region
spans two oceansthe Pacific and the Indianthat are increasingly linked by
shipping and strategy.
1
The CRS Report for the US Congress in 2012
2
stated
that additionally, underlying the pivot is a broader geographic vision of the
Asia-Pacific region that includes the Indian Ocean and many of its coastal states.
In his November 17, 2011 address to the Australian Parliament, President Obama
said that the future being sought in the Asia-Pacific was security, prosperity
and dignity for all.
3
During his speech he covered the imperatives that not only
drove the US relations with the region but also those that impinge on the future
sought. Some salient points covered were as follows:
4
The regions importancehome to half the worlds economies that created
jobs and opportunities for Americans.
Contribution by emerging powers towards regional security.
Security based on an international order that would uphold the rights and
responsibilities of all nations and people.
Freedom of navigation and commerce.
Maintenance of credible US military presence with flexible posturing despite
reduction in defence spending.
Commitment to treaty obligations, involvement with and engagement of
regional organisations and strategic partners.
Continuation of building a cooperative relationship with China.
Further, the Strategic Guidance Document published by the US Department
of Defence in 2012 stated that US economic and security interests are inextricably
linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East
Asia into the Indian Ocean Region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving
challenges and opportunities.
5
132
However, the US interest in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) could be
considered low-key; therefore, the US places the region in the periphery of its
vision. Although there is a fair amount of US commitment in terms of military
presence and political engagement, the requisite degree of coherency in the US
policy is missing. The geographical dimensions by both Clinton and the CRS
report factor in only parts of the IOR. Clinton refers to the start point as the
Indian Subcontinent, and the CRS report refers to many of the coastal states.
In addition, being geographically positioned between the Persian Gulf and
the South China Sea, areas which have been the main focus of the US, dilutes
the US interest in the IOR. Therefore, the pivot point to the Asia-Pacific could
be considered as grounded east of the Malacca Straits. A point from which the
US could, if the need arose, turn and focus on the IOR. This in a way could be
viewed as the IOR being considered a secondary area and an extended part of the
offshore balancing concept leaving the stability of the area to the logic of
great-power balancing to reassert itself, relieving Washington of the burden of
maintaining equilibrium far from American shores.
6
Therefore, the US is looking
at applying a modified mix of the Neo-Nixon doctrine
7
and offshore
balancing concept so that the IOR as a secondary area would look after itself
while the US pivot concentrated on the areas east of the Malacca Straits that are
considered primary. This article examines these issues and the possible implications
in the IOR.
The Dilemma of Geographical Definition
Geography is too important to be left to geographers. But it is far too important
to be left to generals, politicians and corporate chiefs. Notions of applied and
relevant geography pose questions of objectives and interests served.
8
This aspect
becomes clearer when one revisits the US definition of the Asia-Pacific and the
inclusion of the IOR. A part of the IOR is now included in the US definition
of the Asia-Pacific, as was enunciated by Hillary Clinton
9
and the Obama
Administration.
10
The inclusion has clearly been due to the strategic importance
of the energy resources and trade that pass through the Indian Ocean and the
Straits of Malacca before reaching the manufacturing centers [sic] of East Asia.
11
It is evident from recent writings that the US has been looking at the IOR as an
emerging area of Strategic Interest.
12
As per Michael Green and Andrew Shearer:
13
The Pentagons 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) set the tone by calling
for a more integrated approach to the region across military and civilian
organisations [sic] and asking the rest of the US government for an assessment
of US national interests, objectives and force posture implications, which the
National Security Council is now undertaking in preparation for the next National
Security Strategy report, expected in 2012.
However, for the year 2012, no such report was made.
14
This aspect further
questions the standing of the IOR in the pivot strategy and whether the US
US Pivot to Asia-Pacific
133
looks on the IOR as a secondary area with an emphasis only on the protection
of maritime trade and freedom of navigation.
The generally accepted geographical definition of the Asia-Pacific, prior to
the inclusion of the IOR by the US in various statements, was limited to the area
east of the Malacca Straits and included the western Pacific. However, a common
linkage was the maritime element, and the stress on maritime is apt as the
overriding geopolitical characteristic of Asia-Pacifica is its Maritimity.
15
The emphasis to include the IOR in the discourse, essentially maritime, has
led to the growing usage of the wider term Indo-Pacific. The term broadly
refers to the maritime space comprising the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific.
Littoral to it are the states of Asia (including West Asia/Middle East) and eastern
Africa.
16
The foundation of the term Indo-Pacific could be traced back to the
speech by Japans Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the Indian Parliament in August
2007. Abe spoke about the confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans as the
dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity in broader Asia.
17
The
term has also been articulated in Australias 2013 Defence White Paper: A new
Indo-Pacific strategic arc is beginning to emerge, connecting the Indian and Pacific
Oceans through Southeast Asia.
18
Although usage of the term is expanding, it
remains majorly restricted to the strategic community and in government circles
of the US, India, Japan and Australia. This could be attributable to the fact that
other nations are restricted in their outlook to the immediate neighbourhood
because of, firstly, the issues that they face, secondly, their limited capacity and
capability in dealing with these issues only and, thirdly, issues beyond the
immediate neighbourhood being either peripheral or not impinging on their
interests.
Thus, the rationale of the term Indo-Pacific could stem from, firstly, bringing
India into the US Pivot equation and, secondly, connecting the four major players
(US, India, Japan and Australia) on issues of convergence to aid the US pivot
policy towards the Asia-Pacific. However, till the time the term Indo-Pacific does
not gain acceptability and ascendency in the strategic lexicon, the term Asia-
Pacific and its general definition would prevail in most dialogues and discussions:
This implies that the US clearly articulate what such a region would resemble,
whether it would encompass the Indian Ocean region and the Asia-Pacific as a
whole, simply refer to the region stretching from the North-Eastern Indian Ocean
to the south western Pacific Ocean, or just represent an attempt to integrate
India further in an Asian architecture conducive to US interests.
19
Till such time the US idea of Indo-Pacific is articulated, the definition of
Asia-Pacific as perceived by the US could be divided into two broad spectrums:
based on economic-diplomatic and a military-diplomatic combine, both with an
inescapable interlock. The economic-diplomatic combine is of utmost importance
to the US as in 2010, 61 percent [sic] of US goods exports and 72 percent [sic]
of US agricultural exports worldwide went to the Asia-Pacific. By 2015, East
Asian countries are expected to surpass NAFTA and the Euro zone to become
134
the worlds largest trading bloc. Market opportunities will only increase as the
region swells by an additional 175 million people by 2030.
20
In order to protect
the economic-diplomatic combine, the military-diplomatic combine has also
gained ascendancy to defend against threats to those interests (economic).
21
However, the main thrusts of the combines are concentrated east of Malacca.
This could be attributed to the fact that US alliance structure, such as it is in
the Indian Ocean Region, is far less coherent than what it has engineered in
either Europe or East Asia
22
and, therefore, the US interest in the IOR is low-
key. The key question is: Does the US view the IOR as an area for a modified
Offshore Balancing and a mix of a Neo-Nixon doctrine approach? An
approach that could be adopted till such time it is comfortable with the situations
in the Gulf and east of Malacca or till the time it may have to contend with a
similar complex situation in the IOR.
Modified Offshore Balancing and the Neo-Nixon Doctrine in the
IOR
Modified Offshore Balancing
The concept of offshore balancing in the South Asia region is not new and is
attributed to the geo-strategic ideas of Sir Olaf Caroe, the last foreign secretary
for the British raj in India (1939-45).
23
As the British hold was diminishing,
Caroe began to worry about what he came to call, in a prescient phrase, the
wells of power, the oil resources of the Middle East in general and of the Gulf
and the Arabian Peninsula in particular.
24
The British realising their diminishing
power and, therefore, reducing influence in the region apparently induced the
US to enter in the region when the US had no significant interests.
25
During
the late 1940s, a committee was formed to look into the planning requirements
of the Indian Armed Forces.
26
The committee based its report on three
assumptions: one of which clearly spells out the foundations of offshore
balancingChina and India would maintain sufficient forces to overcome a
minor power and would be able to hold out against a major power until Imperial
Forces could arrive. However, the report also mentioned the apprehensions of
India coming under Russias influence and spoke of China as a long-term threat.
China is still viewed as a threat, and although the threat from Russia subsided
after the end of the cold war, its re-entry in to the IOR is a possibility given the
rising debate on its growing proximity with China and pivot to Asia
27
and plans
to increase its Pacific Fleet.
28
Although offshore balancing calls for the retirement of the US from stressful
engagements on the Eurasian continent, notably Iraq and Afghanistan,
29
the
same would not be applicable for the IOR as the mounting importance of South
Asiaa region far less hospitable for US power projectionrenders offshore
balancing too costly and too hazardous to supply the basis for an Indian Ocean
strategy.
30
Therefore, a modified offshore balancing approach would be in order.
135
This modified approach would permit the US to reposition combat power in the
IOR on an as required basis. A task made easier as the US has assets stationed
in Diego Garcia and Australia, which could be diverted to the main expanse of
the IOR. Should the need arise, these assets could be strengthened by positioning
of additional combat power allocated to the three commands that oversee the
region. This would meet the outlook seen in the US approach to the IOR.
While the US defence document prepared by the US Navy, Marine Corps
and Coastguard Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower of October
2007 called for continuously posturing credible combat power in the Western
Pacific and Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean and selective and rapid repositioning of
the combat power to meet contingencies arising elsewhere,
31
the Strategic Guidance
Document 2012 looks at networks of cooperation with emerging partners
32
and specifically at investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to
support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security
in the broader Indian Ocean region.
33
Therefore, although a great deal of interest
is being evinced, and the IOR does appear to be in vogue in US strategic thinking,
this approach appears to be in a state of flux. Some of the major factors attributing
to this are as follows:
Reduction of US commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Situation with Iran and Syria.
Situation in the South China Sea and East China Sea.
Rising Chinese presence in the IOR.
Ability of the US to project power in the IOR due to sequestration that
would result in reduction in number of assets.
The division of the IOR between three US commandsPacific Command
(PACOM), Central Command (CENTCOM) and Africa Command
(AFRICOM).
The US may find it difficult to appropriate assets from the Gulf, even after
withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan due to the ongoing situation with Iran
and Syria. Appropriation of assets from east of Malacca would also be a difficult
task as it could dilute the support it has promised to its allies in the region. The
creation of AFRICOM from the three US commands (EUCOM, PACOM and
CENTCOM) was part of the strategic necessity to move Africa into the centre
of US strategic interests, after years of attempting to implement Africa policy on
the geopolitical edges of three separate commands.
34
The creation of AFRICOM
has now, in a way, placed the IOR in lieu of Africadivided between three
commands as against two earlier (CENTCOM and PACOM). The IOR now
stands divided as follows (see Map 1):
CENTCOM: Middle East nations up to Pakistan, Arabian Sea and the
Gulf of Aden.
AFRICOM: East Coast of Africa, waters along the east coast from South
of Somalia.
PACOM: Main Area of IOR including littoral nations west of India.
136
M
a
p

1
:

I
O
R

u
n
d
e
r

P
A
C
O
M
,

C
E
N
T
C
O
M

a
n
d

A
F
R
I
C
O
M
137
Thus, coordination between the three US commands would be a vital
imperative. Also, the three US commands could find appropriating assets a difficult
task as brought out by Admiral Jonathon Greenert, the US Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO), in his blog dated September 27, 2013: If sequestration-
level reductions persist in the years after FY 2014, the Navy of 2020 would not
be able to execute the missions described in our defence strategy, the Defence
Strategic Guidance.
35
In an earlier blog dated September 20, 2013,
36
the CNO
had mentioned that sequestration would result in a reduction of the naval budget
by 10 per centactually entailing a cut of 14 per cent on all activities, as military
personnel accounts are exempt from this cut. The main impact as per the blog
would be in two areasfirstly, on operations and maintenance, and secondly, on
investments. In short it means that fewer assets would be available to respond to
a contingency. This would have an immense impact on naval activities from
2014 onwards as post sequestration time would be required to bring the combat
power to an acceptable level of numbers and training. This aspect would have a
bearing on the pivot strategy as, firstly, it is still unfolding and, secondly, it would
need a consistent number of assets available at any time. This would also affect
the modified offshore balancing approach; therefore, the US with its allies and
strategic partners would have to work out plans for various contingencies. In
order to ensure an appropriate balance in the IOR the US may have to adopt
and amalgamate the Neo-Nixon doctrine along with the modified offshore
balance concept.
Neo-Nixon Doctrine
In response to a question put before him in 1969 regarding the role of the US
military in Asia, President Nixon had stated:
37
I believe that the time has come
when the United States in our relations with all our Asian friends, be quite
emphatic on two points: One that we will keep our treaty commitments...but
two, that as far as the problems of internal security are concerned, as far as the
problems of military defence, except for the threat of a major power involving
nuclear weapons, that the United States is going to encourage and has the right
to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility
for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.
The main issue of the doctrine was reduction of US presence in regions of
interest. Apart from looking at an exit policy from Vietnam, Nixon had also
expanded on the doctrine so as to resume dialogue with Russia and China. The
US finds itself in somewhat of a similar position as it is : Firstly, looking for an
exit policy from Afghanistan and Iraq; secondly, embroiled in a situation in Syria
where it faced opposition from Russia and China as well as the United Kingdom
38
in respect of a possible military intervention; thirdly, in the middle of the ongoing
imbroglio with Iran; fourthly, reaffirming its status on the treaty obligations with
its allies in Asia-Pacific; fifthly, facing a resurgent Russia and sixthly, balancing
a rising Chinawhich is seen as the central theme of its Pivot policy. The issue
138
is further complicated because of the growing economic and trade engagements,
an aspect that was not so prominent in the late 1960s/early 1970s.
A study of the US assistance in the Persian Gulf, in specific reference to Iran
(under the Shah) and Saudi Arabia, springs forth some aspects that have a bearing
on the US approach to the IOR. Major Marc Jasper in his thesis written while
attending the Naval Post Graduate School clearly brings out that since the 1940s,
US policy in the Middle East has been primarily based on three concerns: access
to oil; the survival of Israel; and containment of hostile states in the Gulf region,
first the Soviet Union, then later Iran and Iraq respectively.
39
Jasper further writes
that although Nixons twin pillar policy was based on arms sales to Iran and
Saudi Arabia, thereby bringing stability to the region and also control of the
region without deploying US troops, the policy, although considered consistent
to date, failed due to fall of one pillar (the Shahs Iran), serious domestic troubles
in the second pillar (Saudi Arabia), and, most important, the advent of a large,
continuous and direct US military presence in the Gulf.
40
The last aspect,
although an issue that goes against the grain of the policy to reduce US presence,
is an essentiality that goes hand in glove with the US assistance to bolster the
capabilities of the Gulf nations. A similar situation exists in the South China
and East China Sea region where there is a US presence, whose military capability
would be augmented,
41
and alliances with several nations. Therefore, the US is
building strategic alliances with nations that are viewed as stable regional powers
and working towards mutual beneficial cooperation. An aspect enunciated by
Chuck Hagel, the US Secretary of Defence, in his speech at the Shangri-La
dialogue 2013, wherein he put forward the following points:
42
The vision for Asia-Pacific was an open and inclusive one.
To achieve the vision, the US was seeking to build relations with rising
powers like India, Indonesia and China.
The US was working to enhance the capacity of its partners so as to provide
for their own and the regions security.
The US was working with its closest and most capable allies and partners
to jointly develop and deploy cutting-edge technologies to tackle emerging
security challenges.
The US was looking towards India as one of the leaders in the broader
Asia region and also moving from defence trade towards sharing of
technology and co-production.
In sum, the overall picture emerging is that firstly, the US would not dilute
its presence in the regions where it is presently deployed; secondly, it would
appropriate assets to areas on an as required basis and thirdly, it would rely on
its strategic partners and allies to ensure regional security for which it is building
their capacities and capabilities. This could be viewed as a modified mix of the
Neo-Nixon doctrine and offshore balancing concept.
139
Implications for the IOR
Since the vital military and political interests of the United States do not require
it to play a leading role in guaranteeing the security of the Indian Ocean littoral,
the traditional American formula of forward deployed forces backed by nuclear
security guarantees is not necessarily appropriate for this region. Instead, the
best means for achieving regional stability is to facilitate the emergence of a multi-
polar regional arrangement led by strong democratic states.
43
This view reinforces
the aspects covered in the previous paragraph as applicable for the IOR. Therefore,
the importance of the IOR to the US would be its importance for its allies and
strategic partners, both intra and extra-regional, mainly due to the following
aspects:
Stability: This aspect is of vital importance as it signifies that the region
is one of the most politically troubled with ingredients that could potentially
lead to inter or intra-state conflicts. Some salient issues influencing stability
are as follows:
The failed state index 2013 includes 10 IOR nations in the top 35.
44
In 2011, a total of 142 political conflicts were recorded in the IOR,
representing more than a third of the 388 conflicts worldwide, including
12 of the worlds 20 wars, as well as an additional eight limited wars.
45
Presence of two nuclear power statesIndia and Pakistan. The China
angle cannot be discounted due to the ongoing border dispute with
India, its proximity to Pakistan and ingress into the Indian Ocean.
Use of the Indian Ocean for maritime terrorism, human smuggling,
drug trafficking and gun running.
Piracy, although on the wane, is an example how a non-traditional
threat, a resultant of instability in Somalia, could affect maritime trade
and stability in a region.
Lack of regional security architecture.
Natural Resources.
The region holds around 49.7 per cent of the worlds proven oil reserves;
around 49.7 per cent of the worlds proven gas reserves and 19.8 per
cent of the worlds coal proven reserves.
46
The east Indian Ocean accounts for 8 per cent of total world fish
production, while the west Indian Ocean is facing overfishing and
exploitation due to deep water fishing by non-littoral states such as
Spain, Taiwan, Japan, France and Uruguay.
47
Availability of minerals, mainly polymetallic nodules and polymetallic
massive sulphides.
48
Other minerals of interest are iron, titanium,
chromate, lithium, bauxite, cobalt, nickel manganese, rubber and tin.
49
Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs): The Indian Ocean accounts for
the transportation of the highest tonnage of goods in the world, with almost
100,000 ships transiting its expanse annually. On its waters are carried
two-thirds of the worlds oil shipments, one-third of bulk cargo traffic and
140
half the worlds container shipments.
50
The IOR is home to major sea
transit routes that pass through several choke points in the region, choke
points that have been witness to closure and threat of closure by both
traditional and non-traditional threats. Therefore, any disruption in the
flow of maritime trade would impact on cost and the worlds economy.
Due to a lack of a US-led or dominated security arrangement, unlike what
exists in other regions, the US interest would be to ensure a more stable region,
with minimal requirement of their presence and intervention. However, the
economic angle due to globalisation would accrue more US attention as being
the worlds greatest trading nation, see its exports and imports travel
predominantly by sea. The US economy, consequently, would not be so prosperous
and dynamic were American or foreign-flagged shipping unable to use the worlds
oceans at will, free from restriction or interference.
51
Although the US is looking at India, Indonesia and Australia as strategic
partners, the implications for the IOR would be dictated majorly by the following
relations:
USAustralia
USIndonesia
USIndia
USPakistan
IndiaChina
PakistanChina
USAustralia
US-Australian relations are well established. However, the quantum of interest
that Australia evinces in the main expanse of the IOR would remain limited.
The Australian interest would at best remain centred in the eastern part of the
IOR mainly due to its capability and capacity. Notwithstanding this limitation,
Australia could aid in guiding meaningful dialogues as it, firstly, takes over as
chair of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-
ARC) from India for the period 2013 to 2015
52
and, secondly, assumes the chair
of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in 2014.
53
USIndonesia
USIndonesia relations have seen resurgence after a comprehensive partnership
was proposed in 2008. Two major issues that stand out are as follows:
54
A 600 million US$ compact through the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC). The money would be invested in renewable energy,
maternal and child nutrition, modernisation of Indonesias public
procurement system and green prosperity.
Recognition of Indonesias role in maintaining maritime security in the
South China Sea dispute.
141
Although the economic relations have not progressed as desired owing to a
variety of reasons, the defence relations have magnified and the main elements
that attract attention are as follows:
55
Cooperation and dialogue in areas of maritime security, peacekeeping,
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, reform and professionalisation.
Frequent joint exercises.
Upgradation of existing military assets and procurement of equipment via
Foreign Military Financing (FMF).
Indonesias importance stems from the fact that it sits astride the Malacca
Straits and could control the eastern entry and exit point to and from the IOR.
A decisive verity recognised by both the US and China. The US brought Indonesia
back in to its ambit despite the cutting of FMF due to the Indonesian military
involvement in the Dili massacre of East Timor civilians and the killing of people
during the August 1999 East Timor independence vote by military-backed
militia.
56
This was brought about by the US-led fight against terrorism and the
recognition that Indonesia was a key to Southeast Asian stability and security,
especially since it is astride the regions vital sea lanes.
57
Owing to this geographical
situation, China would also not want to antagonise Indonesia. Therefore, there
appears to be a tacit understanding between China and Indonesia due to political,
economic and military ties despite Chinas nine dash line claim cutting through
Indonesian waters north of the Natuna Islands that encompass the Natuna gas
fields.
58
In 2013, ChinaIndonesia relations saw a more focused approach: Firstly,
Indonesia was the first southeast nation to be visited by the Chinese President Xi
Jinping since assuming office; secondly, President Jinping became the first foreign
leader to be bestowed the honour of addressing the Indonesian Parliament and
thirdly, economic and trade cooperation was enhanced based on the talks during
the visit. This triangular equation would require delicate handling by all three
nations, and could affect the US pivot if China engages Indonesia positively.
USIndia
USIndia relations have seen an upsurge since the signing of the civil nuclear
deal. India is oft seen as a predominant regional power with a benign approach.
These internationally acceptable attributes aptly fit its envisaged role as a net
provider of security in the Indian Ocean and as a lynch pin in the US pivot to
Asia. A role brought out by Chuck Hagel in his speech at the Shangri-La dialogue
2013, wherein he said:
59
Indias role as a stabilizing power is of growing
importance with the increase of trade and transit between the Indian and Pacific
Oceans. The United States considers Indias efforts to enhance its military
capabilities as a welcome contribution to security in the region.
Indias central position in the IOR overlooking the SLOCs, its proximity to
the choke points in the IOR, especially the Malacca Straits, Straits of Hormuz
and Gulf of Aden accord it the specified importance. In the maritime arena, the
Malabar series of exercises have enabled India and the US in achieving a high
142
degree of inter-operability over the years, despite the varying types of ships and
equipment India operates. The number of military assets being procured from
the US by India has been growing steadily. Although the rejection of the F-16IN
aircraft offered by the US for the Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA)
deal slightly marred the relations, the procurement of assets such as P-8I Poseidon
maritime patrol aircraft, C-17 transport aircraft and C-130J Super Hercules
transport aircraft place India as one of the biggest customers of American weaponry
in this decade. Since 2003, India has procured military equipment worth around
US$ 10 billion.
60
Presently, negotiations are ongoing for the procurement of
AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, CH-47 Chinook heavy lift helicopters and
M-777 lightweight howitzers. Post the third bilateral meeting between the Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the US President Obama on September
27, 2013, the relations are now poised to enter a new level of defence technology
transfer, joint research, co-development and co-production.
61
However, this relationship is governed by two other relations: USPakistan
and IndiaChina. Although the USPakistan relationship has seen a sine curve
ride, the overtures of the US to Pakistan in the past have affected its relations
with India. It is evident that the US would need Pakistan in its withdrawal from
Afghanistan, especially for maritime mobility. The request for US$ 1.162 billion
(US$ 857 million for civilian assistance and US$ 305 million for security
assistance) by the Obama administration for the fiscal year 2014, which
commenced on October 10, 2013,
62
could be a step in this direction. This aspect
of assistance is a tight rope walk that the US would need to tread with caution,
especially as India is heading for elections in 2014.
IndiaChina relations, based on rivalry and mistrust, are an imperative that
are central to Indias role in the IOR. The debate of the string of pearls, oft seen
as an encirclement of India, focuses mainly on the burgeoning Chinese economic
island hopping strategy.
63
Although China has also assisted Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh and Myanmar in building of ports and other related infrastructure,
Indias relations and geographical proximity to these nations could dilute the
Chinese efforts. Therefore, though the issue of use of places does not, presently,
accrue China any advantage of significant maritime presence, it does place China
in a strategic position in the IOR with the ability to increase its maritime footprint,
especially due to its close relation with Pakistan (discussed later). The centrality
of the ocean in the regions affairs is further underscored by the fact that problems
on land invariably find a reflection at sea.
64
China is also wary of Indias look
east policy, and as this policy predates the theory of the string of pearls, it cannot
be seen as a response to the string of pearls theory. In time, China would have
to accept Indias look east policy as a comprehensive part of its national interests.
China also recognises that at present it cannot match Indias military ability to
influence events in the IOR and therefore exerts pressure on India via the land
border. The incursion of Chinese troops 19 kilometres into Ladakh reported on
April 15, 2013 is supportive of this fact.
65
143
Indias policies towards its neighbours, specifically the relations and
investments, in terms of goodwill and trust earned, would determine the focal
point of the US approach to India. It is perhaps for this reason that the US is
engaging the island nations where there is reasonable Chinese influence. A case
in point being the reported signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
with the Maldives to provide a cost free border control system.
66
Signing of a
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
67
was also reported, but the setting up of a
US military base has been denied by the US, and Maldives had stated that it was
yet to decide on signing the SOFA.
68
These aspects could have a bearing on the
US pivot to Asia and IndiaUS relations as, firstly, US could perceive this as
Indias inability to counter Chinese presence in the IOR, both economically and
militarily, and secondly, dilute the aspect of India being seen as a net provider of
security in the region.
PakistanChina
The defence relations of Pakistan with China commenced after the US stopped
arms supplies to both Pakistan and India during the 1965 war between both the
nations. Pakistan being the more affected nation turned to China and received
more than 200 tanks and 100 military aircraft.
69
The flow of conventional arms
from China grew, and it was well established by the early 1980s that nearly 65
percent [sic] of Pakistans aircraft and 75 per cent of its tanks were supplied by
China.
70
In 2012, as per Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI), Pakistan accounted for 55 per cent of Chinese arms exports.
71
The flow
of conventional arms also grew to include nuclear and related technologies. In
the mid-1980s, China supplied Pakistan with a nuclear weapon design suitable
for tactical aircraft delivery. In addition it provided Pakistan with important
components required to detonate a nuclear weapon.
72
The aspect of supply of
nuclear technology is considered most important and sensitive for the region
especially after the Kargil conflict of 1999 that was fought under the shadow of
nuclear weapons. Although China did not evince any support favouring Pakistan,
it could take advantage of the strained relations to counter Indian steps to bolster
its land borders and enhance and expand its maritime capability and capacity.
Pakistan sees China as a balancer against India and the US, as the evolving
geopolitics of the Indian Ocean is being caused by the heightening endeavours
of US and India to gain the over lordship over Indian Ocean region, because of
their respective self-conceived geopolitical right to do so.
73
The increasing
number of exercises conducted between both nations is indicative of a growing
nexus to counter the USIndia influence in the IOR.
In September 2013, Pakistan and China held a joint air force exercise named
Shaheen 2 in Chinas Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. This exercise follows
Shaheen 1 that was held in Pakistan in March 2011.
On the maritime front, Pakistan has proposed annual maritime exercises
commencing from 2014 with the first scheduled in the Arabian Sea. Interestingly,
144
the proposed exercises coincide with the planned first sea trials of Chinas new
strategic submarine that is equipped with JL-2 missiles.
74
Introduction of these
submarines in the planned exercises would alter the strategic scenario tremendously.
The institutionalisation of these exercises could be viewed as a counter to the
Malabar series of exercises and a means of challenging Indias maritime capacity
and capability.
The usage of Pakistani ports/bases as semi-military
75
bases by China to
enhance its maritime, aerospace and military footprint is a possibility given the
commonality due to supply of assets from China as well as co-production of
hardware.
76
Gwadar port, which has once again been taken over by China, is
strategically placed overlooking the entrance to the Straits of Hormuz. Use of
this port would accrue China not only the advantage of reciprocity vis--vis the
Malacca straits but also give it greater operational flexibility in the Arabian Sea:
an aspect that could dilute the US pivot centred east of Malacca as it would
require the US to rethink its appropriation of assets.
Conclusion
The implications of the US pivot in the IOR are complex and cover a multitude
of issues that require comprehensive understanding and delicate handling. The
US approach to the IOR in this context clearly appears incoherent as it seems to
be unable to decide the importance to be given to this region. Some issues that
require a relook and rethink of the strategy the US is to adopt in the IOR as a
part of the pivot are as follows:
Clear geographical definition of the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific.
Efficacy of dividing the IOR between three commands.
The stress on the diplomatic-economic combine due to the maritime trade
that plies the region as compared to the diplomatic-military combine.
Relations with IOR nations, especially Pakistan and India.
Possible effects of sequestration.
The growing Chinese influence.
The US would have to consider at some point in time of positioning more
assets in the IOR and also developing a regional security and economic architecture
with its allies and strategic partners. Before doing so, it would have to clearly
prioritise its relations with them. Therefore, till such time a clear enunciation is
made of its IOR policy, the mixed approach of a modified, Offshore Balancing
and Neo-Nixon doctrine is a workable solution, albeit transitory.
NOTES
1. Hillary Clinton, Americas Pacific Century, Foreign Policy, The American Issue, November
2011, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century?page=
full (Accessed August 01, 2013).
2. Summary of CRS report to the Congress, Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administrations
Rebalancing toward Asia, March 28, 2012, para 3, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
145
R42448.pdf (Accessed August 01, 2013).
3. Speech available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-
president-obama-australian-parliament (Accessed October 29, 2013).
4. Ibid.
5. US Department of Defence (DoD), Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st
Century Defence, p. 2, at http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf
(Accessed August 02, 2013)
6. James R Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, An Ocean Too Far: Offshore Balancing in the Indian
Ocean, Asian Security, 8 (1), p. 1.
7. Walter C. Ladwig, A Neo-Nixon Doctrine for the Indian Ocean: Helping States Help
Themselves, Strategic Analysis, 36 (3), 2012.
8. David Harvey, On the History and Present Condition of Geography: An Historical
Materialistic Manifesto, The Professional Geographer, 36 (1), February 1984, p. 7, at http:/
/www.d.umn.edu/~okuhlke/Archive/GEOG %205803%20Readings/Week%2011/
on_manifesto.pdf (Accessed August 05, 2013).
9. Clinton, no. 2.
10. CRS Report, no. 3.
11. Ibid., p. 5.
12. For example, see: Robert Kaplan, Centre Stage for the Twenty-First Century: Power Plays
in the Indian Ocean, Foreign Affairs, 88 (2), March/April 2009.
Michael J. Green and Andrew Shearer, Defining US Indian Ocean Strategy, The
Washington Quarterly, Spring 2012. Various papers and publications by Future Directions
International, Perth, Australia, at http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/indian-
ocean.html.
13. Michael J. Green and Andrew Shearer, no. 13, p. 1.
14. http://nssarchive.us/ (Accessed August 22, 2013).
15. Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations, Second Edition,
Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2010, p. 295.
16. Gurpreet Khurana, Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation, Strategic
Analysis, 31 (1), Jan-Feb 2007, Note 1, p. 150.
17. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html (Accessed August 06, 2013).
18. Defence White Paper 2013, Australian Government, Department of Defence, Chapter
2, para 2.4, at http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf
(Accessed on August 06, 2013).
19. Colin Geraghty, India in the Indian Ocean Region: Re-calibrating US Expectations,
American Security Project, October 2012, p. 12.
20. David W Barno, Nora Bensahel and Travis Sharp, Pivot but Hedge: A Strategy for Pivoting
to Asia While Hedging in the Middle East, Orbis, Spring 2012, p. 160.
21. Ibid., p. 161.
22. Justin V. Hastings, The Fractured Geopolitics of the United States in the Indian Ocean
Region, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 7 (2), December 2011, p. 185.
23. Lloyd I Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Making of US Foreign Policy for
South Asia: Offshore Balancing in Historical Perspective, Economic and Political Weekly,
February 25, 2006, p. 704.
24. Ibid.
25. Ashok Kapur, Imperial America and the Indian Subcontinent, Journal of Military and
Strategic Studies, 6 (4), Summer 2004.
26. Satyindra Singh, Under Two Ensigns: The Indian Navy 19451950, Oxford and IBH, New
Delhi, 1986, Chapter 2.
27. Fiona Hill and Bobo Lo, Putins Pivot: Why Russia Is Looking East, Foreign Affairs,
Snapshot, July 31, 2013, at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139617/fiona-hill-and-
146
bobo-lo/putins-pivot (Accessed October 07, 2013).
Ariel Cohen, Russias Pivot to Asia?, National Interest, September 11, 2012, at http://
nationalinterest.org/commentary/russias-pivot-asia-7454?page=1 (Accessed October 07,
2013).
28. Zachary Keck, Russia Announces a Naval Buildup in the Pacific, The Diplomat, July 22,
2013, at http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/07/22/russia-announces-a-naval-
buildup-in-the-pacific/ (Accessed October 07, 2013).
29. James R Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, no. 7, p. 1.
30. Ibid.
31. Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, October 2007, at http://www.navy.mil/
maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf (Accessed August 07, 2013).
32. US DoD, no. 6, p. 2.
33. Ibid.
34. Justin V Hastings, no. 23, p. 192.
35. The Impact of Sequestration (Part II), posted on September 27, 2013, US CNO blog,
at http://cno.navylive.dodlive.mil/2013/09/27/the-impact-of-sequestration-part-ii/ (Accessed
October 01, 2013).
36. The Impact of Sequestration (Part I), posted on September 20, 2013, US CNO blog, at
http://cno.navylive.dodlive.mil/2013/09/20/the-impact-of-sequestration-part-1/ (Accessed
October 01, 2013).
37. Ian Delzer, The Nixon Doctrine, Now More than Ever, July 25, 2103, at
blog.nixonfoundation.org/2013/07/the-nixon-doctrine-now-more-than-ever/ (Accessed
October 07, 2013).
38. The British Parliament rejected a motion for military intervention in Syria by 285 to 272
votes.
39. Marc Jasper, Security Assistance in the Persian Gulf and the Roots of the Nixon doctrine,
Thesis written in December 1977 at the Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California,
p. 39, at http://archive.org/stream/securityassistan00jasp#page/38/mode/2up (Accessed
October 08, 2013).
40. Ibid., Abstract, p. V.
41. Chuck Hagel, US Secretary of Defence, Speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue 2013, at http:/
/www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2013-c890/
first-plenary-session-ee9e/chuck-hagel-862d (Accessed October 08, 2013). He mentioned
that in addition to the decision to forward base 60 per cent of naval assets in the Pacific by
2020, the US Air Force has allocated 60 per cent of its overseas based forces to the Asia-
Pacific, including tactical aircraft and bomber forces from the continental United States.
The 1stand 3rdMarine Expeditionary Force and the Armys 25thInfantry Division would
return to the Pacific theatre post withdrawal from Afghanistan and the US Army 1st Corps
was being designated as regionally aligned to the Asia-Pacific region.
42. Ibid.
43. Walter C Ladwig, no. 8, p. 387.
44. The Failed States Index 2013, at http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable (Accessed
October 13, 2013).
45. David Michel and Russell Sticklor, Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and Policy
Challenges, in David Michel and Russell Sticklor (eds.), Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime
Security and Policy Challenges, Stimson, Washington DC, 2012, p. 11.
46. Calculated from figures given in: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013, pp.
6, 20, 30, at http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-review/statistical_review_of_
world_energy_2013.pdf (Accessed October 12, 2013). For the purpose of calculations the
nations of the Middle East have also been taken into account, as most of the oil and gas
would transit through the IOR.
147
47. David Michel, Halae Fuller and Lindsay Dolan, Natural Resources in the Indian Ocean:
Fisheries and Minerals, in David Michel and Russell Sticklor (eds.), Indian Ocean Rising:
Maritime Security and Policy Challenges, Stimson, Washington DC, 2012, p. 103.
