CANON 1, SECTION 2, FULL TEXT 1 OF 2 EN BANC [A.M. No. MTJ-01-1366. February 7, 2003.] ATTY. MARIA ELISSA F.

VELEZ, complainant, vs. Judge RODRIGO R. FLORES, MTC-Branch 2, San Fernando, Pampanga, respondent. SYNOPSIS Complainant Maria Elissa F. Velez, a practicing lawyer, charged respondent Judge Rodrigo R. Flores, MTC-Branch 2, San Fernando, Pampanga, with incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Complainant filed, on behalf of her client-parents, an ejectment case against Jaime Mendoza, Florante Salonga, Eduardo Vital and Ernesto Romero. Because of their failure to reach an amicable settlement during the preliminary conference, the parties were directed to file their respective position papers. When complainant followed up the case with the branch clerk of court, respondent judge told her that she should try giving financial assistance to the defendants. He then asked her to repeat the offer her parents had made to each defendant. The investigating Judge found respondent guilty of soliciting money from complainant and of deliberately delaying the resolution of the case to get the pay-off, and recommended his dismissal from the service. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) concurred in the Investigating Judge's finding that respondent was guilty of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Although there was no conclusive proof that he had demanded or received any money from complainant in connection with the ejectment case, his administrative culpability was sufficiently demonstrated by evidence that he had interceded in the collection case involving complainant's grandmother and the Punzalan spouses. The Supreme Court affirmed the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Judge and the Office of the Court Administrator. Respondent's act of brokering for a fee as settlement in the collection case is bribery and a judge who extorts money from a partylitigant who has a case before the court commits a serious misconduct. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Under Rule 2.04 of the same Code, Judges must refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency. The Court stressed that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than other persons not vested with public trust and confidence. They should bring honor to the judiciary. The influence-peddling or intercession in a case by respondent Judge was reprehensible. He has placed the judiciary as a whole in a bad light. His corrupt practices clearly showed his unfitness to remain in his judicial robe. Respondent judge was dismissed from the service. DHcESI SYLLABUS 1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; JUDICIAL INDOLENCE IS CONSIDERED GROSS NEGLIGENCE OR INEFFICIENCY AND GROSS DERELICTION OF DUTY. This Court concurs in the findings of the investigating Judge and the OCA. Judicial indolence is considered gross negligence or inefficiency, and gross dereliction of duty. Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, requires that judges dispose of court business promptly and decide cases within the periods prescribed by law. It cannot be disputed that respondent failed to promulgate his Decision on the ejectment case within the period provided under the law. The Rules on Summary Procedure states that a first-level court must render judgment within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers or upon the expiration of the period for filing. Should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may during that period require the parties to submit affidavits or other pieces of evidence within ten (10) days. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits or upon the expiration of the period for their filing. In this case, the parties submitted their respective position papers on December 9, 1999; thus the case was deemed submitted for decision on that date. Accordingly, the Decision should have been rendered not later than January 8, 2000. However, respondent rendered it only on June 13, 2000, five months after the case had been submitted for decision. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BROKERING FOR A FEE AS SETTLEMENT OF A CASE IS BRIBERY. Complainant amply demonstrated the propensity of respondent for demanding money from litigants and/or their lawyers by citing an instance when he had actually brokered the amicable settlement of a collection case involving her client. Complainant attached a copy of her PLDT phone bill and of the letter written to her by respondent, who visited her in her office on December 19, 1997, as proofs that he had negotiated for the amount of P5,000 and a bottle of Fundador brandy in exchange for his help in the collection case. Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection with the performance of official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received. Respondent's act of brokering, for a fee, a settlement in the collection case is bribery. It is a serious offense under the amendments to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and under the September 11, 2001 En Banc Resolution in AM No. 01-8-10-SC. This offense merits sanctions ranging from a fine of P20,000 to P40,000; to dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of one's benefits, and disqualification from appointment to any public office.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; A JUDGE WHO EXTORTS MONEY FROM A PARTY-LITIGANT COMMITS SERIOUS MISCONDUCT. A Judge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the court commits a serious misconduct. This Court condemns such act in the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been committed by one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Under Rule 2.04 of the same Code, Judges must refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency. It is significant to stress that they are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than other persons not vested with public trust and confidence. They should bring honor to the judiciary. The influence-peddling or intercession in a case by respondent Judge was reprehensible. He has placed the judiciary as a whole in a bad light. His corrupt practices clearly show his unfitness to remain in his judicial robe. SIacTE DECISION PER CURIAM p: Atty. Maria Elissa F. Velez charges Judge Rodrigo R. Flores of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 2, San Fernando, Pampanga, with incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The charges are relative to a case for ejectment, Civil Case No. 7946 entitled " Spouses Jose and Lina Velez vs. Jaime Mendoza, Florante Salonga, Eduardo Vital and Ernesto Romero." The pertinent Sworn Administrative Complaint 1 was filed by complainant with the Office of Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga on June 13, 2000. The Complaint was then endorsed by Judge Sunga to the Office of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. 2 It was later referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo for appropriate action. 3 Atty. Velez narrated in her Complaint that she had filed, on behalf of her client-parents, an ejectment case against Jaime Mendoza, Florante Salonga, Eduardo Vital and Ernesto Romero. Because of their failure to reach an amicable settlement during the preliminary conference, the parties were directed to file their respective position papers. They did so on December 9, 1999, after which the case was deemed submitted for resolution. On March 14, 2000, complainant moved ex-parte for the early resolution 4 of the case within thirty days from receipt of her Motion. She argued that three months had already elapsed since the parties filed their respective position papers. She filed a second Ex Parte Motion for Early Resolution 5 on April 24, 2000. On May 2 and May 9, 2000, complainant personally followed up her motions with Ramoncito Serrano, Clerk of Court of Branch 2, but to no avail. On May 23, 2000, she attended the hearing of the three criminal cases before the sala of respondent Judge. As she was preparing to leave, he summoned her and told her that he was very busy, but would render his decision soon. Then, in a low, conspiratorial tone, he allegedly said, "'[C]an you consider giving to me . . . your offer of financial assistance to the defendants?' ( Baka p[w]ede mo na lang ibigay sa akin iyong offer mo sa mga kalaban ninyo ?)" She pretended not to have heard anything, gave him a blank stare, and immediately left the court premises. On May 31, 2000, complainant again followed up the case with Clerk of Court Serrano. Told that respondent Judge had not yet arrived, she proceeded to another court to wait. Serrano followed her there and asked her to go to the sala of respondent, who wanted to talk to her. The Judge allegedly told her that the Decision would be finished either on June 3 or June 5, 2000 at the latest. He also said, within hearing distance of his staff, that she should try giving financial assistance to the defendants. He then asked her to repeat the offer her parents had made to each defendant. Complying with his request, she said that her parents had offered P5,000 to each of the four defendants, so that they would peacefully vacate the lot. She allegedly gathered from his tone and demeanor that he was expecting her to give to him, instead of to the defendants, the full amount of P20,000. On two separate occasions, the secretary of complainant phoned the office of respondent Judge to inquire whether a decision had already been rendered. One of the staff members in Branch 2, a certain Max, informed her that although it had not yet been signed, it had already been drafted by respondent Judge on June 5, 2000. A certain Cindy gave her the same information, except for the date, which was supposedly June 9, 2000.

Immediately thereafter, complainant manifested in writing that she would bring the matter to the attention of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). And when she found out that there was no draft decision filed with the records of the case, she proceeded to the Office of Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga, before whom she narrated the foregoing facts. Then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo referred the Sworn Complaint to respondent Judge for comment. 6

In his Comment 7 dated August 24, 2000, respondent averred that he had already promulgated his Decision on the ejectment case on June 13, 2000. He said that he had tried his best to render the Decision at the earliest possible time, but that a delay in its promulgation ensued because of his clogged court docket. This fact had supposedly been acknowledged even by complainant in her first Ex Parte Motion for Early Resolution. He further argued that the delay, which was not "undue," had also been brought about by his research on applicable jurisprudence. These, according to him, were "strong and justifiable reason[s] for [his] failure to decide the case within the reglementary period of ninety days." 8 Moreover, respondent dismissed the allegation of complainant that she would not be able to appear and handle her other cases before his court in the future for fear of his reprisal. He reasoned that he was not a vengeful person, and that he always decided cases on their merits. He also denied that his tone and demeanor during his conversation with complainant implied that he was expecting her to give him the same amount that her parents were willing to give the defendants. This conclusion allegedly existed only in Atty. Velez's fertile imagination. He said that "not even in joke or jest did [he] ask complainant to give [him] P5,000 or P20,000." 9 The Court re-docketed the Complaint as a regular administrative matter 10 and referred it to Executive Judge Adelaida Ala-Medina of the RTC, Branch 45, San Fernando, Pampanga, for investigation, report and recommendation. 11 During the investigation, complainant executed a Supplemental Affidavit 12 to support her claim that the ejectment case was "not the first time Judge Flores asked for money from [her]." She attached a letter 13 dated December 19, 1997 addressed to a certain "Tita Eliza," who complainant claimed was actually she. The letter, she said, was proof that respondent Judge had interceded for the amicable settlement of a collection case she was handling. In return for his intercession, he allegedly demanded from her P5,000 and a bottle of Fundador brandy. 14 On January 2, 2002, Judge Flores filed his Reply to the Supplemental Affidavit of complainant, 15 stating that her letter had not established his culpability for the P5,000 pay-off. According to him, the letter was actually a proof that he and Atty. Velez were on good terms at the time, as evidenced by the salutation "Dear Tita Eliza" and his affectionate closing remark "Your nephew." He alleged that the lawyer had filed the administrative Complaint, simply to get back at him for the delayed promulgation of his Decision on the ejectment case. Lastly, he denied receiving the bottle of Fundador brandy, claiming he was diabetic and was not allowed to take hard drinks. In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation, 16 Executive Judge Ala-Medina found complainant's assertions more credible than those of respondent Judge for the following reasons: "Firstly, Atty. Velez has nothing to gain from accusing Judge Flores with corrupt practices. At the time Atty. Velez filed the administrative complaint on June 13, 2000, she did not know that the judge had already rendered a decision on the same day. To her mind then, she was taking a big risk in making the accusation due to the pending case. Moreover, aside from the ejectment case, Atty. Velez had four (4) other criminal cases pending with Judge Flores at that time. She was very much vulnerable to retaliation from Judge Flores but she came out with her allegations of corruption nonetheless. Hence, the probabilities strongly suggest that Atty. Velez was motivated by her desire to speak the truth. Assuming for argument's sake that the administrative complaint was a tactic to secure a favorable ruling, Atty. Velez could have withdrawn or abandoned the case after she got a favorable ruling in the ejectment case. Yet, her efforts did not wane and she even filed a Supplementary Affidavit to bolster her allegations more than a year after filing the complaint. It would be difficult to sustain such . . . single-minded zeal if Atty. Velez were only after personal advantage. "Second, although the December 1997 letter of Judge Flores to Atty. Velez does not conclusively prove that Judge Flores demanded or received money from Atty. Velez, it raises disturbing questions on the judge's motives and conduct. Contrary to the judge's explanation, the letter does not merely establish the good relations between the parties at that time. The undersigned sees in the letter an attempt to conceal his motives with the false statement suggesting that they are relatives when in fact they are not. It may be a way to mislead anyone who chances upon the letter and sanitize its contents. Being a trial judge, respondent is not expected to be careless enough to document his extortion activities on paper. But the letter was a lapse in judgment since it raises questions on respondent's conduct and reinforces the truth of complainant's allegations. "Third, even without conclusively establishing that Judge Flores demanded money, the December 19, 1997 letter nonetheless shows that the judge was interceding on behalf of a litigant, in a case pending before another judge. . . . As a judge, respondent must be the first to protect and uphold the integrity of his profession by shielding his colleagues from pressure by litigants. Instead, respondent, aware of his influence or perhaps ascendancy over some of his colleagues, allowed himself to be used by litigants to pressure a judge. Indeed, efforts to [reach a compromise in] a case are laudable but incumbent judges should not undertake them because it tarnishes their image and raises suspicions that they are doing so out of financial considerations. . . . . " 17

Hence, the investigating Judge found respondent guilty of soliciting money from complainant and of "deliberately delay[ing] the resolution of the case to get the pay-off." She recommended his dismissal from the service. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) concurred in Judge Medina's findings that respondent was guilty of violating the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. 18 Although there was no conclusive proof that he had demanded or received any money from complainant in connection with the ejectment case, his administrative culpability was sufficiently demonstrated by evidence that he had interceded in the collection case involving complainant's grandmother and the Punzalan spouses. This Court concurs in the findings of the investigating Judge and the OCA. Judicial indolence is considered gross negligence 19 or inefficiency, 20 and gross dereliction of duty. 21Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, requires that judges dispose of court business promptly and decide cases within the periods prescribed by law. 22 It cannot be disputed that respondent failed to promulgate his Decision on the ejectment case within the period provided under the law. The Rules on Summary Procedure states that a first-level court must render judgment within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers or upon the expiration of the period for filing. 23 Should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may during that period require the parties to submit affidavits or other pieces of evidence within ten (10) days. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits or upon the expiration of the period for their filing. 24 In this case, the parties submitted their respective position papers on December 9, 1999; thus the case was deemed submitted for decision on that date. Accordingly, the Decision should have been rendered not later than January 8, 2000. However, respondent rendered it only on June 13, 2000, five months after the case had been submitted for decision. The reason for the adoption of the Rules on Summary Procedure is precisely to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases. It is therefore anomalous when a Judge causes the delay sought to be prevented by the Rule. 25 The need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously cannot be overemphasized, for justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. Furthermore, complainant amply demonstrated the propensity of respondent for demanding money from litigants and/or their lawyers by citing an instance when he had actually brokered the amicable settlement of a collection case involving her client. Complainant attached a copy of her PLDT phone bill and of the letter written to her by respondent, who visited her in her office on December 19, 1997, as proofs that he had negotiated for the amount of P5,000 and a bottle of Fundador brandy in exchange for his help in the collection case. Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection with the performance of official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received. 26 Respondent's act of brokering, for a fee, a settlement in the collection case is bribery. It is a serious offense under the amendments to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and under the September 11, 2001 En Banc Resolution in AM No. 01-8-10-SC. 27 This offense merits sanctions ranging from a fine of P20,000 to P40,000; to dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of one's benefits, and disqualification from appointment to any public office. 28

A Judge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the court commits a serious misconduct. This Court condemns such act in the strongest possible terms. 29Particularly because it has been committed by one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts. 30 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. 31 Under Rule 2.04 of the same Code, Judges must refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency. It is significant to stress that they are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than other persons not vested with public trust and confidence. They should bring honor to the judiciary. 32 The influence-peddling or intercession in a case by respondent Judge was reprehensible. He has placed the judiciary as a whole in a bad light. His corrupt practices clearly show his unfitness to remain in his judicial robe. 33 WHEREFORE, Judge Rodrigo Flores of the Municipal Trial Court (Branch 2) of San Fernando, Pampanga is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits excluding earned leave and vacation benefits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities including government-owned and controlled corporations. This Decision is immediately executory. Respondent Judge is further ordered to cease and desist from discharging the functions of his Office upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the personnel records of respondent. STaHIC

SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1. Signed by Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42, San Fernando, Pampanga; rollo, pp. 47. 2. See 1st Indorsement dated June 20, 2000; rollo, p. 2. 3. See 2nd Indorsement dated June 27, 2000; rollo, p. 1. 4. Rollo, pp. 8-9. 5. Id., pp. 10-11. 6. See 1st Indorsement dated July 20, 2000; rollo, p. 21. 7. Id., pp. 23-26. 8. Comment, p. 2; rollo, p. 24. 9. Id., pp. 4 & 25. 10. See Resolution dated July 11, 2001, p. 46. 11. See Resolution dated September 3, 2001, p. 47. 12. Rollo, pp. 95-96. 13. Rollo, p. 97. The letter reads: "Dec. 19, 1997 Dear Tita Eliza, Mr. Erning Punzalan came to my office & ask[ed] me to help his wife regarding their case filed by you w/c I do not know b/c I have not received any. Anyway, Mr. Punzalan wants me to help them settle the case w/ you amicably. I told them to talk to you provided that they will pay their obligation. They want to do so by installment, are you agreeable to that? Please call the house 926-25-13 tonight. T.Y. Your nephew. (sgd) RFlores" 14. Supplemental Affidavit, par. 7; rollo, p. 96. 15. Rollo, pp. 57-60. 16. Id., pp. 180-185. 17. Investigation, Report and Recommendation, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 183-184. 18. See OCA Report; rollo, pp. 195-202. 19. Cuevas vs. Balderian, 334 SCRA 242, 245 (2000). 20. Yu-Asensi vs. Villanueva, 322 SCRA 255, 270 (2000); Saylo vs. Rojo, 330 SCRA 243, 248 (2000); Office of the Court Administrator vs. Salva, 336 SCRA 133, 141 (2000). 21. Gallego vs. Doronila, 334 SCRA 339, 343 (2000).

