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'.SENATE.SJ:;LECT CQ11HITTEE
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DECLASSIFIEDUNDERAUTHORITYOFTHE INTERAGENCY
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SECURITYCLASSIFICATIONAPPEALSPANEL .. ....
SEC:riON5.3(b)(3) .. .. . . .
ISCA"P-N6. t-on.)- Gt>'\ ,,document11..
STAFF REPORT
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:COVERT ACTION IN CHILE
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1963-1973
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. ..COVERT ACTION .IN CHILE: 1963:-1973 .
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I. OVERVIEVJ AND BACKGROUND
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A. Overview: Covert Action in Chile
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.-Covert United.States involvement in Chile in thedecade be-
tween 1963 and 1973 was. continuous and The Central In-
tel.iigence Agency spent three million dollars in an effort to in.,.
.. :fh.ience the outcome of the 1964 chilean presidential el!2cti.ons.. :-
. . . . .. . . . . . . _
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:. Eight million.d6llars was spent, covertly, in the three years be-
.. . .. . .
tween 19_7'0 :and themilitary coup in 1973. with o.ver
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three million dollars exp-ended in fiscal year.1972 alone.
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Moreover, thebare figur-es are more likely to understate than
. . . . .
.e: to exaggerate_the extent _of U.s. a'c;tion.. I;n the
fore the i973 CIA doliars be channeled
throu.gh the Chilean black v-.'here.the unofficial exc;hange
r.a.te into Chileanescudos often reached.f:ive times the official
rate.
...
Mbre imporiant, it not easy to a box aiound what
was "covert action.u _Clarides.tine. ects'ofthe CIA may be 13-
. be led covertaction, clandes:t:ine intelligence co"rlection or coun-
terintelligence; those distin.cti6ns are mirrored organ_izati:on,
. . .
. .
both at.Headquarters and in field. But projects with differ-
similar For if the CIA pro-
vidcs financial support to a politicrii party, is'iabeicd ''cov-
ert action''; if the Agency develops a paid in that party for
.
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.IN 1963- 1973 .
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.I. OVERVIHJ AND BACKGROUND
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A. Overview: Action in
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-- Co'vert United States involvement in Chile in thedecade be-.
tween-1963 and 1973 Ha.s. continuous and massive. The. Central In-
.
Agency 'spent three million in an effort to- in..,
fh.ience _the outcome of 1964 Chilean presidential elections.
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-.Eight million.dollars Has iri the three be-
t'\-Jeen 19_70 :and the'military coup in _September 1973, with over
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million dollars in year.l972 alone.-
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. the bare figures are more to understate
. . -- .
to exaggerate the.extent _o U.S.cover.t J;n the years be-
e. fore the ;:L973 coup, especially, CIA dol-lars co.uld be channeled
-throu_gh the Chilean black v.rher-e_the unofficial exchange
rateinto Chilean escudos often reached.five ihe official
rate.
.(
Nore importan.tI itisnot easy to a.neat box around ,,rhat
was ''covert action.u ._Clandestine prQjects of the CIA may.be 13-
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' -beled intelligence coilection or coun-
those distinctions are
both at.Headquarters in the.field. BL1t projectswithdiffer-
..ent labels have similar..effects. For instance, if the.CIA pro-
- . .
vidcs financial support to a politicril party. that is.labelcd ''cov-
ert-acti6n"; if the Agency develops a paid asset in that vnrty for
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. the or' information the is "clandestine.

intelligence collection."
IE.O.13526,section3.3(b)(l)
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P;rojects o'f .both kinds provide for the exercise
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..ofU.S. For example, in Chile between 1970 and 1973
the maintained with the for the_
.pose of gathering That contact, meant' that
:the United States sustained coiTl.!Tlunication with thegroup most likely.
to take :powe:r from Preside-nt Salvador.Allende.
'Whatdid CIA money buy It-financed activities cov-
..
. . ering broad spectrum, from_ p'ropaganda tp sup-
..
.. forchilean parties. from public opinion polls_ to
pirect attempt's to foment a coup: The ctistpmary reper-
; . :e
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tory of the S<:?.ntiago Station. incl:t.ideQ. propagcmda assets in the
/
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.Chilean media for the purpose of placing press releases,
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support of.publications, and efforts .oppose communist and left..:
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wing in t. peasant labo;.organizations.
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In addition. to its customary activities, the Station.in
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Santiag"o "t-Jas several times called upon to undertake large, specifl.c
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..When senio! officials in Washington
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or opportunities,.inChile_. special CIA efforts ensued; .
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as part of apackagc of U.S. actions.. For the CIA
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.spent over t\Vo .and one ha.lf million dollars in an election.project
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i11 1964 ..

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Ha.lf decade later_,
- .cial this time at
_-under the injunttion not
Cormnittee of the project.
a-military coup in Chilei
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in 1970, CIA engaged in spc-
the express request of President arid
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to inform t_he State Department or_the 40
The ;CIA .attempted, t9 foment
to a gr-oup. of'Chilean
officers v;ho plotteda c'oup, beginning with the kidnapping_of Chilean
.Army Connnander-in-Chief: Rene Schl).e.ider.
Hhen the cou_p attem})t falled and Allende was.inaugurated Presi-
.
dent;., the CIA began funding opposition sectors in Chile. The ef-
"_.fort gre'tv.to massive..Eight' million- d()llars 1-ias spent in
the three years betHeen 1970 election and the militar.coup in
September 1973. l1oney v1as fur:nishe.d .to mediaorganl.zations, to op-
' . . .
_position :politicalparties and, in amounts, to .private sec-
organizations.
pattern of.UnitedStates c.overt actions .in Chile is strik-
ing but not unique. It arose in the context not only o(Aroeric_an
.foreign policy, butof covert u.s. involvement in other countries,
. . . .
vithin and outside Latin Thi scale in
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the 1964 Chilean election \vas unu.sual but by no means unprecedented.
I E.O.13526,section3.3(b)(l) I
United States support in 1954 for the military operation
which overthre\v Guatemalan .President Arbenz is now a.matter of pub-
lie record.
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B. Issuc.s
Thc.Chilenn case raises most of the issues connected.with
covert action as an instrument of /mlerj_can foreign policy_. It
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from
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acrvcs as such an example for a number of reasons: It consisted
e- .. longl frequently.heavy involvement in. Ch.:i,lean it
1 vol'vcd''the gamut of cov_ert save o_nly cov"ert mili:..
tnry operations; and it a :varietyof procedures for .
.
authorization, different implicationi for.
pol. The j u_dgrrients of past actions .expressedin thiscase are
f:rnmcd not for their own sake; ."l:'ather they .serve
as- bas cis 'for formulating recom..rne'ndations for the future..
The.basi.e fs.sucsare sta.ted: . did the united States
- mount such an extensive a:c.tion program in Chile? Dirl the
pcrccived .threat iustify the covert r8sponse? Has itr.Basonable?
\-Ins. it_p_roE_er? Shouldanv.of it be done again else1-Jhere in the
and those listed belmv run through the pages l.J:hit:h follmv.. They
.
be raised explicitly in a concluding section.
l. \-lhnt_prompted initialmassive covert American invnlvon:ent i;
1964? I.Jhat .,.,,as the intended result? lJas 'the proj:ec!: re-x;pected
tobe n m"!e-time '
...

2. is the effect ol large, concentrated programs <nfcriover't
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political .n.ction. such D.s .l96ll or 1970-73? Ca::rn. .tt1b.ce:y ncmain.
"cQvcrt"'? mwt are tht! 'costs ifth.ey 0'0 'not:? :n:s rlnd:r .-cost
'justi.fiecl t'VCl1 if do SCCXre1t? ., .h\11::ce ttlffi.:e:y ;p:n:qp:er
.given th\2 t1nited t.::t-fe:a:t:y 'C<Wnmci.:tmcnt's or
sense of ..
3. l.Jhat is the .cffcct--ori ro:n tC:b.i].:c;an .Dnd
e .Amcric'm wi.hii..\Cbl <D.cmtinuc ,over'
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4. What <:Ire the of .clandestine relationships, such as
e arising in.counterintelligence. which are no.t
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"covert action"? Can. those be from projects
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.defined as "covert.action"? ; '
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,1 5, l".hat 'vere'the effectsI both a,broad and at home> of' the re la-
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tionships which developedbetween intellig-ence agencies
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and
:.. American-based :nultinati.onal companies or _privo::te Ameri-
______,. ------- ..--'
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-can groups?

the mechanisms for assessment and control of rnajor cov-

'ert action ade'quate: .within the'respectiveagenciesJ es_..:..
the _CIA; among the of'
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State; and behalf? instances and
e 7. \.Jere there adequate procedures for'authorization and control,
both within and .outside 'the a.gencie s, for sensi,-
tive endeavors not labeled action"? .
_ Congress .iriform8cl of and c.onsulted a'botit the various rna,.-
; j or action programs? 1\Tflat -.;.laS itS
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'\vith respect
.to inipor.tant projects not identified as c'ovc'rt action?
.
9. If: the United Statesdecided.to major ac-
.tions but m<1intain a ".capability
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:to perfGrm them. of what
would that cv.pa:bility consist?. Docs t.he Chile an
contain relevant le1son.s?
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C. Historical Recent
Relations
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Chilean Politics and Society: An Overview
. has, _attracted ar more .. in ..
and,mo're the -vmrlcl; than its.temote.
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geographic position and scant population. at
firSt sUggest. , ...... : , .... :.
- Chile's history has been :r::ir\<able in
11'.
. democratic rule. in 1818through
the coup d'etatof i;{;;-;- .Chile unden:1ent_
rour interruptions of its democra!::Lc The first.
.three of thes.e .predated.the. 1932 .
. ..
'From _.1932 until 1973. constitutional rule in.Chilewas unbroken.
Chile defiessimplistic North American stereotypes of Latin
America. morethan two thi-r-ds of itsp.qpul':ltion living..in
and a 1976 cap{ta GNP of $160
1
is of the
.
most.urhanized and industrialized countries in Latin America.
_Nearly all 6 the Chilean population is has an
. . .
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advanced social welfare one n6t
. reaching the majority_of the poor until .popular be.:.
.gan to be exerted in the early 196.0's .. Chiieans are a -largely
integrated mix of ir1digenous American with European immigrant stock.
. ' . . - .
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Until September 1973, Chileans brokercd their'demands in the bi-
cameral parliament through a multi-party system and through_ a
plethora of-economic, trade tinion, or more recently _managerial and
associations.
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2. U.S. Policy Toward Chile
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The history of United Stites policy toward Chile .followed

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patterns of States diplor.tad.c and. economic.interests in th.e
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ht;misphere. the same :yeai the United States recoinized
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Chilean independence, 1823, it the Monroe
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This unilateral policy pronouncement. of.;;/:he United States \vas
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directed as a. warning pmve.rs not to inter- .
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fere in these internal politj:caI\ii"f.faiJ;.s.;. of this hemisphere.
. '. - <:--:-"'{,.: . ...
The U.S. reaction to Fidel Cas.t.fo''J rise to power. suggested
that while .the Monroe Doctr.ine had been abandoned, the
which prompted itwere still alive. astro' s presence spurred
United States hemispheric policylvith special signif:!-cance for
Chile--the Alliartce for Progress. There. lva_s little disagreement.
. . . .
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either at th.e end of the Eisenhovler Administration or at the be:_
ginning of the ne\v Kennedy Administrat).on that something had to
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be done about the alarming threats Castro represented to the sta-
bility of the hemisphere.
The U.s. reaction to the new hemispheric
revolution--evolved into a du,a.l policy response. Rampant
tion, illiteracy. hopeless housing cor:di tio.ns andhunge-r for the
vast. of' Aruericans who \Jere poor: rhese werp seen
. .
as conuuunism's allies. By that logic, loans to national develop-
-
ment with social and at least a verbal preference
regimes, would help to the
ance of another Fidel Castro in our hcmis?herc.
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But there Has another component in U.S .. policy tmv_ard .Latin ;
Junerica. : Counterinsurgency techniques were de.veloped to combat
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..urban or rural guerrilla ;. Developracnt could . not, . : .
overnight, cure the social 1,--1hich _were seen as breeding_
ground of tommurtism. New loans for Latin American in_:.
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tcrnal n-ational _development would. take tinie to hear fruit.
-;I:n the meantime.
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corununist threat would The vicious
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.. circle_ plaguing the logic of the Alliance for Progress soon became
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apparent'. lno'!'dcr to eliminate the short dange{'of
.subver_sion, it was often seen as necessary t.o support Latin
...
can_armed yet frequently it was those very' sa1ne armed forces
-who. t-Jere helping to freeze the status quq "YJhich the .Alli_ance sought
to
. Of all the countries in .the hemisphere, Chile -y,;as chosen. t.o
e_
.become the. for the new Alliance. for Progress; . Chile not
only had the exte_'nsive bureaucratic infr.astructvre to p1an and ad-
minister a national program;_ it also had stubbornly
persistent histor-ic symptoms- of flirting with .communism-. In the
years betv-een 1962 and l-969, Chile rec_eived well over a billion
dollars in dir.ect United States aid. loans and both included.
per capiti any country in the hemis-
phere. 3etHeen 196'!, and 1970, :$200 to $3 00 million in short-term
.lines of credit W<Js continuously available to Chi l_c from privatc
banks.
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A.<_:-/-; J. :.tli@ 1:-n C.h-1,1Gan. Po1\_G-:1fS
i97d e:ha
c::furcr g'.al.vadcrr Allende
,. .
. : . . .
. ..

: fia-d 5een t:f.le Gi-1-k-ie:arl: 16.fc;:::b-st: G'an.rf.:bd&e:Q: for tha: p-reB:idenc:y. His
a1'id:. J:5":t"digi?am- -r;t&.t:( .ifami:.1:L:l:i: G.hi.l:ean _ H.is
piat.t6im 'tia-s all t:h-t:(,b3 :: _: ::fforts- _to tedistrib-
:ti& :1-neome a-nd :resh-ape tha Gh-i-ieati:- . beginning With the na-
of maj:t che i:apper companies;
eX:panded agrari-an with_ so-
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T..h1s Tie e! ft>tir in the 1958 elections. His
. .
eppEinenfs _jGi'ge A1essandri j a cons_ervative. and
6f thQ
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._Pin:gy; _ the cen-trist
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I . Ra&teai Party; . AiiencJe Is gali6ian tnt coo-"_.
p6fcl ei 9aifilitt
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tfiE! Pepuiar Aet3:i1 Fren (FRAP). Alle11clc himself was a moderate
whtch
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hcwever
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was more militant than
.
the eig:olifie Part),
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Allen.tle ttnisheti se.eoncl to AltHHH.tndd. in the 1958 election by
thall. !J?H::.ftt ef: cundidute received a
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into office.
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lt lK16. to .:Jt lcft:is1t derod.:,ed
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c/rn;g:rnes:s.;.imxz!t7l].
, Photo Copy
.from
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end 1963m\.micipal elections..The FRAP parties
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and Cht"istian Party--:-to the left o,f.European
increased its share of the
i.n the 1963 elections, 'it became the la:rge_st
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. The. elee:t:io.n appeared to be a'three-\.Jay Frei r.;as
. Christian DemQcratic and_ the pa_rtie.s. of
as the.ir candidate. The gov-
.. th<a Front. chose Radical Julie Duran
U'tJ.e: .. inp.art.. to an adVerse elec:ticon. result
..
:t9a4, in- a previously province,
r ' .
e
'!he (CCQ.nsenative.s. and
tG ftt:-G:s:p:ect att'Alle:nd(} \tic:tory, thre:'v. their sup-.
.
a.s: t:oo o:nly the
..
''s: majjcmri:t]:' W:ii.c::tt0q, fu:n r?-c:rL::i.ved
. .
..
Jy7; ce.Ji= ttlm: ,, ful1p:]:ccm!1!:I1lJtt: he c:a1le:d: a:
...

:ti.Dl ..'''' 't'fu:a:tt :ii.J.mctlu:d1<2cl: tc.::r.,.'{ and h:ousing
...
1l't0 \V.:ii.t:b: Frei p:ro..p:osed
lt)) 1>-TQ.uill.d Jp;-tl!l:!:'G::l:h.:ns:Cl!' majjQ:rit:y
. in: 4"Q1 G:.'0'01t:Jtcl2l]. i G'Jllilltt.pltll)!t.
i
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lf:lf'{(::ii' lt'tfl:Q'mns; ,, w.h:iilLct :i.imp;l:!:'<t's;s;:ii-...:v:,,, fcd]. sln:@:rrr.. <DJif w.ii1:.:'t!t 1\:.:J.d
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Itnti-J? wJJ:di.ct!}. Cilt:-mar:tde..dl :.'.'UJ1_u;me, the. right-.
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I . w::ii!D}J;!-t:t<JJ frr.mm: lin; Qm-cl!cr.:r .ffGJnnr::il! ;J.: a:-omP'r0-
ll\ii:i.ft4: Ql): t;,l)Q, J1'((i.ifQ:!!11L iiSSlllfr'.. JJ:rr-eli ''s. JrccJJ:.tt w:]th t l\c
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from
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were cordial; . he an independent
e policy. _esta!?lishing diplomatic rela.tions. with the So-
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viet Union soon after his . Th.e government". like its
...
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predeces.S_or, suffe:J;"ed of its tenure. The
.. :. - -: 't
Christian Democrats' vo"te fell . frC?.t!l._.AJ fn 1965. 3l.per.:..
. ... .,. ("'.:...i: ; .. ( . . .,, . . . .
cent in 1969, settii)g the ?-f9? 0.: eleqt;i-ons :_. _ >.'"
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'II. THE fuU:GE Of COVERT ACTION H1 CHILE
A. "Covert Action" nnd Covert 1\ctj.on
' .
.. This study is primarily concerned \vith wh'at is ''cover.t
action"by the Central Intelligence Covert action. projects.
are consid8red a distinct CJ..tegory and arC. authorized and managed
. . . ' . . . .
accordingly. But it is im.portant to bear in mind what .the gory
. >:
excludes as well as ;.;rhat i.t . The Cornrni ttee' s pur_pose is
to evaluate the intent and effect American acti:;itics
in Cpj.le. By that light, .activities not labeled. "covert. acti_ori''
may not to b'e much different :from those falling under tf1at
formal labeL Various sorts of proJects may seek the same end:
. influencing pqli_tic.al eyent:s in Chile. , _
.The CIA. conducts -several kinds of clan.destine ":lctivity in foreign
- countries; clandestine collection .of pqsitivc foreign . .
and covert 1:hose different activities
. are handled SOIP.ey;hat -d-ifferently in \..Jashington; they are the re span.:.
? --------_ ..
sibilityof.different CIA officers in-the Yet all tbree
.
of.-p-;-;j.. be. to have on foreip1
. .
politics from the U.S .. perspective .. All three rely on the estnblish-
mcnt of clandestine relatioriships foreign nationals.
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In the-clandestine collection of. the purpose q
I tbe relationship is the gJtlterinr, of information. f.. CIA officer
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cstabl:i.5hcs a v:ith a nas5ct
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paid or unpnid
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in Cl. P"X:tY .or !;OV.qrnmcnt insU.tution in order to .find .out .v].hat is.
I
going on thnt party or institution. Yet even that kind of
;,
Photocopy
from
' .
Gerald R. Ford :library
--
.
... . -;,
. II.2
,
.. .... ....
- _relat{onsllip may_.ha.vc political :Siljniffcancc. Hitness the
of CIA"'contacts -viit.h the ChileanT!1ilit:iry after'the
. . .
:lnauguration pf.S4lvador Allende:. althoueh the purpose was infor-
'? .
1
.... ......
. !
.. mation-gatherin&,- the United States -- through the CIA --
\ ...
- . ..' . . . .
i._, ..
.its links to group most likely to overthrow the new President.: :...... :.
. I .
To do so was to v1alk a tightrope:- t;he distinction bctHeen col lee-: .) :..
. ' . I .; j
tin:g informat'ipn and ex.ercisinc:; iBhcrently hard to .::. <
.. . .. . . .. . . . . ... ' . . . . 1 -. X.-
maintain. ..Since Chilean mili t:ary petceived its actions. to be:,/\.. ;_)
. . . . . I
..;
... tosom2 degree,.contingent. the attitude ofthe. U.S. government,j.
those for exercising influence had be
. . .
'conse{ously manipulated.
. '
\vhat occurs t;:he rubric of "counterintelligence If may .be
more than collection. to -;\>1-lat is labeled.
e . .
- "covert action." The between them may bemore one 6
metho'd thanof intent.
E.O.13526,section3.3(b)(1)
.
...
Photo'copy
. t
G _from
erald R. Foralibrary
..
11.3
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..
. .