48. Ibid., p. 104.
49. Walter C Ladwig, no. 8, p. 385.
50. Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Navy), Indias Maritime Military Strategy,
Ministry of Defense, New Delhi, 2009, p. 44.
51. James R Holmes, Andrew C Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, Indian Naval Strategy in the
Twenty-first Century, Routledge, London, 2009, p. 108.
52. http://www.iorarc.org/events/13th-council-of-ministers-perth,-australia.aspx (Accessed
October 19, 2013).
53. http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indian_ocean/regional_orgs/ions.html (Accessed October 19,
2013).
54. Murray Hiebert and Jeremiah Magpile, Comprehensive Partnership Nudges US-Indonesia
Relations to New Levels of Cooperation, CSIS, September 28, 2012, at http://csis.org/
publication/comprehensive-partnership-nudges-us-indonesia-relations-new-levels-cooperation
55. Ibid.
56. Sheldon W Simon, U.S.-Southeast Asia Relations: Military Relations Restored with
Indonesia, while US Passes on the First East Asia Summit, Comparative Connections: A
Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/
0504qus_seasia.pdf, accessed on October 21, 2013
57. Ibid.
58. Sarabjeet Singh Parmar, Developments in the South China Sea, in SD Munni and Vivek
Chaddha (eds.), Asian Strategic Review, IDSA/Pentagon, New Delhi, 2013, pp. 130-131.
59. Chuck Hagel, no. 42.
60. India-US Discuss Ways to Boost Defence Ties, Military Deals, The Economic Times,
September 17, 2013, at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-09-17/news/
42148937_1_defence-ties-defence-equipment-defence-system (Accessed October 21, 2013).
61. Joint Statement on Manmohan Singhs Summit Meeting with US President Obama in
Washington, The Hindu, September 28, 2013, at http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/
joint-statement-on-manmohan-singhs-summit-meeting-with-us-president-obama-in-
washington/article5176700.ece (Accessed October 21, 2013).
62. Warren Strobel, As Relations Thaw, US Starts Security Aid to Pakistan, Reuters, available
at http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/20/21053640-as-relations-thaw-us-
restarts-security-aid-to-pakistan?lite (Accessed October 21, 2013).
63. Sarabjeet Singh Parmar, Islandic Hop Scotch in the Indian Ocean Region, IDSA
Comment, December 15, 2011, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IslandicHopScotchin
theIndianOceanRegion_ssparmar_151211 (Accessed October 21, 2013).
64. Talk by Admiral DK Joshi, Indian Chief of Naval Staff, at IDSA, on Role of Indian Navy
in Maintaining Peace in Indian Ocean Region, held on March 05, 2013, at http://idsa.in/
keyspeeches/RoleofIndianNavyinMaintainingPeaceinIndianOceanRegion_CNS (Accessed
April 20, 2013).
65. Chinese troops entered into Indian Territory and pitched camp. The troops finally left
after staying for 3 weeks. This issue resulted in a debate covered by various Indian print
media from end April 2013 onwards.
66. Neil Merrett, US to Provide Maldives with Cost-Free Border Control System, Minivan
News, March 28, 2013, at http://minivannews.com/society/us-to-provide-maldives-with-cost-
free-border-control-system-55343 (Accessed April 21, 2013).
67. Draft copy of the SOFA, at http://www.dhivehisitee.com/images/US-Maldives-SOFA-
draft.pdf (Accessed May 01, 2013).
148
68. MK Bhadrakumar, US Seeks Military Presence in Maldives, at http://indrus.in/blogs/
2013/04/26/us _seeks_military_presence_in_maldives_24183.html (Accessed April 21,
2013).
Abdullah Jameel, No Proposal for US Military Base in Maldives, Insists Minister, Haveeru
Online, April 25, 2013, at http://www.haveeru.com.mv/news/48670 (Accessed May 01,
2013).
69. Paul J Smith, The Tilting Triangle: Geopolitics of the ChinaIndiaPakistan Relationship,
Comparative Strategy, 32 (4), 2013, p. 317.
70. Monika Chansoria, Chinas Arms Sales to Pakistan Unsettling South Asian Security, Indian
Defence Review, 25.4, October-December 2010, at http://www.indiandefencereview.com/
news/chinas-arms-sales-to-pakistan-unsettling-south-asian-security/ (Accessed October 21,
2013).
71. SIPRI Factsheet March 2013, Trends In International Arms Transfers, p. 4, at http://
books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=455# (Accessed October 21, 2013).
72. Gregory S Jones, Pakistans Minimum Deterrent Nuclear Force Requirements, in Henry
D Sokolski (ed.), Pakistans Nuclear Future: Worries beyond War, US Army War College/
Strategic Studies Institute, January 2008, p. 125.
73. Ahsan ur Rahman Khan, Evolving Geopolitics of Indian Ocean: In-depth Analysis,
Oriental Review: Open Research and Discussion Journal, August 06, 2013, at http://
orientalreview.org/2013/08/06/evolving-geopolitics-of-indian-ocean-in-depth-analysis/
74. Rahul Singh, India tracking China-Pak joint naval training, Hindustan Times, New Delhi,
October 09, 2013, at http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/India-tracking-
China-Pak-joint-naval-training/Article1-1133089.aspx (Accessed on October 21, 2013).
75. A semi-military base means using ports/bases for not only refuelling and resupply but also
for logistical support in terms of maintenance, repair and re-ammunitioning that would be
supplied by the host nation as per a prearranged understanding.
76. As per reports Pakistan is looking at procuring hardware like JF-17 fighter planes (co-
production planned), eight F-22P frigates (four of these were delivered in July 2009). Pakistan
has reportedly already received C-801/C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles.
10
The US Rebalancing Strategy:
Responses from Southeast Asia
Rahul Mishra
Introduction
The US Pivot to Asia or Rebalancing towards Asia strategy, since its inception,
has been lauded as a remarkable shift in the American approach towards the
East Asian region and deeper engagement with its security dynamics.
1
In
November 2011, during his visits to Australia and Indonesia, the US President
Barack Obama spoke at length about the American Pivotlater rechristened
as Rebalancing towards Asia, and declared, The United States is a Pacific
power, and we are here to stay.
2
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in
her October 2011 article published in Foreign Policy, coined the term Pivot to
Asia, and described the Pivot as a prologue to Americas Pacific Century.
3
Subsequently, in 2013, during his first ever visit to Southeast Asia as the US
Secretary of State, John Kerry reaffirmed the US commitment to rebalancing
towards Asia.
A closer look at the US Rebalancing towards Asia strategy and consequent
Chinese responses is giving an East Asian twist to what is increasingly referred
to as the New Great Game.
4
The reasons for calling the emerging dynamics
the New Great Game are simple. In the past few years, East Asia in general and
Southeast Asia in particular have emerged as the new global geopolitical centre
of gravity with a re-shift of politico-diplomatic, military, institutional and
economic focus on countries of the region and their intra-regional politics. Just
like the term Indo-Pacific, which attempts to hyphenate the Indian and the Pacific
Oceans and their evolving politico-security, demographic and economic dynamics,
the term New Great Game has also come into vogue, and generated a new set
of intense and increasingly nuanced debates on the likely future of global and
regional politics. Evidently, the Pivot or Rebalancing towards Asia encompasses
initiatives across all elements of American power.
5
Moreover, it attempts to
make inroads into every aspect of regional dynamics.
150
At the politico-diplomatic level, the Obama administration has been more
than ordinarily active in the Southeast Asian region over the past two years.
There have been dozens of high-profile visits by top leaders of the Obama
administration including President Barack Obama, former Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State John Kerry and former Secretary of Defence
Leon Panetta to the region.
Strengthening ties with Vietnam, stepping up defence cooperation with the
Philippines, reinvigorating relations with Thailand and swift reconciliation with
the Thein Sein Government of Myanmar are also critically important elements
of the politico-diplomatic aspect of the Rebalancing strategy in Southeast Asia.
At the military level, apart from a shift in terms of focus of the US Naval Forces,
it involves new troop deployments to Australia, new naval deployments to
Singapore, and new areas for military cooperation with the Philippines.
6
Intensified
military coordination with Japan, and South Korea and bridging gaps with
Indonesia and Vietnam are also part of the military aspect of the American
Rebalancing strategy in Southeast Asia and beyond. The US desire to become
the torchbearer of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and signing Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) with South Korea encompass the economic dimension of the
US Rebalancing towards Asia. Americas proactive participation in the Shangri-
La dialogue, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers
Meeting (ADMM) Plus and the East Asia Summit (EAS) constitute the
institutional dimension of Americas Rebalancing strategy. Clearly, the East Asian
region in general and Southeast Asia in particular lie at the core of the US
Rebalancing towards Asia strategy.
7
Not surprisingly, China has been sceptical of renewed interest and intensified
activism of the US in this part of the world. From the time of release of the first
comprehensive statement regarding the US Pivot or Rebalancing towards Asia
till date, reactions from Chinese leaders and the media have largely been negative.
8
As Amitav Acharya opines, China has viewed these initiatives with much
suspicion and regards them as detrimental to its interests. It sees Washingtons
use of the EAS to address the South China Sea disputes as blatant interference
and unnecessary internationalisation of the issue, which it prefers to address
bilaterally with the respective parties. It deems the TPP as an exclusionary
framework aimed at countering Chinas economic influence. As for Washingtons
rebalancing, Beijing considers it another name for containment.
9
Beijing
perceives that the US Rebalancing towards Asia has squeezed its strategic space
in Asia.
10
Many Chinese are concerned that the Pivot to Asia is little more than
code for an increase in US naval power in the region, aimed at boxing them in.
11
In fact, many believe that the military dimension of the rebalancing seems directed
at them and smacks of containment, and they resent it.
12
China has, over and
again, protested against the US ship visits in the region.
In the broader framework of the US Rebalancing towards Asia, this paper
discusses the responses of and implications for countries of the Southeast Asian
The US Rebalancing Strategy: Responses from Southeast Asia
151
region and their flagship organisation, ASEAN, and its goal of maintaining
cohesion and centrality. The paper attempts to briefly explore the US position
and examine implications of the US Rebalancing towards the region and its
constituent countries, as well as ASEAN and ASEAN-propelled initiatives such
as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Programme (RCEP). The paper
concludes with some observations on likely trends for Southeast Asia in the context
of the US Rebalancing towards Asia and Chinas increasingly assertive postures
with regard to territorial disputes and interplay of several other factors.
Decoding the US Rebalancing in Southeast Asia
In the past few years, Chinas phenomenal military and economic growth and
escalating tensions in the South China Sea have led to deeper uncertainties among
the Southeast Asian countries about the future of the region. A widening gap in
terms of economic and military prowess between China and the Southeast Asian
countries has only intensified such uncertainties and resultant apprehensions.
Evidently, how to adapt to Chinas growing power and influence is a question
that dominates the foreign policy establishment of nearly every country in the
world. Among the regional countries, China arouses unease because of its size,
history, proximity, potential power and more importantly the memories of the
middle kingdom syndrome.
13
It is widely believed that China seeks to ensure a multipolar world and unipolar
Asia, as against the US which has been striving to keep the international system
unipolar, with a multipolar Asia.
14
As the centre of gravity of global politics and
economics is shifting toward Asia, it is clear that the one who dominates Asia
will eventually dominate the world, too. Naturally, China is the strongest claimant
to supremacy in Asia and is doing all that it considers feasible to achieve its
goals. However, a number of issues have to be resolved, militarily or otherwise,
before China ascends to the status of the hegemon in Asia. To forestall such a
situation, the US is trying its best to woo the countries of the region. The
Rebalancing towards Asia seems very much a part of that.
Politico-Diplomatic Dimensions of the Rebalancing
From the speeches made by the US President Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton,
John Kerry and other office bearers of the US administration, it is evident that
Washington is keen to engage countries of the Southeast Asian region. In the
past two years, visits to almost every Southeast Asian country by the US leaders,
attempts to engage ASEAN and other affiliate institutions in a more proactive
manner and offering military and non-military support to the Southeast Asian
countries are part of American attempts to reinvigorate robust presence in
Southeast Asia. A number of initiatives have been taken that have helped boost
Washingtons bilateral ties with several Southeast Asian countries including
Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.
152
Regional Responses
In so far as responses from countries of the Southeast Asian region are concerned,
a wide spectrum is emanating. For instance, while Singapore, the Philippines,
Thailand and Vietnam have welcomed the US move, countries like Indonesia
and Malaysia have demonstrated a cautious approach. Interestingly, countries
such as Cambodia have given a measured response with a blend of apprehension,
while Myanmar has been a direct beneficiary of Americas renewed interest in
Southeast Asia.
As far as the macro-level analysis of the region is concerned, responses could
be broadly divided into maritime and mainland Southeast Asia. As Thitinan
Pongsudhirak argues, It appears that maritime Southeast Asia is increasingly
leaning towards Washington, whereas mainland Southeast Asia is more influenced
by Beijing.
15
He further adds, The region of Southeast Asia is moving ahead
in the face of regionalist rhetoric and aspirations. Maritime Southeast Asia features
states that have locked horns with China over territorial claims in the South
China Sea. The Philippines and Vietnam are at the forefront, with Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Brunei in support, vis--vis China. The South China Sea has
thus become an arena of tension and conflict, inviting the US as a countervailing
superpower to check Beijings assertiveness.
16
Making a distinction between
mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, he argues, The interests and concerns
of maritime Southeast Asian states are divergent from the CLMT (Cambodia,
Laos, Myanmar, Thailand), which were either silent or supportive of Cambodias
pro-China stance at the annual regional ministerial meeting in Phnom Penh in
July 2012, when ASEAN failed to produce a joint statement due to the insistence
of the Philippines and Vietnam on adding the South China Sea issue in the Joint
Statement.
17
While the categorisation seems a bit oversimplified, it does,
however, throw light onto the dynamics of the region. Clearly, parties involved
in the South China Sea dispute with China are finding it difficult to accommodate
their interests with Chinas regional aspirations. Embracing Washingtons
Rebalancing strategy without annoying China represents one of Asias core
challenges today.
18
Responses from individual countries depict that each country
is attempting to deal with the challenge in its own way depending on its strengths
and weaknesses vis--vis the US-China equation.
Vietnam: The Newfound Friend
With Vietnam, the US had fought one of the deadliest wars in the 20
th
century.
For decades, the two countries maintained an arms-length relationship. However,
of late, Vietnam and the US have started inching closer. In 2010, under the
ASEAN chairmanship of Vietnam, the way for the US entry into the EAS was
cleared. Concerns on China have been the primary reason for their newfound
warmth.
In July 2013, Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang visited the US. He was
the second Vietnamese President to visit the country since 1995. (Nguyen Minh
153
Triet was the first Vietnamese President to visit the US in 2007). Sangs visit
came after Obamas overtures reflecting Washingtons desire to place Hanoi at
the centre of its Pivot strategy in East Asia.
19
The exchange of high-level visits
is a significant break from the past, and has provided fresh impetus to Vietnam-
US relations.
20
During the visit, it was decided to establish the Vietnam-US
Comprehensive Partnership to provide an overarching framework for advancing
the relationship.
21
The Partnership is intended to contribute to peace, stability,
cooperation, and prosperity...(It) will create mechanisms for cooperation in areas
including political and diplomatic relations, trade and economic ties...defence
and security.
22
The agreements signed during the visit are likely to play a crucial
role in fostering trust between the two countries and possibly culminating in a
Strategic Partnership.
23
China is perhaps one of the most important factors in shaping the Vietnam-
US relations. Interestingly, the Southeast Asian countries, earlier apprehensive of
the US intentions in their backyard, are now finding it beneficial to lean towards
Washington.
24
The Obama administrations Rebalancing towards Asia policy has
further encouraged these countries to get closer to the US. Clearly, Vietnam is
weighing its options and seems to have found a safe and reliable partner in the
US.
25
Vietnams policymakers acknowledge that cordial relationship with the US
is one of the priorities for Vietnam. As Ton Sinh Thanh, Vietnams Ambassador
to Sri Lanka, states, The history of the relations has had many twists and turns
but the two countries normalised relations in 1995. Now the US is second biggest
trading partner of Vietnam with US$ 25 billion of trade volume, but the US
became Vietnams largest export market with US$ 20 billion. US total investment
in Vietnam amounted to US$ 10.5 billion. About 15,000 Vietnamese students
are studying in the US. Our President Truong Tan Sang visited USA in July
2013, and the two countries have decided to form a Comprehensive Partnership.
26
The Philippines: A Rediscovered Ally
The Philippines has been traditionally close to the US. During the Cold War,
the Philippines always sided with the US by virtue of being in military alliance
with the US. Moreover, during the Korean War, it cooperated with the US, and
provided logistical support during the Vietnam War. In 1992, Philippines had
asked the US to withdraw from the Subic Bay naval base, which led to
downgrading of military ties between the two allies.
27
The 2013 US Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)
operation in the typhoon Haiyan-hit Philippines substantiated the claims made
by the US that it is keen to engage Southeast Asian nations in a robust manner
through the Rebalancing towards Asia strategy. Typhoon Haiyan killed around
2,000 Philippine people. On November 11, 2013, two American transport planes
and a group of US marines were sent to Tacloban. Additionally, the aircraft carrier
George Washington and cruisers Antietam and Cowpens, the destroyers Mustin
154
and Lassen and the supply ship Charles Drew were also sent to the Philippine
coast.
28
According to media reports, the US and the Philippines are likely to sign
a new treaty focussing on upgrading military cooperation between the two
countries.
29
For the Philippines, the US Pivot provided a golden opportunity to
demonstrate a more independent and balanced foreign policy.
30
Chinas
diplomatic standoff with the Philippines on the South China Sea have only
contributed to the acceptability of the US Rebalancing in the Philippines. It
is not a coincidence that the diplomatic tensions heightened after the US Pivot
to Asia strategy was first put in motion back in 2010. China, of course, contributed
to this escalation when it submitted its 9-dash line claim in 2009.
31
Clearly,
the Philippines has re-emerged as a strong ally of the US, which has been
extraordinarily vocal against Chinas posture in the South China Sea dispute.
Singapore: An All-Weather Partner
Singapore is one of the most important allies of the US which has maintained
cordial relations with China as well. Singapore has traditionally been a votary of
institutional balancing in the region, inviting as many major external powers
in the region as possible so that the balance of power remains stable and in the
best interest of Singapore (and other member countries of ASEAN). In a reply
to the parliamentary question on Singapores response to the US Rebalancing
towards Asia, the Minister for Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen said: Singapore
therefore welcomes the US continued engagement of this region to ensure Asias
prosperity and security. In recognition of the US positive influence in the region,
we have allowed US military aircraft and vessels to use our facilities for several
decadesfirst, under our 1990 Memorandum of Understanding and later in
2005, under the Strategic Framework Agreement signed by PM Lee and then-
President George W. Bush. The recent announcement of the deployment of up
to four US Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) to use our military facilities is consistent
with these signed agreements.
32
Singapore will do its best to ensure that the US-China relations dont get
damaged while supporting the US moves in the region, particularly, as Singapore
realises that an overt rivalry, military or otherwise, between the US and China
would damage the Southeast Asian countries the most, not to mention the ASEAN
and its affiliate institutions. As Minister for Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen states:
Ultimately, Singapore is friends with both, and hopes that the US-China relations
flourish. We do not wish to see their relations deteriorate, and indeed, both sides,
China and US, have openly affirmed that the Asia-Pacific region is big enough
to accommodate both the US and China. Other nations need not choose better
relations with one at the expense of the other. Instead, all stakeholders should
work towards an inclusive regional security framework that builds common
understanding and cooperation. To achieve this, the ASEAN Defence Ministers
and their Plus partners are expanding dialogue and enhancing military-to-military
155
interactions through the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting and other
multilateral fora.
33
The Obama administrations strategy of rebalancing US foreign policy
priorities to the region enhances Singapores role as a key US partner in the region.
Singapore and the US are among the 12 countries on both sides of the Pacific
involved in the TPP, which is the centrepiece of the Obama administrations
economic Rebalancing towards Asia.
34
Myanmar: A Test Case of American Engagement in Southeast Asia
One of the most dramatic changes in Southeast Asia lately has been the political
transition in Myanmar. President of Myanmar Thein Sein has been taking steps
to bring the erstwhile pariah country back to the mainstream of international
community. The US support is seemingly reinforcing Thein Seins reformative
policies, and the country, which was called the outpost of tyranny, is turning
into the Outpost of Rebalancing Strategy. This is due to the fact that the US
has been an extremely important external factor influencing Myanmars domestic
politics and economy, regional stature and international acceptability. The US
has been pressurising Myanmar, by all means necessary, to ensure the reversal to
democracy and greater respect for human rights in the country. Needless to say
that the West, led by the US, has been vitally important in shaping Myanmars
own willingness to change.
For almost two decades, since the overthrow of democratically elected
government in Myanmar, Myanmar-US relations remained mired with mutual
suspicion and hostility as the US wanted the junta to restore democracy against
its wishes. Taking cues from other countries that were at loggerheads with the
US, the military junta of Myanmar took extra caution in safeguarding its interests.
As a result, relations with China were strengthened, and subsequently, the capital
was also shifted from Yangon to Naypyidaw. According to Bertil Lintner, The
Juntas apparent fear of a pre-emptive US invasion by sea or air strikes was at the
time seen by some as a major motivation for the juntas decision to move the
capital to what they perceived to be safer, central mountainous location away
from the coast. After all, the US government had publically clubbed Myanmar
together with rogue regimes and referred to it as an outpost of tyranny.
35
Both
Myanmar and the US have been looking for an opportunity to restore ties.
Myanmars China concern gave the US an opportunity to break the ice;
Myanmar too didnt miss the chance.
With the Myanmar visit of Hillary Clinton in November 2011, barely a
month after the launch of the Rebalancing strategy, the US worked for restoration
of ties and easing of sanctions, which manifested the turnaround in the US
approach. It also aimed to secure political manoeuvring space for Aung San Suu
Kyi. Myanmar agreed to the US demands, including the release of political
prisoners and granting more rights to people of the country, which led to
normalisation of ties between Myanmar and the US. Consequently, it was
156
announced on January 13, 2012 that the US would appoint its Ambassador to
Myanmar again, thereby elevating the diplomatic representation in Myanmar.
Subsequently, Derek Mitchell was appointed as the first-ever US Ambassador to
Myanmar after 1990. In July 2012, the US eased sanctions that were imposed
on Myanmar. In fact, Hillary Clinton announced a plan regarding targeted easing
of sanctions.
Later, after much debate and discussions, the US suspended the sanctions
imposed on Myanmar. On February 6, 2012, the US waived some more sanctions.
The most prominent among them was the provision to allow Myanmar to work
with the World Bank and other international financial organisations.
36
The
decision was seen as yet another gesture to appreciate the reform measure taken
by the Thein Sein Government. Within a few weeks since Hillary Clintons visit
to the country, more than a dozen high-profile leaders from the US and other
Western countries paid visits to Naypyidaw.
Apart from Hillary Clinton, several US officials including Congressman Joe
Crowley, US special envoy for Burma, Derek Mitchell and Luis Cdebaca of the
State Department also visited Myanmar. Moreover, Crowley has in the past
sponsored bills authorising sanctions against Myanmar including the 2008
measure that stopped gems from Myanmar entering the US via third countries.
37
Clearly, the US decision to restore ties came in response to the Sein Governments
release of thousands of political prisoners, a move that was hailed by Barack
Obama as a substantial step forward for democratic reform.
38
The US has
acknowledged these changes in swiftly changing Myanmar; it has been taking
into account the suggestions made by Myanmars neighbours including India
and the member countries of ASEAN.
39
Additionally, Myanmars souring ties
with China provided the US a chance to get closer to Myanmar.
The second Obama administration has realised that the real challenge for
the US foreign policy lies in Asia. This sufficiently explains the US Rebalancing
towards Asia strategy policy as also Obamas visit to Myanmar and Thailand
within a month since he assumed the second term in office. Evidently, Myanmar
is one of the major success stories where Obama has made a difference by trying
to bring the country on to a democratic path through diplomatic means.
40
The
November 2012 visit of President Obama had immense symbolic value as it was
the first-ever visit of a sitting US President to Myanmar. Obamas visit was also
indicative of the US acknowledging the ongoing political reforms in Myanmar.
Arguably, the visit is also believed to have foreshadowed Obama administrations
focus on Asia as part of a strategy to dilute the Chinese influence in the region.
41
As another gesture of support, Obama referred to the country by the governments
preferred name Myanmar rather than Burma, which has been used by the
European countries, Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi and other pro-democracy
activists.
42
During the visit, President Obama was full of praise for President
Thein Sein and his government. He stated that the democratic and economic
reforms started by Thein Sein could lead to incredible development
157
opportunities.
43
He added, Flickers of progress that we have seen must not be
extinguished...reforms launched from the top of society must meet the aspirations
of citizens who form its foundation.
44
Encouraging Myanmar to move away from decades of military rule has indeed
been a success for President Obama, which has been acknowledged by his critics
and fans alike. Obamas Myanmar policy was positively received across the US
policy circles as also amongst the allies and friends of the US. There was also a
lingering feeling that friction in the US-Myanmar relations had become a drag
on Americas relations with ASEAN and its member countries.
45
Later, in May
2013, Obama lifted the ban on US entry visas to Myanmars military rulers and
their associates but kept sanctions on investing or doing business with figures
involved in repression since the mid-1990s.
46
Clearly, for the US, Myanmar has not only become a test case of its influence
vis--vis China but also a major opportunity to restore democracy in the country
and integrate it with the global economic system. Although a lot needs to be
done to ensure that Myanmar becomes a fully functioning democracy, the budding
shoots of democratic recovery are surely encouraging.
47
In the process, the Sein
Governments acceptability, both domestically and globally, has also gone up by
leaps and bounds.
Thailand: A Time-Tested Friend
In so far as Thailand is concerned, it is uniquely placed in the dynamics of
superpower relations in the region. While Thailands relations with the US are
more than a century old, it is increasingly getting closer to China. It is believed
that Thai diplomatic, political, military, and economic alignment with Beijing
is inexorable. Thus, the stock still favours the US, but the flow is more toward
China.
48
For the records, it may be mentioned that the 1997 Asian financial
crisis played a huge role in a turnaround in the Thai approach towards China.
Thailands flexible foreign policy, which is equipped to deal with unexpected
situations, adds further momentum to that. As Chulacheeb Chinwanno states:
Thailand pursues a balanced engagement policy with the major powers: China;
the US; Japan; and India. Thailand tries to manage its relations with the US in
such a way that facilitates closer ties with China. An important objective of Thai
foreign policy is to position the country where it will not have to choose
strategically between the US and China, but remain important and relevant to
both.
49
Thailand is cognisant of the benefits that cordial ties with China may accord.
Without being over dependent on the US, Thailand wants to reap the benefits
of Chinas rise in the international economic order. Thus, it is evident that in
managing its relations with both China and the US, Thailands core strategic
concept of bending with the prevailing winds comes into play.
50
While holding
on to the Strategic Partnership with China, Thailand never put the axe to its
formal alliance structure with the US, even if it was moribund during much of
158
the 1970s.
51
In that context, one may argue that Thailand is carefully weighing
its strategic options with regard to Chinas rise. While Thailand cant go against
the ASEAN or the US over the China issue, it is employing a unique blend of
bandwagoning with China on economic issues while not being averse to the
US attempt in covert balancing against China on the military front. An
increasingly assertive China poses a challenge to the countries of the East Asian
region. While a hedging strategy defines the Thai policy vis--vis emerging
East Asian security architecture to a great extent, stepped up US presence in the
region is being welcomed by Thailand as a measure to ensure a multipolar region.
52
An ancient Siamese proverb likens the Thai foreign policy to the bamboo
in the wind: always solidly rooted, but flexible enough to bend whichever way
the wind blows in order to survive.
53
More than mere pragmatism, the proverb
reflects the countrys long-cherished, philosophical approach to international
relations, the canons of which are very much enshrined in the Thai culture and
religion.
54
Throughout its history, Thailand has consistently crafted a cautious,
calculated foreign policy and jealously guarded its independence.
55
Thailand and
several other countries of Southeast Asia are ensuring a multipolar region, and
to prevent undesirable hostilities in the region, they are welcoming the increasing
presence of the US in Southeast Asia. Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand,
South Korea and member countries of ASEAN, while holding their national
interest supreme, cherish the common vision of ensuring a peaceful and prosperous
East Asia.
56
Brunei Darussalam: Navigating Carefully
Ever since its independence from the United Kingdom in 1984, Brunei
Darussalam shares a congenial relation with the US. Their relations date back
to 1850 when both countries signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation which is in force till date. Clearly, today, their cooperation has
been strengthened. In the recent years, frequent exchanges of high-level visits
between the US and Brunei are shaping their relations. In September 2012,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Brunei so as to promote the bilateral
and regional cooperation. During her visit to Brunei, the Secretary launched
the US-Brunei English Language Enrichment Project for ASEAN, dined with
the Royal Family at the Royal Palace Istana Nurul Iman, and held bilateral
meetings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, His Royal Highness
Prince Mohamed.
57
Later in March 2013, the Sultan of Brunei paid a visit to
Washington D.C. when both countries pledged to work towards maintaining
peace and stability in the region.
Brunei does welcome the rejuvenated interests of the US but with certain
conditions. Given that the US Rebalancing towards Asia has several themes, Brunei
is, by and large, interested in the economic aspect of the strategy. Though the
US-Brunei economic relations mainly involve the trading of oil and gas,
agricultural products and garments, both countries are endeavouring to expand
159
the scope of their economic relations. Out of four ASEAN member states
negotiating on the TPP, which is an integral part of the US Rebalancing strategy,
Brunei is one. It can be said that while other Southeast Asian states prefer to
either align with Chinese interests or favour the US Rebalancing towards Asia,
Brunei has taken its own path of neutrality.
Indonesias Dynamic Equilibrium
By virtue of being centrally located in the ASEAN region with the largest
geographic size and economic prowess, Indonesia figures prominently in the
emerging geostrategic dynamics of the region. Remarkably consistent economic
growth and political stability in recent years coupled with impressive domestic
situation and successful diplomacy substantiate Indonesias position as first
among equals in the ASEAN. Today, Indonesia not only holds a key position
in ASEAN, Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Indian Ocean Naval
Symposium (IONS) but also keeps cordial relations with major stakeholders of
the region including China, India and the US. Keeping a fine balance in relations
with both China and the US is one of Indonesias remarkable achievements.
Over the years, it has tried to take some responsibility for the upkeep of ASEAN
by playing a proactive role during the Preah Vihar crisis and 2012 ASEAN
Summit.
Comprehending the rising complexities of the region, Indonesia has devised
the concept of dynamic equilibrium with regard to its engagement with the
major stakeholders of the region. Through promotion of mutual and peaceful
cooperation, it seeks to minimise superpower rivalry in the region in order to
enhance regional security and stability. Moreover, Indonesias own geographical
vulnerabilities have motivated it to strive and contribute towards regional peace,
which sufficiently explains its stand on maintaining ASEAN centrality and
supporting moves for regional cooperation. For instance, Indonesia has been
supportive of Chinas cordial relations with the ASEAN, despite not being at
good terms with China till 1998. However, like many other countries of Southeast
Asia, Indonesia is mindful of the pitfalls of an increasingly assertive China, which
has prompted Jakarta to encourage the US Rebalancing towards Asia; but only
the calibrated and non-threatening aspects so that the Rebalancing doesnt lead
to the creeping in of classical security dilemma in Southeast Asia. Given that the
US Rebalancing towards Asia is crucial for Indonesia for enhancing regional
stability and peace, it favours a benign presence of the US and other major powers.
While one may argue that Indonesias stance on Rebalancing is critically
important, its role will largely depend on factors including the China-US relations,
Chinas relations with ASEAN, Japan and India as also on Indonesias politico-
military and economic prowess in the coming years.
160
Malaysias Cautious Optimism
In so far as the Malaysian response to the US Rebalancing towards Asia is
concerned, Cautious optimism most aptly explains its position.
58
Evidently,
the most problematic strategic conundrum facing Malaysia is the South China
Sea and managing its relations with both the US and China.
59
Malaysia is likely
to continue to embrace Chinas rise and give it the benefit of the doubt. Moreover,
it will continue to downplay regional anxieties about Chinas military build-up.
But if China decides that amphibious landing ships are the best tools to resolve
disputes, Malaysia may well need to rethink its present approach.
60
The recent
visit of the Malaysian Defence Minister is indicative of the fact that Malaysia is
striving hard to keep a fine balance in terms of its relations with the US and
China. The two sides have also agreed to upgrade bilateral military ties and go
in for regular joint training programmes.
Cambodia: Chinas Trusted Partner
If China has a reliable friend in the Southeast Asian region, it is evidently
Cambodia. China is Cambodias largest source of foreign investment and aid
and one of the largest trading partners. However, Chinas dominance is
surrounded by renewed controversies; for instance, while the Cambodian
government warmly welcomes Chinese aid, saying that it comes with no strings
attached; many experts are concerned that China is providing aid for its own
selfish reasons.
61
To substantiate this, the case of Cambodias support to China
vis--vis South China Sea dispute can be taken into consideration. One may
note that after the Vietnamese and Indonesian chairmanships of ASEAN, it was
speculated that the next three annual chairs, namely: Cambodia, Brunei and
Myanmar, would seek to appease Beijing by minimising international exposure
of the South China Sea issue.
62
In fact, this had happened at the 2012 ASEAN
summit, chaired and hosted by Cambodia. As expected, Philippines had insisted
on a reference to the standoff between Manila and Beijing at Scarborough Shoal
in July 2012 but Cambodia, acting as the ASEAN Chair, refused on the grounds
that the boundary disputes are bilateral in nature and thus shouldnt figure in
the joint statement.
63
For the first time in the forty-five year history of ASEAN,
member states were unable to issue a joint communiqu at the end of the Summit.
As far as the US Rebalancing is concerned, at the initial stages, Cambodia
was quite apprehensive of the strategy due to its close proximity to China.
Nevertheless, the situation is beginning to get fluid now. Given that the US is
Cambodias largest trading partner, it holds special place in Cambodian foreign
policy manoeuvres. Their cooperation is growing in a number of areas and in
2012, both countries agreed to begin exploratory discussions of a potential bilateral
investment treaty (BIT).
64
In May 2012, the US and Cambodia held a joint
military exercise so as to improve their capability to take part in the UN
peacekeeping operations. The Angkor Sentinel exercise, held at the National
161
Training Center for Multinational Peacekeeping Forces in Kampong Speu
province, is the fourth to be held since 2010.
65
On the economic front, while
China continues to dominate the centre stage in Cambodia, the US is not so far
away.
Needless to say that Cambodia is aware of the importance of having China
and the US on its side. It may be noted that while Vietnam and Philippines
favour the US rebalancing act simply to leverage their position with regard to the
South China Sea dispute, Cambodia is probably at the other end of the spectrum,
covertly aligning itself closely with Chinese interests.
66
Nevertheless, in essence,
Cambodia tries to step up diplomatic and economic relations with both the
countries.
Military Aspects of the Rebalancing
In so far as the military aspects of the American Rebalancing towards Asia are
concerned, the US has clearly boosted up military funding and assistance to
countries of the regionfrom the Philippines to Vietnam, there is an upward
trend in military cooperation with the US. For instance, according to media
reports, from only 50 ship visits in 2010, nearly 90 ships have visited the
Philippines since January this year.
67
Additionally, the US has stationed
surveillance planes there and promised up to US$ 30 million in support for
building and operating coastal radar stations. Framework agreement on a regular
rotational US military presence in the Philippines is yet to bear fruit.
68
With regard to the military aspect of Singapore-US relations, the two sides
had signed the Strategic Framework Agreement for a closer partnership in defence
and security in 2005 much before the conceptualisation of the US Rebalancing
strategy. The agreement opened a new chapter in the bilateral defence and security
relationship, expanding the scope of current operation in areas including counter-
terrorism, counter-proliferation, joint military exercises and training, policy
dialogues and defence technology.