22. Millare vs. Valera, 325 SCRA 434, 439 (2000); Office of the Court Administrator vs. Panganiban, 277 SCRA 499, 503 (1997). 23. Sec. 10, Rules on Summary Procedure. 24. Uy vs. Medina, 342 SCRA 393, 400 (2000); Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Brs. 87 & 98, QC, 338 SCRA 141, 147 (2000); Enriquez vs. Camarista, 280 SCRA 1, 4-5 (1997); and Cruz vs. Pascual, 244 SCRA 111, 114 (1995). 25. Cuevas vs. Balderian, supra; Quilal-lan vs. Delos Santos, 338 SCRA 653, 655-656 (2000). 26. Art. 210, Revised Penal Code. 27. Rule 140, Sec. 8 (1), Rules of Court. 28. Sec. 11, Rules of Court. 29. Haw Tay vs. Singayao, 154 SCRA 107, 111 (1987); Quiz vs. Castao, 107 SCRA 196, 203-204 (1981); Nazareno vs. Almario, 268 SCRA 657, 665 (1997). 30. Haw Tay vs. Singayao, supra, p. 112. 31. Dumo vs. Perez, 322 SCRA 545, 558 (2000). 32. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge De Guzman Jr. 267 SCRA 291, 301 (1997); Nazareno vs. Almario, supra, pp. 664-665. 33. Magarang vs. Jardin Sr., 330 SCRA 79, 89-90 (2000).

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CANON 1, SECTION 2, FULL TEXT 2 OF 2 THIRD DIVISION [A.M. No. MTJ-99-1221. March 16, 2000.] (Formerly OCA IPI No. 98-524-MTJ) JOSEFINA M. VILLANUEVA, complainant, vs. JUDGE BENJAMIN E. ALMAZAN, respondent. SYNOPSIS There is an administrative case instituted by Josefina M. Villanueva against Judge Benjamin E. Almazan for gross ignorance of the law, abuse of discretion, partiality and gross misconduct. On October 9, 1987, the complainant filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Santo Tomas, La Union, presided over by respondent Judge, two (2) Complaints for Grave Oral Defamation against one Teresita Nabayan. On the same day, the respondent Judge, conducted a "preliminary examination," after which he issued an order downgrading the crimes charged to simple slander. The trial court denied complainant's motion for reconsideration. On January 20, 1998, the day before the scheduled arraignment and pre-trial in the said cases, complainant asked Judge Benjamin E. Almazan to inhibit from the said cases on the ground that he used to be a law partner of the defense counsel. The request was denied.HAaDcS The Court Administrator found respondent judge administratively liable and recommended that he be fined Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. The Supreme Court found merit in the recommendation of the Court Administrator. The original charges for grave oral defamation were cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and did not require preliminary investigation. Preliminary investigation is only required for those cognizable by the Regional Trial Court. Hence, in conducting the preliminary investigation under attack, the respondent judge exceeded his authority under the pertinent rules. Consequently, the respondent judge was devoid of jurisdiction or authority to reduce the charge to simple slander. The respondent judge showed his ignorance not only of the scope of his authority to conduct preliminary investigation but also of the procedure to follow in conducting a preliminary investigation. Where, as in this case, the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Concerning the refusal of respondent judge to inhibit from the cases in question, the Court was not convinced of the need therefor. The private prosecutor did not file the required motion for inhibition, an omission which was interpreted as abandonment of the stance of the complainant to inhibit the respondent Judge from hearing subject cases. SYLLABUS 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; NOT REQUIRED FOR CRIMINAL CASES COGNIZABLE BY MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT. Contrary to the clear mandate of Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 9, of the same Rules, the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation culminating in the lowering of the charge to simple slander. The original charge for grave oral defamation is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, while simple slander is punishable by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos. Thus, the original charges were cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and did not require a preliminary investigation. The proper action the respondent judge could have taken under the premises was to dismiss the complaint if found to be without any basis for further proceedings or if warranted, to issue a warrant of arrest for the respondent, and after arrest, to hold him for trial. It is decisively clear that in conducting the preliminary investigation under attack, the respondent judge exceeded his authority under the pertinent rules. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIRED FOR CRIMINAL CASES COGNIZABLE BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DEVOID OF JURISDICTION TO REDUCE CHARGE OF GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION TO SIMPLE SLANDER; CASE AT BAR. In his Comment, respondent judge was careful to refer to his challenged action as a preliminary examination. Be that as it may, when he concluded that the proper charge should be simple slander, after examining the complainant and her witnesses in subject criminal cases, respondent Judge, in effect, conducted a preliminary investigation. Not only was such preliminary investigation defective; it was a patent error because no preliminary investigation is required for criminal cases cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts. It is only required for those cognizable by the Regional Trial Court. Consequently, the respondent judge was devoid of jurisdiction or authority to reduce the charge to simple slander.

3. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; WHERE LAW INVOLVED IS SIMPLE AND ELEMENTARY, LACK OF CONVERSANCE THEREWITH CONSTITUTES GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. The respondent judge showed his ignorance not only of the scope of his authority to conduct preliminary investigation but also of the procedure to follow in conducting a preliminary investigation. Where, as in this case, the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence requires no less. 4. ID.; ID.; ACTION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE IN PROCEEDING WITH ARRAIGNMENT WITHOUT PARTICIPATION OF GOVERNMENT PROSECUTOR CONSIDERED ERRONEOUS; PUBLIC PROSECUTOR MUST BE AFFORDED OPPORTUNITY TO INTERVENE IN ALL STAGES OF PROCEEDINGS. Equally erroneous was the action of respondent judge in proceeding with the arraignment of the accused in subject criminal cases without the participation of a government prosecutor. The Court need not belabor the point that as the officer in charge of prosecuting criminal cases for the government, rudiments of due process require that the public prosecutor must be afforded an opportunity to intervene in all stages of the proceedings. Here, it cannot be denied that the public prosecutor assigned to handle Criminal Cases Nos. 3097 and 3098 was not notified by respondent judge of the scheduled trial of said cases. That the public prosecutor in the said criminal cases had an arrangement with the respondent Judge as early as June 1997 that trial of cases requiring his appearance be transferred from the previous Tuesday schedule to Wednesdays, did not excuse the failure of the latter to notify the former of the scheduled trial on January 21, 1998 (a Wednesday) in subject criminal cases. 5. ID.; ID.; INHIBITION; FAILURE OF COMPLAINANT TO FILE REQUIRED MOTION CONSIDERED AN ABANDONMENT OF HIS STANCE TO INHIBIT RESPONDENT JUDGE FROM HEARING SUBJECT CASES. Concerning the refusal of respondent judge to inhibit from the cases in question, the Court is not convinced of the need therefor. In this connection, the Court Administrator observed that the complainant wrote respondent judge, asking him to inhibit from subject criminal cases, but a formal motion therefor was necessary so that the alleged grounds thereof could be ventilated properly. As a matter of fact, the request or motion for inhibition was taken up during the scheduled arraignment of the accused on November 12, 1997, when the private prosecutor asked the respondent Judge to inhibit himself from subject cases. Acting thereupon, respondent judge ordered the lawyer to file the corresponding motion within five (5) days from receipt of the Order; and in the meantime, he suspended the arraignment of the accused. However, the private prosecutor did not file the required motion for inhibition, an omission which was interpreted as abandonment of the stance of the complainant to inhibit the respondent Judge from hearing subject cases. DECISION PURISIMA, J p: At bar is an administrative case instituted by Josefina M. Villanueva against Judge Benjamin E. Almazan for gross ignorance of the law, abuse of discretion, partiality and gross misconduct. dctai The verified letter-complaint 1 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator averred that the acts of Judge Benjamin E. Almazan complained of were committed as follows: On October 9, 1997, the complainant filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Santo Tomas, La Union, presided over by respondent Judge, two (2) Complaints for Grave Oral Defamation against one Teresita Nabayan, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3097 and 3098, respectively. On the same day, the respondent Judge, conducted a "preliminary examination," after which he issued the following Order downgrading the crimes charged to simple slander, to wit: "The Court conducted the necessary preliminary examination to determine the existence of probable cause by asking searching questions to the witnesses for the prosecution. In the course of investigation, the Court is convinced that the offense committed by the accused was just simple slander. In view of the findings of the Court in the two (2) entitled cases, the accused is hereby ordered to submit her counter-affidavit including that of her witness/es well as exhibits or evidence/s if there be any within ten (10) days from receipt of this order. Failure on her part to comply with his order, she is barred to present evidence during the trial of this case." On November 21, 1997, the complainant presented a Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration, contending that the aforesaid action of respondent judge does not accord with the Rules of Court under which the judge has no authority to downgrade subject accusation from grave oral defamation to simple slander. In due time, the motion for reconsideration2 was denied for failure of the private prosecutor 3 to get the conformity thereto of the public prosecutor. 4

On January 20, 1998, the day before the scheduled arraignment and pre-trial in the said cases, complainant asked for the inhibition of Judge Benjamin E. Almazan from the said cases on the ground that the latter used to be a law partner of the defense counsel. Said request or motion for inhibition, which was denied, infuriated the respondent Judge who then subjected her (Complainant) to verbal abuse. When asked why he downgraded the charge to that of simple slander, respondent Judge explained to the complainant that he did so "because your answers were wrong." cdrep

On January 21, 1998, accused Teresita Nabayan was arraigned in the absence of the public prosecutor, who did not receive any calendar of cases for that day. The same complaint sought to have Clerk of Court Violeta R. Villanueva investigated for blatant partiality and influence peddling, alleging that the latter discussed the cases during mahjong sessions where she entertained some litigants. Also, she (Violeta R. Villanueva) refused to officially receive the pleading of the herein complainant so as not to mess up the records, and was only forced to receive the same when she got a dressing down from the lawyer of complainant. Respondent Judge and respondent Violeta R. Villanueva submitted their Comments, dated December 24, 1998, which the Office of the Court Administrator received on January 18, 1999. Explaining his aforementioned action complained of, respondent Judge contended that he conducted a preliminary examination of the complainant and her two (2) eyewitnesses, and thereafter, arrived at the conclusion that the acts allegedly committed were not grave oral defamation, as averred in the complaint, such that he issued his questioned Order to the effect that the accused in subject cases should be charged with simple slander only. Respondent Judge theorized that his trouble with the complainant started when he denied her motion in subject criminal cases to amend the Complaint so as to reflect the correct dates of commission of the crimes charged, and the complainant was incensed by the failure of the court to grant her motion, and by the adverse effect on complainant's position of the action thus taken by respondent judge in the said cases when she requested him to inhibit therefrom. Respondent Judge maintained that the denial of the motion for reconsideration of complainant was proper because amendment of the complaint could only be made with the conformity of the public prosecutor who intervened to prosecute the said cases. Respondent Clerk of Court Violeta R. Villanueva denied the allegations of the complaint, branding the same baseless, motivated by ill will and a mere harassment, considering that she has no power to influence or interfere with the issuance of the orders, decisions, or actuations of respondent judge. She brushed aside as blatant lies the allegation that she attends mahjong sessions during office hours and entertains thereat litigants who need her services. That she discussed cases during such sessions is a mere speculation, since the complainant could not have gotten such information as she spent most of her time in Manila. prcd As regards the accusation that she was taking sides, this respondent maintained that the same is a fabrication by the complainant who wanted to impose her will upon the court. On July 27, 1999, there was received from the Court Administrator 5 the report finding respondent judge administratively liable and recommending that he be fined Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. The same report recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Violeta R. Villanueva for insufficiency of evidence. 6 In response to the Resolution of the Court dated August 23, 1999, respondent Judge manifested in a letter, dated September 20, 1999, that he was submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings and records. The principal issues for resolution here concern the propriety of the preliminary investigation conducted by respondent judge, and the arraignment of the accused in subject criminal cases. Corollarily, the downgrading of the said cases, and denial of complainant's motion to inhibit respondent judge from trying the same cases are denounced. After a thorough examination of the report and the records on hand, the Court finds merit in the recommendation of the Court Administrator. The root of the controversy is the unfamiliarity of respondent judge with the rules applicable in cases requiring preliminary investigation. Cdpr Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court reads:

SECTION 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. 7 Section 9, of the same Rules provides: SECTION 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. xxx xxx xxx (b) Where filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court . If the complaint or information is filed directly with the Municipal Trial Court, the procedure provided for in Section 3(a) of this Rule shall likewise be observed. If the judge finds no sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial, he shall dismiss the complaint or information. Otherwise, he shall issue a warrant of arrest after personally examining in writing an under oath the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. Contrary to the clear mandate of the aforestated rules, the respondent Judge conducted the preliminary investigation culminating in the lowering of the charge to simple slander. The original charge for grave oral defamation is punishable 8 by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, while simple slander is punishable by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos. Thus, the original charges were cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and did not require a preliminary investigation. The proper action the respondent judge could have taken under the premises was to dismiss the complaint if found to be without any basis for further proceedings or if warranted, to issue a warrant of arrest for the respondent, and after arrest, to hold him for trial. It is decisively clear that in conducting the preliminary investigation under attack, the respondent judge exceeded his authority under the pertinent rules. prcd In his Comment, respondent judge was careful to refer to his challenged action as a preliminary examination. Be that as it may, when he concluded that the proper charge should be simple slander, after examining the complainant and her witnesses in subject criminal cases, respondent Judge, in effect, conducted a preliminary investigation. Not only was such preliminary investigation defective; it was a patent error because no preliminary investigation is required for criminal cases cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts. It is only required for those cognizable by the Regional Trial Court. 9 Consequently, the respondent judge was devoid of jurisdiction or authority to reduce the charge to simple slander. Furthermore, in Bagunas vs. Fabillar, 10 the Court reiterated that under the new rules of procedure, preliminary investigation has only one stage, viz.: "(u)nder the old rules, the preliminary investigation conducted by a municipal judge had two stages: (1) the preliminary examination stage during which the investigating judge determines whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof, so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial; and (2) the preliminary investigation proper where the complaint or information is read to the accused after his arrest and he is informed of the substance of the evidence adduced against him, after which he is allowed to present evidence in his favor if he so desires. Presidential Decree 911, upon which the present rule is based, removed the preliminary examination stage and integrated it into the preliminary investigation proper. Now, the proceedings consist only of one stage." (Italics supplied) In the present cases, the respondent judge showed his ignorance not only of the scope of his authority to conduct preliminary investigation 11 but also of the procedure to follow in conducting a preliminary investigation. Where, as in this case, the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence requires no less. 12 Equally erroneous was the action of respondent judge in proceeding with the arraignment of the accused in subject criminal cases without the participation of a government prosecutor. The Court need not belabor the point that as the officer in charge of prosecuting criminal cases for the government, rudiments of due process require that the public prosecutor must be afforded an opportunity to intervene in all stages of the proceedings. Here, it cannot be denied that the public prosecutor assigned to handle Criminal Cases Nos. 3097 and 3098 was not notified by respondent judge of the scheduled trial of said cases. That the public prosecutor in the said criminal cases had an arrangement with the respondent Judge as early as June 1997 that trial of cases requiring his appearance be transferred from the previous Tuesday schedule to Wednesdays, did not excuse the failure of the latter to notify the former of the scheduled trial on January 21, 1998 (a Wednesday) in subject criminal cases. cdtai

