The tragic chronological history of how untold thousands, possibly hundreds of thousands, of children became innocent victims of AGENT

ORANGE ("AO) is outlined below. AO contains

TCDD (2,3,7,8tetrachlorodibenzo-para-dioxin), one of the most toxic chemicals known to man. The Tragedy + started in the early 1960s when our government ordered the spraying of AO in the Vietnam War, knowing 1962 Purple andInternational Blue were the Communities first herbicides to arrive in not that AO was dangerous to health. They told our soldiers and the that it was harmful. Millions of our soldiers were exposed to AO, and Vietnam. fathered Later, children it was determined born with Purple major had deformities. a The chronological listing below of the studies conductedhigher by independent and government paid/controlled concentration of TCDD (2,3,7,8-tetrachloroscientists provides a simplified process for studying and dibenzo comparing results. Thethan left any column paratheir dioxin) [DIOXIN] of thelists the (Continued) reports and scientific studies that concluded AO was not harmful. The right column lists the reports and scientific studies that concluded AO was harmful and caused or could cause birth defects. Throughout the chronological history you will see reference numbers such as a 1 or a 23, usually at the end of a sentence. These refer you to the source of the information provided. The sources are listed in the "Reference" section (pages 15-17). Please, read the Chronological History and draw your own conclusions.

COLUMN A

COLUMN B
1943 A botanist, Arthur Galston studied the compound triiocobenzoic acid (a plant growth hormone) in an attempt to adapt soybeans to a short growing season. He found that excessive usage caused catastrophic defoliation a finding later used to develop herbicides disbursed in Vietnam.1 1943 The U.S. Army contacted U. of Chicago to study the possible use of herbicides (2,4-D & 2,4,5-T) to destroy enemy crops in War. This grew out of NAS (National Academy of Sciences) warning the Secretary of War of the potential dangers to the U.S. of biological warfare. 92/94 1950 Most of the chemical industry knew that large quantities of TCDD may be formed as a byproduct of the 2,4,5-T manufacturing process if the manufacturing procedures were not carefully controlled. (TCDD is a carcinogen a cancer-causing substance.)5 1952 Internal memoranda revealed that Monsanto (a major manufacturer of 2,4,5-T) informed the U.S. Army Officials that its 2,4,5-T (later called Agent Orange and Purple) was contaminated during production with TCDD (DIOXIN); DIOXIN is 150,000 times more toxic than arsenic. It is the most dangerous molecule ever created by man.64/7

Revised - 01/19/2014

ATTACHMENT 1

Page 1

COLUMN A

COLUMN B
1961 Defense Secretary McNamara requested feasibility test for defoliation of jungle vegetation in Vietnam. 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T mixtures used. The herbicide choice to be based on: chemical that had had considerable research, availability in large quantities, cost, known/proven safety in regard to their toxicity to humans & animals. . . 2/3 1961 November 30th - President Kennedy gave approval in principle to herbicide (dioxin) spraying in Vietnam. For the year following, Oval Office approval was required for any herbicide spraying of Vietnam targets. In 1962 limited authority granted to the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam and military to approve herbicide spraying of Vietnam targets.95

1962 Purple and Blue were the first herbicides to arrive in Vietnam. Later, it was determined Purple had a higher concentration of TCDD (2,3,4,8-tetrachlorodibenzo para dioxin) ["DIOXIN"] than any of the other mixtures, White, Pink, Green and eventually Orange (AO). The Air Force conducted most of the spraying using C-123s OPERATION RANCH HAND. Spraying was also conducted with army helicopters, River Boats and by hand. From 1962 to 1971 4.2 million U.S. Soldiers possibly made transient/significant contact with AO3/4

1963 U.S. Army reviewed toxicity studies on 2,4,5-T & found increased risk of chloracne, respiratory irritations; this risk was increased when the chemical was applied in high concentrations by inexperienced people. The President's Science Advisory Committee reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the possible health dangers of herbicide use.93 1964 - Dow Chemical was aware as early as 1964 that TCDD was a byproduct of the manufacturing process for Agent Orange.8

1965 AO became the standard herbicide used from 1965 on. Following 1965 the Federal Government reported finding DIOXIN in Agent Orange. However, they denied that AO was harmful. 24 (NOTE Monsanto's disclosure to Army in 1952, 13 yrs. earlier.) 1.9 million liters of Agent Purple was sprayed from 1962-1965. Agent Purple was far more toxic than AO. 3/96 Revised - 01/19/2014

1965 Military dispensed AO in concentrations 6 to 25 times the manufacturers suggested rate. It was also sprayed undiluted. The U.S. Government knew that AO was harmful to our Soldiers.12/70 (Note Monsanto 1952 internal memorandum on page 1.)