69
In the current period, their defence
cooperation ties have been bolstered. In June 2012, Singapore agreed to host in
rotation as many as four US littoral combat ships.
70
Moreover, the two sides also
announced to hold strategic partnership dialogue which includes the Third
Country Training Program (TCTP), a joint technical assistance program for
developing countries in the region, including in the Lower Mekong area. The
initial projects under this program have focused on training officials in the Lower
Mekong region in the areas of environment, health, urban planning, and disaster
management.
71
In December 2013, US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and
Singapores Minister for Defense, Dr Ng Eng Hen met in the Pentagon to witness
the Singapore Armed Forces Exercise Forging Sabre and the 20
th
anniversary
celebrations of the Republic of Singapore Air Forces Peace Carvin II F-16
detachment, and reaffirmed the excellent and longstanding bilateral defence
relationship between the two countries.
72
Amongst all the ASEAN member states, Vietnam seems to prefer the foreign
162
power presence in the Southeast Asian region the most. Vietnams defence
cooperation with the US has been deepening and widening lately. Though both
countries fought a war from 1965 to 1973, the relations were normalised in July
2011. Two months later on September 19, 2011, the MoU on Advancing Bilateral
Defense Cooperation was signed. In October 2013, under the purview of the
MoU, the US and Vietnam held two important annual high-level security meetings
in Washington namely: The 6
th
Political, Security, and Defence Dialogue and
the 4
th
Defence Policy Dialogue. From June to August 2012, Vietnam sent its
first observer to the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) and in July 2012, the
US hosted Vietnams Steering Board 501, which has responsibility for dealing
with unexploded ordnance.
73
In October of the same year, the USS George
Washington aircraft carrier hosted a fly out by a delegation of Vietnamese officials
in international waters off Vietnams eastern coast.
74
This burgeoning defence
cooperation is attributed to Chinas assertive postures in the South China Sea.
As far as Myanmar-US military ties are concerned, they are still at a nascent
stage and have a long way to go. The US policy towards Myanmar has until now
largely skirted the military aspect, focusing instead on developmental aid and
furthering economic ties through the easing of sanctions. However, a defence
attach has always been maintained and discussion are going on about possible
military cooperation.
75
Like Vietnam, the Philippines and Singapore, Malaysia is also upbeat about
its military cooperation with the US. The Combined Afloat Readiness and Training
(CARAT) Malaysia 2011 exercise was launched on June 6, 2011, in Kuantan,
Pahang which is a series of bilateral military exercises during which both the US
Navy and Royal Malaysian Navy learnt more about each others practices in order
to enhance the military capability, planning and execution of both countries
navies.
76
On September 17, 2013, a joint exercise between the Malaysian and
the US, Kris Strike Exercise army held at the 52
nd
Royal Artillery Regiment,
Sungai Petani Airport Camp, in Sungai Petani, Malaysia.
77
In a bid to further
deepen its military cooperation with the US, in early 2014, Malaysias Defence
Minister Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein proclaimed that Malaysia
wishes to intensify joint military exercises and training with the US.
78
In case of Indonesia, defence trade is an important component of the overall
Indonesia-US bilateral relationship. For instance, the US has granted 30 Excess
Defence Articles F-16s to Indonesia, with Indonesia refurbishing them with
national funds. This is a landmark case of defence cooperation.
79
Moreover, in
early September 2013, the US and Indonesia participated in joint counterterrorism
exercise, part of a trend of growing military ties between the two countries.
80
Being a non-NATO ally of the US, Thailand-US military ties are crucial to
the US Rebalancing towards Asia. The US has provided funds for the purchase
of weapons and equipment to the Thai military through the Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) program.
81
Thousands of Thai military officers, including many
of those in top leadership positions throughout the services and in the civilian
163
agencies, have received US training under the International Military Education
and Training (IMET) program.
82
It is believed that sustained attention and commitment of sufficient resources
to the Asia-Pacific region will be the key to assuaging the doubts of regional
friends and allies about US staying power.
83
Nevertheless, in assessing the military
dimension of the US Rebalancing towards Asia, one may argue that the biggest
challenge for the US will be to maintain the military wherewithal necessary for
an active presence in the Southeast Asian region. It will play vital role in shaping
the future role of the US in Southeast Asia.
Economic Dimensions of the US Rebalancing in Southeast Asia
To give a fillip to the Rebalancing towards Asia policy, the US is trying to provide
it the economic dimension as well. The TPP, commercial arm of the Rebalancing
strategy, has been projected as the 21
st
Century trade pact that will involve friends
and allies of the US. So far, China is kept out of the TPP. For ASEAN member
countries, TPP might emerge as a challenge since ASEAN has come up with
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), with China and India
as members.
Trans-Pacific Partnership
The TPP has been lauded as the commercial arm of the US Rebalancing towards
Asia. It is a proposed trade agreement involving Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the US and Vietnam.
It is an attempt to further expand the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
Agreement (TPSEP or P4) of 2005, which was signed by Brunei, Chile, New
Zealand, and Singapore. Projected as the economic pillar of the US Rebalancing
towards Asia and lauded as Obama administrations key long-term foreign policy
objective, the TPP is supposedly designed to bind the region into a stable
economic zone and become the worlds largest free trade zone.
84
Being a free
trade initiative, it aims to liberalise trade in goods and services, encourage
investments, promote innovation and enable economic growth and development.
Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, the US and Vietnam participated in the 17
th
round of negotiations
of TPP, which were held in Peru from May 15-24, 2013.
85
Though the US was
not involved in the TPP at the initial stages, it has arguably become the leader
ever since it joined the negotiation process, so much so that TPP is now perceived
as the US-led multilateral arrangement. According to Li Xiangyang, TPP is an
important part of the US Return to Asia strategy that is based on economic
and geo-political-security considerations. China containment is an undeniable
target of the agreement.
86
Li further adds, Once TPP is instituted, APEC will
be the first to be sidelined. For China, the exclusive TPP will not only bring
about the excludability effect, but also possibly reverse the course of the East
Asian regional integration that China has been pushing for over a decade. It
164
will constitute a major challenge to Chinas rise.
87
However, some experts dont
agree with the argument and maintain that TPP is not a tool to contain China.
Nevertheless, TPP is certainly a tool to re-engage countries of the Southeast Asian
region.
88
TPP and RCEP: Complementary or Competitors
Interestingly, while TPP is being promoted by the US as the Next Generation
FTA, ASEAN itself has been busy flaunting the RCEP as a logical outcome of
maturing cooperation with its Plus Six partner countries: Australia, China,
India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. The stated objective of launching
RCEP negotiation is to achieve a modern, comprehensive, high-quality and
mutually beneficial economic partnership agreement among ASEAN member
states and ASEANs FTA partners. It will cover trade in goods, trade in services,
investment, economic and technical cooperation, intellectual property,
competition, dispute settlement and other issues.
89
As explained in the manifesto, the RCEPs main purpose is to create a
comprehensive and mutually beneficial economic partnership that has a deeper
level of engagement compared to the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA).
90
If everything goes as planned, RCEP will bring the economies of the 16 member
countries closer creating a 3-billion strong market with a combined GDP of
about US$ 19.78 trillion based on 2011 figures. The RCEP would then be the
largest regional trading arrangement.
91
Currently, ASEAN-China Free Trade Area
(ACFTA) is the largest FTA in terms of population and the third largest in terms
of nominal GDP in the world.
It may be noted that ASEAN already has separate bilateral FTAs with non-
ASEAN participating countries. Additionally, several members of the proposed
RCEP have bilateral FTAs with one another. However, numerous terms of
agreement for FTAs and different Rules of Origin have created a spaghetti-
bowl situation, thereby impeding the harmonisation and effective use of the
FTAs. With the RCEP, it is hoped that simpler and streamlined rules, cutting
across the region, will facilitate smoother trade ties. Trade costs are also likely to
go down.
92
According to a recent study done by the Asian Development Bank,
The deal might help consolidate ASEAN FTAs under a single regional agreement
and will provide income gains of around US$ 644 billion in 2025, representing
0.6 percent [sic] of the worlds GDP, through a freer flow of goods, services,
investments and labour among participating economies.
93
One of the primary motives of the ASEAN promoting the RCEP is the
belief that ASEAN must not lag behind in conceptualising and initiating a regional
trade bloc, considering that China and Japan have been striving to assume the
leadership in the region. For ASEAN, RCEP is a vital tool to be at the drivers
seat. Nevertheless, several attempts are going on to realise regional economic
integration. For instance, the East Asia Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA) is
promoted by China, with the ASEAN countries, Japan and South Korea as its
165
other members. Moreover, the proposed Comprehensive Economic Partnership
in East Asia (CEPEA) is promoted by Japan, and its members include the ASEAN
countries, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand.
However, both these initiatives are not advancing well.
94
As mentioned earlier,
RCEP was first mooted during the 19
th
ASEAN summit in Bali, Indonesia, in
November 2011. RCEP not only brought ASEAN to the centre stage of regional
economic integration but also successfully emerged as a conciliatory measure
when Japan and China came up with completely contrasting proposals for regional
trade cooperation. China supported the EAFTA, which restricted the grouping
to ASEAN+3 members; Japan, in contrast, favoured the Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (CEP) in East Asia, which further added three countries: India,
Australia and New Zealand.
95
The foundation stone for negotiations had already
been laid down by ASEAN+6 on the sidelines of the 21
st
ASEAN Leaders Summit
in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in November 2012.
RCEP, if materialised, will strengthen ASEAN regionalism and would lessen
the impact of TPP in terms of regional integration impact. ASEAN-led RCEP
and the US-led TPP have several commonalities. Both are aiming regional
economic integration through trade liberalisation. Four ASEAN member states,
viz., Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam are also involved in the TPP
negotiations. Nonetheless, even though RCEP and TPP have a few analogous
aims, these two economic arrangements are rather different. While India and
China are major negotiators for RCEP, these two are excluded from the TPP.
Some believe that the TPP, rather than being a device to contain China, is a
means of furthering economic integration in the Pacific.
96
However, certain
provisions of the TPP are increasingly becoming a source of dissatisfaction among
the Southeast Asian countries involved in negotiations and further discouraging
the developing countries to be a part of the TPP. For instance, Vietnam is heavily
dependent on non-TPP countries for the import of raw materials, but the TPP
agreement will put restrictions allowing the import of raw materials from TPP
countries only. Moreover, farmers and consumers in Japan are also opposing the
pact.
97
Unlike TPP, RCEP takes into account the sensitivities and apprehensions
of less developed CLMV countriesCambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and
Vietnamand, for that matter, other members also. Thus, in all likelihood, such
countries will prefer RCEP over TPP, thereby strengthening ASEAN regionalism.
For instance, according to reports, the Indonesian government is likely to join
RCEP rather than TPP free trade pacts due a bigger potential market...the
government is still studying the two pacts from the benefit side.
98
Thus, the
economic dimension of the American Rebalancing towards Asia (i.e., the TPP)
has showed somewhat divisive tendencies. Through RCEP, however, ASEAN
strives to put its act together.
As far as membership is concerned, unlike TPP, RCEP is open to non-ASEAN
FTA partners as well. As of now, only ASEAN+6 members are participating. The
possibility of the US joining the RCEP is not unlikely, as it is already a member
166
in an ASEAN-affiliated grouping like the EAS and ADMM Plus. It is worth
noting that the US entry into the EAS in 2011 was staunchly opposed by China.
Likewise, China might again be opposed to its entry into the RCEP, as the US
membership would pose a challenge to Chinas strong influence in the region.
Despite numerous boundary disputes between China and its neighbouring
countries, economic relations, so far, have largely remained unaffected. When
realised, RCEP is likely to give a fillip to their already boosting economic relations,
provided the South China Sea conundrum doesnt drastically alter the security
situation.
As far as ASEAN is concerned, RCEP is predicted to serve two purposes:
First, it will make it easier for ASEAN to achieve the set trade target with potential
economic partners like China and India. Second, RCEP will help in boosting
ASEANs economic ties with India, Australia and other East Asian countries.
Clearly, countries across the region, including India are set to benefit from RCEP.
99
TPP, in contrast, doesnt offer such benefits to the region. With RCEP, it is believed
that in the short run, China appears to have price, quality and standards very
few people can match, but India has advantages in some sectors, too.
100
Currently, ASEANs joining of TPP is not on the cards. Given that all member
countries of ASEAN are yet to become members of APEC and TPP, RCEP might
prove advantageous for the ASEAN economies as most of them desperately need
a makeover. RCEP will open the doors of bigger markets for countries like China
and India and integrate ASEAN economies into the promising East Asian market.
Finalising the RCEP by 2015 would not be a cakewalk for the parties involved
in the negotiations. There do exist a few discrepancies which might act as spoilers.
First, there is huge economic disparity among the main negotiators, India, China
and Japan, which is bound to become an obstacle for the negotiations.
Furthermore, provisions suitable for developed countries will not necessarily be
constructive for lesser developed countries, and vice versa. Second, boundary
disputes are the most likely sources of deep trust deficit between China and its
neighbours including India, Japan and countries of the Southeast Asian region.
Thus, a mutually agreeable framework for solution, acceptable to all concerned
parties, is critically important. Third, tariff reduction and elimination are likely
to be complicated. Tariff barriers have been a basis of discontent in bilateral FTAs
as well, particularly ASEAN-India FTA, which demand attention of the concerned
parties. However, if a comprehensive agreement can be reached, trade barriers in
East Asia will come down.
101
While RCEP negotiations are still at an embryonic stage, it remains to be
seen how it is going to alter the economic calculus in the East Asian region and
the ways through which it will attract non-members to join in. However, like
any other multilateral arrangement, RCEP too is not liberated from the shackles
of apprehensions. The shadow of Chinas speculated dominance over the agreement
has become a matter of debate. However, one may argue that ASEANs unhindered
167
economic relations with its Plus Six partners and its leadership in RCEP
negotiations are likely to determine the future of RCEP.
The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), which is also expected to be
realised by 2015, is closely tied to the successful conclusion of RCEP. To secure
its position at the drivers seat of RCEP and achieve its goals of reinforcing ASEAN
centrality and realising AEC within the specified time limit, it is vital for ASEAN
to accelerate the RCEP negotiations to conclude them by 2015. RCEP holds
immense potential as it will help East Asian countries in facilitating calibrated
responses and policies with respect to its future economic relations with ASEAN
and its FTA partners at bilateral as well as multilateral levels.
The US Rebalancing and ASEAN: Institutional Dimensions
Great power politics has been the biggest catalyst for ASEANs cohesiveness. In
fact, the very foundation of ASEAN lies in great power politics. Thus, the
Rebalancing, if intensified, will have an impact on ASEAN and its affiliate
institutions. Predicting the future of ASEAN, Thitinan Pongsudhirak says,
ASEAN has reached the pinnacle of its integration efforts in its attempts to
forge an ASEAN Community by the end of 2015, resting on the three pillars of
ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC), ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). The
blueprints of these plans are ambitious, and ASEAN is likely to fall short again
in need of a re-launch of its community objectives. But the organisation is likely
to be able to maintain its momentum owing to historical mistrust in East Asia,
the ten member organisation has proved its staying power as a steer and steward
of regional cooperative vehicles.
102
Clearly, ASEAN faces numerous challenges
and it would be difficult to deal with them effectively if member countries of
ASEAN dont equip themselves with a deeper commitment to lasting peace and
robust mutual cooperation. An aggressive US-China rivalry and escalating South
China Sea dispute may not be in the best interests of the ASEAN and its member
countries. Speaking at the opening session of the 21
st
ASEAN Summit in
November 2012, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen stated: The early
ratification of the protocol on the ASEAN charter on Dispute settlement
mechanisms by member countries will help uphold the culture of compliance
within ASEAN. In addition, we need to further strengthen coordination among
executing agencies to promote resource mobilisation, and incorporate regional
agreements into national development programmes and plans of member states...
maintaining regional peace and security is indispensable for ASEANs prosperity
and inclusive growth in the entire ASEAN region. In this regard, ASEAN has
to further strengthen its capacity and role in the discussions and cooperation
mechanisms with ASEAN dialogue partners to address issues related to regional
peace and security.
103
The lack of consensus during the Cambodia Summit and widening fissures
within the ASEAN regarding Chinas role in the South China Sea dispute dont
168
leave ASEAN with no choices but to put its act together. Intensifying competition
for bigger influence in the region might throw the ASEAN open to bigger
challenges. While ASEAN was resilient in handling the US-USSR rivalry during
the Cold War years, a possible China-US rivalry might put difficult choices before
ASEAN and its member countries.
It is beyond doubt that the US Rebalancing towards Asia has created ripples
across countries and institutions of the Southeast Asian region. To be sure, an
active presence of the US provides a reassuring balance to an increasingly assertive
China. While some countries of Southeast Asia find the US Rebalancing
comforting, ASEAN as a grouping doesnt like external powers to decide and
drive the agenda of the region. A wide range of trends are being witnessed in that
context. While the intra-regional integration efforts at economic and security
fronts can be seen in the form of the ARF, ADMM Plus, EAS and RCEP, the
US-led institutions like the TPP are also coming up. While one finds such types
of institutions at cross purposes, problematic issues relating to the balance of
influence in the region also exists. In that context, it would be interesting to note
how ASEAN manages to keep its influence in the East Asian region intact. It
may be argued that if ASEAN successfully manages to focus on unity among its
own members, it might also be able to effectively handle the divisive tendencies
in the region. Needless to say, the tradition of bringing about mutual consensus
without interfering in individual preferences of members needs to be strengthened.
Conclusion
It is believed that under the current Obama administration, the pendulum in
the US policy towards China has swung from attempting to cooperate with China
to pushing back against Chinese assertiveness and challenges to international
laws and norms. Getting tougher with Beijing was necessary, but it has also
created unintentional consequences that have to be dealt with in the times to
come.
104
Clearly, under current circumstances, associations and countries of the
Southeast Asian region, particularly ASEAN as a group, would go for the hedging
strategy, and may not like to antagonise China at the cost of the US, or vice-
versa. Chinas growing power and assertiveness have provided an important
stimulus for renewed American activism in the region. Nevertheless, Southeast
Asian states may take advantage of renewed American interest to hedge against
Chinas rise, most of them will keep their strategic options open.
105
As has been
witnessed in case of a number of countries, they seem to be accepting the increased
presence of the US in the region, while keeping the ties with China intact and
benefitting from its economic growth.
At the regional front, ASEAN seems to be facing challenges, primarily in
terms of the ASEAN Centrality. Moreover, increasing divisions among the
member countries are likely to pose new challenges to ASEAN and its affiliate
institutions. Nevertheless, as long as the fundamentals of ASEAN are intact and
169
it enjoys the support of its ten members, it is in a safe position. Support of the
Plus Six members will play a decisive role in keeping ASEAN cohesive so that
it uses the American Rebalancing towards Asia for its own benefit. That would
mean greater institutional balancing among the external powers of the region
and intense competition for greater diplomatic influence on ASEAN. Diplomacy
of middle and small powers largely depends on the interplay among the
superpowers of international system. This has been proved true ever since the
birth of the Treaty of Westphalia. The US Rebalancing towards Asia is intricately
linked with the US-China equation, and will shape the behaviour of countries
of the region as it unfolds. The US rebalancing is likely to come up as yet another
example demonstrating how the international system and great powers of the
system shape the policies of small, medium and regional powers and their
groupings as well.
Recent trends in the US-China relations indicate that if their relationship
keeps on going on a downward spiral, it might lead to mutual hostilities and
unexpected outcomes at global and regional levels. The fact of the matter is that
the US Rebalancing towards Asia is aimed at capping Chinas strategic space in
the region. China has been sceptical of the Rebalancing, perceiving it as a challenge
to its strategic ambitions. While one cannot deny the potential utility of an active,
and preferably benign, presence of the US for ASEAN member countries and
other countries of the East Asian region, a hyperactive military presence of the
US that flares up any overt rivalry with China is neither feasible for the US nor
desirable by Southeast Asia. Additionally, a hesitantly followed up Rebalancing
towards Asia strategy would not have many takers in the region, and to avoid
being a gimmick for Southeast Asian friends and allies, the Rebalancing strategy
itself has to come out in such a strong fashion that it is able to infuse confidence
about the hyper power status of the US in general and American Rebalancing
strategy in Southeast Asia in particular.
NOTES
1. For the purpose of consistency, this paper uses the term Rebalancing rather than Pivot.
2. Barack Obama Says Asia-Pacific Is Top US Priority, BBC News, November 17, 2011,
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15715446 (Accessed December 26, 2013).
3. Hillary Clinton, Americas Pacific Century, Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, at http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century (Accessed October 14,
2012).
4. Yang Razali Kassim, The New Great Game: ASEANs Balancing Act? RSIS Commentaries,
January 17, 2012, at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/ RSIS0142012.pdf
5. Abraham M. Denmark et al., Regional Perspectives on US Strategic Rebalancing, Asia
Policy, 15, January 2013, p. 2.
6. Mark E. Manyin et al, Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administrations Rebalancing
Toward Asia, Congressional Research Service, at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
R42448.pdf (Accessed September 26, 2013).
7. Scholars like Robert A. Manning, however, believe that Rebalancing is not a new
170
phenomenon. He argues, Long before the US rebalancing was proclaimed, before Obama
became president, the US had been strengthening alliances and security partnerships in
East Asia over the past two decades. The current US posture is the accumulation of those
efforts. For details, see: Robert A Manning, US Rebalancing Asia, Not Containing China,
Atlantic Council, July 2, 2013, at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/us-
rebalancing-asia-not-containing-china (Accessed December 20, 2013).
8. US Pivot to Asia Makes China Nervous, The Washington Post, November 15, 2011, at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-pivot-to-asia-makes-china-nervous/
2011/11/15/gIQAsQpVRN_story.html (Accessed December 19, 2013).
9. Amitav Acharya, Why Two Asias May be Better Than None, World Politics Review, January
8, 2013, at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12603/why-two-asias-may-be-better-
than-none (Accessed January 5, 2014).
10. Security Outlook of the Asia Pacific Countries and Its Implications for the Defence Sector,
NIDS Joint Research Series, 9, The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, 2013. p.
143.
11. US Pivots to the Philippines, BBC, November 12, 2013, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-us-canada-24915818 (Accessed November 12, 2013).
12. Michael E. OHanlon, Rebalancing the US Military in Asia and the Pacific, Brookings,
June 9, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/06/09-rebalancing-us-
military-asia-pacific-ohanlon (Accessed July 12, 2013).
13. Mohan Malik, China and India: Great Power Rivals, Viva Books, New Delhi, 2012, p. 372.
14. Mohan Malik, Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission
on the Strategies and Objectives of Chinas Foreign Affairs & Asian Reactions to Chinas
Rise, March 18, 2008, at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2008hearings/written_testimonies/
08_03_18_wrts/08_03_18_malik_statement.php. (Accessed July 9, 2008).
15. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Obamas Southeast Asia Visit: Reengaging with the Region, East
Asia Forum, November 20, 2012,at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/11/20/obamas-
southeast-asia-visit-re-engaging-with-the-region/ (Accessed November 20, 2012).
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Amitav Acharya, No. 9.
19. Rahul Mishra, Vietnam-US Rapprochement: A New Phase, IDSA Comment, September
2, 2013, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/VietnamUSRapprochement _rmishra_020913
20. Ibid.
21. Joint Statement by President Barack Obama of the United States of America and President
Truong Tan Sang of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Office of the Press Secretary, The
White House, July 25, 2013, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/25/
joint-statement-president-barack-obama-united-states-america-and-preside (Accessed July 28,
2013).
22. Ibid.
23. Rahul Mishra, No. 19.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. The Big Picture of the Changing Indo-Asia-Pacific Region: Opportunities and Challenges
for Vietnam and Sri Lanka, Speech delivered by H.E. Mr. Ton Sinh Thanh, Vietnam
Ambassador at Lakshman Kardigamar Institute of International Relations and Strategic Studies,
August 16, 2013, at http://www.vietnamembassy-srilanka.vn/en/nr070521165843/
nr070815092257/ns130909213753/newsitem_print_preview (Accessed October 14, 2013).
27. Philippines Orders US to Leave Strategic Navy Base at Subic Bay, The New York Times,
December 28, 1991, at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/28/world/philippines-orders-us-
171
to-leave-strategic-navy-base-at-subic-bay.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (Accessed January 21,
2014).
28. US Pivots to the Philippines, No. 11.
29. Ibid.
30. Josef T. Yap, Consequences of the US Rebalance to Asia: Implications for the Philippines,
The National Strategy Forum Review, Spring 2013, 22 (2), pp. 1-3.
31. Ibid.
32. Reply by Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen to Parliamentary Question on the US
Pivot towards Asia, The Strait Times, at http://www.straitstimes.com/sites/straitstimes.com/
files/reply%20on%20 pivot% 20towards%20asia2.pdf (Accessed January 14, 2014).
33. Ibid.
34. Emma Chanlett-Avery, Singapore: Background and US Relations, CRS Report for the
Congress, Congressional Research Service, July 26, 2013,at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RS20490.pdf (Accessed October 27, 2013).
35. Bertil Lintner, Aung San Suu Kyi and Burmas Struggle for Democracy, Silkworm Books,
Thailand, 2012, p. 107.
36. Myanmar: Government Panel Approves Opposition Leaders Run for Parliament, The New
York Times, February 6, 2012, at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/world/asia/myanmar-
panel-approves-aung-san-suu-kyis-run-for-parliament.html?_r=3 (Accessed December 23,
2012).
37. Key US Lawmaker Heads to Myanmar to Assess Reform Pace, The Straits Times, January
11, 2012, at http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/SEAsia/Story/STIStory_754158.
html (Accessed January 2, 2013).
38. US and Burma to Swap Ambassadors in Substantial Step for Reform, The Guardian,
January 13, 2012, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/13/us-burma-swap-
ambassadors-reform (Accessed January 14, 2012).
39. Rahul Mishra, Myanmar and the United States: On a Reconciliatory Path?, IDSA
Comments, February 14, 2012, at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/MyanmarandtheUnited
StatesOnaReconciliatoryPath_rmishra_130212 (Accessed February 14, 2012).
40. Rahul Mishra, Glow of Success in Myanmar, The Indian Express, November 16, 2012, at
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/glow-of-success-in-myanmar/1031603/ (Accessed
November 16, 2012).
41. Obama Lauds Aung San Suu Kyi, Gives a Nod to Myanmar, CNN, November 19, 2012,
at http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/19/politics/obama-asia-trip (Accessed November 30,
2013).
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Obama Walks a Fine Line with Myanmar Presidents Landmark Visit, Reuters, May 19,
2013, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/19/us-usa-myanmar-idUSBRE94I0E
620130519 (Accessed November 30, 2013).
46. Ibid.
No. 10, p. 142.
49. Chulacheeb Chinwanno, Thai-Chinese Relations: Security and Strategic Partnership, RSIS
Working Papers, 155, March 24, 2008.
50. Chantasasawat Busakorn, Burgeoning Sino-Thai Relations: Heightening Cooperation,
Sustaining Economic Security, China: An International Journal, 4 (1), March 2006, pp.
86-112.
51. Ibid.
172
52. Rahul Mishra and Sana Hashmi, India-Thai Relations: Look East, Look West, RSIS
Commentaries, 022/2012, February 7, 2012, at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/
Perspective/RSIS0222012.pdf (Accessed January 21, 2014).
53. Arne Kislenko, Bending with the Wind: The Continuity and Flexibility of Thai Foreign
Policy, International Journal, 57 (4), Autumn, 2002, pp. 537-561.
54. Rahul Mishra, India-Thailand Relations in East Asian Security Dynamics, in S.D. Muni
and Vivek Chadha (eds.), Asian Strategic Review, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2013, pp. 164-
182.
55. Arne Kislenko, Bending with the Wind: The Continuity and Flexibility of Thai Foreign
Policy, International Journal, 57 (4), Autumn, 2002, pp. 537-561.Ibid.
57. History of US-Brunei Relations, at http://brunei.usembassy.gov/brunei_info.html (Accessed
December 15, 2013).
No. 10, p. 21.
59. Ibid.
60. Greg Lopez, Malaysia-US and Malaysia-China Relations, October 24, 2013, at http://
asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2013/10/24/malaysia-us-and-malaysia-china-relations/
61. Pheakdey Heng, Cambodia-China Relations: A Positive-Sum Gum, Journal of Current
Southeast Asian Affairs,31(2), 2012, pp. 57-85.
62. Ralf Emmers, The US Rebalancing Strategy and the South China Sea Disputes, RSIS
Commentaries, September 4, 2013, at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/
RSIS1652012.pdf (Accessed September 5, 2013).
63. Ibid.
64. Cambodia, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President,
at http://www.ustr.gov/node/7961 (Accessed December 6, 2013).
65. Military Exercises Begin between US, Cambodian Forces, The Voice of America, May 17,
2013, at http://www.voacambodia.com/content/military-exercises-begin-between-us-
cambodian-forces/1662601.html (Accessed May 19, 2013).
66. Richard C. Bush III, The Response of Chinas Neighbors to the U.S. Pivot to Asia,
Brookings, January 31, 2012, at http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2012/01/31-
us-pivotRebalancing-bush#, (Accessed February 14, 2013).
67. As Obamas Asia Pivot Falters, China Steps into the Gap, Reuters, October 6, 2013, at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/06/us-asia-usa-china-idUSBRE99501O20131006
68. Ibid, and further details on the issue can be found in the chapter written by Vivek Chadha
dealing with military aspects of the US Pivot to Asia.
69. Factsheet-The Strategic Framework Agreement, July 12, 2005, at http://
www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2005/jul/12jul05_nr/
12jul05_fs.html#.UuUZgRC6brc (Accessed December 30, 2013)
70. Donald K. Emmerson, Challenging ASEAN: American Pivot to Southeast Asia, East Asia
Forum, January 13, 2013, at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/01/13/challenging-asean-
the-american-pivot-in-southeast-asia/ (Accessed January 14, 2013).
71. United States-Singapore Relations, November 17, 2012, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2012/11/200671.htm (Accessed December 20, 2013).
72. Joint Statement by US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Singapore Minister for
Defense Dr Ng Eng Hen, December 12, 2013, at http://www.defense.gov/releases/
release.aspx?releaseid=16418 (Accessed December 12, 2013).
73. Carl Thayer, Vietnam Gradually Warms Up to US Military, The Diplomat, November 6,
2013, at http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/vietnam-gradually-warms-up-to-us-military/
(Accessed November 15, 2013).
173
74. Ibid.
75. Tim McLaughlin, US and Myanmar Up Military Engagement, Myanmar Times, August
1, 2013, at http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/7656-us-and-myanmar-to-
commence-military-cooperation.html (Accessed August 2, 2013).
76. U.S.-Malaysia Show cooperation with Joint Military Exercises, June 2011, at http://
malaysia.usembassy.gov/program_carat2011-060611.html (Accessed December 16, 2013).
77. Malaysia and US Army Joint Exercise, The Malaysian Times, September 17, 2013, at
http://www.themalaysiantimes.com.my/malaysia-and-us-army-joint-exercise/ (Accessed
October 1, 2013).
78. Malaysia, US to Intensify Joint Military Exercises, Training, The Malay Mail, January
19, 2014, at http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/malaysia-us-to-intensify-
joint-military-exercises-training (Accessed January 19, 2014).
79. United States-Indonesia Relations, September 3, 2012, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2012/09/197277.htm (Accessed December 15, 2013).
80. Global Insider: Indonesian Military Seeks Partnerships to Help It Modernize, World Politics
Review, October 17 2013, at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/13309/global-
insider-indonesian-military-seeks-partnerships-to-help-it-modernize (Accessed December 18,
2013).
81. Emma Chanlet-Avery, Ben Dolven, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations, December
20, 2013, at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32593.pdf (Accessed December 20, 2013).
82. Ibid.
83. Bonnie S. Glaser, Pivot to Asia: Prepare for Unintended Consequences, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, pp. 22-24.
84. Foreign Minister Julie Bishop: Talks on TPP, US military Pivot to Asia, The Sydney
Morning Herald, November 21, 2013, at http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-
news/foreign-minister-julie-bishop-talks-on-tpp-us-military-pivot-to-asia-20131120-
2xvwc.html (Accessed November 21, 2013).
85. Sanchita Basu Das, The Trans-Pacific Partnership as a Tool to Contain China: Myth or
Reality?, ISEAS Perspective, May 17, 2013.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership, Inter American Development Bank, http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/
CM%202013/11581.pdf (Accessed December 28, 2013).
90. First Round of RCEP Negotiations Conclude, May 16, 2013, at http://www.asean
briefing.com/news/2013/05/16/first-round-of-rcep-negotiations-conclude.html (Accessed
May 17, 2013).
91. ASEAN and FTA Partners Launch the Worlds Biggest Regional Free Trade Deal,
November 20, 2012, at http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/asean-and-
fta-partners-launch-the-world-s-biggest-regional-free-trade-deal (Accessed January 12, 2014).
92. Rahul Mishra, RCEP: Challenges and Opportunities for India, RSIS Commentaries, 140/
2013, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, July 25, 2013, at http://
www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS1402013.pdf (Accessed July 25, 2013).
93. RCEPs First Round Sets Foundations for Further Talks, Jakarta Post, May 14, 2013, at
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/05/14/rcep-s-first-round-sets-foundations-further-
talks.html (Accessed May 15, 2013).
94. Mahani Zainal Abidin, RCEP-Can It Create the Worlds Largest FTA? The Edge, April
29, 2013, at http://www.theedgemalaysia.com/commentary/236928-rcepcan-it-create
95. Murray Hiebert and Liam Hanlon, ASEAN and Partners Launch Regional Comprehensive
174
Economic Partnership, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 7, 2012,
at http://csis.org/publication/asean-and-partners-launch-regional-comprehensive-economic-
partnership (Accessed May 15, 2013).
96. Robert A. Manning, No. 7.
97. Farmers and Consumers Protest TPP Free Trade Agreement, at http://
www.tokyotimes.com/2013/farmers-and-consumers-protest-tpp-free-trade-agreement/
98. Indonesia May Prefer RCEP to TPP, Xinhua, January 30, 2013, at http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-01/30/c_132139471.htm (Accessed July 14, 2013).
99. Regional Trade Deal to Give Strong Boost to ASEAN Economies: ADB, Xinhua, April
23, 2013, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/business/201304/23/c_132334063.htm
(Accessed April 26, 2013).
100. Surojit Gupta, Ganeshan Wignaraja: RCEP is Huge for Indian Businesseswhich should
Scale Up, The Times of India, February 6, 2o13, at http://articles.timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/2013-02-06/interviews/36765453_1_rcep-indian-businesses-regional-
comprehensive-economic-partnership (Accessed March 1, 2013).
101. Ganeshan Wignaraja, Why the RCEP Matters for Asia and the World, EAF, May 15,
2013, at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/15/why-the-rcep-matters-for-asia-and-the-
world/ (Accessed May 15, 2013).
No. 10, pp. 141-145.
103. Ibid.
104. Bonnie S. Glaser, No. 83.
105. US Rebalance: Potential and Limits in Southeast Asia, Strategic Comments, IISS, 2012
(49), December 19, 2012, at http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20comments/
sections/2012-bb59/us-rebalancepotential-and-limits-in-southeast-asia-c5a7 (Accessed
December 25, 2012)
.
11
Japans Response to the US Pivot to Asia
Shamshad A. Khan
Introduction
In view of the US preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan, and relative decline
of the US with the rise of China, Japan had been mulling strategies to
complement
1
its security alliance with the US. In its National Defense
Programme Guidelines (NDPG) which laid down Japans defence policy for next
decade, it identified new regional powers
2
including Australia, South Korea and
other countries belonging to the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), with which it wanted to strengthen the security cooperation. This
move to complement the US-Japan alliance, or diversify the US-Japan alliance,
as Thomas Wilkins interprets,
3
was primarily aimed at safeguarding Japanese
security. However, the US pivot to Asia (described by a Japanese security expert
as Americas return to Asia) which commits an increased deployment in the
Asia-Pacific has instilled new confidence in Japan with regard to the leadership
role of the US in the Asia-Pacific.