Concerning the refusal of respondent judge to inhibit from the cases in question, the Court is not convinced of the need therefor. In this connection, the Court Administrator observed that the complainant wrote respondent judge, asking him to inhibit from subject criminal cases, but a formal motion therefor was necessary so that the alleged grounds thereof could be ventilated properly. 13 As a matter of fact, the request or motion for inhibition was taken up during the scheduled arraignment of the accused on November 12, 1997, when the private prosecutor asked the respondent Judge to inhibit himself from subject cases. Acting thereupon, respondent judge ordered the lawyer to file the corresponding motion within five (5) days from receipt of the Order; and in the meantime, he suspended the arraignment of the accused. However, the private prosecutor did not file the required motion for inhibition, an omission which was interpreted as abandonment of the stance of the complainant to inhibit the respondent Judge from hearing subject cases. 14

WHEREFORE, Judge Benjamin E. Almazan is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, with stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Let copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of respondent Judge. cdll SO ORDERED. Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1. Dated January 26, 1998. On February 9, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator received a verified complaint containing the same allegations as that in the sworn letter-complaint. 2. Order dated December 23, 1997. 3. Atty. Lazaro C. Gayo. 4. Efren Basconcillo. 5. Alfredo L. Benipayo. 6. On August 23, 1999, this Court issued a resolution which reads: Considering the memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator on the complaint charging respondents with gross ignorance of law, abuse of discretion, gross partiality and gross misconduct relative to Criminal Case Nos. 3097-98, entitled "People vs. Teresita Nabayan," the Court Resolved to ADOPT its recommendation: (a) to REDOCKET this case as an administrative matter; and (b) to DISMISS the charges against respondent Clerk of Court for insufficiency of evidence. The Court further resolved to require respondent Judge to MANIFEST to the Court whether he is submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings and the records of the case, within (10) days from notice. 7. In Cojuanco vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, et al . (190 SCRA 226, 243), this Court held that such a preliminary investigation is required for offenses cognizable by the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan in accordance with Section 1, Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and Section 10, P.D. No. 1386. 8. The Revised Penal Code, Art. 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos. 9. Del Rosario, Jr. vs. Bartolome, 270 SCRA 645, 649. 10. 289 SCRA 383, 394. 11. SEC. 2, Rule 112, Revised Rules of Court. 12. Cortes vs. Agcaoili, 294 SCRA 423, 458. 13. Report of the Court Administrator, p. 3. 14. Ibid.

CANON 1, SECTION 6, FULL TEXT 1 OF 2 FIRST DIVISION [A.M. No. 00-3-108-RTC. January 28, 2005.] RE: REPORT OF ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE WILFREDO F. HERICO ON MISSING CASH BONDS IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 750 AND AND CRIMINAL CASE NO. 812. [A.M. No. 00-11-260-MCTC. January 28, 2005.] RE: FINANCIAL AUDIT ON THE CASH ACCOUNTS OF MESSRS. ROLANDO B. SAA AND BENJAMIN SEVILLA OF MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF CAPALONGA-STA. ELENA, CAMARINES NORTE. DECISION AZCUNA, J p: Before the Court are two consolidated cases: (1) The administrative case against Judge Edgar M. Alba (Retired), then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mercedes, Camarines Norte and also the Acting Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Capalonga-Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte in connection with the missing cash bonds in two pending criminal cases in the MCTC of Capalonga-Sta. Elena, to wit (a) Criminal Case No. 750 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide in the amount of P10,000 and (b) Criminal Case No. 812 for theft/violation of Republic Act No. 7832 ["Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Material Pilferage Act of 1994"] in the amount of P20,000 and (2) The financial audit conducted on the cash accounts of Rolando B. Saa and Benjamin Sevilla of the MCTC, Capalonga-Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte. A.M. No. 00-3-108-RTC : On February 28, 1999, then Presiding Judge Edgar M. Alba of the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Norte applied for optional retirement, docketed as A.M. No. 9743-Ret. 1 Pursuant to the resolution of the Court (en banc) dated March 2, 1999, the Court approved his application, 2 but held in abeyance the payment of his retirement benefits subject to whatever penalties the Court may impose relative to another administrative case against him, docketed as A.M. No. MTJ 99-1210, 3 and subject further to the availability of funds and the usual clearance requirements. Per Administrative Order No. 54-99 dated June 21, 1999 of the Court, Presiding Judge Wilfredo F. Herico of Talisay, Camarines Norte was designated the Acting Presiding Judge of the MTC of Vinzons and the MCTC of Capalonga-Sta. Elena, both in the Province of Camarines Norte. TCSEcI In a letter dated September 29, 1999, Judge Herico informed the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that when he assumed office as Acting Judge of MCTC of Capalonga-Sta. Elena, he discovered that there were missing cash bonds in two pending criminal cases (a) Criminal Case No. 750 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide in the amount of P10,000 and (b) Criminal Case No. 812 for theft/violation of Republic Act No. 7832 ["Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Material Pilferage Act of 1994"] in the amount of P20,000, and that both cases do not even have any release order on file. He asked the Clerk of Court, Rolando B. Saa, to prepare an inventory of the pending cases and found out that there were violations in the proper custody of exhibits. He also requested that the available funds of the MCTC be advanced to cover the amount of the missing cash bonds which would thereafter have to be paid by the person found guilty of misappropriating the same. In a Memorandum to the Court dated January 24, 2000, the OCA recommended that Judge Alba be required to submit his comment on the letter-complaint of Judge Herico and that his retirement benefits be withheld. Pertinent portions of the memorandum read: It was verified that the salaries of Clerk of Court Rolando Saa had been ordered withheld by the Fiscal Management Office since May 1999 for failure to submit the Report on the Monthly Collection and Withdrawal of Fiduciary Fund . Further verification shows that nevertheless, Mr. Saa, is not remiss in reporting regularly the general fund and JDF collections. No charges have yet been filed against Mr. Saa for his failure to submit the aforesaid report. The withholding of his salaries was done only for the purpose of compliance or compelling Mr. Saa to submit the required report. At present, the Fiscal Monitoring Division, this office, is conducting a financial audit on the collections of Mr. Saa. Based on the report of Acting Judge Herico, Mr. Saa is pointing the blame to former Acting Judge, Edgar Alba (MTC, Mercedes, Camarines Norte) who optionally retired last February 28, 1999. . . .

With respect to the request of Judge Herico to avail of cash fund from the Honorable Court to answer for the missing cash bond, such request cannot be given favorable consideration since cash bonds shall only be withdrawn from the collections of the fiduciary funds per Circular No. 50-95 dated October 11, 1995. Lastly, relative to the request of Judge Herico for a judicial audit and physical inventory of cases in MCTC, Capalonga-Sta Elena, Camarines Norte, appropriate action is now currently undertaken by this office. During his recent visit to this office, Mr. Rolando Saa, provided the office with the pertinent copy of the orders and authorization to shed light on the issue regarding the subject missing cash bonds, as follows: 1)An Order dated July 7, 1995 of Acting Presiding Judge Edgar M. Alba in Criminal Case No. 812 for Theft entitled: " People vs. Roger de la Rosa, et al.", which stated that: "A cash bond in the amount of . . . P20,000.00 pesos . . . was filed by the accused Allan Ba[z]ar y Joven through [his] bondsman Edwin Conrado . . . is hereby approved. Finding the bailbond filed by the accused to be in order and satisfactory, the same is hereby approved." (Annex "A") IHEaAc 2)An Order dated January 12, 1996 of Acting Presiding Judge Alba in Criminal Case No. 812 for Violation of R.A. [No.] 7832 entitled: "People vs. Roger de al Rosa, et al.", which stated that "On July 7, 1995 accused Allan Ba[z]ar y Joven filed a cash bond thru his bondsman Edwin Conrado in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos, . . ., in [the] form of cross[ed] cheque numbered 6115[3]3 and dated July 17, 1995. Said bond was approved by the court on condition that the cheque posted by bondsman Edwin Conrado will be replaced with cash within twenty days from date of its approval. However, up to the present, neither the bondsman nor the accused appeared before this court to effect replacement of the cheque with . . . cash. Wherefore, the cash bond filed by Allan Bazar thru his bondsman Edwin Conrado is hereby ordered cancelled and accused Allan Bazar is hereby ordered arrested ." (Annex "B") 3)An Authorization Letter dated September 29, 1995 executed by Ms. Isabel S. Liwag, Court Interpreter and Acting Clerk of Court of M[C]TC. Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, and approved by Acting Presiding Judge Edgar M. Alba, which stated that: " The bearer, Mr. Alejandro M. Pisante, is authorized to encash the PNB Republic Bank Check No. 611533 dated July 17, 1995 in the amount of P20,000.00." (Annex "C") 4)An Authorization Letter dated August 16, 1996, executed by Ms. Ma. Isabel S. Liwag, Court Interpreter and Acting Clerk of Court, and approved by Acting Presiding Judge Edgar M. Alba, which stated that " to authorize the bearer, Mr. Alejandro M. Pisante . . . to encash Check No. 0958078 in the amount of . . . P20,000.00 under Account No. 5167 at the PNB Republic Bank, [Naga Branch, Naga City]." (Annex "D") 5)An Affidavit dated 16 June 1999 executed by Mr. Alejandro M. Pisante, Utility Worker, MCTC, Capalonga, Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, with the following allegations: "that sometime October 1995, by virtue of an authorization given to him by Ms. Liwag and Judge Alba, he attempted to encash PNB Republic Bank Check No. 611533 in the sum of P20,000.00 dated July 17, 1995 under Account No. 5167. However, the same bank refused to pay the check since it is a 'cross[ed] check.' Again sometime August 1996, he was given authority by Ms. Liwag and Judge Alba to encash Check No. 095[8]078 under Account No. 5167. This time, the check was encashed in the sum of P20,000.00 pesos. Thereafter, the aforesaid sum was given to Judge Alba and Ms. Liwag in the presence of some court personnel." (Annex "E") cEaSHC The aforesaid documents are obviously related to the missing cash bonds as reported by Acting Judge Herico. Closer examination of these documents revealed that initially, one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 812 posted a cash bond through his bondsman in the form of a cross[ed] cheque with No. 611533 dated July 17, 1995 under Account No. 5167. Said bond was approved on condition that the cheque will be replaced by cash within twenty (20) days from date of its approval. An authorization was given to Mr. Pisante to encash the cheque. However, the same was denied payment by the bank since it is a cross[ed] check (meaning for deposit onl y to the payee's account). Hence, Judge Alba ordered the cancellation of the cash bond and the consequent arrest of accused Allan Bazar. As a result, bondsman Edwin Conrado issued a new Check No. 0958078 in the sum of P20,000.00 under Account No. 5167 in lieu of the earlier mentioned cross[ed] check, which was subsequently encashed by Mr. Pisante by virtue of an authority granted him by Ms. Liwag and Judge Alba. Analyzing the entire scenario of the reported irregularities in MCTC, Capalonga-Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, the matter poses a serious problem in the latter court particularly with the present Acting Judge and the Clerk of Court who is the accountable officer of the court. Right now, the Acting Judge cannot just merely order the release of the cash bond since there is no more cash bond to speak of. Retired Judge Edgar M. Alba must be made answerable to the missing cash bond. With respect to Ms. Isabel Liwag, it was verified that since January 1995, she was considered on AWOL. In view of the foregoing. It is respectfully recommended that:

1)Retired Judge Edgar M. Alba, MTC, Mercedes and former Acting Presiding Judge of MCTC, Capalonga-Sta. Elena, both in the Province of Camarines Norte, be DIRECTED to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice about reported missing cash bonds in the following cases: Criminal Case [No. 750] for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with a cash bond of P10,000.00 and Criminal Case No. 812 with a cash bond of P20,000.00. ScaEIT

2)The payment of the retirement benefits of Judge Alba be WITHHELD pending the outcome of this administrative matter. 4 On February 1, 2000, Judge Alba submitted a letter-answer/comment (addressed to Judge Herico) stating that the July 8, 1994 order he issued merely approved the P10,000 bail bond posted by the accused, but did not state that he and Ma. Isabel S. Liwag would keep the amount in their custody. He added that per Official Receipt No. 2854940, the P10,000 paid by one Jerry Duazo for the bail of the accused, had been received by two of his staff, Perfidia J. Parale, as evidenced by her initials "PJP," and Ma. Isabel Liwag, whose signature also appeared therein. In seeking to be absolved from any liability, Judge Alba insisted that the ones supposed to be held liable are Isabel Liwag, Perfidia Parale, and Clerk of Court Rolando B. Saa who failed to audit the two in 1995. On June 19, 2000, the Court (First Division) issued a resolution directing Judge Alba to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice regarding the missing cash bonds in the two criminal cases and withholding payment of his retirement benefits pending the outcome of this present case. In another letter dated July 17, 2000 (addressed to the First Division of the Court), Judge Alba again sought the dismissal of the case against him and requested the release of his retirement benefits. He reiterated that he had nothing to do with the missing cash bonds. He pointed out that Isabel Liwag and Perfidia Parale should be made liable as they were the ones authorized to collect, receive, and issue official receipts for cash bonds, trust funds, and other payments made by party-litigants. Both letters of Judge Alba were noted by the Court (First Division) on July 31, 2000 and the case was referred to the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation. aEDCAH In a Memorandum to the Court dated October 16, 2000, the OCA stated: After a careful evaluation of the aforesaid comment-explanation of Judge Edgar M. Alba, it appears that his reasons and arguments do not warrant the outright dismissal of the present matter at bar. Although the aforesaid court employees may be considered as accountable officers in the Court [and] they could be held answerable for the subject missing funds, there is no doubt that retired Judge Alba has an active participation in the whereabouts of the missing cash bonds. It should be noted that in the authorization given to Mr. Alejandro Pisante, retired Judge Alba's signature appeared as the one who approved the encashment of the check payment for the cash bond in Criminal Case No. 812 in the sum of P20,000.00. Besides, Judge Alba could no longer pinpoint Ms. Liwag as the one responsible for the said bonds. After being AWOL for sometime, Ms. Liwag finally tendered her resignation which was later on accepted by Judge Alba. Not only that, Judge Alba also cleared Ms. Liwag from all money and property accountabilities. Since this matter also involves financial liability, the prayer for the release of the retirement benefits cannot be granted. The Fiscal Monitoring Division of the Court Management Office, OCA had conducted financial audit on the pertinent financial records of the MCTC, Capalonga-Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte. The audit covers the period of time when retired Judge Alba was the Acting Judge in the latter court. A separate report shall be submitted as soon as the financial documents necessary for the audit are submitted and completed. Independent of the findings of the said office, the present matter should be further investigated as it appears that the affidavits and other documentary evidence on hand are not sufficient to attach administrative liability to the herein Judge. Nevertheless, the clearance given by Judge Alba to Ms. Liwag further bolsters the suspicion that it was the former who is the one responsible for the missing bonds. xxx xxx xxx In view thereof, it is respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court with the recommendation that: (a)the prayer of retired Judge Edgar M. Alba, MTC, Mercedes, Camarines Norte in his letter-comment dated July 17, 2000 to dismiss the present matter and release his retirement benefits, be DENIED; (b)the matter be referred to the Executive Judge of the RTC, Daet, Camarines Norte for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records. 5