The purpose of this case is to describe and assess "the

e . .
ranr;e of. covert U.S. activities influenced the course a
poli t{cal events in Chile. Mast of the discuss ion which fallo.;s
,
is limited to activities run <IS :'covert

projects.
That category is itself broad. But it ccr tain clandest.inc
. ' .
activities with import<Int p6litical
... _-,11,:
..
.
.
.,
.
B: Covert Action in Chile: Hethods
rf
the set of activities labeled "covert action'' does not in-
American \vith political effects, tha:t
set is nonetheless broad. U.S..cover.t action i:-1 Chile encqmpas sed
.a. range methods_ and' affe_cted a \Jide variety of Ch_ilean institu-
It incJ.uJed _p,::LojE!cts.\7Uich regarcled as common practice
e. .:__.''plumbing'.' -- as Well 2S major efforts forti) by special
The following paragraphs will give <1 flavor of
range._
'
l. Propaga1ida
..
'l.
__ volume, the largest covert in C(lile J IL..____,
IE.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(l) I -I I E.O. lJ526, section 3.3(b)Cl) . I I_
I E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(l) I t
.. lt is relatively cheap. In Chile', it continued at i1 loH lCV?l dur-
'
11 l" h. 1 d ., . 1 . I
1ug norma t1mes. t en -was cran(e up to meet part1cu nr
or counter p.:{rticular <b.ngers.
. 1'bc most coumon form of a propagand:.1 project is simply the
.
dcvclopmcnt of
11
asse t5u in media \-,1110 can place t:iclcs
or lH:: to write them. Ti1e Agency provided to it::; [icl.d St.4tion5
, .
Photo copy
from-
GeraldR. FordLibrary
"'- J... ....t ..
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,
several kinds ofguidance about what $Orts of to emit.
. . . . . - - .
e.. one CIA project in Chile from on8 fiye '. I
media assets during the it (196S-i971).. Nost
,
. . . - . . .
of those assets.worked for a. major which the key
to CIA effoiis. Those assets virqie articles or -editori-
, I
als favorable to U.S. iri the (for example, critici-
zing the Soviet Union in the of:the Czechoslovakian
suppressed nei.]S items harmful.to the'u!1ited States (fo:r instance .
.about Vietnam); and authored articles.critical of Chilean leftists.
propaeanda material purpOrting to be the pioduct b rt
individual or group. In the 1970.electionl for. instance, the CIA
:used "black
11
prop.aganda\o.S0:1 discord het'l.y.een .the Communis-ts cmd.
' .
.
the Socialists and between the naticnal labor confederation and
..
.
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the .c:hilean Conrrnunist Party.
... '
In some cases, the form of propaean_da 'l.vas stillmore direct.
The S_tation finance groups i.lho. erected "t-lall' postersI
dut political' bi the ..and
in other street a6tivities. often these .
.. . . . . .
formed part of p.rojec.ts.intended to inflt.tence the outcomes
. .. . . '
. . .
of Chil_can elections but in at least one instarice the
activities.took pla6e in absence of an election campaign.
Of thirty.:.odd covert nctiori projects undertC1kcn in Chile.by
. , . .
the- CIA .bctvwcn 1961 anc.l 197Lf_,-- more= than a hal uozcu had pr-opa-
. .
as their principal activity. Propaganda 'l.vas. an important

.
.. -Photo Copy
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subsidiary part of m.::my more projects. '1.-lcrc
. ...
"'
p.ttractivc because each placement.mieht produce a 1nul tiplier
r being picked up and repla_ycd' by medj_a. outlets. other than
one in w!1ich it original_ly.came
. :"' .. .-...,
2.. t for Hedia
In to buying:propnganda piecemeal
1
. the Station often
itHholesale. by subsidizingChilean 'f!ledia
t? the United States. Doing so was propaganda larBe.
Instead of placins individual the CIA supported-- or even
. .. . . .
-- friendly mediaoutlets uhos.e tvo:ul0
of
Ao-.r::.ncy support" .. .. . .. .
have: heen questionable in the abseTice

.. 'IE.O.13526, 3.3(b)(l) I
From 1953 through 1970. the Station

. .
I E.O.13526,section3.3(b)(l)
From 1962 to 1970, support was furnished to a right-wing'week1y-.
. . . .
_According to the of former support
this newspaper tcnninated .it so
..
. ri&htist asto alienate responsible
\:
i the largest -- and probably the most significant
1
media was t]1c money provided
j. to El during the Allende regime. That support grew out
l
!
I
of an propaganda In l971 the Station jud0ed that
f
I
!
!
! .El r the moSt im;:>ortant publicationr not
. . . .
I
pressure from the Allende government, intc:rvcn.-
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!e.
Qopy
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'"u L.lurary
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: 'tiorl in the newsprint market the of-government.
e The au.thorizccl $TOO, 000 for El Mercurio 40
on September 9, 1971, and $965,bOO to authori-
. . . .
zation on .t\pril j 1971. A' CIP: post-morter.r concluded. that El .
Hercurio and .other media outlets. supported by the Agency had p1aYed
an ir.1portant role in setting stage for t:!1e Septenber 11. 1973,
.. ..
..
. . ..
'
.J _... Gaining influence inChiiean institutions and groups
..
. ..'Tnro_ugh its covert activities inq1ile, U.S. government
- ,
sought_ to influence. the actionsofa Hide variety of institutions
and groups in Chilean specific i'ntent of those
activities ran the gamui: fr'om at.t.empting to influence .directly the
. . .
e... of
policy t9trying to counter communist or let-
. t;ist in.fluence among organized grou.ps inthe satiety. That most
.
of theie projects included a propag?nda component is obvious.
From 1964 through 1966, the CIA.supp9rt;edI IE.0.13526,section3.3(b)(l) I
lto.t3526,section3.3(b)(l) I l.contac:t into the Chileun Socialist Party.
also the: means by \vhich an early attempt \\
7
:'15 made to develop an.
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the Ministry. Later, in the
!
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! sought to influence .Chilean policy through an asse.t \lhO \7as a llini--
i
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stcr in ihe President's Cabinet.
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with organized groups in Chilean society had
I
mbre than efforts aimed at govcr11ment_institutions.
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But the was sinilar: influencing the direction of political
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events in'Chilc.
Gopy
G . from ,
. R. Fordliorary

: ,:: ...
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,.
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--Projects were
of Chilean university stu4ent .from the
. .
... .
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. communists;
..
. ..
Supporting a group active in Chilean
.
.a.nd intellectual life;
--combatting the
.
Comfllunist-dominated
. .
Central..Unicc3..
. . .

. . . .
Trabajadores
.
Chilenos and supporting
.
democratic
... ..
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. . . . . .
.. groups; and
.
a civic action front .. group:to combat Comr.lunist
.
influence Hithin cultural and intellectual circles.
..
. 5. Major efforts to influence.Chileanelections
Covert- American. activity was a factor in every major
in Chile the decade between 1964 and 1974. In severa1
e ii1stances the United intervention massive.
'The 1964 Presidential election \lasthe rr..ost_ prominent ex'ample
ofa project. :The Central Intelligenc6
.....
more than million in of the election of the
' .
Christian Democratic in.partto.prevcnt the
the prcside.ncy of Salvador Allende. Nore than half of.
the Christian Democratic can;pai'0n . financedby the_
. . .
United States, although he 'i.-las never of this assistance.
l!l Station support an array of:
Chrrstinn Democratic stucle:!nt,.__women, professional .:md ant groups.
. .
Tvo othel. political pa::-tics were funded as \vell in an attcTilpt to
spread tl1e vote.
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from
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R. Ford Library
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.In Hashington' .:tn .election comnlittee 'hT.:lS. estab- .
-
e _ lished, compcsecl of Stat_e Department, Hhite Prouse imd CIA officials.
_That -vms par.:tllcled by iJ. inthe embassy in Santiago.
No-special task force was the but the
.Station in Saritiago was up. The Station ran an American-
. . '
. camp.:d.sn, Jhich included poll:Lng, voter and .get-
. drives, in addition to covert.
- . . . . .
-
The United States \vas alsoinv.olved in the- Presidential
campaign. Thateffort
1
. hm,.rever; smaller and d-irected More.at
. preventing AllendeIs elec'tion than at'e1.ecting another candidate.
0
.... .. . . . . .
:: Nor have U.S. irivolvements beenlimited to Presidential cam.;,
:.- .. __;.: .
paigns. In the 1965 Chilean for
--
$175,000. Ti.1e Station provided covert support to nu..'Tibcr of can-
' ..c.Ifdates selec_ted by the J..mbassador and .the Chief of Station. A .
.
CIA post-m6rtem suggested that the project did have.some impict;
.includinz the of a number o .FRAP.(leftist coalition)
candidates dm might othenvise_ rtave \v6n congressional seats.
. . ..
..
6'. Support for Chilean politi!=al po.r_t_:_:i.es
. .
Nost covert American support to Chilcon political parties
..
furnished as pnrt of-.specificefforts to .election out-
cowes. liO\.'e.vcr, in severalinstances the Cll\ ptovided subsidies
tb parties for more general p-urposes, 'vhcn.elections Here not
l!lincnt..Host such '!.vas dtwing tl_1c .Allende'years,
1970-1973, the U.s:. 8ovcrnmcnt jLtu0cd th<Jt parties o'f the
..
copy
from
GeratdR Ford ,_.b.
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might not SUr.vive either as'opp.ositiop clcr,1Cnts
.
e or contestants in $cvcra1 ye.1rs. m1ay.
In, a. sequence .of decisions in 1971 through 1973, tile Com-
$4 par-
ties ih Chile. Host of 'this money \lent to .the Democratic
' .
. Party (PDC), but: a portion for the National
Party (PN), a conservative grouping more stridently oppose.d. to the
. .
.Allende than tvas the PDC A :smaller amount Hent to t.he .
Party the Left (PIR) , 'tJhich l..Jas i:vooed
. - .
from the ru1ing.Popular Unfty coalition.
. ..
:. : funding of political parties on a large scale in i910-73
. was not. hov7ever. without antecedents' albeit more modest in scale.
,.n r";..___ .: ..-. ___, ... .:
"tv vUUUU...L.'I..I..<=.<.::J . Ul..llU1. .._-
e' zed.. hundred thousand dollars for the ef:f:ort to build .UP .
.PDC in anticip;J.tl(ln of 1964 elections. Small authorizations.
were. made, in 1963 and. 1967, for support to moederate elements
within the
.. ..
..
]. Support for private sector
As part o its of support for opposition elements
.-during .the govcr.nment, the CIA provided money to sevcr.:1l
trade organizations of the Ci1ilcnn private sector, In Septemb2r
197 2, for instance, the Lf0 Conuni ttee authorized 000 in erncr-
suppo1:t for an .ariti-Allendc manufacturers association. At
that tim2' supporting other private sector. H<J.S
s
but rejected bccau'se of the fc'ar that organizations

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Photo Copy
from .
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Gerald R. Ford library
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might: be involved in atiti-government strikes.
:The ConLrnittee authorized ,000 private sector
. -;
.
.iti 1972, as of March 1973 election .
.project: According.to the CIA,':that money. spent only on
. . . . .
. .
election such as drives and
out-the-vote drives. In August 1973, Committee
.. . . . . . '" .
..
support for private sector groups, but was conditioned
on the agreement of the and State Department. agree-
.-
. ment..-v1as nc;>t. forthcoming..
.. , . . .
. ....
- . -.
. . . ..
.. a. Efforts to promote a military coup
:United States covert efforts the course of Chilean
reached a peak .in. 0: . CIA.Has -'directed to under-
take an eff:ort to p{.:omot'e a militaryc'Oup in Chile to preventthe
eaccession to pov<er of Salvador Allende.. "That attempt, the so-
. . . . . . .
.called "Trnck II,".is the
.
subject of
.
separate
.
a Committee -repqrt
. .
\vi.ll be discussed in section IV be1m7. . A brief summary here
v1ill.dei!1onstrate the extreme in American covert. intervention in
. . .
..

.
On September 15, 1970 -- after finished first in the
but before the Chilean decided the President
. . . .
Alessandri, fhe runner-up -- Nixon met
. .
\-lith !Uchanl Helms, the Director of Centrnl Intelli8ence, I!er\ry
i
I
I
-
!
! and John Hitchell..Helms \-Jas directed to prevent Allende
frorn tnki.ng pov1cr. This effortHas to be concluctecl 'I.Iithottt the '
I
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I PhotoCopy
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R. Fordlibrary
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e of the the State Department .or the ..
Ambassador. .. . . . . .
.. ... .
.Itquickly became apparent. that a military coup v1as the
:way _to Allende's to The. CIA cstaplishcd
. . .. .
. 'several groups of military
p<;tssed to ..The CIA.krie.l7 that the plans ofall
. . . . . .
t_he plotters began 'tvith the abductionof the
.. ofstaff:of the Chi ;lean.Ar:rny I Schneider.. .The :
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . - -
. ;has about vlheth.er or not
Hhite House officials avl.;J.re of .t!1e coup plans and. the. fact_'
:thatthey all began "Ylith s. kidnap.
. On October 22 one. of plotters attempted to kidnap.
Schneider, Schneider resisted 1.;ras shot and died.
e.
.
The CIA had been in touch :with
I
that group 0
. r-
..: pl.otters but a week
had its .Support for the group'sspecific plans.
-.
Thecoup plotting collapsed .1.rid Allende Presi-
dent. Afterhis election. the CIA and lJnerica.n military at'taches
Inaintained contacts with the.Chileanmili.'t'ary. ostensibly only
. . . . . .. . :
' .
th': purpose.of collecting intelligence. Hl1ether or not in. those:
. t
.contacts American strayed into encouraging the militm.-y_
tomove t Allende; or "i7hether or not.the Chilcnn mili tc:1r:i
took to: act- aia.inst the Prcsident those con',;_
. . .
tacts cyen though U.S. did intend to provide it:
these are mnjor questions which arc inherent in U.S. covert.acti-
in the period of the Allende r;ovcrnmcmt.
Photo Copy
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..: J.l. J.L.
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C. COVERT ACTION AND MULTINATIONAL .
. between the_ CIA and co_!porations
. -
is, to the Agency, of the utmost sen'sitivi.ty.' Mult-inational or.
, . . . .
.coiporations provided significant
. t0 the CIA. Comp'any.personnel have pro'vided important for.eign
IE.O.13526,section3.3(b)(l)
. Large corpora-
L_
tions: have also serv:ed as contractors for intelligence
systems such as the U-2..
}1ul.tinational corporations have also be.en used in -connection..
with covert ope_rations.. Their. unique services have been used;
E.O.13526,section3.3(b)(l)
iri addition have been used, directly or .. t6

.
e.
do things which they viewed as in'the individual _interests of the.
. .
.. corporations ... ror exampleJ companies have ?r.
certain political parties oi.candidates. Such supp6rt
. . .
is perceived by the company' to _be in its individual
economic interest.
. ;
.
'The follmving is a brief description of the CIA's relationship
with such corporations in Chile in thi'period It
focuses o"n the relationship bet\veen the CIA and ITT. .Not only_
. . : . . '
,.
docs that appear td have been a but
.
a .substa11tial of rnatei{al was by CIA in
'"
connection \vith testimony taken by the_: Sub committee on l1ult "ina tionnl
Corporations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The CIA
Photo.Copy
from .

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pas- been reluctant to allow t he Committee to its files .
. -on _ot"her cooperating corporations. Even ;i.n .regard to the- CIA-
ITt relationship the staff has secure
documents or even The effo"rt is col!tinuing, with the.
. ..
hope 0 f exranding this preliminary :re'p cirt.
. . . . :
' ..
.... ; .
-1. 194 Chilean Ele6tions
..
_ the 1964 presidential campaig!!, representatives of
... . .
. ..
: muttinational corporations tJ:le. CIA with a proposal
. + .
_ to provide campaign_funds to the Chri-stian Democratic ._
The not to accept such funds as 'tvell as.other CIA con-
tacts. 'I.-lith multinational corpo-rations during that campaign_ are_ .
described in Part IV..
. .
..
2 . 1970 Chilea!! Elect i.ons
. In 1970. the CIA, other government agencies, and certain
. . .. . . . '.
multinational tions vere .. linked in opposi tl.on to _the candidacy
and later .the presid-ency. of Salvador Allende. Th{s CIA-multinational
.a
connection can be divide-d into two phases. Phase .I cncompas sed
. "' .
.
.
aC?ti_on.s taken by either the 'CIA or American-based multinational
...
- cornpanies at a: time \vhen official u.s. policy \vas .not to suppor.t .
. . .
. -even. covertly, in any _candidate or party in Chile. During this
,
the Agency vJas, ho).Jevcr! involved in a covert. n spoiling
Operation" designed to . \JOrk against the f>OSSible election. of
Allende .. II between the U.S.
....._ ;
Government _and on on? hnnd and multi-
national and on the o'tlic.r
September 1970 general election. During Phase II it
Photo eopy
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.. was government policy to oppose and to ..
an'y. oppos.ition elements t..Jhich might deprive him of_ the presidc.ncy.
.The governmE!nt sought,the cooperat ion of mul tinat im1a1 corporations
. . ' . . . . ..
.... . .
in this endeavor.
..