ATTACHMENT 1

Page 2

COLUMN A
1967 DOD contracted with Midwest Research Institute (MRI) for an in-depth assessment of the ecological effects of extensive or repeated use of herbicides. MRI reported that, . . the possibility of lethal toxicity to humans. . . .is highly unlikely and should not be a matter of deep concern . . . (First USAF Ranch Hand Study Results)10 1968 U.S. Department of State released an assessment of the ecological consequences of the defoliation program in South Vietnam provided by Tschirley: . . There is no evidence to suggest that herbicide used in Vietnam will cause toxicity for man or animals. 11

COLUMN B
1967 Botanist Arthur Galston warned, we are too ignorant of the interplay of forces in ecological problems to know how far-reaching and how lasting will be the changes in ecology brought about by the widespread spraying of herbicides in Vietnam. These changes may include immediate harm to people in sprayed areas. . . 6 1968 Dr James Clary (former gov. scientist with the Chemical Weapons Branch, BW/CW Division) letter to Senator Daschle When we (military scientists) initiated the herbicide program in the 1960s, we were aware of the potential for damage due to dioxin contamination in herbicide . . . . .We never considered a scenario in which our own personnel would become contaminated with the herbicide . . . . 59 1969 The National Academy of Science (NAS) Research Council Committee received a confidential report prepared by the Bionetics Research Council Committee(BRC) that 2,4,5-T (which contains TCDD) showed a significant potential to increased birth defects. The USDA (U.S. Department of Agriculture) had hired BRC to conduct the Study. The Study was then provided to the NAS.14/15

1969 Society for Social Responsibility in Science sponsored a visit by two zoologists to supplement Tschirleys rpt. They reported there was little evidence of toxic effects of herbicides to animals was found, although they did receive a report of many sick & dying birds & mammals, they did not investigate this report. They found no evidence that herbicides had direct adverse effects on human health. 11 1969 While birth defects did significantly increase in Saigon, critics contended that Saigon was not an area where heavy defoliation missions occurred. So they attributed the increase to the influx of U.S medical personnel who kept better records. (Note response in Column B) 97

1969 - Four months after the NAS Committee saw the BRC report the first reports of human birth defects allegedly attributed to AO started appearing in Vietnamese news papers. 97 The critics argument fails to recognize that the millions of Vietnamese moving to Saigon were forced to move because the U.S. had destroyed their food crops. (According to the Rand Report the U.S. sprayed Dioxin on 63,500 acres in 1964; 160,300 acres in 1965; 751,100 acres in 1966 and 547,400 acres in the first four months of 1967, killing all crops in the sprayed areas.) 91 The Vietnamese either moved or starved to death. They, their families and children, had been sprayed with AO. OCT. 1969 Dr. Lee F. Dubridge, Science Advisor to the President, announced that there would be a partial curtailment of the use of AO. 66

Revised - 01/19/2014

ATTACHMENT 1

Page 3

COLUMN A

COLUMN B
1970 Teratogenic Evaluation of 2,4,5-T study by K. Courtney, D. Gaylor, M. Hogan, H Falk, R. Bates and I. Mitchell (published in Science 5/15/1970). High doses of AO could cause malformed offspring as well as stillbirths in mice.

1970 Dow Chemical Company, the primary manufacturer of 2,4,5-T & 2,4-D denied the teratogenicity of 2,4,5-T, stating that according to their tests (with 2.4.5-T that Dow had produced and then had been disbursed in accordance with their production specifications), there was no indication of any fetal abnormalities. Note Column B 67

1970 (Follow-up to Dow Chemical Co. 2,4,5-T Study); HOWEVER, the Dow texts did confirm the BRC findings that, when dioxin was disbursed in quantities exceeding (then-current) production specifications, birth defects did occur.67 Note the military dispensed AO in concentrations 6 to 25 times the manufacturers suggested rate. 1970 Surgeon General of the U.S. issues a warning that the use of 2,4,5-T might be hazardous to our health. The Secretaries of Agriculture, HEW, and the Interior jointly announced the suspension of certain uses of 2,4,5T. These suspensions resulted from published studies indicating that 2,4,5-T was a teratogen (causing developmental malfunctions & monstrosities [birth defects]).16/67 1970 The Depart of Defense suspended all use of AO. 1970 - Teratogenic evaluation of 2,4,5-T (Science, May 1970) "The herbicide 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid is teratogenic and fetocidal in two strains of mice. . . . . . . the occurrence of hemorrhagic gastrointestinal track in the rat fetus suggest that this compound also has fetotoxic properties. 1972 57 horses in an Eastern Missouri arena died shortly after exposure to arena turf that had been oiltreated with surplus oil sludge contaminated with TCDD. Causes of death? Skin lesions, severe weight loss & heptotoxicity. Birds, dogs, cats, insects & rodents were also found dead in and around arena. A six-year old girl that was exposed developed epstaxis, gastrointestinal complaints and severe hemorrhagic systitis.65