On December 13, 2000, the Court (First Division) denied the request of Judge Alba that the instant case be dismissed and referred the matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Daet, Camarines Norte for investigation, report, and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records. On July 12, 2001, Executive Judge Jose G. Dy of the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte submitted a report to the OCA recommending that Judge Alba be allowed to receive his retirement benefits, thus: Per investigation conducted by the undersigned on April 18, 2001 regarding the missing cash bond in the amount of P10,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 750 for Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, pending before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of CapalongaSta. Elena, Camarines Norte, it was shown that a collection officer of the MCTC of Sta. Elena had on July 7, 1994 received the amount as shown in the [Official] Receipt No. 2854940. It was also revealed by Mr. Saa, the Acting Clerk of Court of MCTC Capalonga, that the collecting officer will have to deposit the amount with the Municipal Treasury but there is no evidence to prove said allegation. The undersigned takes notice of the fact that in the year 1994 and even up to the present, the town of Capalonga is still considered a remote place with bad roads and limited means of transportation. In fact, one has to travel no less than four (4) hours to reach Labo or Daet. As admitted by Mr. Saa, it was only in the year 1999 that the missing cash bonds were discovered, and that from 1994 onwards, he has not visited the MCTC [of] Capalonga. TaEIcS As there is no clear evidence that it was Judge Edgar Alba who received the said amount from the payor, Jerry Duazo, it is therefore respectfully submitted that there is insufficient factual basis to hold Judge Alba liable for the missing P10,000.00. Insofar as the P20,000.00 cash bond in Criminal Case No. 812 is concerned, Court Utility Worker, Alejandro P[i]sante testified on April 18, 2001 that while he place[d] the amount of P20,000.00 on the table of Judge Alba, he did not see Judge take the amount, but it was Mrs. Maria Isabel Liwag who took the said amount in the presence of Perfidia Talento. The foregoing fact was confirmed by Mrs. Talento, who likewise, testified on said date. . . . Considering that it was Mrs. Liwag who was designated to receive the said amount as Acting Clerk of Court, she is the one who should be made to explain and answer for the whereabouts of the said P20,000.00. Unfortunately, she already retired several years ago. Incidentally, no additional evidence was submitted by Judge Wilfredo Herico to strengthen the complaint against Judge Alba on the two missing cash bonds. Premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that Judge Edgar Alba be allowed to receive his retirement benefits unless he is charged in some other administrative complaint. 6 A.M. No. 00-11-260 MCTC : Pursuant to a financial audit conducted on the cash accounts of MCTC-Capalonga-Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, an administrative case was filed against two court personnel, Rolando B. Saa and Benjamin Sevilla (who assumed the position of Officer-in-Charge when Ma. Isabel Liwag resigned on April 19, 1997). Per resolution of the Court ( en banc) dated November 28, 2000, this case was consolidated with A.M. No. 00-3-108-MTC. It also directed the Financial Management Office of the OCA to release the withheld salaries and other allowances of Rolando B. Saa from May 1999 to present; to forfeit in favor of the government all benefits due Ma. Isabel S. Liwag; and to withhold the retirement benefits of Judge Alba pending the resolution of both cases. Further, together with A.M. No. 00-3-108-MTC, this case was referred to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte for investigation, report, and recommendation. caITAC Meanwhile, the Accounting Division, Fiscal Management Office of the OCA recommended that the salary of Rolando B. Saa be withheld effective May, 1999 for non-submission of Fiduciary Fund Reports of Collections, Deposits, Withdrawals, and Disbursements while the salary checks of Benjamin Sevilla from October 16, 1999 to November 30, 1999 be returned to the Cash Disbursements Division for being Absent Without Official Leave (AWOL). In the Memorandum to the Court, dated October 11, 2000, the OCA found that per financial audit conducted, both Rolando B. Saa (Clerk of Court, MCTC of Capalonga-Sta. Elena) and Benjamin Sevilla (former Officer-in-Charge of Sta. Elena) had no cash shortage or accountabilities. However, Ma. Isabel Liwag had shortages of P42,237 for the Judiciary Development Fund and P56,400 for the Fiduciary Fund. The report showed: Based on the documents submitted by Mr. Saa to this office on January 4, 2000, the following are our findings for the account of: JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND: MCTCMCTC

CapalongaSta. ElenaTOTAL (Mr. Saa)(Ms. Liwag) TOTAL COLLECTIONS: Per Cashbooks September 1999)P37,874.00P10,510.00P48,384.00 Per Official (May 1985-June 1997)17,453.0013,735.0031,188.00 Forfeited bonds Court Orders9,637.0030,900.0040,537.00 TotalP64,964.00P55,145.00P120,109.00 LESS: TOTAL THE SAME PERIOD64,464.0012,907.8077,371.80 BALANCEP500.00P42,237.20P42,737.20 Less: Deposits No. 13326609 Dated 9/8/00500.00-0-500.00 SHORTAGEP-0-P42,237.20P42,237.20 GENERAL FUND: MCTCMCTC made under SC OR REMITTANCES FOR per (October 1996-

Receipts

issued

Inventory

of

CapalongaSta. ElenaTOTAL 1996-19991997-1999 TOTAL COLLECTIONS:P8,526.00P11,919.00P20,445.00 LESS: REMITTANCES8,526.0011,919.0020,445.00 BALANCE OF ACCOUNTABILITYP-0-P-0-P-0FIDUCIARY FUND: MCTCMCTCMCTC CapalongaSta. ElenaSta. ElenaTOTAL (10/86-1999)(1991-1996)(5/1/98-1999) Mr. SaaMs. LiwagMr. Sevilla COLLECTIONSP42,700.00P107,400.00P88,300.00P238,400.00 Less: Withdrawals made8,500.0033,000.0014,400.0055,900.00 Unwithdrawn as of 9/30/99P34,200.00P74,400.00P73,900.00P182,500.00 Fiduciary Fund

Less: Deposits with MTO33,600.0018,000.0073,900.00182,500.00 ACCOUNTABILITYP600.00P56,400.00P-0-P57,000.00

Less: Deposits 7063750 Dated 9/25/00600.00-0--0-600.00 FINAL ACCOUNTABILITIESP-0-P56,400.00P-0-P56,400.00

with

MTO

OR#

Note: Subject to amendment upon return of the corrected Statement of Unwithdrawn Fiduciary fund from the MTO-Sta. Elena. The collections and remittances of the funds mentioned above were divided into two (2) stations, one for MCTC-Capalonga and that of Sta. Elena to establish the correct accountabilities. Wayback in 1991, Judge Edgar M. Alba designated Ms. Ma. Isabel S. Liwag, Court Interpreter as the Acting Clerk of Court of the station in Sta. Elena as per attached affidavit executed by Mr. Alejandro M. Pisante, Utility Worker and Mrs. Perfida Parale-Talento, Stenographer of MCTC-Capalonga-Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte and [required] that all fiduciary funds must be given to Ms. Liwag. Ms. Liwag ignored the incumbency of Mr. Saa as the Clerk of Court of MCTC-Capalonga-Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte and continued doing the task as OIC as per instruction of Judge Alba. Ms. Liwag as the designated Officer-in-Charge of Judge Alba went on AWOL sometime in 1996 and eventually filed her resignation effective April 29, 1997. Mr. Saa, aware that Ms. Liwag was the designated OIC of Sta. Elena, did not sign her clearance as to money and property accountabilities copy hereto attached. Judge Alba accepted the resignation of Ms. Liwag as Interpreter I, although he was aware that being the designated Officer-in-Charge of Sta. Elena, she should have been cleared by this Office as to her financial accountabilities. The reason of Ms. Liwag for resigning was her failing health, but as per affidavit executed by Mr. Saa, she left the country. A memorandum in Administrative Matter No. 00-3-108-RTC was submitted to the Court recommending that the matter of the accountability of Judge Alba [regarding] missing cash bonds received by Ms. Liwag but encashed upon instruction of Judge Alba be referred to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte for investigation, report and recommendation. CIDaTc Mr. Sevilla came into the picture on April 29, 1998 after the resignation of Ms. Liwag. Judge Alba then verbally designated him as the new Officer-in-Charge, vice Ms. Liwag. Considering the computation presented above, it would be unfair for Mr. Saa to shoulder the shortages incurred by Ms. Liwag. It is therefore recommended that: 1.The Financial Management Office be advised to release the withheld salaries and other allowances of Mr. Saa from May, 1999 to present. 2.This matter be consolidated with Administrative Matter No. 00-3-108 RTC and referred to the Executive Judge of RTC, Daet, Camarines Norte for investigation report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of records. 3.All benefits in favor of Ms. Liwag for rendering thirteen years (13) of continuous services as Interpreter I be forfeited in favor of the government; and 4.Pending resolution of this administrative matter and A.M. No. 00-3-108 RTC, the retirement benefits of Judge Edgar M. Alba be withheld. 7 In the Memorandum to the Court for the subject administrative cases (A.M. No. 00-3-108-RTC and A.M. No. 00-11-260-MCTC), dated January 20, 2003, the OCA submitted the consolidated report as follows: Upon careful study and evaluation of the aforesaid letter of Judge Dy, the transcripts of the hearing conducted in relation to the investigation on the missing cash bonds, the orders and comments of Acting Presiding Judge Edgar M. Alba, MCTC, Capalonga-Sta. Elena, the manifestations of Judge Herico and Mr. Saa and the affidavits and testimonies of witnesses as well as the financial audit report, this office comes up with the following findings in the two administrative matters: 1.No direct documentary or testimonial evidence shows that Judge Alba took, received or collected and misappropriated the missing cash bonds. ISDCaT 2.The cash bond collection of P10,000.00 was received by Perf[i]dia [J. Parale-] Talento, an employee of the aforesaid circuit court, whose initials "PJP" appeared in the Official Receipt No. 2854940 dated 7 July 1994. A counter-initial/signature belonging to Ms. Liwag also appeared in the said receipt. The bond was paid by a certain Jerry Duazo on 7 July 1994 but the same was not depos ited either in the depository bank or in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer.

3.The cash bond of P20,000.00 was taken by Ms. Liwag in the presence of Ms. Talent[o] and Judge Alba at his table from Alejandro M. Pisante, a Utility Worker, at the circuit court, who had earlier encashed the check payment. In his affidavit dated 16 June 1999, Mr. Pisante stated that in August 1996, he was authorized by Judge Alba and Ms. Liwag to encash Check No. 0958078 in the amount of P20,000.00 and that the same was not given any official receipt for deposit or withdrawal by Ms. Liwag. Prior thereto or on 29 September 1995, Mr. Pisante was also authorized by the same persons to encash PNB Republic Bank Check No. 611533 dated 17 July 1995 in the amount of P20,000.00 but the same was not encashed for being a cross[ed] check. 4.It appears that Ms. Liwag is the one who should explain/account for the missing cash bonds, being the accountable officer. 5.Judge Alba is responsible for approving the resignation of Ms. [Liwag] as Court Interpreter and for clearing her of all money and property accountabilities. By reason of his clearance which freed Ms. Liwag from accountabilities, Judge Alba has to assume the responsibilities of restituting the shortages incurred by Ms. Liwag; after all, he was the one who designated her as an accountable officer of the court. This includes her accountabilities in the Fiduciary Fund and in the Judiciary Development Fund. Likewise, Judge Alba, being the Acting Presiding Judge who has command responsibility over all court personnel, is responsible for his failure to exercise diligence and prudence in the performance of his functions, especially for his acts of designating OIC in Sta. Elena. HESCcA 6.Mr. Saa should be admonished to be more assiduous in the performance of his regular duties as Clerk of Court. The present problems in this circuit court could have been avoided had he promptly protested the set-up of having an Officer-in-Charge in Sta. Elena and reported the same to the Court, through this office. Records reveal that he yielded to the irregular set-up without much ado. In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the following recommendations be considered: (1)Retired Judge Edgar M. Alba, then Acting Presiding Judge of 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capalonga-Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, be: (1-a) found GUILTY of gross negligence for his failure to exercise diligence in approving the resignation of Court Interpreter Isabel Liwag and in clearing her from all money and property accountabilities even when the financial audit shows that Ms. Liwag had incurred shortages of P42,237.20 pertaining to the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and P56,400.00 in the Fiduciary Fund during her incumbency as Officer-in-Charge thereat, and (1-b) directed to RESTITUTE the said shortages; (2)Mr. Rolando B. Saa, be ADMONISHED to be more assiduous in the performance of his duties as Clerk of Court of MCTC Capalonga-Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte; (3)The amount of P30,000.00 out of the P56,400.00 from the Fiduciary Fund that may be restituted be DEPOSITED with the Land Bank of the Philippines to answer for any claim pertaining to the bonds in Criminal Cases Nos. 750 and 812; and (4)The Financial Management Office (FMO), Office of the Court Administrator be directed to [4-a] DEDUCT the amounts of shortages mentioned in paragraph (1-a) from the retirement benefits of Judge Alba to answer for the shortages/accountabilities of Ms. Liwag, and (4-b) RELEASE the balance of the retirement benefits of Judge Alba provided no other legal impediment arises that would warrant the continuous withholding of the same. 8 The Court finds the recommendation of the OCA in the consolidated cases to be well-taken. aIcDCT In the Court's Circular No. 50-95, dated October 11, 1995, then Court Administrator Ernani Cruz Pao directed the Judges and Clerks of Courts to comply with the guidelines and procedures in the collections and deposits of the Court Judiciary Funds, thus: TO:ALL JUDGES AND CLERKS REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, COURTS, METROPOLITAN MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS. SUBJECT:COURT FIDUCIARY FUNDS The following guidelines and procedures for purposes of uniformity in the manner of collections and deposits are hereby established; A.Guidelines in Making Deposits: (1)Deposits of Fiduciary Funds shall be made under a savings account. A current account may also be maintained provided that a savings account is also maintained with automatic fund transfer arrangement. DaIACS OF SHARI'A TRIAL CITIES, CIRCUIT COURTS OF DISTRICT COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL

IN

(2)Deposits shall be made in the name of the Court, with its Clerk of Court and the Executive Judge as authorized signatories. (3)The Clerk of Court shall be the custodian of the Passbook to be issued by the depository bank and shall report to the Executive Judge for RTC, SDC, MetroTC, MTCC, and the Presiding Judge for MTC, MCTC and SCC, the bank's name, branch and savings/current account number. Xerox copy of the passbook shall be submitted to the Fiscal Audit Division.