The pivot to Asia which requires US allies and partners to play an active
role in maintaining peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, however, will
pose new challenges to Japan. Japans security and defence policy, thus far, has
been guided by the pacifist principles and the ideals enshrined in its peace
constitution. Though a section of Japanese politicians have been demanding a
change in these policies, especially the restrictions on the exercise of force, there
has been no political consensus on this. In the wake of the US pivot to Asia
strategy, a section of Japanese strategic community has renewed its demand for
an easing of the normative restrictions on the use of force by its troops. The
present Abe administration is actively contemplating changes in some of these
policies, including the self-imposed ban on the right to collective self-defence in
order to make the US-Japan security relations more robust. It has revised previous
governments NDPGadopted barely two years agoto align Japanese security
policy with the changing realities of regional security.
176
Prior to Americas pivot to Asia strategy, Japan and South Korea were the
supreme US security allies in the Asia-Pacific. Ever since the US declared its
intentions to bolster its security relations with the Philippines, Thailand and
Vietnam identifying them as potential partners, there have been concerns within
Japan, an ally of the US, that it may lose its supremacy in the alliance. To maintain
its relevance in the alliance or avoid abandonment, Japan has been most
forthcoming in welcoming as well as in playing a proactive role in the pivot to
Asia policy. In this context, the paper discusses some questions including: Where
does the US situate Japan in its pivot to Asia policy? What is the response of
Japanese strategic circles to the US rebalancing strategy? What are the measures
the Government of Japan is taking to shoulder its responsibility as an ally?
Situating Japan in the US pivot to Asia Strategy
In its policy pronouncements, the US has identified a number of countries with
which it aims to strengthen its alliance as part of its pivot to Asia strategy, in
which Japan finds special mention. Almost all the key figures in the US
administration, from Hillary Clinton to Tom Donilon, have accorded top priority
to Japan, while enunciating Americas long term vision for peace and stability of
the Asia-Pacific region.
Hillary Clinton in her Foreign Policy articleconsidered the first detailed
blueprint of the US rebalancing strategytermed the US alliance with Japan as
the cornerstone of peace and stability in the region. She stated that both Japan
and the US share a common vision of a stable regional order with clear rules of
the roadfrom freedom of navigation to open markets and fair competition.
4
The new rebalancing strategy was announced at a time when the US was debating
sequestration that is, reducing its budget by $487 billion over the next 10
years. It was apparent that the US wanted its allies and partners to share the
burden of defence expenditure. Clinton made a special reference to Japan, and
stated that Japan will contribute more than $ 5 billion to ensure the continued
enduring presence of American forces in Japan. Both will expand joint
intelligence and reconnaissance activities to deter and react quickly to regional
security challenges.
5
While giving details regarding the defence perspective of the US strategic
rebalancing, Ashton B Carter, Deputy Secretary of Defence, stated that just as
we are thinking about our rebalance to the Asia Pacific, Japan is considering itself
and its role in the region.
6
Till then, Japan had not spelt out its response to the
US strategic rebalancingat least officially. However, it has announced measures
to strengthen security of its outlying islands closer to China. Carter linked Japans
internal balancing strategy with that of the pivot to Asia when he stated:
Japan is assessing its role in regional peacekeeping operations and
humanitarian/disaster response, and considering which capabilities it will
need for the future. The Japanese are exploring forward stationing of their
own forces on Guam, and looking to joint exercises.
7
177
A number of US dignitaries visited Japan following Osamas re-election
apparently to synergise its rebalancing strategy with Japan. Following a visit to
Tokyo, Thomas Donilon, the then National Security advisor to President Obama,
stated that the US alliance with Japan remains the cornerstone of regional security
and prosperity. He added that there is scarcely a regional or global challenge
in the Presidents (Obamas) second term agenda where the United States does
not look to Japan to play an important role.
8
A few months after President Obamas re-election, internal political
developments in Japan led to a snap general election following which the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) assumed office at the end of December 2012. The newly
elected government announced that it intended to revise the defence guidelines
laid down by the previous Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government. The
reason cited was that the, above-mentioned, guidelines, which were to remain in
effect for another decade, did not address the changing regional security realities.
However, it became clear following Chuck Hagels speech at the Shangri-La
Dialogue that the US wanted Japan to change the defence guidelines to further
the US rebalancing strategy. Chuck Hagel stated:
With Japan, we have agreed to review the Defence Guidelines that underpin
our alliance cooperation and are making substantial progress in realigning
our force posture and enhancing alliance missile defence capabilities.
9
Japanese Perspective on the US Rebalancing Strategy
In the words of a Japanese scholar, Japan has naturally welcomed this policy.
10
Most non-Japanese scholars trace the origin of the policy to Hillary Clintons
article in Foreign Policy. Japanese strategic thinkers, however, trace it to the defence
departments Quadrennial Defence Review 2010, which elaborated the US
regional security strategies with a particular focus on Asia. Noburo Yamaguchi,
a professor of military history and strategy at the National Defence Academy of
Japan, argues that the 2010 QDR parted ways with the previous QDR released
in 2006, which focussed on the global war on terror and largely ignored the
11
He further argues that the US Department of Defence
outlined the strategic concept in an official document released in January 2012.
The document declared that the US will of necessity rebalance towards the Asia
Pacific region.
12
Similarly, Tomohiko Satake, a Research Fellow at the National
Institute for Defence Studies, says that the Obama administration has
comprehensively strengthened its political, military, and diplomatic engagement
with the Asia Pacific region
13
on the basis of the January 2012 strategic doctrine.
The Japanese strategic community sought internal changes in Japans pacifist
security policy in the wake of the new US rebalancing strategy. Fumiaki Kubo,
a professor at the University of Tokyo, made some suggestions to the Government
of Japan that would prove effective in bringing closer ties with the US. Kubos
policy prescriptions included:
178
building up the Japan Coast Guard, increasing defence spending, bolstering
Japans Security Council, improving confidentiality law, and amending
governments interpretations of the right of collective defence are among
the approaches that should be pursued.
14
Yet another Japanese strategic thinker argues that Japan should make an all-out
effort to keep the US engaged in the Asia-Pacific and use its defence and security
capability to ensure that insurgency and trouble should not resurface in other
parts of the world. Noburo Yamaguchi argues:
Americas turning back to Asia is based on the assumption that wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan are winding down. If the situation in the two theatres were
to seriously worsen, the US focus might shift away from the Pacific.
Japanese scholars also feel that Japan should make a financial contribution to the
US rebalancing strategy to share the burden with the US. Hideki Asari, deputy
director general of Japan Institute of International Affairs, argues that the financial
difficulties of the United States are a restrictive factor on military planning... the
allies and partners of the United States in the region, including Japan, need to
work together with the US to make the rebalancing strategy sustainable.
However, Tadae Takubo, vice president of the Japan Institute for National
Fundamentalsa Tokyo-based think tankargues that Obamas social security
schemes have deteriorated the already deficit-plagued federal budget further to
the disadvantage of defence outlays.
15
He opines that because of its domestic
problems, the US would have no choice but to ask allies to share defence burdens,
adding that Japan must be prepared to meet USs request.
16
Within Japan, some scholars have also suggested that the Japanese
Government should remove the normative restrictions on its security policy, along
with the legal hurdles in the way the exercising of collective self-defence. Fumiaki
Kubo points out that the Japanese Government maintains that it cannot exercise
the right of Collective Self-Defence. He suggests that amending this long-
standing interpretation would dramatically expand the scope within which Japan
can meaningfully support the US in security matters. He adds:
If Japan makes up for the current weak spots in the current alliance by
adopting the measures...including the amended interpretation of the
Collective right to Self-Defence, it could enhance its value as an ally of the
US.
17
As regards the impact of rebalancing on regional security issues and, more
importantly, on China, the Japanese strategic thinkers are of the view that the
robust US military presence will help moderate Chinas behaviour. Noburo
Yamaguchi opines:
If US political commitment to Asia remains strong with robust military
presence, and its alliance in this region remain tight, China may have less
incentive to compete militarily with the US and its allies, and may be inclined
to be more co-operative.
179
Yet another Japanese scholar argues that China...is the driving factor that
promoted this new US strategy. He goes on to say that the enhanced US
presence in the region will put an end to the discourse on the decline of the
US power. Americas re-commitment to its regional allies and partners will be
a signalling to China.
A section of non-Japanese scholars believe that pivot to Asia strategy is simply
a balance of power strategy and among its key components is the forward
deployed diplomacy.
18
Yet another section of non-Japanese scholars, including
Christopher Layne, believe that Americas rebalancing strategy marks the beginning
of its offshore balancing strategya strategy in which the US withdraws its
forward deployed forces from the region and shifts responsibility of the
maintenance of balance of power to regional countries.
19
Tomohiko Satake, a
Japanese scholar, however differs with these scholars. He debunks Laynes offshore
balancing strategy, and says that the essence of Laynes offshore balancing strategy
is burden shifting or buck passing. Satake believes that the ongoing US strategy
is to project its strong leadership in maintaining the regional order while expecting
its regional allies and friends to enhance their defence capabilities. Therefore,
Satake states that it is not burden shifting or buck-passing, but burden-sharing
that the US is pursuing in Asia. Moreover, he adds that there is no guarantee
that the US would never change its strategy from burden sharing to burden-
shifting (that is offshore balancing). Satake believes that if the US allies do not
play their role in burden sharing they may face risk of abandonment. So, in
Satakes reading, the message between the lines, perhaps to Japan, is to expand
its regional security role. He goes on to say:
From the perspective of its allies, it is necessary to expand their regional
security roles to some extent, as well as further strengthen their defence
capabilities, in order to minimise future risk of abandonment.
20
Japanese Governments Response to the US Pivot to the
Asia-Pacific
The Japanese strategic community welcomed the US rebalancing strategy without
any delay. However, the official response came a little later. Prime Minister Noda,
in a joint press briefing on November 2012, stated: I welcome the US policy to
place importance on the Asia Pacific region. He added that he would like to
further cooperate and work in order to generate synergy effects between the
policies of Japan and the United States.
21
Nodas successor Shinzo Abe took some bold measures, including putting
the defence guidelines, adopted in 2010 by the previous government, on hold
and promised revision in the defence guidelines. An interim report on Japans
Defense Posture Review released by the defence ministry cited two main reasons
for the revision of the NDPG. Firstly, the regional security environment has
become more tense, as seen by Chinas increasing activities in Japans vicinity as
180
well as North Koreas missile launches. Secondly, the US is emphasising its
presence in the Asia-Pacific in cooperation with allies including Japan.
22
At first glance, the move to revise the NDPG appears to be in response to
the challenges posed to Japans territorial integrity by China following Senkakus
nationalisation. But the changes could be a well-thought-out strategy to meet
the US demand as part of the pivot to Asia strategy. In fact, a summary of the
defence posture review notes that Japan will further strengthen defence
cooperation through discussions of roles and missions Japan should carry...for
US-Japan Defense Cooperation.
23
In its revised defence guidelines issued on December 17, 2013, Tokyo noted
that security environment around Japan is becoming increasingly severe, and
felt the need to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance to make it more balanced
and effective.
24
In line with the US policy to play a role in the security of the
Asia-Pacific, Japan also showed its commitment to play a similar role. The
guidelines noted that Japan will contribute more actively than ever to ensure
peace, stability, and prosperity of the world while pursuing its own security and
peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.
25
It further added that Japan will
build comprehensive defence architecture and strengthen its system for preventing
and responding to various contingencies.
26
This commitment is akin to the US
pivot to Asia strategy.
As mentioned previously in this chapter, some scholars see the US pivot to
Asia as a strategy to shift responsibility for the maintenance of balance of power
to regional countries. Some of the changes in Japanese security strategy, as
announced in the newly adopted defence guidelines, suggest that Tokyo is
preparing to assume those responsibilities. The defence guidelines state that the
Self-Defence Forces will strengthen its ability to deal with attacks by aircraft,
naval vessels, and missiles to ensure maritime and air superiority.
27
The
guidelines also unveiled plans to create an amphibious force akin to the US
Marine Force, and note that the SDF will develop full amphibious capability,
in order to land, recapture and secure without delay in case of any invasion to
any remote islands.
28
As of now, Japan does not have a full-fledged marine force.
But it is likely to set up a new amphibious unit combining elements of the ground,
maritime and air self-defence forces on the lines of the US Marine Corps.
29
Japan
seems to be serious about this as it has already participated in a military drill
with the US Marines in the simulated recapture of an isolated island in California
on June 17, 2013.
30
In addition, Japan has drawn up a plan to improve the manoeuvrability of
the Self-Defence Forces. In its budgetary appropriation requests for fiscal 2014,
the defence ministry has sought 100 million to study the feasibility of acquiring
MV-22 Osprey, a vertical take-off and landing transport aircraft.
31
The ministry
is also considering the deployment of the Global Hawk unmanned high-altitude
reconnaissance aircraft used by the US Military as early as fiscal 2015.
32
Much before the review of the NDPG, Japan had already strengthened its
181
naval and air defence capability. It has made a start with the launch in August
2013 of the Izumu class shipthe largest warship since World War IIthat can
carry 15 helicopters.
33
The Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force is also acquiring next-generation
3,300-ton Soryu-class submarinesthe first Japanese submarines to be equipped
with air-independent propulsion systems. Analysts believe that this is partly for
countering the Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threat.
34
Japanese security
experts believe that the air and naval build up is part of Japanese Governments
strategy to secure the south western island closer to China, but it is also crucial
in the context of Americas military strategy against China, especially its air-sea
battle concept.
35
They also add that Japans counter A2/AD capabilities, such
as improving anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities or hardening US military
bases in Japan including Okinawa, is consistent with the US air-sea battle
concept.
36
Similarly, Noburo Yamaguchi also believes that if Japan establishes
a reliable defence posture to safeguard its outlying islands this will work well
to reinforce US capabilities in overcoming A2/AD-related challenges in the
western Pacific.
37
But to complement the US militarily, Japan has to change some of its pacifist
policies, as has been pointed out by the Japanese security experts. Shinzo Abe has
been most vocal about removing some of the restrictions imposed on the exercise
of force by Japanese troops. He has announced an ambitious agenda to make
Japan militarily stronger, by creating a National Defence Force, giving the right
of pre-emptive strike to its defence forces along with the right to engage in
Collective Self Defence to aid the militaries of its security allies including the
US. The Abe administration believes these changes are necessary in view of the
regional security situation.
If Abe can accomplish the above mentioned goals, the defence only security
policy pursued by previous governments would be changed. He has mulled every
option including amending the Constitution and especially Article 9, but he has
fallen short of the required majority in both the houses of the Diet. As a last
option, he wants to change the official interpretation of the right of Collective
Self Defence. In August 2013, Abe government appointed Ichiro Komatsu, a
diplomat as the director general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) that
interprets the Constitution. According to the Japanese media, Komatsu is in
favour of lifting the ban on Japans right to Collective Self-Defence, and that is
why he has been picked for the post.
38
If things go as planned, Japans forces will
have the right to collective self-defence after the CLBs re-interpretation. It will
give more power to its SDF, which will be available to aid the US forces in the
region in any exigencies as well as for PKOs and will finally put an end to the
charge that Japan is a Free Rider on the US security.
Japan has not only shown its willingness to adjust its defence policy and
preparedness to fulfil US expectations and facilitate Americas pivot to Asia
strategy but has also come forward to help regional countries deal with the
182
emerging security architecture. On its part, Japan has launched capacity building
programmes for the navies of South East Asian countries. As part of this
programme Japan has decided to provide Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam
with maritime equipment such as patrol vessels for their coast guards and maritime
communications systems through Official Development Assistancea financial
aid plan of the Japanese Government. Japanese scholars believe that Japans efforts
to enhance the maritime capabilities of South East Asian nations are in consistence
with USs rebalancing strategy.
39
The Pivot to Asia and the Evolving Japan-US-India Security
Architecture
While elaborating the US pivot to Asia policy in Foreign Policy, Hillary Clinton
identified India among key emerging power with which Obama administration
has pursued broader, deeper and more purposeful relationship. The US has
also identified India among the important partners for the United States, and
increasingly central contributors to peace and security in the region.
40
Japan,
however, had been cautious to accord similar priority to India in its envisioned
security architecture despite forging strategic partnership with Delhi in 2006.
The previous NDPG adopted by DPJ government did not give much attention
to India. It did mention India in its official documents that guide Tokyos security
policy but for enhancing cooperation in securing maritime navigation.
41
It
was clear that the then DPJ government wanted to limit security cooperation
with India in the maritime domain only, apparently not to affront China.
The new defence guidelines as well as first ever National Security Strategy
(NSS) adopted by the Shinzo Abe government on December 17, 2013 has made
a departure from the previous stance. It clearly identifies India as a power that
is changing the balance of power. The new defence guidelines recognise Indias
ascendance among key security players. It notes that as a result of change in the
balance of power due to the development of countries such as China and
India...multipolarisation of the international community is progressing.
42
The
NSS document puts this issue more strongly. It argues that India and China are
the primary drivers of change in balance of power.
43
It must be noted that
Japan has adopted the NSS document for the first time which sets out Japans
policies pertaining to national security, and is centred on diplomatic policy and
defence policy. As regards the security cooperation with India is concerned, the
defence guidelines state:
Japan will strengthen its relationship with India in a broad range of fields,
including maritime security, through joint training and exercises as well as
joint implementation of international peace cooperation activities.
44
Japans enunciation that it will strengthen relationship with India in broad
range of fields is reflective of the fact that it does not want to limit its security
cooperation in maritime field only. More importantly, the NSS document clubs
183
India among the countries with which Japan wants to strengthen its cooperative
relations. The NSS document states that Japan will strengthen its cooperative
relations with countries including India, with which it shares universal values
and strategic interests.
45
The other countries mentioned in the document are
Australia, South Korea and ASEAN countries. It further notes that India is
becoming increasingly influential
46
in the international community. It recognises
that India because of its geographic location remains important for Japan,
47
and to secure its maritime interest, it will strengthen cooperation with India.
By boldly positioning India in its security and diplomatic strategy, Japan has
sent a clear signal that New Delhi remains important not only for its maritime
security but also for its overall security. Since the two strategic documents,
mentioned above, will remain effective for a decade, it can be said that India will
continue to gain prominence in Japanese strategic policy.
A quick glance at the US and Japanese strategic perceptions suggest that
they consider India an important player for maintaining peace and security of
the Asia-Pacific. Apart from forging separate strategic partnership with India,
they have established a trilateral dialogue mechanism at the diplomatic level to
discuss issues that impact the regional security. The trend suggests that a US-
Japan-India trilateralism is in the offing.
Conclusion
Japans response to Americas pivot to Asia strategy, suggests that it is ready to
assume its responsibilities as an ally to maintain its relevance in the alliance. It
has taken a number of measures to strengthen its Air Self-Defence Force and
Maritime Self-Defence Force, which analysts interpret, is aimed at A2/AD
Strategy to counter China, a strategy similar to that which the US is keen to
adopt against Chinas naval and air power expansion. It has also revised its defense
guidelineswhich lays down policy for Japans defence strengthto complement
the US rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific. The Abe administration is also debating
the issue of allowing its defence forces to aid the US forces in emergency situations
by interpreting the Constitution to allow its forces to exercise right of Collective
Self Defence. Presently, it is debating two scenarios under which Japans defence
forces could come to the aid the US forces: a)If the US forces are attacked during
joint Japan-US exercises on high seas or on other occasions and b) if a ballistic
missile is targeted towards the US mainland.
48
The scholars debating on the
Japan-US security alliance had identified Japans prohibition against Collective
Self Defence as a constraint
49
on alliance cooperation and US-Japan combined
capabilities.
50
To meet the US expectations under the pivot to Asia strategy,
Japan is gearing up to change the self-imposed prohibition. This, as well as other
security changes, discussed above will certainly strengthen Japans existing security
alliance with the US. But a consensus on changing the existing constitutional
interpretation of exercising Collective Self Defence, as of now, is proving elusive:
both among the political parties and the people. The New Komeito, a junior
184
coalition partner of the ruling LDP, has expressed its opposition to the move.
51
Though, the Japanese media is not opposed to the US pivot to Asia per se, a
section of the Japanese media is opposed to the easing of the legal restriction on
the right of collective self-defence. Asahi Shimbun, in an editorial, stated:
the government wants to make it possible for Japan to help US vessels even
before Japan is attacked. But in that case, wouldnt the SDFs actions
consequently cause Japan to get embroiled in a U.S. war? This is a dangerous
choice.
The daily also states that we must not allow the Constitutional binding to be
lifted by the judgment of experts alone.
52
The media is also opposed to giving the right of pre-emptive strike to Japanese
troops. The Japan Times believes that allowing the SDF to possess such capabilities
carries the danger of increasing the arms race in North East Asia and destabilising
the security situation surrounding Japan.
53
The internal debate in Japan suggest that while the strategic community has
welcomed the USs new Asia initiatives and wants the government to change its
normative security policy, another section of Japanese people is not ready to accept
new role the establishment is willing to assume in response to Americas pivot
to Asia.
They fear that the new security approach of the Abe administration will
change the basic character of the Japanese security policy. A tussle between the
people and the establishment is likely to ensue, and this will make it difficult for
the Japanese Government to go beyond self-defence.
NOTES
1. National Defence Programme Guidelines for Financial Year 2011 and Beyond, Ministry
of Defence, Government of Japan, Tokyo, p. 9.
2. The Defense Guidelines adopted by the DPJ government did not include India among the
club of nations with which Japan wanted to enhance security partnership. The new guidelines
adopted by the LDP in December 2013, however, consider India as an important player
for its overall security. The issue has been dealt with separately in this paper.
3. Thomas. S. Wilkins, Japans Alliance Diversification: A Comparative Analysis of the Indian
and Australian Partnerships, International Relations of Asia Pacific, 11(1), 2010, pp. 115-
155.
4. Hillary Clinton, Americas Pacific Century, Foreign Policy, November 2011.
5. Ibid.
6. Ashton B. Carter, The US Strategic Rebalance to Asia: A Defence Perspective, lecture
delivered at Asia Society, New York, August 01, 2011, at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid=1715 (Accessed September 5, 2013).
7. Ibid.
8. Thomas Donilon, The United States and the Asia Pacific in 2013, Lecture delivered at
Asia Society, New York, March 11, 2013,at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisory-president-united-states-a
9. Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defence, Speech at IISS Asia Security Summit, Shangrila Hotel,
185
Singapore, June 1, 2013,athttp://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=
5251 (Accessed September 5, 2013).
10. Fumiaki Kubo, Prime Minister Abe and President Obama Can Strengthen the Alliance,
AJISS-Commentary No. 171, February 19, 2013, The Japan Institute of International Affairs,
Tokyo.
11. Noburo Yamaguchi, Facilitating the US Pivot: A Japanese Perspective, Global Asia,
December 17, 2012,athttp://www.globalasia.org/V7N4_Winter_2012/Noboru_Yamaguchi.
html (Accessed August 16, 2013).
12. US Department of Defence, Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defence, as quoted in Noburo Yamaguchi, no. 11.
13. Tomohiko Satake, US Rebalancing toward the Asia Pacific and Japan-US Dynamic
Defence, National Institute for Defence Studies, Briefing Memo, Issue 169, October 2012,
at http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/briefing/pdf/2012/briefing_e169.pdf (Accessed
August 16, 2013).
14. Fumiaki Kubo, no. 10.
15. Tadae Takubo, Japan Must be Prepared to Share Burden, Japan Institute for National
Fundamentals, Speaking Out, 178, February 4, 2013, at http://en.jinf.jp/weekly/archives/
1831 (Accessed September 30, 2013).
16. Ibid.
17. Fumiaki Kubo, no. 10.
18. Wei Ling, Rebalancing or De-Balancing: U.S. Pivot and East Asian Order, American
Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 35, 2013, p. 148.
19. Christopher Layne, as quoted in Tomohiko Satake, no. 13.
20. Tomohiko Satake, no.13.
21. Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Noda of Japan Before Bilateral Meeting,
Peace Palace, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/
11/20/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-noda-japan-bilateral-meeting (Accessed
August 16, 2013).
22. Defence Posture Review Interim Report, Ministry of Defence, Government of Japan, at
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2013_chukan/gaiyou_e.pdf (Accessed
September 28, 2013).
23. Ibid.
24. National Defense Program Guidelines for Financial Year 2014 and beyond, Ministry of
Defense, Government of Japan, December 17, 2013, Tokyo, Japan. p. 4.
25. Ibid. p. 2
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid. p. 8.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ground Self Defence Force and US Marines Stage Island Assault Drill, The Mainichi
Daily, June 19, 2013.
31. Purchase of Osprey fleet for SDF Will Boost Defense, Maneuverability, The Yomiuri
Shimbun, September 23, 2013.
32. New Aviation Rules to Include Drones, The Japan Times, September 23, 2013.
33. Rajaram Panda, Japan: The Izumu Warship and Regional Security, IPCS commentary,
at http://www.ipcs.org/article/china/japan-the-izumo-warship-and-regional-security-
4092.html (Accessed September 29, 2013).
34. Paualkalender-Umezu, Japan Quietly Builds Limited CounterA2/AD Capabilities, Defence
News, at http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130917/DEFREG03/309170019/Japan-
Quietly-Builds-Limited-Counter-A2-AD-Capabilities (Accessed September 29, 2013).
35. TomohikoSatake and Yusuke Ishihara, Americas Rebalance to Asia and its implication for
Japan-US-Australia Security Cooperation, Asia Pacific Review, 19(2), 2012.
186
36. Ibid.
37. Noburo Yamaguchi, A Japanese Perspective on US Rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific
Region, Asia Policy, Number 15, January 2013, p. 8.
38. Abe Appoints Diplomat in Bid to Change Interpretation of Constitutions Article 9, The
Mainichi Japan, August 3, 2013.
39. Tomohiko Satake and Yusuke Ishihara, no. 35.
40. Hillary Clinton, no. 4.
41. National Defence Programme Guidelines for Financial Year 2011 and beyond, no. 1, p. 9.
42. National Defense Program Guidelines for Financial Year 2014 and beyond, no. 24, p. 1.
43. National Security Strategy, December 17, 2013, Government of Japan, Tokyo, p. 6.
44. National Defense Program Guidelines for Financial Year 2014 and beyond, no. 24, p. 5.
45. National Security Strategy, no. 42, p. 23.
46. Ibid. p. 24.
47. Ibid.
48. Japan has drawn second scenario considering the reports that North Korea is developing
intercontinental ballistic missiles to target the US mainland.
49. Richard L Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, The US-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through
2020, CSIS Report, p. 27, at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070216_asia2020.pdf
(Accessed November 19, 2013).
50. Ibid.
51. Abes collective Self-Defence ploy may be too hard a sell: New Komeito Chief , Kyodo/
The Japan Times, August 29, 2013.
52. Collective self-defence must not violate principles of Article 9, Asahi Shimbun, September
19, 2013, at http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/AJ201309190038.
53. Stand down on pre-emption, Editorial, The Japan Times, June 13, 2013.
NUCLEAR DIMENSIONS
12
Pivot to Asia and Nuclearisation
Rajiv Nayan
Introduction
The Obama administrations pivot to Asia policy attracted attention not only in
Asia but also globally. Though the termpivotwas used by the then Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton in one of her articles,
1
the policy she pronounced for
the Asia-Pacific region echoed in writings and speeches of other Obama
administration officials and even in some of the documents and reports generated
by the US administrations before Obama. As enunciated, the pivot to Asia policy
is not for the entire Asia. Central Asia, West Asia and a large part of even South
Asia are out of its purview. It is basically for Pacific Asia: Stretching from the
Indian subcontinent to the Western shores of the Americas.
2
In fact, the very
first line, and to an extent the first paragraph, of Clintons article makes it clear
that after investing 10 years in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US is going to focus
on the Asia-Pacific region.
Clinton pronounced the American statecraft which is to be implemented
through means diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise in the region.
Assuring that the policy will be smart and systematic, she briefly informed
about the contours of the new strategic turn in the Pacific Asia policy. She
promised to make use of the existing American assets such as the network of
strong alliances and forward deployed diplomacy as well as to create new diplomatic
infrastructure, such as forging bilateral relationships with China and other
significant Asian countries supporting Asian multilateral institutional frameworks
and initiating minilateral meetings. The area of operation starts from opening
new markets for American businesses to curbing nuclear proliferation to keeping
the sea lanes free for commerce and navigation.
Later, on November 17, 2011, President Obama, in his remarks to the
Australian Parliament, reiterated the broad points made by Clinton.
3
He gave
details and rationale for the American Pacific Asia policy. The pronouncement
generated discussions on multiple dimensions of the American foreign and security
190
policies. A section of the international community considers it a somewhat
assertive, if not aggressive, policy of otherwise careful administration.
4
For some,
it is an indicator of the American withdrawal,
5
though Clinton and others explicitly
stated the commitment of the US in the region. Some viewed it a high-decibel,
low-performance project.
6
Many do not see anything new in the policy;
7
so, they
do not expect any dramatic development. Yet, some see it an evolution of the
American policy to adapt to the new global reality characterised as Rising Asia.
As the pivot to Asia policy articulated by the then Secretary of State was
interpreted differently by different scholars and policymakers, it is important to
make a sober assessment of not only the policy but also the implications of the
policy. Though Clinton mentioned nuclear issues, including the North Korean
problem only at a few places, on a number of occasions, nuclear matters vis--
vis Asia have been approached quite vigorously by the Obama administration.
An impact on the emerging nuclear scenario is certainly one of the important
areas to explore as Asia has emerged as the centre of the global nuclear order.
Currently, Asia has four declared nuclear weapon countries, namely China,
India, Pakistan and North Korea; one acknowledged nuclear weapon country,
Israel and a suspected nuclear weapon country, Iran. China is a member of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). North Korea was a member of the
NPT, but after withdrawing from the treaty, it has conducted three nuclear tests.
The last test was on February 12, 2013. India and Pakistan never joined the
NPT. Israel, too, did not join the NPT, and it is widely acknowledged in the
world to possess nuclear weapons. However, it does not confirm possession of
nuclear weapons. The US provides nuclear protective umbrella to Japan, South
Korea and Australia in the Pacific Asia.
This paper examines the Obama administrations nuclear policy in Asia. It
does not intend to discuss or analyse whether the pivot to Asia is a new or
continuing policy of the US. Instead, it intends to discuss and analyse the impact
or implications of Obamas Asia policy for the nuclearisation of Asia. For the
purpose, the study is based on the assumption that the Obama administration
is taking new initiatives and providing a new thrust to its Asian policy. The
paper seeks to address the research puzzle through answering a set of questions:
Does the US strategy have any impact on the nuclearisation of Asia? Will it give
an impetus to Irans nuclear ambitions? Will there be pressure on North Korea
to cap its nuclear programme? Could the strategy desist the possible option of
nuclearisation in Japan and South Korea? The paper argues that the US pivot to
Asia or the rebalancing policy has had very limited impact on the countries that
have either acquired nuclear weapons along with their delivery capabilities or are
suspected of acquiring such weapons.
North Korea
North Korea along with Iran and Syria constitutes the American idea of the
triangle of proliferation.
8
The US Government accepts that North Korea
191
continues to behave outside the rules of normal and acceptable international
conduct.
9
North Korea is arguably the most important test case of the US Asia
policy. Nuclearisation of North Korea is considered a threat not just to the US
national security but also to international peace and security.
10
For North Korea,
the US has marshalled all the tactics of its old and new diplomacy. On the one
hand, it has used bilateral diplomacy through exploratory rounds
11
and visits
of the Special Representative for North Korea, and on the other, it has exploited
the network of institutions and relationships it is involved and engaged in.
The US somehow roped in North Korea in 2011, and from July 2011 onwards,
three rounds of bilateral denuclearisation dialogue took place. As the US new
Asian rebalancing policy does not prohibit the use of the old tools, it is still
using sanctions and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to influence
the behaviour of North Korea and Iran. The US is pushing for multilateral and
national sanctions. The Special Representative of North Korea Policy, Glyn T
Davis, in a Congressional hearing claimed that sanctions do not have any punitive
role to play in the North Korean case.
12
The imposition of sanctions through the UN has been the most important
part of the US policy for North Korea. Favouring full and transparent
implementation of UN sanctions, the US has not just campaigned for robust
sanctions imposed through multiple UN resolutions, such as 1718, 1874 and
2087, but has also imposed unilateral sanctions stronger than the UNs. In 2013,
the US supported the UNSC resolutions for imposing sanctions on North Korea.
13
Not only North Korean organisations listed in the UNSC resolutions are targeted
by the US Government but also additional North Korean entities come under
American curbs.
14
The American Government maintains
15
that the principal
objective of sanctions is to prevent proliferation, not to punish North Korea.
The US maintains that sanctions may be used to hinder the North Korean nuclear
and ballistic missile developments.
Although the US claims to have an active support of 60-80 countries,
16
especially from its European allies for the campaign for robust sanctions in the
UN, yet it is its East Asian diplomacy that is really crucial. It banks on its allies
such as Japan and South Korea and the new partner China.
17
To enforce
denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, it has used the
traditional framework like the Six-Party Talks as well. It is working with China
in the UNSC and outside
18
to influence the North Korean behaviour. China
seemingly has become an important partner of the US to influence North Korea
because of Chinas geographical location and historical ties with North Korea.
19
However, it maintains that negotiations need to be authentic and credible and
talks should not be held for the sake of talks. It is opposed to the North Korean
provocative behaviour
20
to extract concessions from its neighbours.
A combination of theatre and deterrent capability is required to deal with
the aggressive behaviour of North Korea towards the US. Possibly, as part of its
coercive diplomacy, it threatened to introduce tactical nuclear weapons in East
192
Asia. Whenever North Korean nuclear or ballistic missile tests take place, the
plan to deploy Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) batteries also becomes the subject
of discussions with its allies. Some even suggested modifying the B83 into an
earth or rock penetrator for North Korea and China.
21
Notwithstanding the centrality assigned to North Korea in the pivot to Asia
policy, the US failed to denuclearise North Korea or to an extent denuclearise the
Korean peninsula. This stark reality is reflected in what a Congressman said during
a Congressional hearing, U.S. officials have used diplomacy, energy assistance,
financial sanctions, and counter-proliferation tools, including proactive
interdiction activities. Despite the varying combinations of tools, the United
States has failed to persuade the North Korean regime to abandon its nuclear
weapons program.
22
North Korea is continuing with its missile and nuclear tests. In 2012, North
Korea conducted two long-range tests on April 13 and December 12. North
Korea is developing missiles in all the ranges. It uncovered KN-08, apparently,
North Koreas first ICBM in a military parade.
23
This, too, basically demonstrated
its assertiveness and recklessness towards the commitment it made. The US had
in fact warned North Korea that any missile test under the cover of a satellite
launch will be a deal breaker. All the countries that are parties to the Six-Party
Talks condemned the test, but North Korea, it seems, remains unaffected.
24
North Korea is nuclearising without paying any heed to international public
opinion. The third nuclear test in February 2013 is a testimony to it. According
to one estimate, it has supposedly accumulated between 20 and 40 kilograms
of plutonium, enough perhaps for six to eight nuclear weapons.
25
However,
some calculate more than this stockpile. In 2012, it amended its Constitution to
declare itself as a nuclear weapon state.
26
North Korea maintains that its nuclear
weapons are not a bargaining chip under any circumstances as they are shield
for justice and peace and treasure of the nation.
27
Earlier, North Korea had
promised to have a moratorium on nuclear tests and all its nuclear endeavours,
including uranium enrichment at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. It had also
promised to give access to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors
to the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Though North Korea has so far conducted
three nuclear tests, yet it has not revealed the size of its fissile material stockpile.
This has resulted in different study groups and projects to make guesses. On the
nuclear front, it is working on both the routes: plutonium and enriched uranium.
It resumed enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent fuel despite giving
assurance to the international community and the countries involved in persuading
North Korea to give up activities on both the fronts.
