Epicurus' Conception of Pleasure

David Conan Wolfsdorf

(under review)

Introduction Epicureanism is the signal form of hedonism in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. But the central component of Epicurean hedonism, Epicurus' conception of pleasure, has deeply puzzled and troubled both his ancient and contemporary interpreters and critics. Some of Epicurus' opponents maintain that Epicurus conceives of pleasure merely as absence of pain and that mere absence of pain is not pleasure. Others hold that Epicurus was committed to sensual or carnal pleasures and attack him as a base hedonist. Still others hold that Epicurus was committed to both analgesic and sensual pleasures and that this dual commitment is incoherent since the two alleged hedonic kinds have nothing in common in virtue of which they can rightly be called "pleasures." There is even evidence from within Epicurus' own school of division over how to understand Epicurus' conception of the pleasure that constitutes the goal of human life. In some passages Epicurus appears to suggest that this pleasure is a complex of mental and corporeal components, in others, that the mental component is sufficient.1 Hence, some Epicureans maintain that the goal of human life is a certain mental pleasure, others that it is a complex of mental and corporeal components. The aim of this paper is to clarify Epicurus' conception of pleasure and of the pleasure that he takes to be the goal of human life. Epicurus' views on these topics are obscured by the dearth of primary textual evidence. With the exception of sparse fragments, the principal texts in which Epicurus originally !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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that throughout the paper I refer to Epicurean corporeal and mental pleasures. All pleasures for Epicurus are psychological in the sense that they involve the soul (!"#$) in some way. But some pleasures involve the rational part of the soul, which is to say, the mind. I call these "mental" pleasures. Other pleasures involve the body. Those that involve the body also involve the irrational part of the soul. I refer to these pleasures as "corporeal," rather than "bodily" or "somatic," simply in acknowledgement of the fact that Epicurus views the soul itself as a kind of %&'. Epicurus in fact sometimes speaks of pleasures of the flesh (() *+, %'-./), e.g., in KD 4, precisely to avoid speaking of somatic pleasure. However, this is not always the case. For example, consider the phrase "*0 $*1 23415) .'*6 %&'" at Ep. Men. 131. Unforunately, there is no good English adjective corresponding to "flesh." "Carnal" has the wrong connotation, as does "sensual." Strictly, "corporeal" is of course unsatisfactory too since this just means "relating to the body." However, the term is less natural than "bodily," and thus serves to emphasize the special reason for which it is here used.

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presented his hedonism and conception of pleasure have perished. The extant Letter to Menoeceus, Sovereign Maxims, and Vatican Sayings convey his views in oversimplified terms. Hence, sensitive and sympathetic contemporary interpreters have struggled with a lack of evidence; while the ancients, who in principle had access to more text, often based their interpretations and criticisms on salient or striking claims rather than a careful and thorough scholarly examination. This last point cannot, however, be said of the members of Epicurus' own school; and in that case, there is more reason to think that Epicurus' commitments were unclear or even unstable. My own efforts to make sense of Epicurus' conception of pleasure are limited to the same textual evidence as my contemporaries. However, I hope to show that this evidence, particularly some of the fragments from lost Epicurean works, can be more effectively employed. The bulk of my discussion, sections IIIVIII, focuses on Epicurus' conception of the pleasure that he takes to be the goal of human life. In section IX, I turn to another kind of pleasure that Epicurus recognizes. There I also consider the relation between the two hedonic kinds and the question of what they share in virtue of which they are pleasures. Epicurus and the Doxographical Tradition on Katastematic and Kinetic Pleasure The doxographical tradition attributes to Epicurus a distinction between two kinds of pleasure: kinetic (7 .'*6 ./)8%9) 7:;)$ or 7 () .9)$%19 7:;)$) and katastematic (7 .'*'%*8'*9.< 7:;)$). Most scholars accept that Epicurus is committed to the distinction, but they contest the nature of the distinction and Epicurus' conception of the relation between the two hedonic kinds. One scholar, Boris Nikolsky, has questioned whether the attribution is merely a product of the doxographical tradition.2 I side with the majority here, but Nikolsky's claim is worth pausing over. There is only one passage among Epicurus' surviving texts and fragments where he uses the phrase "7:;)< .'*'%*8'*9.$." This is a fragment from On Choice and Avoidance, which Diogenes Laertius cites in the context of distinguishing Epicurus' position from the Cyrenaics': "[Epicurus]3 differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. The Cyrenaics do not recognize katastematic (.'*'%*8'*9.<)) pleasure, only kinetic (() .9)$%19) pleasure. But he recognizes both (and in each case)4 of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
#!Boris

Nikolsky, "Epicurus on Pleasure," Phronesis 46 (2001) 440-65. Compare J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure, Clarendon Press, 1982, 366-71, who, while admitting the distinction, claim that it is not "important" to Epicurus. $!Here and throughout the paper I use straight brackets to add content to aid intelligibility. I use parentheses to give translations, Greek for English and vice versa, and for explications. %!Usener first suggested a lacuna here. But M. Marcovich (Diogenis Laertii Vitae Philosophorum, Tuebner, 1999, vol 1., 800) does not follow him. The content I have added in parentheses is merely to enhance intelligibility.

#!

the soul and body, as he says in On Choice and Avoidance, in On the Goal, in the first book of On Lives, and in the Letter to the Philosophers in Mytilene. Likewise, Diogenes in the seventeenth book of Selections and Metrodorus in Timocrates say: 'And pleasure is conceived as both kinetic (.'*6 ./)8%9)) and katastematic (.'*'%*8'*9.+=).' And Epicurus, in On Choice and Avoidance, says: 'On the one hand, freedom from mental disturbance (2*'-'>/') and absence of corporeal pain (2?;)/') are katastematic pleasures (.'*'%*8'*9.'@ 7:;)'/); on the other hand, delight (1AB-;%C)8) and joy (#'-D) are viewed as involving stimulation (.'*6 ./)8%9)) through activation.'"5 The fragment from Metrodorus' Timocrates, which perhaps Diogenes the Epicurean cited in his Selections,6 does not by itself confirm that Epicurus recognizes both katastematic and kinetic pleasures. It states that pleasure is conceived in these two ways. It might still be questioned who conceives pleasure as such and in particular whether Epicurus does. Of course, Diogenes Laertius quotes the passage in support of Epicurus' recognition of katastematic and kinetic pleasures. But, the skeptic may object, the doxographical tradition is littered with misconstrued and misused citations. The fragment from On Choice and Avoidance seems to me less subject to 7 doubt. To be sure, some aspects of this fragment are contested. It is questionable whether Epicurus recognizes mental as well as corporeal forms of kinetic pleasure and whether the word "()1-41/E," translated here as "through activation," has been correctly transmitted. I will discuss these problems in section IX. But the fragment clearly identifies 2*'-'>/' and 2?;)/' as katastematic pleasures. Moreover and more importantly, there are good reasons to think that Epicurus recognizes precisely these mental and corporeal states as pleasures or at least as constitutive of pleasures of a distinct kind. I will provide the evidence to support this claim in sections III-VIII. It is also noteworthy that Diogenes Laertius mentions that Epicurus expresses the distinction between katastematic and kinetic pleasures in several other works: On the Goal, On Lives, and in the Letter to the Philosophers in Mytilene. The number of works here is significant, and so is their character. As far as we can judge on the basis of the titles and sparse fragments, all were substantially

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10.136. suggesting this, I am influenced by Diogenes' claim that "they say" (3F4;"%9)), that what they say is identical, and that what Diogenes the Epicurean says occurs in a work called Selections, which suggests selections from seminal Epicurean texts, including those of Epicurus and his successors. (!On Nikolsky's doubts in particular and a response to them, see David Wolfsdorf, "Epicurus on GAB-;%C)8 and H)F-419'," Apeiron 42 (2009) 221-57, at 241-3.

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ethical in content, in other words, good places for Epicurus to articulate the hedonic distinction.8 Still, if the distinction between katastematic and kinetic pleasure were central to Epicurus' hedonic theorizing, one wonders why it is not explicitly made in Epicurus' summary of his ethical doctrines, the Letter to Menoeceus. In fact, among surviving Greek texts, outside of the fragment from On Choice and Avoidance and Diogenes' citation from Metrodorus' Timocrates and Diogenes the Epicurean's quotation of that, the adjective ".'*'%*8'*9.I)" occurs only twice before Diogenes Laertius.9 Notably, the word does not occur in any of the surviving fragments from other Epicureans in the five or six centuries between Epicurus and Diogenes Laertius. This, then, should give us pause. And one might wish to propose the following. Epicurus recognizes some distinction between two hedonic kinds. Moreover, in several lost works he refers to the distinction using the expressions ".'*'%*8'*9.I)" and ".'*6 ./)8%9)" or "() .9)$%19." Yet Epicurus need not have anchored his discussion of his hedonic distinction in, let alone limited his distinction to, these terms. Instead, from among various formulations Epicurus employed to articulate his hedonic distinction, doxographers fixed on the terminological distinction between ".'*'%*8'*9.I)" and ".'*6 ./)8%9)" pleasures. Thus, this expression of the distinction crystallized within the doxographical tradition, say, at some point in the later Hellenistic period. Nikolsky's thesis might be resubmitted in this modified form. But I will push for a stronger position. I will argue here that Epicurus probably coined the terms ".'*D%*8'" and ".'*'%*8'*9.I)," and that he did so and deployed this terminology precisely to articulate his conception of the pleasures that constitute the goal of human life. To be sure, it may then seem strange that no mention of katastematic pleasure, by that name, occurs in the Letter to Menoeceus, Sovereign Maxims, or Vatican Sayings. But this absence may be explained on the grounds that these were popular works, in which Epicurus wished to avoid technical terminology, especially terminology that he himself created.10 Moreover, I suggest that we do find Epicurus expressing the distinction between hedonic kinds in the Letter to Menoeceus, albeit using different terms.11 I will begin to support my position by considering various ways that Epicurus characterizes the pleasure that constitutes the goal of human life. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
)!For

Epicurus' On Lives, see M. Schofield, "Epicurean and Stoic Political Thought," in C. Rowe and M. Schofield, eds., The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, 2000, 435-56, at 436-7. *!Philo Leg. all. 3.160.5; Plut. TG 2.2.3. "+!Another example of a central Epicurean term introduced by Epicurus himself is "?-I38!9=." See Cic. ND 1.44 and Pierre-Marie Morel, "Method and Evidence: On Epicurean Preconception," Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy 23 (2007) 25-48, at 27. ""!This leaves the question why the term doesn't survive in Epicurus' successors. According to Diogenes Laertius, the term does occur in Metrodorus. Beyond this, I conjecture that the remains are too fragmentary.

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Some Epicurean Expressions of the Human JF3;= Compare Epicurus' claims in On Choice and Avoidance that freedom from mental disturbance (2*'-'>/') and absence of corporeal pain (2?;)/') are katastematic pleasures with the following passage from the Letter to Menoeceus: "When we say that pleasure is the goal (*F3;=), we are not speaking of the pleasures of prodigals and those that lie in amusement, as some ignorant, dissenting, or hostile opponents believe. Rather, [we mean] not being in corporeal pain (*0 $*1 23415) .'*6 %&') and not being in a state of mental disturbance ($*1 *'-D**1%K'9 .'*6 !"#$))."12 Here, Epicurus characterizes the pleasure that constitutes the goal (*F3;=) of life as a complex of corporeal and mental constituents. Moreover, Epicurus' terms for the corporeal and mental forms of the pleasure that constitutes the goal are almost identical to those in the fragment from On Choice and Avoidance. This supports the view that Epicurus regards katastematic pleasure as the goal of human life. Accordingly, instead of speaking of Epicurus' view of "katastematic pleasure," we could just as well speak of "telic pleasure."13 Moreover, since telic and katastematic pleasure are characterized as absence of pain, we could also just as well speak of "analgesic pleasure." I will use these various expressions as the context warrants. Despite the near identity of language in the passage from the Letter to Menoeceus and the fragment from On Choice and Avoidance, I think the descriptions "absence of corporeal pain" and "freedom from mental disturbance" merely point to and do not adequately capture Epicurus' conception of telic or katastematic pleasure. This is one fundamental claim for which I will argue in this paper. Consider the following fragment from Epicurus' On the Goal: "For the stable constitution of the flesh (*0 1A%*'KL= %'-.0= .'*D%*8') and the reliable expectation concerning this (*0 ?1-@ *'C*8= ?9%*0) M3?9%') contain the highest and most stable joy (*<) 2.-;*D*8) .'@ N1N'9;*D*8) #'-6)) for those able to reason it out (*;5= (?93;4/O1%K'9 :")'F);9=)."14 Here, Epicurus identifies the "highest and most secure joy" with a complex of corporeal and mental conditions: a stable constitution of the body and a reliable !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"#!Ep.

Men. 131. phrase "telic pleasure" might be viewed as misleading insofar as Epicurus holds that universally mere pleasure, not a specific kind of pleasure, is the goal of life. However, as I have indicated, Epicurus views katastematic pleasure as the goal of human life. Hence, the phrase "telic pleasure" should be understood, in the present context, to refer to the goal of human life. "%!Fr. 68, apud Plut. non posse, 1098d. !
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expectation of that stable corporeal constitution. Given the phrase "highest and most secure joy," I assume that Epicurus takes this complex to constitute the goal of human life and thus also to consist of telic pleasures. But note that "stable corporeal constitution" means and refers to something different from "absence of corporeal pain."15 Likewise, "a reliable expectation of a stable corporeal constitution" means and refers to something different from "freedom from mental disturbance."16 Consider also the following two passages that occur elsewhere in the Letter to Menoeceus: "Health of the body (*<) *;P %Q'*;= R4/19')) and freedom from mental disturbance (*<) *+= !"#+= 2*'-'>/')) is the goal of living blessedly (*;P '.'-/S= O+) *F3;=)."17 "We do all things so as not to suffer (234&1)) or be afraid (*'-N&1))."18 In the first of these two passages, the corporeal component of telic pleasure is described in positive terms as "corporeal health" rather than "absence of corporeal pain," in other words, not in analgesic terms. In the second passage, the mental component is described more precisely as "freedom from fear" rather than "freedom from mental disturbance." It is questionable whether freedom from fear exhausts the mental component of telic pleasure, or whether freedom from fear is just a significant, perhaps the most significant, aspect of it. In short, Epicurus seems to view the goal of human life as a complex of corporeal and mental components. Moreover, this goal is a complex of katastematic pleasures, as they are called in the fragment from On Choice and Avoidance. However, Epicurus describes corporeal and mental telic, analgesic, or katastematic pleasures in somewhat different ways in different passages. Thus, it remains to clarify precisely how he views the pleasures that constitute the goal of human life. The Cyrenaic Criticism of Analgesic Pleasure In pursuing the question of how Epicurus views telic pleasure, I will use, as a foil, an ancient criticism that Epicurus' conception of telic, analgesic, or katastematic pleasure is not in fact a conception of pleasure. Recall Diogenes Laertius' testimony, which states that the Cyrenaics do not recognize katastematic pleasure. A fuller statement of their criticism occurs elsewhere in Diogenes' Lives, in the doxography of the Cyrenaics in book 2: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"&!Absence

of corporeal pain may be short-lived. Additionally, given anaesthesia, freedom from corporeal pain may occur although the body is damaged. "'!For example, one might have a reliable expectation of bodily health, but also a reliable expectation of dementia, and this might cause mental disturbance. "(!128.! ")!128.