Revised - 01/19/2014

ATTACHMENT 1

Page 4

COLUMN A

COLUMN B
1974 The NAS committee, however, was unable to visit the Montagnards where they lived to verify common and consistent reports of serious illness and death, especially among children, after exposure to herbicide sprays.17 1974 In its 1974 Report NAS expressed concern over CDD because of: (1) its very high toxicity to animals, (2) it's presence in Agent Orange, (3) preliminary reports of presence of TCDD in fish in Vietnam, and (4) the lack of any data permitting assessment of TCDD effects on humans. As a result, NAS recommended that long-term studies be made to obtain a firmer basis of assessing the potential harmful effects on man. The NAS committee could not gather any definitive indication of direct damage by herbicides to human health. 17.

1977- Not for Release VA Doc. AOs high toxicity and deformed children similar to thalidomide situation.7

1978 Paul Reutershan, E. Gorman (pers. Injury lawyers) filed suit in N.Y. against Dow Chemical & two other chemical manufacturers for diseases suffered by Vietnam Veterans & their families (including birth defects) due to exposure to Agent Orange.18 1978 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued an emergency suspension of the spraying of 2,4,5-T in national forests after finding a statistically significant increase in the frequency of miscarriages among women living near forests sprayed with AO. AO exceeded risk criteria for teratogenic (causing birth malformations) and fetotoxic (causing harm to the fetus) set by regulations.19/89

1979 - Dr. Haber (VA) reported it was theoretically possible that about 4,200,000 soldiers could have been exposed to AO. 4 (note #22)

Revised - 01/19/2014

ATTACHMENT 1

Page 5

COLUMN A

COLUMN B
1979 Congressional Hearings before House Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, quoted in Human Disease Linked to Dioxin: Congress Calls for 2,4,5-T Ban After Dramatic Herbicide Hearings 28 Bioscience 454 (August 1979). This study, also known as the Alsea Study, cited as showing the 1st correlation between 2,4,5-T (contaminated with TCDD) and teratogenic (BIRTH DEFECTS) in humans. 19/99 1980 Senator Daschle and Rep. Bonior received an anonymous memorandum written on VA stationary which stated: chemical agents 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D commonly known as Agent Orange and Agent Blue, are mutagenic and teratogenic. This means they intercept the genetic DNA message processed on an unborn fetus, thereby resulting in deformed children being born. Therefore, the veteran would appear to have no ill effects from exposure but he would produce deformed children due to the breakage in his genetic chain . . . 7

1982 Study ordered by P.L. 96-151 & expanded by P.L. 97-72 was transferred to the CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), October 1982.22

October 1982 GAO investigated the effectiveness of the Agent Orange examination program. The GAO stated the VAs work was poorly designed & being administrated by physicians who were not familiar with the reported health effects of Agent Orange. 23 Dr. G. Roush (Monsantos Medical Director) Researchers deliberately omitted 5 deaths from exposure and classified 4 workers as unexposed in the Monsanto Zack and Gaffy Study, to equalize the death rates among exposed and unexposed workers. Dr. Roush further admitted that the overall death rate from cancer was 65% greater in the exposed population than expected.

1983 Monsanto Zack & Gaffy Study Basic conclusion that TCDD (Dioxin) not a factor in medical health.98
(Also Published in the "Environmental Science Research,1983.)

ADMITTED FRAUD AND DECEPTION26/98

1983 January 18th 1983 the CDC accepted responsibility for the Agent Orange Exposure Study. (AO Study) 25 It substantially modified the Study Protocol and launched the Study.32 1983 ". . .the Reagan Administration decided to revised the charter of the White House Panel by eliminating
(Continued)