..
. .....
.: ..: I

. . ..
3. Phase. I .
..
.. . '
. A numb.er of multinational corpor:ati?ns Yiere.
..
. . .
aboutthe that Presidentof
<;:bile. All.ende had. in..r.tany public indicated his
" .intention, if to certain basi'c
.
. .
. and to bring under Chilean ownership such service industries as
. . .. . . . ..
.the national t_elephsme company. was atthat time..a. subsid.icrry
. ...
o,t'.International Telephone and Telegraph. Inc.
. In. 1964, Allende had been defeated and it \-laS widely knmm
both' in. Chile and \vithin the circ1e of American multinationa).. cor'po.ra-
.e tions having significant interests in Chile, that Allenqe's opponents
.
.were supportt?d by the United States Government. John McCone, a member
of ITT's Board..of Directors in 1970, kne\.r. of.the significant
.government' 1964 and oJ'the' offer of assistance made
. . . I '
at that time by Arrierican_companies. Agenc.y indicate that
.HcCone informed H.arold Geneen. ITT's Board Chairman, of these facts.
Leaders of American multinational corporati.ons \vith substantial
. . . . . .
i.r1tcre.s ts in Chile.together with other American ci tizcns concerned
about . to Chile .in the event of an Allende victory,
,.
U.S. Govcrnntcnt officials inorder.to make thci'r,.vic,.;s
. .
. .
knoHn. Specifically, Donald the Chief Exe cutive Officer
of Pepsico, Inc:. introduced Aur;ustin Ed\.Jards (the O\.Jnet of the
e.
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. inloent{al El chain] to both Attornei.Geneial
Nitchell and Henry Kissinger. Kendall regarded Edwards as an
e
important-and be able
j_nformation to the American th.e situation in. Chile.
In J0ly 197D the Stat{on Chief in met with
representatives ofITT (lnd, in a discussiono'f the upcoming election.
. . . . .
. . in-dicated that Alessandri could use financial assistance. The
.
.Station Chi.ef .further suggested. the name anind_{vidual who
. .
could be.used as a securecharm.e1 for getting these. funds to the
..
': Alessandri campaign.
: . thereafter J.ohn McCone Richard Helms.
.._As a. result of thiscall_ii _meeting was arranged bet\veen the
man of the Board o-f ITT and the Chief of Westel.-n .
-Division_of the CIA. Acc_o::-di!lg to a CIA memorandum, Geneenoffered.
to makeavailable to the CIA $1 millionto be used in support of .
. ' ,
.
the. campaign. This not accepted. The memoran-
.dum indicated further that CIA's advice \vas sought with respect _to
an irtdividual who might serve as a conduit. of ITT funds to the
campaign.
. ; ,
The CIA confin.l1ed that the indrvi?ual in question vias a
. reliable channel '1.-vhich could be used for 'getting. funds to AlessandrL
A. of funds..from .ITT to a pol-itical party opposing_
Allende! the Party, wai following. CIA
as.to ri funding utilizing two CIA assets in Chile.
These assets were also receiving funds in conncctioiwiXh
the "spo.iling" ope rat ion.
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DLiring. tl;cperiod prlor to the Scptci1;bcJ: clectio;1,
. . . . . . ..
. :sentativcs met v;ith Cll\ both in
e anc.l :i..l) the United ai1d CIA aclv-"isecl .ITT as to '"'Jys in which
. .
:. i C. t !?<1 fely channcl funds both to the Alle'ssc:mdri .cnmpaign
. . . . '
and to.the Party: CIA Has kept both ..to the:;
extent.a:ncl the1ricchanism of such . Ev6ntuaily least
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$350,000 was passed by.ITT t6 this campaign.
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. 4. . Phase 1I .....
Folloh1ing the Seytember 4 the Uniteq States
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gcw<:.rrimerit. adopted a.policy o s t:cd_ against
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Chl.l'e ariel .in.-this co.nnection sought to "corrd.{ the influencd of .
.ceneen,, on other American businessmen..Specifically,.the.
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by the 40 comrntttec to American
businesscis having interests 'in Chile to see if they could be.
in_duccd tC? _ta_ke ac_tions v1hich -'I.JOuld further the govero-
of in cGile.' There is no
i
that representp.tives of the CIA ever n1et \Jit.h ai}y
!
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oration other tl1r:1n ITT in a nu.Il)ber.
of meetings were held by re.prescntativps of American multi-
i
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nationals having business interests in Chile the.evidence t.s
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.. scantyand os to acti?ns ,.,ere_.undcrtakeri .as
a resul.t..o-f these,- Incet.ings -ai1d ,.;hich, if any, busirw_sscs.?th_er
. .
than ITT supplied money to inclividu<Jls in Chile to be used in
.
anti-Allcndc efforti. . . ,
------------------
)'r At one of meeting:>, on Scpl:ember -:::9, \H11i;un !)roc, Cld.cf
of llc:nd_spllen.: Divisi.on of the CTA lllCt: \.Jith EchJwnl
Gorrit:y or: J.'fT. Broc sought to h.:1vc ITT ilWOlvcd ,,in a lllorc active
\Jay" i.u Chile. Acconlii1L to Cli\ document:; "ITT toc1ic. 110te of tir.
prcsent.1tion on ccono111ic but did not t:oit
i n an<l ccj, vc \J <tv ." Copy
from
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One institutioi1 in Chile \vhich '1.-'.JS used in .J anti..:..
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United ?ta t.nnd ITT:we'rc funnc_ling money into the
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hands of issociatccl the paper
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J E.O.13526,section3.3(b)(l)
A great deal of testimony has heei1 taken or .thr> r1.bove ma.t-
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ters, Jni ly before ::he Subcommi.ttee _on Nultinationa 1 Corpor;<.:.
... . - . . .. . . . .
atio'ns and more r_ccently _in ,.,.ith the Track rr Chile
The material \rhich .be developed here for t'he
. . .. . . . .
. would involve the of
.: .. . J -
., be_t\-Jecn the CIA ITT J;.n_ the period to the_.September 1970.
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... .election.
.inquiry':is '"hether .ata. time
e. tlic of the .govcrnrncn_t \las neutrality and
to even coverE, .the
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was acting on its own to that an
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improper level of encouragement and assi.. tance furnished t.O I-TT
financial support of the .
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III.
CHILE: ASSESSHENT AND AUTHORIZATION
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e.
A._ Intelligence.Estimates ancl Covert-Action .
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,The intelligence conununity p.roduces seycrai kinds of assess- .
for policy... makers. Of these, the: most.imp9rtant are: National
_intell.igen_ce Estimates agreed assessm-ents of
and by the U.S. .intelligence
.
community. This.se_c.tion; on a review of NIEIs and other.in-
t;elligence Chile written during 1969-197-3,.
compares..the sequen<;:eof actions authorized during_ tha:t pe-
..
i"iod- tlY the in '.S best:estir.wtes of what an
government for U.S.
.' .
.. <..NTE's are approved. by the Intellig.ence Boa-rd.
. . . . .
: (USIB); di ssenting.agencies- register ..Prior co 1973,
.e a formal Board 9f National.Es.tima tes.supervised the.production of
drafts by 6ffice of Natiorialts timates. In .1973, that
..
structure was replaced by a sys-tem of Na.tional'IntelligcnccOffi-
-cers s), senior analysts drawn from the ClA and othe1: intelli-
gence agel!cies. .. . ..:
:There bcen.pei sistent of NIE's, and many of
these with the . new structure:
the documents are least-common-
. .
denominator. compro.mises and t1:tUS are of.'lit.tlc val\tC to policy mok-
. t 'hey oricntC'd tO\Jar cJ short-:tange prediction:; th;m
.
.
.-.-
:r Tbe!_;C inc ludc Intc11igencc produced by the CIA'H 0f-
fice of Cur rent InteLligence (OCT) and Noll'!> pro-
duced by the St.::tte Depart men t 's Burc.:H! o f :md ltt-
(INR) .
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assessments. Another criticism deals not with the NIE' s
e.
themselves but their It'is charged _that policy
makers ignore NIE's or them.onlj confirm
. . .
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. ... ..
_their pre-exi.sting policy ... ......_...=. . ... -:
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1. The NIE's
Between 1969 and 1973, five NIE's one in each
. . . . . . . . ' . .
year . l.n Augt.:st 1-970, one month before Al-lende won .the . Se-ptember 4
. . ...
election, the intelligence co'mmunity predicte_d
likely policies and goals of an Allende :administration:'':
a. .An Allende governr,;ent wol1ld move, gradually and
Marxist state in Chile. To tl1is,
n.Putra li.z:e., o.r ..ohtain .
e of the var ious gl:oups and -instit-utions which might block his prog- __
ress. Later NIE' s on Chile did note that the oppo:Si t_ion .t o Allende
-
' _in Chile facing- certain problems.
.
a 1971
.
Chile NIE
:stat.ed that: 'the consolidition of Harxis:t leader ship -in
Chiie \vas not. A 1972 NIE noted that . the traditional
political _system in to remarkable.
s t udent , trade u n ion elections con-
to take place in normal fas hion, with pro-govcrhment foiccs
the results when they were adversi. oppdsi-
tion ne-vrs m.edia bad been able to resist government _intimidation and
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These were made by the intQlligcnce in
response to National Security Study NcmoraJH.l.um (NSSt--1) 97. That
response . grcw out of n 1970 NIE.
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. _ _: in denouncing the govei-nment. The 1972 NIE concl'uded
e that the most likely. course of events in Chile the_ year
oi. io moves by Allende toward the pace of his
revolution in order toaccommodate the opp.osition andtc; preserve
..
. . . .
he had Firially, a NIE
stand-off in Chile to the mosi likely co?ise
. .-
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the
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0
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. . .
_ One of Allende's goals would be the expulsion of_U.S.
..
influence from Chile_, although he would try to avoid a.
. ..
of the U.S.
. .
Later NIE
1
s coi1firmed the predict ion_
. .
that- U.S. rels;1tions would be.dominated by the problems _
. . .. . . . .. . .. . . .
of_ but so men tiorte"d.that seemed. to
v7ish to_avoid a confrontat-ion (1971)':' had taken pains publicly
. . . . . . . . .
to strC;SS his-_desire for amicable relations \vith t-he United
0
(1972), and had kept lines operi to Washington on
Chilean for expropriated S. copper ..(1973 )..
. . . . . .... . . .
,
- c. --Allende would seek to with soci al -
ist countries. As later NIE
1
s.pointed out, Al-lcnde did expand-
ChileIs relations Hith communist countries, although he had been
careful not to subordinate Chilean t,o any or
. . . . . .
socialist power or to break'
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existing tics with non-communist na-
. . . , . .
.
t
tions on \-lhom he continued to rely on for aid 0971): Chile NIE's
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_in 1971_and 1972 ch;1rting Dn i!lde-

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pcndent, . nnt ic course for Chile.,both witb in tbe hcmi sphere .
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. and internationally. Allende was, in shor.t,.conuni.t.tedto a
non-alignment.
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d. Allende \Wuld establish'close ties w:lth Cuba.. tater
NIE's -the nature of the Cubari-Chilean ieiationship; A
1971 NIE that the Allende
of distance and Fubi: And,
. . .
long personal Alleride _
Allende h?d. refrained from overtuies to him.
. .
_... In addition, .a 1972 NIE noted. that Havanna had been circtlmspect. :. :
. .abol)t tryingto use Chile. asa for revolution
'
. throughout Latin America:.
:
e. The Soviet presence in Chile under Allende c::ould expand
i.n m.=my different \Ja.ys, but theestablishment- of a major oerma-
nent-Soviet military presence ,,,ould be unlil:ely. Later NIE's
. . . .
confirmed this vieH. Al971 NIE stated that although thE:_Soviet
0
Union would to cultivate channels of into
.Alleride's government through Chilean _Comrnunist it
... '\vould be unsure of its to make a
on kij issues given fot
That satn!? NIE noted that neither Alle'ncie nor thech.ilean milita:ry-
'CStabli s hnient tolerat e a Soviet n1ilitary
in Chile. A 1972 Chile NiE focused on the Soviet attitude
0
to the Allende reg:Lmc. Itrioted that Soviet overtures. tQ Allende
..
,. had . thus far been ch.arcicterized by cmition and r _cst raint ..This was, in
I .
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part, to Soviet reluctance to ant.1goni 2e the U.S .. nnd, more .
i.mpoltantly, a Soviet.desire to avoi.cl with Allende the typeof.
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. commitment foi'.. that they had entered irito with
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.cuba. A 1973 NIE also noted that the .Soviets did not \Jant
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another. Cuba on their hands:..
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f. probably avQ{d the risk o1 disceinible .
Chilean subversi0n in other rluring the period
in 'Hhich he \7as trying to himself in___129'!.-7e.r in Chile.
A 1912 NIE confirmed this shbrt-term prediction.
. . . .Allende. had gone great convince his Latin 'American
. . .. . . . .
.neighbo.rs did not. shar.e Castro's goal$
although some in Chile had rec:eived arms .. .
and funds from ext'remists in his p'olitical coali tio,n, this had
.
-prob2bly not occurred at Allende.' s behest.
e g;The 1970 .of _the lil<,ely policies goals ofan
",
Allendeadministration also . inclvded astatement concerning ' the"
. . threat a Marxist in Chile \JOuld pose to the
..
. States. It sta ted that the United State s .had. no vital national
int?rests Chile, the world militari power woul d
be by a!! Allende government, and an
victoq in Chile 'Would not pose any likely threat to the
,pea.ce o the region. The intelligen.c .e community noted, . h?wever;
that a.n 'Allende victory would threaten cohcs:i.on ai19. ..
'"'oul.d repre sent a psychologic.al set-ba ck to the U.S. a.nd a .definite
advance for the Marxist
..
NIE's and Covert
0
As a result of this look at the Chile NIE' s, a number of corn
ments can be made thc.m .::\nd their relation to
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about covert act ion':
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a._ Despite the community' .s . vies that the U S.
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-had-tio yital national interest in thile,
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the was bf
: the_'Exe'cutive Branch to.. in that:_ natio-n's intern.al, 'p'o-
. . . . .
f
1itical and economic affairs: 14 and October 24,
1970, CIA, at President N:lxon's att_empted to pre- .-
. . . . . . .
-.
d.'etat_in Chile . A v1ide - ar_r-ay_ of p, S. ecqnomic press1..1:es ini-
to assure_t _hat_Allende's economic probJems woul? as
: . a major_ And, betV:7een Harch 25, 1970 20,-
. -
1975, the 40 Committee authorized ne.arly nine million dollars for
. . . .
CIA covert operations Chile. of this total, over six mil-
....
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'.1i6n dollars Mas spent.
e.. this -analysis, _the Chile NIE's _were ei.ther, at b.est.-
selectively-used o_r' at oy- makers '\Jhen
.
the time.came to make deci-Si?TIS u:S. CQVert involvement
in Chile... 40 _Committee c;iecisions regarding Chile_reflected
concern about the internal at).d internati onal consequences of an
Allende government was reflected in tha intell igence .
.... . .
actibn decisions-were __not, in $h6rt, cbns i stent with intell i -
,..
gence estimates.
.-
b. the fact that, with one norie of the
NIE
1
; contained a footnote, -the_ estimates _not appear
f:o ent a vJotered- dovin , leas t.--common- dcnom;ihator app'!:'oach.
The estimates did, h6wcver , contain as sessments and piedictions

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which C:9.uld have been.in'terpr_eted by pqlicy makers to 'i.vhat-
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ever conclusions they wished to draw from them.' The were,
. .. . ' . . .
.in this somewhat like theB:i,bJ.e-.,.al_i things to all people;
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
They served to narrow the of uncertainty about futureevents
. .. . . . . . .
in Chile, and thus riar;ow the rangepfj_ustifi.abie_U.s.
:But a range remained. -
. . . .
.:For example, a 1971 estimate stated_-that, on.the hand,
' . ' . . .. . .
',.. ..
Allende_was moving his
l:. . .
goal of building. a revolu-tionary_nationalistic, socialist. society
..
on ?1arxist -principles, but, on the:other. hand, the consolidati-on
. .. . . . . .
Mari{st in Chile not inevitable;
and Allende had a long:, hard -r..7a.y to goto a.chieve t}:lis: As a
.. . . .
:fur_thtr example, a 1973 NIE -r..-1hi ch _addressed_ the possibility_of ep. -
e hanced Soviet influence in Chile stated that the Soviets 1.-Je re in-
. .'i:erested both in increasing their influen-ce. inSouth America and
.
' . .
in Allendes successful coalition.of l.eftist.parties. asa model .
for a !'lar.xistreyolution through the estimate tvent
on to .f>flY that the_ Soviets di.d. not want anothe_r,Cuba on thC::ir. honds
and that the Sov;Lets '"'ere reluc.t a n.t to ant2.goniz e the U.S.
. .
.c. Director Colby
1
s July 14, . 1975 briefil)e of the Select
. .
Committee.on Chile both intelligence information and
intcrpre.t_ati. o.n not in the Chil-e NIE's the other inteili-
r,ence repo:rt5 reviewed in.this.. study. A possible
for this.omi'ssion isCIA compart mentati on. Ana lys ts and
operators oftencxist in worlds.
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e to the. ., Intelligence Directorate. As . a .result, those 'who
. v1ere responsible for preparing NIE
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s. on Chiie may have denied.
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cess. to .certain inforrnat ":'hich could have. added to 9r subs tan-.
revised .t :heir and p--redictions . .
although the degree of .information bet\.Jeen
. . .
. .and opeJ;ators is unclear, it 'is .cer_tain analysts .
. .
weJ;e not privy .to informatfon concerning covert operations approveCl
..
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the and being irnplemel!-.ted in .by the. CIA op-era-
flaw it foi thai the
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,'1972 assessment of the durability of 6ppoiition writ-
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.ten ,,ithout of covert A.'Tierican funding .of precisely
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those sectors .. Thus, there no i-vhether those sec-
tors would
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. Bett.;een April and 1974, . CIA's consultatfon with

. its 1 ight. cornmi.tt<:;t:;S- -and/ thu;, Congrcs; I . .
. .
cise of its. oversight furict.ion--appeared to from pe_rfunctory.
. . . . . . . . . .
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to Thet"e may have been ins tan.ce_s of perj.ury. .
. . .
Beginning 1973, . publ i c allegations made con-
. cerni1_1g -?-Cti vi ties undertaken .by the CIA in Chile. . In.
. .
Congress began to assume controt' .in the exercise of its
oversight function_,. Vlh.ich it had badly n.e.f)lected .in .the pa;t ,. both
. . .
in the number anci !d-epth of consultations viith the Central Intelli-
. . . . .
gence Agency. to 1973 there ..twenty r.1eetin'gs between
. .
Congressional Committees and the.. CIA regarding CJ:lile; these meet..:
,.:ere _held bef?rc House :and .s.enatc Armed Services and .t:..ppro-
e .. their. Intelligence Subcor.un:i.ttees. . From
March 1973 so December 1974 there were t.hirt_een l1eld not
only before these Committees, but aiso before the Senate Foreign
. . .
on .Nul tination.al Corpora.tions and the House
Foreign Aff.airs Subcommittee. on Affairs.
. . . . : .
B.ased 'on CIA records, there were a total of formal.
CIA..:.Congressional on Chile between 1964 and 1974, At.
twenty of these meetings, there 'was s'omc .discussion of covert ,ac-
t:ton. because the Conunittee not yet . receivqd access
to , the complete CIA Legislative Journal entries or memoranda
-- .
for record on .these it is tp
either the scope, nature or the content of the CIA's pres entations.
From information currently in the possession of the and
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e..
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on important occasions the CIA did no't report .on covert
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action until long the it omitted
important, highly operations, outcomes
. .' . . . .. . - . . .
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which could' have and impact ort both
. . . . . . . .
arid .foreign affairs. .. . : .
Of.the covert iction Rrograms in Chile
. .
with 49 approval- during.the perio,d 1964-1974, Congress
. .
was briefed. in some. on eig11t.. Presumably twenty-five
others tvere simply undertaken Hithout'congressional consu.ltation.
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These t'tventy-five proj included. :. the.expenditure in 1971 of
. . . ..
$L1 million, half .of which "jas . to purchase radio stations
. . . . . . . . .
and newspapc:::-s the other half went to. support-munici'p-a.l' c-an-
e .didates and anti-Allende pol'itical parties; and the additional ex:..
- pend.iture .in late 1971 oi $815-,oooto provi d e s upport.._to oppo s it i on
.. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .... .
partiesand private-sec tor for.the Ma rch congre.s-
elections.
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Of.the overall total do llars actua;ly
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spentby thec:r.A on L, Q Gonunittee- approved covert a ction ope ra t i on s
in'Chile betweeri 1964' and
. '
ing before, some times
.ing.abol.tt .five million.dolla rs..
were not consulterl on
ert action operations 'tlhich 'tverc
mit lee- - the Track II att empt to
Congress received kind of
after. the on proj e cis t otal -
Furt he r , Congr.e ssional ove rsig h t
. . . . .
two high- ri s k, cov-
not revi ewed by t he full L, Q Com..:
. . .
foriwn t . a mili t ary coup in 1970 and
e n l ater CIA project involying \l ith. Chi1c nn 111ili tar y of ft -
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. .IV.. MAJOR COVERT ACTION PROGRANS AND .THEIR EFFECTS
.
This sectioD outl:j._nes the major of covert action
. .
by.the United States in by period. In
instance, covert acti,on 1-Jas' an. instrument of States
. .,, . . . . . . . . . . ' . ' .
. forei'gn policy, decided at the.highest_level:sof the
Each to sets forth that pblicy context. With-
OUt it . it is.impossibl.e tOunderstaT).d ac_tions..
l-Je_:;e After a discussion of policy; each subsect.ion
elaborates the covert act:Lon methods andtactics employed {n each
case. Finally, the effect of eachmajor program is asscs.sed, .
.The section begins with first major United Statescov-
ert.action in 1964 presidential elections.
.
.A.' The 1964 ?residenti"al'Elections
' .
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l .. United States 'Policy .
. .the United States 'ms involved on a.mass{vf.:! scalein the l96lf
presidential election in Chile. The Special Group authorized over
. . . ..
million dollars during the .1962-1964 period to prevent'th_e
.el.ection of a Socialist or Cominunist. candidate.' A total of
.
l)early mill:Lon was onsom7 fifteen cuvert ac-
,. tionprojects. ranging from ?rganizing slum to .
funds to.volitical parties.
..
..-:The goal, broadly, \vas to prevent or minimize the influence
. - .
of Chilean or Marxists in the government. thnt would
. \
. . .
.emerge frmri the 1964election. Consequ_ently, the U.S. sou'ght th e
most effective 1-:ay of o'pposing FRAP (Popular Action Front), nn al.-
i- -liance o'f Socialists, Comr1un:i.sts. anc1 other p<nt1es of the
..
. .
..
. \ .
' .
. Pho,tpCppy
rom .
GeraldR. Fordlibrary
...IV.2
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....... .-_ . : . . ... .
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.. . , , ' . . . '. r ,
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left Hhich backed the candidac:y of Sa.lvador Al).ende. Specifically,
the policy involved supporting the .Christian Democratic Party; the
. . - . .
.
(a conlition.of par6ies), and a
of anti-communist.pr.opaganda and organizing activities.
..
..
' .
.. The groundwork.for the ele'ction was l.3.i.d early 1961 by est.ab-
.. . . .
,., _ . .
lishing operational relati.onships '.tith key poiiti.cal partiesand by .
: organizational mechanisms
Projects that had
.. ' . : . ' . ..
.conducted Since the 1950I 5 among peasantS; slum dweller:S;' organized
. . -
labor, students, and the media provided a basis for much of_the.pre-
- .. - .
election -action.
' , : -.
The mairt facirig the United two years
. : , the election v7as the. selectionof.a party and/or candidate to sup-.
e.:port.agains.t the left..:.vling alliance. The CiA presented_t\vO papers
to the.Special on April 2, 1962. _One of these p-roposed the
. . .
. support of the Chri$tian Derilocratic Party. The other prop.osed sup-
. .
port of the Party, a the right of the Christian
The Special Group .approved
..
this strategy appears.to have begun as an to hedge bets and
support two candidites for President, it evolved into a- strategy
designed to support the Christian-Democratic
.on August 27, 1962, the Spccial .Group the use of D.
. .
tl:ird- country funding charme'l, authorizccJ $130,000 in fiscal
1963 for t:he Chile.an Christ ion Dc1:1ocrats. The pref_erence of:
the Kennedy Administration had.been for n. ccritcl>riGht government
e. i.n .Ch.i consi.st ing of the Radicnls on the r:i.ght and the Christ ian
. , . ...
.. Photo Copy
,
from . .
R Ford!;ibra;,,
.
. . .
. .
. . .: . . . . .
.. . .
... . .
Democrats in .the center. However, events in Chile in 1961-
. e the .. creation right-wing alliance th.at in-
. : i
throughout . 1963, the States funded both the Christian Demo-
crats and the right-wing:coalition, the Democratic Front.
After a .by-election in May 1964 destro'yed . the
the U.S. threw its:support fully beh{nd the Christian Democratic
However, 6IA funds subsidize the Radical
in order to enhance the Christi.an Demo.crats' image as a
moderate part.y being .attacked from the right as well as
.
'the left:
.
. -:
2. Covert Action Methods
. Covert action during the 1964 campaign \vas composed o f t \.J'O
. e major elements. One \vas direct finaq.cial support of the Christian
campaign. The . CIA unde nrrote s l i ghtly mor e
.
than half . of
the tot'al cost of that campa ign.
.'
:After debateJ the Special Groupdecided not to inform the
Qhri stian Democratic c andi .dat e Eduarqo Frei qf American cove rt.
. support .? campai gn: . A number of intermediaries were t here-
. fore mobilized to the money to the Christian Democrats. In
addi tion t he subs idies for t he Chr i s tian Democ rati c Part y,
Sp_ec.ial Group allocated funds to the Radica l Party and to _priy.at e
citizens' groups.
--,-
' .
.. .
In .i o support for . pol i tic? l t he CIA moun ted
a massive anti-communi s t pr opcJga nda campair,n. Ex t e n s ive use l Ja.S
. P.hoto copy
: . ... \
. from
'. Gerald R. 'Ford library
:
.
made of the press,
. I
radio,
. .
pamphlets,
.' .
posters,
..
leaflets,,
e -direct -paper streamers, wall_painting. It\vas a
"terror
11
. v1hich relied heavily on imag.es of Soviet tanks ..
' . . . .
.. .
and Cuban firing squads, and was pitched especially to womeri. Hun-
. . .
ofthousands of copies of the pastora_]. letter.-.
of Pius XL were distributed by Demdcratic
Th.ey" carried .the designation, "printed privately.by citizens with-
out political-affiliation, in order :morebroadly to. diss.emil)ate its
content." Dis information and "black propagandJ. "--material which ..
purported. to origina te from anOther . such as the Chilean Com- I
munist used as
..
-fh_e propaganda. .v1as enm.. mous. During.the first we.ek
- . . . . .
CIA-fu!lded propaganda produced .tv:enty"radio spots per day in
Santiago and on 44
broadc.asts five time daily on three Santiago stat.ions. and
. cial out1ets; thousands of cartoonsI and much paid press. advertising.
. . I . .
By the end o(JuneI the group produced 2 .lf daily in Santiago
. and the provinces, 26 Heekly "corrunentary". programs, and 3,000 posters
c,
daily. study of the 1964.effort, the
CIA holds th<1t the anti-communist scare carn.!Jaign \vas the mostef-
undertakcn .6n bqhalf of the Democratic
Candidate.
rhc proriaganda campaign. conducted internationally_as \vcll,
..
. . . . . .
rcp?rted an endorsement 6f Frci by the .sister of a Lbtin
.._
American. a _public letter from a former pr.csidcnt in exile
. , . Photo Copy
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. . ..ra,u Ford library
1. .. ..... '" .-'
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. 'the U.s:; a [i}essage from the 'l.vomen .of Venezuela";.and dire 'l.varn-
e ipgs about an Allende victory from .figures in mil'itary gov- :
. .. . .
... . . .
.. ernments in' Lc:itin America.
The CIA ran politi6al independent the
.
Christ;:ianDemocrats'. campaign in a number of importantvoter blocks,
incl.ud.ing slum peasants' .organized- labor; and dissideFlt
Socialists. Support 'l.vas given to _an:ti-Comrriunist" of the
Radi<;al Party_ in their efforts to positions. of influence
..
.in the partyhierarchy, to. :prevent the party fr:om thro1.ving its
_support behind Allende.
.
. . .
. . .. .- .
. ...
.
3. CIA Organization 1n the ChileanElection
. .
The CIA .regards. the organizat;:ion.ofthe election project as
one of the triumphs of that project. Iril\Tashington.an
e
committee was established, consisting of the Assis.tant Secretary
of for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas }1ann_; the Hesterh Hem-
isphere Divisi6n Chief .of the CIA, Desmond Ralph . .
. . . -- . .
.and 1-IcGc;orge_Bundy from the \\fhite.House;. the Chief of the .\.Jestel-n
Hemisphere Division Branch. Four, the Branch: .that has jur-isdiction_
over Chile. This_group.-v1as :ln close touch I..J ith the State Department
office of Eolivian and Chilean Affairs under Hilliam T. Dentzer.
In'Santiago there '\vas .a par_allel Electi on Commit tee that coordin3.
.
U.S. . efforts. It the Deputy Chief.of Missi6n, Joseph John
Jova; the CIA Chief ofStation; and the heads of.the Political and
-
Economi_c Section's, as the Ambassador. The Eicc.tion Commit-
tee in ijashington coordinated lines to authority and to the
e. field :1nd other agencies. No special. task.fo rce was csti:l.blishcd;
.. ____ ___ .. _.
Gerald R. Ford t.ibrary
"."j
..
...
.
\ .., ' a
..
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..
... . .. . ,
.. .and the CIA Station. in Santiago \vas tempor_arily iricreased only by
three officers .
..
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4 . . ."Role of Hultinational Corporations
A group of American businessmen fn Chile o.ffered to provi_de.
one and .a million dollars to be administered .and disbursed cov-
ertly . by the . U.S. Government to pr.eve:nt from winning. the
1964 election.
. .
..
This vent to the 303 Committee (the name of the special
. .
. Group \vas changed in June 1964) which decided not to ac;:cept of-
. fer. It decided that . offers business could n:c;;t be. ac:-
. . .
cepted, as they were neither a secure way nor honorable way,
. .
doing -busine ss; According to .a current . CIA official, this decision
.. \oiCi.S a o( polity \;hie:l1 Set (he p::-ecedent of refusing t:O
...
. .
e.e1c.cept CIA and private business. CIA
n10ney passed to . t'he Christian Democrats through a
. . . .
. .
private businessman., represented as yrivate money.
5: .Role of the , Chilean .Military
.
-According to the_ CIA records i on July 19' 1964 the Chilean .
Defense which is the of the u.s. JCS, went to
to propose a coup _if Allende Won. This
-offer Has transmitted to the CIA Chief. stati_on, \Jho told
Chilean Defense touncil through an intermedia ry that the United
States was opposed. t..oa coup_. _ On July 20, the Deputy
; .
Chief of Hiss ion at the U.S. Embassy was appr oache d by a Chi l ean
Air Force who threatene d a if Allende won. The DCM
e
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PhotoCopy
from
GeraldR. FordLibrary
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...
..o.g. a d' tcit tl}erq nO. ..
' . . .
. cet it... a jClurnalist.l .. ttj
e . .
S.t<atiQf:"l. R<ttd:ieal c.and.idate.,. several.other .
. !:.:to.

