Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
1
decided to translate it from Russian to English and to publish it. – David
Dastych
[Full text of the interview]
Question: You have entered history as “the last dictator of Poland”, the
one who imposed the martial law on the 13th of December 1981. Now
there is going on a criminal trial, where responsibility is put on you for all
that has happened in these years. Do you feel culpable?
Answer: I confess for twelve years now. And then, in 1981, I knew: the
decision to introduce the martial law will hang on me to the end of my
days. I talked about it during the trial. The martial law was a nightmare for
me. But at that time, in my opinion, there was no other variant which
could be better for Poland. I knew the realities of that epoch. I knew what
could menace to us in case we resigned of the introduction of the “law of
war” [martial law]. I can remind to you the known words of Brezhnev: “If
the Polish communists would submit themselves to counter-revolutionary
public feeling, then the fate of Poland, the fate of peace in Europe would
be solved by force.” If I, or you, were a Soviet general and could see the
developments in Poland, I would have decided to intervene.
Q: Was there any other decision? What your comrades of the Party
leadership suggested to you?
A: The martial law – it was an evil, but a smaller evil in comparison to that
catastrophe we stood at the threshold of. There were particular political
reasons for this catastrophe [to happen]. In the Polish Communist Party
there were dogmatists – “troglodytes”, as I named them – who did not
want any reforms and were ready to get rid of them at any price. They
maintained secret contacts with the leaders of the USSR, incited them to
military intervention. In the inner circle of Brezhnev there also were old
dogmatists – Romanov, Grishin. Well, I should be careful [pointing to] old
sclerotics: Brezhnev died at 75, and I am already 86 years old.
There were also economic reasons. At that time USSR, Czechoslovakia and
GDR [East Germany] offered main help to Poland – we needed all:
products, energy, raw materials. Beginning from the 1st of January 1982,
2
all supplies of natural gas were to be cut off. Already in December 1981,
we suffered big downfall of the supply of energy-portents. And, finally, the
third threat – the military one. Being the Commander-in-Chief I knew:
Soviet armies were concentrated at our frontiers. I understood too well
what that meant.
I couldn’t forget about still one more factor. Following Yalta, after the year
1945, the [Western] frontier of Poland changed favorably for us. At that
time, the only guarantor of our Western frontier territories was Stalin, who
pushed frontiers Westward to enlarge the zone of Soviet influence.
Western Germany [FRG] opposed this. In 1967, General de Gaulle was the
only one among the Western European politicians, who came to Poland
from the West, entering ten kilometers deep into former [German] Silesia.
By this [move] he confirmed that it was the territory of Poland nowadays.
From Moscow we always received reminders about who guaranteed our
[Western] frontier. And [Russians] let us think: as long as you remain a
socialist state, your [national] territory will not be curbed. And if not,
then…
Q: As you are coming from a family of landed gentry, don’t you feel
nostalgic about the old, before-the-war Poland?
One may criticize socialism at free will, but no one can deny that: after the
war Poland made a great social leap forward. [After WWI] we inherited a
country of 24 million inhabitants –- six million perished during the war. But
by 1970 there were counted [in Poland] 38 million people – it was a real
demographical dash. As to the reproductiveness, we outdistanced GDR
[East Germany], and also Czechoslovakia. But social provisions for such a
big population growth began to crumble in the 1970s. As people used to
tell then, in [Polish] shops one could find only vinegar. But [sarcastically]
that vinegar was a strong aphrodisiac, as it brought about the birth of 14
millions of new Poles.
3
A: On the one hand, the martial law delayed the fall of the Berlin Wall by
eight years. But there’s also an opposite view. The entering of the Warsaw
Pact armies to Poland [in the 1980s] certainly could have solidified the
position of the partisans of a brutal policy line in the leadership of the
USSR. In such case, Gorbachev wouldn’t have assumed power and he
couldn’t begin his reforms. I don’t justify that forced decision [of the
martial law] but it was the least of all evils. There is no subjunctive mood
in history. But we know how ended the coup d’etat of Jozef Pilsudski in
1926, and how ended an unprepared Warsaw Uprising of 1944.