In 2010, Siegfried S. Heckers famous report informed the world that at the
Yongbyon Nuclear Complex, North Korea is building a 25 to 30 megawatt-
electric (MWe) experimental Light-Water Reactor (LWR).
28
This was considered
North Koreas first attempt to acquire LWR technology. His report also informed
about the existence of ultra-modern enrichment facility to feed the reactor.
193
Although Hecker maintained that when the facility was shown to him, it was
meant to produce only Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU); yet he acknowledged
that with little efforts the facility may be converted to enrich uranium to produce
bomb grade materials. He also felt that LWR could be used for manufacturing
plutonium, though he did not seem quite convinced that North Korea would
use LWR for producing plutonium. Later, in 2013, he maintained that North
Korea requires tests to miniaturise weapons.
29
Currently, North Korea may be struggling, but it has not given up on the
nuclear front. Some members of the US academic community informed that
North Korea is wary of American interventionist policy against non-nuclear
weapon countries, and this apprehension is basically leading it to develop and
preserve nuclear weapons.
30
The attempt to isolate does not seem to be working.
To what extent sanctions are biting is not known, but the country has not changed
its behaviour. It has also refused to show transparency. Despite the failure to
deter or persuade North Korea from going nuclear, the US does not appear willing
to accept North Korean nuclear weapons. It wants verifiable denuclearisation of
the Korean peninsula. The US officials are visiting the region, and in the bilateral
meetings with China, Japan and South Korea, they are emphasising the point.
31
Japan and South Korea
The ineffectiveness of the US and the international community in denuclearising
the Korean peninsula and restraining the behaviour of North Korea worries North
Koreas neighbours. China has its own understanding with North Korea; so, the
North Korean nuclearisation and continuous nuclear and missile testings may
not be troubling China much. But a nuclear North Korea is making South Korea
and Japan quite nervous.
32
This anxiety further increases when the Obama
administration talks about drastically reducing the size of the American nuclear
weapon stockpile and bringing it to a few hundreds. The combination of North
Korean nuclearisation and the apprehension of the US withdrawal of the extended
deterrence seems to have triggered yet another round of discussions of South
Korea and Japan going nuclear.
When the current Japanese Prime Minister won his elections, it was expected
that he could take a tough line on nuclearising Japan. But he appears by and
large restrained. Actually, he, on a number of occasions, denied that the country
had any plan to develop its independent nuclear weapons. A few years ago, a
Japanese foreign minister had indicated that the country has the capability and
may review the need for nuclear weapons.
33
The general impression was that he
meant indigenously acquiring nuclear weapons, though officially it was later
explained that what he meant was continuation of the protective nuclear umbrella
extended by the US.
In the past, too, some Japanese Prime Ministers explored the nuclear weapon
option by igniting the debate on nuclear weapons. After the North Korean
nuclearisation, the then Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso
34
too wanted a debate
194
on nuclear weapons, which was basically for testing the mood of people for it as
well as signalling the concerned country that the option is not completely
unthinkable. It is an open secret that Japan has been conducting secret nuclear
feasibility studies for years, and it has continued to do so because of North Korea
in recent years, especially after 2006.
The Japanese strategic and policymaking communities also seem to be divided
on the weaponisation of Japan. A strong section
35
still favours relying on the
extended deterrence and other options such as BMD and civil defence
36
to counter
North Korea weaponisation and possible aggression. The Fukushima incident has
at least in the short and medium term put a brake on the campaign for nuclear
weapons for Japan. However, strong voices are emerging, and increasingly becoming
louder, that want Japan to have nuclear weapons
37
Or at least, it should threaten
to have the nuclear arsenal. This section may not succeed now, but it will have
the Japanese Government retain the option of weaponisation in the future.
In this context, one question that is generally being posed is: Does Japan
have technological capabilities to assemble weapons and their delivery systems
quickly? This question has been answered by different analysts in different ways.
For a long period, Japan is being called a para nuclear state. The Japanese
plutonium reprocessing capability, time and again, has been coming under the
limelight in the context of the hidden nuclear weapon development ambitions of
Japan, and the Japanese Government has been repeatedly denying that with the
kind of nuclear material Japan has, it cannot develop nuclear weapons. It is
generally understood that if Japan decides to develop nuclear weapons, in a very
short period, it may have more weapons materials than some of existing nuclear
weapon countries. Of course, Russia and the US will be the exceptions. In 2011,
William J Perry, Chairman, Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture
of the United States testified in one of the US Congress committees, Turkey,
and especially Germany and Japan, have the potential to become nuclear weapons
powers rather quickly were they to decide to do so.
38
The consensus is that
Japan has the capability, and it may produce a plutonium-based bomb, but it
will take time as it may have to overcome several hurdles other than technical.
Similarly, the question of the nuclearisation of South Korea has also been
significant. South Korea has explored diplomatic options. It has become a reluctant
supporter of the Six-Party Talks.
39
Like the US, it wants assurance that the Six-
Party Talks should deliver and should not continue as a mere talk shop. The
extended deterrence is becoming the mutually assuring security language of South
Korea and the US. In the past, several times, possible nuclear weapon preparedness
was reported. However, each time, the South Korean Government vehemently
denied those news reports. After the North Korean nuclearisation and the
perception of the decline of America, South Korea has been exploring options
other than the reliance on American-extended nuclear deterrence. It looked towards
China to restrain North Korea. However, it seemingly has been disappointed
with the Chinese behaviour as well.
195
In South Korea, too, a section is becoming vocal and assertive for building,
or exploring to build, nuclear weapons to counter its dangerous neighbours. The
surveys regularly conducted by different bodies demonstrate the positive
connection between North Korea provocation and the demand for nuclearisation
of South Korea.
40
One opinion poll indicates that 66.5 per cent of South Koreans
support the idea that South Korea should develop nuclear weapons.
41
The pro-
nuclear bomb section, which is receiving domestic political support, is presenting
its case even on international platforms.
42
The international strategic community is divided on the capability of South
Korea to assemble nuclear weapons at a short notice as well. Generally, it is
acknowledged that at least since the early 1970s, South Korea has developed its
capability to develop nuclear weapons. It has mastered key technological steps
such as enrichment and reprocessing. And it can adapt the existing institutions
or build new institutions to support its bomb-making project. Some may argue
that as an NPT country and a country which has signed the safeguards agreements
with the IAEA, it will find the task extremely difficult. However, though the task
may be difficult, it is not impossible. South Korea may come under serious pressure
to develop nuclear weapons when Japan does so. Considering the ethnic mistrust,
South Korea is neither going to trust Japanese nuclear umbrella nor the Chinese
umbrella.
Although the US is promising to reduce its nuclear arsenals, it will be difficult
for it to withdraw nuclear protective umbrella considering the emerging nuclear
situation in Asia. This fact was admitted on many occasions, including in the
Congressional hearings in which it was stated: Extended deterrence, U.S. security
assurances, including nuclear assurances, virtually eliminate any incentives ...
our other allies and friends may have to acquire their own nuclear weapons
capabilities. Without a policy of extended deterrence we would face a highly
proliferated nuclear world, a world that would be much more unstable than we
face today.
43
The most interesting aspect is that the US pivot to Asia policy
raised the question whether the US has the capability to provide nuclear umbrella
to its allies as it is not investing in nuclear modernisation in recent years.
44
And
quite importantly, the official answer to the concern was that the US is investing
resources to protect its allies because of the US pivot to Asia policy.
Iran
As discussed, Iran does not come in the Asia-Pacific described in the US classic
pivot to Asia policy. On the surface, it may be seen as a Middle East problem
rather an Asian concern for America. If it is assumed that the focus is shifting
to the American idea or categorisation of Asia, Iran should not be a priority for
the US. In reality, for the US, notwithstanding its gradual withdrawal from Iraq
and Afghanistan, the Middle East is as important as Asia. Iran is not going to
disappear from the US radar because of the presence of the strong Jewish lobby
196
in the US and its sustained involvement in the Middle East because of several
economic and foreign policy reasons.
Iran, an NPT member country, maintains that it has an inalienable right to
nuclear energy under Article 4 of the treaty, and the treaty nowhere prohibits
enrichment of uranium for the peaceful or civil nuclear energy purpose. The
NPT, it seems, has emerged as the biggest barrier to address the Iranian problem
in the US way. The US maintained that Iran was building toward a nuclear
weapons programme.
45
Iran keeps insisting that it does not have any programme,
which indicates any step towards nuclear weapons development.However, the
US and a strong section of the international community suspected that Iran was
developing enrichment technology for nuclear weapons development.
46
To ensure that Iran does not develop enrichment technology for development
of nuclear weapons, the US has been signalling all kinds of measures. Though
Israel has been applying pressure to launch pre-emptive strikes before it is too
late, yet the Obama administration has basically relied on diplomacy. It has worked
with the international community in the UN and the member states of the UNSC
to impose sanctions. The US has also been working with its European partners
which are being considered almost irrelevant in the administrations new Asia
policy. Currently, E3+3 process
47
involves the UK, France, Germany, Russia and
China with the US for addressing the Iranian issue. After the role Russia played
in engaging the Syrian chemical weapons issue, it seems the US may rely on
Russia, and possibly China, for Iran as well. If the current trend continues, the
US European allies may play either secondary or background role vis--vis the
Iranian issue.
After several ups and downs, the E3+3 and Iran agreed on a historic Joint
Plan of Action on November 23, 2013.
48
Both sides had a six-month set of
initial understanding as a step towards resolving urgent concerns within a
year and have a mutually agreed long-term comprehensive solution.
49
Both
sides have started implementing the interim agreement since January 20, 2014.
Under the deal, Iran is supposed to curb its activities on enrichment of uranium
and the existing enriched uranium stockpile. Iran has to halt enrichment of
uranium above 5 per cent. During the period, it has to convert the half of the
existing 20 per cent enriched uranium stockpile to below 5 per cent level. Half
of them are to be diluted in a form that it is not enriched again. There will also
be no additional or next generation centrifuges or new centrifuges facility. Iran
was restrained to undertake work at Natanz, Fordow and, more importantly,
Arak. Among other provisions of the agreement, prominent were enhanced
monitoring, Irans addressing of all so-called UNSC resolutions, curbing military-
oriented nuclear activities, especially at Parchin and limited sanctions relaxation.
The US also threatened to impose additional sanctions if Iran defies the agreement.
After the interim measures, the comprehensive solution may have the
following elements:
Have a specified long-term duration to be agreed upon.
197
Reflect the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT and the IAEA
Safeguards Agreements.
Comprehensively lift UNSC multilateral and national nuclear-related
sanctions, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance,
and energy, on a schedule to be agreed upon.
Involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed
parameters consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope
and level of enrichment activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and
stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to be agreed upon.
Fully resolve concerns related to the reactor at Arak, designated by the
IAEA as the IR-40. No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable
of reprocessing.
Fully implement the agreed transparency measures and enhanced
monitoring. Ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, consistent with
the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Iranian Parliament).
Include international civil nuclear cooperation, including among others,
on acquiring modern light water power and research reactors and associated
equipment, and the supply of modern nuclear fuel as well as agreed research
and development (R&D) practices.
The IAEA is yet another institution through which the US uses to check
nuclear ambitions of Iran. The November 2013 deal has continued to see a role
for it.
50
Since May 15, 1974, an agreement signed between the IAEA and Iran
is in operation to apply safeguards on the declared Iranian facilities. Iran has
declared 17 nuclear facilities and nine locations outside facilities where nuclear
material is customarily used.Since 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors has
adopted 12 resolutions regarding implementation of safeguards, and through
UNSC, the US has been insisting that Iran implement what the IAEA Board of
Governors has been demanding. Of all the outstanding issues, the possible military
dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme has been the most contentious.
Iran has been asked to ratify Additional Protocol and to open all its sites for the
IAEA inspection as confidence building measures to demonstrate that it genuinely
not developing nuclear weapons in the November 2013 deal.
The IAEA reports on the Iranian facilities and nuclear activities send mixed
signals. Iran declared that it had not reprocessed spent fuel and extracted
plutonium, and the IAEA reports had been endorsing the Iranian claims. Although
Iran is not going to suspend its uranium enrichment, yet as it was before the
November 2013 deal, the declared activities do not appear alarming. Iran has
been maintaining that verification of all the declared sites of the country by the
IAEA does not point towards any suspicious acts, though some observations
made in the reports were objected by Iran. However, the IAEA reports indicated
that activities for nuclear device were taking place at the Parchin site. Iran objected
that some of the facts supplied to the IAEA for making the reports were from
questionable sources. The Iranian Government earlier maintained that the IAEA
198
reports had not reflected the cooperative approach Iran had been taking towards
IAEA. According to Iran, IAEA is an independent international organisation,
not part of the UN; therefore, it is not obliged to implement UNSC resolutions.
The IAEA, as Iran wants, should take into account merely its own statute and
the Safeguards Agreement Iran signed with it.
51
The IAEA reports, frequently, kept drawing attention, and activating the
US to work with the international organisations, its friends and allies. The Obama
administration, for its first term, had announced to use bilateral diplomacy to
address the Iranian issue. However, the US had taken unilateral measures to
impose sanctions, too.
52
The US integrated its various departments and agencies
to implement a network of laws and Iran-focused orders. The Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act is now complementing the 1996 Iran
Sanctions Act. Other relevant US legal mechanisms for sanctions on Iran are the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act, Executive
Order 13590 and Executive Order 13622. The US has also mobilised its financial
institutions and private companies to increase the effectiveness of sanctions. No
doubt, these financial institutions are mobilised more than before, but several
instances of sanctions busting has been appearing.
However, throughout the first term, the Obama administration struggled to
draw a new road map to solve the Iranian puzzle. The political change in Iran
after the election of Hassan Rouhani and the general understanding that he had
been authorisedby the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to negotiate
nuclear issues appear making significant changes in the US attitude and policy
towards Iran. Rouhani has been making positive statements, and after the gap of
about three decades, the top leaders of both the countries are greeting each other.
The US Secretary of State met the Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif in New York
during the September 2013 UN General Assembly meeting. The evolving or
new approach of the US may be gauged from the statement of Secretary of State
that notes: Needless to say, one meeting and a change in tone, which was
welcome, doesnt answer those questions yet, and theres a lot of work to be done.
So we will engage in that work, obviously, and we hope very, very muchall of
usthat we can get concrete results that will answer the outstanding questions
regarding the program. But I think all of us were pleased that the Foreign Minister
came today, that he did put some possibilities on the table. Now its up to people
to do the hard work of trying to fill out what those possibilities could do.
53
The US is accused of softening the language on Iranian nuclear weapons,
which the US officially denies. In the US, a section of the policy community
apprehends that the new Iranian leadership is basically buying time to build
nuclear weapons.
54
Analysts from Irans neighbouring Gulf and Arab countries
along with Israel also express such concerns.
55
Therefore, to ward off this criticism,
the November 2013 deal has imposed several curbs on the enrichment level.
Moreover, a strong section in Israel, including the Israeli Government, maintains
that even if Iran renounces its nuclear weapons officially, the hatred towards Israel
199
may compel Iran to develop and possess nuclear weapons clandestinely. In fact,
US officials made it obvious after the recentpolitical change in Iran. Nevertheless,
an opinion poll of security experts conducted by a journal clearly indicates that
the charm offensive of Rouhani is working.
56
The future of the Iranian relationship with the US in particular and the
West in general appears entering into an interesting phase.
57
Rouhani has made
tall promises on the nuclear front by stating that he would resolve the issue within
a year. Though his basic concern is to get sanctions rolled back, as discussed, the
US even in the changed circumstances, will extract a concrete and verifiable
assurance from Iran that it is not developing nuclear weapons. The US may get
the Additional Protocol ratified.
58
Earlier, Iran wanted enriched uranium for
research and isotopes for medical treatment. Now, it is willing to negotiate that
as well. The US may have to face hardliners in both the countries, who may try
to come in the way of a reasonable solution. If the current US administration
succeeds, it will be a great achievement.
Other Issues of Nuclear Asia
Chinese Conundrum
Officially, the US designates China as a partner in its pivot to Asia policy. It
is relying on it to a great extent to solve the North Korean nuclear behaviour
and to an extent address the Iranian issue. However, a strong section of the US
policymakers acknowledges that China is always the get out of jail free card
for North Korea. They can always provide ways for the North Koreans to export
materials, import materials, should they wish.
59
Chinas neighbours, too, hardly
trust China in solving the Iranian or the North Korean nuclear issue.
On the contrary, its neighbours fear secret Chinese nuclear weapons
development programme.
60
Interestingly, the US supports a strong, prosperous
and successful China, playing a greater role in supporting international rules,
norms of responsible behaviour. At the same time, it maintains that the growing
Chinese military modernisation, which includes modernisation of its nuclear
weapons and missiles and other delivery vehicles, has worried Chinas neighbours.
In recent years, it is developing both cruise and ballistic missiles in all the ranges.
It is believed to be modernising new warheads as well. China will of course claim
to have stronger and more credible nuclear deterrence, which in the Chinese
thinking, is the cornerstone of Chinas ability to safeguard its national security
within a complex international environment.
61
Though Chinas official reaction
to it is restrained or highly nuanced, yet its academic community articulates
what the government does not want to state publicly.
An emerging dominant view is that China is developing the modern strategic
systems for anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) missions. Chinese missile and fast
developing submarines may be useful for the Asia theatre in which the American
carriers groups may be harmed. However, one of the Chinese writers maintains,
200
China should deploy forces to North America and the Caribbean to reach a
balance. However, currently, China cannot compete with the US on a military
basis. Therefore, China should have weapons that could be an ace in the hole.
Although Chinas conventional weapons have developed rapidly, China and the
US are still about 20 years apart in this field.
62
The writer further states, Only
nuclear weapons can force the US to use methods other than starting wars to
compete with China. Without deterrent capability, Chinas security can only rely
on US good intentions and restraint. However, looking at US political ethics and
US history, we cannot find these virtues.
63
In this context, a relevant question is: Is China augmenting its nuclear strength
because of the US pivot to Asia policy? The answer to it is quite complex. China
is modernising its military. Nuclear weapons are not an exception.
64
Pivot to
Asia or Asia rebalancing policy is a recent phenomenon. It may have just provided
an extra argument to the ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile modernisation of
China. The Chinese Government intends to shift the blame on the US Asia-
Pacific policy in a subtle manner. In the 2013 White Paper, it notes: The Asia-
Pacific region has become an increasingly significant stage for world economic
development and strategic interaction between major powers. The US is adjusting
its Asia-Pacific security strategy, and the regional landscape is undergoing profound
changes.
65
The Chinese apprehension or excuse that the American deployment
of BMD may adversely affect the nuclear deterrence or strategic stability has
been contested not only by the US and its regional allies but also by several
experts in and outside the US.
What is the US approach to the rapid Chinese nuclear modernisation? Even
those in the US who have faith in the American nuclear deterrence architecture
express apprehensions about the US-China crisis management mechanisms.
Transparency of the Chinese Militarys modernisation is one of the policy options
suggested by the US. However, the US denies that it intends to encircle China.
Nor does it step up its nuclear weapons programme
66
to counter the aggressive
Chinese nuclear behaviour. A section of the US strategic community believes
that the American nuclear deterrence vis--vis China is incredibly strong.
67
Some
of the Western writings raise serious questions about the Chinese ability to harm
the US. But the fact is that the US is reluctant to take on China, and China is
asserting its nuclear presence all over Asia
Proliferation Network
The US policymakers fear undermining of the non-proliferation regime by the
proliferation network. Some even believe that North Korea funds its regime
through illicit and clandestine proliferation activities. The current proliferation
network continues to dodge all non-proliferation initiatives by hiding shipping
containers and using the ring of overseas agents, front companies, banking
arrangements, transnational criminal groups and so on. On a number of
occasions, the US policymakers, including the US Government, have admitted
201
that the proliferation network exists, but only on a few occasions, do they mention
the complicity of China and Pakistan. However, these days, generally, the US
policymakers mention only Iran-North Korea transactions and overlook other
countries such as Pakistan and China involved in illicit and clandestine
transactions.
Significantly, hearings of experts and government officials in the US Congress
committees continue to underline the existence of the proliferation network and
even the Pakistani involvement. One of the hearings mentioned March 2011
Iran-Syria transactions of rocket launchers as one of the categories of weapons
from Iran to Syria, which was intercepted in Turkey. The same hearing discussed
Pakistan as one of the patrons of North Korea in black market weapons deals.
68
Congressman Ted Poe, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-
proliferation and Trade of the US Congress made a very profound statement in
the April 2013 Congressional hearing: China also helps the North Koreans,
and China helps Pakistan. Meanwhile, the North Koreans assist the Iranian nuclear
program, and while they are doing that they assist the Pakistanis in a missile
program in exchange for nuclear technology. The Pakistanis not only assist the
North Koreans, but they help the Iranians as well. And then of course Iran assists
Syria in chemical and biological weapons programs. They are all busy bees helping
each other out getting weapons they wish to probably use in the future. This is
a serious threat to the world, this proliferation, and it is important that we
recognize [sic] the truth for what it is.
69
Unfortunately, a strong section of US policymakers, including the US
Government, believes that the proliferation network in which A Q Khan and the
Pakistani establishment were involved no longer exists. An impression is created
that it is the private sector or privately-owned companies from Pakistan and China
that are involved in proliferation activities. Definitely, it is far from the truth.
Interestingly, the Chairman of Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs in
the 2011 full committee hearing raised the issue, Does a responsible stakeholder,
as reported in the Western press, allow the trans-shipment of North Korean missile
components to Iran via Beijing airport in open defiance of those U.N. sanctions,
which as a Perm-5 Member State, it is duly bound to enforce?
70
To which Larry
Wortzel, Commissioner, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
answered: They [Chinese authorities] are pretty heavily involved. They accept
those transshipments [sic] from North Korea through China. They facilitate them.
Those things dont happen without the concurrence of central authorities in the
provinces and from a national air control system. They have got their own customs
people, so they are well aware of it and they could stop it.
71
Worse, some of the Western analysts,
72
who acknowledge that the A Q Khan
proliferation network was state-sponsored using a unique business model involving
several private companies and individuals, recommend to overlook the involvement
of the Pakistani state in the proliferation network. The puzzling argument is that
if the Pakistani Government or State is targeted, it may go against Western and
202
European interests. This kind of argument not just hides the true nature of
proliferation network but also legitimises the proliferation link and, on top of it,
the Pakistani nuclear blackmail. However, in the US, sensible voices in the strategic
community recognise the danger. One of the analysts aptly sums up the issue as
follows: One crucial difference between the challenges of deterring Russia and
deterring the PRC pertains to the degree that China has abetted the nuclear
capabilities of North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, helped them to become a network of
proliferation. And these countries with their known relationships to terrorist
organizations [sic] appear to be moving toward an age that may include nuclear
terrorism. How does the United Statesthe United States, in my opinion, has
failed to arrest Chinas support for this network. We may in the not-too-distant
future be paying a very heavy price.
73
Conclusion
The pivot to Asia policy, generally understood as the American pro-active policy
in Asia, expected America to use strong and realistic diplomacy
74
at least in
relation to China and North Korea. After the announcement or adoption of
pivot to Asia or Asian rebalancing policy, nuclearisation of Asia has not seen
any positive development. The reason for it is very simple: the US has failed to
target the central figure of the Asian nuclearisation, that is, China. North Korea
is marching ahead with its nuclearisation programme. The US has outsourced
its North Korea denuclearisation programme to China, which is playing a highly
deceptive game. It gives the impression to be working with other great powers,
including the US, but in reality, it is busting sanctions against North Korea and
even clandestinely supplying key technologies for its nuclear and missile
programmes. But from time to time, it keeps issuing statements and notifications
against North Korea to mislead international public opinion.
In the near future, it does not seem that the affected neighbours of North
Korea will develop nuclear weapons, but they will not close the option either.
The technological preparedness will continue. For Japan and South Korea and
many other countries in South East Asia, the aggressive military and nuclear
modernisation of China is further preparing them to explore nuclear weapons
option. As long as the US keeps extending its nuclear protective umbrella to its
allies, at least those countries will shelve the idea of developing nuclear weapons.
This will lead to a setback to the current move to reduce nuclear weapons arsenals.
There is a possibility of keeping more nuclear weapons than declared by the US.
However, other countries in the region, which are not protected by the nuclear
umbrella, will feel insecure because of the existence and modernisation of Chinese
and North Korean nuclear weapons. Just now, these countries may not have the
capability to assemble weapons. However, the pressure may force them to
nuclearise. As a result, the world may witness a new nuclear weapons chain reaction
and a new Asian nuclear race.
The Asian nuclear arms race may be fuelled by the already existing
203
proliferation network. The US is downplaying some of the key actors because of
its inability to deal with emerging Asian security dynamics. It has declared China
a stakeholder of the non-proliferation system and officially wants to make it a
partner to manage Asian affairs.
75
The US Government is also deliberately
downplaying continued proliferation activities of Pakistan. This overlooking will
not help in understanding the existing proliferation network that starts from
East Asia and passes through South Asia involving Pakistan and West Asia and
reaching America. So, the problem of Iranian nuclear weapons may be solved, if
it is really solved, mainly because of the change of the regime in Iran, not because
of American diplomacy and policy.
The Asian nuclear race may spill over into the world at large, and we may
witness a global nuclear arms race. The nuclearisation of Asia may have its spiral
effects on other aspects of weapon too. Pan-Asia institutions and regimes through
which the US operates is either ineffective or fragmented in nature. The US,
before and after the announcement of pivot to Asia or Asia rebalancing policy,
took several initiatives to strengthen the archaic regime based on the Cold War
legal arrangement. However, even these initiatives seem to have failed. The
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is the most burning example. Pivot to Asia
policy needs sharpening, and the US must focus on the root cause called China
if it wants to manage the nuclearisation of Asia.
NOTES
1. Hillary Clinton, Americas Pacific Century, Foreign Policy, November 2011, at http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century.
2. Ibid.
3. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama to the
Australian Parliament, Canberra, November 17, 2011, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament.
4. Ministry of National Defence, Information Office of the State Council, Peoples Republic
of China, The Diversified Employment of Chinas Armed Forces, White Paper, April
2013, at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2013-04/16/content_4442752.htm.
Xenia Dormandy, US Election Note: China Policy after 2012, Americas Programme Paper
AMP PP 2012/01, Chatham House, May 2012, at http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/
default/files/public/Research/Americas/0512usen_china.pdf.
Munir Akram, Shifting Asian Pivot, South Asia Monitor, April 28, 2013, at http://
southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=sarc&nid=5003.
Daljit Singh, Pivoting Asia, Engaging ChinaAmerican Strategy in East Asia Today,
ISEAS Perspective, Institute for South East Asian Studies, Singapore, October 19, 2012, at
http://www.iseas.edu.sg/documents/publication/ISEAS%20Perspective_19oct12.pdf;
5. Stuart Grudgings, As Obamas Asia Pivot Falters, China Steps into the Gap, Reuters,
October 6, 2013, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/06/us-asia-usa-china-
idUSBRE99501O20131006.
Justin Logan, China, America, and the Pivot to Asia, Policy Analysis, No. 717, January 8,
2013, at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa717.pdf.
Matt Schiavenza, What Exactly Does It Mean that the U.S. Is Pivoting to Asia?: And
Will It Last, The Atlantic, April 15, 2013, at http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/
2013/04/what-exactly-does-it-mean-that-the-us-is-pivoting-to-asia/274936/.
204
Christopher R Hill, The Obama Anti-Doctrine: Questions over Asia Pivot, Gulf Times,
October 24, 2013, at http://www.gulf-times.com/Mobile/Opinion/189/details/369605/The-
Obama-anti-doctrine%3A-questions-over-Asia-pivot.
6. Robert S. Ross, The Problem with the Pivot: Obamas New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary
and Counterproductive, China-US Focus, December 6, 2012, at http://
www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-problem-with-the-pivot-obamas-new-asia-policy-
is-unnecessary-and-counterproductive/.
7. Benjamin H. Friedman, What Asian Pivot?, Cato Institute, November 13, 2018, at
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/what-asian-pivot.
Benny Avni, Obamas Asia Pivot Fails to Materialize, Newsweek, November 17, 2013, at
http://www.newsweek.com/obamas-asia-pivot-fails-materialize-3359.
Carl Pi-Cheng Huang, Asia Pivot: Old Wine in NewBottles?, International Security
Discipulus, December 2, 2012, at http://internationalsecuritydiscipulus.wordpress.com/2012/
12/02/asia-pivot-old-wine-in-new-bottles/.
John Feffer, The Paradoxes of the Pacific Pivot, April 15, 2013, at http://
www.warandpeace.ru/en/analysis/view/79083/.
8. The US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Breaking the
Iran, North Korea and Syria Nexus, Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle
East and North Africa and the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific and the Subcommittee
on Terrorism, Non-proliferation and Trade, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First
Session, Serial No. 11312, Government Printing Office, April 11, 2013, at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg80364/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg80364.pdf.
9. The US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, The Security
Situation on the Korean Peninsula, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session,
H.A.S.C. No. 112125, Government Printing Office, March 28, 2012, at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg73797/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg73797.pdf.
10. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on North
Korean Announcement of Nuclear Test, February 12, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2013/02/12/statement-president-north-korean-announcement-nuclear-test.
11. The United States Government, Department of State, U.S.-DPRK Bilateral Discussions,
February 29, 2012, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184869.htm.
12. The US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US Policy
toward North Korea, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, S. HRG. 113
36, Government Printing Office, March 7, 2013, at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
113shrg81468/pdf/CHRG-113shrg81468.pdf.
13. United Nations, Additional Items and Luxury Goods, September 17, 2013. at http://
www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/pdf/List_Items_and_Luxury_Goods.pdf.
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2087 (13), 6904th Meeting, S/RES/2087
(2013), January 22, 2013, at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/
2087(2013).
14. United States Government, Department of State, Additional Designation of Three North
Korean Individuals Pursuant to Executive Order 13382, Public Notice 8254, Federal Register,
78 (57), March 25, 2013, at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/03/25/2013-
06752/additional-designation-of-three-north-korean-individuals-pursuant-to-executive-order-
13382#h-7.
United States Government, Department of State, Additional Designation of A North
Korean Entity and Two North Korean Individuals Pursuant to Executive Order 13382,
Public Notice 8198, Federal Register, 78 (38), February 26, 2013, at https://
www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/02/26/2013-04423/additional-designation-of-a-north-
korean-entity-and-two-north-korean-individuals-pursuant-to.
15. The US Congress, no. 12.
205
16. Glyn Davies, Testimony Before the Senate Committee On Foreign Relations, United
States Government, Department of State, US Policy Towards North Korea, March 7, 2013,
at http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2013/03/205691.htm
18. Ibid.
20. Glyn Davies, no. 16.
21. The US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Nuclear
Weapons Modernization in Russia and China: Understanding Impacts to the United States,
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, One Hundred Twelfth Congress,
First Session, H.A.S.C. No. 11278, Government Printing Office, October, 14, 2011, at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg71449/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg71449.pdf.
23. Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Showcases Its Military Might at a Mass Rally, The New
York Times, July 17, 2013, at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/world/asia/north-korea-
shows-military-might-at-mass-rally.html?_r=0.
24. Glyn Davies, no. 16.
26. Antoine Bondaz, New Direction for Chinas North Korea Policy, Carnegie-Tsinghuah
Center for Global Policy, August 27, 2013, at http://www.carnegietsinghua.org/2013/08/
27/new-direction-for-china-s-north-korea-policy/gkhw.
27. S. Korea Denounced for Diplomacy to Pressurize North to Dismantle Nukes, Korea
Central News Agency, July 9, 2013, at http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201307/news09/
20130709-10ee.html.
28. Siegfried S. Hecker, A Return Trip to North Koreas Yongbyon Nuclear Complex, Center
for International Security and Cooperation, The Freeman Spogli Institute for International
Studies, Stanford University, November 20, 2010, at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/23035/
HeckerYongbyon.pdf.
29. Fredrik Dahl, North Korea Has Everything in Place for New Atom Test U.S. Expert,
the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation, July 17, 2013, at http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/news/
i nternati onal /North_Korea_has_ever ythi ng_i n_pl ace_f or_new_at om_t est _-
_U.S._expert.html?cid=36479558&utm_source=NSSPI+News+Digest&utm_campaign=7423999dd5-
RSS_EMAIL_CAMPAIGN&utm_medi um=emai l &utm_term=0_d96553fdd0-
7423999dd5-388006630.
30. The US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US Policy
toward North Korea, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, North Koreas Sea
of Fire: Bullying, Brinkmanship and Blackmail, Serial No. 1126, Government Printing
Office, March 10, 2011, at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg65056/pdf/
CHRG-112hhrg65056.pdf.
31. John Kerry, Remarks with Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, and Republic of
Korea Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se before Their Meeting, United States Government,
Department of State, Brunei, July 1, 2013, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/
07/210053.htm.
32. Steve Herman, Rising Voices in S. Korea, Japan Advocate Nuclear Weapons, Voice of
America, February 15, 2013, at http://www.voanews.com/content/rising-voices-in-south-
korea-japan-advocate-nuclear-weapons/1604309.html.
33. Japan Says It Could Build a Nuclear Bomb, The Washington Post, Associated Press,
November 29, 2006, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/
29/AR2006112901641.html.
34. Selig S. Harrison, Nuclear weapons in Japan? Not now, USA Today, March 22, 2011, at
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2011-03-23-column23_ST1_N.htm.
206
35. Takashi Yokota, Why Japan Wont Acquire Nuclear Weapons, Newsweek, June 12, 2009,
athttp://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/06/12/the-n-word.html.
36. Narusighe Michisita, For Japan, There Are Other Options, The New York Times, March
13, 2013, at http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/03/11/will-south-korea-and-
japan-take-the-nuclear-route/for-japan-there-are-other-options-besides-nuclear-weapons.
37. David McNeill, Japan Must Develop Nuclear Weapons, Warns Tokyo Governor, The
Independent, March 8, 2011, at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/japan-must-
develop-nuclear-weapons-warns-tokyo-governor-2235186.html.
Julian Ryall, Japan Should Develop Nuclear Weapons to Defend Itself , The Telegraph,
February 4, 2011, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/8303366/Japan-
should-develop-nuclear-weapons-to-defend-itself.html.
38. The US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, The Status
of United States Strategic Forces, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, H.A.S.C. No. 11212, March 2, 2011,
Government Printing Office, at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg65112/pdf/
CHRG-112hhrg65112.pdf.
39. Seoul to send working-level officials to six-way meeting proposed by China, Yonhap News
Agency, September 16, 2013, at http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.
html?cid=AEN20130916009200315.
40. Kim Jiyoon et al., The Fallout: South Korean Public Opinion Following North Koreas
Third Nuclear Test, Issue Brief, No. 46, February 25, 2013, at http://asaninst.org/eng/
03_publications/publications_detail.php?seq=100407.
41. Chang-Hoon Shin, UNSCR 1540 and Peace and Security in Northeast Asia, UNSCR
1540 Committee Expert Group meeting, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, at http://
asaninst.org/library/download_eng.php?input_name=board_attach1&save_name=.
42. Douglas H Paal, Keynote: M J Chung, Member National Assembly of the Republic of
Korea, 2013, Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, April 9, 2013, at http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/09/
keynote-m.j.-chung-member-national-assembly-of-republic-of-korea/fv9t
45. Jen Psaki, Daily Press Briefing, United States Government, Department of State,
Washington DC, October 1, 2013, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/10/
215013.htm#IRAN3
46. How Close is Iran to a Nuclear Weapon?, PBS Newshour, November 9, 2013, at http:/
/www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec13/albright_11-09.html.
International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
GOV//2013/56, November 14, 2013, at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Board/2013/gov2013-56.pdf.
Lynn E. Davis et al., Irans Nuclear Future: Critical U.S. Policy Choices, Rand Corporation,
2011, at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1087.
pdf.
Ben Smith, Is Iran Developing a Nuclear Weapon?, House of Commons Library,
International Affairs and Defence Section, February 15, 2012, p. 5.