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"[The Cyrenaics hold that] the removal of pain is not pleasure, as Epicurus claims. Nor is the absence of pleasure pain. For both pleasure and pain consist in stimulation (() .9)$%19),19 whereas absence of pleasure like absence of pain is not stimulation, since painlessness is the condition of one who is, as it were, asleep."20 Clement of Alexandria provides a similar testimony: "These Cyrenaics (namely, the Annicerians) reject Epicurus' definition of pleasure, that is, the removal of what causes pain, stigmatizing it as the condition of a corpse "21 In ancient hedonic theorizing, the distinction between pleasure and absence of pain goes back at least to Plato. In Republic 9, Socrates examines the place of pleasure in the just life, and he draws a trifold distinction between pleasure, pain, and calm (7%"#/'). He distinguishes pleasure and pain from calm on the grounds that the former two are states of ./)8%9=.22 More precisely, the .9)$%19= are there understood to be painful departures from or pleasant restorations to states of bodily health or psychological wellbeing. But, he holds, bodily health and psychological wellbeing themselves are non-hedonic states. Similarly, in the doxography Diogenes reports that the Cyrenaics distinguish "intermediate conditions" (F%'= .'*'%*D%19=) between pleasure and pain: 28:;)/' (absence of pleasure) and 2?;)/' (absence of pain).23 I take it that here "28:;)/'" and "2?;)/'" designate the same condition, although the senses of these terms differ. The Cyrenaics and Plato thus have similar views, and perhaps Plato's view informs the Cyrenaics'.24 In short, the Cyrenaics think that what Epicurus identifies as the goal is not pleasure, but an affect-neutral intermediate condition. The Cyrenaics' criticism of Epicurus' view that absence of pain is pleasure in fact comprises several points. It will be useful to distinguish and discuss these individually. Consider first what appears to be the most tendentious aspect of the Cyrenaics' criticism: that analgesic pleasure is like the condition of one who is asleep or one who is dead. The criticism here is that unconscious entities do not experience pain, yet they do not thereby experience pleasure. The basic defect in the criticism, and the reason it is tendentious, is that Epicurus obviously holds that only animate entities can experience pleasure. This disposes of the criticism that analgesic pleasure is like being dead. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"*!I

will justify the translation of "() .9)$%19" as "in stimulation" below. 2.89. #"!Clem. strom. 2.21.130.8.! ##!Rep. 583c. #$!DL 2.90. #%!Cp. Callicles' criticism of Socrates that a life free of replenishments would be that of a corpse or stone. (Grg. 494b)
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I take the Cyrenaics to intend their criticism that analgesic pleasure is like being asleep in the same spirit as their criticism that analgesic pleasure is like being dead. But the former criticism prompts an interesting consideration. At the end of the Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus writes: "Exercise yourself in these and related precepts day and night Then, never, neither in waking nor in a dream (;TK U?'- ;T* V)'-), will you be disturbed (:9'*'-'#K$%W) "25 Freedom from mental disturbance is, thus, supposed to characterize one's dream states as well as one's waking states. Consequently, if consciousness or awareness is a condition on analgesic pleasure, we must understand consciousness or awareness broadly here to include dream states. I will. Precisely, the term that best corresponds to consciousness or awareness in Epicurus is "'X%K8%9=" (in one of its uses). For instance: "Accustom yourself to believe that death is nothing to us. For all good and bad lies in awareness (() 'Y%K$%19), and death is the deprivation of awareness ('Y%K$%1S=)."26 Epicurus has a perceptualist theory of dreams. That is, he believes that dream images derive from 1X:S3' in the external environment that are apprehended by means of mental or noetic perception.27 Moreover, Epicurus holds that people with a certain frame or disposition of mind are more or less susceptible to disturbing images and hence disturbing dreams. Compare Diogenes Laertius' comment: "[The Epicurean sage] will be like himself even when he is asleep."28 In short, for Epicurus consciousness broadly construed to include dream-states is necessary for analgesic pleasure. A second point in the Cyrenaics' criticism of analgesic pleasure may now be introduced by means of the following question: Is a conscious being who is not in a state of pain experiencing pleasure? There seem to be many occasions where we are simply in an affect-neutral state, neither pleased nor pained, neither enjoying ourselves nor in a state of discomfort. Hence, it seems to be a distortion of the term "pleasure" or "7:;)$" to view such conditions as within its extension. What exactly, then, is Epicurus committed to when he suggests that katastematic or telic pleasure is a state of absence of pain in a conscious being? Let's return to the fragment from Epicurus' On the Goal: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
#&!135. #'!Ep. #(!I

Men. 124. will return to this topic in section VII.!Cf. Elizabeth Asmis, "Lucretius' Explanation of Moving Dream Figures at 4.768-76," American Journal of Philology 102 (1981) 138-45; Diskin Clay," An Epicurean Interpretation of Dreams," American Journal of Philology 101 (1980) 342-65. #)!10.120.

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"For the stable constitution of the flesh and the reliable expectation concerning this (*0 ?1-@ *'C*8= ?9%*0) M3?9%') contain the highest and most stable joy for those able to reason it out (*;5= (?93;4/O1%K'9 :")'F);9=)." Two aspects of this fragment suggest that Epicurus does not hold that mere absence of pain in a conscious being constitutes pleasure. First, the telic pleasure here described is said to be accessible "to those able to reason it out." This suggests, though it does not entail, that such pleasure depends on reasoning. As such, it suggests that such pleasure is restricted to beings with a certain cognitive development, namely, adult humans, and, if they exist as conscious rational beings, gods. The second point strengthens these suggestions. The telic pleasure here described entails a reliable expectation of corporeal health. In other words, the telic pleasure here described does not merely require a present-oriented awareness of absence of pain; it requires a future-oriented understanding of the security of this condition. Once again, this is a higher cognitive state accessible, in principle, only to beings with a certain cognitive development. Further confirmation of this point comes from the following passage in the Letter to Menoeceus: "[The hedonic goal] is sober reasoning (3;49%I=), searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs from which the greatest tumult seizes the soul."29 Consider also the following Sovereign Maxim: "It is impossible (;A. M%*9)) to live pleasantly without living wisely (B-;)/S=) and finely and justly Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though he lives finely and justly, it is impossible (;A. M%*9)) for him to live pleasantly."30 I assume, and will corroborate the interpretation below,31 that in this maxim "live pleasantly" (7:FS= O+)) means "live a life of telic pleasure." Shortly, I will say more about the reasoning and wisdom of which Epicurus here speaks. But first, I want to draw attention to the fact that the claim that telic pleasure requires reasoning or wisdom depends upon telic pleasure having a mental component. Indeed, we have seen several passages that suggest that telic pleasure is a complex of mental and corporeal constituents. This entails that the *F3;= in question is specifically the human *F3;= or more broadly the *F3;= of beings with sentient bodies and the ability to reason. But this raises two further questions. Does Epicurus hold that the achievement of the corporeal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
#*!132. $+!KD

5. VIII.

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component of telic pleasure, independently of the mental component, requires reasoning or wisdom? Obviously, corporeal health or absence of corporeal pain does not require wisdom. But perhaps Epicurus' conception of the corporeal component of telic pleasure is not limited to corporeal health or absence of corporeal pain at a given moment. Relatedly, in the case of animals that lack the capacity for reasoning, at least sophisticated reasoning of the kind pertinent here and certainly wisdom, is the *F3;= merely the corporeal component of telic pleasure (that is, absent any mental attitude toward that condition)? I will return to these questions in section VIII. Let's now turn to the reasoning and wisdom that Epicurus requires for the human *F3;=. This, I take it, comprises an understanding of Epicurus' own philosophical doctrines. The doctrines in question are physical and epistemological. These doctrines serve to securely allay fear and, in conjunction with Epicurus' ethical-psychological doctrines, govern desire. These points pervade Epicurus' surviving letters. Here are some examples from the Letter to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus: "I recommend constant study of nature; and with this activity more than any other I bring calm ((44'38)/OS)) to my life. That is why I have composed for you this summary of the basic principles of the entire set of doctrines."32 "Moreover, one must believe that it is the task of physics to work out precisely the cause of the most important things, and that blessedness (*0 '.D-9;)) lies in this and in knowing the natures that are observed in the meteorological and astronomical phenomena "33 "Freedom from mental disturbance (2*'-'>/') involves a continuous recollection of the general and most important points [of Epicurean physics]."34 "First of all, do not believe that there is any other goal to be achieved by the knowledge of meteorological and astronomical phenomena than freedom from mental disturbance (2*'-'>/')) and a stable conviction (?/%*9) NFN'9;)), just as with the rest [of the study of physics]."35 "We must also reason through (Z)'3;49%*F;)) the fact that among desires, some are natural, others are empty. And among natural desires, some are necessary, while others are merely natural. And among necessary [natural] desires, some are necessary for flourishing; others are [necessary] !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$#!Ep. $$!Ep.

Hdt. 37. Hdt. 78. $%!Ep. Hdt. 82. $&!Ep. Pyth. 85.

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for freedom from bodily distress; still others are [necessary] for life itself. An unwavering (2?3')<=) comprehension of these things can direct every choice and avoidance toward the health of the body (*<) *;P %Q'*;= R4/19')) and the freedom from mental disturbance (*<) *+= !"#+= 2*'-'>/')), since this is the goal of living blessedly."36 For convenience, I'll say that all of the doctrines that constitute Epicurus' physics, including the meteorology and astronomy and the empirical epistemology on which the former are based, as well as the ethical-psychological doctrines constitute wisdom. I suggest that Epicurus regards wisdom not only an instrument necessary for the attainment of telic pleasure, but as partly constitutive of that pleasure. The basic reason for this is that wisdom constitutes both the mental state that excludes mental disturbance and the mental state of secure expectation of continued bodily and psychological wellbeing. Recall again Epicurus' claim in the Letter to Menoeceus: "[The hedonic goal] is sober reasoning (3;49%I=)." I will elaborate on this point and further clarify the relation between wisdom and telic pleasure section VIII. For now and in short, contrary to the Cyrenaics' criticism, analgesic pleasure is not merely absence of pain in a conscious being. For Epicurus, analgesic pleasure requires absence of pain in a conscious being who possesses wisdom. Now, of course, the Cyrenaics or anyone may still object that such a condition is not pleasure or a pleasure. In considering this point, I turn to a third aspect of the Cyrenaics' criticism. The Cyrenaics maintain that pleasure requires ./)8%9=, whereas analgesic pleasure is an a-kinetic condition. To understand this criticism, we must clarify what the Cyrenaics mean by "./)8%9=." "[/)8%9=" is usually rendered as "motion" or "change." Accordingly, analgesic pleasure is often taken to entail the absence of change. Compare Cicero's rendition of the Epicurean distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasures as "voluptas movens" and "voluptas stans."37 Note that "change" has both a process and product sense. That is, a change may be a process of change, or it may be the result of this process. The sense of "change" in question is certainly the process sense. Motion is a type of process change; however, it is questionable whether the process change in question is specifically motion. More fundamentally, it is a question how process change is involved in kinetic pleasure. Consider Cicero's criticism of Epicurus in relation to the Cyrenaic view, here represented by Aristippus the elder:

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$'!Ep.

Men. 127-8. Cp. "Through love of true philosophy, every troubling and vexatious desire is dissolved." (fr. 66 Bailey, apud Porph. ad Marc. 31) $(!de fin. books 1-2 passim.

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"Epicurus should have defended this pleasure, which Aristippus does, namely, where the sense (sensus) is gently and joyfully moved (movetur), that which animals, if they could speak, would call 'pleasure.'"38 Here, the ./)8%9= that pleasure involves is a process change of the sense organ. Compare this with Lucretius' description of gustatory pleasure and displeasure: "When the particles of trickling savor are smooth (levia), they touch the palate pleasantly and pleasurably tickle all the moist regions of the tongue in their circuitous flow. Others, in proportion as their shape is rougher, tend more to prick and tear the sense (sensum) by their entry."39 Here, atoms or atomic complexes constitutive of the food or drink affect the atoms or atomic complexes constitutive of the sense (sensus). In both quotations, something is moved or altered. Does "sensus" here refer to the sense faculty, a part of the soul, or the sense organ, a part of the body? Do the quotations permit us to interpret a distinction? The sense faculty qua part of the soul must be altered insofar as experience occurs. But the sense organ must be altered insofar as senseperception requires a corporeal alteration as well as a psychological one.40 Presumably, two alterations are involved in the experience of corporeal or senseperceptual kinetic pleasure: the corporeal affection and the (irrational) soul's perception of the corporeal affection. This is, at least, true for an Epicurean. Compare Epicurus' description of sense-perception in the Letter to Herodotus: "[The body] does not possess the capacity [for sense-perception] by itself, but another thing [the soul] congenital with the body provides it. And this other thing, when the capacity it possesses has been realized through stimulation (.'*D *<) ./)8%9)), at once produces in itself a senseperceptual quality and through its joint affection and collaboration transmits [this quality] to the body."41 Since the Cyrenaics were not atomists and, more generally, disregarded inquiry into nature (B"%9;3;4/'), I doubt that they would have explained or sought to explain the ./)8%9= of kinetic pleasure in the sort of physical terms that Lucretius does. In fact, when they claim, as they do, that pleasure is a smooth (31/') ./)8%9=, while pain is a rough (*-'#15') one, it may be questioned whether smoothness and roughness as well as the ./)8%9= of which these are characterized are to be understood in experiential versus objective terms. In this case, a better translation of "./)8%9=" may be "stimulus" or "stimulation." Indeed, this is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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fin. 2.18.! cp. 2.400-423.! %+!Note that in this case, the "psychological" component is the irrational part of the soul. %"!64.
$*!4.622-27;

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consistent with the fact that the Cyrenaics conceive of pleasure and pain as ?DK8, where "?DK;=" is here understood as an affection, that is, as a condition of being affected by something. Precisely, then, the Cyrenaics conceive of pleasure and pain as psychological affections, ways that the soul is affected. Hence, I suggest that when they claim that pleasure and pain are .9)$%19=, we may take this to mean that pleasure and pain are forms of stimulation. Consequently, a non- or a-kinetic pleasure would be one derived from the body or soul (or a corporeal or psychological part) in a case where that entity was not being affected or changed. In other words, it would be pleasure derived from a part of the individual that was absent stimulus. In short, this aspect of the Cyrenaic criticism of analgesic pleasure is a criticism of stimulus-free pleasure. This aspect of the Cyrenaic criticism happens to be well encapsulated in the following passage from Philo of Judaea, where he is commenting on a passage in Genesis: "[Moses (the presumed author of the book)], therefore, does well when he adds: 'You will go upon your breast and belly.'42 For pleasure is not one of the things that is calm (\-1;C)*S)) and stationary (]%*'F)S)). It is rather a thing that is in motion (.9);"F)S)) and full of disturbance (*'-'#+=). For as flame is in motion (() .9)$%19), so an affection (?DK;=), when it is in motion (() .9)$%19) in the soul, like a flame, does not permit [the soul] to rest (\-115)). Consequently, [Moses] does not agree with those who say that pleasure is katastematic (.'*'%*8'*9.<)). For calm (\-1/') is akin to stones and wood and everything that lacks a soul, but it is alien to pleasure; for [pleasure] tends toward tickling and convulsions, and in some cases it requires not calm (\-1/'=), but intense and violent motion (.9)$%1Q=)."43 The question may now be raised why the Cyrenaics maintain that pleasure requires ./)8%9=. Is this criticism conceptually or rather empirically motivated? It is unclear to me how the motivation could be conceptual. I assume that it is empirical. That is, I assume that the Cyrenaics conclude on the basis of their experience that pleasure occurs when we are affected by something in such a way that we are stimulated smoothly. For example, pleasure occurs when we eat and drink certain things, but not when the mouth or tongue stands in an unstimulated state. Thus, for the Cyrenaics, the mere experience or awareness of one's corporeal or psychological condition, absent stimulation, is not a hedonic condition. The crux of the Cyrenaic criticism, then, is that analgesic conditions, which merely require absence of stimulation, are not hedonic conditions. Having pursued the Cyrenaic criticism, as I say, as a foil, I now want to turn to Epicurus' reasons for thinking that katastematic or telic pleasure is a hedonic condition. My basic thesis here is that the Cyrenaic criticism under!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
%#!The %$!Leg.

reference here is to Gen. 3.14. all. 3.160.!

