DIGESTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPUBLIC VS SANDOVAL!

FACTS! The Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) headed by Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and demands to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) concerning genuine agrarian reform. Meetings were held between the two parties, however, MAR advised KMP to wait for the ratication of the 1987 constitution and allow the government to implement the comprehensive land reform program. KMP decided to march to Malacaang to air their demands. Tadeo talked to the press that there will be bloodshed if they were not allowed to pass through Mendiola. In anticipation of the disturbance, Oplan Yellow was put into effect wherein the anti-riot forces were assembled. The clash, then, occurred between the two parties which resulted in the death of 12 marchers, 39 were wounded with gunshots, and 12 sustained minor injuries. Three of the police and military personnel sustained gunshot wound and 20 suffered minor physical injuries. President Aquino created the Citizens Mendiola Commission tasked to investigate the disorders, deaths and casualties that took place. From the result of the investigation, there were several recommendations and suggestions from the commission. One of the recommendations is that the deceased and the wounded victims of the Mendiola incident be compensated by the government. Thus, the petitioners (KMPs heir of the deceased together with the injured members) led a case for the compensation from the government. On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines together with the military ofcers implead as defendants of the court and led petition for certiorari.!

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ISSUE! Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit! HELD:! This is not a suit against the State with its consent. The recommendation made by the Commission regarding indemnication of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. It cannot be inferred that the State has admitted any liability, much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit. This Court has also pronounced that an ofcer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his ofce when his acts are wholly without authority.! The general rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has given its consent; it cannot be invoked by both the military ofcers to release them from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnication from the government. The state cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower court.!

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The instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED.! ABERCA v. VER! FACTS! Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes against CommunistTerrorist underground houses. TFM raided several houses, employing in most cases defectively judicial search warrants, arrested people without warrant of arrest, denied visitation rights, and interrogated them with the use of threats and tortures. A motion to dismiss was led by defendants, stating that 1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry about their detention because the writ of habeas corpus was suspended; 2) defendants are immune from liability for acts done in their ofcial duties; 3) there was no cause of action. On Nov 8, 1983, Judge Fortun granted the motion to dismiss, which prompted plaintiffs to le a MR on Nov 18, 1983. He later inhibited himself and was replaced Judge Lising, who denied the MR for being led out of time. Another MR was led, and was only modied to include Maj. Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba for ofcers accountable in the said complaint.!

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ISSUES! 1. Whether or not immunity from suit may be invoked?! 2. Whether petitioners have the right to question the alleged violation of their rights in the constitution?! 3. Whether the superior ofcers who gave the orders are liable?! Page 1 " of "10

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HELD:! 1. NO, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a sanction to rights and freedom enshrined in the constitution. These rights cannot be violated just because of an order given by a superior. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Even though they just followed the orders of their superior, these do not authorize them to disregard the rights of the petitioners, and therefore cannot be considered acts done in their ofcial duties. Article 32 speaks of any public ofcer or private individual, and violation of these constitutional rights does not exempt them from responsibility.! 2. YES, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from claiming damages for the illegal arrest and detention in violation of their constitutional rights by seeking judicial authority. What the writ suspends is merely the right of an individual to seek release from detention as a speedy means of obtaining liberty. It cannot suspend their rights and cause of action for injuries suffered due to violation of their rights.! 3. YES, Article 32 speaks of the liabilities of people who are in direct violation of the rights stated, as well as people who are indirectly responsible for such acts. In the case at hand, the superior ofcers are the ones who gave the order, and can be considered indirectly responsible. It was also stated in the complaint who were the ones who directly and indirectly participated in those acts. By ling a motion to dismiss, they admitted all the facts stated in the complaint.!

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SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VS MANALO! FACTS:! Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007. ! Ten days after their escape, they led a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military ofcers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently led a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition.! On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all ofcial and unofcial investigation reports as to the Manalos custody, conrm the present places of ofcial assignment of two military ofcials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.! HELD:! In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public ofcials or employees and by private individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo, the Court explained. (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October 7, 2008)!

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ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO PETITION! Permutations of the Right to Security A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. Some scholars postulate that freedom from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international Page 2 " of "10

DIGESTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS human right. It is the right to security of person as the word security itself means freedom from fear. Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.!

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xxx! Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.! xxx! Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.!

Freedom from fear as a right In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolicacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to security is actually the freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.!