.....
:oi .. : . said this.group g
.. V,Q,l;!l;_Q <! (fQ't:,!:f tf.Al:le:n.d:e:, Q'r i.fFre:i vlQU. and sou.ght
: ...... .._1;._ ,.;.._..;...,__..:: ... -r:r. .. . : '1;'; . : . f .
. --:": ...... ..... .r.::art:J;.. 0 tu.e
. ntlli.t:acy._.
. . . . . . : . .. . ' . . . .. :' . . . .... . .
<e:ltltti.cm. i.f.t:h.e.- s:t:at'es.
u.:
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ttl).ce ... .. ..... ..
....
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:... tiktt U;.. w:rabJlE.cll Eduardo..
. . -:: . . . . ' .. . . . . .
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1Ft..)),:tt<D eeitt<EhlliiQ.:ln ,@r. a:tt t:fre:..rra.gnb-orhood
.. .1ilh1lt ntal})' mrcms-:t:l'GUt::$ auimur:tr fo-r
. . . ..
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4Js:t: 119;61(\{A:.rJ.<t>. t.t.M..cU ttli1ma:afl1a:n, iim DaaaJ2 anrrCbngrcs.:.
ctn-N.I}'fu1:5&:5lfs., tUit2 1J9:YiQJ HJ:1n-R-didtu1tiliali.J. a<Jml!ai;p.n-:,. and. .
tthvt: nna:s:iil:tmaw... _of' CIA ...
. \E.0.13526,section3.3(b)(l) j

Flt:turrdh::td5:)J1l.c.m1tni::1:iutGd' ro the U.S.
1 .
ll9J.Q:J r::..:w'siiv.O prt.!'-nJ.:ection
I , . ' t
f'hoto Copy
...
. from
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GeraldR Ford
. "LI..,rary
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oe I
. B. Covert Action DuriilB 1964- J. 969
During the the. election'oi: Democratic
.. . . .
President Eduardo Frei in 1964 and the presidential
paign of 1970, the conducted a of covert activities in
. . . . .
Chile. Operating withiri sectors of society,
ities v!ere allintended to strengthen groups tv-hich supported Pres-
dent Frei and .opposed leftist influe.nces. .
. ..
. The CIA spent.a of a+m9st $2mii1ion'on covert action in
..
Chile during this period, of which one--fourth was covere.d by 40
authorizations for specificpoliticalaction .efforts.
The CIA conducted a score of covert actionprojects Chile
during these years.
1, . Covert Action Hethods
In February.1965 the 303 Committee approved $17 5,000 for
a pol itical action project to provide covert suppor_t
to selecied carididates in the March 1965 Congres sional
in Chile. According to.the CIA, t-v7enty-t-vm candidates l;.rere
by the an:d the Ambassador. 9 were elected.
.The up to T3 FRAP candidates who would other-
. wise have c6ngressi6nal seats.
. . .
Another election effort auth.orized in July 196B, in.
preparation. the Harch 1969congress ional election. The Lf0
Committee $350,000'for-this effortwl.th the cctive
ot moderate fhc 1970
dential election. The consisted of providing financial
.r.upport to candid<.ltes, supr>orting t1 Party in .
enr1r.,. t:" rr t r ><:: :n,,n v. fr()tn./\.1 1c' .n ' :. Socia1ist }">art: v.
GeraldR. FordLibrary
I
. ..1- v ;/
. .
-.gnndo _activities, nnd assfsting independent groups. .TheCIA re-.
gArdcd the clcct: _im) c'ffort as relatively effective; ten.of .the
. .
twlcvc candidates selected for their rnces, includ-
.. . . . .
. . .
ing one very unexpected victory:- The ;upport provided to the
. . . .. . .
, S6cialisc group deprived the.Socialist Party of a mini-
. .. :: . . '
mum of seven
,
...Tre. 303 Commi-ttee also apprbved $30,000 in'1967 to strengthen
of Radical Paity.
I ,
. A number of other political actions not requiring 303 Committee
. . . . ..
. \
approval \:ere conducted. .ThQ pro]etf.to the. effecti
Party and to subsidize .the
..
.pn:rt}t during the 196Lf elections continued into late 196? or 1969,
.. as did a project to key members of.the Socialist Party
. .
. :r.....
""'"'l'"'A"''-' PU"""'""" S"'".;...,,..;..,..., ..,,-, .rl "'''a" ...f..-.-."""'
4lool . ....... '-.<Lto." : J. ........... V.._U .....
_A . 1968 C!A conducted a. p;-oj to influe1l.ce the policies of the
..
- (V
' 'Ch:i.lcan gov.cn\ment through an asset who Has a ministf!r in the
Cubinet.
. :_Co_vart nction efforts conducted clurir1g this period.to
influence the political development of va rl.ous sectors of Chilean
.One .proj cct. I /E.O.13526,section3.3(b)(l)
I E.O.13526,section3.3(b)(l)
Ghxistinn. Democr<:ttic support among peasants and sl'um-
. to t.rain .and organize.


und trt'ltil public iof CIA fun.ding .
i .n 19(\7 for-ced its A project to compete- organizat ion.Jlly
\Vi.th nmottt; the trrb<wt poor of was initiated
. '
...
. '
.. Photo Copy
from
Gerald.R. Ford Library
.1u '
'
'shortly aft;er the 1964election, and \-Jas mid-1969
because the was to the
ependentposture of the qrganization by.using i:t on.a large scale
- . . ! Ill
..to deliver votesir.. "th21969 and 1970: presidential elections. .F-rom
1962 to 1966 CiA SUI=Jported anti-CO!l111J.Unist group active
. . , .
.: ..
.in Chilean political ahd life.
. .. . . . . .
Twopr'?jects \wrked thin o'rganizedlabor.in Chile. One;'
:which hegan during the 1964 election period, v1as a labor action.
.-
. combat the Central Unica de
' . ;: . . . . . . .. .
.. (CUTC) and to support democratic labor groups.
. . . . .
Anot.her p:;-dject- \vas conducted.in the Ca!=holic labor fie1:d..
Seven CIA projects during .this. period supported media .
. . : .
:Or1e. begun 1953,. :ttw K0.. H
. I IE.0.13526,section3.3(b)(l) I I 1.-hich-:;.;.::s an
e of the 1964 election effort. :supported
activities through wall posters attributed to fictiti ous g.roups
. ,
leaflet and public
A supporied a we ekly
_____ s ci r cu1 on, de - .
. .
: . clined thereafter but it an of the
paign during and for a time a fter the 1970 election c ampaign.
Another project fu.-'1ded an a sset \vho produce d re gul a r radio po-
litical comment_ary shows attacking the political parti es on the
Jeft and c andidates. Aftei th6 Soviet in-
6f Czechoriiovakia, this a women's march on.
the Soviet: Embas sy ;.-1hich led tp the ass.:iulting ofa Soviet diplo-
mat. major. police action, .:l.ncl mass media cover age. Ot hCl" assets
funded under thi s projec t placed e ai t oria ls alrn6s t
.
Photo Copy
from
GeraldR. Ford-Library
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l
. . dei1Y !n .rn i-13 . Chile I 6
.
mnjor ncvrspoper
.
and' after .1968'
0
e ovct the. content of that p:Jper IS in-

. t
. .
CIA cove-rt relations with Chile :s in-
tg!'n?.t $et'ViCCS; .. A_ liaison . proj CCt
. . .
serrvice, conducted from 1959 .until
. .
lts primary purpose
.. .
(;IA in collection. Hm-1ever, .
- . .
E.O. 13526, section 3.3(b)(l)
..
Wil)5 .t[Ql. :ii.mJ . hy mee-ting the
"' '
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. <;t'l;"l)Ql . ..
. : Q,f .
..
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W;(NiiC n;: ODiUl:ttt<?-riri:g,
Q,Jt a:tlt'.d:l 0Jll:g:<:tmi!.z.:.J.Jtt .iim:t:r:
. . .
.. 11-til.. ir;_: :i:ims;l!:an-.c:.:c-,; t 0f t h.e
ttQ: <:!1 Q-JI. ]a.g::iiu.:iimwl! e
e
}Ji)hfoi tJ..R) qQIHI{Q.. Q Q'![flc;<tt!}iVCC1JY, W:ii !.{]} (C ct{(l lJllYll..!ll'l lii !J:t::- cd'mnin;l.l:C'..' cl
.. . . ,_ . . Photo Copy
--- .......__..:____________... ..:_..
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..The_propilganda' projccts.probably had.a substant i.al cumuiat ive
.
6ver these both in helping to public
e. opinion conce_rning the nature of ..the -threat by conununists
and.other and in maintaining an propaganda
during the 1960's
ready to be us.ed.in the l970 election campaign.'
..
AStat;e Department officer involvedinChi.le suggested to
the Committee st.aff that one effect of CIA activity d{Jring these
may have been to induce the.National Party to run its qwn
. candidate in 1970, rather 'than to support some sort of allianc"e
..
with.the Christian Democrats. _By court"ing the right .
various of itscovert action effor.ts the CIA ha.ve
. .
the. impressi.on that itcould b_e a viable a'lternativ:e to the PDC, .
and thereby indirectly aided.Allende_:s victory. Horeover,: in.a
cp'-tintry where arid "anti-
imperialism': claimed almost universal s'upport' the persis.terit.
that the Christian Democrats :and other parties ' of
the. center and right v1ere linked to,. tqe CIA may have underc.ut
!or
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C01127965
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1: . : United States Policy andcaverr Action
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Early .1969, . .Nixon a
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Latin labelled by "Action for Progress. It. was to
rhe for the. .. . ...
'ized pa_temalistic. and InS'tea.d,.
to .seek ..mature with Latin American .
1
i .'.. . and the
' . .
. . .. Alliance were to droppee\; .the United itself
prepared to deal foreign governments pragmatically. .: .. .
. ... . . . . .. . ... . . :. . ..
. The ur{ited Stat-es of action_in the . ..
. . ..
Chilean elect.ions this. l _ess Neverthe-
_less. that cove;t vement was . . It; 1970,
that t?.e . United support. any
. singl,e ..candidate ;in .the should. instead wage "spoiling....
opera.tions Popuiar unity coalition which supported. t:he
left;icst candidate, . In all .. the.ClA.
. . . . ,
to ol?: action efect the. ...
. _1970 Of this half was
. .
. . .
approved by the 40 Committee. !he_ .large-scale propaganda campai.gn
which \-vas was to that an
..
'Victor.y was With violence and repl:'cssion . .
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SECRET
C01127965
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2. Policy ..... .: .
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'
;,, Discussions within the'Unitedstates about: . .
" 19.10 elections.began in wake of the March.1969 Ccm- '.
. . . . . . ., . .. . . . . ..
elections. The CIA's inyolve:ment inthose elec.tions
..
..was regarded by t-lashington relatively even though ..
. . " . : . . . . . . . . . . .. .
the _Democrats.' portion of the vote fellfrom in ..
.. .l965 .to31% in 1969. ;96S the .had
.. .
$350,000. that effprt, oi 000 actuaily
1
.. of the twelve CIA-supported candidates were elected...
. .. . . .. . . .
. '.Th.e 197:0 election was di.scussed at a 40 Cqmmittee meeting'
. . . . ..
,.
. ..
..:
. . It that something 'Qedone. and.
{
...
; the CIA representative noted that .' eiectionopcra.t:ion .not be
0 '
. unless itwere start.eq early: 'But no acdon was taken
e:
. .
.at.that.time. . . . .
1 ...
.
The 1970 Presidential race qui.cldyturned into a 3-way
contes't. The conservative National Par.ty, buoyed by the. 1969
l ..
. .
1.... Con&ressional '..
..
Jorge Allessandri. Radomiro' Tomic became Christian.DcmocrDt:i.c
1
.
..
i
, nominee. Tomic, the left of President Frei, was unhnppy about:
on the Frci s recordand at one point made
to Harxis't left. Salva.do-re Allende was once a.r,ain
1
J
.the candidate t 'o the left., .. this time.formed into a Pop\.ll.:ll.' Uhity
i
coalition \vhich included both Marxist a\'ld non-Uarxist pnrt_ic!J .
.Allende's platfor.m it\eludcd the cop.pct miner.
1
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: . reform, soc.iaiization of sectors of
.the 'wage improved with Socialist
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countries. .. _.,; ' .
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"In December 1969, the embassy and for- .
. . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . ...
C!. .for' an ..
however. was.vithdrawn because of the State Depar.tmEmtIs qualms.
whether or not the Vnited States snould:get
.. . . . .. . ... . . ' .
,.
' .
'7h'e CIA felt :-it not in a positiOn to supportromic actively
0 -
:

., . . '"
,
' because ambassadorial "ground rules" or_the.prev.:i,ous.few years
. . . . .. .
... the .c:IA from dealing ?"it'tt the Christian ...
.The Age;pcy believed that tlle apparent .front ..
' .. . :. more n:one.y he'lp. in his.
..
,I
'!
On. Uare.h 1970, .the 40 ...'1 joint
0

'
l .
.. .CIA that operations -- .
.. other acti:vl.ties -- be undertaken by the CIA in an effort to
f
. . . .
prevent_an vic-cory.by Allende. Thisfirst
t-7as.' "fol:' $135.,000, .vita. .possibi:lity of later .
. : .On June 13, 1970,. . submitt.e.d .a .
. '?roposal to. the Department of Stateand tho'! Cll\ for. re-
vie,.,. The first phase ve d an increase in su\)Portfor
._anti..:.Allen.de camo::tiP,n. The second t>'as a $500,000. co.ntinr.,ency phm
to in. the 'event of a vote
the top tuo finishers. In resp011St! to reluctance_.
the: .knbass.:tdor resp(?ndcd by 'ifAllende .tV"ere to po\.;cr,
. . . . . .. . .
ho,., ,..-ould the U.S. to those 'li1ho as.ltcd ,.,hilt itdid?
..
;
.
...
..
......._______ ...:.. . _----- ... .
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SECRET .
C01127965
. SEeRET.
....
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: <"Iv.16. : . . . .. .: .
... ..
... .. ; .
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:, . . ...4: . .. .
an 27 , the 4o the
...
for . by. $,300,.ooo. State
. . ' . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .
De9artnient officials, at the .:tyes" only .
. .. .. . . : . . .
They .againstthe. contingency. pian. a:nd a on was..
. . . . . . .... ., . .
: deferred the results of"the Sentember ' election. : .. :. . . '
;j ....." me:t t'imcs. ..:
1' :.' .July. The CIA .turned ITT's pr9posal to make f.unds .
CIA. to .d;d .
..::. to to /.Some. oo() of ITT
. . . .
.<.. .
mon7y ,,as. :duri1tg the .in eq_ual ' .:
! :. ..: amOUl'lt c:ur.e from: other 1).5. business'!S. . . Accordiil,r. to ....... . . ....
! . .:-. .the. Station the.. :.
the. .of
;. . IE.O.i35;6, 3.3(b)(l) j . I
l
Ales:;oandri.in the of the' .c.ampaign. ...
".: .The on ..7 did. not::

t . .. 0 "
: :.' .to _c.;it:her or T:nuic. ..
I ..antl:-Allende. i,n Chile intenGifiod, nolicv makers
-'1 . ." I:UXt! the iSsue of U;S. ooliey ;n.the'.eve,;t .,"f Allende
'victory. A; study .in. re:-ponse to NSSI-197 was aporoved by the
l (lC) 13. 'l'he nat;>er'f.
'set forth O?tions, on!!.in th.e pf a covert .
1
. . . . . . . . . .. . "
. conscn.sus' of the IG favored.maintainine minim.1.l relations
!
. but theSenior Review Group decision until after.
the Similarly, an "Option's:Paper" to
:J-
. ..
l
'O membc.x:-s bn Aur!ust 13, hut .no. . .
* 1'hc. had access to ti1c study lH>r the
'\llinutcs of IC ;mel Senior r.cvie'" C:roup Clclivcr.. t:iont;. 1.ki.s di:;cu,!a- .
.. ..... ,: ... '-- ....1 ,...,_ .. 1,"' f"TA . .,
SECB:O:
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C01127965
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.... .
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....