1983 By focusing the work of the AOWG on Agent Orange only, the administration laid the groundwork for
(Continued)

Revised - 01/19/2014

ATTACHMENT 1

Page 6

COLUMN A
1983 (Cont.) its mandate to explore the effects of all herbicides and contaminants and concentrating . . . only on Agent Orange." White House Panel called the Agent Orange Work Group (AOWG). 28 - page 27 1983 Dissenting Views of Hon. Richard K. Armey, Hon. Frank Horton, Hon. Howard C. Vielson, Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Hon. Jon L. Kyl, and Hon. Chuch Douglass Regrettably however, instead of advancing the debate on Agent Orange in a positive direction, the Human Resources Subcommittee has abused this issue in order to launch an ideological assault upon a Republican White House with which it has never agreed. Consequently, constructive suggestions for further review and detached review of science are given a back seat . . . 29 1984 Monsanto Zack & Suskind 1980 Study AND the Suskind & Hertzberg 1984 Study that TCDD (Dioxin) not a factor in medical health.26/88 1984 Sept. AOWG ordered that . . . . all documents related to Agent Orange research studies slated for review by any person or organization outside the Federal Government be submitted first to the Chair, AOWG. 33 (Emphasis added) 1984 The White House Agent Orange Working Group also withheld a second report on the Birth Defects of RANCH HAND Vets. This is the report RANCH HAND scientists disclosed to Senator Daschle in 1987. Ranch Hand scientists (Dr. Albanese and Dr. Michalek) told Senator Daschle that the White House AOWG withheld the Birth Defect Study. The report was finally published in 1988.60/106 1986 The Justice Department ordered the Defense Department not to assist the Special Master (person organizing the Distribution Plan ordered by Judge Weinstein) overseeing the legal settlement between manufacturers of AO and Vietnam Veterans. 37

COLUMN B
1983 (Cont.) manipulating the [AO] Study to the point of uselessness. (as reported in Admiral Zumwalts 1990 AO
Report and the 101 Congress 2 Session House Report 101672, page 28-37) The White House had been warned by the
st nd

OMB (Offices of Management & Budget) that the cost of caring for Vietnam Veterans suffering from diseases related to their exposure to AO while serving our Country in the Vietnam War would be in the hundreds of billions of dollars. The White House was deeply concerned that the Federal Government would be placed in the position of paying compensation to veterans suffering diseases related to Agent Orange and, moreover, feared that providing help to Vietnam Veterans would set the precedent of having the United States compensate civilian victims of toxic contamination exposure. . . 28( Page 28) 3rd Para.

1984 Dr. Suskind Purposefully omitted secret Monsanto Studies that documented psychoneuroses and long term nervous system & liver damage.88 1984 December 17, 1984, The Air Force Birth Defects study concluded that There was an increase in the risk of Ranch Hand birth defects with time (pre versus post Southeast Asia), and this change is statistically significant, had remained unpublished. The study also concluded, A significant change in risk of the occurrence of neonatal death was noted. . . U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, Project Ranch Hand II: An Epidemiological Investigation of Health Effects in Air Force Personnel Following Exposure to Herbicides: Reproductive Outcome Update, WORKING DRAFT NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE 90

1986 Judge Weinsteins Distribution Plan included funding for a class of children fathered by Vietnam Veterans, of children with birth defects. 36 (Question If the Defense Department provided assistance, would that suggest that the Government agreed AO could be the cause of Vietnam Veteran illnesses & birth defects?)

Revised - 01/19/2014

ATTACHMENT 1

Page 7

COLUMN A
1986 July A OMB memorandum provides evidence that it was the White House, not CDC, that was making decisions during possibly the most crucial phase of the AO Exposure Study. The memorandum states that the decision on whether to cancel the [AO] study will be influenced by CDCs public testimony before the House Veterans Affairs Committee on July 31, 1986. It is important that the testimony leave the AOWG with options on the future of the Agent Orange study. . The memorandum contains an admission that the final decision was based on the Federal Governments legal culpability, not necessarily the independent work of scientists. 40 (Emphasis added)

COLUMN B
1986 The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy & Commerce documented how untutored officials of the Office of Management & Budget (OMB) interfered with and second- guessed the professional judgments of agency scientist & multidisciplinary panels of outside peer review experts effectively to alter or forestall CDC research [on AO] 41 1986 Environmental Study Group, Department of Defense (ESG) personnel informed the IOM team that ESGs ability to make determinations on company locations has been hampered by CDC imposed constraints. The ESG also pointed out that there is a considerable loss of numbers of veterans with potential exposure from the study because of CDCs stringent eligibility requirements. 42 1986 After reviewing the work of the Environmental Study Group, Dept. of Defense (ESG), the IOM team concluded that CDC had wrongly restricted the study.43

1987 . . . the Chair of the AOWG informed the Chairman of the White House Domestic Policy Council, it has been concluded that military records cannot support a valid epidemiological study of the health effects of Agent Orange exposure on Vietnam Veterans . . .I advise you to recommend to the Domestic Policy Council that the Agent Orange exposure study be cancelled. 45 (emphasis added)