B.Guidelines in Making Withdrawals: (1)Withdrawal slips shall be signed by the Executive/Presiding Judge and countersigned by the Clerk of Court. (2)No withdrawals, except as specifically provided in the immediately preceding paragraph, shall be allowed unless there is a lawful order from the Court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter involved. (3)When maintaining a current account, withdrawals shall be made by check. Signatories on the check shall likewise be the Executive/Presiding Judge and the Clerk of Court. (4)All collections from bail bonds, rental deposits, and other fiduciary collections shall be deposited within twenty four (24) hours by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the Land Bank of the Philippines. (5)Interest earned on these deposits and any forfeited amounts shall accrue to the general fund of the national government. W ithin two (2) weeks after the end of each quarter, the Clerk of Court shall withdraw such interest and forfeited amounts and shall remit the same to the National Treasury under a separate, remittance advice, duplicate copy thereof to be furnished the Chief Accountant of the Supreme Court for record and control purposes. ASDTEa (6)Only one depository bank shall be maintained and the bank must be formally informed by the Executive/Presiding Judge as to who are the authorized signatories to the withdrawal slips and that every withdrawal slip must be accompanied by a court order authorizing the withdrawal of the amount indicated thereat. (7)Except in instances specifically mentioned in the immediately succeeding paragraph, all fiduciary collections currently deposited with the local treasurers/ and other depositories shall be withdrawn therefrom and deposited with the savings/current accounts maintained by the court for these collections. (8)In localities where there are no branches of the Land Bank of the Philippines, fiduciary collections shall be deposited by the Clerk of Court with the Provincial, City or Municipal Treasurer. (9)Within two (2) weeks after the end of each quarter, all Clerks of Court are hereby required to submit to the Chief Accountant of the Supreme Court, copy furnished the Office of the Court Administrator, a quarterly report indicating the outstanding balance maintained with the depository bank or local treasurer, and the date, nature and amount of all deposits and withdrawals made within such period. Circulars that are inconsistent herewith are considered revoked. This Circular shall take effect on November 1, 1995. In the Court's Circular No. 26-97, dated May 5, 1997, then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo directed the Judges and Clerks of Courts of the Lower Courts to observe the procedures with regard to monies received by the collecting officers of the courts: TO:ALL JUDGES AND CLERKS REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, COURTS, METROPOLITAN MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS, SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS SUBJECT:LEGAL FEES FORM FOR LOWER COURTS To eradicate the practice of some clerks of court of retaining the original copy of the official receipt issued in acknowledgment of payment for file with the record of the case instead of issuing the same to payor, JUDGES and CLERKS OF COURT are hereby DIRECTED TO: OF SHARI'A TRIAL CITIES, CIRCUIT COURTS OF DISTRICT COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL

IN

1)Compel their collecting officials to strictly comply with the provisions of the AUDITING AND ACCOUNTING MANUAL, Art. VI, Secs. 61 and 113, to wit: ARTICLE VI Accountable Forms Sec. 61.Kinds of Accountable Forms (a) Official Receipts For proper accounting and control of collections, collecting officers shall promptly issue official receipts for all monies received by them . These receipts may be in the form of stamps or officially numbered receipts. . . . (Italics supplied.) EAHcCT Sec. 113.Issuance of official receipt For proper accounting and control of revenues, no payment of any nature shall be received by a collecting officer without immediately issuing an official receipt in acknowledgment thereof . This receipt may be in the form of stamps . . . or officially numbered receipts, subject to proper custody and accountability. (Italics supplied.) 2)Cause the attachment of the Legal Fees Form for lower courts (Annex "A"), which is to be provided by the Property Division of the Office of the Court Administrator, to the record of the case in lieu of the official receipt. Non-compliance with this CIRCULAR shall be dealt with administrative sanctions. Annex "A" of Circular No. 26-97 REPUBLIC RTC/SDC/METC/MTCC/MTC/MCTC/SCC LEGAL FEES FORM Case No. ____________ RECEIVED this _______ day of _____, 19__ the following payments: 1.General fund a.Clerk of CourtP ________ O.R. No. __________ General Fund b.Sheriff's General FundP ________ O.R. No. __________ 2.Judiciary FundP ________ O.R. No. __________ 3.Fiduciary Fund P ________ O.R. No. __________ 4.Sheriff's Trust FundP ________ O.R. No. __________ 5.Legal FeeP ________ O.R. No. __________ 6.Land Registration FeeP ________ O.R. No. __________ 7.Victims FeeP ________ O.R. No. __________ Total: _______________ Paid By:Received By:_______________ _______________________________________ (Note: _______________) Compensation Research Fund Development OF THE PHILIPPINES

Moreover, the "adjudicative support functions" of a Branch Clerk of Court in the First Level Courts, i.e., Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, state that he: 1.Attends all court sessions; 2.Supervises the withdrawal of all records of cases to be heard and the preparation of the notices of hearings, court's calendar, reports, minutes, monthly reports, inventory of cases, index of exhibits, and paging of records of cases; 3.Sees to it that all returns of notices are attached to the corresponding evidence properly marked during the hearing as collected in an exhibit folder; and 4.Signs notices of orders and decisions for service to the parties, release papers of detained prisoners who are acquitted and/or who filed their corresponding bail bonds duly approved by the presiding judge." 9 The Judiciary Development Fund and the Fiduciary Fund partake of the nature of trust funds. Facts show that Perfidia J. Talento, who was appointed as the Court Stenographer and designated as the Assistant Clerk of the MCTC of Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, initialed "PJP" on Official Receipt No. 2854940 dated July 7, 1994 with regard to the cash bond of P10,000 posted by one Jerry Duazo for the accused Mario Zamala y Dasco in Criminal Case No. 750 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Ma. Isabel Liwag, Court Interpreter I and designated as Acting Clerk of Court of MCTC of Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, affixed her counterinitial/signature in the same receipt. The aforesaid amount had not been deposited either in the depository bank or in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. ISTECA In Criminal Case No. 812, Alejandro M. Pisante, a Utility Worker of the MCTC of Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, after encashing the check, handed the P20,000, cash bond to Ma. Isabel Liwag in the presence of Perfidia J. Talento and Judge Alba. In his affidavit dated June 16, 1999, Alejandro M. Pisante stated that on September 29, 1995, he was authorized by Judge Alba and Liwag to encash PNB Republic Bank Check No. 611533 dated July 17, 1995 in the amount of P20,000 but the same was not encashed for being a crossed check. Thereafter, in August 1996, he was authorized by the two to encash Check No. 0958078 (as replacement for the prior check) in the amount of P20,000, but Liwag failed to issue any official receipt corresponding to the deposit or withdrawal thereof. Clerks of Court are the custodians of all bail bonds, rental deposits and other fiduciary collections. In the ordinary course of proceedings, Judges have nothing to do with the collections, because Clerks of Court are the officers mandated to deposit them with an authorized government depository bank. Hence, Judges cannot be directly faulted if these funds are not immediately deposited, especially since they would not normally know exactly when the Clerks of Court received them. To repeat, the Clerks of Court are the ones responsible for such matters. 10 Section 14, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 14.Deposit of cash as bail. The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of Section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit. A Judge is not one of those authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail, nor should such cash be kept in the office of the Judge. The proper procedure in the handling of cash submitted or given to the municipal court as bail bond is for the court to direct the Clerk of Court to officially receive the cash and to immediately deposit it with the municipal treasurer's office. The transaction must not only be properly receipted for but should also appear in the records of the case. 11 On the part of Judges, they are required to compel their collecting officials, such as Clerks of Court, to promptly issue official receipts for all monies received by them. 12 Verily, being designated the Acting Clerk of Court or Officer-in-Charge of MCTC of Sta. Elena by Judge Alba in 1991, Liwag had the duties and responsibilities of a Branch Clerk of Court. As such, it was her duty to collect and receive, by herself or through a duly appointed cashier, all monies in payment of all legal fees, as well as to receive deposits, fines, and dues. A Clerk of Court, or an Acting Clerk of Court, has the duty to ensure full compliance with the circulars of this Court and the Court Administrator on deposits or collections of court funds as set forth in Circular Nos. 50-95 and 26-97. 13 Clearly, it should be Liwag, being an accountable officer, and not Judge Alba, who should be made liable for the missing cash bonds. She should have made sure that the bail bonds posted by the accused in the two criminal cases had been immediately deposited, upon receipt thereof, with the City, Municipal, or Provincial Treasurer where the court was located should there be no branch of the Land Bank of the Philippines in the locality. Failure to remit the funds to the Municipal Treasurer would warrant administrative sanctions. aAHISE

By reason of Judge Alba's designation of Ma. Isabel Liwag as the Acting Clerk of Court of MCTC-Sta. Elena, she performed the functions of an Officer-in-Charge, including the accountability of fiduciary funds of MCTC-Sta. Elena despite the fact that Rolando B. Saa was the incumbent Clerk of Court of MCTC-Capalonga-Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte. Per office procedure, Rolando B. Saa, being the Clerk of Court of MCTC-Capalonga-Sta. Elena, should be the one to sign the clearance of Liwag as to money and property accountabilities. However, Judge Alba accepted the resignation of Liwag, due to health reasons, as Interpreter I of MCTC-CapalongaSta. Elena. It bears stressing that as the designated Acting Clerk of Court (Officer-in-Charge) of MCTC-Sta. Elena, who is an accountable officer, Liwag should have sought clearance with the OCA as to her financial accountabilities before she retired. In lieu thereof, it was Judge Alba who made a letter 14 addressed to then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa stating: January 16, 1998 HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA Chief Justice Supreme Court Manila THRU:HON. [ALFREDO] BENIPAYO Court Administrator Supreme Court, Manila Sir: This is to certify that Ms. MA. ISABEL S. LIWAG, Court Interpreter I of Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capalonga-Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte has tender[ed] her resignation [in] May, 1997. For purposes of declaring the position of MCTC Court Interpreter I as VACANT by virtue of said resignation of Ms. Ma. Isabel S. Liwag and for the purpose of filling up such vacant position, the undersigned Presiding Judge hereby accepts said resignation. However, this acceptance should mean to be interpreted that said Ma. Isabel S. Liwag is free from all money & property accountabilities of the Office of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capalonga-Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte. This certification is being issued only for the purpose above mentioned. Very respectfully yours, (signed) EDGAR M. ALBA Judge Administrative Circular No. 1, dated January 28, 1988 provides, among others, that the Presiding Judge of a court must, upon assumption of office, and every semester thereafter on June 30th and December 31st of every year conduct a physical inventory of their dockets for the purpose of determining the actual number of cases pending in their salas. The inventory shall indicate the cases pending trial, the cases submitted for decision, and the cases that have been archived. Said inventory shall be submitted to the Supreme Court, through the Court Administrator. EHTIDA As found by the OCA, while no direct documentary or testimonial evidence will establish the fact that Judge Alba took, received, collected, misappropriated, or in any way handled the missing cash bonds, yet due diligence dictates that as the Acting Judge of the MCTC of Capalonga-Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, he should have taken the necessary steps to ensure that the correct procedure in the collections and deposits of court funds were dutifully carried out before he retired. Further, he should have prepared an inventory of the cases, both active and archived, for an effective docket control. In so doing, Judge Alba would have discovered the mi ssing cash bonds in the two pending criminal cases before issuing a certification clearing Liwag of all cash and property accountabilities. The Court agrees with the finding of the OCA that by clearing Liwag from all accountabilities, Judge Alba should be made to assume the responsibility of restituting the shortages incurred by her. Even after Judge Alba retired on February 28, 1999, he may still be held

administratively accountable for the negligence and inefficiency committed during his incumbency. Accordingly, since Judge Alba may no longer be dismissed or suspended by reason of his retirement, restitution of the amount lost may be deducted from his retirement pay and benefits. In view of the foregoing, Judge Alba is ordered to pay the following amounts representing the shortage in the funds of the MCTC of Capalonga-Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, to wit: P42,237.20 (for the Judiciary Development Fund) and P56,400 (for the Fiduciary Fund), or the total amount of P98,637.20. Of the P56,400 (for the Fiduciary Fund) to be restituted by Judge Alba, P30,000 representing the total amount for the two missing cash bonds, i.e., (a) Criminal Case No. 750 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide in the amount of P10,000 and (b) Criminal Case No. 812 for theft/violation of Republic Act No. 7832 ["Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Material Pilferage Act of 1994"] with a cash bond of P20,000, shall be deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines. Since Judge Alba had already retired from the service, the Financial Management Office of the Office of the Court Administrator is directed to deduct the amount of P98,637.20, representing the total amount of the shortage to be restituted, from the retirement pay and benefits due him and to release the remainder of the retirement pay and benefits due him unless he is charged in some other administrative complaint or the same is otherwise withheld for some lawful cause. cSDIHT This serves as a reminder to Judges. For the orderly administration of justice, trial court Judges are bound to keep a record of the proceedings in their respective courts to ensure the proper, systematic, and efficient management of their court dockets. In this regard, circulars of this Court shall be strictly complied with to protect the safekeeping of funds and collections and to establish full accountability of government funds. Finally, the recommendation of the OCA that Rolando B. Saa should be admonished is in order. As Branch Clerk of Court of MCTCCapalonga-Sta. Elena, Rolando B. Saa is the administrative officer exercising control and supervision over all subordinate personnel of the court. 15 He should have brought to the attention of the OCA any irregularity in the designation of duties and functions within the court even if the same was by the authority of Judge Alba. Judge Alba's designation of Liwag from 1991 until her retiremen t in May 1997 as the Acting Clerk of Court or Officer-in-Charge of MCTC-Sta. Elena, thereby splitting the MCTC into MCTC-Capalonga and MCTC-Sta. Elena, respectively, and having thus the duties and responsibilities of a Branch Clerk of Court, was a clear irregularity too glaring not to be noticed by Saa. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Judge Edgar M. Alba (Retired), former Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Mercedes, Camarines Norte and likewise, then Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capalonga-Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, is found GUILTY of gross negligence and inefficiency. He is ORDERED to restitute the following amounts representing the shortage in the funds of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capalonga-Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, to wit: P42,237.20 from the Judiciary Development Fund and P56,400 from the Fiduciary Fund, or the total amount of P98,637.20. Of the P56,400 from the Fiduciary Fund to be restituted by Judge Alba, P30,000 shall be deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines to defray any claim pertaining to the bonds in Criminal Cases Nos. 750 and 812. Considering that Judge Alba had already retired from the service, the Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to deduct the amount of P98,637.20, representing the total amount of the shortage to be restituted, from the retirement pay and benefits due him and to release the remainder of the retirement pay and benefits due him unless he is charged in some other administrative complaint or the same is otherwise withheld for some lawful cause. Rolando B. Saa, Clerk of Court of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capalonga-Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect, diligent and cautious in the performance of his duties with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar shortcoming shall be dealt with more severely. Benjamin Sevilla, former Officer-in-Charge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte is ABSOLVED from any liability and cash accountability. jurcda2005 SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago and Carpio, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1."Re: Application for optional retirement of Judge Edgar M. Alba," Rollo, p. 6. 2.Under Republic Act No. 910, as amended.

3.Formerly OCA-IPI No. 97-376-MTJ, entitled "Jerbert Yao v. Judge Edgar M. Alba" for the following charges: gross misconduct, knowingly rendering patently erroneous decision, irregularities and dereliction of duty, gross ignorance of the law, immorality, harassment, and oppression re: Criminal Case No. 12065. However, in a resolution dated October 22, 2003 in A.M. No. MTJ 99-1210, the Court (Second Division), upon the recommendation of Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, in his Memorandum dated September 29, 2003, granted the request of Judge Alba for the release of his retirement benefits, subject to the retention of P20,000 to guarantee whatever administrative penalty may be imposed upon him; directed the Fiscal Management Office of the Office of the Court Administrator to release the retirement benefits of Judge Alba and retain the amount of P20,000 to answer for whatever administrative penalty may be imposed upon him; and directed Justice Pedro Ramirez (Retired) to resolve the investigation of A.M. No. MTJ 99-1210 with dispatch. 4.Rollo, pp. 2-4. 5.Rollo, pp. 22-23. 6.Rollo, pp. 44-45. 7.Rollo, pp. 1-3. 8.Memorandum of the OCA dated January 20, 2003, pp. 2-3. 9.THE 2002 REVISED MANUAL FOR CLERKS OF COURT, Vol. I, p. 622, prepared by The 2001 Ad Hoc Committee for the Revision of the Manual for Clerks of Court, April 2002. 10.Relova v. Rosales, 392 SCRA 585 (2002). 11.Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Palayan City, 403 SCRA 350 (2003), citing Agulan, Jr. v. Fernandez, 356 SCRA 162 (2001), Daag v. Serrano, 118 SCRA 381 (1982).