IJ.
..
.... operations" had ;wo objectives: . (1) '\.mdc.rmininp.
: 1"! ' .
efforts to bx.ing o.bout _c()alition_.'of. forces.
' . .. .. .. . . . . . .
which_ could. control of,the1>residenc.y in 19.70; and (2)'.
l
. . . . . . . .
inr. non-Harxist-politic3l andforces i-n 'topr.de'r. to : .
.. . . . . . . . '
. ..
f
'i:o develop alternative to t_he es.Ped.alivi11
.. .. .
for the election.
. . . . .
.'J: .. . InworkinP. these'objectiyes,. c;:IA.madeuse of ahalf
i. ... .covert .lCtion . . . . . . an ..
. . .. ' ... .
' .
intensive caml?aign mad:e use of virtually all
Chiie inter-
. ..
. . as well. t>lac'eme.nts were through
{ . ' . .. . . . . . . .
subsidizing right-winp. women's .and "civic action" Rrouos. .A "terror
, ... .of .2!-:s.the i%4.. .

. . . .
; . .. eiectionprogram, equated an Allende vi'ctory with violence' and.
. , . . . . . . .. . . . .
.. _._:_S1:alinist repre.s_siO? Unlike 196' -hm.;ever, the'1970 did
I
,.
'not.involve pollst . p,rass--roots
. . . . . --
J
'i'
development" efforts,.no:r, mentioned, dire.'ct
l ..
. . :
. . .
.J :. of anycandidate.. . . .
.
1. In ;:Lduition to'the mass-ive campaign, the
effort t>rior tothe election included -political action aimed .1.t:
l
.I .
j
s-plinterinP, the centrist RadicalParty and reduci.nJ; the numbci of
1
thnt l?arty could.'dcliver to the Pooular
1
1
Also,... -- material to
be. the pro.duct of another_p,roup-- \ias 1Jsc'd in 1970 to dissent
'i
bct\-ICC.\\ to:wnunists and Socialists', and between the national la.bor
J
. .
i
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confcder:ltion <md the Chilean Comrnuuitv P01rty.
. .
.
. . ..
..
.,
>j
'
..
..
SECRET
C01127965
. .. .

..
...
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'
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-
.-
._
the Is propaganda ooerat:ion
..
-
.c
_:: of that been_ .
. ._I___,l__.had used.extensively by CIA during-the.Harch 1_96_9:. .
<:,l .
Durin? th.c it
'0 . . . .
of thousands of high-quality prin:ted.
-:: . .. . .. . . . .
. .
postersand_ to" colorful books.;: carried
-propagandaprottram tnany radi-o ;m.d-:press outlets..
. . . .: ... .
...
. .. that in place ori_or to t _he 1970. .
A'
. ..
cam'Paign included an support:J!'I'Oup tha-t
:cal features, editorials; arid new_s ar'ticles for and
-
;' a proyin.cial nress serv:ice; a ser-
for placinB .and items;.1....------''--........., .j
= . . .'. . - . . . '
=.. . ... . ..
:.: . -netts s-eT."vl.c-e; and se.r:vice.
<:.l
! There. ,-;ras a t-ride of :
N
II)
!"'). mailed to2,200 jou_rnalists, academicians..polit:icians,

I
and O!=-her make!s; a eomic book what co_uld pe
to be lil\e .ifAllende wpn the presidential
.. and dist.ribution of a classic.on the_Kronstadt .
. . . . . . . : . . . . ... . . . . . . -
Lenin; poster distribution and sip,n teams :. Ttle
J
.. . . . . .. . . . . . . ,.
. sign pairit'ing teams ha'd in.structions tc;> paint ' the slogan."Suonreclol)_"
-on'2,000 \Jalls, evol<inp, an.imap,e of communist firing SCJ.uads. The
_. ..terror of the
invasion '"ith of Prap,u.-:: and of t<mks :i.n clowntm.n1
Qth'er post.ers.- _used. in. 1964,
Cub<1n political prisoners before the s11u:id, and that
lll.\ Allende victot"y would ll\C3.1\ the end .of and fa.mU'I 1He
. ..
in Chile.
.. '
..
_____ :.___:.__: ,
SECRET
C0.1127965
. . ... .
...'"' . . . .; :

. .
tV.19 . .......... ..
.. . ..... ..\- .
.
. ......
.. . .
One', . .
. . . . . .

.
.
.'
f{ltUo sh.Ol-75 on a .hook- ..
. . . . . .. . . . .; " . .. . .
. audhnces, had. CIA 1.965;and :
j . . :. fol! CtA. the pr:es.idericy.
, ot 'F;l station to
. au day 'based on.CIA.
;- il etfecC..since its \-lere..
. Qtt, radio:networks.
. ' . . . .. . .. . . . . .. . . : .. .. . .,
. . .tr w:u Qne the Americ;an .
. . .... ' . . . .. . . . ...
.circles .abroad. A
.. radioitems was.reportedin
.. a-a over.5 ,000 :listeners.
.... . : receiyec1cJ;A(undini durinr, ..the
...... . . . . . . . . . r ..
\t7JQJ a ... of the Radical P<irty:,
: : in: reduce the. .number ..of
'l . . . ' . .. .. ' . . : ';. .. .. .. . .
. . . ; . . . . ...,. .. .
' ;
' I
..,.. I
.. .
.. '
.
.. .
l
f
lf:t"1t,, e.ontrihutGd. to the..political
. . . .
1
.]
Themes developed
'i .
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.
.
l
CNmitiim'< eve11 more dudng the
l
J . . ..
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J . ..
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...
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...--.--:- --.. .. ......-..-- - ........ ....___. __. .- - ... -
SECRET.
C01127965
SECRE,T
.. . .
. ....:... . .
.... .
. . ....
' ..
r
I '
. ' . .
..
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. .. - .. . :.
.... ; _
. Chilean1nilitarv to action. .
.. . . .
.'.: Second. many of the assets involyed in the :.
paisn sa_visib'le that t:heir "t..ras limited. there-
after. Several of them. left: Chile. The the.
!ltency was fn July 1970 bY. 'students l1ho
. ,
."that ithad received' funds f':"OU; Anaconda and other .larP.e u.s.
. ... . . . . ' ..
. interests to finance .f\l.lesandri 's camoaiin:. .A:n.inquirY by. ...
.. . . . .. . .
. repol'ted.onAugust i(1970. that the was
. . . . . . . . .
... by com#anies inwhich businessmen
involved: that it.. received $600,000. .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
.aforeigner called "Charlie;"' and.that: contribut:e"ci'
. : . . .- . .;.. . .: . . . . . . . . ..
-.
toit. .char,ges of CIA "t-!ere made. and
. 'the was forced.to before the september 4 .
..
_Fina.lly. 1970
. . . . . .
mechanisms and coordination among CIA assets
. .. .
a ve1cal anh-Allende.oppo.sition tofunction. effec:-
t:iyely:even befora the netof 'President '-Jas inaugurated.
4 . .. 0. ' - : :
..
. ..

. .
..
.
: .... .
.:
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;,
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: .
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.:. :

C01127965
SECRET
I
. ,.... ,..' .
,
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<
' 0 .. ... ..

...... 0.
...

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..
0
: U, 1\et!en Scptetnber 4 and i4: 197_0 ..: ; .
' : ;on A. 1.970. ALlende !<lOt\ a plurality' in Cnile Presi.-
- .. it '
Sil\ee a ma'Jority of the
I 'the t:hat a .'
. . . .. . . ' .. . .. . . . . . . ... .
_@f the and.' ' finishers.
. . . . .
r. joitlt Oetobex: .24.,.1970: .
J. . . . U\ to .
: .: (1.0, to ...
. .tN.
o ' ' e 0 o o o o o o .. 4 . o \
U.. CIA 0-irector' Richard.
.. .. . ' . . . . . .. . . ...
ia to.
..


. . . . . .. . .. . ' . . '
; .. t.41 4,Q; meeting
i . . . .. ,
1. :: l.$ t:Gt- t::be:_C'.!A, U.S. ...
. J . . ' : .
.} .. . ttQ> &Qnll 'arffice
0
] '1!': :u: ail!JJ. oy.
. 0 .... : : : 0
.,.. : ..
' . .. ttQl j:iimutt<I: t.fur c:JP.ponents to
.} . tl<b hw.$ .. ll'ither.
... l cut mCNJm..
ltQ) cri:ocr and
. . . . . . . ' . ' .
' . .. .. .. .
ltQW.fl\l.ic:li Ilill<ln\O.t:.:i;)l'fu an-.:t t.lla. Chilean mi 1f-
:; . . .. . ..
. .. ltQ> ,.
.. .

-=x:::::-w I
*,. l) :lOU! tlo' ar:/\ noel
whQ, WJl:I!ct alio.\lt:. t..ha P.t:esident's

llS:. tut>tthu.: .. . ...
SECRET
C01127965
SECRET
:. .' ...
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I
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1
..' ."IY.22
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".:... ...... ..... , '. .' .. '. . .
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e;
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...._; ';

Track I
' :. . ... : ... :-
.- .
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"


.. .a. 'Political Action ' . ....
.'
. ..
...
' '
. both the 40 and CU fastcne'd on
:.. .
. ' : . . . . . . ' .. . . .
. 6o-cilllod re-election gambit as !"eans of. prevend.n.g_ Allende's .
... ..
of This gambit. --;.zhich WfiS.' considered a
':t
t?
the Allende problem, _consistiedof inducing
.'.
' . .
enough.Congressional votes e',J.ect Allende with
. .
.. .
.
. ..
. . . .
.
.
.
-1
'i
that would re'sign, thus
I
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the wa/fo.r.a special elec.uon..fn which Frei legally.
become a'candidate._. . .-14meeting of the 40.
.
was t .he 'committee authorize-d a C'On:.
'
i
.. .for 'support'-of .::. .
The .funci.s were tobe
.,
i
h:andled.by. Ambassador. Kor'ry.and ifi't that they .
. . .' . . . ., . .
. . . .
'
./
be_ by t::he. ;of the Christian
!
.,

. . . '
:- toswing Congressional votes 'to
..
a bribe fund. The funds were never spent ..
.
. The t .hrust of CIA's -l 'racl< I activities bring about. the
conditions in.which the . .gambit could take. place. to do this.
. . . . .
: the CIA. at the the 40 mobilized an inter-
. locking politic.al. economic." and desip,ned
."this end.. As part of. its program, the
CIA at-tempted to. Frei to , at the.least, cons ent to
. . .....
the gambit or, better yet, in i1np tati<?n. .i:}1e
. felt that .pressures. those whose opinion .nndvic\vs he valued--
:J':-
. '
. .
.,
..
'j
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']
..
. .t'

:
C01127965
....... .... ... .
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.
..
..

in certain .
. . . . .
. '
_the only hope of converting Frei> Iri and Aineriea,
. . : ..
prominf!nt: and. infiuential of .theChristian ..
. .
movement. as well as the Catholic -church, were to.
. . . .. . .. ... . '
'In spite of e.ff_or;:s, Frei refused'
.. ' ' .
. .. . . . ... . ..
'to the process an4. the .
. .
. . ..
.;_ ..
' .. ..
.... ..
-
. .
b. fropaganda Campaign .. .. ...
,
I
.
-On September 14
4
the.40. propaga.rtda
;
!
camp should by:the,CIA to foeu.s on the;.

.. .' .. . . . . . . . . .
.. of an Allende government. 'fhe campa.ign was to include support .
for the Frei :a .CIA ...
the was to create concerns <!-bout c;;hile's .futu..:;-e if .

.
. .
Allende were by the .C'ongress. <J;he campaign was to..be
.. ' . .
:. towrard Frei himself, the Chilean military e.lite, an.d
I o . .. 0 t 0 0 0 0 ' .
j . .. Chi.l.ean :. . . .. . .
' .
.. .. . : : _campaign __ First.
' in respot:se an attack by Allende on the Si:?-ntiago newspaper .
. , . - . . . . . .. .
which had bean the majDr opposition voiceto Allend
0
.up tothat time. CIA,: :its covert.
, . r '
orches.trated cablesof support and protest from lead1.ng newspapers
America to El Mercurio. a protest from
an. press and press c.overagc the.
protest. In addition,
.. .
and .. traveled to Chile for on-the-sccne ;-eporting. By
'
.
..:. ..
.,
''t
SECRE"f
C01127965
$EGRET

......
..... . ::IV.2'. .
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September is, the C-IA had in place in, or rout-e to, Chilefif..:. :
. . .. . . ' . . .
teen .journa'list ten.different. .. grou9
. . . .. . . . . ..
was supplemented by eight mor.e journalists fromfive: countries .
. . .
. ,.,
under' t:he direction of high-level agent_S who wereI for the.. most
...
.- . .'
p.art capa_cities media./,ield.
.. . .
, . .Second, the CIA relied upon its own to .
. .
1 propaganda in Chile. iricludlng an. press:
: - . .. . .. : . . . . . . . .... .. .. . .
: .... of individual news items through agents;.financing of
:. ...
. a small subs.idy .of. Patria y an.
. . .. . . . . . .- . . . .
.its -programs; adverti.sements,
. . .
an'd political rallies; and thedirec.t mailing of foreign news
.. . '. .. . ' . . . .. . ... - . ... ..
. ar..ti.cles t:o Frei,.his wife;.selected leaders. and the

." . . . . . . . . . . . . .". : ... .. .

.- .'
:.'Third..:speciai and '"inside" 'briefings were given
. f .
to p.s. journalists; The CIA a '!ir.le cover story
. Acc.ording'to a CIA_memorandum, the
. . . . .
corresponden.t in Chile accepted All'ende s
moderation and constitutionality atface val1.le. . CIA briefings
. ' . . . . , ...
in Washington resulted in a in the basi'_c of the
. . story on s Septe.mber 4 victory. :
.The magnitude of the CIA's propaganda campaign mounteo during
six-week interim period in the Lat:in Amarican ancl
media .,.;As. quantified by the Agency. Accordi!lg to the CIA, parti<ll
l
.
l
rctur.ns showed 726 broadcasts,
. . - . ' .
..items a direct result of Agency.activity. The Ar,cncy
.
j
had noway to measure the scope of the
------ --'-----=-.
SECRET
.,_.____, ___________
C01127965
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l. .
. .1V..25
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' 0 o0 I 1,, 'I :' o '' . o ' ' ' ' , \' . '
0 0 0
o , , o J o, : o , I I , '"'. ; ; ."''... ', , :,
0
. : '... ! . . . ' . : , :.-:. . .
ho1ri muc.h."it.S. .news. Chilean
. . . . . .. .
rind coverage--but conciudeu . that ics.
.; . was' bdtb' and. . . . . . '.:...
.. . " . . .. . . . .,
.... ..
,. ..
. . ...
. ' .
...
.
. .
. ,.;:..
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..
'...
. .
"" . . .. . .
' .
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c. :ressurcs . .. ..
;.
.
..
... on 29. 1970, the 40 met. It
. .. . . . . . . ..
. .
:that; the gambit hadbeen.overtal<en'by event's 1r1as .dead.
Tlie ..best cabinet being .replaced
. '
. . . .. .
;wit!_l a also deemed dead. The point then
. .
. made that there W!=>Uld be no military'.action
' .
pressures could be brought.'to on. It ;wasagreed thatan
! 0
.. . 'bemad/to take certain st.eps
be in. with s.desir.e
. . ,
.economic' act'ipn.
:. The economic offensive against Chile, undertaken as a {!art'of
:- ' ' .. ' .
, I. was demonstrate the economi.c r .eact:ion
.to Allend':'s accession t'o. power, as w"e11.as ro 'forecast. t:he fu_tuLe
. .
consequences thereo'f. Ge'nerally, the40 approved
,- off all .to curtail investment .in
.and approachin'g othe.r nations to co'oper.ate in th1s venture. .
.. . .
these tqc 40 Committee, and the establish-
mcnt. t;>f an. gr()up to coordinate overt economic
activi.ties Chile' 9fthe CIA's Western Uemisphe.re
. .. . .
.. .
..
.
.
Division Chief and representatives fromstate, the NSC'. and .:
U..s.. effot"ts to an economic crisis in Chile proved to be
..
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.
.
...
SEC.B:EI
C0 1127 965
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2.Track I!
.. :-:< :. :. .. .;
. .
. As tJrevious.Ly U.S. ef:f.,:,-: .;lJ.ende's assump- .
.
ti..on.of' tra-::L
.''
:L4.. 'l-rack'11;was ini.tiated'by
wnen
.
.
he the to play a .
. .nizing,g. mil:itar y
. ..
, coup d'etat iri Chile. l'ne Agency >.: . :: actiOn without
. .
.. . .
,. with tttc!. o; ' oi.Se and Wit:hout in-
1 . . . .
.. .. ..
j. fo:rmi,ng the'11. S. Ambassador. \']hil;: . .:ies in genel:al
: .and.other . of t:o ...;:..
. ession t:opower.
.. . . . . .. ... . .. .
. . ....
were explored by the40 Committ:ec :: ._ the 4U Com-
0 4
-tili.ttee was never informed of ttrl.s . . .NC?r did itever
.approve th_at role. : Tne only inst.5.> : .he Agency "'!as to
. :
. report, botn . .'": S i-"<ls 't'P.c :Hhit'e
. . .
. ....
House.
\
. . .
.i
. .'October 5. and October .. .'!.A made 21 contacts
. .
with 'key milit:ary
.
. and Carabinero (
.
-p.. . Ch;ile. Those
Chil.earis we.re .to. : . .::ren of:
strong support at the highest.leveJ. :overnmentboth
, .. .
anc\ aftera coup.
.
. .
"rraclts I .and li. did, in fact. x the month aftef
September 15. Ambassador Xorry , l ].i> . . -:xcluded from
TrackII. was authorized ,:. :oup, provided Fret
:l
in that At th.:- .: . .:ecting on September
.j
l'' he and other "Q.ppropriatemereb(..: .. . . sy mission" were .
. .,
]
. ...
Oluthoriz cd to intensify,their co:'l :.; . milit"ryofficers
toassess their wil1ihgnessto ;\,: .
::;ambit." The
.
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C01127965
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:-:
,
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Ambassado1; was 'als.o his
..
.- .militat'1 awilre.that ifAllende were seated. the military' could ex-.
.. . ..
. :.
pect no further military (MAP.) the United States..
0 '. ;".
Later.l(orry was author:ized to ;nform the Chilean military. that.
'. 0 :
allMAP and-milita-rY. -were . being held in abeyance
..
o(.the_ on Octo .
. The essertti.al Tracks.- I and .II_.
. - .
by to Korry during this.perior;l: was p.ot
. .:_ . I I .,;a.s Track I had
1 . . . . . : . .. . . . . : .
.; .: objective in mind. The difference b_etween the two tracks;was. that
j . .. . . .. . -. . . .. . . . .. . . : . .. .
j.. the CIA's direct: with the military. and its.active
. . . - .. . . . .. . ' . - . . . ... .
promotion and 'support or . were to be'known onl'y' to asm_all
. .
.'of . individuals it; the. White House and the CIA.
. . . . . . . ..
l>espite these IIproved.to be no more.successful
...
than Tx:ack. I in preventing s assumption _of office. Although
. .
certain within the ar_my were actively involved in
. .. . .
coup:p'lotting. the p.lans of the dis.sident Chileans never got o_ff the
.. . . . . . . .. . .
._. . A rather coup attempt: di4 on October
.. . . ... .
. but lost.strength'following the abortive kidnap and
. . ...
of Chilean Rene.Schneider on.October
22.
..
On' October 24, 1970, Allende was confir-me d as Presi-
dcnt by the Congress. On November 3, he was
U.S. efforts,both ov.ert: to_ of
of[icc had failed..
. '
. ..
\ . 4
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. _. _._S:EGREI

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E. Covert Action During..the'Aliende Y.ears. 1970--1973
. . :
..
_1_. _United States_Policy and Covert. Action .
:. In his.1971 State of the Wotl(f
25.
. . . . . . . . .. . .
.. ;
1971, Nixon we .are prepared.t:o hav.e the
kind of relationship w.ith_ the that it:..ispre-
pared to_.have with us... p.ublic of
l .. the 97 Charles
1 ' , " 4 I ' .
.; Meyer. ofs.tat:e .inter-Americ:an (ARA)
"! ; . . . . . . :. . . .. . . . . . .
that but" line i!l his. testimony
before Semite For.eign Relations ori Mult;Lnationai.
. . .. !
. .. .

