RULE 130: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE 1. LLANTO VS ALZONA, G.R. NO. 150730, January 31, 005 S!a!"#"n! $% !&" 'a(!

): Maria Sales was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Laguna which she acquired under a free patent. Until they died, she and her husband Bernardo lived on the said land in the house which they constructed. Maria died in August !"#. $n %anuary !!&, a real estate 'ortgage contract was purportedly e(ecuted by Maria, who was already deceased at that ti'e, in favor of )o'inador Al*ona and his brother +rnesto Al*ona, as co,'ortgagee. +stela -elongco, one of the daughters of Maria and Bernardo, signed as witness. .he 'ortgage was foreclosed and was sold in a 'ortgage sale to +rnesto, being the highest bidder. /e later on e(ecuted a 0onsolidation of 1wnership over the property and a .ransfer 0ertificate of .itle was issued in his na'e. Mila Llanto, another daughter of Maria and Bernardo, and the rest of her brothers and sisters filed a co'plaint for Annul'ent of Mortgage and Auction Sale with 2econveyance of .itle. /owever, the 2.0 ruled in favor of the Al*onas, declaring the' as 'ortgagees in good faith, by giving credence to the testi'ony of +rnesto Al*ona, that the latter conducted a credit investigation before he approved the loan sought and the property 'ortgaged. .he 0A affir'ed the decision of the 2.0. S!a!"#"n! $% !&" I))u": 3hether or not the 0A erred in affir'ing the ruling of the 2.0 that +rnesto and )o'inador are 'ortgagees in good faith, by giving credence to the testi'ony of +rnesto Al*ona Ru*+n,: NO. $t is well settled in our 4urisdiction that the deter'ination of credibility of witnesses is properly within the do'ain of the trial court as it is in the best position to observe their de'eanor and bodily 'ove'ents. 5urther, findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses and their testi'onies are entitled to great respect, and even finality, unless said findings are arbitrary, or facts and circu'stances of weight and influence have been overloo6ed, 'isunderstood, or 'isapplied by the trial 4udge which, if considered, would have affected the case. .hese findings are binding on this 0ourt especially when affir'ed by the appellate court.

RULE 130: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE . RU-EN LASCANO .). /EO/LE O' T0E /0ILI//INES 7.2. 8o. ##9: Septe'ber ;, 9&&; S!a!"#"n! $% !&" 'a(!): Lascano was initially charged as a co,conspirator in People v. Altabano, et al, with the cri'e of 'urder perpetrated against Arnold 5ernande*. /e absconded and re'ained at large while his co,accused were on trial. But when the case was sub'itted for decision, he surfaced and thereafter underwent a separate trial for the sa'e charge after his arrest. A'ong those charged of 'urder, two were convicted while the rest were acquitted. 1n auto'atic review of the Supre'e 0ourt, the conviction was reduced to ho'icide only. Based on this decision, Lascano<s case was downgraded to /o'icide and he pleaded not guilty. As stipulated by the prosecution and the defense at the pre,trial conference, the testi'onial and docu'entary evidence in the previous case =People v. Altabano, et al,> were dee'ed introduced in the present case, sub4ect to cross,e(a'ination of the witnesses and without pre4udice to the presentation of additional evidence. 9 witnesses testified for the prosecution, a'ong the' were 1felia $bacuado and +strellita Mallari who had already testified in the previous case. .he 2.0 rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty as charged. 1n appeal, the 0ourt of Appeals affir'ed the trial court<s decision, e(cept for the prison sentence which it 'odified. Lascano filed a petition for review with the Supre'e 0ourt, attributing error to the 0ourt of Appeals in relying on the alleged conflicting testi'onies of prosecution witnesses $bacuado and Mallari in the previous and present case. S!a!"#"n! $% !&" I))u": 3hether or not the Supre'e 0ourt, on appeal, can re,evaluate factual issues as regards the credibility of witnesses Ru*+n,: NO. $t is doctrinal that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing that the trial court had overloo6ed, 'isunderstood or 'isapplied so'e facts or circu'stances of weight and substance which could reverse a 4udg'ent of conviction. $n fact, in so'e instances, such findings are even accorded finality. .his is so because the assign'ent of value to a witness< testi'ony is essentially the do'ain of the trial court, not to 'ention that it is the trial 4udge who has the direct opportunity to observe the de'eanor of a witness on the stand which opportunity provides hi' unique facility in deter'ining whether or not to accord credence to the testi'ony or whether the witness is telling the truth or not.

RULE 130: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE 3. NORT01EST AIRLINES, INC. .). STEVEN /. C0IONG 7.2. 81. ???&, %A8UA2@ A , 9&&" S!a!"#"n! $% !&" 'a(!): -hili'are and Shipping and Seagull Mariti'e 0orp., as the authori*e -hilippine agent of .rans1cean Line hired Steven 0hiong as .hird +ngineer 1 .rans1cean vessel at San )iego , 0alifornia port. -hili'are dispatched a letter of 7uarantee to 0L /utchins, .rans1ceanagentat San )iego port confir'ing 0hiong arrival. 5or this purpose, -hili'are purchased a 8orthwestplane tic6et for 0hiong for San )iugo with a deaparturedaate of April , !"!. 1n April , !"! 0hoing arrived at the Manila $nternational Airport where he Marilyn 0alvo, -hili'areLiaison 1fficer. .hey proceeded to the -hilippine 0oastguard for the docu'entation of his sea'an boo6 and passport. Later, he went to 8orthwest chec6,in counter, the 8orthwest infor' hi' that his na'e does not appear in the co'puter list of departing passenger. 0hiong was not allowed to board 8orthwest flight and was unable to wor6 abroad. $t appears that 0hiong<s na'e was crossed out and substituted with one 3. 0onstine. 0hoing filed a case for breach of contract and for da'ages with the trial court. 8orthwest filed a 'otion to dis'iss on the ground of lac6 of 4urisdiction. S!a!"#"n! $% !&" I))u": 3hether or not the testi'ony of the e'ployees of -hili'are shall be inad'issible in evidence due to relationship Ru*+n,: .his 0ourt has repeatedly held that a witness< relationship to the victi' does not auto'atically affect the veracity of his or her testi'ony. 3hile this principle is often applied in cri'inal cases, we dee' that the sa'e principle 'ay apply in this case, albeit civil in nature. $f a witness< relationship with a party does not ipso facto render hi' a biased witness in cri'inal cases where the quantu' of evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, there is no reason why the sa'e principle should not apply in civil cases where the quantu' of evidence is only preponderance of evidence. $t is of no 'o'ent that 0hiong<s witnesses B who all corroborated his testi'ony on his presence at the airport on, and flight details for, April , !"!, and that he was subsequently bu'ped,off B are, li6ewise, e'ployees of -hili'are which 'ay have an interest in the outco'e of this case. .he foregoing docu'entary and testi'onial evidence, ta6en together, a'ply establish the fact that 0hiong was present at M$A on April , !"!, passed through the -07 counter without delay, proceeded to the 8orthwest chec6,in counter, but when he presented his confir'ed tic6et thereat, he was not issued a boarding pass, and ulti'ately barred fro' boarding 8orthwest 5light 8o. 9: on that day.

RULE 130: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE 2. MA3IMO ALVAREZ vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ 7.2. 8o. :A:A! 1ctober :, 9&&? S!a!"#"n! $% !&" 'a(!): Susan 2a'ire* filed a 0ri'inal case of Arson against Ma(i'o Alvare*. Ma(i'o Alvare* is the estranged husband of +speran*a 7. Alvare*, her sister. +speran*a was called bythe -rosecutor to testify against her husband. Ma(i'o raises no ob4ection. She then testifies on what she saw before, during and after the incident, the burning of the house of Susan of which she also resides. .he -rosecutor as6s also if he could identify the assailant and she pointed to her estranged husband. Ma(i'o then filed a 'otion to disqualify +speran*a fro' testifying against hi' and her testi'ony he deleted fro' the record. /is ground for such disqualification is pursuant to 2ule A& of the 2ules of 0ourt on Marital )isqualification 2ule. .he .rial 0ourt granted the 'otion. 1n appeal to the 0A, it was reversed so hence, this appeal to the Supre'e 0ourt. S!a!"#"n! $% !&" I))u": 3hether or not +speran*a can testify Ru*+n,: )uring their 'arriage, neither the husband nor the wife 'ay testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, e(cept in a civil case by one against the other, or in a cri'inal case for a cri'e co''itted by one against the other or the latter<s direct descendants or ascendants.C .he reasons given for the rule are: 1. .here is identity of interests between husband and wifeD . $f one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of per4uryD 3. .he policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the ris6 of an occasional failure of 4ustice, and to prevent do'estic disunion and unhappinessD and 2. 3here there is want of do'estic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testi'ony of the other. But li6e all other general rules, the 'arital disqualification rule has its own e(ceptions. Li6e the rule itself, the e(ceptions are bac6ed by sound reasons which, in the e(cepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. 5or instance, where the 'arital and do'estic relations are so strained that there is no 'ore har'ony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which 'ay be disturbed, the reason based upon such har'ony and tranquility fails. $n such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of per4ury based on that identity is non,e(istent. Li6ewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law ai's at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, 'erely leave a void in the unhappy ho'e. 1bviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly i'pairs the con4ugal relation between hi' and his wife +speran*a.

RULE 130: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE 5. CECILIA ZULUETA .).C A an4 AL'REDO MARTIN 7.2. 8o. &;A"A 5ebruary 9&, !!# S!a!"#"n! $% !&" 'a(!: 0ecilia Euluetais the wife of respondent Alfredo Martin. /e is a doctor of 'edicine. 0ecilia sensed that her husband was having an illicit affair with other wo'en. She went to the clinic of her husband and in the presence of her husband<s secretaryD she forcibly opened the drawer and cabinet and too6 ?; docu'ents and papers consisting of correspondence between hi' and his para'our. She filed a case for legal separation and for disqualification fro' the practice of 'edicine against her husband. She used the docu'ents and papers as her evidence. .he husband brought a suit for the recovery of those docu'ents and paper. /e alleged that he is the e(clusive owner of such. S!a!"#"n! $% !&" I))u": 3hether the docu'ents are ad'issible in evidence against the husband Ru*+n,: .he docu'ents and papers in question are inad'issible in evidence. .he constitutional in4unction declaring Cthe privacy of co''unication and correspondence to be inviolableC is no less applicable because it is the wife =who thin6s herself aggrieved by her husbandFs infidelity> who is the party against who' the constitutional provision is to be enforced. .he only e(ception to the prohibition in the 0onstitution is if there is a Clawful order fro' a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.C Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inad'issible Cfor any purpose in any proceeding.C .he inti'acies between husband and wife do not 4ustify any one of the' in brea6ing the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransac6ing the' for any telltale evidence of 'arital infidelity. A person, by contracting 'arriage, does not shed hisGher integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to hi' or to her. .he law insures absolute freedo' of co''unication between the spouses by 'a6ing it privileged. 8either husband nor wife 'ay testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the 'arriage subsists. 8either 'ay be e(a'ined without the consent of the other as to any co''unication received in confidence by one fro' the other during the 'arriage, save for specified e(ceptions. But one thing is freedo' of co''unicationD quite another is a co'pulsion for each one to share what one 6nows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

RULE 130: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE A!!$rn"y5C*+"n! /r+.+*"," 6. MERCADO V. VITRIOLO, 257 SCRA 1 S!a!"#"n! $% !&" 'a(!): 2osa Mercado<s husband filed a civil case for annul'ent of their 'arriage which the 2.0 dis'issed. 3hen the counsel of 2osa died, Atty. Hitriolo entered his appearance as collaborating counsel for 2osa in !!:. Later, he has been appointed as counsel for 2osa, in substitution of Atty. de Leon. $n !!!, Hitriolo filed a cri'inal action against 2osa for falsification of public docu'ent alleging that 2osa 'ade false entries in the 0ertificates of Live Birth of her children by indicating in said 0ertificates that she is 'arried to 5erdinand 5ernande*, and that their 'arriage was sole'ni*ed on April , !;!, when in truth, she is legally 'arried to 2uben Mercado and their 'arriage too6 place on April , !;".2osa denied the accusations against her alleging that the cri'inal co'plaint for falsification of public docu'ent disclosed confidential facts and infor'ation relating to the civil case for annul'ent, then handled by Hitriolo as her counsel. 2osa then bring this action against Hitriolo clai'ing that, in filing the cri'inal case for falsification, Hitriolo is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer,client relationship, and should be disbarred. Hirtiolo clai's that his filing of the cri'inal co'plaint for falsification does not violate the rule on privileged co''unication because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are public docu'ents and in no way connected with the confidence ta6en during his engage'ent as counsel. 2osa confided to hi' only 'atters of facts relating to the annul'ent caseD nothing was said about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her children. .he birth certificates are filed in the 2ecords )ivision of 0/+) and are accessible to anyone. S!a!"#"n! $% !&" I))u": 3hether Hitriolo violated the rule on privileged co''unication between attorney and client when he filed a cri'inal case for falsification of public docu'ent against his for'er client Ru*+n,: NO. .he factors essential to establish the e(istence of the privilege are as follows: (1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorneyclient relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.5Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged co''unication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the e'ploy'ent. .his is to 'a6e the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against hi', and for the lawyer

RULE 130: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE to be equally free to obtain infor'ation fro' the prospective client.1n the other hand, a co''unication fro' a =prospective> client to a lawyer for so'e purpose other than on account of the =prospective> attorney,client relation is not privileged. (2) The client made the communication in confidence. 5.he 'ere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presu'ption of confidentiality. .he client 'ust intend the co''unication to be confidential.A confidential co''unication refers to infor'ation trans'itted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by 'eans which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the infor'ation to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the trans'ission of the infor'ation or the acco'plish'ent of the purpose for which it was given. 1ur 4urisprudence on the 'atter rests on quiescent ground. .hus, a co'pro'ise agree'ent prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party, an offer and counter,offer for settle'ent,or a docu'ent given by a client to his counsel not in his professional capacity,are not privileged co''unications, the ele'ent of confidentiality not being present. =A>The le al advice must be sou ht from the attorney in his professional capacity..he co''unication 'ade by a client to his attorney 'ust not be intended for 'ere infor'ation, but for the purpose of see6ing legal advice fro' his attorney as to his rights or obligations. .he co''unication 'ust have been trans'itted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of see6ing legal advice.$f the client see6s an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a co''unication disclosed for such purpose. Applyin all these rules to the case at bar, !e hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate "osa#s alle ations. 3e note that co'plainant did not even specify the alleged co''unication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her clai's were couched in general ter's and lac6ed specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged co''unication when he instituted a cri'inal action against her for falsification of public docu'ents because the cri'inal co'plaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annul'ent then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which will deter'ine the 'erit of her co'plaint. .he 0ourt cannot be involved in a guessing ga'e as to the e(istence of facts which the co'plainant 'ust prove. $ndeed, co'plainant failed to attend the hearings at the $B-. 3ithout any testi'ony fro' the co'plainant as to the specific confidential infor'ation allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not i'possible to deter'ine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged co''unication. Such confidential infor'ation is a crucial lin6 in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged co''unication between attorney and client. $t is not enough to 'erely assert the attorney,client privilege. .he burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege.

RULE 130: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE 7. ALMONTE V. VAS8UEZ, 22 SCRA 96 S!a!"#"n! $% !&" 'a(!): 1'buds'an Hasque* required 2ogado =0hief Accountant> and 2ivera =0hief of the 2ecords of a Section> of +cono'ic $ntelligence and $nvestigation Bureau> to produce all docu'ents relating to -ersonal Service 5unds of year !"" and all evidence for the whole plantilla of +$$B for !"". .he subpoena ducestecum was issued by the 1'buds'an in connection with his investigation of an anony'ous letter alleging that funds representing savings fro' unfilled positions in the +$$B had been illegally disbursed. Al'onte =for'er +$$B 0o''issioner> and -ere* =0hief of +$$B<s Budget and 5iscal Mg't. )ivision> deniedthe ano'alous activities that circulated around the +$$B office. 7raft $nvestigation 1fficer SaIo, found the co''ents unsatisfactory so he as6ed for authority to conduct a preli'inary investigationD issued a subpoena to Al'onte and -ere* for the' to sub'it their counter,affidavits and the affidavits of their witnessesDand the subpoena ducestecum to 0hief Accountant 2ogado..hey 'oved to quash the subpoena ducestecu'. .hey clai' privilege of an agency of the 7overn'ent. 1MBU)SMA8 HASJU+E granted the 'otion to quash the subpoena but denied their 'otion to quash the subpoena ducestecum. -etitioners were not being forced to produce evidence against the'selves, since the subpoena ducestecum was directed to the 0hief Accountant2ogado. S!a!"#"n! $% !&" I))u": 3hether petitioners can be ordered to produce docu'ents relating to personal services and salary vouchers of +$$B e'ployees Ru*+n,: :ES. A govern'ental privilege against disclosure is recogni*ed with respect to state secrets bearing on 'ilitary, diplo'atic and si'ilar 'atters. .his privilege is based upon public interest of such para'ount i'portance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citi*en, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights. But where the clai' of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect 'ilitary, diplo'atic or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality of his conversations, courts have declined to find in the 0onstitution an absolute privilege of the -resident against a subpoena considered essential to the enforce'ent of cri'inal laws. $n the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets !ill be disclosed by the production of records pertainin to the personnel of the %$$&. $ndeed, %$$&'s function is the atherin and evaluation of intelli ence reports and information re ardin (ille al activities affectin the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabota e, smu lin , tax evasion, dollar saltin .( 0onsequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it 'ay be sufficient to deter'ine fro' the circu'stances of the case that there is reasonable

RULE 130: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE danger that co'pulsion of the evidence will e(pose 'ilitary 'atters without co'pelling production, no si'ilar e(cuse can be 'ade for a privilege resting on other considerations. 01A 0ircular 8o. "",9!A, part H, 8o. ; reads: .he only ite' of e(penditure which should be treated as strictly confidential because it falls under the category of classified infor'ation is that relating to purchase of infor'ation and pay'ent of rewards. /owever, reasonable records should be 'aintained and 6ept for inspection of the 0hair'an, 01A or his duly authori*ed representative. All other e(penditures are to be considered unclassified supported by invoices, receipts and other docu'ents, and, therefore, sub4ect to reasonable inquiry by the 0hair'an or his duly authori*ed representative. $t should be noted that the regulation requires that Creasonable recordsC be 6ept 4ustifying the confidential or privileged character of the infor'ation relating to infor'ers. There are no such reasonable records in this case to substitute for the records claimed to be confidential. .he other statutes and regulations invo6ed by petitioners in support of their contention that the docu'ents sought in the subpoena duces tecum of the 1'buds'an are classified 'erely indicate the confidential nature of the +$$BFs functions, but they do not e(e'pt the +$$B fro' the duty to account for its funds to the proper authorities. $ndeed by denying that there were savings 'ade fro' certain ite's in the agency and alleging that the )BM had released to the +$$B only the allocations needed for the !:; personnel retained after its reorgani*ation, petitioners invited inquiry into the veracity of their clai'. $f, as they clai', the subpoenaed records have been e(a'ined by the 01A and found by it to be regular in all respects, there is no reason why they cannot be shown to another agency of the govern'ent which by constitutional 'andate is required to loo6 into any co'plaint concerning public office. The )mbudsman is investi atin a complaint that several items in the %$$& !ere filled by fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in 1*++ !ere used for ille al purposes. The plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his investi ation. ,e and his -eputies are desi nated by the .onstitution (protectors of the people( and as such they are re/uired by it (to act promptly on complaints in any form or manner a ainst public officials or employees of the 0overnment, or any subdivision, a ency or instrumentality thereof, includin overnment-o!ned or controlled corporation.( ,is need for the documents thus out!ei hs the claim of confidentiality of petitioners. Above all, even if the subpoenaed docu'ents are treated as presu'ptively privileged, this decision would only 4ustify ordering their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction. /owever, as concession to the nature of the functions of the +$$B and 4ust to be sure no infor'ation of a confidential character is disclosed, the e(a'ination of records in this case should be 'ade in strict confidence by the 1'buds'an hi'self. 2eference 'ay be 'ade to the docu'ents in any decision or order which the 1'buds'an 'ay render or issue but only to the e(tent that it will not reveal covert activities of the agency. Above all, there 'ust be a scrupulous protection of the docu'ents delivered.

RULE 130: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE ". C0AVEZ V. /CGG, 77 SCRA 722 S!a!"#"n! $% !&" 'a(!): Because of the several news reports referring to the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various accounts in Swiss ban6s and the reported e(ecution of a co'pro'ise, between the govern'ent =thru -077> and Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets, 0have* brought this action in court. /e de'ands that -077 'a6e public any and all negotiations and agree'ents pertaining to -077Fs tas6 of recovering the MarcosesF ill,gotten wealth and clai's that any co'pro'ise on the alleged ill,gotten wealth involves an issue of Cpara'ount public interest,C since it has a Cdebilitating effect on the countryFs econo'yC that would be greatly pre4udicial to the national interest of the 5ilipino people. /ence, the people in general have a right to 6now the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the govern'ent. 2espondents do not deny forging a co'pro'ise agree'ent with the Marcos heirs but they clai' that 0have*< action is pre'ature because there is no showing that he as6ed -077 to disclose the negotiations and the Agree'ents. And even if he has, -077 'ay not yet be co'pelled to 'a6e any disclosure, since the proposed ter's and conditions of the Agree'ents have not beco'e effective and binding. .hey further aver that the Marcos heirs have sub'itted the sub4ect Agree'ents to the Sandiganbayan for its approval and that the 2epublic opposed such 'ove because said Agree'ents have not been ratified by or even sub'itted to the -resident for approvalD and the heirs have failed to co'ply with their underta6ings therein, particularly the collation and sub'ission of an inventory of their assets. Acting on a 'otion of 0have*, the 0ourt issued a .21 , en4oining respondents, their agents andGor representatives fro' Centering into, or perfecting andGor e(ecuting any agree'ent with the heirs of the late Marcos relating to and concerning their ill,gotten wealth. S!a!"#"n! $% !&" I))u": 3hether 0have* has a right to respondentsF disclosure of any agree'ent that 'ay be arrived at concerning the MarcosesF purported ill,gotten wealth Ru*+n,: :ES. -077, its officers and all govern'ent functionaries and officials who are or 'ay be directly or indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill,gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are )$2+0.+) to disclose to the public the ter's of any proposed co'pro'ise settle'ent, as well as the final agree'ent, relating to such alleged ill,gotten wealth.

RULE 130: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE $n see6ing the public disclosure of negotiations and agree'ents pertaining to said co'pro'ise settle'ent, petitioner invo6es the following provisions of the 0onstitution:1ec. 2 3Article $$$4. .he right of the people to infor'ation on 'atters of public
concern shall be recogni*ed. Access to official records, and to docu'ents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to govern'ent research data used as basis for policy develop'ent, shall be afforded the citi*en, sub4ect to such li'itations as 'ay be provided by law. 1ec. 2+ 3Article $$4.Sub4ect to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and i'ple'ents a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

.he Cinfor'ationC and the CtransactionsC referred to in the sub4ect provisions have as yet no defined scope and e(tent. .here are no specific laws prescribing the e(act li'itations within which the right 'ay be e(ercised or the correlative state duty 'ay be obliged. /owever, the following are so'e of the recogni*ed restrictions: Limitations to the Right: (1) 5ational 1ecurity 6atters- At the very least, this 4urisdiction recogni*es the co''on law holding that there is a govern'ental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding 'ilitary, diplo'atic and other national security 'atters. But where there is no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege 'ay not be invo6ed to withhold docu'ents and other infor'ation, provided that they are e(a'ined Cin strict confidenceC and given Cscrupulous protection.CLi6ewise, infor'ation on inter,govern'ent e(changes prior to the conclusion of treaties and e(ecutive agree'ents 'ay be sub4ect to reasonable safeguards for the sa6e of national interest. (2) Trade 1ecrets and&an7in Transactions ,.he drafters of the 0onstitution also unequivocally affir'ed that, aside fro' national security 'atters and intelligence infor'ation, trade or industrial secrets =pursuant to the $ntellectual -roperty 0ode and other related laws> as well as ban6ing transactions =pursuant to the Secrecy of Ban6 )eposits Act> are also e(e'pted fro' co'pulsory disclosure. (8) .riminal 6atters, 0lassified law enforce'ent 'atters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of cri'inals, which courts 'ay not inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. +fforts at effective law enforce'ent would be seriously 4eopardi*ed by free public access to, for e(a'ple, police infor'ation regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert cri'inal activities. (9) )ther .onfidential$nformation- +thical Standards Act further prohibits public officials and e'ployees fro' using or divulging Cconfidential or classified infor'ation officially 6nown to the' by reason of their office and not 'ade available to the public.C .hese include diplo'atic correspondence, closed door 0abinet 'eetings and e(ecutive sessions of either house of 0ongress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supre'e 0ourt.

RULE 130: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE 1cope: 6atters of Public .oncern and Transactions $nvolvin Public $nterest $n general, writings co'ing into the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions 'ust be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of govern'ental affairs. .his principle is ai'ed at affording the people an opportunity to deter'ine whether those to who' they have entrusted the affairs of the govern'ent are honesty, faithfully and co'petently perfor'ing their functions as public servants. Undeniably, the essence of de'ocracy lies in the free flow of thoughtD but thoughts and ideas 'ust be well,infor'ed so that the public would gain a better perspective of vital issues confronting the' and, thus, be able to critici*e as well as participate in the affairs of the govern'ent in a responsible, reasonable and effective 'anner. 0ertainly, it is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited e(change of ideas a'ong a well,infor'ed public that a govern'ent re'ains responsive to the changes desired by the people. The 5ature of the 6arcoses' Alle ed $ll-0otten ;ealth AquinoFs +.1. , created the -077 to assist her in the recovery of vast govern'ent resources allegedly a'assed by Marcos, his fa'ily, relatives and close associates.Under +.1. 9, all persons and entities who had 6nowledge or possession of ill,gotten assets and properties were warned and, under pain of penalties prescribed by law, prohibited fro' concealing, transferring or dissipating the' or fro' otherwise frustrating or obstructing the recovery efforts of the govern'ent.+.1. : gives additional powers to the -077 which, ta6ing into account the overridin considerations of national interest and national survival , required it to achieve e(peditiously and effectively its vital tas6 of recovering ill,gotten wealth. ;ith such pronouncements of our overnment, !hose authority emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the 6arcoses' alle ed illotten !ealth is a matter of public concern and imbued !ith public interest. 3e 'ay also add that Cill,gotten wealth,C by its very nature, assu'es a public character. .he assets and properties referred to supposedly originated fro' the govern'ent itself. .o all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, sub4ect only to the satisfaction of positive clai's of certain persons as 'ay be ad4udged by co'petent courts. Another declared overriding consideration for the e(peditious recovery of ill, gotten wealth is that it 'ay be used for national econo'ic recovery.

RULE 130: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE D+;*$#a!+( an4 Na!+$na* S"(ur+!y Ma!!"r) 7. C0AVEZ V. /EA, 392 SCRA 15 S!a!"#"n! $% !&" 'a(!): 1n !;;, then -resident Marcos issued -. ). 8o. &": creating -ublic +state Authority which was tas6ed -+A Cto reclai' land, including foreshore and sub'erged areas,C and Cto develop, i'prove, acquire, ( ( ( lease and sell any and all 6inds of lands.C /e also issued -.). 8o. &"? transferring to -+A portions of the Manila bay. 1n !!?, -+A entered into a %oint Henture Agree'ent =C%HA> with AMA2$ which was a private corporation concerning a part of the reclai'ed lands. 1n !!", petitioner 5ran6 $. 0have* as a ta(payer, filed the instant -etition for Manda'us contending that the govern'ent stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by -+A of the reclai'ed lands to AMA2$. /e prays that -+A publicly disclose the ter's of any renegotiation of the %HA, invo6ing Section 9", Article $$, and Section ;, Article $$$, of the !"; 0onstitution on the right of the people to infor'ation on 'atters of public concern. Later, 0have* filed an 1'nibus Motion to require -+A to sub'it the ter's of the renegotiated -+A,AMA2$ contract a'ong others. 1n !!!, -+A and AMA2$ signed an A'ended %oint Henture Agree'ent =CA'ended %HA,C> which the then -resident +strada approved. )ue to the approval of the A'ended %HA by the 1ffice of the -resident, 0have* now prays that on Cconstitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void. S!a!"#"n! $% !&" I))u": 3hether the 0onstitutional 2ight to $nfor'ation includes official infor'ation on on,going negotiations before a final agree'ent Ru*+n,: @es. .he constitutional right to infor'ation includes official infor'ation on on, going negotiations before a final contract. .he infor'ation, however, 'ust constitute definite propositions by the govern'ent and should not cover recogni*ed e(ceptions li6e privileged infor'ation, 'ilitary and diplo'atic secrets and si'ilar 'atters affecting na!+$na* )"(ur+!y and public order. Section ;, Article $$$ and Section 9", Article $$ of the 0onstitution see6 to pro'ote transparency in policy,'a6ing and in the operations of the govern'ent, as well as provide the people sufficient infor'ation to e(ercise effectively other constitutional rights. -+A asserts, citing 0have* v. -077, that in cases of on,going negotiations the right to infor'ation is li'ited to Cdefinite propositions of the govern'ent.C .he 0ourt distinguished between the infor'ation which the law on public bidding requires -+A to disclose publicly, and the infor'ation which the constitutional right to infor'ation requires -+A to release to the public.

RULE 130: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE Before the consu''ation of the contract, -+A 'ust, on its own and without de'and fro' anyone, disclose to the public 'atters relating to the disposition of its property. $nfor'ation, however, on on,going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being underta6en by the bidding or review co''ittee is not i''ediately accessible under the right to infor'ation. 3hile the evaluation or review is still on,going, there are no Cofficial acts, transactions, or decisionsC on the bids or proposals. /owever, once the co''ittee 'a6es its official reco''endation, there arises a Cdefinite propositionC on the part of the govern'ent. 5ro' this 'o'ent, the publicFs right to infor'ation attaches, and any citi*en can access all the non,proprietary infor'ation leading to such definite proposition. $n 0have* v. -077, the 0ourt ruled as follows: C0onsidering the intent of the fra'ers of the 0onstitution, we believe that it is incu'bent upon the -077 and its officers, as well as other govern'ent representatives, to disclose sufficient public infor'ation on any proposed settle'ent they have decided to ta6e up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill,gotten wealth. Such infor'ation, though, 'ust pertain to definite propositions of the govern'ent, not necessarily to intra,agency or inter,agency reco''endations or co''unications during the stage when co''on assertions are still in the process of being for'ulated or are in the Ce(ploratoryC stage. .here is need, of course, to observe the sa'e restrictions on disclosure of infor'ation in general, as discussed earlier B such as on 'atters involving na!+$na* )"(ur+!y, 4+;*$#a!+( $r %$r"+,n r"*a!+$n), intelligence and other classified infor'ation.C 2equiring a consu''ated contract will 6eep the public in the dar6 until the contract and this negates the State policy of full transparency on 'atters of public concern, a situation which the fra'ers of the 0onstitution could not have intended. Such a require'ent will prevent the citi*enry fro' participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of 2ights.

RULE 130: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE E<"(u!+." /r+.+*"," 10. SENATE V. ERMITA, 299 SCRA 1 S!a!"#"n! $% !&" 'a(!): .he Senate conducted an investigation and issued invitations to various officials of the +(ecutive depart'ent as resource spea6ers in a public hearing on the 8orth 2ail pro4ect. Said public hearing was spar6ed by a privilege speech of Sen. +nrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the said pro4ect. .he Senate 0o''ittee on 8ational )efense and Security li6ewise issued invitations to officials of the A51n Septe'ber 9", 9&&?, +(ecutive +r'ita sent a letter to the Senate requesting postpone'ent of the hearing. 1n the sa'e day, then -resident Arroyo issued +1 :#: requiring heads of depart'ents to obtain the consent of the -resident before they can validly appear before investigations including Senate $nquiry. $t also granted "<"(u!+." ;r+.+*"," on all classified or confidential infor'ation between the -resident and the public officers covered by the +1. )espite this develop'ent, the investigation pushed through, with only 0ol. Balutan and Brig. 7en. 7udani a'ong all the A5- officials invited attending. Both were subsequently relieved for defying the -resident<s order. .hese petitions were therefore filed assailing the constitutionality of +(ecutive 1rder :#:. S!a!"#"n! $% !&" I))u": 3hether or not +.1. :#: is unconstitutional for contravening the -ower of $nquiry of the Senate Ru*+n,: .he S0 ruled that +1 :#: is constitutional in part. .o deter'ine the validity of the provisions of +1 :#:, the S0 distinguished Section 9 fro' Section 99 of Art. H$ of the !"; 0onstitution. .he 0ongress< power of inquiry is e(pressly recogni*ed in Section 9 of Article H$ of the 0onstitution. Although there is no provision in the 0onstitution e(pressly investing either /ouse of 0ongress with power to 'a6e investigations and e(act testi'ony to the end that it 'ay e(ercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be i'plied. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of infor'ation respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or changeD and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite infor'ation B which is not infrequently true B recourse 'ust be had to others who do possess it. Section 99 on the other hand provides for the Juestion /our. .he Juestion /our is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely a co'ple'ent to or a supple'ent of the Legislative $nquiry. .he appearance of the 'e'bers of 0abinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of chec6 and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.

RULE 130: TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE Section 99 refers only to Juestion /our, whereas, Section 9 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that 'atter, 'ay be su''oned and if he refuses, he can be held in conte'pt of the /ouse. A distinction was thus 'ade between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. 3hile attendance was 'eant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was co'pulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 9 and 99, therefore, while closely related and co'ple'entary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the sa'e power of 0ongress. 1ne specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the ai' of which is to elicit infor'ation that 'ay be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the ob4ective of which is to obtain infor'ation in pursuit of 0ongress< oversight function. Ulti'ately, the power of 0ongress to co'pel the appearance of e(ecutive officials under Section 9 and the lac6 of it under Section 99 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. 3hile the e(ecutive branch is a co,equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of 0ongress to legislate by refusing to co'ply with its de'ands for infor'ation. 3hen 0ongress e(ercises its power of inquiry, the only way for depart'ent heads to e(e'pt the'selves therefro' is by a valid clai' of e(ecutive privilege. .hey are not e(e'pt by the 'ere fact that they are depart'ent heads. 1nly one e(ecutive official 'ay be e(e'pted fro' this power K the -resident on who' e(ecutive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of 0ongress e(cept through the power of i'peach'ent. $t is based on her being the highest official of the e(ecutive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co,equal branch of govern'ent which is sanctioned by a long,standing custo'. .he require'ent then to secure presidential consent under Section of +.1 :#:, li'ited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. 5or under Section 99, Article H$ of the 0onstitution, the appearance of depart'ent heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section cannot, however, be applied to appearances of depart'ent heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. 0ongress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the depart'ent head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid clai' of privilege is subsequently 'ade, either by the -resident herself or by the +(ecutive Secretary.