12.Taran v. Jacinto, Jr., 400 SCRA 464 (2003). 13.Refer also to Circular No. 13-92 dated March 1, 1992, Circular No. 8-A-93 dated June 21, 1993, and Circular No. 32-93 dated July 9, 1993. 14.A.M. No. 00-3-108-RTC, Rollo, p. 37. 15.Office of the Court Administrator v. Perlez, 349 SCRA 417 (2001).

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CANON 1, SECTION 6, FULL TEXT 2 OF 2 FIRST DIVISION [A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609. September 20, 2005.] [OCA-IPI No. 03-1490-MTJ] TRINIDAD O. LACHICA, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, respondent. SYLLABUS 1.REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; DEPOSIT OF CASH AS BAIL; PERSONS WITH WHOM A CASH BAIL BOND MAY BE DEPOSITED. It is . . . undisputed that respondent judge personally received the cash bail bond for the accused. For this act alone, respondent is already administratively liable. Section 14, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies the

persons with whom a cash bail bond may be deposited, namely: the collector of internal revenue or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer. A judge is not authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail nor should such cash be kept in his office. 2.JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; GROSS MISCONDUCT; COMMITTED IN CASE AT BAR. The respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having abused her judicial authority when she personally accepted the cash bail bond of the accused and for deliberately making untruthful statements in her comment and during the investigation of the instant administrative case with intent to mislead this Court. The foregoing acts not only seriously undermine and adversely reflect on the honesty and integrity of respondent judge as an officer of the court; they also betray a character flaw which speaks ill of her person. Making false representations is a vice which no judge should imbibe. As the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly justice, he must therefore, be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. 3.ID.; ID.; THE EXACTING STANDARDS OF CONDUCT DEMANDED FROM JUDGES ARE DESIGNED TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE INTEGRITY AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDICIARY. In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. Respondent must bear in mind that the exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself. 4.ID.; ID.; MISCONDUCT; DEFINED. Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct of a person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. To justify the taking of drastic disciplinary action, as is what is sought by complainant in this case, the law requires that the error or mistake must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith. 5.REMEDIAL LAW; RULES OF COURT; CHARGES AGAINST JUDGES; GROSS MISCONDUCT; PENALTY. Gross misconduct under Section 8 (3), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, is classified as a serious offense punishable by any of the sanctions enumerated in Section 11 of the same Rule which provides that: "SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00." DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p: In an Affidavit dated October 2, 2003, 1 Trinidad O. Lachica charged Judge Rosabella M. Tormis of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City, Branch IV, with Abuse of Authority relative to Criminal Cases Nos. 57220-R to 57223-R. 2 Complainant alleged that since the filing of the information, accused Domugho has remained at large. Thus, the cases were ordered archived 3 but an alias warrant of arrest 4 was issued by respondent judge on January 14, 2000. EIDTAa On July 2, 2003, Domugho was apprehended by PO3 Epifanio G. Sanjorjo at around 8:45 p.m. and was brought to the police station for booking and custody at 9:30 p.m. 5 However, on July 3, 2003, at around 8:30 a.m., complainant was surprised to receive a call from the accused informing her that she was released from confinement on July 2, 2003 at 10:00 p.m. Complainant inquired from the police station if an Order of Release was issued by the court, but she was informed that the accused was released because the respondent judge called the police station and told the desk officer that the accused had posted a cash bail bond and may already be released. Complainant checked the case records but the expediente contained no copy of the release order. It was only at 1:00 p.m. that she was shown a copy thereof. Meanwhile, the case records could not be located. It was only on 4:30 p.m. of July 3, 2003 that the same was found. The police blotter showed no entry that an order of release was received by the police. Only a notation that the accused had put up a cash bail bond was entered therein. ECAaTS Complainant also averred that it was improper for the respondent judge to receive the cash bail bond as the function belongs exclusively to the Office of the Clerk of Court. She claimed that respondent judge committed an act of impropriety when she called the

police station to verbally order the release of the accused. She claimed that it was irregular that no copy of the release order was found in the expediente in the morning of July 3, 2003 considering that it was supposedly issued on July 2, 2003. In her Comment 6 dated December 3, 2003 respondent judge denied the charges of complainant. She maintained that on July 2, 2003 at 7:00 p.m., she issued the Order of Release after the accused posted a cash bond. She claimed that the accused was released by virtue of the Order of Release and not on the basis of her alleged telephone call to the police station. On August 2, 2004, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City for investigation, report and recommendation. 7 The investigating judge submitted a Report 8 dated November 18, 2004 recommending that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P20,000.00 or suspended for three (3) months based on the following findings: 1. The accused was arrested at 8:45 in the evening of July 2, 200[4], was booked at the Waterfront Police Station at 9:00 p.m., and released without a Release Order at 10:00 that same night. 2. The arresting officer and the accused never appeared before the respondent judge on the night of July 2, 200[4], as claimed by respondent judge. The accused was arrested at 8:45 p.m., after her classes at Southwestern University. She could not have appeared before respondent judge prior to her arrest since she was in school. Had it been true that the arresting officer appeared before the judge that night, it would have been highly improbable for the arresting officer not to have asked for a copy of the Release Order. 3. No one saw the Release Order on July 2, 200[4], except the respondent judge, as per testimony of the complainant and Helen Mongoya, and as shown by the police blotter, and the affidavit of the arresting officer claiming that they were reprimanded by their Chief because they released the accused without a Release Order. 4. The accused was released without the Release Order, and only upon the telephone call of respondent judge. 5. The Release Order was never issued on the night of July 2, 200[4]. No judge in his right mind would issue a Release Order without the record of the case, more so if the case had been "archived". 5. The Release Order appeared only in the afternoon of July 3, 200[4]. 6. The record of the case was found by court aide, Juan Aos, in the bodega of MTCC, Branch 4, together with the records of other archived cases, at about 4:30 in the afternoon of July 3, 200[4]. 7. Respondent judge was in Manila early morning of July 3, 200[4]. 8. It was physically impossible for the respondent judge to have signed the Release Order before 1:00 p.m. of July 3, 200[4], since she was in Manila. Questions may be raised whether the Receipt for the Cash Bond and the Release Order were signed by a person other than the respondent judge. As can be gleaned from the record, the signature appearing on the Receipt for the Cash Bond, the Release Order and the signature of the respondent judge on her Comment dated December 10, 2003, do not appear to be signed by the same person. 9. Respondent judge authenticated the Release Order during the Investigation proper as the Release Order she issued on July 2, 2003. 9 The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) agreed with the findings of the investigating judge but recommended that respondent judge be suspended for three (3) months. 10 We agree with the findings of the investigating judge and the OCA except for the recommended penalty. During the investigation, it was established that the accused was arrested on July 2, 2003 at 8:45 p.m. and was brought directly to the Waterfront Police Station where she was booked at 9:00 p.m. At about 10:00 p.m. the accused was set free without a release order. 11 Respondent judge, however, claimed that she issued the Order of Release on July 2, 2003 at around 7:00 p.m. after the accused and her counsel, together with the arresting officer, came to her office and posted a cash bond. It was by virtue of this order that the accused was released.

A circumspect scrutiny of the testimonies given by respondent judge reveals that she made several untruthful statements possibly with the intent to mislead the Court. It was improbable that, as claimed by respondent judge, she issued the Order of Release on July 2, 2003 at around 7:00 p.m. considering that the accused was apprehended at 8:45 p.m. The complainant and the arresting officer, as well as the entry in the police blotter all declared that the arrest was made at 8:45 p.m. and not earlier. Verily, respondent judge could not have issued the release order at around 7:00 p.m. as the accused has not yet been arrested at that time. She also insisted that on July 2, 2003, the accused and her counsel, and the arresting officer went to her office and posted a bond whereupon she issued the Order of Release. However, this is belied by the testimonies of the arresting officer and the complainant who both claimed that the accused was brought directly to the police station after the arrest. We agree with the observation of the OCA that, it would be impossible for complainant or the arresting officer not to have mentioned anything regarding this incident if the same actually transpired. Likewise, as pointed out by the investigating judge, it is highly improbable for the arresting officer not to have demanded a copy of the release order if he really appeared before the respondent. Incidentally, the arresting officer denied receiving any order of release from respondent judge on July 2, 2003. In fact, he claimed that they were reprimanded by their commanding officer for releasing from their custody the person of the accused without any accompanying court order. The following day, July 3, 2003, he went to the court to secure a copy of the said order. Respondent judge also averred that the Order of Release was received by SPO1 James Estrera, which receipt was duly noted in the police blotter. An examination of the records, however, discloses that what SPO1 Estrera received was only a copy of the Receipt of the Cash Bail Bond dated July 2, 2003 and not the Order of Release. In fact, there was no mention of a release order in the police blotter. 12 It is also undisputed that respondent judge personally received the cash bail bond for the accused. For this act alone, respondent is already administratively liable. Section 14, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be deposited, namely: the collector of internal revenue or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer. A judge is not authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail nor should such cash be kept in his office. The respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having abused her judicial authority when she personally accepted the cash bail bond of the accused and for deliberately making untruthful statements in her comment and during the investigation of the instant administrative case with intent to mislead this Court. The foregoing acts not only seriously undermine and adversely reflect on the honesty and integrity of respondent judge as an officer of the court; they also betray a character flaw which speaks ill of her person. Making false representations is a vice which no judge should imbibe. As the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly justice, he must therefore, be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. 13 In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. 14 Respondent must bear in mind that the exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 15 When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself. 16

Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct of a person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. 17 To justify the taking of drastic disciplinary action, as is what is sought by complainant in this case, the law requires that the error or mistake must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith. 18 It need not be overemphasized that in receiving the cash bond respondent judge ran afoul with Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Indeed, in the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Fernandez, 19 the Court held that: The rules specify the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be deposited namely: the collector of internal revenue, or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer. Section 14 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000) provides: SEC. 14. Deposit of Cash as bail. The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer the amount of the bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and of a written undertaking showing

compliance with the requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the deposit. A judge is not one of those authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail, nor should such cash be kept in the office of the judge. Gross misconduct under Section 8(3), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, is classified as a serious offense punishable by any of the sanctions enumerated inSection 11 of the same Rule which provides that: SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. This is not the first time that respondent judge was sanctioned by this Court. It appears that aside from this case, respondent judge has been administratively charged eight (8) other times. 20 Of these cases three (3) have been dismissed. 21 On April 27, 2004 in Administrative Matter No. MTJ-00-1337, 22 the Court found respondent guilty of improper conduct for trying to influence the course of litigation in Criminal Case No. 99796-12 and was accordingly reprimanded. She was also admonished for conduct unbecoming of a judge. On December 17, 2004, respondent was fined in the amount of P5,000.00 in Administrative Matters Nos. 04-7-373-RTC 23 and 04-7374-RTC, 24 for gross violation of Section 17, Rule 114, for having approved the bail of an accused in Criminal Cases Nos. CEBBRL-783 and 922 pending before the RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, absent showing of unavailability of all RTC judges in Cebu City. cDIHES On March 16, 2005, respondent judge was admonished in Administrative Matter No. 04-1554-MTJ and reminded to be more circumspect in granting postponements. Clearly, being chastised thrice has not reformed respondent. For the foregoing considerations, we find that the penalties recommended by the investigating judge and the OCA are not commensurate to respondent judge's misconduct which is aggravated by her past misdeeds. Respondent judge's infraction merits suspension from the service for six (6) months. WHEREFORE, Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, Branch IV, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from office for six (6) months without salary and other benefits and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. TASCEc SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1. Rollo, pp. 1-4. 2. People v. Norma Domugho @ Rona Cantillas for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 3. Rollo, p. 5. 4. Id. at 6. 5. Id. at 7. 6. Id. at 23-28. 7. Id. at 52.

8. Id. at 57-62. 9. Id. at 61-62. 10. Id. at 100. 11. Id. at 13-17. 12. Id. at 7. 13. Guerrero v. Deray, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1466, 10 December 2002, 393 SCRA 591, 600. 14. Pascual v. Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1625, 10 March 2003, 398 SCRA 695, 702. 15. Vedaa v. Judge Valencia, 356 Phil. 317, 329 [1998]. 16. Yap v. Inopiquez, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-02-1431, 9 May 2003, 403 SCRA 141, 150. 17. Canson v. Garchitorena, 370 Phil. 287, 306 [1999]. 18. Fernandez v. Judge Espaol, 351 Phil. 928, 935 [1998]. 19. A.M. No. MTJ-03-1511, 20 August 2004, 437 SCRA 81, 84. 20. (1) IPI No. 01-1157-MTJ for Grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law; (2) IPI No. 02-1289-MTJ for Dishonesty and grave misconduct; (3) IPI No. 03-1414-MTJ for Gross ignorance of the law; (4) IPI No. 03-1490-MTJ, the instant case, for Abuse of Authority; (5) A.M. No. MTJ-00-1337, for Conduct Unbecoming a Dispenser of Justice, Navarro v. Tormis, 27 April 2004, 428 SCRA 37; (6) IPI No. 04-1554-MTJ for Ignorance of the law, bias and partiality, oppression and violation of Art. 207, Revised Penal Code, etc.; (7) A.M. No. 04-7-373-RTC, Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu , 17 December 2004, 447 SCRA 246; (8) A.M. No. 04-7-374-RTC, Re: Violation of Judge Ildefonso Suerte, RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, of Administrative Order No. 36-2004 dated March 3, 2004, 17 December 2004, 447 SCRA 246. 21. IPI Nos. 01-1157-MTJ; 02-1289-MTJ and 03-1414-MTJ. 22. Navarro v. Tormis, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1337, 27 April 2004, 428 SCRA 37. 23. Entitled Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu. 24. Entitled Re: Violation of Judge Ildefonso Suerte, RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, of Administrative Order No. 36-2004 dated March 3, 2004.

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CANON 3, SECTION 1, FULL TEXT 1 OF 3 EN BANC [G.R. No. L-15824. May 30, 1961.] RICARDO M. GUTIERREZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ARSENIO SANTOS, ETC., ET AL., respondents. Mariano G. Bustos and Agripino S. Bustos for petitioner. Quiambao, Galang & Beltran for respondents Benigno Musni. Antonio R. Abagon for respondent Rogelio de la Rosa. Solicitor General for respondent Secretary of Public Works and Communication.