. ..
...
: .. . . . ....
. Meyer. The policy the Mr.Chair-:-
. man. was that.there wou1.d be no intervent;ion in the
...
political affairs ofchile. We were consisten.t in..
'
.that ,.,e financed no .cancidar;cs, no political parties
before.or September 3, or 4 .... .The
policy of the United States was th2t Chile's prob-l'ern
...
.. . .
.'-las aChilean problem, _to aettled.by Cnile. As
... the President stated in October of 1969, \till
deal with governments as they are." (Multinational
Cor orations and United StatesForei n Polic , Hear-
. 1ngs e ore t e u conunit;.tee on Hu tinatJ.ona Corp.ora-.
. : tions of'the Combittee on Fore:i.gn Relations, United
_ States Ninety-Third Congress,
. cro. 1973, Part. 1, P.. ;o2)
. .
Ye_t, public after Allende's
.
.
.. '.
..
inauguration thd 40 CommitteeaP,proved a total over seven mi"l.-
dollars in covert support opposition groups in Chile. That
. .
I ' o
money also funded an propaga.nda carap;1ign.
Of the total authorized by t:h.e L,Q ComJ:Oittee: over six million dol-
lQt:s '-l.<ts spent during tl\e._Allende and $84.000 ex-
.
pended shortly thereafter for commitments m.:1de .bc.fore the c_oup.
. ..
. .
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.
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t : ... , ...
,. o t o ' o I o" ott , ' I o t f I ' t o '
.1
.. 1.he cunounc. Qtl in Chile during 1:970:..7l
+;
.$1 miilion,. .prcject not re
. . . .. . . .. . .. . . . . .. ' . . . . ' .
quir.nt 40 .. . .
. .1
'
. to.maximize
...mi .t.o prevent:
. . . .
. it''i.bility. eont;ary. 'to u.s.'and'
.. . . . . . ' . . . . . .
fha ttC:ool wt overt posture deuied the All.ende
.. -. ': . . .. . .. .. . . . .. . .
! _handy or4!i:gn enemy eo a dQmestiea:rid
0

0
0 0 0
.. 4 " 0 ' 0 ' I ' O , 0 O
t'. . .n4U.onArrallyJ.ng point. At the same .:time, covert'act:icn'was bnf7.
; .. .: o felt 1:he de.sire to frus-
:. -.. trita=
1
c i.n Western Hemisphere. thus
'limit a ;.: ihe .fear .
.. tuiibot" other--LAtin. count-,;ies;
. . . ,
the! datorminacion co 'sustain the princ:iple.of compensat1.on for u: s.
. . "' . '. . . 1 .
nationllUiod by Al.Lof.lde. . :
Kiuin.sn several o.f'these concerns.in a back-
. . -. . ..
. . .. . . . . .. .
&l'OJJrtd to ;f').o prcus. Sepl.:ernber l&: l!nO, inthe wake of
. . .. . . , .
o.laodon plurality: .
. '
. Now 1t 1s'fn1rty for one to predict
'
Alhnda wins,. is C( good chance that he will
. :&Uita.blUh over ll of yeats some sort.of Co.m-
. t gove1runont. 'l:n that you \.roulcl have one
not Ot'l lU't isJ..ntld oH the which has not: a t:radi-
.. .
.. t'io11.al :tnd impa.ct on .Lacin
. ..
{n Latitf counr.:ry you \"l1Uld a
UO\U!rnnui\\t, joit'tint;, fot' cxnu\plc. Arr,cntina.
t\l.rcmly alo1lr. long fran-
tUn., j t)1.n:i.nr, l>cru, nl'reauy been heading
'in thnt bc:cn l1i.fficult to deal witll,
BbliVi>:t, which . 0\lso Jtonc in a lllore
. anti.U.S. tlil:ectiO,,l, even any of
. .
So." l: rlon.'t think we r.hould tlell.ule lv('s an
i.l\ Chile,,:o\11<1 not
[Ol: us tor I:orcc:s <ln-d for
'. .
SE.CRE'f
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: .. , >. Leitin.. and indeed.to
.. . . Hhnt would happen co the

t . )ft;:mhpherc l!oard, or cothe Organi-
State6. tnid forth. is extremely
: : Prt'-'bhrni!ti-tE\1., ,, U ill cme of th():;e \..rhich
. hllPl"Y fof interests. {M\.lltinational '
:. St:atcs l.,..o-reiBn Policy, l'leat:ings
. , C.:orooratioris ..
.. ()f th@ Rch.tions. Unir;ed States .
, . Ce>rt&rcs$, . .
, . . 2, .p.p, ... . . .. .
\. it(!t:J.Qn ll'i'_Qf. thb 'tnt_ciligence
. . . . . .
' Q.f of:
.. of .
t .. . . .. ..
). i of Allendes revolution . . .
' ita ..<.
I . , . . . . .. . . , . . : . . . . . . . .:
;. to ac;tivi.stexiles from- other
; 0 ' ' , '
; . . taea
; . o:. tO ..
j . m . .. .. : .
.. : .1\\ra.
.... Tne ;
.. dif:fic'ulties
cut ttrf.ec'o-
.
. . .

ar.r.
e.:! c
the
and!' For
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.. \ .
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..
t
.
. ...... _: ... '' - .. : -: .. ..,: .. ,
. ....,.
0 ......
; 0 ,' o .. ' t ' I ' ;,,., o o ' .'. : ' ' ;
l _, .. . .. :!.
l . .. the combined effect on.Chile's foreign 9xchange
. . . . . . .. .
' I .
:j . of the foreign credit and domestic cop-per.strikes was.' :
. . . ... .. . . .
. : ,. .
f .
devastating. . . . . . .. _ . . ... ;> ! ..... : .
l.
. ' . . . : ' . ' ;' I
l
Throughout the Allende U.S. clpsc.contact _
with armed .both _the..CIA. u s.: -
0 .. : ..
-.military The.basic-purpose of the
...j...
.I
.... of .to 9etect any inclination. the. .
!
0 ...
1
. . to But U. S... orfi.cial-s also were instructed .
: fl/ , I , ', ! , :
. to seek influence the Chilean military an:d tobe
1 . ... . . . . . . . . . .
i its' without to _promise u.s... ;
. .
-. port for..mi'l.itary which might be premature. :in_stan-ce,
. . . . .. ... . , . ' .
. in ..
the stationwas.instructed to.put the u.s. gov-
. . ' . . . . .
_:_. in a to_t.:_ake !l.itule a<lvant.age a.polit:i-
. or a solution .to thepresent .chilean d'ilemma,. depend-
" !.
. . .
: ing _on de'?elopments wit_hi,n the and the impact on.
#
. the military
.. ...
...
. . . .
is .evidence of _u.s..assistan-ce ..co.up,
... 0
. .. . . . .
despite .tre.quent'allegations-of' such .aid,' Rather the United states..,.-.
' 0 , a : o ' .
'by its previous.actions, its existing the o
- . . - . . ' . - . . . . . . . .
its contacts with the.01ilean the signal..that
would-not lopk with on a coup.: And-U.S.
- .. .. .. . . ' .. . . . .. . :.. . . ..
.years before 1973 did no.t always in thethin
. line _knowing about coup plotting and
- . .. -:. . . . ' . .. . .
stimulat:ing it.
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. .: . .......... ........ . :. . : . . ... . . : .... ...;.... .... ::_: : .:.... .. .:; .
I . . , . ,.. "; + ;. . : . . :. : , ; ,' . ., .'' : " .
. ....
;2. t-Jet:hods of Covert Action . . . . ..:.... <:........
, , . / ' . . , : : ' r : . . ,

.;.'. .a_. : for .,. : . ::. .
.
More than half of 4o funds
. . . !
._ :tlle opposition political partiC?s: the Christian.Democraticrart:y
. .. CPD.C) . Party (PN). ::.. :
R:aaical P.a.rty (PDR and FIR). in 197iCIA the. . :
..
<'Pnc and PN to -purchase their own radio and s:.
.. . : . .
:f.
. . ,.. . . .
f. ..'. A1l parties w-re .Passedmoney prior to the April 1971
. .
. . . . . . . . .. . . . : . . \.. .. .
municipal anda ln 'iuiy. . In
. i97.1
....
.PDR. and induce the PIR, then.a ofthe.UP coalition,to
. . . .
' .
from. th.e join: the. ition. ; .
; . . .. . . . . . . ; . . . . .
: . .
:
.
. ..
supported t-he. in ,by- elections in 1972, .
; . ." . . . .. : .
; . . the Ma.rch 1973.congressio.nal Money ?rcvidedto po-
li.ti.cal parties not.oniy in. t'he
Vii\r.;ous elec-tions; but en.abled the parties to an anti-
c:a.mpaignthroughout the Allende years;.urging
J
.. . ...
. .
.
T.he ' CIAundertook a'major pofitica'l_' action during the.1970:.
.1973. period t:he Radi c al ?arty of t .he Lef.t .<P I R)
. co from the Radical Party 'lind join the. \ opposit;ion.
:. un9er . the CIAhhd. political .action to
Democratic Radical Party.(PDR) to split from PR pl:ior the
j
197.0 elect:ions, ncariy of. 40 Com-

funds to_both splinter groups thc.Allende
.j
. years.
. : 1 .. I : .;
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o I ... J .
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J
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C01127965
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4. :
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... .,, ...
. . . . , ,
.
.
.
. . .
the Allende.years, the CIA to forge a united
. ... , . .
. . . . . . .' . .
. opposition. The signifieance.'qf this'effort can be .by noting'
. .
. twomain.efementsopposing the. Uniiy government
. . . . . .., . ' .. . . . .. . . . . . : , '
..-were the National PartyI .. VC'!=.Y_ and 'the -reform...: .
istChristHm Party, of whos_e .
. . .
the major of t:he
\, . . ' ..
. .. ..
..
. .
.
'
. . .' Propaganda ar.d Su.tlport: f.or Media '
: _'. :: .; Besi.des 'funding par.ties,.the4q Committee approved
.. , . to _to.
,i ; : , I o o ' o :
\ .. _. : propaganda campaign. f!lillion-was sp'eni in:
; . . : . .. : '. . . . . .. . ' . .. . :. . . . . .
. o El Mercurio. the country ' .s largest newspaper. and the' most important
j .: :.
.!
i . played a signi_ficaht rol_e setting t:be st:Jigefo-rt:he
4
! '
i.
. coup of Septembet' ll, 1973.
. ..
. . .
40 Coiillllittee i'ti .1911- .and eariy 197-2 for subsidiz
. . . . . . .
ing El were based that the .Chilean government:..
' .
was.trying to.close the BfHex-curio .chain.
. .. ..: . 'freedom t-he pres's
..
...
.it. is difficult to. the of the j udgr:tent
. - . . . . .
about the Chilean $OVernment's intentions with respect to the media.
The alarming field on which the 40 Committee decisions to.
. . . .
a_upport El Hercurio \\'ereoased with.intcll_igcnce community
. . For.exnmple 4.ugust 19Jl 'Intelligence
- .. . . . . . . . .
. .after governinent's . ..
..
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...
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C01127965
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.:.
. growing domination of the press but commented El Mercurio
..
. . . . .
. to its independence: _one month latcr t_he 40
,f . .
J '$700 .,
f CIA documen'ts .that '"as the only
,.. most
.1 _. .iri . . '
'
' : .. ..
. .
' .. ' .
Among theoooks.and.pamphlets producedQy opposition
' ., .
searcq the Institu.te of Studies. \\as one which
1 it:appeared in October i9J2 at 'time of th_e lAPA (Inter-Ameri-
i ?ress in ... . And, the. 19JO- .
:- . _.-: " -
. which free.dom .of the presswas . .
. .. .
i.
;
: . major funded a wide range of
.
. .
'.
produced

. .
and a large number of books and special studies. It developed ma-
in the El (El Nercurio,
a of: 120.ooo.' and. 300,000.on La Segunda,
. . . . . . . . . .
1o?ith and Ul.timuNoticias, \"ith 100.000--1971 .circulation
the PDC's La Prensa: t.he. PN's La. Tribuna;two weekly,
.
.i{cwspape1'S) all radio stat_i9ns controlled by oppositio!l parties;
... -and several recular shows on three TV channels..
El Mercurio was .a -'major-channel for during 1970-
. .
1913, as bcen during the 1970 elections and
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C01127965
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. 1);1,- the This.was.
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.e.PJ'{\f@ntly...- an_attetllpt.tc.1 Allendc _to tnkc measures
' 0 ,. ; ,
. . misht the armed to inter:- ' ...
0
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.. .. . . ..... .
. .. ....
' vene.
. ,.
...
-: .. :
.' ' .
: .
IE.O.13526,section3.3(b)(l)
' ' ! .
j ' .
i A eeo..nQX0.1c _t.e.chnical material: went_. to.
j:.:_. ;
! _:- 1 E.O.13526,section3.3(b)(l) I
I
I
I
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IE.O.13526,section3.3(b)(l)
. :
... :
..- . !-ctx-- h:iiv.a:t::e:
:.. . _'_ 1\lj
. .. . . . . . . . .
4tC0 !'QID\01$.; ttCDl lJ!e.Il.p> m.:tint:airy .
. . .
.
in!
.
".::'1 ciQ: w.iltbl s.trrike
.. (D)f sup-
li_$ ctQnfudid:erablc
v.t.Q-JJ<m:t Cil,f--th.esc
.;
lj)i\: (t'Q1 J_}ltin&-.ab.Q.U:t:. mi:lJ.ii 1;-a,rey: iimt i!on..
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-.; .Th_e issue ,of whether to private
. :within the Embassy and' the 40 -Cormnittee thrbughout iate 1972..3'nd
. . . . . . . . .
:.1973. september 1972, die 40. $i4,000. f .or
: . support" of a industrial SOFOFA.
.-.. but:decided against: financial
' . .
g.an_i.zations because .of poss.ible in
: . _:atr:i,:kes. the.. a'Pproyed $10.0,000
'i
,
. . .pr.i.va.te sector
: ' J J E.O.13526,section3.3(b)(l)
..
. as part oi a. $1.5 'tnillion _for
.. .
.. . P-?Posi cion According to CIA this
. . . . . . : . . . ..
..
,-.limited supp9rt to sector was confined to
. . "" ..... . . . . . . . .
.specific in support of.the opposition electoral cam- .
. . . . . . . .
paign. such as :voter drive_s. and a get-.out -the-vote
campaign_.
.. .
' .
' .
. 'After March elect;ions, in fqrces
...
. : to aehieve a .m;tjod.t:y in t..J:lP. senate that
permit.ted them. impeac.h Aliende and net-1
. . . . : . . .
was a _discussion ,ofobje_ccives. There seemed li.ttle likcli-
>
hood ofa coup.but there did appe:ar to be a
that increasing unrest .in the entire country mighti,n- .
. the the Allende order to
prdcr. _vario.tis for the private
. . . .
cx.amined in <;ontext, but the: Ambassador. and
remained .opposcdtoany support of. sector
. . . - .
. .
.
troups because of hi_gh level of tension
.. .. t_Q , h().P,C. mUit"ry intervention.
S.E:GHEI
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,:', Neve-rtheless, on August ..40 ...
..
....' . . . .. . . .. . .. . .. . ... . . .
..:..

. . :posal granting $1 to opposition arid privatesector. .
'
.. with:passa;e of funds on .. of:
....
.....
Davis of .: .
... these passed to ..sector befoie.themili.:_. : :::
0 0
.
tary three weeks . - ..... . '... .: ., ......<.::: ..-<: .. .... .
. ....
.. , . ."While.these de1.iberations wer,. . Station ; .
.. .to take. .
'
.1.
.. be to the oppo,si . ...
.
.ers. Ambassador that these taken
., . . . . . . ....
: 0 ..
. but a.spec:i:fie proposal for $25,000 in .support to.' the
..The;e was a CIA for. ;s'upport t:o t .he . . .
. it::is. .th; 4Q .Com-
. .
mittee..On August 25--16 days befQre 't:he ad-.
_-visedthe.Sta.tion that soundings being taken. but. the CIA
. . .. . . : .. .
...
tiort's proposal was never . ..
. . The pattern. of U.S. de.liberations s_uggests a care.ful
:. supporting_the O.Ppo.Sition .and .fi{nding
. bring about a rn'i.lit .ar;' doup.. However..
. ..
conditionsinChile, the interconnect:ions among
... . ...the CIA-supported political parties, thevarious militant
..
(gremios) and paramilitary prone to.te.rrori:sm
...
. and. vi'olent were .!!'any. CIA was awat"e that links .
and pai-ties .made cle'ar ?-i'stinc-
tions .
.
..
..
... ..
.. ..
. .
.. .: .:
.
. .
'
\
' ...
...
SECRET
0
C01127965
. .. -.-
.......
.
. . :- ..- .
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..
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;,
..... ....... ....
.. ... .. .. . ..
.
.
.
.'
..
,'
.. . :
. ..: . : ..... . . . ...:... .' . .... .... .... ...
. .. .. .. . .. ..... . . _.' .. . :. . .,,.. ..
.. ...... . . .\ .... .. .. .... .::!, -..
.......
..: .. :- :.- , . . The most prominent. of the groups was
.; _. :.. y Libertad and 'Liberty), whi.ch .
. . September 4 so-cailed.
<t . th.e .in tt? : :<:_.
and a possible .pretext 'for .. . : . ... .. :. : . <
.. . . .. . . the Aliende y. : -:, ..
:., .. .by : :
j . . ... . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . .
! Detl}ocrats. cal:+ing for :.to. government mea.sures. and urg-
,. . ' , . . . ,. ' .
. in the armed ' forces. .
.: ..

: .
t?.;overthrow government.
: CIA .funds directly .supported :?acria y Libertad to .
. . ' . . .
: Allcndc'g the Agency occasionally pro-
......
; vidcd the gr?UP sums throut;h third for
. : . .; .
tions or . specific propaganda _activity. It is also possible that
. . . .
Cl!\ fund.s given to opposition pa-rties Patt':i:a y_ Libct'tad
nnd t:he Rolando b1:ig,:1de, given the. clos.e ties between 'the
SECRET
C01127965
; .....
.... .. ....
' . .
.. . ;_... .
..... . . ...
.. .
. .
:Withrep-.u:d to the t:ra:clcer.s'' .. t:uo facts :ae- :uitd.i.Spu:ted.
Ffr!ft, t:he' 40 did.nc,t . . be.. di-
... . t:o .. . atA . the. ew6 ..
. . . . . . ...
. '
.
.... li.mgt:hy st:tikes. ser:aa.ci frgFL ltily 1:3" 1.9:7). t:he
SC!.ptembern been on tl\e..ba.s.isof.
. . . .
-
.. .
. ...

'

j..
.'U:icuL _ur:q aff t:(!i, t.he.se
. . . . . . .. "
..
i . J!t: u iiJnf.:..g<IJve:i::wnent s.t:rikers p
'
. . . . ...

i
' .
IE.O.13526,section3.3(b)(l)

lfnl N'gJedxer l\.972_rr.C!Je CIA that:

'{
.___---11ha:cii 4:a st:ri.kers. to

.i
..
.
p:t&liWW:fi 'lr'fle_ .ru [l'.ii:S-S-e-d it
ltEDe .
. tfrtilllti!!.'d! 11!; (l-tf1<'ird' c :- 1: 'JJi; l l:s
.__ ------:- .... ---
-
. .
. ''l!b of d1.e .l!!UL tr. the .l':llnndc

l
J
I
.. .:!:.:crtcdi>y
St.zl!ltcs fonled of ..i:;" . c:,c- ItO
CL<t;. to th.c
A'llcnJes: ':.:rc .
I lileet::lwt,\lith o; the- "irc.a:;ur.v Jnlm
j ..
.
,....--.---------....... .\ oo I
ft'
-SECRET
C01127965
.. .

'';:.;. 40.
\
..
."' ........
. . '
. . '
vatl.tc:. .mJ em f1"Ilcn.J..: Y:t
... ' .. . .. . : . . . ... . . .. . . ' ..'
anl4lr=l:-46l-;l tzie af. .covert. uit::wu:t
. . .
. ..
.
che c: pre.sS'CJr'e atcim.Q"t:lic-d r: .
.
.
. .
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....
..
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as<a of' 'l'itc
.. . . . . . . .. . .. .
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.. dda.aea: & .c:ewf.:tc-tbU-' c:!M e:::t:zrna.l or tlre interr.::r.l f;:tC.tors
.1
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.,
..
. =rrt! u of
<

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.. .. . . ....-: . . . .
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... er.-nC BJa<! .iti$
f t . :
.- . ic f3 tes . one f.reeins and (lthcr' cnJs .. .
' . . .
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.
.... .- .-.:s in 11th.. : .
, I ' . . . - , , . : "'
adt'Ter &::;1t!nd4mee: up:on znt tt1cn
-: . 0
forfcn'eiza nqc iTI
'\'
1!104 cr]970. a
l
. . .. t-c-
. uf.tb
. . . .
. .
J
:U Wll!l.l' . em.! t!te of
...
J
. .
ap-ee:romtsr -:-nih t...'le F'-4t$ieru ElOG
. .. . . .. . . . : . .
.. .;lout 4ilea;, *poe.ndmee ouu U:1it.ca
..
0
a
cklrrin5 etf .
lw;a .. u.s.
direc; in.Cfilc :1t: l. 1
.. . .. . . . . . '
,- fr.Jt c! icn:cir;n esdP.atcJ c :j) ta
. .
,,
.olllion. Unit(!d l:n::,f.: in
. . . . .
;,lnost: all o! the' o'r t:!1::
b;' cn,.t 191.J. ui,icc,t.Stt!t:c:> con-
trnllett'.:m or: the CJf..Chilt.!'n

.
..
.
. . .
SECRET
C01127965
J
. .
. ...

. . ... .., ... .. .. ..
.\ . ;. l' 41- . . .. . . .< ..
.; . .. t .
" .. .. .
a situ:tti'ln o contr?i cop?er
. .
. . . . . .
'
ductionI tec:hnolor;y,.:and spar2 }"arts, . .:mJ. , the
,. ci1i:'icott'\:_econo!;\:;; to. ..:2nd . .
. . . . . - ..
. . . . . . ' .
r,ovcrtu-nent
1
1!1uch o it
. .

