1 IN RE: AMADO MACASAET DECISION Heres the clue REYES, R.T., J.

: The Court employee who was fired by the lady jurist is a niece of another lady justice who earlier retired. The worker was inherited by the incumbent lady justice. My problem with this report is that while my source is definite about the employee opening a gift-wrapped box that contained at least P10 million, he wont confide to me the identity of the jurist. Unless the employee who was fired talks against her boss and she should as a matter of duty we will never know who this justice really is. The members of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan are all called justices. The head of the Office of Government Corporate Counsel is also honored by being addressed as such. So is the head of the Court of Tax Appeals. Since the employee was fired for opening the box which she thought contained perishable goods but turned out there was an estimated P10 million in it, she should be loyal to her duty of telling the truth. That way, she would have rendered a great service to the justice system. Without her talking, every lady with the title of Justice is suspect. There are more than a dozen of them in different courts but only one was caught red-handed taking a bribe. Her name should be known so that the Supreme Court can act swiftly on a clear case of bribery. Otherwise, this case becomes one where the pot calls the kettle black. Or is that the reason the employee would not talk, that her former boss could spill the beans on her peers? September 19, 2007 The Bribe Giver The stupidity here is that the bribe-giver what else would we call him or her did not check whether the lady justice was in the office or not. Better still he or she could have the box full of money delivered to her home. But then her family would get to know about and ask who was the kind soul that was so liberal with money a boxful of it. The Supreme Court cannot let this pass. A full investigation should be conducted. The magistrate who was sent the bribe should be impeached. The gift gives proof to the pernicious rumor that the courts are dirty. This time, the lady justice is with a higher court. The court is like a basket of apples. There a few which are rotten that makes the whole basket rotten. The names and reputation of highly-respected jurists must be saved from suspicions they are thieves. I learned from some lawyers that the bribe money given to a lady justice came from a Chinese-Filipino businessman who has been criminally charged. It is funny that the delivery of five boxes of money (I said only one earlier) coincided on the day the lady justice, obviously acting as ponente, acquitted the prospect. The secretary of the lady justice who took the bribe made five trips to the guardhouse to pick up the boxes. Incidentally, this secretary is a namesake of her aunt, a deceased associate justice of the Supreme Court. I dare say that if her name is Cecilia, it is entirely possible that the lady justice is a member of the Supreme Court. The late justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma is the only lady justice I know who retired and died at a ripe old age and left behind a reputation of decency and integrity.

FREEDOM of the press and judicial independence (kalayaan ng pamamahayag at kalayaang panghukuman) two constitutional values which unfortunately clash in this case for indirect contempt of court have to be weighed and balanced against each other. The Antecedents The case stemmed from certain articles that appeared in the Business Circuit column of Amado P. Macasaet in the Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation of which he is the publisher. The articles, containing statements and innuendoes about an alleged bribery incident in the Supreme Court, came out in four (4) issues of the newspaper onSeptember 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007, reproduced as follows: September 18, 2007 Bribery in the Court A lady justice (I have not been told whether she is from the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals) did not report for a day last week. Her secretary received a gift-wrapped box about the size of two dozen milk cans. Believing that the gift might be something perishable, she opened the box. Indeed, it was a gift estimated at P10 million. Posthaste, the secretary informed the magistrate about the gift. She thought she was doing her job. The lady justice fired her instead. She would not have anybody catch her accepting a bribe. But she practically did.

2 We are coming closer and closer to the truth. The lady justice shamed her court. She should resign or be impeached. That is the only way the soiled reputation of the Highest Court could be restored. September 20, 2007 Cecilia, please save the court I have established the lady justices secretary who opened one of the five milk boxes containing bribe money is a niece of the late, respected and honorable Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma from Batangas. The secretary is a niece of the late justice and a namesake. Cecilia, you have a duty to honor the memory of your aunt, who, during her stay in the court, was known for having balls. More important than that, you have a duty to save the sagging reputation of the Supreme Court. Cecilia, you must tell the Court en banc everything you know about the money that was sent in five boxes to your boss. Not in retaliation for your dismissal, but for no other reason than as a duty to your country and, I must again say, to honor the memory of your late illustrious aunt, a legal luminary and staunch defender of the Constitution. The other reason you must spill the beans is that if you do not, other lady justices are suspects. That is not fair to them. September 21, 2007 Wrong date, same facts On verification, I discovered that the secretary of a lady justice of the Supreme Court who was said to have accepted five milk boxes of money, was fired as early as March. Not last week as I mistakenly reported. It turns out that Cecilia Muoz-Delis from Bicol picked up the last five boxes several times in March. She never opened the first four boxes which she picked up from the guardhouse of the Court. She opened the last and saw the money because the lady justice was absent on that day. Forthwith, she was fired. Cecilia, who is from Bicol, never opened any of the first four boxes delivered on various dates (I have not been told when). She picked up all of them from the Supreme Court guardhouse and left them with the lady justice. She wouldnt dare open the first four because the lady justice was in her office. She opened the fifth one because the lady justice did not report for work on that day. The succeeding two articles, however, gave an indication that the supposed bribery happened in the Supreme Court. Respondent Macasaet, in his September 19, 2007article, wrote, among others, that I dare say that if her name is Cecilia, it is entirely possible that the lady justice is a member of the Supreme Court x x x. We are coming closer and closer to the truth. The lady justice shamed her court. She should resign or be impeached. That is the only way the soiled reputation of the Highest Court could be restored. Similarly, in his September 20, 2007 article, respondent said that Cecilia had a duty to save the sagging reputation of the Supreme Court. Also on September 20, 2007, at around 6:00 p.m., Marites Daguilan-Vitug, Editor in Chief of Newsbreak, faxed a letter to Supreme Court Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago asking for three things 1. In (sic) April 13, 2007, you concurred with a decision penned by Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. ruling that the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division did not commit a grave abuse of discretion by finding probable cause against Henry Go. However, five months later (September 3, 2007), acting on Gos motion for reconsideration, you reversed yourself and ordered the dismissal of the graft case against Go. Please explain the circumstances that led to this reversal. Cecilia thought that the gift-wrapped box contained some perishables like food. What she found was money instead. She was fired. Whenever a gift for lady justice comes, she would order Cecilia to pick it up from the guardhouse. So the fifth she picked up was one of those errands.

Where is Cecilia? I cannot get any information on the present whereabouts of Cecilia. However, if the Supreme Court has intentions to investigate what I have been saying, maybe the Chief Justice himself should find out where she could be sent an invitation to appear before an investigation group in the Court. Better still, as I said, yesterday, Cecilia should disclose everything she knows regarding the box before the Court en banc. Farthest thing from my mind is to embarrass the lady justice whose identity I do not know up to now. It is my conviction that the Court should investigate reports of wrongdoing by any of its peers. Justice is served that way. The Chief Justice and the rest of the justices should not have a problem finding out who she is. It is a simple job of asking a clerk to go to personnel department of the Court and find out who Cecilia worked for.[1] The September 18, 2007 article, the first of the series of articles, caught the attention of Assistant Court Administrator (ACA) Jose Midas P. Marquez, Chief of the Supreme Court Public Information Office, in the course of his monitoring the daily news reports and columns in major newspapers. However, since it was vague about which court was being referred to, whether the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax Appeals,[2] ACA Marquez opted to merely note it.[3]

3 2. We have gathered from three sources that you received a cash gift of P10 million after you issued the decision early September. Please comment. Were checking if this is accurate. Your secretary, who opened the gift-wrapped box thinking that it contained perishable items, found cash instead. It was after this incident that you removed her.[4] assigned to their utility personnel; that it was highly unlikely for something as blatant as [a] bribery attempt to have been done right in the doors of the Court. [8] Delis ended her letter to respondent Macasaet with a plea My family and I have been suffering ever since your article came out last Tuesday, because I was being alluded to. This suffering has increased because the name of my beloved aunt x x x has been drawn into a controversy that should not have involved me or any member of my family in the first place. And so, I ask you, Sir, to please cease from mentioning my name or any of my relatives, living or deceased, in order to promote your tabloid journalism. If your source is as reliable as you believe, I suggest you practice better judgment and journalistic responsibility by verifying your data before printing anything and affecting the lives of innocent people. If this is some kind of war you are waging against the lady justice, we do not want to be collateral damage.[9] In her affidavit, Delis stated that she had nothing to do with, nor did x x x have any knowledge of such alleged attempted bribery,[10] and that she executed her affidavit to allow Justice Consuelo Ynares Santiago to defend her honor,[11] and for the purpose of correcting the erroneous information of Mr. Macasaet.[12] That same morning, too, despite the prior telephone conversation between ACA Marquez and Daguilan-Vitug, Newsbreak posted an on-line article written by Danguilan-Vitug herself and Aries Rufo, which was regularly updated, entitled Supreme Court Justice Suspected of Accepting Payoff (update)[13] with the picture of Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago We pieced the story of the alleged bribery from accounts of various sources within and outside the Supreme Court who have requested not to be named because of their sensitive disclosures. In March this year, Ynares-Santiago fired her staff member, Cecilia Delis, supposedly after the latter opened a gift-wrapped box delivered to their office, thinking that it contained perishable items. Delis, however, found wads of peso bills instead. The amount, two sources say, is estimated at P10 million.[14] Later that morning, Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago called ACA Marquez to her office and gave him copies of her written statement categorically deny(ing) the accusations and insinuations, all malicious and unfounded, published in Malaya and in Newsbreak; and underscoring that these are blatant lies clearly aimed at smearing and maligning my character and person, and the integrity of the Judiciary which (she has) been faithfully serving for 34 years now.[15] Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago also gave ACA Marquez copies of Delis letter to respondent Macasaet and her affidavit, which Delis herself had brought to Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago earlier that morning.[16] In the afternoon of September 24, 2007, ACA Marquez held a press conference and released to the media copies of Delis letter to respondent Macasaet, her affidavit, and the written statement of Mme. Justice Santiago.[17] On September 25, 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution stating On September 24, 2007, Daisy Cecilia Muoz Delis, accompanied by the Clerk of Court En Banc, Hon. Ma. Luisa D. Villarama, went to see Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago and gave the latter copies of her letter to respondent Macasaet and her affidavit. Delis, in her letter to respondent Macasaet, described his articles as baseless reports. In other words, she wrote respondent Macasaet, the scenario you painted and continue to paint is improbable and could only have emanated from a polluted source, who, unfortunately, chose me to be a part of this fictional charge. She clarified that she was a Judicial Staff Officer, and not a secretary as the articles claimed she was; that she voluntarily resigned from office and was not fired; that as a matter of procedure, she would not have been tasked to receive boxes, as such was a duty Upon evaluation of the columns Business Circuit of Amado P. Macasaet in the September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007 issues of the Malaya, it appears that certain statements and innuendoes therein tend, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

3.

Upon receipt of the faxed letter, Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago called for ACA Marquez, showed him the letter of Daguilan-Vitug, and requested him to tell Daguilan-Vitugthat she (Mme. Justice YnaresSantiago) had been consistent on her position in the Go case, that she never reversed herself, that she never received a cash gift, and that no secretary was terminated for opening a gift-wrapped box containing money. Accordingly, ACA Marquez went back to his office, called up Daguilan-Vitug and told her what Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago told him.[5] That same evening, at around seven, Daguilan-Vitug faxed the corrected version of the earlier letter 1. On April 13, 2007, you dissented against the decision penned by Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. ruling that the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division did not commit a grave abuse of discretion by finding probable cause against Henry Go. The vote was 3-2 in favor of Callejas (sic) decision. Five months later (September 3, 2007), acting on Gos motion for reconsideration (by that time, Callejo had already retired), you ordered the dismissal of the graft case against Go. I understand the exchanges were bitter and the deliberations long. Please explain the contentious issues. We have gathered from three sources that you received a cash gift of P10 million in March 2007 in the midst of deliberations on the case. Please comment. Were checking if this is accurate. Your secretary, who opened the gift-wrapped box thinking that it contained perishable items, found cash instead. It was after this incident that you removed her in March 2007.[6]

2.

3.

The following day, September 21, 2007, respondent Macasaet, in his column, named the supposed secretary who was forthwith x x x fired allegedly after opening the box of money: It turns out that Cecilia Muoz Delis from Bicol picked up the last five boxes several times in March. From the foregoing series of articles, respondent Macasaet has painted a clear picture: a Chinese-Filipino businessman who was acquitted of a crime supposedly left P10 million in five different boxes with the security guard at the Supreme Court guardhouse, which was picked up by Cecilia Muoz Delis who was forthwith fired for opening one of the boxes. Upon the request of Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago, the Chief Justice instructed ACA Marquez to have the 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st September 2007 Business Circuit columns of respondent Macasaet included in the September 25, 2007 agenda of the Court En Banc,[7] which case was docketed as A.M. No. 07-09-13SC. (Re: In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. A.P. Macasaet Published in Malaya dated September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007).

4 WHEREFORE, Amado P. Macasaet is ORDERED to EXPLAIN why no sanction should be imposed on him for indirect contempt of court in accordance with Section 3(d), (Rule 71) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, within five (5) days from receipt hereof. Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.[18] The following day, September 26, 2007, Newsbreak posted its on-line article entitled Supreme Court Orders Malaya Publisher to Explain Stories with a banner headline, This is not meant to chill the media. On October 16, 2007, the Court En Banc noted respondent Macasaets Explanation dated October 1, 2007,[19] and directed the Clerk of Court to include in the records of the case the affidavit of Delis dated September 24, 2007. The High Court also created an investigating committee composed of retired Supreme Court justices, namely, Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino as Chairperson; and Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., as members, to receive the evidence from all parties concerned. The Committee may, on its own, call such persons who can shed light on the matter. It shall be endowed with all the powers necessary to discharge its duty. The Committee was likewise directed to submit its report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from the start of its hearing.[20] Retired Justices Mendoza and Callejo, however, both begged off and were eventually replaced by retired Supreme Court Justices Jose C. Vitug[21] and Justo P. Torres.[22] The Investigation From October 30, 2007 to March 10, 2008, the Investigating Committee held hearings and gathered affidavits and testimonies from the parties concerned. The Committee invited respondent Macasaet, Daguilan-Vitug, Delis, and ACA Marquez to a preliminary meeting, in which they were requested to submit their respective affidavits which served as their testimonies on direct examination.[23] They were then later cross-examined on various dates: respondent Macasaet on January 10, 2008, Daguilan-Vitug on January 17, 2008, Delis on January 24, 2008, and ACA Marquez on January 28, 2008. The Chief of the Security Services and the Cashier of the High Court likewise testified on January 22 and 24, 2008, respectively. According to the Committee AMADO P. MACASAET testified on January 10, 2008 but, as expected, he invoked his right under R.A. No. 53, as amended by R.A. No. 1477 to refuse to disclose the source/s of his story regarding the rumored bribery of a Lady Justice (later identified as Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago) of a high court (later revealed as the Supreme Court) who allegedly received Php 10 million contained ina giftwrapped Carnation carton box (later changed to five [5] gift-wrapped boxes), for deciding a criminal case in favor of a rich Chinese-Filipino businessman. (Pls. see columns of September 18 and 19, 2007) The pay-off was allegedly discovered when Cecilia Muoz-Delis (not the Lady Justices secretary but a judicial staff officer V of the PET or Presidential Electoral Tribunal) who is a niece and namesake of retired Supreme Court Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma, allegedly opened the last box (according to his column of September 21, 2007 titled Wrong date same facts); but the first (according to his testimony on January 10, 2008, pp. 71, 89, 92, 125, tsn). By his own conclusion, the boxes of money were delivered on different dates because I dont think a bribe giver will deliver five boxes at the same time (87, tsn, January 10, 2008). He decided to go ahead and publish the story because he thought that eventually my effort at consistently x x x exposing the alleged bribery, one day sooner or later somebody will come up and admit or deny (it). And I think that (was) what really happened (29, tsn, January 10, 2008). He found out that the Lady Justice involved is Justice Consuelo YnaresSantiago of the Supreme Court, after he received a letter dated September 21, 2007 from Cecilia Muoz-Delis, the Cecilia mentioned in his columns, denying any knowledge of the alleged bribery or boxes of money for she had already resigned (not dismissed) from the Court on March 15, 2007, six (6) months before the alleged bribery supposedly occurred a week before Macasaet wrote about it in his column of September 18, 2007. (Annex A, Letter dated September 21, 2007 of Cecilia Delis to Macasaet) So, when did the bribery happen? The date was never made certain, for in his first column of September 18, 2007, Macasaet stated that the gift-wrapped box of money was delivered to the office of the Lady Justice, a day last week when the Lady Justice did not report for work. That must have been sometime on September 10-14, 2007 the week before September 18, 2007. However, the next day, September 19, 2007, he wrote in his column that the delivery of five boxes (not just one box) of money, coincided on the day that the Lady Justice, acting as ponente, dismissed the criminal case against Chinese-Filipino businessman Henry T. Go in the Sandiganbayan. That must be September 3, 2007 because the Resolution in G.R. No. 172602 Henry T. Go versus The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, et al. was promulgated on that date. This he affirmed when he testified on January 10, 2008 (46, 74, tsn, January 10, 2008). However, when he returned to the witness chair on January 17, 2008, after going back to his informant (on his own request) to ascertain the dates when the boxes of money were delivered to the Office of Justice Santiago, so that the Investigating Committee could subpoena the relevant logbooks of the Security Services of the Court to verify the truth of the alleged deliveries, Macasaet again changed his earlier testimonies on date/dates of the deliveries. He informed the Committee that, Macasaet testified that his source is not a relative of his, nor a government employee, certainly not an employee of the judiciary, and, that he (Macasaet) has known him for some 10 to 15 years (12-20, tsn, January 10, 2008). Significantly, in his column of September 19, 2007, Macasaet revealed that he did not have only one source, but several sources, i.e., some lawyers, who told him that the bribe money given to a lady justice came from a Chinese-Filipino businessman who has been criminally charged. He emphatically declared on the witness chair that he trusts his source with my heart and soul and believes his word as coming straight out of the Bible (94, 113, tsn, January 10, 2008; 14, tsn,January 17, 2008). But because this source did not have direct knowledge of the bribery (26, tsn, January 10, 2008), he allegedly tried to verify from other sources the information he had received , but I could not get confirmation (29, tsn, January 10, 2008). Notwithstanding the lack of confirmation and the paucity of details as to the identity of the Lady Justice and of the High Court where she sits, Macasaet believes that the bribery had actually taken place because I trust my source with my heart and soul (93-94, 113, tsn, January 10, 2008).