Testimony (1990) Opinions & comments of scientists regarding the use of exposure data & correlation with spray in an Agent Orange Epidemiological Study. They all disagreeing with the AOWG opinion that military records cannot support a valid epidemiological AO study: 1. Dr. Jeanne Stellman that available records were quite sufficient to determine exposure to AO. 102 2. Richard Christian (ESG member) CDC conclusions false, he had personally informed the CDC that adequate military records existed to identify Company-specific movements as well as spray locations. 101 3. (Regarding the 1988 IOM site visit) The IOM said they were satisfied that the Environmental Study Group, Dept. of Defense (ESG) is capable of determining locations & filling gaps. ESG highly competent in records. 100 4. IOM critical of CDCs alteration of protocol, manipulation of data and the AOWG's lack of scientific experience. 44

Revised - 01/19/2014

ATTACHMENT 1

Page 8

COLUMN A
1987 Two months later the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) acknowledged the instruction to cancel the [AO] study. . . . AOWG has instructed CDC to begin the process of cancelling the contracts and closing out all activities related to the Agent Orange Exposure Study. 47

COLUMN B
1987 NOTE Once the Agent Orange Exposure Study was cancelled on the premise that assessing exposure was scientifically impossible, Federal scientists were able to dismiss any link between diseases and maladies they discovered and Agent Orange. 48 1987 Ranch Hand Scientists (Dr. Albanese, Dr. Michalek) confirmed to Senator Daschle that an unpublished 1984 Birth Defects Study shows that birth defects among Ranch Hand children were double those of children in the control group and not "minor" as originally reported. This data was egregiously suppressed by the White House Agent Orange Working Group, (Manipulation of Data). It was finally published in 1988. This increase in birth defects takes on added significance when one considers that the original CDC Birth Defects Study, which found no increase in birth defects, merely examined birth defects as reported on birth certificates, rather than as reported by the childs parents [or doctor]. The CDC never recorded hidden birth defects, such as internal organ malformations and other disabilities that only became apparent as the child developed. Consequently, it is very likely that the CDC's negative findings on birth defects were also vastly understated.60 In addition to the elevated birth defects, Ranch Hander's also showed a significant increase in skin cancers unrelated to overexposure to the sun as originally suggested in the 1984 report. Air Force scientists also admitted that Air Force and White House Management representatives were involved in scientific decisions in spite of the studys protocol which prohibited such involvement.
(Quote from Admiral Zumwalts Agent Orange Report)
60

1988 The Chairman of the AOWG sent a memorandum to its members advising them that the future release of any information related to Agent Orange must be cleared by the AOWG. Quote, The release of any report, without the review mandated by the Agent Orange Working Group [AOWG] procedures, could constitute a serious breach and may undercut our credibility. Any premature release could cause embarrassment to the government. Research
(Continued)

Revised - 01/19/2014

ATTACHMENT 1

Page 9

COLUMN A
(Continued 1988 (Continued) findings and conclusions must be submitted to the AOWG 48 hours prior to release for review, comment and clearance before going to Congress or the public. 49 (Emphasis Added) 1989 The CDC released its 1983 study concluding that AO was unlikely cause of elevated cancer in Vietnam Veterans. (Study released even though it had been cancelled by the AOWG in 1987.)

COLUMN B

1989 A CDC study found that Vietnam veterans were more likely than non Vietnam veterans to report birth defects. The study also concluded that Vietnam veterans reporting exposure to herbicides are at even greater risk of reporting miscarriages, birth defects, serious health problems, and infant mortality. Any possible link between herbicide exposure and the reported birth defects was dismissed by the CDC because of the cancellation of the exposure study.50 CDCs review of birth records found that the offspring of Vietnam veterans were twice as likely to have digestive system birth defects and were also twice as likely to suffer early neonatal death. The birth records review also indicated that the offspring of Vietnam veterans were more susceptible to cerebrospinal malformations, such as spina bifida, anencephaly, and hydrocephalus.51 The CDC explained this problem as a underreporting of the birth defects among non-Vietnam veterans, rather than an excess among Vietnam veterans.51 CDCs semen analysis of Vietnam veterans also found problems; Mean sperm concentration 20% lower. CDC quickly concluded there was no link to AO. 52

1990 Air Force releases a follow-up morbidity report on the Ranch Hander's. That report, 1987 Follow-up Examination Results, described statistically significant increases in health problems among Ranch Hander's including all cancers skin and systemic combined, both verified and suspected; skin cancers alone; hereditary and degenerative neurological diseases and other problems. The Air Force concluded, however, that these and other problems cannot necessarily be related to Agent Orange/dioxin exposure, as they do not always show a dose-response relationship . . . 61

Revised - 01/19/2014

ATTACHMENT 1

Page 10

COLUMN A
1991 Dow Chemical Company, response to 2,3,7,8 TCDD study by Michael A. Gallo; Robert Wood Johnson Medical School University of Medicine . . New Jersey Attacks the validity of Gallos scientific study tying TCDD to Birth Defects. NOTE Dow 1970 admission on page 4, Column B that when dioxin was distributed in quantities exceeding (then current) production specifications that birth defects did occur.