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characterizes Epicurus' position. While Epicurus does maintain that katastematic or telic pleasure requires absence of pain or freedom from distress, he holds that there is more to katastematic or telic pleasure than this. Precisely, I am going to argue that, in Epicurus' view, certain aspects of katastematic or telic pleasure contribute to a hedonic condition, indeed, to the most deeply hedonic condition that humans can experience. These others aspects are: a well-founded sense of security and an aspect particularly under-appreciated in the scholarly literature a well-founded sense of gratitude. There are, then, two points to consider here. One is whether Epicurus holds that a well-founded sense of security and a well-founded sense of gratitude are aspects of the human *F3;=. The other is whether Epicurus' view of the human *F3;=, including a well-founded sense of security and a well-founded sense of gratitude, constitutes a hedonic condition. I will discuss the first point in sections VI and VII. I will discuss the second in section VIII. As a preliminary to both discussions, however, I need to discuss the terms ".'*D%*8'" and ".'*'%*8'*9.I)." "['*D%*8 ' " and "['*'%*8 '*9.I) " The phrase "7 .'*'%*8'*9.< 7:;)$" is often taken to mean stable pleasure. Cicero's Latin "stans" embodies this interpretation; and Philo seems to assume the same when he says that "pleasure is not one of the things that is stationary (]%*'F)S))." This is also the way some contemporary translators have rendered the terms. For example, in her Italian translation of Usener's Epicurea, Ilaria Ramelli translates the phrase as "piacere stabile."44 But I doubt that the term ".'*'%*8'*9.0)" means stable or the like; nor, more importantly, do I think that Epicurus understood the term this way. Consider once again the fragment from On the Goal, specifically the phrase "the stable constitution of the flesh." Here, the word for "stable," which could also be rendered as "well-established," is "1A%*'KF=." "['*D%*8'" is the word I've rendered as "constitution." Consequently, as I see it, a literal rendition of "7 .'*'%*8'*9.< 7:;)$" should be "constitutional pleasure." Of course, it is questionable whether "constitution" is the right rendition of ".'*D%*8'." So let's consider the Greek term. It is an extraordinary fact unnoticed by scholars that there is no compelling evidence that the word ".'*D%*8'" was used before Epicurus. A chronologically indexed word search using the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae yields six instances of ".'*D%*8'" before Epicurus. But in fact all of these instances derive from post-Epicurean, mainly Late Antique, texts. One is a testimony in Diogenes Laertius concerning a preEpicurean figure, Anaxarchus.45 Another derives from spurious fragments of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
%%!Epicurea,

I. Ramelli, trans., Bompiani, 2002, 607. Cp. Voula Tsouna, "Cicron et Philodme: Quelques considerations sur l'thique," in Cicron et Philodme, C. Auvray and D. Delattre, eds., Editions d'Ulm, 2001, 159-78, at 166. %&!DL 9.61.

"%!

Eudoxus' Twelve Year Lunar Orbit.46 A third comes from a scholiast on Speusippus.47 A fourth occurs in Damascius' report on Eudemus of Rhodes' History of Theology.48 The remaining two instances are from a so-called fragment of Diocles of Carystus. Versions of the alleged fragment occur in Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita, Pseudo-Galen's History of Philosophy, and Stobaeus.49 The proximate source of these passages is, then, Atius' lost Placita. The word ".'*D%*8'" occurs in two of the versions: "Diocles says that most diseases occur through an imbalance of elements in the body and of the constitution (.'@ *;P .'*'%*$'*;=)."50 "Diocles says that most causes of disease occur through an imbalance of elements in the body and of the constitution of air (.'@ *;P .'*'%*$'*;= 2F-;=)."51 The basic problem is that we have no good reason to think that the passages provide a fragment rather than a doxa or testimony. Moreover, the content of the passages does not appear to be consistent with what else we know of Diocles' nosology. Philip van der Eijk concludes his commentary on these texts: "This concise report on Diocles' views of the causes of diseases corresponds only to a small extent to what the more specific evidence from other sources suggests Many of Diocles' causal explanations of diseases do not refer to elements or to climactic forces at all, and apart from fr. 52 nowhere do we find explanations in terms of 'imbalance of the elements.' The present report is, therefore, to be used with caution; and the fact that it is preserved in Atius suggests that it is the product of considerable doxographic simplification."52 I conclude that we cannot use the so-called fragment of Diocles as evidence of a pre-Epicurean instance of ".'*D%*8'." Consequently, there are no surviving pre-Epicurean uses of ".'*D%*8'." There are two possible explanations for this fact: ".'*D%*8'" was used before Epicurus, but no instances survive; alternatively, Epicurus coined the term !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
%'!cod. %(!cod.

Berol. phil. 1577, vol. 7, p.186, l.127. Paris. Graec. 1854, on EN 1153b5ff. (= Cramer, anec. Paris. I, p.219, 16-21). %)!Aporiae and Solutions concerning First Principles, vo1. 1, p.319 Ruelle, sect. 150.16 (English translation in S. Ahble-Rappe, Damascius' Problems and Solutions concerning First Principles, Oxford University Press, 2010, 417). %*!Placita 5.30; Historia 132; Stobaeus 4.29-31. I am citing from Philip J. van der Eijk, Diocles of Carystus, vol. 1, Brill, 2000, 104-7. &+!Placita 5.30. &"!Historia 132. The Stobaeus passage reads: "Diocles said that most diseases occur through an imbalance." &#!Van der Eijk (2000) vol. 2, 113.

"&!

".'*D%*8'." It is not crucial to my argument that Epicurus coined the term. But if the term was used before Epicurus, it is reasonable to believe that it was a rare expression; and in that case Epicurus appropriated the rare expression. I will try to show, however, that there is a reason, appropriate to Epicurus' hedonic theory, for him to have employed the term ".'*D%*8'"; and this lends some support to the hypothesis that he actually coined the term for hedonic-theoretical purposes. Since Epicurus speaks of ".'*'%*8'*9.'@ 7:;)'/," there is strong reason to believe that he deployed the term ".'*D%*8'" specifically for the purpose of hedonic theorizing and precisely in order to distinguish the kind of pleasure he conceives as constitutive of the goal of human life from other kinds of pleasure. The term ".'*D%*8'" is cognate with ".'*D%*'%9=," and the two are obviously closely related. Moreover, LSJ indicates that there are senses of ".'*D%*'%9=" that are equivalent to senses of ".'*D%*8'." For example, one primary and longstanding sense of ".'*D%*'%9=" is "constitution." (Note also that ".'*D%*'%9=" as "constitution" is used both in a process and product sense. That is, it is used to refer to the process of constituting as well as to the product of that process.) We may then put the following question: Why did Epicurus not avail himself of the term ".'*D%*'%9=" and speak of katastatic pleasures? One possibility relates to the fact that the word ".'*D%*'%9=" was used by certain of Epicurus' philosophical predecessors within the context of hedonic theorizing and specifically used in a manner from which Epicurus wanted to differentiate himself. Precisely, Plato and Aristotle use ".'*D%*'%9=" and forms of the verb ".'K/%*89" to refer to the idea, of Platonic origin, that pleasures are processes by which the body or soul is constituted in a certain way. For example, in Philebus Socrates says: "We have agreed that when we undergo a process of being constituted (.'K9%*+*'9) toward our nature (1Y= *<) 'R*&) BC%9)), this constituting (.'*D%*'%9)) is pleasure."53 More precisely, then, Socrates characterizes the constituting process that is pleasure as one in which we are brought "toward our nature." Basically, by "our nature" Socrates means a state of corporeal or psychological wellbeing; and Socrates' use of the phrase "1Y= *<) 'R*&) BC%9)" is significant since there are constituting processes that yield unnatural states. Consider also Timaeus' description of pleasure in Timaeus: "Pains [occur] when [bodies] are alienated from [their natural condition], and pleasures [occur] when they undergo constitution (.'K9%*D1)') back to the same condition (1Y= *0 'A*0 ?D39))."54

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&$!Phlb. &%!Ti.

42d5-7. Cf. 46c6. 64e6-65a1.

"'!

Compare Aristotle's description of pleasure in Rhetoric, which draws on Plato's views in Philebus and Timaeus: "Let us submit that pleasure is a certain change (./)8%9=) of the soul and a swift and perceived process of constituting (.'*D%*'%9)) [the soul] toward its prevailing nature (1Y= *<) R?D-#;"%') BC%9)), and pain is the opposite. And if this is what pleasure is, it is clear that what is productive of the condition described is pleasant, while what is destructive of it or productive of the opposite constituting process (*+= ()')*/'= .'*'%*D%1S=) is painful."55 Aristotle's use of the phrase "*+= ()')*/'= .'*'%*D%1S=" corroborates the point that ".'*D%*'%9=" itself cannot be taken to entail a constructive or positive construction process. Thus, again, the prepositional phrase "toward our nature" or "toward the prevailing nature" is a significant clarification of the kind of constituting process that Plato and Aristotle (at least in this Rhetoric passage) take to be pleasure. Morphologically, the "-%9=" ending on nominal roots typically serves to convey the idea of process or activity. In contrast, the "-'" ending typically serves to convey the idea of product or result. Accordingly, the "-'" ending in ".'*D%*8'" should convey the product or result of the process characterized by the idea of the root ".'K9%*'-" or ".'*' + ]%*'-." If, accordingly, Epicurus deliberately deployed ".'*D%*8'" in contrast to ".'*D%*'%9=" within the context of hedonic theorizing, then his intention would have been to convey the product or result sense of the "constituting process," that is, constitution qua product of that process. I will continue to render ".'*D%*8'" as "constitution" and understand it in this product sense.56 Accordingly, I suggest that Epicurus' conceives of "katastematic" pleasure as "constitutional" pleasure. That is, Epicurus conceives of katastematic pleasure as pleasure derived from the corporeal or mental constitution, where such constitutions are conceived as states or products rather than as processes of change or constituting processes. Now, we know that Epicurus recognizes both corporeal and mental constitutions. But, since there are various kinds of constituting process, both body and mind can be variously constituted. Hence, the adjective "1A%*'KF=" in the fragment from On the Goal is significant in indicating that the corporeal constitution that Epicurus takes to be constitutive of the *F3;= is well constructed. In this case, a well-constructed corporeal constitution is a state of corporeal health. Obviously, Epicurus holds that the mental constitution constitutive of the goal must also be well constructed. As we have seen, Epicurus holds that such good constitution requires wisdom. But consider also the following fragment from Epicurus' Letter to Metrodorus, which contains the one other instance of ".'*D%*8'" among Epicurus' extant writings: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&&!Rh. &'!I

1369b33-38. Cp. MM 2.7.16.1, 17.1. note that "constitution" can be used in a process as well as a product sense.

"(!

"When the opportunity for expectation ((3?/:;=) has been stripped away and [the opportunity] for pleasure in the flesh and for gratitude at the preservation [in memory] of things past has been removed, what sort of natural constitution (.'*D%*8' B"[%9.I)]) would I still retain, Metrodorus?"57 By "natural" here, I assume Epicurus means something equivalent to "wellconstructed." Epicurus, then, indicates here that the following are necessary for the natural or well-constructed constitution: expectation, corporeal pleasure, and gratitude at the memory of certain things past. Given that these components are both corporeal and mental, I take it that Epicurus intends the phrase "natural constitution" to cover both corporeal and mental components. Support for this point comes from the fact that, with the exception of gratitude, the components of the natural constitution here described resemble those described as constituting the highest and most secure joy in the fragment from On the Goal. The corporeal component in the fragment from On the Goal is a stable constitution of the flesh, in other words, corporeal health. In the fragment from the Letter to Metrodorus, Epicurus speaks of corporeal pleasure. But we have seen that Epicurus elsewhere identifies corporeal pleasure, that is, katastematic pleasure of the body, with corporeal health. The mental component in the fragment from On the Goal is a reliable expectation (M3?9%') concerning absence of corporeal pain.58 The fact that Epicurus includes gratitude at the memory of things past among requirements of the natural constitution further supports my argument earlier in the paper that in merely speaking of absence of corporeal pain and freedom from mental distress Epicurus under-describes the constituents of katastematic or telic pleasure. But my present point is that Epicurus conceives of a reliable expectation of corporeal health and gratitude at the memory of certain things past as components of the natural constitution of the mind of adult humans. Natural or well-constructed corporeal and mental constitutions are stable or at least relatively stable. Hence katastematic pleasures are stable or at least relatively stable. But the stability of katastematic pleasure is a function of the pleasure deriving from a constitution in its natural state, not from the meaning of the word ".'*D%*8'*9.I)." With these points in mind, let us pursue Epicurus' view that well-founded senses of security and gratitude are aspects of telic pleasure. A Well-Founded Sense of Security !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&(!PHerc. &)!Cp.

1232 =!fr.!73.10-17 Arrighetti.! "The cry of the flesh is not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to be cold. If one has these things and expects that he will have them ((3?/OS) ^>19)), he would rival Zeus for happiness." (SV 33)

")!

I suggest that Epicurus views a well-founded sense of security as an aspect of telic pleasure. By "well-founded" I mean that one's sense of security correlates with the fact that one is secure in the way one takes oneself to be. In other words, one is not deluded in taking oneself to be secure, nor in the way in which one takes oneself to be secure. Although ".'*D%*8'" does not mean "stable condition," constitutional pleasure is supposed to be a secure and hence stable condition. One succinct and explicit piece of evidence for this comes from the description of the *F3;= in the fragment from On the Goal: "the stable (1A%*'KL=) constitution of the flesh and the reliable (?9%*0)) expectation concerning this contain the most secure (N1N'9;*D*8)) joy." Another piece of evidence comes from Sovereign Maxim 7: "Some men have wanted to become famous and renowned, thinking that they would thereby gain security (2%BD319')) through [the support of]59 other men. If the life of such men really is secure (2%B'3<=), they have attained the natural good (*0 *+= BC%1S= 24'K0)). If, however, it is insecure (< 2%B'3<=), they have not attained that for the sake of which, in accordance with what is congenial by nature (*0 *+= BC%1S= ;Y.15;)), they set out." This maxim makes clear that the natural good (*0 *+= BC%1S= 24'K0)) is security (2%BD319')). I take it that the natural good here is the human *F3;=. So the security in question is equivalent to telic pleasure.60 The well-founded sense of security of the human *F3;= is rooted in the epistemological security at the foundations of wisdom. As Epicurus says in the Letter to Herodotus: experience, which includes "our sense-perceptions and affective-states," provides "the most stable conviction" (7 N1N'9;*D*' ?/%*9=).61 The stability of this conviction ensures peace of mind. For instance, as Epicurus says in the Letter to Pythocles: "if one is at odds with clear evidence, one will never be able to achieve genuine freedom from mental disturbance (2*'-'>/'= 4)$%9;")."62 Note the adjective "4)$%9;"" here. It is possible to experience peace of mind in the absence of wisdom. But Epicurus holds that in the absence of wisdom such states are unstable. Hence, by "genuine" freedom from mental !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&*!Note

that the phrase "*<) (> 2)K-Q?S) 2%B'31/')" does not here mean safety from the threat of other people, but safety derived from the support of other people. On this point, see G. Roksam, Live Unnoticed: On the Vicissitudes of an Epicurean Doctrine, Brill, 2007, 38-39. '+!What is congenial according to nature is also pleasure, albeit not necessarily katastematic pleasure. Cp. "[pleasure] is our first and kindred (%"441)9.0)) good." (Ep. Men. 129) "All pleasure, because it has a congenial nature (BC%9) M#19) ;Y.1/')), is good." (ibid.) '"!63. Cp. "So, if one refers all of these calculations concerning the soul to the affective-states and sense-perceptions and remembers what was said at the outset, one will see the points comprehended in outline with sufficient clarity to be able to work out the details from this basis with precision and firmness (N1N'/S=)." (68) Cp. " For in this way the mind will grasp the stability of the earth more securely and more soundly in relation to the sense-perceptual appearances." (Pap. 154 25 III = 42.10.II Arrighetti) '#!96.

"*!

disturbance, Epicurus means freedom from mental disturbance engendered in such a way so as to ensure its stability. From the claims that there are genuine and non-genuine forms of 2*'-'>/' and that genuine 2*'-'>/' constitutes the mental component of telic pleasure, it follows that there are genuine and nongenuine telic pleasures. Precisely, genuine telic pleasure is pleasure engendered in such a way so as it ensure its stability.63 Consider, further, Vatican Saying 14: "Even though security (*+= 2%B'31/'=) through [the support of] other men comes to some extent (F#-9 *9)0=) by means of the power to repel [attacks] and by means of prosperity, the security (2%BD319') that comes from a quiet life and withdrawal from the many is the purest (1Y39.-9)1%*D*8)." I take it that by "1Y39.-9)1%*D*8" here, Epicurus intends to convey that the security in question is not sequentially mixed, that is, interspersed and riddled, with periods of insecurity. In other words, telic security is continuous, which is another way of saying that it is stable. It follows that since the security that is the natural good is of the purest kind, so the pleasure that constitutes the human *F3;= is of the purest kind. On this point, consider Sovereign Maxim 12: "It is impossible for someone ignorant about the nature of the cosmos but still suspicious about the subjects of myths to dissolve (3C19)) his fear about the most important matters. So it is impossible, without knowing natural science, to attain pleasures that are unmixed (2.1-'/;"= *6= 7:;)6=)." I presume that Epicurus here means that the pleasures that a person who is ignorant of Epicurus' physical doctrines experiences will be short-lived. That is, these pleasures will be brief respites from the pains engendered by empty fears.64 Such a person will, then, not dissolve (3C19)) his mental disturbances, but merely temporarily distract himself from them. In short, the well-founded sense of security that wisdom engenders is accompanied by a well-founded sense of confidence and of self-confidence. One is confident in the security of one's wellbeing65 and in one's ability to ensure that security. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
'$!It

is a significant question, to which I will return in section VIII, how Epicurus can take "4)$%9;"" in this way. ! '%!Cp. "If the things productive of profligates' pleasures really freed them from fears of the mind if, further, they taught them to limit their desires, we should never have any fault to find with such persons, for they would then be filled with pleasures to overflowing on all sides and would be free from all pain " (KD 10); "No pleasure is bad by itself. But things productive of some pleasures bring troubles greater than the pleasures." (KD 8) '&!As I mentioned above, I will return in section VIII to consider whether in fact this is a state of wellbeing.