5 according to his informant, the deliveries were made between November 2006 and March 2007; before Cecilia Delis resigned or was dismissed from the Court. [24] On March 11, 2008 the Investigating Committee submitted to the Office of the Chief Justice its March 10, 2008 Report and Recommendation,[25] with the followingfindings of facts on the subject columns The following statements in Macasaets columns appear to the Supreme Court to be innuendoes (that) tend, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 1) From the column of Tuesday, September 18, 2007 The gift gives proof to the pernicious rumor that the courts are dirty. This time, the lady justice is with a higher court. The court is like a basket of apples. There (are) a few which are rotten. That makes the whole basket rotten. The names and reputation of highly-respected jurists must be saved from suspicion that they are thieves. Her name should be known so that the Supreme Court can act swiftly on a clear case of bribery. Otherwise, this case becomes one where the pot calls the kettle black. Or, is that the reason the employee would not talk, that her former boss could spill the beans on her peers? 2) From the column of Wednesday, September 19, 2007 The lady justice shamed her court. She should resign or be impeached. That is the only way the soiled reputation of the Highest Court could be restored. 3) From the column of Thursday, September 20, 2007 Cecilia x x x you have a duty to save the sagging reputation of the Supreme Court. Inasmuch as Macasaets snide remarks about the courts, particularly the Highest Court, and about the justices being suspected as thieves, appear to have [been] provoked by the rumored bribery in the Court, the Investigating Committee was constrained to find out how true the accusations were and whether the columnist had exercised due care and diligence in checking out the credibility of his informant and the veracity of the derogatory information fed to him before he published it in his columns in the Malaya.[26] Additional observations and conclusion were submitted, like the following The Committee finds that neither Macasaets columns in Malaya, nor Ms. Vitugs story in Newsbreak, about the pay-off of Php 10 million to Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago for rendering a Resolution favorable to Henry T. Go in his petition against the Sandiganbayan (according to Macasaet), or, a decision favoring 2. Barque against Manotok in a big land case (according to Ms. Vitug), have a leg to stand on. As Justice Vitug has observed during the last hearing before the Committee, everything that has been heard thus far would appear to be hearsay. Ms. Vitug admitted there is no paper trail to support the charge of bribery against Justice Santiago, for although her sources had pointed to Cecilia Muoz Delis as the root source of the story, the information she received was second-hand or may be third-hand because none of her sources had talked with Delis herself (70, 72 tsn Jan. 17, 2008). Delis had refused to be interviewed by her, and had emphatically denied in her letter and affidavit any knowledge of the alleged bribery because she was no longer working in the Court when it supposedly happened. Macasaets sources likewise fed him double hearsay information from a source that refused to reveal the identity of the Lady Justice nor a high court but alleged that the Php 10 million bribe was discovered by her secretary named Cecilia, a niece and namesake of the late Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma, who was fired from her job on account of it. The Committee observed that Macasaets story about the bribery and of Cecilias role in supposedly discovering it, is full of holes, inconsistencies, and contradictions, indicating that he did not exercise due diligence, patience, and care in checking the veracity of the information fed to him, before giving it publicity in his columns. Nor was he bothered by the damage that his columns would inflict on the reputation of a member of the Highest Court and on the Court itself. In fact, he was happy that he wrote the columns (103 tsn Jan. 10, 2008). Even if he failed to get confirmation of the bribery, one day sooner or later, somebody would come up and admit or deny it. He did not care that he smeared the whole Judiciary to fish her out, because after she is fished out, the suspicion on the rest would be removed (29-30 tsn Jan. 10, 2008).[27] (Emphasis supplied) The Committee likewise noted the inconsistencies and assumptions of Macasaet, betraying lack of veracity of the alleged bribery 1. For instance, he said that he could not get confirmation of the bribery story given to him by his source. Later, he said that his sources told me they had personal knowledge but would not reveal the name of the Lady Justice (65, tsn, January 10, 2008). His allegation that the Lady Justice (later identified as Justice Santiago) did not report for work last week, i.e., the week before his first column came out on September 18, 2007, was refuted by the Courts Public Information Officer (PIO) Atty. Midas Marquez, who testified that no Lady Justice was absent that week. The date when the gift-wrapped box of money was allegedly opened by Cecilia is also uncertain because of Macasaets conflicting allegations about it. Macasaets first column of September 18, 2007, stated that it happened last week, i.e., sometime in the week of September 10-14, 2007. The next day, September 19, 2007, he, however, wrote in his column that the five boxes (not one) of money were delivered on the day (September 3, 2007) when the Lady Justice, acting as ponente, acquitted the accused Henry T. Go. But again, because his story about Cecilias role in the discovery of the bribery in September 2007, was contradicted by the record of Cecilias resignation from the Court on March 15, 2007 (Annexes D and D-1, Cecilia Delis Letter of Resignation & Clearance), Macasaet, after consulting his source again,

3.

6 changed his story when he testified on January 17, 2008. He said that, according to his source, the boxes of money were delivered, not any one time in September 2007, but on different dates in November 2006 up to March 2007, before Cecilia resigned or was fired from the office of Justice Santiago (5-6, tsn, January 17, 2008). That allegation is, however, refuted by the logbooks of the Security Services for the period of November 2006 to March 2007 which contain no record of the alleged deliveries of boxes of money to the office of Justice Santiago. Danilo Pablo, head of the Courts Security Services affirmed that in his ten (10) years of service in the Court, he has not received any report of boxes of money being delivered to any of the Justices (45-46, tsn, January 22, 2008).[28] The Committee further wondered which of the five (5) boxes was opened and yielded money. It found 1. x x x In his column of September 21, 2007, Macasaet alleged that Cecilia picked up the five boxes of money several times in March (not last week as I mistakenly reported), and she never opened the first four boxes x x x she opened the last and saw the money because the Lady Justice was absent on that day. But when he testified before the Committee on January 10, 2008, Macasaet alleged that it was the first one that was opened according to his source (71, 89, 92, 125, tsn, January 10, 2008). 2. Contradicting his published story that five (5) boxes of money were delivered on the day the Lady Justice acquitted Henry Go, Macasaet testified at the investigation that they were delivered on different occasions according to my source (70, tsn, January 10, 2008). But no sooner had he attributed that information to my source than he admitted that it was only my own conclusion x x x I assumed that the giver of the money is not so stupid as to have them delivered all in one trip. As a matter of fact, I even wondered why said boxes were not delivered in the home of the Lady Justice (72, tsn, January 10, 2008). 3. The amount of the bribe is also questionable. For while in his own column of September 18, 2007, Macasaet stated that the gift was estimated at Php 10 million, he later testified on January 10, 2008that the amount was my own calculation because I talked to people, I said this kind of box how much money in One Thousand Pesos bills can it hold, he told me it is ten (million). So that was acalculation (77, tsn, January 10, 2008). He also merely assumed that the money was in one thousand pesos bills (78, tsn, January 10, 2008). No one really knows their denomination. He said he was told that the size of the box where the money was placed was this milk called carnation in carton (79, tsn, January 10, 2008). But, at the final hearing on February 1, 2008, he denied that said that, I never said carnation boxes; I said milk boxes that should make a lot of difference (84, tsn, February 1, 2008). 4. Since only one gift-wrapped box of money was opened, Macasaet admitted that he has no knowledge of whether the four (4) other boxes were also opened, when and where they were opened, and by whom they were opened (90, tsn, January 10, 2008). Therefore, no one knows whether they also contained money. That the five (5) boxes contained a total of ten million pesos, is just another assumption of Macasaets. It is a calculation based on estimates obtained from friends and how much five boxes can hold in one thousand peso bills, more or less ten million, he explained (91, tsn, January 10, 2008). The sin of assumption which is a cardinal sin in Newsbreaks Guide to Ethical Journalistic Conduct was repeatedly committed by Macasaet in writing his story about the bribery of a Lady Justice of the Supreme Court. (Annex E, page 1, Newsbreak Guide to Ethical Journalistic Conduct). [29] Consequently, the Committee concluded In view of its tenuous underpinnings, we find the bribery story in Macasaets columns of September 18-21, 2007, and in Ms. Vitugs Newsbreak issue of September 25, 2007, unbelievable. Why should five boxes supposedly containing a total of Php 10 million as bribe money be delivered to the office of a Lady Justice in the Supreme Court, where it would have to pass examination by the security guards and the quizzical eyes of her own employees? Why not to her home? Or at some agreed meeting place outside the Court and her home? Or why not quietly deposit it in her bank account? And why was she absent from her office on the day of the presumably agreed date for the payment of the bribe? If the bribe was for dismissing the information against Henry Go in the Sandiganbayan, why was it paid prematurely in November 2006-March 2007 when the case of Henry Go was still up in the air and, in fact, was decided against him on April 13, 2007? The favorable resolution on his motion for reconsideration, penned by Justice Santiago, was promulgated on September 3, 2007, almost one year after the pay-off, if there was such a pay-off? xxxx The Committee considers this case not just another event that should pass unnoticed for it has implications far beyond the allocated ramparts of free speech. Needless to say, that while we espouse the enjoyment of freedom of expression by media, particularly, it behooves it to observe great circumspection so as not to destroy reputations, integrity and character so dear to every individual, more so to a revered institution like the Supreme Court. Everyone deserves respect and dignity.[30] Finding sufficient basis to hold respondent Macasaet in indirect contempt of court, the Committee recommended The Committee finds that the statements of respondent Amado P. Macasaet about the Supreme Court in his Business Circuit columns in the September 18-21, 2007 issues of the newspaperMalaya, maligning and degrading the Supreme Court and tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, to be utterly unjustified. WHEREFORE, the Committee believes there exist valid grounds for this Honorable Court, if it is so minded, to cite Amado P. Macasaet for indirect contempt within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[31] (Emphasis supplied)

7 Our Ruling IN view of respondents invocation of his right to press freedom as a defense, it is essential to first examine the nature and evolution of this preferred liberty, together with the countervailing interest of judicial independence, which includes the right to due process of law, the right to a fair trial, and the preservation of public confidence in the courts for the proper administration of justice. Nature and History of Press Freedom Freedom of expression, which includes freedom of speech and of the press, is one of the hallmarks of a democratic society. It has been recognized as such for centuries. The history of press freedom dates back to the English Magna Carta, promulgated in 1215, which established the principle that not even the lawmaker should be above the law. Through the years, many treatises on press freedom arose in reaction to various measures taken to curtail it. In the 17th Century, John Milton wrote Areopagitica, a philosophical defense of the right to free speech. It was a reaction to the Licensing Order of June 14, 1643, which declared that no book, pamphlet, paper, nor part of any such book, pamphlet, or paper, shall from henceforth be printed, bound, stitched or put to sale by any person or persons whatsoever, unless the same be first approved of and licensed under the hands of such person or persons as both, or either of the said Houses shall appoint for the licensing of the same. Milton advocated that a written work should not be suppressed before publication. Writers of treacherous, slanderous, or blasphemous materials should first be tried according to law. Only after it has been established that their writings are of a treacherous, slanderous, or blasphemous nature should they be subsequently punished for their wrongful acts. Sir William Blackstone, 19th Century English jurist, in his still widely cited historical and analytical treatise on English common law, aptly described the twin aspects of press freedom: x x x Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity. To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was formerly done, both before and since the Revolution, is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion and government. But to punish as the law does at present any dangerous or offensive writings, which, when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty. Thus, the will of individuals is still left free: the abuse only of that free will is the object of legal punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or inquiry: liberty of private sentiment is still left; the disseminating, or making public, of bad sentiments destructive to the ends of society, is the crime which society corrects.[32] (Emphasis supplied) In the United States, press freedom was first put into organic law with the First Amendment to its Constitution, declaring that Congress shall make no law x x x abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. This set in stone the basis for virtually all contemporary laws and jurisprudence on the subject of press freedom. Our Constitutions and jurisprudence are no different. Section 4, Article III, 1987 Constitution, which in part provides that [n]o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press x x x x, is a provision found in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions.[33] Media and Its Multiplying Roles in Democracy One of the notable features of recent years is the accelerated development of the media. They have grown from strength to strength, and have substantially influenced people, either favorably or unfavorably, towards those in government. The use of information technology has firmed up the media networks hold on power. Traditional media for mass communication newspapers, magazines, radio, and standard television have been joined by satellite and cable television, electronic mail, short messaging and multi-media service, and the internet, giving rise to new opportunities for electronic news and information companies to even intensify their influence over the general public. Studies show that people rely heavily on the media for their knowledge of events in the world and for impressions that form the basis for their own judgments. The media exert a strong influence on what people think and feel. Certainly, the power of Philippine media is of no small measure The power of the press to influence politics is proven. Policy issues and the implementation of government programs requiring greater public discussion are sometimes displaced in the government agenda by matters that have been given more importance in the news. Public officials are obliged to attend to media queries even if these are not necessarily the most important questions of the day. Nowhere in Southeast Asia are government officials so accessible to the press. Cabinet ministers are available from the earliest hours to answer questions from radio show hosts on the news of the day involving their responsibilities. Furthermore, television news programs have spawned media celebrities whose popularity with the masses has catapulted their entry into politics. Medias focus on celebrity has infected the political culture with exaggerated concern for personality and color, and the kind of impact associated with sports and entertainment. Political parties have tended to recruit popular figures from these fields to assure they have winners in the race for seats in Congress.[34] The reach of Philippine media is quite extensive In the Philippines radio has the biggest audience among all the mass media (85 percent), followed by television at 74 percent, and print, 32 percent. Print, however, has an 82 percent reach in Metropolitan Manila, which has a population of some 10 million and is the countrys business, political, and cultural center. Print may thus be surmised to be as influential in the capital as television, which has a reach of 96 percent among residents.[35] Due to their preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties, the freedoms of speech, of expression, and of the press have progressed dramatically. As early as 1942, even before the advent of television, the distinguished U.S. appellate court Judge Learned Hand had already observed that [t]he hand that rules the press, the radio, the screen, and the far-spread magazine, rules the country. He concluded that medias power was an unchangeable fact of life: Whether we like or not, we must learn to accept it. There is much truth today in those statements.