COLUMN B
1991 TCDD Study by Michael A. Gallo; Robert W. Johnson Medical School University of Medicine . . .New Jersey the human teratogenicity (developmental malformations and monstrosities) studies of these compounds [TCDD] suggest that adverse reproductive effects can be caused by them. The studies (principally toxicologic, but also some epidemiologic) conducted this far suggest TCDD is capable of producing these effects. 1991 - Congress passes the Agent Orange Act (P.L. 1024),which superseded The "Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-542)." 1991 The Agent Orange Act (P.L. 102-4) established for the first time a presumption of service-connection for diseases associated with herbicide exposure [ such as AO]. Under the Agent Orange Act, veterans seeking disability compensation for diseases they thought to be associated with herbicides no longer were required to provide proof of exposure. P.L. 102-4 authorized the VA to contract with the IOM to review and summarize the scientific evidence concerning the association between exposure to herbicides used in support of military operations in Vietnam during the Vietnam Era and each disease suspected to be associated with such exposure. P.L. 102-4 mandated that the IOM determine, to the extent possible:105 1. "whether there is a statistical association between the suspect diseases and herbicide exposure, taking into account the strength of the scientific evidence and the appropriateness of the methods used to detect the association;" 2. "the increased risk of disease among individuals exposed to herbicides during service in Vietnam during the Vietnam Era;" and 3. "whether there is a plausible biological mechanism or other evidence of a causal relationship between herbicide exposure and the health outcome."
(Continued)

Revised - 01/19/2014

ATTACHMENT 1

Page 11

COLUMN A

COLUMN B
1991 (Continued) The VA is then required to review the reports of the IOM and issue regulations establishing a presumption of service- connection for any disease for which there is scientific evidence of a positive association with herbicide exposure." (emphasis added) "Once the VA has established presumption of service connection for a certain disease or medical condition, a Vietnam veteran with that disease is eligible for disability compensation. The amount of compensation is based on the degree of disability and, again, veterans are compensated only for approved conditions that have demonstrated sufficient evidence of an association with herbicide exposure." (Note - no mention of analyzing birth defects as an IOM assignment.)105 1992 Air Force finally publishes a Ranch Hand Birth Defects Report. The 1992 report confirmed the high rate of birth defects and infant deaths among children fathered by Ranch Hand veterans. But the report stated that because the birth defects did not increase consistently with dioxin exposure, Agent Orange wasnt to blame. 77 1992 1994 - NAS concluded in 1994 that the 1992 conclusion might be inaccurate. The NAS criticized the Ranch Hand study and singled out the 1992 birth defects report as an example of its many flaws. NAS stated that the study group was too small to begin with and had omitted hundreds of subject from the analysis. That made it harder to connect birth defects to Agent Orange, or easier not to. NAS reported Some aspect of the Ranch Hand experience to have increased the risk of fathering children with birth defects, but the implications of this finding are unclear. 78 2000 Results of the Hatfield Study. Agent Orange dioxins is still very prevalent in and around where the dioxin was sprayed and around the airfields in Vietnam where it was loaded and stored. The dioxin has spread into the food chain. One mothers breast milk contained dioxin levels six times higher than what the World Health (Continued)

Revised - 01/19/2014

ATTACHMENT 1

Page 12

COLUMN A

COLUMN B
2000 (Continued) Organization deems safe. She has a 2 year old with spina bifida, recognized by the U.S. as child birth defect from AO. Another family living and working at one of the air fields has two children, both with devastating illnesses, including rare blood & bone diseases. One daughter died at 7. The 10-month old son requires painful blood transfusions every month to stay alive. Their only healthy child is the one they had before moving to the airbase. The U.S. denies any accountability. 79 2009 Dr. Jeanne Stellman (an epidemiologist who spent decades studying AO for the American Legion and the NAS) - We do not know the answer to the Question: What happened to Vietnam veterans? The government doesnt want to study this because of international liability and issues surrounding chemical warfare. And theyre going to win because theyre bigger and everybodys getting old and there are new wars to worry about.
(quote copied from chicagotribune.com)