SYLLABUS 1. JUDGES; DISQUALIFICATION FROM HEARING A PARTICULAR CASE; RESPONDENT JUDGE AS PRACTITIONER CONTENDED THAT THE STREAMS INVOLVED ARE PRIVATE IN NATURE; MANDAMUS WILL NOT LIE TO COMPEL HIM TO HEAR THE CASE. Respondent's contention, while a practitioner, that the streams and rivers subject of the petition for prohibition filed before him were among those that he considered as private in nature, warrants his inhibiting himself from hearing and deciding the petition; and it appearing that respondent Judge's fear, expressed in his order disqualifying himself, that this previous contention of his "might, some way or another, influence his decision" is not capricious and whimsical, mandamus will not lie to compel him to hear and decide the instant case. DECISION DIZON, J p: On August 15, 1958 Benigno Musni and other filed a complaint with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications against Ricardo M. Gutierrez alleging therein inter alia, that the latter had illegally constructed dams, dikes and other obstructions across navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal fishing grounds located in Barrio San Esteban, Macabebe, Pampanga. They prayed that, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056, the said obstructions be ordered removed or destroyed. The original complaint was subsequently amended by adding six more to the streams or waterways mentioned therein. On December 13, 1958 Gutierrez filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the proceedings to be held before Julian C. Cargullo, the investigator appointed by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, would be void because Republic Act 2056 was unconstitutional as it conferred judicial powers to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. This motion was denied and the investigator set the case for hearing on December 19 and 20, 1958. On December 15, 1958 Gutierrez filed with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a petition for prohibition which was subsequently amended twice against the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Florencio Moreno, the Department investigator, Julian C. Cargullo, Senator Rogelio de la Rosa, Benigno Musni and his complainants, to prevent the carrying out of the investigation referred to above. Main contentions of the petitioner were: firstly, that Act 2506 was unconstitutional because it granted judicial powers to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and secondly, that the nature and character of the streams and waterways subject of the complaint lodged with the Department of Public Works and Communications was already res judicata having been the subject of an agreement between Zobel Family former owners of petitioner's fishponds, and the Municipality of Macabebe. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1520 and was assigned by lottery to Branch I of said court, presided by the Hon. Arsenio Santos. The Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the Department Investigator filed their answer to the petition for prohibition alleging therein several affirmative defense. Respondent Rogelio de la Rosa adopted said answer in toto as his own, while the other respondents filed a separate pleading invoking virtually the same defense pleaded by their co-parties. On February 25, 1959 respondent de la Rosa filed a motion to disqualify the Hon. Arsenio Santos from trying and deciding the case, upon the ground that sometime in 1948 he had acted as counsel for fishpond owners, like the petitioner Gutierrez, in an administrative investigation involving the same or at least similar issues and properties, and had expressed views in the course of said investigation prejudicial or adverse to the contention of the respondents in the pending case. Petitioner Gutierrez objected to the motion aforesaid upon the ground that there was no legal ground upon which Judge Santos could be disqualified under the provisions of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. After hearing on the matter, the respondent Judge issued an order dated April 15, 1959 disqualifying himself and endorsing the case to the Second Branch of the court, for reasons stated as follows: "Meanwhile, the new respondent, in his motion dated February 24, 1959, is seeking the disqualification of the presiding judge from sitting in the instant case on the ground that, before his appointment to the bench, he has been counsel for some fishpond owners, "like petitioner herein", as evidenced by photostatic copies of two (2) communications, annex A and annex B (par. 2 of the motion); and that under section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, "no judge shall sit in a case in which he has been a counsel" (par. 4, same motion). The motion is being objected to by the petitioner for reasons stated in his written opposition dated March 14, 1959. A perusa l of the legal provisions, invoked by said respondent, does no show that the presiding judge is included in any of their prohibitions, because he is not pecunially interested in the case; he is not related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity; he has not been an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or counsel; neither has he presided in any inferior court, whose ruling or decision being the subject of review (sec. 1, Rule 126, supra).

It is true that while in the practice of law as a member of a law firm, the presiding judge, in behalf of Roman Santos, Manuel Borja and heirs of Proceso de Guzman, wrote the then Secretary of the Interior a letter dated June 1, 1948, annex A of the motion, requesting that the proposed lease, in public bidding, of certain streams listed in Resolution No. 26, series of 1948 of the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga be held in abeyance until after the Committee on Rivers and Streams, created under Administrative Order No. 32 issued by the President of the Philippines, would have determined their nature, whether private or public. But, nowhere in the letters, annex A and Annex B, could be found any showing that the presiding judge has ever appeared as counsel for Ricardo Gutierrez, the herein petitioner, contrary to the contention of the respondent, Senator Rogelio de la Rosa. Had he been his counsel, the presiding judge should have disqualified himself from sitting in the present case even without a motion, as he did in a case pending in the second branch of this court, wherein Manuel Borja is the petitioner. On the other hand, in the petition, annex 1 of the re-amended petition, filed by Benigno Musni and others on August 15, 1958, they stated that the respondents named therein, one of them being Ricardo Gutierrez, "constructed dams, dikes and other works in public navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal fishing grounds in the municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga"; and that such navigable waters, waterways, rivers and communal fishing grounds are those specified in list, annex A of the said petition, annex 1 of the re- amended petition. A reading of this list shows that some of the streams mentioned in Resolution No. 26, series of 1948 of the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga, included in the fishponds of Roman Santos, Manuel Borja and heirs of Proceso de Guzman, were the ones, which the presiding judge, then law practitioner, contended in his letter, annex A of the motion, to be private and not public; and that the said streams, as shown by the plan, Exhibit A-De la Rosa, were more or less similar to these included in the fishpond or fishponds of the petitioner, Ricardo Gutierrez, which were being investigated by Mr. Julian C. Cargullo, upon order of the respondent Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Such being the case, the presiding judge is inclined to grant the motion by disqualifying himself to sit in the case, not because he has been a counsel for the above named petitioner, which is entirely false, neither because of "extremada delicadeza", but because his opinion given in the aforesaid letter might, some way or another, influence on his decision in the case at bar. While this would be a too remote possibility, yet it is the duty of the court to administer justice without any suspicion of bias and prejudice, otherwise a partylitigant might lose confidence in the judiciary that must be avoided as much as possible for the purpose of preserving its dignity." Petitioner Gutierrez filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order mentioned above, but the respondent Judge denied said motion in his order of August 11, 1959 where the following is stated: "While it is true that presiding judge was not counsel for the petitioner, yet in his letter dated June 1, 1949, attached to the record, as then a private law practitioner and as counsel for Manuel Borja, Roman Santos and the heirs of Proceso de Guzman, he informed the then Secretary of Interior that the streams and rivers, intended to be leased at public auction by the municipal counsel of Macabebe, Pampanga, in its Resolution No. 26, were private and not public. In his same letter, the presiding judge even stated that copies of Resolution No. 26 were furnished the persons mentioned therein, one of them being Ricardo Gutierrez, the herein petitioner because the streams and rivers subject of the instant petition were among those to be leased. In other words, the interests of Manuel Borja, Roman Santos and the heirs of Proceso de Guzman were identical to the interests of the herein petitioner Ricardo Gutierrez, so much so that whatever may be the resolution of the Secretary of the Interior then would benefit the interests of the said petitioner. Under these circumstances, the presiding judge believes that he has no other recourse but to disqualify himself from sitting in this case."

On August 22, 1959 Gutierrez commenced the present action for mandamus against the Hon. Arsenio Santos, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Department Investigator and the parties who filed the complaint against him, for the purpose of compelling the aforesaid Judge "to proceed, continue with the hearing and take cognizance of Civil Case No. 1520 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga." Petitioner, invoking the provisions of section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, argues that the case of the respondent Judge does not fall under any one of the grounds for the disqualification of judicial officers stated therein Assuming arguendo that a literal interpretation of the legal provision relied upon justifies petitioner's contention to a certain degree, it should not be forgotten that, in construing and applying said legal provision, we cannot disregard its true intention nor the real ground for the disqualification of a judge or judicial officer, which is the impossibility of rendering an impartial judgment upon the matter before him. It has been said, in fact that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to

nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge (30 Am. Jur. p. 767). Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the Judge. Consequently, we take it to be the true intention of the law stated in general terms that no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent (30 Am. Jur. Supra) because ". . . However upright the judge, and however free from the slightest inclination but to do justice, there is peril of his unconscious bias or prejudice, or lest any former opinion formed ex parte may still linger to affect unconsciously his present judgment, or lest he may be moved or swayed unconsciously by his knowledge of the facts which may not be revealed or stated at the trial, or cannot under the rules of evidence. No effort of the will can shut out memory; there is no art of forgetting. We cannot be certain that the human mind will deliberate and determine unaffected by that which it knows, but which it should forget in that process." . . . (Ann. Cas. 1917A, p. 1235) In the present case the respondent judge himself has candidly stated that the opinion expressed by him in a letter dated June 1, 1948 addressed by him as counsel for Manuel Borja and others to the then Secretary of the Interior, attached to the motion for disqualification as Annex A, "might, some way or another, influence (on) his decision in the case at bar" (order of April 13, 1959). The fear he has thus expressed of not being able to under a truly impartial judgment does not appear to be capricious and whimsical, having in mind particularly that in his order of August 11, 1959 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, His Honor reiterated that in the aforesaid letter he informed the Secretary of the Interior that the streams and rivers to be auctioned, for lease purposes, by the municipal council of Macabebe, Pampanga, were private and not public streams and rivers; that the streams and rivers subject of the petition for prohibition filed by herein petitioner were among those that he considered as private in nature; that, therefore, the interests of Borja and his other clients "were identical to the interests of the herein petitioner etc." In view of these circumstances, we are constrained to agree with His Honor that the opinion thus expressed by him years ago "might, some way or another, influence his decision" in the case before him. WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus under consideration as hereby denied, without costs. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur. Barrera, J., took no part.

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Canon 3, Section 1, FULL TEXT 2 OF 2 IN RE: TOMAS FLORDELIZA FIRST DIVISION [March 12, 1923.] In re impeachment of HONORABLE TOMAS FLORDELIZA, Judge of First Instance of the Sixteenth Judicial District . The respondent Judge in his own behalf. SYLLABUS 1. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; THE LAWS' DELAY. Congested conditions of court dockets is deplorable and intolerable. It can have no other result than the loss of evidence, the abandonment of cases, and the denial and frequent defeat of justice. It lowers the standards of the courts, and brings them into disrepute. 2. ID.; ID.; DUTY OF THE JUDICIARY. The laws delay can be overcome to a great extent if there is judicial teamwork reaching from the capital to the most remote district, and from the highest to the lowest judicial officer. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDGES. A judge should display that interest in his office which stops not at the minimum of the day's labors fixed by law and which ceases not at the expiration of official sessions, but which proceeds diligently on holidays and by artificial light and even into vacation periods.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. "The judge must cultivate a capacity for quick decision. Habits of indecision must be sedulously overcome. He must not delay by slothfulness of mind or body the judgment to which a party is entitled." (One of the proposed canons for a decalogue for the judiciary.) 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 129, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, CONSTRUED. The law requires that before leave shall be granted or salary shall be paid to any judge or auxiliary judge of first instance, he shall make a certificate that all cases and proceedings which have been under submission for determination or decision for a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or before the date of making the certificate. "Determine" does not mean more than tried. "Decided" or "decide" means "to form a definite opinion." In this jurisdiction, upon the trial of a question of fact, the decision of the court must be given in writing and filed with the clerk. (C. C. P., sec. 133.) 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The purpose of the Philippine Legislature in placing section 129 of the Administrative Code and related provisions on the statute books is evident. With the judicial facts before it, the Legislature had in mind a forceful method reaching the pockets of the judges by which to spur them on to greater activity. The wise and salutary legislation it is now for the court to vitalize by equally wise and salutary interpretation and enforcement. 7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. The vacation months should not be excluded in the computation of the ninety-day period prescribed by law. The time should begin to run from the submission of the case without awaiting notification from the clerk of court. An oral decision is not sufficient. 8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. As to the point that the time taken by a stenographer to transcribe his notes should not be taken into consideration, no hard and fast rule can be laid down. The general rule would be to conform with the intent of the law and thus not permit decisions to be delayed for this reason, but conceivably special circumstances may arise, which cannot now be imagined, which would force the trial judge to await the transcription of the stenographer's notes for long periods of time; when they do the judge should so state. 9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGES OF FIRST INSTANCE. The doctrines announced in In re Impeachment of Honorable Antonio Horrilleno ([1922]), 43 Phil., 212), approved. DECISION MALCOLM, J p: Six members of the bar of Sorsogon who, together, make claim to at least 50 per cent of the law practice of that province, have filed a verified petition in this court praying for the removal from office of the Honorable Tomas Flordeliza, Judge of First Instance of the Sixteenth Judicial District. The charges laid against the respondent Judge are, in general: (1) That on different occasions the respondent certified falsely as to the status of the cases pending decision before him, in violation of section 129 of the Administrative Code; (2) that the respondent is guilty of delay and lack diligence in the disposition of the cases pending before him, in violation of section 165 of the Administrative Code, and generally accepted principles which determine judicial standards; and (3) that the respondent is guilty of partiality in the performance of his official duties. A copy of the above-mentioned complaint was by, order of the court, furnished the respondent Judge, with instructions to answer the same. In response to this order, Judge Flordeliza has filed a verified answer, denying each and every charge, and suggesting the disbarment of the complaints. Certificates from the provincial commander of the Philippine Constabulary, the provincial governor of Sorsogon, and Attorney Robert E. Manly, as to the moral conduct, social standing, and integrity of the respondent have been furnished. The records of the cases in question have also been forwarded by the respondent. We feel that we have before us all of the facts which are necessary for the disposition of this matter. For this reason, therefore, we forego referring the charges to the Attorney-General for investigation and proceed to dispose of them as justice requires. For purposes of investigation and proceed to dispose of them as justice requires. For purposes of convenience, the order of the charges as found in the complaint will be departed from. One charge is that the respondent Judge has proceeded in many cases with manifest and evident partiality. It is alleged that the Judge has deferred unduly to the accused Father Casiano de Vera, the accused Fermin Barranechea, the justice of the peace Gillego de Vera, the justice of the peace Felix Gallego, and Amado Gimenez, municipal president of Bacon, Sorsogon. It is further alleged that the Judge has acted with discourtesy toward the complainants, while showing a spirit of condescension to attorneys Francisco Arellano and Federico Jimenez. The respondent, on the other hand, proffered satisfactory explanation of these matters, mentioned in the complaint. At best a charge of partiality is difficult to prove and is one which is to be expected from disgruntled lawyers.

Under the subject of negligent performance of the duties of his office to grave prejudice of the public interest, complaints alleged that there are too many cases placed on the calendar for one day. Even without taking into consideration the expected explanation of the respondent, this obviously, is a question which must rest in the in the discretion of the presiding Judge. Under the same subject, it is further alleged that court sessions are held only for three hours and a half each day, while section 165 of the Administrative Code calls for not less than five-hour sessions of courts of first instance except on Saturdays. The respondent answers that he has held court for five hours each day as prescribed by the law. We accept the statement of his Honor. Under the same subject, attention is invited to the fact that only 11 civil cases and 107 criminal cases, making a total of 118 cases were decided by Judge Flordeliza during the year 1921. The respondent Judge, on the contrary, states that 66 civil cases, 190 criminal cases, and 9 complaints against justice of the peace, or a total of 265 cases were disposed of. The annual report of the clerk of court of Sorsogon for the year 1921 shows that 11 ordinary civil cases, 4 probate cases, 3 land registration cases, 9 administrative investigations, and 81 criminal cases were decided during the year. The same report shows that 256 ordinary civil cases, 104 probate cases, 11 land registration cases, 1 administrative investigation, and 266 criminal cases, or a total of 638 cases were pending on December 31, 1921. As of September 30, 1922, according to data furnished by the office of the Attorney-General, 236 criminal cases, 262 civil cases, 108 probate cases, and 8 land registration cases, making 614 cases in all were pending decision in Sorsogon. Under the same subject of negligence, the serious charge is made that there has been greatly delay in the disposition of criminal cases in which the accused is without bail. The time which has elapsed between the arrest of the defendant and the trial in these cases is between four months and nine months. In response, the judge contends: (1) That he is not responsible for the accused before the complaint or information is filed; (2) that the postponements have been due to the failure of Government witnesses to appear; and (3) that where the complaint or information is filed in March or April, he may set the case for trial when court reopens in July or August. We postpone our comment on the last two phases of the complaint until we reach an analysis of the case later on in the opinion. The last and most serious charged presented, having a close relationship with the congestion of cases on the docket of the court of Instance Of Sorsogon, the delay in the disposition of these cases, especially criminal cases, and lack of diligence in catching up with the court work, concerns the alleged false certification of the respondent under section 129 of the Administrative Code, in order to secure the payment of his salary. Attention is invited to a number of cases which were decided beyond the ninety-day period mentioned in the law, and, with certain qualifications, these facts are admitted by the respondent. The latter, however, offers four reasons or, more accurately speaking, excuses, for this state of affairs. He says in the first place that the timing taken by stenographers in transcribing their notes should not be counted in the computation of the ninety-day period. He contends in the next place that the vacation period should be excluded. He asserts in the next place that the period should begin to run from the date the clerk reported the case for decision. And, lastly, his construction of the law is, that an oral decision is sufficient.

