CANON 1, SECTION 2, FULL TEXT 1 OF 2 EN BANC [A.M. No. MTJ-01-1366. February 7, 2003.] ATTY. MARIA ELISSA F.

VELEZ, complainant, vs. Judge RODRIGO R. FLORES, MTC-Branch 2, San Fernando, Pampanga, respondent. SYNOPSIS Complainant Maria Elissa F. Velez, a practicing lawyer, charged respondent Judge Rodrigo R. Flores, MTC-Branch 2, San Fernando, Pampanga, with incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Complainant filed, on behalf of her client-parents, an ejectment case against Jaime Mendoza, Florante Salonga, Eduardo Vital and Ernesto Romero. Because of their failure to reach an amicable settlement during the preliminary conference, the parties were directed to file their respective position papers. When complainant followed up the case with the branch clerk of court, respondent judge told her that she should try giving financial assistance to the defendants. He then asked her to repeat the offer her parents had made to each defendant. The investigating Judge found respondent guilty of soliciting money from complainant and of deliberately delaying the resolution of the case to get the pay-off, and recommended his dismissal from the service. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) concurred in the Investigating Judge's finding that respondent was guilty of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Although there was no conclusive proof that he had demanded or received any money from complainant in connection with the ejectment case, his administrative culpability was sufficiently demonstrated by evidence that he had interceded in the collection case involving complainant's grandmother and the Punzalan spouses. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Judge and the Office of the Court Administrator. Respondent's act of brokering for a fee as settlement in the collection case is bribery and a judge who extorts money from a partylitigant who has a case before the court commits a serious misconduct. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Under Rule 2.04 of the same Code, Judges must refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency. The Court stressed that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than other persons not vested with public trust and confidence. They should bring honor to the judiciary. The influence-peddling or intercession in a case by respondent Judge was reprehensible. He has placed the judiciary as a whole in a bad light. His corrupt practices clearly showed his unfitness to remain in his judicial robe. Respondent judge was dismissed from the service. DHcESI SYLLABUS 1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; JUDICIAL INDOLENCE IS CONSIDERED GROSS NEGLIGENCE OR INEFFICIENCY AND GROSS DERELICTION OF DUTY. This Court concurs in the findings of the investigating Judge and the OCA. Judicial indolence is considered gross negligence or inefficiency, and gross dereliction of duty. Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, requires that judges dispose of court business promptly and decide cases within the periods prescribed by law. It cannot be disputed that respondent failed to promulgate his Decision on the ejectment case within the period provided under the law. The Rules on Summary Procedure states that a first-level court must render judgment within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers or upon the expiration of the period for filing. Should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may during that period require the parties to submit affidavits or other pieces of evidence within ten (10) days. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits or upon the expiration of the period for their filing. In this case, the parties submitted their respective position papers on December 9, 1999; thus the case was deemed submitted for decision on that date. Accordingly, the Decision should have been rendered not later than January 8, 2000. However, respondent rendered it only on June 13, 2000, five months after the case had been submitted for decision. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BROKERING FOR A FEE AS SETTLEMENT OF A CASE IS BRIBERY. Complainant amply demonstrated the propensity of respondent for demanding money from litigants and/or their lawyers by citing an instance when he had actually brokered the amicable settlement of a collection case involving her client. Complainant attached a copy of her PLDT phone bill and of the letter written to her by respondent, who visited her in her office on December 19, 1997, as proofs that he had negotiated for the amount of P5,000 and a bottle of Fundador brandy in exchange for his help in the collection case. Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection with the performance of official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received. Respondent's act of brokering, for a fee, a settlement in the collection case is bribery. It is a serious offense under the amendments to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and under the September 11, 2001 En Banc Resolution in AM No. 01-8-10-SC. This offense merits sanctions ranging from a fine of P20,000 to P40,000; to dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of one's benefits, and disqualification from appointment to any public office.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; A JUDGE WHO EXTORTS MONEY FROM A PARTY-LITIGANT COMMITS SERIOUS MISCONDUCT. A Judge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the court commits a serious misconduct. This Court condemns such act in the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been committed by one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Under Rule 2.04 of the same Code, Judges must refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency. It is significant to stress that they are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than other persons not vested with public trust and confidence. They should bring honor to the judiciary. The influence-peddling or intercession in a case by respondent Judge was reprehensible. He has placed the judiciary as a whole in a bad light. His corrupt practices clearly show his unfitness to remain in his judicial robe. SIacTE DECISION PER CURIAM p: Atty. Maria Elissa F. Velez charges Judge Rodrigo R. Flores of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 2, San Fernando, Pampanga, with incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The charges are relative to a case for ejectment, Civil Case No. 7946 entitled " Spouses Jose and Lina Velez vs. Jaime Mendoza, Florante Salonga, Eduardo Vital and Ernesto Romero." The pertinent Sworn Administrative Complaint 1 was filed by complainant with the Office of Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga on June 13, 2000. The Complaint was then endorsed by Judge Sunga to the Office of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. 2 It was later referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo for appropriate action. 3 Atty. Velez narrated in her Complaint that she had filed, on behalf of her client-parents, an ejectment case against Jaime Mendoza, Florante Salonga, Eduardo Vital and Ernesto Romero. Because of their failure to reach an amicable settlement during the preliminary conference, the parties were directed to file their respective position papers. They did so on December 9, 1999, after which the case was deemed submitted for resolution. On March 14, 2000, complainant moved ex-parte for the early resolution 4 of the case within thirty days from receipt of her Motion. She argued that three months had already elapsed since the parties filed their respective position papers. She filed a second Ex Parte Motion for Early Resolution 5 on April 24, 2000. On May 2 and May 9, 2000, complainant personally followed up her motions with Ramoncito Serrano, Clerk of Court of Branch 2, but to no avail. On May 23, 2000, she attended the hearing of the three criminal cases before the sala of respondent Judge. As she was preparing to leave, he summoned her and told her that he was very busy, but would render his decision soon. Then, in a low, conspiratorial tone, he allegedly said, "'[C]an you consider giving to me . . . your offer of financial assistance to the defendants?' (Baka p[w]ede mo na lang ibigay sa akin iyong offer mo sa mga kalaban ninyo ?)" She pretended not to have heard anything, gave him a blank stare, and immediately left the court premises. On May 31, 2000, complainant again followed up the case with Clerk of Court Serrano. Told that respondent Judge had not yet arrived, she proceeded to another court to wait. Serrano followed her there and asked her to go to the sala of respondent, who wanted to talk to her. The Judge allegedly told her that the Decision would be finished either on June 3 or June 5, 2000 at the latest. He also said, within hearing distance of his staff, that she should try giving financial assistance to the defendants. He then asked her to repeat the offer her parents had made to each defendant. Complying with his request, she said that her parents had offered P5,000 to each of the four defendants, so that they would peacefully vacate the lot. She allegedly gathered from his tone and demeanor that he was expecting her to give to him, instead of to the defendants, the full amount of P20,000. On two separate occasions, the secretary of complainant phoned the office of respondent Judge to inquire whether a decision had already been rendered. One of the staff members in Branch 2, a certain Max, informed her that although it had not yet been signed, it had already been drafted by respondent Judge on June 5, 2000. A certain Cindy gave her the same information, except for the date, which was supposedly June 9, 2000.

Immediately thereafter, complainant manifested in writing that she would bring the matter to the attention of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). And when she found out that there was no draft decision filed with the records of the case, she proceeded to the Office of Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga, before whom she narrated the foregoing facts. Then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo referred the Sworn Complaint to respondent Judge for comment. 6

In his Comment 7 dated August 24, 2000, respondent averred that he had already promulgated his Decision on the ejectment case on June 13, 2000. He said that he had tried his best to render the Decision at the earliest possible time, but that a delay in its promulgation ensued because of his clogged court docket. This fact had supposedly been acknowledged even by complainant in her first Ex Parte Motion for Early Resolution. He further argued that the delay, which was not "undue," had also been brought about by his research on applicable jurisprudence. These, according to him, were "strong and justifiable reason[s] for [his] failure to decide the case within the reglementary period of ninety days." 8 Moreover, respondent dismissed the allegation of complainant that she would not be able to appear and handle her other cases before his court in the future for fear of his reprisal. He reasoned that he was not a vengeful person, and that he always decided cases on their merits. He also denied that his tone and demeanor during his conversation with complainant implied that he was expecting her to give him the same amount that her parents were willing to give the defendants. This conclusion allegedly existed only in Atty. Velez's fertile imagination. He said that "not even in joke or jest did [he] ask complainant to give [him] P5,000 or P20,000." 9 The Court re-docketed the Complaint as a regular administrative matter 10 and referred it to Executive Judge Adelaida Ala-Medina of the RTC, Branch 45, San Fernando, Pampanga, for investigation, report and recommendation. 11 During the investigation, complainant executed a Supplemental Affidavit 12 to support her claim that the ejectment case was "not the first time Judge Flores asked for money from [her]." She attached a letter 13 dated December 19, 1997 addressed to a certain "Tita Eliza," who complainant claimed was actually she. The letter, she said, was proof that respondent Judge had interceded for the amicable settlement of a collection case she was handling. In return for his intercession, he allegedly demanded from her P5,000 and a bottle of Fundador brandy. 14 On January 2, 2002, Judge Flores filed his Reply to the Supplemental Affidavit of complainant, 15 stating that her letter had not established his culpability for the P5,000 pay-off. According to him, the letter was actually a proof that he and Atty. Velez were on good terms at the time, as evidenced by the salutation "Dear Tita Eliza" and his affectionate closing remark "Your nephew." He alleged that the lawyer had filed the administrative Complaint, simply to get back at him for the delayed promulgation of his Decision on the ejectment case. Lastly, he denied receiving the bottle of Fundador brandy, claiming he was diabetic and was not allowed to take hard drinks. In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation, 16 Executive Judge Ala-Medina found complainant's assertions more credible than those of respondent Judge for the following reasons: "Firstly, Atty. Velez has nothing to gain from accusing Judge Flores with corrupt practices. At the time Atty. Velez filed the administrative complaint on June 13, 2000, she did not know that the judge had already rendered a decision on the same day. To her mind then, she was taking a big risk in making the accusation due to the pending case. Moreover, aside from the ejectment case, Atty. Velez had four (4) other criminal cases pending with Judge Flores at that time. She was very much vulnerable to retaliation from Judge Flores but she came out with her allegations of corruption nonetheless. Hence, the probabilities strongly suggest that Atty. Velez was motivated by her desire to speak the truth. Assuming for argument's sake that the administrative complaint was a tactic to secure a favorable ruling, Atty. Velez could have withdrawn or abandoned the case after she got a favorable ruling in the ejectment case. Yet, her efforts did not wane and she even filed a Supplementary Affidavit to bolster her allegations more than a year after filing the complaint. It would be difficult to sustain such . . . single-minded zeal if Atty. Velez were only after personal advantage. "Second, although the December 1997 letter of Judge Flores to Atty. Velez does not conclusively prove that Judge Flores demanded or received money from Atty. Velez, it raises disturbing questions on the judge's motives and conduct. Contrary to the judge's explanation, the letter does not merely establish the good relations between the parties at that time. The undersigned sees in the letter an attempt to conceal his motives with the false statement suggesting that they are relatives when in fact they are not. It may be a way to mislead anyone who chances upon the letter and sanitize its contents. Being a trial judge, respondent is not expected to be careless enough to document his extortion activities on paper. But the letter was a lapse in judgment since it raises questions on respondent's conduct and reinforces the truth of complainant's allegations. "Third, even without conclusively establishing that Judge Flores demanded money, the December 19, 1997 letter nonetheless shows that the judge was interceding on behalf of a litigant, in a case pending before another judge. . . . As a judge, respondent must be the first to protect and uphold the integrity of his profession by shielding his colleagues from pressure by litigants. Instead, respondent, aware of his influence or perhaps ascendancy over some of his colleagues, allowed himself to be used by litigants to pressure a judge. Indeed, efforts to [reach a compromise in] a case are laudable but incumbent judges should not undertake them because it tarnishes their image and raises suspicions that they are doing so out of financial considerations. . . . . " 17

Hence, the investigating Judge found respondent guilty of soliciting money from complainant and of "deliberately delay[ing] the resolution of the case to get the pay-off." She recommended his dismissal from the service. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) concurred in Judge Medina's findings that respondent was guilty of violating the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. 18 Although there was no conclusive proof that he had demanded or received any money from complainant in connection with the ejectment case, his administrative culpability was sufficiently demonstrated by evidence that he had interceded in the collection case involving complainant's grandmother and the Punzalan spouses. This Court concurs in the findings of the investigating Judge and the OCA. Judicial indolence is considered gross negligence 19 or inefficiency, 20 and gross dereliction of duty. 21Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, requires that judges dispose of court business promptly and decide cases within the periods prescribed by law. 22 It cannot be disputed that respondent failed to promulgate his Decision on the ejectment case within the period provided under the law. The Rules on Summary Procedure states that a first-level court must render judgment within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers or upon the expiration of the period for filing. 23 Should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may during that period require the parties to submit affidavits or other pieces of evidence within ten (10) days. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits or upon the expiration of the period for their filing. 24 In this case, the parties submitted their respective position papers on December 9, 1999; thus the case was deemed submitted for decision on that date. Accordingly, the Decision should have been rendered not later than January 8, 2000. However, respondent rendered it only on June 13, 2000, five months after the case had been submitted for decision. The reason for the adoption of the Rules on Summary Procedure is precisely to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases. It is therefore anomalous when a Judge causes the delay sought to be prevented by the Rule. 25 The need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously cannot be overemphasized, for justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. Furthermore, complainant amply demonstrated the propensity of respondent for demanding money from litigants and/or their lawyers by citing an instance when he had actually brokered the amicable settlement of a collection case involving her client. Complainant attached a copy of her PLDT phone bill and of the letter written to her by respondent, who visited her in her office on December 19, 1997, as proofs that he had negotiated for the amount of P5,000 and a bottle of Fundador brandy in exchange for his help in the collection case. Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection with the performance of official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received. 26 Respondent's act of brokering, for a fee, a settlement in the collection case is bribery. It is a serious offense under the amendments to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and under the September 11, 2001 En Banc Resolution in AM No. 01-8-10-SC. 27 This offense merits sanctions ranging from a fine of P20,000 to P40,000; to dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of one's benefits, and disqualification from appointment to any public office. 28

A Judge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the court commits a serious misconduct. This Court condemns such act in the strongest possible terms. 29Particularly because it has been committed by one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts. 30 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. 31 Under Rule 2.04 of the same Code, Judges must refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency. It is significant to stress that they are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than other persons not vested with public trust and confidence. They should bring honor to the judiciary. 32 The influence-peddling or intercession in a case by respondent Judge was reprehensible. He has placed the judiciary as a whole in a bad light. His corrupt practices clearly show his unfitness to remain in his judicial robe. 33 WHEREFORE, Judge Rodrigo Flores of the Municipal Trial Court (Branch 2) of San Fernando, Pampanga is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits excluding earned leave and vacation benefits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities including government-owned and controlled corporations. This Decision is immediately executory. Respondent Judge is further ordered to cease and desist from discharging the functions of his Office upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personnel records of respondent. STaHIC

SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1. Signed by Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42, San Fernando, Pampanga; rollo, pp. 47. 2. See 1st Indorsement dated June 20, 2000; rollo, p. 2. 3. See 2nd Indorsement dated June 27, 2000; rollo, p. 1. 4. Rollo, pp. 8-9. 5. Id., pp. 10-11. 6. See 1st Indorsement dated July 20, 2000; rollo, p. 21. 7. Id., pp. 23-26. 8. Comment, p. 2; rollo, p. 24. 9. Id., pp. 4 & 25. 10. See Resolution dated July 11, 2001, p. 46. 11. See Resolution dated September 3, 2001, p. 47. 12. Rollo, pp. 95-96. 13. Rollo, p. 97. The letter reads: "Dec. 19, 1997 Dear Tita Eliza, Mr. Erning Punzalan came to my office & ask[ed] me to help his wife regarding their case filed by you w/c I do not know b/c I have not received any. Anyway, Mr. Punzalan wants me to help them settle the case w/ you amicably. I told them to talk to you provided that they will pay their obligation. They want to do so by installment, are you agreeable to that? Please call the house 926-25-13 tonight. T.Y. Your nephew. (sgd) RFlores" 14. Supplemental Affidavit, par. 7; rollo, p. 96. 15. Rollo, pp. 57-60. 16. Id., pp. 180-185. 17. Investigation, Report and Recommendation, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 183-184. 18. See OCA Report; rollo, pp. 195-202. 19. Cuevas vs. Balderian, 334 SCRA 242, 245 (2000). 20. Yu-Asensi vs. Villanueva, 322 SCRA 255, 270 (2000); Saylo vs. Rojo, 330 SCRA 243, 248 (2000); Office of the Court Administrator vs. Salva, 336 SCRA 133, 141 (2000). 21. Gallego vs. Doronila, 334 SCRA 339, 343 (2000).

22. Millare vs. Valera, 325 SCRA 434, 439 (2000); Office of the Court Administrator vs. Panganiban, 277 SCRA 499, 503 (1997). 23. Sec. 10, Rules on Summary Procedure. 24. Uy vs. Medina, 342 SCRA 393, 400 (2000); Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Brs. 87 & 98, QC, 338 SCRA 141, 147 (2000); Enriquez vs. Camarista, 280 SCRA 1, 4-5 (1997); and Cruz vs. Pascual, 244 SCRA 111, 114 (1995). 25. Cuevas vs. Balderian, supra; Quilal-lan vs. Delos Santos, 338 SCRA 653, 655-656 (2000). 26. Art. 210, Revised Penal Code. 27. Rule 140, Sec. 8 (1), Rules of Court. 28. Sec. 11, Rules of Court. 29. Haw Tay vs. Singayao, 154 SCRA 107, 111 (1987); Quiz vs. Castao, 107 SCRA 196, 203-204 (1981); Nazareno vs. Almario, 268 SCRA 657, 665 (1997). 30. Haw Tay vs. Singayao, supra, p. 112. 31. Dumo vs. Perez, 322 SCRA 545, 558 (2000). 32. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge De Guzman Jr. 267 SCRA 291, 301 (1997); Nazareno vs. Almario, supra, pp. 664-665. 33. Magarang vs. Jardin Sr., 330 SCRA 79, 89-90 (2000).

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CANON 1, SECTION 2, FULL TEXT 2 OF 2 THIRD DIVISION [A.M. No. MTJ-99-1221. March 16, 2000.] (Formerly OCA IPI No. 98-524-MTJ) JOSEFINA M. VILLANUEVA, complainant, vs. JUDGE BENJAMIN E. ALMAZAN, respondent. SYNOPSIS There is an administrative case instituted by Josefina M. Villanueva against Judge Benjamin E. Almazan for gross ignorance of the law, abuse of discretion, partiality and gross misconduct. On October 9, 1987, the complainant filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Santo Tomas, La Union, presided over by respondent Judge, two (2) Complaints for Grave Oral Defamation against one Teresita Nabayan. On the same day, the respondent Judge, conducted a "preliminary examination," after which he issued an order downgrading the crimes charged to simple slander. The trial court denied complainant's motion for reconsideration. On January 20, 1998, the day before the scheduled arraignment and pre-trial in the said cases, complainant asked Judge Benjamin E. Almazan to inhibit from the said cases on the ground that he used to be a law partner of the defense counsel. The request was denied.HAaDcS The Court Administrator found respondent judge administratively liable and recommended that he be fined Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. The Supreme Court found merit in the recommendation of the Court Administrator. The original charges for grave oral defamation were cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and did not require preliminary investigation. Preliminary investigation is only required for those cognizable by the Regional Trial Court. Hence, in conducting the preliminary investigation under attack, the respondent judge exceeded his authority under the pertinent rules. Consequently, the respondent judge was devoid of jurisdiction or authority to reduce the charge to simple slander. The respondent judge showed his ignorance not only of the scope of his authority to conduct preliminary investigation but also of the procedure to follow in conducting a preliminary investigation. Where, as in this case, the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Concerning the refusal of respondent judge to inhibit from the cases in question, the Court was not convinced of the need therefor. The private prosecutor did not file the required motion for inhibition, an omission which was interpreted as abandonment of the stance of the complainant to inhibit the respondent Judge from hearing subject cases. SYLLABUS 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; NOT REQUIRED FOR CRIMINAL CASES COGNIZABLE BY MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT. Contrary to the clear mandate of Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 9, of the same Rules, the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation culminating in the lowering of the charge to simple slander. The original charge for grave oral defamation is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, while simple slander is punishable by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos. Thus, the original charges were cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and did not require a preliminary investigation. The proper action the respondent judge could have taken under the premises was to dismiss the complaint if found to be without any basis for further proceedings or if warranted, to issue a warrant of arrest for the respondent, and after arrest, to hold him for trial. It is decisively clear that in conducting the preliminary investigation under attack, the respondent judge exceeded his authority under the pertinent rules.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIRED FOR CRIMINAL CASES COGNIZABLE BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DEVOID OF JURISDICTION TO REDUCE CHARGE OF GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION TO SIMPLE SLANDER; CASE AT BAR. In his Comment, respondent judge was careful to refer to his challenged action as a preliminary examination. Be that as it may, when he concluded that the proper charge should be simple slander, after examining the complainant and her witnesses in subject criminal cases, respondent Judge, in effect, conducted a preliminary investigation. Not only was such preliminary investigation defective; it was a patent error because no preliminary investigation is required for criminal cases cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts. It is only required for those cognizable by the Regional Trial Court. Consequently, the respondent judge was devoid of jurisdiction or authority to reduce the charge to simple slander. 3. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; WHERE LAW INVOLVED IS SIMPLE AND ELEMENTARY, LACK OF CONVERSANCE THEREWITH CONSTITUTES GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. The respondent judge showed his ignorance not only of the scope of his authority to conduct preliminary investigation but also of the procedure to follow in conducting a preliminary investigation. Where, as in this case, the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence requires no less. 4. ID.; ID.; ACTION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE IN PROCEEDING WITH ARRAIGNMENT WITHOUT PARTICIPATION OF GOVERNMENT PROSECUTOR CONSIDERED ERRONEOUS; PUBLIC PROSECUTOR MUST BE AFFORDED OPPORTUNITY TO INTERVENE IN ALL STAGES OF PROCEEDINGS. Equally erroneous was the action of respondent judge in proceeding with the arraignment of the accused in subject criminal cases without the participation of a government prosecutor. The Court need not belabor the point that as the officer in charge of prosecuting criminal cases for the government, rudiments of due process require that the public prosecutor must be afforded an opportunity to intervene in all stages of the proceedings. Here, it cannot be denied that the public prosecutor assigned to handle Criminal Cases Nos. 3097 and 3098 was not notified by respondent judge of the scheduled trial of said cases. That the public prosecutor in the said criminal cases had an arrangement with the respondent Judge as early as June 1997 that trial of cases requiring his appearance be transferred from the previous Tuesday schedule to Wednesdays, did not excuse the failure of the latter to notify the former of the scheduled trial on January 21, 1998 (a Wednesday) in subject criminal cases. 5. ID.; ID.; INHIBITION; FAILURE OF COMPLAINANT TO FILE REQUIRED MOTION CONSIDERED AN ABANDONMENT OF HIS STANCE TO INHIBIT RESPONDENT JUDGE FROM HEARING SUBJECT CASES. Concerning the refusal of respondent judge to inhibit from the cases in question, the Court is not convinced of the need therefor. In this connection, the Court Administrator observed that the complainant wrote respondent judge, asking him to inhibit from subject criminal cases, but a formal motion therefor was necessary so that the alleged grounds thereof could be ventilated properly. As a matter of fact, the request or motion for inhibition was taken up during the scheduled arraignment of the accused on November 12, 1997, when the private prosecutor asked the respondent Judge to inhibit himself from subject cases. Acting thereupon, respondent judge ordered the lawyer to file the corresponding motion within five (5) days from receipt of the Order; and in the meantime, he suspended the arraignment of the accused. However, the private prosecutor did not file the required motion for inhibition, an omission which was interpreted as abandonment of the stance of the complainant to inhibit the respondent Judge from hearing subject cases. DECISION PURISIMA, J p: At bar is an administrative case instituted by Josefina M. Villanueva against Judge Benjamin E. Almazan for gross ignorance of the law, abuse of discretion, partiality and gross misconduct. dctai The verified letter-complaint 1 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator averred that the acts of Judge Benjamin E. Almazan complained of were committed as follows:

On October 9, 1997, the complainant filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Santo Tomas, La Union, presided over by respondent Judge, two (2) Complaints for Grave Oral Defamation against one Teresita Nabayan, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3097 and 3098, respectively. On the same day, the respondent Judge, conducted a "preliminary examination," after which he issued the following Order downgrading the crimes charged to simple slander, to wit: "The Court conducted the necessary preliminary examination to determine the existence of probable cause by asking searching questions to the witnesses for the prosecution. In the course of investigation, the Court is convinced that the offense committed by the accused was just simple slander. In view of the findings of the Court in the two (2) entitled cases, the accused is hereby ordered to submit her counteraffidavit including that of her witness/es well as exhibits or evidence/s if there be any within ten (10) days from receipt of this order. Failure on her part to comply with his order, she is barred to present evidence during the trial of this case." On November 21, 1997, the complainant presented a Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration, contending that the aforesaid action of respondent judge does not accord with the Rules of Court under which the judge has no authority to downgrade subject accusation from grave oral defamation to simple slander. In due time, the motion for reconsideration2 was denied for failure of the private prosecutor 3 to get the conformity thereto of the public prosecutor. 4 On January 20, 1998, the day before the scheduled arraignment and pre-trial in the said cases, complainant asked for the inhibition of Judge Benjamin E. Almazan from the said cases on the ground that the latter used to be a law partner of the defense counsel. Said request or motion for inhibition, which was denied, infuriated the respondent Judge who then subjected her (Complainant) to verbal abuse. When asked why he downgraded the charge to that of simple slander, respondent Judge explained to the complainant that he did so "because your answers were wrong." cdrep

On January 21, 1998, accused Teresita Nabayan was arraigned in the absence of the public prosecutor, who did not receive any calendar of cases for that day. The same complaint sought to have Clerk of Court Violeta R. Villanueva investigated for blatant partiality and influence peddling, alleging that the latter discussed the cases during mahjong sessions where she entertained some litigants. Also, she (Violeta R. Villanueva) refused to officially receive the pleading of the herein complainant so as not to mess up the records, and was only forced to receive the same when she got a dressing down from the lawyer of complainant. Respondent Judge and respondent Violeta R. Villanueva submitted their Comments, dated December 24, 1998, which the Office of the Court Administrator received on January 18, 1999. Explaining his aforementioned action complained of, respondent Judge contended that he conducted a preliminary examination of the complainant and her two (2) eyewitnesses, and thereafter, arrived at the conclusion that the acts allegedly committed were not grave oral defamation, as averred in the complaint, such that he issued his questioned Order to the effect that the accused in subject cases should be charged with simple slander only. Respondent Judge theorized that his trouble with the complainant started when he denied her motion in subject criminal cases to amend the Complaint so as to reflect the correct dates of commission of the crimes charged, and the complainant was incensed by the failure of the court to grant her motion, and by the adverse effect on complainant's position of the action thus taken by respondent judge in the said cases when she requested him to inhibit therefrom. Respondent Judge maintained that the denial of the motion for reconsideration of complainant was proper because amendment of the complaint could only be made with the conformity of the public prosecutor who intervened to prosecute the said cases.

Respondent Clerk of Court Violeta R. Villanueva denied the allegations of the complaint, branding the same baseless, motivated by ill will and a mere harassment, considering that she has no power to influence or interfere with the issuance of the orders, decisions, or actuations of respondent judge. She brushed aside as blatant lies the allegation that she attends mahjong sessions during office hours and entertains thereat litigants who need her services. That she discussed cases during such sessions is a mere speculation, since the complainant could not have gotten such information as she spent most of her time in Manila. prcd As regards the accusation that she was taking sides, this respondent maintained that the same is a fabrication by the complainant who wanted to impose her will upon the court. On July 27, 1999, there was received from the Court Administrator 5 the report finding respondent judge administratively liable and recommending that he be fined Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. The same report recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Violeta R. Villanueva for insufficiency of evidence. 6 In response to the Resolution of the Court dated August 23, 1999, respondent Judge manifested in a letter, dated September 20, 1999, that he was submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings and records. The principal issues for resolution here concern the propriety of the preliminary investigation conducted by respondent judge, and the arraignment of the accused in subject criminal cases. Corollarily, the downgrading of the said cases, and denial of complainant's motion to inhibit respondent judge from trying the same cases are denounced. After a thorough examination of the report and the records on hand, the Court finds merit in the recommendation of the Court Administrator. The root of the controversy is the unfamiliarity of respondent judge with the rules applicable in cases requiring preliminary investigation. Cdpr Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court reads: SECTION 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. 7 Section 9, of the same Rules provides: SECTION 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. xxx xxx xxx (b) Where filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court. If the complaint or information is filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court, the procedure provided for in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall likewise be observed. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant of arrest after personally examining in writing an under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. Contrary to the clear mandate of the aforestated rules, the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation culminating in the lowering of the charge to simple slander. The original charge for grave oral defamation is punishable 8 by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, while simple slander is punishable byarresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos. Thus, the original charges were cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and did not require a preliminary investigation. The proper action the respondent judge could have taken under the premises was to dismiss the complaint if found to be without any basis for further

proceedings or if warranted, to issue a warrant of arrest for the respondent, and after arrest, to hold him for trial. It is decisively clear that in conducting the preliminary investigation under attack, the respondent judge exceeded his authority under the pertinent rules. prcd In his Comment, respondent judge was careful to refer to his challenged action as a preliminary examination. Be that as it may, when he concluded that the proper charge should be simple slander, after examining the complainant and her witnesses in subject criminal cases, respondent Judge, in effect, conducted a preliminary investigation. Not only was such preliminary investigation defective; it was a patent error because no preliminary investigation is required for criminal cases cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts. It is only required for those cognizable by the Regional Trial Court. 9 Consequently, the respondent judge was devoid of jurisdiction or authority to reduce the charge to simple slander. Furthermore, in Bagunas vs. Fabillar, 10 the Court reiterated that under the new rules of procedure, preliminary investigation has only one stage, viz.: "(u)nder the old rules, the preliminary investigation conducted by a municipal judge had two stages: (1) the preliminary examination stage during which the investigating judge determines whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial; and (2) the preliminary investigation proper where the complaint or information is read to the accused after his arrest and he is informed of the substance of the evidence adduced against him, after which he is allowed to present evidence in his favor if he so desires. Presidential Decree 911, upon which the present rule is based, removed the preliminary examination stage and integrated it into the preliminary investigation proper. Now, the proceedings consist only of one stage." (Italics supplied) In the present cases, the respondent judge showed his ignorance not only of the scope of his authority to conduct preliminary investigation 11 but also of the procedure to follow in conducting a preliminary investigation. Where, as in this case, the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence requires no less. 12 Equally erroneous was the action of respondent judge in proceeding with the arraignment of the accused in subject criminal cases without the participation of a government prosecutor. The Court need not belabor the point that as the officer in charge of prosecuting criminal cases for the government, rudiments of due process require that the public prosecutor must be afforded an opportunity to intervene in all stages of the proceedings. Here, it cannot be denied that the public prosecutor assigned to handle Criminal Cases Nos. 3097 and 3098 was not notified by respondent judge of the scheduled trial of said cases. That the public prosecutor in the said criminal cases had an arrangement with the respondent Judge as early as June 1997 that trial of cases requiring his appearance be transferred from the previous Tuesday schedule to Wednesdays, did not excuse the failure of the latter to notify the former of the scheduled trial on January 21, 1998 (a Wednesday) in subject criminal cases. cdtai Concerning the refusal of respondent judge to inhibit from the cases in question, the Court is not convinced of the need therefor. In this connection, the Court Administrator observed that the complainant wrote respondent judge, asking him to inhibit from subject criminal cases, but a formal motion therefor was necessary so that the alleged grounds thereof could be ventilated properly. 13 As a matter of fact, the request or motion for inhibition was taken up during the scheduled arraignment of the accused on November 12, 1997, when the private prosecutor asked the respondent Judge to inhibit himself from subject cases. Acting thereupon, respondent judge ordered the lawyer to file the corresponding motion within five (5) days from receipt of the Order; and in the meantime, he suspended the arraignment of the accused. However, the private prosecutor did not file the required motion for inhibition, an omission which was interpreted as abandonment of the stance of the complainant to inhibit the respondent Judge from hearing subject cases. 14

WHEREFORE, Judge Benjamin E. Almazan is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, with stern warning that a repetition of the same or

similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Let copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of respondent Judge. cdll SO ORDERED. Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1. Dated January 26, 1998. On February 9, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator received a verified complaint containing the same allegations as that in the sworn letter-complaint. 2. Order dated December 23, 1997. 3. Atty. Lazaro C. Gayo. 4. Efren Basconcillo. 5. Alfredo L. Benipayo. 6. On August 23, 1999, this Court issued a resolution which reads: Considering the memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator on the complaint charging respondents with gross ignorance of law, abuse of discretion, gross partiality and gross misconduct relative to Criminal Case Nos. 3097-98, entitled "People vs. Teresita Nabayan," the Court Resolved to ADOPT its recommendation: (a) to REDOCKET this case as an administrative matter; and (b) to DISMISS the charges against respondent Clerk of Court for insufficiency of evidence. The Court further resolved to require respondent Judge to MANIFEST to the Court whether he is submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings and the records of the case, within (10) days from notice. 7. In Cojuanco vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, et al. (190 SCRA 226, 243), this Court held that such a preliminary investigation is required for offenses cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan in accordance with Section 1, Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and Section 10, P.D. No. 1386. 8. The Revised Penal Code, Art. 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos. 9. Del Rosario, Jr. vs. Bartolome, 270 SCRA 645, 649. 10. 289 SCRA 383, 394. 11. SEC. 2, Rule 112, Revised Rules of Court. 12. Cortes vs. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA 423, 458. 13. Report of the Court Administrator, p. 3. 14. Ibid.