2010 IOM Veterans & Agent Orange - Update 2010 (Congressionally mandated biennial update) stated Work needs to be undertaken to resolve questions regarding several health out-comes, most importantly COPD, tonsil cancer, melanoma, brain cancer, Alzheimers disease, and paternally transmitted effects to offspring. Institute of Medicine 2911 Hatfield Report Dioxin congerer profiles confirm that the main source of dioxin contamination at Bien Hoa Airbase was Agent Orange & other dioxin-containing herbicides. TCDD contributed over 80% of the TEQ (TCDD Toxic equivalents) in most soil and sediment samples analyzed from the Airbase. 83 2011 Hatfield Report The evidence indicates that dioxin moves from the former Agent Orange storage and washing/loading area (Z1 Area), & the Pacer Ivy Area into surrounding drainage ditches, small creeks, ponds & lakes, & ultimately into humans (via ingestion of contaminated fish, ducks and mollusks, direct dermal contact with soils and sediments, and likely via inhalation of dust) . . . 84 (Emphasis added) Revised - 01/19/2014 ATTACHMENT 1 Page 13

COLUMN A

COLUMN B
2011 Hatfield Report The maximum TEQ concentration recorded in Tilapia fat from Mr. Hoc Lake in the Pacer Ivy Area in 2010 (4,040 pg/g wet weight basis) is more than 200 times the acceptable level established by Health Canada. Tilapia fat tissue samples from Mr. Quy Lake (2,460 pg/g), NE Perimeter Lake (1,680 pg/g), Gate 2 Lake (1,520 pg/g), and Z1 Lake (1,440 pg/g) all exceed this guideline by more than 70 times (Figure 7). 85 2011 Hatfield 2011 All breast milk samples analyzed exhibited TEQs exceeding the WHO Tolerable Daily Intake guideline of 4 pg TEQ/kg bw/d. High dioxin and furan levels in breast mild are cause for concern, and emphasize the need for raising awareness of potential contaminated food items originating from Bien Hoa Airbase 86

Revised - 01/19/2014

ATTACHMENT 1

Page 14

REFERENCES
1 - Agent Orange Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia AGENT ORANGE (Page 4) 2nd Para. 2 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 160) 4th Para. 3 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 161) 1 st/2nd Para. 4 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 164) 1 st Para. 5 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 175) 2nd Para. 6 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 164) 3 rd Para. 7 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 26, note #86) 8 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 23) 3rd Para. 9 Article The extent and patterns of usage of Agent Orange and other herbicides in Vietnam (page 684) 3rd Para. 10 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 164) 4 th Para. 11 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 165) 2 nd Para. 12 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 3) 3rd Para. 13 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 167) 1 st Para. 14 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 166) 2nd Para. 15 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 5) 1st Para. 16 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 167) 2 nd Para. 17 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 171) 3 rd Para. 18 Agent Orange On Trial Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts by Peter H. Schuck; (page 37) 1st and 2nd Para. 19 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 180) 1st Para. 20 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 171) 3 rd Para. 21 Agent Orange: Veterans Complaints and Studies of Health Effects Issue Brief No. IB83043; (page CRS-7) 5th Para. 22 Agent Orange: Veterans Complaints and Studies of Health Effects Issue Brief No. IB83043; (page CRS-7) 6th Para. 23 Agent Orange: Veterans Complaints and Studies of Health Effects Issue Brief No. IB83043; (page CRS-5) 6th Para. 24 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 3) 4th Para. 25 Agent Orange: Veterans Complaints and Studies of Health Effects Issue Brief No. IB83043; (page CRS-8) 2nd Para. 26 Admiral Zumwalts 1990 testimony before the Human Resources Committee, U.S. House; (page 3) 3 rd Para. 27 GAO 1990 Briefing Report Agent Orange Studies; Poor Contracting Practices at CDC; (page2) 2nd Para. 28 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 27-37) 29 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 39-42) 30 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 10) 2nd Para. 31 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 14) 3rd Para. 32 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 15) 3rd Para. 33 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 32) 4th Para. 34 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 16) 2nd Para. 35 Agent Orange On Trial Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts by Peter H. Schuck; (page 220) 2nd Para. 36 Agent Orange On Trial Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts by Peter H. Schuck; (page 218) 2nd Para. 37 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 29) 3rd Para. 38 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 29) 4th Para. 39 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 29) 5th Para. Revised - 01/19/2014 ATTACHMENT 1 Page 15

REFERENCES
40 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 31) 2nd 3rd Para. 41 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 18) 2nd Para. 42 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 19) 3rd Para. 43 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 19) 4th Para. 44 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 20) 2nd & 3rd Para. 45 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 32) 2nd Para. 46 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 22) 4th Para. & (page 23) 2nd Para. 47 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 32) 3rd Para. 48 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 33) 2nd Para. 49 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 32) 4th Para. 50 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 33) 3rd & 4th Para. 51 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 33) 5th Para. 52 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 34) 1st, 2nd Para. 53 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 14) 4th Para. 54 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 14) 1st Para. 55 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 2) 4th Para. 56 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 16) 2nd Para. 57 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 16) 1st Para. 58 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 19) 2nd Para. 59 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 4) 2nd Para. 60 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 20) full page 61 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 20 & 21) last Para. on page 20, 1st Para. on page 21 62 San Diego Union Tribune Robert Weissman Nov 2, 1988 (page 9) last Para. 63 San Diego Union Tribune Robert Weissman Nov 2, 1988 (page 11) 1st 6th Para. 64 Wikipedia Free Encyclopedia AGENT ORANGE (Page 3) 3rd Para. 65 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 178) 2 nd Para. 66 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 166) 4th Para. 67 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 167) 3 rd Para. 68 Admiral Zumwalts 1990 testimony before the Human Resources Committee, U.S. House; (page 2) 6 th Para. 69 THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES Agent Orange Act of 1991; Public Law 102-4; 102nd Congress (1st Session) 70 US Comptroller General-Health Effects of Exposure to Herbicide Orange in South Vietnam should be Resolved (page 2) 3rd Para. 71 Affidavit of Admiral Zumwalt; 1996 lawsuit Ivy vs. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. (page 7) Para #25, #26, #27 72 Zumwalts Interview 1996 Agent Orange and the Anguish of an American Family (page 4) 4th Para. 73 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 21) 3rd Para. 74 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 20) 2nd Para. 75 San Diego Union Tribune Robert Weissman Nov 2, 1988 (page 2) 5th & 6th Para. 76 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990 (page 4) 2nd Para. 77 San Diego Union Tribune Robert Weissman Nov 2, 1988 (page 9) last Para. & (page 10) 1st through 2nd Para. Revised - 01/19/2014 ATTACHMENT 1 Page 16

REFERENCES
78 San Diego Union Tribune Robert Weissman Nov 2, 1988 (page 10) 1st- 8th Para. 79 Agent Oranges lethal legacy: At former U.S. bases in Vietnam a potent poison in clear and present danger; Chicago Trib. Part 4 (pages 2-5) 80 Congressional Research Services Veterans Affairs: Health Care & Benefits for Veterans Exposed to Agent Orange (page 4) 2nd Para. 81 Hatfield Consultants 2011 Environmental & Human Health assess. Of Dioxin Contamination (Vietnam) (page 2) 3rd Para. 82 Hatfield Consultants 2011 Environmental & Human Health assess. Of Dioxin Contamination (Vietnam) (page 3) 4th Para. 83 Hatfield Consultants 2011 Environmental & Human Health assess. Of Dioxin Contamination (Vietnam) (page 3) 6th Para. 84 Hatfield Consultants 2011 Environmental & Human Health assess. Of Dioxin Contamination (Vietnam) (page 5) 1st Para. 85 Hatfield Consultants 2011 Environmental & Human Health assess. Of Dioxin Contamination (Vietnam) (page 5) 3rd Para. 86 Hatfield Consultants 2011 Environmental & Human Health assess. Of Dioxin Contamination (Vietnam) (page 6) 6th Para. 87 Wikipedia Free Encyclopedia AGENT ORANGE (Page 8) 2nd Para. 88 Admiral Zumwalts 1990 testimony before the Human Resources Committee, U.S. House; (page 3) 4 th Para. 89 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 179) 4th Para. 90 Affidavit of Admiral Zumwalt; 1996 lawsuit Ivy vs. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. (page 11) Para #43 91 Rand Report affects of Dioxin Spraying in Vietnam requested by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense), page 1 Note at the bottom of the page. 92 Wikipedia Free Encyclopedia AGENT ORANGE (Page 4) 3rd Para. 93 The Freeman - Government Claims immunity from Tort Liability - (page 1) 5th and 6th Para. 94 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 160)2nd Para. 95 Operation Ranch Hand; Air University Review; July-August 1983; (Page 2) 4th Para 96 The Extent , Patterns & Usage of Agent Orange (Page 682) 3rd Para. 97 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 166) 3rd Para. 98 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990; (page 22) 3rd Para. 99 Boston College Environment Affairs Law Review Vo. 8/Issue 2 12/1/1979 Soldiers of Orange; (page 179) 2nd Para. 100 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 19) 2nd Para. 101 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 12) 5th Para. 102 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 10) 3rd Para. 103 TWELFTH REPORT by the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; (page 20) 5th Para. 104 See Admiral Zumwalt's Report to the Secretary May 1990; (page 26) Note 84 (Lilienfeld and Gallo) 105 Congressional Research Services Veterans Affairs: Health Care & Benefits for Vets Exposed to Agent Orange (page 3) 1st Para. 106 How the Military Misled Vietnam Veterans and Their Families about the Health Risks of Agent Orange (Robert Weissman); (page 2 - full page).

Revised - 01/19/2014

ATTACHMENT 1

Page 17