The admitted facts require of us an interpretation and construction of section 129 of the Administrative Code, not alone to set right the respondent Judge, but in order to lay down a definite ruling for the benefit of all the members of the judiciary to whom the law applies. Said section 129, derived from Act No. 1552, reads as follows: "Judges and auxiliary judges of first instance, judges of municipal courts, and justices of the peace shall certify on their applications for leave, and upon salary vouchers presented by them for payment, upon the pay rolls upon which their salaries are paid, that all special proceedings, applications, petitions, demurrers, motion, and all civil and criminal cases which have been under submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or before the date of making the certificate, and no leave shall be granted and no salary shall be paid without such certificate. "In case any special proceeding, application, petition, demurrer, motion, civil or criminal case is resubmitted upon the voluntary application or consent in writing of all the parties to the case, cause, or proceeding, and not otherwise, the ninety days herein prescribed within which a decision should be made shall begin to run from the date of such resubmission." The law requires that before leave shall be granted or salary shall be paid to any judge or auxiliary judge of first instance, he shall make a certificate that all cases and proceedings which have been under submission for determination or decision for a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or before the date of making the certificate. The key words, needing construction, are "determined and decided." The word "determined" is hardy the equivalent of "decided" and does not have the quite as far-reaching a meaning. "Determine," it has been said, does not mean more than tried. (Goddard vs. Fullam [1865]., 38 Vt., 75.) "Decided" or "decide," according to the lexicographers, is defined as "to form a definite opinion," to render judgment." ( In reMilford & M. R. R. [1895], 68 N. H., 570.) In this

jurisdiction, upon the trial of a question of fact, the decision of the court must be given in writing and filed with the clerk. (C. C. P., sec. 133.) The meaning given to section 129 of the Administrative Code by the respondent Judge would result in qualifying the law where no such qualifications were intended. With special reference to the answer of the respondent Judge, we state that the vacation months should not be excluded in the computation of the ninety-day period prescribed by law, that the time should begin to run from the submission of the case, without awaiting notification from the clerk of court, and that an oral decision is not sufficient. As to the point that the time taken by a stenographer to transcribe his notes should not be taken into consideration, no hard and fast rule can be laid down. The general rule would be to conform with the intent of the law and thus not permit decisions to be delayed for this reason, but conceivably special circumstances may arise, which cannot now imagined, which would force the trial judge to await the transcription of the stenographer's notes for long periods of time; when they do the judge should so state. Sometimes, in the United States, judges are prohibited from drawing their salaries so long as cases that have been submitted to them for decision for ninety days remain undecided. California is an instance of a jurisdiction with such a provision appearing in its Constitution. The law there is, however, somewhat more extensive and explicit than in the Philippines, because applying to members of the Supreme Court as well as to members of inferior courts, and because of this further provision: "In the determination of causes, all decisions of the Supreme Court and of the district courts of appeal shall be stated." (23 Cyc., 528; 5 Henning, General Laws of California, lxxxv; Meyers vs. Kenfield [1881], 62 Cal., 512.) The purpose of the Philippine Legislature in placing section 129 of the Administrative Code and related provisions on the statute books is evident. With the judicial facts before it, the Legislature must have had in mind a forceful method reaching the poc kets of the judges by which to spur them on to greater activity. This wise and salutary legislation it is now for this Tribunal to vitalize by equally wise and salutary interpretation and enforcement. Much of the popular criticism of the courts which, it must be frankly admitted, is all too often justified, is based on the laws' delay. Congested conditions of court dockets is deplorable and intolerable. It can have no other result than the loss of evidence, the abandonment of cases, and denial and frequent defeat of justice. It lowers the standards of the courts, and brings them into disrepute. The statistics relating to the unsatisfactory condition of judicial business in the Philippines are a matter of public knowledge. Said the report of the Special Mission to the Philippines: "The judges in too many courts do not realize the necessity of reaching early and prompt decisions and are too ready to postpone hearings and trials." It is known, also, that His Excellency, the Governor-General, and the Secretary of Justice, have given their attention to the subject, and have endeavored by all legitimate means to aid in cleaning up the court dockets. The members of the Supreme Court in an effort to do their part have cheerfully foregone vacations in order to catch with accumulated legal business. But for the best results to attain, there must be judicial teamwork reaching from the capital to the most remote district, and from the highest to the lowest judicial officer. One of the proposed canons for a decalogue for the judiciary is this: "The judge must cultivate a capacity for quick decision. Habits of indecision must be sedulously overcome. He must not delay by slothfulness of mind or body the judgment to which a party is entitled." We write down our conformity. The provision of law which is authority for this decision is section 173 of the Administrative Code, relating to the removal and suspicion of Judges of First Instance. The grounds for removal of a judge of first instance therein provided are two: (1) Serious misconduct, and (2) inefficiency. In a recent decision on the general subject of impeachment of judges of first instance, it was said that for serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. Again, it was said that impeachment proceedings are in their nature highly penal in character, and are governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases. The charges must therefore be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( In re Impeachment of Honorable Antonio Horrilleno [1922], 43 Phil., 212.) At common law there was an offense known as extortion in office, which was the taking by color of office, of money or other thing of value that is not due, before it is due, or more than is due. It has been held that a judge is removable from office for demanding and receiving compensation to which he is not entitled, and this is so not withstanding he acts in good faith and in an honest be lief that he is entitled to such compensation. The strict doctrine of these cases is: Here is one bad act; you ought not to have an opportunity to commit another. (15 R. C. L., 551; Commonwealth vs. Chambers [1829], 1 J. J. Marsh., 108; State ex rel. Rowe vs. District Court [1911], 44 Mont., 318 ; 27 Ann. Cas., 396, and note; Brackenridge vs. State [1889], 27 Tex. App., 513; 4 L. R. A., 360.) That we do not adopt the rather harsh doctrines of these American cases is because the statutes there in question differ from ours and because we are not prepared to say that a judge should be separated from office where he apparently is acting in good faith, under a misconception of the law.

In conclusion, therefore, we have decided to pay no particular attention to the general charges of partiality and negligence which have been filed against Judge Flordeliza. We do find, however, that he has not displayed that interest in his office which stops not at the minimum of the day's labors fixed by law, and which ceases not at the expiration of official sessions, but which proceeds diligently on holidays and by artificial light and even into vacation periods. Only thus can he do his part in the great work of speeding up the administration of justice and of rehabilitating the judiciary in the estimation of the people. The mountains of six or seven hundred pending cases in Sorsogon could be removed by a judge of first instance of alert mind and quick decision, not afraid of work, with the aid of a helpful bar and a sympathetic government. As willful and international wrongdoing in receiving compensation has not been demonstrated, we are not prepared to find that sufficient cause exists in our judgment involving serious misconduct or inefficiency as warrants us in recommending the removal of the respondent Judge to the Governor-General. We will take such a step if future derelictions of duty of this character recur. Correcting, therefore, Judge of First Instance Tomas Flordeliza in his wrong construction of section 129 of the Administrative Code, and admonishing him to proceed more assiduously in the performance of his judicial labors, it is our order that these proceedings be filed without further action. Copies of this decision shall be furnished the complaints, the respondent, and His Excellency, the Governor-General. Araullo, C.J., Street, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

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CANON 3, SECTION 1, FULL TEXT 3 OF 3 SECOND DIVISION [G.R. Nos. L-39516-17. January 28, 1975.] ROSARIO CASTILLO and SONIA VILLASANTA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE CELESTINO JUAN, respondent. Castillo & Morales Law Offices for petitioners. Respondent Judge in his own behalf. SYNOPSIS Petitioners were the offended parties in two rape cases pending trial before respondent judge. On two separate instances, respondent Judge conferred with them in his chambers and informed them that their cases were weak, the accused would likely be acquitted, and that a settlement would be to their advantage. The conferences took place even before petitioners had finished presenting their evidence. Petitioners thereafter instituted the present certiorari proceedings against respondent Judge to restrain him from continuing with the trial of their cases on the ground that his actuations showed lack of impartiality. In answer, respondent Judge alleged that he did the act complained of prompted by the best of motives, "as an act of charity" and as a "clear attempt to humanize justice." Petition granted; respondent Judge ordered to desist from further conducting trial of the two cases. SYLLABUS 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; HEARING BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE. In every litigation, especially in criminal cases, the manner and attitude of the trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. The judge should not indulge or even give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He must refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters, and keep himself away from the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. He must manifest to the parties as well as to the public that he hears both side with patience and understanding to avoid reaching an unjust decision. Although it is not necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, it is essential that he holds the balance true. Similarly, he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. The whole of this is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance. As set, forth in Mateo Jr. vs. Villaluz (L-34756, March 31, 1973) "It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of the decree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just . . . ."

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES UNDER RULES OF COURT IN LINE WITH DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT. In line with the due process requirement, the Rules of Court provides for disqualification of judges on grounds other than their pecuniary interest, relationship, previous connection, or his having presided in an inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review. The 1964 amendment contains this additional paragraph: "A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reason other than those mentioned above." Moreover, where the judge cannot discern for himself his inability to meet the test of neutrality, the Supreme Court has seen to it that he should disqualify himself. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRIAL JUDGE IN INSTANT CASE MUST BE DISQUALIFIED. While not entirely discounting the submission of respondent Judge that his final decision would depend on the evidence of the complainants, it cannot be denied, however, that after his conference with them informing them of the weakness of their cases, the likelihood of an acquittal of the accused, and the advantage of an settlement, they could no longer be expected to have faith in his impartiality. Complainants could very well conclude that the respondent Judge had prejudged the cases when he told them that their cases were weak even before they could have completed their evidence. The fact that respondent Judge so acted because any monetary settlement would benefit them, considering their straightened financial circumstances, was of no moment. Even admitting that, according to his beat lights, respondent Judge acted from a sense of sympathy or "charity", his conduct cannot be said to be consonant with the exacting standard of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The administration of justice would thus be subject to a reproach if respondent Judge should not be disqualified. DECISION FERNANDO, J p: In this certiorari proceedings, petitioners, two young maidens who are the offended parties in two rape cases, assail the actuation of respondent Judge and seek his disqualification on the ground of bias and prejudice. What was done by him, according to their strongly-worded petition, was in disregard of the highly-prized ideal in adjudication, likewise a due process requirement, that a litigant "is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 1 Briefly, on two separate occassions, on August 15 and 27, 1974, in the secrecy of his chambers, he informed petitioners of the weakness of their cases, the likelihood of a verdict of acquittal in favor of the accused, and impressed upon them that it would be to their advantage to settle, as the most he could do on their behalf was to have such accused indemnify them. This move, according to him, would assure their being spared from the embarassment occasioned by suits of this character, clearly prejudicial to their future. These conversations took place even before the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence, one of the petitioners not having testified as yet. Respondent Judge could not very well deny that he did invite them to confer with him, but he would impress on this Court that their version should not be lent credence and that he was prompted to act thus from the best of motives, "as an act of charity" and as a "clear attempt to humanize justice." 2 With the problem thus laid bare and the essentials exposed to view, it is obvious that the petitions are impressed with merit. Respect for a number of decisions, most of them recent in character, yields no other conclusion. Petitioners are entitled to the remedy sought. Respondent Judge must be disqualified from further hearing the cases. 1. In every litigation, perhaps much more so in criminal cases, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. What has been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance. As set forth in Mateo Jr. v. Villaluz: 3 "It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play favorites. For him, the parties stand on equal footing. In the language of Justice Dizon: 'It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.'" 4 The above excerpt is from the leading case of Gutierrez v. Santos. 5 The Villaluz decision is only one of a number of cases where Gutierrez was cited with approval. 6 In Geotina v. Gonzales, 7 a judge, according to Justice Castro, the ponente, should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity." 8

It is in line with the above due process requirement that the Rules of Court provide for disqualification of judges 9 outside of the instances referring to their pecuniary interest, relationship, previous connection, or his having presided in an inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review. 10 The 1964 amendment contains this additional paragraph: "A Judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above." 11 An excerpt from the Villaluz opinion is again relevant: "Thereby, it is made clear to the occupants of the bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there may be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences or predilections are many and varied. It is well, therefore, that if any such should make its appearance and prove difficult to resist, the better course for a judge is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood. His reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is even more important, the ideal of an impartial administration of justice is lived up to. Thus is due process vindicated." 12 What is more, in the event that a judge may be unable to discern for himself his inability to meet the test of the cold neutrality required of him, this Court has seen to it that he should disqualify himself. 13 From what has been set forth, this certainly is another one of such cases.

2. This is not to discount in its entirety the submission of respondent Judge, who argued on his own behalf, that his final decision would be dependent on the evidence that could be presented by petitioners. What cannot be denied, however, is that after such conferences, they could no longer be expected to have faith in his impartiality. Even before they had been fully heard, they were told that their cases were weak. They could very well conclude then that there was a prejudgment. Under the circumstances, the fact that he acted as he did because any monetary settlement would benefit petitioners, considering their straitened financial circumstances, was of no moment. Even if it be admitted that, according to his best lights, respondent Judge acted from a sense of sympathy or "charity", his conduct cannot be said to be consonant with the exacting standard of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The administration of justice would thus be subject to a reproach if there be a rejection of the plea for disqualification. 3. It is to be made clear, moreover, that nothing said in this opinion has reference to the merits of the two prosecutions for rape. That is not a matter before us. The controversy passed upon is whether respondent Judge should continue to preside at such trial. The decision reached goes no further than that he should not. That accomplished, the hearings should continue, with the outcome dependent on an appraisal, according to law, of the evidence submitted by the prosecution and the defense. WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petitions for certiorari, and respondent Judge is ordered to desist from further conducting the trial of the two prosecutions for rape, Criminal Cases Nos. 733 and 734 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, respectively entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernesto de Villa and People of the Philippines v. Ernesto de Villa. No costs. Makalintal, C.J., Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur. Antonio, J., is on sick leave. Footnotes 1. Gutierrez vs. Santos, L-15824, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 249. 2. Answer, pars. 6, C and 10. 3. L-34756, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 18. 4. Ibid, 23. 5. L-15824, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 249. 6. Cf. Del Castillo v. Javelona, L-16742, Sept. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 146; People v. Gomez, L-22345, May 29, 1967, 20 SCRA 293; Austria v. Masaquel, L-22536, Aug. 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 1247; Zaldivar v. Estenzo, L-26065. May 3, 1968, 23 SCRA 533; Geotina v. Gonzales, L-26310, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 66. In Luque v. Kayanan, L-26826, Aug. 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 165 and Tobias v. Ericta, Adm. Case No. 242-J, July 29, 1972, 46 SCRA 83, there was reference to the need for "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" without invoking Gutierrez v. Santos. 7. L-26310, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 66. 8. Ibid, 73-74. 9. Cf. Rule 137.

10. According to Rule 137, Section 1, first paragraph: "No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record." 11. Ibid, second paragraph. 12. L-34756, 50 SCRA 18, 24-25. Cf. Pimentel v. Salanga, L-27934, September 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 160. 13. Cf. Luque v. Kayanan, L-26826, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 165; Paredes v. Gopengco, L-23710, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 688; Mateo v. Villaluz, L-34756, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 18.

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