The mass media in a free society uphold the democratic way of life. They provide citizens with relevant information to help them make informed decisions about public issues affecting their lives. Affirming the right of the public to know, they serve as vehicles for the necessary exchange of ideas through fair and open debate. As the Fourth Estate in our democracy, they vigorously exercise their independence and vigilantly guard against infringements. Over the years, the Philippine media have earned the reputation of being the freest and liveliest in Asia.[36] Members of Philippine media have assumed the role of a watchdog and have been protective and assertive of this role. They demand accountability of government officials and agencies. They have been adversarial when they relate with any of the three branches of government. They uphold the citizens right

8 to know, and make public officials, including judges and justices, responsible for their deeds or misdeeds. Through their watchdog function, the media motivate the public to be vigilant in exercising the citizens right to an effective, efficient and corrupt-free government. Open Justice and Judicial Independence Closely linked with the right to freedom of speech and of the press is the public right to scrutinize and criticize government. The freedom to question the government has been a protected right of longstanding tradition throughout American history. There is no doubt that the fundamental freedom to criticize government necessarily includes the right to criticize the courts, their proceedings and decisions. Since the drafting of their Constitution over 200 years ago, American judges have anticipated and sometimes even encouraged public scrutiny of themselves, if not of the judiciary as a whole.[37] This open justice principle, which is as fundamental to a democratic society as freedom of speech, has been an accepted doctrine in several jurisdictions. It is justified on the ground that if the determination of justice cannot be hidden from the public, this will provide: (1) a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy, and (2) the maintenance of the publics confidence in the administration of justice.[38] While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. [39] Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The debate over the independence of the judiciary is nothing new. More than 200 years ago, the Founding Fathers of the American Constitution engaged in heated arguments, both before and after the Constitutional Convention, focusing on the extent and nature of the judiciarys role in the newly-formed government.[40] The signers of the Declaration of Independence, well aware of the oppressive results of the unchecked political power of the King of England who established absolute tyranny over American colonies, recognized the importance of creating a stable system of justice to protect the people. Cognizant of the need to create a system of checks and balances to ensure that the rule of law shall rule, the resulting Constitution provided for a three-tiered system of government, so structured that no branch holds limitless power. The judicial branch is described as the least dangerous branch of government.[41] But it holds a special place in the tripartite system, as it is primarily responsible for protecting basic human liberties from government encroachment. It completes the nations system of checks and balances. It serves as an arbiter of disputes between factions and instruments of government. In our constitutional scheme and democracy, our courts of justice are vested with judicial power, which includes the duty x x x to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. [42] The present judicial system allows the people to rely upon our courts with substantial certainty; it encourages the resolution of disputes in courtrooms rather than on the streets. To accomplish these tasks, an independent judiciary is very vital. Judicial independence is the backbone of democracy. It is essential not only to the preservation of our justice system, but of government as well. Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has observed that judicial independence encompasses two distinct but related concepts of independence.[43] One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of independence when he can do his job without having to hear or at least without having to take it seriously if he does hear criticisms of his personal morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a class. A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of this confidence threatens the maintenance of an independent Third Estate. For sure, judicial criticism can be constructive, uncovering and addressing a problem that merits public attention. Public awareness, debate, and criticism of the courts ensure that people are informed of what they are doing that have broad implications for all citizens. Informed discussion, comment, debate and disagreement from lawyers, academics, and public officials have been hallmarks of a great legal tradition and have played a vital role in shaping the law. But there is an important line between legitimate criticism and illegitimate attack upon the courts or their judges. Attacks upon the court or a judge not only risk the inhibition of all judges as they conscientiously endeavor to discharge their constitutional responsibilities; they also undermine the peoples confidence in the courts. Personal attacks, criticisms laden with political threats, those that misrepresent and distort the nature and context of judicial decisions, those that are misleading or without factual or legal basis, and those that blame the judges for the ills of society, damage the integrity of the judiciary and threaten the doctrine of judicial independence. These attacks do a grave disservice to the principle of an independent judiciary and mislead the public as to the role of judges in a constitutional democracy, shaking the very foundation of our democratic government. Such attacks on the judiciary can result in two distinct yet related undesirable consequences.[44] First, the criticism will prevent judges from remaining insulated from the personal and political consequences of making an unpopular decision, thus placing judicial independence at risk. Second, unjust criticism of the judiciary will erode the publics trust and confidence in the judiciary as an institution. Both judicial independence and the publics trust and confidence in the judiciary as an institution are vital components in maintaining a healthy democracy. Accordingly, it has been consistently held that, while freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy, these freedoms are not absolute. For, if left unbridled, they have the tendency to be abused and can translate to licenses, which could lead to disorder and anarchy. Thus, in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,[45] this Court ruled that [f]rom the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right (to free expression) is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude, however, a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not absolute. It would be too much to insist that, at all times and under all circumstances, it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition.[46] In Lagunzad v. Vda. De Gonzales,[47] it was held that while the right of freedom of expression occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties, it is not without limitations. As the revered Holmes once said, the limitation on ones right to extend ones fist is when it hits the nose of another. Indeed, freedom of speech cannot be absolute and unconditional. In legal, political, and philosophical contexts, it is always regarded as liable to be overridden by important countervailing interests, such as state security, public order, safety of individual citizens, protection of reputation, and due process of law, which encompasses not only the right to a fair trial, but also the preservation of public confidence in the proper administration of justice.

9 As early as 1930, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice George Malcolm, declared that [a]s important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary.[48] In Zaldivar v. Gonzalez,[49] the Court said that freedom of speech and expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter put it: A Survey of Philippine Jurisprudence x x x A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press.[50] Even the major international and regional human rights instruments of civil and political rights the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), [51] the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),[52] the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), [53] and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR)[54] protect both freedom of expression and the administration of justice. Freedom of expression is protected under Article 19 of the ICCPR (1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. (2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. However, Article 19 of the ICCPR is made subject to Article 14(1), which guarantees the right of individuals to be equal before the courts and tribunals and be entitled to a fair x x x hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, where [t]he press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (order public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the Parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice x x x. Article 10(2) of the ECHR goes further by explicitly mentioning the maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary . (Emphasis supplied) The very first case decided by the Supreme Court, In the matter of the proceedings against Marcelino Aguas for contempt of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga ,[56] was a contempt proceeding. Before, as it is now, this Court had to use this power to impress upon contemnors the legal theory and constitutional premises of judicial legitimacy complementing popular sovereignty and public interest. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice James Smith stated that contempt proceedings against a contemnor were against someone who had done an act or was about to do such act which was disrespectful to the court or offensive to its dignity.[57] Through the years, the Court has punished contemnors for a variety of offenses that have attempted to degrade its dignity and impeded the administration of justice. In 1916, Amzi B. Kelly was fined P1,000 and sentenced to six months in prison for contempt of court after he published a letter to the editor of The Independent criticizing the Court for its decision to hold him in contempt for having published a book stating that various government officials, including the members of the Supreme Court, were guilty of politically assassinating General Mariano Noriel, who was executed for the killing of a political rival in 1915.[58] In 1949, Atty. Vicente Sotto was fined P1,000.00 for publishing a statement in the Manila Times objecting to one of the High Courts decisions, citing that such decision by the majority was but another evidence of the incompetency or narrow-mindedness of the majority of its members and called for the resignation of the Courts entire membership in the wake of so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years.[59] In 1987, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre,[60] in almost identical letters dated October 20, 1986 sent to four (4) Justices of the Supreme Court (all members of the First Division), stated among others It is important to call your attention to the dismissal of (case cited) by an untenable minute-resolution x x x which we consider as an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the First Division of the Supreme Court of which you are a member. We consider the three minute-resolutions x x x railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the SC under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics. There is nothing final in this world. We assure you that this case is far from finished by a long shot. For at the proper time, we shall so act and bring this case before another forum where the members of the Court can no longer deny action with minute resolutions that are not only unjust but are knowingly and deliberately promulgated x x x. Judges have an affirmative duty to defend and uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. The courts need to be able to sanction those who obstruct their processes. The judiciary itself must continue to be a voice that explains and preserves its own independence. The respect accorded to judges is an adjunct of the social-contract necessity for impartial judges in the creation of a civil society. In the words of the great political philosopher John Locke The great and chief end, therefore, for mens uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property, to which in the state of nature there are many things wanting x x x there wants an established, settled, known law x x x there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law x x x there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution.[55] (Emphasis supplied)

10

Please understand that we are pursuing further remedies in our quest for justice under the law. We intend to hold responsible members of the First Division who participated in the promulgation ofthese three minute-resolutions in question x x x. In our quest for justice, we wish to avoid having injustice to anyone, particularly the members of the First Division, providing that they had no hand in the promulgation of the resolution in question. x x x If, however, we do not hear from you after a week, then we will consider your silence that you supported the dismissal of our petition. We will then be guided accordingly.[61] The letter to one of the Justices further stated We leave the next move to you by informing us your participation x x x. Please do not take this matter lightly. x x x The moment we take action in the plans we are completing, we will then call a press conference with TV and radio coverage. Arrangements in this regard are being done. The people should or ought to know why we were thwarted in our quest for plain justice.[62] These letters were referred by the First Division en consulta to the Court en banc. True to her threats, after having lost her case before the Supreme Court, Ilustre filed on December 16, 1986 an affidavit-complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging, among others, some Justices of both the Supreme Court and the CA with knowingly and deliberately rendering unjust resolutions. On January 29, 1987, the Supreme Court en banc required Ilustre to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for her foregoing statements, conduct, acts, and charges against the Supreme Court and/or official actions of the justices concerned which, unless satisfactorily explained, transcended the permissible bounds of propriety and undermined and degraded the administration of justice. In her answer, Ilustre contended, inter alia, that she had no intention to affront the honor and dignity of the Court; that the letters to the individual justices were private in character; that the Court was estopped, having failed to immediately take disciplinary proceedings against her; and that the citation for contempt was a vindictive reprisal against her. The Supreme Court found her explanation unsatisfactory. The claim of lack of evil intention was disbelieved in the face of attendant circumstances. Reliance on the privacy of communication was likewise held as misplaced. Letters addressed to individual Justices in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial records and are a matter of public concern for the entire Court. (Underscoring supplied) The Court likewise stated that it was only in the exercise of forbearance that it refrained from immediately issuing a show-cause order, expecting that she and her lawyer would realize the unjustness and unfairness of their accusations. Neither was there any vindictive reprisal involved. The Courts authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession. In resum, the Court found that Ilustre had transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice: (a) in her letters addressed to the individual Justices, quoted in the show-cause Resolution, particularly the underlined portions thereof; (b) in the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan quoted in the same Resolution; (c) in her statement, conduct, acts, and charges against the Supreme Court and/or official actions of the Justices concerned and her description of improper motives; and (d) in her unjustified outburst that she could no longer expect justice from the Court.

The fact that said letter was not technically considered pleadings nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court.[63] Ilustre was fined P1,000.00 for contempt, evidently considered as indirect, taking into account the penalty imposed and the fact that the proceedings taken were not summary in nature. In Perkins v. Director of Prisons,[64] the Court had an occasion to examine the fundamental foundations of the power to punish for contempt: The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, to the due administration of justice. [65] The Court there held that the exercise of this power is as old as the English history itself, and has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts. Being a common-law power, inherent in all courts, the moment the courts of the United States were called into existence they became vested with it. It is a power coming to us from the common law, and, so far as we know, has been universally admitted and recognized.[66] After World War II, this Court reiterated it had an inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. [67] This power to punish for contempt is necessary for its own protection against improper interference with the due administration of justice x x x. It is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties-litigant.[68] These twin principles were to be succinctly cited in the later case of Zaldivar v. Gonzales.[69] Of course, the power to punish for contempt is exercised on the preservative principle. There must be caution and hesitancy on the part of the judge whenever the possible exercise of his awesome prerogative presents itself. The power to punish for contempt, as was pointed out by Mr. Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban,[70]should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. But when called for, most especially when needed to preserve the very existence and integrity of no less than the Highest Court, this principle bears importance. In the 1995 case People v. Godoy,[71] the Court, citing In Re: Vicente Sotto,[72] had the opportunity to define the relations of the courts and of the press. Quoting the statements made by Judge Holmes in U.S. v. Sullen,[73] the Court said: The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. x x x In a clear case where it is necessary in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, the Court will not hesitate to exercise undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.[74] (Emphasis supplied)

11 Thus, while the Court in Godoy agreed that our Constitution and our laws recognize the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and of the press, these two constitutional guaranties must not be confused with an abuse of such liberties. Quoting Godoy further Obstructing, by means of the spoken or written word, the administration of justice by the courts has been described as an abuse of the liberty of the speech or the press such as will subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of court. [75] Finally, in the more recent 2007 case Roxas v. Zuzuarregui,[76] the Court en banc in a unanimous per curiam resolution imposed a P30,000 fine on Atty. Romeo Roxas for making unfair and unfounded accusations against a member of this Court, and mocking the Court for allegedly being part of the wrongdoing and being a dispenser of injustice. We found the letter of Atty. Roxas full of contemptuous remarks that tended to degrade the dignity of the Court and erode public confidence that should be accorded to it. We also said that his invocation of free speech and privacy of communication will not, however, free him from liability. As already stated, his letter contained defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and confidence therein. Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates. Accordingly, Atty. Roxas was found guilty of indirect contempt of court and fined P30,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of a similar act would warrant a more severe penalty. Application of Existing Jurisprudence to the Case at Bar In determining the liability of the respondent in this contempt proceeding, we weigh the conflicting constitutional considerations respondents claim of his right to press freedom, on one hand; and, on the other hand, ensuring judicial independence by upholding public interest in maintaining the dignity of the judiciary and the orderly administration of justice both indispensable to the preservation of democracy and the maintenance of a just society. The apparently conflicting constitutional considerations summed up by a distinguished former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, Justice H.R. Khanna, bears a hand in resolving the issue There are one or two matters to which I would like to make pointed reference in the context of the freedom of the press. One of them relates to the danger of trial by the press. Certain aspects of a case are so much highlighted by the press that the publicity gives rise to strong public emotions. The inevitable effect of that is to prejudice the case of one party or the other for a fair trial. We must consider the question as to what extent are restraints necessary and have to be exercised by the press with a view to preserving the purity of judicial process. At the same time, we have to guard against another danger. A person cannot x x x by starting some kind of judicial proceedings in respect of matter of vital public importance stifle all public discussions of that matter on pain of contempt of court. A line tobalance the whole thing has to be drawn at some point. It also seems necessary in exercising the power of contempt of court x x x vis--vis the press that no hyper-sensitivity is shown and due account is taken of the proper functioning of a free press in a democratic society. This is vital for ensuring the health of democracy. At the same time, the press must also keep in view its responsibility and see that nothing is done as may bring the courts x x x into disrepute and make people lose faith in these institution(s). One other matter which must not be lost sight of is that while comment is free, facts are sacred.[77] We have no problems with legitimate criticisms pointing out flaws in our decisions, judicial reasoning, or even how we run our public offices or public affairs. They should even be constructive and should pave the way for a more responsive, effective and efficient judiciary. Unfortunately, the published articles of respondent Macasaet are not of this genre. On the contrary, he has crossed the line, as his are baseless scurrilous attacks which demonstrate nothing but an abuse of press freedom. They leave no redeeming value in furtherance of freedom of the press. They do nothing but damage the integrity of the High Court, undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, and threaten the doctrine of judicial independence. A veteran journalist of many years and a president of a group of respectable media practitioners, respondent Macasaet has brilliantly sewn an incredible tale, adorned it with some facts to make it lifelike, but impregnated it as well with insinuations and innuendoes, which, when digested entirely by an unsuspecting soul, may make him throw up with seethe. Thus, he published his highly speculative articles that bribery occurred in the High Court, based on specious information, without any regard for the injury such would cause to the reputation of the judiciary and the effective administration of justice. Nor did he give any thought to the undue, irreparable damage such false accusations and thinly veiled allusions would have on a member of the Court. The Investigating Committee could not have put it any better when it found respondent feigning his highest respect for this Court Macasaets diatribes against the Court generate public distrust in the administration of Justice by the Supreme Court, instead of promoting respect for its integrity and honor. They derogate his avowal of highest respect for this Court (10, tsn, Jan. 10, 2008); his declaration that he has always upheld the majesty of the law as interpreted by the Court (96, tsn, Jan. 10, 2008); that his opinion of the Court has actually been elevated ten miles up because of its decisions in the cases involving Proclamation No. 1017, the CPR, EO 464, and the Peoples Initiative (97, tsn, Jan. 10, 2008); that he has done everything to preserve the integrity and majesty of the Court and its jurists (84-85, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008); that he wants the integrity of the Court preserved because this is the last bastion of democracy (32, tsn, Jan. 10, 2008). These tongue-in cheek protestations do not repair or erase the damage and injury that his contemptuous remarks about the Court and the Justices have wrought upon the institutional integrity, dignity, and honor of the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact, nowhere in his columns do we find a single word of respect for the Court or the integrity and honor of the Court. On the contrary, what we find are allegations of pernicious rumor that the courts are dirty, suspicions that the jurists are thieves, that the Highest Court has a soiled reputation, and that the Supreme Court has a sagging reputation. He admitted that the rumor about the courts being dirty referred specifically (to) the Supreme Court (100, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008) and was based on personal conclusion which (was), in turn, based on confidential information fed to me. It is in that respect that I thought that I have (a) duty to protect and keep the Honor of this Court (98, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008). He unburdened his heretofore hidden anger, if not disgust, with the Court when he clarified that the word dirty x x x is not necessarily related to money (101, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008). It is my belief that lack of familiarity with the law is x x x kind of dirty referring to then Associate Justice Artemio Panganibans support for, and Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.s act of swearing into office then Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as Acting President of the Philippines even while then President Joseph Estrada was still in Malacaang, which Macasaet believed to be quite a bit of dirt (102-106, tsn, Feb. 1, 2008).[78]