47 It is a European Union-led commission or Consortium which is negotiating with Iran to
find a solution to its nuclear puzzle. It has all the five permanent members of United Nations
Security Council and Germany. However, E3+3 is called so because it has European members
the United Kingdom, France and Germany (E3) + the United States, Russia and China (3).
48. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings
Regarding the Islamic Republic of Irans Nuclear Program, November 23, 2013, at http:/
207
/www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/23/fact-sheet-first-step-understandings-
regarding-islamic-republic-iran-s-n.
49. Ibid.
50. International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Iran Sign Joint Statement on Framework for
Cooperation November 11, 2013, at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2013/
prn201321.html#annex.
51. International Atomic Energy Agency, Communication Dated 10 July 2013 Received from
the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency regarding the Report
of the Director General on the Implementation of Safeguards in Iran, INFCIRC/853,
July 23, 2013, at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2013/infcirc853.pdf.
52. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Iran Sanctions, http://www.state.gov/e/
eb/tfs/spi/iran/index.htm.
United States Government, US Department of the Treasury, Resource Center: Iran
Sanctions, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/iran.aspx.
53. John Kerry, Remarks After the P-5+1 Ministerial on Iran, United States Government,
Department of State, New York City, September 26, 2013, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/
remarks/2013/09/214827.htm.
54. http://www.nationaljournal.com/global-security-newswire/security-insiders-iranian-president-
rouhani-s-outreach-to-u-s-is-genuine-20131001.
55. Jodi Rudoren, Israel and Others in Mideast View Overtures of U.S. and Iran with
Suspicion, The New York Times, September 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/
29/world/middleeast/israel-and-others-in-mideast-view-overtures-of-us-and-iran-with-
suspicion.html?pagewanted=all&pagewanted=print.
56 http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/insiders-poll/security-insiders-iranian-president-
rouhani-s-outreach-to-u-s-is-genuine-20130930.
57. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by The President On First
Step Agreement On Irans Nuclear Program, November 23, 2013, at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/23/statement-president-first-step-agreement-
irans-nuclear-program.
58. The White House, no. 50.
60. Michael Richardson, Chinas Nuclear Programme Still Shrouded in Secrecy, Japan Times,
May 23, 2013, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/05/23/commentary/chinas-
nuclear-program-still-shrouded-in-secrecy/#.UjBxBdJBPit.
61. Time to Upgrade Chinas Nuclear Capabilities, Global Times, September 7, 2012, at http:/
/www.globaltimes.cn/content/731670.shtml.
62. Sun Peisong, Nuke deterrent ensures long-term security, Global Times, December 18,
2012, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/750893.shtml.
63. Ibid.
64. Rajiv Nayan, Nuclear Modernisation in Indias Neighbourhood, in SD Muni and Vivek
Chadha (eds), Asian Strategic Review, 1993, pp. 277-294.
65. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2013-04/16/content_4442752.htm.
69. Ibid.
70. The US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Assessing
Chinas Behaviour and Its Impact on US Interests, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress,
First Session, Serial No. 1122, January 19, 2011, at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112hhrg64008/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg64008.pdf
71. Ibid.
208
72. http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/brunotertrais5010305
e17790.pdf.
75. The White House, no. 3.
INDIAN PERSPECTIVE
13
Indias Approach to the Asia-Pacific
Arvind Gupta
Several political, security, economic and socio-cultural factors are at play in the
Asia-Pacific making the region highly dynamic. India needs to have a long-term
strategy to make use of the opportunities arising in the Asia-Pacific while keeping
in view the security challenges. The Asia-Pacific is marked by the following key
trends: rise of China; the rebalancing strategy of the US; a regional architecture
underpinned by the centrality of ASEAN; the growing importance of the Indian
Ocean region and maritime issues and the growing salience of non-traditional
security threats.
This paper discusses some of the key trends in the Asia-Pacific and sets out
a long-term approach for India to maximise its security and developmental
opportunities. The focus is on Indo-ASEAN relations, while other countries are
discussed in brief.
Rise of China
Chinas rise has created a flux. An economic giant, with a GDP of US$ 7.3
trillion (2011-World Bank) and an annual military expenditure of Yuan 650
billion (approximately US$ 103 billion) in 2012, China has overtaken Japan in
economic and military terms and may overtake the US economy in the next 10-
20 years depending upon the growth rate differential between the two countries.
Chinas rise is altering the balance of power globally and regionally. The
confidence in Chinas peaceful rise and development has been seriously dented
due to rising tensions in the South China Sea and East China Sea. The new
leadership is nationalistic and sharply focused on Chinas core interests.
Chinas rapid military modernisation and projection of its power beyond
immediate neighbourhood and in the West Pacific has raised apprehensions among
its neighbours. It has developed a powerful navywith aircraft carriers,
submarines, anti-ship missileswhich is rivalling that of Japan and the US. China
212
is following the Anti-Access Anti-Denial (A2D) strategy to deter the US from
entering the island chain in the area of Chinese influence.
The rising tide of nationalism in China has caused anxieties among
neighbours. Chinas formulations on core interests with attendant focus on
sovereignty has created doubts in the minds of the neighbouring countries about
Chinas intentions. China regards the South China Sea as its internal waters.
This will have major impact not only in the neighbourhood but also for
international shipping.
On the flip side, it must also be recognised that Chinas rise has also benefited
the neighbours, particularly in the economic field. For most countries, China is
the number one trading partner. China-Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) trade is $ 380 billion. The ASEAN economies have got integrated
with that of China. People-to-people contacts between China and its neighbours
have also deepened with greater connectivity, openness and transparency.
China is getting integrated with the regional architectures. This has increased
Chinas role in regional stability. For instance, China has a Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) with ASEAN. The ASEAN countries are part of a global supply chain
which passes through China to global markets. Thus, the economic and social
interdependence has increased. China is participating in Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations. RECP will bring about a higher
level of economic integration between the ASEAN, China, Japan, Australia and
India.
The future is uncertain. Chinas economic performance is suspect and riddled
with many problems. How long will China maintain its growth? What will be
the impact of the slowdown of Chinese economy in the region? It will all be
worth studying. China presents a complex picture. The talk of containment of
China is problematic given the growing interdependence between China and
most major economies of the region.
The US has been a key player in the security and economic architecture of the
region. The biggest challenge before the US is to adjust to the rise of China.
Having got entrapped in the highly expensive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and
having been affected by the economic slowdown, the US is in a perilous state.
The US has been compelled to reduce its defence budget due to lack of resources.
Many analysts believe that the US is declining vis--vis China although it
will remain a military and economic power in the foreseeable future. The US
also has the ability to bounce back due to its vast capabilities in innovation. Yet,
according to some conjectures, China will overtake the US as the number one
economy in the next two decades. That will be an important psychological moment
for the world.
Beset by fundamental changes in the international order, the US has signalled
213
a shift in its policies towards Asia. Doubts have arisen among the US allies in its
ability to shore up its key military alliances in the region, for instance, with
Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and Thailand. Faced with a rising
China and a declining US, many countries are adopting hedging strategies vis-
-vis China. Essentially most of the countries are seeking greater engagement
with China, while being on guard against its assertiveness.
The US has declared a policy of rebalancing and pivoting to Asia. The policy
is imprecise and has created considerable confusion. Did the US ever leave Asia?
If not, why is this talk of return to Asia? What will be the nature of the US
defence postures? Will the 60:40 ratio in military deployments between Asia and
the rest of the world be sufficient to strengthen the US defence in Asia Pacific?
In recent times, the rebalancing strategy has been further elaborated by officials
in the second Obama administration. Economic and cultural dimensions of the
strategy have been elaborated. The aim of rebalancing strategy has been defined
to be the strengthening of the existing alliances, searching for new partners (India,
Indonesia), forging economic partnerships [Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)] and
achieving a constructive relationship with China.
However, Beijing has taken rebalancing as an attempt to contain China. It
clearly is suspicious of the US partnerships especially the one with India. The
Chinese are developing their own A2D strategies to prevent the US from coming
too close to the Chinese shores. The Chinese assertiveness in South China Sea,
East China Sea and other areas are part of its strategy to keep the US away and
to signal the Chinese area of influence.
The US is concerned about China, but it has to avoid an open confrontation.
The US statements on China indicate the US desire to engage with China as
deeply as practical. The strategic and economic dialogue between the two countries
has been institutionalised. Yet, the relationship between the two countries is far
from smooth. Elements of competition and confrontation are manifest in the
US-China relations. The rest of the world is also unsure about the direction in
which the US-China relationship is proceeding.
How other Countries are Readjusting?
It is in this shifting background that other countries are adjusting their policies.
(a) The ASEAN Region, traditionally a region divided by numerous internal
fault lines, has sought to put its act together particularly since the 1997
Asian financial crisis. The ASEAN countries have sought to resolve their
disputes through consensus and dialogue. They have engaged with the
outside world while emphasising the ASEAN centrality in so far as their
region is concerned. With a combined GDP of over $ 2 trillion (2011)
and total trade of $ 2.4 trillion (2011), ASEAN has emerged as a
formidable economic force. Yet stability in ASEAN is crucially dependent
upon internal as well as external factors. China and the US factors have
214
challenged the ASEAN, and it finds itself at the crossroads. ASEAN
unity is under strain. Vietnam and the Philippines are directly affected
by Chinas rise. The South China Sea is a hotspot of tension and is likely
to remain so. The mistrust between China and ASEAN is increasing
because of the South China Sea issues. The ASEAN is trying to forge an
economic union by 2015. The ASEAN+6 has established the RCEP
even as the US is pushing for the TPP which excludes China. Some
countries like Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Indonesia have doubts
about joining the TPP negotiations.
(b) Japan is getting revitalised. Prime Minister Abe is determined to restore
Japans primacy. Japans New Defence Policy guidelines indicate that Japan
is likely to devote increasing attention to recrafting its military strategy
and enhancing its defence postures. Chinas assertiveness and North
Koreas nuclear programme are serious security concerns for Japan. In
the altered scenarios, Japan is focusing on India as a security partner.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singhs visit to Japan got worldwide headlines
as it signalled deepening of India-Japan strategic and security partnership.
Prime Minister Abe is reported to have proposed a strategy whereby
Australia, India, Japan and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to
safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean
region to the Western Pacific...I am prepared to invest to the greater
possible extent, Japans capabilities in this security diamond.The Indian
Prime Minister spoke of India and Japan as natural and indispensable
partners for...a peaceful, stable, cooperative and prosperous future for
the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. Clearly, India-Japan relations
are important in the context of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific.
(c) Australia sees opportunities for itself in the so-called Asian Century.
It welcomes the rise of China and accepts its military growth as natural.
Australia is pulling out all stops to deepen its relations with China at
every level. At the same time, Australia is also hedging against China by
building its own defence capabilities and supporting US rebalancing and
pivoting to the Asia Pacific. It is seeking partnerships with India, Japan
and South Korea. In particular, Australia takes note of Indias growing
strategic weight in the region and assigns special importance to India in
the context of Indo-Pacific. It regards Indian and pacific oceans as
one strategic arch. India needs to deepen its relations with Australia,
particularly in the context of Australias emergence as a major supplier
of coal and possibly uranium in the future. Australia is also helping
India in education and skill developments.
(d) South Korea faces a volatile security environment, particularly in the
context of North Koreas nuclear and missile programme and its
unpredictable behaviour. South Korea pays major emphasis on the
protection of the sea lanes of communication in the East Asian region
215
and seek cooperation with India in this regard. It also takes note of
Chinese hegemonic outlook in the region. While maintaining close ties
with India, the Cheonan incident and Yeon Pyieng Island shelling in
2010 have highlighted the increasing military trend in that area. The
Republic of Korea (RoK) relies heavily on international maritime lanes
and shipping. In recent track-2 level discussions, South Korea has
underscored desirability of a cooperative mechanism and dialogue between
the RoK and the Indian navy, institutionalising an official bilateral
mechanism for planning and coordination of maritime issues on the
lines of an annual maritime dialogue. South Korea also wants maritime
cooperation with India such as joint naval exercises.
Opportunities for India
The PMs visit to Japan in May 2013 has been commented upon widely. Strong
strategic relationship with Japan is in Indias favour. India has strategic
partnerships with the US, Japan, South Korea and Australia. These countries
want to have closer security cooperation particularly in the maritime sector. India-
Japan-US trilateral dialogue should focus on the Asia-Pacific issues including
security cooperation. These partnerships would promote stability in the region.
China should realise that India has legitimate interests in the region.
What should be Indias long term strategy in Asia-Pacific? With the shift of
centre of gravity to the Asia-Pacific region, India must seek a role in the shaping
of political, economic, social and security process in the region. Not doing so
could adversely affect Indias interests. Indias strategy should be to seek deeper
engagement and economic integration with the Asia-Pacific region. India should
be particularly engaged in the security dialogues and processes in the region.
India enjoys high credibility in ASEAN and East Asia. India and ASEAN
have raised their partnership to strategic level. The challenge is to deepen it further.
The ASEAN-India Commemorate Summit Vision Statement has identified
a number of projects for cooperation in the fields of political and security,
economic, socio-cultural and developmental, connectivity in regional architecture.
Earlier, the ASEAN-India Eminent Persons Report (2013) had identified even a
larger spread of projects for cooperation. Thus, there is no dearth of ideas. However,
what is required is the identification of resources, establishment of institutional
framework, monitoring mechanisms, coordination etc. to ensure a timely
implementation of these projects.
The next big trend in ASEAN region will be the ASEAN Economic Union
and RCEP. This will open up opportunities for India. The success of ASEAN-
India cooperation will depend upon how rapidly the two sides move towards
economic integration through the FTA in services and in future through the
RCEP. India has yet to weigh the costs and benefits of joining the RCEP. The
connectivity between ASEAN and India has been talked about for a long time,
but the progress has been slow. Similarly, the regional cooperation, particularly
216
within the framework of Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical
and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and Ganga-Mekong Cooperation, the
Trilateral Highway, etc. has also been slow. The two sides need to focus on
implementation issues.
One of the weaknesses of Indias Look East Policy (LEP) has been the relatively
less involvement of Indias North East in it. This lacuna must be addressed
urgently. The benefits of the LEP, particularly, the increased trade, better
connectivity, greater socio-cultural links, cooperation in the area of capacity
building, education, youth, etc. must be felt by the people of North East, who
are otherwise sceptical of the LEP. Therefore, it is essential that the governments
in the North East and the social and cultural institutions in the region should
be involved in the formulation and implementation of India-ASEAN policies.
Of the numerous activities outlined in the Vision Statement
1
, some should be
based in the North Eastern (NE) states. For instance, an India-ASEAN cultural
centre could be set up in Guwahati. Similarly, Imphal could host an India-ASEAN
sports academy. A study of local cultures could be undertaken through an NE
university. A special programme can be designed for capacity building targeting
the youth of the North East. Trade facilitation centres encouraging trade between
the North East and the South East Asia could be set up in the North East. The
government could also consider setting up the branches of these institutions in
the North East.
The Vision Statement talks about security cooperation between India and
the ASEAN. An institutional framework needs to be set up for this purpose. For
instance, the India-Japan security statement of 2008 could be adopted for India-
ASEAN security dialogue and cooperation. This will help set up a broad-based
security dialogue between the Indian and ASEAN institutions. India-ASEAN
counter-terrorism dialogue should be stepped up, and information sharing should
be facilitated. Mutual legal assistance treaties and extradition treaties should be
set up. Maritime security dialogue should be initiated
Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) Islands should be brought into the framework
of India-ASEAN relations. Giving due consideration to the concerns of the tribes,
it is possible to develop some of the islands, particularly, in Nicobar, for tourism.
Nicobari youth are keen to take to modernism. Scholarships for the youth of
A&N Islands could be provided to make them a stakeholder.
In terms of trade linkages, the Dawei port offers numerous opportunities.
During the Thai Prime Ministers visit to New Delhi in January 2012, India and
Thailand agreed to develop Chennai-Dawei corridor project. Dawei is a city in
southeastern Myanmar and is capital of Tanintharyi Region. Myanmar
government has already approved plans to develop a large port and industrial
estate in Dawei with the Italian-Thai Development Public Company Limited
(ITD) as a major contractor. The entire project estimated to be at least US$ 58
billion. In November 2010, ITD signed a 60-year framework agreement with
the Myanmar Port Authority to build a port and an industrial estate on 250
217
square kilometres of land in Dawei. This is likely to transform Thailand into a
major transit hub within the East-West Economic Corridor. Japan is also keen
to invest in the Dawei project. India must invest in Dawei project, as also work
on the Chennai-Dawei corridor.
People-to-people connectivity needs to be improved. But this will require
liberations of the visa regime between India and the ASEAN.
India needs to pay special attention to Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam,
Indonesia and Singapore on bilateral level. These countries can help India in
raising Indian regional profile.
Additionally, India needs to focus on the Indian Ocean issues and those of
Ocean governance. India needs to take active role in the shaping of the agenda
of Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). In
recent times, the Australians and the Japanese have talked about the concept of
Indo-Pacific.
NOTES
1. See Vision StatementASEAN-India Commemorative Summit, December 20, 2012,
Ministry of External Affairs, http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/20982/
Vision+StatementASEANIndia+Commemorative+Summit, (Accessed on December 20,
2013).
14
Americas Pivot to Asia and
Indias Nuanced Approach
Rup Narayan Das
The tectonic shift of the economy from Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific in recent
years; together with Chinas economic and military rise has thrown up both
challenges and opportunities to the countries of the region. The defining aspect
of this unfolding geo-strategic scenario is the efforts of US to maintain its
preeminence in the region and was articulated in its Pivot to Asia policy. President
Obama fleshed out the essential features of this paradigm shift in his address to
the Australian Parliament in November 2011. The US Defence Department
strategic guidelines Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21
st
century
Defence
1
unveiled on 5
th
January, 2012 provided further clarity to the evolving
strategic shift. The document announced the shift in US focus from Middle
East to Asia-Pacific. Later speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on
2
nd
June 2012 the US Defence Secretary Leone Panetta outlined details of the
US plan for its rebalance towards Asia-Pacific declaring that the US Navy will
reposition 60 percent of its warships in Asia-Pacific by 2020 as part of the new
military strategy.
2
Chinas posturing to challenge the US supremacy in the region
has added salience to the evolving security scenario. India, yet another rising
power, perforce is poised to play a catalytic role in this evolving equilibrium.
Although Indias engagement with the Asia-Pacific has its own imperatives, the
development in the region has cast some resonance on the India-China relations
ever since India initiated its look east policy in early 1990s. Indias foray into
the South China Sea in October 2011, when its state owned Oil and Natural
Gas Commission (ONGC) Videsh, Ltd (OVL) signed an agreement with Petro-
Vietnam to explore hydrocarbon in the disputed South China Sea gave a further
twist to Indias look east policy.
Both India and China have had deep engagement with the countries of the
region. While Chinas closer physical proximity, historical and ethnic linkage has
nurtured its relationship with the region, India also has a cultural, historical and
Americas Pivot to Asia and Indias Nuanced Approach
219
political relationship with the region. Chinas economic surplus has enabled Beijing
to invest heavily in the countries of the region. The 1997, the Asian Financial
crises provided a very good opportunity to China to deepen its economic
engagement with the region. While economic engagement with China has brought
economic benefits to the countries of the region, Chinas military rise has given
rise to consternation, if not outright fear, in the minds of the leaders of these
countries. The spat over South China Sea which got intensified in 2010 and
Chinas assertiveness have further exacerbated the security scenario in the region.
The saber-rattling on the East China Sea over the Senkaku islands also fueled the
tension in the Asia-Pacific. It was against this unfolding geo-strategic scenario
that former US secretary of State Ms. Hilary Clinton forcefully articulated the
imperatives of the freedom of navigation earlier at the Asian Regional Forum in
2010 much to the chagrin of China. The United States, which has been the
resident power in the region, has reinvigorated its strategic engagement with the
region. Many countries in the region are now looking towards India not only for
economic engagement, but also for strategic reassurance to soft balance China.
What has added salience to the evolving strategic scenario in the region is the
nudging of the USA to mentor India in this endeavor of hedging China. It may,
however, be mentioned that much before USA unveiled its Pivot to Asia strategy
and articulated the Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region India has been engaging
with the countries of the region; and US has also been trying to co-opt India in
its strategy to contain or hedge China. India in tune with its strategic autonomy
in foreign policy postulates has been following a nuanced approach to this
unfolding geo-strategic scenario. It is against this backdrop that India is trying
to calibrate its engagement in the region with a degree of circumspection and
finesse in deference to the Chinese sensitivity and susceptibility
From Benign Neglect to Active Engagement
Indias engagement in the Asia-Pacific region particularly with countries of South-
East Asia like Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea Thailand and
Malaysia has been rooted in the history and culture of the countries of the region.
Indias cultural influence is very vivid and pronounced in Indonesia in particular;
so also in Kampuchea, where the world famous Angkor Vat temple is located.
In modern times, India extended moral and political support to Indonesia and
Vietnam in their fight against imperialism and colonialism. In Indonesias fight
against imperialism, India had played an active role even prior to her
independence. Similarly, India played an important role in the Geneva Conference
of 1954 on Indo-China that brought peace, though elusive, to the region. In
fact India and China together had worked hard for peace and stability in the
region in the wake of the Geneva Conference.
3
How does one explain Indias earlier low key and subdued relationship with
the region in spite of geographical contiguity and proximity until when India
ushered what is christened as the look east policy? One plausible reason perhaps
220
is that the cold war years were characterized by geopolitics in which India was
tagged with the erstwhile Soviet Union and its economy was on the back burner.
With globalisation, India also initiated economic reforms and liberalisation, and
this started echoing in Indias external relationship and foreign policy postulates.
Indias shift in foreign policy was articulated with economic contents with the
ASEAN as a whole and with individual counties of the regional forum. Since
1991, however, a conscious effort was begun to reach out to these countries as
part of Indias look east policy.
India became a Sectoral Dialogue Partner of the ASEAN in 1992 and a Full
Dialogue Partner in 1996. The accordance of the status of a Full Dialogue Partner
to India with the ASEAN along with others such as Australia, Canada, China,
European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russia and the USA
is recognition of Indias economic prowess and potential. As part of its look east
policy, India had been seeking a summit level engagement with the ASEAN,
i.e., interaction at the highest level. It was in this backdrop that at the Seventh
ASEAN Summit, held in November 2001 in Brunei, Darussalam, the then
Chairman of the ASEAN, took a decision to upgrade its relations with India to
Summit level. India participated in the first ASEAN-India Summit Meeting in
Phnom Penh in November 2002 and the second ASEANIndia Summit Meeting
in Bali in October 2003.
Yet another aspect of Indias engagement with the East Asia is the platform
of East Asian Summit. Indias participation in the first ever East Asian Summit
in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 was aimed to engage
India with fastest growing economies of the world. It is pertinent to mention
that ever since India initiated its look east policy, the volume of its trade with
the ten member countries has been growing significantly. The signing of the
FTA with the 10 member-ASEAN countries, after protracted negotiation, opens
a new chapter in the Indian relationship with the ASEAN countries, both at the
bilateral and multilateral levels.
Indias Perception of the Evolving Security Scenario in the Region
Although India officially has not extended its support or lack of it to USAs Pivot
to Asia, its articulation and posturing are suggestive of its nuanced approach to
the region. Indias concerns in the Asia-Pacific were reflected in the Annual Report
of the Ministry of Defence. Referring to the evolving security situation in the
region, the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence of the Government of
India for the year 2010-11 said, The security situation in East Asia increased
security concerns among several nations and underlined the need for initiatives
for building trust and confidence in the region. The establishment of the ASEAN
Defence Ministers Meeting Plus forum of ten ASEAN and eight non-ASEAN
countries, including India is seen as an effort to establish open and inclusive
security architecture for the region. Indias policy is to encourage and participate
in cooperative approach which would enable all countries in the region to counter
221
traditional and non-traditional security challenges and to ensure that the critical
sea lanes are kept open, secure and free for navigation and trade.
4
Considering
that traditionally the Annual Reports of the Ministries and Departments of
Government of India are very circumspect in articulating views, such observation
in the Ministrys Annual Report reflected Indias deep concerns with regard to
the unfolding of the geo-strategic scenario in the Asia-Pacific. Referring to China,
the Report mentioned, ...India is conscious and watchful of the implications of
Chinas evolving military profile in the immediate and extended neighborhood.
Indias policy is to engage with China on the principles of mutual trust and
respect and sensitivity for each others concerns.
5
The Report for the year 2011-12, while toning down the concerns spelt out
Indias avenues for engagement in the region with some degree of clarity. It said,
India has supported efforts to establish open and inclusive security
architecture for the region. Indias policy is to encourage and participate in
cooperative approaches which would enable all countries in the region to
address traditional and non-traditional security challenges and to ensure that
the critical sea lanes in the region are kept open, secure and free for navigation
and trade. Indias continued engagement with ASEAN led for a like the
ADMM Plus and ASEAN Regional Forum are part of our progressive and
multifaceted bilateral and multilateral partnership with the ASEAN
community.
It further added that at the same time India was mindful of the impact that
inter-State tensions may have on economic relations and on the military balance
in the region and the manner in which these would affect Indias national interest.
6
These articulation resonates the very the underlying objectives of USAs strategy
of Rebalancing.
Indias studied response to the evolving security scenario in the Asia-Pacific
region was reiterated clearly at the first ever trilateral meeting of the think-tanks
of India, Japan and South Korea held in New Delhi on 29
th
June, 2012 in the
backdrop of the spat over South China Sea. Inaugurating the trilateral meeting
Secretary (East) of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India Mr.
Sanjay Singh articulated Indias concerns and commitments in so many words.
He said, ...There is common commitment to maintaining freedom of the seas,
combatting terrorism, and promoting inclusive economic growth. India, Japan
and ROK depend heavily on the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) for
their energy security. These are also the mainstay for trade and connectivity
amongst our countries in the region. India has a valued geo-strategic location
straddling the SLOCs... Alluding to South China Sea he added,
Similar potential exists for example in South China Sea which today is
witnessing competing claims. Our common objective is to see that the seas
and oceans become regions of cooperation instead of competition particularly
as our energy security and trade depends on them. The primacy of our efforts
must be to maintain trade, energy and economic security in the seas around
222
us. There is indeed a compelling case for us to cooperate on maritime
security.
The message was crystal clear which he articulated in no uncertain words
when he said, A trilateral forum such as this gives a significant message not only
for the participants but also to the observers as it is a manifestation of greater
degree of maturity, trust and mutual understanding amongst the partners. It
means that the partners have been able to manage their relationship well and
have developed the confidence to talk and find solutions to over-arching issues
and concerns both bilateral and regional.
7
He also referred to Indias trilateral
dialogue with Japan and the US in this regard.
The strategic and security contents of Indias engagement with the ASEAN
received further impetus at the Commemorative Summit of the ASEAN-India
summit held in New Delhi in December 2012 to mark the 20
th
anniversary of
ASEAN-India summit. Welcoming the delegates, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan
Singh said that as maritime nations, India and ASEAN should intensify their
engagement for maritime security and safety, for freedom of navigation and for
peaceful settlement of maritime disputes in accordance with international law.
Reiterating the idea of a regional security architecture, he urged up on the member
countries to intensify political and security consultations, including in regional
forums such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus and proposed that the leaders should
work together more purposefully for the evolution of an open, balanced, inclusive
and transparent regional architecture.
8
The articulation clearly reflected Indias
desire and willingness to work with other stake holders including the US for
peace and stability in the region. A common refrain in the narrative of the
deliberation was the commitment to the values of freedom, democracy, and access
to market and the strategic significance of freedom of navigation.
The elevation of Indias engagement with the ASEAN to the strategic level
was well received by the ASEAN community. In an editorial The Nation of
Thailand wrote, It took two decades for the leaders of ASEAN and India to
have the courage to say that they are strategic partners in the truest sense of the
world. They have been reluctant to say this all along, as they dont want to give
the wrong impression that they are ganging up against common adversaries. But
the rapidly changing regional environment and global uncertainties have made
ASEAN and India realise that they have to forge closer relations beyond the
economic and the trade tracks. Without mincing words the editorial concluded,
From now on, India should do more to maintain the confidence of ASEAN and
demonstrate its commitment to make tangible progress on their bilateral ties. In
the past, ASEAN also wooed China, thinking that it would help to strengthen
the regional security. However the rising tension in the South China Sea
accompanied by Beijings tough talk has recently changed the thinking within
the region. ASEAN wants to make sure that along with US, India will walk side
by side with the grouping to increase its support when it is placed on a line-up
223
with China. In similar vein, ASEANs increased engagement with India will
intensify in proportion to the degree of cooperation the region gets from Beijing
on the code of conduct for the South China Sea and other areas.
9
The border incursion by China on 15
th
April 2013 in the Depasang in the
Ladakh region on the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and the
three week border standoff between the armies of China and India found its
echoes in Indias engagement in the Asia-Pacific, particularly with Japan and to
a lesser extent with other countries in the region. It may be just a coincidence,
but pertinent that Indias Defence Minister A.K. Antony visited three of USs
close allies-Australia, Singapore and Thailand immediately after the border
incursion. Not only that the timing of the visit was significant, but also the fact
that his subsequent visit to China in July 2013 was preceded by his visits to these
three countries. The priority was loud and clear in the context of their timing.
In Bangkok, Antony held wide ranging talks with his Thai counterpart Air Chief
Marshal Sukhompol Suwanatat, calling for cooperation in several areas including
keeping open sea lanes and measures to tackle piracy. Antony said both India
and Thailand had large stakes in the maintenance of peace and stability in its
immediate neighborhood and in the wider Asia-Pacific region. Our trade is
dependent on the sea lanes. Hence, security of the sea lanes and freedom of
navigation is critical to our economic and overall security. India supports the
freedom of navigation in accordance with the principles of international law, he
said in his talks with Suwanatat. He further said that India supports resolution
of differences and process of dialogue and consensus between the parties to such
disputes. All countries must exercise restraint and resolve issues diplomatically,
according to the principles of international law.
10
Indias nuanced position with regard to South China Sea, which is discussed
below, can be attributed to Chinese sensitivity. Nevertheless Indias articulation
of freedom of navigation and international law is endorsement of the US position
and at variance with the Chinese position. If this articulation is read in conjunction
with Indias strategic posturing then the message is very clear. India does not
want to get involved in the dispute nor does it want to take side with the parties
to the dispute vis-a-vis China. At the same it does not want to shy away from
the problem. Considering Chinese sensitivity India has always been careful not
to get involved in the diplomatic parleys between China and the ASEAN on the
issue of a code of conduct between China and the countries in dispute. But a
day after China agreed to hold official consultation with the ASEAN to give
shape to a proposed code of conduct at the ASEAN regional Forum and the
East Asia Summit ministerial meeting held at Bander Seri Begawan in Brunei in
the last week of June 2013, Indias External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid
said that New Delhi would contribute to the process as much as it could.
11
224
The US Nudging to India: Going beyond Look East,
Engage East
The call to engage India in the Asia-Pacific was renewed by the USA when
President Obama visited India in November 2010. Addressing the members of
Parliament, a rare honour extended to very select Heads of State or the
Government, President Obama said, ...more broadly, India and the United States
can partner in Asia. Today the United States is once again playing a leadership
role in Asia-strengthening old alliances; deepening relationships, as we are doing
with China; and we are reengaging with regional organisations like the ASEAN
and joining the East Asia Summitorganisations in which India is also a partner.
Like your neighbours in South-East Asia, we want India not only to Look East;
we want India to Engage East because it will increase the security and prosperity
of all our nations.
12
The appeal to exhort India was reiterated when Ms. Hilary Clinton visited
India, on July 2011. Speaking in Chennai she said, Much of the history of the
21
st
Century will be written in Asia which, in turn, will be influenced by the
partnership between the US and India and its relationship with neighbors.
13
She added that India could build a leadership role in the Asia-Pacific in fora like
the East Asia Summit and the Asian Regional Forum, contribute more to maritime
security, democracy promotion, explore a new Silk Route into Central Asia,
support rebuilding Afghanistan and even help stabilise Pakistan. President Barack
Obama in his address to the Australian Parliament in November 2011 welcomed
Indias look east policy and urged India to play a larger role as an Asian Power.
14
Commenting on Mrs. Clintons visit to India an opinion piece article in
China Daily said, In the current Obama administration, Clinton has emerged
as one of the most vocal proponent of the China balancing theory.
15
In her
official press conference in India, Clinton urged India to play a leading role in
Asia-Pacific, which directly or indirectly hints at the balancing of Chinas influence
in the region. Referring to the Indo-US relations, the article said, Overall, Indo-
US relations have improved over the last decade, but it will be an exaggeration
to say that India is a US ally in the region. A 2005 Indo-US civil nuclear deal
did not change the status of the Indo-US strategic relationship in a large way.
The emerging new relationship between the two democracies is only a late
recognition of their converging interest in combating global terrorism sponsored
by state and non-state actors. There is a long way to go for before an Indo-US
strategic relationship, and it will be immature at this stage. The message is subtle,
yet clear to wean away Indian from moving closer to USA.
During his visit to India in June 2012, the US Secretary of Defence Leone
E. Panetta in his address at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses further
articulated the US rebalancing in Indias context describing the defence
cooperation with India as a linchpin in this strategy. He reiterated that the US
supports Southeast Asian multilateral forums such as the ASEAN Defence
225
Ministers Meeting-Plus and that these mechanisms would prevent and manage
regional tensions. He further said that Indias voice and involvement in these
international forums would be critical.
16
There seems to be slight moderation in US strategy towards Asia-Pacific
with the exit of Ms. Hillary Clinton and the assumption of the position of the
secretary of state by John Kerry, presumably soft towards China. But when Tom
Donilon the US National Security Advisor, while speaking at the Asia Forum,
said, US and Indian interests powerfully converge in the Asia-Pacific, where
India has much to give and much to gain. South East Asia begins in Northeast
India, and we welcome Indias efforts to look East, from supporting reforms in
Burma to trilateral cooperation with Japan to promoting maritime security
17
.
It clearly conveyed the message that there would be change with continuity as
regards USAs engagement with India as far as Asia Pacific is concerned.
Vietnam: The Fulcrum of Indias look east Policy
Indias foray into the South China Sea has indeed given a new twist to its
engagement with Vietnam and to its look east policy and Indias larger
engagement in the Asia-Pacific as a major stake holder in the peace and stability
in the region. To put the issue in perspective, it may be mentioned that as soon
it was reported in the media that Indias External affairs Minister S.M. Krishnas
would visit Vietnam to participate in the Fourteenth India-Vietnam Joint
Commission Meeting on Trade, Economic, Scientific & Technological
Cooperation which took place on September 16, 2011 in Hanoi and that the
two countries were to sign an agreement to explore oil in the disputed South
China Sea, the media went overboard in reacting and commenting. New Delhi
and Beijing, however, at the governmental level tried to handle the issue deftly.
On September 15, 2011, alluding to the media report, the Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu said that China enjoys indisputable sovereignty
over the South China Sea, and that Chinas stand was based on historical facts
and international law. It further stated that China was opposed to any project in
the South China Sea, without directly referring to India.
18
Indias Measured Response
The issue was blown out of proportion by the over-zealous media. This can be
discerned from a statement by Defence Minister A.K. Antony, which he made
in his interaction with the media after the Coast Guard annual conference in
New Delhi wherein he said, South China Sea is not our worry. Our worry is to
guard our own backyard and our own areas in our neighboring island nations.
We are more concerned about areas around us and we are not the main players
in the South China Sea.
19
On yet another occasion, while addressing at the
Naval Commanders Conference in New Delhi on October 12, 2011, he said
India had no plans to increase its presence in the South China Sea and is only
226
interested in the uninterrupted passage of ships in the region. There is no
question of India going there in large scale. We will go there for exercise and
uninterrupted passage of ships and trade. There is no question of any naval
presence there. That is not our intention, our main concern is to protect our
core area of interest, he said.