A: No, my decision was truly legitimate. The Polish Parliament (The Sejm)
voted for the introduction of the martial law [in 1981]. It was not a coup
d’etat at all.
A: Let me begin from [the fact] that presently there are many divergences
between Poland and Russia – especially on the higher level, in the
academic circles and so on. All that makes me bitter. I will never stop
repeating: I have high respect for Russia, I love Russians, Russian nation,
Russian culture. The Russian nation is close to us, a Slav nation. Russia –
it’s a huge, multi-national country, the whole continent.
In spite of [the fact that] there was a forced exile to Siberia in my life, that
there was taiga – where my Father remained for ages, I am very grateful
to Vladimir Putin for making possible to me to travel to Altayskiy Kray
To pay a visit at the grave of my Father. But regardless of my difficult life
history, I still love Russia, and I think that our mutual relations may be and
can be good. It’s a pity that it isn’t so now. I don’t want to judge which
party is more culpable for that. Now I am far away from politics and I don’t
dispose of full information to be able to formulate a judgment. But, to
begin with, in my opinion, we have to get rid of emotions, of which,
unfortunately, there is a lot in Poland. One can’t build normal relations on
emotions. Different countries can’t understand history in the same way.
But this should not prevent them from living in harmony, moreover when
they are neighbors.
Q: Now, twelve years after the crush of the Berlin Wall, are there still any
dividing lines in Europe?
A: There will be no wall between Russia and the rest of Europe. All
[countries] have their own traditions and ways to democracy and all need
different timing to walk that long way [to the end]. After the fall of the
4
USSR, there was necessary to bring together [again] what had been
dispersed. A time will come, and we will be close [with Russia] again.
Gorbachev didn’t want any new barriers to rise in Europe, and he didn’t
want to disrupt the Soviet Union either. After all, there are other
geopolitical realities – China, the Islamic world. Perhaps in twenty, thirty
years to come we will be together again.
Q: And in 1939, who invaded Poland?
A: Poland was subjected to aggression from both sides [Germany and the
Soviet Union]. And then there was Katyn Massacre, which is very painful
for the Polish national identity. Assessments of the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact had been made from our and from the Russian side. Putin himself
admitted that the agreement with Hitler was immoral.
But this Pact should be examined in the political context of that epoch. At
that time, I was 16 years old and I remember the bitter, unfortunate things
that have been committed, also by us. But the history, the wounds
inflicted by it are not to be quickly healed.
Let me give you an example. When I was President [of Poland], I flew for a
visit to England. In a castle outside London Margaret Thatcher took me to
the attic, where there were stacked on the table old things, some
documents. She picked up an old, worn out thin brown leather folder and
said: “Do you know who it belonged to?” I didn’t know. “To Napoleon. But I
wouldn’t bring a Frenchman to this place!” See: two hundred years have
passed, and the British cannot forget. They live with the French in alliance,
two world wars fought together. Nevertheless, each country retained its
diametrically opposite view of Napoleon, its own version of history. But
this should not prevent cooperation. I am, incidentally, a staunch
Bonapartist myself.
5
lead to stagnation. So we were searching a third way. We hit upon the
possibility of introducing a third economic factor - cooperatives. All
documents of that time were not only signed by Mazowiecki, but also by
myself. [That’s why] Gorbachev called Poland a “laboratory of reforms.”
Since that time our country has changed very much. I would be lying if I
said: everything that is happening now, I like it. Now no one takes into
account the social costs. Therefore many problems have accumulated.
6
An [eventual] deployment of [elements] of the American BMD in Poland by
no means would enhance Poland’s security. One way or the other, we are
members of NATO. And, according to the agreement, each country -
member of the alliance - has the right to collective defense. Therefore a
U.S. bilateral agreement with Poland on missile defense – could be an
unnecessary duplication of the existing security system. So the
[acceptance of the American] missile defense system could be truly a
manifestation of [Poland’s] distrust of NATO. And in the conditions of the
present [economic] crisis, it became still prohibitively expensive.