12 To reiterate the words of the Committee, this case is not just another event that should pass unnoticed for it has implications far beyond the allocated ramparts of free speech. [79] To allow respondent to use press freedom as an excuse to capriciously disparage the reputation of the Court and that of innocent private individuals would be to make a mockery of this liberty. Respondent has absolutely no basis to call the Supreme Court a court of thieves and a basket of rotten apples. These publications directly undermine the integrity of the justices and render suspect the Supreme Court as an institution. Without bases for his publications, purely resorting to speculation and fishing expeditions in the hope of striking or creating a story, with utter disregard for the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court, he has committed acts that degrade and impede the orderly administration of justice. We cannot close our eyes to the comprehensive Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee. It enumerated the inconsistencies and assumptions of respondent which lacked veracity and showed the reckless disregard of whether the alleged bribery was false or not. [80] Indeed, the confidential information allegedly received by respondent by which he swears with his heart and soul[81] was found by the Investigating Committeeunbelievable. It was a story that reeked of urban legend, as it generated more questions than answers.[82] Respondent Macasaets wanton disregard for the truth was exhibited by his apathetic manner of verifying the veracity of the information he had gathered for his September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007 articles concerning the alleged bribery of a Lady Justice. His bases for the amount of money, the number of boxes, the date of delivery of the boxes, among other important details, were, by his own admission founded on personal assumptions. This nonchalant attitude extended to his very testimony before the investigating committee Justice Aquino: You did not endeavor to verify the information given by your source before publishing the story about the bribery? I tried, I could not get confirmation, I thought that eventually my effort at consistently trying or exposing the alleged bribery one day sooner or later somebody will come up and admit or deny. x x x x Justice Vitug: Do you confirm the fact of authorship of the columns of September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007? On a stack of Bible, I confirm it. Does that mean that you also confirm the accuracy of those information that were said? I am not confirming the accuracy of the information and I think that is precisely the reason for this hearing, I must repeat that the purpose is to fish [the Lady Justice] out so that the rest of the Lady Justices in all the Courts suspicion can be removed from them. I failed in the sense that one denied, she felt alluded to and said she is not involved.[83] Respondent thus admits to having written his articles as means to fish out the Lady Justice involved in an alleged bribery fed to him by his source, with reckless disregard of whether or not such bribery indeed took place. It defies reason why any responsible journalist would go on to publish any material in a newspaper of general circulation without having ascertained even the five Ws and one H of the story.[84] That he could not, through his extensive network of informants, confirm the approximate date when the alleged bribery took place, the identities of the persons involved, or any other important detail, before he began his series of articles only leads to the rational conclusion that he did not care whether or not the story he published was true. His aim, as he admits, was to go on a fishing expedition to see if someone would confirm or deny his now clearly baseless accusations. This practice of fishing for information by publishing unverified information in a manner that leads the reading public to believe such is true cannot be tolerated. Aggravating respondents affront to the dignity of the Court is his unwillingness to show any remorse or repentance for his contemptuous acts. In fact, as he made clear in his testimony before the Investigating Committee when asked what his thoughts were about his having published the instant articles, he replied that he was happy in the sense that [he] did a job in [his] best lights and the effort ended up in the creation of [the investigating panel].[85] However, such assertions of having acted in the best interest of the Judiciary are belied by the fact that he could have caused the creation of an investigating panel to look into such allegations in a more rational and prudent manner. In the words of the Investigating Committee If he had no malice toward the Court, if, as he professes, the purpose of his columns was to save the integrity and honor of the Court, Macasaet should, and could, have reported the rumored bribery directly to the Chief Justice and asked for its investigation. He should have refrained from calling the Court names, before giving it a chance to act on his report and on his suggestion to investigate the matter. Since he knew the name of the Court employee who allegedly discovered the bribe money, the Court could have begun its investigation with her to ascertain the identity of the nameless Lady Justice and the veracity of the rumored bribery. His disparaging remarks about the Court and jurists in conjunction with his unverified report on the alleged bribery were totally uncalled for and unjustified. [86] It is precisely because of his failure to abide by the tenets of responsible journalism that we accept the findings of the Investigating Committee in holding respondent Macasaet guilty of indirect contempt of court. He must be made accountable for his complete failure to exercise even a single vestige of responsible journalism in publishing his unfounded and ill-thought diatribes against the Judiciary and the honorable people who serve it. Respondent also asserts that the subject matter of his articles is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. He cites Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which partly states that x x x members of the Supreme Court x x x may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of x x x bribery x x x and Section 3(1), Article XI, which provides that [t]he House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all case of impeachment. We cannot agree. What Macasaet conveniently forgets is that no impeachment complaint has been filed against Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago. Thus, his cited constitutional provisions do not come into play.

Mr. Macasaet:

Mr. Macasaet: Justice Vitug:

Mr. Macasaet:

13 Respondent claims that there is a violation of his right to due process. From the time his articles were published, no formal charge has been filed against him as required under Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent fails to see, however, that under Section 4 of the same Rule, proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed, by an order or any other formal charge requiring respondent to show why he should not be punished for contempt. Our Resolution dated September 25, 2007 satisfies the Rule. He cannot validly claim that such resolution is vague. He cannot feign ignorance of the contents of his September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007 articles in the Malaya. Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure pertinently provides: SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt. xxxx (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; xxxx SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may bepunished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. x x x (Underscoring supplied) We are not unaware of the vigorous dissent of then Associate Justice, now our Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno, in an earlier case,[87] in which he so lucidly argued for the right to journalistic shield, behind which the Dissenting Opinion of an esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Carpio, and respondent Macasaet, take full refuge. While we hold his thesis in high regard, the case at bar does not fall within his erudite defense of press freedom. The critical issues then were the right of newsmen to refuse subpoenas, summons, or invitations to appear in administrative investigations, and not to reveal their confidential sources of information under R.A. No. 53, as amended. None of these are the issues at hand. Be that as it may, elementary decision-making teaches that we cite the majority opinion as precedent, not lonely dissenting opinions.[88] In his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio assails the Committee proceedings as fatally defective for patent denial of due process[89] because when the witnesses the Committee summoned testified, the Committee monopolized the right to propound questions to the witnesses, denying to Macasaet such right.[90] He continues to say that [w]ith the procedure the Committee adopted, Macasaet was reduced to a passive participant, unable to subject the testimonies of adverse witnesses to rigorous probing under cross-examination. As matters stand, Macasaet will be subjected to punitive sanctions based on evidence he had no opportunity to scrutinize. [91] We disagree on triple grounds. First, the proceedings of the Committee are presumed to be regular. Thus, the onus probandi to prove otherwise rests on Macasaet, not on the Committee. Suffice it to say that the Dissenting Opinion which cites People v. Godoy as to the criminal character of a contempt proceeding, [92] fails to state what Godoy likewise instructs Strictly speaking however, they are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are preserved. [93] Second, assuming arguendo that Macasaet was not able to cross-examine his witnesses, this does not necessarily mean that his right to due process of law was violated. The right of an accused to cross-examine the witnesses against him, although an adjunct of the Constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face,[94] can be waived when not timely asserted. In the case of Macasaet, never did he assert his right to cross-examine the witnesses against him despite the opportunity to do so. During the entire course of the proceedings in the Committee, respondent was vigorously represented by counsel de parte. Respondent or his counsel could have moved to cross-examine the adverse witnesses. Respondent had every opportunity to do so. Lamentably, he failed to exercise the said right. Interestingly, during the last hearing date, counsel for respondent requested that respondent be allowed to say something, which the Committee granted. Respondent then proceeded with a lengthy discourse, all of 45 pages, on everything and anything, except his right to cross-examination.[95] Verily, it cannot be validly claimed now that his right to cross-examine was violated. Third, the Court is bereft of any power to invoke the right to cross-examine the witnesses against respondent, for and in his behalf. Otherwise, the Court will be acting as his counsel, which is absurd. Just a Word More A free press is regarded as a key pillar of democracy. Reporters must be free to report, expose, and hold government officials and agencies including an independent judiciary accountable. Press attention surrounding the judiciary ensures public accountability. Such publicity acts as a check on judicial competence and integrity, exposes inefficiencies and irregularities, keeps vigil over various public interest cases, and puts pressure on responsible judicial officials. This freedom has been used and has benefited the cause of justice. The press has become an important actor a judicial watchdog in the ongoing judicial transformation. When properly validated, its acts are protected speech from an accepted function. Freedom, however, has not guaranteed quality journalism. The press has been vulnerable to a host of legitimate criticisms such as incompetence, commercialism, and even corruption. By disproportionately informing the public about specific court processes, or by spreading unsubstantiated allegations about corruption and other forms of judicial misconduct, the press dramatically undermines the publics faith in the courts and threatens the very foundation of our democratic government. Oftentimes, journalists writing about the judiciary and court cases lack basic knowledge of the law and judicial procedures, on the basis of which they draw faulty conclusions which they pass on to their readers as gospel truths. Trial by publicity also influences the independence of judges as the public is fed with partial information and vocal opinions, and judges are pressured to decide in accordance with the public opinion. Faith in the judiciary is undermined when judges rule against the expectations of the public which has been brainwashed by dramatic reports and graphic comments. In some cases, unchecked rumors or

14 allegations of irregularities are immediately published because journalists lack professional competence to verify the information, or are simply eager to break the news and attract a wider readership. The role of the press in relation to the judiciary needs to be regulated. This can be done through voluntary codes of conduct on the part of the press and through judicial policies, such as the rule on sub judice and contempt of court rulings. The absence of clear voluntary codes developed by the press, as its self-regulator, strengthens the need for the Court to use its power in the meantime to cite critics for contempt. This is necessary in cases where such criticism is obviously malicious or in violation of the sub judice rule, or where there is an evident attempt to influence the outcome of a case. Judges have the duty to defend and uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. They should sanction those who obstruct or impede the judicial processes. The effective administration of justice may only be realized with the strong faith and confidence of the public in the competence and integrity of the judiciary, free from political and popular pressure. Criticism at every level of government is certainly welcome. After all, it is an essential part of the checks and balances in our republican system of government. However, criticisms should not impede or obstruct an integral component of our republican institutions from discharging its constitutionally-mandated duties. As the Court said in In Re: Almacen:[96] Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizen whom it is expected to serve. xxxx But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. x x x[97] All told, illegitimate and uninformed criticisms against the courts and judges, those which cross the line and attempt to subvert the judicial process, must be avoided. They do a great disservice to the Constitution. They seriously mislead the public as to the proper functioning of the judiciary. While all citizens have a right to scrutinize and criticize the judiciary, they have an ethical and societal obligation not to cross that too important line. Senator Ernesto Maceda, the seasoned politician who has graced both the executive and the legislative departments in various capacities, in a Privilege Speech, once appealed for voluntary self-restraint with respect to this Court There are proper procedures for dealing with instances of official misdemeanor without setting an entire institution on fire. Arson is not the best means for pest-control. In case of possibility of corruption in the Supreme Court, one possible means is the initiation of impeachment proceedings against specifically identified justices. A move for impeachment, of course, requires much sobriety and solid evidence. Whatever charges are brought forward must be substantiated. Those who dare prosecute must come into the open and append their names to the accusations they make, with courage and conviction. This is the manner civil society conserves its civility x x x. The ends of justice are not served by heckling nor by crude insinuation or by irresponsible reporting. The house of democracy is never strengthened by those who choose to throw rocks under the cover of darkness and anonymity. The institutions of our liberty are never enriched by the irresponsible accusations of the uninformed. The bedrocks of our Republic are not reinforced by those who evade responsibility under the veil of freedom.[98] During interpellation, he went on to say x x x And in the context of what I have just said, I think that all newspapers, all media are welcome to do their worse, criticize the members of the Executive Department, Members of the Senate, and any other agency of the Government. But I am just suggesting that when it comes to the judiciary, and specifically to the Supreme Court, that a different policy, one of more caution, should be adopted precisely because x x x people may lose faith in the Executive or the President; they may lose faith in Congress, the Congressmen and the Senators, but as long as they have their faith unshaken and complete in the last bulwark of democracy x x x which is the Supreme Court, then our democracy will survive.[99] Each of us has important responsibilities in a constitutional democracy. We, judges, will continue to discharge our judicial functions with fairness. We urge all and sundry to abide by theirs. We need to respect each other. As the golden rule goes let us not do to others what we do not want others to do to us. Igalang natin ang isat-isa. Huwag nating gawin sa iba ang ayaw nating gawin nila sa atin. Given the gravity of respondent Macasaets improper conduct, coupled with the recalcitrant manner in which he responded when confronted with the reality of his wrongdoing, a penalty of fine in the amount of P20,000.00 would be right and reasonable. Disposition WHEREFORE, the Court declares respondent Amado P. Macasaet GUILTY of indirect contempt of court and sentences him to pay a fine of P20,000.00, in accordance with Sections 3(d) and 7, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. SO ORDERED. IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO. A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC

DECISION PER CURIAM:

This case is concerned with charges that, in preparing a decision for the Court, a designated member plagiarized the works of certain authors and twisted their meanings to support the decision. The Background Facts Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya and about 70 other elderly women, all members of the Malaya Lolas Organization, filed with the Court in G.R. No. 162230 a special civil action of certiorari with application for preliminary mandatory injunction against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Justice, and the Office of the Solicitor General.

15 Petitioners claimed that in destroying villages in the Philippines during World War II, the Japanese army systematically raped them and a number of other women, seizing them and holding them in houses or cells where soldiers repeatedly ravished and abused them. Petitioners alleged that they have since 1998 been approaching the Executive Department, represented by the respondent public officials, requesting assistance in filing claims against the Japanese military officers who established the comfort women stations. But that Department declined, saying that petitioners individual claims had already been fully satisfied under the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Petitioners wanted the Court to render judgment, compelling the Executive Department to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice and other international tribunals. On April 28, 2010, the Court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners action. Justice Mariano C. del Castillo wrote the decision for the Court. The Court essentially gave two reasons for its decision: it cannot grant the petition because, first, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative under the Constitution and the law to determine whether to espouse petitioners claim against Japan; and, second, the Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to espouse their claims. On June 9, 2010, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Courts decision. More than a month later on July 18, 2010, counsel for petitioners, Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr., announced in his online blog that his clients would file a supplemental petition detailing plagiarism committed by the court under the second reason it gave for dismissing the petition and that these stolen passages were also twisted to support the courts erroneous conclusions that the Filipino comfort women of World War Two have no further legal remedies. The media gave publicity to Atty. Roques announcement. On July 19, 2010, petitioners filed the supplemental motion for reconsideration that Atty. Roque announced. It accused Justice Del Castillo of manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism[1] when he wrote the decision for the Court and of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment.[2] They charged Justice Del Castillo of copying without acknowledgement certain passages from three foreign articles: a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009); b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005). Petitioners claim that the integrity of the Courts deliberations in the case has been put into question by Justice Del Castillos fraud. The Court should thus address and disclose to the public the truth about the manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism [3] that resulted in gross prejudice to the petitioners. Because of the publicity that the supplemental motion for reconsideration generated, Justice Del Castillo circulated a letter to his colleagues, subsequently verified, stating that when he wrote the decision for the Court he had the intent to attribute all sources used in it. He said in the pertinent part: It must be emphasized that there was every intention to attribute all sources, whenever due. At no point was there ever any malicious intent to appropriate anothers work as our own. We recall that this ponencia was thrice included in the Agenda of the Court en banc. It was deliberated upon during the Baguio session on April 13, 2010, April 20, 2010 and in Manila on April 27, 2010. Each time, suggestions were made which necessitated major revisions in the draft. Sources were re-studied, discussions modified, passages added or deleted. The resulting decision comprises 34 pages with 78 footnotes. xxxx As regards the claim of the petitioners that the concepts as contained in the above foreign materials were twisted, the same remains their opinion which we do not necessarily share.[4]

On July 27, 2010, the Court En Banc referred the charges against Justice Del Castillo to its Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, chaired by the Chief Justice, forinvestigation and recommendation. The Chief Justice designated retired Justice Jose C. Vitug to serve as consultant of the Committee. He graciously accepted. On August 2, 2010, the Committee directed petitioners to comment on Justice Del Castillos verified letter. When this was done, it set the matter for hearing. In the meantime, on July 19, 2010, Evan Criddle wrote on his blog that he and his co-author Evan Fox-Descent (referred to jointly as Criddle-Descent) learned of alleged plagiarism involving their work but Criddles concern, after reading the supplemental motion for reconsideration, was the Courts conclusion that prohibitions against sexual slavery are not jus cogens or internationally binding norms that treaties cannot diminish. On July 23, 2010, Dr. Mark Ellis wrote the Court expressing concern that in mentioning his work, the Court may have misread the argument [he] made in the article and employed them for cross purposes. Dr. Ellis said that he wrote the article precisely to argue for appropriate legal remedy for victims of war crimes. On August 8, 2010, after the referral of the matter to the Committee for investigation, the Dean of the University of the Philippines (U.P.) College of Law publicized a Statement from his faculty, claiming that the Vinuya decision was an extraordinary act of injustice and a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The statement said that Justice Del Castillo had a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors work, and that the Courts deci sion amounted to an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive. [5] On August 18, 2010 Mr. Christian J. Tams wrote Chief Justice Renato C. Corona that, although relevant sentences in the Courts decision were taken from his work, he was given generic reference only in the footnote and in connection with a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the passages taken from his work. He thought that the form of referencing was inappropriate. Mr. Tams was also concerned that the decision may have used his work to support an approach to erga omnes concept (obligations owed by individual States to the community of nations) that is not consistent with what he advocated. On August 26, 2010, the Committee heard the parties submissions in the summary manner of administrative investigations. Counsels from both sides were given ample time to address the Committee and submit their evidence. The Committee queried them on these. Counsels for Justice Del Castillo later asked to be heard with the other parties not in attendance so they could make submissions that their client regarded as sensitive and confidential, involving the drafting process that went into the making of the Courts decision in the Vinuya case. Petitioners counsels vigorously objected and the Committee sustained the objection. After consulting Justice Del Castillo, his counsels requested the Committee to hear the Justices court researcher, whose name need not be mentioned here, explain the research work that went into the making of the decision in the Vinuya case. The Committee granted the request.

