The Tragedy of American Diplomacy?

Rethinking the Marshall Plan

Michael Cox Caroline Kennedy-Pipe Rethinking the Cold War If we take seriously E. H. Carr's dictum that history is not a single, well-defined narrative but a terrain of contestation between competing and evolving interpretations whose influence is as much shaped by time and place as by any given set of facts, it should come as no great shock to discover that the past is constantly being reassessed or, to use the more familiar term, revised by successive generations of historians.! "he post-!#$% period in general, and the Cold &ar conflict in particular, has been no e'ception to this simple but important historiographic rule. (fter all, for the better part of forty years, the East-&est confrontation divided nations, shaped people's political choices, )ustified repression in the East, gave rise to the new national security state inthe &est, distorted the economies of both capitalism and Communism, inserted itself into the culture of the two sides, led to the death of nearly twenty million people, and came close to destroying tens of millions more in *ctober !#+,. -ittle wonder that the Cold &ar has been studied in such minute andacrimonious detail. (rguably, it was the most important period in world history. "here have been at least three waves of Cold &ar revisionism. "he first of these, given intellectual definition by &illiam (ppleman &illiams but made popular as a result of the .ietnam &ar, sought to challenge the orthodo' view that it was the /oviet 0nion's refusal to withdraw from Eastern Europe and the threat of further /oviet aggression that made hostilities inevitable. Holding up a mirror to the 0nited /tates rather than the 0//1, &illiams essentially inverted the old orthodo' story and argued that the basic cause of the conflict was not Communist e'pansion, but the 0./. pursuit of an *pen 2oor world in which all countries and all peoples would have to sing from the same free enterprise hymn sheet printed in &ashington3and those that !nd Page "#$ did not 4including the /oviet 0nion5 would be forced to suffer the conse6uences. Inspired more by 7redrick 8ackson "urner and Charles 9eard than by :arl ;ar' or .ladimir -enin, &illiams and others in the so-called &isconsin school offered an analysis that was radical in form but 6uintessentially (merican in character. "hey caused rough seas for the traditionalist ship of state by suggesting that the latter's e'planation of the Cold &ar was 6uestionable on at least four empirical grounds< it underestimated /oviet weakness, overstated the /oviet threat, ignored the degree to which 0./. policymakers were guided by economic considerations, and failed to discuss the active role played by the 0nited /tates in bringing about the collapse of the =rand (lliance after &orld &ar II. "he revisionists accused the traditionalists of having been trapped by their own blinkered ideology and of producing what was less a real history of the Cold &ar than a rationali>ation for 0./. foreign policy in the postwar years., 1evisionism in its classical form peaked remarkably 6uickly, to be superseded in the post-.ietnam era by what many academics came to regard as a more balanced, less e'citing, but ultimately more scholarly picture of the Cold &ar. Eschewing the materialism and radicalism of the revisionists, but at the same time refusing to endorse the traditionalist view that the /oviet 0nion constituted a serious military threat to &estern Europe, the proponents of what was somewhat imprecisely termed post-revisionism aimed to construct what they believed would be a more complete picture of how the Cold &ar began. &orking on the positivist assumption that the task of the historian is not to write morality tales in which heroes

and evil demons are locked in mortal combat, they sought to stand back from the fray and to discern the underlying reasons for events. ?ost-revisionism swept all before it, leaving conservative defenders and left-wing opponents of (merican foreign policy behind in its wake. Inspired in large part by =eorge :ennan's realist criti6ue of the Cold &ar, the post-revisionists in general3and 8ohn =addis in particular 3authored many studies that reflected solid scholarship and balanced )udgment. @o doubt for these reasons, post-revisionist work soon became e'tremely popular among a new generation of students tired of old dogmas.A However, the larger role performed by the post-revisionists was not so !nd Page "%$ much to modify revisionism while absorbing its insights, but, instead, to bury it almost completely. Indeed, according to some skeptics, there was nothing at all revisionist about post-revisionism< It was merely a new brand of traditionalism made academically respectable by the number of archival references cited. In a memorable phrase, the radical historian Carolyn Eisenberg described it at the time as merely orthodo'y, plus archives. $ "he third and final wave of Cold &ar rethinking came with the 6uite une'pected end of the Cold &ar, an event that not only changed the structure of the international system but also precipitated a deep intellectual crisis in at least two of the academic disciplines that had purportedly failed to anticipate what happened in !#B#-!##!. However, whereas the fall of Communism caused a genuine shock in both international relations and /oviet studies,% the disintegration of the socialist pro)ect created enormous opportunities for new research in the field of Cold &ar history by opening up several archives in the old enemy camp. @ow, for the first time, it finally seemed possible to piece together the whole story and not )ust a selective version based almost entirely on &estern sources.+ "he prospects were obviously e'citing, and for a while historians had a veritable field day3to such an e'tent that some began to worry that they might now have too much original material with which to work rather than too little. (dmittedly, researchers never had access to the most important archives in ;oscow, which have remained sealed.C @or would any historian be so epistemologically naDve as to assume that archives are neutral spaces or provide all the answers. 9ut at least there were new primary sources to e'plore, and what they yielded was most impressive, so impressive in fact that many believed it was once again time to revise our views about the !nd Page ""$ Cold &ar. *r at least that was the position adopted by 8ohn =addis, who, having earlier led the move toward post-revisionism, now suggested that the new evidence made it necessary for us to look once again at the past and to accept that a good deal of what had passed for Cold &ar history before was not an all-rounded account but only a rough appro'imation. =addis even suggested a new Cold &ar typology. &hereas he previously divided the field into proponents of different schools of thought who had access to more or less the same limited sources, he now argued that the real line of demarcation was between old and new versions of the Cold &ar3the former based on almost no information from the e'-Communist archives and the latter based on increasing amounts of material through which to sift. =addis argued that in the past we could not know what really happened, but now we could, at least with much greater certainty. B 1egardless of whether =addis is right that we do now know what happened 4a claim that many historians have 6uestioned5, we can all accept that the new sources have provided Cold &ar studies with a much-needed shot in the arm. In some ways, the end of the Cold &ar could not have come at a better time for a sub)ect that seemed to have reached an intellectual dead end. Charges of staleness could hardly be leveled against the filed now with the proliferation of )ournal articles, the fre6uent conferences on various aspects of the Cold &ar, and the continued influ' of newly released primary material.# It is also true that far more attention is now being paid, at least within the scholarly community in Europe, to the e'periences of the smaller &est European countries during the years of the ;arshall ?lan.!E 9ut, as

we will go on to argue, a considerable academic deficit remains in our understanding of the e'periences of Central and East European states. ;oreover, not all is well in the academic garden, as recent rumblings have made only too clear. (lthough we now have more of everything3including two new )ournals devoted to the study of the Cold &ar!! 3some critics have argued that there has not been enough intellectual innovation over the past decade. It may well be true, as =eir -undestad has observed, that the new Cold &ar history represents very significant progress compared to the old, but, as he has also argued, this has not been accompanied by much in the way of new thinking.!, !nd Page &''$ *n the contrary, when historians 4including some of the most eminent5 have sought to produce a synthesis, they have tended to look back instead of looking forward. "he result has been a partial but discernible rehabilitation of old orthodo'ies about who started the Cold &ar and why.!A In some cases, like that of =addis, the argument has been advanced with a notable degree of subtlety. In others, it has, to paraphrase 2ean (cheson, been made in ways that are sometimes clearer than the truth. !$ *f course, the long march back toward what one European historian has called the new traditionalism has not upset everybody.!% *ne observer, who could scarcely conceal his delight, argued that the new history represented progress on many fronts, but its most important result, he believed, was to put the last nail into the coffin of radical revisionism and all those who in the !#+Es had been critical of the 0./. role in the Cold &ar.!+ "he specter of &illiam (ppleman &illiams, it seemed, could finally be laid to rest. "he central purpose of this article is to 6uestion the increasingly influential thesis that new evidence does indeed bear out old truths about theCold &ar. @aturally, we are not the first to do so. ;elvyn -effler, among others, has shown that once you get inside the enemy archives the stories you discover there do not necessarily confirm the orthodo' view that the Cold &ar was a simple case of /oviet e'pansionism and (merican reaction. "he new evidence might prove many things, he notes, but the one thing it doesnot do is provide us with a clear and unambiguous view of the Cold &ar. !C &e wholeheartedly agree. (s our discussion of one especially important moment in the Cold &ar will attempt to demonstrate, the evidence3both old and new3does not point to simple traditional conclusions about !nd Page &'&$ (merican innocence and /oviet intransigence. &hat emerges instead is an altogether more comple' picture that seems to run directly counter to the neworthodo'y and its working assumption of /oviet guilt and 0./. impartiality. !B *ur analysis of the ;arshall ?lan will show that it was (merican policies as much as 4and perhaps more than5 /oviet actions that finally led to the division of Europe and thus to the Cold &ar itself. ;any historians will feel uncomfortable with this conclusionF and it is certainly not a point of view that is popular with (merican historians, especially now. @or should this much surprise us. (fter all, the ;arshall ?lan has always tended to receive favorable reviews within the 0nited /tates3partly because few appear inclined to think critically about an act of generosity involving something close to G!A billionF!# partly because in the conte't of !#$C the ;arshall ?lan stood in sharp contrast to its shrill predecessor, the "ruman 2octrineF and partly because of the huge reputation of =eorge ;arshall, whose role in the ;arshall ?lan was commemorated by the 9ritish government with the scholarships that still bear his name.,E "here may also be concern in some 6uarters that attacking the ;arshall ?lan would lend credibility to the revisionist cause, which has long been out of fashion. "he result, as 2iane :un> noted in a special !##C issue of Foreign Affairs designed mainly to celebrate the ;arshall ?lan rather than to analy>e it, has been to leave the reputation of both the?lan and ;arshall himself essentially intact. (lthough the end of the Cold &ar might have forced scholars to rethink their views on nearly everything else, she notes, this has not been true of the ;arshall ?lan. :un> writes that,far from challenging established truths about the ?lan and its place in

history, the collapse of the /oviet 0nion and the thaw of the Cold &ar !nd Page &'($ have only enhanced its importance and the reputation of its (merican creators. ,! "his deferential attitude toward the ;arshall ?lan and 0./. policy has meant that Cold &ar historians have merely been pouring fine new empirical wine into some fairly old conceptual bottles3a tendency that not only makes for somewhat lackluster history, but also leaves old certainties unchallenged. Here we would like to challenge those certainties by raising a number of difficult issues that over the last several years have not been addressed with the seriousness they deserve. &e suspect that these issues have not been addressed because they raise awkward 6uestions about the now-fashionable view that as long as 8osif /talin was running the /oviet 0nion a Cold &ar was unavoidable, ,, and that by !#$C the methods that /talin employed in Eastern Europe made the Cold &ar inevitable. ,A In this article we shall seek to refute both of these claims.,$ "he first part of our article focuses on the issue of what finally happened in Eastern Europe after the promulgation of the ;arshall ?lan. &e do not doubt that it was /talin who eventually sealed the fate of Eastern Europe. "hat much is self-evident. However, as we shall attempt to argue, the way that0./. aid was originally conceived under the ;arshall ?lan not only limited /oviet options but propelled the /oviet 0nion into a more antagonistic and hostile stance, including the establishment of its own economic and political bloc, for which it was then held e'clusively responsible. &e do not assume /oviet, let alone /talin's, innocenceF nor do we see anything particularly benign about /oviet intentions. @evertheless, we would still insist, as have some other observers who benefited from having been there at the time, that /oviet foreign policy was not )ust a given thing deriving from an essentialist core, buta series of responses and reactions that were )ust as likely to be shaped bythe way others acted toward the /oviet 0nion as by /talin's own outlook.,% E'actly what the /oviet 0nion did in Eastern Europe was not predetermined, !nd Page &')$ and thus the final comple'ion of the countries in the region was by no means set in stone. "his raises the 6uestion of whether a different approach by 0./. policymakers could have led to a different outcome for the peoples of East and Central Europe. "hat 6uestion in turn leads to another issue, again one largely bypassed in the new historiography< the e'tent to which the division of Europe was the outcome most desired by the /oviet leadership itself.,+ "he traditional or orthodo' line is that, other things being e6ual, division was the option most favored by ;oscow after the war. &e take a rather different view and suggest that the division of Europe, far from being /talin's preferred option, was possibly the outcome he least desired.,C *nce again the new material points to less orthodo' conclusions than those recently propounded by some historians. &hat this material shows, basically, is that /talin was still committed to cooperation with the &est and some level of serious intercourse between the two parts of Europe. (ccording to .ladislav Hubok and Constantine ?leshakov, it was only by late !#$C that /talin finally gave up on this preferred route and accepted the inevitability, though not necessarily the desirability, of the two-bloc system. ,B "he pu>>ling feature about European politics after !#$B, therefore, was that the /oviet 0nion probably ended up with a situation, in response to the European 1ecovery ?rogram 4E1?5, that it had showed little sign of wanting during and after &orld &ar II. It is not surprising that /talin was reluctant to get involved in a confrontation with the &est. (fter all, as even the rather conventional-minded .o)tech ;astny has acknowledged, the Cold &ar was something that /talin never wanted because he reali>ed that the /oviet 0nion was manifestly unable to compete with the 0nited /tates over the long term.,# (n e'tended and costly standoff against a powerful enemy