#+!

A Well-Founded Sense of Gratitude Consider the following passage from the Letter to Menoeceus: "Therefore, both old and young ought to philosophize, the former in order that, as age comes over him, he may be young in good things through his gratitude at things past (:96 *<) #D-9) *&) 414;)I*S)) So we must exercise ourselves in the things that bring wellbeing (1A:'9;)/')), since if that is present, we have everything "66 This passage suggests that gratitude at things past is partly constitutive of wellbeing for humans. Moreover, since Epicurus says that when we have wellbeing, "we have everything" (?D)*' M#;1)), we can infer that gratitude at things past is an aspect of the human *F3;=. Indeed, we have already seen that the fragment from the Letter to Metrodorus expresses the same idea: "gratitude at the preservation (in memory) of things past" ((?9[;)+=] *[+= *&) 414;)I*]S) #D-9*;=) is necessary for the "natural constitution" (.'*D%*8' B"[%9.I)]).67 Pleasure derived from memories is distinct from pleasure derived from gratitude at memories. For convenience, I will refer to the former as "memorial pleasure" and the latter as "memorial gratitude." Contrast the fragment from the Letter to Metrodorus, which speaks of memorial gratitude, with the following fragment from the Letter to Idomeneus: "On this blessed day of my life, as I am at the point of death, I write this to you. The disease in my bladder and stomach are pursuing their course, lacking nothing of their natural severity. But against all this is the joy in my soul at the memory of my past conversations with you ((?@ *+, *&) 414;)I*S) 75) :9'3;49%&) )$W) "68 In this fragment, Epicurus speaks of pleasure derived from memory. It is possible that in speaking of memorial pleasure here, Epicurus means to convey memorial gratitude. I will tentatively assume so and adduce grounds to support this assumption below. Now, the objects of gratitude are not restricted to the past. Nor does Epicurus hold that the gratitude constitutive of telic pleasure is limited to memorial gratitude. For example, Diogenes Laertius transmits a doxa suggesting that the Epicurean sage feels gratitude toward "friends, present and absent "69 I !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
''!122. '(!The

security of the reconstruction may be questioned. This is the only instance of the noun "(?9;)$" in Epicurus' surviving writings. However, the verb "(?99)$%.;'9" occurs once elsewhere: ".'@ 46- *&[) K1&)] (?9)8%*_F[;) `= 'Y]*a/Sb) ?;33&) [24'K&)] [V)*S])." (Letter to Polyainos, fr. 86 Arrighetti). Moreover, the phrase "#D-9) *&) 414;)I*S)" occurs in the Letter to Menoeceus 122. And compare the phrase "#D-9*9 *&) 2?;33"F)S)" in SV 55.! ')!fr. 30 Bailey (= DL 10.22).! '*!DL 10.118.!

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will return to non-memorial gratitude below. However, the passage from the Letter to Menoeceus, the fragment from the Letter to Metrodorus, and the fragment from the Letter to Idomeneus (as I am proposing to interpret it) suggest that memorial gratitude plays a special role in Epicurus' conception of the human *F3;=. Further confirmation of this point comes from Vatican Saying 17: "It is not the young man who is to be viewed as blessed ('.'-9%*0=), but the old man who has lived well. The old man has set anchor as though in a harbor; and the goods about which he previously lacked confident expectation (*6 ?-I*1-;) :"%13?9%*;C1)') he has fastened (.'*'.31/%'=) with a secure sense of gratitude (2%B'315 #D-9*9)."70 This maxim raises a couple questions: What are the goods of which the young man lacked confident expectation? And what role does a secure sense of gratitude play in fastening these goods? I presume that the goods are whatever the young man thought would de re constitute a well-lived life.71 These, the old man has achieved. Hence the old man has achieved telic pleasure. Moreover, this maxim states that a secure sense of gratitude is constitutive of such telic pleasure. How, then, does Epicurus conceive of gratitude as a constituent of telic pleasure? I suggest that Epicurus conceives of gratitude as variously constitutive of telic pleasure. In one respect, gratitude entails an appreciation for past and present benefits or goods that one has received and possesses. In another respect, gratitude can play an auxiliary role in sustaining 2*'-'>/' in the face of certain difficulties. In considering this latter auxiliary function, observe that while wisdom, particularly wisdom concerning desire, can raise the probability of bodily health and thus the absence of bodily pain, it cannot ensure 2?;)/'. This is true throughout life, but especially as one ages. The physical maladies that Epicurus suffered in old age attest to his own recognition of this point. Epicurus holds that memorial gratitude has value in the face of such difficulties. Recall his statement in the Letter to Idomeneus: the joy in his heart at the memory of his past conversations with Idomeneus overcomes his physical suffering. Accordingly, Epicurus holds that the mind is able to preserve its freedom from disturbance and telic pleasure, despite physical pain. Now, in the Letter to Idomeneus, as I noted, Epicurus speaks of memorial pleasure, not gratitude. However, I proposed that Epicurus there intended to convey the value of memorial gratitude. This interpretation is supported by Epicurus' view of the auxiliary role of memorial gratitude against misfortunes, which is explicit in Vatican Saying 55: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(+!It

is difficult to know whether "2%B'315 #D-9*9" is a dative of instrument or accompaniment. This is the only instance of ".'*'.31/S" in Epicurus. The verb ".31/S" occurs at Ep. Hdt. 43. There the accompanying dative is instrumental. But there are different senses of instrumentality. Compare fastening two pieces of wood with glue using a vice. Both the vice and glue are instrumental. ("!I say that the young man conceives of these goods de re. This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that the old man has achieved these goods and what the old man has achieved are genuine goods.

##!

"Misfortunes (*D= %"B;-D=) must be cured by a sense of gratitude (#D-9*9) for what has perished (*&) 2?;33"F)S)) and the knowledge that the past (*0 414;)I=) cannot be undone (c?-'.*;))."72 This saying also helps to explain the meaning of the claim in Vatican Saying 17 that the old man has fastened goods by means of his secure sense of gratitude. Through memory and a stable sense of gratitude at what has been, the old man has ensured his wellbeing. If this is correct, however, then the following fundamental problem seems to arise: in various passages discussed in section III, Epicurus characterizes the human *F3;= as a complex of corporeal and mental constituents; however, it now appears that Epicurus is committed to the view that telic pleasure does not require corporeal health or absence of corporeal pain. I will return to this problem in section VIII.73 Presently, I turn to a second problem with role of memorial gratitude as a constituent or aspect of telic pleasure. The question is how memorial gratitude can be conceived as constitutive of constitutional rather than kinetic pleasure. Several scholars have suggested that Epicurus conceives of memory as a function of 1X:S3' impinging on the mind. In other words, Epicurus' conception of memory is perceptualist. A perceptualist theory of memory threatens to undermine my position that gratitude, including memorial gratitude, is a constituent of telic pleasure. If the imagery that constituted the memories that figure in memorial gratitude derived from occurrent mind-independent 1X:S3', then the pleasure of such gratitude would be the product of mental stimulation and thus would be kinetic rather than constitutional. I will argue that my interpretation of Epicurus' conception of constitutional pleasure can accommodate Epicurus' conception of memory and memorial gratitude. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(#!It

is appropriate here to comment on the fundamental distinction between the hedonisms of Epicurus and the Cyrenaics. Epicurus holds that the affective capacities of the mind are greater than those of the body. In contrast, the Cyrenaics hold that the affective capacities of the body are greater than those of the mind. This distinction helps explain a number of Cyrenaic doxai. The Cyrenaics recognize both mental and corporeal pleasures and pains. "Not all mental pleasures and pains depend upon ((?@) corporeal pleasures and pains. For example, there is joy (#'-6)) in the impersonal (!93+,)!prosperity (1A81-/E) of our country just as in our own prosperity." (DL 2.89) "However, they say that corporeal pleasures are far better than mental pleasures, and corporeal pains far worse than mental pains. This is the reason why offenders are punished with corporeal pains. For they held pain to be more repellent, pleasure to be more congenial." (DL 2.90)!"For these reasons they expended more on the management of the one (namely, corporeal pleasures and pains)." (DL 2.90) Observe also that the Cyrenaics deny the existence of memorial and anticipatory pleasures:!"And yet, they do not admit that pleasure is derived from the memory or the expectation of good (a doctrine of Epicurus). For they assert that the movement affecting the mind is dissolved ((.3C1*'9) in the course of time." (89)!! ($!On this subject, see Anna Angeli, "Compendi, Eklogai, Tetrapharmakos: Due Capitoli de Dissenso nell' Epicureismo," CErc 16 (1986) 53-66, at 61-66. On the role of memory in combating pain, see DL 10.22, 137; Men. 122. Angeli cites a numer of other passages at n.100.

#$!

The very idea of a perceptualist theory of memory relates to a broader Epicurean theme, namely, a perceptualist theory of mental imagery. Epicurus does hold a perceptualist theory of dream imagery and of what I will call "willed imagery."74 Important discussion of these topics occurs in Lucretius. At line 722 of book 4, Lucretius begins an explanation of "what things move the mind" (quae moveant animum res). In his ensuing account, he explains both dream imagery and what I proposing to call "willed imagery," that is, the mind's ability to "conceive of (cogitet) anything it wishes (quod cuique libido venerit)."75 Common to the explanation of both types of imagery is the omnipresence of innumerably diverse 1X:S3' in the environment proximately surrounding the subject of experience. These 1X:S3' constitute the imagistic objects of dreaming and of mental imagery generally. For example, in the case of willed imagery, the mind, through its particular orientation and interests, is receptive to specific 1X:S3' and sequences of 1X:S3' that it wishes to behold. By "orientation and interests" I mean that the mind is prepared, that is, trained or conditioned in advance of particular episodes of imagistic cognition to apprehend specific 1X:S3' and sequences of 1X:S3'. Imagistic recollection or remembering would seem to operate in this fashion. Through the interest in thinking of, say, an absent acquaintance, the mind is poised to receive 1X:S3' of that person. Granted this, this perceptualist explanation of willed imagistic cognition is cogent only insofar as it presumes some non-perceptual mental content. Moreover, that non-perceptual mental content must be genuinely memorial, that is, already stored in the mind. For example, assume again that the mind wishes to imagistically cognize, in other words, envision an absent acquaintance. On pain of vicious regress, the content or object of the conative attitude cannot itself require an 1X:S3;) of that acquaintance.76 It is here, I think, that the Epicurean epistemological notion of preconception (?-I38!9=) and cognitively derivative kinds must play a role. Diogenes Laertius characterizes ?-I38!9= as follows: "By preconception they mean a sort of apprehension (.'*D38!9)) or correct opinion (:I>') d-K<)) or concept (M));9')) or universal conception (.'K;39.<) )I8%9)) stored (()'?;.19F)8)); and this is a memory ()$8)) of something that has often appeared from the external environment; for example, such-and-such a thing is a human (*0 *;9;P*I) (%*9) c)K-S?;=). For as soon as the word 'human' is spoken, we cognize ();15*'9) the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(%!My

strategy here will be to consider Epicurus' conception of mental imagery broadly and then to suggest that there are two aspects of memory or two kinds of memory, imagistic and nonimagistic. Non-imagistic memory is indeed constitutional. Hence Epicurus can hold that the psychological constitution, rather than stimulation of the psychological constitution, is responsible for memorial gratitude.! (&!4.779-80.! ('!Cp. Bailey's note: "But, as Giussani points out, Lucr. never explains what it is which causes the mind to wish to make this selection; what is the original libido." (Lucretius De Rerum Natura, Clarendon Press, 1947, vol. 3, 1275)

#%!

schema (*C?;=) of human, which is derived from episodes of senseperception that have occurred previously And we would not have inquired into what we were seeking (that is, we would not have wondered whether, for example, something in the distance is a human), if we had not already known this (that is, had that preconception of human)."77 In this passage, Diogenes exemplifies preconception using a natural kind, human. But there are particular or singular as well as generic preconceptions. For example, exposure to a particular human can produce a preconception of that particular human.78 On the basis of generic and singular preconceptions, I suggest, memories with more complex content are formed. Given this, let us return to Lucretius and his explanation of dream images. Consider what Lucretius says when he explains why in a dream state the mind does not balk at the fantastic cinema of images it apprehends: "Nature constrains this to come to pass just because all the senses of the body are checked and at rest throughout the limbs, nor can they refute the falsehood by true facts. Moreover, memory lies at rest and idle in sleep (meminisse iacet languetque sopore); nor does it argue against us that he, whom the mind believes that it beholds alive, has long ago become prey to death and doom."79 Memory is said to be incapacitated here and thus to be incapable of contradicting the content of the dream. Observe, further, that the content of the memory is propositional and singular: a particular person is not longer alive. In short, then, I suggest that Epicurus is committed to the existence of conceptual (rather than occurrently perceptual) memory. Such memory includes propositional contents, presumably dependent on more basic non-propositional preconceptions, all of which are, consistently with commonsense, stored or retained in the mind. Note, moreover, that the existence of such memory does not jeopardize Epicurus' empiricism, for two basic reasons. First, memorial contents are perceptually based. Second, as Lucretius' discussion of dream contents shows, not every mental content must correspond to an object, that is, a body present in one's environment. Beliefs, even the most rudimentary beliefs, about one's experience, for example, that a human is present, are supported by a complex !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
((!DL

10.33. Asmis: "just as we associate the outline (= schema) of a human being with the words 'human being,' so we associate an outline of Socrates with the word 'Socrates.' We use this notion (= preconception) whenever we form any sort of belief about Socrates." ("Epicurean Epistemology," forthcoming in Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, 260-94, at 277.) (*!4.762-7.!
()!Cp.

#&!

array of information, including sense-perceptual, preconceptual, and doxastic (which is to say, propositional memorial) information. Finally, the idea that Epicurus is committed to a conceptualist theory of memory is further supported by a common point in his letters, namely, that the reader should commit the contents of those letters to memory. Here are a couple examples from the Letter to Herodotus: "For those who are unable to study carefully all my physical writings or to go into the longer treatises at all, I have myself prepared a summary of the whole system, Herodotus, to preserve the memory (.'*'%#15) *<) )$8)) of enough of the principal doctrines We must continuously return to the [principal doctrines] and must memorize them (() *+, )$W ?;98*F;)) "80 "And these [epistemological and physical doctrines], if set in memory (() )$W *9KF1)'), will be a constant source of aid."81 Assuming then that Epicurus is committed to a conceptualist theory of memory, memory is partly constitutive of one's psychological constitution. This point is corroborated by the following passage from the Letter to Herodotus: "Freedom from mental disturbance (2*'-'>/') is a release from all of these [fears] and possession of persistent memory (%")1#+ )$8) M#19)) of the general and most important [doctrines of the system]."82 In this case, Epicurus is speaking precisely of memory that is partly constitutive of a well-founded mental constitution. And since such memory is partly constitutive of 2*'-'>/', which is constitutive of telic pleasure, the memorized contents are partly constitutive of telic pleasure. Now, in this case, the memorized contents are the doctrines that constitute Epicurean wisdom. So these are not the contents that constitute memorial gratitude, at least not the memorial gratitude that I have been discussing. We need, then, to draw a distinction between the two kinds of memory: memory of generic content and memory of particular content. For example, the memory of the principle that pleasure is the good is generic memory. The memory of once reading a token sentence with that content is particular memory. Accordingly, we can also distinguish between generic and particular memorial gratitude. An example of the former is this: a physically infirm old man may be grateful for having been able to run and swim when he was younger. In the fragment from the Letter to Idomeneus, Epicurus appears to have particular memorial gratitude in mind (assuming, once again, that he has memorial gratitude and not merely !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
)+!Ep.