. 'b; li;5....
. . . . . . .. : , . ..
.
,7ith a policy of
:
'
,
in1970.
1
to 0:1 oc ess:!nt:!.il.l
f.. pnrts fror:1 \!?;,ted ..
: . . - ... . .. .
. i.t} cor.e,crcial (froM 7?.4 of
. .. . . . . ' ' ':. - .
.. .. .
:. .' thetotai i1 197{) co 6. 6 .1972)
:, . : 4ffccted s to- .
0
. :lU'' for.. tlL? -1"1ost ;criticetl. oc:cL:o.r.r. of t!1e
..
w
' copr.er', steel. ehcti..icity. .. .
.
.1
Dy lat.e 1972, as Ui' the Chile<ln Sinistry of.the
.J... . ..Econ.om']:. that.a;.lmosf_ of the _.t_r:;ct(s
i Chuq\.d.c":ltl3ta 30 oj C'l.t.y.
. .....?l all ta}ds. il'C\;l of 'ouscr.
..' .
<;h'ile' complct;cly o
. . . .. . . . ..
'l'Cl'l'ts or tire::;." . terms, value of States .
t
. . . . .. . . .
.and_ to--' by U..s. firr.-ls.
.fro1:1 in 1970.to 1!>71..
:c_oi>:H:r _in iour.of. ever-:; doUnrr.
Chile 'lne .m<likctin:o.
of: C!1ilcan cci>pcr under control ilr:i:J.ltC
. . .
-1
United !;tater. cor,,orations
1
even afcer"joiut \mntnrc.:; uat,_,l!nn C!liln
. .. ..
1 nnc.t

'rhus, cmt:crn:lll:-"-il.ld\\ccd
t I .
t. ... .1
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C01127965
.. .
. :. .lV. 42
... ...
'
..
. . . ..
.:. .
'
: ... I.
. . _ f, :.
.of for in.1971. \.,.a!.cs.clear't:h.e: .
... '
.. .
'
.
0 o I o '
. . .
in .the E in: in-. :
-1 - :.. .the. .year ; l:dst :
':1 . .
. losses fr9n .to-; 11
. . ... .. ...
..':
1
.:>,.'__." ..

. ._ .. . .:' ' _-_ ,.... . _. .. : . .. :, :,._;._.
.t. -J.. of,
l : f'O'i'1:lrt:/:rl.cndc . . . . .. .. . . . . . .. ...
'! . ....: .states . 's ."
; .. . ' . I ' , . " ; .
.. ,za.s artic:Jlatatl :l1'ul c:attieJ out ..cro;'l. l_e\7cls Qf' tile
. .. ... . . .. . ..
Stat;es by

. , . . . . . . . . . .. . .
extendedthrough the united State$ .. directors on t .
' . . . . .
.'&ovirning boards ot' financial policy.
. .
..... ...
. clearly framed during the l 'rack II period. Richard Helms.i
. , . . . .
. : from his September lS;1970 meeting with Preside-nt the m'eeting..:
: - .
. . . . .
: .
which initiated Track 11, contain the indication: "Hake economy
". . A week Korry Frei . .
.,
. .. . . . . . . . ' . .
nut be allowed to.reach Chite under Allende.
. . " .
l
. While the Chilean economy "'ias vulne.rable.to U. S..action
j
I . ' .
longer it not in short run. That fact was app7e-
'1
._in the _government. However., its im
pHcationss_ . in September and l." eem not to have
:_ . 0. . o!.l9_7 -. A February';1.971 Intelligence ..noted
that . was not immediately- toinvestment. trade or
1l, ..monetary .sanctions_impos_ed _hi United_States. _In fact, .i:he im-
position of sanctions was.sccn tobe of,possible benefit to Chile,
1 .. .
it; would have given Chile 3: justification for nearly .a
1
i
. .. ...
billion dollars of debt to the U.S.
'1
.'
SECRET
C01127965
...
.:.. .
. . : .. .
.
.'
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I o o
..
. ..

...
.
....

.
...... ... ;
.. . ' ..
... .
,'
... ..
.. ... 0
.. .
. ..
cons'isted of seycral pron&s.. -Bilater!ll
. . . .
foreign assistance was. cut off, and the. u.s.. used..itspre'dominant
in to up nriu.'
: .. . .. .. . . . . :
of multilateral _cred.it. Fina.lly,the States gove.rnrnent acte<L.
. . . . . . . ... . .. . . . . . .
tocoordinate the acdon.s of private banks, domestic and foreign..
. . . . . . .
. .The figures tell the story:
. ..
.$35 mil-
. . .
. . in dollars.in 1.97"1.. U;S. ..
.. .credits, which had totalled $234 miliion 1967 and $29 mil-
. . . . . .. . .
- ..lion in1969. drop.ped to zero.in 197l : Loans from the mult'i-lateral
... in the U.S. held wh;il.t amounted:
to.a $46 i'97o; they feil ..t .o.$2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(United ..
.. ... . .
... . Reac'tiouto' events in. ;nuci'l of t:h2
.. 0
. inthe Unitaa 3tates governr.1ent fo'r the deVel'o<lr.fent of a
1
.,o:;L.icy. on
. ... . .. . . . . - . .
. In to' be kno.\.rn as.the
. . . .
. P.roposed.._to. Cillculation of . .'...
. any to 11-ationalized .U.S. cop;;anies
', ...o o o 0 ' o ' ' t "' I o ... 0 '
. in facttold tile!=. oveC: mo1tcy . 'l'he of.tae11. ii.
. -- . ..
. ernrr.Cnt lias 'lnJanuary 1972, announced
'tlh'7n confrontc.d vould cut of
'"<'litl'\hold its.support:frcr.t lo:.1i1s unc
1
.er considera-
. ..
in urul:til.:ltcral i
"'411 i
. \!bile nc,;nrt.r.2J1t of State, t:hc iX0C:\lCj';
.of: U11itcd
. . . .
.-. :
t:cClno:l1ic 11olicy Cllil!!' the point .int
1
m of..
... . .
..
.. .
.. :
.. ...
.
'
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C01127965
..
.....
r : ...
. ...
...
. ..
. . .
.. . . ... . ...
.. l . I .. I ..
. ...,
t:\i:; ah<;. to }'.rc:sic!r..:'nt !!ix"n' :r
Jimuar.Y i1olicy.imnou}lCCr.c-r:':t froM the
.:"Jrensury':. T!1c. in: elo3c. t!it:h the:
.. . . . . : . .. . - . . .'. .
eouncil 'm1cl tlt.rou.::n itsUnite';! St<:lt.cs ?;Pvernors ..
.tile. Cl) .,
. . . . . . ; . . .; .. ... .
Grf)Ui> - .- oF. xntcmaional nan!.- ft\r
. . .. . .... .. . . ... .. .. . . : .. . ..".
..
structiot\'.3nc! .,s :tii.t:hc ''soft....lo.:m.
. . . .
. Developr.o$!rit Associatiqn. ;_ <'i> u.s:
.! J. l!xeeutive Diractor otl the l2oard Governors. tho. ..'
j
. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. .. . . .. .
!
: .C:i>. t:1e.Cltl'. the- tcononic P.cvict-1 C'rl')l,\p
.. the .
l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . t
.\.. of American ai1cl (Li). the
...' . ..'. : . .....:. . .,. .. :.' : . .: . . . ' : . . .. :.
' ...
.' .. . ' .. .
!
.
. A tot! inztituilc-n, I:.. port
r .. . .. . .. . ... . , . .
._also assu:-1ad :tn unusual:pu!.llic prof:ilc to;.\'<;!rcl '
.
l' took t:l2
. . .. . ' .. .
I :
Cl1ile's crecit frot'l .. in tlte. scco-:1d.
. . . .
catcr.o1:y.tO.''lJ' in. .t:f1e last .. Insc.i!:ar ar. the rntin?.
.. !Ji!:lil:ar Ly s ...
. .
:anc, ,interu::.tiou.-'ll invc:.t;or:. it c-:.il.P- !l 'pr.ohlr.r.\
3.ttr.:Lc.c:inr; <\cedec.l throu<;0:1 in.rest-
.
..
..
...
.... .,. . .
. .' .F'inciliy. lin?:.c<1
o'( for U.S.' C:"lHe's'nulCl.bl:t:l:':.\1,
-..-.
tio:H; t!1c l'.lcssnn:Jri m1.:l Y.'r.:i t;1c sc.c'om'
j
.
:,i...hc3t cripitn of al-:;' ccuritry ia '"o-rl.l. Y::t,
.. ..
...
.
' 0
...;.;,.j,_____......;....;...._-.:_..;__,:.___ ___ ...
SECRET
C01127965
SECRET
:.
.. :

...
. .:.- ..
. . .
1'.
..
in c:,:: l:J72 nT'I1 fo-.:c.:i"'::, . s
!
:..d:;tccn forcir.n. n.atioas. the .L'nitt"Hl
.. . . . . . '
c:>r;: for.Inter-
. . .
A.f;airs to rcscJ:tcdulino; '
p:f. Chile'r. . :debt T!le St_:tt:es ::iso'
. . . . . . . . .. . . ..
,.. llrcssure inc!ividunlly oa t.he nations. :_..
.
..
. .. . " . .
.. .
not to s a:; a.
. .
. ...... .- .
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SECRET
C01127965
__ :-
...
.1V..46; . ..
..
: t
.
t '
' . . .. . . ...... .
. . .

. .
.4. U.S.'Relation3 with t1'1e Chilean
...
0
United States relations \-litli the Chileanmilitary during
.. . . . . . . . ' ..
.,
'1970-1973 be viewed not the
.
o! close between. the American .
. . . . . .
... . . . . . . ..
;.
services_ar.d of continuinz intelligence collection
. . . . . . - ,
: 'efforts. but. als.o it1 the ext of_ TJ;ack to
.. . . .. - .
. ...
foment.a milr'tary: Tracl(. .t'I a break. nature
...
. . . . . ' . .
of 1;elattons between U.S. officials a'Pd 'the Chile.an military..
.: -Close.
- u.s: of The
military. .in waJ> substantial:', both.of.-
. . . .. '" .
. milita-ry attaches to the Embassy a.nd.members Q the . .
. . . . . . .
. Group \Jho. provided uaining:and 'to t}le
.... . . . . . ..
,
. . .
. -. .Ii_\ late 1960,s, G:-x:oup number_ed.
'> . 'over fiftYi by t:he Allende period, itwas. to 3 doze11 oi .
. . : .. . . .. . .
/ . ...so. which _primarily.Fo'.tlo. u_. _s._
. $. Pre-Tt'ack I! . . ..
. . ...
.In.J'uly 1.969 the CIA. .2nd arproval. for' a
. .
. Rrogram to es.i:abli,sh'intellit;ence assets in'the Chilean _.
. '
armed for t:he purpose of.ide'nt:ifying': coup
plotting. The prqg::am.las 'fot:_fo'il:r invol ai:.s
from all three of the Chilean military
l front c01nmand level officers to fieldand company gri:i.de officers
c\ "
. . '
.. to retired general 'offi:cers t:o enlisted From 1969 t:o
therro)ect was by to its
oojcct;ivc of mon_itorinc ancl reportinB coup--oriented.
activityuithin the Chile:an.military. _
.
' .
... ..
SECRET
C01127 965

. .. . .. . ... .. . .' . ..
..
.
. ..During August. -and of .1.9.69, .it became in- .
. .
. clear from the reports. the growing
' .
. isfactipn and unrestWithin the amed' forces leading to an un..: .
. ..
stable These e:Yent's the Tacnazo ..
. of '21 October 1969.. identified. t'he
. ...
. . .. . .. . .
. aims anci si,gnificance of the Tacnazo future
. . .
tions. between . the Chilean military. The saw
how close the 'came to :. it a .
.. particuiarly in the
...
o.f. l9.7fl and the strong 'Of. of. ;
. . . . . .... -. .. . .. . ... ...
:.: Salyador. .. : . . . . . ... .-.:; .. . . . . .
.
....' . . ... . ' . ..
. \
.. : . .. .. . . .....
: 1.
1:! .. Track II . . .
. .
.
..
.
..:.. .
..
.. . .
The Track II to organize miiitary coUp

to deny Allende
. . . . . . . ... . . .. '
. .Presidl;mcy the Santiago s net-work

'
. With che U.S. . Army 'becat:le in a two-
.
,; way channel between the Sr:;ation and the two. main coup pl,ott ing '
..{. groups in the . did ! plans
I , . . , . . . . .
1 _.: .of these . but they also the s advice on the.
f..,neciuinics . and timing of the .cou.p . U.S. gov-. .
:1 . support if the coup successful,.. the death .
:l. .: .schneider, the ,military coup effort collapsed in di.s-
:l array and with it the. Sta.tion s coup r:porting network.
l lt: took thC! Station anothe'r ten months to overcome the Chilean mili-
:1.. t ary' . . _ rebuild network. of .
..A's part. ,of its atternpt to ind':lce the Chilean military t .o in-
. tervene b0fo<e the Octo_bcr 24 Congressional vote, . tho United
1 had thtea to: cut military , ntilitary to
SECRET
C01l27965 ... . .... __
,
4
', ' ' I ' '
act. That was:aceoU1p:lnicd a 1lromise. of in : .
.math acoup, a.ssistance off-at ... :..
time of

(see Table I).. Rather, it .

ued while all other forQS of economic aid.were ended.
. . .
n also continued. Orders from 1972 to 1973
everi more from 1.973 to..1974. II).
. .. . . .
.. . .
Train'ing of Chilean military pe1:sonnel.in Panama also . rose .
the Ailende .'(see. III): . .: -.: :::.:_..; . : : .' ":-- ;-,
.. ... : . . ': : . .. .. .. - .
' f', . : :' :, T , .. ...'.; . : ;<:' "
.! .'e: .. 1970-'73 . . ; ... . . !..:-:: . .. .
. . . . . . . . .. ..:-.. "' . - . . . .. . .. . . .
. .

Track 'the.CIA its: of
. .
..: .
.
. ..
.
contaet:s; and the .CIA clo'se to Chilean militaryofficers
attemptto :' .'
. . . ..
I thei-r part, Chilean c;fficer.s -who ,;ereaware that ..

States once..had.sought. a to.. .from. .. .
. . .. . ... . . ' ...
i
' must have' been. 'to 'of .
. . .. . .
U:s. support for a coup: . .. ... . .. .. .. -
... . . . ..
. .
By September 1971 a network ofo?-&_ents was in place
. .
' .
the was receiving almost daily reports of new coup .plotting.
: . . . . . . . . .
. .
The Station and Headquarters began &..o .e>--plore. ways to this net-:
. .'Worlc to influence.over the direction of planning. Two ef- .
. .. ' . .
. \O:C.CC mounteq bothOf tO haveexceeded t.heir. in-
telligence collectionmandate. The fi;st was .a .dis.iufor.mation . ef- .
fort stimulate military coup groups into.a strong unified
.move ar,ainst the government. The second and more effor.'t
.-
Vas the collection'of.'Otlerational data actual'ly needed for Q coup.
' . . .
. e.g., arrest lists, key civilian in'st:a'llations ana personnel that
. . ' ...
needed protection. key governtncnt installations which need to be
. . . . . ..
.taken ovor t anclr,ovc.rnment: plans whic'h would.be.used
. . . . .. . . . .
in ease of a military uprising . .
!:::=zw::.-----------------------..-..
SECRET
: C01127965
SECRET
..
.: . ..
. . "l'ABLE. I . .., .. . '". :.. ,

... . .. .. . . . .. . ..: ....... . i.. . .. . .
..
...< !o!i'litnrx (in :: . :._..."<:.". >..
0 : _ . : :
.... . . ...:.... . . . . .. .. . . :. . . .
... : . . .. . . r.rogrammed .. ....., .... Delivered
.:: ...:- :__::. : .: . _ . ;.. :.:a-,366:ooo .
l
1966
' . .4;143,000 . . . . .' . . . . 766,000 .
1967
. :- . .. 1,801,000 .. . '. .1. 507000
1968
... :.... 734,000 .. .. . ....2,662,000.
1969
.852,000 . .: .. . ;. 1.966,000'.
1970
. , , :. ... ..: .. 698,000 . ; . . . .. 1,03.3.000
1971
. .-: .: .S70,000 . .... : .. 2,227.000 .
1972
.. . . ' .. . ..941.00.0 . . . ... .. .. . 918,000
1973
1 . .. ... . 912 ;000. . . . :::- . . . 619,_009.
.. :
... ... . . . .. - .

... .. . ..
...
.. . .' .
. .
.i
....
.
.. ......' .. -
i . . .. . . : . . . ' . .. . .. II'. . ..: ._. .. ... ..:
., .
: ... ... -.-:..
: .. ... .._. _. . ::llilftary Sa.le.s . (itt dollars)
.
,
..
:
..... .
............. . . .. . ..': . .' . .. . ..
. ... ...
. . . . . ..
: ... . . : . ',.. . ' :... Orders : :--: : ._:::. .">: >:...::
..... .
1966
...:>. .' 1;os7 ..o.oo
.....:.. ......:>:.' i,49'<(000 .
._ .. . . 1.690,000 .
: . . . . .2. 559.000
1967
1968
. . . ..."4,077,ooo.
.:. . . . 2,100,00:)
. . . : '.
1969
... .
. . . 9,145'.000 . .
1970 . .. " 7 ;503 '000
1971
. . 2,'886,000
..._:
.4,383,000
1972 . . .:. : .
. . .2 .242.000
.: 1973
. .. :. . 14,972',000
: 1974 , ,:, -': .76,1201 000 ,

. ..
..
]
.:.
. . . . .
t
. III
._1
l
. . .
...
..
' .
Training inPanama of People)'
.;,
.. . .
.i
. '
.
. . .
.i 1966 .. . '68
.

i.
1967 .57 . .
-.
. 1968 '.169
.. . ..
107 ' . .
..
-j .1969
.,
.f 1970
,'. . , . .lSi
. 197l :. . ........1'46
. 1972 .197 .. . ... .
J
'1 1973
..
257
:J 197/.I
.... ..
. 260 ..
.
J ---------
1 . hom of to Senate Scle'ct
r.:.Commitece Request and are UoClossificd
... ..
... ..
SECRET

C01127965
.
. SECRET...
. ' ,.
..:rv. so . ...
...: . . .....
. ., .
.. . .... ' . 0
! .
0
1R 1971 proposed to

,
::is wh.ich that :.. ...., . ..
. -- -.. "'.... .. . . . . .
InvestrgaCiones unit, with the app_royal ?f
:. .. i .act.ing 1nconcert: t:h Cuba .. :
. (nci1 & A:m;
.. .If might .. . .
., . _ tor.them uiount. .a co.up... tt. is . ...
... . ii88i ifi:fle some . .'-,-..
_- ... Se 8tii ::: c; > :_
l ' tl:e .,..est t:.he .i,..,-". : . . . .. . . . :
0
j tn'e,restof fhe fnformatic;m was to be made up. of . veri.: ...
.l ... . _. .. : .. .... '<{.-\...: .. .' . .
; _. .. !R I : . ..
.... . t tiii: eci a Chile..
.Ctx fi8f .-on i. :
j'
.1'81: 88 the . :
: . l972 and 1973
.:. igetiit:::. B8itilti'91!the that
,.,{t..h t.he best c.hance: :or ,., .,. .. : . .
0'"oup W1th 1:.tle 'Dest cnance x:ora s\iccessful coup had formedI and
.Jfeg:Rf : ilm&unt .o! time and to ..
.
i:h.:i.s .K,!ouo t=.han it had on
1
,.. .._. ' . .. .' ....
t:hl.S than lthad em preV1.ous groups, . . . .
.. 1{ltlil8ti?{;t!glft-firfH; t6. t s .at ion. ..:
LJ(.JC\bc1' Bv _19_11 t.l.- ,. . . .
I97r. B1 January_T974 Station successfully pene:
C.he and \ies in cont: ,J . .
tlte group and was.'in .cont<l.ct: .throueh an wxth
.
l_!g tgJt:l: . tffi i'JW. .1972, CIA adopteda
0 0
lliotc: sta-:ice'\j::; av..:is
0
\ 1 , ,
0 0
0
mote dctl.ve stanc,c V'rS'"' a.- vrs- l.ts m'i
1
h !tary penet1:ation program,


!li 'iJppot{ .
J
f:llaalttfvvd. to .coinpile .
''tt.l.co.l Cll''"ntt)..cm:- 1 ,lnta, tn{! ia..' :
1

unb o:ncr operat1.ona1 UOl.ta, cnu u
1
. vc. e 4.ort to .
.. . .
1
_____
.
___- ;...,;....________ -.......
SEGRE+
----------- ------'
:c01127965 ...
. .. ..
: ..: IV.5l . ,:
. ..
. :'-.

. . . .
...
. ..
....
.:
the coup-minded Cl{litary by. means of. disinformation .. .
0
,.
reached. two pe- .
. .
. . .. . .
one iri
,
the lastweek ofllJne.an.d the.other dut:in:g. the.
.....
..
of August the firsttwo weeks in It.is clear the
... 'fiA. rec:cived reports the J?lanning oi the
which carried out. September 11 the
, and September 1973. .
.,. .:.. I , -
: The CIAs penetrat:Lonprogrammust: be .viewe<,l. asa part.
. . . . . .
.,
.
of States overt and' t'o the..
. ... . . '. :. . . . . .. . .. .. .. . ' . .
. .
government. to aboucand influencing..a mili-.
' . ' : .. ' ... . .. .
.
. : .. .
eary al 'to the Al.lendepresidency.
....
. . .
. '
.. '
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: .
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.,
-
...
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.:
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: ...
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,
I
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.
4

SeCRET
...