held out great uncertainty. "he most immediate results of the breakdown of relations in !#$C were distinctly negative !nd Page &'*$ from the /oviet 0nion's perspective3antagoni>ing the &estern powers and uniting them more closely together, precipitating a costly economic embargo against the /oviet bloc itself, and leaving the /oviet 0nion in control of a series of hostile countries that proved politically unstable and, after !#+B, economically costly to prop up. How much the Cold &ar actually cost the /oviet 0nion can never be assessed, but there seems little doubt that the social, political, and economic burden on ;oscow was immense.AE *ur article goes on to address the larger 6uestion of whether Eastern and Central Europe might have escaped the /oviet grip. It is difficult to envisage how this might have occurred, not )ust because of /talin's determination to maintain tight control over countries like ?oland and C>echoslovakia3the standard orthodo' e'planation3but also because of his genuine concern 4confirmed by the ;arshall ?lan5 that the 0nited /tates and its &estern allies were determined to undermine /oviet influence in Eastern Europe by e'ploiting the 0//1's weak economic control over the region and luring the East Europeans back into the &estern camp. In this sense there really was a basic security dilemma that stemmed initially from the 0./. government's refusal to recogni>e that ;oscow had certain security needs in Eastern Europe.A! (lthough 0./. policy may have seemed perfectly reasonable to the officials who formulated it, the net effect was to invite the /oviet 0nion to act in a more intransigent way than it might have otherwise. It is no coincidence that /talin's turn toward Cold &ar policies followed rather than preceded the breakdown in negotiations in 8uly !#$C. *ne of the likely reasons for this change of course was a concern that the ?lan was intended to pull Eastern Europe gradually back into the capitalist fold. (s more recent scholarship has shown, the 0nited /tates never accepted the loss of Eastern Europe and did everything it could short of war to eliminate Communist influence in the region. 7urthermore, as both ?eter =rose and =regory ;itrovich have revealed, the concept of rollback began not with the election of 2wight Eisenhower in !#%,, but with the ;arshall ?lan itself.A, 0nfortunately, this particular aspect of the !nd Page &'+$ ?lan has not received the full attention it deserves, mainly because most historians seem to have agreed with &illiam "aubman's earlier )udgment that ;arshall's intentions, and presumably those of the ?lan, were primarily defensive in character.AA In light of what we now know, such a view can no longer be sustained. It neither corresponds to the evidence nor e'plains whythe /oviet 0nion responded to the ?lan by dramatically changing thestatus ofEastern Europe from a sphere of influence3which it had been since the end of the war3to a bloc of tightlycontrolled economic and political satellites. "his brings us to a fourth issue, namely, the curious tendency in some of the more recent 0./. analyses of the ;arshall ?lan to overlook or downplay the role of (merica's key allies. "his charge is not new. (fter all, nearly twenty years ago the 9ritish writer &illiam Cromwell made much the same point.A$ European historians more generally have always complained about their (merican counterparts' apparent indifference to what the European states said or did during the Cold &ar. It would seem that this bias has not disappeared entirely, and, in the rush to e'plain or )ustify 0./. actions, scant notice seems to have been taken of the large body of recent work on the positions adopted by the 0nited :ingdom or 7rance in response to the E1?.A% (s we shall see, a serious rethinking of the ;arshall ?lan demonstrates )ust how keen the 9ritish and the 7rench were to e'clude the /oviet 0nion from a conference on European security and how aware /oviet leaders were of what one historian has called the double game then being played by the 9ritish and 7rench foreign ministers, Ernest 9evin and =eorges 9idault.A+ "he attitude of the 9ritish and 7rench governments was apparently one of the most crucial reasons for ;oscow's decision not to participate in the plan.AC

7inally, our analysis also raises a series of 6uestions about which of the two superpowers had the greater range of choices after the war. Here again we want to take issue with those, including =addis, who insist that /talin !nd Page &',$ rather than Harry "ruman had more options after the war and in !#$C. "his view ignores the gap in the two sides' economic capabilities3a gap that was huge by any measure and unlikely to be closed for a long time if ever. "he gap in itself did not make the 0nited /tates aggressive, nor did it make the /oviet 0nion defensive. However, the e'istence of the gap does suggest that, other things being e6ual, the /oviet 0nion was far less free to choose a course of action than its main capitalist competitor was.AB In pointing out this disparity we certainly are not trying to )ustify anything the 0//1 might have done, but, by situating ;oscow's policy in the real world of material capabilities, we are more likely to arrive at a realistic assessment of what /talin could have done. ;oreover, although we accept that ideology played a role in shaping the /oviet 0nion's outlook3 indeed one of the more important developments over the past several years has been the systematic attempt by scholars to trace the impact of ideology on ;oscow's response to the ;arshall ?lan3we would be concerned if the stress on ideational factors went too far.A# ;ark :ramer has convincingly shown that we cannot understand how the Cold &ar began, continued, and ended without bringing in ideology.$E Iet we should be careful 4as of course :ramer is5 in not allowing this renewed interest in the ideology to distract us from looking at some of the more basic material factors that determined and constrained /oviet actions. Catastrophically weakened by four years of one of the most brutal and devastating wars in history, the /oviet 0nion confronted massive economic problems at home and was faced by the material and military power of a reinvigorated and highly dynamic (merican economy that was at least si' times larger than the /oviet economy. In that sense /talin had only a limited range of policy choices. In the end he chose 4or was impelled5 to go along one path rather than another. "his outcome was not necessarily the only one possible, but given the straits in which the /oviet 0nion found itself by the second half of !#$C, we should not be surprised by what happened. "he irony, though, is that what /talin ultimately did3in opposing the ;arshall ?lan's intended reinvigoration of the &estern world, in establishing the Communist Information 9ureau 4Cominform5, and in imposing greater economic and political control over Eastern Europe while attempting to force a resolution of the =erman 6uestion !nd Page &'#$ through the blockade of !#$B-!#$#3was probably not what he would have done if left to his druthers. Marshall Aid- American .nitiati/e ?erhaps no other (merican initiative in the post-!#$% period has generated as much interest and favorable comment among &estern historians as the ;arshall ?lan. ;uch of the commentary initially came from those who were actually present at the creation. $! ( good deal more analysis followed in the !#+Es and !#CEs as new archival material became available in the &est.$, "he result was a mass of new work ranging from the more standard diplomatic accounts of what actually happened to more comple' assessments that refused to see the ?lan in simple Cold &ar terms and depicted it either as an attempt to reconcile 7rance and =ermany and give a huge boost to the process of European integration or as a means of e'porting the more successful corporatist (merican economic model to a class-divided postwar Europe.$A Iet in spite of this new intellectual ferment, most writers agreed about one thing< that the purposes of the ?lan were multiple and that its conse6uences were of enormous import. &hether indeed there ever was a ?lan per se is not at all certain, but, as the chief historian of the ?lan has pointed out, the measure rested s6uarely on an (merican conviction that European economic recovery was essential to the long-term interests of the 0nited /tates. $$

"he details of the ?lan's genesis re6uire only the briefest recitation here. *n % 8une !#$C, in a commencement address at Harvard 0niversity, /ecretary of /tate =eorge ;arshall announced what became known as the ;arshall ?lan. "he secretary of state argued that the economic plight of postwar Europe made the continent vulnerable to economic and political collapse and ultimately !nd Page &'%$ war. ;arshall called on the European countries to consult about the type of aid they needed and to notify the 0nited /tates, which would respond in a positive fashion to an appeal for help.$% "he motives behind the offer were of course highly comple'. @onetheless, the primary aim was to stabili>e &estern Europe through economic and political reconstruction and, in so doing, to create a pan-national framework in which the &est European countries could look forward to sustained growth, deeper cooperation, and an endto the nationalist conflicts that had so scarred the continent for the past century.$+ "he ?lan, however, was never 6uite what it seemed. Contrary to popular mythology, it was not )ust a simple program of aid. (s the influential 9ritish economist /ir (lec Cairncross has pointed out, 0./. aid to Europe had been flowing across the (tlantic for the better part of two years even before ;arshall's speech.$C &hat made the 8une !#$C initiative different, Cairncross noted, was its attempt to link aid to the reform of European institutions andpractices. ;oreover, although the tone of the speech was mild and non- ideological, its implications were anything but. 7or, as we now know 4and have known for a long time5, the ?lan was not merely a reactive move designed to prevent economic chaosF instead, it was the most dedicated effort yet to reduce Communist influence in Europe and was intended to affect not only the most obvious countries like 7rance and Italy, $B but also the smaller states under /oviet control. "his was certainly how =eorge :ennan conceived of the ?lan. (lthough :ennan continued to believe that the basic cause of the crisis in &estern Europe was not Communism as such but the need to restore the continent's economic health, he was in no doubt that the ?lan had a deeply subversive purpose.$# 2ean (cheson was e6ually convinced of the !nd Page &'"$ ?lan's thrust, noting that what 0./. citi>ens and the representatives in congress alike always wanted to learn in the last analysis was how ;arshall aid operated to block the e'tension of /oviet power and the acceptance of Communist economic and political organisation and alignment. %E (t a meeting on ,B ;ay !#$C, when 0./. officials decided that the East European countries would be allowed to participate in the program, they stipulated that any countries taking part would have to reorient their economies away from the 0//1 toward broader European integration. In light of these ob)ectives, it is hardly surprising that 0./. officials were amenable to the idea of including the East European governments in discussions of aid but were much less happy about the prospect of /oviet participation. "here is little evidence that officials in &ashington ever seriously considered bringing the /oviet 0nion into the E1?. "here was of course a view, e'pressed most forcefully by 8ames 7orrestal, that ;oscow might participate, but 7orrestal raised this issue not because he wanted ;oscow to )oin but because he feared that it would, thereby wrecking the ?lan altogether. %! 2espite this minor risk, the informed view was that the /oviet 0nion in the end would refuse to take part. :ennan, among others, believed and hoped that this would be the case. "he ;arshall ?lan, he wrote, was offered to the /oviet 0nion with the intention that it would be turned down. He e'plained that the offer would be in such a form that the 1ussian satellite economies would either e'clude themselves by an unwillingness to accept or agree to abandon the e'clusive orientation of their economies. %, (ccording to the long-time 0./. envoy (verell Harriman, ;arshall, too, was confident that the 1ussians would not accept the E1?. ;arshall reali>ed that if, contrary to his e'pectations, the /oviet 0nion did seek to take part, Congress would have killed the ?lan at the outset. *ne of ;arshall's economic advisers, Charles :indleberger, was less confident than his boss about ;oscow's

intentions regarding the ?lan, and he later acknowledged that he had been greatly relieved when the /oviet 0nion decided not to participate. %A :indleberger made much the same point in !#BC during ceremonies marking the fortieth anniversary of the ?lan. "he fear in &ashington, he recalled was that the /oviet bear might hug the ;arshall ?lan to death. %$ @evertheless, the invitation !nd Page &&'$ to ;oscow still had to be e'tended. ?olitically there was no alternative, even though, as the 0./. ambassador to 7rance reassured both 9idault and 9evin in 8une 4a reassurance they welcomed5, the offer was little more than window dressing. %% "hus, by the late spring of !#$C, 0./. officials had concluded that if the ?lan was to proceed, the /oviet 0nion would have to be kept out. @ot only would /oviet participation hamper the recovery program in &estern Europe, it would also eliminate any possibility of getting Congress to agree to the E1?. ;ore generally, from an economic point of view, there was no need for the /oviet 0nion to be involved. In fact, in the hectic weeks following ;arshall's speech, a view began to emerge in &ashington, though it was not shared by all, that it might not even be essential for the East European countries to be included. ( senior official involved in high-level 0./. discussions pointed out that although the reunification of Europe might be desirable, it was not critical for the recovery program in &estern Europe. &illiam Clayton, one of the main architects of the ?lan, agreed, and in a ;ay !#$C memorandum he noted, en passant, that although &estern Europe was economically essential to the East, the reverse was not true. "he E1? could thus go forward without the participation of the Eastern European countries. %+ 0./. opposition to /oviet involvement in the ;arshall ?lan was in line with a larger shift that had already taken place in 0./. thinking over the previous year. "he reasons for this shift have been analy>ed in great detail by scholars of the early Cold &ar, who have clearly demonstrated that /oviet behavior itself was one of the main factors responsible. *ther factors also contributed to the changes in &estern thinking signaled by :ennan's famous -ong "elegram of 7ebruary !#$+, &inston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech a month later, Clark Clifford's memorandum of /eptember !#$+, and the "ruman 2octrine of ;arch !#$C. How and why this reorientation took place need not detain us here. &hat is important is the impact it had in shaping a near-consensus in &ashington about the nature of the /oviet 0nion and the best way of dealing with it. Increasingly, policymakers concluded that the 0nited /tates could not rely solely on diplomacy and must instead achieve and maintain a defined position of strength. "hey reali>ed that this approach !nd Page &&&$ could lead to rigidity and would leave little room for a serious e'change of views. 9ut at least it was safer than the alternative of negotiations, which carried all sorts of dangers, particularly if /talin tried to shape the &estern policy agenda. "he meeting of the Council of 7oreign ;inisters in ;oscow in (pril !#$C was crucial in finally convincing ;arshall that negotiating with the /oviet 0nion was an almost impossible task and that there was little point in pursuing the matter much further.%C ?olicymakers in the 0nited /tates were not the only ones who revised their thinking about the /oviet 0nion and the prospect of its participation in the E1?. (s we have known for some time, the &est Europeans in general3and the 9ritish in particular3were e6ually hostile to the idea of including the /oviet 0nion in a future European settlement. (lthough the views of the &est Europeans have been somewhat underplayed in recent assessments, their changing perceptions of /talin's intentions were crucial to the debates over the ;arshall ?lan.%B In saying this, we are not endorsing the once popular view that 0./. leaders were pushed into confrontation with the /oviet 0nion by their wily 9ritish counterparts.%# "he Cold &ar, after all, was not )ust a ruse devised in -ondon to preserve 9ritish influence in the wider world, as some have suggested.+E /till, there is no denying that some influential