Hdt. 35-36. Hdt. 83. Cp. "So grasp them well and quickly retain them in your memory " (Ep. Pyth. 85) )#!82,!with my italics.
)"!Ep.

#'!

memorial pleasure in mind). But in Vatican Sayings 17 and 55, he might also have generic memorial gratitude or both generic and particular memorial gratitude in mind. Assume that memorial gratitude is hedonic (a claim I will evaluate in section VIII). The question, then, is whether memorial gratitude is a katastematic or kinetic pleasure. Since the memory is a constituent of one's psychological constitution, awareness of or attention to a pleasant memory should be a katastematic pleasure. Indeed, this is how I interpret Epicurus' view that memorial gratitude is necessary for the natural (mental) constitution. On the other hand, concordantly with Epicurus' view of mental imagery, recollection can induce images pertaining to the memorial content. That is, in recollecting, one may prompt the mind to apprehend relevant 1X:S3'. In such cases, which presumably are more common than not, the subject experiences a complex hedonic condition consisting of kinetic and katastematic pleasure. But granting this does not undermine the claim that memorial pleasure or memorial gratitude per se is katastematic. Finally, although I have focused on memorial gratitude and done so because Epicurus seems to view this as a salient form of the gratitude that partly constitutes telic pleasure, I have also suggested that Epicurus recognizes gratitude for present and persistent goods as constitutive of telic pleasure. For instance, consider the following maxim from an unspecified Epicurean work preserved in Stobaeus' Anthology: "Let there be gratitude (#D-9=) to blessed nature, because she has made what is necessary easy to acquire and what is difficult to acquire unnecessary."83 This fragment does not indicate that Epicurus held such gratitude to be constitutive of the human *F3;=, but there is a passage from the Letter to Menoeceus with very similar content that more closely connects the content of the maxim to the *F3;=: "We hold that self-sufficiency is a great good, not so that in all cases we should make use of little, but so that if we do not have much, we are contented with little, since we are genuinely persuaded that those have the greatest enjoyment of luxury who have least need of it, and that whatever is natural is easy to acquire, while what is empty is difficult to acquire."84

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
)$!fr.

66 Bailey, apud Stob. 17.23.!

)%!130.!

#(!

In short, then, although Epicurus has a special interest in what I called the "auxiliary role" of memorial gratitude, he holds that gratitude more generally is a constituent of telic pleasure.85 Conclusion to the Discussion of Telic Pleasure The preceding account of katastematic or telic pleasure raises a number of pressing questions. I have flagged some of these along the way, others not. The present section addresses these questions.
The Significance of Well-Foundedness

What is the significance of the fact that the senses of security and gratitude constitutive of telic pleasure are well founded? In contrast to momentary or transient pleasure, telic pleasure pervades one's life. But if one's sense of security and gratitude were false or poorly founded, then the hedonic condition to which they contribute would inevitably be undermined. Recall the following passage from the Letter to Pythocles: "If one is at odds with clear evidence, one will never be able to achieve genuine freedom from mental disturbance (2*'-'>/'= 4)$%9;")." Relatedly, as we observed in Sovereign Maxim 5: "It is impossible (;A. M%*9)) to live pleasantly without living wisely (B-;)/S=)." I take it that by "live pleasantly," it is now clear that Epicurus means: live a life pervaded with pleasure. In short, it is for the stability and perdurance of the hedonic condition that the senses of security and gratitude must be well-founded.
Subjective and Objective Aspects of Telic Pleasure

Is telic pleasure a subjective state, an objective state, or a complex of subjective and objective constituents? This question is further complicated by the consideration that telic pleasure has corporeal and mental constituents. In that case, it may be questioned whether each of these constituents is a subjective state, an objective state, or a complex of the two. Telic pleasure appears to be a complex of subjective and objective constituents. Precisely, telic pleasure seems to be an intentional state or intentional attitude. Qua intentional, the attitude takes an object. This is most !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
)&!Note

that Epicurus wrote a treatise on Gratitude and Gifts (DL 10.28). Cp. Norman W. DeWitt, "The Epicurean Doctrine of Gratitude," American Journal of Philology 58 (1937) 320-8.

#)!

evident from consideration of the corporeal constituent, 2?;)/'. On the one hand, 2?;)/' requires that the body be in a state of health. On the other hand, one must have some psychological attitude toward this state of health. Minimally, one must be aware of the healthy corporeal state. In other words, minimally, the psychological attitude requires 'X%K8%9= (in the broad sense of this word). Moreover, such awareness has some phenomenal character. In other words, such awareness entails a distinct quality of consciousness.86 In a recent contribution to Epicurus' psychology, Elizabeth Asmis suggests that pleasure and pain are not merely cognitive conditions. That is, they do not merely indicate our corporeal or mental conditions. Additionally, they have a "practical function." Precisely, they involve pro and con attitudes: "[Pleasure and pain] comprise an attitude, pro or con, concerning the object of awareness. To attend to something pleasant is to be attracted to it; to attend to something painful is to have an aversion to it."87 On Asmis's view, then, the hedonic attitude is complex. This seems to me a plausible interpretation, for Epicurus speaks of pleasure and pain as both epistemological and practical standards.88 Granted this, what sort of pro-attitude does Epicurus think that the hedonic attitude involves? Nothing in Epicurus directly speaks to this question. However, I think a reasonable answer can be derived from certain of his commitments. For example, consider the idea that the pro-attitude is a state of desire. This possibility seems to me to be ruled out by the fact that pleasure is treated as an object of desire or pursuit.89 More compelling is the idea that the pro-attitude is a sort of evaluative attitude, that is, a taking of some entity to be good. This attitude needn't be cognitive, however, and it needn't be propositional. Rather, it may be or at least may be akin to the pro-attitudes of liking or preferring. This view well accords with Epicurus' commitment to the so-called Cradle Argument, according to which pleasure is our (and other animals') first and congenital object of pursuit, while pain is the first and congenital object of avoidance.90 Compare the view of Torquatus that the positive value of pleasure is evident to the non-rational perceptual faculties of

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
)'!Note

that this is the way Torquatus construes Epicurus' conception of katastematic pleasure in Cic. de fin. 1.38ff. However, I would prefer to avoid using Cicero as evidence of Epicurus' position in cases where we can derive the view from Epicurus himself. )(!Here again I am citing here from a draft of Asmis's chapter "Epicurean Psychology," forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of Epicureanism. ))!DL 10.34, 128-129 (as cited by Asmis). )*!Cp. Cic. de fin. 1.30: "omne animal simul atque natum sit voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et quantum posit a se repellere." Cp. DL 10.137. ! *+!Ep. Men. 129.

#*!

beings in their natural state.91 In short, then, I suggest that for Epicurus the proattitude of pleasure is an evaluative, but non-cognitive and non-propositional attitude. In the case of 2*'-'>/', again, one can distinguish between the mental state conceived objectively and the experience or awareness of the mental state. This distinction holds, even if it is a psychological fact that one must be aware of one's mental states. Accordingly, again, the attitude would seem to be a complex of cognitive and pro-attitudinal constituents. Beyond this basic position that telic pleasure is an intentional state in which the hedonic attitude consists of cognitive and pro-attitudinal components two further complications must be noted. One concerns the consideration that one's corporeal and mental states are not always objects of focal awareness. Rather, assuming they are, in some sense, continuous objects of awareness, they seem to be objects of background awareness. I note this point both because it seems to me to be true, but also because it compels the question whether Epicurus recognizes background awareness. eX%K8%9= (in the broad sense of "awareness") entails (?9N;3$. If (?9N;3$ is understood as attention, deliberate application of the mind or senses, or cognitive straining or concentration, then we have a problem.92 Attention is focal; it is also voluntary. But, again, awareness is not necessarily focal, nor is it voluntary. Background awareness is neither. Alternatively, (?9N;3$ may be understood as a "passive process by which the senses or the mind 'get hold' of anything at all."93 I note the problem, but will not attempt to solve it or pursue it further here. I return to it in section IX. A second complication concerns the fact that the mental constituent of telic pleasure includes senses of security and gratitude. But the intentional objects of these senses differ from those of 2*'-'>/' (here taking 2*'-'>/' narrowly as mere absence of mental distress). The intentional objects of gratitude include memories. The intentional objects of security include prospective states of affairs. Furthermore, these intentional objects are propositional. Additionally, the attitudes of senses of security and gratitude cannot be identical to the hedonic attitude involved in 2*'-'>/' (again, narrowly construed). The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*"!Cic.

de fin. 1.30. Note that Torquatus first speaks of the desirability or pursuit-worthiness of pleasure (voluptas expetenda), but then (at 1.31) of the goodness (bonum) of pleasure. *#!On this sort of interpretation, see C. Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus, Oxfordu University Press, 1928, 259-74. *$!I am citing here from Elizabeth Asmis, Epicurus' Scientific Method, Cornell University Press, 1984, 125, who in turn is referring to Norman DeWitt, "Epicurus f1-@ g')*'%/'=," Transactions of the American Philological Association 70 (1939) 414-27, at 421-3; J. M. Rist, Epicurus, Cambridge University Press, 1972, 25; and D. Furley, "Knowledge of Atoms and Void in Epicureanism," in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, J. P. Anton and G. L. Kustas, State University of New York Press, 1976, 607-19, at 611. Asmis herself suggests something of a middle course: "An (?9N;3$, 'application,' therefore, is a response by which the perceptual organ makes an effort to bring an object into focus; and it is neither a guarantee of a truthful presentation nor simply a passive submission to external influences. Although the response is involuntary, the perceptual organ engages in an activity of its own." (1984, 126)

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cognitive attitude involved in 2*'-'>/' (narrowly construed) is perceptual, more precisely proprioceptive. But given that the intentional objects of senses of security and gratitude include non-present entities, the cognitive attitude must include doxastic and imaginative (although not imagistic) aspects. It is also questionable whether the so-called hedonic attitude is identical in these cases too. I devote a separate subsection to this question.
The Corporeal and Mental Constituents of Telic Pleasure

Complicating the preceding discussion is the fact that the evidence regarding Epicurus' view of the corporeal and mental constituents of telic pleasure seems contradictory. As I noted above, Epicurus' own physical ailments testify to his recognition that wisdom does not ensure corporeal health. But, as the fragment from the Letter to Idomeneus indicates, Epicurus holds that physical maladies needn't unsettle the mental component of telic pleasure. On the contrary, the mental component of telic pleasure will, in such cases, serve to sustain one's prevailing hedonic state against the physical pain or discomfort. This fact also indicates that Epicurus regards the mental component of telic pleasure as of greater value than the physical aspect. On this topic, compare Diogenes Laertius' testimony, which contrasts Epicurus' view with that of the Cyrenaics: "[Epicurus] further disagrees with the Cyrenaics in that they hold that corporeal pains are worse than mental pains. At least, wrongdoers are corporeally punished. But Epicurus holds that mental pains are worse. At least, the flesh suffers the storms of the present alone. The mind those of the past and future as well as the present. In this way, he holds mental pleasures to be greater (1/O;)'=) than those of the body."94 Diogenes Laertius suggests here that the relative greatness of mental affect is a function of the broad temporal scope of its possible objects: past, present, and future. I suggest that Epicurus additionally held that the mind has a greater capacity for affective attitudes. In other words, the mind, that is, the rational part of the soul, can experience deeper or more profound affective attitudes than the irrational part of the soul. This seems a necessary inference from Epicurus' view that the hedonic experience of memorial gratitude can overcome corporeal pain.95 Contrast this position, again, with the Cyrenaics who deny the possibility of anticipatory and memorial pleasures, claiming that in such alleged cases the ./)8%9= affecting the mind is too weak.96 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*%!DL *&!An

10.137. extreme expression of this idea is the doxa that the wise man will remain in a state of wellbeing even while being corporeally tortured. (DL 10.118) *'!DL 2.90.

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But, granting this disparity between the positions of Epicurus and the Cyrenaics, how can Epicurus' position be squared with his claims that telic pleasure is complex of mental and corporeal constituents? My proposal to resolve or allay the difficulty is as follows. Epicurus recognizes that one cannot ensure a life free of corporeal pain. However, he holds that corporeal pain is short-lived and that when it does occur, corporeal pain does not unsettle one's peace of mind. Moreover, as we have discussed, in circumstances of corporeal pain, the mind can attend to pleasant memories and thereby overcome the corporeal pain. Evidence of the brevity of corporeal pain, and in this case its relation to corporeal pleasure, derives from Sovereign Maxim 4: "Continuous corporeal (() *+, %'-./) pain does not last long. On the contrary, pain, if extreme, is present a very short time. And even that degree of pain that barely outweighs corporeal (.'*6 %D-.') pleasure does not last many days. Illnesses of long duration even permit an excess of corporeal pleasure (() *+, %'-./) over pain."97 On empirical grounds, the truth of this maxim seems dubious. For example, some severe burn victims suffer from such excruciating and chronic pain that they justifiably choose to end their lives. It seems uncharitable and naive to maintain that such people would respond otherwise if they were wise. To this extent, Epicurus' position is defective. On the other hand, Epicurus may justifiably hold that those who are wise can respond positively to most circumstances of great adversity.98 Setting aside the question of whether Epicurus' position here is defensible, he evidently holds that mental pleasure is more powerful than corporeal pain. Moreover, the fact that this point explicitly enters the Sovereign Maxims and indeed occurs close to the beginning of this set indicates the importance it holds in Epicurus' theory of pleasure. Epicurus' hedonic theory also seems to need and to be committed to the following view of the relation between corporeal pain and mental pleasure: corporeal pain is generally more prevalent in old age; and by that time, one is (ideally) in a better mental condition to manage the pain both because one has achieved wisdom and because one has accumulated memorial goods that can be objects of gratitude. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
*(!The *)!In

brevity or lack of intensity of pain is also referred to at Ep. Men. 135. Cp. Diog Oen. fr. 58. fact, it is worth considering this possibility in relation to a Patrick Boleyn-Fitzgerald's discussion of gratitude ("Gratitude and Justice," Ethics 109 (1998) 119-37, 152-3). Boleyn-Fitzgerald argues that the objects of gratitude needn't be restricted to benefits, as most philosophers in the Western tradition have taken them, but can in fact include evils and harms. Western thinkers tend to view gratitude in judicial terms as an attitude owed in response to some benefit. In contrast, Boleyn-Fitzgerald cites as consistent with the Bhuddist ethical idea that hardship is an opportunity to cultivate gratitude, the Dalai Lama's response of gratitude to Chinese oppression. This, of course, is a different use of gratitude than the kind Epicurus recommends.

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Katastematic Pleasure in Animals and Infants

Does Epicurus admit katastematic or analgesic pleasure in animals and infants? The question is complicated in at least two respects. First, Epicurus distinguishes corporeal and mental katastematic or analgesic pleasure. So we must consider whether animals and infants can be in either of these states. Second, Epicurus distinguishes genuine and non-genuine katastematic pleasure. At least, we have seen that he recognizes this distinction in the case of 2*'-'>/', in other words, katastematic mental pleasure. Recall the passage from the Letter to Pythocles: "if one is at odds with clear evidence, one will never be able to achieve genuine freedom from disturbance (2*'-'>/'= 4)$%9;")." I suggested that by "genuine freedom from mental disturbance" Epicurus means freedom from mental disturbance engendered in such a way so as to ensure its stability. From this I inferred that Epicurus commits to the concept of genuine telic pleasure, where by "genuine telic pleasure" is meant pleasure engendered in such a way so as it ensure its stability throughout one's life. It is a question, to which I will return shortly, how "genuine" functions here so as to yield this result. For now, the question is whether animals and infants can be in genuine or non-genuine katastematic hedonic states. It should be clear that animals and infants cannot be in a state of genuine 2*'-'>/', for two reasons. First, such a state requires wisdom. Second, such a state is a state of the rational soul or mind, which animals and infants lack or possess only to a limited extent. The first point also suggests that animals and infants cannot be in a state of genuine 2?;)/', that is, a well-founded state of corporeal health, again, if such a state depends on wisdom, in this case, specifically wisdom pertaining to our desires. It remains then that animals and infants may be in non-genuine states of 2?;)/', that is, states of corporeal health that are unstable. But it might be objected here that the wisdom needed for well-founded 2?;)/' is only needed for beings susceptible to psychological corruption. Animals' and infants' motivations are natural. Hence, although they lack wisdom, they do not need wisdom to ensure a stable state of 2?;)/'. In the case of infants, this is unsatisfactory since infants have little capacity to care for their corporeal needs. In other words, they lack the capacity to satisfy their corporeal motivations. Infants need good care, and this they must derive from the skill of their caregivers. It remains, then, that mature animals whose motivations are in a natural state may be in states of 2?;)/' that are stable, without requiring wisdom. At this point, I simply don't know of any textual evidence that enables us to confirm Epicurus' position on the matter. Tentatively, I conclude that mature animals can be in stable states of 2?;)/' and hence enjoy genuine telic pleasure for beings of their kind. I return now to the question of how Epicurus can conceive of genuine 2*'-'>/' as 2*'-'>/' that is stable. Consequently, I am interested here in Epicurus' use of the word "4)$%9;)" in the phrase "2*'-'>/' 4)$%9;=." The word ! $$!