20
India-Japan-China: Indias Fine Balancing
In Indias looks east policy and in its engagement in the Asia-Pacific, Japan is
increasingly occupying a strategic significance. This, however, cannot be said to
be endorsement of US Pivot to Asia Policy. There are subtle similarities, but
there are differences in thrust and approach. According to a Japanese writer and
security analyst Japan wants to create an international coalition together with
India, the United States and other nations, to pressure on China. However, New
Delhi is seeking a multilateral foreign policy that places equal importance on its
relations with not only Japan and the United States, but also on China, Russia
and the Middle East. The writer further observed that although India also has
deep interest in the Asia-Pacific and a forward looking attitude toward boosting
cooperation through joint military drills and other means. However, India is
reluctant to security policies that target a specific country. Instead, India expects
that such cooperation will help introduce technology that will improve its military
capabilities.
21
Indias growing engagement strategic and security engagement with Japan
can be discerned from the Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs,
Government of India, for the year 2010-11, which said Defence and security
cooperation has gradually emerged as a key factor of Indias Strategic and Global
Partnership with Japan and is recognised by both sides as beneficial to peace and
prosperity in Asia and the world. Within the framework of the October 2008
India-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, which was the first of
such document signed by India with any other country, a concrete Action Plan
was issued in 2009. The Plan envisaged a wide range of issues, ranging from
maritime safety and security, fight against piracy and transnational crime, safety
of transport, protection of marine environment and non-traditional security threats
like disaster management through consultation and cooperation.
Indias relations with Japan have undergone a significant transformation in
recent years, with the establishment of the India-Japan Strategic and Global
Partnership and the practice of annual summits during the visit of Prime Minister
Dr. Manmohan Singh to Japan in December 2006. India and Japan have also
concluded an Annual Strategic Dialogue between Foreign Ministers since 2007.
Besides, there are other dialogue mechanisms between the two countries as well
such as the 2+2 dialogue consisting of the foreign secretaries and defence secretaries
of the two countries. The high points of Indias relations with Japan in recent
years was signing of two very significant documents, viz. a Joint Statement Vision
for India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership in the Next Decade and a Joint
227
Declaration between leaders of India and Japan and conclusion of the
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement during the visit of Prime
Minister Dr. Manmohan Singhs to Japan in October 2010 for the annual summit
meeting with his Japanese counterpart Naoto Kan. The visit helped in giving an
impetus to the upward trend in the India-Japan relationship and the summit
level commitment to this increasing important relationship.
In pursuance with Indias strategic partnership with Japan the defence and
security relationship have been further intensified in recent years coinciding with
the US Pivot to Asia. In this exercise India as usual has been very careful about
Chinese sensitivities. The first India-Japan Maritime Affairs Dialogue was held
in New Delhi on January 29, 2013. In the dialogue issues of mutual interest
such as maritime security including non-traditional threats, cooperation in
shipping, marine sciences and technology, marine biodiversity and cooperation
at various multilateral forums were discussed. To what extent New Delhi can go
with US Pivot to Asia strategy became clearer when New Delhi withdrew from
in March 2013 from a scheduled naval exercise with the US and Japanese navies
off the US Pacific island of Guam. It was reported in the media that US and
Japanese naval officials visited India in March 2013 to discuss coordination for
the trilateral exercise. The Indian defence ministry first indicated a preference for
holding the exercise off the coast of the Japanese island of Okinawa. Then it took
the view that war games should be kept to the bilateral level for the time being
in deference to Chinese sensibilities.
22
The Elephant in the Room
Thus it is evident that in the narrative of the India-Japan relationship China
has been the elephant in the room. No wonder, therefore, China was the key
component of the discussion between the Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh
and his Japanese counterpart, Naoto Kan during the visit of the former to Japan
in October 2011. This prompted a leading strategic analyst of an Indian daily,
Pramit Pal Chaudhary, to remark that the prime ministers of India and Japan
talked the language of strategy through a round of Chinese whispers. Foreign
Secretary Ms. Nirupama Rao was quoted as saying that the two prime ministers
exchanged views on China and that their discussions covered strategic security
and economic issues. The two countries, she said, shared their experiences in
handling China, We both wish to see the peaceful rise of China, she added.
The two sides discussed how China could be engaged and drawn into cooperation.
It was reported that India shared with Japan its mechanism of border talks with
China.
23
As China is wary of the closer strategic proximity between India and Japan,
this discomfort was evident in the Chinese media after Prime Minister Dr.
Manmohan Singhs visit to Japan in 2011. Japans decision to allow its companies
to take part in arms development projects with countries other than the US and
the $15 billion currency swap deal between India and Japan are a cause of concern
228
to China. China Daily quoted ShiYing, a researcher at the China Institute of
International Studies in Beijing, In terms of political safety, (Japan) wants to
counter China by linking with countries such as the US, India and Australia.
But on the other hand, it is aware of the fact that Sino-Japanese relations are a
prerequisite for its quest to become a normal country. So personally, I think this
is itself contradictory, China Daily quoted Zhao Gancheng, director at the
Shanghai Institute for International Studies. Nonetheless, Liu Jiangyong, an expert
on Japan studies at the Tsinghua University, said Tokyos incentives are primarily
economic.
24
New Delhis Calibrated Approach
Given the persistent security distrust between Japan and China and conscious
of Chinese wariness, New Delhi has been sensitive to the Chinese consternation
about the evolving security and strategic relationship between India and Japan.
Moreover the timing of the growing strategic and security relationship with Japan
(a close ally of US) coincided with Indias growing proximity to the US and
signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal. It was against this backdrop that that New
Delhi made it clear that the India-Japan strategic relations are not aimed against
China in so many words. India thus, scrupulously avoided any reference in the
text of the India-Japan declaration to the new security challenges a sobriquet
that forms part of Japans strategic partnership with Australia, and which is an
euphemism for Chinas assertiveness. It must also be recalled that immediately
after signing the security declaration with Japan, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan
Singh said in Tokyo that the increase in Indias bilateral relation with China in
the last year alone was more than the whole of total trade with Japan. The
message was clearly meant for Beijing. Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh
further emphatically said that economic relations and security cooperation with
Japan would not be at the cost of any third country, least of all China.
25
It is in
this backdrop that India is trying to strike a fine balance in its strategic
engagement with Japan while keeping Chinese sensitivities in mind.
This can be discerned from the comments expressed by leading Chinese
scholars working on India. For example, when Prime minister Dr. Manmohan
Singh visited Japan earlier in October 2010, before his arrival in Hanoi to
participate in the East Asian Summit meeting, where he later met and interacted
with his Chinese counterpart, the Global Times, known for its strong opinion,
commented that containing China was the motivation behind Dr. Singhs East
Asia tour. Contrasted with this rather pessimistic assessment, Prof. Rong Ying,
Vice-President of China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) said, At the
government level, and at the level of scholars here who study India, we are very
aware of Indias good interaction with the regional countries and the Look East
policy, which has been announced for a long time. Referring to Prime Minister
Dr. Manmohan Singhs meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao on
the sidelines of the East Asia Summit and sounding a note of optimism, he
229
further said, This meeting is very significant, as it has become increasingly
important for both sides to better communicate their interests. He added, Both
governments agree that the relationship is of importance beyond bilateral issues,
and has strategic and global significance. In areas like G-20 cooperation, global
economic governance and climate change, the two countries can really show to
the public and the world at large that that they can work together. By doing so,
we can also help build strategic trust, which is particularly important in a fast
changing regional environment.
26
It was against this backdrop that the first ever US-Japan-India Trilateral
meeting took place in Washington in the third week of December 2011.
Commenting on the event, the Peoples Daily Online said that the meeting held
at the Assistant Secretary level is believed to be a part of the current US efforts
to carry out its pivot to Asia Policy, which aims at consolidating the US
predominance in Asia. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Liu Weimin,
when asked to comment on the event, said The United States, Japan and India
are countries with great influence in the Asia Pacific region. We hope the trilateral
meeting will be conducive to regional peace and security.
27
As a matter of trust
and transparency it is understood that India appraised China about the US-
Japan-India trilateral.
Security and strategic relationship between India and Japan were accelerated
after the border incursion on 15
th
April in LAC between India and China, when
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Japan in the last week of May 2013.
It may be noted that Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh hailed Japan as a
natural and indispensable partner in our quest for stability and peace in the vast
region in Asia that is washed by the Pacific and Indian Ocean. He further said,
Our defence and security dialogue, military exercise and defence technology
should grow. As usual Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singhs visit to Japan was
closely followed and carefully commented by the Chinese media. The Peoples
Daily slammed Japan calling it a petty burglar, for what it saw as an attempt
on Tokyos part to get India inside the ring of strategic partners to counter China.
28
While Beijing avoided directly criticizing India, yet in another article in Global
entitled India gets close to Japan at its own peril made a dig at India. The
article said, ... as an embodiment of the look east policy, India has strengthened
economic, strategic and security cooperation with countries like Japan, South
Korea and Vietnam. It has interfered in the South China Sea disputes in a high-
profile manner against the backdrop of the US pivot to Asia. Some Indian scholars
acknowledge that some parts of the look east policy target China.
29
India-South Korea Strategic Partnership
The evolving India-South Korea strategic partnership is yet another aspect of
Indias renewed Look East Policy in the Asia-Pacific. India elevated its
relationship with Republic of Korea during the visit of President Lee to India in
January 2010. In pursuance with the elevation of their relationship to strategic
230
level, New Delhi has set up a defence wing in its embassy in Seoul. Indias Defence
Minister A.K. Antony visited Seoul in September, 2010, and exchanged views
on defence and security issues. The defence cooperation between the two countries
was given an impetus during the visit of Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh
to Seoul in March 2010. During the visit, both sides agreed to continues high-
level exchange between the defence establishment of the two countries, undertake
activities as mutually agreed for deepening bilateral defence relations, and to
explore the possibilities of joint-ventures in research and development, and
manufacture of military equipment, including through the transfer of technology
and co-production. Seoul evinced interest to increase cooperation with India in
military and defence industry, including naval ships, aircrafts and ship-building.
Conclusion
Indias calibrated approach to its engagement in the Asia-Pacific can be understood
in the larger context of the dynamics its complex relationship with its largest
neighbour China with whom it still has an unresolved border dispute and there
is a persistent security dilemma; its historical, political and economic linkages
with the countries of the region, the geo-strategic significance of the sea lanes of
communication which are so essential to its energy security and maritime trade
and its strategic relationship with the US and Japan in particular. USA and India
should also, together, calibrate their bilateral dialogue as how best to deal with
China. The interest of US and China are intertwined, so also the interest of
India and China, though not in a similar manner, or to the same extent. There
are communication and dialogue mechanism between US and China, and also
between India and China. Maybe a trilateral mechanism among US, China and
India can dispel a lot of strategic mistrust and suspicion, and promote better
understanding and cooperation between and among US, China and India. Both
USA and China know very well that India follows strategic autonomy in its
foreign policy and that it cannot be used against China. Tension was built up in
the Asia-Pacific in the backdrop of the leadership transition in China, which
has been completed since then; and the Presidential elections in the USA and
elections in both Japan and Republic of Korea. Now that the political transitions
in these countries have been completed, and there is a degree of order and stability,
it is hoped that all the major players in the region will greatly cherish peace and
stability in the region.
In fact there are signals indicating the changing approach to Pivot to Asia
and Indias expected role therein. For example recently in an interaction at the
American Enterprise Institute, the United States Chief of Army Staff General
Raymond T Odierno said, One of the things we have to remember is that they
(India) maintain their own strategic autonomy...where you get into a policy of
containment is when you start having large land forces forward stationed in
countries-and that is not our plan.. Reinforcing the point further, he asserted
...So ours is not to contain China, ours is to build better support for the United
231
States Pacific Command and to see it tends to ensure that we dont get into
conflict, we dont build animosity between all the major powers in Asia-Pacific...
as you look to Asia-Pacific, its about competition for limited resources, its about
making sure that everyone is able to sustain their sovereignty and meet their own
interests.
30
This spirit was reiterated on 19
th
August, 2013 when the Chinese
Defence Minister Chang Wanquan visited USA and met with US Defence
Secretary Chuck Hagel in Washington when two sides pledged to strengthened
bilateral military cooperation.
NOTES
1. http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf
2. http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1681
3. For details please see T.N. Kaul, India, China and Indo-China: Reflection of a liberated
Diplomat (New Delhi; Allied Publishers 1980).
4. Annual Report 2010-11, Ministry of Defense, Govt. of India, p. 4.
5. Annual Report, 2010-11, Ministry of Defence Government of India, pp. 4-6.
6. Ibid, p. 4.
7. India-Japan-ROK Trilateral DialogueInaugural Address by Shri Sanjay Singh, Secretary
(East), http://idsa.in/event/IndiaJapanROKTrilateralDialogueInauguralAddress
8. Opening Statement by Prime Minister at Plenary Session of India-ASEAN Commemorative
Summit, Strategic Digest, January, 2013, http://pmindia.nic.in/speech-
details.php?nodeid=1259
9. ASEAN Leaders Woo India During Uncertain Times, The Nation, Bangkok, 23rd,
December, 2013, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Asean-woos-India-during-
uncertain-times-30196641.html
10. India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, Pioneer, New Delhi, 7th
June, 2013.
11. Anirban Bhaumik, India to help develop South China Sea code, Deccan Herald, 11th
August, 2013.
12. http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2010/11/obama_speech_to_india_parliame.html
13. http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/Chennai/As-China-looms-US-tells-India-to-
lead-Asia/Article1-723313.aspx
14. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/obama-in-australia/obamas-speech-to-
parliament/story-fnb0o39u-1226197973237
15. Binod Singh, Clintons India visit reached no consensus on fighting terrorism, China Daily,
July 27, 2011. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-07/26/content_12985144.htm
16. http://www.idsa.in/keyspeeches/LeonEPanettaonPartnersinthe21stcentury
17. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-
security-advisory-president-united-states-a
18. http://www.livemint.com/2011/09/15161303/Refrain-from-South-China-Sea-o.html.
Accessed on May 19, 2012.
19. Sandeep Dikshit, India China to have system soon to check intrusions, The Hindu,
September 27, 2011 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2491086.ece. Accessed
on May 19, 2012.
20. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-concerned-over-chinese-presence-in-pok-antony/
858945/
21. Seima Oki, Japan, India split over policies toward China, The Yomiuri Shimbun reproduced
in The Statesman, New Delhi, 2nd June, 2013.
22. Shishir Gupta and Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, Fearing China, India pulls out of war games
with US, Japan, Hindustan Times, 13th, April, 2013.
232
23. Pramit Pal Chaudhary, Chinese glue brings India Japan together, Hindustan Times, 26th
October 2011.
24. Kim Varma, Indo-Japan ties worry for China: State media, The Pioneer, New Delhi, 31st
December, 2011.
25. http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2008/10/25/india-japan-in-security-pact-a-new-
architecture-for-asia/
26. Ananth Krishnan, After Prime Ministers meeting, India and China look to address trust
gap, The Hindu, October 30, 2010. http://www.thehindu.com/news/article857587.ece
27. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7684096.html
28. Suthirtho Patranobis, China slams Japan for attempting to turn India against it, The
Hindustan Times, 29th May, 2013.
29. Liu Zongyi, Global Times, 30th May. 2013.
30. US army chief: Growing ties with India not to contain China, Rediff.com, 5
th
August,
2013.
APPENDICES
Appendix I
Remarks by President Obama to the Australian
Parliament
Parliament House, Canberra, Australia
November 17, 2011
President Obama: Prime Minister Gillard, Leader Abbott, thank you both for
your very warm welcome. Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, members of the House
and Senate, ladies and gentlemen, I thank you for the honor of standing in this
great chamber to reaffirm the bonds between the United States and the
Commonwealth of Australia, two of the worlds oldest democracies and two of
the worlds oldest friends.
To you and the people of Australia, thank you for your extraordinary
hospitality. And here, in this citythis ancient meeting placeI want to
acknowledge the original inhabitants of this land, and one of the worlds oldest
continuous cultures, the First Australians.
I first came to Australia as a child, traveling between my birthplace of Hawaii,
and Indonesia, where I would live for four years. As an eight-year-old, I couldnt
always understand your foreign language. (Laughter). Last night I did try to talk
some Strine. (Laughter). Today I dont want to subject you to any earbashing.
I really do love that one and I will be introducing that into the vernacular in
Washington.(Laughter).
But to a young American boy, Australia and its peopleyour optimism,
your easy-going ways, your irreverent sense of humorall felt so familiar. It felt
like home. Ive always wanted to return. I tried last yeartwice. But this is a
Lucky Country, and today I feel lucky to be here as we mark the 60th anniversary
of our unbreakable alliance.
The bonds between us run deep. In each others story we see so much of
ourselves. Ancestors who crossed vast oceanssome by choice, some in chains.
Settlers who pushed west across sweeping plains. Dreamers who toiled with hearts
and hands to lay railroads and to build cities. Generations of immigrants who,
with each new arrival, add a new thread to the brilliant tapestry of our nations.
And we are citizens who live by a common creedno matter who you are, no
matter what you look like, everyone deserves a fair chance; everyone deserves a
fair go.
Of course, progress in our society has not always come without tensions, or
236
struggles to overcome a painful past. But we are countries with a willingness to
face our imperfections, and to keep reaching for our ideals. Thats the spirit we
saw in this chamber three years ago, as this nation inspired the world with a
historic gesture of reconciliation with Indigenous Australians. Its the spirit of
progress, in America, which allows me to stand before you today, as President of
the United States. And its the spirit Ill see later today when I become the first
U.S. President to visit the Northern Territory, where Ill meet the Traditional
Owners of the Land.
Nor has our progress come without great sacrifice. This morning, I was
humbled and deeply moved by a visit to your war memorial to pay my respects
to Australias fallen sons and daughters. Later today, in Darwin, Ill join the Prime
Minister in saluting our brave men and women in uniform. And it will be a
reminder thatfrom the trenches of the First World War to the mountains of
AfghanistanAussies and Americans have stood together, we have fought
together, we have given lives together in every single major conflict of the past
hundred years. Every single one.
This solidarity has sustained us through a difficult decade. We will never
forget the attacks of 9/11, that took the lives not only of Americans, but people
from many nations, including Australia. In the United States, we will never forget
how Australia invoked the ANZUS Treatyfor the first time evershowing
that our two nations stood as one. And none of us will ever forget those weve
lost to al Qaedas terror in the years since, including innocent Australians.
And thats why, as both the Prime Minister and the Opposition Leader
indicated, we are determined to succeed in Afghanistan. It is why I salute
Australiaoutside of NATO, the largest contributor of troops to this vital mission.
And its why we honor all those who have served there for our security, including
32 Australian patriots who gave their lives, among them Captain Bryce Duffy,
Corporal Ashley Birt, and Lance Corporal Luke Gavin. We will honor their
sacrifice by making sure that Afghanistan is never again used as a source for
attacks against our people. Never again.
As two global partners, we stand up for the security and the dignity of people
around the world. We see it when our rescue workers rush to help others in times
of fire and drought and flooding rains. We see it when we partner to keep the
peacefrom East Timor to the Balkansand when we pursue our shared vision:
a world without nuclear weapons. We see it in the development that lifts up a
child in Africa; the assistance that saves a family from famine; and when we
extend our support to the people of the Middle East and North Africa, who
deserve the same liberty that allows us to gather in this great hall of democracy.
This is the alliance we reaffirm todayrooted in our values; renewed by
every generation. This is the partnership we worked to deepen over the past three
years. And today I can stand before you and say with confidence that the alliance
between the United States and Australia has never been stronger. It has been to
our past; our alliance continues to be indispensable to our future. So here, among
Appendices
237
close friends, Id like to address the larger purpose of my visit to this regionour
efforts to advance security, prosperity and human dignity across the Asia Pacific.
For the United States, this reflects a broader shift. After a decade in which
we fought two wars that cost us dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States
is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region. In just
a few weeks, after nearly nine years, the last American troops will leave Iraq and
our war there will be over. In Afghanistan, weve begun a transitiona responsible
transitionso Afghans can take responsibility for their future and so coalition
forces can begin to draw down. And with partners like Australia, weve struck
major blows against al Qaeda and put that terrorist organization on the path to
defeat, including delivering justice to Osama bin Laden.
So make no mistake, the tide of war is receding, and America is looking
ahead to the future that we must build. From Europe to the Americas, weve
strengthened alliances and partnerships. At home, were investing in the sources
of our long-term economic strengththe education of our children, the training
of our workers, the infrastructure that fuels commerce, the science and the research
that leads to new breakthroughs. Weve made hard decisions to cut our deficit
and put our fiscal house in orderand we will continue to do more. Because our
economic strength at home is the foundation of our leadership in the world,
including here in the Asia Pacific.
Our new focus on this region reflects a fundamental truththe United States
has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation. Asian immigrants helped build
America, and millions of American families, including my own, cherish our ties
to this region. From the bombing of Darwin to the liberation of Pacific islands,
from the rice paddies of Southeast Asia to a cold Korean Peninsula, generations
of Americans have served here, and died hereso democracies could take root;
so economic miracles could lift hundreds of millions to prosperity. Americans
have bled with you for this progress, and we will not allow itwe will never
allow it to be reversed.
Here, we see the future. As the worlds fastest-growing regionand home to
more than half the global economythe Asia Pacific is critical to achieving my
highest priority, and thats creating jobs and opportunity for the American people.
With most of the worlds nuclear power and some half of humanity, Asia will
largely define whether the century ahead will be marked by conflict or cooperation,
needless suffering or human progress.
As President, I have, therefore, made a deliberate and strategic decisionas
a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping
this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership
with our allies and friends.
Let me tell you what this means. First, we seek security, which is the
foundation of peace and prosperity. We stand for an international order in which
the rights and responsibilities of all nations and all people are upheld. Where
international law and norms are enforced. Where commerce and freedom of
238
navigation are not impeded. Where emerging powers contribute to regional
security, and where disagreements are resolved peacefully. Thats the future that
we seek.
Now, I know that some in this region have wondered about Americas
commitment to upholding these principles. So let me address this directly. As
the United States puts our fiscal house in order, we are reducing our spending.
And, yes, after a decade of extraordinary growth in our military budgetsand
as we definitively end the war in Iraq, and begin to wind down the war in
Afghanistanwe will make some reductions in defense spending.
As we consider the future of our armed forces, weve begun a review that will
identify our most important strategic interests and guide our defense priorities
and spending over the coming decade. So here is what this region must know.
As we end todays wars, I have directed my national security team to make our
presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority. As a result, reductions in
U.S. defense spending will notI repeat, will notcome at the expense of the
Asia Pacific.
My guidance is clear. As we plan and budget for the future, we will allocate
the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this region.
We will preserve our unique ability to project power and deter threats to peace.
We will keep our commitments, including our treaty obligations to allies like
Australia. And we will constantly strengthen our capabilities to meet the needs
of the 21st century. Our enduring interests in the region demand our enduring
presence in the region. The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to
stay.
Indeed, we are already modernizing Americas defense posture across the Asia
Pacific. It will be more broadly distributedmaintaining our strong presence in
Japan and the Korean Peninsula, while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia.
Our posture will be more flexiblewith new capabilities to ensure that our forces
can operate freely. And our posture will be more sustainable, by helping allies
and partners build their capacity, with more training and exercises.
We see our new posture here in Australia. The initiatives that the Prime
Minister and I announced yesterday will bring our two militaries even closer
together. Well have new opportunities to train with other allies and partners,
from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. And it will allow us to respond faster to
the full range of challenges, including humanitarian crises and disaster relief.
Since World War II, Australians have warmly welcomed American service
members whove passed through. On behalf of the American people, I thank you
for welcoming those who will come next, as they ensure that our alliance stays
strong and ready for the tests of our time.
We see Americas enhanced presence in the alliance that weve strengthened:
In Japan, where our alliance remains a cornerstone of regional security. In Thailand,
where were partnering for disaster relief. In the Philippines, where were increasing
ship visits and training. And in South Korea, where our commitment to the
Appendices
239
security of the Republic of Korea will never waver. Indeed, we also reiterate our
resolve to act firmly against any proliferation activities by North Korea. The
transfer of nuclear materials or material by North Korea to states or non-state
entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States and our allies,
and we would hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences of such
action.
We see Americas enhanced presence across Southeast Asiain our partnership
with Indonesia against piracy and violent extremism, and in our work with
Malaysia to prevent proliferation; in the ships well deploy to Singapore, and in
our closer cooperation with Vietnam and Cambodia; and in our welcome of
India as it looks east and plays a larger role as an Asian power.
At the same time, well reengage with our regional organizations. Our work
in Bali this week will mark my third meeting with ASEAN leaders, and Ill be
proud to be the first American President to attend the East Asia Summit. And
together, I believe we can address shared challenges, such as proliferation and
maritime security, including cooperation in the South China Sea.
Meanwhile, the United States will continue our effort to build a cooperative
relationship with China. All of our nationsAustralia, the United Statesall of
our nations have a profound interest in the rise of a peaceful and prosperous
China. Thats why the United States welcomes it. Weve seen that China can be
a partner from reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula to preventing
proliferation. And well seek more opportunities for cooperation with Beijing,
including greater communication between our militaries to promote
understanding and avoid miscalculation. We will do this, even as we continue to
speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms
and respecting the universal human rights of the Chinese people.
A secure and peaceful Asia is the foundation for the second area in which
America is leading again, and thats advancing our shared prosperity. History
teaches us the greatest force the world has ever known for creating wealth and
opportunity is free markets. So we seek economies that are open and transparent.
We seek trade that is free and fair. And we seek an open international economic
system, where rules are clear and every nation plays by them.
In Australia and America, we understand these principles. Were among the
most open economies on Earth. Six years into our landmark trade agreement,
commerce between us has soared. Our workers are creating new partnerships
and new products, like the advanced aircraft technologies we build together in
Victoria. Were the leading investor in Australia, and you invest more in America
than you do in any other nation, creating good jobs in both countries.
We recognize that economic partnerships cant just be about one nation
extracting anothers resources. We understand that no long-term strategy for
growth can be imposed from above. Real prosperityprosperity that fosters
innovation, and prosperity that endurescomes from unleashing our greatest
economic resource, and thats the entrepreneurial spirit, the talents of our people.
240
So even as America competes aggressively in Asian markets, were forging
the economic partnerships that create opportunity for all. Building on our historic
trade agreement with South Korea, were working with Australia and our other
APEC partners to create a seamless regional economy. And with Australia and
other partners, were on track to achieve our most ambitious trade agreement
yet, and a potential model for the entire regionthe Trans-Pacific Partnership.
The United States remains the worlds largest and most dynamic economy.
But in an interconnected world, we all rise and fall together. Thats why I pushed
so hard to put the G20 at the front and center of global economic decision-
makingto give more nations a leadership role in managing the international
economy, including Australia. And together, we saved the world economy from
a depression. And now, our urgent challenge is to create the growth that puts
people to work.
We need growth that is fair, where every nation plays by the rules; where
workers rights are respected, and our businesses can compete on a level playing
field; where the intellectual property and new technologies that fuel innovation
are protected; and where currencies are market driven so no nation has an unfair
advantage.
We also need growth that is broadnot just for the few, but for the many
with reforms that protect consumers from abuse and a global commitment to
end the corruption that stifles growth. We need growth that is balanced, because
we will all prosper more when countries with large surpluses take action to boost
demand at home.
And we need growth that is sustainable. This includes the clean energy that
creates green jobs and combats climate change, which cannot be denied. We see
it in the stronger fires, the devastating floods, the Pacific islands confronting
rising seas. And as countries with large carbon footprints, the United States and
Australia have a special responsibility to lead.
Every nation will contribute to the solution in its own wayand I know
this issue is not without controversy, in both our countries. But what we can
doand what we are doingis to work together to make unprecedented
investments in clean energy, to increase energy efficiency, and to meet the
commitments we made at Copenhagen and Cancun. We can do this, and we
will.
As we grow our economies, well also remember the link between growth
and good governancethe rule of law, transparent institutions, the equal
administration of justice. Because history shows that, over the long run, democracy
and economic growth go hand in hand. And prosperity without freedom is just
another form of poverty.
And this brings me to the final area where we are leadingour support for
the fundamental rights of every human being. Every nation will chart its own
course. Yet it is also true that certain rights are universal; among them, freedom
Appendices
241
of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and
the freedom of citizens to choose their own leaders.
These are not American rights, or Australian rights, or Western rights. These
are human rights. They stir in every soul, as weve seen in the democracies that
have succeeded here in Asia. Other models have been tried and they have failed
fascism and communism, rule by one man and rule by committee. And they
failed for the same simple reason: They ignore the ultimate source of power and
legitimacythe will of the people. Yes, democracy can be messy and roughI
understand you mix it up quite well during Question Time. (Laughter). But
whatever our differences of party or of ideology, we know in our democracies we
are blessed with the greatest form of government ever known to man.
So as two great democracies, we speak up for those freedoms when they are
threatened. We partner with emerging democracies, like Indonesia, to help
strengthen the institutions upon which good governance depends. We encourage
open government, because democracies depend on an informed and active
citizenry. We help strengthen civil societies, because they empower our citizens
to hold their governments accountable. And we advance the rights of all people
women, minorities and indigenous culturesbecause when societies harness the
potential of all their citizens, these societies are more successful, they are more
prosperous and they are more just.
These principles have guided our approach to Burma, with a combination
of sanctions and engagement. And today, Aung San Suu Kyi is free from house
arrest. Some political prisoners have been released, and the government has begun
a dialogue. Still, violations of human rights persist. So we will continue to speak
clearly about the steps that must be taken for the government of Burma to have
a better relationship with the United States.
This is the future we seek in the Asia Pacificsecurity, prosperity and dignity
for all. Thats what we stand for. Thats who we are. Thats the future we will
pursue, in partnership with allies and friends, and with every element of American
power. So let there be no doubt: In the Asia Pacific in the 21st century, the
United States of America is all in.
Still, in times of great change and uncertainty, the future can seem unsettling.
Across a vast ocean, its impossible to know what lies beyond the horizon. But
if this vast region and its people teach us anything, its the yearning for liberty
and progress will not be denied.
Its why women in this country demanded that their voices be heard, making
Australia the first nation to let women vote and run for parliament and, one day,
become Prime Minister. Its why the people took to the streetsfrom Delhi to
Seoul, from Manila to Jakartato throw off colonialism and dictatorship and
build some of the worlds largest democracies.
Its why a soldier in a watchtower along the DMZ defends a free people in
the South, and why a man from the North risks his life to escape across the
border. Why soldiers in blue helmets keep the peace in a new nation. And why
242
women of courage go into brothels to save young girls from modern-day slavery,
which must come to an end.
Its why men of peace in saffron robes faced beatings and bullets, and why
every dayfrom some of the worlds largest cities to dusty rural towns, in small
acts of courage the world may never seea student posts a blog; a citizen signs
a charter; an activist remains unbowed, imprisoned in his home, just to have the
same rights that we cherish here today.
Men and women like these know what the world must never forget. The
currents of history may ebb and flow, but over time they movedecidedly,
decisivelyin a single direction. History is on the side of the freefree societies,
free governments, free economies, free people. And the future belongs to those
who stand firm for those ideals, in this region and around the world.
This is the story of the alliance we celebrate today. This is the essence of
Americas leadership; it is the essence of our partnership. This is the work we will
carry on together, for the security and prosperity and dignity of all people.
So God bless Australia. God bless America. And God bless the friendship
between our two peoples. (Applause).
Thank you very much.
Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-
president-obama-australian-parliament, (Accessed on February 07,
2014)
Appendix II
Americas Engagement in the Asia-Pacific
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State
Kahala Hotel, Honolulu, HI
October 28, 2010
Aloha. The original idea for this speech is that we were going to do it outside.
And if you saw the front page of the newspaper this morning where I was being
greeted by Admiral Willard with my hair straight up in the wind (laughter)
we decided we didnt want another story about my hair. (Laughter.) So we
appreciate the hotel accommodating us and allowing us to meet inside, although
granted the lure of the beauty of Hawaii is right out those doors.
I want to thank the senator for his introduction, but much more than that,
for his friendship, his leadership, and his service to our country. There isnt anyone
active in public service today who has done more in more capacities to really
represent the American dream and to firmly root it in the soil of his native Hawaii
and to represent, in the very best American tradition, the soldier, the Medal of
Honor winner, the senator, and just an all-around wonderful man. (Applause.)
And of course, its absolutely a treat to see him here with Irene and to have a
chance to see both of them is a special pleasure for me.
I also want to recognize Congresswoman Mazie Hirono who is here. Thank
you so much Mazie. (Applause.) And Mayor Peter Carlisle Mayor, thank you
for being here. (Applause.) I think both Senator Akaka and Congressman Djou
were unable to come, but I want to recognize Senator Colleen Hanabusa who is
here. Thank you so much Colleen for coming. (Applause.) And when youve
been in and around American politics as long as my husband and I have been,
you make a lot of friends over the years. And Im so pleased that George Ariyoshi
and John and Lynne Waihee and Ben Cayetano are here as well. Those are
wonderful friends who we served with and got to know over the years. (Applause.)
And I want to recognize Admiral Willard, our PACOM commander; Australian
ambassador to the U.S., Kim Beazley. I know there are also students from the
East-West Center, and there are some high school students. And I thank the
students particularly for being here and all of the sponsors of this occasion.
Im delighted to return to Hawaii. As Charles Morrison said, my trip last
time was cut short by the terrible earthquake in Haiti. But this is the birthplace
of our President and Americas bridge to the East, and it is where I am kicking
off a sevencountry tour of the Asia-Pacific region.
244
Ive been looking forward to this trip for some time. From Hawaii it will be
onto Guam and then Vietnam and Cambodia, then Malaysia and Papua New
Guinea, New Zealand, Australia, and American Samoa. It is an itinerary that
reflects Asias diversity and dynamism. And it complements the route that President
Obama will take in just a few weeks when he visits India, Indonesia, Japan, and
South Korea. Together, the President and I will cover a significant portion of this
vital region at a pivotal moment, after nearly two years of intensive engagement.
And everywhere we go, we will advance one overarching set of goals: to sustain
and strengthen Americas leadership in the Asia-Pacific region and to improve
security, heighten prosperity, and promote our values.
Through these trips, and in many other ways, we are practicing what you
might call forward-deployed diplomacy. And by that we mean weve adopted
a very proactive footing; weve sent the full range of our diplomatic assets
including our highest-ranking officials, our development experts, our teams on
a wide range of pressing issues into every corner and every capital of the Asia-
Pacific region. We have quickened the pace and widened the scope of our
engagement with regional institutions, with our partners and allies, and with
people themselves in an active effort to advance shared objectives.
This has been our priority since Day One of the Obama Administration,
because we know that much of the history of the 21
st
century will be written in
Asia. This region will see the most transformative economic growth on the planet.
Most of its cities will become global centers of commerce and culture. And as
more people across the region gain access to education and opportunity, we will
see the rise of the next generation of regional and global leaders in business and
science, technology, politics, and the arts.
And yet, deep-seated challenges lurk in Asia. The ongoing human rights
abuses inflicted by the military junta in Burma remind us there are places where
progress is absent. North Koreas provocative acts and history of proliferation
activities requires a watchful vigilance. And military buildups matched with
ongoing territorial disputes create anxieties that reverberate. Solutions to urgent
global problems, like climate change, will succeed or fail based on what happens
in Asia. This is the future taking shape today full of fast-paced change, and
marked by challenges. And it is a future in which the United States must lead.
Because the progress we see today is the result not only of the hard work of
leaders and citizens across the region, but the American soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and Marines who protect borders and patrol the regions waters; the American
diplomats who have settled conflicts and brought nations together in common
cause; the American business leaders and entrepreneurs who invested in new
markets and formed trans-Pacific partnerships; the American aid workers who
helped countries rebuild in the wake of disasters; and the American educators
and students who have shared ideas and experiences with their counterparts across
the ocean.
Now, there are some who say that this long legacy of American leadership in
Appendices
245
the Asia-Pacific is coming to a close. That we are not here to stay. And I say, look
at our record. It tells a very different story.