figures on the 9ritish side accepted the inevitability of a de facto division of =ermany and the e'clusion of the /oviet 0nion from any real involvement in Europe's future. "he 9ritish 7oreign /ecretary, Ernest 9evin, was convinced that /oviet participation in the ;arshall program would greatly complicate 9ritain's chances of receiving substantial (merican aid.+! (s he later made clear in a report given to the 9ritish Cabinet a short while after the /oviet 0nion withdrew from the 7ranco-9ritish-/oviet discussions on , 8uly !#$C, from a practical point of view, it is far better to have them definitely out than half-heartedly in. (ny other outcome, he noted might have enabled the /oviets !nd Page &&($ to play the "ro)an horse and wreck Europe's prospects of availing themselves of (merican assistance. +, 9ritish hostility to /oviet involvement in the ;arshall ?lan was evident when 9evin held a series of important meetings with 0./. 0nder /ecretary of /tate &illiam Clayton in -ondon on ,$-,+ 8une !#$C. (lthough Clayton informed a press conference before leaving for Europe that these meetings were not connected to the issue of aid, he brought along a memorandum from =eorge ;arshall about the proposed program.+A "he issue of /oviet participation was not directly addressed, but the message urged the 9ritish to sei>e the initiative.+$ "he four subse6uent meetings between 9ritish and (merican officials discussed the issue of aid and 9ritain's future role in Europe. 9evin pressed the 9ritish case, e'plicitly linking the argument for re)uvenation in the 0nited :ingdom to the containment of the /oviet 0nion. &ithout a powerful and stable 9ritain, he argued, the /oviet 0nion could assume control of the continent. 9evin also linked future 9ritish prosperity to the establishment of the 9i>one in =ermany, emphasi>ing yet again that without economic aid, 9ritain, the 9i>one and indeed Europe as a whole would find it hard to resist /oviet pressure.+% 9evin was e6ually clear on another matter< that at least one of the goals of the ;arshall ?lan should be to break down the Iron Curtain and lure the /oviet satellites away from ;oscow's influence.++ Inevitably, the issue of /oviet participation in the E1? was discussed. "he participants e'pressed strong doubts about the advisability of including the /oviet 0nion in any recovery program drawn up in &ashington. Clayton indicated that there would have to be a radical shift in ;oscow's position before the (merican people would approve financial aid to the 0//1. ;oreover, because the /oviet 0nion, in his view, did not need food, fuel and fiber there would be little basis for participating in the short term phase. He pointed out that the /oviet 0nion had already offered wheat to 7rance and had actually delivered !BE,EEE tons. In addition, given the sheer scale of ?olish reparations to the 0//1, /talin would have difficulty in making a case for early entry into the aid program.+C /oviet participation in the first phase therefore was ruled out. In the longer term, a rather different argument was used against possible /oviet participation< that of the general weakness of the /oviet economy itself. :ennan noted at the time that the state of 1ussia's own economy !nd Page &&)$ was such that she was in any case illplaced to make a substantial contribution to a constructive pro)ect. +B ;uch to 9evin's relief, the "ruman administration was determined to have the aid program go ahead with or without the /oviet 0nion. (s :ennan argued once again, if it proved impossible to secure /oviet or satellite participation on reasonable terms, the 0nited /tates would look for the elaboration of the western European pro)ect as a pis-aller. +# &ith the conclusion of these initial discussions 9ritish foreign policy had effectively come full circle, evolving from what it had been in !#$+3when 9ritish officials were still seeking cooperation with ;oscow in the hope of avoiding the division of =ermany and Europe3to a position of ready acceptance that a divided Europe was likely and that one should not be unduly concerned about /oviet sensitivities. "his was a striking turnaround. (s /ean =reenwood has recently shown, only a year earlier 9evin not

only had been keen to keep his lines of communication open to ;oscow but had remained more than a little suspicious of 0./. motives and intentions.CE "welve months later the 0nited :ingdom was locked into a special relationship with the 0nited /tates, and the /oviet threat was the cement holding it together. Indeed, as (nne 2eighton has argued, 9evin was convinced after the meetings with Clayton that the most important task was to make sure that the /oviets did not participate in the recovery program.C! "he (nglo-(merican talks therefore established the tone for the subse6uent meeting with /oviet officials to discuss the ;arshall ?lan. 9evin had the assurances he wanted that the E1? would go ahead with, or more hopefully, without the /oviet 0nion. Marshall Plan- The 0o/iet Dimension "he 6uestion of /oviet participation in the ;arshall ?lan represented less of an opportunity for the &est to improve relations with ;oscow than a problem that re6uired careful finessing lest it disrupt the E1?. (t no time did the "ruman administration take steps to ease the path for /oviet inclusion in the ?lanF on the contrary, nearly everything was done to guarantee that ;oscow would stay out. (lthough the ?lan conceivably might have been used as a bridge to the 0//1, it instead merely increased the distance between the two !nd Page &&*$ sides. &illiam Cromwell, whose views on the (merican role can hardly be described as hostile, has noted that one finds almost entirely missing any serious conviction by 0./. policy-makers that the ;arshall ?lan represented a ma)or opportunity to reduce East-&est tensions by organi>ing economic recovery in a pan-European framework. If anything, the opposite was probably the case. "he whole &estern approach, in Cromwell's view, was designed not to ameliorate the cold war, but to pursue a struggle that had already begun.C, "he approach adopted by both the (mericans and the 9ritish stood in rather sharp contrast to that of /talin. @ewly available documents show that /oviet leaders were still interested in pursuing some form of dJtente with the &est, despite the &estern governments' increasing movement toward a final break with ;oscow.CA ( more belligerent option always remained a distinct possibility, but in the months leading up to the critical meeting in 8uly there was strong evidence that the /oviet government was still seeking a better relationship with the 0nited /tates. "his at least was the conclusion reached by the 0./. Central Intelligence =roup, which in 8anuary !#$C reported eight instances of apparently accommodating /oviet behavior, including concessions on "rieste, East European force reductions, a more conciliatory stance on the veto in the 0nited @ations, and acceptance of former secretary of state 8ames 9yrnes's proposals for drafting the =erman and (ustrian treaties. Even the announcement of the "ruman 2octrine in ;arch !#$C did not much change this orientation. /talin's response to the speech was notably mild according to one source.C$ *n the same day that "ruman was delivering his message to Congress, the 0./. embassy in ;oscow continued to report 4as it had for some months5 on the /oviet 0nion's less aggressive international position. Embassy officials speculated that this might be connected to the deteriorating economic situation within the 0//1 itself and the need to concentrate on internal problems. C% ( 0./. /tate 2epartment official, 8ohn Hickerson, wondered the same thing, and in a memorandum in late ;arch !#$C he even compared the economic situation in the 0//1 in the spring of !nd Page &&+$ !#$C with the disastrous year of !#AA. He acknowledged that things were not 6uite as bad as they had been fourteen years earlier, but he said it seems clear that the ?olitburo desires to avoid ma)or political developments that might lead to a showdown. "he ?olitburo's stance, he concluded was largely due to weakness of the internal situation. C+

"his view of the /oviet situation was not an aberration. "here seemed to be a widespread understanding in both the 0nited /tates and &estern Europe that the economic situation in the 0//1 was distinctly unfavorable. "he influential 9ritish maga>ine The Economist carried regular reports through ;arch !#$C on the critical problems facing the /oviet 0nion.CC The New York Times carried an e6ually somber analysis on # ;arch that came to the attention of the /tate 2epartment.CB ;eanwhile, in the 0./. embassy in ;oscow, few doubted that /talin was facing challenges on many different fronts. (s &alter 9edell /mith pointed out in 7ebruary !#$C, there was a consciousness in ;oscow that the 0//1's overall position was precarious. (lthough this had not resulted in a diminution of anti-(merican propaganda, what 9edell /mith called the /oviet 0nion's weakened position was likely to have an impact on /oviet conduct abroad.C# "he adverse circumstances of the 0//1 may in part e'plain the posture adopted by /talin, who was eager to reassure any &esterner who cared to listen that there was no danger of war and that good relations with the &est were most desirable. Even /talin's evaluation of the Conference of 7oreign ;inisters 4C7;5 in (pril !#$C was reasonably upbeat. &hereas ;arshall had returned home convinced that the game was up with the /oviet 0nion, /talin was relatively optimistic. He agreed that the meeting had all the 6ualities of combat reconnaissance, but he claimed that on all important issues, such as democrati>ation, political organi>ations, economic unity and reparations, compromise is within reach. BE In conversations with both 9evin and ;arshall during the C7; in ;oscow on the proposed treaties with (ustria and =ermany, the /oviet leader continued to speak with some confidence about the future of the wartime alliance.B! ;oreover, despite !nd Page &&,$ the obvious lack of agreement over the future of =ermany and the issue of /oviet reparations, he sensed that compromise was still possible.B, In an interview with the 1epublican senator Harold /tassen in ;ay !#$C, he reaffirmed that there was every reason to hope for continued cooperation between the two sides.BA @aturally, /talin was keeping his options and had not abandoned his traditional suspicion of the &est. (s a /oviet diplomatic cable in /eptember !#$+ made clear, the war had changed the international landscape, leaving the 0nited /tates as the most powerful force in the world and the greatest threat to /oviet security. 9ut even this relatively bleak analysis, /talin believed, was no cause for panic.B$ /oviet 7oreign ;inister .yacheslav ;olotov did not rule out further cooperation,B% and until the middle of !#$C he continued to look forward to the possibility that the 0nited /tates and the /oviet 0nion would )ointly manage the system of international relations. B+ "his outlook also received theoretical support from the economist Evgenii .arga3the ?olonius of the Comintern as -eon "rotsky had once called him3who was never one to stray too far from the official line. In an earlier study, Changes in the Capitalist Economy in the Wake of the Second World War, .arga had argued that the crisis of capitalism might be delayed because certain elements of centrali>ed planning had been adopted by the &estern powers during the war. He even hinted that capitalism might develop peacefully. (lthough in the period leading up to the summer of !#$C he came under attack and was roundly condemned, he was not forced to recant his argument. 9y mid-!#$C he had returned to a robust defense of his main thesis< that the adoption of planning in the &estern states signaled important structural changes in the nature of capitalism and possibly allowed for better relations between the capitalist world and the /oviet 0nion.BC It was therefore not insignificant that ;olotov asked .arga in 8une !#$C to assess 0./. intentions with regard to the ;arshall ?lan. .arga prepared a !nd Page &&#$ report and submitted it to ;olotov on ,$ 8une.BB He argued that the primary purpose of the ?lan was to forestall, or at least mitigate, the worst effects of the coming crisis within the (merican economy by seeking out new markets in Europe3a classic restatement of the standard /oviet theory of capitalist crises. Economic self-interest, rather than

enlightenment, lay at the heart of the ?lan, according to .arga. 9ut he also contended that the ?lan had multiple political purposes along with its economic rationale. "he three most significant political aims, in his view, were to demonstrate 0./. hegemony over Europe, to induce the &est Europeans to form an anti-/oviet bloc if the 0//1 refused to participate, and to hold the 0//1 responsible if the ?lan did not achieve its specified ob)ectives. He noted that the ?lan also had a fairly obvious subversive purpose3to place ma'imum pressure on the East Europeans and thereby draw them away from ;oscow back into the larger capitalist fold. 9ut he claimed there was no reason to be alarmed at this stage. (fter all, the 0nited /tates was unlikely to get everything it wanted. 7urthermore, if the ?lan was driven largely by economic necessity, as .arga and others assumed,B# it was possible for the 0//1 to e'ploit this need for its own ends. .arga thus implied that the ?lan was an opportunity as much as a threat, and that the aim of /oviet diplomacy therefore should be to disconnect the issue of aid from the political conditions the 0nited /tates would inevitably seek to attach to it. In this way the /oviet 0nion could derive ma'imum advantage. (s one analyst has cogently observed, although .arga's analysis reflected a strong degree of caution and suspicion one could still infer that with astute bargaining the /oviet 0nion would be able to gain from participation in Kthe ?lanL. #E *n ,! 8une, the /oviet ?olitburo endorsed the idea of at least discussing the aid program with the 9ritish and the 7rench. "he assembled officials hoped that the ;arshall ?lan might offer a useful opportunity to establish a framework for receiving substantial credits from &ashington. (ccordingly, ;olotov suggested to the 9ritish and the 7rench that they should meet in ?aris to discuss the program. "he /oviet authorities also transmitted instructions to the other East European states to ensure their participation in the ?lan.#! (t this stage, /oviet leaders wanted to ensure that the countries that !nd Page &&%$ suffered most from =erman aggression would be given priority for the receipt of 0./. credits. "his stance, though self-serving, was in line with ;oscow's long-standing position that any economic aid should be distributed according to efforts made in defeating @a>i =ermany. 7or the time being, /oviet leaders remained serious in pursuing the aid initiative. In a cable on ,, 8une, the ?olitburo instructed the /oviet ambassadors in &arsaw, ?rague, and 9elgrade to tell the leaders of those countries39oMesMaw 9eirut, :lement =ottwald and 8osip 9ro> "ito respectively3to take the initiative in securing their participation in working out the economic measures in 6uestion, and ensure that they lodge their claims. #, /oviet leaders did not discount the need for vigilance, as reflected in the ,$ 8une memorandum from /oviet (mbassador @ikolai @ovikov.#A 9ut at this stage in the proceedings, they still hoped that under the auspices of the ;arshall ?lan there would be ample room for what (nna 2i 9iagio has called a >one of economic e'change that would enable the two sides to continue their wartime cooperation while avoiding undue interference in each other's sphere of influence. #$ /talin highlighted three key issues in the official instructions he gave to the /oviet officials who traveled to ?aris for the meeting. (lthough the three guidelines were cautious in tone, they did not preclude /oviet agreement if the &est was prepared to enter into serious negotiations that might lead to a compromise. "he first issue was =ermany, the resolution of which /talin hoped to keep separate from the issue of economic aid. "he /oviet delegation for the ?aris conference was thus instructed not to discuss the =erman 6uestion during the ?aris meeting. "he second issue was economic aid. /talin instructed the delegates to ensure that this 6uestion was discussed in terms of specific country needs rather than an all-European basis that would enable 0./. officials to design their own program of reform. "he final issue was the status of Eastern Europe. *nce again, the instructions were clear, and the /oviet delegates were left in no doubt that they should ob)ect 3and presumably ob)ect strongly3to any aid terms that threatened interference in the internal affairs of the recipient countries. (s /talin

envisaged it, the 0nited /tates could provide aid, but it would have to be aid without any conditions, especially conditions that might infringe on the European countries' sovereignty or encroach on their economic independence. #% !nd Page &&"$ &hen ;olotov arrived in ?aris on ,+ 8une for the meeting, he had more than !EE advisers with him. (s both contemporaneous and later commentators have pointed out, this in itself was at least one indicator of the seriousness with which /talin was prepared to treat the negotiations.#+ "wo days before the meeting, the leading 9ritish newspaper commented that the whole atmosphere of international debate had changed to a healthier and hopefully more helpful mood. #C ;olotov's speech on the first day was relatively mild in tone and thus seemed to confirm this analysis. However, there was no hiding the underlying tensions and the fact that the 9ritish and 7rench, egged on by the (mericans, were in no mood to negotiate. 9evin conveyed this sentiment in his subse6uent report to the 9ritish cabinet, noting that he and 9idault had aimed from the outset of the ?aris conference on thrashing out the differences of principle between us, making that the breaking point with the /oviet 0nion.#B &hen ;olotov asked 9evin what had been discussed during the earlier meetings with Clayton, 9evin was less than frank.## (ccording to 9idault, ;olotov asked him, immediately after arriving, what 9idault and 9evin had been doing behind his back. In the first session ;olotov also in6uired what additional information the 7rench and 9ritish governments had received from the 0nited /tates. (gain the /oviet foreign minister was reassured that nothing had been discussed that affected his position.!EE (t the subse6uent negotiating sessions, ;olotov was presented with (nglo-7rench proposals calling for economic moderni>ation programs under the auspices of a central European organi>ation that would oversee the distribution of 0./. aid. "he 7rench also tabled a proposal re6uiring an audit of the individual resources of participating members. /oviet opposition to these proposals soon became evident. ;olotov attacked both ideas on the grounds that they infringed on the sovereignty and independence of the European states. (s an alternative, he proposed that individual countries should make their own assessments of national needs and that these analyses would determine the amount of total credit re6uired from the 0nited /tates. 9evin and 9idault insisted, however, that disclosure of resources was a prere6uisite for participation !nd Page &('$ in the aid program. It is not difficult to see why this demand and the proposal for a central European organi>ation were unpalatable to ;olotov. 9oth proposals would have led to the very sort of interference in the internal affairs of the East European countries that /talin had e'plicitly ruled out. /oviet leaders reali>ed that if these proposals were adopted, the East European governments would have to alter their internal policies and priorities in a way that would leave them dependent on the markets and systems of &estern Europe, and thus ultimately on the 0nited /tates. 7rom ;oscow's perspective, this was unacceptable. "here was a risk that a central organi>ation overseeing the program would ac6uire undue influence in Eastern and Central Europe and even in the 0//1 itself.!E! /oviet suspicions of &estern intentions were heightened when ;olotov received information from other sources about the various discussions that had already taken place between 9evin, 9idault, and the (mericans. "he reports confirmed what he already suspected about the central role that &estern leaders envisaged for the 9i>one in a recovered Europe. ;olotov had tried to prohibit any discussion of the =erman 6uestion during the meetings. He suggested that =erman participation in the ;arshall ?lan should not be considered until key decisions had been made about =ermany as a whole.!E, "his view was re)ected by both 9evin and 9idault, who argued that, in light of continued food shortages, it was essential for =ermany to be represented at the planning stage.!EA

"he 0nited /tates took no official part in these meetings, but both the 9ritish and the 7rench kept the 0./. ambassador in ?aris, 8efferson Caffrey, fully informed. Caffrey reported to ;arshall that although there were difficulties in the discussion with ;olotov, the 9ritish and 7rench had let the /oviet foreign minister know that they were prepared to go ahead with full steam even if the /oviets refuse to do so. 9y ! 8uly, 9evin was predicting that the conference would soon break down.!E$ *n , 8uly, after consulting with /talin 4who had remained in ;oscow5, ;olotov reemphasi>ed the /oviet 0nion's refusal to accept the terms of the ;arshall ?lan. (t a meeting on A8uly, ;olotov predicted that &estern actions would result not in the unification or reconstruction of Europe but the division of Europe into two groups. "hat same day, 9evin and 9idault issued a )oint communi6uJ inviting !nd Page &(&$ twenty-two other European countries to send representatives to ?aris to consider the recovery plan. "he &estern bloc, as 9evin observed, was about to be born.!E% /oviet leaders considered a wrecking plan to disrupt the forthcoming ?aris conference. "he 9ritish and the 7rench had agreed that the European states would work out a common program and send it to &ashington for approval. /oviet officials planned to turn up for the conference, but then to leave, taking the East European delegations with them. In a telegram on %8uly, the /oviet government instructed the East European leaders to attend the conference but to stress their opposition to the ?lan. "his initiative, however, was dropped.!E+ (ccording to (nna 2i 9iagio, /oviet leaders worried that such a dramatic strategy might compel the East European leaders to choose between national economic interests and ideological loyalty to ;oscow. Evidently, /talin hesitated before trying to coerce all the East European states into such action, for fear that some of them might resist.!EC (t this stage, when the Communist parties did not yet have full control in some of the East European states, /oviet leaders could not be fully confident that their line would hold. "he ?aris conference duly collapsed, but the readiness of some of the East European governments, most notably the C>echoslovak government, to take part in the ;arshall ?lan 4even without the 0//15 spurred a forceful /oviet reaction. "he ;arshall ?lan was threatening to undermine cohesion in the East. "o be sure, opinions among the East European states about the ;arshall ?lan varied widely. "ito was adamantly opposed to the program, whereas the ?olish authorities displayed a considerable degree of interest.!EB However, it was C>echoslovakia's position that particularly worried /talin.!E# 7rom the beginning the ?rague government had been in favor of )oining the E1?. Even when C>echoslovak leaders were informed of ;oscow's re)ection of the ?lan, the C>echoslovak government led by :lement =ottwald and Edvard 9eneN decided to accept the invitation to attend the ?aris meeting.!!E ?olish leaders !nd Page &(($ signaled that they, too, would attend, and the 9ulgarians, Hungarians, and (lbanians also seemed to favor this option. (s is now well known, /talin e'erted enormous pressure on C>echoslovak leaders to reverse their decision. &hen 8an ;asaryk, the C>echoslovak foreign minister, visited ;oscow in early 8uly, he was threatened with draconian sanctions if his government continued to pursue the ;arshall ?lan.!!! "he C>echoslovak leaders duly submitted to /oviet pressure. *ddly, this momentous development caused little concern on the part of the (mericans. In an assessment of the outcome of the ?aris conference and the withdrawal of the /oviet 0nion and C>echoslovakia, 2ean (cheson remarked that once again =eneral =eorge ;arshall's )udgment and his luck combined to produce the desired result. !!, 9y 8uly, under pressure from ;oscow, the 1omanians, (lbanians, and ?oles had also declined the offer of (merican aid, and the 7inns did so as well. (ny hopes the /oviet 0nion once had of economic cooperation with the &est were effectively shelved. "he so-called ;olotov ?lan was proclaimed as a

response to the E1?, and it prompted swift efforts to coordinate economic activities among the East European states. 9y (ugust, the 0./. ambassador in 9elgrade was reporting that Iugoslavia had intensified its drive to coordinate economic and financial policies with other East European states. ?oland, too, began redirecting its foreign trade toward ;oscow.!!A In @ovember, =eorge ;arshall said he had believed all along that C>echoslovakia would not be permitted to )oin the ?lan.!!$ To1ard Cold War /ignificantly, the collapse of the ?aris conference, with all its implications for the future of East-&est relations, did not provoke doom and gloom on the &estern side. *n the contrary, &estern leaders were pleased that ;oscow's bluff had been called and that the /oviet delegation had withdrawn from the discussions. "he &estern powers could now get on with the )ob at hand without having to worry about /oviet obstructionism. "here was a sense of relief !nd Page &()$ that ;oscow had declined to participate, even though the likelihood of /oviet participation had never been particularly great. (s :ennan later admitted, one of the prices of /oviet participation would have been cooperation in overcoming real barriers in East-&est trade. /uch a move would have e'posed the war-ravaged /oviet economy to the much more powerful (merican economyF so in a sense we put the 1ussians over a barrel and when the full horror of KtheirL alternatives dawned on them, they left suddenly in the middle of the night. "he departure of the /oviet delegates did not much surprise 8an ;asaryk. &ith bitterness and resignation, he indicated that C>echoslovakia would be staying out of the ;arshall ?lan, partly because it would inevitably have led to the loss of /oviet control over Eastern Europe3the (merican goal all along3and partly because of the way the ?lan had been put together. He believed that the offer of aid to ?oland and C>echoslovakia had been genuine. 9ut the offer to the /oviet 0nion, the cru' of the matter as he called it, was the biggest piece of eyewash in the whole scheme. 2o you see "ruman and Congress forking out billions of dollars to enemy @umber *ne, Communist 1ussia, from whom we all have to be savedO "he answer, he concluded, was obvious.!!% &ith the ?aris conference over, /talin concluded3albeit reluctantly3 that the /oviet 0nion no longer could count on having serious economic relations with the &est or on avoiding the creation of a twobloc system in Europe. "he most immediate response was the tightening of /oviet control over the East European states and foreign Communist parties in general. "he political counterpart to both the "ruman doctrine and the ;arshall ?lan came with the announcement of the ;olotov ?lan and the formal establishment of the Communist Information 9ureau, or Cominform.!!+ In /eptember !#$C, representatives of the Communist parties of the /oviet 0nion, 9ulgaria, 1omania, C>echoslovakia, Hungary, ?oland, and Iugoslavia3as well as 7rance and Italy3met in />klarska ?oreba in ?oland to create an organi>ation to coordinate their activities. "he Cominform was at one level the successor to the Communist International 4Comintern5, which had been abolished in !#$AF but the first meeting of the new body, as =eoffrey 1oberts has noted, was a strictly European affair intended mainly to establish a political line for Eastern Europe in the wake of the ;arshall ?lan.!!C (t the conference, the delegates, even those from countries such as C>echoslovakia that had earlier e'pressed an interest in )oining the ;arshall ?lan, roundly condemned the !nd Page &(*$ (merican initiative. "his marked a return to the type of thinking that had been associated with ?olitburo member (ndrei Hhdanov3namely that of the militant two camps line. (pparently, the two-camp thesis made its way into Hhdanov's speech at a relatively late stage of the drafting process, indicating a degree of improvisation after the failure of the ;arshall ?lan conference.!!B

"he establishment of the Cominform had profound implications for the conduct of /oviet foreign policy vis-P-vis the &estern governments as well as Eastern Europe. (t the />klarska ?oreba conference, the 7rench and Italian Communists were critici>ed for their attempts to follow reformist strategies of national unity.!!# "he &est European Communist parties were discouraged from taking part in any form of coalition government or cooperating with other parties, and they were encouraged simply to be parties of opposition.!,E &hat chance did this opposition haveF and more precisely, how did the delegates at the Cominform conference rate their own chances of successO "here are two views on this matter. (ccording to &ilfried -oth, the new Cominform program was essentially an optimistic one. /oviet leaders believed that at this stage they could forestall the success of the ;arshall ?lan in &estern Europe through the encouragement of positive forces. -oth argues that for the duration of the conference /talin was convinced that the peoples of Europe would not accept the e'ploitation of (merican capital. !,! /talin also hoped that the restoration of =ermany would be unpalatable to both the 9ritish and the 7rench. "he /oviet dictator continued to assert that the division of Europe could be avoided through education, which would provide the ground for resistance in Europe against (merican-style economic enslavement. "his meant an intensification of strikes, demonstrations, and mass mobili>ations against capitalism but certainly not inter-bloc conflict. (s Hhdanov noted at the conference< If only two million people bellow, they Kthe 7renchL would chase out the (mericans and the English. -ater we will see if any coalitions are possible. !,, "his interpretation has not gone unchallenged. 2i 9iagio agrees that the tone of the conference was initially upbeat and enlivened by the view that the;arshall ?lan might fail in the same way that the 2awes plan did in the !nd Page &(+$ !#,Es. 9ut she contends that this assessment did not carry over into the program adopted by the end of the conference. "he final program, she argues, was aggressive in tone but lacking in inner confidence. (lthough it called on the Communist parties in &estern Europe to abandon their previous gradualism and adopt a line of militant opposition to the ;arshall ?lan, few if any of the participants truly believed that this would thwart the E1?.!,A (s it turned out, the new aggressive line had the opposite impact of what was intended. In the 0nited /tates the hardening of the Iron Curtain helped mobili>e political support behind the ;arshall ?lan. In Europe it provided a new sense of urgency, and it put the Communist parties in the untenable position of opposing the vast 6uantities of (merican aid that could improve ordinary people's lives. (t the Cominform meeting, the discussions focused on the thorny issue of =ermany. "he /oviet delegation made clear its own position and pressed for the establishment of a united, demilitari>ed, and democratic =ermany.!,$ However, the failure of the C7; meeting in -ondon in @ovember-2ecember !#$C, and the subse6uent 7rankfurt resolutions, left no doubt that the &est would not agree to such a thing and was intent on creating a &est =erman state. (ny hopes on the /oviet side for a great-power condominium over =ermany had disintegrated by the end of !#$C. ;olotov linked the advent of the ;arshall aid scheme to the permanent division of =ermany and the economic reinvigoration of the &estern >ones under (merican domination.!,% "he promise of 0./. assistance to the &estern >ones of =ermany under the ;arshall ?lan had a far-reaching impact in the /oviet >one. "he leaders of the /ocialist 0nity ?arty of =ermany 4/E2, the Communist party5 were becoming increasingly concerned about the deterioration of economic conditions and the surge of popular resentment against reparations payments to the /oviet 0nion. In a message sent directly to /talin, /E2 leaders argued that the promised dollars from the (mericans were having a powerful effect among the working masses and had raised hopes of finding a way to end the everyday suffering in the /oviet >one of =ermany. !,+ (s

has been noted elsewhere, the prospect of the &estern >ones' participation in the ;arshall plan made the reparations payments from the /oviet >one seem increasingly unbearable.!,C "he /E2 therefore wanted a halt to the /oviet 0nion's dismantling !nd Page &(,$ of industrial facilities and the provision by ;oscow of economic aid to alleviate suffering. (bove all, the provision of 0./. aid to the &estern >ones undermined any plans the /E2 may have had to push for an all-=erman solution.!,B "he leaders of the /E2 were correct in predicting that the creation of two economic and political blocs inherent in the ;arshall ?lan would result in the division of =ermany along the Elbe.!,# /talin briefly took heart from the disputes that erupted when the three &estern occupying powers met in -ondon in 7ebruary !#$B to discuss the form of the new &est =erman state, and he implemented a mini-blockade over 9erlin for two days in ;arch and (pril. @onetheless, /oviet pressure and suggestions for top-level discussions with the (mericans proved futile. /talin's final gamble to blockade 9erlin in 8une !#$B also failed to dent &estern resolve.!AE "he repercussions for Eastern and Central Europe were immense. "he change in /oviet strategy was radical and was marked by a series of bilateral treaties that were imposed on the East-European states. "he first of these was concluded with 1omania on $ 7ebruary !#$B. "wo weeks later the /oviet 0nion signed a nearly identical treaty with Hungary. "he following month, /oviet and 9ulgarian leaders adopted a "reaty of 7riendship and ;utual Co-operation. (ll these documents contained clauses outlining the duties of both parties in the event of a military conflict, particularly if it resulted from =erman aggression. "he primary /oviet concern was the establishment of a military-political coalition in the &estern >ones of =ermany. /oviet writers e'plicitly linked the two issues. (t the beginning of !#$B the 0//1 concluded treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with 1omania, Hungary, 9ulgaria, and 7inland, fully corresponding to the goals and principles of the 0nited @ations *rgani>ation and having great significance for strengthening peace and security in Europe.... "ogether with them the /oviet 0nion continued its efforts to prevent the shameful conse6uences of the policy of the &estern powers in relation to =ermany. !A! "he process of consolidation following the ;arshall ?lan also had an impact in northern Europe, sparked by 7innish interest in )oining the E1?. *n ,,7ebruary !#$B, /talin sent a letter to 7innish ?resident 8uho ?aasikivi proposing !nd Page &(#$ a /oviet-7innish treaty. "he /oviet leader directly alluded to the bilateral treaty with Hungary as a possible model. He suggested that the treaty provide for mutual assistance against a possible attack by =ermany. ;olotov described the treaty as a )oint defense pact. (t the time there was widespread concern in both 7inland and the &est that ;oscow intended to swallow 7inland. ?aasikivi feared, at least initially, that /talin's intention was to bring 7inland under /oviet military control and into a Communist bloc. &estern diplomats believed that /talin was pursuing a policy of East European military integration.!A, It was in C>echoslovakia that /talin took the most radical measures of all. &ith the backing of the /oviet (rmy, the C>echoslovak Communist ?arty engineered the removal of 9eneN's coalition government and installed itself in power.!AA "he Communist takeover in C>echoslovakia led to a brief war scare in the 0nited /tates and eliminated any remaining congressional ob)ections to the ;arshall ?lan.!A$ "he fears, though perhaps somewhat overblown, were real enough, as intelligence reports at the time seemed to indicate.!A% In a notable understatement, a 0./. official commented that the possibility of reaching agreement with the /oviet 0nion had been much reduced. !A+ @one of this really came as much of a surprise to other (merican officials, least of all =eorge :ennan. He had predicted that once

the /oviet 0nion re)ected the terms laid down in 8uly !#$C a period of /turm und 2rang would ensue, as /oviet officials resorted to belligerent rhetoric and moved 6uickly to consolidate their control over Eastern Europe. "he task for (merican diplomacy, as he saw it, was to ride out the storm, e'plain why it was happening, and advise those in power not to allow all this to upset their nerve by responding in such a way that would reinforce the status 6uo in Europe. "his may have been sound advice, but, as :ennan soon discovered, few high-level officials were ready or willing to listen to such words of reassurance and calm. "he die had already been cast. !nd Page &(%$ Concl2sion &e began this paper with a brief tour of the historiography of the Cold &ar. It is therefore fitting that we conclude by asking once again what the events of !#$C-!#$B actually mean for the way historians3 including the new traditionalists3have tried to make sense of the origins of the Cold &ar. "o answer this 6uestion it is perhaps worth looking at an assessment made by 8ohn =addis in his earlier postrevisionist phase. In his )ustly famous The nited States and the !rigins of the Cold War "#$"%"#$&, =addis discussed the unavoidable issue of Cold &ar responsibility< If one must assign responsibility for the Cold &ar, the most meaningful way to proceed is to ask which side had the greater opportunity to accommodate itself, at least in part, to the other's position, given the range of alternatives as they appeared at the time. 1evisionists have argued that (merican policy-makers possessed greater freedom of action, but their view ignores the constraints imposed by domestic politics. -ittle is known even today about how /talin defined his options, but it does seem safe to say that the very nature of the /oviet system afforded him a larger selection of alternatives than were open to leaders of the 0nited /tates. "he 1ussian dictator was immune from pressures of Congress, public opinion, or the press. Even ideology did not restrict him< /talin was the master of communist doctrine, not a prisoner of it, and could modify or suspend ;ar'ism--eninism whenever it suited him to do so. "his is not to say that /talin wanted a Cold &ar3he had every reason to avoid one. 9ut his absolute powers did give him more chances to surmount the internal restraints on his policy than were available to his democratic counterparts in the &est.!AC "his is an interesting and multifaceted assessment of the comparable positions of the /oviet 0nion and the 0nited /tates in the early postwar period, and it is an especially useful framework through which to view the ;arshall ?lan. =addis in !#C, rightly saw the origins of the Cold &ar as a complicated issue 4a position he now seems to have abandoned5 and raised the critical 6uestion of options and opportunities. &e agree with the way he addressed the issue. @onetheless, even his earlier, more nuanced conclusion is misleading. In !#C,, it may well have seemed that the autocratic /talin had more room for maneuverF and no doubt some would still make this argument today. 9ut despotism should not be e6uated with freedom of action. "he totalitarian nature of the system did not permit /talin the lu'ury of overcoming the limits of the /oviet system any more than he could wish away the huge 4and as it turned out insuperable5 problem of controlling allies such as "ito. @aturally, !nd Page &("$ all rulers, including those in democratic countries, work within a set of constraints. "ruman faced a difficult Congress, a hostile press, a divided 2emocratic ?arty, and a budget he knew he had to balance. 9ut the sorts of difficulties /talin faced at the time were much more severe. "he (merican system set limits on what "ruman could do, but "ruman did not face the terrible problem of having to reconstruct a teetering economy in a country that had )ust lost ,C million people. "he (merican economy was not in crisis in !#$C, despite .arga's )eremiads to the contrary. In fact, it is somewhat strange that in the same year

.arga was confidently predicting an (merican recession, the 0//1 itself was in the midst of a real recession and was also plagued by famine. @or did "ruman face the problem of violent nationalist insurgencies, as /talin did in the 9altic states and western 0kraine.!AB "he e'istence of these problems does not mean that the /oviet system would have been less brutal under better circumstances. @or does it mean that /oviet leaders would have been pro-&estern or would have cut off support for Communist ?arties abroad. 9ut the constraints did make /oviet leaders cautious in their dealings with the powerful, nuclear-armed 0nited /tates. (s .o)tech ;astny has argued, the ;arshall ?lan not only was deeply subversive of /talin's concept of international order, but also shifted onto /talin the burden of deciding whether he would allow his East European clients to accept the (merican aid. He had the unenviable choice of either risking the intrusion of &estern influences ... or insulating the sphere. !A# In the end, with great reluctance, /talin chose the latter course of action. /oviet insecurity might also help e'plain something else we have e'amined here, namely, /talin's desire through the first part of !#$C to maintain at least some sort of dialogue with the 0nited /tates. He seemed to be more than willing to cooperate with the &est over a range of issues and indeed appeared to envisage a postwar situation in which great-power collaboration3or, more precisely, condominium3 would have been the norm, not the e'ception.!$E "his was certainly the case in =ermany, where /talin did not seek the creation of what became the "ri>one. "o be sure, /talin viewed contacts and connections with the &est with great suspicion. He feared that these contacts, if mediated through a central European organi>ation, could undermine Communist influence in the East. /oviet officials had argued from the outset that a !nd Page &)'$ 0nited /tates of Europe was possible only for the purpose of suppressing socialism in Europe. !$! "he trick for /talin therefore was to secure economic and political aid but not to compromise /oviet security interests.!$, "he problem was that this ambition ran afoul of 0./. planning for the application of the ;arshall ?lan to Eastern Europe. "he e'plicit purpose of the 0./. proposal was to mitigate /oviet influence in Central and Eastern Europe within a more general strategic framework of rolling back Communism to its original prewar frontiers. "he tragedy, in our view, was that in working so conspicuously to achieve this goal, the 0nited /tates actually made /ovieti>ation of the region more or less inevitable. "he 0./. government was supported in this venture by 9ritish leaders, who like their (merican counterparts sought to pull the East Europeans away from the 0//1 without apparently reali>ing that such a frontal challenge was likely to make the situation worse by posing a threat to /oviet security.!$A (s we have seen, /oviet intentions toward the East European states were far less clear in !#$C than traditional accounts imply. "his aspect of Cold &ar studies3the e'periences of the East European states in !#$%-!#$B3is in need of much greater analysis. Churchill in !#$+ spoke about the Iron Curtain dividing Europe, but, as /oviet reactions to the ;arshall ?lan indicate, the division of Europe was not what /talin was seeking. (s 2i 9iagio in particular has shown, /oviet leaders could still envisage serious economic ties between the two parts of Europe. "his possibility, however, had to be balanced against fears that &estern economic penetration might undermine Communist influence in the East, turning the Central and East European economies away from ;oscow. /uch fears were especially salient with regard to the /oviet >one of =ermany, where even the prospect of 0./. aid had provided a much-needed boost to popular morale. "he subse6uent e'clusion of eastern =ermany from the aid program had dramatic social and economic conse6uences.!$$ 0p to the time that 0./. assistance began flowing to the &estern >ones of =ermany, /oviet leaders were still hoping for cooperation under the banner of the 6uadripartite agreements.

"his brings us to the knotty issue of economic aid to Eastern Europe. *ne of the perennial debates in Cold &ar historiography has revolved around !nd Page &)&$ two 6uestions relating to this issue< 7irst, where does responsibility lie for consigning Eastern and Central Europe to CommunismO /econd, could Eastern Europe have escaped /oviet dominationO &estern policymakers in !#$C seemed to believe that they could save at least some of the East and Central European states. *ne suspects, however, that many East European citi>ens feared that their fate was already sealed. "his also appears to be the underlying assumption of some historians currently working on the Cold &ar. Iet, our e'amination of /oviet reactions to the ;arshall ?lan suggests that a more fle'ible operation of the 0./. program might have curbed the momentum toward /talini>ation in the East. "he problem was that the chief (merican concern was the reconstruction of democratic &est European countries, rather than the plight of the East Europeans. /imilarly, the 9ritish and 7rench were intent on ensuring 0./. support for economic recovery in &estern Europe, an ob)ective that in their view presupposed the e'clusion of the /oviet 0nion from the E1?.!$% @onetheless, the 6uestion remains< &ould /talin really have been prepared to accept any form of (merican conditionally attached to aidO "he answer depends of course on the conditions themselves and the e'tent to which they would have impinged on the integrity of the /oviet system or on /oviet relations with Eastern Europe. Here /talin was caught on the horns of an obvious dilemma. *n the one hand, he had every reason to want 0./. aidF on the other, the fragility of /oviet control over Eastern Europe and the many weaknesses of his own command economy meant that he could never be confident about the ability of the /oviet system to withstand e'ternal scrutiny or to compete with what the (mericans had to offer in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the argument could be made that one of the reasons /talin had to refuse the ;arshall ?lan was not that he was blinded by his own ideological opposition to capitalism or even by a romantic attachment to the idea of revolution, but that he was deeply fearful of the strength and lure of capitalism. &hat increased this fear was the attempt by the 0nited /tates to e'ploit its economic superiority not only to revive &estern Europe but also to lure Eastern Europe back into the &estern camp. 7aced with such an adversary, /talin may have felt that he had little choice but to retreat into his political lair, draw in his security blanket in the shape of a newly created Communist Eastern Europe, mobili>e his e'ternal support, and order (ndrei Hhdanov to promote !nd Page &)($ the two-camp thesis as loudly as possible. (s a result of the ;arshall ?lan, /talin moved ahead with the Cominform and re)ected any idea that Communist parties in Eastern and Central Europe could or should act independently through individual paths to socialism.!$+ "his volte-face did little to aid the path of political development in the East, but that was because it was a strategy born not of self-confidence or even desire, but of weakness and insecurity.!$C 2mitrii .olkogonov argues that /talin was acutely aware of the dearth of state funds, state gold, and state valuables throughout the postwar period, a constraint that limited ;oscow's ability to fund the activities of foreign Communist parties. *n occasion the /oviet dictator was not above asking the Chinese Communist ?arty for contributions to the maintenance of the international Communist movement. &hereas the 0nited /tates could amply afford to fund the new Central Intelligence (gency, /talin had to divert money from the poorest in his own land to foment opposition to capitalism elsewhere.!$B "his is not, it should be stressed, a frivolous point. 7or those within the /oviet bloc, the human costs of the pursuit of the Cold &ar were high indeed. "he formation of the /oviet bloc at the very time that a &estern bloc was emerging was no coincidence.!$# @or is it an accident that the &estern bloc survived long after the /oviet bloc

disappeared. "o be sure, nothing is inevitable. 7ew scholars of international relations anticipated the demise of /oviet power in Eastern Europe in !#B#. @onetheless, it would not be too fanciful to argue that the roots of the /oviet bloc's dissolution can be traced back to the way the bloc was put together in the first place3in haste, without much enthusiasm or legitimacy, and as an option of last resort. "he contrast with the 0./. e'perience could not be more stark. "he democratically elected governments in &estern Europe were eager to establish close ties with the 0nited /tates, and they did their best to ensure a strong 0./. presence in Europe. It is therefore not surprising that the &estern bloc outlived its competitor. &hether the Cold &ar might have been avoided if 0./. leaders had acted more cautiously and had taken greater account of /oviet security concerns remains an open 6uestion. Historians are not re6uired to think of alternatives or to dwell too long on counterfactuals. .o)tech ;astny has argued with great certainty that the ;arshall ?lan was not the turning point it was later made !nd Page &))$ out to be for the /oviet 0nion, but we are far less certain.!%E If we accept that history is not predetermined and that different outcomes are always feasible, we are bound to wonder what might have happened in Europe if, despite the urging of the 9ritish and 7rench, the 0nited /tates had tried to keep the door open to ;oscow or at least had tried to keep it open longer rather than shutting it with such finality in the spring and summer of !#$C. Ironically, if the 0nited /tates had more consistently pursued an *pen 2oor strategy3the very strategy that the radical historian &illiam (ppleman &illiams had always insisted was the basic cause of the Cold &ar3it is possible that the East-&est conflict might have been less intense or, perhaps, might have been avoided altogether. "his surely was the real tragedy of (merican diplomacy in the year !#$C. 'ichael Co( is a professor of international relations at the 0niversity of -ondon. Caroline )ennedy%*ipe is a professor of politics at the 0niversity of /taffordshire. 3ootnotes !. E. H. Carr, What +s ,istory- 4-ondon< ;acmillan, !#+!5. ,. "he primary and secondary literature on revisionism is of course huge. "he most obvious starting point for &illiam (ppleman &illiams is his )ustly famous The Tragedy of American .iplomacy/ 7irst published by a small @ew Iork company in !#%#, it went on to be reprinted twice 4in !#+, and !#C,5 and soon became a national best-seller. 7or background, see ?aul ;. 9uhle and Edward 1ice-;a'imin, William Appleman Williams0 The Tragedy of Empire 4@ew Iork< 1outledge, !##%5. /ee also 9radford ?erkins, "he "ragedy of (merican 2iplomacy< "wenty-7ive Iears (fter, 1e2iews in American ,istory, .ol. !,, @o. ! 4;arch !#B$5, pp.!-!B. A. 8ohn -ewis =addis, The nited States and the !rigins of the Cold War "#$"%"#$& 4@ew Iork< Columbia 0niversity ?ress, !#C,5. /ee also 8ohn -ewis =addis, "he Emerging ?ost-1evisionist /ynthesis on the *rigins of the Cold &ar, .iplomatic ,istory, .ol. C, @o. A 4/ummer !#BA5, pp.!C!!#E. $. *n Eisenberg's own contribution to the early revisionist canon, see her 0./. ?olicy in ?ost-&ar =ermany< the Conservative 1estoration, Science and Society, .ol. $+, @o. , 4/pring !#B,5, pp.,$-AB. Her most developed contribution to the revisionist cause remains Carolyn Eisenberg, .rawing the 3ine0

The American .ecision to .i2ide 4ermany, "#$$%"#$# 4Cambridge, 0:< Cambridge 0niversity ?ress, !##+5. %. /ee ;ichael Co', ed., 1ethinking the So2iet Collapse0 So2ietology, the .eath of Communism, and the New 1ussia 4-ondon< ?inter ?ublishers, !##B5. +. *dd (rne &estad, /ecrets of the /econd &orld< "he 1ussian (rchives and the 1einterpretation of Cold &ar History, .iplomatic ,istory, .ol. ,!, @o. , 4/pring !##C5, pp.,%#-,C!. /ee more generally, /ymposium< /oviet (rchives31ecent 1evelations and Cold &ar Historiography, .iplomatic ,istory, .ol. ,!, @o. , 4/pring !##C5, pp.,!C-AE%. C. /ee ;ark :ramer, (rchival 1esearch in ;oscow< ?rogress and ?itfalls, Cold War +nternational ,istory *ro5ect 6ulletin, @o. A 47all !##A5, pp.!, ,!-$$, esp.A!-A$F 8ames =. Hershberg, /oviet (rchives< "he *pening 2oor, Cold War +nternational ,istory *ro5ect 6ulletin, @o. ! 4/pring !##,5, p.!F and 8onathan Haslam, 1ussian (rchives and *ur 0nderstanding of the Cold &ar, .iplomatic ,istory, .ol. ,!, @o. , 4!##C5, p.,!C. B. 8ohn -ewis =addis, We Now )now0 1ethinking Cold War ,istory 4*'ford< Clarendon ?ress, !##C5. #. :athleen 9urk, "he ;arshall ?lan< 7illing in /ome of the 9lanks, Contemporary European ,istory, .ol. !E, @o. , 48uly ,EE!5, pp.,+C-,#$. !E. 9ernadette &helan, +reland and the 'arshall *lan "#$&%"#7& 42ublin< 7our Courts ?ress, ,EEE5. !!. /ee 8ournal of Cold War Studies, edited at Harvard 0niversity and published by ;I" ?ress since the beginning of !###F and Cold War ,istory, edited at the 0niversity of -ondon since (ugust ,EEE. !,. /ee =eir -undestad, How 4@ot5 to /tudy the *rigins of the Cold &ar, in *dd (rne &estad, ed., 1e2iewing the Cold War0 Approaches, +nterpretations, Theory 4-ondon< 7rank Cass, ,EEE5, p.C%. !A. 7or some of the more recent e'amples of the new orthodo'y, see 9eatrice Heuser, @/C +B and the /oviet "hreat< ( @ew ?erspective on &estern "hreat ?erceptions and ?olicy ;aking, 1e2iew of +nternational Studies, .ol. !C, @o. ! 48anuary !##!5, pp.!C-$EF 2ouglas 8. ;c2onald, Communist 9loc E'pansion in the Early Cold &ar< Challenging 1ealism, 1efuting 1evisionism, +nternational Security, .ol. ,E, @o. A 4&inter !##%5, pp.!%,-!CBF Eduard ;ark, "he &ar /care of !#$+ and Its Conse6uences, .iplomatic ,istory, .ol. ,!, @o. A 48uly !##C5, pp.ABA-$!%. /ee also Harvey :lehr, 8ohn Earl Haynes, and 7ridrikh 7irsov, eds., The Secret World of American Communism 4@ew Haven< Iale 0niversity ?ress, !##%5F and 1. C. 1aack, Stalin9s .ri2e to the West "#:;%"#$70 The !rigins of the Cold War 4/tanford, C(< /tanford 0niversity ?ress, !##%5. !$. /ee 8ames Chace, Acheson0 The Secretary of State Who Created the American World 4@ew Iork< /imon Q /chuster, !##B5, pp.!%+-!+#. !%. -undestad, How 4@ot5 to /tudy the *rigins of the Cold &ar, p.C%.

!+. /am "anenhaus, "he 1ed /care, New York 1e2iew of 6ooks, .ol. $+, @o. ! 4!$ 8anuary !###5, pp.$$-$B. /ee also his heated e'change with several of the better-known (merican revisionist historians of the Cold &ar in "he 1ed /care< (n E'change, New York 1e2iew of 6ooks, .ol. $+, @o. + 4B(pril !###5, pp.C%-C+. !C. ;elvyn ?. -effler, Inside Enemy (rchives< "he Cold &ar 1eopened, Foreign Affairs, .ol. C%, @o., 48uly (ugust !##+5, p.!,,F and ;elvyn ?. -effler, "he Cold &ar< &hat 2o &e @ow :now, American ,istorical 1e2iew, .ol. !E$, @o. , 4(pril !###5, pp.%E!-%,$. !B. 7or a sample of some of the more recent work on the 0//1 and the ;arshall ?lan, see .ladislav Hubok and Constantine ?leshakov, +nside the )remlin9s Cold War 4Cambridge, ;(< Harvard 0niversity ?ress, !##+5, pp.#B-!A#F and .o)tech ;astny, The Cold War and So2iet +nsecurity0 The Stalin Years 4@ew Iork< *'ford 0niversity ?ress, !##+5, pp.,A-,#. /ee also /cott ?arrish and ;ikhail ;. @arisnky, @ew Evidence on the /oviet 1e)ection of the ;arshall ?lan, !#$C< "wo 1eports, &orking ?aper @o. #, Cold &ar International History ?ro)ect, &ashington, 2C, ;arch !##$F /cott ?arrish, "he ;arshall ?lan, /oviet-(merican 1elations, and the 2ivision of Europe, in @orman @aimark and -eonid =ibianski, eds., The Esta<lishment of Communist 1egimes in Eastern Europe, "#$$%"#$# 49oulder< &estview ?ress, !##C5, pp.,+C-A!,F and =eoffrey 1oberts, ;oscow and the ;arshall ?lan< ?olitics, Ideology and the *nset of Cold &ar, !#$C, Europe%Asia Studies, .ol. $+, @o. B 42ecember !##$5, pp.!AC!-!AB+F and /ilvio ?ons, Stalin and the +ne2ita<le War 4-ondon< 7rank Cass, ,EE,5. !#. /ignificantly, the one ma)or attempt in the past to think about the ;arshall ?lan in new ways was by a 9ritish historian. /ee (lan ;ilward, The 1econstruction of Western Europe, "#$7%"#7" 4-ondon< ;ethuen, !#B$5. His efforts, however, did little to impress (mericans. /ee the rebuttal in ;ichael 8. Hogan, The 'arshall *lan0 America, 6ritain, and the 1econstruction of Western Europe, "#$&%"#7= 4Cambridge, 0:< Cambridge 0niversity ?ress, !#BC5, pp.$A!-$A,. ,E. /ee, for e'ample, 7orrest ?ogue, 4eorge C/ 'arshall0 Statesman, "#$7%"#$# 4@ew Iork< .iking, !#BC5F and Ed Cray, 4eorge C/ 'arshall, Soldier and Statesman 4@ew Iork< &.&. @orton, !##E5. ,!. /ee 2iane 9. :un>, "he ;arshall ?lan 1econsidered< ( Comple' of ;otives, in ?eter =rose, ed., The 'arshall *lan and +ts 3egacy 4@ew Iork< Council on 7oreign 1elations, !##C5, p.!A. ,,. =addis, We Now )now, pp.,#,-,#$. ,A. ;astny, The Cold War and So2iet +nsecurity, p.,C. /ee also pp.,A-,$. ,$. "here is of course a problem with any e'ercise that seeks to highlight the comple'ities of /talinist foreign policymaking. @ot the least of these is that any attempt to interpret the rather narrow parameters of /oviet policy options can lead to the charge of )ustifying /oviet behavior. "his is certainly not the intention here. "he tragedies and brutality of the /oviet system cannot be glossed over. 7or the problems of working on /talinist policy, see /tephen 7. Cohen, 1ethinking the So2iet E(perience0 *olitics and ,istory Since "#"& 4@ew Iork< *'ford 0niversity ?ress, !#B%5, pp.A!-AB. ,%. "he others we have in mind here are =eorge :ennan and E. H. Carr, the 9ritish historian of early /oviet 1ussia. 7or an e'amination of their oddly similar views about /oviet foreign policy, see ;ichael

Co', 1e6uiem for a Cold &ar Critic< "he 1ise and 7all of =eorge 7. :ennan, !#$+-!#%E, +rish Sla2onic Studies, @o. !! 4!##E-!##!5, pp.!-A+F and ;ichael Co', &ill the 1eal E. H. Carr ?lease /tand 0pO +nternational Affairs, .ol. C%, @o. A 48uly !###5, pp.+$A-+%A. ,+. *n the making of /oviet foreign policy, see .ladislav Hubok, /oviet Intelligence and the Cold &ar< "he '/mall' Committee of Information, !#%,-%A, .iplomatic ,istory, .ol. !E, @o. , 48uly !##%5, pp.$%A-$C,. ,C. 7or a more detailed discussion of /oviet foreign policy in this period see Caroline :ennedy-?ipe, Stalin9s Cold War0 So2iet Strategies in Europe, "#$:%"#7> 4;anchester, 0:< ;anchester 0niversity ?ress, !##%5. ,B. Hubok and ?leshakov, +nside the )remlin9s Cold War, p.A#. /ee also .ladislav Hubok and Constantine ?leshakov "he /oviet 0nion, in 2avid 1eynolds, ed., The !rigins of the Cold War in Europe0 +nternational *erspecti2e 4@ew Haven< Iale 0niversity ?ress, !##$5, p.+E. ,#. His e'act phrase is the 0nwanted Cold &ar. ;astny argues that the Cold &ar was both unintended and une'pectedF it was, though, he argues, predetermined. /ee ;astny, The Cold War and So2iet +nsecurity, p.,A. AE. 7or reflections on the costs of the Cold &ar to the /oviet 0nion, see ;ikhail =orbachev, !n 'y Country and the World 4@ew Iork< Columbia 0niversity ?ress, ,EEE5. A!. /ee 1obert 8ervis, &as the Cold &ar a /ecurity 2ilemmaO 8ournal of Cold War Studies, .ol. A, @o. ! 4&inter ,EE!5, pp.A+-+E. A,. /ee, for e'ample, ?eter =rose, !peration 1oll<ack? America9s Secret War <ehind the +ron Curtain 4@ew Iork< Houghton ;ifflin, ,EEE5F and =regory ;itrovich, ndermining the )remlin0 American Strategy to Su<2ert the So2iet 6loc, "#$&%"#7> 4Ithaca< Cornell 0niversity ?ress, ,EEE5. /ee also the claims that the E1? contained operatives from the CI( in /allie ?isani, The C+A and the 'arshall *lan 4Edinburgh< Edinburgh 0niversity ?ress, !##!5. *n the very positive propaganda campaign waged by the (mericans over the benefits of ;arshall (id, see Hans-8Rrgen /chrSder, ;arshall ?lan ?ropaganda in (ustria and &estern =ermany, in =Rnter 9ischof, (nton ?elinka, and 2ieter /tiefel, eds., The 'arshall *lan in Austria 4@ew 9runswick, @8< "ransaction ?ublishers, ,EEE5. AA. &illiam "aubman, Stalin9s American *olicy0 From Entente to .@tente to Cold War 4@ew Iork< &. &. @orton Q Company, !#B!5, p.!CA. A$. &illiam Cromwell, "he ;arshall ?lan, 9ritain and the Cold &ar, 1e2iew of +nternational Studies, .ol. B, @o. $ 4*ctober !#B,5, pp.,AA-,$#. A%. Henry ?elling, 6ritain and the 'arshall *lan 4-ondon< ;acmillan, !#BB5. A+. /cott ?arrish and ;ikhail ;. @arinsky, @ew Evidence on the /oviet 1e)ection of the ;arshall ?lan, !#$C< "wo 1eports, C&IH? &orking ?aper @o. # 4&ashington, 2C< Cold &ar International History ?ro)ect, ;arch !##$5, p.$,.

AC. &ilfried -oth, Stalin9s nwanted Child0 The So2iet nion, the 4erman Auestion and the Founding of the 4.1 4-ondon< ;acmillan, !##B5, p.+%F (lan 9ullock, Ernest 6e2in0 Foreign Secretary "#$7% "#7" 4-ondon< Heinemann, !#BA5, pp.$E%-,CF and 7eliks Chuev, ed., Sto sorok s 'oloto2ym0 +B dne2nika F/ Chue2a 4;oscow< "erra, !##!5, p.BB, 6uoted in ;ikhail @arinsky, /oviet 7oreign ?olicy and the *rigins of the Cold &ar, in =abriel =orodetsky, ed., So2iet Foreign *olicy, "#"&%"##"0 A 1etrospecti2e 4-ondon< 7rank Cass, !##$5, p.!EB. AB. ;elvyn -effler, A *reponderance of *ower0 National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War 4/tanford, C(< /tanford 0niversity ?ress, !##,5. /ee also &illiam Curti &ohlforth, The Elusi2e 6alance0 *ower and *erceptions during the Cold War 4Ithaca, @I< Cornell 0niversity ?ress, !##A5. A#. 1oberts, ;oscow and the ;arshall ?lan, pp.!AB!-!ABA. $E. /ee ;ark :ramer's definitive statement on this in his Ideology and the Cold &ar, 1e2iew of +nternational Studies, .ol. ,%, @o. $ 4*ctober !###5, pp.%A#-%C+. /ee also @igel =ould-2avies, 1ethinking the 1ole of Ideology in International ?olitics during the Cold &ar, 8ournal of Cold War Studies, .ol. !, @o. ! 4&inter !###5, pp.#E-!E#. $!. 7or an early e'ample of an official history of the ;arshall ?lan published under the auspices of the =overnmental (ffairs Institute in &ashington, 2C, see Harry 9ayard ?rice, The 'arshall *lan and +ts 'eaning 4Ithaca< Cornell 0niversity ?ress, !#%%5. 7or a later e'ample, see Charles ?. :indleberger, 'arshall *lan .ays 49oston< =eorge (llen Q 0nwin, !#BC5. $,. /ee, for e'ample, Hadley (rkes, 6ureaucracy, The 'arshall *lan and the National +nterest 4?rinceton, @8< ?rinceton 0niversity ?ress, !#C,5F and 8ohn =imbel, The !rigins of the 'arshall *lan 4/tanford, C(< /tanford 0niversity ?ress, !#C+5. $A. /ee, above all, Hogan, The 'arshall *lan/ 7or a summary of the literature, see ;elvyn ?. -effler, "he 0nited /tates and the /trategic 2imensions of the ;arshall ?lan, .iplomatic ,istory, .ol. !,, @o. A 48uly !##B5, pp.,CC-AE+. $$. Hogan, The 'arshall *lan, p.,C. "his view was shared by some on the /oviet side who perceived 0./. economic leadership in Europe as a prere6uisite for the survival of many &est European countries and of the 0nited /tates itself. /ee (leksandr .. :irsanov, The SA and Western Europe0 Economic 1elations after World War ++ 4;oscow< ?rogress, !#C%5. $%. 7or essential background on how the speech was formulated, see 2ean (cheson, *resent at the Creation0 'y Years in the State .epartment 4@ew Iork< &. &. @orton, !#+#5, pp.,,+-,A%. $+. 7or a discussion of the perceptions of 0./. policymakers regarding /oviet motivations and the vulnerability of &est European countries to political and economic implosion, see @otter to 1usk, !$ 8uly !#$C, in 0./. 2epartment of /tate, Foreign 1elations of the nited States, !#$C, .ol. .I, p.,!C 4hereinafter referred to as F1 S, with appropriate years and volume numbers5. /ee also Clayton ;emorandum, "he European Crisis, ,C ;ay !#$C, in F1 S, !#$C, .ol. III, p.,!C, 6uoted in 8ohn

-ewis =addis, The 3ong *eace0 +nCuiries into the ,istory of the Cold War 4@ew Iork< *'ford 0niversity ?ress, !#BC5, p.$!. $C. /ee /ir (lec Cairncross, "he ;arshall ?lan, paper presented at "he ;arshall ?lan and Its Conse6uences< ( %Eth (nniversary Conference, 0niversity of -eeds, -eeds, 0:, ,A-,$ ;ay !##C. $B. /talin appears to have believed that a Communist takeover in Italy was a serious possibility in !#$C. /ee (rkhiv ?re>identa 1ossiiskoi 7ederatsii 4(?175, 7ond 47.5 $%, *pis' 4*p.5 !, 2elo 42.5 A!#, -isty 4-l.5 $-C, 6uoted in 2mitri .olkogonov, The 1ise and Fall of the So2iet Empire0 *olitical 3eaders from 3enin to 4or<ache2 4-ondon< Harper Collins, !##B5. $#. /ee &alter -. Hi'son, 4eorge )ennan0 Cold War +conoclast 4@ew Iork< Columbia 0niversity ?ress, !#BB5. %E. (cheson, *resent at the Creation, p.,AA. %!. /ee &alter Isaacson and Evan "homas, The Wise 'en0 Si( Friends and the World That They 'ade 4@ew Iork< /imon Q /chuster, !#B+5, p.$!$. /ee also :ramer, Ideology and the Cold &ar. %,. :ennan to /ecretary of /tate, in F1 S !#$C, .ol. III, p.,,B. %A. /ee :indleberger's comments in /tanley Hoffmann and Charles /. ;aier, eds., The 'arshall *lan0 A 1etrospecti2e 49oulder< &estview ?ress, !#B$5, pp.,,-,A. %$. Charles :indleberger, 'arshall *lan .ays 49oston< (llen Q 0nwin, !#BC5, p.!EE. %%. Caffrey to /ecretary of /tate ;arshall, !B 8une !#$C, in F1 S, !#$C, .ol. III, p.,+EF and Clayton's memorandum, "he European Crisis, ,C ;ay !#$C, in F1 S, !#$C, .ol. III, p.,AE. /ee also Clayton's view that there would have to be a radical change in the 1ussian position regarding European recovery and other related matters <efore the American people would approve the e'tension of financial assistance to 1ussia. F1 S, !#$C, .ol. III, pp.,+B, ,CE, ,B$. %+. /ee =eorge 7. :ennan, 'emoirs, "#=7%"#7D 49oston< -ittle 9rown Q Co., !#C+5, p.$%,F and F1 S, !#$C, .ol. III, p.,A%. %C. 7or the best short account of this episode and its significance, see ?hilip Helikow, =eorge C. ;arshall and the ;oscow C7; ;eeting, .iplomacy and Statecraft, .ol. B, @o. , 48uly !##C5, pp.#C!,$. %B. /ee, for e'ample, .ictor 1othwell, 6ritain and the Cold War, "#$"%"#$& 4-ondon< ;acmillan, !#$C5. 7or an assessment of /oviet attitudes in the wake of the Ialta Conference, see also /ir 7rank 1oberts "he Ialta Conference, in =ill 9ennett, ed., The End of the War in Europe, "#$7 4-ondon< H;/*, !##+5, pp.%%-+!. 1oberts argues that /oviet behavior from !#$$ onward gave the 9ritish and the (mericans no choice but to proceed with the ;arshall ?lan and the (tlantic (lliance.

%#. 7or an assessment of the 9ritish part in the Cold &ar, see /ean =reenwood, 6ritain and the Cold War, "#$7%"##" 49asingstoke< ;acmillan, ,EEE5. +E. 7or an earlier and typically provocative discussion, see 2onald Cameron &att, 1ethinking the Cold &ar< ( -etter to a 9ritish Historian, The *olitical Auarterly, .ol. $#, @o. $ 4*ctober-2ecember !#CB5, pp.$$+-$%+F and ;ichael 7. Hopkins, ( 9ritish Cold &arO +ntelligence and National Security, .ol. C, @o. $ 4*ctober !##,5, pp.$C#-$B,. +!. /ee (nne 2eighton, The +mpossi<le *eace, 6ritain, the .i2ision of 4ermany, and the !rigins of the Cold War 4*'ford, 0:< Clarendon ?ress, !##E5, pp.!B,-!B#. +,. Tuoted in ?eter Hennessy, Ne2er Again 4-ondon< .intage, !##A5, p.,#+. +A. F1 S, !#$C, .ol. III, p.,$C, cited in 2eighton, The +mpossi<le *eace, p.!B!. +$. F1 S, !#$C, .ol. III, p.,$C. +%. Ibid. p.,C,. ++. Ibid. p.,#!. +C. F1 S, !#$C, .ol. III, p.,#E. +B. &ashington to 7oreign *ffice 47*5, ,% 8une !#$C, 1eport of /ecretary of /tate's .isit to ?aris, in 0nited :ingdom @ational (rchives 40:@(5, Cabinet ?apers, C(9 ,!U!C%#. +#. &ashington to 7*, ,% 8une !#$C, C(9 ,!U!C%#. CE. /ean =reenwood, 6ritain and the Cold War, "#$7%"#7" 4-ondon< ;acmillan, ,EEE5, p.$%. C!. 2eighton, The +mpossi<le *eace, p.!B%. C,. &illiam C. Cromwell, "he ;arshall @on-?lan, Congress and the /oviet 0nion, Western *olitical Auarterly, .ol. A,, @o. $ 42ecember !#C#5, p.$A$. CA. /cott 2. ?arrish "he "urn toward Confrontation< "he /oviet 1eaction to the ;arshall ?lan, !#$C, in ?arrish and @arinsky, @ew Evidence on the /oviet 1e)ection of the ;arshall ?lan F (nna 2i 9iagio, "he ;arshall ?lan and the 7ounding of the Cominform, 8une-/eptember !#$C, in 7rancesca =ori and /ilvio ?ons, eds., The So2iet nion and Europe in the Cold War, "#$:%7: 4-ondon< ;acmillan, !##+5, pp.,EB-,,!. C$. &illiam *. ;cCagg 8r., Stalin Em<attled, "#$:%"#$; 42etroit< &ayne /tate 0niversity ?ress, !#CB5, p.,+,. C%. F1 S, !#$C, .ol. I., p.%$$ n. ,. /ee also "aubman, Stalin9s American *olicy, p.!%%.

C+. ;emorandum of ,C ;arch !#$C, 1ef. B+!.EEUA-,C$C, in Confidential /S. State .epartment Central Files % So2iet nion0 +nternal Affairs, "#$7%"#$#, 1eel , 47rederick, ;2< 0niversity ?ublications of (merica, !#B%5. 7or 0./. embassy reports on the dire situation in the 0//1 from late !#$+ onward, see F1 S, !#$C, .ol. I., pp.%!%-%!C, %A%, %$$ n. ,. CC. /ee The Economist, A! ;ay !#$C, cited in 2eighton, The +mpossi<le *eace, p.!C$. CB. 2ays of 2ecision< *n *ur 1ussian ?olicy, The New York Times, # ;arch !#$C, p. E!. C#. F1 S, !#$C, .ol. I., p.%A%. BE. Tuoted in @arinsky, /oviet 7oreign ?olicy and the *rigins of the Cold &ar, p.!E+. /ee also =eoffrey 1oberts, The So2iet nion in World *olitics0 Coe(istence, 1e2olution and Cold War, "#$7% "##" 4-ondon< 1outledge, !##B5 p.,A. B!. F1 S, !#$C, .ol. II, pp.A$E-A$!. B,. Ibid., pp.A$A-A$$. BA. *n /talin's optimism concerning the future of cooperation with the &est, see (le'ander &erth, 1ussia0 The *ost%War Years 4@ew Iork< "aplinger, !#C!5. /ee also 8. .. /talin, Sochineniya, .ol. A 4!+5, !#$+ %"#7: 4/tanford, C(< Hoover Institution ?ress, !#+C5, pp.C%-CC. B$. Hubok and ?leshakov, +nside the )remlin9s Cold War, pp.!E!-!EA. B%. 7or recent disclosures about ;olotov, see (le'ander *. Chubaryan and .ladimir *. ?echatnov, ;olotov, '"he -iberal'< /talin's !#$% Criticism of His 2eputy, Cold War ,istory, .ol. !, @o. ! 4(ugust ,EEE5, pp.!,#-!$E. B+. Hubok and ?leshakov, +nside the )remlin9s Cold War, pp.!E,-!EA. BC. .arga's view that some form of economic cooperation with the 0nited /tates was possible was not discredited until !#$#. In (pril !#$# the )ournal Eoprosy ekonomiki printed transcripts of a session of the -earned Council of the Economics Institute of the 0//1 (cademy of /ciences that severely critici>ed .arga. BB. 1eport of (cademician .arga to 7oreign ;inister ;olotov, ,$ 8une !#$C, (rkhiv vneshnei politiki 1ossiiskoi 7ederatsii 4(.? 175, 7. +, *p.#, 2. ,!A, -l. ,!%, cited in @arinsky, /oviet 7oreign ?olicy and the *rigins of the Cold &ar, p.!EB. /ee also ?arrish, "he ;arshall ?lan and the 2ivision of Europe, pp.,CC-,C#. B#. @ovikov to ;olotov, cited in ?arrish, "he "urn toward Confrontation, p.!#. #E. @arinsky, /oviet 7oreign ?olicy and the *rigins of the Cold &ar, pp.!E%-!!E.

#!. ;olotov to 9odrov, ,, 8une !#$C, in =alina (. "akhnenko, (natomiya odnogo politicheskogo resheniya< : $%-letiyu plana ;arshalla, 'eBdunarodnaya BhiBn9 4;oscow5, @o. % 4;ay !##,5, pp.!!A!,C. #,. Ibid. #A. @ovikov to ;olotov, ,$ 8une !#$C, (.? 17, 7. !B, *p.A#, 2. ,%E, -l. A!$-A,E, reproduced in "akhnenko, (natomiya odnogo politicheskogo resheniya, pp.!,!-!,,. #$. 2i 9iagio, "he ;arshall ?lan, p.,!E. #%. *n fears of what would happen if the 0//1 opened up to the &est, see (nna 2i 9iagio, 3e origini dell9isolaBionismo so2ietico/ 39 nione Societica e l9Europa dal "#"; al "#=; 4;ilan< 7eltrinelli, !##E5, p.!A!. #+. .o)tech ;astny has argued that the /oviet participants were determined to use the ?aris meeting to see how the 0./. proposal could be deprived of any strings attached, thus making it possible to have the (merican cake and eat it too. /ee ;astny, The Cold War and So2iet +nsecurity, p.,B. #C. Hope of /oviet CooperationO The Times 4-ondon5, ,$ 8une !#$C, p.$. #B. *n this issue, see 9ullock, Ernest 6e2in, p.$!+. /ee also 2eighton, The +mpossi<le *eace, pp.!B%!B+. /ee also note of !$ 8uly !#$B in F1 S, !#$B, .ol. II, p.#+$. ##. F1 S, !#$C, .ol. III, p.,#C. !EE. (mbassador in 7rance 4Caffrey5 to the /ecretary of /tate, "elegram %E!.92.EuropeU+-,C$C, ?aris, ,C 8une !#$C, in F1 S, !#$C, .ol. III, p.,#+. !E!. *n this point, see @ataliia I. Egorova, /talin's 7oreign ?olicy and the Cominform !#$C-%A, in =ori and ?ons, eds., The So2iet nion and Europe in the Cold War, p.!#B. !E,. F1 S, !#$C, .ol. III, p.AE$. !EA. Ibid. !E$. Ibid., p.AE,. !E%. .. ;olotov, Eoprosy 2neshnei politiki0 1echi i Baya2leniya 4;oscow< ?oliti>dat, !#$B5. !E+. ;. ;. @arinskii, ///1 i plan ;arshalla. ?o materialam (rkhiva ?re>identa @7, No2aya i no2eishaya istoriya 4;oscow5, @o. , 4;arch-(pril !##A5, pp.!,-AC. !EC. 2i 9iagio, "he ;arshall ?lan, pp.,EB-,,!.

!EB. *n Iugoslavia's role during this period, see 9eatrice Heuser, Western Containment *olicies in the Cold War, "#$;%"#7: 4-ondon< 1outledge, !#B#5. *n the relationship between /talin and "ito, see Iu /. =irenko, Stalin%Tito 4;oscow< @ovosti, !##!5, pp.A,%-A,+, in 1. Craig @ation, ( 9alkan 0nionO in =ori and ?ons, eds., The So2iet nion and Europe in the Cold War, pp.!A,-!AB. !E#. F1 S, !#$C, .ol. III, p.A!B. !!E. "he 0./. ambassador in ?rague reported that 9eneN had been determined to accept the offer but had been forced to go along with the /oviet position. F1 S, !#$C, .ol. III, p.A!B. !!!. (mbassador in C>echoslovakia 4/teinhardt5 to the /ecretary of /tate, "elegram B$E.%E 1ecoveryUC-!E$C, !E 8uly !#$C, in F1 S, !#$C, .ol. III, pp.A!B-A,E. !!,. (cheson, *resent at the Creation, p.,A%. !!A. 7or an assessment of the changes in /oviet trade, see (mbassador in Iugoslavia 4Cannon5 to the /ecretary of /tate, "elegram B$E.%E 1ecoveryUB-C$C, in F1 S, !#$C, .ol. I., pp.BA$-BA+. !!$. /ee ??/-!A, 1esumJ of &orld /ituation, + @ovember !#$C, in (nna :asten @elson, ed., The State .epartment *olicy *lanning Staff *apers, "#$&%"#$#, A vols. 4@ew Iork< =arland, !#BA5, .ol. ! 4!#$C5, pp.!,#-!A+. !!%. Tuoted in Charles -. ;ee, The 'arshall *lan0 The 3aunching of the *a( Americana 4@ew Iork< /imon Q /chuster, !#B$5, pp.!A+-!%E. !!+. =iuliano ?rocacci, ed., The Cominform 'inutes of the Three Conferences "#$&F"#$;F"#$#, Annali, GGG 4;ilan< 7eltrinelli, !##$5. !!C. 1oberts, The So2iet nion, p.,%. !!B. 2i 9iagio, "he ;arshall ?lan, pp.,!$-,!%. 2i 9iagio's evidence is at variance with 9ritish views of the Cominform in !#$C. /ir 7rank 1oberts argued that the establishment of the Cominform was not a departure in /oviet foreign policy because the Comintern had never really been dissolved. 1oberts to 9evin, C *ctober !#$C, in 7*, AC!U++$C%. /ee also ;artin :itchen, 9ritish ?olicy towards the /oviet 0nion, !#$%-!#$B, in =orodetsky, ed., So2iet Foreign *olicy "#"&%"##", pp.!!!-!A$. !!#. 2i 9iagio, "he ;arshall ?lan, pp.,!$-,!%. !,E. 1oberts, ;oscow and the ;arshall ?lan, pp.!AB!-!ABA. !,!. -oth, Stalin9s nwanted Child, p.+%. !,,. Cited in i<id/ !,A. 2i 9iagio, "he ;arshall ?lan, pp.,!$-,!%.

!,$. ?rocacci, The Cominform 'inutes of the Three Conferences, pp.,!+-,%!. !,%. 2i 9iagio, "he ;arshall ?lan, p.,!$. !,+. -oth, Stalin9s nwanted Child, pp.+%-+C. !,C. Ibid., p.++. !,B. Ibid., p.+C. !,#. Ibid., pp.+C-+#. !AE. *n the /oviet blockade of 9erlin in !#$B, see Hannes (domeit, So2iet 1isk%Taking and Crisis 6eha2iour 4-ondon< (llen and 0nwin, !#B,5. !A!. .. =. "rukhanovskii, ed., +storiya meBhdunarodnykh otnoshenii i 2neshnei politiki SSS1, .ol. III, !#$% %"#>: 4;oscow< I>datel'stvo me>hdunarodnykh otnoshenii, !##A5 p.,!#. !A,. /ee 0./. 2epartment of /tate, ,C 7ebruary !#$B, in 0./. @ational (rchives 4@(1(5, 1ecord =roup 41=5 %#, C+E2.+!!!U,-,C$BF and 0./. 2epartment of /tate, ,B 7ebruary !#$B, in @(1(, 1= %#, C+E2. +!!!U,-,B$B, both cited in Caroline :ennedy-?ipe, Stalin9s Cold War 4;anchester, 0:< ;anchester 0niversity ?ress, !##%5, p.!,A. !AA. :arel :aplan, The Short 'arch0 The Communist Takeo2er in CBechoslo2akia0 "#$7%"#$; 4@ew Iork< /t. ;artin's ?ress, !#BC5. !A$. 7rank :ofsky, ,arry S/ Truman and the War Scare of "#$;0 A Successful Campaign to .ecei2e the Nation 4@ew Iork< /t ;artin's ?ress, !##A5. !A%. -effler, "he 0nited /tates and the /trategic 2imensions of the ;arshall ?lan, pp.,CC-AE+. !A+. Ibid. 7or a discussion of the tragic ramifications of the effects of e'clusion from the ;arshall ?lan on C>ech areas abutting (ustria, a recipient of ;arshall ?lan aid, /ee 9urk, "he ;arshall ?lan, p.,BE. !AC. =addis, The !rigins of the Cold War, pp.A%A-A+!. !AB. =osudarstvennyi (rkhiv 1ossiiskoi 7ederatsii 4=(175, 7. #$E!,*p.,, 2. ,A%, -l. ,C-A%, cited in .olkogonov, The 1ise and Fall of the So2iet Empire, p.!%E. !A#. ;astny, The Cold War and So2iet +nsecurity, p.,C. !$E. Here too, though, it is important to take account of /oviet leaders' perceptions of the way the 0//1 was being treated by the 0nited /tates. ;olotov himself believed that the 0nited /tates would seek to dominate the /oviet 0nion. /ee @. .. @ovikov, Eospominaniya diplomata 4;oscow< ?oliti>dat, !#B#5, p.AC#.

!$!. /ee :irsanov, The SA and Western Europe, pp.A+,. !$,. "akhnenko, (natomiya odnogo politicheskogo resheniya, pp.!!A-,C. !$A. "he 9ritish by and large seemed to discount the prospect that the ;arshall ?lan might in fact make relations with the 0//1 significantly more dangerous. /ee 7* AC!U++$C%. 7or a broader analysis of 9ritish views of the /oviet threat after !#$C, see :itchen, 9ritish ?olicy towards the /oviet 0nion, !#$%-!#$B, pp.!!!-!A$. !$$. "he implications for /oviet policy in the eastern >one of =ermany are evident in =(17, 7. C!B$, *p.!, 2. !+%, -l. !+E-!+!, in @orman ;. @aimark, The 1ussians in 4ermany/ A ,istory of the So2iet Hone of !ccupation, "#$7%"#$# 4Cambridge, ;(< 9elknap ?ress, !##%5, pp.A!E-A!!. !$%. /ee for e'ample, the 7rench position favoring the creation of an anti-/oviet bloc in *ctober !#$C, in 0:@(, 7* AC!U+C+C$, cited in :itchen, 9ritish ?olicy towards the /oviet 0nion, !#$%-!#$B, p.!,#. It was also apparent to /oviet officials at the ?aris conference that 9ritain and 7rance had no intention of agreeing to a plan that the /oviet 0nion would accept. /ee .. ;. ;olotov, *ro<lems of Foreign *olicy0 Speeches and Statements, April "#$7%No2em<er "#$; 4;oscow< 7oreign -anguages ?ublishing House, !#$#5. !$+. ?aolo /priano, Stalin and the European Communists 4-ondon< .erso, !#B%5. !$C. /ome historians have pointed to /talin's e'traordinary ineptitude in foreign policy. "hey stress that his diplomacy usually provoked the opposite reaction of the one he had intended. /ee, for e'ample, ;ikhail ;. @arinskii, "he /oviet 0nion and the 9erlin Crisis, in =ori and ?ons, eds., The So2iet nion and Europe in the Cold War, pp.CA-C$. !$B. .olkogonov, The 1ise and Fall of the So2iet Empire, p.!$%. !$#. /oviet commentators were well aware that the ;arshall (id program heralded the establishment of a &estern bloc. /ee "akhnenko, (natomiya odnogo politicheskogo resheniya. !%E. ;astny, The Cold War and So2iet +nsecurity, p.,+.