"4)$%9;)," like "genuine" or "real," seems not to have a descriptive meaning, but rather what may be called a "contrastive" one. A genuine F simply is an F. In other words, "genuine" does not affect the extension of the noun-phrase that it modifies. Nonetheless, "genuine" is clearly meaningful, and so must be meaningful in some other way. Precisely, I suggest "genuine" and related terms serve to emphasize the legitimacy of the ontological or metaphysical status or nature of the entity to which the noun-phrase they modify refers, in contrast to some illegitimate entity. Commonly perhaps necessarily this illegitimate entity appears to be an F, but isn't. For example, consider the sentence: "That jacket is not made of genuine leather; it is made of a synthetic likeness." According to this interpretation of "4)$%9;)," non-genuine 2*'-'>/' shares with genuine 2*'-'>/' some appearance property, but lacks some essential property of 2*'-'>/'. The shared appearance property seems to be some hedonic condition, say, calm, tranquility, or the like. The lacking essential property is stability. Given this, Epicurus must understand "2*'-'>/'" not merely as lack or absence of psychological disturbance, but as freedom from mental disturbance. I suggest this because lack of mental disturbance does not entail freedom from mental disturbance, since the former may be a transient condition, whereas, strictly speaking the latter is not.99 This, finally, explains why throughout my discussion I have rendered "2*'-'>/'" as "freedom from mental disturbance." In contrast, since wisdom cannot assure 2?;)/', I have rendered that term more weakly as "absence of corporeal pain."
Telic Pleasure and Wisdom

What precisely is the relation between telic pleasure and wisdom? Is wisdom identical to telic pleasure? Is it coextensive with it? Is it a constituent of it? In some passages Epicurus seems to identify telic pleasure with wisdom. For example, in the passage from the Letter to Menoeceus: "[The goal] is sober reasoning " In other words, Epicurus takes pleasure to be a cognitive state. But this position is complicated. Wisdom is something like propositional memory, that is, propositional contents that have been committed to memory. Such content is dispositional, not occurrent. But telic pleasure is occurrent and requires awareness. So, minimally, telic pleasure would have to be awareness of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
**!The

word "4)$%9;)" occurs elsewhere in the Letter to Pythocles and twice in the Letter to Menoeceus: "Many others besides you (Pythocles) will find these reasonings useful, and especially those who have recently had a taste of genuine physical inquiry (B"%9;3;4/'= 4)8%/;") " (Ep. Pyth. 85) "Genuine physical inquiry" would seem to be physical inquiry whose methodology is sound, so that it can achieve its goal, which is accurate knowledge and understanding of its objects. "There is no fear in one who is living if he has genuinely comprehended (.'*1938BI*9 4)8%/S=) that there is no fear in not living." (Ep. Pyth. 125) "A genuine comprehension of the thesis" would seem to be a comprehension that is secure, such that one who comprehends idea cannot lose that comprehension. "[We are] genuinely persuaded (?1?19%F);9 4)$%9S=) that they have the sweetest enjoyment of luxury who have the least need of it." (Ep. Men. 130) The use of "genuine" here is akin to that in the preceding quotation although it is doubtful that persuasion entails a secure grasp of the content. !

$%!

such propositional content. But it clearly isn't. Rather, one is aware of one's freedom from disturbance and lack of pain. Moreover, insofar as a sense of security and a sense of gratitude entail subjective states however these may depend on wisdom they cannot be identical to it. Strictly, then, when Epicurus identifies the human *F3;= with wisdom, he must be overstating or misstating his position. Granted this, is it rather that a human being who has come to possess wisdom by the means that Epicurus envisions will, as a psychological consequence, also come to have well-founded senses of security and gratitude? I think the answer to this question is affirmative. The wisdom will cause one to have a well-founded sense of security regarding one's corporeal and mental conditions.100 Additionally, the wisdom will cause one to have a well-founded sense of gratitude at past goods, from which one benefitted en route to the possession of wisdom, as well as one's present goods. Granted this, I think that wisdom is also partly constitutive of telic pleasure. Wisdom causes subjective senses of security and gratitude, but it is constitutive of the well-foundedness of those psychological states. Furthermore, in the case of 2*'-'>/' in particular, wisdom informs the evaluative attitude constitutive of the hedonic attitude. Still further, it is reasonable to think that wisdom is among the objects of gratitude and security. That is, the sage is grateful for and secure in his wisdom.
The Hedonic Character of the Human JF3;=

According to Epicurus, the human *F3;= consists of at least three fundamental constituents. The first is itself a rather complex condition: awareness of freedom from mental distress and absence of pain as well as a proattitude toward these conditions.101 The second includes a well-founded sense of security in the perdurance of such freedom. This second component also includes well-founded confidence that although absence of corporeal pain cannot be secured, occurrences of corporeal pain can be managed and will not unsettle 2*'-'>/'. The third component is a well-founded sense of gratitude at the past and present goods that constitute one's life and wellbeing. The question is whether these constituents comprise a hedonic state. In considering the question, I'll begin with whether the natural attitude toward awareness of freedom from distress and absence of pain is hedonic. It seems to me uncontroversial that the natural attitude toward awareness of absence from corporeal pain or mental distress is hedonic when that awareness follows the experience of pain or distress. That is to say, it is natural to be pleased by absence of pain or distress when pain or distress that one has suffered ceases. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"++!More

precisely, one can only be relatively secure about one's corporeal condition. One will, however, be secure that if one suffers corporeal pain, this pain will not overwhelm or destabilize one's mental state or mental pleasure. "+"!To avoid begging the question, I resist claiming that this is a hedonic pro-attitude.!

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However, I doubt that a hedonic attitude is the natural attitude toward a merely un-stimulated, intact state of the body. For instance, it does not seem to me natural that one be pleased by the cessation of hedonic sensory stimulations. One might, in such a case, be affect neutral or even displeased or discomfitted. Of course, the sage will not have that attitude. My point is that I doubt that animals and infants will have a hedonic attitude to mere corporeal health. My objection may be put another way. Epicurus seems to think that the fundamental psychological need of animals is to be free of pain or distress.102 But Epicurus seems to construe the pain here in terms of corporeal pain and the distress in terms of fear of the former. The problem is that boredom and consequent depression are forms of pain, discomfort, or distress that have nothing to do with fear or anxiety relating to corporeal harm. My suggestion, then, is that animals need stimulation, both physical and psychological. Now in the case of adult humans, at least sages, the psychological attitude toward absence of pain and distress is much richer than in animals. It involves a more fully articulate or articulable understanding of the value of one's condition, a sense of security, self-confidence, and gratitude. It is, thus, easier to see why one would conceive of such a state as hedonic. In considering whether this state is in fact hedonic, it is necessary to distinguish between two conceptions: (i) (ii) The various attitudes just described constitute a hedonic attitude (or constitutes a complex of hedonic attitudes). Pleasure is taken in those attitudes or in having those attitudes.

I will briefly consider the second conception below. Presently, I have been assuming that Epicurus is committed to the first one. Accordingly, he holds that the senses of gratitude and security themselves are hedonic attitudes. Our question, then, is whether feeling grateful is a pleasure and whether feeling secure is a pleasure. In contemporary hedonic theorizing, two hedonic kinds have been distinguished. Reference to these can aid our consideration of the problem. The hedonic kinds are enjoyment and being-pleased-that. Both are intentional states. The former takes experiences or activities as objects. The latter takes propositions or facts.103 For example, one may enjoy listening to a symphony, and one may be pleased that one is at the symphony. The objects of gratitude are not activities or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"+#!Cp.

the following lines from the Letter to Menoeceus: "We do everything in order not to be in pain and not to be disturbed. And as soon as we achieve this, the tempest of the soul is dissolved and the animal (Oh;") has no need to pursue anything lacking or to seek anything else by which the good of the body and soul will be fulfilled." (128) "+$!These distinctions can be found in Terence Penelhum, "Pleasure and Falsity," American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1964) 81-91 and David Barton Perry, The Concept of Pleasure, Mouton & Co., 1967.

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experiences. It is less clear whether they are propositions or facts. One is grateful to someone for something. For example, one is grateful to a stranger for help towing one's car. However, if one renders this propositionally one is grateful that a stranger helped tow one's car the sense alters. The personal object of gratitude becomes impersonal. One is grateful that a stranger helped tow one's car is consistent with one being grateful that some stranger or another helped tow one's car. In this case, the object of gratitude is actually the world treated as a benefactor. But in fact one is grateful to a particular stranger, a particular person, for the help. A second consideration bearing on the question whether gratitude is hedonic is that gratitude is something that one, as it were, bestows upon another person. But pleasure is certainly not like that. One can take pleasure in another person, that is, in being with that person or in thinking about that person. But such pleasure is not bestowed upon that person. These, then, are two reasons to think that while gratitude is certainly a pro-attitude, it is not a kind of pleasure. One often speaks of feeling secure about some object. But the object of security may be propositional; for example, one may feel secure that one is out of harms way or that one's son is not endangering his life by traveling to Khartoum. However, security per se does not seem hedonic. One may feel utterly secure, but affect-neutral or bored. It is rather in the particular case where one's sense of security comes as a sense of relief that one may be pleased that one is secure. This is the kind of case Epicurus seems to have in mind when he speaks of the security and confidence of mental pleasure. But now I question whether such a hedonic feeling of security as relief would perdure through the life of the sage. It would seem rather that with the passage of time the sense of relief would dissipate and that one would be left with a sense of security and confidence that one's wellbeing was intact and would perdure. Again, such feelings of security and confidence are pro-attitudes. But they do not seem to be hedonic attitudes. If these considerations are correct, then there is good reason to think that what Epicurus conceives as telic pleasure is in fact not a hedonic state. And if so, then, in a sense, the Cyrenaics' criticism is vindicated, although not in their terms. But perhaps the following line of defense remains open to Epicurus. The logic of the hedonic concepts of enjoyment and being-pleased-that suggests that Epicurean telic pleasure is not pleasure. But perhaps it is possible to draw a distinction pleasure, on the one hand, and our pleasure concepts (enjoyment and being-pleased-that), on the other. Perhaps pleasure must be identified phenomenologically. And perhaps telic pleasure, as Epicurus conceives it, has a hedonic phenomenal character. Moreover, Epicurean telic pleasure shares this phenomenal character with non-genuine 2*'-'>/', kinetic pleasures of body and mind, and what we call "contentment," "tranquility," or "peace of mind." In other words, all of these states share a hedonic quality. It is this quality that "pleasure" or "7:;)$" essentially designates.

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If this hypothesis were correct, then when Epicurus speaks of pleasure and pain as "?'K$" (in one of the senses in which he uses that word, a narrow sense), he would be referring to affective quality. He could then hold that affective quality is one way of being affected (now in a broader sense of "?DK;="). Alternatively, Epicurus might hold that affective quality is one of the constituents of pleasure, the phenomenological constituent; the others being cognitive and pro-attitudinal. If he held this view, however, then, for the reasons that we have already considered regarding the logic of the concepts of enjoyment and being-pleased-that, Epicurus would need to maintain that senses of security and gratitude are not themselves hedonic attitudes. Rather, pleasure is taken in these senses. I note this possibility, but will not pursue it further here. More generally, I will not pursue the idea of hedonic or affective quality further here, but I will return to it in section IX. Epicurus on Kinetic Pleasure I have a bit more to say about Epicurus' view of the human *F3;= below. But for now I turn to Epicurus' conception of kinetic pleasure. I'll begin with some evidence supporting the view that Epicurus recognizes such pleasure. Once again, consider the testimony and fragment from Diogenes Laertius: "But [Epicurus] recognizes both [katastematic and kinetic pleasures] (and in each case) of the soul and body, as he says in On Choice and Avoidance, in On the Goal, in the first book of On Lives, and in the Letter to the Philosophers in Mytilene. Likewise, Diogenes in the seventeenth book of Selections and Metrodorus in Timocrates say: 'And pleasure is conceived as both kinetic (.'*6 ./)8%9)) and katastematic.' And Epicurus, in On Choice and Avoidance, says: 'On the one hand freedom from mental disturbance and absence of bodily pain are katastematic pleasures; on the other hand, delight and joy are viewed as involving stimulation (.'*6 ./)8%9)) through activation.'" So Epicurus explicitly draws the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasures in On Choice and Avoidance and apparently also in On the Goal, On Lives, and in the Letter to the Philosophers in Mytilene. The following fragment, from On the Goal, provides more direct evidence that Epicurus wrote of kinetic pleasure in that text: "For I at least cannot conceive of the good if I take away the pleasures due to tastes, the pleasures due to sex, the pleasures due to sounds, and the pleasant visual .9)$%19= due to shape."104 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"+%!U

67. Cp. Athen. 546e.

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More generally, consider the following passage from Plutarch: "All by themselves and without a teacher, these noble, smooth (315'), and agreeable motions (.9)$'*') of the flesh beckon, as [the Epicureans say] "105 I conclude, then, that Epicurus recognizes kinetic pleasure. I also presume that in the passage from the Letter to Menoeceus where Epicurus speaks of "the pleasures of prodigals and those that lie in amusement," he is referring to kinetic pleasures. Most of the kinetic pleasures cited in the preceding quotations are corporeal.106 But the fragment from On Choice and Avoidance suggests that Epicurus recognizes mental as well as corporeal kinetic pleasures.107 Recall also !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"+&!adv. "+'!Most

Col. 1122e.! of the corporeal kinetic pleasures are sense-perceptual. However, in the fragment from On the Goal Epicurus includes sexual pleasures. It is unclear whether he conceives of sexual pleasure as sense-perceptual, for example, as a kind of tactile pleasure. But there is a distinction between exteroception and proprioception. Moreover, it may be questioned whether the concept of sense-perception, understood as exteroception by means of corporeal faculties, is equivalent to 'Y%K8%9= (in one sense of this term). Instead, 'Y%K8%9= might be understood as perception by means of corporeal faculties, whether exteroceptive or proprioceptive. On this view, it is prudent to maintain that Epicurus recognizes kinetic corporeal pleasures as indeed corporeal, and not specifically as sense-perceptual. Contrast Asmis's view according to which the Epicurean distinction between 'Y%K8%9= and ?DK;= is equivalent to the distinction between exteroception and proprioception: "Epicurus held that sensory awareness is of two kinds, an awareness of things as external to ourselves and an awareness of inner conditions. Epicurus called the former 'X%K8%9=, 'perception,' and the latter ?DK;=, 'affection'; and he identified the 'affections,' understood here in the restricted sense in which they are a type of awareness, or 'feeling,' as pleasure and pain. Accordingly, perceptions and affections complement each other by showing two distinct kinds of reality, external objects and inner conditions." (1984, 97-8) "+(!There he calls them "#'-D" and "1AB-;%C)8" respectively. But it has been doubted that Epicurus could have referred to kinetic corporeal pleasure as "1AB-;%C)8," precisely because the "B-;-" root in "1AB-;%C)8" suggests intellectual activity. Indeed, in Protagoras Plato has Prodicus of Ceos draw a distinction between corporeal and mental pleasures in the terms of "7:;)$" and "1AB-;%C)8" respectively and alludes to this etymological point: "We in the audience would be wholly delighted (1AB-'/)1%K'9), not pleased (7:;/1%K'), for being delighted (1AB-'/)1%K'9) is a condition of learning something and partaking of understanding (B-;)$%1S=) with the intellect (:9');/E) itself, whereas being pleased (i:1%K'9) is a condition of one eating something or experiencing some other pleasure (7:j) with the body (%Q'*9) itself." (Prt. 337c1-4) However, David Wolfsdorf has, I think convincingly, shown that outside of this Plato passage and prior to Epicurus "1AB-;%C)8" was regularly used in Greek literature to refer to pleasures associated with festivities, including pleasures of eating, drinking, dance, and music. Now, since there are passages in which Epicurus uses "#'-D" to refer to mental katastematic pleasure, it cannot be concluded that Epicurus (and his followers) rigidly adhered to the terminological distinctions in the fragment from On Choice and Avoidance. Indeed, Wolfsdorf states: "Let me emphasize that I am not arguing for the strong thesis that the words "#'-D" and "1AB-;%C)8" are technical Epicurean terms for kinetic pleasures of the soul and body respectively. I am only arguing for the weaker thesis [that] they are used in [the fragment from On Choice and Avoidance] to refer to kinetic pleasures of the soul and body respectively." (2009, 237)!