C01127965
....
... .,. ... . .
. : .
.....
. ...
' .
: .
..... .: .
.. .
..... '. ..
... ...
"'.....
..... . .. . . .
: ..
'.. .
...
...
..
.. . ..... ..
.....
..
.

.....
. .' . . . ..... ...
.
of a o o
..

, . . .
.. .: : ':"" .... .. ...:
... . .....
.
...
.
- .
.
..
..r.. Posc.:.1973
,'
.. ' ' f
...
. ...
. ' _.. ' : : : ' : ; :

' .. .:- . : ...... . ..
0
:.
: i. Chile Since the Coup . : .. . . ... . .
. . .
..: .: Following September 1973 coup,:.the_..military_Junta,
0
'iedby _Gerieral Augusto' Pinochet_, t.'o. its
. . . . . .
-acquired po_wer ." Politic.al p'arties lotere . was
J-' in press instituted, support-.
-J..= . . .. .of Ailende deemed of.the. _new.
(: . .. . jailed,.and elections were p:ut off .; .
..
... : _-_ l'he-prospects for the revival;of.democracy in Chi.l_e_ :have
. .: little- the -two .y_ear.s. .A i97S .
. . . . . . . . r
... ... . . .. . .
:.: . Inteliigence estimate stated that the Chilean armed forces were
.. . . . . . .
. . . . ..
.. detepnined t 'o over_see a . political morit:orium and to
revamp-_the Chilean po.litical' The 'NIE sta-ted that the

:'
. .: Junta had tight, authoritarian controls over
.
- .
.
.- life in which generally cont;inued.in effect. .Ithad outiat-.'ed
. ..
.1-farxist parties-in Chile as well as.other parties which had com:..
0 ' . . . . .
I . ,PJ;ised. Allende.9 _coalition. .In the Ch;i_stian Democra_tic
ha'd.. rece_ss.- _
two parties were forbidden from engaging {n political ac,.:ivi::y
restricted to purely housekeeping functions.
. ,
charges concerning the of human
. .
. . '
.

.
. . . . .
.
. . .
in Chile continue - to be directed at the Junta. _ Mostrecently, a
Nat:i.ons report on that ''torture ccnte}:'S"
a-re beingopciated :l:n parts of the count-ry. The
lengthy docu1ncnt, issued October 14, 1975, listed 11 centers where
.. ..
. . ..
.
.. .. ..
....
SECRET
C01127965
... . ..
..
: . ...
..
.... ...
.. ... ,.
.. ..
. .
.. . .. .. '. . .... . '. , ........ . .
.. .
.,;.:_. .. . ..... - ...
r
' :
,
.. .'" . . ....
....
... .-:.
.. .it: snys prisoners nre questioned "by methods to
.
. . . . . .. . .
. .
'torture." The Pinochet hadoriginSllly offere'd full
UN &t:.oup, ..of . . ..r
o o o . ' '' :: o o ' I o
moyement in Chile.. llo\iever,_:;s.ix... day:; before group'sa.rr'ivaf' . :
. .... . ........,... :;.:;. . .. . ' .
'insantiago,.t .hc governma.rit: :rtwersed and, not;ified grout>
.. . .. ...... .. .. :. ;. _. ol
.
. .. . . its ;. . .. .
0
" . . -.:. . - ! .; .. . . . .. ... ..
......,""' .. in Chile .. . ->.:. ,. '
. . _.: _. :... ;_,.:. . . .. -
: .. :::....,.. ; .. fo:r _was cut ba.ck sha:n:>ly after
.: ... :":!' \ ' ..... .. :.:.:;: ::: }.: ... .. . .
1-..:. :'...the c.o.up. p'rojects except for one. a
.. ... '.. :'';:: , .. .... . . . . . .
: : terminated. Covert in
.: . ' . ' . .:. ..< : . . . .
..... Chile either continuations oradaptations
. . . . .. ....:.. .. ::.o.. . . .
:. of proj_cts t .nan any ne\-J initiatives.
1,' .. .:' .The .o.. s.ince the coup to
{: . .. .the both at' home
S- .ab-road, ..to _maintain to the levels .of
.,..-..
.:r
'-'
.. Another goar, in part through worck .

. '

=
that haabeei1.dcme before
Q
. .
.....
-
.. . the was to help the ne\.r &et organized and i.mp.lement
Pro.ied: .record .e.rA._I______.I were .involved
preparing em ovcr"'ll economic pl3nwhich served as the
Qasis fcir the Juntn's mos_t important economic dccision_s.
l.
As. stated., a CIA project continued after the coup.
.'ACl/\ mcmorand\Un dealing with.the project st.:ltecl that a of..
' . . . . '
activities, including the procluction of books. a mailing._e ffort.
' o' I
..
:r; ..
.
I.
...' '
SE:GRET
C01127965
.. . .... ....
..
';! :
...
..
... ....

. ...
...' -
.. 4 : .- .. ..
. ..
.: ...
. . ..... .
I ,,
......
...
. . .
' ' ' o ",' ' I
program,.and themedi.a coordination effort .
. ..
. . .,
.. bee_n terminated, but nccess' t'o certain.chilean media outlets
had retained in order'to'cnable the CIA stat;on insantiago
.

. .
,.
' I mold public in of .the new 'govern.:.
. . .
ment as to infl.uence the of ..
..

through pressuresexerted by the 1'h.; memorandum.went on
: : that these had, to .the
4
. . . . .. .. . . . '
.: , ;
'I Junta in the positive light. chii.ean p.ublic to
..
- _-assist foreign'journalists in:Chileto obtain facts the
...
situation.. Further. the'memo.randum wen't on p:n)j ect' I
.assets hadbeen asked to help.the JW'lta. prepar.e .a White .. -
.
I
''The .\fuite B.ook.:'publis:hed Junt..a"Sho.rtly.after coup,
I ' '
' . . . . . .. . '
I
to Justify the Allende..It":as dis-
: ..
'.
._t-z:ibuted both in and in other forei.gn capitals.
.. . . . .
. '
....
. Cb'ilean s
IE.O.13526,section3.3(b)(l)
to tbc DDO
1
s concern that
l .ay tllc Aucncy open to of JlOl{tical_ rcp.rcssion,
:

.
SECRET

C01127965
SEPRU
: . ..
...
.., . ..
...
... .
.-
the memo !eiexrcd to abovestated that some of
.CIA,s I lwo':Jld. b_e to' 'it'in
,..; A
-
._..
$'
sub.version from this support: could be adaptable to the
._.. ":. . . . .

con't:rolof' internal subversionas well..However, t:he memo went
=
CIA. _ma,k.e ( . . jat. tile.ou_tset
,. .. .. . . . . . . . . . .
that no CIA support would be provided for use.in- internal political
l!

'1 :ri
the attemp.t - .the .'
, ,..;
0

to.maintain _it in its ;or.

. .of Detainees," which clos-ely follow.ed the. standards on
. . . ' . .
.,
_.:huinaO::rights set by 1949.Geneva
,,

: .., :... . ....

.; ...: .
:. ..
. .. .
...
..
. . .. :. .
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.... .
..
- ...
..... .,.
. ....
.
.! . . ,..
. ' ...
. .
..
. . . .. :
4 . ...
.J.
..
..
. .. ....
..... .....
. : ... . .

l
. .. . . ....
;j..
.........
., . ..
.;
.. . .. .
; .. ' :.
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l
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SECRET
C01127965

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'
V. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS. '. . ..
.. . . . . I ._. : . . . ..
. .. ' covert action in Chile was. an eletnent. .of American foreign.
. . .. . '
policy .that nation. It is in that light that action:.
. . . . . 0 0 ..,
must be evaluated. l'he linkbetween.covert action. and
.policy was obvious throughout the decade \964 a'nd)!n4.
. . . . . . . .
., ' . .
...
1964, the:Unlted States commi.trne.nt.to" .democratic reform
0 0 .:
..via the Ailiance'for..Progress was by covertsup'Port to
.. " .. _.:, . . . . . .
the' election of candidate. of .the Chri.sti.an Democratic
t . ,.. ... . . . .
{ . ..a t-e wh_ich the.All seemed made.
r. was.- theri by ove_rt . .
' . u.s:
0 4 0 0
"' ao ot ' 'J'" f
0
0
l . .:beeomj.ng President of Chile. When that to
h his. o.ppos:i.tion.formed a o; actions; covert .
. aid t .o opposit.ion forces, phis .correct"
plus. .. _. . . .
' . . . . . . . . .
: . : _following _conclusions. are'_'suggestedby tl_le evi-
dence.of the Chile case.
...
..
. . ..
. . . . .. . ..

..
. . . . ., .. . ' ..
: . . .
Initial -: .
: : ....
.
"';
.. . .. . . . ..
... . ::.m 1964, the United .States 'fi!8SSively involved,
. . . '
. .
-i.n Chile because so seeme.d consistent with'overall American
. .The election of a moderate-left Chile
. . '
:was a cornerstone of the tO\"ard Latin typified'by
.
. .
.

. _.. t.he for. Progress.
.
'Whet-heror not;: the 1964 i>roject .Was a
: effort. itwas not. Nor it likely that it
. . . . .
could have ''!'he involvement, and scale that
. . .
iny_olvement, generated commitments and expectations on boths1.dcs.
SECREf
C01127965
...
.. .;
..... .
.. .
... l
., .... . .
''.
.
.
. ...
.. ...
t
..te I fo-r r:.he u.s. 'ascets aUd eh.a.qc.els of ftmdi.nl;which.
' . .
t
.. . .! .. . . . . . .
.uud r.n: t:. to:hie;h. were t;ec:ipi-
ftit' o ciA. r;har . 'counted
..
' : : -: . .; 0 : : .. . .. 0
,'" .,. : : . ' : ; 0. : . - . 0
. 1;. of Ma1ot CovertActiem Pro.grams ._ .. .: :. :_ .
. . . ..
. .
obvious about covert actionprograms bnthe
\ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . .
l
.
.
eA14.of' Chilca' is are unlikeiy..co remain .c:overt. ..Ih
l .
i .
I
ChLlt. ;964, too . too.many .
. . . ' . . . .
.
. ,. broadcasts . United
.. . . . .
=: for in Lati'n for .
;' Tho involvement inl964 created a in aild.
ihAwhara itt .La.cin America.:.thatt:h.e United States government
.. ..
Again b4 involvad in1970. .Covertness made stillharder to .
. . . . ' .
!
"ACbieVQ, evan though. the C.IA.involvement\<7aS much smaller
..
..
.. .
I
.J
.j.
ithact bean in 1964.
. . :i .
_- ,\'than COVC!Irt actions' in Chile became public knowledge,...the
..
.
costa wora obvious. The United States seen,. by its CO':'ert ac-
. a & . , .. \
'.tlonfi, to hAva not only'its-official policies but .its
t
.1
: and p1.iueiplcs long standing. At the
1 . .
. '1
'tiute lll'itw.u proclnitnint a profile
11
in Latin American re-
. lati:ona:.thQ U: S.- covarntncnt was s.eeking to a coup in
. . ... of covert ventur.es.which .nre "blm.:L"l" are clear
-. . . .. - . . ._ . ..
... .Cmoush. llut U\4Y '-costs to PilY even if the could
>
l : ' for.lot"'8 por_iocliof time: .Sonle of these may
r. . of successes may
SECRET
C011 27965 . ___ - .._. ------ ---.-
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turn. to failures.
Several officials from
.. I .
testimony argued that the poor. showing of the Christian.
. ..
. Democrats in 1970 .. 'in pa.rt,
:.
. c()Vcrt support. The PDC had been spared the of its'
. .. . . .. .. .
.
'
gra.ss roots organization. .In 1964. the qA did that for.. it.
. . . . . . . ..
In 1970, 'WiCh less' CIA activity on it!7 behalf I .the .
. crat:ic Party . .. ._ . ; ... ... .'. ..
. . ;t . . .' ' . . ' . ' .
. . . the more 'costs: of
remain . are. those to Ainer.l.can ideals 'relations
. .. . . . . . . . .. . :.. . . .
. nations of constitutional government. lQ the case of
. . .. . .
. : ,..
,ciiile 1 of those were far. from .abstract:; ' the
; . - .. o,
t
.,
.... qf :United .States officers in '!rack II
to .a govern-.
0
..
.: lo
"ment. , .. ... ..
.
.
0
.Covert action .has be,cn perceived as a middle ground between
.. . . .
.:1
l
.. :. diplomatic. and the use oi force.'
J:n t .he. of Chile. tha:t ,i,d.ddle g-round may have been fa'!=
broad. Given the of cove.rt action: it should be.
... . . . . . ...
' . .
to to severe threats to the security of
.. . . . . . . . .
..
United State.s. It is far from clear that covert action \<las em-
.
p.loyed in Chile only. in to . of The
s-eeming of action .may $enior policy
r ' ' ..
. ..
makers to ..do when it that ;thos.e accions.
. .. ,; .
might have been better left undone . 'W'hen the band aid. n
.quick fix" has' i-n }\as beelt all too easy to
tlle next st.ep- - T:rack II . . .
. .. .
..
' .
..
. .
' . .
..
41
..
..
. '
... .
..

.
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"""-------..;...c.'__,_--0-- .. ... ' "
SECRET
----------- ---- . .
..------- --- - -------- --------'---'-------------
C01127965
! -
.-
! .
c-
t:hose-ma.;y be adverse. institutions as
.....
. .: . . .
.-
'The Chilean the most
have 1;rpwn -ti1rough on covert suppOr-t .. :rfle :
cnristian Democra-ts may be- ci -case.- i:O Internal +efom_.and -:
; _l.oc:al oo:ganiz?tion may ...dthe.red. . important:. t:bose .
-. -may as cor:r;upted vitbin'their
. . .
It1Latin.America -particularly.
. . .. . .
_.of .CIA is:the of.' death. It-would be the fimil _iron:!_
. .
i
,; a decade .i.u utJ'liit 'desttoyed . -_
p
!
,.....

: .. -- thecrcdibil_i:ty o Chilean esse!l?i.a:l

i . . .. . -
force if,Chile is t:o be extr:icated from_ itscurrent: politicaln-?--ght-
j-
1
mare.
.
I
..
.
. The-ef.fects on American ins.tit_ut:ion's are less obvious,but no

,....,
-...._; . . .-
::2 ._less_ U.S. ins.titutions w.it:h o:.ve:rt.

of their o..._"'l-
=


been corrupted by theiruse for short-
-Q,j
M . .
; t:erm political endsand by thci:r involvement with
M
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:That: co1;ruption would probably exist in theperceptionof
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Americans-whether or.not:.itexisted in any particular because
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-of the pervasiveness of clandest:i.ne U.S. activitY: ..
. In the end. the_whole of= u.s. pol:icy making maY' be affected.
7hc 3-vailability of'an "C.."tra" means may
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day -when outmr.ioed policies are ab;mdoned and.new; ..
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. Arguably .the election'project . was part:of a .."progressive"
ap-proach.toChile. The ..if not:
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actually sustained. by the. desire to elect democratic
By.197o.. covert action had become m :
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theeiection of Uni!;ed_States
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. -. '"lovproilen but.at;:he Saine t:illle ac1:ed, avert:lY,., to' ensure
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dlat the qu_lean elections came out .: DCtw.itil- .
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. . Effect:s of Clandesd.ne ActionsNet: ctirert:.
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onia.:Uy &ay.not:.
.t:hose 'that .laOOl. .
:.=..ay. leaders fer:.t:he pu.X:pose of bte:ll:i-
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euce dfect;s oxi t:Jle Cbi.lean:insr:i.tu1:icns Cllt'e tiits .
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. Si:mi.larly. when c:overt: mdl
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a:

.1.._'tlieix: of ..
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Hult.ina!:ional Compani:es
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for a single party 'candidate. A.t the same. time. 'the C_IA prov-ided
to hnerican-based ..
. . . . . . . ' ;-"" . .. . ' . . .. .
.. giving just such direct 'That all .of
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and p'.roblems fr.om exposure.; and eH.minated. many of the
. . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . -
.safeguards of control pre.$ent in CIA coV:e:t
. . . Th_e. 'of'..
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:. between. the CIA and compan.ies existed. when -indiv.iduals.
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. such as former Director John McCone, utillzed contacts and -informa-.
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whi.1e: .the a. . .
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of Directo-rs he sat. appearance was heightened _bec.a0;se .
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.. contacts between tne and_ t.6' .' ..
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. ning; and. cor-Poriu:e "interventi-o-n. ':i.n. country!.s :
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election. process. ..
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. , of cooper4tian is exaceTbated when a. cooperating
, .1nay be- calle-d give before an appropriate congres.:.
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j : . c'oqunittee. The may with tl)e . ques-
. of whet:her come forward to -set ' the .str.aight it::
. . . . . .
.t.bat t.eut:itnony givel1 on 'or .a cowp_any .l$
untrue. : The situation' is difficult, for in coDling the Agency
: reveal sources and methods by which it _learned the
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':F. Executive Command and Control of Major covert Action
. .: Procedures within th.e CIA far controlling 'maiox- ac-
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tion programs seem.. .in . the instance of Chile' , tight. :
.... made Station .....
}. 'vioots. in_ Washington.. on. _the ;t;:.
:t tion.''were impossible. . . . . . .:
f .'. :. ..issue politicai
' not. ..
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'.. . . but for insuring. that a:,;.-e are'
! . . ... . .. . . . . . . .. . . 0
. countable' to the- senior political' po1icy officials. of. .
.. both .in Washington ancl' in. . . ...::
, o . a '
. : .'The Track II _episode stands as to the. dangers which
;''':. . . for .insuring .Execu-
:. or Track 'II was .
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ttal.conception, to be operated t>"ithout. the Ameri.can Am-'
0
.. in 'the ot 40. _'mem-
Henry. . .'rhe government thus
":i.t:self m.aj or sour"ces, of counsel p.olitics: And
' ...the '!UJlbassaqor in Santiago was left in. tht! position o( having'
. : with any 'politica_l spill:--over from project of
.
he :was. not infonned..
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. danger was 'greater s'till. the trutb af?ouc: 17om-
municat:'ion CIA ..'15. . .
. ..
l970--an issue is the conflicting testimony--all
: agreed that Track II constituted a broad mandate to'
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the CIA. Agency W3$ siven' to belic:ve it had virt:uai carte
.. .
'blanche authoritv to anvthinr.: mnrnovPr
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'to.do It"!as l _it.tle.guidanc:e about.wha_t .,
it from White. .
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wonder that. customary safegtiai.ds within the CIA. or
I
consultation the CIA and the. in-advance
. . .. .
of. havebeen less ..
.. .. ... oi%ack an itis. of the
:_ .mechanisms .:for:. and. It... . .:..
'l ...... . .. . . .... . . .. .'.:. . : .. . . . .' :.. :. !
.. ... . to ,several .ahor.te'omings' in . the normal px:ocesses :
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conttol: . :.: .. . : . . .
:...
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.. --even.withinthe CIA. for review proposed cov- ..
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actions by the 'of : _: Th;; .
has.improved, but the. operators.stillare .sepa.rated from
. . . . . . . '. . . . .. ... . ...; .. .
.the intelligence ana_lysts, those.whose business it_is to
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and foreign po_litics'.. for s most ..
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prestigious.intelligence analyses--NIEs--eontain no m(!ntion of
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cov-
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ert operations. Indeed, drafted _may even have
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.kno\m'of u.s. actions in Chi.le.

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<, -.:dec:isi(!ns about :which are: to the. 40.Com-
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are made within 'the C'IA. There is little evidence. in the
-Chile whic.h should have been npproyed lilY the 40
Committee '"ere not to it, but x:-emain
.. .. o 0 0 I .C, o
atthemer'cy of CIA judgments about political sensitivity.
submissions t:o t:he - 40.Committee often ore too terse. To
J assess px:oj ects, Colnmittee kno'foT recipients
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. .of the of activities and SO On. 'Ihose
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.: det:ails matter ..* ... : 0 0 '
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--the form in:which covert ect.s ..witl) ..
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: and other State varies. . ltde-.
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pends _h.ow are J:tow are
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Station .
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maj.or 'are.appr.oved bY. .40. ..'.:
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t
.:! l-7ithout searc:hin& by the Committee .
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hiere are annual reviews the 40 of on-goin.g:p::r.ojects,
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. 'but those are . .-
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Command and Control- of Clandestine Project Labelled "Co\7-
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- eitA.ction
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main point tobe.made .abo1lt _proc:es's of authorizing and
-- eemtrollin& sensitive labelled "covert.
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is that itis differentfromt:hat.for "cov-ert:actionn proj-
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..1 : Clandestine collection of human intelligence is not. the sub-
. -. . . . . ... . -.- ..
. . Ject .ItO Committee But'those be .
. politically .as.a. ."covert suppose the effort. is.
...:to develop a co'ilection asset in a foreign cabinet: Similarly.
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amb'assadors .8enerally. know CIA assets only"by. description.
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by _naie. The o{ course, is security. That
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This . conclusion is based only on.discussions with.
*
and former of.t;icials. !l'he has requested, not
yet access to CIA submi:ssions to the 40 Committee.
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