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CHITAT NG VS CANADA! Another important case in the 1990s at the UN Human Rights Committee considered the relationship between the execution of a death sentence and the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment. It has been suggested that the Committee takes an intermediate position on the death row phenomenon, not accepting delay in execution along as a violation of the ICCPR, but examining the facts of each particular case in determining whether the conditions as a whole constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Charles Chitat Ng v Canada case dealt with the extradition to the US from Canada of Mr Ng who, if convicted in the US, could face the death penalty.! In this case the Committee paid particular attention to the execution methods. Whole assessing the alleged violation of Art 7 of the ICCPR (prohibtiion on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment), the Court found that methods of execution to be in themselves cruel, inhuman and degrading. In its deliberation of whether the imposition of capital punishment violated Art 7, the Committee considered Mr Chitat Ngs personal factors, the conditions of detention on death row and the proposed method of execution.! The Committee stressed how the execution of death penalty should cause the least possible physical and mental suffering. Execution by Cyanid gas asphyxiation instead, as in this case, may cause prolonged agony and suffering, as death is not swift, rather it may take up to 12 minutes, during which condemned persons remain conscious, experience obvious pain and agony, drool and convulse and often soil themselves. It was thus found that this type of execution did not meet the test of Art 7 and thus Canada by extraditing Mr Ng without seeking and receiving assurances that he would not be executed, failed to comply with its ICCPR obligations.! Page 3 " of "10

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Source: Human Rights Manual and Sourcebook for Africa by Theodora Christou!

CHAPTER 7 DIGESTS! CARINO VS CHR! FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latters attention.! The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.! ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations! RULING: No.! The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of nality and deniteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.! The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specic type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.! The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.! The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make ndings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But factnding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or ofcial. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, nally and denitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.!

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Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. ! EPZA VS CHR! FACTS:! Valles, Aedia and Ordonez led with CHR a joint complaint against EPZA for allegedly violating their human rights when EPZA Project Engineer Damondamon along with 215th PNP Company tried to level the area occupied by complainants.The same parcel of land was reserved and allocated for purpose of development into Cavite ExportProcessing Zone which was bought by Filoil Renery Corporation and was later sold to EPZA.CHR issued an order Page 4 " of "10

DIGESTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS of injunction for EPZA and company to desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism and harassment until further order. 2 weeks later the group started bulldozing the area and CHR reiterated its order of injunction, including the Secretary of Public Works and Highways to desist from doing work on the area. EPZA led a motion to life the order with CHR for lack of authority and said motion was dismissed.EPZA led the case at bar for certiorari and prohibition alleging that CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing a restraining order and injunctive writ; that the private respondents have no clear and positive right to be protected by an injunction; and that CHR abused its discretion in entertaining the complaint.! EPZAs petition was granted and a TRO was issued ordering CHR to cease and desist from! enforcing/implementing the injunction orders. CHR commented that its function is not limited to mere investigation (Art. 13, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution).!

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ISSUE:! WON CHR has the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of.! HELD:! In Carino vs CHR, it was held that CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make ndings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights.But fact-nding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or ofcial. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. The constitutional provision directing the CHR to"provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue are straining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and never derived by implication.Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of theSupreme Court.A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action,for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose.! EPZAs! petition is granted!

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CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS EXEC SECRETARY! FACTS:! On 25 July 1987, Cory issued EO 284 which allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government ofces or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The CLU excepted this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Art 7 other than those provided in the Constitution; CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the only exceptions against holding any other ofce or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-ofcio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.!

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ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.! HELD:! Sec 13, Art 7 provides:! Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other ofce or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be nancially interested in any Page 5 " of "10

DIGESTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conict of interest in the conduct of their ofce.! It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple ofces or employment in the government, except in those cases specied in the Constitution itself and as above claried with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-ofcio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their ofce, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive ofcials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof. In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple ofces or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.!

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NAACP VS ALABAMA! Brief Fact Summary: The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held unconstitutional Alabamas demand that the NAACP reveal the names and addresses of all of its Alabama members and agents.! Synopsis of Rule of Law: In the domain of indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or association, abridgments of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action. Compelled disclosure of afliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute an effective restraint on freedom of association.!

FACTS:! The Respondent, Alabama (Respondent), demanded that the Petitioner, the NAACP (Petitioner), provide a list of all of the Alabama NAACP members based on the states foreign corporation registration law made in the course of an injunction action brought to stop the Petitioner from conducting activities in the state. Respondent moved for the production of a large number of the Petitioners records. The Petitioner produced almost all the requested data except for membership lists. The trial court adjudged the Petitioner in contempt and imposed a $100,000.00 ne.!

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ISSUE:! Whether compelled disclosure of membership lists violates the Petitioners members rights of freedom of association?! Whether Respondent has demonstrated an interest in obtaining the membership lists, which is sufcient to justify the deterrent effect which releasing this lists would have on the free exercise of the constitutionally protected right of association?! HELD:! Yes. Judgment of the lower court reversed. In the domain of indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or association, abridgments of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action. Compelled disclosure of afliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute an effective restraint on freedom of association. There is a vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in ones associations. This production order must be regarded as entailing the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by the Petitioners members of their freedom of association. Further, it is apparent that forced disclosure would result in adversely affecting the members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs, which they have the right to advocate. Therefore, compelled disclosure of membership lists violates the Petitioners members rights of freedom of association.! No. Judgment of the lower court reversed. The Petitioner has not objected to divulging the identity of its members who are employed or hold ofce positions. There is no justication for the interest of obtaining membership lists.!

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DIGESTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS This case holds that disclosure of the membership lists is unconstitutional partly based on the chilling effect that it would have on the freedom of association.!

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KILOSBAYAN VS ERMITA! Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notied or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted.Petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation are peoples and/or nongovernmental organizations engaged in public and civic causes aimed at protecting the peoples rights to self-governance and justice. ! Respondent ExecutiveSecretary Eduardo Ermita is the head of the Ofce of the President and is in charge of releasing presidential appointments including those of Supreme Court Justices. RespondentGregory Ong is allegedly the party whose appointment would ll up the vacancy in this court.Petitioners allege that Ermita, in representation of the Ofce of the President,announced an appointment in favor of Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to ll up the vacancy created by the retirement of Associate Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. They contend that such appointment is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They claim that Ong is aChinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certicate indicates Chinese citizenship. The birth certicate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of Ongs birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese. Petitioners invoke the Constitution which requires members of the Supreme Court to be natural-born citizens, or those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship. They maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after Ongs birth, his father was nally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen. They further assert that this birth certicate prevails over Ongs new IdenticationCerticate issued by the Bureau of Immigration stating that he is a natural-born Filipino. Petitioners thereupon pray for the annulment of the appointment of Ong asAssociate Justice of this Court. They led a motion for the issuance of a TemporaryRestraining Order to prevent and restrain Ermita from releasing the appointment of Ong,and to prevent and restrain Ong from assuming the ofce and discharging the functions ofAssociate Justice of this Court.!

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ISSUE: Whether or not Gregory Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen ! HELD:! Petition GRANTED! It is clear from the records of this case that respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau ofImmigration and the DOJ cannot amend the nal decision of the trial court stating that Ong and his mother were naturalized with his father. Furthermore, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order, and under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change. The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of Ongs ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, Ongs mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Court. Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. !

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Until this is done, Ong cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason,he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.!

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KILOS BAYAN VS JANOLO! ! On July 9, 2007, private respondent Gregory Ong (Ong), following the promulgation of the Courts Decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, led a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules Court for the amendment/correction/ supplementation or annotation of the entry on citizenship in his Certicate of Birthrafed to Branch 264 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City over which public respondent Leoncio Janolo, Jr. presided.! ! Petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation assail four Orders and the Decision emanating from the proceedings in the RTC case.! ! Petitioners assert that public respondent erred and committed grave abuse of discretion: (a) [i]n not voluntarily inhibiting himself from presiding over the case; (b) [i]n declaring herein [p]etitioners as having defaulted; and (c) in granting the Petition of [r]espondent Gregory S. Ong.[10]! ! The Court shall rst resolve the preliminary objections raised by respondents. Both Ong and the OSG claim that petitioners availed themselves of an improper remedy and disregarded the hierarchy of courts. Ong adds that the defective verication renders the petition as unsigned pleading, and the lack of service of the petition on all adverse parties violates basic rules.! ! The hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for appeals and petitions for extraordinary writs. The rule on hierarchy of courts is not absolute, and the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition led directly with it. A direct invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction may be allowed where there are special and important reasons therefor clearly and specically set out in the petition.! ! The present petition is bereft of even a single allegation of exceptional and compelling circumstance to warrant an exception to the rule. In fact, this valid objection elicited no response from petitioners, who glossed over all procedural issues in their Consolidated Reply. If petitioners themselves do not provide the Court some basis for the direct recourse, the Court is not minded to search for one.! ! On procedural grounds alone then, the petition is susceptible to dismissal. The Court deems it best, however, to resolve the substantial issues in the interest of justice.! ! In their motion for voluntary inhibition, petitioners cite that Ong, his counsel, and public respondent are members of the San Beda Law Alumni Association which, along with the schools Benedictine community, publicly endorsed and supported Ongs petition through newspaper advertisements. Moreover, from the account of the proceedings, petitioners point out that issuing the order of default without resolving the motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion for inhibition exhibits blatant bias for being unduly precipitate and wholly unwarranted.! ! The rule on compulsory disqualication and voluntary inhibition of judges is provided under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:! ! No judge or judicial ofcer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or afnity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.! ! A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. (underscoring supplied)!

In the nal reckoning, there is really no hard and fast rule when it comes to the inhibition of judges. Each case should be treated differently and decided based on its peculiar circumstances. ! !

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DIGESTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test, the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest nding of arbitrariness and whimsicality. The discretion given to trial judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that they are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.! ! Impartiality being a state of mind, there is thus a need for some kind of manifestation of its reality, in order to provide good, sound or ethical grounds or just and valid reasons for inhibition.[23] Bare allegations of bias and prejudice are not enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor.[24] !

In Gochan v. Gochan,[25] the Court elucidated further:! ! Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for them to inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.! ! In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of their partiality will not sufce. It cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred oaths of ofce of magistrates, requiring them to administer justice fairly and equitably both to the poor and the rich, the weak and the strong, the lonely and the wellconnected.[26] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)! !

A judge must decide based on a rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in a case brought before him.[29] In the present case, petitioners cite public respondents afliation with an alumni association as the sole ground to which they anchor their motion for the voluntary inhibition of public respondent.! ! Before the trial court, petitioners alleged that the law school ties among public respondent, Ong and his counsel, they having graduated from San Beda College of Law, albeit years apart, spell partiality.! ! Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a schoolmate or classmate appears before the judge as counsel for one of the parties, however.[30] In one case,[31] the Court ruled that organizational afliation per se is not a ground for inhibition.! ! Membership in a college fraternity, by itself, does not constitute a ground to disqualify an investigator, prosecutor or judge from acting on the case of a respondent who happens to be a member of the same fraternity. A trial Judge, appellate Justice, or member of this Court who is or was a member of a college fraternity, a university alumni association, a socio-civic association like Jaycees or Rotary, a religion-oriented organization like Knights of Columbus or Methodist Men, and various other fraternal organizations is not expected to automatically inhibit himself or herself from acting whenever a case involving a member of his or her group happens to come before him or her for action.! ! A member in good standing of any reputable organization is expected all the more to maintain the highest standards of probity, integrity, and honor and to faithfully comply with the ethics of the legal profession.[32] (underscoring supplied)! ! ! The added fact that the law schools alumni association published statements in support of Ongs application cannot lend credence to the imputation of bias on the part of pubic respondent. No clear and convincing evidence was shown to indicate that public respondent actively sponsored and participated in the adoption and publication of the alumni associations stand. It is inconceivable to suppose that the alumni associations statement obliged all its members to earnestly embrace the manifesto as a matter of creed. ! ! Page 9 " of "10

DIGESTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS Arbitrariness cannot be inferred either from the fact that public respondent resolved the motion for voluntary inhibition one day after it was led. Since the personal process of careful self-examination[33] is essentially a matter of conscience, the judge may decide as soon as the factual basis of the motions has been clearly laid before the court because from there on the resolution of the motion enters the subjective phase. ! ! That public respondent, Ong and his counsel former Senator Rene Saguisag are all graduates of San Beda College of Law was clearly and early on established. Hence, this sole ground relied upon by petitioners in their motion, it bears repeating, no longer required a hearing or called for the submission of a comment or opposition, and the absence thereof did not prejudice petitioners. ! ! ! No trace of bias can be found at that juncture when the court proceeded to declare petitioners in default after resolving the pending incidents. It is an equally important doctrine that bias and prejudice must be shown to have resulted in an opinion on the merits on the basis of an extrajudicial source, not on what the judge learned from participating in the case. As long as opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented and the conduct observed by the magistrate, such opinion even if later found to be erroneous will not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. While palpable error may be inferred from the decision or the order itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose.[47]! ! Divergence of opinion as to applicable laws and jurisprudence between counsel and the judge is not a proper ground for disqualication. Opinions framed in the course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove bias or prejudice. Repeated rulings against a litigant no matter how erroneous are not bases for disqualication.[48]! ! In the absence then of clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge, a ruling not to inhibit oneself cannot just be overturned.[50] In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate such acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice as to thaw the attributes of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Unjustied assumptions and mere misgivings that the hand of prejudice, passion, pride and pettiness moves the judge in the performance of his functions are patently weak to parry the presumption that a judge shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts. ! ! In ne, the Court nds no grave abuse of discretion when public respondent did not inhibit himself from hearing the case.! ! ! The Court, in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,[68] stated that substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry are effected through a petition led in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Jurisprudence has settled that such proceedings are adversarial in nature or [o]ne having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.[69] In this case, impleaded as defendants were the Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila and any other person having or claiming an interest under the entry sought to be corrected. The interest of the State was amply represented by the Ofce of the Solicitor General, while petitioners interest was deemed waived when they failed to appear and le a responsive pleading.! ! Petitioners raise no additional ground to substantiate their imputation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent insofar as the issuance of the October 24, 2007 Decision is concerned. Since no further issues were raised, the Court is precluded from making a denitive pronouncement on the substantial aspect of the assailed decision.! ! WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

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