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that in our treatment of Epicurus' conception of memory in section VII, we discussed dream and willed imagery as conditions that, as Lucretius said, "move the mind." Cases where such mental movements are pleasant, then, also exemplify mental kinetic pleasure. I presume, further, that mental kinetic pleasures also include pleasures of learning, study, and conversation. What corporeal and mental kinetic pleasures share as kinetic is ./)8%9= or stimulation of the irrational and rational parts of the soul. In the case of kinetic corporeal pleasures, I presume that the body itself or rather a part of it is also moved in a corresponding way. (Recall our consideration in section IV of whether the movement involved in sense-perceptual pleasure is a movement of both the body and the sense-perceptual faculty.) As the quotation from Plutarch suggests, the kind of stimulation that kinetic pleasure involves is, more precisely, smooth. Indeed, the Cyrenaics maintain that pleasure, that is, kinetic pleasure, is smooth (31/') ./)8%9=: "Pleasure is a smooth stimulation; pain is a rough stimulation."108 "The Cyrenaics say that their conception of pleasure is smooth and gentle stimulation with a certain perception."109 The word "315;)" does not occur in Epicurus.110 Moreover, I do not assume that the way the Cyrenaics understand the smoothness of kinetic pleasure is the same as the way Epicurus does.111 But Lucretius' use of the Latin equivalent "levis" in his description of gustatory pleasure sheds light on Epicurus' conception: "When the particles of trickling savor are smooth (levia), they touch the palate pleasantly and pleasurably tickle all the moist regions of the tongue in their circuitous flow." More generally, Lucretius describes kinetic sense-perceptual pleasure as follows: "You may readily agree that such substances as titillate the senses agreeably are composed of smooth (levibus) and round atoms. Those that seem bitter and harsh are more tightly compacted of hooked particles and accordingly tear their way into our senses and rend our bodies by their inroads. The same conflict between two types of structure applies to everything that strikes the senses as good or bad. You cannot suppose that the rasping stridulation of a screeching saw is formed of elements as smooth (levibus) as the notes a minstrel's nimble fingers wake from the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"+)!DL

2.86.! 2.20.106.3. ""+!It occurs once in a scholion at Ep. Hdt. 66. """![Reference suppressed to preserve anonymity]
"+*!Strom.

%+!

lyre-strings and mold to melody. You cannot suppose that atoms of the same shape are entering our nostrils when stinking corpses are roasting as when the stage is freshly sprinkled with saffron of Cilicia and a nearby altar exhales the perfumes of the East. You cannot attribute the same composition to sights that feast the eye with color and those that make it smart and weep or that appear loathsome and repulsive through sheer ugliness. Nothing that gratifies the senses is ever without a certain smoothness (levore) of the constituent atoms. Whatever, on the other hand, is painful and harsh is characterized by a certain roughness of the matter."112 In his explanation of sense-perceptual pleasures (as well as pains) that is, a salient subset of kinetic corporeal pleasures Lucretius describes smoothness as a physical property of the atomic constituents of the compounds that affect the sense-perceptual faculties. Because these atomic constituents of the bodies impacting the sense-perceptual faculties are smooth, their contact with the atomic constituents of the sense-perceptual faculties stimulates the senseperceptual faculties in a particular way. This stimulation preserves the intrinsic order or structure of the sense-perceptual faculties. Compare small waves or pulses through a body. And contrast the way painful sensations are characterized as involving atomic shapes that "tear their way into our senses and rend our bodies by their inroads."113 Taking Lucretius as representative of Epicurus' own view and extending Lucretius' account of sense-perceptual pleasures to all kinetic pleasures, I assume that for Epicurus the kind of stimulation that kinetic pleasure involves is one in which the intrinsic structure of the psychological faculty affected is preserved. In other words, kinetic pleasure supervenes on katastematic conditions. It follows that in the case of genuine katastematic pleasure, kinetic pleasure supervenes on the well-founded katastematic condition. Given this, consider again the fragment from On Choice and Avoidance:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
""#!DRN

2.402-423. Lucretius' explanation of sense-perception generally and sense-perceptual pleasure in particular can thus also be seen to reduce to an explanation of touch or physical contact between atoms. Indeed, he says as much: "For touch and nothing but touch is the essence of all our corporeal perceptions It is touch again that is felt when the atoms are jarred by a knock so that they are disordered and upset the senses " (2.436-40) ""$!I want to register a difficulty with Epicurus' position. The account apparently fails to explain the fact that usually when we experience visual and auditory pleasures in particular, it is not isolated colors and sounds in which we take pleasure, but their combinations. Consequently, it does not make sense to think of the pleasure as deriving from the smoothness or roughness of the constituent atoms, but rather from the composites. I do not know how to resolve this problem. But the following idea seems to be an appropriate point of departure: the composites themselves are structured in a derivatively smooth way, which is to say, in a way that titillates the senses while preserving their intrinsic order.!

%"!

"On the one hand, freedom from mental disturbance and absence of corporeal pain are katastematic pleasures; on the other hand, delight and joy are viewed as kinetic through activation." I presume that in the first clause Epicurus is characterizing genuine katastematic pleasure. In other words, he is characterizing what he takes to be the goal of human life. Assuming so, I suggest that in the second clause he is characterizing what may, by transference, be called "genuine kinetic pleasure." By this I mean merely and only kinetic pleasure that supervenes on genuine katastematic pleasure. Assuming so, then the content of the second clause can be more fully understood as: "on the other hand, delight and joy are viewed [by us Epicureans] as involving stimulation (.'*6 ./)8%9)) through activation (()1-41/E) [of wellfounded katastematic conditions]." I have added the content in brackets to clarify my interpretation of the sense of the fragment. Observe now the resemblance between this conception and Epicurus' description of sense-perception in the Letter to Herodotus: "Hence on the departure of the soul, [the body] loses [the capacity for] sense-perception. For [the body] does not possess the power (:C)'9)) [of sense-perception] in itself, but another thing (the soul) congenital with the body provides it. And this other thing, when the power (:")D1S=) it possesses has been activated (%")*131%K1/%8=) through stimulation (.'*6 *<) ./)8%9)), at once produces in itself a sense-perceptual quality and through its joint affection and collaboration transmits it to the body."114 In short, Epicurus is here claiming that a sense-perceptual quality is engendered when the capacity or power of the sense-perceptual faculty of the soul is "realized through stimulation" (%")*131%K1/%8= .'*6 *<) ./)8%9)). One final point regarding the fragment from On Choice and Avoidance deserves mention. The occurrence of "()1-41/'," has been contested. Long and Sedley note that the original Greek, which would have been written in capitals and without accents (GkGlmGnen), is ambiguous between the dative singular and the nominative plural. They suggest that the text should be rendered as "()F-419'9." Accordingly, they translate the line as "joy and delight are regarded as kinetic activities."115 In light of my preceding interpretation, I see no reason to favor the normative plural. But some commentators have contested the text in a more fundamental way. They doubt that Epicurus would have used the word "()F-419'" at all. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
""%!Ep. ""&!A.

Hdt. 64. A. Long and D. S. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Cambridge University Press, 1987. Vol 2., 125. Wolfsdorf has recently followed Long and Sedley in this alteration (2009, 223).

%#!

"H)F-419'" is an Aristotelian term. In fact, in several passages in Epicurus where the word "()F-419'" has been transmitted, this is clearly a scribal error for the Epicurean epistemological term "()D-419'" meaning "clear evidence."116 If the fragment were rendered accordingly, it would read: "Joy and delight are viewed through clear evidence as kinetic." Jeffrey Purinton, for instance, is attracted to this interpretation. He suggests rendering "N3F?;)*'9" as "are experienced," viz.: "joy and delighted are experienced through clear evidence as kinetic." Purinton holds, with the Cyrenaics, that katastematic pleasures are affect-neutral, whereas kinetic pleasures feel like something; hence, the fragment conveys that there is clear evidence of the occurrence of kinetic pleasure, but none for katastematic pleasure. As I've argued above, however, katastematic pleasure does feel like something.117 So Purinton's reason to emend "()1-41/'," to "()'-41/E" does not persuade me. Still, once we exclude the cases where it is reasonable to emend "()F-419'" to "()'-41/'," the difficulty of accepting "()1-41/'," is aggravated by the fact that the instance in the fragment from On Choice and Avoidance appears to be the only one in Epicurus' surviving writings.118 Granted this, I see four reasons to accept the transmitted and edited occurrence of "()1-41/E." One is that "()F-419'" occurs in other philosophers of the late fourth and third century, including Epicurus' one time mentor if subsequent object of scorn Nausiphanes of Teos, as well as the Epicurean Polystratus.119 The second is that Epicurus wrote a treatise in response to Theophrastus who uses the word "()F-419'" frequently.120 Third, we have seen that there is a passage from the Letter to Herodotus that expresses an idea similar to that in the fragment from On Choice and Avoidance and in close terms. Fourth and finally, we have seen that good sense can be made of the fragment as transmitted. So much then for an interpretation of the fragment from On Choice and Avoidance. It remains to consider two questions pertaining to kinetic pleasure. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
""'!Wolfsdorf

cites two instances from the Letter to Herodotus, at 48 and 52. He discusses the general problem at (2009) 237-9. ""(!Consider also Wolfsdorf's argument that all Epicurean instances of "N3F?19)" in the passive are used to mean "to be regarded." (2009, 238) "")!Note that the cognate "()F-48'" also occurs once, at Letter to Herodotus 37. There is an instance of "()1[-]41[/'9]," which Arrighetti treats as part of a fragment from Epicurus' Letter to Phyrson, fr. 93. The fragment derives from Philodemus' On Piety (col. 28, l. 787). It is unclear to me, however, that this occurrence derives from Epicurus' letter rather than Philodemus' discussion of some of the content of that letter. ""*!Nausiphanes, fr. 1.4; Polystratus 15.1, 31.12.! "#+!Cp. Plut. Adv. col. 1110c. Relatedly, I note that it is unclear how much Epicurus had access to Aristotle, who died just about the time Epicurus arrived in Athens. However, Epicurus might well have had access to some of Aristotle's exoteric writings, if not his esoteric writings. In particular, Epicurus might have read Aristotle's celebrated Protrepticus, wherein Aristotle speaks of pleasure in terms of ()F-419'. It may also be noteworthy that Epicurus himself wrote a Protrepticus.!

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Restorative pleasure

The concept of restorative pleasure presents an interesting challenge for my preceding accounts of both kinetic and katastematic pleasure. Some scholars have claimed that Epicurus recognizes pleasures of restoration. Moreover, they have claimed that such restorative pleasures are kinetic. Indeed, we have seen that there is a historical precedent for the idea of kinetic restorative pleasure. Plato conceives of pleasure as a process of restoration and of this restorative process as a kind of ./)8%9=. Further support for the view that Epicurus recognizes kinetic restorative pleasure might also be derived from consideration of the fact that Epicurus introduced the term ".'*D%*8'" precisely in opposition to the Platonic idea of pleasure as a kind of .'*D%*'%9=. Given Epicurus' distinction between katastematic and kinetic pleasures, then, it might seem that Epicurus conceives of restorative pleasure as kinetic. The evidence that Epicurus recognizes restorative pleasures is, however, difficult and contested. The clearest evidence derives from the following passage in Cicero's On Goals, where Cicero portrays himself as interrogating Torquatus: "'Tell me then,' I said, 'in the case of one who is thirsty, is drinking a pleasure?' 'Who would deny it?' 'Is it the same pleasure as having a quenched thirst?' 'No, it is quite different. A quenched thirst (restincta sitis) is a static (= katastematic) (stabilitatem) pleasure, whereas the pleasure of having one's thirst quenched (ipsius restinctionis) is kinetic (in motu).'"121 This passage clearly distinguishses restoration qua process from restoration qua product and identifies the former as a kinetic pleasure. But despite this clarity, the passage cannot be taken as evidence of Epicurus' commitment to restorative pleasure as kinetic without independent supporting evidence from Epicurus or at least an Epicurean such as Lucretius. In other words, I distrust the authority of Cicero as an independent source of evidence for Epicurus' conception of restorative pleasure. The clearest evidence of restorative pleasure from an Epicurean is, perhaps, the following one from Lucretius: "Pain occurs when bodies of matter that have been unsettled by some force within the living flesh of the limbs stagger in their inmost stations. And when they move back into place (inque locum remigrant), soothing pleasure comes into being."122 However, it is questionable whether this should be understood to mean that pleasure occurs as the bodies of matter are moving back into place, or rather whether pleasure occurs when the bodies of matter are back in place. For example, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"#"!de

fin. 2.9.

"##!2.963-66.!

%%!

Bailey's translation seems committed to the latter interpretation: "when they settle back into their place, comforting pleasure comes to pass."123 Some support for this construal may be derived from Lucretius' following account of the pain of hunger: "Since animals are always on the move, they lose a great many atoms, some squeezed out from the innermost depths by the process of perspiration, some breathed out through the mouth when they gasp and pant. By these processes, the body's density is diminished and its substance is sapped. This results in pain. Hence food is taken so that, when duly distributed through limbs and veins, it may underpin the frame and rebuild its strength and sate its open-mouthed lust for eating."124 In this passage only pain is described, not the pleasure that is supposed to attend the restoration of the nutritional deficit, the "rebuilding" of the depleted frame and reconstitution of the animal's strength. In light of the previous passage, it seems reasonable to infer a correlative pleasure.125 But if so, then the pleasure seems to derive precisely from the reconstruction of the damaged or depleted constitution. In other words, the pleasure is a function of the restored constitution, not the process of restoration. Further support for this view comes from another passage in Lucretius where he is describing the pleasure of eating: "The pleasure derived from taste is confined to the palate. Once the food has plunged down through the throat and is channeled throughout the limbs, there is no pleasure."126 Now, it is uncontroversial that once "food has plunged down through the throat," there is no gustatory pleasure, that is, the palate is no longer being smoothly stimulated. But if restorative pleasure occurred, then there would be pleasure subsequent to swallowing. Lucretius appears to indicate that there isn't. Generally speaking, restorative pleasure is unintelligible as kinetic pleasure if kinetic pleasure entails a smooth stimulation. Restorative pleasure is not, so to speak, a variation on a katastematic theme. Restoration is of the natural katastematic condition itself. As such, if Epicurus recognizes restorative pleasure, he must recognize it as a kind of katastematic pleasure. In considering this possibility, observe that restoration might occur in two 127 ways. For the sake of simplicity, I'll focus on corporeal restoration, say, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"#$!(1947) "#&!Note

vol. 1, 287.

"#%!4.861-69.!

that in these cases, pain is not merely a function of the disarrangement of atomic structures, but also their depletion. Thus, the restorative process can be understood in both ways.! "#'!4.627-9.

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restoration that occurs when one who is dehydrated drinks. Assume some derangement of an atomic complex, that is, of a collection of atoms constitutive of a single structure. Presumably, in the case of dehydration, the derangment is actually a depletion. At any rate, the restoration of this derangement may occur in such a way that each atomic constituent of the complex sequentially returns to its proper place. That is, one part of the complex after another is restored, analogously to the way a fallen wall may be restored one brick at a time. Call this "partitive restoration." Alternatively, the restoration of the complex may occur in such a way that all of the atomic constituents simultaneously, however gradually, return to their proper places. Call this "coordinated restoration." The fundamental difference between partitive and coordinated restoration is that in the case of coordinated restoration no proper part of the atomic complex will have been restored without the whole atomic complex having been restored. In the case of coordinated restoration, then, pain of diminishing degrees of intensity exists until the process concludes, for at each point in the process until the terminus the atoms constitutive of the complex are deranged, albeit to increasingly lesser extents. In the case of partitive restoration, pain in principle also incrementally diminishes, but for a different reason. In this case, fewer and fewer atoms are deranged. Given this distinction between two forms of restoration, the question now is whether pleasure occurs during either restorative process. If pleasure occurs during coordinated restoration, then the pleasure must be pleasure taken in the increasing diminution of pain. I think that in fact this is psychologically possible, even common. But the sources of the pleasure and the pain must be distinct. The pain derives from the derangment of the constitution. The pleasure derives from the awareness that the pain is diminishing. The latter is a second-order affective condition. As such, it appears more mental than corporeal. Whether or not this is actually what occurs, Epicurus must commit to something like it, for consider Sovereign Maxim 3: "As long as pleasure is present, so long as it is present, there is no pain, either of body or soul or both at once." In other words, if pleasure is taken in one's corporeal condition, there cannot be pain derived from one's corporeal condition simultaneously. In contrast, Epicurus does seem to allow compresent opposed affective conditions so long as the opposite conditions are in the body and the mind. At least, recall the fragment from the Letter to Idomeneus where Epicurus speaks of his mind's joy set over against his corporeal pain. Even here, however, matters are complicated. Does Epicurus actually accept that opposed affections can simultaneously be objects of awareness? Or is his view, rather, that one's awareness can only be oriented to one affective condition at a time and that, in his own case, wisdom !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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provides a sort of psychological strength that enables him to sustain his awareness on the mental pleasure and ignore the corporeal pain. Contrast this view with an idea of Plato's or rather his character Socrates. In Philebus Socrates is discussing what he calls a "mixed pleasure," in which the body is in pain, but the mind is pleasantly anticipating relief. Socrates says: "Now when there is pain over and against pleasure or pleasure against pain, both are finally joined in a single blend (/') .-o%9)). We have talked about them earlier [and] when we discussed this, we did not make any special mention, as we do now, of the fact that in all cases where [the affective components] are not in agreement, the final result is a single mixture (15>9= /') of both pleasure and pain."128 In this case, Plato envisions some sort of experiential fusion of the opposed affective conditions. Epicurus seems to reject such a view. Similar problems beset the idea of pleasure occurring during partitive restoration. In this case, part of the body is deranged and thus in pain, while another part is intact or restored and thus in a state of pleasure. And as the restoration proceeds, pain diminishes, while pleasure increases. Now, in this case, the sources of the pleasure and pain are distinct; they are distinct parts of the body (or of the soul). Hence, again, the question is whether Epicurus allows simultaneous awareness of opposed affective conditions, or whether the mind must focus on one affective condition at a time. It might be thought that there is some relatively direct evidence from Epicurus himself in support of the view that he conceives of restorative pleasure in the way I have just described. Consider the following maxims: "The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures "129 "Once the pain produced by want is removed, pleasure in the flesh will not increase "130 These statements seem to suggest that as pain is removed, pleasure increases and culminates in the complete absence of pain. Indeed, this is how Plutarch construes Epicurus' position: "Epicurus has assigned a common limit to [the pleasures,] the removal of all pain as though nature increased pleasure up to the point where it eliminates what is painful, but did not permit it to make any further increase "131 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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But the maxims need not be construed in this way. The first one may instead be understood in terms of the distinction between genuine and non-genuine 2*'-'>/' or 2?;)/'. That is, Epicurus is claiming that the greatest pleasure is pleasure that perdures, in other words, pleasure that excludes episodes of pain. The remainder of the maxim, which I quote in full now, supports this interpretation: "The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. When pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain or distress or both." In the case of the second maxim, Epicurus' point is just that kinetic pleasures, that is, smooth stimulations of the natural katastematic state, do not increase the pleasure of the katastematic state, they merely vary it. Again, consider the maxim in full: "Once the pain produced by want is removed, pleasure in the flesh will not increase. After that, [pleasure] only admits variation " In sum, I suggest that Epicurus does not recognize kinetic pleasures of restoration. He may recognize restorative pleasures as katastematic. But this too seems doubtful.132
Katastematic and Kinetic Pleasures as Pleasures

In virtue of what are both kinetic and katastematic pleasures pleasures? Epicurus does not explicitly address this question. In his criticism of Epicurus' hedonic theory, Cicero maintains that kinetic pleasure and what Epicurus calls katastematic pleasure have nothing in common and thus that Epicurus cannot coherently speak of both as pleasures: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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is also worth bearing in mind that between the time that Plato expressed his view that pleasure is a kinetic restorative process and Epicurus developed his view of pleasure, Aristotle had made it a central task of his own hedonic theorizing to show, contra Plato, that, strictly speaking, there are no restorative pleasures. Pleasure may, he argues, coincide with restorative processes, but the source of the pleasure is not the restoration itself. Rather, the pleasure derives from that part of the subject that remains in tact. "It is only coincidentally (.'*6 %"N1N8.;=) that the processes restoring one to the natural state ('] .'K9%*o%'9 1Y= *<) B"%9.<) ^>9)) are pleasant. The activation (()F-419') in the case of the appetites belongs to one's residual natural disposition " (EN 1152b34-1153a1) Of course, it may be questioned whether Epicurus would have been familiar with Aristotle's view. I suspect that he would have. Even if Epicurus did not have access to Aristotle's esoteric works, in particular, the pertinent sections in what are now Eudemian Ethics and Nicomachean Ethics, Epicurus did have access to some of Theophrastus' writings; and Theophrastus certainly would have presented, whether or not he wholly endorsed, Aristotle's view. Epicurus' description of kinetic pleasure in On Choice and Avoidance using the phrase "involving stimulation through activation" further encourages my confidence in this.

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"Unless you are extremely obstinate, you are bound to concede that pleasure is one thing and absence of pain is another Why, then, do you call two such different things by the same name?"133 I think Epicurus' most likely response and best line of defense against Cicero's criticism is this. Kinetic and katastematic pleasures share three conditions: (i) (ii) (iii) cognitions of the body or soul or a part thereof, where the object of cognition is in a pain-free condition, pro-evaluative attitudes toward these cognitions, a hedonic quality.

I have discussed conditions (i) and (ii) previously. But with respect to (i), I should add the following remark here. By a "pain-free" condition, I mean a condition in which the relevant part of the body or soul is intact or in its natural or proper state. This state needn't be genuine. In other words, it needn't be stable or well-founded. I will focus on (iii). I introduced the idea of (iii) in section VIII. There I floated the hypothesis that Epicurus either identifies pleasure not telic pleasure, just pleasure with a phenomenal character or quality of consciousness or awareness, in a word, a quale,134 or that Epicurus holds that such a quale is a condition of being a pleasure. I called this simply a "hedonic quality." I am proposing here that Epicurus is committed to the latter view: having a hedonic quality is one of several Epicurean conditions on being a pleasure. What reason is there to think that Epicurus recognizes hedonic qualities? Given that pleasure and pain entail forms of awareness, minimally these states of awareness must be distinguished from one another and from other forms of awareness. Similarly, insofar as Epicurus holds that pleasure entails a proattitude, precisely, a non-propositional evaluative attitude, toward a certain state of awareness, that state of awareness must be distinguished by some quality in virtue of which it is positively evaluated. Hedonic quality satisfies both requirements. Admittedly, these considerations only indicate that Epicurus ought to recognize hedonic quality as a condition of pleasure; they do not show that he actually does. Perhaps the strongest reason I've adduced in the preceding discussion for thinking that Epicurus recognizes hedonic quality is my account of Epicurus' conception of telic pleasure in contrast to the Cyrenaic criticism that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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fin. 2.9. that I am not using this term of art in the narrow sense of a non-representational quality of consciousness.
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analgesic pleasure is like being asleep or dead. I have argued that telic pleasure feels like something. Precisely, senses of security and gratitude have a phenomenal character. I take it as uncontroversial that Epicurus recognizes that kinetic pleasures feel like something. By way of corroboration of this point, consider the following passage in which Athenaeus cites graphic and colorful terms that Epicurus uses to characterize kinetic pleasures: " the gusts (.'*'949%;j=) and frissons ((?1)*-Q'*'), which Epicurus often refers to, and the ticklings (4'-4'39%;j=) and titillations ()C4'*')."135 Since, then, both kinetic and katastematic pleasures feel like something, I infer that they either share a distinctive hedonic feeling or possess a common hedonic tone.136 I will not try to argue for one or the other of these construals of hedonic quality because I doubt that Epicurus recognized the distinction. But, resting with the vaguer notion of hedonic quality, I will close by suggesting how Epicurus would have construed hedonic quality within his ontology. Recall, once more, the passage on sense-perception from the Letter to Herodotus: "[The body] does not possess the capacity [for sense-perception] by itself, but another thing [the soul] congenital with the body provides it. And this other thing, when the capacity it possesses has been realized through stimulation, at once produces in itself a sense-perceptual quality (%C?*S' 'Y%K8*9.0)) and through its joint affection and collaboration transmits [this quality] to the body." I have drawn attention to the phrase "%C?*S' 'Y%K8*9.0)," which I render as "sense-perceptual quality." By analogy with this conception, I suggest that Epicurus recognizes %"?*Q'*' ?'K8*9.D, that is, qualities that belong to the category of ?DK;= (in one of the uses of this word), of which pleasure and pain are members in other words, affective qualities. Some of these qualities, namely, corporeal ones, are, like sense-perceptual qualities, engendered through psycho-somatic interactions. But others, namely, mental ones, are engendered through stimulation of the mind alone or, in the case of 2*'-'>/', through the mere constitution of the mind. Conclusion !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the distinction between distinctive feeling and hedonic tone theories of hedonic quality, see Fred Feldman, "Hedonism," in Encyclopedia of Ethics, L. and C. Becker, eds., 2nd edition, Routledge, 2001, 662-69 and more recently Ben Bramble, "The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure," Philosophical Studies (2012) on-line.

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I began this paper by remarking on the fact that Epicurus' conception of pleasure has deeply puzzled and troubled his ancient and contemporary interpreters and critics. I have attempted here to shed light on the puzzlement and trouble. We have seen that those opponents of Epicurus, namely, the Cyrenaics, who maintain that Epicurus conceives of pleasure merely as absence of pain mischaracterize and misunderstand his view of telic pleasure in particular. Others unnamed in the Letter to Menoeceus, but populous throughout the reception of Epicureanism137 who hold that Epicurus was a base hedonist utterly fail to understand his view of the human *F3;=. Cicero, who maintains that Epicurus' commitment to katastematic and kinetic pleasures is incoherent since the two alleged hedonic kinds have nothing hedonic in common, certainly makes a challenging criticism. But I have tried to show that Epicurus has some resources to defend himself. Finally, we have also seen why Epicurus' claims about telic pleasure were subject to divergent interpretations among members of his own school. While Epicurus claims that the human *F3;= consists of both mental and corporeal pleasures, he does not view these components as playing analogous roles in the good life. I do not claim to have resolved all of the problems relating to Epicurus' conception of pleaure and of the pleasure that he takes to be the goal of human life. However, I hope to have advanced our understanding of these topics. In closing I would like to draw attention to two problems that invite further exploration.
Is Epicurus' Conception of the Human JF3;= the Human JF3;= ?

The Epicurean goal of human life turns out to be something like a state of wellbeing, a well-founded contentment, tranquility, or peace of mind regardless of whether these conditions are hedonic. I say "something like" these conditions because I am not convinced that someone in the state that Epicurus conceives as the human *F3;= would in fact be in a state of wellbeing or a wellfounded contentment. In developing this point, I avail myself of a distinction between so-called negative and positive goods.138 The distinction is analogous to Berlin's distinction between negative and positive freedoms. It is noteworthy that much of the human *F3;= according to Epicurus seems to be a negative good, that is freedom from mental disturbance, lack of corporeal pain, security from pain and distress. In contrast, gratitude seems to be a positive good. My worry is that the negative goods constitutive of the Epicurean human *F3;= are merely necessary but not sufficient for a genuinely fulfilling life and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Howard Jones, The Epicurean Tradition, Routledge, 1989, passim. Cf. also Don Cameron Allen, "The Rehabilitation of Epicurus and his Theory of Pleasure in the Early Renaissance," Studies in Philology 41 (1944) 1-14. "$)!For this distinction, see Andrew Valls, "Self-Development and the Liberal State: The Cases of John Stuart Mill and Wilhelm von Humboldt," Review of Politics 61 (1999) 251-74.

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that the addition of the positive good of gratitude is still insufficient. In other words, Epicurus' conception of the human *F3;= lacks enough positive goods to constitute a genuinely fulfilling human life. Clearly, the negative goods are of great value. Those who lack such goods, for instance, those whose lives are filled with anxieties over their corporeal and material security cannot be in a state of (subjective and objective) wellbeing. But what about a sense of purpose? Positive goals? Moreover, a fulfilling life seems to require challenges, difficulties, hardships, even loss and suffering. For example, could living one's entire life in a completely safe gated community where all of one's material needs were met constitute a good and fulfilling life? Certain things, like loving relationships with other human beings, which are clearly constituents of normal meaningful human lives, are in fact among the things that Epicurus himself treasures: "Of the things that wisdom provides for the blessedness of one's whole life, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship."139 Indeed, here friendship is treated as the principal feature of the good life. The question is whether Epicurus conceives of the value of friends merely as supportive of 2*'-'>/' and 2?;)/'. In other words, does Epicurean friendship also provide positive goods? And if so, does Epicurus acknowledge these as constitutive of the human *F3;=? In short, has my account of Epicurus' conception of the human *F3;= failed to recognize certain positive goods?
The Development of Telic Pleasure

Cicero criticizes Torquatus' defense of Epicurus' hedonic theory on the grounds that Epicurus appeals to the uncorrupted inclination of animals and young children toward pleasure to support his view that pleasure is the natural goal toward which conscious beings strive. Epicurus himself also says something to this effect in the Letter to Menoeceus: "Pleasure is our first and congenial good. It is the starting-point of every choice and avoidance."140 Granted this, Cicero takes it that animals and young children pursue kinetic, not katastematic pleasure. But this then only licenses the inference that kinetic pleasure is the human *F3;=: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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27. Cp. "The same understanding that produces confidence about there being nothing fearful that is eternal or long-lasting and has also realized that security amid even these limited [bad] things is most easily achieved through friendship." (KD 28) "%+!129.

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"He could hardly have claimed that natural instinct leads them to seek the pleasure of absence of pain. This is not the sort of thing that can arouse appetitive desire. The static condition of freedom from pain produces no motive force to impel the mind to act Only the caress of sensual pleasure has this effect. So it is the fact that kinetic pleasure is attractive to young children and animals that Epicurus relies on to demonstrate that pleasure is what we naturally seek. He makes no appeal to katastematic pleasure, which consists simply in the absence of pain. Surely, then, it is inconsistent to say that nature proceeds from one kind of pleasure, but the supreme good from another?"141 Whether or not Epicurus' argument for the value of katastematic pleasure is faulty on the grounds that Cicero suggests, my principal point in appealing to Cicero here is just to emphasize it would be valuable to elucidate Epicurus' conception of the way that telic pleasure and motivation toward it develop. A comment by Alexander of Aphrodisias, in his Supplement to On the Soul, sheds some light on the problem that Cicero raises. The topic under discussion in section 17 of Alexander's work is the first (?-&*;)) and congenial (;Y.15;)) object of desire: "The Epicureans think that pleasure is the first congenial thing without qualification (p?3&=), but they say that as we progress this pleasure (*'C*8) *<) 7:;)$)) becomes more fully articulated (:9'-K-;P%K'9)."142 I take it that by "this pleasure" Alexander means the pleasure that is congenial to us. The idea, then, is that as we develop, in particular, psychologically develop, the pleasure that is congenial to us develops. Prima facie, this seems to be a sensible position. All pleasure is, in one sense, psychological. As we develop, we develop psychologically, and in particular the rational part of our souls develops. If we develop well, the rational part of the soul comes to play a dominant role in our lives; indeed, to a large extent it comes to be the central constituent of who and what we are. The rational part of the soul is capable of pleasure. Consequently, if pleasure is congenial to us, the kind of pleasure that depends on the rational part of the soul will become the pleasure congenial to us. This is a gesture at an Epicurean defense against Cicero's criticism. But clearly the topic deserves a sustained and careful treatment.

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