16 The researcher demonstrated by Power Point presentation how the attribution of the lifted passages to the writings of Criddle-Descent and Ellis, found in the beginning drafts of her report to Justice Del Castillo, were unintentionally deleted. She tearfully expressed remorse at her grievous mistake and grief for having caused an enormous amount of suffering for Justice Del Castillo and his family. [6] On the other hand, addressing the Committee in reaction to the researchers explanation, counsel for petitioners insisted that lack of intent is not a defense in plagiarism since all that is required is for a writer to acknowledge that certain words or language in his work were taken from anothers work. Counsel invoked the Courts ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine,[7] arguing that standards on plagiarism in the academe should apply with more force to the judiciary. After the hearing, the Committee gave the parties ten days to file their respective memoranda. They filed their memoranda in due course. Subsequently after deliberation, the Committee submitted its unanimous findings and recommendations to the Court. The Issues This case presents two issues: 1. Whether or not, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, Justice Del Castillo plagiarized the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis. 2. Whether or not Justice Del Castillo twisted the works of these authors to make it appear that such works supported the Courts position in the Vinuya decision. The Courts Rulings Because of the pending motion for reconsideration in the Vinuya case, the Court like its Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards will purposely avoid touching the merits of the Courts decision in that case or the soundness or lack of soundness of the position it has so far taken in the same. The Court will deal, not with the essential merit or persuasiveness of the foreign authors works, but how the decision that J ustice Del Castillo wrote for the Court appropriated parts of those works and for what purpose the decision employed the same. At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another persons language, thoughts, or ideas. To plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from (another) and pass them off as ones own.[8] The passing off of the work of another as ones own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism. The Passages from Tams Petitioners point out that the Vinuya decision lifted passages from Tams book, Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law (2006) and used them in Footnote 69 with what the author thought was a mere generic reference. But, although Tams himself may have believed that the footnoting in this case was not an appropriate form of referencing, [9] he and petitioners cannot deny that the decision did attribute the source or sources of such passages. Justice Del Castillo did not pass off Tams work as his own. The Justice primarily attributed the ideas embodied in the passages to Bruno Simma, whom Tams himself credited for them. Still, Footnote 69 mentioned, apart from Simma, Tams article as another source of those ideas. The Court believes that whether or not the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy the footnoting standards of counsel for petitioners is not an ethical matter but one concerning clarity of writing. The statement See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005) in the Vinuya decision is an attribution no matter if Tams thought that it gave him somewhat less credit than he deserved. Such attribution altogether negates the idea that Justice Del Castillo passed off the challenged passages as his own. That it would have been better had Justice Del Castillo used the introductory phrase cited in rather than the phrase See would make a case of mere inadvertent slip in attribution rather than a case of manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism. If the Justices ci tations were imprecise, it would just be a case of bad footnoting rather than one of theft or deceit. If it were otherwise, many would be target of abuse for every editorial error, for every mistake in citing pagination, and for every technical detail of form. The Passages from Ellis and Criddle-Descent Petitioners also attack the Courts decision for lifting and using as footnotes, without attribution to the author, passages from the published work of Ellis. The Court made the following statement on page 27 of its decision, marked with Footnote 65 at the end: We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law. 65 xxx

Footnote 65 appears down the bottom of the page. Since the lengthy passages in that footnote came almost verbatim from Ellis article,[10] such passages ought to have been introduced by an acknowledgement that they are from that article. The footnote could very well have read: 65 In an article, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006), Mark Ellis said: The concept of rape as an international crime is relatively new. This is not to say that rape has never been historically prohibited, particularly in war. But modern-day sensitivity to the crime of rape did not emerge until after World War II. In the Nuremberg Charter, the word rape was not mentioned. The article on crimes against humanity explicitly set forth prohibited acts, but rape was not mentioned by name. (For example, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Prussia and the United States provides that in time of war all women and children shall not be molested in their persons. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Between his Majesty the King of Prussia and the United States of America, art. 23, Sept. 10, 1785, U.S.-Pruss., 8 TREATIES & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS OF THE U.S. 78, 85. The 1863 Lieber Instructions classified rape as a crime of troop discipline. (Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. INTL. L. 219, 224). It specified rape as a capital crime punishable by the death penalty (Id. at 236). The 1907 Hague Convention protected women by requiring the protection of their honour. (Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws & Customs of War on Land, art. 46, Oct. 18, 1907. General Assembly resolution 95 (I) of December 11, 1946 entitled, Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nrnberg Tribunal; General Assembly document A/64/Add.1 of 1946; See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. Article 6(c) of the Charter established crimes against humanity as the following: CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime

17 within the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. The Nuremberg Judgment did not make any reference to rape and rape was not prosecuted. (Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The International Criminal Tribunals Crime and Punishment in the International Arena,7 ILSA J. INTL. COMP. L. 667, 676.) However, International Military Tribunal for the Far East prosecuted rape crimes, even though its Statute did not explicitly criminalize rape. The Far East Tribunal held General Iwane Matsui, Commander Shunroku Hata and Foreign Minister Hirota criminally responsible for a series of crimes, including rape, committed by persons under their authority. (THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 445-54 (1977). The first mention of rape as a specific crime came in December 1945 when Control Council Law No. 10 included the term rape in the definition of crimes against humanity. Law No. 10, adopted by the four occupying powers in Germany, was devised to establish a uniform basis for prosecuting war criminals in German courts. (Control Council for Germany, Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50, 53 (1946)) The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was the first modern-day international instrument to establish protections against rape for women. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entry into force Oct. 20, 1950) [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].Furthermore, the ICC, the ICTY, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have significantly advanced the crime of rape by enabling it to be prosecuted as genocide, a war crime, and a crime against humanity. But, as it happened, the acknowledgment above or a similar introduction was missing from Footnote 65. Next, petitioners also point out that the following eight sentences and their accompanying footnotes appear in text on pages 30-32 of the Vinuya decision: xxx In international law, the term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority. 71 Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since the 1700s,72 but peremptory norms began to attract greater scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred von Verdross's influential 1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in International Law.73 The recognition of jus cogens gained even more force in the 1950s and 1960s with the ILCs preparation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).74 Though there was a consensus that certain international norms had attained the status of jus cogens,75 the ILC was unable to reach a consensus on the proper criteria for identifying peremptory norms. After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully in 1963 that there is not as yet any generally accepted criterion by which to identify a general rule of international law as having the character of jus cogens.76 In a commentary accompanying the draft convention, the ILC indicated that the prudent course seems to be to x x x leave the full content of this rule to be worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals.77 Thus, while the existence of jus cogens in international law is undisputed, no consensus exists on its substance, 77 beyond a tiny core of principles and rules.78

Admittedly, the Vinuya decision lifted the above, including their footnotes, from CriddleDescents article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens.[11] Criddle-Descents footnotes were carried into the Vinuya decisions own footnotes but no attributions were made to the two authors in those footnotes. The Explanation Unless amply explained, the above lifting from the works of Ellis and Criddle-Descent could be construed as plagiarism. But one of Justice Del Castillos researchers, a court-employed attorney, explained how she accidentally deleted the attributions, originally planted in the beginning drafts of her report to him, which report eventually became the working draft of the decision. She said that, for most parts, she did her research electronically. For international materials, she sourced these mainly from Westlaw, an online research service for legal and law-related materials to which the Court subscribes. In the old days, the common practice was that after a Justice would have assigned a case for study and report, the researcher would source his materials mostly from available law books and published articles on print. When he found a relevant item in a book, whether for one side of the issue or for the other, he would place a strip of paper marker on the appropriate page, pencil mark the item, and place the book on his desk where other relevant books would have piled up. He would later paraphrase or copy the marked out passages from some of these books as he typed his manuscript on a manual typewriter. This occasion would give him a clear opportunity to attribute the materials used to their authors or sources. With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillos researcher also explained, most legal references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes or in internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found items that were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded or copied them into her main manuscript, a smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she might need. The researchers technique in this case is not too far different from that employed by a carpenter. The carpenter first gets the pieces of lumber he would need, choosing the kinds and sizes suitable to the object he has in mind, say a table. When ready, he would measure out the portions he needs, cut them out of the pieces of lumber he had collected, and construct his table. He would get rid of the scraps. Here, Justice Del Castillos researcher did just that. She electronically cut relevant materials from books and journals in the Westlaw website and pasted these to a main manuscript in her computer that contained the issues for discussion in her proposed report to the Justice. She used the Microsoft Word program.[12] Later, after she decided on the general shape that her report would take, she began pruning from that manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing the positions in the general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting paragraphs, sentences, and words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief editor, demanded. Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computerliterate court researchers use everyday in their work. Justice Del Castillos researcher showed the Committee the early drafts of her report in the Vinuya case and these included the passages lifted from the separate articles of Criddle-Descent and of Ellis with proper attributions to these authors. But, as it happened, in the course of editing and cleaning up her draft, the researcher accidentally deleted the attributions. First Finding The Court adopts the Committees finding that the researchers explanation regarding the accidental removal of proper attributions to the three authors is credible. Given the operational properties of the Microsoft program in use by the Court, the accidental decapitation of attributions to sources of research materials is not remote.

18 xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they cannot be alienated or renounced.43 _____________________________ 43 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

For most senior lawyers and judges who are not computer literate, a familiar example similar to the circumstances of the present case would probably help illustrate the likelihood of such an accident happening. If researcher X, for example, happens to be interested in the inalienable character of juridical personality in connection with an assignment and if the book of the learned Civilist, Arturo M. Tolentino, happens to have been published in a website, researcher X would probably show interest in the following passage from that book: xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they cannot be alienated or renounced.15 xxx _____________________________ 15 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

As it happened, the Microsoft word program does not have a function that raises an alarm when original materials are cut up or pruned. The portions that remain simply blend in with the rest of the manuscript, adjusting the footnote number and removing any clue that what should stick together had just been severed. This was what happened in the attributions to Ellis and Criddle-Descent. The researcher deleted the subject tags and, accidentally, their accompanying footnotes that served as reminder of the sources of the lifted passages. With 119 sources cited in the decision, the loss of the 2 of them was not easily detectable. Petitioners point out, however, that Justice Del Castillos verified letter of July 22, 2010 is inconsistent with his researchers claim that the omissions were mere errors in attribution. They cite the fact that the Justice did not disclose his researchers error in that letter despite the latters confession regarding her mistake even before the Justice sent his letter to the Chief Justice. By denying plagiarism in his letter, Justice Del Castillo allegedly perjured himself and sought to whitewash the case. [13] But nothing in the July 22 letter supports the charge of false testimony. Justice Del Castillo merely explained that there was every intention to attribute all sources whenever due and that there was never any malicious intent to appropriate anothers work as our own, which as it turns out is a true statement. He recalled how the Court deliberated upon the case more than once, prompting major revisions in the draft of the decision. In the process, (s)ources were re-studied, discussions modified, passages added or deleted. Nothing in the letter suggests a cover-up. Indeed, it did not preclude a researchers inadvertent error. And it is understandable that Justice Del Castillo did not initially disclose his researchers error. He wrote the decision for the Court and was expected to take full responsibility for any lapse arising from its preparation. What is more, the process of drafting a particular decision for the Court is confidential, which explained his initial request to be heard on the matter without the attendance of the other parties. Notably, neither Justice Del Castillo nor his researcher had a motive or reason for omitting attribution for the lifted passages to Criddle-Descent or to Ellis. The latter authors are highly respected professors of international law. The law journals that published their works have exceptional reputations. It did not make sense to intentionally omit attribution to these authors when the decision cites an abundance of other sources. Citing these authors as the sources of the lifted passages would enhance rather than diminish their informative value. Both Justice Del Castillo and his researcher gain nothing from the omission. Thus, the failure to mention the works of Criddle-Decent and Ellis was unquestionably due to inadvertence or pure oversight. Petitioners of course insist that intent is not material in committing plagiarism since all that a writer has to do, to avoid the charge, is to enclose lifted portions with quotation marks and acknowledge the sources from which these were taken.[14] Petitioners point out that the Court should apply to this case the ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine.[15] They argue that standards on plagiarism in the academe should apply with more force to the judiciary. But petitioners theory ignores the fact that plagiarism is essentially a form of fraud where intent to deceive is inherent. Their theory provides no room for errors in research, an unrealistic position considering that there is hardly any substantial written work in any field of discipline that is free of any mistake. The theory places an automatic universal curse even on errors that, as in this case, have reasonable and logical explanations.

Because the sentence has a footnote mark (#15) that attributes the idea to other sources, it is evident that Tolentino did not originate it. The idea is not a product of his intellect. He merely lifted it from Von Tuhr and Valverde, two reputable foreign authors. When researcher X copies and pastes the above passage and its footnote into a manuscript-in-themaking in his computer, the footnote number would, given the computer program in use, automatically change and adjust to the footnoting sequence of researcher Xs manuscript. Thus, if the preceding footnote in the manuscript when the passage from Tolentino was pasted on it is 23, Tolentinos footnote would automatically change from the original Footnote 15 to Footnote 24. But then, to be of use in his materials-gathering scheme, researcher X would have to tag the Tolentino passage with a short description of its subject for easy reference. A suitable subject description would be: The inalienable character of juridical personality .23 The footnote mark, 23 From Tolentino, which researcher X attaches to the subject tag, serves as reminder to him to attribute the passage in its final form to Tolentino. After the passage has been tagged, it would now appear like this: The inalienable character of juridical personality.23 xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they cannot be alienated or renounced.24 xxx _____________________________ 23 From Tolentino. 24 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

The tag is of course temporary and would later have to go. It serves but a marker to help researcher X maneuver the passage into the right spot in his final manuscript. The mistake of Justice Del Castillos researcher is that, after the Justice had decided what texts, passages, and citations were to be retained including those from Criddle-Descent and Ellis, and when she was already cleaning up her work and deleting all subject tags, she unintentionally deleted the footnotes that went with such tagswith disastrous effect. To understand this, in Tolentinos example, the equivalent would be researcher Xs removal during cleanup of the tag, The inalienable character of juridical personality.23, by a simple delete operation, and the unintended removal as well of the accompanying footnote (#23). The erasure of the footnote eliminates the link between the lifted passage and its source, Tolentinos book. Only the following would remain in the manuscript:

19 Indeed, the 8th edition of Blacks Law Dictionary defines plagiarism as the deliberate and knowing presentation of another person's original ideas or creative expressions as one's own. [16] Thus, plagiarism presupposes intent and a deliberate, conscious effort to steal anothers work and pass it off as ones own. Besides, the Court said nothing in U.P. Board of Regents that would indicate that an intent to pass off anothers work as ones own is not required in plagiarism. The Court merely affirmed the academic freedom of a university to withdraw a masters degree that a student obtained based on evidence that she misappropriated the work of others, passing them off as her own. This is not the case here since, as already stated, Justice Del Castillo actually imputed the borrowed passages to others. of.[19] For example, if one lifts the lyrics of the National Anthem, uses it in his work, and declares that Jose Palma who wrote it did not love his country, then there is twisting or misrepresentation of what the anthems lyrics said. Here, nothing in the Vinuya decision said or implied that, based on the lifted passages, authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis supported the Courts conclusion that the Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to espouse Vinuya et al.s claims. The fact is that, first, since the attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis were accidentally deleted, it is impossible for any person reading the decision to connect the same to the works of those authors as to conclude that in writing the decision Justice Del Castillo twisted their intended messages. And, second, the lifted passages provided mere background facts that established the state of international law at various stages of its development. These are neutral data that could support conflicting theories regarding whether or not the judiciary has the power today to order the Executive Department to sue another country or whether the duty to prosecute violators of international crimes has attained the status of jus cogens. Considering how it was impossible for Justice Del Castillo to have twisted the meaning of the passages he lifted from the works of Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis, the charge of twisting or misrepresentation against him is to say the least, unkind. To be more accurate, however, the charge is reckless and obtuse. No Misconduct This is best illustrated in the familiar example above. After the deletion of the subject tag and, accidentally, its footnote which connects to the source, the lifted passage would appear like this: xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they cannot be alienated or renounced.43 _____________________________ 43 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291. Although the unintended deletion severed the passages link to Tolentino, the passage remains to be attributed to Von Tuhr and Valverde, the original sources that Tolentino himself cites. The text and its footnote reference cancel out any impression that the passage is a creation of researcher X. It is the same with the passages from Criddle-Descent and Ellis. Because such passages remained attributed by the footnotes to the authors original sources, the omission of attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis gave no impression that the passages were the creations of Justice Del Castillo. This wholly negates the idea that he was passing them off as his own thoughts. True the subject passages in this case were reproduced in the Vinuya decision without placing them in quotation marks. But such passages are much unlike the creative line from Robert Frost, [17] The woods are lovely, dark, and deep, but I have promises to keep, and miles to go before I sleep, and miles to go before I sleep. The passages here consisted of common definitions and terms, abridged history of certain principles of law, and similar frequently repeated phrases that, in the world of legal literature, already belong to the public realm. To paraphrase Bast and Samuels,[18] while the academic publishing model is based on the originality of the writers thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine ofstare decisis, which encourages courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength of a decision lies in the soundness and general acceptance of the precedents and long held legal opinions it draws from. Third Finding Petitioners allege that the decision twisted the passages from Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis. The Court adopts the Committees finding that this is not so. Indeed, this allegation of twisting or misrepresentation remains a mystery to the Court. To twist means to distort or pervert the meaning On occasions judges and justices have mistakenly cited the wrong sources, failed to use quotation marks, inadvertently omitted necessary information from footnotes or endnotes. But these do not, in every case, amount to misconduct. Only errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption, or malice are subject of disciplinary action.[20] This is not the case here. Justice Del Castillos acts or omissions were not shown to have been impelled by any of such disreputable motives .[21] If the rule were otherwise, no judge or justice, however competent, honest, or dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the judiciary with an unblemished record.[22] No Inexcusable Negligence Finally, petitioners assert that, even if they were to concede that the omission was the result of plain error, Justice Del Castillo is nonetheless guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. They point out that he has full control and supervision over his researcher and should not have surrendered the writing of the decision to the latter.[23] But this assumes that Justice Del Castillo abdicated the writing of the Vinuya decision to his researcher, which is contrary to the evidence adduced during the hearing. As his researcher testified, the Justice set the direction that the research and study were to take by discussing the issues with her, setting forth his position on those issues, and reviewing and commenting on the study that she was putting together until he was completely satisfied with it.[24] In every sense, Justice Del Castillo was in control of the writing of the report to the Court, which report eventually became the basis for the decision, and determined its final outcome. Assigning cases for study and research to a court attorney, the equivalent of a law clerk in the United States Supreme Court, is standard practice in the high courts of all nations. This is dictated by necessity. With about 80 to 100 cases assigned to a Justice in our Court each month, it would be truly senseless for him to do all the studies and research, going to the library, searching the internet, checking footnotes, and watching the punctuations. If he does all these by himself, he would have to allocate at least one to two weeks of work for each case that has been submitted for decision. The wheels of justice in the Supreme Court will grind to a halt under such a proposition. What is important is that, in this case, Justice Del Castillo retained control over the writing of the decision in the Vinuya case without, however, having to look over his researchers shoulder as she cleaned up her draft report to ensure that she hit the right computer keys. The Justices researcher was after all

Second Finding The Court also adopts the Committees finding that the omission of attributions to CriddleDescent and Ellis did not bring about an impression that Justice Del Castillo himself created the passages that he lifted from their published articles. That he merely got those passages from others remains selfevident, despite the accidental deletion. The fact is that he still imputed the passages to the sources from which Criddle-Descent and Ellis borrowed them in the first place.

20 competent in the field of assignment given her. She finished law from a leading law school, graduated third in her class, served as Editor-in Chief of her schools Law Journal, and placed fourth in the bar examinations when she took it. She earned a masters degree in International Law and Human Rights from a prestigious university in the United States under the Global-Hauser program, which counsel for petitioners concedes to be one of the top post graduate programs on International Law in the world. Justice Del Castillo did not exercise bad judgment in assigning the research work in the Vinuya case to her. Can errors in preparing decisions be prevented? Not until computers cease to be operated by human beings who are vulnerable to human errors. They are hypocrites who believe that the courts should be as error-free as they themselves are. Incidentally, in the course of the submission of petitioners exhibits, the Committee noted that petitioners Exhibit J, the accusing statement of the Faculty of the U.P. College of Law on the al legations of plagiarism and misinterpretation, was a mere dummy. The whole of the statement was reproduced but the signatures portion below merely listed the names of 38 faculty members, in solid rows, with the letters Sgd or signed printed beside the names without exception. These included the name of retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a U.P. professor. Because the Committee declined to admit a mere dummy of Exhibit J, it directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy within three days of the August 26 hearing.[25] He complied. As it turned out, the original statement was signed by only a minority of the faculty members on the list. The set of signatories that appeared like solid teeth in the dummy turned out to be broken teeth in the original. Since only 37 out of the 81 on the list signed the document, it does not appear to be a statement of the Faculty but of just some of its members. And retired Justice V. V. Mendoza did not sign the statement, contrary to what the dummy represented. The Committee wondered why the Dean submitted a dummy of the signed document when U.P. has an abundance of copying machines. Since the above circumstances appear to be related to separate en banc matter concerning the supposed Faculty statement, there is a need for the Committee to turn over the signed copy of the same to the en banc for its consideration in relation to that matter. WHEREFORE, in view of all of the above, the Court: 1. DISMISSES for lack of merit petitioner Vinuya, et al.s charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice Mariano C. del Castillo; 2. DIRECTS the Public Information Office to send copies of this decision to Professors Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Dr. Mark Ellis, and Professor Christian J. Tams at their known addresses; 3. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to provide all court attorneys involved in legal research and reporting with copies of this decision and to enjoin them to avoid editing errors committed in the Vinuya case while using the existing computer program especially when the volume of citations and footnoting is substantial; and 4. Finally, DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to acquire the necessary software for use by the Court that can prevent future lapses in citations and attributions. Further, the Court DIRECTS the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards to turn over to the en banc the dummy as well as the signed copy of petitioners Exhibit J, entitled Restoring Integrity, a statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law for the en bancs consideration in relation to the separate pending matter concerning that supposed Faculty statement. SO ORDERED. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 March 31, 2006 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: "Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives." Justice Brandeis, Loughran v. Loughran 1 THE CASES The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-requisite psychological evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services (SC Clinic) revealed "(e)vidence of ego disintegration" and "developing psychotic process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June 1998, when he applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed problems with selfesteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge. Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way to Atty. Floros appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City, on 4 November 1998. Upon Judge Floros personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999.2 After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, reported its findings to erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo L. Benipayo, who submitted his own report/memorandum 3 to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 recommending, among other things, that his report be considered as an administrative complaint against Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an appropriate psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator Benipayo recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation against him. In a Resolution4 dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA, docketing the complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in view of the commission of the following acts or omissions as reported by the audit team: (a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding qualifications and for announcing in open court during court session his qualification in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct; (b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters; (c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedures; (d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct; (e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in the private practice of law; (f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and without filing the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing; (g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the accused without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of the custodian of the accused; (h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor; (i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical examination of the accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pickup"; (j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide;

21 (k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system; (l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings; (m) For violation of Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987. Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired Court of Appeals Justice Pedro Ramirez (consultant, OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt. Judge Floro was directed to comment within ten days from receipt of the resolution and to subject himself to an appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted "by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution." In the same breath, the Court resolved to place Judge Floro under preventive suspension "for the duration of the investigation of the administrative charges against him." He was barely eight months into his position. On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified Comment where he set forth both affirmative and negative defenses6 while he filed his "Answer/Compliance" on 26 August 1999. On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/final dismissal of his case for failure to prosecute.7However, on 21 March 2000, he presented himself as his first witness in the hearing conducted by Justice Ramirez.8 Subsequently, on 7 July 2000, Judge Floro filed a "Petition for Inhibition/Disqualification" against Justice Ramirez as investigator9 which was denied by Justice Ramirez in an Order dated 11 July 2000. 10 Judge Floros motion for reconsideration 11 suffered the same fate. 12 On 27 July 2000, Judge Floro submitted the question of Justice Ramirezs inhibition/disqualification to this Court. 13 On 8 August 2000, the Court ruled against the inhibition of Justice Ramirez. 13 On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered by the Court to comment on Judge Floros motion to dismiss, 15 recommended that the same should be denied. Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001. 16 The day after, Justice Ramirez came out with a "Partial Report" recommending the dismissal of Judge Floro from office "by reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73." 17 In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against him and even after Justice Ramirez came out with his report and recommendation on 7 March 2001, Judge Floro had been indiscriminately filing cases against those he perceived to have connived to boot him out of office. A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20 July 1999 preventive suspension follows: 1. OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA against Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Team Leader, Judicial Audit Team, Office of the Court Administrator 18 2. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ against Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City 19 3. AC No. 5286 against Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo and Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr.20 4. AC No. CBD-00-740 against Thelma C. Bahia, Court Management Office, Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Atty. II, Court Management Office, both of the Office of the Court Administrator and Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 73, Malabon 21 5. AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) against former Court Administrator Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo and (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator 22 6. A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez23 7. A.C. No. 6050 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez24 On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he filed, now totaling seven, be dismissed. 25 On 14 February 2006, the Court granted the motion to dismiss.26 The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460: "(f)or using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor." The complainant Luz Arriego is the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN. On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court stenographer Jocelyn Japitenga testified on 16 July 2001. On 31 July 2001, Arriego filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which was opposed by Judge Floro on 21 August 2001. On 5 September 2001, Judge Floro testified on his behalf while Atty. Galang testified against him on 4 October 2001. On 16 October 2001, Judge Floro filed a Memorandum in this case. 27 The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a resolution issued by Judge Floro on 11 May 1999 in Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN "In Re: Petition To Be Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei, Petitioner." The resolution disposed of the motions for voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the reconsideration of the order denying the petition for naturalization filed by petitioner in that case, Mary Ng Nei. This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter written by Atty. David S. Narvasa, the petitioners counsel.28 The OCA, through Court Administrator Benipayo, made the following evaluation: In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition and declared it as null and void. However, he ordered the raffling of the case anew (not re-raffle due to inhibition) so that the petitioner, Mary Ng Nei, will have a chance to have the case be assigned to other judges through an impartial raffle. When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he should have continued hearing and taking cognizance of the case. It is improper for him to order the raffle of the case "anew" as this violates Administrative Circular No. 1 (Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution) dated January 28, 1988 which provides to wit: "8. Raffle of Cases: xxxx 8.3 Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified application of the interested party who seeks issuance of a provisional remedy and only upon a finding by the Executive Judge that unless the special raffle is conducted, irreparable damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The special raffle shall be conducted by at least two judges in a multiple-sala station. x x x x" Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu proprio order the special raffle of a case since such is only allowed upon a verified application of the interested party seeking a provisional remedy and only upon the Executive Judges finding that if a special raffle is not conducted, the applicant will suffer irreparable damage. Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.s order is contrary to the above-mentioned Administrative Circular. Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to even mention in his resolution that Justice Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. is his benefactor in his nomination for judgeship. It is not unusual to hear a judge who speaks highly of a "padrino" (who helped him get his position). Such remark even if made as an expression of deep gratitude makes the judge guilty of creating a dubious impression about his integrity and independence. Such flaunting and expression of feelings must be suppressed by the judges concerned. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment (Canon 2, Rule 2.03, Code of Judicial Conduct). The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the ruling on the motion for reconsideration are judicial matters which this Office has no authority to review. The remedy is judicial, not administrative. 29 The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on (a) his act of ordering the raffle of the case in violation of Administrative Circular No. 1; and (b) his remark on page 5 of the subject resolution that "Justice Hermosisima, Jr. x x x helped undersigned so much, in the JBC, regarding his nomination x x x." In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA. 30 Judge Floro, through his counsel, filed his Comment on 22 October 199931 which was noted by this Court on 7 December 1999. On 11 January 2000, Judge Floro filed a Formal Offer of Evidence which this Court, in a resolution dated 25 January 2000, referred to Justice Ramirez for inclusion in his report and recommendation. For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and recommendation in this case as well as in the second case (i.e., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a resolution dated 14 February 2006, the Court directed Judge Floro as well as the other parties in these two cases to inform the Court whether or not they are willing to submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed and the evidence so far submitted by them or to have the decision in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of the two. On 20 February 2006, the OCA, thru Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., manifested its willingness to submit A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for resolution based on the pleadings and the evidence submitted therein. Complainant Luz Arriego in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 likewise informed this Court, in a Letter dated 28 February 2006, her willingness to submit her case for decision based on the pleadings already submitted and on the evidence previously offered and marked. On the other hand, on 3 March 2006,

22 Judge Floro manifested his preference to have A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC. In the interest of orderly administration of justice, considering that these are consolidated cases, we resolve to render as well a consolidated decision. But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all fronts regarding Judge Floros alleged mental illness and its effects on his duties as Judge of a Regional Trial Court. For our part, figuring out whether Judge Floro is indeed psychologically impaired and/or disabled as concluded by the investigator appointed by this Court is frankly beyond our sphere of competence, involving as it does a purely medical issue; hence, we will have to depend on the findings of the mental health professionals who interviewed/analyzed Judge Floro. Our job is simply to wade through the evidence, filter out the irrelevant and the irreverent in order to determine once and for all if Judge Floro is indeed guilty of the charges against him. If the evidence makes out a case against Judge Floro, the next issue is to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed. Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted with an evil mind or because of a psychological or mental incapacity. Upon the resolution of this question hinges the applicability of equity. As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges ("c" and "g", "h" and "j", "e" and "f") will be jointly discussed as they had likewise been jointly discussed by the OCA. These charges involve common facts and to treat them separately will be superfluous. DISCUSSION As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not warrant the supreme penalty of dismissal against Judge Floro (a) Re: Charge of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding qualifications AND for announcing in open court during court session his qualifications in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating calling cards bearing his name as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City, and indicating therein that he is a "bar exams topnotcher (87.55%)" and with "full second honors" from the Ateneo de Manila University, A.B. and LL.B. 32 The audit team likewise reported that: "(b)efore the start of court session, Judge Floro is introduced as a private law practitioner, a graduate of Ateneo de Manila University with second honors, and a bar topnotcher during the 1983 Bar Examinations with an average score of 87.55%. Afterwards, a reading of the Holy Bible, particularly the Book of Revelation according to Saint John, was made. The people in the courtroom were given the opportunity to ask Judge Floro questions on the matter read. No questions were asked; hence the session commenced."33 Judge Floro argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin, 34 "the use of professional cards containing the name of the lawyer, his title, his office and residence is not improper" and that the word "title" should be broad enough to include a Judges legal standing in the bar, his honors duly earned or even his Law School. Moreover, other lawyers do include in their calling cards their former/present titles/positions like President of the Jaycees, Rotary Club, etc., so where then does one draw the line? Finally, Judge Floro argues that his cards were not being circulated but were given merely as tokens to close friends or by reciprocity to other callers considering that common sense dictates that he is not allowed by law to seek other professional employment. As to the charge that he had been announcing in open court his qualifications, Judge Floro counters that it was his branch clerk of court, Atty. Esmeralda Galang-Dizon, who suggested that during his initial court session, she would briefly announce his appointment with an introduction of his school, honors, bar rating and law practice. Naively, Judge Floro agreed as the introduction was done only during the first week of his assumption into office. Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that "a judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory." A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: "a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services." This means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their profession, cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x x using or permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), with more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or self-glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity." 35 The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory details in his professional card, did Judge Floro violate Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct? In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., 36 we explained that the use of an ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers is permitted and that the card "may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced." In herein case, Judge Floros calling cards cannot be considered as simple and ordinary. By including therein the honors he received from his law school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity and modesty required of judges. Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his cards as these were just given by him as tokens and/or only to a few who requested the same. 37 The investigation by Justice Ramirez into the matter reveals otherwise. An eye-witness from the OCA categorically stated that Judge Floro circulated these cards. 38 Worse, Judge Floros very own witness, a researcher from an adjoining branch, testified that Judge Floro gave her one of these cards. 39 As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, it should be measured against Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC being more favorable to respondent Judge Floro. Rule 140, before its amendment, automatically classified violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as serious charges. As amended, a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct may amount to gross misconduct, which is a serious charge, or it may amount to simple misconduct, which is a less serious charge or it may simply be a case of vulgar and/or unbecoming conduct which is a light charge. "Misconduct" is defined as wrong or improper conduct while "gross" connotes something "out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful." 40 For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. 41 With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards containing selflaudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription against judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are held to a higher standard as they must act within the confines of the code they swore to observe. As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been announcing in open court his qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of unnecessary publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity. Verily, the public looks upon judges as the bastion of justice confident, competent and true. And to discover that this is not so, as the judge appears so unsure of his capabilities that he has to court the litigants and their lawyers approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the judiciary. As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements went on for only a week, Judge Floro is guilty of simple misconduct only. (b)Re: Charge of allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters The audit team observed that "inside Judge Floros chamber[s], there is a folding bed with cushion located at the right corner of the room. A man, who was later identified as Judge Floros driver, was sleeping. However, upon seeing the audit team, the driver immediately went out of the room." 42 Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or factual basis. The man the audit team saw "sleeping" on his folding bed, J. Torralba, was Judge Floros aide or "alalay" whom he allows to rest from time to time (in between periods and especially during court sessions) for humanitarian reasons. J. Torralba was not sleeping during that time that the audit team was in Branch 73 as he immediately left when he saw the members thereof. This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or deplorable in Judge Floro having allowed another person to use his folding bed for short periods of time during office hours and while there is no one else in the room. The situation would have been different if there had been any allegation of misuse or abuse of government funds and/or facilities such as in the case of Presado v. Genova 43 wherein Judge Genova was found guilty of serious misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he and his family used his chambers as residential quarters, with the provincial government paying for the electrical bills.