For the past 21 months, the Obama Administration has been intent on
strengthening our leadership, increasing our engagement, and putting into practice
new ways of projecting our ideas and influence throughout this changing region.
Weve done all this with a great deal of support from leaders on both sides of the
political aisle who share our vision for Americas role in Asia. Together, we are
focused on a distant time horizon, one that stretches out for decades to come.
And I know how hard it is in todays political climate to think beyond tomorrow.
But one of my hopes is that in Asia and elsewhere we can begin doing that again.
Because it took decades for us to build our infrastructure of leadership in the
world, and it will take decades for us to continue and implement the policies
going forward.
So now, at the start of my sixth trip to Asia as Secretary of State, I am optimistic
and confident about Asias future. And I am optimistic and confident about
Americas future. And I am optimistic and confident about what all of these
countries can do together with American leadership in the years ahead.
So today, Id like briefly to discuss the steps that the Obama Administration
has taken to strengthen the main tools of American engagement in Asia: our
alliances, our emerging partnerships, and our work with regional institutions.
And I will describe how we are using these tools to pursue this forward-deployed
diplomacy along three key tracks: first, shaping the future Asia-Pacific economy;
second, underwriting regional security; and third, supporting stronger democratic
institutions and the spread of universal human values.
Let me begin where our approach to Asia begins with our allies. In a vast
and diverse region, our bonds with our allies Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand,
and the Philippines remain the foundation for our strategic engagement. These
alliances have safeguarded regional peace and security for the past half century
and supported the regions remarkable economic growth. Today we are working
not just to sustain them but to update them, so they remain effective in a changing
world.
That starts with our alliance with Japan, the cornerstone of our engagement
in the Asia-Pacific. This year, our countries celebrated the 50
th
anniversary of our
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. But our partnership extends far
beyond security. We are two of the worlds three biggest economies, the top two
contributors to reconstruction in Afghanistan, and we share a commitment to
leading on major global issues from nonproliferation to climate change. To ensure
that the next fifty years of our alliance are as effective as the last, we are broadening
our cooperation to reflect the changing strategic environment. I covered the full
range of issues that we face together in my two-hour discussion and then my
remarks with the foreign minister from Japan yesterday.
This year also marked a milestone with another ally: the 60th anniversary of
the start of the Korean War, which Secretary Gates and I commemorated in
246
Seoul this past summer. And in two weeks, our presidents will meet in Seoul
when President Obama travels there for the G-20 summit.
Our two countries have stood together in the face of threats and provocative
acts from North Korea, including the tragic sinking of the Cheonan by a North
Korean torpedo. We will continue to coordinate closely with both Seoul and
Tokyo in our efforts to make clear to North Korea there is only one path that
promises the full benefits of engagement with the outside worlda full, verifiable,
and irreversible denuclearization.
The alliance between South Korea and the United States is a lynchpin of
stability and security in the region and now even far beyond. We are working
together in Afghanistan, where a South Korean reconstruction team is at work
in Parwan Province; in the Gulf of Aden, where Korean and U.S. forces are
coordinating anti-piracy missions. And of course, beyond our military cooperation,
our countries enjoy a vibrant economic relationship, which is why our two
Presidents have called for resolving the outstanding issues related to the U.S.-
Korea Free Trade Agreement by the time of the G-20 meeting in Seoul.
Next year marks another celebration the 60
th
anniversary of the alliance
between Australia and the United States. In two weeks, I will finish my tour of
this region with a visit to Australia for the 25
th
anniversary of the Australia-U.S.
ministerial; its called AUSMIN. And Secretary Gates and I will meet with our
counterparts, Foreign Minister Rudd and Defense Minister Smith. And I well
also meet with Julia Gillard, Australias first woman prime minister, and have a
chance not only to consult with the leaders, but also to give a policy address
about the future of the alliance between Australia and the U.S.
With our Southeast Asian allies, Thailand and the Philippines, the United
States is working closely on an expanding range of political, economic,
environmental, and security-related issues. This summer, we launched our Creative
Partnership Agreement with Thailand, which brings together Thai and American
universities and businesses to help develop the innovative sectors of the Thai
economy. With the Philippines, we will hold our first ever 2+2 Strategic Dialogue
this coming January. And last month, I had the pleasure of joining President
Aquino in signing a Millennium Challenge Compact to accelerate economic
development and decrease poverty in the Philippines.
With each of our five allies in the region, what began as security alliances
have broadened over time and now encompass shared actions on many fronts.
And we will continue to ask ourselves the hard questions about how to strengthen
the alliances further, tailoring them for each relationship to deliver more benefits
to more of our people.
Beyond our alliances, the United States is strengthening relationships with
new partners. Indonesia is playing a leading role in the region and especially in
regional institutions. As chair of ASEAN next year, Indonesia will host the 2011
East Asia Summit. And as the creator of the Bali Democracy Forum, it is a
leading advocate for democratic reforms throughout Asia. Our two presidents
Appendices
247
will formally launch our new Comprehensive Partnership Agreement during
President Obamas visit to Indonesia next month.
In Vietnam, we are cultivating a level of cooperation that would have been
unimaginable just 10 years ago. Our diplomatic and economic ties are more
productive than ever, and weve recently expanded our discussion on maritime
security and other defense-related issues. Vietnam also invited us to participate
as a guest at the East Asia Summit for the first time this year. That opens up a
critical new avenue for cooperation. And though we still have our differences, we
are committed to moving beyond our painful past toward a more prosperous and
successful relationship.
Few countries punch as far above their weight as Singapore, and were working
together to promote economic growth and integration, leveraging Singapores
leadership in ASEAN and the role it has played in negotiating the Trans-Pacific
Partnership. And in Malaysia and New Zealand, our diplomats and development
experts are bringing their talents to bear and building stronger ties on every level,
including increased trade, people-to-people exchanges, and efforts to strengthen
the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
In a crowded field of highly dynamic, increasingly influential emerging
nations, two, of course, stand out India and China. Their simultaneous rise is
reshaping the world and our ability to cooperate effectively with these two countries
will be a critical test of our leadership. With growing ties between our governments,
our economies, and our peoples, India and the United States have never mattered
more to each other. As the worlds two largest democracies, we are united by
common interests and common values.
Earlier this year, we launched the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue. And one of
the core issues we addressed is Indias growing engagement and integration into
East Asia, because we believe that India is a key player in this region and on the
global stage. Thats why President Obama is also beginning his own major trip
to Asia next week with a stop in India. His trip will bring together two of our
top priorities renewed American leadership in Asia and a U.S.-India partnership
that is elevated to an entirely new level.
Now, the relationship between China and the United States is complex and
of enormous consequence, and we are committed to getting it right. Now, there
are some in both countries who believe that Chinas interests and ours are
fundamentally at odds. They apply a zero-sum calculation to our relationship. So
whenever one of us succeeds, the other must fail. But that is not our view. In the
21
st
century, it is not in anyones interest for the United States and China to see
each other as adversaries. So we are working together to chart a positive,
cooperative, and comprehensive relationship for this new century.
There are also many in China who believe that the United States is bent on
containing China, and I would simply point out that since the beginning of our
diplomatic relations, China has experienced breathtaking growth and
development. And this is primarily due, of course, to the hard work of the Chinese
248
people. But U.S. policy has consistently, through Republican and Democratic
administrations and congresses supported this goal since the 1970s. And we do
look forward to working closely with China, both bilaterally and through key
institutions as it takes on a greater role, and at the same time, takes on more
responsibility in regional and global affairs. In the immediate future, we need to
work together on a more effective approach to deal with North Koreas provocations
to press them to rebuild ties with the South and to return to the Six-Party Talks.
On Iran, we look to China to help ensure the effective implementation of
global sanctions aimed at preventing Iran from pursuing its nuclear ambitions.
On military matters, we seek a deeper dialogue in an effort to build trust and
establish rules of the road as our militaries operate in greater proximity. On climate
change, as the worlds two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, w have a shared
responsibility to produce tangible strategies that improve energy efficiency and
advance global climate diplomacy.
On currency and trade, the United States seeks responsible policy adjustments
that have been clearly articulated by Secretary Geithner and a better climate for
American businesses, products, and intellectual property in China. Looking
beyond our governments, our two countries must work together to increase the
number of students studying in each country. And we have an initiative called
100000 Strong to promote that goal. And on human rights, we seek a far-reaching
dialogue that advances the protection of the universal rights of all people. We
will welcome President Hu Jintao to Washington in early 2011 for a state visit.
The United States is committed to making this visit a historic success. And I
look forward to meeting with my counterpart, State Councilor Dai Bingguo
later this week to help prepare for that trip.
Now, our relationship with our allies and our partners are two of the three
key elements of our engagement in the Asia Pacific region. The third is our
participation in the regions multilateral institutions. When I was here in Hawaii
10 months ago, I spoke about the importance of strong institutions for Asias
future. And let me simply state the principle that will guide Americas role in
Asian institutions. If consequential security, political, and economic issues are
being discussed, and if they involve our interests, then we will seek a seat at the
table. Thats why we view ASEAN as a fulcrum for the regions emerging regional
architecture. And we see it as indispensable on a host of political, economic, and
strategic matters.
The United States has taken a series of steps to build stronger ties with
ASEAN, including acceding to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and opening
a U.S. mission to ASEAN. Secretary Gates recently returned from Hanoi where
he participated in the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting. President Obama
has personally engaged with ASEAN leaders twice to signal how seriously the
United States takes our engagement. And weve taken a leading role in the ASEAN
Regional Forum, where we have discussed ongoing security issues such as North
Korea and the South China Sea. On the latter issue, we are encouraged by Chinas
Appendices
249
recent steps to enter discussions with ASEAN about a more formal, binding
code of conduct.
With regard to APEC, we see this as a pivotal moment in which APEC can
revitalize its mission and embrace a 21
st
century economic agenda. And we admire
Japans forward-leaning leadership at this years APEC. They have defined a new
path forward for APEC on trade liberalization and promoted specific efforts to
increase business investment in small and medium enterprises.
We have been closely collaborating with Japan to prepare the way for our
own leadership of APEC next year, and that will build on the leaders meeting
here in Honolulu. And I appreciate the Host Committee members who are here
for your support of this important meeting. Our aim is to help APEC evolve
into an important, results-oriented forum for driving shared and inclusive,
sustainable economic progress.
The United States is also leading through what we call mini-laterals, as
opposed to multilaterals, like the Lower Mekong Initiative we launched last year
to support education, health, and environmental programs in Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand, and Vietnam. And we are working through the Pacific Island Forum
to support the Pacific Island nations as they strive to really confront and solve the
challenges they face, from climate change to freedom of navigation. And to that
end, I am pleased to announce that USAID will return to the Pacific next year,
opening an office in Fiji, with a fund of $21 million to support climate change
mitigation.
Now, immediately following this speech, I will leave for Hanoi, where I will
represent our country at the East Asia Summit. This will be the first time that
the United States is participating and we are grateful for the opportunity. I will
introduce the two core principles that the Obama Administration will take in its
approach to the EASfirst, ASEANs central role, and second, our desire to see
EAS emerge as a forum for substantive engagement on pressing strategic and
political issues, including nuclear nonproliferation, maritime security, and climate
change.
So these are the primary tools of our engagementour alliances, our
partnerships, and multilateral institutions.
And as we put these relationships to work, we do so in recognition that the
United States is uniquely positioned to play a leading role in the Asia Pacific
because of our history, our capabilities, and our credibility. People look to us, as
they have for decades. The most common thing that Asian leaders have said to
me in my travels over this last 20 months is thank you, were so glad that youre
playing an active role in Asia again. Because they look to us to help create the
conditions for broad, sustained economic growth and to ensure security by
effectively deploying our own military and to defend human rights and dignity
by supporting strong democratic institutions.
So we intend to project American leadership in these three areaseconomic
growth, regional security, and enduring values. These arenas formed the foundation
250
of American leadership in the 20
th
century, and they are just as relevant in the
21
st
century. But the way we operate in these arenas has to changebecause the
world has changed and it will keep changing.
The first is economic growth. One theme consistently stands out: Asia still
wants America to be an optimistic, engaged, open, and creative partner in the
regions flourishing trade and financial interactions. And as I talk with business
leaders across our own nation, I hear how important it is for the United States
to expand our exports and our investment opportunities in the dynamic markets
of Asia. These are essential features of the rebalancing agenda of our
administration.
Now, for our part, we are getting our house in orderincreasing our savings,
reforming our financial systems, relying less on borrowing. And President Obama
has set a goal of doubling our exports, in order to create jobs and bring much-
needed balance to our trade relationships.
But achieving balance in those relationships requires a two-way commitment.
Thats the nature of balanceit cant be unilaterally imposed. So we are working
through APEC, the G-20, and our bilateral relationships to advocate for more
open markets, fewer restrictions on exports, more transparency, and an overall
commitment to fairness. American businesses and workers need to have confidence
that they are operating on a level playing field, with predictable rules on everything
from intellectual property to indigenous innovation.
When free trade is done right, it creates jobs, lowers prices, fuels growth, and
lifts peoples standards of living. I mentioned our earlier I mentioned earlier
our hope to complete discussions on the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement to
permit its submission to Congress. We are also pressing ahead with negotiations
for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an innovative, ambitious multilateral free trade
agreement that would bring together nine Pacific Rim countries, including four
new free trade partners for the United States, and potentially others in the future.
2011 will be a pivotal year for this agenda. Starting with the Korea Free
Trade Agreement, continuing with the negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
working together for financial rebalancing at the G-20, and culminating at the
APEC Leaders Summit in Hawaii, we have a historic chance to create broad,
sustained, and balanced growth across the Asia Pacific and we intend to seize
that.
Sustained economic progress relies on durable investments in stability and
securityinvestments the United States will continue to make. Our military
presence in Asia has deterred conflict and provided security for 60 years, and will
continue to support economic growth and political integration.
But our military presence must evolve to reflect an evolving world. The
Pentagon is now engaged in a comprehensive Global Posture Review, which will
lay out a plan for the continued forward presence of U.S. forces in the region.
That plan will reflect three principles: Our defense posture will become more
politically sustainable, operationally resilient, and geographically dispersed.
Appendices
251
With these principles in mind, we are enhancing our presence in Northeast
Asia. The buildup on Guam reflects these ideas, as does the agreement on basing
that we have reached with Japanan agreement that comes during the 50
th
anniversary of our mutual security alliance. We have also adopted new defense
guidelines with South Korea.
In Southeast Asia and the Pacific, we are shifting our presence to reflect
these principles. For example, we have increased our naval presence in Singapore.
We are engaging more with the Philippines and Thailand to enhance their capacity
to counter terrorists and respond to humanitarian disasters. We have created new
parameters for military cooperation with New Zealand and we continue to
modernize our defense ties with Australia to respond to a more complex maritime
environment. And we are expanding our work with the Indian navy in the Pacific,
because we understand how important the Indo-Pacific basin is to global trade
and commerce.
Now, some might ask: Why is a Secretary of State is talking about defense
posture? But this is where the three Ds of our foreign policydefense, diplomacy,
and developmentcome together. Our military activities in Asia are a key part
of our comprehensive engagement. By balancing and integrating them with a
forward-deployed approach to diplomacy and development, we put ourselves in
the best position to secure our own interests and to promote the common interest.
This is true for our forces on the Korean Peninsula maintaining peace and
security, our naval forces confronting piracy, promoting free navigation, and
providing humanitarian relief for millions of people, and our soldiers and civilians
working closely with friends and partners in Southeast Asia to train, equip, and
develop capacity for countries to respond swiftly to terrorist threats.
More than our military might, and more than the size of our economy, our
most precious asset as a nation is the persuasive power of our valuesin particular,
our steadfast belief in democracy and human rights.
Our commitment to uphold and project these values is an indispensable
aspect of our national character. And it is one of the best and most important
contributions we offer the world. So of course, it is an essential element of
everything we do in U.S. foreign policy.
Like many nations, we are troubled by the abuses we see in some places in
the region. We join billions of people worldwide in calling for the release of
Aung San Suu Kyi; her imprisonment must come to an end. And we are saddened
that Asia remains the only place in the world where three iconic Nobel laureates
Aung San Suu Kyi, the Dalai Lama, and Liu Xiaoboare either under house
arrest, in prison, or in exile.
As we deepen our engagement with partners with whom we disagree on
these issues, we will continue to urge them to embrace reforms that would improve
governance, protect human rights, and advance political freedoms.
And I would like to underscore the American commitment to seek
accountability for the human rights violations that have occurred in Burma by
252
working to establish an international Commission of Inquiry through close
consultations with our friends, allies, and other partners at the United Nations.
Burma will soon hold a deeply flawed election, and one thing we have learned
over the last few years is that democracy is more than elections. And we will
make clear to Burmas new leaders, old and new alike, that they must break from
the policies of the past.
Now, we know we cannot impose our values on other countries, but we do
believe that certain values are universalthat they are cherished by people in
every nation in the world, including in Asiaand that they are intrinsic to stable,
peaceful, and prosperous countries. In short, human rights are in everyones interest.
This is a message that the United States delivers every day, in every region.
Now, we also know that we have to work with these countries on many issues
simultaneously, so we never quit from promoting all of our concerns. We may
make progress on the economy or on security or on human rights and not on the
other one or two, but we have to have a comprehensive approach. And what I
have described today is a mix of old commitments and new steps that we are
taking. And through these steps, we will listen, we will cooperate, and we will
lead.
Of course, it is the people of Asia who must make the tough choices and it
is their leaders who must make an absolutely fundamental choice to improve not
just the standard of living of their people but their political freedom and their
human rights as well. Asia can count on us to stand with leaders and people who
take actions that will build that better future, that will improve the lives of everyday
citizens, and by doing so not just grow an economy but transform a country. We
make this commitment not just because of whats at stake in Asia, we make this
commitment because of what is at stake for the United States. This is about our
future. This is about the opportunities our children and grandchildren will have.
And we look to the Asia Pacific region as we have for many decades as an area
where the United States is uniquely positioned to play a major role in helping to
shape that future.
I know how much Hawaii serves as that bridge to the Asia Pacific region,
and I know how the very diversity and dynamism of Hawaii says so much about
what is possible not only in our own country but in countries throughout the
Pacific. So we will continue to stand for what we believe is in Americas interest
and what we are absolutely convinced is also in the interests of the people of Asia
as well. And I look forward to returning to Hawaii for the APEC Leaders Summit
when we will take stock of what we have accomplished and how far we have
come, and to look to the leaders and people of Hawaii to continue to show us
the way.
Thank you all very much. (Applause).
Source: http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/10/
150141.htm (Accessed on February 07, 2014)
Admiral Greenert, US Navy, 43
Afghanistan, 3, 6, 11, 16, 33, 36, 37, 40,
52, 87, 93, 126, 134, 142, 189
Future, 98
War, 89
Africa Command (AFRICOM), 135
Africa, 34, 89
Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ),
19
Air Sea Battle (ASB), 51, 52, 69, 71, 76,
77
Al Minhad Air Base, 89
Ali Al Salem Air Base, 89
Al-Qaeda, 92, 97
American Taxpayer Relief Act, 43
Amos, General Jim, 43
Annual Defence Dialogue (ADD), 121
Anthony Lake, 4
Anti-access and area denial (A2/AD), 35-
36, 38, 51, 59, 71, 72, 74, 75, 115,
127, 181, 183, 199
Anti-Access Anti-Denial (A2D)
Capabilities, 9
Strategy, 212
Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Warfare, 75
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs), 71,
123
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs),
123
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), 181
Antony, A.K., Defence Minister, 23, 225
Arab News, 99
Arab Spring, 85, 86, 92, 97, 98
Area of Responsibility (AOR), 89
Index
Asaafanie Naval Base, 88
Asahi Shimbun, 184
Asari, Hideki, 178
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting
(ADMM), 53, 166
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC),
167
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA),
164
ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), 53
ASEAN Political and Security Community
(APSC), 167
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
(ASCC), 167
ASEAN+3, 110, 165
ASEAN+6, 165, 214
ASEAN-Affiliated Group, 166
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA),
164
ASEAN-India Eminent Persons Report,
215
ASEAN-India FTA, 166
ASEAN-led forums, 108
ASEAN-led RCEP, 165
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), 55
Asia-Pacific, 3, 5, 7, 16-19, 23-24, 34, 43,
48, 41, 49, 51, 74, 86, 176, 179, 183,
224
Dynamism, 17
Military re-deployment, 10
Pivot strategy, 4
Rapid growth, 17
Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), 10, 17, 24, 78, 107, 109,
254
150, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160,
163, 164, 176, 212
Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), 53
AUSMIN, 56
Australia, 9, 10, 17, 22, 31, 34, 41, 52,
53, 55, 56, 73, 74, 78, 87, 106, 120,
133, 158, 163, 165, 166, 176, 213,
214, 220
Parliament, 3, 16
Baker, Rodger
Stratfor, 4
Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), 119,
124, 192, 194, 200
BIMSTEC, 216
Black, Jeremy, 71
Border Defence Cooperation Agreement
(BDCA), 121
Brazil, 18
Broader shift, 3
Brunei, 17, 33-34, 56, 158, 163
Budget Control Act (BCA), 72
Burns, William, 100
Bush, George W. (II), 6
C4ISR, 126
Cambodia, 17, 152, 160, 165
Camp Buehring, 89
Campbell, Kurt, 5
Canada, 91, 163, 220
Carney, Jay, White House Press Secretary,
17
Carrier Strike Groups (CGSs), 115, 119
Carter, Ashton B., Deputy Secretary of
Defence, 38, 42, 176
Central Asia, 89, 189
Central Command (CENTCOM), 135
Central Military Commission (CMC), 122
Chang Wanquan, China Minister of
Defence, 54
Chile, 17, 34, 163
China Daily, 228
China Institute of International Studies
(CIIS), 228
China Marine Surveillance (CMS), 123
China, 9, 10, 15, 18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 33,
37, 51, 55, 60, 70, 77, 93, 96, 106,
107, 111, 118, 119, 120, 127, 134,
143, 152, 157, 161, 163, 165, 166,
167, 182, 189, 190, 192, 196, 212,
220, 228
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM), 35
Anti-submarine rockets, 35
Assertion, 9
CI strategy, 118, 125
Emerging, 32
Factor, 32
JL-2, 35
Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM),
35
Luyang III, 35
Military capability, 35
Military News, 125
Multiple Independently Targetable Re-
Entry Vehicle (MIRV), 35
Navy, 48
Non-democratic system, 18
Rise, 3, 9, 16, 24, 25, 34, 211
Surface to air missiles, 35
White Paper of 2013, 36
China-ASEAN (CAFTA), 110
relations, 110
China-Taiwan (ECFA), 110
China-US
equation, 152
relations, 74, 154, 159, 169, 213
rivalry, 168
Chinese Renminbi (RMB), 110
Clinton, Hillary, US Secretary of State, 4,
16, 33, 85, 107-8, 131, 132, 149, 150,
151, 155, 156, 176, 177, 182, 219,
224, 243
Cobra Gold, 55
Cold start, 76
Cold War, 16, 31, 79, 106
end of, 32
history, 41
Collective Self Defence, 181
Colombia, 18
Index
255
Command and Control (C2), 75, 79
Communist Party of China (CPC), 126
Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(CEP), 165
Comprehensive Economic Partnership in
East Asia (CEPEA), 165
Confidence Building Measure (CBM), 121
Congressional Research Service (CRS), 20
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
(CARAT), 54
Counter Intervention (CI), 115
Counter-Terrorism Exercise (CTX), 53
Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO), 76-77
Defense Posture Review, 179
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), 177
Disaster Response Initiative (DSI), 75
Donilon, Thomas, National Security
Adviser, 4, 9, 21, 108
Dr Ng Eng Hen, 154
E3+3, 196
EA-18G electronic aircraft, 41
East Asia Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA),
164
East Asia Summit (EAS), 21, 53, 150
in Phnom Penh, 17
East Asia, 132, 134
East China Sea (ECS), 24, 33, 53, 108,
115, 119, 211
Economic resurgence, 11
Egypt, 88
Energy Self Sufficiency, 72
Europe, 34, 89, 134
European Union, 220
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), 117
Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA),
116
Five dragons, 122
Follow On Force Attack (FOFA), 71
Force Posture Initiatives, 22
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), 141
Forward Deployed Naval Force (FDNF),
39
France, 196
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), 17, 91, 212
Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), 57
G-2, 61
G-20, 229
Ganga-Mekong Cooperation, 216
GCC-Iran relationship, 92
Geneva Conference, 219
Germany, 196
Global Posture Review, 7
Global Times, 35, 122
Global Trends 2030, 114
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), 96
Greenert, Jonathan W., US Chief of Naval
Operations, 38
Guam, 39, 41, 50, 69, 73
Gulf Arab Sheikhdoms, 88
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 86-88,
90, 93-95, 98
Gulf Union, 94
Hafrolbaten AWACs aerial base, 88
Hagel, Chuck, US Secretary of Defence,
17, 21, 55, 95, 177
Hecker, Siegfried S., 192
Hedging strategy, 48
Hindustan Times, 117
Hoffman, F.G., 79
IAEA, 198
Ideological assertion, 11
Ikenberry, G. John, 78
India, 10, 18, 23, 25, 51, 53, 75, 118, 120,
133, 134, 143, 157, 158, 159, 165,
166, 182, 190, 213, 220, 224
Look East Policy, 23, 216
Rising global power, 24
India-China relations, 142
India-Japan relations, 214, 227
India-Japan-China, 226
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS),
159
256
Indian Ocean Region (IOR), 132-33, 135,
138-39, 141
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA),
159
India-Pakistan border, 70
India-South Korea strategic partnership,
229
India-US
influence, 143
nuclear deal, 228
relations, 6, 24, 75, 141, 143
Indo-Asia-Pacific, 7, 70
Indonesia, 4, 10, 16, 18, 33, 39, 51, 53,
55, 56, 151, 159, 213, 219
Indonesia-US relations, 140, 162
Integrated Joint Operations (IJOs), 122
Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR), 20, 38, 75, 79,
116
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM),
115
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
(IRBMs), 115
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), 98, 192
International Energy Agency (IEA), 91
Iran, 90, 93, 96, 190, 191, 201, 202
threat, 88
reduction, 198
Iraq, 11, 21, 36, 40, 52, 87, 88, 93, 126,
134, 189
War, 73
Island Assault Unit, 59
Israel, 89, 90, 94, 95, 98
Israel-Palestine peace talks, 96
Jakarta, 4
Japan, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 24, 31, 33,
38, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 69, 73, 74,
75, 78, 87, 109, 120, 133, 157, 158,
159, 163, 165, 176, 194, 213, 214,
220, 228
Japan-China tension, 107
Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force
(JMSDF), 58-59
Japan-South Korea defence cooperation, 22
Japan-US Alliance, 180
Jasper, Major Marc, 138
Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV), 38
Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC),
51-52
Joint Sea 2013, 36
Joshi, Ashok, Major General, 78
Kargil conflict of 1999, 143
Kautilyas Arthasastra, 78
Kerry, John, US Secretary of State, 17, 99,
149-51
Khan, A.Q., 201
Khan, Brigadier Feroz Hassan (Retd), 76
KN-08, 192
Korean
crisis, 6
Peninsula, 17, 24
Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs), 124
Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), 58
Landing Platform Dock (LPD), 117
Lanxin Xiang, 74
Lao PDR, 165
Laos, 152, 219
Latin America, 34, 114
Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of
Singapore, 23
Li Guanglie, China Defence Minister, 120
Li Xiangyang, 163
Liao, Kai, 74
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 177
Light-Water Reactor (LWR), 192-93
Line of Actual Control (LAC), 121
Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), 38, 39, 50,
52, 55
Locklear, Admiral Samuel J., 43
Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU), 193
Lt Gen R. Nanavati, 76
Malaysia, 10, 17, 33, 34, 39, 51, 55, 56,
114, 160, 162, 163, 219
Cautious Optimism, 160
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), 58
Index
257
Mearsheimer, John, 8
Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft
(MMRCA), 142
Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM),
123
Mexico, 91, 163
MH-60 anti-submarine helicopters, 41
Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA),
90
Middle East, 5, 6, 16, 34, 37
Peace, 98
Miere, Christian Le, 79
Military Technical Revolution (MTR), 71
Miyako Island, 59
Multiple Independently Targetable Re-
entry Vehicle (MIRV), 124
MV-22 aircraft, 57
Myanmar, 17, 109, 151, 152, 155, 156,
165
Myanmar-US military ties, 162
National Defense Programme Guidelines
(NDPG), 175, 180, 182
National Defense University (NDU), 77
National Oceanic Administration (NOA),
123
Neo-Nixon doctrine, 138
Network Centric Warfare (NCW), 71
New Great Game, 149
New Pacific Community, 5
New Zealand, 17, 34, 53, 158, 163, 165,
220
Next Generation FTA, 164
Nigeria, 18, 91
No First Use (NFU), 124
Noburo Yamaguchi, 178
North Korea, 37, 190, 191, 200, 202
nuclear, 199
Northeast Asia, 6
Nye, Joseph S., 33
Obama, Barack, President of USA, 3, 10,
16, 23, 33, 85, 89, 151, 133, 189, 235
Signing Sequester Bill, 42
Offshore
balancing, 132, 138, 179
maritime role, 57
Okinawa, 50, 59
Olivelle, Patrick, 79
Operational superiority, 37
Osprey-F-35B aircraft, 58
P5+1, 95
P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, 57
P-8 Maritime Surveillance Aircraft, 41
Pacific Asia, 189
Pacific Command (PACOM), 135
Pakistan, 6, 76, 143, 190, 202
Pakistan-China, 143
Panetta, Leon, Former US Defence
Secretary, 4, 20, 23, 25, 37, 97, 150
Peace Mission, 120
Peoples Daily, 22, 106, 107, 122
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), 52, 72,
107, 115
Peoples Liberation Army-Navys (PLA-
Ns), 51
Peoples Republic of China (PRC), 121
Peru, 17, 34, 163
Philippines, 9, 10, 18, 22, 33, 39, 41, 51,
53, 70, 73, 78, 108, 109, 120, 151,
152, 153, 161, 162, 213
PLA Air Force (PLAAF), 118
PLA Army (PLAA), 122
PLA Daily, 107, 120
PLA Navy (PLAN), 54, 58, 59, 116-20,
122
PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF),
118
Plus Six, 164
Pongsudhirak, Thitinan, 152
post-World War II era, 16
President Nixon, 137
twin pillar policy, 138
President Thein Sein, 156
President Xi Jinping, 58, 118, 121
Proactive deterrence, 37
Prof. Muni, 18
Prof. Rong Ying, 228
258
Prompt Global Strike (PGS), 70
Qatar, 98
Qin Gang, Chinese Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson, 109
Quadrennial Defence Review 2010, 177
Rao, Nirupama, Indias Ambassador to the
US, 23
Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP), 151, 163, 166,
212
Republic of Korea, 10, 109, 220
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), 71,
74
Rice, Condoleezza, 32, 34
Rice, Susan, 4
Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), 37
Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), 55,
162
Rohani, Hassan, Iranian President, 95
Roosevelt, Teddy, 9
Russia, 93, 96, 118, 119, 120, 196, 202,
220
Saudi Arabia, 90, 91, 94, 98
SCS, 118, 119
Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs),
53, 139, 141, 221
Senkakau/Diayou islands, 19
Seoul, 4
Shambaugh, David, 78
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO), 120
Shangri-La Dialogue, 21, 94, 95
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM),
115, 124
Singapore, 10, 17, 34, 38, 39, 41, 52, 55,
56, 152, 162, 163, 219
Singapore-US relations, 161
Singh, Manmohan, PM of India, 23, 60,
121, 226
Six-Party Talks, 192, 194
South Africa, 18
South Asia, 7, 51, 89
South China Sea, 24, 33, 35, 53, 109, 115,
132, 140, 152160-61, , 167, 211
South Korea, 4, 18, 19, 22, 24, 31, 38,
39, 51, 52, 53, 55, 57, 74, 75, 78, 87,
120, 158, 165, 176, 194, 195, 213,
214
Southeast Asia, 22, 158
Soviet Union, 138
Special Operations Forces, 20
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 143
Strait Times, 118
Strategic architecture, 11
Sudan, 6
Syria, 92, 93, 201
Human Rights Act, 198
Taiwan, 33, 70, 73, 75
Thailand, 10, 17, 39, 51, 55, 56, 70, 78,
151, 152, 157, 213
Thailand-US military ties, 162
The Diplomat, 117
The Economist (London), 9
The Hindu, 121
The History of the Peloponnesian War, 114
The Japan Times, 184
Thucydides Trap, 114, 127
Tokyo, 4
Tomohiko Satake, 177
Ton Sinh Thanh, 153
Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), 11, 17,
34, 78, 110, 150, 159, 163, 213
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic
Partnership (TPSEP), 17, 164
Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL), 124
Turkey, 18, 89, 114, 201
UK, 196
UN peacekeeping operations, 117
United Arab Emirates, 94
United Nations (UN), 91
United Nations Security Council (UNSC),
93, 191, 196, 198
United States-ROK Alliance, 43
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), 36, 49-
50, 72
Index
259
US Air Force (USAF), 41, 71
US Central Commands (CENTCOMs),
86
US National Intelligence Council Report
2012, 18
US Pacific Command (USPACOM), 70
US Pacific Fleet, 56
US X-band missile defence radar, 56
US, 10, 15, 18, 19, 22, 25, 56, 59, 74,
75, 91, 99, 106, 111, 120, 127, 133,
150, 157, 163
Aegis ships, 56
Allies, 87, 94
Bilateral alliances, 78
Defence expenditure, 41
Defence strategy, 43
Federal budget, 21
Forces, 7, 33, 52
in Korea, 69
Interests, 88
Marine Corps, 9, 43, 180
Military, 52, 70
assets, 40
missions, 21
National Military Strategy, 71
Naval facility, 88
Naval Forces, 150
Navy, 39, 50, 53, 54, 55, 69, 71
New Way of War, 70
Plans, 55
Power projection, 134
Power, 21
Statecraft, 189
Rebalancing, 11, 15, 18-20, 23-24, 31,
32, 34, 36, 41, 60, 154, 156, 163
Pivot, 3, 11, 32, 44, 49, 60, 61, 69,
73, 76, 79, 86, 105, 107, 132, 150
to Asia, 3, 5, 7-9, 94, 149-50, 175-
76, 180-81, 183, 190, 195, 199,
220, 229
Economy, 15, 21
9/11 attack, 92
US-Arab relationship, 97
US-Australian relations, 140
US-Brunei economic relations, 158
US-Israel partnership, 91
US-Japan
Alliance, 176
Defense Cooperation, 180
Joint exercise Dawn Blitz, 58
Joint Statement, 57
Relations, 6, 175
Security treaty, 108
US-Japan-India strategic triangle, 10, 183,
229
US-led global economy, 10
US-led TPP, 165
US-Myanmar relations, 157
US-Pakistan relationship, 142
USS Freedom, 52, 54
USS George Washington, 39, 162
USS Mason, 54
USS Truman, 95
US-South Korean relationship, 6
US-Soviet Union
Relations, 74
Rivalry, 168
Venezuela, 91
Vietnam, 10, 17, 33, 34, 39, 53, 56, 69,
75, 109, 150, 151, 152, 161, 162, 163,
165, 219, 225
Cam Ranh Bay, 69
Era, 70
Vietnam-US relations, 153
Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS)
Operations, 54
War on terror, 33
Weillie, Admiral Jiang, 118
West Asia, 11, 86, 90, 189
Western Pacific Ocean, 58, 118
Wilkins, Thomas, 176
World Economic Forum, 23
World Energy Outlook 2012, 91
World War II, 70, 78, 181
Wortzel, Larry, 201
260
WTO, 111
Wu Shengli, 54
Xi Jinping Vice President, 108-09
Xinhua, 106
Xi-Obama 2013 summit, 108
Yellow Sea, 120
Yemen, 88, 92
Yokosuka-Guam-Papua-New Guinea, 115
Zahran Aerial Naval Base, 88

Book ASR2013

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Book ASR2013

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

ASIAN STRATEGIC REVIEW

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen