THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 130991 March 11, 2004 (425 scra 376) DIMO R !

"T# $ D V "O%M NT, IN&. !ND "'( M. DI(ON, petitioners, vs. " ON!RDO %. DIM!&'"!NG!N, respondent. D &ISION S!NDOV!")G'TI RR (, J.* Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the ecision 1 dated !arch "#, 1997 and the Resolution " dated $cto%er 1#, 1997, %oth rendered %& the Court of 'ppeals in C'().R. *P +o. 4#9,-, .Dimo Realty & Development Inc., and Spouses Gregorio and Luz Mojares Dizon vs. Hon. edro !. Santiago, residing "udge o# t$e Regional !rial %ourt &R!%' o# (uezon %ity, )ranc$ *+*, and Leonardo . Dimaculangan.. /he factual antecedents as %orne %& the records are0 $n 1e%ruar& 14, 1995, 2eonardo P. imaculangan, respondent, filed with the Regional /rial Court, Branch 9,, 3ue4on Cit&, a complaint for specific performance against imo Realt& 5 evelopment, 6nc. 7 imo Realt&8 and spouses )regorio and 2u4 !o9ares i4on, petitioners, doc:eted as Civil Case +o. 395("-##,. /he complaint alleges that sometime in 19,7 to 19,;, petitioners engaged the services of respondent as geodetic surve&or to su%divide 7into su%division lots8 two 7"8 parcels of land situated in Barrio +amuco, Rosario, Batangas covered %& /ransfer Certificate of /itles 7/C/8 +os. /("597" and /("4"94 of the Registr& of eeds of that province. 's pa&ment for respondent<s services, petitioner agreed to give him one 718 su%division lot 72ot 19, Bloc: 17 covered %& /C/ +o. /("597"8 at =illa 2u4 *u%division and pa& him P9,"##.## in cash. 'fter the completion of respondent<s wor:, petitioners paid him P9,"##.## in installments and delivered to him possession of the lot. >owever, despite respondent<s demands, petitioners failed to deliver the title of the lot, prompting him to file with the R/C a complaint for specific performance and damages. 6nstead of filing an answer, petitioners, on !arch "7, 1995, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds0 718 the cause of action has prescri%ed or is %arred %& the statute of limitations? 7"8 venue was improperl& laid considering that the trial court has no 9urisdiction over the su%9ect propert& situated in Batangas? 7-8 the claim is unenforcea%le under the provisions of the statute of frauds? and 7-8 the complaint fails to state a sufficient cause of action. $n @une "7, 1995, the trial court issued an $rder +,s-,ss,./ 0h1 co-23a,.0 4or ,-2ro21r 51.61. Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration with motion for inhi%ition. 6n an $rder dated @ul& 11, 1995, the trial court granted the motion for inhi%ition, hence, the case was re(raffled to Branch 1#1 of the same R/C at 3ue4on Cit&. $n 'ugust "1, 1995, this Branch issued an $rder /ra.0,./ r1s2o.+1.07s -o0,o. 4or r1co.s,+1ra0,o. of the $rder dismissing the complaint, thus0 .' close scrutin& of the allegations in the complaint indu%ita%l& show that the a%ove(captioned case is one for specific performance, and therefore, a personal action. /he complaint see:s not the recover& of the lot as plaintiff is alread& in possession thereof, %ut the peaceful deliver& of the title covering said lot. Aven assuming for the sa:e of argument that plaintiff li:ewise see:s the recover& of real propert&, this is, however, merel& an incident to the principal personal action which is for the enforcement of the agreement %etween the parties. .>ence, the a%ove(captioned case %eing a personal action, the court in the place where the plaintiff resides, i.e. 3ue4on Cit&, is the proper venue of the action. .B>ARA1$RA, premises considered, the !otion for Reconsideration filed %& the plaintiff %eing impressed with merit is here%& )R'+/A . .*$ $R ARA .. 1rom the said $rder, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. !eanwhile, petitioner imo Realt& filed with the !unicipal /rial Court 7!/C8 at Rosario, Batangas two 7"8 separate complaints for unlawful detainer and forci%le entr& against @ose !ati%ag and spouses Ben9amin and Cenaida ela Roca 7lot %u&ers8, doc:eted as Civil Cases +os. 79, and 797, respectivel&. /his prompted respondent to file with the trial court 7Branch 1#18 a motion for issuance of a temporar& restraining order 7/R$8 and a preliminar& in9unction against petitioner imo Realt& and the !/C of Rosario, Batangas. 'cting thereon, the trial court, in an $rder dated $cto%er ", 1995, ,ss61+ a TRO a.+ s68s1961.03:, a ;r,0 o4 2r13,-,.ar: ,.<6.c0,o. 1.<o,.,./ 210,0,o.1r and the !/C .from proceeding with Civil Cases +os. 79, and 797 pending hearing D D D.. 6mmediatel&, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion to lift the /R$ and the writ of preliminar& in9unction and an urgent motion for inhi%ition, %ut were denied in an $rder dated $cto%er "#, 1995. $n $cto%er -#, 1995, petitioners filed consolidated motions for reconsideration and for resolution %ut were denied in an $rder dated @une 5, 1995. 6n the same $rder, the trial court set the case for pre(trial on @ul& -, 199,. 's a conseEuence, on @une 1;, 199,, petitioners filed with the Court of 'ppeals a petition for certiorari, prohi%ition and mandamus 7with pra&er for issuance of a writ of preliminar& in9unction8 see:ing 718 to nullif& the trial court<s $rder dated 'ugust "1, 1995 granting respondent<s motion for reconsideration? $rder of $cto%er "#, 1995 den&ing petitioners< motion to lift the /R$ and the writ of preliminar& in9unction and motion for inhi%ition? and $rder dated @une 5, 199, den&ing petitioners< consolidated motions for reconsideration and for resolution? 7"8 to prohi%it the trial court from hearing Civil Case +o. 395("-##,? and 7-8 to dismiss the complaint for improper venue. $n !arch "#, 1997, the 'ppellate Court rendered a ecision, the dispositive portion of which reads0 .B>ARA1$RA, the following orders are here%& ordered P'R/6'22F +G22616A 0 1. $cto%er "#, 1995 $rder H onl& insofar as it ordered the issuance of the temporar& restraining order, and su%seEuentl&, the preliminar& in9unction? ". @une 5, 199, $rder H onl& insofar as it ordered the setting of the case for pre(trial?

.ConseEuentl&, as an incident to item num%er " a%ove, the respondent 9udge is here%& ordered to A*6*/ from further proceedings with Civil Case 3 95("-##,, eDcept to 6**GA an order directing the petitioners herein to file their answer to the complaint. Gntil then, or after such time for filing the answer has eDpired, the respondent 9udge ma& not as &et proceed with the case. .$n the other hand, the rest of the petitioners< pra&ers are here%& ordered A+6A for lac: of merit. .*$ $R ARA .. /he Court of 'ppeals ratiocinated as follows0 .'fter a careful stud& of the orders assailed in this petition, we conclude that the respondent 9udge did not commit an& grave a%use of discretion insofar as the order dated 'ugust "1, 1995 is concerned. /hus, we agree with his findings that the case filed %& imaculangan is a personal action involving as it does the mere deliver& of the title to 2ot 19, Bloc: 17, which he, undisputa%l&, alread& holds possession thereof. 6t does not, in an& wa&, involve the issue of ownership over the particular propert&, as this is not disputed %& the petitioners, that the same propert& %elongs to imaculangan. .6n an attempt to put in issue the ownership over the particular propert&, the petitioners continuousl& rel& on the doctrine in the case of Aspineli v. *antiago. 6n Aspineli, the issue is, who as %etween !rs. Ramire4, on the one hand, and the Aspinelis on the other, has a %etter right to the aforementioned 2ot -4. Clearl&, the ownership over the propert& has %een put in issue. >owever, in the case at %ar, the petitioners do not den& the fact that imaculangan is alread& in possession of the propert&. /hus, Aspineli is somewhat misplaced. /he case at %ar is one for specific performance for the deliver& of the title to the propert&. 's such, it is a personal action. ConseEuentl&, venue has %een propert& laid in the court of 3ue4on Cit&, it %eing the residence of imaculangan. .2i:ewise, we do not find an& grave a%use of discretion on the part of the respondent 9udge when he issued the $cto%er "#, 1995 $rder, at least insofar as the issue of inhi%ition is concerned. .=eril&, a 9udge ma&, in the eDercise of his sound discretion, inhi%it himself voluntaril& from sitting in a case, %ut it should %e %ased on good, sound or ethical grounds, or for 9ust and valid reasons. 6t is not enough that a part& throws some tenuous allegations of partialit& at the 9udge. +o less than imperative is that it is the 9udge<s sacred dut& to administer 9ustice without fear or favor. .>owever, we find that insofar as he ordered the issuance of a preliminar& in9unction in the $cto%er "#, 1995 $rder, the respondent 9udge eDceeded his 9urisdiction. 6t must %e noted that the in9unction was directed against 6!$ Realt& and an& other persons acting in their %ehalf, as well as the !/C, Rosario, Batangas, 1ourth @udicial Region, en9oining and restraining them from proceeding with Civil Cases 79, and 797 pending %efore the !/C, Rosario, Batangas, 1ourth @udicial Region, pending hearing and resolution on whether a preliminar& in9unction should issue. $n the other hand, the regional trial court where the 9udge sits is located in 3ue4on Cit&, and as such, properl& %elongs to the +ational Capital @udicial Region. /his %eing the case, it is clear that the respondent 9udge has eDceeded his 9urisdiction %ecause an in9unction issued %& him ma& onl& %e enforced in an& part of the region. ConseEuentl&, the temporar& restraining order, and su%seEuentl&, the preliminar& in9unction issued %& the respondent 9udge are here%& ordered nullified, having %een issued in eDcess of his 9urisdiction. .But such error of the respondent 9udge does not necessaril& warrant his inhi%ition in the case. 't most, it is onl& correcti%le %& certiorari, as in this particular petition. .*imilarl&, we do not find grave a%use of discretion on the part of the respondent 9udge insofar as he denied in his $rder of @une 5, 199,, the !otion for Reconsideration filed %& the spouses and 6!$ Realt&. 's we mentioned in the earlier part of this decision, we agree with the findings of the respondent 9udge insofar as it ruled that the case filed %& imaculangan is a personal action. >ence, the respondent 9udge did not commit an& grave a%use of discretion when it denied the !otion for Reconsideration. Be therefore uphold the validit& of this $rder. .Bith regard to the order of the respondent 9udge setting the case for pre(trial, we find that the same was issued in grave a%use of his discretion. Be agree with the o%servation made %& the petitioner that the issues have not &et %een 9oined as the petitioners herein have not &et filed an answer. $n this score, the writs pra&ed for must %e granted. /he respondent 9udge must order the petitioners herein to file their answer. Gntil then, or after such time for filing the answer has eDpired, the respondent 9udge ma& not as &et proceed with the case.. 1rom the said ecision, %oth parties filed their motions for reconsideration %ut were denied. >ence, this petition for review on certiorari. 1or our resolution are the twin issues of whether the Court of 'ppeals erred 718 in holding that respondent<s complaint is a personal action? and 7"8 in sustaining the trial court<s $rder den&ing petitioners< motion for inhi%ition. Basic as a horn%oo: principle is that 9urisdiction over the su%9ect matter of a case is conferred %& law and determined %& the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff<s cause of action. 6n Deltaventures Resources, Inc. vs. %a,ato,- we held0 .=6r,s+,c0,o. o51r 0h1 s68<1c0 -a001r ,s +101r-,.1+ 62o. 0h1 a331/a0,o.s -a+1 ,. 0h1 co-23a,.0 , irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or not entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein H a matter resolved onl& after and as a result of the trial.. /he nature of an action, as well as which court or %od& has 9urisdiction over it, is determined %ased on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.4 2et us eDamine respondent<s allegations in his complaint. /he pertinent allegations are Euoted as follows0 .D D D .". *ometime in 19,7 to 19,;, the services of plaintiff as geodetic surve&or was hired %& the defendants to su%divide into su%division lots parcels of lands located at Rosario, Batangas, in the name of defendant spouses which is covered %& /C/ /(

eeds of Batangas and /C/ /("4"94 in the name of Ruperto Rodelas D D D0 DDD .-. 6t was the agreement of the parties that plaintiff<s services will %e paid with one 718 lot of the su%division now called =622' 2GC *GB 6=6*6$+ and originall& covered %& /C/ /("597", designated as 2ot 19, Bloc: 17 of the su%division plan plus the additional amount of P9,"##.## to %e paid in cash with the understanding that upon accomplishment of the su%division plan and full pa&ment of the agreed price, the corresponding title to said lot alread& transferred in the name of the plaintiff %e delivered to the plaintiff. DDD .4. $n several occasions from 19,; to 1975, plaintiff paid the additional amount of P9,"##.## %& installments. DDD .5. Plaintiff has %een ma:ing ver%al demands upon defendants, ever& now and then, for the deliver& of the title to 2ot 19, Bloc: 17 of the su%division alread& named =622' 2GC *GB 6=6*6$+ %ut defendant spouses have %een giving the plaintiff a runaround. DDD .;. =er%al demands have %een made upon defendants to deliver the title of the lot in Euestion %ut defendants refused and continued to refuse to deliver said lot to the plaintiff without an& valid reason at all. D D D.. 1rom the a%ove allegations, it can easil& %e discerned that respondent is asserting that petitioners violated the contract of services %& refusing to deliver the title of the su%9ect lot to him and is thus demanding that the& compl& with their o%ligation. 6t %ears emphasis that respondent does not allege in his complaint that he is see:ing to recover the lot from petitioners. /his is %ecause he has %een in possession thereof. 6n fact, petitioner imo Realt& even filed with the !/C of Rosario, Batangas two 7"8 separate complaints for unlawful detainer and forci%le entr& against respondent<s %u&ers. 6t is thus clear that what is %eing claimed %& respondent is simpl& the deliver& of the title to him as pa&ment for his services. 6t follows that the complaint %elow is not a real action, %ut a personal action. *ections 1 and ", Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provide0 .*AC/6$+ 1. -enue o# real actions. H 'ctions affecting title to or possession of real propert&, or interest therein, shall %e commenced and tried in the proper court which has 9urisdiction over the area wherein the real propert& involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. D D D. *AC/6$+ ". -enue o# personal actions. H 'll other actions ma& %e commenced and tried where the plaintiff or an& of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or an& of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non(resident defendant where he ma& %e found, at the election of the plaintiff.. 5 Considering that respondent<s complaint, %eing one for specific performance, we agree with the Court of 'ppeals that the venue is in the R/C of 3ue4on Cit& since respondent 7then plaintiff8 resides at +o. ; Cavite *treet, Best 'venue, 3ue4on Cit&. Petitioners further claim that the 'ppellate Court should not have sustained the trial court<s denial of petitioners< motion for inhi%ition. *uffice it to state that whether 9udges should inhi%it themselves from a case rests on their own .sound discretion.. $therwise stated, inhi%ition parta:es of voluntariness on the part of the 9udges themselves. /his Court has to %e shown acts or conduct of the 9udge clearl& indicative of ar%itrariness or pre9udice %efore the latter can %e %randed the stigma of %eing %iased or partial. , 6n a catena of cases, we held that .%ias and pre9udice, to %e considered valid reasons for the voluntar& inhi%ition of 9udges, must %e proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of partialit& and pre9udgment will not suffice. /hese cannot %e presumed, especiall& if weighed against the sacred o%ligation of 9udges whose oaths of office reEuire them to administer 9ustice without respect to person and to do eEual right to the poor and the rich..7 >ere, petitioners merel& alleged the ar%itrar& issuance of a temporar& restraining order without however showing %ias or pre9udice on the part of the trial 9udge. 6n fact, the Court of 'ppeals held that .such error of the respondent 9udge does not necessaril& warrant his inhi%ition in the case.. >H R ?OR , the petition is A+6A . /he assailed ecision dated !arch "#, 1997 and the Resolution dated $cto%er 1#, 1997 of the Court of 'ppeals in C' ).R. *P +o. 4#9,- are here%& '116R!A . Costs against petitioners. SO ORD R D. THIRD DIVISION !.M. RT= No. 03)1775. !2r,3 30, 2003 (402 scra 65) Dr. IS!G!NI !. &R'(, complainant, vs. =6+/1 %HI"@ RT I. IT'RR!"D , R1/,o.a3 Tr,a3 &o6r0, !.0,2o3o &,0:, @ra.ch 72, respondent. D &ISION %!NG!NI@!N, J.: +ot ever& erroneous act will su%9ect a 9udge to disciplinar& sanctions. $nl& 9udicial errors tainted with %ad faith, fraud, dishonest&, gross ignorance or deli%erate intent to do an in9ustice will %e administrativel& sanctioned. Th1 &as1

"597" of the Registr& of

6n a verified ComplaintI1J filed %efore the $ffice of Court 'dministrator 7$C'8, r. 6sagani C. Cru4 charges @udge Phil%ert 6. 6turralde of the Regional /rial Court 7R/C8 of 'ntipolo Cit& 7Branch 7"8 with gross misconduct, dishonest&, gross ignorance of the law, %ias and partialit&. Th1 ?ac0s $n 'pril 1;, "##1, r. 6sagani C. Cru4 filed against his *wiss wife, Folande 2. Cru4, a Complaint for 6n9unction under 'rticle 7" of the 1amil& Code. /he case, doc:eted as Civil Case +o. #1(,1-9, was assigned to Branch 7" of the Regional /rial Court of 'ntipolo Cit&, the designated 1amil& Court in that area. 's Branch 7" had no presiding 9udge at the time, the hearings were conducted %& ADecutive @udge !auricio !. Rivera. 'fter several negotiations, the parties filed a @oint !otion to *uspend Proceedings with Pra&er for a >old( eparture $rder on !rs. Cru4. @udge Rivera granted the !otion for the suspension of the proceedings, %ut denied the reEuest for the issuance of a hold(departure order. $n *eptem%er "1, "##1, !rs. Cru4 filed a !otion as:ing the court to allow her and her two children to ta:e a vacation to *wit4erland and to compel complainant to return her travel documents. *hortl& thereafter, on $cto%er 19, "##1, respondent assumed office as the new presiding 9udge of Branch 7". 't a hearing on +ovem%er ",, "##1, complainant filed his $pposition to the !otion filed %& his wife. >e also as:ed the court to issue a hold(departure order andKor a writ of preliminar& in9unction to prevent her from leaving the countr&. uring the same hearing, respondent eDpressed his predisposition to grant her !otion. >is declaration supposedl& constituted partialit&, which showed that he had alread& pre9udged the incidents of the case. ConseEuentl&, complainant filed a !otion to inhi%it respondent from further hearing the case. /he latter denied this !otion in an $rder dated 1e%ruar& ";, "##".I"J Aarlier, on @anuar& 9, "##", complainant<s counsel received, simultaneousl& %& mail, respondent<s $rders dated +ovem%er ",, ecem%er 7 and ecem%er 1;, "##1. /he ecem%er 1;, "##1 $rder denied the application of complainant for the issuance of a hold(departure order andKor a writ of preliminar& in9unction and compelled him to surrender all the travel documents of his wife and children. >e claims that the simultaneous mailing of the three $rders Lhad a ver& insidious effect.M >e argues that he could have moved for the amendment or correction of the two earlier ones, had these %een served on him ahead of the ecem%er 1;, "##1 $rder. >e insinuates that the last $rder was either antedated or properl& dated %ut mailed ver& late. 'ccording to him, either of these acts renders respondent lia%le for gross negligence of dut&. 1urthermore, in ordering him to return the travel documents of his wife and den&ing his application for a hold(departure orderKin9unction respondent allegedl& committed either gross ignorance or deli%erate misapplication of the law. Complainant also su%mitted a verified *upplemental ComplaintI-J dated 1e%ruar& ",, "##", accusing respondent of plagiarism. 6n his 1e%ruar& ";, "##" $rder, the latter purportedl& copied several paragraphs from an article written %& 'tt&. Raul @. Pala%rica in the @anuar& "7, "##" issue of the $ilippine Daily In.uirer. /he word(for(word reproduction of portions of the article supposedl& constituted an act of dishonest& that should %e dealt with administrativel&. 6n an 6ndorsementI4J dated !arch 4, "##", the $C' reEuired @udge 6turralde to comment on the foregoing Complaints. 6n his Comment,I5J he stated that, contrar& to what had %een alleged in the verified Complaint, he could not find an& specific act of dishonest&, gross misconduct, or gross ignorance of the law and procedure on his part. 6f at all, he might have %een perceived as %iased %ecause of his $rders that were unfavora%le to complainant. 'llegedl&, in den&ing the !otion to issue hold(departure orderKwrit of preliminar& in9unction and ordering complainant to surrender his wife<s passport and other travel documents, respondent might have ir:ed the former. 6n his defense, the latter maintains that he merel& upheld ADecutive @udge Rivera<s earlier $rder. $n the !otion to 6nhi%it, respondent avers that he first met the parties and their respective counsels onl& during the +ovem%er ",, "##1 hearing, and that none of them had %een :nown to him personall& or otherwise prior to that date. !oreover, he %elieved he could decide the case on the merits (( without %ias, pre9udice, fear or favor. /hus, he found no 9ustifia%le reason to inhi%it himself from hearing it. >e claims that he even advised the parties to appeal his $rders %& wa& of a petition for certiorari, if the& %elieve his rulings were erroneous. 's to the allegation of plagiarism, he argues that there is nothing wrong in adopting or citing a newspaper article containing the legal views of 'tt&. Pala%rica, who is a seasoned and respected mem%er of the %ar. >e adds that, even granting without admitting that his acts amounted to plagiarism, complainant is not the proper part& to assert such cause of action. Respondent maintains that while there is a constitutional guarantee for the litigants< right to air their legitimate grievance through legal action, the& should %e en9oined to do so onl& after thorough circumspection and eDhaustion of all other availa%le remedies. >e claims that the instant administrative case was resorted to, onl& to intimidate, harass and pressure him to inhi%it himself from hearing the civil case. R12or0 a.+ R1co--1.+a0,o. o4 0h1 O&! 'fter a thorough stud& of the verified Complaint and respondent<s Comment, the $C' su%mitted to this Court its evaluation and recommendation as follows0 L V!"'!TION0 /here is nothing in the records of this case which shows that respondent @udge should %e held administrativel& lia%le for the charges lodged against him as the issues are clearl& 9udicial in character. Complainant<s proper recourse is to avail himself of the remedies set forth under the Rules of Court. 6t is well(entrenched that when the matter complained of is 9udicial in nature, complainant should not see: redress in the form of IanJ administrative complaint. L/he esta%lished doctrine and polic& is that disciplinar& proceedings and criminal actions against @udges are not complementar& or suppletor& ItoJ, nor a su%stitute for, 9udicial remedies. Resort to and eDhaustion of these 9udicial remedies, as well as the entr& of 9udgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre(reEuisites for the ta:ing of other measures against the persons of the 9udges concerned, whether civil, administrative IorJ criminal IinJ nature. 6t is onl& after the availa%le 9udicial remedies have %een eDhausted and the appellate tri%unals have spo:en with finalit&, that the door to an inEuir& into ItheJ criminal, civil or administrative lia%ilit& Iof 9udgesJ ma& %e said to have opened or closed.

LBe deem it %est not to discuss the allegation that respondent pre9udged the pending incidents as the same is unsu%stantiated. Bare allegations do not constitute su%stantial evidence. LR &OMM ND!TION0 Respectfull& su%mitted for the consideration of the >onora%le Court is our recommendation that the instant case %e DISMISS DI,J the issues raised %eing 9udicial in character.MI,J Th1 &o6r07s R63,./ Be agree with the $C'. !+-,.,s0ra0,51 ",a8,3,0: o4 R1s2o.+1.0 *ettled is the rule in administrative cases that complainants %ear the onus of esta%lishing their averments %& su%stantial evidence.I7J 'fter a careful scrutin& of the evidence and the arguments of the parties, we find no sufficient %asis to hold respondent administrativel& lia%le. /he accusations of dishonest&, neglect of dut& and gross ignorance of the law are %ereft of factual %ases. 1urthermore, the& pertain to alleged errors he committed in the eDercise of his ad9udicative functions. *uch errors cannot %e corrected through administrative proceedings, %ut should instead %e assailed through appropriate 9udicial remedies. 's complainant admitted in a 2etterI;J dated $cto%er "", "##", the Euestioned rulings of respondent 9udge are the su%9ect of a certiorari case still pending %efore the Court of 'ppeals.I9J /o sa& the least, a decision on the propriet& of the latter<s rulings in this administrative proceeding would %e premature. 6ndeed, where sufficient 9udicial remedies eDist, the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper recourse to correct a 9udge<s allegedl& erroneous act. isciplinar& proceedings against 9udges do not complement, supplement or su%stitute 9udicial remedies. /hus, an& inEuir& into their administrative lia%ilit& arising from 9udicial acts ma& %e made onl& after other availa%le remedies have %een settled.I1#J Parties(litigants a%use court processes %& prematurel& resorting to administrative disciplinar& action, even %efore the 9udicial issues involved have %een finall& resolved.I11J 's to the allegation of %ias and partialit&, complainant apparentl& got that impression when respondent declared during the +ovem%er ",, "##1 hearing that the latter was inclined to grant the !otion of !rs. Cru4 to allow her and her children to travel to *wit4erland. /he suspicion of respondent<s supposed preferential leanings might have %een fortified %& the su%seEuent denial of complainant<s !otion for the issuance of a hold(departure order. 6t is important to note that *upreme Court Circular +o. -9(97I1"J eDplicitl& provides that hold(departure orders ma& %e issued only in criminal cases* L6n order to avoid the indiscriminate issuance of >old( eparture $rders resulting in inconvenience to the parties affected, the same %eing tantamount to an infringement on the right and li%ert& of an individual to travel and to ensure that the >old eparture $rders which are issued contain complete and accurate information, the following guidelines are here%& promulgated0 1. >old( eparture $rders sha33 81 ,ss61+ o.3: ,. cr,-,.a3 cas1s within the eDclusive 9urisdiction of the Regional /rial Courts.M 7Amphasis supplied8 $n the %asis of this Circular, it is not surprising that respondent 9udge eDpressed his predisposition to den& the issuance of a hold( departure order, considering that the su%9ect case is not criminal in nature. /he terms and conditions for the issuance of a hold(departure order are clear and unmista:a%le. /he& leave no room for an& other interpretation and proscri%e no deviation from their mandate. >ad respondent ruled otherwise, he would have %een guilt& of gross ignorance of the law andKor willful violation of the aforesaid Circular. $n the denial of his !otion for 6nhi%ition, complainant has not shown an& evidence that would indicate a predisposition on the part of respondent to decide the case in favor of one part& or the other. 's the latter averred in his Comment, he did not :now an& of the parties or their respective counsels personall& or otherwise. Bhen he assumed his post as presiding 9udge of R/C Branch 7" of 'ntipolo Cit&, the case was alread& proceeding in due course. Besides, he had no previous :nowledge or information a%out the su%9ect case or its incidents prior to his assignment to that %ranch. 6n no wa& can respondent %e faulted for den&ing the !otion for 6nhi%ition filed %& complainant, considering that the latter<s allegation of partialit& has not %een reasona%l& esta%lished. =eril&, the test to determine the propriet& of the denial of a motion to inhi%it is whether the movant was deprived of a fair and impartial trial.I1-J ' ruling not to inhi%it oneself cannot %e overturned in the a%sence of clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge.I14J 6t is settled that mere suspicion of partialit& is not enough. /here should %e hard evidence to prove it, as well as a manifest showing of %ias and partialit& stemming from an eDtra9udicial source or some other %asis.I15J /o %e sure, a 9udge<s conduct must %e clearl& indicative of ar%itrariness and pre9udice %efore it can %e stigmati4ed as %iased and partial.I1,J 6n this case, the truth of such allegations cannot %e presumed or deduced from the circumstances stated %& complainant in his verified Compliant.I17J /he allegation of plagiarism does not contain a cause of action. +either has complainant shown his legal standing to pursue this accusation. 's a matter of pu%lic polic&, not ever& error or mista:e committed %& 9udges in the performance of their official duties renders them administrativel& lia%le. 6n the a%sence of fraud, dishonest& or deli%erate intent to do an in9ustice, acts done in their official capacit&, even though erroneous, do not alwa&s constitute misconduct.I1;J $nl& errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption or malice ma& %e the su%9ect of disciplinar& action.I19J 1or administrative lia%ilit& to attach, respondent must %e shown to have %een moved %& %ad faith, dishonest&, hatred or some other motive.I"#J 6ndeed, 9udges ma& not %e held administrativel& lia%le for an& of their official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as the& acted in good faith.I"1J 6n Sarmiento v. Salamat,I""J this Court declared that while imposing discipline on erring court mem%ers is a primordial responsi%ilit& of the >igh /ri%unal, it will nonetheless protect the innocent ones from the thoughtless importunings of disgruntled litigants. /he Court eDplained as follows0 L2et it %e :nown that this Court will never tolerate or condone an& conduct, act or omission that would violate the norm of pu%lic accounta%ilit& or diminish the people<s faith in the 9udiciar&. >owever, when an administrative charge against a court personnel holds no %asis whatsoever in fact or in law, this Court will not hesitate to protect the innocent court emplo&ee against an& groundless

accusation that trifles with 9udicial processes. 's a final note, this Court will not shir: from its responsi%ilit& of imposing discipline upon emplo&ees of the 9udiciar&, %ut neither will it hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that onl& serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderl& administration of 9ustice.MI"-J >H R ?OR , the Complaint is here%& DISMISS/D for lac: of merit. *$ $R ARA .

THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 1430A9 ?18r6ar: 27, 2003 (39A scra 323) M R& D S R. GO&H!N, !"?R DO R. GO&H!N, !NG "IN! R. GO&H!N H RN! (, M!. M R& D R. GO&H!N GOROS% , &RIS%O R. GO&H!N =R. a.+ M!R"ON R. GO&H!N, petitioners, vs. VIRGINI! GO&H!N, "O'IS GO&H!N, "!%'"!%' R !" ST!T &OR%OR!TION, ? "IB GO&H!N $ SONS R !"T# &OR%OR!TION a.+ M!&T!N R !"T# &OR%OR!TION, respondents. D &ISION %!NG!NI@!N, J.: 'llegations and perceptions of %ias from the mere tenor and language of a 9udge is insufficient to show pre9udgment. 'llowing inhi%ition for these reasons would open the floodgates to a%use. Gnless there is concrete proof that a 9udge has a personal interest in the proceedings, and that his %ias stems from an eDtra(9udicial source, this Court shall alwa&s commence from the presumption that a magistrate shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts.1 /he Case Before us is a Petition for Review on %ertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the @anuar& ";, "### ecision " and the !a& ", "### Resolution- of the Court of 'ppeals 7C'8 in C'()R *P +o. 549;5. /he decretal portion of the ecision reads as follows0 .B>ARA1$RA, premises considered, the petition is )R'+/A . 'ccordingl&, the $rder dated 1- 'ugust 1999 den&ing petitioners< !otion for 6nhi%ition and the $rder dated "# 'ugust 1999 den&ing the !otion for Reconsideration are here%& nullified and respondent @udge is here%& inhi%ited from further sitting in Civil Case +o. CAB("1;54 entitled N)ochan et. al. vs. )ochan, et al.<.4 /he assailed Resolution denied petitioner<s !otion for Reconsideration.5 /he 1acts /he facts of the case are summari4ed %& the Court of 'ppeals in this wise0 ./here is no dispute as to the antecedent facts that gave rise to the instant petition involving close relatives who are either aunties, nieces and nephews or first(cousins. .$n #- 'pril 199;, private respondents filed a Complaint for *pecific Performance and amages against petitioners. /he case was raffled to respondent @udge icdican and doc:eted as Civil Case +o. CAB("1;54. .$n ", !a& 199;, petitioners filed their 'nswer with Counterclaim and affirmative defenses. .$n #7 'ugust 199;, %efore pre(trial could %e conducted, petitioners filed a motion for a hearing on their affirmative defenses some of which are grounds for a motion to dismiss and therefore ma& %e the su%9ect of a preliminar& hearing pursuant to *ection ,, Rule 1,, 1997 RCP. /he motion was set for hearing on 11 'ugust 199;. .6n an order dated 11 'ugust 199;, respondent 9udge denied petitioners< motion without conducting a hearing. Respondent 9udge however did not stop with the denial %ut went on to rule on the merits of the affirmative defenses, stating as follows0 NI/Jhe *tatute of 1rauds does not appl& in this case %ecause the contract which is the su%9ect matter of this case is alread& an eDecuted contract. /he *tatute of 1rauds applies onl& to eDecutor& contracts. D D D. 1or another, the contention of the defendants that the claims of the plaintiffs are alread& eDtinguished %& full pa&ment thereof does not appear to %e indu%ita%le %ecause the plaintiffs denied under oat$ the due eDecution and genuineness of the receipts which are attached as 'nneDes 1(', 1(B and 1(C of the defendants< answer. D D D. /hen, still for another, the contention that the Complaint is defective %ecause it allegedl& has fIaJiled to implead indispensa%le parties appears to %e wanting in merit %ecause the parties to the memorandum of agreement adverted to in the complaint are all parties in this case. /hen the matter of pa&ment of doc:eting and filing fees is not a fatal issue in this case %ecause the record shows that the plaintiffs had paid at least PhP1,5,###.## plus...< ./he a%ove ruling is the su%9ect of a petition for certiorari %efore this Court doc:eted as C.'.().R. *P +o. 49#;4 which is pending resolution on a motion for IreJconsideration. Because of the pendenc& of this petition, petitioners filed on "; *eptem%er 199; a motion to suspend proceedings. 6nstead of suspending proceedings, the respondent 9udge set the case for pre(trial on #9 +ovem%er 199;, per $rder dated #1 $cto%er 199;. .$n #5 +ovem%er 199;, petitioners< counsel 'tt&. Rolando 2im filed a motion to reset the pre(trial from #9 +ovem%er 199; to #ecem%er 199; on the ground that he had to go to @apan %ecause of a previous commitment. 'tt&. =icente Aspina, who attended the pre(trial to eDplain 'tt&. 2im<s a%sence, manifested to respondent 9udge that the petitioners were willing to eDplore the possi%ilit& of an amica%le settlement. 6n spite of the a%sence of handling counsel 'tt&. 2im and in spite of 'tt&. Aspina<s manifestation of a possi%le compromise, respondent 9udge proceeded with and terminated the pre(trial. 'nd in spite of the manifestation of 'tt&. Aspina, respondent 9udge indicated in the pre(trial order he issued that the Npossi%ilit& 7of a compromise8 is nil.< .'fter the termination of the pre(trial, respondent 9udge proceeded to hear the evidence of private respondents who presented their first witness on direct eDamination on 1; @anuar& 1999. /his first witness was cross(eDamined %& petitioners< counsel on "" @anuar& 1999. 1urther hearings were set for "; and -# 'pril 1999. $n "- 'pril 1999, petitioners< counsel 'tt&. 2im filed an urgent motion pra&ing that the hearing on "; 'pril %e moved to -# 'pril 1999 on the ground that he had to undergo medical tests and treatment on "7 and "; 'pril

1999, and that his law partner 'tt&. Aspina would not %e a%le to attend in his %ehalf %ecause the latter had to attend his %rother<s wedding in Oananga, 2e&te on "; 'pril 1999. .Petitioners< counsel went to court on -# 'pril 1999 and was surprised to learn that his motion to reset the hearing on "; 'pril 1999 was disregarded and that trial proceeded with private respondents< counsel conducting a re(direct eDamination of their first witness and presenting their second witness on direct eDamination. uring the hearing on -# 'pril 1999, respondent 9udge ordered petitioners< counsel to conduct the re(cross eDamination of the first witness and the cross(eDamination of the second witness. Petitioners< counsel manifested that he had not read the transcript of stenographic notes ta:en during the hearing on "; 'pril 1999 and was therefore not prepared for cross(eDamination. >owever, when respondent 9udge threatened to waive petitioners< right to eDamine private respondents< witnesses, petitioners< counsel had no choice %ut to accede to do what he was not prepared for. .$n #5 'ugust 1999, petitioners filed a motion to inhi%it respondent 9udge from further sitting in the case on grounds of partialit&, pre( 9udgment and gross ignorance of the law. /he motion was set for hearing on #9 'ugust 1999 at 1#0## '.!. .6n an order dated 1- 'ugust 1999, respondent 9udge denied the motion for inhi%ition on the ground that petitioners failed to appear to su%stantiate the motion. .$n 1, 'ugust 1999, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial which the respondent 9udge li:ewise denied in his $rder dated "# 'ugust 1999, reiterating that petitioners failed to appear during the hearing on the motion.., 7Citations omitted8 Ruling of the Court of 'ppeals /he C' opined that the apprehensions of respondents a%out the %ias or partialit& of @udge icdican in favor of petitioners were well( founded.7 6t held that the totalit& of the circumstances showed that he had a glaring animosit& towards their case. ; 6t further ruled that he had .li:ewise displa&ed petulance and impatience in his handling of the case, a norm of %ehavior inconsistent with the cold neutralit& of an impartial 9udge..9 /he C' %ased its ruling on the following circumstances1# pointed out %& respondents0 1. @udge icdican denied the !otion to >ear 'ffirmative efenses filed %& respondents, %ut in the same $rder ruled on its merits without giving them an opportunit& to %e heard. ". /he a%ove $rder of the 9udge was too well(prepared to %e eDtemporaneous, leading respondents to suspect that he was %ent on deciding the case in favor of petitioners. -. Bithout indicating for the record respondents< o%9ections, @udge icdican admitted all eDhi%its of petitioners and even allowed their witnesses to answer all Euestions, even if he had not &et resolved the applica%ilit& of the *tatute of 1rauds. 4. /he 9udge denied respondents< reEuests for postponements, which were reasona%le and 9ustified under the circumstances. 1urther, during the 'pril ";, 1999 hearing, he allowed petitioners to present their witnesses even in the a%sence of respondents< counsel. 'nd, :nowing that the counsel was a%sent when those witnesses testified in the previous hearing, the 9udge forced him to cross(eDamine them in the su%seEuent 'pril -#, 1999 hearing. 5. uring the hearing for respondents< !otion for 6nhi%ition, the 9udge started to hear the case %efore the scheduled time. ,. @udge icdican issued a Pretrial $rder stating that the possi%ilit& of a compromise was .nil. despite the pretrial manifestation of respondents< counsel that the parties were willing to eDplore the possi%ilit& of a compromise. >ence, this Petition.11 /he 6ssues 6n their !emorandum,1" petitioners su%mit the following issues for our consideration0 .1. Bhether or not the respondents are guilt& of forum shopping in filing two petitions for certiorari in the C' %ased on the same order of @udge icdican? .". Bhether or not the C' was correct in en9oining @udge icdican from sitting in the case at %ar on the ground of %ias and partialit&? .-. Bhether or not filing of a motion for inhi%ition on flims& grounds is not a form of forum shopping.. 1*impl& stated, the issues in this case are as follows0 718 whether respondents are guilt& of forum shopping, and 7"8 whether @udge icdican should have inhi%ited himself. /he Court<s Ruling /he Petition is meritorious insofar as the second issue is concerned. @udge icdican need not inhi%it himself. 1irst 6ssue0 0orum S$opping Petitioners argue that respondents should have raised the issue of @udge icdican<s alleged %ias and partialit& in their first Petition for Certiorari doc:eted as C'()R *P +o. 49#;4, not in the present case doc:eted in the appellate court as C'()R *P +o. 549;5. 1or filing two Petitions raising the same issues, respondents allegedl& split their cause of action and thus %ecame guilt& of forum shopping. Petitioners further contend that the elements of litis pendentia or res judicata are present in the case at %ar, %ecause the matter raised in this Petition could have %een ta:en up in the first one. Be disagree. /his Court has alread& definitivel& ruled on this matter in )R +o. 14,#;9. 14 6n its ecision, it was confronted with the ver& same Euestion raised in this Petition. 't issue then is whether there was forum shopping in the filing of two Petitions for Certiorari (( one for C'()R *P +o. 49#;4 and the other for C'()R *P +o. 549;5, the precursor of the present Petition. /he Court made a distinction %etween the two Petitions filed. /he first involved the .propriet& of the affirmative defenses relied upon %& petitioners Iherein respondentsJ in Civil Case +o. CAB("1 ;54.. 15 /he second Petition, which is the su%9ect of the present appeal, .raised the issue of whether or not pu%lic respondent @udge icdican was guilt& of manifest partialit& warranting his inhi%ition from

further hearing Civil Case +o. CAB("1 ;54..1, Below we Euote a more important point0 .I/Jhe two petitions did not see: the same relief from the Court of 'ppeals. 6n C'().R. *P. +o. 49#;4, petitioners pra&ed, among others, for the annulment of the orders of the trial court den&ing their motion for preliminar& hearing on affirmative defenses in Civil Case +o. CAB("1;54. +o such reliefs are involved in the second petition, where petitioners merel& pra&ed for the issuance of an order en9oining pu%lic respondent @udge icdican from further tr&ing the case and to assign a new 9udge in his stead..17 6t should %e clear that our ecision in )R +o. 14,#;9 has %ecome final and eDecutor& with the denial 1; of respondents< Iherein petitioners<J !otion for Reconsideration therein. !ain 6ssue0 In$i,ition 'lthough we find that respondents did not commit forum(shopping, still we gave due course to this Petition on the main issue of inhi%ition. Petitioners argue that the C' erred when it ruled that @udge icdican should %e inhi%ited from hearing Civil Case +o. CAB( "1;54 on the ground of %ias and pre9udice. ' critical component of due process is a hearing %efore a tri%unal that is impartial and disinterested. 19 Aver& litigant is indeed entitled to nothing less than .the cold neutralit& of an impartial 9udge.. 'll the other elements of due process, li:e notice and hearing, would %e meaningless if the ultimate decision were to come from a %iased 9udge."# *ection 1 of Rule 1-7 of the Rules of Court provides0 .*AC/6$+ 1. Dis.uali#ication o# judges. ( +o 9udge or 9udicial officer shall sit in an& case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniaril& interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either part& within the siDth degree of consanguinit& or affinit&, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has %een eDecutor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in an& inferior court when his ruling or decision is the su%9ect of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed %& them and entered upon the record. .' 9udge ma&, in the eDercise of his sound discretion, disEualif& himself from sitting in a case, for 9ust or valid reasons other than those mentioned a%ove.."1 /he Rules contemplate two :inds of inhi%ition0 compulsor& and voluntar&. /he instances mentioned in the first paragraph of the cited Rule conclusivel& presume that 9udges cannot activel& and impartiall& sit in a case. /he second paragraph, which em%odies voluntar& inhi%ition, leaves to the discretion of the 9udges concerned whether to sit in a case for other 9ust and valid reasons, with onl& their conscience as guide. /o %e sure, 9udges ma& not %e legall& prohi%ited from sitting in a litigation. "" But when circumstances reasona%l& arouse suspicions, and out of such suspicions a suggestion is made of record that the& might %e induced to act with pre9udice for or against a litigant, the& should conduct a careful self(eDamination."- Gnder the second paragraph of the cited *ection of the Rules of Court, parties have the right to see: the inhi%ition or the disEualification of 9udges who do not appear to %e wholl& free, disinterested, impartial or independent in handling a case. Bhether 9udges should inhi%it themselves therefrom rests on their own .sound discretion.. "4 /hat discretion is a matter of conscience and is addressed primaril& to their sense of fairness and 9ustice."5 >owever, 9udges are eDhorted to eDercise their discretion in a wa& that the people<s faith in the courts of 9ustice would not %e impaired. ' salutar& norm for them to o%serve is to reflect on the possi%ilit& that the losing parties might nurture at the %ac: of their minds the thought that the former have unmeritoriousl& tilted the scales of 9ustice against them. ", $f course, the 9udges< right must %e weighed against their dut& to decide cases without fear of repression. =eril&, the second paragraph of *ection 1 of Rule 1-7 does not give 9udges the unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. /he inhi%ition must %e for 9ust and valid causes. /he mere imputation of %ias or partialit& is not enough ground for them to inhi%it, especiall& when the charge is without %asis."7 /his Court has to %e shown acts or conduct clearl& indicative of ar%itrariness or pre9udice %efore it can %rand them with the stigma of %ias or partialit&."; 6n a string of cases, the *upreme Court has said that %ias and pre9udice, to %e considered valid reasons for the voluntar& inhi%ition of 9udges, must %e proved with clear and convincing evidence. "9 Bare allegations of their partialit& will not suffice. 6t cannot %e presumed, especiall& if weighed against the sacred oaths of office of magistrates, reEuiring them to administer 9ustice fairl& and eEuita%l& (( %oth to the poor and the rich, the wea: and the strong, the lonel& and the well(connected.-# AEuall& important is the esta%lished doctrine that %ias and pre9udice must %e shown to have resulted in an opinion on the merits on the %asis of an eDtra9udicial source, not on what the 9udge learned from participating in the case. -1 's long as opinions formed in the course of 9udicial proceedings are %ased on the evidence presented and the conduct o%served %& the magistrate, such opinion (( even if later found to %e erroneous (( will not prove personal %ias or pre9udice on the part of the 9udge. -" Bhile palpa%le error ma& %e inferred from the decision or the order itself, eDtrinsic evidence is reEuired to esta%lish %ias, %ad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. 't %ottom, to disEualif& a 9udge, the movant must prove %ias and pre9udice %& clear and convincing evidence.-Prescinding from the foregoing standards, we do not agree with the Court of 'ppeals< conclusion that @udge icdican has shown a glaring %ias against respondents< case. >is actuations have not engendered reasona%le suspicion as to his fairness and a%ilit& to decide the case with the cold neutralit& of an impartial 9udge. =eril&, respondents have not convinced us that @udge icdican should inhi%it himself from hearing the case. 2et us now eDamine one %& one the circumstances relied upon %& the C' in ruling for the inhi%ition of @udge icdican. Denial of Respondents Motion to Hear Affirmative Defenses /he first circumstance which the appellate court relied upon to show the alleged %ias and partialit& of @udge icdican was his denial of

the !otion to >ear 'ffirmative efenses filed %& respondents. -4 'ccording to them, even if the 9udge had denied their !otion, he still ruled on the merits of their affirmative defenses and thus deprived them of an opportunit& to %e heard. /he fact that respondents< !otion for >earing was denied does not %& itself show %ias and partialit&. Clearl&, @udge icdican %ased his denial on the Rules of Court, according to which a preliminar& hearing on affirmative defenses is indeed discretionar& on the part of a 9udge.-5 /hus, @udge icdican cannot %e charged with %ias and partialit&, merel& on the %asis of his decision not to grant a motion for a preliminar& hearing. Be are not unmindful of our ruling in the previous Goc$an v. Goc$an case.-, /his Court held therein that the trial court committed grave a%use of discretion when it denied the motion of respondents for a preliminar& hearing on their affirmative defenses. But even in that case, two mem%ers of this Court -7 dissented and %elieved that respondent 9udge 7herein @udge icdican8 had not committed an& grave a%use of discretion in disallowing the preliminar& hearing on respondents< affirmative defenses. 6n an& event, this Court<s ruling of grave a%use of discretion in a certiorari proceeding such as the one issued in the earlier Goc$an case does not necessaril& translate to %ias and partialit& that would ipso #acto lead to the inhi%ition of the trial 9udge. 6n fact, in the previousl& cited case, this Court did not mention an& %adge of %ias or partialit& on the part of @udge icdican. >e was simpl& directed to conduct forthwith the preliminar& hearing on the affirmative defenses. /o repeat, as long as opinions formed in the course of 9udicial proceedings are %ased on the evidence presented and the conduct o%served %& the 9udge, such opinion (( even if later found to %e erroneous on appeal or made with grave a%use of discretion on certiorari (( will not necessaril& prove personal %ias or pre9udice on the part of the 9udge.-; +either can respondents convince us that the& were deprived of due process. /he essence of due process is the reasona%le opportunit& to %e heard and to su%mit an& evidence availa%le in support of one<s defense. -9 Bhere one is accorded an opportunit& to %e heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of procedural due process. 4# ue process was designed to afford an opportunit& to %e heard? an oral hearing need not alwa&s %e held. !oreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if the pleader is granted an opportunit& to see: reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.41 icdican<s $rder4" den&ing respondents< !otion for >earing was %ased on the pleadings filed %& %oth parties. Respondents filed their !otion to >ear 'ffirmative efenses, while petitioners filed their Comment to the !otion. 4- /hus, it cannot %e said that respondent @udge 9udge ar%itraril& ruled thereon. >e thereafter allowed the respondents and petitioners to file their !otion for Reconsideration 44 and $pposition,45 respectivel&, %efore deciding on the matter again. Character of the Order Denying Respondents Motion Respondents further argue that %efore hearing their !otion to >ear 'ffirmative efenses, @udge icdican had alread& prepared an $rder den&ing their plea. /his is an allegation that the& have not %een a%le to prove. Be cannot rel& merel& on their su%missions that he was in fact %ent on ruling against them. Petitioners correctl& argued as follows0 ./he fact is that @udge icdican reall& dictated his $rder in open court with legal citations and authorities %ut did not prepare it %eforehand. Be respectfull& su%mit that said act cannot %e considered as a manifestation of %ias and partialit& and deprived respondents of due process %ecause the motion filed %& respondents, cop& of which was attached as 'nneD N'< to the repl& of petitioners was complete with the evidence alread& attached as anneDes thereto and contained citation of authorities and the opposition of petitioners, cop& of which was attached to the repl& as 'nneD NB,< contained citations of authorities as well..4, /he argument that the $rder of @udge icdican was too scholarl& to %e eDtemporaneous is merel& the con9ecture of respondents. /his characteri4ation does not show in an& wa& that he was %iased or partial. Besides, as earlier adverted to, %oth the !otion and the Comment thereto had %een filed da&s %efore the hearing thereon. 6t is not unusual (( in fact, it is eDpected (( that the 9udge would stud& the !otion and the Comment filed %efore him. 6f he prepared well for the arguments, he should %e commended, not faulted. Besides, @udge icdican ruled that the issues raised in the !otion could %e determined on the %asis of preponderance of evidence presented %& %oth parties.47 /his means that he did not foreclose the possi%ilit& that the parties would ventilate these defenses during the trial. /o show his fairness, he even allowed the postponement of the pretrial set for that hearing upon the reEuest of respondents< counsel. /his act showed that he was in no hurr& to decide the case in favor of petitioners. 's to respondents< dou%ts arising from the alleged .suspicious. appearance of the /*+ of the 'ugust 11, "##- hearing, this Court cannot ta:e it as an indication of partialit& on the part of the 9udge. Clearl&, it was 'tt&. @onathan ). /ala%o, the %ranch cler: of court of Branch 11 of the R/C of Ce%u, who had issued the Certification4; dated +ovem%er 11, 1999. Respondents failed to prove that @udge icdican had a hand in its issuance. Bhat is clear is that the /*+ of 'ugust 11, 199; was prepared and signed %& Amel&n =. 1uentes, stenographic reporter of Branch 11 of the R/C of Ce%u. Connecting this .suddenl& found. /*+ to @udge icdican is not onl& speculative, %ut also %aseless and unfair and will not suffice to %ar respondent 9udge from performing his lawfull& mandated dut&. Admission of Petitioners !hi"its #itho$t indicating Respondents O"%ections 6n his $rder49 dated @une ", 1999, @udge icdican admitted the documentar& evidence of plaintiffs. >e did so after petitioners had filed their 1ormal $ffer of ADhi%its5# and respondents their Comments 7on Plaintiff<s ADhi%its8. 51 /he former was filed on !a& 5, 1999 and the latter on !a& 1", 1999. >e issued his $rder admitting the evidence of petitioners onl& on @une ", 1999 or a good "1 da&s after respondents had su%mitted their o%9ections to the former<s eDhi%its. Be cannot see how such an $rder would translate to %ias and partialit&. Respondents argue the 9udge should have indicated their o%9ections for the record. But it is clear that he indeed allowed them to file their CommentK$%9ections to petitioners< 1ormal $ffer. 6t is enough that he allowed %oth parties to %e heard, and that he decided %ased on their su%missions. Be do not agree, either, with the appellate court<s findings that petitioners< witnesses were allowed to answer all Euestions as:ed of

them, even if respondent 9udge had not &et ruled on the applica%ilit& of the *tatute of 1rauds. 'side from the fact that these o%9ections are sweeping and unsu%stantiated, the& should have %een raised %efore the trial 9udge himself. Respondents had ever& opportunit& to o%9ect to the Euestions the witnesses were as:ed and the answers the latter gave during the trial, %ased on the following provision of the Rules of Court0 .$%9ection to a Euestion propounded in the course of the oral eDamination of a witness shall %e made as soon as the grounds therefor shall %ecome reasona%l& apparent..5" 's to the stri:ing out of answers, the rule on evidence 7Rule 1-"8 provide0 .*AC. -9. Stri1ing out ans2er. ( *hould a witness answer the Euestion %efore the adverse part& had the opportunit& to voice full& its o%9ection to the same, and such o%9ection is found to %e meritorious, the court shall sustain the o%9ection and order the answer given to %e stric:en off the record. .$n proper motion, the court ma& also order the stri:ing out of answers which are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper..5Respondents have not shown that the& were in an& wa& denied their right to o%9ect to Euestions propounded in the course of the hearing. Denial of Re&$ests for Postponement and the 'orced Cross( !amination of #itnesses /he C' also ruled that the denial %& @udge icdican of the postponements reEuested %& respondents< counsels also showed his %ias and partialit&. Be disagree. ' motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, %ut a reEuest addressed to the sound discretion of the court.54 Parties as:ing for postponement have a%solutel& no right to assume that their motions would %e granted. /hus, the& must %e prepared on the da& of the hearing.55 )iven this rule, the Euestion of the correctness of the denial of respondents< reEuests for postponements was addressed to the sound discretion of @udge icdican. >is action thereon cannot %e distur%ed %& appellate courts in the a%sence of an& clear and manifest a%use of discretion resulting in a denial of su%stantial 9ustice. 5, *ince there was no such finding with regard to the disallowance of the reEuests for postponement, the C' cannot overturn the decision of the 9udge. !uch less can it assume his %ias and partialit& %ased merel& on the denial of the reEuests for postponement. !oreover, respondents cannot claim that all their reEuests were turned down %& @udge icdican. /his Court ta:es notice of the fact that respondents as:ed for an eDtension of time to file their answer and later as:ed for two postponements of the pretrial. 6n fact, when the pretrial was finall& set for 'ugust 11, 199;, the& then filed their !otion to >ear 'ffirmative efenses. 'nd when the 9udge denied it, the& again as:ed for a postponement of the pretrial, a reEuest that was readil& granted %& the trial court. Respondents fault @udge icdican for not postponing the pretrial on +ovem%er 9, 199;, when their counsel had to represent the Ce%u 2ions Clu% in an international conference in @apan. But the& should %e aware that the court had alread& given them one whole month to procure from the Court of 'ppeals a temporar& restraining order 7/R$8 to cause the suspension of the proceedings in the lower court. *o, on +ovem%er 9, 199;, the& were given sufficient time to prepare for the pretrial. 6f their counsel learned of the date of the conference onl& recentl&, he could have easil& assigned the case to 'tt&. =icente '. Aspina @r., his co(counsel. 6n fact, 'tt&. Aspina, armed with a special power of attorne& to represent respondents, was present in court on the hearing date. >e even admitted that he was a%le to read the records of the case. 'lso, as correctl& argued %& petitioners< counsel, respondents had with them their pretrial %riefs which could have guided them. 's can %e seen from the Pretrial $rder, respondents were a%l& represented %& 'tt&. Aspina. >ence, the& suffered no pre9udice even if the pretrial was not postponed. /he trial court o%served during the hearing0 ./he Court actuall& does not consider that as the reason to postpone the pre(trial in this case %ecause it seemed that there is a pattern to dela&. 'nd the Court can not countenance that there would %e no movement of this case. /here seemed to %e a pattern as o%served %& the Court. *o we will go on with the pre(trial if there is no possi%ilit& of an amica%le settlement..57 6t seems that respondents have no one else to %lame %ut themselves for the trial court<s denial of their reEuests for postponement. 's to the other time when the reEuest of respondents for postponement was denied %& @udge icdican, this Court notes that %oth their counsels (( 'tt&s. 2im and Aspina (( were present during the preceding hearing when the dates of the succeeding hearings were agreed upon. 's stated in the /*+,5; the parties agreed that the neDt setting would %e on 'pril ";, 1999 at 90## a.m. and on 'pril -#, 1999 at 1#0## a.m. But on 'pril "-, 1999 (( more than two months after the trial date had %een set and onl& five da&s %efore the scheduled hearing (( respondents< counsel filed an urgent !otion to Reset the hearing to 'pril ";, 1999, %ecause %oth law&ers allegedl& had other commitments. Petitioners filed an $pposition to the !otion to Reset? thus, respondent 9udge<s denial of the !otion was not at all ar%itrar& or whimsical. /he appellate court also faults @udge icdican for allowing petitioners to present their witnesses even in the a%sence of respondents< counsel and, on the succeeding hearing, for forcing the counsel to cross(eDamine the witness presented previousl&. 's we have ruled a%ove, parties as:ing for postponement have a%solutel& no right to assume that their motion would %e granted and must thus %e prepared on the da& of the hearing.59 Bhat further militates against respondents< counsel is his eDcuse that he was informed %& a court personnel that his !otion to Reset had %een granted.,# *upposedl& %ecause of this information, the counsel was under the impression that there would %e no hearing on the last scheduled date. >is assumption that his motion to reset would %e granted was %ad enough. Bhat was worse was that, in following up the proceedings of the case, he relied on the unauthori4ed communication of an unidentified court personnel. >e could have easil& verified if there was a hearing, and what transpired if it indeed there was one. /his is the dut& imposed upon law&ers. ue diligence reEuires that law&ers should o%tain timel& information from the concerned cler:s of court regarding action on their motions? lac: of notice thereof will not necessaril& ma:e them an& less accounta%le for their omission.,1

Petitioners correctl& argue thus0 .D D D. @udge icdican then allowed the counsel for petitioners to conduct the redirect eDamination of his first witness, and to conduct the direct eDamination of his second witness, giving the petitioners the opportunit& to conduct the re(cross eDamination of said witness and cross(eDamination of the second witness on 'pril -#, 1999. @udge icdican therefore was ver& fair and considerate to respondents in giving them the opportunit& to re(cross eDamine and cross(eDamine petitioners< witnesses instead of considering the respondents to have waived said right which was within his prerogative..," 6ndeed, the right to cross(eDamine ma& %e waived. ,- /he repeated failure of a part& to cross(eDamine a witness is an implied waiver of that right.,4 Respondents in this case were afforded the opportunit& to cross and re(cross eDamine the other parties< witnesses. 6t was respondents< counsel who failed to ta:e advantage of these opportunities. Denial of the Motion for )nhi"ition /he appellate court maintains that during the hearing for respondents< !otion for 6nhi%ition, the 9udge called the case %efore the scheduled time. 'gain, this is a claim that remains unproven and unsu%stantiated. >ence, it cannot %e the eDtra9udicial source from which can %e inferred %ias and partialit&. Both parties uniforml& Euote the proceedings on the hearing date for the case succeeding that on which the !otion to 6nhi%it was to %e heard0 .C$GR/0 Bere &ou here last !onda&P 6 did not see &ouP '//F. 26!0 6 was here, &our >onor. C$GR/0 Bhen this case was called, there was no appearance. C$GR/ 6+/ARPRA/AR0 >e came late, Four >onor. '//F. 26!0 6 was here, &our >onor, at 1#0## o<cloc:, &our >onor, in fact, there were still man& parties around, &our >onor. C$GR/0 's far as the minute is concerned, it is not reflected that &ou were here. Bhen the case was called &ou were not here. /he court could not %e at the merc& of the parties, so, the court has to act. *o, the court stand %& that order. *o &ou are not read&..,5 Respondents maintain that .IoJn the date of said hearing, counsel for respondents was present at 1#0## a.m. >owever, he learned that the hearing of the case was called earlier upon order of @udge icdican. Counsel for respondents then decided to leave the courtroom, to inEuire later, al%eit unsurprised..,, Bithout presenting an& proof of their presence on the hearing date at the designated time, the arguments of respondents< counsel lose force and credence. *uch arguments %ecome even less convincing when validated against the records of this case. 's shown %& the !inutes of the *ession,7 held on 'ugust 9, 1999 at 1#0## a.m., onl& the counsels for plaintiffs Iherein petitionersJ were present. 6t should %e o%served that the entries in official records made in the performance of dut& %& a pu%lic officer of the Philippines or %& some other person especiall& en9oined %& law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. ,; /his means that, in the present case, such evidence is satisfactor&, more so %ecause it has %een uncontradicted %& opposing evidence. 'lso, when the court interpreter,9 signed the !inutes of the *ession, it is presumed that official dut& was regularl& performed.7# 6n an& event, @udge icdican cannot %e accused of evading the !otion filed for his inhi%ition. >e allowed it to %e filed and even cancelled one hearing until the resolution of that !otion. >e also allowed petitioners to file their $pposition thereto 71 and thus showed that he wanted to hear %oth sides of the issue. Be do not find the $rder7" den&ing the !otion for 6nhi%ition ar%itrar& or whimsical. Respondent 9udge clearl& eDplained wh& the grounds for it were un9ust and invalid. $n the %asis of his circumspect and 9udicious ruling, we do not see how %ias and partialit& on his part can %e inferred. /hereafter, he allowed a !otion for Reconsideration7- to %e filed with the corresponding $pposition74 thereto. Be again emphasi4e that personal %ias or pre9udice is not proved %& the opinions the 9udge forms in the course of 9udicial proceedings, so long as these have %een %ased on the evidence presented and the conduct o%served %& the 9udge, even if such opinions are later found to %e erroneous.75 Declaration of the A"sence of the Possi"ility of a Compromise 1inall&, @udge icdican was charged with %ias, %ased on his pretrial $rder stating that there was no more possi%ilit& of a compromise among the parties. 1rom the time the original Complaint was filed up to the date of the pretrial, the parties had more than seven months to enter into a compromise agreement. /his was more than sufficient time. 6t escapes this Court wh&, eDactl& on the da& of the pretrial, respondents suddenl& informed the court that it was eDploring the possi%ilit& of a settlement. Besides, their a%sence during the pretrial negated the sincerit& of their desire to enter into a settlement. Be ta:e note of the following argument of petitioners0 .But @udge icdican did not %elieve in their sincerit& to pursue an amica%le settlement of the case since the& had alread& filed their first

petition for certiorari see:ing the issuance of a /R$KBrit of Preliminar& Iln9unctionJ en9oining him from ta:ing further proceedings in the case %elow. 1urthermore, the& were never present at the scheduled pre(trials and hearings of the case..7, '22 /$2 , a perusal of the records of this case will reveal that respondents failed to adduce an& eDtrinsic evidence to prove that @udge icdican had %een motivated %& malice or pre9udice in issuing the assailed rulings. /he& simpl& lean on his series of allegedl& adverse rulings, which the& characteri4e as tainted with %ias and partialit&. Be note that his rulings resolving the various motions or reEuests the& had filed were all made onl& after considering the arguments raised %& all the parties. 6t is true that he erred in some of his rulings, %ut such errors do not necessaril& translate to pre9udice. /he instances when he allegedl& eDhi%ited antagonism and partialit& against respondents andKor their counsels did not deprive them of a fair and impartial trial. /he parties should %e guided %& the words of this Court in imentel v. Salanga377 .Afforts to attain fair, 9ust and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in un9ustified assumptions, or ma:e a speculative approach to this ideal. 6t ill %ehooves this Court to tar and feather a 9udge as %iased or pre9udiced, simpl& %ecause counsel for a part& litigant happens to complain against him. 's applied here, respondent 9udge has not as &et crossed the line that divides partialit& and impartialit&. >e has not thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. +o act or conduct of his would show ar%itrariness or pre9udice. /herefore, we are not to assume what respondent 9udge, not otherwise legall& disEualified, will do in a case %efore him. D D D Pre9udice is not to %e presumed. Aspeciall& if weighed against a 9udge<s legal o%ligation under his oath to administer 9ustice Nwithout respect to person and do eEual right to the poor and the rich.< /o disEualif& or not to disEualif& himself then, as far as respondent 9udge is concerned, is a matter o# conscience.47; >H R ?OR , the Petition is here%& GR56!/D and the assailed C' ecision and Resolution R/-/RS/D and S/! 5SID/. /he pra&er for the inhi%ition of @udge 6saias icdican is here%& D/6I/D. >e is DIR/%!/D to proceed with the hearing of CAB("1 ;54 with all reasona%l& speed. +o pronouncement as to costs. *$ $R ARA . N @!N& G.R. No. ")26310 S1201-81r 30, 1971 (41 scra 66) =OS G. G OTIN!, petitioner(appellant, vs. TH HON. =OS ". GON(!" (, ,. h,s ca2ac,0: as M6.,c,2a3 =6+/1 o4 S6r,/ao, S6r,/ao +13 Nor01, TH %ROVIN&I!" ?IS&!" O? S'RIG!O D " NORT , a.+ TH % O%" O? TH %HI"I%%IN S respondents( appellees. &!STRO, J.: $n 'ugust -#, 19,5 Rosario R. Calderon filed with the municipal court of *urigao, *urigao del +orte, presided %& @udge @ose 2. )on4ale4 7hereinafter referred to as the respondent 9udge8, a criminal complaint 1 for serious ph&sical in9uries through rec:less imprudence against r. @ose ). )eotina 7hereinafter referred to as the petitioner8 and Remedios Oierulf. 'fter conducting the reEuisite preliminar& eDamination, the respondent @udge dismissed the criminal action as to Oierulf. /hereafter, he ordered the arrest of the petitioner, fiDing the %ond for his provisional li%ert& at P-##. $n $cto%er "7, 19,5 the petitioner filed a motion to disEualif& the respondent 9udge from hearing the criminal case, alleging as ground therefor the relationship of the latter to the complainant Calderon within the siDth civil degree %& affinit& Q a disEualification eDplicitl& spelled out in section 1 of Rule 1-7 of the Rules of Court. *aid section pertinentl& states0 *AC/6$+ 1. Dis.uali#ication o# judges. Q +o 9udge or 9udicial officer shall sit in an& case ... in which he is related to either part& within the siDth degree of consanguinit& or affinit& ... computed according to the rules of the civil law ... /he petitioner esta%lished the relationship of the complainant Calderon to the respondent 9udge thus0 /he hus%and of Calderon and the respondent 9udge have common great grandparents Q @uan )on4ale4 and Ramona Rodrigue4. @uan and Ramona )on4ale4 %egot two children Q Pantaleona and *imon. Pantaleona married 2uis Calderon. /he spouses 2uis and Pantaleona %egot a son whom the& also named 2uis. /he son 2uis married Rosario Cerda. 2uis and Rosario Calderon %egot a son, @uanito, who married another Rosario, the complainant in the criminal action. $n the other hand, *imon )on4ale4 married )eronima *amson. /he spouses *imon and )eronima %egot a son, Ricardo, who married =isitacion 2egaspi. /he couple, Ricardo and =isitacion )on4ale4, %egot a son Q @ose, the respondent 9udge. /he motion for disEualification, opposed %& the respondent provincial fiscal, was denied %& the respondent 9udge upon the ground that he %ears no relationship either to the plaintiff, the People of the Philippines, or to the defendant, r. @ose ). )eotina 7petitioner and appellant herein8 Q the onl& parties he considers as litigants in the criminal case. /he respondent 9udge also considered the complainant Calderon as a mere witness in the criminal action, not a part& within the contemplation of section 1 of Rule 1-7. /wice, on +ovem%er ,, 19,5 and on !arch 1, 19,,, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order den&ing his motion for disEualification, to no avail. *o the petitioner, on 'pril 4, 19,,, filed with the Court of 1irst 6nstance of *urigao del +orte a petition for prohi%ition with preliminar& in9unction, see:ing 718 the annulment of the orders den&ing his motion for disEualification and motions for reconsideration, and 7"8 the issuance of an order directing the respondent 9udge to cease and desist from tr&ing the criminal action. $n 'pril 1", 19,, the respondent provincial fiscal moved for the dismissal of the petition, alleging as ground therefor lac: of cause of action. $n 'pril 15, 19,, the Court of 1irst 6nstance issued an order dismissing the petition, holding that ... the provisions of *ec. ", Rule 1-7 of the +ew Rules of Court, are clear and specific to the effect that no appeal shall %e ta:en of the determination of the @udge affected in favor of his competenc& until after the case has %een decided %& him. 6t is, therefore, clear that up to this moment the petitioner cannot and should not have filed this case in this Court. >e should await the decision of the municipal @udge who has resolved in favor of his competenc& to tr& said criminal case. 6t is onl& in the event that the municipal @udge renders a decision of conviction when the counsel should ta:e the necessar& steps to protect his

client. $n !a& 17, 19,, the court a .uo re9ected the petitionerRs motion for reconsideration of !a& 7, 19,,. >ence, the present appeal. Resolution of the central issue posed %& the present appeal reEuires a determination of whether the petitioner 7the defendant in the criminal complaint8 ma& avail of a special civil action for prohi%ition to restrain the respondent 9udge, allegedl& disEualified to sit in the case, from hearing the criminal action, independentl& of the remed& of appeal provided for %& section " of Rule 1-7 of the Rules of Court. /he petitioner specificall& imputes error to the court a .uo in the latterRs 718 treating his petition for prohi%ition as an appeal from the orders of the respondent 9udge den&ing his motion for disEualification and su%seEuent motions for reconsideration, and 7"8 appl&ing section " of Rule 1-7 as %asis for dismissing his petition. /he petitioner argues that the lower court failed to regard the special civil action for prohi%ition as the proper remed& in the case at %ar, considering that the respondent 9udge, despite his disEualification, insisted on hearing the criminal case. *uch insistence, according to the petitioner, constitutes grave a%use of discretion amounting to lac: or eDcess of 9urisdiction. /he petitioner adds that appeal in this instance is not a speed& and adeEuate remed& in the ordinar& course of law. $n the other hand, the respondents rest their case solel& on the provisions of section " of Rule 1-7. /he& contend that appeal after final 9udgment in the criminal action is the proper remed& availa%le to the petitioner. 6t thus %ehooves us to inEuire into the coverage and intendment of sections 1 and " of Rule 1-7 of the Rules of Court. *ection 1 reads0 *AC/6$+ 1. Dis.uali#ication o# judges. Q +o 9udge or 9udicial officer shall sit in an& case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniaril& interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either part& within the siDth degree of consanguinit& or affinit& or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has %een eDecutor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in an& inferior court when his ruling or decision is the su%9ect of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed %& them and entered upon the record. ' 9udge ma&, in the eDercise of his sound discretion, disEualif& himself from sitting in a case, for 9ust or valid reasons other than those mentioned a%ove. *ection " provides0 *AC. ". 7,jection t$at judge dis.uali#ied, $o2 made and e##ect . Q 6f it %e claimed that an official is disEualified from sitting as a%ove provided, the part& o%9ecting to his competenc& ma&, in writing, file with the official his o%9ection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the Euestion of his disEualification. >is decision shall %e forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, %ut no appeal or sta&, shall %e allowed from, or %& reason of, his decision in favor of his own competenc&, until after final 9udgment in the case. /he intendment of section 1 is incontesta%l& that a 9udge, sitting in a case, must at all times %e wholl& free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Alementar& due process reEuires a hearing %efore an impartial and disinterested tri%unal. ' 9udge has %oth the dut& of rendering a 9ust decision and the dut& of doing it in a manner completel& free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrit&. 2 /o effect this intendment full&, section 1 enumerates the grounds for the disEualification of a 9udge. /he first paragraph of section 6 refers eDclusivel& to legal grounds for challenging a 9udgeRs competenc&. /he second paragraph thereof authori4es a 9udge to inhi%it himself voluntaril&, in the a%sence of an& challenge from either part&, on good, sound or ethical grounds, 3 or for 9ust and valid reasons, other than those mentioned in the first paragraph. /he same second paragraph leaves the matter of disEualification to the sound discretion of the 9udge. *ection " prescri%es the procedure to %e followed %& a litigant see:ing the disEualification of a 9udge %ased on an& of the grounds enumerated in section 1. *ection " purports to protect the 9udge who falls within the compass of an& of the prohi%itor& provisions of section 1 from an& misunderstanding as to his 9udicial actuations. 4 /hus, the section reEuires the o%9ection to %e stated in writing, with the ground therefor stated therein. /he same section then reEuires the 9udge to ma:e a determination of his competenc&, and to proceed with the trial of the case or to withdraw therefrom, in accordance with such determination. 6f a part& o%9ects to the Eualification of a 9udge %ased on the ground of relationship to a part& to the case within the prohi%ited degree and the challenged 9udge denies such relationship and rules in favor of his own competenc&, then the 9udge has no recourse %ut to proceed with the case. 6n such an event, section " allows no appeal from or sta& of the determination of the 9udge in favor of his competenc& until after final 9udgment in the main case. /his rule allowing a challenged 9udge to continue to tr& a case as well applies in those instances when a part& o%9ects to the 9udgeRs competenc& on circumstances not constitutive of legal grounds for disEualification. /he rationale for the rule is that a 9udge is dut& %ound not to sit in the trial of a given case if legall& disEualified, and to proceed with the trial and decision of the case if not legall& disEualified. .>e cannot shir: the responsi%ilit& without the ris: of %eing called upon to account for his dereliction.. 5 /he remed& of the aggrieved part&, in the first case, consists of a challenge against the determination made %& the 9udge of his competenc& in the appeal from the principal case. 6n the latter case, where a 9udge, not legall& disEualified under the first paragraph of section 1, does not inhi%it himself, the aggrieved part& still has a right to relief. 6f it appears that the aggrieved part& was the victim of an unfair and partial trial %ecause of the 9udgeRs %ias or pre9udice, this Court will not hesitate to order a new trial, if necessar&, in the interest of 9ustice. 6 /he prohi%itor& provision em%odied in section " against an appeal from or sta& of the proceedings undou%tedl& applies in all civil cases. 1or in the said cases, the part& aggrieved, in his appeal to the proper court from the final 9udgment rendered in the main case, ma& raise the Euestion of the correctness of the determination %& the 9udge of his competenc& to sit in the case. 6n criminal cases, the same rule applies where the accused see:s the disEualification of the 9udge. 6n this case, the accused, in the event of his conviction, has the opportunit& to Euestion the 9udgeRs ruling on his competenc& in his appeal from the decision on the merits. 6n the event of his acEuittal, the accused has no cause for complaint against the 9udgeRs ruling of non(disEualification. 7

Bhere, however, the prosecution or the offended part& see:s the 9udgeRs disEualification, the restriction finds no application. 1or where the 9udge decides in favor of his own competenc&, proceeds to tr& the case, and renders a verdict of acEuittal, the prosecution or offended part& has neither the right to appeal nor an& plain, speed& and adeEuate remed& in the ordinar& course of law to have the ruling of the 9udge on the motion see:ing his disEualification reviewed on appeal, .... since no appeal from the 9udgment of acEuittal could possi%l& %e ta:en %& the prosecution %& virtue of the dou%le 9eopard& provision of the Constitution.. A >ence, resort to the eDtraordinar& remedies or special civil actions of prohi%ition and certiorari constitutes the onl& means availa%le to the prosecution or the offended part& for the review %& a superior court of the 9udgeRs denial of the motion see:ing his disEualification on eDisting and valid legal grounds. Reverting now to the case at %ar, one circumstance stands out and commands our attention0 that the legal ground for the respondent 9udgeRs disEualification is indu%ita%le. /he respondent 9udge ma:es no denial whatsoever of his relationship within siDth degree of affinit& to the complainant Calderon. $n record remains the petitionerRs uncontested claim of admission on the part of the respondent 9udge of his relationship to the complainant Calderon within the prohi%ited degree. 6nstead of disputing the petitionerRs averment of his relationship to the complainant Calderon, the respondent 9udge, in his order dated $cto%er ";, 19,5, den&ing the petitionerRs motion to disEualif&, evaded the vital Euestion and instead ruled on the inapplica%ilit& of section 1 on the ground that he %ears no relationship to either the People of the Philippines, the plaintiff, or r. @ose ). )eotina, the accused 7petitioner and appellant herein8 Q the onl& parties he considers as litigants in the criminal action. $n record, therefore, the respondent 9udgeRs relationship to the complainant Calderon within the prohi%ited degree is, we repeat, indu%ita%le. /he respondent 9udgeRs o%servation regarding the inapplica%ilit& of section 1 of Rule 1-7 on the ground that he %ears no relationship to either the People of the Philippines, the plaintiff, or the petitioner )eotina the accused, completel& ignores the interest of the complainant Calderon in the criminal prosecution. ' crime constitutes a pu%lic offense against the *tate? for this reason, section 1 of Rule 11# of the Rules of Court directs the commencement of all criminal actions in the name of the People of the Philippines. But a crime also constitutes an offense against the aggrieved or offended part&? for this reason, section 15 of Rule 11# allows the intervention of the offended part& in the prosecution of the offense, to the eDceptions provided therein. /he right of the offended part& to eDact civil lia%ilit& arising from the offense finds eDpress recognition in our laws and 9urisprudence. !oreover, the respondent 9udgeRs interpretation of the phrase .either part&. as used in section 1 of Rule 1-7 Q limiting the reference solel& to either the plaintiff or the defendant in a criminal action Q defies elementar& logic and common sense. +o section of the Rules of Court, no article of the Revised Penal Code and the Civil Code of the Philippines, eDcludes the aggrieved person as a part& to a criminal action. $n the other hand, several sections 9 of the Rules of Court and two provisions 10 of the Revised Penal Code and the Civil Code of the Philippines recogni4e the offended part& as a part& to the criminal action.. /he record of the case at %ar also reveals that the respondent 9udge, despite his relationship to the complainant Calderon within the prohi%ited degree and the protestations of the petitioner, adamantl& refused to inhi%it himself from proceeding with the criminal action and insisted on sitting in 9udgment. 6n this connection, we o%serve that section 1 of Rule 1-7 allows a 9udge, although disEualified on the grounds enumerated therein to sit in a case, %ut onl& upon the written consent of all the parties in interest, signed %& them and entered upon the record. /his eDception, we %elieve, applies without regard to the indu%ita%ilit& of the legal ground for the disEualification of a 9udge. >ence, although the proscri%ed relationship eDists, if the parties, with :nowledge of the ground for the disEualification, waive their o%9ection to the competenc& of the 9udge %& authori4ing him in writing to proceed with the case, then the 9udge, armed with such written consent, is free to tr& the litigation %efore him. /he refusal of the respondent 9udge to disEualif& himself and his insistence to hear the criminal case in the face of the eDpress prohi%ition contained in section 1 of Rule 1-7, to our mind, constitute grave a%use of discretion amounting to lac: or eDcess of 9urisdiction. *trict compliance with the istringent rule on disEualification on account of relationship %etween the 9udge and one of the parties serves not onl& to protect the rights of the parties and assure an impartial administration of 9ustice %ut also to prevent erosion of the peopleRs confidence in the 9udiciar&. Considering, therefore, the indu%ita%ilit& of the relationship %etween the respondent 9udge and the complainant Calderon within the proscri%ed degree, the refusal of the said respondent to withdraw from the criminal case despite the o%9ection persistentl& interposed %& the petitioner to his competenc&, and the all(important principle of maintenance of the confidence of the people in the impartialit& of the administration of 9ustice, we %elieve that the resort %& the petitioner to the special civil action of prohi%ition to restrain the respondent 9udge from proceeding with the criminal action is appropriate. Be hold that the prohi%itor& provision against an appeal from or a sta& of the proceedings contained in section " of Rule 1-7 does not operate to %ar an accused person, in proper cases, from availing of the special civil action of prohi%ition %efore superior courts for determination, ahead of the 9udgment on the merits, of whether the challenged 9udge committed grave a%use of discretion amounting to lac: or eDcess of 9urisdiction in refusing to disEualif& himself. 1inall&, we must set aright certain inaccurate concepts articulated %& the petitioner regarding the via%ilit& and nature of a disEualified 9udgeRs decision. /he petitioner claims that the disEualification of a 9udge renders him without 9urisdiction and, conseEuentl&, his 9udgment in the action %efore him is a nullit&. /o our mind, the disEualification of a 9udge does not necessaril& render his 9udgment null and void. +either section 1 nor section " of Rule 1-7 so states. /he disEualification of the person called upon to preside over a specific case does not divest his court of 9urisdiction over the su%9ect(matter of or the persons of the parties to the said case. 't most, the disEualification stri:es onl& at the authorit& of the challenged 9udge to preside over the trial of the specific case and therein to eDercise the 9urisdiction of the court. 6mportant is the distinction %etween the 9urisdiction of the court and the authorit& of the 9udge called upon to eDercise such 9urisdiction. ' 9udge ma& %e disEualified to tr&, sit in or act in a specific case, %ut his disEualification does not destro& the 9urisdiction of the court which he presides. /hus, if su%seEuentl& the 9udgment of a disEualified 9udge should %e set aside as null and void %& a higher court, the nullit& stems not from the courtRs lac: of 9urisdiction %ut from the a%sence of authorit& on the part of the disEualified 9udge to tr& the given case. Be therefore hold that the respondent 9udge is without authorit& to preside over the criminal case in Euestion. *ection 1, in commanding him to withdraw from the case herein involved, necessaril& divests him of all authorit& to actin an& 9udicial capacit& in connection therewith. Be further hold that where the disEualif&ing fact is indu%ita%le and the parties to the case ma:e no waiver of such disEualification, as in the case at %ar, sec. 1 forthwith completel& strips the 9udge of authorit& to proceed. 'll his acts in the premises are without authorit& of law.

'CC$R 6+)2F, 9udgment is here%& rendered setting aside 718 the order of the Court of 1irst 6nstance of *urigao del +orte dismissing the petition for prohi%ition, and 7"8 the orders of the respondent 9udge den&ing the motion for his disEualification and su%seEuent motions for reconsideration. /he respondent 9udge is here%& ordered to refrain permanentl& from ta:ing further action in criminal case 5#4". +o pronouncement as to costs. 2et a cop& of this decision %e forwarded to the >onora%le, the *ecretar& of @ustice. N @!N& G.R. No. 14A991 =a.6ar: 21, 2004 ( scra 63) % O%" O? TH %HI"I%%IN S, 'ppellee, vs. " ON!RDO N'G'ID : M!#!O, 'ppellant. AC6*6$+ &!R%IO, J.: /he Case 1 Before this Court for automatic review is the ecision dated 1, !a& "##1 of the Regional /rial Court of !anila, Branch 1;, in Criminal Case +o. ##(179,9;. /he trial court found 2eonardo +uguid & !a&ao 7.appellant.8 guilt& of the crime of serious illegal detention with rape and imposed on him the death penalt&. /he Charge /he 6nformation charging appellant with the crime of serious illegal detention with rape reads0 /hat on or a%out @anuar& 1, "###, in the Cit& of !anila, Philippines, the said accused, %eing then a private individual and without authorit& of law, willfull&, unlawfull&, feloniousl& and illegall& detain 7sic8 R$BA+' R6'+C'RA* F !6R'+ ' %& then and there ta:ing and loc:ing her inside his room located at 19-" 1irme4a *treet, *ampaloc, this Cit&, and preventing her from going out of said room for a period of three 7-8 hours, more or less, there%& depriving her of her li%ert& and during the said period of time, said accused %& means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit0 %& po:ing a :nife, threatening to :ill her should she resist and cho:ing her, did then and there willfull&, unlawfull& and feloniousl& succeed in having carnal :nowledge of her, against her will and consent. Contrar& to law." 'rraignment and Plea Bhen arraigned on 14 1e%ruar& "###, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de o#icio, entered a plea of not guilt&./he /rial -ersion o# t$e rosecution /he prosecution presented four witnesses0 718 complainant Rowena Rian4ares 7.Rowena.8? 7"8 r. !irasol Pangan of the G.P. Philippine )eneral >ospital $%stetrics and )&necolog& epartment, who eDamined the complainant? 7-8 Aldee Ause%io? and 748 ante !agat. /he *olicitor )eneral summari4ed the prosecution<s version of the incident in the People<s Brief as follows0 $n ecem%er -1, 1999, a%out 7 o<cloc: in the evening, appellant and his companions 7names not on record8 were having a drin:ing spree outside the house of @un Rian4ares DDD. 7p. 5, /*+, !a& "", "###8. '%out " o<cloc: in the morning of the following da& or right after the +ew Fear<s eve cele%ration, @un Rian4ares left their house to see a friend. >is wife, Rowena Rian4ares, was left %ehind sleeping inside the room of their house with their daughter IsiD 7,8 &ears oldJ and son Ithree 7-8 &ears oldJ 7pp. -(4, i,id.'. 'fter a while, Rowena Rian4ares heard a :noc: at the door of their room. ConseEuentl&, she rose from the %ed and partiall& opened the door to loo: IatJ who was :noc:ing. 6t was appellant. 'ppellant tried to push open the door, telling Rowena Rian4ares that her hus%and was as:ing for mone& to %u& liEuor. Rowena Rian4ares got suspicious %ecause her hus%and had mone& at that time and he would not as: mone& from her. Rowena Rian4ares thus closed the door 7pp. -(5, i,id.' /hereafter, Rowena Rian4ares went %ac: to sleep. ' few minutes later, she heard appellant upstairs repeatedl& shouting that her hus%and was ver& mad %ecause he did not have mone& to %u& liEuor. Bhen she heard appellant sa& that her hus%and was allegedl& mad, she opened the door of their room and went out. *he went inside appellant<s room which was located in front of their room to confront him. *he told appellant0 4)a1it $i$ingi ng pera si 8uya "un mo may pera naman siya94 6mmediatel& thereafter, appellant rushed to her %ac: and placed his left arm around her nec: with his right hand holding a :itchen :nife, a%out twelve 71"8 inches long 7pp. 5(, and 1", i,id.'. Rowena Rian4ares got surprised and, conseEuentl&, pushed appellant<s left arm. 6n the process, Rowena Rian4ares got off %alance and fell down DDD the stairwa& screaming. *he as:ed for help shouting her hus%and<s name 7p. 11, i,id.' 'ppellant immediatel& went after Rowena Rian4ares and upon catching up with her, appellant held her hair and left arm. >e then dragged her upstairs towards his 7appellant<s8 room 7pp. 5(,, i,id.' 6nside the room, appellant as:ed Rowena Rian4ares to undress while pointing the :nife he was holding at her right rear side of the %od&. >e threatened to :ill Rowena Rian4ares if she did not undress herself. $ut of fear, she was forced to undress herself. /hen, appellant :issed the different parts of her %od&. Rowena Rian4ares struggled and resisted. *he grappled for possession of the :nife and succeeded in holding its %laded portion causing her in9ur& on the right palm. *he persisted in grappling for possession of the :nife %ut failed. 6n the process, she sustained a further in9ur& on her left arm. 6nstead of relenting, appellant pulled her and slapped the %ac: of her head. /hereafter, appellant dragged and forced her to lie down on the lower portion of the dou%le Idec:J %ed located inside appellant<s room 7pp. ,(1-, i,id.'. Bhile Rowena Rian4ares was DDD l&ing down DDD with her legs spread apart, appellant placed himself on top of her. >e placed his left foot under Rowena Rian4ares< left leg and his right foot on Rowena Rian4ares< right leg. Bhile in that position, appellant forced his

private organ into Rowena Rian4ares< private part. Rowena Rian4ares continued to shout for help %ut appellant po:ed the :nife at the left side of her %od&. Bhile appellant was raping her, he pointed the :nife at Rowena Rian4ares< private part and told her that he wanted to get IaJ thrill out of it %ecause he could not get a full erection since he was under the influence of .sha%u.. Rowena Rian4ares pleaded IwithJ appellant to stop and assured him that she would help him get out DDD %ut appellant remained unmoved 7pp. 1-(17, i,id.'. '%out ten 71#8 minutes after Rowena Rian4ares was dragged %& appellant to his room, some%od& :noc:ed at appellant<s door and shouted0 4)ernie ano ,a ang ginaga2a mo dyan94 'ppellant answered %ac:0 4:malis 1ayo 1undi papatayin 1o ito. 4 7pp. 1;(19, i%id.8. Aldee Ause%io, a neigh%or of spouses @un and Rowena Rian4ares at 1irme4a *treet, *ampaloc, !anila 7p. 7, /*+, !a& -#, "###8, testified that on @anuar& 1, "###, a%out "015 in the morning, he went to the house of his 8uya @ose .@un. Rian4ares %ecause he was summoned %& the latter 7p. 4, /*+, !a& -#, "###8. Bhen he was a%out to enter the house, Aldee Ause%io heard Rowena Rian4ares shout. 6mmediatel&, Aldee Ause%io :ic:ed the entrance gate of the house to open it. >e then hurriedl& went upstairs and saw Rowena Rian4ares using her feet in tr&ing to prevent the door of appellant<s room from closing. 'fter the door was closed, he immediatel& :noc:ed at the door. 'ppellant, however, shouted, telling him to leave and no%od& should go up? otherwise, he would :ill Rowena Rian4ares 7pp. 4(5, i%id.8. ConseEuentl&, Aldee Ause%io went outside the house to loo: for @un Rian4ares %ecause he did not see him inside the house. Bhen he found @un Rian4ares, he told him that there was a pro%lem in his house 7p. 5, i%id.8. '%out thirt& 7-#8 minutes later, Rowena Rian4ares< hus%and arrived. @un Rian4ares :noc:ed at appellant<s door and as:ed appellant what was he doing to his wife. 'ppellant pounded the floor, using the handle of the :nife and shouted. >e as:ed @un Rian4ares to leave him alone? otherwise, he would :ill his wife 7pp. 1;(19, !a& "", "###8. /hirt& 7-#8 minutes thereafter, Baranga& Councilor +ida !agat, together with her hus%and, ante !agat, arrived. *he and her relatives negotiated for Rowena Rian4ares< release. >owever, appellant told them to leave? otherwise, he would :ill Rowena Rian4ares. Bhile the& were negotiating for Rowena Rian4ares< release, appellant was still on top of her 7Rowena Rian4ares8 7pp. 19("#, i%id.8. 'fter more than an hour of failed negotiations %& Baranga& Councilor +ida !agat, the policemen too: over 7pp. "(4, /*+, @ul& 11, "###8. /he policemen 7names not on record8 forci%l& opened the door and immediatel&, thereafter, the& got hold of appellant. Before the& could get hold of appellant, however, he 7appellant tried to sta% Rowena Rian4ares %ut the latter was a%le to evade the thrust. 6nstead, she was hit on her left arm. /hen a certain Colonel Castro pulled Rowena Rian4ares and immediatel& covered her with a %lan:et 7p. "#, /*+, !a& "", "###8. DDD r. !irasol Pangan testified that she was the one who ph&sicall& eDamined Rowena Rian4ares. *he testified that she eDamined Rowena Rian4ares< %od& from head to foot. *he found the following in9uries on her %od&0 1. one 718 hematoma on the right nec:? ". two 7"8 a%rasions at the left lower hip approDimatel& #.5cm.? -. one 718 a%rasion at the left forearm? 4. one 718 a%rasion hematoma(circular at the left lower arm? 5. multiple a%rasion hematoma at the volar aspect of the second, fourth digits of right hand and under the nose? ,. one 718 hematoma at the %ac: and the anterior tract the largest of which measures , D1 cm.? 7. one 718 sta% wound at the left forearm? and ;. one 718 hematoma measuring two cm. at the right la%ia minora of the genitalia.4 =ersion of the efense 'ppellant 2eonardo +uguid was the sole witness for the defense. /he Pu%lic 'ttorne& summari4ed the defense<s version of what transpired, as follows0 2eonardo +uguid testified that he :new the victim %ecause he wor:ed in the latter<s !anila O(9 college as their dog trainer. >e had %een wor:ing with the Rian4ares IspousesJ for five 758 &ears. 7/*+, *eptem%er 11, "###, pp. 1(48 $n ecem%er -1, 1999 at a%out 1#0-# p.m., Rowena Rian4ares entered his room. >e as:ed her what she wanted %ut Rowena did not answer and instead she :issed him on the lips. >e had seD with Rowena and the latter<s hus%and arrived. @un called up for Rowena %ut the latter told her hus%and that she was in the accused(appellant<s room tal:ing with the latter. @un left at around 110## pm and Rowena sta&ed in his room until the police called %& her hus%and arrived. >e told Rowena to go out of the room %ut the latter refused to do so. /he police :ept on convincing them to go out of the room %ut Rowena told them that the& were 9ust tal:ing and the& would go out soon. /he police :ic:ed the door open and he was arrested. >e was %rought to the police station wherein he was mauled and was forced to confess that he raped Rowena. /he first time he had seDual intercourse with Rowena was the middle of 199; when the& went to Bulacan. Rowena told her then that she saw in him what was lac:ing in her hus%and. Rowena<s hus%and was an alcoholic and a drug user. >e does not :now wh& she filed ItJhis serious illegal detention with rape IchargeJ against him. 7/*+, *eptem%er 11, "###, pp. 1( 158 >e testified that he had wor:ed with Rian4ares from 1995("###. /here was a time he had an argument with @un so he was as:ed to leave the Rian4ares< house. 7/*+, *eptem%er 11,"###, pp. 15(1,8 /he first time he had seDual intercourse with Rowena was when the& went to Bulacan to get rice from Rowena<s parents. Prior to @anuar& 1, "###, he had several seDual intercourse 7sic8 with Rowena. Rowena gave him several lovenotes %ut he lost them all. 7/*+, *eptem%er 11, "###, pp. 15(1,8 $n @anuar& 1, "###, he did not notice that Rowena was %leeding when she emerged from the room. >e was holding a :nife when the police arrested him %ecause he was forced to fight %ac: at the police who were mauling him inside his room. >e had a :itchen :nife inside his room %ecause Rowena<s hus%and told him to %ring the :itchen :nife inside him 7sic8 room so that he could easil& open the %oD of firecrac:ers in case an&%od& came to %u&. 7/*+, *eptem%er 11, "###, pp. "4(-#85

/he /rial Court<s Ruling /he trial court considered the testimonies of Rowena and the other prosecution witnesses to %e straightforward and credi%le. /he ph&sical in9uries Rowena suffered, confirmed %& the eDamining ph&sician and o%served %& the trial court, corro%orated her version of the events. $n the other hand, the trial court found du%ious appellant<s stor& that he and Rowena were sweethearts. /he trial court held that0 /he accused<s sweetheart defense is of dou%tful nature and undeserving of credence. 1irstl&, the accused<s version of the incident is unnatural and contrar& to common human eDperience. 6f it was true that the complainant was in the accused<s room on the second floor at 110## p.m., when her hus%and called her from the ground floor, she would surel& had Euic:l& gotten out of the room, instead of cooll& telling her hus%and that she was with the accused in the latter<s room. *econdl&, the accused<s declaration is contradicted not onl& %& the straightforward, convincing and %elieva%le testimonies of the complainant and prosecution witnesses Ause%io and !agat, %ut also %& the ph&sical evidence of the in9uries sustained %& the complainant on the occasion of the commission of the crime, ADhi%its .1. and .1(1 .., /he trial court ruled that the acts of the appellant in loc:ing up Rowena against her will in his room for three hours, threatening to :ill her and then seDuall& assaulting her, constituted the crime of serious illegal detention with rape. /he dispositive portion of the trial court<s ecision of 1, !a& "##1 reads0 B>ARA1$RA, the accused 2eonardo +uguid & !a&ao, is here%& convicted of the crime of serious illegal detention with rape under 'rticle ",7 of the Penal Code and sentenced to suffer the severe penalt& of death %& lethal in9ection and accessor& penalties provided %& law and to pa& the costs. $n the civil lia%ilit& of the accused, he is also sentenced to pa& the complainant, Rowena Rian4ares & !iranda, moral and nominal damages in the respective sums of P1##,###.## and P5#,###.##, with interest thereon at the legal rate of ,S per annum from this date until full& paid. *$ $R ARA .7 >ence, this automatic review. /he 6ssues 'ppellant see:s the reversal of his conviction %& contending that0 />A /R6'2 C$GR/ ARRA 6+ C$+=6C/6+) 'PPA22'+/ $1 *AR6$G* 622A)'2 />A 2'//AR<* )G62/ B'* +$/ PR$=A+ BAF$+ RA'*$+'B2A $GB/.;

A/A+/6$+ B6/> R'PA B>A+

'ppellant, arguing through the Pu%lic 'ttorne&, alleged that the trial court erred in re9ecting his sweetheart defense, which was not unli:el& since he spent most of his time with Rowena. 6n the alternative, appellant claims he is lia%le onl& for simple rape %ecause the prosecution failed to show that his primar& purpose was to detain Rowena, thus0 DDD 6t is undenia%le that the accused(appellant<s primar& purpose was to have carnal :nowledge of Rowena Rian4ares. /he accused( appellant immediatel& ordered Rowena Rian4ares to undress and raped her. 's a matter of fact, even at the time the police forci%l& opened the door, Rowena and the accused(appellant were still %oth na:ed and the accused(appellant was still positioned on top of Rowena.9 /he *olicitor )eneral agreed that appellant is onl& lia%le for simple rape under 'rticle --5 1# of the Revised Penal Code %ecause0 718 it necessaril& follows from the Court<s ruling in People v. *actao11 that there is no compleD crime of illegal detention with rape? 1" and 7"8 appellant did not release Rowena after the rape onl& %ecause her hus%and and the police were outside appellant<s room. 6n the Repl& Brief, the Pu%lic 'ttorne& raised as an additional ground for reversal the presiding 9udge<s alleged lac: of impartialit& in deciding the case. /he Ruling of the Court /he Court shall first discuss the *olicitor )eneral<s contention that there is no compleD crime of serious illegal detention with rape. 6n People v. *actao+ the Court ruled as follows0 6t ma& %e worth to mention at the outset that there is no compleD crime of rape with serious illegal detention. 6f the purpose is to deprive the offended part& of li%ert&, the crime committed is illegal detention. 'nd, if during the course of the illegal detention, the offended part& is raped, a separate crime of rape is committed? in this instance, two independent crimes are committed. >owever, if the o%9ective of the offender is to rape the victim onl&, and in the process, the latter had to %e illegall& detained, onl& the crime of rape is committed since illegal detention is deemed a%sor%ed in rape. >ence, in eople v. %$ing Suy Sionga, *ionga was found guilt& of two independent crimes, i.e., serious illegal detention and acts of lasciviousness, %ecause the two acts did not come within the purview of 'rt. 4; of the Revised Penal Code which applies to compleD crimes, for certainl&, one cannot %e considered as a means to commit the other. DDD1- 7underscoring supplied8 /he decision in *actao+ promulgated on "9 $cto%er 199-, eDplained the rules on the treatment of serious illegal detention and rape at that time. Prior to the effectivit& of Repu%lic 'ct +o. 7,59 7.R' 7,59.8 on -1 ecem%er 199-, 14 when the person :idnapped or illegall& detained was raped, two independent crimes of :idnapping and rape were committed. R' 7,59, however, amended the last paragraph of 'rticle ",7 of the Revised Penal Code on serious illegal detention and :idnapping to read0 Bhen the victim is :illed or dies as a conseEuence of the detention or is raped, or is su%9ected to torture or dehumani4ing acts, the maDimum penalt& shall %e imposed. Gnder this provision, when the person :idnapped or illegall& detained is raped, the offense committed is the s21c,a3 co-231C cr,-1 of serious illegal detention or :idnapping with rape, punisha%le with the maDimum penalt& of death.15 /he last paragraph of 'rticle ",7 applies onl& to instances where the person illegall& detained or :idnapped is raped. 6t does not provide for a co-231C cr,-1 of rape

with serious illegal detention. 's the Court ruled in *actao+ there is no compleD crime of illegal detention with rape under 'rticle 4; of the Revised Penal Code. /here is also no compleD crime of :idnapping with attempted rape under 'rticle 4; %ecause there is no single act which results in two or more grave or less grave felonies. +either is illegal detention a necessar& means for committing rape.1, +onetheless, the Court concurs with the Pu%lic 'ttorne& and the *olicitor )eneral that the crime committed in this case is not serious illegal detention with rape. Rather, appellant is guilt& of rape Eualified %& the use of a deadl& weapon. /he elements of :idnapping and serious illegal detention under 'rticle ",7 of the Revised Penal Code 17 are0 718 the offender is a private individual? 7"8 he :idnaps or detains another or in an& other manner deprives the latter of his li%ert&? 7-8 the act of detention or :idnapping must %e illegal? and 748 in the commission of the offense, an& of the following circumstances is present0 7a8 the :idnapping or detention lasts for more than - da&s? or 7%8 it is committed %& simulating pu%lic authorit&? or 7c8 an& serious ph&sical in9uries are inflicted upon the person :idnapped or detained or threats to :ill him are made? or 7d8 the person :idnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a pu%lic officer.1; /he essence of illegal detention is the deprivation of the victim<s li%ert&. /he prosecution must prove actual confinement or restriction of the victim, and that such deprivation was the intention of the appellant. 19 /he accused must have acted purposel& or :nowingl& to restrain the victim %ecause what constitutes the offense is ta:ing coupled with intent to restrain."# Be agree with the Pu%lic 'ttorne& that the facts in the present case indicate that appellant<s principal o%9ective was not to deprive Rowena of her li%ert&. Be Euote from the findings of the trial court0 DDD Caught %& surprise, the complainant struggled to free herself from the hold of the accused and ran down the stairwa&, %ut in her haste she stum%led and fell down. /he accused followed her down? held her hair and left hand and dragged her upstairs to his room, while she shouted for help. $nce inside the room, the accused forced the complainant to undressed 7sic8 and then he :issed all the parts of her %od&. /he complainant tried to resist and in the process, she sustained a wound in her left arm and a :nife wound in her right palm, ADhi%it .1.. /he accused forced the complainant to lie on a %ed and placed himself on top of her and at the same time position his :nees %etween her legs and forced them to separate. 'fter which he proceeded to rape her, and while doing so, he remar:ed to her, 4;eng 7complainant<s nic:name8, pasensiya 1a na. 6a1a,ato 1asi a1o.4 7Please forgive me %ecause 6 am high on drugIsJ8. >e further told her that he would insert the :nife he was holding in her vagina to enhance his eDcitement. DDD 1inall&, at around 50## a.m., the police officer forced open the door and %arged inside the room, and s68+61+ 0h1 +6-84o6.+1+ acc6s1+ ;ho ;as 0h1. o. 0o2 o4 0h1 co-23a,.a.0. "1 7Amphasis supplied8 1rom this narration, it is clear that appellant<s real aim was to have carnal :nowledge of Rowena. 'ppellant too: Rowena no further than to his room ( which was onl& across the hall from Rowena<s room ( where he immediatel& forced her to undress. 6n fact, appellant was so intent on raping her that he was still na:ed and on top of her when the police %ro:e into the room. "" /a:en together, these circumstances engender dou%t that the intention of appellant was to detain Rowena. /he detention was merel& incidental to the real o%9ective of appellant. 6t is true that appellant :ept Rowena inside his room for more than an hour while the police tried to negotiate with him. >owever, this does not constitute illegal detention in light of the fact that appellant was on top of Rowena raping her even while he was shouting at the police and other people outside. /his is %orne out %& Rowena<s testimon&0 30 Could &ou tell us what was the position of the accused when the policemen forci%l& opened the doorP '0 >e was on top of me. 30 1or how long IdidJ the accused sta&ed 7sic8 on top of &ouP !* !3-os0 0;o ho6rs 4ro- 0h1 51r: s0ar0."- 7Amphasis supplied8 'ppellant maintained this position until the police %arged into the room and su%dued him. "4 )iven these facts, appellant is not lia%le for the crime of serious illegal detention with rape. >owever, appellant is still lia%le for the crime of rape. Bhen the information charges a compleD crime and the evidence fails to support one of the component offenses, the defendant is still lia%le for the other offense supported %& the evidence. "5 /hus, in People v. Oliva+", the Court found Carlito $liva guilt& of statutor& rape even if the information charged him of :idnapping with rape. 'rticles ",,(' and ",,(B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended %& R' ;-5-, provide0 'rticle ",,('. Rape? Bhen 'nd >ow Committed. ( Rape is Committed ( 18 B& a man who shall have carnal :nowledge of a woman under an& of the following circumstances0 a8 /hrough force, threat, or intimidation? DDD. 'rticle ",,(B. Penalties. ( Rape under paragraph 1 of the neDt preceding article shall %e punished %& reclusion perpetua. Bhenever the ra21 ,s co--,001+ ;,0h 0h1 6s1 o4 a +1a+3: ;1a2o. or %& two or more persons, the 21.a30: sha33 81 recl$sion perpet$a 0o +1a0h. DDD. 7Amphasis supplied8 /he trial court held that appellant, with the use of a :nife, succeeded in raping Rowena in the earl& hours of 1 @anuar& "###. /he trial court found the testimonies of Rowena and the other prosecution witnesses .straightforward, convincing and %elieva%le. and supported %& the evidence of the in9uries sustained %& Rowena."7 /he weighing of the testimonies of witnesses is %est left to the trial court since it is in the %est position to discharge that function. "; /he trial 9udge has the advantage of personall& o%serving the conduct and demeanor of witnesses, an opportunit& not availa%le to an appellate court."9 '%sent compelling reasons, we will not distur% on appeal the trial court<s findings on the credi%ilit& of a witness.

/he Pu%lic 'ttorne& argues that @udge 2aguio was %iased against appellant, and that it was clear from the 9udge<s remar:s that he had alread& concluded that appellant was l&ing %efore appellant had finished presenting his evidence, to wit0 PR$* )GR'F0 30 Fou mean to tell the court that the hus%and on ecem%er -1, 1999 in the evening he left the houseP '0 'fter we have a drin:ing spree he left the house. DDD />A C$GR/0 30 Bhat time was thatP '0 6 cannot remem%er. 30 Bas it past 110##P '0 6 cannot remem%er the time. 30 Fou do not :now what time the hus%and left the houseP '0 6 cannot remem%er. DDD 30 But &ou said that it was around 1#0-# when Rowena entered &our roomP '0 Fes, sir. 30 *o how did &ou :now the timeP IFJou hIaJve a wristwatchP '0 6n m& room there was a wall cloc:. 30 *o &ou :now that the hus%and of Rowena went out or left the house %efore 1#0-#P '0 Fes, sir. Before he left we were drin:ing together. 30 Fes. 'nd &ou said that it was after the two of &ou dran: together that he leftP '0 Fes, sir. 30 'nd then &ou, went up in the roomP '0 Fes, sir. 30 'nd how man& minutes after &ou entered &our room did Rowena entered 7sic8 &our roomP '0 1#0-# ho. 30 Ilang minuto ang na1araan pagpaso1 mo sa 1u2arto mo na pinaso1 1a ni Ro2ena. H$,ag -a ng magmamaangmaangan eh. .agtatanga(tangahan -a pa eh. 7 Ilang minuto ang lumipas9 Hindi 1a naman mu1$ang tanga e$. Mu1$a 1a ngang inteli$ensiya e$. '0 Hindi 1o na $o alam e$. 30 8aya nga $u2ag 1a ng magtangatanga$an. ag1apaso1 mo sa 1u2arto ilang minuto ang lumipas ,ago pumaso1 sa 1u2arto mo si Ro2ena '0 1# minutes, sir. 30 /hat means that &ou :new that the hus%and of Rowena left the house %efore 1#0-# p.m.P '0 7Bitness cannot answer8 />A C$GR/0 !a:e it on record that the witness cannot answer. Alam mo y$ng mga taong nagsisin$ngaling ganyan hindi ma-asagot pag na-o-orner. %1o231 ;ho 0133 a 3,1 0h1: ca..o0 6s6a33: a.s;1r ;h1. 0h1: ar1 cor.1r1+. 6 don<t thin: there is a need to further cross(eDamine this witness.-# 7Amphasis supplied8 'side from these admittedl& deplora%le comments, the Court finds no other indications of partialit& or %ias in the records of the case. /he su%9ect remar:s were made after appellant was su%9ected to eDtensive direct and cross(eDamination.-1 /he eDamination of appellant was no more rigorous than that of Rowena<s, in which @udge 2aguio also freEuentl& intervened %& posing clarificator& Euestions. /he trial court did not prohi%it appellant from presenting additional evidence or witnesses, although appellant chose not to do so. 't the reEuest of appellant<s counsel, @udge 2aguio ordered a continuance for the defense to continue its presentation of evidence after appellant<s testimon&.-" 1urther, contradictions and inconsistencies marred appellant<s testimon&. 'ppellant initiall& stated that at 10## o<cloc: in the morning on 1 @anuar& "### he was .helping in the house doing household chores li:e cleaning the plates and cleaning the house..-- /his conflicts with his narration that Rowena entered his room at 1#0-# o<cloc: in the evening on -1 ecem%er 1999 and s0a:1+ ;,0h h,- 6.0,3 0h1 2o3,c1 arr,51+ and :ic:ed his door open.-4 'ppellant also stated that he had never gone out with Rowena in the 5 &ears that he had wor:ed for her hus%and.-5 >owever, appellant later testified that he accompanied Rowena to her parents< house in Bulacan in 199;, where the& had seDual intercourse for the first time. -, 2i:ewise, appellant originall& claimed that he and Rowena had two seDual encounters in 199; ( once in Bulacan and - wee:s afterwards in the house of Rowena and her hus%and. -7 >e changed this later to man& times, more than "# times, and then to a%out 5# times in 199;. -; 1inall&, appellant failed in four instances to answer the Euestions propounded to him during cross(eDamination.-9 Be stress that this does not eDcuse the assailed remar:s of @udge 2aguio. !ore circumspect conduct is eDpected from a 9udge of our courts. 6t is the dut& of all 9udges not onl& to %e impartial %ut also to appear impartial. 4# 6n the future, @udge 2aguio should adhere more

closel& to the rule that .a 9udge should so %ehave at all times as to promote pu%lic confidence in the integrit& and impartialit& of the 9udiciar&..41 +evertheless, after a thorough review of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the assailed ecision insofar as it found appellant to have raped Rowena. /he testimon& of Rowena, corro%orated %& the results of the medical eDamination and the testimonies of other witnesses, esta%lish %e&ond reasona%le dou%t that0 718 appellant forci%l& succeeded in having carnal :nowledge of Rowena on 1 @anuar& "###? and 7"8 that appellant committed the crime with the use of a deadl& weapon, a :nife. 6n contrast to appellant<s erratic testimon&, Rowena was candid and steadfast in her claim that appellant raped her, thus0 30 'nd what did &ou IdoJ after the accused uttered 5te ;eng galit na sa iyo si 8uya "un9 '0 6 opened the door and went out of our room and 6 as:ed Bernie )a1it $i$ingi ng pera si 8uya "un mo may pera naman siya. />A C$GR/0 30 't that time where was the accusedP '0 Bhen 6 tal:ed to him he was inside his room and all of the 7sic8 sudden he was at m& %ac:. />A C$GR/0 Continue. PR$*. )GR'F0 30 'nd what did IheJ do after thatP '0 >e placed his left arm around m& nec: and his right hand which was holding a :nife 7stop8 and 6 saw his right hand holding a :nife. 30 'nd how did &ou react when the accused placed his left hand IonJ &our nec: and &ou saw him holding a :nifeP '0 6 was surprised. &46agulat po a1o.4' 30 'nd what did &ou doP '0 'nd at the same time 6 pushed the left area of the accused and in the process 6 fell to the stairwa& all the wa& down. 30 'nd what did the accused do after &ou fell downP '0 >e immediatel& went down as he held m& hair and m& left arm and he dragged me upstairs. 30 'nd to what place upstairs did the accused drag &ouP '0 /o his room. 30 B& the wa&, how far is his room IfromJ &our roomP '0 /he room of the accused is in front of m& room. DDD 30 Bhen he succeeded in dragging &ou inside his room what happened neDtP '0 >e as:ed me to undress. 30 'nd did &ou o%ligeP '0 >e po:ed the :nife he was holding at me and he threatened me. >e threatened to :ill me. />A C$GR/0 30 *o what did &ou doP '0 6 undressed. 30 Bhile he was po:ing his :nife at &ou and threatening to :ill &ou. Bhat eDactl& IwereJ the words uttered %& himP '0 Sige, mag$u,ad 1a. 8ung $indi papatayin 1ita. 30 'nd what was he doing with his :nife while he was uttering those wordsP '0 >e was po:ing his :nife at the right rear side of m& %od&. 30 'nd how did &ou feel at that timeP '0 6 was ver& frightened. 'nd 6 was trem%ling. 30 +ow, &ou said that he was po:ing a :nife at &our %ac:. id &ou sustain in9uriesP '0 Fes, sir. 30 o &ou still have scars up to the presentP '0 Fes, sir. PR$*. )GR'F0 !a& 6 %e allowed, Four >onor to 7interrupted8 />A C$GR/0 Be will have a lad& staff to loo: IatJ the scars. DDD 7't this instance the court interpreter, !a. Alena 'rcenal, accompanied the complainant inside the cham%ers of the presiding 9udge to ta:e a loo: at the scars sustained %& the complainant DDD8 DDD />A C$GR/0 2ater the court interpreter informed the court that the complainant IhadJ " scars, one is on the middle right side of her %od& and the other one is on the upper left side of her %ac:.

PR$*. )GR'F0 Gpper right side. />A C$GR/0 Fes, upper right side. PR$*. )GR'F0 30 +ow, %& the wa& when &ou fell on the stairs and &ou were gra%%ed %& the accused did &ou shoutP '0 Fes, sir. 30 Bhat did &ou shoutP '0 6 shouted "un, tulungan mo a1o. DDD 30 DDD +ow after &ou removed &our dress what did the accused IdoJP '0 >e :issed all the parts of m& %od&. 30 'nd what did &ou do after thatP '0 6 struggled and resisted. 30 Bhat did the accused doP '0 6 grappled with him for the possession of the :nife he was holding. 30 Bere &ou a%le to gra% possession of the :nifeP '0 6 was a%le to hold it %ut in the course of our grappling m& left arm sustained 7stop8 the handle of the :nife forcefull& hit the left portion of m& arm. 7Bitness showing to the court slight visi%le scar8 />A C$GR/0 Bill the defense and the prosecution confirm the o%servation of the courtP '//F. )'RC6'0 Fes, Four >onor. PR$*. )GR'F0 6t is ver& apparent. DDD 30 Fou also mentioned that &ou also sustained in9ur& on &our right hand. Bhat causeIdJ the in9ur& on &our right handP '0 Because 6 was a%le to get hold of the %laded portion of the :nife and it sliced m& right palm. 30 B& the wa&, will &ou please descri%e to the court the :nife that was used %& the accused in threatening or intimidating &ouP '0 /he %laded portion of the :nife is a%out 1" inches more or less and the handle is a%out , inches more or less. DDD 30 *o when &ou were not successful in grappling the :nife from the accused what did the accused do neDtP '0 >e pulled m& hair and slapped the %ac: of m& head. 30 'nd what else did he doP '0 >e dragged me and forced me to lie down on the dou%le %ed. DDD 30 'nd after he dragged &ou to the lower %ed what else did &ou doP '0 <ung pong paa 1o e$ ginanoon niya po sa paa nya. 8inross niya po. />A C$GR/0 30 Fou mean doon sa pagitan ng ano mo= '0 <uong d>a?la2a 1o pong paa ginanyan nya po yung paa 1o. 30 Sige i(demonstrate mo. '0 Inang1la po. 30 8aya nga pinagitan nya yong sa paa niya sa side mo9 '0 Hindi po. Ganito po. <ung paa niya ginanyan po niya. 30 8aya nga. Di na1a,u1a yung paa mo. PR$*. )GR'F0 30 Di ,a na1a,u1$ang ganyan9 />A C$GR/0 7o. PR$*. )GR'F0 !apos yung paa niya na1aganoon. '0 7po. PR$*. )GR'F0

are$o. '0 7po. PR$*. )GR'F0 6 do that m&self so 6 :now. 7'tt&. )arcia laughs8 '//F. )'RC6'0 =er& incriminating. 7laughs8 />A C$GR/0 Bitness demonstrating %& opening her legs and then pointing out that the accused placed his left foot under the left leg of the complainant and then loc:ed it %& raising his left leg of the accused and the same thing was done on her right leg. />A C$GR/0 30 *o &ou were una%le to move %oth &our legs when the accused did thatP '0 Fes, sir. 30 'nd at that 9uncture at that time &ou did not have an&more underwearP '0 6 did not have an&more underwear. DDD PR$*. )GR'F0 DDD 30 +ow what did the accused do neDt after placing his two legs in %etween &our legsP '0 >e raped me. 30 Bhen &ou said he raped &ou, &ou mean his private parts were forced into &our private partP '0 Fes, sir. 30 'nd what did &ou do when the accused inserted his penis into &our private partP '0 6 continued struggling and resisting %ut he po:ed the :nife he was holding at the left side of m& %od&. 'nd 6 was so frightened. 30 'nd after that what happenedP '0 >e did ever&thing to me. >e :issed me, he inserted his fingers in m& seD organ. Aver&thing. />A C$GR/0 30 'fter he satisfied his lust on &ou what did the accused doP '0 >e did not allowed 7sic8 me to leave the room. PR$*. )GR'F0 30 Bhat else did he do with that :nife to &ouP '0 Bhile he was in the act of raping me the accused at one time pointed the :nife he was holding at m& private part and he said that he would insert it in m& private part to get IaJ thrill out of it %ecause he was high on sha%u. Because he could not have a complete or full erection %ecause he was under the influence of sha%u 7.Bato.8. />A C$GR/0 30 But despite the fact that he was not a%le to have a complete or full erection he succeeded in penetrating &ou with his seD organP '0 Fes, sir.4" Rowena<s account of her resistance and struggle with appellant was consistent with the results of the ph&sical eDamination. r. !irasol Pangan, the eDamining ph&sician, testified on the g&necologic emergenc& sheet 4- of Rowena dated 1 @anuar& "### and discussed the findings, as follows0 30 Could &ou tell us &our findings on the victimP '0 /here<s the hematoma at the right nec:, two a%rasions at the left lower lip approDimatel& #.5cm. /here<s a%rasion at the left forIeJarm, an a%rasion hematoma circular at the left lower arm, multiple a%rasions at the volar aspect of the second ... fourth digits of right hand, under the nose, hematoma at the %ac: and the anterior tract the largest of which measured ,D1 cm. /here<s a sta% wound at the left forearm. 6n the eDamination of the genitalia, there<s the two cms. hematoma at the right laI%Jia minora. 30 >ow a%out the organ of the victim, did &ou ... 7interrupted8 '0 Fes, the last part 6 read was the genitalia, that referred to the organ of the victim, the right laI%Jia minora have two cms. a%rasions hematoma. 6n reference to the vagina, the cerviD, the uterus and the ovar& which have no significant findings. DDD 30 Fou have a note here at the lower portion of the report .*eDual and Ph&sical a%use on the victim., was this &our conclusion %ased on the ph&sical eDaminationP '0 Based on the areas involved, the findings that we have, the arm and the trun: aside from the findings on the genital organ. DDD 30 Could normal intercourse cause such in9uries to the organ of the victim without use of violenceP

'0 +o, sir. DDD PR$*. )GR'F0 30 DDD &ou stated, octor that the :ind of in9uries in the genitalia of the victim could not have %een caused %& a normal seDual intercourse. I!J& Euestion is, could it %e the result of forceful and unwelcome penetration %& a firm penisP '0 Fes, sir, it could %e caused. 30 6t could %e caused %& a forceful thrust of a human fingerP '0 Fes, sir, it could also %e caused.44 'ppellant<s claim that he and Rowena had consensual seD was contradicted not onl& %& Rowena %ut also %& neigh%or Aldee Ause%io, who testified that0 718 he heard Rowena scream for help? 7"8 he saw her tr&ing to sandwich her feet against the door to :eep the door to appellant<s room from closing? and 7-8 appellant shouted 4papatayin niya la$at ng tao sa loo,4 when he :noc:ed on the door.45 /ogether with the ph&sical in9uries sustained %& Rowena ( which appellant said he did not even notice4, ( these statements %elie appellant<s assertion of consensual seD. /he sweetheart defense emplo&ed %& appellant also deserves scant consideration. 'side from %eing inherentl& wea:, it was uncorro%orated %& an& evidence other than the self(serving testimon& of appellant. 'ppellant admitted that he had no notes, letters, gifts or an& other item to show for an affair that had allegedl& %een ongoing since 199;.47 /he 6nformation specificall& alleged the use of a deadl& weapon, a :nife, in the commission of the rape and the prosecution proved that appellant used such a weapon. Gnder 'rticle ",,(B, the use of a deadl& weapon Eualifies the rape and the penalt& is reclusion perpetua to death. *ince reclusion perpetua to death are two indivisi%le penalties, 'rticle ,- of the Revised Penal Code applies. 'rticle ,- provides0 1. Bhen in the commission of the deed there is present onl& one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalt& shall %e applied. ". Bhen there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalt& shall %e applied. -. Bhen the commission of the act is attended %& some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalt& shall %e applied. 4. Bhen %oth mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall reasona%l& allow them to offset one another in consideration of their num%er and importance, for the purpose of appl&ing the penalt& in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation. 6n rape with the use of a deadl& weapon, the presence of an aggravating circumstance increases the penalt& to death. 4; 6n the present case, appellant raped Rowena in her dwelling, which is an aggravating circumstance under 'rticle 14 7-8 of the Revised Penal Code. 49 >owever, the 6nformation did not specificall& allege dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. 6n People v. /allego+5# the Court ruled that where the information did not allege the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, dwelling could not raise the penalt& to death. /he Court held0 DDD /he accused must thence %e afforded ever& opportunit& to present his defense on an aggravating circumstance that would spell the difference %etween life and death in order for the Court to properl& .eDercise eDtreme caution in reviewing the parties< evidence.. /his, the accused can do onl& if he is appraised of the aggravating circumstance raising the penalt& imposa%le upon him to death. *uch aggravating circumstance must %e alleged in the information, otherwise the Court cannot appreciate it. /he death sentence %eing irrevoca%le, we cannot allow the decision to ta:e awa& life to hinge on the inadvertence or :eenness of the accused in predicting what aggravating circumstance will %e appreciated against him.51 /he "### Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now reEuire the complaint or information to state the Eualif&ing and aggravating circumstances attending an offense.5" Bhen the law or rules specif& certain circumstances that can aggravate an offense, or circumstances that would attach to the offense a greater penalt& than that ordinaril& prescri%ed, such circumstances must %e %oth alleged and proved to 9ustif& the imposition of the increased penalt&.51urther, the circumstance of dwelling could not %e considered in the present case even if it were properl& alleged in the 6nformation. Bhere the offender resided in the same house as the victim when the offense was committed, dwelling could not %e considered as an aggravating circumstance.54 6t is undisputed in this case that appellant was a .live(in. dog trainer and that he sta&ed in the Rian4ares< house in a room across Rowena<s room. /herefore, the penalt& imposa%le on appellant is reclusion perpetua. ' word on the eDamination of Rowena. ' rape victim is ph&sicall&, sociall&, ps&chologicall& and emotionall& scarred, resulting in trauma which ma& last a lifetime.55 6t was thus highl& inconsiderate for the prosecutor and the defense counsel to trade Euips at the precise time Rowena was reliving her harrowing eDperience.5, Courts are loo:ed up to %& people with high respect and are regarded as places where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and 9ustice solemnl& dispensed. 57 2evit& has no place in the courtroom during the eDamination of a victim of rape, and particularl& not at her eDpense. /he trial court awarded moral and nominal damages %ut failed to award indemnit& e@ delicto. 'n award of indemnit& e@ delicto is mandator& upon a finding of guilt in rape cases. 5; Be thus award P5#,### to Rowena as civil indemnit&. 6n accordance with prevailing 9urisprudence, the award of moral damages is reduced to P5#,###. /he award of nominal damages is deleted for lac: of legal %asis. >H R ?OR , the ecision dated 1, !a& "##1 of the Regional /rial Court of !anila, Branch 1;, in Criminal Case +o. ##(179,9;, is !$ 616A . 'ppellant 2A$+'R $ +G)G6 & !'F'$ is ad9udged guilt& of R'PA, and sentenced to suffer the penalt& of reclusion

perpetua and to pa& Rowena Rian4ares P5#,### as civil indemnit& and P5#,### as moral damages. *$ $R ARA .

A+ B'+C G.R. No. ")27934 S1201-81r 1A, 1967 (21 scra 160) &ONST!NT %IM NT ", petitioner, vs. TH HONOR!@" ='DG !NG "INO &. S!"!NG!, respondent. R SO"'TION S!N&H (, J.: Challenged here in an original petition for certiorari andKor prohi%ition is the right of respondent 9udge of the Court of 1irst 6nstance of 6locos *ur 7Branch 6=8 to sit in 9udgment in cases where petitioner, a practicing attorne&, appears as counsel. PetitionerRs petition recites the facts that follow0 Petitioner is counsel of record in cases pending %efore respondent 9udge, viz0 718 Civil Case "1(C, entitled .Pa%lo 1este9o et al., petitioners, vs. !arciano Ca%ildo et al., respondents,. a special civil action for mandamus to compel pa&ment of salaries of elective and appointive municipal officials? petitioner is counsel for principal respondent, 'cting !a&or Brigido =ilog? 7"8 Criminal Case 4;9; and C(5, entitled .People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Constante 'nies, accused,. for frustrated murder? petitioner is the private prosecutor therein? 7-8 Criminal Case C(9-, entitled .People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Romeo Pimentel, accused,. for frustrated homicide? petitioner is defense counsel therein? 748 Alection Case "47#, entitled .'velino Bal%in, protestant, vs. Clemente '%a&a, protestee,. an election protest involving the office of ma&or of Candon, 6locos *ur? petitioner is counsel for protestant therein. PetitionerRs misgivings stem from the fact that he is complainant in an administrative case he himself lodged in this Court on !a& 1", 19,7, against respondent 9udge upon averments of .serious misconduct, inefficienc& in office, partialit&, ignorance of the law and incompetence..1 Petitioner see:s in the complaint therein to have respondent 9udge immediatel& suspended from office, and, after due notice and hearing, removed therefrom. /he 9udgeRs return traversed the factual averments. Bhereupon, this Court, on @ul& 1-, 19,7, referred the administrative case to !r. @ustice Aulogio *errano of the Court of 'ppeals .for investigation, report and recommendation.. /hat case is still pending. $n @ul& -1, 19,7, petitioner moved in the court %elow to have respondent 9udge disEualif& himself from sitting in Civil Case "1(C, Criminal Cases 4;9; and C(5, and Alection Case "47# aforesaid. >e there pra&ed that the records of those cases %e transferred to another sala, either at +arvacan or =igan, %oth of 6locos *ur. $n 'ugust 1, 19,7, respondent 9udge re9ected the foregoing motion. >e stood his ground with the statement that the administrative complaint against him is no cause for disEualification under the Rules of Court? that Civil Case "1(C and Alectoral Case "47# .are now on the final stages of termination. and transfer thereof to another sala .would onl& dela& their final disposition, ma:e the parties suffer IfromJ further efforts and eDpenses., and .would %e violative. of 'dministrative $rder -71 of the epartment of @ustice defining the courtRs territorial 9urisdiction? and that he is .sworn to administer 9ustice in accordance with the law and the merits of the cases to %e heard and decided %& him.. Civil Case "1(C was then calendared for 'ugust 1# and 11, 19,7. ' move to reconsider the foregoing resolution failed of its purpose. Civil Case "1(C was rescheduled for hearing from 'ugust 1# and 11, 19,7 to 'ugust "" and "-, 19,7. >ence, the present petition. Petitioner ma:es his eDercise along the following lines0 6mmediate resolution of the pro%lem of disEualification .is a matter of profound importance, particularl& on his career and potential as a practitioner of law? his cases .ma& fall %& the accident of raffle into the sala of respondent @udge. and he cannot .resign from an accepted case ever& time it falls. therein? his clients will have .the natural hesitation to retain as counsel one who is sort of unaccepta%le to the presiding 9udge.. Petitioner winds up with a pra&er that respondent 9udge %e stopped from further sitting in or otherwise tr&ing or deciding the cases heretofore mentioned. >e as:s for the issuance forthwith of a writ of preliminar& in9unction e@ parte.*a2p$Al.nBt Be now resolve the petition. 6s a 9udge disEualified from acting in litigations in which counsel of record for one of the parties is his adversar& in an administrative case said counsel lodged against himP /he answer is to %e sought within the terms of *ection 1, Rule 1-7, Rules of Court," which reads in full0 *ec. 1. Dis.uali#ication o# judges. Q +o 9udge or 9udicial officer shall sit in an& case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniaril& interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either part& within the siDth degree of consaguinit& or affinit&, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which %e has %een eDecutor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in an& inferior court when his ruling or decision is the su%9ect of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed %& them and entered upon the record. ' 9udge ma&, in the eDercise of his sound discretion, disEualif& himself from sitting in a case, for 9ust or valid reasons other than those mentioned a%ove. Petitioner sa&s that, argua%l&, his case comes within the coverage of the second paragraph of the rule 9ust Euoted. /he theor& advocated is that the present 719,48 rules for the first time provide a %road polic&(oriented ground for disEualification of 9udges. 6t is his su%mission that a 9udge ma& now %e %arred from the %ench in specific cases for reasons other than those enumerated in the law. >e

stresses that respondent 9udge, in the factual environment presented, did not ma:e use of his sound discretion when he refused to disEualif& himself from acting in the cases referred to. Before the second paragraph of *ection 1, Rule 1-7 of the new Rules, came into %eing, law and earl& 9urisprudence gave no room for a 9udge, on o%9ection of a part&, to disEualif& himself, a%sent an& of the specific grounds for disEualification set forth in the law. /he following from eople vs. Moreno I1949J, ;- Phil. ";,, "94, is eDpressive of the rule0 ./o ta:e or not to ta:e cogni4ance of a case, does not depend upon the discretion of a 9udge not legall& disEualified to sit in a given case. 6t is his dut& not to sit in its trial and decision if legall& disEualified? %ut if the 9udge is not disEualified, it is a matter of official dut& for him to proceed with the trial and decision of the case. >e cannot shir: the responsi%ilit& without the ris: of %eing called upon to account for his dereliction.. - /hen came Del %astillo vs. "avelona, 2(1,74", *eptem%er "9, 19,", from which sprang the added second paragraph of *ection 1, Rule 1-7, aforeEuoted. 6n Del %astillo, the 9udge inhi%ited himself from the case %ecause the law&er of the part& defendant was his first cousin. 4 /he 9udge felt that if defendant should win, his %lood relationship with defendantRs law&er might cast some suspicion on his integrit&? %ut, if defendant %e the defeated part&, it might %ring unpleasant conseEuences. Plaintiff protested the 9udgeRs posture. 6n upholding the 9udge, we declared0 . . . $%viousl&, Rule 1", Iof the old RulesJ enumerates the grounds for disEualification of a 9udge upon %eing challenged and under which he should disEualif& himself. !$e rule, $o2ever, $as never ,een interpreted to pro$i,it a judge #rom voluntarily in$i,iting $imsel#, in t$e a,sence o# any c$allenge ,y eit$er party , due to his close %lood relationship with counsel for one of said parties. Considering the spirit of the Rule, it would seem that cases o# voluntary in$i,ition, ,ased on good, sound andCor et$ical grounds, is a matter o# discretion on t$e part o# t$e judge and the official who is empowered to act upon the reEuest for such inhi%ition. DDD DDD DDD . . . 6n other words, while Rule 1", provides for disEualification, it does not include nor preclude cases and circumstances #or voluntary in$i,ition 2$ic$ depends upon t$e discretion o# t$e o##icers concerned.5 /he Del %astillo opinion made the pointed o%servation that the cases cited %& plaintiff are instances where the 9udge was challenged Q not cases of voluntar& inhi%ition. 6ndeed, as earl& as 19-1, clear intimation there was that voluntar& inhi%ition upon sound grounds ma& %e recogni4ed, when this Court said in one case0,.. . . 6t is true that i# "udge GarduDo $ad a,stained #rom trying t$e case at ,ar, there would have %een less suscepti%ilit& to suspicion. But, as a matter of law, the grounds for the motion of recusation do not constitute a legal cause for the disEualification of a 9udge.. /hus, the genesis of the provision 7paragraph ", *ection 1, Rule 1-78, not to sa& the letter thereof, clearl& illumines the course of construction we should ta:e. /he eDercise of sound discretion Q mentioned in the rule Q has reference eDclusivel& to a situation where a 9udge dis.uali#ies himself, not when he goes forward with the case. 7 1or, the permissive authorit& given a 9udge in the second paragraph of *ection 1, Rule 1-7, is onl& in the matter of disEualification, not otherwise. Better stated &et, when a 9udge does not inhi%it himself, and he is not legall& disEualified %& the first paragraph of *ection 1, Rule 1-7, the rule remains as it has %een Q he has to continue with the case.*a2p$Al.nBt *o it is, that the state of the law, with respect to the situation %efore us, is unaffected %& the amendment 7paragraph " of *ection 1, Rule 1-78 introduced in the 19,4 Rules. 'nd it is this0 ' 9udge cannot %e disEualified %& a litigant or his law&er for grounds other than those specified in the first paragraph of *ection 1, Rule 1-7. /his is not to sa& that all avenues of relief are closed to a part& properl& aggrieved. 6f a litigant is denied a fair and impartial trial, induced %& the 9udgeRs %ias or pre9udice, we will not hesitate to order a new trial, if necessar&, in the interest of 9ustice. *uch was the view ta:en %& this Court in Dais vs. !orres, 57 Phil. ;97, 9#"(9#4. 6n that case, we found that the filing of charges %& a part& against a 9udge generated .resentment. or the 9udgeRs part that led to his .%ias or pre9udice, which is reflected in the decision.. Be there discoursed on the .principle of impartialit&, disinterestedness, and fairness on the part of the 9udge. which .is as old as the histor& of courts.. Be followed this with the pronouncement that, upon the circumstances o%taining, we did not feel assured that the trial 9udgeRs finding were not influenced %& %ias or pre9udice. 'ccordingl&, we set aside the 9udgment and directed a new trial.; Afforts to attain fair, 9ust and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in un9ustified assumptions, or ma:e a speculative approach to this ideal. 6t ill %ehooves this Court to tar and feather a 9udge as %iased or pre9udiced, simpl& %ecause counsel for a part& litigant happens to complain against him. 's applied here, respondent 9udge has not as &et crossed the line that divides partialit& and impartialit&. >e has not thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. +o act or conduct of his would show ar%itrariness or pre9udice. /herefore, we are not to assume what respondent 9udge, not otherwise legall& disEualified, will do in a case %efore him. 9 Be have had occasion to rule in a criminal case that a charge made %efore trial that a part& .will not %e given a fair, impartial and 9ust hearing. is .premature.. 1# Pre9udice is not to %e presumed. Aspeciall& if weighed against a 9udgeRs legal o%ligation under his oath to administer 9ustice .without respect to person and do eEual right to the poor and the rich.. 11 /o disEualif& or not to disEualif& himself then, as far as respondent 9udge is concerned, is a matter o# conscience. 'll the foregoing notwithstanding, this should %e a good occasion as an& to draw attention of all 9udges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacit& to tr& and decide a case fairl& and 9udiciousl& comes to the fore %& wa& of challenge from an& one of the parties. ' 9udge ma& not %e legall& prohi%ited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might %e induced to act in favor of one part& or with %ias or pre9udice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasona%l& capa%le of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self(eDamination. >e should eDercise his discretion in a wa& that the peopleRs faith in the courts of 9ustice is not impaired. ' salutar& norm is that he reflect on the pro%a%ilit& that a losing part& might nurture at the %ac: of his mind the thought that the 9udge had unmeritoriousl& tilted the scales of 9ustice against him. /hat passion on the part of a 9udge ma& %e generated %ecause of serious charges of misconduct against him %& a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. >e is a man, su%9ect to the frailties of other men. >e should, therefore, eDercise great care and caution %efore ma:ing up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit where that part& or counsel is involved. >e could in good grace inhi%it himself where that case could %e heard %& another 9udge and where no apprecia%le pre9udice would %e occasioned to others involved therein. $n the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit ma& depend to a great eDtent the all(important confidence in the impartialit& of the 9udiciar&. 6f after reflection he should resolve to

voluntaril& desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might %e seriousl& impugned, his action is to %e interpreted as giving meaning and su%stance to the second paragraph of *ection 1, Rule 1-7. >e serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of 9ustice. 6n the end we are persuaded to sa& that since respondent 9udge is not legall& under o%ligation to disEualif& himself, we ma& not, on certiorari or prohi%ition, prevent him from sitting, tr&ing and rendering 9udgment in the cases herein mentioned.1" Gpon the premises, the petition herein for certiorari and prohi%ition is denied. *o ordered.

?IRST DIVISION !. M. No. RT=)02)1699 ) Oc0o81r 15, 2003 (413 scra 364) V RN TT 'M!"I)%!&O, @ RN!RDINO D. NG, OR"!NDO H. H!@IT!N a.+ =OS %HIN ?. !NDR!D!, complainants, vs. R IN!TO G. D'I"!"!, s61+ ,. h,s ca2ac,0: as 0h1 %r1s,+,./ =6+/1 o4 0h1 R1/,o.a3 Tr,a3 &o6r0 ) @ra.ch 57, MaEa0, &,0:, !ID! &. "OM'GD!NG, o44,c1r),.)char/1 a.+ "I"I! N. @!T', &o6r0 S01.o/ra2h1r o4 0h1 sa-1 @ra.ch, Respondents. AC6*6$+ VIT'G, ".3 Complainants filed an administrative complaint against @udge Reinato ). 3uilala, acting cler: of court 'ida C. 2omugdang and court stenographer 2ilia +. Batu of the Regional /rial Court, Branch 57, of !a:ati Cit&. 'cting on the recommendation of the $ffice of the Court 'dministrator 7$C'8, the Court doc:eted the complaint as a regular administrative matter which it then referred to 'ssociate @ustice Adgardo 1. *undiam of the Court of 'ppeals for investigation, report and recommendation. Complainants were officers of the Philippine Retirement 'uthorit&, the defendant in an action for specific performance, entitled .Philippine Retirement 'uthorit& !em%ers 'ssociation 1oundation, 6nc., 7PR'!'8 vs. Philippine Retirement 'uthorit& 7PR'8,. doc:eted Civil Case +o. #1(11". Complainants charged respondent 9udge with %ias and partialit& on various occasions, among which was when respondent 9udge, during the hearing on plaintiffs application for a writ of preliminar& in9unction, led and coached Ramon Collado, a witness for PR'!', and instructed the latters counsel on what Euestions to as:. $n #, !arch "##1, respondent 9udge issued an order granting the motion of PR'!' to set the case for hearing without giving the counsel for PR' an opportunit& to oppose it. $n "# !arch "##1, at the hearing on the pra&er of PR'!' for the issuance of a writ of preliminar& mandator& in9unction, respondent 9udge remar:ed that he could ver& well issue the writ eD parte, impressing upon the plaintiff that he was in a position to resolve the application without having to hear the evidence for defendant PR'. 6n the same hearing, respondent 9udge unceremoniousl& interrupted 'tt&. =ernette Gmali(Paco, the colla%orating counsel for PR' and one of herein complainants, while 'tt&. Gmali(Paco was eDplaining a matter propounded %& the court. Complainants further averred that during the hearing on the afternoon of 19 1e%ruar& "##1, respondent 9udge delegated to his acting cler: of court 'ida C. 2omugdang, who was not a mem%er of the %ar, the tas: of receiving evidence from the parties, as well as of ruling on an& o%9ections which might %e proffered thereon, there%& ignoring *ection 9, Rule -#, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which reEuires 718 that the parties agree to the delegation in writing, 7"8 that the cler: of court %e a mem%er of the %ar, and 7-8 that the cler: of court would not issue rulings on an& o%9ections which might %e interposed. /he non(compliance with the procedural rules was alleged to have %een o%literated from the certified transcript of stenographic notes where, in connivance with respondent 9udge, respondent stenographer 2ilia +. Batu had made it to appear that the session was presided over %& @udge 3uilala himself. 6n the assailed stenographic notes, the statements issued %& 2omugdang were shown to have %een made %& @udge 3uilala although the 9udge was neither present nor even in his cham%ers during the hearing. @osephine =igden stated in her affidavit that at a little past noon, after the end of the morning session, she was at the %alcon& of the %uilding when she saw respondent 9udge hurriedl& go down and %oard a car. *he was also surprised to see a lad& presiding at the afternoon hearing and ma:ing rulings on the o%9ections raised %& the parties. /he account of =igden was colla%orated %& olores Rigonan, counsel for PR', who claimed that on that afternoon, when the hearing was a%out to proceed, she as:ed respondent 2omugdang on the wherea%outs of the 9udge and 2omugdang replied, .Gmalis na ho.. Bhen as:ed who could then rule on .o%9ections,. 2omugdang answered, .Parang ganun din attorne&.. Rigonan came to reali4e the serious implications of 2omugdangRs response onl& when she saw a cop& of the transcript of stenographic notes where it was made to appear that respondent 9udge was present during the proceedings. Complainants finall& asserted that su%seEuent to their filing of the instant administrative case against him, respondent 9udge %latantl& showed hatred and a predilection for eDacting vengeance against them %& issuing orders favora%le to PR'!' and pre9udicial to the interests of PR'.1 6n his comment, respondent @udge 3uilala would call attention to the fact that the allegations of %ias and partialit& %& complainants were made with little su%stance. >e stated that it had %een the practice of the court to as: Euestions to all witnesses of %oth parties appearing %efore him. uring the hearing adverted to, there were instances when Ramon Collado, a witness who had difficult& in understanding the Euestions propounded to him, would %e admonished %& the 9udge to tr& to understand the Euestion well or to simpl& answer the Euestion. Referring to the charge that he hastil& granted the pra&er of counsel for PR'!' for an earl& setting of the case without giving the other part&, PR', the opportunit& to oppose it, respondent 9udge eDplained that cases involving a pra&er for in9unctive relief necessitated eDpeditious and 9udicious resolution such that a hearing would even at times %e dispensed with. 'ccording to him, the rules allowed him to issue a writ eD parte should he find the matter to %e .of eDtreme urgenc& and that the applicant would suffer grave in9ustice and irrepara%le in9ur&.. Respondent 9udge, nevertheless, stressed that despite his 9udicial prerogatives, he did not immediatel& issue the writ, and his willingness to hear the argument of %oth parties should negate an& accusation of %ias and partialit& on his part. 's regards the claim that he did not listen to the dissertations of complainant 'tt&. =ernette Gmali(Paco during the hearing of "# !arch "##1, respondent 9udge felt that since 'tt&. Gmali(Paco was not a part& to the case, she could not ver& well participate in the

proceedings. >e was not o%liged, he said, to hear the pontifications and lectures of 'tt&. Gmali(Paco that might onl& serve to dela& the proceedings. Respondent 9udge denied that he had violated *ection 9, Rule -#, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when he delegated the reception of evidence of the parties and the rendition of rulings on o%9ections to the acting cler: of court considering that the hearing on the afternoon of 19 1e%ruar& "##1 was scheduled merel& for the presentation of documentar& evidence, consisting %asicall& of accounting figures, as well as for the reconciliation of certain records. Respondent 9udge averred that with the :nowledge and consent of the parties and their counsel, he designated respondent 'ida 2omugdang, the acting cler: of court, to underta:e what was purel& a ministerial matter. /he proceedings too: place in the courtroom while he remained in his cham%ers ta:ing up matters that eEuall& needed his immediate attention. 6n an& event, respondent 9udge said, 2omugdang acted impartiall& and that, indeed, %oth parties and their respective counsel had agreed to and eDpressed no o%9ection to the delegation and, having voluntaril& su%mitted themselves to her ruling, the& should %e deemed to %e in estoppel from assailing the proceedings. Respondent 2omugdang, in her case, eDplained that %efore the start of the afternoon hearing, 'tt&. =ernette Gmali(Paco, in the presence of 'tt&. olores Rigonan and 'tt&. 1elis%erto =erano, inEuired if she was a mem%er of the %ar. *he replied that she was not a law&er. *he as:ed them if the& had an& o%9ection %ut, not hearing an&, she went on to receive the evidence. 6n the course of the proceedings, the counsel of the respective parties raised o%9ections to Euestions %eing propounded %& either side on which she was then as:ed to rule on. 6t was upon their insistence, she said, that she made rulings on their o%9ections. 2omugdang lamented that 'ttorne&s Gmali(Paco, 1elis%erto =erano and olores Rigonan, who :new %etter the rules of procedure than she, had consented to the proceedings rather than opted to call the attention of the 9udge. *he said that not onl& did the& fail to ma:e an& o%9ection %ut that also the& did not %other to have the proceedings nullified. Relative to the charge against respondent stenographer 2ilia +. Batu that she connived with respondent 9udge in falsif&ing 9udicial records, respondent Batu narrated that the case of the parties was scheduled to %e heard on the morning of 19 1e%ruar& "##1 %ut, for lac: of material time, 'tt&. 1elis%erto =erano, counsel for PR'!', moved to have the hearing continued in the afternoon. Respondent 9udge granted the motion and ordered the parties to %e present for the continuation of the hearing at two ocloc: that afternoon. 6t was solel& %ecause she was under the impression that the afternoon hearing was %ut an eDtension of the morning proceedings that respondent stenographer Batu caused it to appear as such on the first page of the transcript of stenographic notes. *he stressed that she had no intention of falsif&ing an& official document or ma:ing an& untruthful statement. 6n administrative proceedings, the complainant has the %urden of su%stantiating the charges asseverated in the complaint. " 'ccording to complainants, respondent 9udge eDhi%ited partialit& and %ias on four separate occasions ( 18 %& leading or coaching a witness for the plaintiff, "8 %& granting the motion of the plaintiff to set the case for an earlier hearing without giving the counsel for the defendant an opportunit& to oppose it, -8 %& commenting, during one hearing, that he could issue the writ of preliminar& in9unction eD parte, and 48 %& undul& interrupting one of the complainants, 'tt&. =ernette Gmali(Paco, while the latter was eDplaining a matter in open court. Complainants claimed that @udge 3uilala had coached the main witness for the plaintiff, Ramon Collado, during the hearing held on 1and 19 1e%ruar& "##1, for the issuance of a writ of preliminar& in9unction. 6t was proffered that respondent 9udge, instead of ruling on an o%9ection, would reform the Euestion of counsel for the plaintiff there%& ena%ling the witness to answer. 6nvestigating @ustice Adgardo *undiam made this o%servation in his report? vi40 .1rom the aforeEuoted TeDchanges of the counsel of the parties, the witness and respondent @udge during the testimon& of plaintiff PR'!'s witness Collado, it appears that respondent @udge deviated from the ordinar& course of listening merel& to the testimon& of a witness and merel& ruling on o%9ections. 6t appears that respondent @udge, instead of ruling on o%9ections, advised the witness to 9ust understand or answer the Euestion or respondent @udge ordering the reforming of the Euestion or ma:ing suggestions or as:ed the Euestion himself. 'l%eit such actuations of respondent @udge were not irregular per se, on the eDcuses that he himself wanted clarifications on some issues or facts %eing elicited or wanted the ta:ing of the testimon& not to drag on due to persistent o%9ections of a part&s counsel, however, a presiding @udge should :eep himself in doing so Tto the minimum to prevent himself from appearing as Tcounsel of a part& and to prevent an& part& from suspecting that he was favoring the other. 't an& rate, from the aforeEuoted testimon& of Ramon Collado, the undersigned investigating @ustice can not decipher an& clear(cut showing that respondent @udge was partial towards plaintiff PR'!'s witness, Ramon Collado..6t is within the sound discretion of the trial 9udge to as: Euestions from witnesses, if onl& to clarif& what ma& appear to him to %e vague points in the narration. 3uestions designed to avoid o%scurit& in the testimon& or to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper. /he 9udge ma& aptl& need to intervene in the presentation of evidence in order to eDpedite the resolution of a case and prevent unnecessar& waste of time.4 @udges, however, should %e eDtremel& careful so as not to %e misunderstood, and the& must refrain from ma:ing comments, remar:s or suggestions that could lead to even the slightest suspicion that he is there%& undul& assisting a part& or counsel. =eril&, @udge 3uilala deviated somewhat from usual practice when he ignored the o%9ection of counsel and, instead, as:ed the Euestion himself. 6nvestigating @ustice *undiam, nevertheless, was correct in holding that %ias and partialit& could not necessaril& %e inferred therefrom. Ramon Collado, the Chief $perating $fficer of plaintiff and a *panish national, concededl& found difficult& understanding the Euestions propounded to him, as well as in ma:ing himself understood, at the hearing. Respondent 9udge must have thought it %est to ta:e a hand in the eDamination of the witness and to allow the latter to properl& ma:e his narration, given the circumstances. Bith regard to the charges that respondent 9udge granted plaintiffs motion for the plaintiff for an earlier hearing without giving the defendant an opportunit& to %e heard thereon, the Court shares the views of @ustice *undiam that no patent irregularit& could also %e deduced therefrom .Bhile it shows that %efore the su%9ect motion was filed, see:ing for an earlier hearing 7for !arch 9 and 1-, "##18 on plaintiff PR'!'s pra&er for a writ of preliminar& mandator& in9unction, there were alread& previousl& set hearing dates for the same 7!arch "# and "-, "##18, however, the undersigned investigating @ustice could not find an& patent irregularit& on the part of the respondent @udge in granting earlier dates of hearing considering that the incident %eing heard was whether or not to grant the writ of preliminar& mandator& in9unction. Pra&ers for in9unctive reliefs are given priorit& in the attention of the court. /hus, the granting of the motion, %& itself, did not necessaril& prove the claim of complainants that respondent @udge was %ias against defendant PR' and partial to plaintiff PR'!'.. 5

Bhen respondent 9udge uttered the statement that he could issue a writ of preliminar& in9unction eD parte 7during the hearing on "# !arch "##18, %omplainants, unfortunatel&, mistoo: that to mean that he could rule on plaintiffs pra&er for preliminar& in9unction without hearing the evidence. @udge 3uilala eDplained that he was simpl& stating a procedural fact. 6ndeed, under the rules, a writ of preliminar& mandator& in9unction eD parte could %e issued without it %eing necessaril& conditioned on prior notice and hearing. , Bhere the dela& would prevent an effective relief or might result in serious damage, hearing could 9ustifia%l& %e dispensed with, 7 although, as a matter of course, such a rule, considering the peremptor& nature of the eDtraordinar& remed&, must %e strictl& and restrictivel& applied.; /he foregoing notwithstanding, enough could %e gleaned from the records a%out respondent 9udges unnecessar& %ic:ering with counsel for the defendant. >is utterances could easil& and ver& well %e mista:en for, if not reflective of, a mar: of arrogance. Rather than rule on the o%9ection of 'tt&. Rigonan, respondent 9udge instead %rushed off the matter with what would appear to %e a conceited show of a prerogative of his office, a conduct that falls %elow the standard of decorum eDpected of a 9udge. 6n the words of the investigating @ustice .I/heJ statement of respondent @udge appears to %e a rec:less one, uncalled for D D D. /rial 9udges should %e circumspect, carefull& 9udicious and foremost, legall& correct in their pronouncements or utterances, especiall& in open court, to avoid an& showing of ignorance, arrogance or %ias or partialit& to a part&. D D D Parentheticall&, su%9ect statement of respondent @udge could have %een worded in a more 9udiciall& suita%le manner, short of showing his irritation towards respondent PR's counsel, which ma& onl& tend to suggest his %ias against defendant PR's counsel or partialit& to the other part&. /rial 9udges should %e circumspect and act with proper 9udicial decorum in their pronouncements or utterances, especiall& in open court..9 Bith respect to the charge that respondent 9udge left his cham%ers on the afternoon of 19 1e%ruar& "##1 and that he delegated to acting cler: of court 'ida C. 2omugdang, who was not even a law&er, the tas: of receiving evidence for the parties, the pertinent rules of procedure indeed were o%viousl& ignored. *ection 9, Rule -#, of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides0 .*ec. 9. @udge to receive evidence? delegation to cler: of court. ((( /he 9udge of the court where the case is pending shall personall& receive the evidence to %e adduced %& the parties. >owever, in default or eD parte hearings, and in an& case where the parties agree in writing, the court ma& delegate the reception of the evidence to its cler: of court who is a mem%er of the %ar. /he cler: of court shall have no power to rule on o%9ections to an& Euestion or to the admission of eDhi%its, which o%9ections shall %e resolved %& the court upon su%mission of his report and the transcripts within ten 71#8 da&s from termination of the hearing.. /he rule is uneEuivocal and admits of no further discussion? neither agreement %& the parties nor their acEuiescence can 9ustif& its violation. Respondent stenographer 2ilia +. Batu, li:ewise, was also remiss, al%eit without an& apparent ill(motive, in her dut& to accuratel& record the proceedings %efore the court. /he afternoon session was clearl& separate from the morning hearing. ' transcript of stenographic notes should %e a faithful and eDact recording of all matters that transpire during a court proceeding.1# /he Court cannot with certitude pass upon the various other claims of complainants, such as respondent 9udges refusal to recuse himself from the case, his contempt orders, and the li:e, which are appurtenant to Civil Case +o. #1(11" and not to this administrative matter. B>ARA1$RA, the Court finds 7a8 respondent @udge Reinato ). 3uilala guilt& for conduct un%ecoming a 9udge and of violating *ection 9, Rule -#, of the Rules of Court, and he is here%& penali4ed with a fine of /en /housand 7P1#,###.##8 Pesos? 7%8 respondent acting cler: of court 'ida C. 2omugdang guilt& of having acted in contravention with the rules on the reception %& her, al%eit upon the directive of respondent 9udge, of evidence without herself %eing a mem%er of the %ar, and she is here%& *A=ARA2F RAPR6!'+ A ? and 7c8 respondent stenographer 2ilia +. Batu to have %een remiss in her dut& to accuratel& reflect the circumstances surrounding the proceedings in the afternoon hearing of 19 1e%ruar& "##1, and she is ' !$+6*>A to henceforth %e circumspect in her duties. Respondents are each warned against committing an& further infraction on their part. *$ $R ARA .

S &OND DIVISION !.M. No. MT=)04)1535 March 12, 2004 (425 scra 403) DR. &ONR!DO T. MONT M!#OR, complainant, vs. ='DG ='!N O. @ RM =O, =R., M10ro2o3,0a. Tr,a3 &o6r0, @ra.ch 3, Ma.,3a, respondent. RA*$2G/6$+ TING!, J.* /he instant administrative case traces its roots from an unlawful detainer case 1 filed %& Ben9amin and esmond /. !ontema&or against 2olita !arco. /he case was raffled to !etropolitan /rial Court " @udge, >on. @uan $. Berme9o, @r. 7@udge Berme9o8, the respondent herein. /he records reveal that the pre(trial conference was held on !a& "#, "##". 1inding no possi%ilit& of settlement, @udge Berme9o issued a reE!rial 7rder of even date defining the issues su%mitted for decision and the stipulations agreed upon, and directing the parties to su%mit their respective position papers within 1# da&s from receipt of the 7rder, after which, the case shall %e deemed su%mitted for decision.'ccordingl&, the plaintiffs su%mitted their osition aper on @une 1-, "##". !ore than a month later, the& filed a Motion #or /arly Resolution dated @ul& -#, "##". /he defendant, on the other hand, su%mitted her osition aper onl& on 'ugust 14, "##". /he plaintiffs then filed another Motion #or /arly Resolution on *eptem%er ,, "##". 'cting on this motion, @udge Berme9o issued an

$rder dated *eptem%er "-, "##" declaring the case su%mitted for decision. $n $cto%er 1#, "##", "udgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. Copies thereof were sent %& registered mail to the parties and their respective counsels on $cto%er 1,, "##". $n ecem%er 1", "##", the plaintiffs filed their first Motion #or /@ecution and set the same for hearing on ecem%er 1,, "##". >owever, the motion was not included in the court calendar %ecause ecem%er 1,, "##" apparentl& was not a motion da&. $n ecem%er "#, "##", the defendant filed a 6otice o# 5ppeal. *u%seEuentl&, the plaintiffs< filed a Second Motion #or /@ecution dated ecem%er ",, "##" and set the same for hearing on @anuar& -, "##-. Concomitantl&, r. Conrado /. !ontema&or 7 r. !ontema&or8, the complainant herein and the plaintiffs< attorne&(in(fact, also filed on ecem%er ",, "##" a Motion to Re.uire De#endantFs %ounsel to In#orm t$e %ourt t$e Date He Received a %opy o# t$e "udgment 4 and set the same for hearing on @anuar& -, "##-. @udge Berme9o did not act on either motion. 6n his 7rder5 dated @anuar& ,, "##-, the respondent @udge gave due course to the defendant<s appeal and reEuired the latter to post a supersedeas %ond in the amount of P5;7,5##.## within 1# da&s from receipt thereof. $n @anuar& "1, "##-, the plaintiffs filed their !$ird Motion #or /@ecution. $n the same da&, r. !ontema&or filed a Second Motion to Re.uire De#endantFs %ounsel to In#orm t$e %ourt t$e Date He Received a %opy o# t$e "udgment ., Both motions were heard on @anuar& -1, "##-, during which, @udge Berme9o directed the plaintiffs to su%mit to the court an 5##idavit o# Service to the defendant of the pending motions. 'ccordingl&, the plaintiffs filed a %ompliance and Mani#estation7 on 1e%ruar& 4, "##- stating, among other things, that the defendant was served copies of the Motion #or /@ecution, on ecem%er 1", "##"? Second Motion #or /@ecution, on ecem%er ",, "##"? Motion to Re.uire De#endantFs %ounsel to In#orm t$e %ourt t$e Date He Received a %opy o# t$e "udgment , on ecem%er ",, "##"? /hird !otion for ADecution, on @anuar& "1, "##-? Second Motion to Re.uire De#endantFs %ounsel to In#orm t$e %ourt t$e Date He Received a %opy o# t$e "udgment, on @anuar& "", "##-? and %ompliance and Mani#estation, on 1e%ruar& -, "##-. /he plaintiffs also filed on 1e%ruar& "4, "##- an /@E arte Motion to Resolve 5ll ending Incidents of even date. Resolving this motion, @udge Berme9o issued an $rder dated !arch 1", "##-, stating that the Motion #or /@ecution dated ecem%er 1", "##", was not resolved %ecause the da& it was set for hearing, i.e., ecem%er 1,, "##", was not a motion da& and %ecause there was no proof that the defendant had alread& received a cop& of the "udgment dated $cto%er 1#, "##". 1urther, the Second Motion #or /@ecution dated ecem%er ",, "##", was not acted upon considering the 6otice o# 5ppeal filed %& the defendant and the court<s own $rder dated @anuar& ,, "##-, reEuiring the former to post a supersedeas %ond. 'nent the Motion to Re.uire De#endantFs %ounsel to In#orm t$e %ourt t$e Date He Received a %opy o# t$e "udgment , the same was not acted upon %ecause the court was then conducting a semestral inventor& of its pending cases. 1inall&, the !$ird Motion #or /@ecution dated @anuar& -1, "##- was deemed su%mitted for resolution. $n 'pril "4, "##-, the defendant filed an :rgent Motion #or /@tension; dated 'pril "-, "##- claiming that she onl& had until 'pril "1, "##- within which to post a supersedeas %ond and pra&ing for an eDtension of 1# da&s, or until !a& 1, "##-, to post the %ond. 6n an 7rder dated 'pril "4, "##-,9 the respondent @udge granted the motion and gave the defendant until !a& 5, "##- within which to post a supersedeas %ond. Gpon the defendant<s posting of a supersedeas %ond, @udge Berme9o issued an 7rder1# dated !a& 5, "##- directing the Branch Cler: of Court to transmit the entire records of the case to the Regional /rial Court for further proceedings in connection with the defendant<s appeal. 6ncensed %& the foregoing proceedings, r. !ontema&or filed with the $ffice of the Court 'dministrator 7$C'8 the instant 5dministrative %omplaint11 charging @udge Berme9o with gross incompetence and inefficienc&, gross negligence, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, andKor conduct pre9udicial to the %est interest of the service. 6n the instant complaint, r. !ontema&or asserts that the respondent @udge failed to decide the case within the period provided under *ection 11, Rule 7# of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 7Rules of Court8. >e alleges that @udge Berme9o .did not %other to chec: defendant<s preposterous claim that she received a cop& of the @udgment onl& on ecem%er 5, "##", even if it was released more than fort&(five 7458 da&s earlier on $cto%er 1,, "##"..1" >e stresses that even if the defendant received a cop& of the "udgment on ecem%er 5, "##", still, @udge Berme9o should have rec:oned the period to appeal from the time the defendant<s counsel received a cop& of the "udgment and not when the defendant received it herself. Bhat is more, the registr& return card showing the date the defendant<s counsel received a cop& of the "udgment was missing from the records. r. !ontema&or adds that the 7rder dated @anuar& ,, "##- giving due course to the defendant<s appeal and reEuiring the latter to post a supersedeas %ond within 1# da&s from receipt thereof was released %& registered mail more than one month later on 1e%ruar& 11, "##-,1- and personal service thereof was made on 'pril 9, "##-, or more than three months after the issuance thereof. /he motive for the %elated service was purportedl& to give the defendant more time to post a supersedeas %ond. r. !ontema&or also faults the respondent @udge for granting the defendant<s :rgent Motion #or /@tension to post a supersedeas %ond in violation of *ection 1-, Rule 7# of the Rules of Court. !oreover, @udge Berme9o did not resolve the three 7-8 Motions #or /@ecution and t2o 7"8 Motions to Re.uire De#endantFs %ounsel to In#orm t$e %ourt t$e Date He Received a %opy o# t$e "udgment. r. !ontema&or also avers that @udge Berme9o prevented the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court within 15 da&s from the perfection of the appeal in violation of *ection ,, Rule 4# of the Rules of Court. 'ccording to him, it was onl& after the respondent @udge received the defendant<s supersedeas %ond that the former issued the 7rder dated !a& 5, "##- directing the Branch Cler: of Court to transmit the records of the case to the appellate court.14 ReEuired to comment, @udge Berme9o vigorousl& disputes r. !ontema&or<s allegations.

6n his Comments15 dated 'ugust 11, "##-, he eDplains that he did not act on the plaintiffs< Motion #or /arly Resolution dated @ul& -#, "##" %ecause there was &et no proof that the defendant alread& received the $rder of !a& "#, "##" reEuiring the parties to su%mit their respective position papers, the affidavits of their witnesses and other documentar& evidence. 6ndeed, after the defendant filed her osition aper on 'ugust 14, "##", he issued an 7rder on *eptem%er "-, "##" declaring the case su%mitted for decision. >ence, the "udgment rendered on $cto%er 1#, "##" was well within the prescri%ed period of -# da&s under the 1991 Revised Rule on *ummar& Procedure 7Rule on *ummar& Procedure8. @udge Berme9o sa&s that he did not act on the first Motion #or /@ecution %ecause the court had not &et received the registr& return receipts of the service of 9udgment at that time. 1urthermore, ecem%er 1,, "##", the hearing date the plaintiffs reEuested, was not a motion da&. >e also did not act upon the Second Motion #or /@ecution and the Motion to Re.uire De#endantFs %ounsel to In#orm t$e %ourt t$e Date He Received a %opy o# t$e "udgment %oth filed on ecem%er ",, "##" %ecause at that time, the court was conducting a semestral inventor& of pending cases, and also %ecause the defendant had alread& filed a 6otice o# 5ppeal on ecem%er "#, "##". @udge Berme9o denies that he did not act on the !$ird Motion #or /@ecution and the Second Motion to Re.uire De#endantFs %ounsel to In#orm t$e %ourt t$e Date He Received a %opy o# t$e "udgment which were set for hearing on @anuar& -1, "##-. >e claims that he issued an $rder on the same date reEuiring r. !ontema&or to su%mit to the court an 'ffidavit of *ervice of said motions on the defendant. >e further claims that he even advised r. !ontema&or<s counsel in open court to find out the registr& receipt num%er of the registered mail containing the court<s @udgment addressed to the defendant<s counsel to ena%le r. !ontema&or to secure a certification from the Philippine Postal $ffice regarding the date the defendant<s counsel received a cop& of the "udgment. 6n an& event, the respondent @udge asserts that he resolved the plaintiffs< /@E arte Motion to Resolve 5ll ending Incidents in the 7rder dated !arch 1", "##-. @udge Berme9o also denies that the registr& return card indicating the date the defendant<s counsel received a cop& of the "udgment was missing from the records. >e sa&s that at the time the defendant filed her 6otice o# 5ppeal, the court had not &et received the registr& return card. Respondent @udge admits that he gave due course to the 6otice o# 5ppeal of the defendant in an 7rder dated @anuar& ,, "##- and reEuired the latter to post a supersedeas %ond within 1# da&s from receipt of the same. >e alleges that to ensure that the defendant would receive a cop& of the 7rder, he even reEuired the *heriff to personall& serve it to the defendant, and ordered another cop& to %e sent %& registered mail. /he respective counsels of the parties were also furnished copies of the said 7rder %oth %& personal service and %& registered mail. /he @udge does not den&, however, that when r. !ontema&or filed the %ompliance and Mani#estation on 1e%ruar& 4, "##-, the court was still waiting for the defendant to post a supersedeas %ond. @udge Berme9o rationali4es the granting of the defendant<s :rgent Motion #or /@tension of time to post a supersedeas %ond since the %ond had alread& %een processed and was read& for signature, %ut the signatories and approving officials of the %onding compan& were not availa%le %ecause of the 2enten season. >e maintains that the said motion for eDtension is not a prohi%ited pleading under the Rules of Court, and that the granting thereof was made in good faith and in the interest of 9ustice. >e further denies that he prevented the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court. )iven that the defendant had not &et posted the supersedeas %ond, and there was no proof to convince him that the latter had alread& received a cop& of the $rder reEuiring her to file the %ond, the court could not transmit the records. 6n his Reply dated 'ugust "1, "##-, r. !ontema&or points out that copies of the "udgment were sent to the parties %& registered mail on $cto%er 1,, "##", as certified %& the Branch Cler: of Court, and not on $cto%er 11, "##", as claimed %& @udge Berme9o.1, >e also disputes the respondent @udge<s claim that he did not act on the first Motion #or /@ecution %ecause there was &et no proof of receipt of the "udgment %& the defendant<s counsel. r. !ontema&or highlights the fact that the first Motion #or /@ecution was alread& pending at the time the 6otice o# 5ppeal was filed. >e also notes that while @udge Berme9o reEuired the plaintiffs to su%mit an 'ffidavit of *ervice relative to the Second Motion to Re.uire De#endantFs %ounsel to In#orm t$e %ourt t$e Date He Received a %opy o# t$e "udgment, he did not reEuire the same of the defendant when she filed her +otice of 'ppeal. 1inall&, r. !ontema&or denies that @udge Berme9o resolved all pending incidents in the $rder dated !arch 1", "##-, %ecause the @udge did not act on the plaintiffs< !$ird Motion #or /@ecution. $n *eptem%er 11, "##-, the respondent @udge filed a Rejoinder maintaining that "udgment was rendered well within the -#(da& period reEuired under the Rule on *ummar& Procedure. /hereafter, he filed a Mani#estation as:ing that the present administrative case %e su%mitted for resolution without further argument from the parties. 6n his Reply to Rejoinder, r. !ontema&or su%mits a Certification from the !anila Central Post $ffice stating that the defendant received the mail matter containing a cop& of the "udgment on $cto%er 17, "##".17 'nother Certification from the !a:ati Central Post $ffice1; stating that the defendant<s counsel received a cop& of the "udgment on $cto%er 1;, "##", r. !ontema&or claims, contradicts @udge Berme9o<s allegation that the court received no proof that the defendant<s counsel had received a cop& of the "udgment. ReEuired to evaluate the complaint, the $C' su%mitted its Report and Recommendation on +ovem%er 11, "##- finding merit in the complaint and recommending that @udge Berme9o %e fined in the amount of P5,###.## for failing to decide the case within the period fiDed %& law. /he respondent @udge maintains that he is not lia%le for dela& in the rendition of 9udgment. 6n essence, he argues that since the 7rder deeming the case su%mitted for resolution was issued on *eptem%er "-, "##", the rendition of 9udgment on $cto%er 1#, "##" was made within the mandator& -#(da& period. /he Court is not persuaded. *ection 11, Rule 7# of the Rules of Court provides a period of -# da&s for the court to render 9udgment in forci%le entr& and unlawful detainer cases. /his period shall %e counted from the receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or the eDpiration of the period for filing the same. *ection 11, Rule 7# echoes *ection 1# of the Rule on *ummar& Procedure which governs unlawful detainer cases, among others. 19

/he latter provision similarl& mandates the resolution of such cases within -# da&s after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the eDpiration of the period for filing the same. Clearl&, the rec:oning point from which the mandator& period for rendition of 9udgment should %e computed is the receipt of the last affidavits and position papers of the parties, or the eDpiration of the period for filing the same, as provided %& the Rules, .o0 from the issuance of the order %& the 9udge deeming the case su%mitted for resolution. /he rec:oning point is fiDed %& law, not %& the 9udge. ' 9udge cannot %& himself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases %e&ond that authori4ed %& the law."# /he records do not reveal when the parties received @udge Berme9o<s 7rder reEuiring them to su%mit their respective affidavits and position papers. 'ssuming, however, that the court received the defendant<s osition aper on 'ugust 14, "##", as respondent @udge claims, 9udgment should have %een rendered on *eptem%er 1-, "##". 6nstead, the decision was dated $cto%er 1#, "##", or nearl& a month after the lapse of the mandator& period for rendition of 9udgment and almost two months from the receipt of the defendant<s osition aper. Plainl&, @udge Berme9o is guilt& of dela& and, thus, administrativel& lia%le. Rule 1.#" of the Code of @udicial Conduct reEuires 9udges to administer 9ustice without dela&. Rule -.#5 of the same Code admonishes all 9udges to dispose of the court<s %usiness promptl& and decide cases within the reEuired periods. /he failure to decide a case within the reEuired period is not eDcusa%le, constitutes gross inefficienc&"1 and is a ground for the imposition of administrative sanctions against the defaulting 9udge."" ela& in the rendition of 9udgment, however, is the least of @udge Berme9o<s administrative transgressions. *ection 19, Rule 7# of the Rules of Court, states0 .6f 9udgment is rendered against the defendant, eDecution sha33 ,ss61 ,--1+,a013: 62o. -o0,o., unless an appeal has %een perfected and the defendant to sta& eDecution files a sufficient supersedeas %ond, approved %& the !unicipal /rial Court and eDecuted in favor of the plaintiff to pa& the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the 9udgment appealed fromU.. /he 9udgment is eDecuted immediatel& in favor of the plaintiff, as a matter of right, to prevent further damage arising from the loss of possession."/he respondent @udge, however, can onl& offer fee%le eDcuses for his inaction on the plaintiffs< Motions #or /@ecution. >e claims that the first Motion #or /@ecution pra&ed that hearing %e set on a date that was not a motion da&. @udge Berme9o forgets that while the Rules of Court reEuires all motions to %e scheduled for hearing on 1rida& afternoons, or if 1rida& is a non(wor:ing da&, in the afternoon of the neDt wor:ing da&, the same Rules provides an eDception for motions reEuiring immediate action. "4 Perhaps, as a 9udgment in favor of the plaintiffs in an unlawful detainer case is immediatel& eDecutor&, the plaintiffs %elieved that their motion came under the eDception. >owever, if the respondent @udge did not share this view, he could have simpl& set the motion for hearing on the neDt motion da&. 6nstead, he untena%l& ignored the motion. @udge Berme9o also rationali4es his failure to act on the motion on the ground that there was no proof &et that the defendant<s counsel had received notice of the "udgment. 6n this connection, r. !ontema&or alleges that the registr& return card indicating the defense counsel<s notice of 9udgment is missing from the records, a charge that respondent @udge vehementl& denies. B& doing so, he placed himself in a Catch("". >is denial eDposes his lia%ilit&, as the succeeding discussion shows. Copies of the "udgment were transmitted to the parties on $cto%er 1,, "##" %& registered mail. /he plaintiffs filed their first Motion #or /@ecution almost 0;o -o.0hs 3a01r on ecem%er 1", "##". /he fact that the registr& receipts of the service of 9udgment had not &et returned at this point would have %een cause for apprehension for an& responsi%le 9udge. Fet @udge Berme9o has not conve&ed an& sem%lance of anDiet&. >e did not inEuire from, nor inform, the Cler: of Court a%out the a%sence of the receipts two months after copies of the "udgment were sent to the parties. 6nstead, he found the lac: of registr& receipts a convenient reason for tarr&ing on the motion. 3uestioning the timeliness of the defendant<s 6otice o# 5ppeal, r. !ontema&or su%seEuentl& filed two separate motions to reEuire the defense counsel to inform the court of the date of his receipt of a cop& of the "udgment. /his is a strange reEuest since that fact could have %een easil& verified from the registr& return receipts, if indeed the& were eDtant from the records. But @udge Berme9o did not act on either motion. *tranger still, he admits to advising r. !ontema&or to secure the registr& receipt num%er of the notice of 9udgment to the defendant<s counsel to esta%lish the latter<s date of receipt when, to repeat, all the respondent @udge had to do was loo: into the records. /hese circumstances ma& lead a sophisticated mind to conclude one of two things. $ne, the registr& receipts are indeed missing from the records %ut @udge Berme9o is den&ing it to cover up such loss. /his conclusion is %uttressed %& the odd fact that, despite the seriousness of r. !ontema&or<s allegations, the respondent @udge has not offered in these administrative proceedings an& evidence of the eDistence of the registr& receipts. 'n o%vious disregard of :eeping records is evidence of incompetence and lac: of professionalism. /he Court has held that0 ' 9udge is charged with eDercising eDtra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his custod& are intact. /here is no 9ustification for missing records save fortuitous eventsU /his Court reiterates that 9udges must adopt a s&stem of record management and organi4e their doc:ets in order to %olster the prompt and efficient dispatch of %usiness. 6t is, in fact, incum%ent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing s&stem in his court %ecause he is after all the one directl& responsi%le for the proper discharge of his official functions."5 /wo, @udge Berme9o is suppressing proof of the registr& return receipts, in which case, he is not onl& guilt& of dragging his feet in the resolution of the motions %ut, worse, %ias in favor of the defendant. $n such receipts hinge the answer to r. !ontema&or<s Euestion0 id the defendant file her 6otice o# 5ppeal on timeP ' negative answer would have dire conseEuences for the defendant since it would preclude an& sta& in the eDecution of the adverse 9udgment. $ther circumstances support the theor& of %ias. @udge Berme9o provides a flims& 9ustification for his inaction on r. !ontema&or<s Second Motion #or /@ecution. 'ccording to the respondent @udge, the court was underta:ing its semestral inventor& when the motion was filed. Aven if the Court were to admit the adeEuac& of this o%vious preteDt, @udge Berme9o, at the ver& least, should have set the motion for hearing on the neDt motion da& after the inventor&. But again, he disregarded the second motion. +eDt, under *ection 19, Rule 7#, supra, in case the defendant does not file an& supersedeas %ond or did not ma:e an& monthl& deposit, the plaintiff would %e entitled as a matter of right to the immediate eDecution of the inferior court<s 9udgment. 6n such a case the

eDecution is mandator&.", 6n 1ernande4 v. AspaVol, the Court held0 . . . . Considering these principles, respondent 9udge should simpl& have ascertained from the records the allegations in complainant<s motion for eDecution and, on that %asis, resolved the motion. >ad she done this, she could not have failed to notice that the defendant had not given a supersedeas %ond to sta& immediate eDecution of the 9udgment and had not paid the current rents as the& fell due. /he defendant<s failure to compl& with these reEuisites entitled the complainant to the immediate eDecution of the 9udgment. /he court<s dut& was simpl& to order such eDecution."7 6n this case, @udge Berme9o did not order the immediate eDecution of the @udgment. $n the contrar&, he even ordered defendant to file a supersedeas %ond, which, in an& event, should have %een posted within the period to file an appeal. 6n %$ua v. %ourt o# 5ppeals,"; the Court declared0 's a general rule, a 9udgment in favor of the plaintiff in an e9ectment suit is immediatel& eDecutor&, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the propert& in Euestion. /o sta& the immediate eDecution of the said 9udgment while the appeal is pending, the foregoing provision reEuires that the following reEuisites must concur0 718 the defendant perfects his appeal? 7"8 he files a supersedeas %ond? and 7-8 he periodicall& deposits the rentals which %ecome due during the pendenc& of the appeal. /he failure of the defendant to compl& with an& of these conditions is a ground for the outright eDecution of the 9udgment, the dut& of the court in this respect %eing .ministerial and imperative.. >ence, if the defendant(appellant perfected the appeal %ut failed to file a supersedeas %ond, the immediate eDecution of the 9udgment would automaticall& follow. Conversel&, the filing of a supersedeas %ond will not sta& the eDecution of the 9udgment if the appeal is not perfected. N1c1ssar,3: 0h1., 0h1 s621rs1+1as 8o.+ sho63+ 81 4,31+ ;,0h,. 0h1 21r,o+ 4or 0h1 21r41c0,o. o4 0h1 a221a3. IAmphasis supplied.J /he records show that on @anuar& ,, "##-, @udge Berme9o granted the defendant 1# da&s from receipt of the 7rder giving due course to the 6otice o# 5ppeal to post a supersedeas %ond. 'ssuming that the defendant received a cop& of the "udgment onl& on ecem%er 5, "##", the period granted was wa& %e&ond the 15(da& period for perfecting an appeal. Mor1 0ha. 0hr11 -o.0hs a401r, the defendant filed an :rgent Motion #or /@tension alleging that .she had until 'pril "1, "##- to file her supersedeas %ond. and as:ing for 1# more da&s to post the same."9 >ow service of the 7rder of @anuar& ,, "##- too: so long was not sufficientl& eDplained. !oreover, the :rgent Motion #or /@tension was filed onl& on 'pril "4, "##- -# or three da&s a401r her alleged last da& to post the %ond on 'pril "1, "##-,-1 in violation of the rule that motions for eDtension must %e filed prior to the eDpiration of the period sought to %e eDtended.-" Compounding the erroneous admission of said motion for eDtension, @udge Berme9o, on the same da&, issued an 7rder allowing the defendant an additional eDtension of 15 da&s, -or1 0ha. the 1# da&s she initiall& as:ed for, and in further violation of the rule enunciated in %$ua, supra. 6n the meantime, the transmittal to the appellate court of the case<s records was deferred to await the posting of the supersedeas %ond. 'ctions for forci%le entr& or unlawful detainer involve pertur%ation of social order which must %e resolved as promptl& as possi%le and, accordingl&, technicalities or details of procedure which ma& cause unnecessar& dela& should carefull& %e avoided. -- /his rule lost all significance in the plaintiffs< unlawful detainer case. +ot onl& did the& suffer dela& in the resolution of the action and in the eDecution of the decision in their favor, %ut li:ewise dela& in the appeal process. /he Court is not prepared to rule that @udge Berme9o is guilt& of the loss of the registr& receipts proving the date of receipt %& the defendant<s counsel of the notice of 9udgment in the a%sence of the records of Civil Case +o. 171;"4(C= %efore us. +either is the Court Euic: to hold respondent @udge guilt& of %ias and pre9udice in the a%sence of an& showing that his acts stem from an eDtra9udicial source resulting in an opinion in the merits on some %asis other than what the respondent @udge learned from his participation in the case.-4 @udge Berme9o claims that he was moved %& good faith and the interest of 9ustice, particularl& in granting the defendant her motion for eDtension to post a supersedeas %ond, considering that the %ond was read& for signing an&wa&. /he Court is inclined to give respondent @udge the %enefit of the dou%t, especiall& in light of his "udgment in the unlawful detainer case, which was in favor of the plaintiffs. >owever, %& countenancing, permitting, and even creating the man& dela&s in o%vious disregard of the letter and the spirit of the Rules of Court and the Rule on *ummar& Procedure, @udge Berme9o has put in Euestion his partialit&. 6t %ears reminding him that a 9udge must at all times not onl& %e impartial %ut maintain the appearance of impartialit&. -5 /hus, under Canon " of the Code of @udicial Conduct, a 9udge should avoid impropriet& and appearance of impropriet& in all activities. *pecificall&, under Rule ".#1 of the Code, a 9udge should so %ehave at all times as to promote pu%lic confidence in the integrit& and impartialit& of the 9udiciar&. /he appearance of %ias or pre9udice can %e as damaging to pu%lic confidence and the administration of 9ustice as actual %ias or pre9udice.-, !&&ORDING"#, the Court finds respondent @udge @uan $. Berme9o, @r., of Branch - of the !etropolitan /rial Court of !anila guilt& of dela& in the rendition of 9udgment in violation of Rules 1.#" and -.#5 of the Code of @udicial Conduct for which he is fined the amount of P5,###.##. Respondent @udge is also declared guilt& of impropriet& in violation of Canon " of said Code and is fined the amount of P1#,###.##. SO ORD R D.

N @!N& !.M. No. RT=)96)1336 =63: 25, 1996 =O& "#N T!" NS)D!@ON, complainant, vs. ='DG H RMIN . !R& O, respondent. % R &'RI!M*

$nce again, this Court must stri:e hard at an erring mem%er of the @udiciar&. /he case %efore us stemmed from a sworn(complaint filed %& @ocel&n C. /alens( a%on, Cler: of Court = of the Regional /rial Court of *an 1ernando Pampanga, charging @udge >ermin A. 'rceo, the ADecutive @udge thereat with gross misconduct. /he complaint was later amended to include immoralit&. @udge 'rceo filed his answer with counter(complaint to the main complaint and his answer to the amended complaint. >e li:ewise su%mit the affidavits of his witnesses. 'fter considering the answers, we issued a Resolution dated 1e%ruar& 1, 199, referring the case to 'ssociate @ustice Portia 'liVo( >ormachuelos of the Court of 'ppeals for investigation, report, and recommendations, and at the same time, placing @udge 'rceo under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation 7p. ,1, Rollo8. 'fter reEuest for postponement from %oth parties, hearings were held on !arch 4, 19, "#, "1, "", and on 'pril 1, ;, 1# and 1;, 199,. Both parties presented their respective witnesses. ADcept for 'tt&. 'rnel *antos and Prosecutor Ramon *. Ra4on, all of @udge 'rceoRs witnesses were court emplo&ees assigned at either the $ffice of the Cler: of Court or Branch 4- of the Regional /rial Court of *an 1ernando, Pampanga. 6n due time, the 6nvestigating @ustice su%mitted her Report and Recommendation with the following findings0 /he evidence shows that complainant 'tt&. @ocel&n .@o&. C. /alens( a%on, "9, a resident of olores, *an 1ernando, Pampanga, is the 'ssistant Cler: of Court of the R/C, *an 1ernando, Pampanga which item she assumed on 'ugust 1#, 1995, after wor:ing for more than a &ear as Branch Cler: of Court of R/C Oaloo:an Cit& under @udge 'doracion ). 'ngeles. 't the time of her assumption to office, she was a%out to get married to 'tt&. a%on, a law&er who wor:s at the Court of 'ppeals. *he is a !ethodist, the same religion as that of respondentRs wife and famil&. Respondent @udge >ermin A. 'rceo, 54, a resident of )uiguinto, Bulacan is the Presiding @udge of the R/C Branch 4- in *an 1ernando, Pampanga. >e was newl& designated ADecutive @udge therein vice @udge /eodoro Ba& who transferred to 3ue4on Cit&. >is wife is ailing and on dial&sis, and has %een residing in the G.*. with their daughter since 19;9. >is famil& is in the printing %usiness and his translations of some laws and %oo:s have %een pu%lished 7ADhs. 15("-8. >e has pursued further legal studies a%road either as participant or guest. >e is President of the Pampanga('ngeles Cit& R/C @udges 'ssociation and was designated Presidential 'ssistant for $perations of the Philippine @udges 'ssociation 7P@'8. /hree da&s after complainant first reported at the $ffice of the Cler: of Court, 'tt&. Alenita 3uinsa&, she was summoned %& respondent. >e was t&ping when she came in and at this first meeting, she was surprised that without even loo:ing up at her, he as:ed her in a loud voice what she wanted. Bhen he did loo: at her she was %othered %& the wa& he loo:ed at her from head to foot .as if he were undressing her.. Respondent told her that she was going to %e detailed to his office as his assistant, a situation which she did not welcome having heard of respondentRs reputation in the office as .%astos. and .mania:is. prompting her to wor: for her transfer to Branch 45 under @udge 'delaida 'la(!edina. $n 'ugust "1, 1995, complainant received respondentRs ADecutive $rder +o. ##1(95 7ADh. >8 reEuiring her to report to the office of the ADecutive @udge effective 'ugust ";, 1995. >er wor: was to draft and file memos and circulars, pa& telephone and electric %ills and other clerical duties assigned to her %& respondent. 't one time she was designated to act as Branch Cler: of Court of Branch 4- in the a%sence of $6C Bernardo /aruc. *he o%served respondent to %e rude and disrespectful to her and the other court personnel. >e tal:ed in a loud and shouted at them? used offensive words such as .walang isip., .tanga.? told green 9o:es and stories? made harsh and negative comments a%out court personnel in the presence of others. Bhenever he had the opportunit& he would ma:e %odil& contact 7.chancing.8 with her and certain female emplo&ees. /wice as she was a%out to go out the door respondent would approach it in %ig strides so that his %od& would %e in contact with hers and he would press the lower part of his %od& against her respondent as:ed her wh& she was pla&ing with her forefinger, at the same time gesturing with his to signif& seDual intercourse. *ometime in +ovem%er 1995, respondent :issed complainant on the chee:, a fact admitted %& him in his testimon&. >e also admitted :issing witnesses !aril&n 2eander, Aster )alicia and other female emplo&ees. *ometime in $cto%er 1995, the Courts of *an 1ernando transferred to the )reenfields Countr& Clu% due to the inundation of their regular offices with lahar. Aster )alicia whose house was also affected was allowed to house her appliances in the staff room of R/C Branch 4-. /hese included a =CR on which, as testified %& witness Bernardo /aruc, a =>* tape entitled .6llegal in Blue. %rought %& respondent was pla&ed at respondentRs %idding. /he tape contained eDplicit seD scenes and during its showing respondent would come out of his cham%er and tease the female emplo&ees a%out it. /aruc further related that at one time respondent %rought and showed to the emplo&ees a picture which when held in some wa& showed figures in coital position. 'dding to complainantRs apprehensions a%out respondentRs seDual predilection were the revelations of !aril&n *enapilo( 2eander, "-, a stenographer of Branch 4-. /estif&ing on her own eDperiences with respondent, 2eander stated that respondent wrote a love poem to her 7ADh. '8 and that man& times while ta:ing dictation from respondent in his cham%ers, he would suddenl& dictate love letters or poems addressed to her as if courting her 7ADhs. B to A8. >e :issed her several times, pointedl& stared at her lower parts when she wore tight pants and made %od& contacts 7.chancing.8. 't one point %ursting into tears Q which prompted this 6nvestigator to suspend her testimon&? she was so agitated Q 2eander testified of the time that respondent summoned her to his cham%er and she found him clad onl& in %riefs. Bhen she turned around to flee, respondent called after her sa&ing .wh& are &ou afraid. 'fter all, this is for &ou.. 2eander too: into her confidence the most senior emplo&ee in Branch 4-, $6C Cler: of Court Bernardo /aruc who then too: it upon himself to accompan& 2eander in respondentRs office whenever he could or as: other female emplo&ees to accompan& her. /aruc as:ed 2eander to report the matter to eput& Court 'dministrator Re&naldo *uare4 %ut 2eander eDpressed fear of retri%ution from respondent. Bhen 2eanderRs wedding was set in late 1995, respondent taunted her %& sa&ing .6:a&, ang dami :o pa namang %ala: saR&o, :inuha pa naman :ita ng %aha& sa isang su%division, tapos sina&ang mo lang, tanga :a :asiW. /his is admitted %& respondent who said it was onl& a 9o:e. 's:ed wh& she did not file an& complaint against the respondent for seDuall& harassing her, !aril&n 2eander eDplained0 6 am afraid considering that 6 am 9ust an ordinar& emplo&ee. 'nd 6 :now for a fact that @udge >ermin 'rceo is a ver& influential person, he is ver& rich. 6 :now he has lots of friends in Pampanga li:e the )overnor. 6 :now

6 cannot fight %& m&self alone.. 7/*+, !arch "#, 19,,, p. -#8. 1or the complainant, these personal and vicarious eDperiences hit %ottom with the incident that happened in the afternoon of ecem%er ,, 1995. 's testified %& complainant, corro%orated in parts %& Bernardo /aruc, Folanda =alencia and Rosanna )arcia, complainant was summoned at a%out 10-# p.m. to respondentRs temporar& cham%er at )reenfields Countr& Clu% %& respondent who himself came to the *taff room. B& this time, onl& the $ffice of the Cler: of Court and R/C Branch 4- had %een left at )reenfields? the other R/C %ranches had returned to their usual offices at the >all of @ustice. /he *angguniang Panglalawigan which had also occupied )reenfields had li:ewise vacated the %uilding onl& the da& %efore. 't his temporar& cham%er at )reenfields, respondent occupied two 7"8 small ad9oining rooms while the personnel of the $ffice of the Cler: of Court and R/C Branch 4- occupied a %igger room called the !aple Room 7Please see ADhs. .@., .O., and .".8. 6n respondentRs 1loor Plan mar:ed ADhi%it .". it appears that from respondentRs cham%er, one had to pass a chapel and %ar lounge %efore reaching the staff room. /he door to the outer room of the cham%er was eEuipped with a :no% and an automatic door closer. Bhen loc:ed from inside, it could not %e opened outside eDcept with a :e&. *ince there was no airconditioner, this door was usuall& held open for ventilation %& a chair or a small ta%le. /he outer room had filing ca%inets and sac: of rice lined up on two 7"8 sides of the wall. /he inner room also had a door %ut without a :no%. Respondent had his des: here. /he window in this room opened to the lawn of the Countr& Clu%. 'mid this %ac:drop in what ma& have %een a somnolent afternoon at )reenfields, complainant entered respondentRs office. 'lread& made cautious %& respondentRs reputation and !rs. 2eanderRs eDperience, she too: care to chec: the outer door and noted the chair which prevented it from closing. >er apprehension increased %ecause the hallwa& was clear of people and onl& the personnel of Branch 4- and the $ffice of the Cler: of Court were left holding office there. *he entered the inner room, and sat on a chair infront of respondentRs des:. /he& tal:ed a%out the impending construction of the >all of @ustice. /heir conversion was interrupted when Bernardo /aruc dropped %& to tell respondent of a phone call for him. Respondent left the room %ut told complainant to remain for the signing of her Certificate of *ervice which she was then %ringing. 'fter a few minutes respondent returned and the& resumed their conversation. Bhen the tal: veered to his wife, complainant %ecame uneas& and directed respondentRs attention to her unsigned Certificate of *ervice. 'fter respondent signed it, complainant prepared to leave the room. 't this 9uncture, respondent handed to her a folded &ellow paper containing his handwritten poem 7ADh. !? p. "", Record8. >ereunder Euoted is the poem and complainantRs interpretation of it as contained in her !emorandum0 umating :a sa %uha& :o isang araw ng 'gosto 'ng %aon mo a& R&ong ganda at talinong a%ogado 'ng tamis ng R&ong ngiti ang %umihag sa puso :o !ala:as na pampalu%ag sa mainit :ong ulo. 6ndeed, the last two lines of the first stan4a are consistent with complainantRs claim regarding respondentRs rude manner and erratic mood swings. /he second stan4a of respondentRs poem also 9i%es with his own testimon& that he would often loo: for complainant whenever he would not see her, and with complainantRs testimon& that respondentRs %ehavior towards her Q his propensit& to utter remar:s with seDual connotations, his acts of ma:ing ph&sical contact with her, among others Q 'ng a:ala :oR& ga&ong lamang magiging pagtingin sa i&o ':o itong amo at i:aw ang empla&ado Ba:it ha%ang tumatagal isip :oR& nagugulo Pag di :a na:i:itaR& langing nagagalit a:o. /he third stan4a is most descriptive of respondentRs attitude towards complainant which complainant and her witnesses descri%ed as rude. 6t is also consistent with the testimonies of witnesses that respondent would shout at complainant and would crac: green 9o:es towards her0 amdamin :ong sumusupling pilit :ong itinatago *a mala:as na mga tinig asi: at mga %iro +gunit :ung nag(iisa puso :oR& nagdurugo >inahanap ng puso :o ang maganda mong an&o. /he fifth stan4a 9i%es with complainantRs testimon& that respondent gave her an uneDpected :iss on at least two occasions0 Bawat pata: ng luha :oR& mga %util ng pag(i%ig +a si&a :ong :alasag sa pagnana:aw ng hali: *a pisngi mo a:ing mahal, a:ing nilalangit Pata: ng ulan Q sa %uha& :ong tigang ang na:a:awangis. 1inall&, the fourth and last paragraphs of the poem provides the conteDt of the lascivious acts committed %& respondent against complainant on , ecem%er 19950 *awimpalad na pag(i%ig na%igong pangarap +a i:aw a& maang:in, mahag:an at ma&a:ap Pag(i%ig moR& i%iniga& sa higit na mapalad ':o nga&oR& naririto %igong(%igong umii&a:. Oapalaran a& malupit, di :ita ma:atali: *a nga&on o %u:as pag:at di mo i%ig 'ang:inin :ita :ahit sa panaginip )anoRn :ita :amahal @o&, a:ing pag(i%ig. 7ComplainantRs !emorandum pp. -"(--8 Complainant found the poem repulsive 7o%scene8 particularl& the line sa&ing .Oapalaran a& malupit, di :ita ma:atali: sa

nga&on at %u:as pag:at di mo i%ig.. 6n her testimon&, complainant said she considered the poem malicious %ecause the& were %oth married persons, and he was a 9udge and she was his su%ordinate. 'lthough outraged, complainant respectfull& as:ed permission to leave while putting the poem in the poc:et of her %la4er. *he then proceeded towards the outer room where she was surprised to find the door closed and the chair holding it open now %arricaded it. /he :no%Rs %utton was now in a vertical position signif&ing that door was loc:ed. Complainant was removing the chair when respondent wal:ed to her in %ig strides as:ing her for a :iss. *econds later he was em%racing her and tr&ing to :iss her. Complainant evaded and struggled and pushed respondent awa&. /hen panic:ing, she ran in the direction of the filing ca%inets. Respondent caught up with her, em%raced her again, pinned her against the filing ca%inets and pressed the lower of his %od& against hers. Complainant screamed for help while resisting and pushing respondent. /hen she ran for the open windows of the inner room. But %efore she could reach it respondent again caught her. 6n the ensuing struggle, complainant slipped and fell on the floor, her el%ows supporting the upper part of her %od& while her legs were outstretched %etween respondentRs feet. Respondent then %ent :nees in a somewhat sitting 7sEuatting8 position, placed his palms on either side of her head and :issed her on the mouth with his mouth open and his tongue stic:ing out. 's complainant continued to struggle, respondent suddenl& stopped and sat on the chair nearest the door of the inner room with his face red and %reathing heavil&. Complainant angril& shouted .maniac, demon&o, %astos, napa:awalanghi&a nin&o.. Respondent :ept muttering .6 love &ou. and was ver& apologetic offering for his driver to ta:e her home. Complainant headed for the !aple Room where, when she entered, she was o%served %& Bernardo /aruc and Folanda =alencia to %e flushed in the face and with her hair disheveled. Folanda particularl& found surprising complainantRs disheveled hair %ecause complainant considered her 7long straight8 hair one of her assets and was alwa&s arranging it. Rosanna )arcia in her testimon& o%served that complainant was reall& angr& as shown %& the wa& she gra%%ed her %ag .talagang galit.. 6t is to %e noted that !rs. Rosanna )arcia, -,, was a most reluctant witness. Bhen first su%poenaed, she did not appear and sent a medical certificate 7p. 1"#, Record8 that she was suffering from h&pertension. *he testified that she was as:ed %& respondent to sign an affidavit 7ADh. 1, pp. 5,(57, Record8 prepared %& him and that eventuall&, she eDecuted a *inumpaang *ala&sa& in her own handwriting 7ADh. )8 wherein she stated that some of the statements in her earlier affidavit were false and that she was onl& forced to sign %ecause respondent shouted at her when she refused? that she was afraid of respondent who was her %oos. *he corro%orated complainantRs declaration that respondent went to the door of the !aple Room in order to call her 7complainant8, adding that his call could not %e made from his office %ecause he could not %e heard as his office was far from the !aple Room. /his is in direct contrast to respondentRs testimon& that he did not summon complainant %ut she came to him to get the poem that she as:ed him to ma:e for her. Bhen complainant angril& left the !aple Room, Folanda =alencia followed and wal:ed with her outside. $n the road, complainant told =alencia .napa:awalanghi&a ni @udge, %astos, demon&o. and vowed that she would tell her famil& a%out what respondent did to her so that her father would maul him. 's testified %& Folanda =alencia, complainant was so angr& .nagdada%og talaga si&a. 7/*+, !arch 19, 199,, p. 1948. But as the& were alread& on the road, complainant did not tell =alencia what happened. /he neDt da& complainant related her eDperience to Bernardo /aruc with whom she rode to the office. 's testified %& /aruc0 '. *he was telling me a%out the incident which happened that afternoon of ecem%er ,, 1995. 3. Can &ou tell us what she told &ou a%out the ecem%er ,, 1995 incidentP '. *he told me that she was :issed %& the @udge inside his office. 3. Bhat else did she tell &ou, if an&P '. *he said that she was pushed on the floor and she was ver& disorgani4ed in relating the incident it was as if she was tr&ing to sa& all things at the same time. But what 6 got from her was that she was :issed %& the @udge in the office on ecem%er , on the lips and she was fuming mad. 3. Bhat was &our reaction when &ou heard that from 'tt&. /alens( a%otP '. 6 was . . . 6 was shoc:ed . . . 6 donRt :now the proper term. 6 was shoc:ed. 3. Bhat did &ou sa& or do upon learning the incidentP '. Bhen she later on was pacified, she as:ed me, .what am 6 doing to doP 'm 6 doing to press chargesP. 3. Bhat did &ou sa&P '. 6 told her it is up to her and %efore doing it she has to weigh all thing, the conseEuences if she would file a case. 3. Bas that the end of the conversationP '. +o, she :ept on retelling it all over again till we reach the office. 7/*+, !arch "#, 19,,, pp. 1"7(1";8. Complainant also related what happened to witness 'tt&. Alenita 3uinsa& %ut, as testified %& 'tt&. 3uinsa&, complainant did not want an&%od& 7else8 to :now a%out the :issing incident at that point. 'tt&. 3uinsa& advised complainant to tal: with respondent and as: for a transfer. $n ecem%er 1", 1995 complainant went to the >all of @ustice where respondent was, and as he was a%out to %oard his car, approached him and ver%all& %roached her reEuest for transfer. >e acceded. /hus in the morning of ecem%er 1;, 1995, complainant %rought her written reEuest for transfer dated ecem%er 1", 1995 7ADh. +8 for respondentRs signature, reminding him of his earlier ver%al approval. >e refused sa&ing he needed her for two 7"8 administrative cases that he was investigating. Bhen she insisted, he shouted at her sa&ing it was his decision and had to %e o%e&ed. >owever, he eventuall& signed the memorandum 7ADh. $8 transferring her later that morning. /wo da&s later, on ecem%er "#, 1995, complainant, after consulting her famil&, reported the matter to the police and filed with the !unicipal /rial Court of *an 1ernando, Pampanga criminal cases for acts of lasciviousness 7ADh. -8, =iolation of 'nti( *eDual >arassment 2aw 7ADh. 58 and this administrative case the following da&.

1or his part, respondent mostl& denied complainantRs allegations. >e presented his version of some specific incidents or conduct such as that he was merel& imitating complainantRs gesture with her forefinger as she nervousl& introduced her %o&friend to him . >e admitted that he :issed her 7.+ovem%er incident was not the first %ut it was the last.8 and other female emplo&ees? admitted the pre(wedding incident where he told !rs. 2eander .tanga :a :asi. %ut said it was onl& a 9o:e? admitted that his voice is louder than others %ut he does not shout? admitted that he tells green %ut .never vulgar. 9o:es. en&ing !aril&n 2eanderRs allegations and disclaiming an& :nowledge of ADhs. ' to A, he descri%ed 2eander as a .ver& &oung funn& person, alwa&s laughing.. 6n his testimon& he never showed wh& !aril&n 2eander, Rosanna )arcia or Folanda =alencia would testif& against him to corro%orate complainantRs testimon&, reserving his venom for Bernardo /aruc. >e said /arucRs research wor: were .not usa%le.. >e insinuated that /aruc per9ured himself %ecause he was 9ealous a%out !aril&n 2eander with whom he 7/aruc8 has a relationship. >e declared that nothing happened on ecem%er ,, that it was complainant who entered his room to get the poem she herself as:ed him to ma:e. >e called the ecem%er , incident a .mere fa%rication. of complainant in vengeful retaliation of four 748 incident that he either scolded or humiliated her namel&0 in *eptem%er 1995 when he reminded, %ut did not scold, her to report to Branch 4-? in +ovem%er 1995 when he reproached her for not reflecting in her Certificate of *ervice that she had gone to >ong:ong? in the first wee: of ecem%er 1995 when she committed an error in the notice for a 9udgesR meeting? and finall& on ecem%er 1;, 1995, when he scolded her for insisting to allow her to return to the $ffice of the Cler: of Court. >e asserted that he never noticed an& change of complainantRs %ehavior towards him and that he was never attracted to her. >e dismissed the poem mar:ed ADhi%it .!. as nothing more than an intellectual creation .too apocr&phal to %e true., that it was eDaggerated and meant onl& to praise and entertain complainant. >e declared that he had in fact written other poems 7ADhs. "5 to -#8 including the one pu%lished through a certain 1red RoDas 7ADh. "58. Bel&ing the :issing incident, he contended that there had %een a gardener wor:ing at -0## to 50## that afternoon on the lawn 9ust outside the window of his office, impl&ing that if indeed complainant had screamed, it would have %een heard %& the gardener. But it is to %e noted that this alleged gardener was never presented. 7pp. 11(-1, Report and Recommendation8 Based on the foregoing findings, the 6nvestigating @ustice made the following conclusions0 a8 that there is sufficient evidence to create a moral certaint& that respondent committed the acts complained of, especiall& the violent :issing incident which transpired last ecem%er ,, 1995? %8 that complainant and her witnesses are credi%le witnesses who have no ulterior motive or %ias to falsel& testif& against respondent? c8 that respondentRs denials can not prevail over the weight and pro%ative value of the affirmative assertions of complainant and her witnesses? d8 that respondentRs poem had dammed him, %eing documented proof of his seDual intentions towards the complainant? e8 that %& filing her charges imputing to respondent a crime against chastit& and with her %ac:ground as a law&er and a court emplo&ee, complainant was well(aware that her honor would itself %e on trial? f8 that it is un%elieva%le that complainant, a demure newl&(married lad& and a religious person, would fa%ricate a stor& with such severe implications on respondentRs professional and personal life 9ust to get even with respondent for an alleged simple scolding incident? and g8 that %& doing the acts complained of, respondent has tempted the morals of not onl& complainant %ut also the other court emplo&ees over whom he eDercised power and influence as ADecutive @udge. /he 6nvestigating @ustice thereupon, recommended that respondent %e dismissed from the service with pre9udice to re(appointment in an& other government position and with forfeiture of all %enefits and privileges appertaining him, if an&. /he Court has reviewed the record of this case and has there%& satisfied itself that the findings and recommendations of the 6nvestigating @ustice are in truth adeEuatel& supported %& the evidence and are in accord with applica%le legal principles. /he Court agrees and adopts such findings and recommendations. /he integrit& of the @udiciar& rests not onl& upon the fact that it is a%le to administer 9ustice %ut also upon the perception and confidence of the communit& that the people who run the s&stem have done 9ustice. 't times, the strict manner %& which we appl& the law ma&, in fact, do 9ustice %ut ma& not necessaril& create confidence among the people that 9ustice, indeed, is served. >ence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the 9udiciar&, particularl& 9udges and 9ustices, must not onl& %e proficient in %oth the su%stantive and procedural aspects of the law, %ut more importantl&, the& must possess the highest integrit&, pro%it&, and unEuestiona%le moral uprightness, %oth in their pu%lic and private lives. $nl& then can the people %e reassured that the wheels of 9ustice in this countr& run with fairness and eEuit&, thus creating confidence in the 9udicial s&stem. Bith the avowed o%9ective of promoting confidence in the @udiciar&, we have the following provisions of the Code of @udicial Conduct0 Canon 6 Rule 1.#10 ' @udge should %e the em%odiment of competence, integrit& and independence. Canon 66 Rule ".##0 ' @udge should avoid impropriet& and the appearance of impropriet& in all activities. Rule ".#10 ' 9udge should so %ehave at all times as to promote pu%lic confidence in the integrit& and impartiall& of the 9udiciar&. /he Court has adhered and set forth the eDacting standards of moralit& and decenc& which ever& mem%er of the 9udiciar& must o%serve 7*icat vs. 'lcantara, 1,1 *CR' "4; I19;;J8. ' magistrate is 9udged not onl& %& his official acts %ut also %& his private morals, to the eDtent that such private morals are eDternali4ed 7@unio vs. Rivera, ""5 *CR' ,;; I199-J8. >e should not onl& possess proficienc& in law %ut should li:ewise possess moral integrit& for the people loo: up to him as a virtuous and upright man. 6n Dy !e,an Hard2are and 5uto Supply %o. vs. !apucar 71#" *CR' 49- I19;1J8, the Court laid down the rationale wh& ever& 9udge must possess moral integrit&, thusl&0 /he personal and official actuations of ever& mem%er of the 9udiciar& must %e %e&ond reproach and a%ove suspicion. /he faith and confidence of the people in the administration of 9ustice can not %e maintained if a 9udge who dispenses it is not eEuipped with the cardinal 9udicial virtue of moral integrit& and if he o%tusel& continues to commit affront to pu%lic decenc&. 6n fact, moral integrit& is more than a virtue? it is a necessit& in the 9udiciar&. 7at p. 5#48 6n %astillo vs. %alanog 7199 *CR' 75 I1991J8, it was emphasi4ed that0

/he Code of @udicial Athics mandates that the conduct of a 9udge must %e free of a whiff of impropriet& not onl& with respect to his performance of his 9udicial duties, %ut also to his %ehavior outside his sala and as a private individual. /here is no dichotom& of moralit&? a pu%lic official is also 9udged %& his private morals. /he Code dictates that a 9udge, in order to promote pu%lic confidence in the integrit& and impartialit& of the 9udiciar&, must %ehave with propriet& at all times. 's we have ver& recentl& eDplained, a 9udgeRs official life can not simpl& %e detached or separated from his personal eDistence. /hus0 Being the su%9ect of constant pu%lic scrutin&, a 9udge should freel& and willingl& accept restrictions on conduct that might %e viewed as %urdensome %& the ordinar& citi4en. ' 9udge should personif& integrit& and eDemplif& honest pu%lic service. /he personal %ehavior of a 9udge, %oth in the performance of his official duties and in private life should %e a%ove suspicion. 7at p. 9-.8 Respondent has failed to measure up these eDacting standards. >e has %ehave in a manner un%ecoming of a 9udge and as model of moral uprightness. >e has %etra&ed the peopleRs high eDpectations and diminished the esteem in which the& hold the 9udiciar& in general. Be need not repeat the narration of lewd and lustful acts committed %& respondent 9udge in order to conclude that he is indeed unworth& to remain in office. /he audacit& under which the same were committed and the seeming impunit& with which the& were perpetrated shoc: our sense of moralit&. 'll roads lead us to the conclusion that respondent 9udge has failed to %ehave in a manner that will promote confidence in the 9udiciar&. >is actuations, if condoned, would damage the integrit& of the 9udiciar&, fomenting distrust in the s&stem. >ence, his acts deserve no less than the severest form of disciplinar& sanction of dismissal from the service. /he actuations of respondent are aggravated %& the fact that complainant is one of his su%ordinates over whom he eDercises control and supervision, he %eing the eDecutive 9udge. >e too: advantage of his position and power in order to carr& out his lustful and lascivious desires. 6nstead of he %eing in loco parentis over his su%ordinate emplo&ees, respondent was the one who pre&ed on them, ta:ing advantage of his superior position. +oteworth& then is the following o%servation of the 6nvestigating @ustice0 But the ver& act of forcing himself upon a married woman, %eing himself of a married man, clearl& diverts from the standard of moralit& eDpected of a man of less than his standing in societ&. /his is eDacer%ated %& the fact that %& doing the acts complained of, he has tempted the morals not onl& the complainant %ut also the &oung !rs. !aril&n 2eander and the other emplo&ees in the court over whom he eDercised power and influence as ADecutive @udge. 7pp. -,(-7.8 Respondent ma& indeed %e a legall& competent person as evidenced %& his pu%lished law %oo:s 7translations from Anglish to /agalog8 and his legal studies a%road, %ut he has demonstrated himself to %e wanting of moral integrit&. >e has violated the Code of @udicial Conduct which reEuires ever& 9udge to %e the em%odiment of competence, integrit&, and independence and to avoid impropriet& and the appearance of impropriet& in all activities as to promote pu%lic confidence in the integrit& and impartialit& of the 9udiciar&. >aving tarnished the image of the @udiciar&, respondent, the Court holds without an& hesitation, must %e meted out the severest form of disciplinar& sanctionQdismissal from the service. 's a reminder to all 9udges, it is fitting to reiterate one of the mandates of the Court in its Circular +o. 1- dated @ul& 1, 19;7, to wit0 1inall&, all trial 9udges should endeavor to conduct themselves strictl& in accordance with the mandate of eDisting laws and the Code of @udicial Athics that the& %e eDemplars in the communities and the living personification of 9ustice and the Rule of 2aw. B>ARA1$RA, @udge >ermin A. 'rceo is here%& 6*!6**A from the service for gross misconduct and immoralit& pre9udicial to the %est interests of the service, with forfeiture of all retirement %enefits and with pre9udice to re(emplo&ment in an& %ranch of the government, including government(owned and controlled corporations. *$ $R ARA .

THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 1126A4 !2r,3 26, 1994 (231 scra A07) RODO"?O . %!R!#NO, &" M!RTIN @. !R@O" D!, D'!RDO R. % R (, &!SIMIRO &. &!R!N&HO, DIOSD!DO T. S!MSON, M!BIMO G. S'M R! a.+ M!R& "INO M. D "! &R'(, petitioners, vs. HON. I"'MIN!DO M N S S, %r1s,+,./ =6+/1, @ra.ch 49, R1/,o.a3 Tr,a3 &o6r0, ?,rs0 =6+,c,a3 R1/,o., 'r+a.10a, %a./as,.a., "OR N(O M. M!T O, !RT'RO STR!D!, NORM! "'STIN! a.+ %!@"O M R&!DO, respondents. RA*$2G/6$+ VIT'G, J.: Petitioner Rodolfo Para&no is the incum%ent municipal ma&or of Grdaneta, Pangasinan. /he other petitioners, namel&, Clemartin 'r%oleda, Aduardo Pere4, Casimiro Carancho, iosdado *amson, !aDimo *umera and !arcelino ela Cru4, are mem%ers of the *angguniang Ba&an of the municipalit& who, along with Para&no, are the protestees in separate election protests now still pending with the court a .uo. /his petition for certiorari see:s to set aside the orders, dated "" $cto%er 199- 1 and 1, +ovem%er 199-, 2 of respondent @udge 6luminado !eneses of Branch 49, Regional /rial Court, of Grdaneta, Pangasinan, voluntaril& inhi%iting himself from hearing the election cases and den&ing petitionersR motion for the reconsideration thereof. /he ma&oralt& protest 7doc:eted Case +o. G(5-4,8, involving Para&no, was originall& raffled and assigned to Branch 45 of the Regional /rial Court, Grdaneta, Pangasinan, presided over %& @udge !anuel =illanueva. /he councilorsR protest 7doc:eted Case +o. G(5-478, involving the other petitioners, was assigned to Branch 49 of the Regional /rial Court, also sitting in Grdaneta, Pangasinan, with respondent @udge 6luminado !eneses presiding.

$n "" $cto%er 199", a motion for the inhi%ition of @udge =illanueva was filed %& petitioner Para&no, which the court promptl& granted. 'fter the records of Case +o. G(5-4, were thus forwarded to ADecutive @udge Romulo '%asolo, the latter, in an order, dated ", $cto%er 199", directed the assignment of the case to Branch 4, of the court %ut onl& after its presiding @udge, >on. Roger omagas, agreed to hear and tr& the case. Claiming impropriet& in the assignment of the case, petitioner Para&no assailed %efore this Court the order of the ADecutive @udge. /he Court issued a temporar& restraining order and promptl& remanded the case to the Court of 'ppeals for proper disposition. /he appellate court set aside the Euestioned order of ", $cto%er 199", and it directed the ADecutive @udge to instead include the case in the regular raffle for re( assignment. /he case was thereupon re(raffled to Branch 49, where the councilorsR protests were then pending. /he Committee on Revision in Case +o. G(5-4, 7the ma&oralt& protest8 terminated its wor: on #7 $cto%er 199- %ut prior to the su%mission of its report, a .!otion to Gse Revision Committee Report Blan: 1orm. was filed %& protestant 2oren4o !ateo 7herein private respondent8. 6n the afternoon of "1 $cto%er 199-, while the revision of %allots in Case +o. G(5-47 7councilorsR protest8 was in progress, private respondent !ateo, the Revisor for the protestants(councilors in the Revision Committee, manifested0 3 . . . . 6 would li:e also to ma:e of record that the /rial Presiding @udge of Branch 49 is the same /rial @udge of this Alectoral Protest Case G(5-4,, Para&no versus !ateo 7sic8 and therefore the Protestant loo: at it that there seems to %e a certain degree of greater s&mpath& of the /rial Presiding @udge to the Protestee. . . . 7=erceles /ranscript of *tenographic +otes, Civil Case +o. G(5-47, revision of Ballots on $cto%er "1, 199-, 1045 p.m., pp. ,(78 /he following da&, respondent 9udge issued the assailed order inhi%iting himself from further hearing the two cases. /he motion for a reconsideration of the order was denied %& the 9udge. >ence, this petition for certiorari. Be see merit in the petition. *ection 1, Rule 1-7, of the Rules of Court reads0 *ec. 1. isEualification of 9udges. Q +o 9udge or 9udicial officer shall sit in an& case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniaril& interested as heir, legatee, or creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either part& within the siDth degree of consanguinit& or affinit&, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has %een eDecutor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in an& inferior court when his ruling or decision is the su%9ect of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed %& them and entered upon the record. ' 9udge ma&, in the eDercise of his sound discretion, disEualif& himself from sitting in a case, for 9ust or valid reasons other than those mentioned a%ove. /he underl&ing reason for the a%ove rule is o%viousl& to ensure that a 9udge, sitting in a case, will at all times %e free from inclinations or pre9udices and %e well capa%le to render a 9ust and independent 9udgment. ' litigant, we often hear, is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutralit& of a 9udge. 4 ue process reEuires it. 6ndeed, he not onl& must %e a%le to so act without %ias %ut should even appear to so %e. 5 6mpartialit& is a state of mind? hence, the need for some :ind of manifestation of its realit&. 6 =eril&, a 9udge ma&, in the eDercise of his sound discretion, inhi%it himself voluntaril& from sitting in a case, %ut it should %e %ased on good, sound or ethical grounds, 7 or for 9ust and valid reasons. A 6t is not enough that a part& throws some tenuous allegations of partialit& at the 9udge. +o less than imperative is that it is the 9udgeRs sacred dut& to administer 9ustice without fear or favor. 9 Be ta:e note that the electoral protests here involved have remained unresolved for Euite some time now. 'n& further dela& in the disposition of the cases, particularl& election protests where pu%lic interest is heavil& involved, 10 cannot %e countenanced. 'll told and given the circumstances, we view the call for 9udgeRs inhi%ition, and his acceding thereto, in this particular instance to %e %ereft of legal %asis and improper. B>ARA1$RA, the petition is )R'+/A . /he assailed $rders of the respondent @udge are *A/ '*6 A and he is directed to proceed with dispatch in resolving the election protests at %ar. +o costs. *$ $R ARA .

S &OND DIVISION G.R. No. ")37635 =63: 22, 1975 (65 scra 245) &R S N&IO M!RTIN (, petitioner, vs. " O%ODO @. GIRON ""!, as =6+/1 o4 0h1 &o6r0 o4 ?,rs0 I.s0a.c1 o4 !8ra, @ra.ch II, respondent. &ON& %&ION =R., J.: 6n Criminal Case +o. "1 of the Court of 1irst 6nstance of '%ra, Branch 66, Cresencio !artine4, as principal, and =iernes uclan and 'rnold Ba&ongan, as accessories after the fact, were charged with the murder of one 'lfredo Batoon. 's the first two were not apprehended, trial proceeded with respect to the third, 'rnold Ba&ongan. /hereafter, decision was rendered, the pertinent and dispositive portions of which are as follows Q DDD DDD DDD 6t is worth& to state, however, that the offense of murder was clearl& esta%lished and was committed %& Cresencio !artine4, from the evidence on record, there is no showing that 'rnold Ba&ongan is an accessor& after the fact. /he evidence as a whole, however, tends to allude )regorio Banawa, the then incum%ent !a&or of *allapadan to have :nowledge of the perpetrator and commission of the crime %ut did not ta:e an& action. 6t is further informed that )regorio Banawa to date is hiding the principal accused Cresencio !artine4.

6n view of the foregoing consideration, the Court here%& dismisses the charge against 'rnold Ba&ongan and is therefore ordered 'C3G6//A . /he Provincial 1iscal is here%& directed to investigate this case further to avoid miscarriage of 9ustice and the possi%ilit& of including )regorio Banawa and for the prompt apprehension of the principal accused Cresencio !artine4. 7pp. 1#(11, rollo8. DDD DDD DDD *u%seEuent to the acEuittal of 'rnold Ba&ongan, Cresencio !artine4 surrendered to the Philippine Consta%ular& and later was arraigned %efore Branch 66 of the same Court of 1irst instance. 'fter having pleaded .not guilt&. to the charge, and %efore the prosecution started to present its evidence, counsel for accused Cresencio !artine4 moved that the trial @udge inhi%it himself from hearing the case on its merits on the grounds .718 that the respondent had the chance to pass upon the issue and has formed an opinion as to who committed the crime of murder? 7"8 that it would not %e fair that he would sit, hear and pass 9udgment? and 7-8 that the respondent is no longer impartial,. and pra&ed that the case %e transferred to Branch 6 of the same Court. Respondent denied the oral motion. Petitioner did not move for a reconsideration of the denial of the motion so the trial proceeded. Bhen the trial was alread& in the re%uttal stage for the government, this Petition for Prohi%ition was filed. 6n his petition, Cresencio !artine4 as:s for a writ of prohi%ition commanding respondent @udge to desist from hearing and deciding Criminal Case +o. "1 of the Court of 1irst 6nstance of '%ra? declaring the hearing heretofore had as a mistrial? and ordering that said criminal case %e heard anew %& the presiding @udge of Branch 6 of the said Court or an& other Court within the @udicial istrict. $n %eing reEuired to comment, the *olicitor )eneral did so, and, citing the cases of ais vs. /orres, et al., 57 Phil. ;97, 9#-? 2uEue vs. Oa&anan, "9 *CR' 1,5? and )eotina vs. )on4ales, 41 *CR' ,,, opined .that it would %e in the %est interest of 9ustice and in :eeping with the clear intendment and pronouncements of the >onora%le Court that the case should %e tried anew %& another 9udge and that the respondent @udge should desist from further ta:ing cogni4ance of the case.. $n the other hand, respondent @udge maintains that the trial was fair, impartial and li%eral to the herein accused(petitioner as can %e gleaned from the records of Criminal Case +o. "1. Respondent eDplains that the statement that the .crime was committed %& Cresencio !artine4. appearing in the decision acEuitting 'rnold Ba&ongan after a separate trial .was %ased merel& on the prosecution evidence where petitioner was not on trial, therefore did not confront witnesses, did not su%mit his defense evidence and surel& will not in an& wa& affect or appl& to him. /he decision to %e rendered shall %e %ased upon the evidence adduced and su%mitted %& %oth parties.. /he trial of the case has alread& %een terminated and the Case su%mitted for decision. /wo issues are presented %efore us Q first, whether or not to order a new trial for petitioner? and second, whether or not respondent 9udge should %e allowed to decide petitionerRs case. 6t cannot %e denied that elementar& due process reEuires that a case %e heard %& a tri%unal that is impartial and disinterested. 'nd if an accused has %een the victim of an unfair and partial trial, this court will certainl& not hesitate to order a new trial in the interest of 9ustice. 1 6n as:ing that the case %e tried %& another @udge, petitioner alleges in general that respondent should not %e impartial as contemplated in the +ew Constitution. +o specific resolution, order, or ruling of respondent is cited in particular as one of partialit&. 6t should %e noted that after petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilt&, and after respondent had denied petitionerRs motion for the former to inhi%it himself from tr&ing the case, petitioner did not move for a reconsideration of the denial of the motion. 6nstead the trial proceeded. Petitioner too: no further action towards the disEualification of respondent until the trial was alread& in the re%uttal stage for the government at which time the present Petition for Prohi%ition was filed. /he onl& conclusion we can draw from these circumstances is that the trial was fair and impartial. Be are, therefore, not inclined to order a new trial for petitioner. 's to the second issue0 ' @udge has the dut& not onl& to render a 9ust and impartial decision, %ut also render it in such a manner as to %e free from an& suspicion as to its fairness and impartialit&, and also as to the 9udgeRs integrit&. 2 Bhile we grant respondentRs capacit& to render a 9ust and impartial decision, his statement in the decision acEuitting 'rnold Ba&ongan to the effect that the .crime was committed %& Cresencio !artine4. renders it impossi%le for respondent to %e free from the suspicion that in deciding petitionerRs case, respondent will %e %iased and pre9udiced. Be therefore hold that under these circumstances petitioner has the right to have his case decided %& another @udge. B>ARA1$RA, the petition for prohi%ition is granted. Respondent is ordered to transmit the records of Criminal Case +o. "1 of the Court of 1irst 6nstance of '%ra to Branch 6= of the Court of 1irst 6nstance of 6locos *ur, and the @udge presiding the said court will decide the same. Bithout pronouncement as to cost. *$ $R ARA . 5ntonio and 5.uino, ""., concur. S12ara01 O2,.,o.s ? RN!NDO, J.+ concurring0 /he merit, %oth in the main opinion %& @ustice Concepcion and in the concurrence of @ustice Barredo, is readil& discerni%le even from a cursor& perusal. /he& manifest the most careful and painsta:ing appraisal of the interests that must %e %alanced, that of the *tate in pursuance of its grave responsi%ilit& to assure that a crime does not go unpunished and to conduct a prosecution with dispatch to avoid the danger of witnesses %eing una%le to remem%er with accurac& what transpired that could ensue if the new trial sought were granted conseEuent upon further dela&, and that of the accused %eing entitled to nothing less .than the cold neutralit& of an impartial 9udge.. 1 !oreover, as pointed out in the opinion of @ustice Barredo, this doctrine has received the imprimatur of the present Constitution. 2 /he conclusion reached, no new hearing %eing reEuired %ut respondent @udge 2eopoldo B. )ironella %eing precluded from deciding the case, has then much to recommend it. !& vote is thus cast with the rest of m& %rethren. Candor compels the admission that at first 6 would have gone along with the recommendation of the *olicitor()eneral to have a new trial. 1urther reflection persuades me that the result reached %& us manifests fealt& to the constitutional commands of due process and impartialit&, considering that no unfairness tainted the proceedings. >ence m& conformit& with the decision. 's, however, there are certain points which to m& mind possess relevance, 6 add these few words.

1. /he difficult& this case presented could have %een o%viated had respondent @udge granted the motion that he disEualif& himself in view of his having previousl& come to the conclusion in acEuitting 'rnold Ba&ongan that it is petitioner Cresencio !artine4 who committed the offense. >e was led to do so, as he pointed out, in view of evidence presented at the previous trial, where petitioner had no participation. +ecessaril&, he was una%le to confront the witnesses or to su%mit evidence on his %ehalf. Respondent @udge entertains no dou%t that in the present case with petitioner as the accused, who could thus offer proof to eDculpate himself, he could decide the case fairl&, uninfluenced %& his previous eDplicit declaration attri%uting the offense to him. Bould that he were less certain of his o%9ectivit&P /here is, of course, that loft& conception of the men on the %ench, standing aloof on chill and distant heights, to paraphrase Cardo4o, a%ove and %e&ond the sweep of pertur%ing and deflecting forces arising from inherited instincts, traditional %eliefs, acEuired convictions, and most specificall&, %ias arising from circumstances as those herein disclosed. 3 6t would %e no reflection on respondent @udge had he %een more s&mpathetic to the plea for disEualification. >e appeared to have %een heedless of the oft(reiterated admonition addressed to trial 9udges to avoid even the impression of the guilt or innocence of an accused %eing dependent on pre9udice or pre9udgment. $nl& last @anuar&, in %astillo v. "uan, 4 such an approach was restated in his manner0 .6n ever& litigation, perhaps much more so in criminal cases, the manner and attitude of a trial 9udge are crucial to ever&one concerned, the offended part&, less than the accused. 6t is not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at times human failing of &ielding to first impressions. >e is to refrain from reaching hast& conclusions or pre9udging matters. 6t would %e deplora%le if he la&s himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of %eing imprisoned in the net of his own s&mpathies and predilections. 6t must %e o%vious to the parties as well as the pu%lic that he follows the traditional mode of ad9udication reEuiring that he hear %oth sides with patience and understanding to :eep the ris: of reaching an un9ust decision at a minimum. 6t is not necessar& that he should possess mar:ed proficienc& in law, %ut it is essential that he is to hold the %alance true. Bhat is eEuall& important is that he should avoid an& conduct that casts dou%t on his impartialit&. Bhat has %een said is not merel& a matter of 9udicial ethics. 6t is impressed with constitutional significance.. 5 +or is it a matter solel& of a 9udge %eing possessed of the highl& sought(after trait of o%9ectivit&. 6t is eEuall& important that such an impression finds acceptance. 6t does not admit of dou%t that it is not so much the confidence he feels in his impartialit& %ut the feeling in the heart of an accused that the one to decide his case has not as &et made up his mind as to his guilt that the law ta:es into account. +ot onl& that, the reaction of the general pu%lic cannot %e ignored. /hat eDplains wh& in alang v. Gosa, 6 this Court was appreciative when respondent @udge acceded to a plea for disEualification. /hus0 ./his voluntar& inhi%ition %& respondent @udge is to %e commended. >e has lived up to what is eDpected of occupants of the %ench. /he pu%lic faith in the impartial administration of 9ustice is thus reinforced. 6t is not enough that the& decide cases without %ias and favoritism. 6t does not suffice that the& in fact rid themselves of prepossessions. /heir actuation must inspire that %elief. /his is an instance where appearance is 9ust as important as the realit&. 2i:e CaesarRs wife, a 9udge must not onl& %e pure %ut %e&ond suspicion. 't least, that is an ideal worth striving for. Bhat is more, there is deference to the due process mandate.. 7 ". /o repeat, respondent @udge had less Eualms a%out his o%9ectivit&. >e turned down the motion for inhi%ition and proceeded with the trial. >e ought not have done so, %ut he indulged in conduct that certainl& could not merit appro%ation if deference %e paid to previous controlling doctrines, repeated time and time again. /hat is wh&, it does appear, a new trial would seem to %e indicated. /hat was how, as noted, 6 loo:ed upon the matter on first reading the pleadings. 6f now 6 9oin m& %rethren, it is %ecause, as dul& set forth in %oth opinions, respondent @udge conducted a trial free from an& procedural infirmit& and mar:ed %& no evidence of unfairness. /he Court is then confronted not with what could %e %ut with what had %een. 6t is a realit& rather than a h&pothetical state of facts that confronts us. ' pragmatic approach then is not to %e re9ected outright. Bhat petitioner could get in a new trial, he had failed to show that he was deprived of in the previous prosecution. 6t could therefore %e a clear case of reEuiring the superfluous if once again %oth the state and the petitioner would %e called upon to go through the process of a hearing, to the complete disregard of what had gone %efore. /he apprehended evil is that notwithstanding the opportunit& of petitioner to disprove evidence offered at the trial where he was not a part&, the conviction formed %& respondent @udge that he was the perpetrator of the offense would persist. 6f so, then the fairness of the trial would count for naught. Bith the decision reached %& us that another 9udge could on a careful stud& of the records decide the case, such a fear is minimi4ed, if not altogether eradicated. 6t is in the light of the a%ove considerations, reinforced %& the clear and cogent reasoning found in %oth opinions, that 6 would, in this case at least, allow a relaDation of the )utierre4 doctrine that assures a litigant that he is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutralit& of an impartial 9udge. @!RR DO, J.+ concurring0 6 concur, %ut 6 feel it ma& not %e inappropriate to add a few words to the a%le main opinion penned %& !r. @ustice Concepcion @r. 6n addition to the facts alread& stated in the main opinion, it is perhaps %etter to point out, as eDplained %& respondent 9udge, that the instant petition was filed %& a new counsel of petitioner. /he former defense counsel was another law&er who alone attended the trial from the ver& %eginning until he had to withdraw %ecause he was suspended from the practice of law %& the *upreme Court. /hat law&er was in fact the one who made the oral motion for inhi%ition of respondent 9udge %efore the People could present its evidence. /hat motion which was never reduced to writing was denied. 'pparentl& seeing nothing wrong with such denial, counsel too: no step to Euestion it. 6nstead, the trial proceeded without an& unusual incident until the withdrawal of the former defense counsel. 't that time, *eptem%er ,, 197-, even the defense had alread& rested and the prosecution had finished presenting one re%uttal witness. 's a matter of fact, evidentl& %ecause Be have not issued an& restraining order, after the present petition was filed on $cto%er 17, 197-, the trial has alread& %een completed and the case was considered su%mitted for decision on ecem%er "9, 197-. /o m& mind, these details 6 have mentioned provide additional ground to support the holding in the main opinion that petitioner is not entitled to a new trial. 1rom these facts, it is Euite clear that petitioner had agreed to %e tried %& respondent 9udge. 6t is onl& in the cases of disEualification specificall& mentioned in *ection 1 of Rule 1-7 that 9udges are supposed to inhi%it themselves motu propio without %eing as:ed to do so %& the parties in interest, considering the in9unction of the rule is addressed to the 9udge himself. Bhere the cause for inhi%ition is supposed %ias, or pre9udice or possi%le pre9udgment deduced from actuations of the 9udge in the course of the proceedings, it is %ut logical that the initiative to stop him from further acting should come from the part& that might %e aggrieved %& his continuing to act. Bithal, the challenge must %e serious and persistent. 6n other words, such ground for disEualification is su%9ect to waiver and ma& not %e invo:ed for the first time after the trial has alread& %een terminated, unless, of course, the %ias or pre9udice complained of has actuall& materiali4ed and manifested itself and can thus %e properl& demonstrated, in which event the trial ma& %e annulled and set aside.