23 Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to allow such familiarity from his aide as this becomes fodder for gossip as what had apparently happened in this case. Judge Floro should have been aware of and attuned to the sensibilities of his staff who were understandably uncomfortable with the uncommon arrangement of a judge allowing his aide easy access to his folding bed. (c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedure (g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the accused without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of the custodian of the accused The memorandum report reads: c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of the absence of the trial prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr. still proceeded with the hearing of the following matters: (c-1) "Motion for Release on Recognizance" filed by the accused, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384, 20371, 20246 and 20442 entitled "People vs. Luisito Beltran", "People vs. Emma Alvarez, et al.", "People vs. Rowena Camino", and "People vs. John Richie Villaluz", respectively. In the hearing of these motions, Judge Floro, Jr. propounded questions (in a form of direct examination) to the custodian of the accused without the accused being sworn by the administering officer. (Note: initially, Judge Floro, Jr. ordered the Branch Clerk of Court Dizon to place the accused under oath prior to the start of his questions. However, COC Dizon refused). The hearing on the aforesaid motions is an offshoot of a previous hearing wherein the accused had pleaded guilty to a lesser offense. After the reading of the sentence, Judge Floro, Jr. would automatically inform the accused that they are qualified to apply for probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even instruct his staff to draft the application in behalf of the accused so that a motion for release on recognizance will immediately be heard and be consequently granted. As appearing in the minutes of the hearing (attached herewith as Annexes "3" to "6"), the custodians of the accused are either a barangay kagawad, barangay tanod or a member of the lupong tagapamayapa. Likewise, no written order granting the motion for release on recognizance is being issued by Judge Floro, Jr. since according to him neither rules nor circular mandates the issuance of a written order. Instead, after granting the motion, Judge Floro, Jr. just requires the parties to sign the minutes of the session. Photocopies of the minutes dated March 4, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384-MN; 20373-MN; and 20371-MN are hereto attached as Annexes "3" to "5". On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN and 20442-MN, Judge Floro, Jr. granted a similar motion without issuing a written order. Copies of the minutes are hereto attached as annexes "6" to "7." 44 In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never violated any rule of procedure with respect to the cases mentioned by the Audit Team, asserting that Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, Rules of Court refers only to final and not interlocutory orders. Only final orders and judgments are promulgated, rendered and entered. xxxx Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case at bar, herein respondent faithfully complied with the requirements of Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as amended, regarding the applications for release on recognizance, thus: a. The application for release on recognizance, although captioned as MOTION FOR RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily governed by Sec. 7 of P.D. 968, a Special Law on Probation. b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given due course/taken cognizance of by respondent, if on its face, the same bears the rubber stamp mark/receipt by the Office of the City/Public Prosecutor. c. The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO MANILA (all courts), especially in RTC, MALABON, and in Malolos, Bulacan (where respondent practiced from 1985-1998 almost 14 years), [and especially the practice of former Judge A. V. Cabigao, Br. 73, RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila], is to interview the custodian, in the chambers, regarding his being a responsible member of the community where the accused reside/resides; the questions propounded are in the form of direct and even cross examination questions. d. The accused is not required to be placed on the witness stand, since there is no such requirement. All that is required, is to inform the accused regarding some matters of probation (optional) such as whether he was sentenced previously by a Court, whether or not he has had previous cases, etc. e. Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct Court hearings on application for release on recognizance, respondent, for caution in most of the applications, included the interview/hearing on the applications for release on recognizance, during criminal trial dates, where a fiscal/trial prosecutor is available; at other times, the hearing is held in the chambers. 45 The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability for ignorance of the rules on probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law), as amended. Contrary to his remonstrations, the release of an accused on recognizance entails more than a cursory interview of the custodian and the applicant. Under the Probation Law,46 and as we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares,47 it is incumbent upon the Judge hearing the application to ascertain first that the applicant is not a "disqualified offender" as "(p)utting the discharge of the accused on hold would have allowed [the judge] more time to pass upon the request for provisional liberty." Moreover, from Judge Floros explanations, it would seem that he completely did away with the requirement for an investigation report by the probation officer. Under the Probation Law, the accuseds temporary liberty is warranted only during the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report on the application for probation and the resolution thereon.48 As we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares49 : It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions, i.e., order to conduct case study prior to action on application for release on recognizance, was prescribed precisely to underscore the interim character of the provisional liberty envisioned under the Probation Law. Stated differently, the temporary liberty of an applicant for probation is effective no longer than the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report and the resolution of the petition, which the law mandates as no more than sixty (60) days to finish the case study and report and a maximum of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report for the trial judge to resolve the application for probation. By allowing the temporary liberty of the accused even before the order to submit the case study and report, respondent Judge unceremoniously extended the pro tem discharge of the accused to the detriment of the prosecution and the private complainants. (Emphasis supplied) As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an accused on recognizance need not be in writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of Appeals50 wherein we held that "no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation." Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss in his duties as judge when he did not reduce into writing his orders for the release on recognizance of the accused in Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, "People v. Luisito Beltran," "People v. Emma Alvarez, et al.," "People v. Rowena Camino," and "People v. John Richie Villaluz." 51 From his explanation that such written orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floros failure was not due to inadvertence or negligence on his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule. In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floros handling of probation cases. First, he ordered the release on recognizance of the accused without the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the probation officer to render a case study and investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order granting the release of the accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing. It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the accused on recognizance, as well as his eventual probation, was already a done deal even before the hearing on his application as Judge Floro took up the cudgels for the accused by instructing his staff to draft the application for probation. This, Judge Floro did not deny. Thus, we agree in the observation of the audit team that Judge Floro, as a matter of policy, had been approving applications for release on recognizance hastily and without observing the requirements of the law for said purpose. Verily, we having nothing against courts leaning backward in favor of the accused; in fact, this is a salutary endeavor, but only when the situation so warrants. In herein case, however, we cannot countenance what Judge Floro did as "the unsolicited fervor to release the accused significantly deprived the prosecution and the private complainants of their right to due process." 52 Judge Floros insistence that orders made in open court need n ot be reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 53 Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold it conscientiously.54 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and simply apply it for anything less is constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. 55 True, not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanctions. 56 To hold otherwise "would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of

24 rendering infallible judgments." 57This rule, however, admits of an exception as "good faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of error." 58 Thus, even if a judge acted in good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable. 59 (d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal cases where he declared that he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof that in criminal cases, he is always "pro-accused" particularly concerning detention prisoners and bonded accused who have to continually pay for the premiums on their bonds during the pendency of their cases. Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart upon Atty. Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy his predicament of having 40 detention prisoners and other bonded accused whose cases could not be tried due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor assigned to his sala. He narrated as well to Atty. Buenaventura the sufferings of detention prisoners languishing in the Malabon/Navotas jail whose cases had not been tried during the vacancy of his sala from February 1997 to 5 November 1998. At any rate, Judge Floro submits that there is no single evidence or proof submitted by any litigant or private complainant that he sided with the accused. Atty. Dizon, Judge Floros Clerk of Court, on the other hand, categorically stated under oath that Judge Floro, during a staff meeting, admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of his Public Attorneys Office (PAO) lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated with them especially those under detention as he, himself, had been accused by his brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded offenses. 60 Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is more credible especially since it is corroborated by independent evidence, 61 e.g., Judge Floros unwarranted eagerness in approving application for release on recognizance as previously discussed. Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice "should not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and honest" as well. 62 Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. 63 Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. 64 "His language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued." 65 On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an independent judiciary is to be realized. And by professing his bias for the accused, Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct as his capacity for objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding the publics trust in his ability to render justice. As we held in Castillo v. Juan 66 : In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. What has been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance. (h) Re: Charge of using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor. (j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide. The memorandum report states: During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 20385-MN entitled: "People vs. Nenita Salvador", Judge Floro, Jr., in the absence of the public prosecutor and considering that the private complainant was not being represented by a private prosecutor, used his moral ascendancy and influence to convince the private complainant to settle and eventually cause the dismissal of the case in the guise of settling its civil aspect by making the private complainants and the accused sign the settlement. (Copy of the signed stenographic notes is hereto attached as Annex "8"). xxxx In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide, Judge Floro, Jr. put on record the "manifestations" of the private complainant and the accused relative to their willingness to settle the civil aspect of the case. In the same order, Judge Floro, Jr. reserved his ruling on the said settlement until after the public prosecutor has given his comment. However, per report of the court employees in Branch 73, the aforesaid order was actually a revised one or a deviation from the original order given in open court. Actually, the said criminal case was already settled even without the presence of the public prosecutor. The settlement was in the nature of absolving not only the civil liability of the accused but the criminal liability as well. It was further reported that the private complainants signed the compromise agreement due to the insistence or persuasion of Judge Floro, Jr. The audit team was furnished a copy of the stenographic notes (unsigned draft order) and the revised order (signed). Copies of the stenographic notes and the revised order are hereto attached as Annexes "8", "13", and "14". (Note: the stenographic notes were signed by the parties to the case). In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, Luz Arriego, filed an administrative case against Judge Floro docketed as A.M. OCA-I.P.I. No. 99-812-RTJ. In her Affidavit Complaint67 dated 9 August 1999, she alleged that on 8 March 1999, Judge Floro forced them to settle her daughters case against the accused therein despite the absence of the trial prosecutor. When the parties could not agree on the amount to be paid by the accused for the medical expenses incurred by complaining witness, they requested respondent that they be given time to study the matter and consult a lawyer to which Judge Floro replied that the case be settled immediately, uttering, "ngayon na! ngayon na!" Moreover, Judge Floro allegedly made them believe that the counter-charges filed by the accused against the complaining witness would likewise be dismissed, so they agreed to settle the case. However, the written Order issued by respondent Judge did not reflect the agreement entered into by the parties in open court. Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and the complaint filed by Mrs. Arriego, maintaining that the hearing on said case was not only in accordance with the Rules of Court but was also beneficial to the litigants concerned as they openly manifested their willingness to patch up their differences in the spirit of reconciliation. Then, considering that the parties suggested that they would file the necessary pleadings in due course, Judge Floro waited for such pleadings before the TSN-dictated Order could be reduced to writing. Meanwhile, in the course of a conversation between Judge Floro and Court Administrator Benipayo, the latter opined that under Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of compromise in criminal cases is tantamount to an admission of guilt except in some cases. With this in mind, the 8 March 1999 Order of the hearing on even date was superseded by the revised written Order likewise dated 8 March 1999. Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventuras stance that he has no power to revise an Order, courts have plenary power to recall and amend or revise any orally dictated order in substance and in form even motu proprio. The rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus v. Court of Appeals 68 wherein we declared: x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation, and that indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order or judgment has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft thereof drawn up and signed and/or copy thereof somehow read or acquired by any party. In truth, even after promulgation (i.e., filing with the clerk of court), and even after service on the parties of notice of an order or judgment, the Court rendering it indisputably has plenary power to recall and amend or revise it in substance or form on motion of any party or even motu proprio, provided that in the case of a final order or judgment, the same has not attained finality. (Emphasis supplied) In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in open court ostensibly a judicial approval of a compromise agreement which was amended or revised by removing the stamp of judicial

25 approval, the written order merely stating that Judge Floro was reserving its ruling regarding the manifestations of the parties to enter into a compromise agreement after the public prosecutor shall have submitted its comments thereto. 69 Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to revise his oral order per the Echaus ruling and factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an amendment, we find no basis for the charge of dishonesty (under paragraph "j" of the complaint). Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor, the same must likewise fail for lack of basis. The controversial settlement never came to pass. It was not judicially approved as reflected in the revised Order of 8 March 1999, thus, Mrs. Arriego actually had no cause for complaint. She cannot, on one hand, complain that the written order did not reflect the agreement reached during the hearing and, on the other hand, claim that this agreement was reached under duress at the instance of Judge Floro. (i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical examination of the accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up" The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20347-MN, Judge Floro "motu proprio ordered the physical and mental examination of the accused by any physician, over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up." 70 In refutation, Judge Floro argues -In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the demeanor of the accused NESTOR ESCARLAN and noted the manifestations of his counsel de oficio, Atty. E. Gallevo, PAO lawyer, and the comment/objections of the trial prosecutor, Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus: a. Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the accused opted to enter a plea of not guilty; b. But upon query of the Court, the accused approached the bench and he appeared trembling and stammering; c. Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent, readily admitted that accused is "nauutal", has difficulty of reasoning, of speaking, and very nervous; d. Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused often changed his mind regarding the plea, from not guilty to guilty and to not guilty, and so forth; e. Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo, upon citation by the Court/respondent of the pertinent provisions of the Rules, namely Rule 28 (Mental Examination of Persons), Sec. 12 of Rule 116, and Sec. 5(g) of Rule 135, Rules of Court (plenary powers to issue orders to conform to justice), manifested orally that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up"; f. Hence, respondent exercised his sound discretion in issuing the ORDER OF MENTAL EXAMINATION. The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support, since it is well-settled that "the court may order a physical or MENTAL examination of a party where his physical or mental condition is material to the issues involved." (27 C.J.S. p. 119, cf. MARTIN, p. 107, id.). 71 PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for Judge Floro. He testified that he moved for the suspension of the arraignment of the accused Nestor Escarlan Escancilla in order to assess his mental fitness for trial. 72 As reflected in the Order for suspension, however, and as admitted by Judge Floro himself in his Comment, Atty. Gallevo merely manifested that accused is "mahina ang pick-up." Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the arraignment motu proprio and "over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor." It must be remembered that the scheduled arraignment took place in February 1999 when the applicable rule was still Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads: SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof: (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose. The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant to a motion filed by the accused unlike Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees that the suspension be made "upon motion by the proper party." 73 Thus, it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to order the suspension of the arraignment motu proprio based on his own assessment of the situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense. 74 As we underscored in People v. Alcalde 75 : Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered. x x x. xxxx The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him under the Bill of Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the law secures or gives. x x x. Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his assessment of the accuseds mental fitness for trial is already beside the point. If ever he erred, he erred in the side of caution which, under the circumstances of the case, is not an actionable wrong. (e)Re: Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in the private practice of law (f)Re: Charge of appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and without filing the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing In support of the above charges, the memorandum report states: i.Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has personal cases pending before the lower courts in Bulacan. He admitted that Atty. Bordador, the counsel of record in some of these cases, is just signing the pleadings for him while he (Judge Floro, Jr.) acts as collaborating counsel. When attending the hearing of the cases, Judge Floro, Jr. admitted that he does not file an application for leave of absence. Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending civil case in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and a criminal case in Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan. It is reported that in these cases, he is appearing and filing pleadings in his capacity as party and counsel for himself and even indicating in the pleadings that he is the Presiding Judge of Branch 73, RTC, Malabon. Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that Judge Floro, Jr. indeed has a pending case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 46-M-98, entitled: "In Re: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Robert V. Floro, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner - versus Jesie V. Floro and Benjamin V. Floro". In this case Judge Floro, Jr. filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Entry of Judgment with Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission" wherein he signed as the petitioner and at the same time indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon, Metro Manila. Court stenographer Marissa Garcia, RTC, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan confirmed this information. Judge Floro, Jr. even attached a copy of his oath taking and his picture together with President Joseph Estrada to the aforesaid pleading. Photocopy of the said Motion is hereto attached as Annex "9". Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, to appear as counsel or collaborating counsel in several civil cases (except the abovementioned case) pending before lower courts. 76 Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law. Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that: "No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give professional advice to client." Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand, provides that: "A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law." Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge claiming that he hired lawyers to attend to his personal cases. 77 A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not reveal any concrete proof of Judge Floro having appeared as counsel in his personal cases after he had already been appointed Judge except that he prepared a pleading ("Ex Parte Motion For Issuance of Entry of Judgment With Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission") jointly with his counsel of record in connection with a habeas corpus case he filed against his brothers for the custody of their "mild, mentally-retarded" brother. He explained, however, that he prepared the said pleading in the heat of anger as he could not accept the judgment of dismissal in that case. 78 He