6n the case at %ar, nowhere in the record does it appear that petitioner has in an& manner alleged, much less proven, that respondent 9udge ever acted with partialit&, %ias or pre9udice at an& stage of his trial. 6ndeed, the charge against respondent is that he has alread& pre9udged the guilt of petitioner. /hat does not necessaril& mean the trial would %e unfair. 'nd there is here no pretense nor showing that it has %een so. Gnder these circumstances, to grant a new trial now and reEuire the parties to %egin all over again would not onl& %e a vain superfluit& %ut could entail unpredicta%le conseEuences detrimental to the interests of 9ustice. 1or one thing, it would not %e a simple matter for the prosecution and, for the matter, the defense to reproduce its evidence as the& were in their original form and content. /here is even the ris: that the witnesses ma& no longer %e availa%le or willing to testif&. Besides, it does not seem fair nor proper that after su%mitting himself for and actuall& undergoing trial %efore respondent 9udge, petitioner, thru new counsel, should %e permitted to have another chance, after having studied all the evidence and found the same to %e discouraging, to sa& the least, to improve his position to the pre9udice of the state. 1or o%vious reasons, a new trial ma& %e resorted to onl& as a last alternative when the paramount interests of 9ustice can no longer %e satisfied otherwise. /he records of this case do not present such a situation as would warrant the great inconvenience of having petitionerRs trial repeated. /he allegations of the petition do not furnish sufficient 9ustification for Gs to dou%t the actual impartialit& and fairness of that trial. 'ccordingl&, the petition for new trial should %e denied. 'll these do not mean, however, that 6 am in favor of allowing respondent 9udge to decide petitionerRs case. /hat is entirel& a different matter. 6 am convinced from a scrutin& of the record that respondent 9udge means well and has %een tr&ing his level %est to compl& with his sworn dut& to do 9ustice to petitioner. But with his previous solemn finding in his decision acEuitting the accused 'rnold Ba&ongan that .the offense of !urder was clearl& esta%lished and was committed %& Cresencio !artine4., herein petitioner, it would %e too much to eDpect that the new and additional evidence %efore him will not %e unwittingl& viewed %& him in the light of his previous finding that it was the petitioner who committed the crime charged in the information. !oreover, and more importantl&, even if it %e a fact that respondent 9udge would %e so mentall& eEuipped as to %e impervious to the influence of his previous ratiocination, nothing he can sa& can sufficientl& dispel from petitioner and his neigh%ors and the pu%lic at large the possi%le suspicion that the truth is otherwise. 6t is indeed in the peculiar circumstances of this case that 6 would sa&, paraphrasing @ustice *anche4, that it is eEuall& important to %eing trul& impartial that a 9udge should not give reasona%le cause to an& of the parties to entertain an& dou%t a%out his impartialit&. 72uEue vs. Oa&anan, "# *CR' 1,5, 17;.8 /his dictum is even more compelling when it comes to criminal cases li:e that of petitioner, as an indispensa%le element not onl& of due process in a general sense %ut of the right of the accused to have .an impartial and pu%lic trial. under *ection 19 of the Bill of Rights of the Philippine Constitution of 197-. 6n this respect, therefore, m& vote is to order respondent 9udge not to decide petitionerRs case and to let the records %e su%mitted for decision to another 9udge as directed in the main opinion. 'nd in answer to the possi%le argument that the 9udge who will %e newl& assigned to decide the case will not have the %enefit of having seen the witnesses and o%served their demeanor, suffice it to sa& that this is nothing unusual, for it has happened and will still happen in num%erless times when 9udges either retire, resign, die or are transferred or removed, without %eing a%le to decide cases full& tried %& them, in which eventualit&, their respective successors perform the tas: of ma:ing the decision without holding a new trial. +one of the decisions rendered under such circumstances has ever %een Euestioned, much less set aside. 's a matter of fact, there are provisions in the @udiciar& 'ct permitting implicitl& that it %e done, al%eit in cases of transfers, the law prefers that the decision %e made %& the 9udge who heard the case. 7*ec. 51.8 /o %e a%solutel& fair, however, 6 would add that if in the course of his stud& of the records, the new 9udge should feel that there are matters which ought to %e clarified or rectified, he ma& ta:e such action as he ma& deem suita%le, including the recalling of witnesses for further Euestioning. /his procedure would ena%le the new 9udge to clear the record from an& possi%le taint of partialit& or pre9udgment of respondent 9udge that might have unwittingl& crept into the proceedings %efore him.

S &OND DIVISION G.R. No. ")3A229 !6/6s0 30, 1974 (5A scra 776) @!SI"IO S. %!"!NG, petitioner, vs. HONOR!@" M!RI!NO !. (OS!, <6+/1 o4 0h1 &o6r0 o4 ?,rs0 I.s0a.c1 o4 &186, @ra.ch V, a.+ ='"I TO %. H RR R!, respondents. R SO"'TION ? RN!NDO, J.:p /his petition for certiorari and prohi%ition was predicated on the fear and the misgivings that the trial 9udge, respondent !ariano '. Cosa, ma& find it difficult to live up to the ideal set forth in Gutierrez v. Santos. /he due process clause reEuires a .hearing %efore an impartial and disinterested tri%unal, ... ever& litigant I%eingJ entitled to nothing less than the cold neutralit& of an impartial 9udge.. 1 Briefl&, the %asis of the complaint was that after respondent @udge had acEuitted private respondent @ulieto P. >errera of the crime of estafa, with the statement in his opinion that the charge was nothing %ut a .clear concocted stor&. with the testimonies %eing. rehearsed and rehashed therefore, maliciousl& presented %& the Ioffended part&, now petitionerJ causing great damage and pre9udice Ito >erreraRs moral and socialJ standing and a destruction of IhisJ image as well as 7his8 character ..., 2 the aforesaid >errera, thus acEuitted, now private respondent here, filed an action for damages against the complainant, now petitioner. 6t is his su%mission here that considering the language used %& respondent @udge, he would not %e a%le to decide such civil case 9ustl& and impartiall&. Bhen reEuired to comment, respondents filed an answer instead, maintaining that there is no %asis for disEualification. !emoranda was thereafter reEuired from %oth parties. /hat was done, and the case was thus read& for decision. 't that stage, there was from private respondent >errera a motion to withdraw opposition, wherein he alleged0 .1. /hat respondent I@ulieto P. >erreraJ sincerel& %elieves in the earl& disposition and termination of the a%ove(entitled case, that it reali4es to withdraw his $pposition to herein PetitionerRs petition? ". /hat, time is of the essence, and %& wa& of his withdrawal, the a%ove(entitled case can therefore %e calendared on the earliest possi%le time %& the court who ma& eventuall& %e assigned, there%& tried on the merits? -. /hat this motion of herein respondent I@ulieto P. >erreraJ is made for reason of eDpedienc& in order that earl& disposition of the case %& wa& of trial on the merits %e attained.. 3

/hereafter, a manifestation was filed %& respondent @udge to the following effect0 ./he undersigned Presiding @udge of Branch = of the Court of 1irst 6nstance of Ce%u, formal part& respondent in the a%ove(entitled case, was furnished with a cop& of the R!otion for Certiorari and Prohi%ition with Preliminar& !andator& 6n9unctionR on @une "9, 1974. Bith the withdrawal of the opposition of respondent @ulieto P. >errera, the undersigned finds no reason wh& he should not inhi%it himself from tr&ing Civil Case +o. R(1-,"#, entitled 4"ulieto . Herrera, lainti## v. )asilio alang, De#endant.4 6n view of this development, the undersigned respectfull& manifests that he voluntaril& inhi%its himself from conducting the trial of the said case. /herefore, the dismissal of the a%ove(entitled petition appears to %e in order.. 4 /his voluntar& inhi%ition %& respondent @udge is to %e commended. >e has lived up to what is eDpected of occupants of the %ench. /he pu%lic faith in the impartial administration of 9ustice is thus reinforced. 6t is not enough that the& decide cases without %ias and favoritism. 6t does not suffice that the& in fact rid themselves of prepossessions. /heir actuation must inspire that %elief. /his is an instance where appearance is 9ust as important as the realit&. 2i:e CaesarRs wife, a 9udge must not onl& %e pure %ut %e&ond suspicion. 't least, that is an ideal worth striving for. Bhat is more, there is deference to the due process mandate. 5 B>ARA1$RA, the case is dismissed for %eing moot and academic. N @!N& G.R. No. ")15A24 Ma: 30, 1961 (2 scra 249) RI&!RDO M. G'TI RR (, petitioner, vs. HON. !RS NIO S!NTOS, T&. T !"., respondents. DI(ON, J.* $n 'ugust 15, 195; Benigno !usni and others filed a complaint with the *ecretar& of Pu%lic Bor:s and Communications against Ricardo !. )utierre4 alleging therein, enter alia, that the latter had illegall& constructed dams, di:es and other o%structions across naviga%le waters, waterwa&s, rivers and communal fishing grounds located in Barrio *an Aste%an, !aca%e%e, Pampanga. /he& pra&ed that, pursuant to the provisions of Repu%lic 'ct +o. "#5,, the said o%structions %e ordered removed or destro&ed. /he original complaint was su%seEuentl& amended %& adding siD more to the streams or waterwa&s mentioned therein. $n ecem%er 1-, 195; )utierre4 filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the proceedings to %e held %efore @ulian C. Cargullo, the investigator appointed %& the *ecretar& of Pu%lic Bor:s and Communications, would %e void %ecause Repu%lic 'ct "#5, was unconstitutional as it conferred 9udicial powers to the *ecretar& of Pu%lic Bor:s and Communications. /his motion was denied and the investigator set the case for hearing on ecem%er 19 and "#, 195;. $n ecem%er 15, 195; )utierre4 filed with the Court of 1irst 6nstance of Pampanga a petition for prohi%ition Q which was su%seEuentl& amended twice Q against the *ecretar& of Pu%lic Bor:s and Communications, 1lorencio !oreno, the epartment investigator, @ulian C. Cargullo, *enator Rogelio de la Rosa, Benigno !usni and his complainants, to prevent the carr&ing out of the investigation referred to a%ove. !ain contentions of petitioner were0 firstl&, that 'ct "5#, was unconstitutional %ecause it granted 9udicial power to the *ecretar& of Pu%lic Bor:s and Communications, and secondl&, that the nature and character of the streams and waterwa&s su%9ect of the complaint lodged with the epartment of Pu%lic Bor:s and Communications was alread& res judicata, having %een the su%9ect of an agreement %etween the Co%el 1amil& Q former owners of petitionerRs fishponds Q and the !unicipalit& of !aca%e%e. *aid case was doc:eted as Civil Case +o. 15"# and was assigned %& lotter& to Branch 6 of said court, presided %& the >on. 'rsenio *antos. /he *ecretar& of Pu%lic Bor:s and Communications and the epartment 6nvestigator filed their answer to the petition for prohi%ition alleging therein several affirmative defenses. Respondent Rogelio de la Rosa adopted said answer in toto as his own, while the other respondents filed a separate pleading invo:ing virtuall& the same defenses pleaded %& their co(parties. $n 1e%ruar& "5, 1959 respondent de la Rosa filed a motion to disEualif& the >on. 'rsenio *antos from tr&ing and deciding the case, upon the ground that sometime in 194; he had acted as counsel for fishpond owners, li:e the petitioner )utierre4, in an administrative investigation in involving the same or at least similar issues and properties, and had eDpressed views in the course of said investigation pre9udicial or adverse to the contention of the respondents in the pending case. Petitioner )utierre4 o%9ected to the motion aforesaid upon the ground that there was no legal ground upon which @udge *antos could %e disEualified under the provisions of Rule 1"5 of the Rules of Court. 'fter the hearing on the matter, the respondent @udge issued an order dated 'pril 1,, 1959 disEualif&ing himself and endorsing the case to the *econd Branch of the court, for reasons stated as follows0 !eanwhile, the new respondent, in his motion dated 1e%ruar& "4, 1959, is see:ing the disEualification of the presiding 9udge from sitting in the instant case on the ground that, %efore his appointment to the %ench, he has %een counsel for some fishpond owners, .li:e petitioner herein., as evidenced %& photostatic copies of two 7"8 communications, anneD ' and anneD B 7par " of the motion8? and that under section 1, Rule 1"5 of the Rules of Court, .no 9udge shall sit in a case in which he has %een a counsel. 7par. 4, some motion8. /he motion is %eing o%9ected to %& the petitioner for reasons stated in his written opposition dated !arch 14, 1959. ' perusal of the legal provisions, invo:ed %& said respondent, does not show that the presiding 9udge is included in an& of their prohi%itions, %ecause he is not pecuniaril& interested in the case? he is not related to either part& within the siDth degree of consanguinit& or affinit&? he has not %een an eDecutor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or counselH neither has he presided in an& inferior court, whose ruling or decision %eing the su%9ect of review 7sec. 1, Rule 1",, supra8. 6t is true that while in the practice of law as a mem%er of a law firm, the presiding 9udge, in %ehalf of Roman *antos, !anuel Bor9a and heirs of Proceso de )u4man, wrote the then *ecretar& of the 6nterior a letter dated @une 1, 194;, anneD ' of the motion, reEuesting that the proposed lease, in pu%lic %idding, of certain streams listed in resolution +o. ",, series of 194; of the municipal council of !aca%e%e, Pampanga %e held in a%e&ance until after the Committee on Rivers and *treams, created under 'dministrative $rder +o. -" issued %& the President of the Philippines, would have determined their nature whether private or pu%lic. But, nowhere in the letters, anneD ' and anneD B, could %e found an& showing that the presiding 9udge has ever appeared as

counsel for Ricardo )utierre4, the herein petitioner? contrar& to the contention of the respondent, *enator Rogelio de la Rosa. >ad he %een his counsel, the presiding 9udge should have disEualified himself from sitting in the present case even without motion, as he did in a case pending in the second %ranch of this court, wherein !anuel Bor9a is the petitioner. $n the other hand, in the petition, anneD 1 of the reamended petition, filed %& Benigno !usni and others on 'ugust 15, 195;, the& stated that the respondents named therein, one if them %eing Ricardo )utierre4, .constructed dams, di:es and other wor:s in pu%lic naviga%le waters, waterwa&s, rivers and communal fishing grounds in the !unicipalit& of !aca%e%e, Pampanga.? and that such naviga%le waters, waterwa&s, rivers and communal fishing grounds are those specified in the list, anneD ' of the and petition, anneD 1 of the re(amended petition. ' reading of this list shows that some of the streams mentioned in resolution +o. ",, series of 194; of the municipal council of !aca%e%e, Pampanga, included in the fishponds of Roman *antos, !anuel Bor9a and heirs of Proceso de )u4man, were the ones, which the presiding 9udge, then law practitioner, contended in his letter, anneD ' of the motion, to %e private and not pu%lic? and that the said streams, as shown %& the plan, ADhi%it ' ( e la Rosa, were more or less similar to those included in the fishpond or fishponds of the petitioner, Ricardo )utierre4, which were %eing investigated %& !r. @ulian C. Cargullo, upon order of the respondent *ecretar& of Pu%lic Bor:s and Communications. *uch %eing the case, the presiding 9udge is inclined to grant the motion, %& disEualif&ing himself to sit in this case, not %ecause he has %een a counsel for the a%ove(named petitioner, which is entirel& false, neither %ecause of .eDtremada delicade4a., %ut %ecause his opinion given in the aforesaid letter might, some wa& or another, influence on his decision in the case at %ar. Bhile this would %e a too remote possi%ilit&, &et it is the dut& of the court to administer 9ustice without an& suspicion of %ias and pre9udice, otherwise a part&(litigant might lose confidence in the 9udiciar& that must %e avoided as much as possi%le for the purpose of preserving its dignit&. Petitioner )utierre4 filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order mentioned a%ove, %ut the respondent @udge denied said motion in his order of 'ugust 11, 1959 where the following is stated0 Bhile it is true that presiding 9udge was not counsel for the petitioner, &et in his letter dated @une 1, 1949, attached to the record, as then a private law practitioner and as counsel for !anuel Bor9a, Roman *antos and the heirs of Proceso de )u4man, he informed the then *ecretar& of 6nterior that the streams and rivers, intended to %e leased at pu%lic caution %& the municipal council of !aca%e%e, Pampanga, in its Resolution +o. ",. were private and not pu%lic. 6n his same letter, the presiding 9udge even stated that copies of Resolution +o. ", were furnished the persons mentioned therein, one of them %eing Ricardo )utierre4, the herein petitioner, %ecause the streams and rivers su%9ect of the instant petition were among those to %e leased. 6n other words, the interests of !anuel Bor9a, Roman *antos and the heirs of Proceso de )u4man were identical to the interests of the herein petitioner Ricardo )utierre4, so much so that whatever ma& %e the resolution of the *ecretar& of the 6nterior then would %enefit the interests of the said petitioner. Gnder these circumstances, the presiding 9udge %elieves that he has no other recourse %ut to disEualif& himself from sitting in this case. $n 'ugust "", 1959 )utierre4 commenced the present action for mandamus against the >on. 'rsenio *antos, the *ecretar& of Pu%lic Bor:s and Communications, the epartment 6nvestigator and the parties who filed the complaint against him, for the purpose of compelling the aforesaid @udge .to proceed, continue with the hearing and ta:e cogni4ance of Civil Case +o. 15"# of the Court of 1irst 6nstance of Pampanga.. Petitioner invo:ing the provisions of section 1, Rule 1", of the Rules of Court, argues that the case of the respondent 9udge does not fall under an& one of the grounds for the disEualification of 9udicial officers stated therein. 'ssuming arguendo that a literal interpretation of the legal provision relied upon 9ustifies petitionerRs contention to a certain degree, it should not %e forgotten that, in construing and appl&ing said legal provision, we cannot disregard its true intention nor the real ground for the disEualification of a 9udge or 9udicial officer, which is the impossi%ilit& of rendering an impartial 9udgment upon the matter %efore him. 6t has %een said, in fact, that due process of law reEuires a hearing %efore an impartial and disinterested tri%unal, and that ever& litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutralit& of an impartial 9udge 7-# 'm. @ur. p. 7,78. !oreover, second onl& to the dut& of rendering a 9ust decision, is the dut& of doing it in a manner that will not arouse an& suspicion as to its fairness and the integrit& of the @udge. ConseEuentl&, we ta:e it to %e the true intention of the law Q stated in general terms Q that no 9udge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholl& free, disinterested, impartial and independent 7-# 'm. @ur. Supra8 %ecause Q . . . >owever upright the 9udge, and however free from the slightest inclination %ut to do 9ustice, there is peril of his unconscious %ias or pre9udice, or lest an& former opinion formed eD parte ma& still linger to affect unconsciousl& his present 9udgment, or lest he ma& %e moved or swa&ed unconsciousl& %& his :nowledge of the facts which ma& not %e revealed or stated at the trial, or cannot under the rules of evidence. +o effort of the will can shut out memor&? there is no art of forgetting. Be cannot %e certain that the human mind will deli%erate and determine unaffected %& that which it :nows, %ut which it should forget in that process. . . . 7'nn. Cas. 1917', p. 1"-58 . 6n the present case the respondent 9udge himself has candidl& stated that the opinion eDpressed %& him in a letter dated @une 1, 194; addressed %& him as counsel for !anuel Bor9a and others to the then *ecretar& of the 6nterior, attached to the motion for disEualification as 'nneD ', .might, some wa& or another, influence 7on8 his decision in the case at %ar. 7order of 'pril 1-, 19598. /he fear he has thus eDpressed Q of not %eing a%le to render a trul& impartial 9udgment Q does not appear to %e capricious and whimsical, having in mind particularl& that in his order of 'ugust 11, 1959 den&ing petitionersR motion for reconsideration, >is >onor reiterated that in the aforesaid letter he informed the *ecretar& of the 6nterior that the streams and rivers to %e auctioned, for lease purposes, %& the municipal council of !aca%e%e, Pampanga, were private and not pu%lic streams and rivers? that the streams and rivers su%9ect of the petition for prohi%ition filed %& herein petitioner were among those that he considered as private in nature? that, therefore, the interests of Bor9a and his other clients .were identical to the interest of the herein petitioner etc.. 6n view of these circumstances, we are constrained to agree with >is >onor that the opinion thus eDpressed %& him &ears ago .might, some wa& or another, influence his decision. in the case %efore him. B>ARA1$RA, the petition for mandamus under consideration is here%& denied, without costs.

N @!N& G.R. No. 133250 =63: 9, 2002 (403 scra 1) ?R!N&IS&O I. &H!V (, petitioner, vs. %'@"I& ST!T S !'THORIT# a.+ !M!RI &O!ST!" @!# D V "O%M NT &OR%OR!TION, respondents. &!R%IO, J.: /his is an original Petition for !andamus with pra&er for a writ of preliminar& in9unction and a temporar& restraining order. /he petition see:s to compel the Pu%lic Astates 'uthorit& 7.PA'. for %revit&8 to disclose all facts on PA'Rs then on(going renegotiations with 'mari Coastal Ba& and evelopment Corporation 7.'!'R6. for %revit&8 to reclaim portions of !anila Ba&. /he petition further see:s to en9oin PA' from signing a new agreement with '!'R6 involving such reclamation. Th1 ?ac0s $n +ovem%er "#, 197-, the government, through the Commissioner of Pu%lic >ighwa&s, signed a contract with the Construction and evelopment Corporation of the Philippines 7.C CP. for %revit&8 to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of !anila Ba&. /he contract also included the construction of Phases 6 and 66 of the !anila(Cavite Coastal Road. C CP o%ligated itself to carr& out all the wor:s in consideration of fift& percent of the total reclaimed land. $n 1e%ruar& 4, 1977, then President 1erdinand A. !arcos issued Presidential ecree +o. 1#;4 creating PA'. P +o. 1#;4 tas:ed PA' .to reclaim land, including foreshore and su%merged areas,. and .to develop, improve, acEuire, D D D lease and sell an& and all :inds of lands..1 $n the same date, then President !arcos issued Presidential ecree +o. 1#;5 transferring to PA' the .lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the !anila Ba&. " under the !anila(Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Pro9ect 7!CCRRP8. $n ecem%er "9, 19;1, then President !arcos issued a memorandum directing PA' to amend its contract with C CP, so that .I'Jll future wor:s in !CCRRP D D D shall %e funded and owned %& PA'.. 'ccordingl&, PA' and C CP eDecuted a !emorandum of 'greement dated ecem%er "9, 19;1, which stated0 .7i8 C CP shall underta:e all reclamation, construction, and such other wor:s in the !CCRRP as ma& %e agreed upon %& the parties, to %e paid according to progress of wor:s on a unit priceKlump sum %asis for items of wor: to %e agreed upon, su%9ect to price escalation, retention and other terms and conditions provided for in Presidential ecree +o. 1594. 'll the financing reEuired for such wor:s shall %e provided %& PA'. DDD 7iii8 D D D C CP shall give up all its development rights and here%& agrees to cede and transfer in favor of PA', all of the rights, title, interest and participation of C CP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed %& C CP in the !CCRRP as of ecem%er -#, 19;1 which have not &et %een sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of %& C CP as of said date, which areas consist of approDimatel& +inet&(+ine /housand 1our >undred *event& /hree 799,47-8 sEuare meters in the 1inancial Center 'rea covered %& land pledge +o. 5 and approDimatel& /hree !illion /hree >undred Aight& /wo /housand Aight >undred Aight& Aight 7-,-;",;;;8 sEuare meters of reclaimed areas at var&ing elevations a%ove !ean 2ow Bater 2evel located outside the 1inancial Center 'rea and the 1irst +eigh%orhood Gnit..$n @anuar& 19, 19;;, then President Cora4on C. 'Euino issued *pecial Patent +o. -517, granting and transferring to PA' .the parcels of land so reclaimed under the !anila(Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Pro9ect 7!CCRRP8 containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninet& four 71,915,;948 sEuare meters.. *u%seEuentl&, on 'pril 9, 19;;, the Register of eeds of the !unicipalit& of ParaVaEue issued /ransfer Certificates of /itle +os. 7-#9, 7-11, and 7-1", in the name of PA', covering the three reclaimed islands :nown as the .1reedom 6slands. located at the southern portion of the !anila(Cavite Coastal Road, ParaVaEue Cit&. /he 1reedom 6slands have a total land area of $ne !illion 1ive >undred *event& Aight /housand 1our >undred and 1ort& $ne 71,57;,4418 sEuare meters or 157.;41 hectares. $n 'pril "5, 1995, PA' entered into a @oint =enture 'greement 7.@='. for %revit&8 with '!'R6, a private corporation, to develop the 1reedom 6slands. /he @=' also reEuired the reclamation of an additional "5# hectares of su%merged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the !aster evelopment Plan of the *outhern Reclamation Pro9ect(!CCRRP. PA' and '!'R6 entered into the @=' through negotiation without pu%lic %idding. 4 $n 'pril ";, 1995, the Board of irectors of PA', in its Resolution +o. 1"45, confirmed the @='.5 $n @une ;, 1995, then President 1idel =. Ramos, through then ADecutive *ecretar& Ru%en /orres, approved the @='., $n +ovem%er "9, 199,, then *enate President Arnesto !aceda delivered a privilege speech in the *enate and denounced the @=' as the .grandmother of all scams.. 's a result, the *enate Committee on )overnment Corporations and Pu%lic Anterprises, and the Committee on 'ccounta%ilit& of Pu%lic $fficers and 6nvestigations, conducted a 9oint investigation. /he *enate Committees reported the results of their investigation in *enate Committee Report +o. 5,# dated *eptem%er 1,, 1997. 7 'mong the conclusions of their report are0 718 the reclaimed lands PA' see:s to transfer to '!'R6 under the @=' are lands of the pu%lic domain which the government has not classified as aliena%le lands and therefore PA' cannot alienate these lands? 7"8 the certificates of title covering the 1reedom 6slands are thus void, and 7-8 the @=' itself is illegal. $n ecem%er 5, 1997, then President 1idel =. Ramos issued Presidential 'dministrative $rder +o. -,5 creating a 2egal /as: 1orce to conduct a stud& on the legalit& of the @=' in view of *enate Committee Report +o. 5,#. /he mem%ers of the 2egal /as: 1orce were the *ecretar& of @ustice,; the Chief Presidential 2egal Counsel,9 and the )overnment Corporate Counsel.1# /he 2egal /as: 1orce upheld the legalit& of the @=', contrar& to the conclusions reached %& the *enate Committees.11 $n 'pril 4 and 5, 199;, the $ilippine Daily In.uirer and !oday pu%lished reports that there were on(going renegotiations %etween PA'

and '!'R6 under an order issued %& then President 1idel =. Ramos. 'ccording to these reports, PA' irector +estor Oalaw, PA' Chairman 'rsenio Fulo and retired +av& $fficer *ergio Cru4 composed the negotiating panel of PA'. $n 'pril 1-, 199;, 'ntonio !. Culueta filed %efore the Court a etition #or ro$i,ition 2it$ 5pplication #or t$e Issuance o# a !emporary Restraining 7rder and reliminary Injunction doc:eted as ).R. +o. 1-"994 see:ing to nullif& the @='. /he Court dismissed the petition .for unwarranted disregard of 9udicial hierarch&, without pre9udice to the refiling of the case %efore the proper court..1" $n 'pril "7, 199;, petitioner 1ran: 6. Chave4 7.Petitioner. for %revit&8 as a taDpa&er, filed the instant etition #or Mandamus 2it$ rayer #or t$e Issuance o# a ;rit o# reliminary Injunction and !emporary Restraining 7rder . Petitioner contends the government stands to lose %illions of pesos in the sale %& PA' of the reclaimed lands to '!'R6. Petitioner pra&s that PA' pu%licl& disclose the terms of an& renegotiation of the @=', invo:ing *ection ";, 'rticle 66, and *ection 7, 'rticle 666, of the 19;7 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of pu%lic concern. Petitioner assails the sale to '!'R6 of lands of the pu%lic domain as a %latant violation of *ection -, 'rticle X66 of the 19;7 Constitution prohi%iting the sale of aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain to private corporations. 1inall&, petitioner asserts that he see:s to en9oin the loss of %illions of pesos in properties of the *tate that are of pu%lic dominion. 'fter several motions for eDtension of time,1- PA' and '!'R6 filed their Comments on $cto%er 19, 199; and @une "5, 199;, respectivel&. !eanwhile, on ecem%er ";, 199;, petitioner filed an $mni%us !otion0 7a8 to reEuire PA' to su%mit the terms of the renegotiated PA'('!'R6 contract? 7%8 for issuance of a temporar& restraining order? and 7c8 to set the case for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative !otion for 6ssuance of a /R$ dated !a& ",, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated @une "", 1999. 6n a Resolution dated !arch "-, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and reEuired the parties to file their respective memoranda. $n !arch -#, 1999, PA' and '!'R6 signed the 'mended @oint =enture 'greement 7.'mended @=',. for %revit&8. $n !a& ";, 1999, the $ffice of the President under the administration of then President @oseph A. Astrada approved the 'mended @='. ue to the approval of the 'mended @=' %& the $ffice of the President, petitioner now pra&s that on .constitutional and statutor& grounds the renegotiated contract %e declared null and void..14 Th1 Iss61s 15 1, /he issues raised %& petitioner, PA' and '!'R6 are as follows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h1 &o6r0Fs R63,./ 'irst iss$e: ,hether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic "eca$se of s$"se&$ent events. /he petition pra&s that PA' pu%licl& disclose the .terms and conditions of the on(going negotiations for a new agreement.. /he petition also pra&s that the Court en9oin PA' from .privatel& entering into, perfecting andKor eDecuting an& new agreement with '!'R6.. PA' and '!'R6 claim the petition is now moot and academic %ecause '!'R6 furnished petitioner on @une "1, 1999 a cop& of the signed 'mended @=' containing the terms and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. /hus, PA' has satisfied petitionerRs pra&er for a pu%lic disclosure of the renegotiations. 2i:ewise, petitionerRs pra&er to en9oin the signing of the 'mended @=' is now moot %ecause PA' and '!'R6 have alread& signed the 'mended @=' on !arch -#, 1999. !oreover, the $ffice of the President has approved the 'mended @=' on !a& ";, 1999. Petitioner counters that PA' and '!'R6 cannot avoid the constitutional issue %& simpl& fast(trac:ing the signing and approval of the 'mended @=' %efore the Court could act on the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it from the am%it of 9udicial review. Be rule that the signing of the 'mended @=' %& PA' and '!'R6 and its approval %& the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its 9urisdiction. PA' and '!'R6 have still to implement the 'mended @='. /he pra&er to en9oin the signing of the 'mended @=' on constitutional grounds necessaril& includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PA' and '!'R6 have signed one in violation of the Constitution. PetitionerRs principal %asis in assailing the renegotiation of the @=' is its violation of *ection -, 'rticle X66 of the Constitution, which prohi%its the government from alienating lands of the pu%lic domain to private corporations. 6f the 'mended @=' indeed violates the Constitution, it is the dut& of the Court to en9oin its implementation, and if alread& implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract. /he 'mended @=' is not an ordinar& commercial contract %ut one which see:s to transfer title and o,nership to 012.3 hectares of reclaimed lands and s$"merged areas of Manila 4ay to a single private corporation . 6t now %ecomes more compelling for the Court to resolve the issue to insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard the national patrimon&. *upervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. 6n the instant case, if the 'mended @=' runs counter to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent the transfer of title and ownership of aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain in the name of '!'R6. Aven in cases where supervening

events had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the %ench, %ar, and the pu%lic.17 'lso, the instant petition is a case of first impression. 'll previous decisions of the Court involving *ection -, 'rticle X66 of the 19;7 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 197- Constitution, 1; covered agric$lt$ral lands sold to private corporations which acEuired the lands from private parties. /he transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim the right to %$dicial confirmation of their imperfect titles19 under 5itle )) of Commonwealth 'ct. 141 7.C' +o. 141. for %revit&8. 6n the instant case, '!'R6 see:s to acEuire from PA', a pu%lic corporation, reclaimed lands and su%merged areas for non(agric$lt$ral purposes %& p$rchase under P +o. 1#;4 7charter of PA'8 and 5itle ))) of C' +o. 141. Certain underta:ings %& '!'R6 under the 'mended @=' constitute the consideration for the purchase. +either '!'R6 nor PA' can claim 9udicial confirmation of their titles %ecause the lands covered %& the 'mended @=' are newl& reclaimed or still to %e reclaimed. @udicial confirmation of imperfect title reEuires open, continuous, eDclusive and notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the pu%lic domain for at least thirt& &ears since @une 1", 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for filing applications for 9udicial confirmation of imperfect title eDpired on ecem%er -1, 19;7."# 2astl&, there is a need to resolve immediatel& the constitutional issue raised in this petition %ecause of the possi%le transfer at an& time %& PA' to '!'R6 of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Gnder the 'mended @=', PA' is o%ligated to transfer to '!'R6 the latterRs sevent& percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses. /he 'mended @=' even allows '!'R6 to mortgage at an& time the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation pro9ect."1 6econd iss$e: ,hether the petition merits dismissal for failing to o"serve the principle governing the hierarchy of co$rts . PA' and '!'R6 claim petitioner ignored the 9udicial hierarch& %& see:ing relief directl& from the Court. /he principle of hierarch& of courts applies generall& to cases involving factual Euestions. 's it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. /he instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the pu%lic. "" /he Court can resolve this case without determining an& factual issue related to the case. 'lso, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original 9urisdiction of the Court under *ection 5, 'rticle =666 of the Constitution. Be resolve to eDercise primar& 9urisdiction over the instant case. 5hird iss$e: ,hether the petition merits dismissal for non(e!ha$stion of administrative remedies. PA' faults petitioner for see:ing 9udicial intervention in compelling PA' to disclose pu%licl& certain information without first as:ing PA' the needed information. PA' claims petitionerRs direct resort to the Court violates the principle of eDhaustion of administrative remedies. 6t also violates the rule that mandamus ma& issue onl& if there is no other plain, speed& and adeEuate remed& in the ordinar& course of law. PA' distinguishes the instant case from /aVada v. /uvera "- where the Court granted the petition for mandamus even if the petitioners there did not initiall& demand from the $ffice of the President the pu%lication of the presidential decrees. PA' points out that in /aVada, the ADecutive epartment had an affirmative stat$tory dut& under 'rticle " of the Civil Code "4 and *ection 1 of Commonwealth 'ct +o. ,-;"5 to pu%lish the presidential decrees. /here was, therefore, no need for the petitioners in /aVada to ma:e an initial demand from the $ffice of the President. 6n the instant case, PA' claims it has no affirmative statutor& dut& to disclose pu%licl& information a%out its renegotiation of the @='. /hus, PA' asserts that the Court must appl& the principle of eDhaustion of administrative remedies to the instant case in view of the failure of petitioner here to demand initiall& from PA' the needed information. /he original @=' sought to dispose to '!'R6 pu%lic lands held %& PA', a government corporation. Gnder *ection 79 of the )overnment 'uditing Code,", the disposition of government lands to private parties reEuires pu%lic %idding. P A ,as $nder a positive legal d$ty to disclose to the p$"lic the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands . /he law o%ligated PA' to ma:e this pu%lic disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from an&one. PA' failed to ma:e this pu%lic disclosure %ecause the original @=', li:e the 'mended @=', was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a pu%lic %idding. Considering that PA' had an affirmative statutor& dut& to ma:e the pu%lic disclosure, and was even in %reach of this legal dut&, petitioner had the right to see: direct 9udicial intervention. !oreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of eDhaustion of administrative remedies does not appl& when the issue involved is a purel& legal or constitutional Euestion. "7 /he principal issue in the instant case is the capacit& of '!'R6 to acEuire lands held %& PA' in view of the constitutional %an prohi%iting the alienation of lands of the pu%lic domain to private corporations. Be rule that the principle of eDhaustion of administrative remedies does not appl& in the instant case. 'o$rth iss$e: ,hether petitioner has loc$s standi to "ring this s$it PA' argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his constitutional right to information without a showing that PA' refused to perform an affirmative dut& imposed on PA' %& the Constitution. PA' also claims that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer an& concrete in9ur& %ecause of the signing or implementation of the 'mended @='. /hus, there is no actual controvers& reEuiring the eDercise of the power of 9udicial review. /he petitioner has standing to %ring this taDpa&erRs suit %ecause the petition see:s to compel PA' to compl& with its constitutional duties. /here are two constitutional issues involved here. 1irst is the right of citi4ens to information on matters of pu%lic concern. *econd is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the eEuita%le distri%ution of aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain among 1ilipino citi4ens. /he thrust of the first issue is to compel PA' to disclose pu%licl& information on the sale of government lands worth %illions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutor& law mandate PA' to disclose. /he thrust of the second issue is to prevent PA' from alienating hundreds of hectares of aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PA' to compl& with a constitutional dut& to the nation. !oreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the pu%lic. 6n Chave7 v. PC//,"; the Court upheld the right of a citi4en to %ring a taDpa&erRs suit on matters of transcendental importance to the pu%lic, thus ( .Besides, petitioner emphasi4es, the matter of recovering the ill(gotten wealth of the !arcoses is an issue of Rtranscendental importance to the pu%lic.R >e asserts that ordinar& taDpa&ers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions Euestioning the validit& of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of Rparamount pu%lic interest,R and

if the& Rimmediatel& affect the social, economic and moral well %eing of the people.R !oreover, the mere fact that he is a citi4en satisfies the reEuirement of personal interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a pu%lic right, such as in this case. >e invo:es several decisions of this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the su%9ect of the case involved pu%lic interest. DDD 6n !aDada v. !uvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a pu%lic right and the o%9ect of mandamus is to o%tain the enforcement of a pu%lic dut&, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest? and %ecause it is sufficient that petitioner is a citi4en and as such is interested in the eDecution of the laws, he need not show that he has an& legal or special interest in the result of the action. 6n the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to %e informed on matters of pu%lic concern, a right then recogni4ed in *ection ,, 'rticle 6= of the 197- Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in order to %e valid and enforcea%le must %e pu%lished in the $fficial )a4ette or otherwise effectivel& promulgated. 6n ruling for the petitionersR legal standing, the Court declared that the right the& sought to %e enforced Ris a pu%lic right recogni4ed %& no less than the fundamental law of the land.R Legaspi v. %ivil Service %ommission, while reiterating /aVada, further declared that Rwhen a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a pu%lic right, the reEuirement of personal interest is satisfied %& the mere fact that petitioner is a citi4en and, therefore, part of the general Rpu%licR which possesses the right.R 1urther, in 5l,ano v. Reyes, we said that while eDpenditure of pu%lic funds ma& not have %een involved under the Euestioned contract for the development, management and operation of the !anila 6nternational Container /erminal, Rpu%lic interest IwasJ definitel& involved considering the important role Iof the su%9ect contractJ . . . in the economic development of the countr& and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.R Be concluded that, as a conseEuence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authorit& for upholding the petitionerRs standing. *imilarl&, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official records, documents and papers Q a right guaranteed under *ection 7, 'rticle 666 of the 19;7 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a 1ilipino citi4en. Because of the satisfaction of the two %asic reEuisites laid down %& decisional law to sustain petitionerRs legal standing, i.e. 718 the enforcement of a pu%lic right 7"8 espoused %& a 1ilipino citi4en, we rule that the petition at %ar should %e allowed.. Be rule that since the instant petition, %rought %& a citi4en, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights ( to information and to the eEuita%le diffusion of natural resources ( matters of transcendental pu%lic importance, the petitioner has the reEuisite locus standi. 'ifth iss$e: ,hether the constit$tional right to information incl$des official information on on(going negotiations "efore a final agreement. *ection 7, 'rticle 666 of the Constitution eDplains the peopleRs right to information on matters of pu%lic concern in this manner0 .*ec. 7. /he right of the people to information on matters of pu%lic concern shall %e recogni4ed . Access to official records+ and to doc$ments+ and papers pertaining to official acts+ transactions+ or decisions , as well as to government research data used as %asis for polic& development, shall %e afforded the citi4en, su%9ect to such limitations as ma& %e provided %& law.. 7Amphasis supplied8 /he *tate polic& of full transparenc& in all transactions involving pu%lic interest reinforces the peopleRs right to information on matters of pu%lic concern. /his *tate polic& is eDpressed in *ection ";, 'rticle 66 of the Constitution, thus0 .*ec. ";. *u%9ect to reasona%le conditions prescri%ed %& law, the *tate adopts and implements a policy of f$ll p$"lic disclos$re of all its transactions involving p$"lic interest.. 7Amphasis supplied8 /hese twin provisions of the Constitution see: to promote transparenc& in polic&(ma:ing and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to eDercise effectivel& other constitutional rights. /hese twin provisions are essential to the eDercise of freedom of eDpression. 6f the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions to citi4ens, whatever citi4ens sa&, even if eDpressed without an& restraint, will %e speculative and amount to nothing. /hese twin provisions are also essential to hold pu%lic officials .at all times D D D accounta%le to the people,. "9 for unless citi4ens have the proper information, the& cannot hold pu%lic officials accounta%le for an&thing. 'rmed with the right information, citi4ens can participate in pu%lic discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. 'n informed citi4enr& is essential to the eDistence and proper functioning of an& democrac&. 's eDplained %& the Court in 8almonte v. 4elmonte+ Jr.-# H .'n essential element of these freedoms is to :eep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication %etween the government and the people. 6t is in the interest of the *tate that the channels for free political discussion %e maintained to the end that the government ma& perceive and %e responsive to the peopleRs will. Fet, this open dialogue can %e effective onl& to the eDtent that the citi4enr& is informed and thus a%le to formulate its will intelligentl&. $nl& when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such %ear fruit.. PA' asserts, citing Chave7 v. PC//,-1 that in cases of on(going negotiations the right to information is limited to .definite propositions of the government.. PA' maintains the right does not include access to .intra(agenc& or inter(agenc& recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of %eing formulated or are in the ReDplorator& stageR.. 'lso, '!'R6 contends that petitioner cannot invo:e the right at the pre(decisional stage or %efore the closing of the transaction. /o support its contention, '!'R6 cites the following discussion in the 19;, Constitutional Commission0 GMr. S6ar1H. 'nd when we sa& RtransactionsR which should %e distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the )entleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itselfP Mr. O231* 5he 9transactions9 $sed here+ ) s$ppose is generic and therefore+ it can cover "oth steps leading to a contract and already a cons$mmated contract+ Mr. Presiding Officer. Mr. 6$are7: 5his contemplates incl$sion of negotiations leading to the cons$mmation of the transaction.

Mr. Ople: :es+ s$"%ect only to reasona"le safeg$ards on the national interest. Mr. 6$are7: /han: &ou..-" 7Amphasis supplied8 '!'R6 argues there must first %e a consummated contract %efore petitioner can invo:e the right. ReEuiring government officials to reveal their deli%erations at the pre(decisional stage will degrade the Eualit& of decision(ma:ing in government agencies. )overnment officials will hesitate to eDpress their real sentiments during deli%erations if there is immediate pu%lic dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all :inds of pressure %efore the& decide. Be must first distinguish %etween information the law on pu%lic %idding reEuires PA' to disclose pu%licl&, and information the constitutional right to information reEuires PA' to release to the pu%lic. Before the consummation of the contract, PA' must, on its own and without demand from an&one, disclose to the pu%lic matters relating to the disposition of its propert&. /hese include the si4e, location, technical description and nature of the propert& %eing disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties Eualified to %id, the minimum price and similar information. PA' must prepare all these data and disclose them to the pu%lic at the start of the disposition process, long %efore the consummation of the contract, %ecause the )overnment 'uditing Code reEuires p$"lic "idding. 6f PA' fails to ma:e this disclosure, an& citi4en can demand from PA' this information at an& time during the %idding process. 6nformation, however, on on(going eval$ation or revie, of %ids or proposals %eing underta:en %& the %idding or review committee is not immediatel& accessi%le under the right to information. Bhile the evaluation or review is still on(going, there are no .official acts, transactions, or decisions. on the %ids or proposals. >owever, once the committee ma:es its official recommendation, there arises a ;definite proposition; on the part of the government. 1rom this moment, the pu%licRs right to information attaches, and an& citi4en can access all the non(proprietar& information leading to such definite proposition. 6n Chave7 v. PC//,-- the Court ruled as follows0 .Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we %elieve that it is incum%ent upon the PC)) and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient pu%lic information on an& proposed settlement the& have decided to ta:e up with the ostensi%le owners and holders of ill(gotten wealth. *uch information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government , not necessaril& to intra(agenc& or inter(agenc& recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of %eing formulated or are in the .eDplorator&. stage. /here is need, of course, to o%serve the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier H such as on matters involving national securit&, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.. 7Amphasis supplied8 Contrar& to '!'R6Rs contention, the commissioners of the 19;, Constitutional Commission understood that the right to information ;contemplates incl$sion of negotiations leading to the cons$mmation of the transaction.; Certainl&, a consummated contract is not a reEuirement for the eDercise of the right to information. $therwise, the people can never eDercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it ma& %e too late for the pu%lic to eDpose its defects.*I2p$i*.nJt ReEuiring a consummated contract will :eep the pu%lic in the dar: until the contract, which ma& %e grossl& disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, %ecomes a #ait accompli. /his negates the *tate polic& of full transparenc& on matters of pu%lic concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. *uch a reEuirement will prevent the citi4enr& from participating in the pu%lic discussion of an& proposed contract, effectivel& truncating a %asic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Be can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat %& the *tate of its avowed .polic& of full disclosure of all its transactions involving pu%lic interest.. /he right covers three categories of information which are .matters of pu%lic concern,. namel&0 718 official records? 7"8 documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions? and 7-8 government research data used in formulating policies. /he first categor& refers to an& document that is part of the pu%lic records in the custod& of government agencies or officials. /he second categor& refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing, esta%lishing, confirming, supporting, 9ustif&ing or eDplaining official acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. /he third categor& refers to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned %& the government and used in formulating government policies. /he information that petitioner ma& access on the renegotiation of the @=' includes evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and eDpert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the @='. >owever, the right to information does not compel PA' to prepare lists, a%stracts, summaries and the li:e relating to the renegotiation of the @='.-4 /he right onl& affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunit& to inspect and cop& them. $ne who eDercises the right must cop& the records, documents and papers at his eDpense. /he eDercise of the right is also su%9ect to reasona%le regulations to protect the integrit& of the pu%lic records and to minimi4e disruption to government operations, li:e rules specif&ing when and how to conduct the inspection and cop&ing.-5 /he right to information, however, does not eDtend to matters recogni4ed as privileged information under the separation of powers. -, /he right does not also appl& to information on militar& and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national securit&, and information on investigations of crimes %& law enforcement agencies %efore the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long recogni4ed as confidential.-7 /he right ma& also %e su%9ect to other limitations that Congress ma& impose %& law. /here is no claim %& PA' that the information demanded %& petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. /he information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed(door Ca%inet meetings which, li:e internal deli%erations of the *upreme Court and other collegiate courts, or eDecutive sessions of either house of Congress, -; are recogni4ed as confidential. /his :ind of information cannot %e pried open %& a co(eEual %ranch of government. ' fran: eDchange of eDplorator& ideas and assessments, free from the glare of pu%licit& and pressure %& interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision(ma:ing of those tas:ed to eDercise Presidential, 2egislative and @udicial power. -9 /his is not the situation in the instant case. Be rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on(going negotiations %efore a final contract. /he information, however, must constitute definite propositions %& the government and should not cover recogni4ed eDceptions li:e privileged information, militar& and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national securit& and pu%lic order. 4#

Congress has also prescri%ed other limitations on the right to information in several legislations.41 6i!th iss$e: ,hether stip$lations in the Amended J8A for the transfer to AMAR) of lands+ reclaimed or to "e reclaimed+ violate the Constit$tion. 5he Regalian Doctrine /he ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and su%merged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the *tate owns all lands and waters of the pu%lic domain. Gpon the *panish conEuest of the Philippines, ownership of all .lands, territories and possessions. in the Philippines passed to the *panish Crown.4" /he Oing, as the sovereign ruler and representative of the people, acEuired and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines eDcept those he disposed of %& grant or sale to private individuals. /he 19-5, 197- and 19;7 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine su%stituting, however, the *tate, in lieu of the Oing, as the owner of all lands and waters of the pu%lic domain. /he Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time(honored principle of land ownership that .all lands that were not acEuired from the )overnment, either %& purchase or %& grant, %elong to the pu%lic domain.. 4- 'rticle --9 of the Civil Code of 1;;9, which is now 'rticle 4"# of the Civil Code of 195#, incorporated the Regalian doctrine. O,nership and Disposition of Reclaimed *ands /he *panish 2aw of Baters of 1;,, was the first statutor& law governing the ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. $n !a& 1;, 19#7, the Philippine Commission enacted 'ct +o. 1,54 which provided for the lease+ "$t not the sale+ of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individ$als . 2ater, on +ovem%er "9, 1919, the Philippine 2egislature approved 'ct +o. ";74, the Pu%lic 2and 'ct, which authori4ed the lease+ "$t not the sale+ of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individ$als. $n +ovem%er 7, 19-,, the +ational 'ssem%l& passed Commonwealth 'ct +o. 141, also :nown as the Pu%lic 2and 'ct, which a$thori7ed the lease+ "$t not the sale+ of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individ$als. C' +o. 141 continues to this da& as the general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the pu%lic domain. 5he 6panish *a, of #aters of <=11 and the Civil Code of <==> Gnder the *panish 2aw of Baters of 1;,,, the shores, %a&s, coves, inlets and all waters within the maritime 4one of the *panish territor& %elonged to the pu%lic domain for pu%lic use. 44 /he *panish 2aw of Baters of 1;,, allowed the reclamation of the sea under 'rticle 5, which provided as follows0 .'rticle 5. 2ands reclaimed from the sea in conseEuence of wor:s constructed %& the *tate, or %& the provinces, pue%los or private persons, with proper permission, shall %ecome the propert& of the part& constructing such wor:s, unless otherwise provided %& the terms of the grant of authorit&.. Gnder the *panish 2aw of Baters, land reclaimed from the sea %elonged to the part& underta:ing the reclamation, provided the government issued the necessar& permit and did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the *tate. 'rticle --9 of the Civil Code of 1;;9 defined propert& of pu%lic dominion as follows0 .'rt. --9. Propert& of pu%lic dominion is H 1. /hat devoted to pu%lic use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and %ridges constructed %& the *tate, river%an:s, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character? ". /hat %elonging eDclusivel& to the *tate which, without %eing of general pu%lic use, is emplo&ed in some pu%lic service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other wor:s for the defense of the territor&, and mines, until granted to private individuals.. Propert& devoted to pu%lic use referred to propert& open for use %& the pu%lic. 6n contrast, propert& devoted to pu%lic service referred to propert& used for some specific pu%lic service and open onl& to those authori4ed to use the propert&. Propert& of pu%lic dominion referred not onl& to propert& devoted to pu%lic use, %ut also to propert& not so used %ut emplo&ed to develop the national ,ealth. /his class of propert& constituted propert& of pu%lic dominion although emplo&ed for some economic or commercial activit& to increase the national wealth. 'rticle -41 of the Civil Code of 1;;9 governed the re(classification of propert& of pu%lic dominion into private propert&, to wit0 .'rt. -41. Propert& of pu%lic dominion, when no longer devoted to pu%lic use or to the defense of the territor&, shall %ecome a part of the private propert& of the *tate.. /his provision, however, was not self(eDecuting. /he legislature, or the eDecutive department pursuant to law, must declare the propert& no longer needed for pu%lic use or territorial defense %efore the government could lease or alienate the propert& to private parties.45 Act .o. <13? of the Philippine Commission $n !a& ;, 19#7, the Philippine Commission enacted 'ct +o. 1,54 which regulated the lease of reclaimed and foreshore lands. /he salient provisions of this law were as follows0 .*ection 1. /he control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in eDisting law, and the title to all /overnment or p$"lic lands made or reclaimed "y the /overnment "y dredging or filling or otherwise throughout the Philippine 6slands, shall "e retained "y the /overnment without pre9udice to vested rights and without pre9udice to rights conceded to the Cit& of !anila in the 2uneta ADtension. *ection ". 7a8 /he *ecretar& of the 6nterior shall cause all )overnment or pu%lic lands made or reclaimed %& the )overnment %& dredging or filling or otherwise to %e divided into lots or %loc:s, with the necessar& streets and alle&wa&s located thereon, and shall cause plats and plans of such surve&s to %e prepared and filed with the Bureau of 2ands. 7%8 Gpon completion of such plats and plans the /overnor(/eneral shall give notice to the p$"lic that s$ch parts of the lands so made or reclaimed as are not needed for p$"lic p$rposes ,ill "e leased for commercial and "$siness p$rposes, D D D. DDD

7e8 5he leases a"ove provided for shall "e disposed of to the highest and "est "idder therefore, su%9ect to such regulations and safeguards as the )overnor()eneral ma& %& eDecutive order prescri%e.. 7Amphasis supplied8 'ct +o. 1,54 mandated that the government sho$ld retain title to all lands reclaimed "y the government . /he 'ct also vested in the government control and disposition of foreshore lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed %& the government onl& if these lands were no longer needed for pu%lic purpose. 'ct +o. 1,54 mandated p$"lic "idding in the lease of government reclaimed lands. 'ct +o. 1,54 made government reclaimed lands s$i generis in that unli:e other pu%lic lands which the government could sell to private parties, these reclaimed lands were availa%le onl& for lease to private parties. 'ct +o. 1,54, however, did not repeal *ection 5 of the *panish 2aw of Baters of 1;,,. 'ct +o. 1,54 did not prohi%it private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea under *ection 5 of the *panish 2aw of Baters. 2ands reclaimed from the sea %& private parties with government permission remained private lands. Act .o. @=2? of the Philippine *egislat$re $n +ovem%er "9, 1919, the Philippine 2egislature enacted 'ct +o. ";74, the Pu%lic 2and 'ct. 4, /he salient provisions of 'ct +o. ";74, on reclaimed lands, were as follows0 .*ec. ,. 5he /overnor(/eneral+ $pon the recommendation of the 6ecretary of Agric$lt$re and .at$ral Reso$rces+ shall from time to time classify the lands of the p$"lic domain into H 7a8 Aliena"le or disposa"le, 7%8 /im%er, and 7c8 !ineral lands, D D D. *ec. 7. 1or the purposes of the government and disposition of aliena%le or disposa%le pu%lic lands, the /overnor(/eneral+ $pon recommendation "y the 6ecretary of Agric$lt$re and .at$ral Reso$rces+ shall from time to time declare ,hat lands are open to disposition or concession $nder this Act.. *ec. ;. Only those lands shall "e declared open to disposition or concession ,hich have "een officially delimited or classified D D D. DDD *ec. 55. 'n& tract of land of the pu%lic domain which, %eing neither tim%er nor mineral land, shall %e classified as s$ita"le for residential p$rposes or for commercial+ ind$strial+ or other prod$ctive p$rposes other than agric$lt$ral p$rposes , and shall %e open to disposition or concession, shall %e disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise. *ec. 5,. 5he lands disposa"le $nder this title shall "e classified as follo,s 0 AaB *ands reclaimed "y the /overnment "y dredging+ filling+ or other means ? A"B 'oreshoreC AcB Marshy lands or lands covered with water %ordering upon the shores or %an:s of naviga%le la:es or rivers? 7d8 2ands not included in an& of the foregoing classes. D D D. *ec. 5;. 5he lands comprised in classes AaB+ A"B+ and AcB of section fifty(si! shall "e disposed of to private parties "y lease only and not other,ise, as soon as the /overnor(/eneral+ $pon recommendation "y the 6ecretary of Agric$lt$re and .at$ral Reso$rces+ shall declare that the same are not necessary for the p$"lic service and are open to disposition under this chapter. 5he lands incl$ded in class AdB may "e disposed of "y sale or lease $nder the provisions of this Act.. 7Amphasis supplied8 *ection , of 'ct +o. ";74 authori4ed the )overnor()eneral to .classif& lands of the pu%lic domain into D D D aliena%le or disposa%le. 47 lands. *ection 7 of the 'ct empowered the )overnor()eneral to .declare what lands are open to disposition or concession.. *ection ; of the 'ct limited aliena%le or disposa%le lands onl& to those lands which have %een .officiall& delimited and classified.. *ection 5, of 'ct +o. ";74 stated that lands .disposa%le under this title4; shall %e classified. as government reclaimed, foreshore and marsh& lands, as well as other lands. 'll these lands, however, must %e suita%le for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive non(agric$lt$ral purposes. /hese provisions vested upon the )overnor()eneral the power to classif& inaliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain into disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain. /hese provisions also empowered the )overnor()eneral to classif& further such disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain into government reclaimed, foreshore or marsh& lands of the pu%lic domain, as well as other non(agricultural lands. *ection 5; of 'ct +o. ";74 categoricall& mandated that disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marsh& lands ;shall "e disposed of to private parties "y lease only and not other,ise.; /he )overnor()eneral, %efore allowing the lease of these lands to private parties, must formall& declare that the lands were .not necessar& for the pu%lic service.. 'ct +o. ";74 reiterated the *tate polic& to lease and not to sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marsh& lands of the pu%lic domain, a polic& first enunciated in 19#7 in 'ct +o. 1,54. )overnment reclaimed, foreshore and marsh& lands remained s$i generis, as the onl& aliena%le or disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain that the government could not sell to private parties. /he rationale %ehind this *tate polic& is o%vious. )overnment reclaimed, foreshore and marsh& pu%lic lands for non(agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for pu%lic service. /his is the reason the government prohi%ited the sale, and onl& allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. /he *tate alwa&s reserved these lands for some future pu%lic service. 'ct +o. ";74 did not authori4e the reclassification of government reclaimed, foreshore and marsh& lands into other non(agricultural lands under *ection 5, 7d8. 2ands falling under *ection 5, 7d8 were the onl& lands for non(agricultural purposes the government could sell to private parties. /hus, under 'ct +o. ";74, the government could not sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marsh& lands to private parties+ $nless the legislat$re passed a la, allo,ing their sale.49 'ct +o. ";74 did not prohi%it private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant to *ection 5 of the *panish 2aw of Baters of

1;,,. 2ands reclaimed from the sea %& private parties with government permission remained private lands. Dispositions $nder the <>03 Constit$tion $n !a& 14, 19-5, the 19-5 Constitution too: effect upon its ratification %& the 1ilipino people. /he 19-5 Constitution, in adopting the Regalian doctrine, declared in *ection 1, 'rticle X666, that H .*ection 1. 'll agricultural, tim%er, and mineral lands of the pu%lic domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energ& and other natural resources of the Philippines %elong to the *tate, and their disposition, eDploitation, development, or utili4ation shall %e limited to citi4ens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least siDt& per centum of the capital of which is owned %& such citi4ens, su%9ect to an& eDisting right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the )overnment esta%lished under this Constitution. .at$ral reso$rces+ ,ith the e!ception of p$"lic agric$lt$ral land+ shall not "e alienated , and no license, concession, or lease for the eDploitation, development, or utili4ation of an& of the natural resources shall %e granted for a period eDceeding twent&(five &ears, renewa%le for another twent&(five &ears, eDcept as to water rights for irrigation, water suppl&, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases %eneficial use ma& %e the measure and limit of the grant.. 7Amphasis supplied8 /he 19-5 Constitution %arred the alienation of all natural resources eDcept pu%lic agricultural lands, which were the onl& natural resources the *tate could alienate. /hus, foreshore lands, considered part of the *tateRs natural resources, %ecame inaliena%le %& constitutional fiat, availa%le onl& for lease for "5 &ears, renewa%le for another "5 &ears. /he government could alienate foreshore lands onl& after these lands were reclaimed and classified as aliena%le agricultural lands of the pu%lic domain. )overnment reclaimed and marsh& lands of the pu%lic domain, %eing neither tim%er nor mineral lands, fell under the classification of pu%lic agricultural lands. 5# >owever, government reclaimed and marsh& lands, although su%9ect to classification as disposa%le pu%lic agricultural lands, could onl& %e leased and not sold to private parties %ecause of 'ct +o. ";74. /he prohi%ition on private parties from acEuiring ownership of government reclaimed and marsh& lands of the pu%lic domain was onl& a statutor& prohi%ition and the legislature could therefore remove such prohi%ition. /he 19-5 Constitution did not prohi%it individuals and corporations from acEuiring government reclaimed and marsh& lands of the pu%lic domain that were classified as agricultural lands under eDisting pu%lic land laws. *ection ", 'rticle X666 of the 19-5 Constitution provided as follows0 .*ection ". .o private corporation or association may ac&$ire+ lease+ or hold p$"lic agric$lt$ral lands in e!cess of one tho$sand and t,enty fo$r hectares+ nor may any individ$al ac&$ire s$ch lands "y p$rchase in e!cess of one h$ndred and forty hectares+ or "y lease in e!cess of one tho$sand and t,enty(fo$r hectares , or %& homestead in eDcess of twent&(four hectares. 2ands adapted to gra4ing, not eDceeding two thousand hectares, ma& %e leased to an individual, private corporation, or association.. 7Amphasis supplied8 *till, after the effectivit& of the 19-5 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal *ection 5; of 'ct +o. ";74 to open for sale to private parties government reclaimed and marsh& lands of the pu%lic domain. $n the contrar&, the legislature continued the long esta%lished *tate polic& of retaining for the government title and ownership of government reclaimed and marsh& lands of the pu%lic domain. Common,ealth Act .o. <?< of the Philippine .ational Assem"ly $n +ovem%er 7, 19-,, the +ational 'ssem%l& approved Commonwealth 'ct +o. 141, also :nown as the Pu%lic 2and 'ct, which compiled the then eDisting laws on lands of the pu%lic domain. C' +o. 141, as amended, remains to this da& the e!isting general la, governing the classification and disposition of lands of the pu%lic domain other than tim%er and mineral lands.51 *ection , of C' +o. 141 empowers the President to classif& lands of the pu%lic domain into .aliena%le or disposa%le. 5" lands of the pu%lic domain, which prior to such classification are inaliena%le and outside the commerce of man. *ection 7 of C' +o. 141 authori4es the President to .declare what lands are open to disposition or concession.. *ection ; of C' +o. 141 states that the government can declare open for disposition or concession onl& lands that are .officiall& delimited and classified.. *ections ,, 7 and ; of C' +o. 141 read as follows0 .*ec. ,. 5he President+ $pon the recommendation of the 6ecretary of Agric$lt$re and Commerce+ shall from time to time classify the lands of the p$"lic domain into H AaB Aliena"le or disposa"le, 7%8 /im%er, and 7c8 !ineral lands, and ma& at an& time and in li:e manner transfer such lands from one class to another,5- for the purpose of their administration and disposition. *ec. 7. 1or the purposes of the administration and disposition of aliena%le or disposa%le pu%lic lands, the President+ $pon recommendation "y the 6ecretary of Agric$lt$re and Commerce+ shall from time to time declare ,hat lands are open to disposition or concession under this 'ct. *ec. ;. Only those lands shall "e declared open to disposition or concession ,hich have "een officially delimited and classified and, when practica%le, surve&ed, and ,hich have not "een reserved for p$"lic or &$asi(p$"lic $ses , nor appropriated %& the )overnment, nor in an& manner %ecome private propert&, nor those on which a private right authori4ed and recogni4ed %& this 'ct or an& other valid law ma& %e claimed, or which, having %een reserved or appropriated, have ceased to %e so. D D D.. /hus, %efore the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the pu%lic domain, the President must first officiall& classif& these lands as aliena%le or disposa%le, and then declare them open to disposition or concession. /here must %e no law reserving these lands for pu%lic or Euasi(pu%lic uses. /he salient provisions of C' +o. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and marsh& lands of the pu%lic domain, are as follows0 .*ec. 5;. Any tract of land of the p$"lic domain ,hich+ "eing neither tim"er nor mineral land+ is intended to "e $sed for residential p$rposes or for commercial+ ind$strial+ or other prod$ctive p$rposes other than agric$lt$ral+ and is

open to disposition or concession+ shall "e disposed of $nder the provisions of this chapter and not other,ise . *ec. 59. 5he lands disposa"le $nder this title shall "e classified as follo,s 0 AaB *ands reclaimed "y the /overnment "y dredging+ filling+ or other meansC A"B 'oreshoreC AcB Marshy lands or lands covered with water %ordering upon the shores or %an:s of naviga%le la:es or rivers? 7d8 2ands not included in an& of the foregoing classes. *ec. ,#. 'n& tract of land comprised under this title ma& %e leased or sold, as the case ma& %e, to an& person, corporation, or association authori4ed to purchase or lease pu%lic lands for agricultural purposes. D D D. *ec. ,1. 5he lands comprised in classes AaB+ A"B+ and AcB of section fifty(nine shall "e disposed of to private parties "y lease only and not other,ise , as soon as the President, upon recommendation %& the *ecretar& of 'griculture, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the p$"lic service and are open to disposition under this chapter. 5he lands incl$ded in class AdB may "e disposed of "y sale or lease $nder the provisions of this Act. . 7Amphasis supplied8 *ection ,1 of C' +o. 141 readopted, after the effectivit& of the 19-5 Constitution, *ection 5; of 'ct +o. ";74 prohi%iting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marsh& disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain. 'll these lands are intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other non(agricultural purposes. 's %efore, *ection ,1 allowed onl& the lease of such lands to private parties. /he government could sell to private parties onl& lands falling under *ection 59 7d8 of C' +o. 141, or those lands for non(agricultural purposes not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marsh& disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain. 1oreshore lands, however, %ecame inaliena%le under the 19-5 Constitution which onl& allowed the lease of these lands to Eualified private parties. *ection 5; of C' +o. 141 eDpressl& states that disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than agricultural .shall "e disposed of $nder the provisions of this chapter and not other,ise .. Gnder *ection 1# of C' +o. 141, the term .disposition. includes lease of the land. 'n& disposition of government reclaimed, foreshore and marsh& disposa%le lands for non(agricultural purposes must compl& with Chapter 6X, /itle 666 of C' +o. 141, 54 unless a su%seEuent law amended or repealed these provisions. 6n his concurring opinion in the landmar: case of Rep$"lic Real state Corporation v. Co$rt of Appeals ,55 @ustice Re&nato *. Puno summari4ed succinctl& the law on this matter, as follows0 .1oreshore lands are lands of pu%lic dominion intended for pu%lic use. *o too are lands reclaimed %& the government %& dredging, filling, or other means. 'ct 1,54 mandated that the control and disposition of the foreshore and lands under water remained in the national government. *aid law allowed onl& the RleasingR of reclaimed land. /he Pu%lic 2and 'cts of 1919 and 19-, also declared that the foreshore and lands reclaimed %& the government were to %e .disposed of to private parties %& lease onl& and not otherwise.. Before leasing, however, the )overnor()eneral, upon recommendation of the *ecretar& of 'griculture and +atural Resources, had first to determine that the land reclaimed was not necessar& for the pu%lic service. /his reEuisite must have %een met %efore the land could %e disposed of. 4$t even then+ the foreshore and lands $nder ,ater ,ere not to "e alienated and sold to private parties. 5he disposition of the reclaimed land ,as only "y lease. 5he land remained property of the 6tate.. 7Amphasis supplied8 's o%served %& @ustice Puno in his concurring opinion, .Commonwealth 'ct +o. 141 has remained in effect at present.. /he *tate polic& prohi%iting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed, foreshore and marsh& aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain, first implemented in 19#7 was thus reaffirmed in C' +o. 141 after the 19-5 Constitution too: effect. /he prohi%ition on the sale of foreshore lands, however, %ecame a constitutional edict under the 19-5 Constitution. 1oreshore lands %ecame inaliena%le as natural resources of the *tate, unless reclaimed %& the government and classified as agricultural lands of the pu%lic domain, in which case the& would fall under the classification of government reclaimed lands. 'fter the effectivit& of the 19-5 Constitution, government reclaimed and marsh& disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain continued to %e onl& leased and not sold to private parties.5, /hese lands remained s$i generis, as the onl& aliena%le or disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain the government could not sell to private parties. *ince then and until now, the onl& wa& the government can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marsh& disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain is for the legislature to pass a law authori4ing such sale. C' +o. 141 does not authori4e the President to reclassif& government reclaimed and marsh& lands into other non(agricultural lands under *ection 59 7d8. 2ands classified under *ection 59 7d8 are the onl& aliena%le or disposa%le lands for non(agricultural purposes that the government could sell to private parties. !oreover, *ection ,# of C' +o. 141 e!pressly reEuires congressional authorit& %efore lands under *ection 59 that the government previousl& transferred to government units or entities could %e sold to private parties. *ection ,# of C' +o. 141 declares that H .*ec. ,#. D D D /he area so leased or sold shall %e such as shall, in the 9udgment of the *ecretar& of 'griculture and +atural Resources, %e reasona%l& necessar& for the purposes for which such sale or lease is reEuested, and shall not eDceed one hundred and fort&(four hectares0 Provided, however, /hat this limitation shall not appl& to grants, donations, or transfers made to a province, municipalit& or %ranch or su%division of the )overnment for the purposes deemed %& said entities conducive to the pu%lic interest? "$t the land so granted+ donated+ or transferred to a province+ m$nicipality or "ranch or s$"division of the /overnment shall not "e alienated+ enc$m"ered+ or other,ise disposed of in a manner affecting its title+ e!cept ,hen a$thori7ed "y Congress0 D D D.. 7Amphasis supplied8 /he congressional authorit& reEuired in *ection ,# of C' +o. 141 mirrors the legislative authorit& reEuired in *ection 5, of 'ct +o. ";74. $ne reason for the congressional authorit& is that *ection ,# of C' +o. 141 eDempted government units and entities from the maDimum area of pu%lic lands that could %e acEuired from the *tate. /hese government units and entities should not 9ust turn around and sell these lands to private parties in violation of constitutional or statutor& limitations. $therwise, the transfer of lands for non(agricultural purposes to government units and entities could %e used to circumvent constitutional limitations on ownership of aliena%le or disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain. 6n the same manner, such transfers could also %e used to evade the statutor& prohi%ition in C'

+o. 141 on the sale of government reclaimed and marsh& lands of the pu%lic domain to private parties. *ection ,# of C' +o. 141 constitutes %& operation of law a lien on these lands.57 6n case of sale or lease of disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain falling under *ection 59 of C' +o. 141, *ections ,- and ,7 reEuire a pu%lic %idding. *ections ,- and ,7 of C' +o. 141 provide as follows0 .*ec. ,-. Bhenever it is decided that lands covered %& this chapter are not needed for pu%lic purposes, the irector of 2ands shall as: the *ecretar& of 'griculture and Commerce 7now the *ecretar& of +atural Resources8 for authorit& to dispose of the same. Gpon receipt of such authorit&, the irector of 2ands shall give notice %& pu%lic advertisement in the same manner as in the case of leases or sales of agricultural pu%lic land, D D D. *ec. ,7. 5he lease or sale shall "e made "y oral "iddingC and ad%$dication shall "e made to the highest "idder . D D D.. 7Amphasis supplied8 /hus, C' +o. 141 mandates the )overnment to put to pu%lic auction all leases or sales of aliena%le or disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain.5; 2i:e 'ct +o. 1,54 and 'ct +o. ";74 %efore it, C' +o. 141 did not repeal *ection 5 of the *panish 2aw of Baters of 1;,,. Private parties could still reclaim portions of the sea with government permission. >owever, the reclaimed land co$ld "ecome private land only if classified as aliena"le agric$lt$ral land of the p$"lic domain open to disposition under C' +o. 141. /he 19-5 Constitution prohi%ited the alienation of all natural resources eDcept pu%lic agricultural lands. 5he Civil Code of <>3D /he Civil Code of 195# readopted su%stantiall& the definition of propert& of pu%lic dominion found in the Civil Code of 1;;9. 'rticles 4"# and 4"" of the Civil Code of 195# state that H .'rt. 4"#. /he following things are propert& of pu%lic dominion0 718 /hose intended for pu%lic use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and %ridges constructed %& the *tate, %an:s, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character? 7"8 /hose which %elong to the *tate, without %eing for pu%lic use, and are intended for some pu%lic service or for the development of the national wealth. D D D. 'rt. 4"". Propert& of pu%lic dominion, when no longer intended for pu%lic use or for pu%lic service, shall form part of the patrimonial propert& of the *tate.. 'gain, the government must formall& declare that the propert& of pu%lic dominion is no longer needed for pu%lic use or pu%lic service, %efore the same could %e classified as patrimonial propert& of the *tate. 59 6n the case of government reclaimed and marsh& lands of the pu%lic domain, the declaration of their %eing disposa%le, as well as the manner of their disposition, is governed %& the applica%le provisions of C' +o. 141. 2i:e the Civil Code of 1;;9, the Civil Code of 195# included as propert& of pu%lic dominion those properties of the *tate which, without %eing for pu%lic use, are intended for pu%lic service or the . development of the national ,ealth .. /hus, government reclaimed and marsh& lands of the *tate, even if not emplo&ed for pu%lic use or pu%lic service, if developed to enhance the national wealth, are classified as propert& of pu%lic dominion. Dispositions $nder the <>20 Constit$tion /he 197- Constitution, which too: effect on @anuar& 17, 197-, li:ewise adopted the Regalian doctrine. *ection ;, 'rticle X6= of the 197- Constitution stated that H .*ec. ;. 'll lands of the pu%lic domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energ&, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines %elong to the *tate. #ith the e!ception of agric$lt$ral+ ind$strial or commercial+ residential+ and resettlement lands of the p$"lic domain+ nat$ral reso$rces shall not "e alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the eDploration, development, eDploitation, or utili4ation of an& of the natural resources shall %e granted for a period eDceeding twent&(five &ears, renewa%le for not more than twent&(five &ears, eDcept as to water rights for irrigation, water suppl&, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases, %eneficial use ma& %e the measure and the limit of the grant.. 7Amphasis supplied8 /he 197- Constitution prohi%ited the alienation of all natural resources with the eDception of .agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the pu%lic domain.. 6n contrast, the 19-5 Constitution %arred the alienation of all natural resources eDcept .pu%lic agricultural lands.. >owever, the term .pu%lic agricultural lands. in the 19-5 Constitution encompassed industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the pu%lic domain. ,# 6f the land of pu%lic domain were neither tim%er nor mineral land, it would fall under the classification of agricultural land of the pu%lic domain. 4oth the <>03 and <>20 Constit$tions+ therefore+ prohi"ited the alienation of all nat$ral reso$rces e!cept agric$lt$ral lands of the p$"lic domain . /he 197- Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the pu%lic domain to individuals who were citi4ens of the Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholl& owned %& Philippine citi4ens, were no longer allowed to acEuire aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain unli:e in the 19-5 Constitution. *ection 11, 'rticle X6= of the 197- Constitution declared that H .*ec. 11. /he Batasang Pam%ansa, ta:ing into account conservation, ecological, and development reEuirements of the natural resources, shall determine %& law the si4e of land of the pu%lic domain which ma& %e developed, held or acEuired %&, or leased to, an& Eualified individual, corporation, or association, and the conditions therefor. .o private corporation or association may hold aliena"le lands of the p$"lic domain e!cept "y lease not to eDceed one thousand hectares in area nor ma& an& citi4en hold such lands %& lease in eDcess of five hundred hectares or acEuire %& purchase, homestead or grant, in eDcess of twent&(four hectares. +o private corporation or association ma& hold %& lease, concession, license or permit, tim%er or forest lands and other tim%er or forest resources in eDcess of one hundred thousand hectares. >owever, such area ma& %e increased %& the Batasang Pam%ansa upon recommendation of the +ational Aconomic and evelopment 'uthorit&..

7Amphasis supplied8 /hus, under the 197- Constitution, private corporations could hold aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain onl& through lease. $nl& individuals could now acEuire aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain, and private corporations "ecame a"sol$tely "arred from ac&$iring any -ind of aliena"le land of the p$"lic domain . /he constitutional %an eDtended to all :inds of aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain, while the statutor& %an under C' +o. 141 applied onl& to government reclaimed, foreshore and marsh& aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain. PD .o. <D=? Creating the P$"lic states A$thority $n 1e%ruar& 4, 1977, then President 1erdinand !arcos issued Presidential ecree +o. 1#;4 creating PA', a wholl& government owned and controlled corporation with a special charter. *ections 4 and ; of P +o. 1#;4, vests PA' with the following purposes and powers0 .*ec. 4. Purpose. /he 'uthorit& is here%& created for the following purposes0 7a8 5o reclaim land+ incl$ding foreshore and s$"merged areas+ "y dredging+ filling or other means+ or to ac&$ire reclaimed landC 7%8 /o develop, improve, acEuire, administer, deal in, su%divide, dispose, lease and sell any and all -inds of lands , %uildings, estates and other forms of real propert&, owned, managed, controlled andKor operated %& the government? 7c8 /o provide for, operate or administer such service as ma& %e necessar& for the efficient, economical and %eneficial utili4ation of the a%ove properties. *ec. 5. Powers and functions of the 'uthorit&. /he 'uthorit& shall, in carr&ing out the purposes for which it is created, have the following powers and functions0 7a8/o prescri%e its %&(laws. DDD 7i8 5o hold lands of the p$"lic domain in eDcess of the area permitted to private corporations %& statute. 798 5o reclaim lands and to construct wor: across, or otherwise, an& stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume D D D. DDD 7o8 /o perform such acts and eDercise such functions as ma& %e necessar& for the attainment of the purposes and o%9ectives herein specified.. 7Amphasis supplied8 P +o. 1#;4 authori4es PA' to reclaim %oth foreshore and su%merged areas of the pu%lic domain. 1oreshore areas are those covered and uncovered %& the e%% and flow of the tide. ,1 *u%merged areas are those permanentl& under water regardless of the e%% and flow of the tide.," 1oreshore and su%merged areas indisputa%l& %elong to the pu%lic domain ,- and are inaliena%le unless reclaimed, classified as aliena%le lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for pu%lic service. /he %an in the 197- Constitution on private corporations from acEuiring aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain did not appl& to PA' since it was then, and until toda&, a full& owned government corporation. /he constitutional %an applied then, as it still applies now, onl& to .private corporations and associations.. P +o. 1#;4 eDpressl& empowers P A ;to hold lands of the p$"lic domain . even .in eDcess of the area permitted to private corporations %& statute.. 5h$s+ P A can hold title to private lands+ as ,ell as title to lands of the p$"lic domain. 6n order for PA' to sell its reclaimed foreshore and su%merged aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain, there must %e legislative authorit& empowering PA' to sell these lands. /his legislative authorit& is necessar& in view of *ection ,# of C' +o.141, which states H .*ec. ,#. D D D? %ut the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province, municipalit&, or %ranch or su%division of the )overnment shall not %e alienated, encum%ered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, e!cept ,hen a$thori7ed "y Congress? D D D.. 7Amphasis supplied8 Bithout such legislative authorit&, PA' could not sell %ut onl& lease its reclaimed foreshore and su%merged aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain. +evertheless, an& legislative authorit& granted to PA' to sell its reclaimed aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain would %e su%9ect to the constitutional %an on private corporations from acEuiring aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain. >ence, such legislative authorit& could onl& %enefit private individuals. Dispositions $nder the <>=2 Constit$tion /he 19;7 Constitution, li:e the 19-5 and 197- Constitutions %efore it, has adopted the Regalian doctrine. /he 19;7 Constitution declares that all natural resources are .o,ned "y the 6tate,. and eDcept for aliena%le agricultural lands of the pu%lic domain, natural resources cannot %e alienated. *ections " and -, 'rticle X66 of the 19;7 Constitution state that H .*ection ". 'll lands of the pu%lic domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energ&, fisheries, forests or tim%er, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural reso$rces are o,ned "y the 6tate. #ith the e!ception of agric$lt$ral lands+ all other nat$ral reso$rces shall not "e alienated . /he eDploration, development, and utili4ation of natural resources shall %e under the full control and supervision of the *tate. D D D. *ection -. 2ands of the pu%lic domain are classified into agricultural, forest or tim%er, mineral lands, and national par:s. 'gricultural lands of the pu%lic domain ma& %e further classified %& law according to the uses which the& ma& %e devoted. Aliena"le lands of the p$"lic domain shall "e limited to agric$lt$ral lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold s$ch aliena"le lands of the p$"lic domain e!cept "y lease+ for a period not e!ceeding t,enty(five years+ rene,a"le for not more than t,enty(five years+ and not to e!ceed one tho$sand hectares in area . Citi4ens of the Philippines ma& lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acEuire not more than twelve hectares thereof %& purchase, homestead, or grant. /a:ing into account the reEuirements of conservation, ecolog&, and development, and su%9ect to the reEuirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, %& law, the si4e of lands of the pu%lic domain which ma& %e acEuired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.. 7Amphasis supplied8

/he 19;7 Constitution continues the *tate polic& in the 197- Constitution %anning private corporations from ac&$iring any -ind of aliena"le land of the p$"lic domain. 2i:e the 197- Constitution, the 19;7 Constitution allows private corporations to hold aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain only thro$gh lease. 's in the 19-5 and 197- Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marsh& aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain is still C' +o. 141. 5he Rationale "ehind the Constit$tional 4an /he rationale %ehind the constitutional %an on corporations from acEuiring, eDcept through lease, aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain is not well understood. uring the deli%erations of the 19;, Constitutional Commission, the commissioners pro%ed the rationale %ehind this %an, thus0 .1R. BAR+'*0 !r. =ice(President, m& Euestions have reference to page -, line 5 which sa&s0 T+o private corporation or association ma& hold aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain eDcept %& lease, not to eDceed one thousand hectares in area.R 6f we recall, this provision did not eDist under the 19-5 Constitution, %ut this was introduced in the 197- Constitution. 6n effect, it prohi%its private corporations from acEuiring aliena%le pu%lic lands. 4$t it has not "een very clear in %$rispr$dence ,hat the reason for this is. 6n some of the cases decided in 19;" and 19;-, it ,as indicated that the p$rpose of this is to prevent large landholdings. 6s that the intent of this provisionP !R. =622A)'*0 6 thin: that is the spirit of the provision. 1R. BAR+'*0 6n eDisting decisions involving the 6glesia ni Cristo, there were instances where the 6glesia ni Cristo was not allowed to acEuire a mere -1-(sEuare meter land where a chapel stood %ecause the *upreme Court said it would %e in violation of this.. 7Amphasis supplied8 6n Ayog v. C$si,,4 the Court eDplained the rationale %ehind this constitutional %an in this wa&0 .6ndeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohi%ition against purchases of pu%lic agricultural lands %& private corporations is to eEuita%l& diffuse land ownership or to encourage Rowner(cultivatorship and the economic famil&(si4e farmR and to prevent a recurrence of cases li:e the instant case. >uge landholdings %& corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest.. >owever, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have simpl& limited the si4e of aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain that corporations could acEuire. /he Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could acEuire not more than "4 hectares of aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain under the 197- Constitution, and not more than 1" hectares under the 19;7 Constitution. 6f the constitutional intent is to encourage economic famil&(si4e farms, placing the land in the name of a corporation would %e more effective in preventing the %rea:(up of farmlands. 6f the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of su%divided parcels of the farmland. /his would prevent the continuing %rea:(up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the neDt. 6n actual practice, the constitutional %an strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from acEuiring more than the allowed area of aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain. Bithout the constitutional %an, individuals who alread& acEuired the maDimum area of aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain could easil& set up corporations to acEuire more aliena%le pu%lic lands. 'n individual could own as man& corporations as his means would allow him. 'n individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation %& putting his nominees as stoc:holders of the corporation. /he corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acEuisition %& individuals of aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain. /he constitutional intent, under the 197- and 19;7 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of onl& a limited area of aliena%le land of the pu%lic domain to a Eualified individual. /his constitutional intent is safeguarded %& the provision prohi%iting corporations from acEuiring aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. /he availa%le aliena%le pu%lic lands are graduall& decreasing in the face of an ever(growing population. /he most effective wa& to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain onl& to individuals. /his, it would seem, is the practical %enefit arising from the constitutional %an. 5he Amended Joint 8ent$re Agreement /he su%9ect matter of the 'mended @=', as stated in its second Bhereas clause, consists of three properties, namel&0 1. .I/Jhree partiall& reclaimed and su%stantiall& eroded islands along Amilio 'guinaldo Boulevard in ParanaEue and 2as Pinas, !etro !anila, with a com%ined titled area of 1,57;,441 sEuare meters?. ". .I'Jnother area of ",4"1,559 sEuare meters contiguous to the three islands?. and -. .I'Jt '!'R6Rs option as approved %& PA', an additional -5# hectares more or less to regulari4e the configuration of the reclaimed area..,5 PA' confirms that the 'mended @=' involves .the development of the 1reedom 6slands and further reclamation of a%out "5# hectares D D D,. plus an option .granted to '!'R6 to su%seEuentl& reclaim another -5# hectares D D D..,, 6n short, the 'mended @=' covers a reclamation area of 75# hectares. Only <32.=? hectares of the 23D(hectare reclamation pro%ect have "een reclaimed+ and the rest of the 3>@.<3 hectares are still s$"merged areas forming part of Manila 4ay . Gnder the 'mended @=', '!'R6 will reim%urse PA' the sum of P1,;94,1"9,"##.## for PA'Rs .actual cost. in partiall& reclaiming the 1reedom 6slands. '!'R6 will also complete, at its own eDpense, the reclamation of the 1reedom 6slands. '!'R6 will further shoulder all the reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling 59".15 hectares, still to %e reclaimed. '!'R6 and PA' will share, in the proportion of 7# percent and -# percent, respectivel&, the total net usa%le area which is defined in the 'mended @=' as the total reclaimed area less -# percent earmar:ed for common areas. /itle to '!'R6Rs share in the net usa%le area, totaling -,7.5 hectares, will %e issued in the name of '!'R6. *ection 5." 7c8 of the 'mended @=' provides that H .D D D, PA' shall have the dut& to eDecute without dela& the necessar& deed of transfer or conve&ance of the title pertaining to '!'R6Rs 2and share %ased on the 2and 'llocation Plan. P A+ ,hen re&$ested in ,riting "y AMAR)+ shall then ca$se the

iss$ance and delivery of the proper certificates of title covering AMAR)9s *and 6hare in the name of AMAR) , D D D? provided, that if more than sevent& percent 77#S8 of the titled area at an& given time pertains to '!'R6, PA' shall deliver to '!'R6 onl& sevent& percent 77#S8 of the titles pertaining to '!'R6, until such time when a corresponding proportionate area of additional land pertaining to PA' has %een titled.. 7Amphasis supplied8 )ndisp$ta"ly+ $nder the Amended J8A AMAR) ,ill ac&$ire and o,n a ma!im$m of 012.3 hectares of reclaimed land ,hich ,ill "e titled in its name. /o implement the 'mended @=', PA' delegated to the unincorporated PA'('!'R6 9oint venture PA'Rs statutor& authorit&, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and su%merged areas in !anila Ba&. *ection -.".a of the 'mended @=' states that H .PA' here%& contri%utes to the 9oint venture its rights and privileges to perform Rawland Reclamation and >ori4ontal evelopment as well as own the Reclamation 'rea, there%& granting the @oint =enture the full and eDclusive right, authorit& and privilege to underta:e the Pro9ect in accordance with the !aster evelopment Plan.. /he 'mended @=' is the product of a renegotiation of the original @=' dated 'pril "5, 1995 and its supplemental agreement dated 'ugust 9, 1995. 5he 5hreshold )ss$e /he threshold issue is whether '!'R6, a private corporation, can acEuire and own under the 'mended @=' -,7.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and su%merged areas in !anila Ba& in view of *ections " and -, 'rticle X66 of the 19;7 Constitution which state that0 .*ection ". 'll lands of the pu%lic domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energ&, fisheries, forests or tim%er, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned %& the *tate. #ith the e!ception of agric$lt$ral lands+ all other nat$ral reso$rces shall not "e alienated . D D D. DDD *ection -. D D D 'liena%le lands of the pu%lic domain shall %e limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold s$ch aliena"le lands of the p$"lic domain e!cept "y lease , D D D..7Amphasis supplied8 Classification of Reclaimed 'oreshore and 6$"merged Areas PA' readil& concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or su%merged areas of !anila Ba& are aliena%le or disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain. 6n its !emorandum,,7 PA' admits that H .Gnder the Pu%lic 2and 'ct 7C' 141, as amended8, reclaimed lands are classified as aliena"le and disposa"le lands of the p$"lic domain0 R*ec. 59. /he lands disposa%le under this title shall %e classified as follows0 7a8 2ands reclaimed %& the government %& dredging, filling, or other means? D D D.R. 7Amphasis supplied8 2i:ewise, the 2egal /as: 1orce,; constituted under Presidential 'dministrative $rder +o. -,5 admitted in its Report and Recommendation to then President 1idel =. Ramos, ;ERFeclaimed lands are classified as aliena"le and disposa"le lands of the p$"lic domain..,9 /he 2egal /as: 1orce concluded that H . . Conclusion Reclaimed lands are lands of the pu%lic domain. >owever, %& statutor& authorit&, the rights of ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands have %een transferred to PA', %& virtue of which PA', as owner, ma& validl& conve& the same to an& Eualified person without violating the Constitution or an& statute. /he constitutional provision prohi%iting private corporations from holding pu%lic land, eDcept %& lease 7*ec. -, 'rt. X=66, 7# 19;7 Constitution8, does not appl& to reclaimed lands whose ownership has passed on to PA' %& statutor& grant.. Gnder *ection ", 'rticle X66 of the 19;7 Constitution, the foreshore and su%merged areas of !anila Ba& are part of the .lands of the pu%lic domain, waters D D D and other natural resources. and conseEuentl& .owned %& the *tate.. 's such, foreshore and su%merged areas .shall not %e alienated,. unless the& are classified as .agricultural lands. of the pu%lic domain. /he mere reclamation of these areas %& PA' does not convert these inaliena%le natural resources of the *tate into aliena%le or disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain. /here must %e a law or presidential proclamation officiall& classif&ing these reclaimed lands as aliena%le or disposa%le and open to disposition or concession. !oreover, these reclaimed lands cannot %e classified as aliena%le or disposa%le if the law has reserved them for some pu%lic or Euasi(pu%lic use.71 *ection ; of C' +o. 141 provides that .onl& those lands shall %e declared open to disposition or concession which have %een officially delimited and classified..7" /he President has the authorit& to classif& inaliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain into aliena%le or disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain, pursuant to *ection , of C' +o. 141. 6n 2aurel vs. )arcia, 7- the ADecutive epartment attempted to sell the Roppongi propert& in /o:&o, @apan, which was acEuired %& the Philippine )overnment for use as the Chancer& of the Philippine Am%ass&. 'lthough the Chancer& had transferred to another location thirteen &ears earlier, the Court still ruled that, under 'rticle 4""74 of the Civil Code, a propert& of pu%lic dominion retains such character until formall& declared otherwise. /he Court ruled that H ./he fact that the Roppongi site has not %een used for a long time for actual Am%ass& service does not automaticall& convert it to patrimonial propert&. 'n& such conversion happens onl& if the propert& is withdrawn from pu%lic use 7Ce%u $D&gen and 'cet&lene Co. v. Bercilles, ,, *CR' 4;1 I1975J. A property contin$es to "e part of the p$"lic domain+ not availa"le for private appropriation or o,nership 9$ntil there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to ,ithdra, it from "eing s$ch9 76gnacio v. irector of 2ands, 1#; Phil. --5 I19,#J.. 7Amphasis supplied8 P +o. 1#;5, issued on 1e%ruar& 4, 1977, authori4ed the issuance of special land patents for lands reclaimed %& PA' from the foreshore or su%merged areas of !anila Ba&. $n @anuar& 19, 19;; then President Cora4on C. 'Euino issued *pecial Patent +o. -517

in the name of PA' for the 157.;4 hectares comprising the partiall& reclaimed 1reedom 6slands. *u%seEuentl&, on 'pril 9, 1999 the Register of eeds of the !unicipalit& of ParanaEue issued /C/ +os. 7-#9, 7-11 and 7-1" in the name of PA' pursuant to *ection 1#of P +o. 15"9 authori4ing the issuance of certificates of title corresponding to land patents. /o this da&, these certificates of title are still in the name of PA'. P +o. 1#;5, coupled with President 'EuinoRs act$al iss$ance of a special patent covering the 1reedom 6slands, is eEuivalent to an official proclamation classif&ing the 1reedom 6slands as aliena%le or disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain. P +o. 1#;5 and President 'EuinoRs issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the 1reedom 6slands are no longer needed for pu%lic service. 5he 'reedom )slands are th$s aliena"le or disposa"le lands of the p$"lic domain+ open to disposition or concession to &$alified parties. 't the time then President 'Euino issued *pecial Patent +o. -517, PA' had alread& reclaimed the 1reedom 6slands although su%seEuentl& there were partial erosions on some areas. /he government had also completed the necessar& surve&s on these islands. /hus, the 1reedom 6slands were no longer part of !anila Ba& %ut part of the land mass. *ection -, 'rticle X66 of the 19;7 Constitution classifies lands of the pu%lic domain into .agricultural, forest or tim%er, mineral lands, and national par:s.. Being neither tim%er, mineral, nor national par: lands, the reclaimed 1reedom 6slands necessaril& fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the pu%lic domain. Gnder the 19;7 Constitution, agricultural lands of the pu%lic domain are the onl& natural resources that the *tate ma& alienate to Eualified private parties. 'll other natural resources, such as the seas or %a&s, are .waters D D D owned %& the *tate. forming part of the pu%lic domain, and are inaliena%le pursuant to *ection ", 'rticle X66 of the 19;7 Constitution. '!'R6 claims that the 1reedom 6slands are private lands %ecause C CP, then a private corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract dated +ovem%er "#, 197- with the Commissioner of Pu%lic >ighwa&s. '!'R6, citing 'rticle 5 of the *panish 2aw of Baters of 1;,,, argues that .if the ownership of reclaimed lands ma& %e given to the part& constructing the wor:s, then it cannot %e said that reclaimed lands are lands of the pu%lic domain which the *tate ma& not alienate.. 75 'rticle 5 of the *panish 2aw of Baters reads as follows0 .'rticle 5. 2ands reclaimed from the sea in conseEuence of wor:s constructed %& the *tate, or %& the provinces, pue%los or private persons, 2it$ proper permission, shall %ecome the propert& of the part& constructing such wor:s, $nless other,ise provided "y the terms of the grant of a$thority .. 7Amphasis supplied8 Gnder 'rticle 5 of the *panish 2aw of Baters of 1;,,, private parties could reclaim from the sea onl& with .proper permission. from the *tate. Private parties could own the reclaimed land onl& if not .otherwise provided %& the terms of the grant of authorit&.. /his clearl& meant that no one could reclaim from the sea without permission from the *tate %ecause the sea is propert& of pu%lic dominion. 6t also meant that the *tate could grant or withhold ownership of the reclaimed land %ecause an& reclaimed land, li:e the sea from which it emerged, %elonged to the *tate. /hus, a private person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the *tate could not acEuire ownership of the reclaimed land which would remain propert& of pu%lic dominion li:e the sea it replaced. 7, 'rticle 5 of the *panish 2aw of Baters of 1;,, adopted the time(honored principle of land ownership that .all lands that were not acEuired from the government, either %& purchase or %& grant, %elong to the pu%lic domain..77 'rticle 5 of the *panish 2aw of Baters must %e read together with laws su%seEuentl& enacted on the disposition of pu%lic lands. 6n particular, C' +o. 141 reEuires that lands of the pu%lic domain must first %e classified as aliena%le or disposa%le %efore the government can alienate them. /hese lands must not %e reserved for pu%lic or Euasi(pu%lic purposes. 7; !oreover, the contract %etween C CP and the government was eDecuted after the effectivit& of the 197- Constitution which %arred private corporations from acEuiring an& :ind of aliena%le land of the pu%lic domain. /his contract could not have converted the 1reedom 6slands into private lands of a private corporation. Presidential ecree +o. -(', issued on @anuar& 11, 197-, revo:ed all laws authori4ing the reclamation of areas under water and revested solel& in the +ational )overnment the power to reclaim lands. *ection 1 of P +o. -(' declared that H .5he provisions of any la, to the contrary not,ithstanding , the reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall %e limited to the .ational /overnment or any person a$thori7ed "y it $nder a proper contract . 7Amphasis supplied8 D D D.. P +o. -(' repealed *ection 5 of the *panish 2aw of Baters of 1;,, %ecause reclamation of areas under water could now %e underta:en onl& %& the +ational )overnment or %& a person contracted %& the +ational )overnment. Private parties ma& reclaim from the sea onl& under a contract with the +ational )overnment, and no longer %& grant or permission as provided in *ection 5 of the *panish 2aw of Baters of 1;,,. ADecutive $rder +o. 5"5, issued on 1e%ruar& 14, 1979, designated PA' as the +ational )overnmentRs implementing arm to underta:e .all reclamation pro9ects of the government,. which . shall "e $nderta-en "y the P A or thro$gh a proper contract e!ec$ted "y it ,ith any person or entity.. Gnder such contract, a private part& receives compensation for reclamation services rendered to PA'. Pa&ment to the contractor ma& %e in cash, or in :ind consisting of portions of the reclaimed land, su%9ect to the constitutional %an on private corporations from acEuiring aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain. /he reclaimed land can %e used as pa&ment in :ind onl& if the reclaimed land is first classified as aliena%le or disposa%le land open to disposition, and then declared no longer needed for pu%lic service. /he 'mended @=' covers not onl& the 1reedom 6slands, %ut also an additional 59".15 hectares which are still su%merged and forming part of !anila Ba&. 5here is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these s$"merged areas as aliena"le or disposa"le lands of the p$"lic domain open to disposition . /hese su%merged areas are not covered %& an& patent or certificate of title. /here can %e no dispute that these su%merged areas form part of the pu%lic domain, and in their present state are inaliena"le and o$tside the commerce of man. Gntil reclaimed from the sea, these su%merged areas are, under the Constitution, .waters D D D owned %& the *tate,. forming part of the pu%lic domain and conseEuentl& inaliena%le. $nl& when actuall& reclaimed from the sea can these su%merged areas %e classified as pu%lic agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the onl& natural resources that the *tate ma& alienate. $nce reclaimed and transformed into pu%lic agricultural lands, the government ma& then officiall& classif& these lands as aliena%le or disposa%le lands open to disposition. /hereafter, the government ma& declare these lands no longer needed for pu%lic

service. $nl& then can these reclaimed lands %e considered aliena%le or disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain and within the commerce of man. /he classification of PA'Rs reclaimed foreshore and su%merged lands into aliena%le or disposa%le lands open to disposition is necessar& %ecause PA' is tas:ed under its charter to underta:e pu%lic services that reEuire the use of lands of the pu%lic domain. Gnder *ection 5 of P +o. 1#;4, the functions of PA' include the following0 .I/Jo own or operate railroads, tramwa&s and other :inds of land transportation, D D D? I/Jo construct, maintain and operate such s&stems of sanitar& sewers as ma& %e necessar&? I/Jo construct, maintain and operate such storm drains as ma& %e necessar&.. PA' is empowered to issue .rules and regulations as ma& %e necessar& for the proper use %& private parties of any or all of the high,ays+ roads+ $tilities+ "$ildings andGor any of its properties and to impose or collect fees or tolls for their use.. /hus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and su%merged lands held %& the PA' would actuall& %e needed for pu%lic use or service since man& of the functions imposed on PA' %& its charter constitute essential pu%lic services. !oreover, *ection 1 of ADecutive $rder +o. 5"5 provides that PA' .shall %e primaril& responsi%le for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation pro9ects for and on %ehalf of the +ational )overnment.. /he same section also states that .I'Jll reclamation pro9ects shall %e approved %& the President upon recommendation of the PA', and shall %e underta:en %& the PA' or through a proper contract eDecuted %& it with an& person or entit&? D D D.. /hus, under A$ +o. 5"5, in relation to P +o. -(' and P +o.1#;4, PA' %ecame the primar& implementing agenc& of the +ational )overnment to reclaim foreshore and su%merged lands of the pu%lic domain. A$ +o. 5"5 recogni4ed PA' as the government entit& .to underta:e the reclamation of lands and ensure their maDimum utili4ation in promoting p$"lic ,elfare and interests..79 *ince large portions of these reclaimed lands would o%viousl& %e needed for pu%lic service, there must %e a formal declaration segregating reclaimed lands no longer needed for pu%lic service from those still needed for pu%lic service.*I2p$i*.nJt *ection - of A$ +o. 5"5, %& declaring that all lands reclaimed %& PA' .shall %elong to or %e owned %& the PA',. could not automaticall& operate to classif& inaliena%le lands into aliena%le or disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain. $therwise, reclaimed foreshore and su%merged lands of the pu%lic domain would automaticall& %ecome aliena%le once reclaimed %& PA', whether or not classified as aliena%le or disposa%le. /he Revised 'dministrative Code of 19;7, a later law than either P +o. 1#;4 or A$ +o. 5"5, vests in the epartment of Anvironment and +atural Resources 7. A+R. for %revit&8 the following powers and functions0 .*ec. 4. Powers and 1unctions. /he epartment shall0 718 D D D DDD 748 !ercise s$pervision and control over forest lands, aliena"le and disposa"le p$"lic lands , mineral resources and, in the process of eDercising such control, impose appropriate taDes, fees, charges, rentals and an& such form of lev& and collect such revenues for the eDploration, development, utili4ation or gathering of such resources? DDD 7148 Prom$lgate r$les+ reg$lations and g$idelines on the iss$ance of licenses+ permits+ concessions+ lease agreements and s$ch other privileges concerning the development+ e!ploration and $tili7ation of the co$ntry9s marine+ fresh,ater+ and "rac-ish ,ater and over all a&$atic reso$rces of the co$ntry and shall contin$e to oversee+ s$pervise and police o$r nat$ral reso$rces? cancel or cause to cancel such privileges upon failure, non(compliance or violations of an& regulation, order, and for all other causes which are in furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of the national interest? 7158 !ercise e!cl$sive %$risdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the p$"lic domain and serve as the sole agency responsi"le for classification, su%(classification, surve&ing and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies..;# 7Amphasis supplied8 's manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the *tate, A+R eDercises .supervision and control over aliena%le and disposa%le pu%lic lands.. A+R also eDercises .eDclusive 9urisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the pu%lic domain.. /hus, A+R decides whether areas under water, li:e foreshore or su%merged areas of !anila Ba&, should %e reclaimed or not. /his means that PA' needs authori4ation from A+R %efore PA' can underta:e reclamation pro9ects in !anila Ba&, or in an& part of the countr&. A+R also eDercises eDclusive 9urisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the pu%lic domain. >ence, A+R decides whether reclaimed lands of PA' should %e classified as aliena%le under *ections ,;1 and 7;" of C' +o. 141. $nce A+R decides that the reclaimed lands should %e so classified, it then recommends to the President the issuance of a proclamation classif&ing the lands as aliena%le or disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain open to disposition. Be note that then A+R *ecretar& 1ulgencio *. 1actoran, @r. countersigned *pecial Patent +o. -517 in compliance with the Revised 'dministrative Code and *ections , and 7 of C' +o. 141. 6n short, A+R is vested with the power to authori4e the reclamation of areas under water, while PA' is vested with the power to underta:e the ph&sical reclamation of areas under water, whether directl& or through private contractors. A+R is also empowered to classif& lands of the pu%lic domain into aliena%le or disposa%le lands su%9ect to the approval of the President. $n the other hand, PA' is tas:ed to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain. Clearl&, the mere ph&sical act of reclamation %& PA' of foreshore or su%merged areas does not ma:e the reclaimed lands aliena%le or disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain, much less patrimonial lands of PA'. 2i:ewise, the mere transfer %& the +ational )overnment of lands of the pu%lic domain to PA' does not ma:e the lands aliena%le or disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain, much less patrimonial lands of PA'. '%sent two official acts H a classification that these lands are aliena%le or disposa%le and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for pu%lic service, lands reclaimed %& PA' remain inaliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain. $nl& such an official classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into aliena%le or disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain, open to disposition under the Constitution, /itle 6 and /itle 666;- of C' +o. 141 and other applica%le laws.;4

P A9s A$thority to 6ell Reclaimed *ands PA', li:e the 2egal /as: 1orce, argues that as aliena%le or disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain, the reclaimed lands shall %e disposed of in accordance with C' +o. 141, the Pu%lic 2and 'ct. PA', citing *ection ,# of C' +o. 141, admits that reclaimed lands transferred to a %ranch or su%division of the government .shall not %e alienated, encum%ered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, e!cept ,hen a$thori7ed "y Congress0 D D D..;5 7Amphasis %& PA'8 6n *a$rel vs. /arcia,;, the Court cited *ection 4; of the Revised 'dministrative Code of 19;7, which states that H .*ec. 4;. $fficial 'uthori4ed to Conve& Real Propert&. Bhenever real propert& of the )overnment is a$thori7ed "y la, to "e conveyed, the deed of conve&ance shall %e eDecuted in %ehalf of the government %& the following0 D D D.. /hus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to conve& an& real propert& %elonging to the )overnment. /he Court declared that ( .6t is not for the President to conve& real propert& of the government on his or her own sole will. Any s$ch conveyance m$st "e a$thori7ed and approved "y a la, enacted "y the Congress . 6t reEuires eDecutive and legislative concurrence.. 7Amphasis supplied8 PA' contends that P +o. 1#;5 and A$ +o. 5"5 constitute the legislative authorit& allowing PA' to sell its reclaimed lands. P +o. 1#;5, issued on 1e%ruar& 4, 1977, provides that H .5he land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila 4ay pursuant to the contract for the reclamation and construction of the !anila(Cavite Coastal Road Pro9ect %etween the Repu%lic of the Philippines and the Construction and evelopment Corporation of the Philippines dated +ovem%er "#, 197- andKor an& other contract or reclamation covering the same area is here"y transferred+ conveyed and assigned to the o,nership and administration of the P$"lic states A$thority esta%lished pursuant to P +o. 1#;4? Provided, however, /hat the rights and interests of the Construction and evelopment Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the aforesaid contract shall %e recogni4ed and respected. >enceforth, the Pu%lic Astates 'uthorit& shall eDercise the rights and assume the o%ligations of the Repu%lic of the Philippines 7 epartment of Pu%lic >ighwa&s8 arising from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract %etween the Repu%lic of the Philippines and the Construction and evelopment Corporation of the Philippines. 6n consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Pu%lic Astates 'uthorit& shall issue in favor of the Repu%lic of the Philippines the corresponding shares of stoc: in said entit& with an issued value of said shares of stoc: 7which8 shall %e deemed full& paid and non(assessa%le. /he *ecretar& of Pu%lic >ighwa&s and the )eneral !anager of the Pu%lic Astates 'uthorit& shall eDecute such contracts or agreements, including appropriate agreements with the Construction and evelopment Corporation of the Philippines, as ma& %e necessar& to implement the a%ove. 6pecial land patentGpatents shall "e iss$ed "y the 6ecretary of .at$ral Reso$rces in favor of the P$"lic states A$thority ,itho$t pre%$dice to the s$"se&$ent transfer to the contractor or his assignees of s$ch portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to "e reclaimed as provided for in the a"ove(mentioned contract. On the "asis of s$ch patents+ the *and Registration Commission shall iss$e the corresponding certificate of title .. 7Amphasis supplied8 $n the other hand, *ection - of A$ +o. 5"5, issued on 1e%ruar& 14, 1979, provides that ( .*ec. -. All lands reclaimed "y P A shall "elong to or "e o,ned "y the P A which shall %e responsi%le for its administration, development, utili4ation or disposition in accordance with the provisions of Presidential ecree +o. 1#;4. 'n& and all income that the PA' ma& derive from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands shall %e used in accordance with the provisions of Presidential ecree +o. 1#;4.. /here is no eDpress authorit& under either P +o. 1#;5 or A$ +o. 5"5 for PA' to sell its reclaimed lands. P +o. 1#;5 merel& transferred .ownership and administration. of lands reclaimed from !anila Ba& to PA', while A$ +o. 5"5 declared that lands reclaimed %& PA' .shall %elong to or %e owned %& PA'.. A$ +o. 5"5 eDpressl& states that PA' should dispose of its reclaimed lands .in accordance with the provisions of Presidential ecree +o. 1#;4,. the charter of PA'. PA'Rs charter, however, eDpressl& tas:s PA' .to develop, improve, acEuire, administer, deal in, su%divide, dispose, lease and sell any and all -inds of lands D D D owned, managed, controlled andKor operated %& the government..;7 7Amphasis supplied8 5here is+ therefore+ legislative a$thority granted to P A to sell its lands+ ,hether patrimonial or aliena"le lands of the p$"lic domain . PA' ma& sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PA' charter free from constitutional limitations. /he constitutional %an on private corporations from acEuiring aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain does not appl& to the sale of PA'Rs patrimonial lands. PA' ma& also sell its aliena"le or disposa"le lands of the p$"lic domain to private individuals since, with the legislative authorit&, there is no longer an& statutor& prohi%ition against such sales and the constitutional %an does not appl& to individuals. PA', however, cannot sell an& of its aliena%le or disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain to private corporations since *ection -, 'rticle X66 of the 19;7 Constitution eDpressl& prohi%its such sales. /he legislative authorit& %enefits onl& individuals. Private corporations remain %arred from acEuiring an& :ind of aliena%le land of the pu%lic domain, including government reclaimed lands. /he provision in P +o. 1#;5 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could %e transferred %& PA' to the .contractor or his assignees. 7Amphasis supplied8 would not appl& to private corporations %ut onl& to individuals %ecause of the constitutional %an. $therwise, the provisions of P +o. 1#;5 would violate %oth the 197- and 19;7 Constitutions. 5he re&$irement of p$"lic a$ction in the sale of reclaimed lands 'ssuming the reclaimed lands of PA' are classified as aliena%le or disposa%le lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for pu%lic service, PA' would have to conduct a pu%lic %idding in selling or leasing these lands. PA' must o%serve the provisions of *ections ,- and ,7 of C' +o. 141 reEuiring pu%lic auction, in the a%sence of a law eDempting PA' from holding a pu%lic auction.;; *pecial Patent +o. -517 eDpressl& states that the patent is issued %& authorit& of the Constitution and P +o. 1#;4, .supplemented %& Commonwealth 'ct +o. 141, as amended.. /his is an ac:nowledgment that the provisions of C' +o. 141 appl& to the disposition of reclaimed aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain unless otherwise provided %& law. ADecutive $rder +o. ,54, ;9 which

authori4es PA' .to determine the :ind and manner of pa&ment for the transfer. of its assets and properties, does not eDempt PA' from the reEuirement of pu%lic auction. A$ +o. ,54 merel& authori4es PA' to decide the mode of pa&ment, whether in :ind and in installment, %ut does not authori4e PA' to dispense with pu%lic auction. !oreover, under *ection 79 of P +o. 1445, otherwise :nown as the )overnment 'uditing Code, the government is reEuired to sell valua%le government propert& through pu%lic %idding. *ection 79 of P +o. 1445 mandates that H .*ection 79. #hen government property has %ecome unservicea%le for an& cause, or is no longer needed, it shall, upon application of the officer accounta%le therefor, %e inspected %& the head of the agenc& or his dul& authori4ed representative in the presence of the auditor concerned and, if found to %e valueless or unsalea%le, it ma& %e destro&ed in their presence. )f fo$nd to "e val$a"le+ it may "e sold at p$"lic a$ction to the highest "idder under the supervision of the proper committee on award or similar %od& in the presence of the auditor concerned or other authori4ed representative of the Commission, after advertising "y printed notice in the Official /a7ette+ or for not less than three consec$tive days in any ne,spaper of general circ$lation, or where the value of the propert& does not warrant the eDpense of pu%lication, %& notices posted for a li:e period in at least three pu%lic places in the localit& where the propert& is to %e sold. )n the event that the p$"lic a$ction fails+ the property may "e sold at a private sale at s$ch price as may "e fi!ed "y the same committee or "ody concerned and approved "y the Commission.. 6t is onl& when the pu%lic auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the Commission on 'udit must approve the selling price.9# /he Commission on 'udit implements *ection 79 of the )overnment 'uditing Code through Circular +o. ;9("9, 91 dated @anuar& "7, 19;9. /his circular emphasi4es that government assets must %e disposed of onl& through pu%lic auction, and a negotiated sale can %e resorted to onl& in case of .failure of pu%lic auction.. 't the pu%lic auction sale, onl& Philippine citi4ens are Eualified to %id for PA'Rs reclaimed foreshore and su%merged aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain. Private corporations are %arred from %idding at the auction sale of an& :ind of aliena%le land of the pu%lic domain. PA' originall& scheduled a pu%lic %idding for the 1reedom 6slands on ecem%er 1#, 1991. PA' imposed a condition that the winning %idder should reclaim another "5# hectares of su%merged areas to regulari4e the shape of the 1reedom 6slands, under a ,#(4# sharing of the additional reclaimed areas in favor of the winning %idder. 9" +o one, however, su%mitted a %id. $n ecem%er "-, 1994, the )overnment Corporate Counsel advised PA' it could sell the 1reedom 6slands through negotiation, without need of another pu%lic %idding, %ecause of the failure of the pu%lic %idding on ecem%er 1#, 1991.9>owever, the original @=' dated 'pril "5, 1995 covered not onl& the 1reedom 6slands and the additional "5# hectares still to %e reclaimed, it also granted an option to '!'R6 to reclaim another -5# hectares. /he original @=', a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 23D hectares.94 /he failure of pu%lic %idding on ecem%er 1#, 1991, involving onl& 4#7.;4 hectares, 95 is not a valid 9ustification for a negotiated sale of 75# hectares, almost dou%le the area pu%licl& auctioned. Besides, the failure of pu%lic %idding happened on ecem%er 1#, 1991, more than three &ears %efore the signing of the original @=' on 'pril "5, 1995. /he economic situation in the countr& had greatl& improved during the intervening period. Reclamation $nder the 4O5 *a, and the *ocal /overnment Code /he constitutional prohi%ition in *ection -, 'rticle X66 of the 19;7 Constitution is a%solute and clear0 .Private corporations or associations ma& not hold such aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain eDcept %& lease, D D D.. Aven Repu%lic 'ct +o. ,957 7.B$/ 2aw,. for %revit&8, cited %& PA' and '!'R6 as legislative authorit& to sell reclaimed lands to private parties, recogni4es the constitutional %an. *ection , of R' +o. ,957 states H .*ec. ,. Repa&ment *cheme. ( 1or the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of an& infrastructure pro9ects underta:en through the %uild(operate(and(transfer arrangement or an& of its variations pursuant to the provisions of this 'ct, the pro9ect proponent D D D ma& li:ewise %e repaid in the form of a share in the revenue of the pro9ect or other non(monetar& pa&ments, such as, %ut not limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land, s$"%ect to the constit$tional re&$irements ,ith respect to the o,nership of the land0 D D D.. 7Amphasis supplied8 ' private corporation, even one that underta:es the ph&sical reclamation of a government B$/ pro9ect, cannot acEuire reclaimed aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain in view of the constitutional %an. *ection -#" of the 2ocal )overnment Code, also mentioned %& PA' and '!'R6, authori4es local governments in land reclamation pro9ects to pa& the contractor or developer in :ind consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed land, to wit0 .*ection -#". 1inancing, Construction, !aintenance, $peration, and !anagement of 6nfrastructure Pro9ects %& the Private *ector. D D D DDD 6n case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repa&ment plan ma& consist of the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or the industrial estate constructed.. 'lthough *ection -#" of the 2ocal )overnment Code does not contain a proviso similar to that of the B$/ 2aw, the constitutional restrictions on land ownership automaticall& appl& even though not eDpressl& mentioned in the 2ocal )overnment Code. /hus, under either the B$/ 2aw or the 2ocal )overnment Code, the contractor or developer, if a corporate entit&, can onl& %e paid with leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed land. 6f the contractor or developer is an individual, portions of the reclaimed land, not eDceeding 1" hectares9, of non(agricultural lands, ma& %e conve&ed to him in ownership in view of the legislative authorit& allowing such conve&ance. /his is the onl& wa& these provisions of the B$/ 2aw and the 2ocal )overnment Code can avoid a direct collision with *ection -, 'rticle X66 of the 19;7 Constitution. Registration of lands of the p$"lic domain 1inall&, PA' theori4es that the .act of conve&ing the ownership of the reclaimed lands to pu%lic respondent PA' transformed such lands of the pu%lic domain to private lands.. /his theor& is echoed %& '!'R6 which maintains that the .issuance of the special patent leading to the eventual issuance of title ta:es the su%9ect land awa& from the land of pu%lic domain and converts the propert& into patrimonial or private propert&.. 6n short, PA' and '!'R6 contend that with the issuance of *pecial Patent +o. -517 and the corresponding

certificates of titles, the 157.;4 hectares comprising the 1reedom 6slands have %ecome private lands of PA'. 6n support of their theor&, PA' and '!'R6 cite the following rulings of the Court0 1. Sumail v. "udge o# %0I o# %ota,ato,97 where the Court held H .$nce the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was issued, the land ceased to %e part of the pu%lic domain and %ecame private propert& over which the irector of 2ands has neither control nor 9urisdiction.. ". Lee Hong Ho1 v. David,9; where the Court declared ( .'fter the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title %ased on a pu%lic land patent, the land covered there%& automaticall& comes under the operation of Repu%lic 'ct 49, su%9ect to all the safeguards provided therein..-. Heirs o# Gregorio !engco v. Heirs o# "ose 5li2alas,99 where the Court ruled ( .Bhile the irector of 2ands has the power to review homestead patents, he ma& do so onl& so long as the land remains part of the pu%lic domain and continues to %e under his eDclusive control? %ut once the patent is registered and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to %e part of the pu%lic domain and %ecomes private propert& over which the irector of 2ands has neither control nor 9urisdiction.. 4. Manalo v. Intermediate 5ppellate %ourt,1## where the Court held H .Bhen the lots in dispute were certified as disposa%le on !a& 19, 1971, and free patents were issued covering the same in favor of the private respondents, the said lots ceased to %e part of the pu%lic domain and, therefore, the irector of 2ands lost 9urisdiction over the same.. 5.Repu%lic v. Court of 'ppeals,1#1 where the Court stated H .Proclamation +o. -5#, dated $cto%er 9, 195,, of President !agsa&sa& legall& effected a land grant to the !indanao !edical Center, Bureau of !edical *ervices, epartment of >ealth, of the whole lot, validl& sufficient for initial registration under the 2and Registration 'ct. *uch land grant is constitutive of a Rfee simpleR title or a%solute title in favor of petitioner !indanao !edical Center. /hus, *ection 1"" of the 'ct, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving pu%lic lands, provides that RBhenever pu%lic lands in the Philippine 6slands %elonging to the )overnment of the Gnited *tates or to the )overnment of the Philippines are alienated, granted or conve&ed to persons or to pu%lic or private corporations, the same shall %e %rought forthwith under the operation of this 'ct 72and Registration 'ct, 'ct 49,8 and shall %ecome registered lands.R. /he first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the corresponding certificates of titles iss$ed to private parties. /hese four cases uniforml& hold that the irector of 2ands has no 9urisdiction over private lands or that upon issuance of the certificate of title the land automaticall& comes under the /orrens *&stem. /he fifth case cited involves the registration under the /orrens *&stem of a 1".;(hectare pu%lic land granted %& the +ational )overnment to !indanao !edical Center, a government unit under the epartment of >ealth. /he +ational )overnment transferred the 1".;(hectare pu%lic land to serve as the site for the hospital %uildings and other facilities of !indanao !edical Center, which performed a pu%lic service. /he Court affirmed the registration of the 1".;( hectare pu%lic land in the name of !indanao !edical Center under *ection 1"" of 'ct +o. 49,. /his fifth case is an eDample of a pu%lic land %eing registered under 'ct +o. 49, without the land losing its character as a propert& of pu%lic dominion. 6n the instant case, the onl& patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of PA', a wholl& government owned corporation performing pu%lic as well as proprietar& functions. +o patent or certificate of title has %een issued to an& private part&. +o one is as:ing the irector of 2ands to cancel PA'Rs patent or certificates of title. 6n fact, the thrust of the instant petition is that PA'Rs certificates of title should remain with PA', and the land covered %& these certificates, %eing aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain, should not %e sold to a private corporation. Registration of land under 'ct +o. 49, or P +o. 15"9 does not vest in the registrant private or pu%lic ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of acEuiring ownership %ut is merel& evidence of ownership previousl& conferred %& an& of the recogni4ed modes of acEuiring ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a %etter right than what the registrant had prior to the registration.1#" /he registration of lands of the pu%lic domain under the /orrens s&stem, %& itself, cannot convert pu%lic lands into private lands.1#@urisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the aliena%le land of the pu%lic domain automaticall& %ecomes private land cannot appl& to government units and entities li:e PA'. /he transfer of the 1reedom 6slands to PA' was made su%9ect to the provisions of C' +o. 141 as eDpressl& stated in *pecial Patent +o. -517 issued %& then President 'Euino, to wit0 .+$B, />ARA1$RA, O+$B FA, that %& authorit& of the Constitution of the Philippines and in conformit& with the provisions of Presidential ecree +o. 1#;4+ s$pplemented "y Common,ealth Act .o. <?<+ as amended , there are here%& granted and conve&ed unto the Pu%lic Astates 'uthorit& the aforesaid tracts of land containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninet& four 71,915,;948 sEuare meters? the technical description of which are hereto attached and made an integral part hereof.. 7Amphasis supplied8 /hus, the provisions of C' +o. 141 appl& to the 1reedom 6slands on matters not covered %& P +o. 1#;4. *ection ,# of C' +o. 141 prohi%its, .eDcept when authori4ed %& Congress,. the sale of aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain that are transferred to government units or entities. *ection ,# of C' +o. 141 constitutes, under *ection 44 of P +o. 15"9, a .statutor& lien affecting title. of the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of title. 1#4 'liena%le lands of the pu%lic domain held %& government entities under *ection ,# of C' +o. 141 remain pu%lic lands %ecause the& cannot %e alienated or encum%ered unless Congress passes a law authori4ing their disposition. Congress, however, cannot authori4e the sale to private corporations of reclaimed aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain %ecause of the constitutional %an. $nl& individuals can %enefit from such law. /he grant of legislative authorit& to sell pu%lic lands in accordance with *ection ,# of C' +o. 141 does not automaticall& convert aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain into private or patrimonial lands. /he aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain must %e transferred to Eualified private parties, or to government entities not tas:ed to dispose of pu%lic lands, %efore these lands can %ecome private or patrimonial lands. $therwise, the constitutional %an will %ecome illusor& if Congress can declare lands of the pu%lic domain as private

or patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agenc& tas:ed to dispose of pu%lic lands. /his will allow private corporations to acEuire directl& from government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are concededl& pu%lic lands. Gnder A$ +o. 5"5, PA' %ecame the central implementing agency of the +ational )overnment to reclaim foreshore and su%merged areas of the pu%lic domain. /hus, A$ +o. 5"5 declares that H .AXACG/6=A $R AR +$. 5"5 esignating the Pu%lic Astates 'uthorit& as the 'genc& Primaril& Responsi%le for all Reclamation Pro9ects Bhereas, there are several reclamation pro9ects which are ongoing or %eing proposed to %e underta:en in various parts of the countr& which need to %e evaluated for consistenc& with national programs? Bhereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the )overnmentRs declared polic& to provide for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands? Bhereas, Presidential ecree +o. -(' reEuires that all reclamation of areas shall %e limited to the +ational )overnment or an& person authori4ed %& it under proper contract? #hereas+ a central a$thority is needed to act on "ehalf of the .ational /overnment ,hich shall ens$re a coordinated and integrated approach in the reclamation of landsC #hereas+ Presidential Decree .o. <D=? creates the P$"lic states A$thority as a government corporation to $nderta-e reclamation of lands and ens$re their ma!im$m $tili7ation in promoting p$"lic ,elfare and interests ? and Bhereas, Presidential ecree +o. 141, provides the President with continuing authorit& to reorgani4e the national government including the transfer, a%olition, or merger of functions and offices. +$B, />ARA1$RA, 6, 1AR 6+'+ A. !'RC$*, President of the Philippines, %& virtue of the powers vested in me %& the Constitution and pursuant to Presidential ecree +o. 141,, do here%& order and direct the following0 *ection 1. 5he P$"lic states A$thority AP AB shall "e primarily responsi"le for integrating+ directing+ and coordinating all reclamation pro%ects for and on "ehalf of the .ational /overnment . 'll reclamation pro9ects shall %e approved %& the President upon recommendation of the PA', and shall %e underta:en %& the PA' or through a proper contract eDecuted %& it with an& person or entit&? Provided, that, reclamation pro9ects of an& national government agenc& or entit& authori4ed under its charter shall %e underta:en in consultation with the PA' upon approval of the President. D D D .. 's the central implementing agenc& tas:ed to underta:e reclamation pro9ects nationwide, with authorit& to sell reclaimed lands, PA' too: the place of A+R as the government agenc& charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the pu%lic domain. /he reclaimed lands %eing leased or sold %& PA' are not private lands, in the same manner that A+R, when it disposes of other aliena%le lands, does not dispose of private lands %ut aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain. $nl& when Eualified private parties acEuire these lands will the lands %ecome private lands. )n the hands of the government agency tas-ed and a$thori7ed to dispose of aliena"le of disposa"le lands of the p$"lic domain+ these lands are still p$"lic+ not private lands . 1urthermore, PA'Rs charter eDpressl& states that PA' . shall hold lands of the p$"lic domain . as well as .an& and all :inds of lands.. PA' can hold %oth lands of the pu%lic domain and private lands. /hus, the mere fact that aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain li:e the 1reedom 6slands are transferred to PA' and issued land patents or certificates of title in PA'Rs name does not automaticall& ma:e such lands private. /o allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the pu%lic domain to %e transferred to PA' as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional %an on private corporations from acEuiring an& :ind of aliena%le land of the pu%lic domain. PA' will simpl& turn around, as P A has no, done $nder the Amended J8A, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to %e reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in onl& one transaction. /his scheme will effectivel& nullif& the constitutional %an in *ection -, 'rticle X66 of the 19;7 Constitution which was intended to diffuse eEuita%l& the ownership of aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain among 1ilipinos, now num%ering over ;# million strong. /his scheme, if allowed, can even %e applied to aliena%le agricultural lands of the pu%lic domain since PA' can .acEuire D D D an& and all :inds of lands.. /his will open the floodgates to corporations and even individuals acEuiring hundreds of hectares of aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain under the guise that in the hands of PA' these lands are private lands. /his will result in corporations amassing huge landholdings never %efore seen in this countr& ( creating the ver& evil that the constitutional %an was designed to prevent. /his will completel& reverse the clear direction of constitutional development in this countr&. /he 19-5 Constitution allowed private corporations to acEuire not more than 1,#"4 hectares of pu%lic lands. 1#5 /he 197- Constitution prohi%ited private corporations from acEuiring an& :ind of pu%lic land, and the 19;7 Constitution has uneEuivocall& reiterated this prohi%ition. /he contention of PA' and '!'R6 that pu%lic lands, once registered under 'ct +o. 49, or P +o. 15"9, automaticall& %ecome private lands is contrar& to eDisting laws. *everal laws authori4e lands of the pu%lic domain to %e registered under the /orrens *&stem or 'ct +o. 49,, now P +o. 15"9, without losing their character as pu%lic lands. *ection 1"" of 'ct +o. 49,, and *ection 1#- of P +o. 15"9, respectivel&, provide as follows0 'ct +o. 49, .*ec. 1"". Bhenever pu%lic lands in the Philippine 6slands %elonging to the D D D )overnment of the Philippine 6slands are alienated, granted, or conve&ed to persons or the p$"lic or private corporations, the same shall %e %rought forthwith under the operation of this 'ct and shall %ecome registered lands.. P +o. 15"9 .*ec. 1#-. Certificate of /itle to Patents. Bhenever pu%lic land is %& the )overnment alienated, granted or conve&ed to any person, the same shall %e %rought forthwith under the operation of this ecree.. 7Amphasis supplied8 Based on its legislative histor&, the phrase .conve&ed to an& person. in *ection 1#- of P +o. 15"9 includes conve&ances of pu%lic lands to pu%lic corporations.

'liena%le lands of the pu%lic domain .granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipalit&, or %ranch or su%division of the )overnment,. as provided in *ection ,# of C' +o. 141, ma& %e registered under the /orrens *&stem pursuant to *ection 1#- of P +o. 15"9. *uch registration, however, is eDpressl& su%9ect to the condition in *ection ,# of C' +o. 141 that the land .shall not %e alienated, encum%ered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title+ e!cept ,hen a$thori7ed "y Congress .. /his provision refers to government reclaimed, foreshore and marsh& lands of the pu%lic domain that have %een titled %ut still cannot %e alienated or encum%ered unless eDpressl& authori4ed %& Congress. /he need for legislative authorit& prevents the registered land of the pu%lic domain from %ecoming private land that can %e disposed of to Eualified private parties. /he Revised 'dministrative Code of 19;7 also recogni4es that lands of the pu%lic domain ma& %e registered under the /orrens *&stem. *ection 4;, Chapter 1", Boo: 6 of the Code states H .*ec. 4;. $fficial 'uthori4ed to Conve& Real Propert&. Bhenever real propert& of the )overnment is authori4ed %& law to %e conve&ed, the deed of conve&ance shall %e eDecuted in %ehalf of the government %& the following0 718 D D D 7"8 'or property "elonging to the Rep$"lic of the Philippines+ "$t titled in the name of any political s$"division or of any corporate agency or instr$mentality, %& the eDecutive head of the agenc& or instrumentalit&.. 7Amphasis supplied8 /hus, private propert& purchased %& the +ational )overnment for eDpansion of a pu%lic wharf ma& %e titled in the name of a government corporation regulating port operations in the countr&. Private propert& purchased %& the +ational )overnment for eDpansion of an airport ma& also %e titled in the name of the government agenc& tas:ed to administer the airport. Private propert& donated to a municipalit& for use as a town pla4a or pu%lic school site ma& li:ewise %e titled in the name of the municipalit&. 1#, 'll these properties %ecome properties of the pu%lic domain, and if alread& registered under 'ct +o. 49, or P +o. 15"9, remain registered land. /here is no reEuirement or provision in an& eDisting law for the de(registration of land from the /orrens *&stem. Private lands ta:en %& the )overnment for pu%lic use under its power of eminent domain %ecome unEuestiona%l& part of the pu%lic domain. +evertheless, *ection ;5 of P +o. 15"9 authori4es the Register of eeds to issue in the name of the +ational )overnment new certificates of title covering such eDpropriated lands. *ection ;5 of P +o. 15"9 states H .*ec. ;5. 2and ta:en %& eminent domain. Bhenever an& registered land, or interest therein, is eDpropriated or ta:en %& eminent domain, the +ational )overnment, province, cit& or municipalit&, or an& other agenc& or instrumentalit& eDercising such right shall file for registration in the proper Registr& a certified cop& of the 9udgment which shall state definitel& %& an adeEuate description, the particular propert& or interest eDpropriated, the num%er of the certificate of title, and the nature of the pu%lic use. ' memorandum of the right or interest ta:en shall %e made on each certificate of title %& the Register of eeds, and where the fee simple is ta:en, a ne, certificate shall "e iss$ed in favor of the .ational /overnment+ province+ city+ m$nicipality, or an& other agenc& or instrumentalit& eDercising such right for the land so ta:en. /he legal eDpenses incident to the memorandum of registration or issuance of a new certificate of title shall %e for the account of the authorit& ta:ing the land or interest therein.. 7Amphasis supplied8 ConseEuentl&, lands registered under 'ct +o. 49, or P +o. 15"9 are not eDclusivel& private or patrimonial lands. 2ands of the pu%lic domain ma& also %e registered pursuant to eDisting laws. '!'R6 ma:es a parting shot that the 'mended @=' is not a sale to '!'R6 of the 1reedom 6slands or of the lands to %e reclaimed from su%merged areas of !anila Ba&. 6n the words of '!'R6, the 'mended @=' .is not a sale %ut a 9oint venture with a stipulation for reim%ursement of the original cost incurred %& PA' for the earlier reclamation and construction wor:s performed %& the C CP under its 197- contract with the Repu%lic.. Bhether the 'mended @=' is a sale or a 9oint venture, the fact remains that the 'mended @=' reEuires PA' to .cause the issuance and deliver& of the certificates of title conve&ing '!'R6Rs 2and *hare in the name of '!'R6..1#7 /his stipulation still contravenes *ection -, 'rticle X66 of the 19;7 Constitution which provides that private corporations .shall not hold such aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain eDcept %& lease.. /he transfer of title and ownership to '!'R6 clearl& means that '!'R6 will .hold. the reclaimed lands other than %& lease. /he transfer of title and ownership is a .disposition. of the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under C' +o. 141, 1#; the )overnment 'uditing Code,1#9 and *ection -, 'rticle X66 of the 19;7 Constitution. /he Regalian doctrine is deepl& implanted in our legal s&stem. 1oreshore and su%merged areas form part of the pu%lic domain and are inaliena%le. 2ands reclaimed from foreshore and su%merged areas also form part of the pu%lic domain and are also inaliena%le, unless converted pursuant to law into aliena%le or disposa%le lands of the pu%lic domain. >istoricall&, lands reclaimed %& the government are s$i generis, not availa%le for sale to private parties unli:e other aliena%le pu%lic lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for pu%lic use or pu%lic service. 'liena%le lands of the pu%lic domain, increasingl& %ecoming scarce natural resources, are to %e distri%uted eEuita%l& among our ever(growing population. /o insure such eEuita%le distri%ution, the 197- and 19;7 Constitutions have %arred private corporations from acEuiring an& :ind of aliena%le land of the pu%lic domain. /hose who attempt to dispose of inaliena%le natural resources of the *tate, or see: to circumvent the constitutional %an on alienation of lands of the pu%lic domain to private corporations, do so at their own ris:. Be can now summari4e our conclusions as follows0 1. /he 157.;4 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the 1reedom 6slands, now covered %& certificates of title in the name of PA', are aliena"le lands of the p$"lic domain . PA' ma& lease these lands to private corporations %ut ma& not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PA' ma& onl& sell these lands to Philippine citi4ens, su%9ect to the ownership limitations in the 19;7 Constitution and eDisting laws. ". /he 59".15 hectares of su%merged areas of !anila Ba& remain inaliena%le natural resources of the pu%lic domain until classified as aliena%le or disposa%le lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for pu%lic service. /he government can ma:e such classification and declaration onl& after PA' has reclaimed these su%merged areas. $nl& then can these lands Eualif& as agricultural lands of the pu%lic domain, which are the onl& natural resources the government can alienate. 6n their present state, the 59".15 hectares of su%merged areas are inaliena"le and o$tside the commerce of man. -. *ince the 'mended @=' see:s to transfer to '!'R6, a private corporation, ownership of 77.-4 hectares 11# of the 1reedom

6slands, such transfer is void for %eing contrar& to *ection -, 'rticle X66 of the 19;7 Constitution which prohi%its private corporations from acEuiring an& :ind of aliena%le land of the pu%lic domain. 4. *ince the 'mended @=' also see:s to transfer to '!'R6 ownership of "9#.15, hectares 111 of still su%merged areas of !anila Ba&, such transfer is void for %eing contrar& to *ection ", 'rticle X66 of the 19;7 Constitution which prohi%its the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the pu%lic domain. PA' ma& reclaim these su%merged areas. /hereafter, the government can classif& the reclaimed lands as aliena%le or disposa%le, and further declare them no longer needed for pu%lic service. *till, the transfer of such reclaimed aliena%le lands of the pu%lic domain to '!'R6 will %e void in view of *ection -, 'rticle X66 of the 19;7 Constitution which prohi%its private corporations from acEuiring an& :ind of aliena%le land of the pu%lic domain. Clearl&, the 'mended @=' violates glaringl& *ections " and -, 'rticle X66 of the 19;7 Constitution. Gnder 'rticle 14#9 11" of the Civil Code, contracts whose .o%9ect or purpose is contrar& to law,. or whose .o%9ect is outside the commerce of men,. are .ineDistent and void from the %eginning.. /he Court must perform its dut& to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the 'mended J8A n$ll and void a" initio. 6eventh iss$e: ,hether the Co$rt is the proper for$m to raise the iss$e of ,hether the Amended J8A is grossly disadvantageo$s to the government. Considering that the 'mended @=' is null and void a% initio, there is no necessit& to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters. B>ARA1$RA, the petition is GR!NT D. /he Pu%lic Astates 'uthorit& and 'mari Coastal Ba& evelopment Corporation are % RM!N NT"# N=OIN D from implementing the 'mended @oint =enture 'greement which is here%& declared N'"" and VOID a" initio. *$ $R ARA .