26 likewise explained that the pleading was signed by him alone due to inadvertence and that he had rectified the same by filing an Amended Manifestation with Affidavit of Merit. 79 Finally, during the hearing of this case, Judge Floro argued that he filed the subject pleading as petitioner and not as counsel. 80 The proscription against the private practice of law by judges is based on sound public policy, thus: [T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest. 81 Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that what is envisioned by "private practice" is more than an isolated court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. 82 In herein case, save for the "Motion for Entry of Judgment," it does not appear from the records that Judge Floro filed other pleadings or appeared in any other court proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that Judge Floros act of filing the motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated case and does not in any wise constitute private practice of law. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that Judge Floro is obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he himself is the petitioner. Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The only logical explanation we can reach for such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or put pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus in the right. 83 Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a "judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency." By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a very awkward position. As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge Floro has been attending the hearing of his personal cases without filing for leave of absence. As Judge Floro vehemently protests the charge as untrue, it was incumbent upon the OCA to prove its case. Time and again we have held that although administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules on evidence, the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is still subject to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirement of due process. 84 (k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system (l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings The memorandum report reads: In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to observe the way Judge Floro, Jr. conducts court proceedings. With the assistance of the court staff, the team was able to obtain a tape-recorded proceeding conducted by Judge Floro, Jr. Attached is the transcript of the proceedings (Annex "15"). The tape record of the court proceedings is also submitted along with this report as Exhibit "A". xxxx The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A certain Atty. Abelarde was appearing for the plaintiff while Atty. Emmanuel Basa was appearing for the defendant. During the hearing, it seems that the counsels for both parties were guiding Judge Floro, Jr. on how to proceed with the trial. There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the Rules of Court, to wit: "Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito ay ang Rules of Court, hindi nila maayos ang Rules of Court natin, hindi realistic kinopya lang sa law of California on Civil Procedure; pagdating dito eh dahil sa kanila maraming nagkakaproblema, masyadong maraming eh ako wala akong pinagkopyahan yan but ginawa ko lang yon Sabi ko si Judge nagko-complain kasi, sabi ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi alam yan talo na sa akin except na hindi papayag kasi marami diyang " In another proceeding conducted on a different day, Judge Floro, Jr., instead of holding trial, discussed, in open court, the case involving his brother. He even condemned the Philippine justice system and manifested his disgust on the unfairness of the system. Thus, he said: "Sabi ko paano ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa korteng eto bulok ang hustisya. Ang kapatid ko napakayaman, ako walang pera." He continued: "Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha kundi makita ko lang. Bawal kasi; yung kapatid ko retarded, bawal. In memory of my brother, Robert Floro. So, ngayon nag-file ako. Sabi ni Judge Agloro senermonan pa ako, ganun ganun Sabi ko paano ko makikita ang katarungan. Tapos ngayon ang nangyari di Judge na ako, hindi ko pa nakita ang kapatid ko. Di ngayon, ang ginawa ko na-dismiss na yung case, hindi ko inano kasi wala akong nakikitang katarungan dahil ang kapatid ko ay napakaraming pera. Alam ko naman kung ang isang court eh parehas o may kiling eh. Yung abogado niya malakas na malakas doon. Sana hindi nakarecord eto (laughs) baka ako ma-contempt dito." 85 Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically arguing that these are all hearsay fabrications supplied by his Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon, and by disgruntled RTC personnel due to ill or ulterior motives (i.e., to allegedly cover-up their consistent tardiness, habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of duties which were all unearthed by Judge Floro). As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized the Philippine judicial system, Judge Floro contends that this recording was done clandestinely by his staff in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (Republic Act No. 4200) and, to suit their plans, they twisted the facts by cutting portions thereof. They also made it appear that the conversation took place in a court proceeding when, in fact, this was inside his chambers. During the investigation, it was established that the two tapes in question were submitted to the OCA sans the "yellow notes" and the official transcribed copy thereof. 86 This means that the transcribed copy that was submitted by the audit team as Annex "15" is but an unofficial copy and does not, by itself, prove that what was being recorded was a court proceeding. This being the case, the two tapes, without concrete proof that they were taken officially during a court proceeding, cannot be used against Judge Floro as the unauthorized recording of a private conversation is inadmissible under Rep. Act No. 4200. 87 Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents thereof, we are thus left with only Judge Floros word against that of Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of Court who testified under oath as to Judge Floros alleged propensity to criticize the judiciary and to use intemperate language. Resolving these particular charges would therefore depend upon which party is more credible. Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that: Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine Justice System? A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of us in branch 73 the alleged "kabulukan ng hustisya". Time and again he said the Rules of Court is of no use. He said that since theory and the practice of law are very different, the Rules of Court does not always apply to different cases. Not only the justice system did he criticize but likewise Judges and Justices. He told us . . . and I quote "Dyan sa Malolos sangkatutak ang corrupt na Judges . . . Sa Court of Appeals P25,000.00 ang pinakamababang lagayan diyan." To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize the very institution he is now serving? Where is his respect to the court, to the bar and to the bench? How can he uphold courts as temples of justice if he himself did not believe in the justice system? xxxx Q What can you say about charge letter "L" which reads for the use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings? A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the presence of me, the Court Interpreter, the Legal Researcher, maybe a Clerk, he always discuss matters regarding practitioners in our court. There is one time one Atty. Feliciano a lady lawyer, he said, "Luka-luka, talaga yang babaing yan" and then he would call even not during court session, but during office hours our Court Interpreter "malandi, luka-luka, may fruit of the sun". So, it did not surprise us one time when during a pre-trial conference in a Civil Case, for Civil Case No. 25-86-MN "Lopez v. Reyes and Mercado", he uttered offensive language against his fellow judge. Take the transcription of this court proceeding is already adapted by the Court Administrator. It was the content of the tape he sent the Court Administrator. Actually, for consultation and advise after hearing what Judge Floro discussed in open Court, before all of us, the court staff present in the hearing and before the lawyer and the defendants in the case, we were in quandary whether or not to attach in the record the stenographic notes or even the actual transcription of the proceedings because it contained offensive languages against the justice system, against a certain judge, against a certain Clerk of Court named Jude Assanda, against people he is disgusted with. In fact, instead of discussing the merit of the case or the possibility of the amicable settlement between the parties, he integrated this kind of discussion. So, as a Clerk of Court, I may not use my discretion whether or not to advise the stenographer to indeed present the same or attach the same in the

27 record because it contained offensive languages highly improper and intemperate languages like for example, "putang ina", words like "ako ang anghel ng kamatayan, etcetera, etcetera". 88 The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the straightforward and candid declarations of Atty. Dizon especially in the light of confirming proofs from Judge Floro himself. The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject utterances are consistent with Judge Floros claims of intellectual superiority for having graduated with several honors from the Ateneo School of Law and having placed 13th in the bar examinations. Moreover, his utterances against the judicial system on account of his perception of injustice in the disposition of his brothers case are not far removed from his reactions to what he perceived were injustices committed against him by the OCA and by the persons who were either in charge of the cases against him or had some sort of participation therein. Consequently, although there is no direct proof that Judge Floro said what he is claimed to have said, nonetheless, evidence that he sees himself as intellectually superior as well as evidence of his habit of crying foul when things do not go his way, show that it is more likely that he actually criticized the Rules of Court and the judicial system and is thus guilty of unbecoming conduct. Verily, in administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 89 In this case, there is ample and competent proof of violation on Judge Floros part. (m) Re: Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1 July 1987 The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro [D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he discusses matters involving his personal life and beliefs. Canon 3, Rule 3.03 provides that "[a] judge shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court." A disorderly judge generates disorderly work. An indecorous judge invites indecorous reactions. Hence, the need to maintain order and proper decorum in court. When the judge respects himself, others will respect him too. When he is orderly, others will follow suit. Proceedings in court must be conducted formally and solemnly. The atmosphere must be characterized with honor and dignity befitting the seriousness and importance of a judicial trial called to ascertain the truth. Anything which tends to detract from this atmosphere must be avoided. And the judge is supposed to be in control and is therefore responsible for any detraction therefrom. Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice) dated July 1, 1987 provides that trial of cases should be conducted efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan the course and direction of trials so that waste of time is avoided. Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and movements. He must always keep in mind that he is the visible representative of the law. Judge Floro, Jr.s claims that he is endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen "little friends" are manifestations of his psychological instability and therefore casts doubt on his capacity to carry out the functions and responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to subject Judge Floro, Jr. once again to psychiatric or mental examination to ascertain his fitness to remain in the judiciary. 90 Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an offense but, as its title would suggest, it merely sets the guidelines in the administration of justice following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify the fact that the 13 charges are inextricably linked to the charge of mental/psychological illness which allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit to continue discharging the functions of his office. This being the case, we will consider the allegation that Judge Floro proclaims himself to be endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen "little friends" in determining the transcendental issue of his mental/psychological fitness to remain in office. But before we even go into that, we must determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed for the seven of the 13 charges discussed above. To recapitulate, we have found Judge Floro guilty, in one way or another, of seven of the 13 charges against him. Thus: 1) Charge "a" - simple misconduct 2) Charges "c" and "g" gross ignorance of the law 3) Charge "d" unbecoming conduct 4) Charge "e" unbecoming conduct 5) Charges "k" and "l" unbecoming conduct Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Under Rule 140 as amended, a judge guilty of a serious charge may be dismissed from the service, suspended from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months or fined in the amount of P 20,000.00 but not exceeding P 40,000.00 depending on the circumstances of the case. In herein case, considering that Judge Floro had barely warmed his seat when he was slammed with these charges, his relative inexperience is to be taken in his favor. And, considering further that there is no allegation or proof that he acted in bad faith or with corrupt motives, we hold that a fine is the appropriate penalty. The fine is to be imposed in the maximum, i.e. P 40,000.00, as we will treat the findings of simple misconduct and unbecoming conduct as aggravating circumstances. 91 Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC Malabon Branch due to a medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office As we have explained, the common thread which binds the 13 seemingly unrelated accusations in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 is the charge of mental illness against Judge Floro embodied in the requirement for him to undergo an appropriate mental or psychological examination and which necessitated his suspension pending investigation. This charge of mental illness, if true, renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office notwithstanding the fact that, in disposing of the 13 charges, there had been no finding of dismissal from the service against Judge Floro. The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro when the latter applied for judgeship (which application he later voluntarily withdrew) way back in September 1995. The psychological report, as prepared by Cecilia C. Villegas, M.D. (Director III, Chief SC Clinic Services) and Melinda C. Grio (Psychologist), stated in part: PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION: There are evidences of developing psychotic process at present. REMARKS: Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious during the interview. He was argumentative and over solicitous of questions asked, giving the impressions of marked suspiciousness. He centered on his academic excellence, an Ateneo de Manila graduate of the College of Law, rated top 13th place in the bar examination. He emphasized his obsessive and compulsive method of studying, at least 15 hours per day regardless of whether it was school days or vacation time. Vying for honors all the time and graduated Law as second honor, he calls this self-discipline and self-organization. He expressed dissatisfaction of his achievements, tend to be a perfectionist and cannot accept failures. To emphasize his ultra bright mind and analytical system, he related that, for the past 3 to 5 years, he has been experiencing "Psychic vision" every morning and that the biggest secret of the universe are the "unseen things." He can predict future events because of "power in psychic phenomenon" as when his bar results was to be released, he saw lights in the sky "no. 13-1," and he got the 13th place. He has been practicing "parapsychology" seeing plenty of "dwendes" around him. He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be irrelevant. Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego disintegration are prominent findings, both in the interview (conscious) and psychological test results. (unconscious level). 92 Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro again presented himself to the Supreme Court Clinic when he applied anew for judgeship, this time of RTC Malabon. Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and Celeste P. Vista, M.D. (Psychiatrist and Medical Officer IV) did the interview and evaluation. Dr. Vista observed: Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), and he takes pride in this. During the interview, he was quite reluctant to reveal information about his family background and would rather talk about his work and academic achievements. However, he failed to integrate his knowledge into a cohesive unit which he can utilize to cope with the various tasks that he undertakes. This renders him confused and ambivalent with a tendency to vacillate with decision-making. He also has a low self-esteem and prone to mood swings with the slightest provocation. From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic change in his personality and level of functioning as a lawyer in private practice. However, he showed a pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal deficits. He has poor social skills and showed discomfort with close social contacts. Paranoid ideations, suspiciousness of others motives as well as perceptual distortions were evident during the interview. Atty. Floros current intelligence function is along the mild mental retardation (68) which is below the expected cognitive efficiency of a judge. Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. Furthermore, he is at present not intellectually and emotionally equipped to hurdle the

28 responsibilities of a judge and he may decompensate when exposed to anxiety-provoking and stress-laden situation. 93 It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted report as it allowed Judge Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, however, resurrected the issue of his mental and psychological capacity to preside over a regional trial court. Thus, the Resolution of 20 July 1999 specifically ordered Judge Floro to submit to "appropriate psychological or mental examination." On 1 February 2000, per recommendation of Justice Ramirez, 94 the Court clarified that the "appropriate psychological or mental examination" being adverted to in the Resolution of 20 July 1999 is to be conducted by the SC Clinic. The Court thereby directed Judge Floro to "submit himself to the SC Clinic for psychological or mental examination, within ten (10) days from notice." 95 Judge Floro sought reconsideration which was denied by the Court on 22 February 2000. 96 The order to submit to the appropriate psychological examination by the SC Clinic was reiterated by the Court on 17 October 2000 with the admonition that Judge Floros failure to do so would result in appropriate disciplinary sanctions. 97 On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought reconsideration of the 17 October 2000 Resolution with a conjunctive special motion for him to undergo psychiatric examination by any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution. 98 This was denied by the Court on 14 November 2000. 99 On 10 November 2000, Judge Floro moved, among other things, for the inhibition or disqualification of Supreme Court Clinic doctors 100 and psychologist 101 with a manifestation that he filed cases against them for revocation of licenses before the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), the Philippine Medical Association (PMA) and the PAP 102 for alleged gross incompetence and dishonorable conduct under Sec. 24 of Rep. Act No. 2382/1959 Medical Act/Code of Medical Ethics. 103 On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the approval of Court Administrator Benipayo, moved that Judge Floro be sanctioned for obvious contempt in refusing to comply with the 1 February 2000 and 17 October 2000 resolutions. According to Justice Ramirez, Judge Floros filing of administrative cases with the PRC against Dr. Mendoza, et al., is an indication of the latters intention to disregard and disobey the legal orders of the Court.104 The Court en banc agreed in the report of Justice Ramirez, thus Judge Floro was ordered to submit to psychological and mental examination within 10 days from receipt, otherwise, he "shall be ordered arrested and detained at the jail of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x." 105 Judge Floro finally complied with the directive on 13 and 15 December 2000. 106 He likewise sought the services of a private practitioner, Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, who came out with his own evaluation of Judge Floro on 3 January 2001. 107 Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for the third time in December 2000, this time in connection with A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460. Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff Officer reported that "(o)ver all data strongly suggest a delusional disorder with movement in the paranoid direction." Dr. Celeste Vista, for her part, stated that: Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge Floro is basically a cautious, and suspicious individual with a compulsion to analyze and observe motives in his milieu. Despite his status, cognitive assets and impressive educational background, his current functioning is gauged along the LOW AVERAGE intelligence. He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine situations. However, his test protocol is characterized by disabling indicators. There is impairment in reality testing which is an indicator of a psychotic process. He is unable to make an objective assessment and judgment of his milieu. Hence, he is apt to misconstrue signals from his environment resulting to perceptual distortions, disturbed associations, and lapses in judgment. Such that, cultural beliefs in dwarfs, psychic and paranormal phenomena and divine gifts of healing have become incorporated in a delusional (false and unshakable beliefs) system, that it has interfered and tainted his occupational and social functioning. Hence, he is found to be unfit in performing his court duties as a judge. 108 Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of Judge Floro, Supreme Court Senior Chief Staff Officer Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D., reported to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in March 2001 that The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is thus substantially supported by evidence. Based on the three[3] psychological tests and evaluation of the two[2] psychiatrists, the undersigned has no other recourse but to recommend that Judge Florentino Floro be declared unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge, effective immediately. Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down, Judge Floro submitted earlier psychological evaluations conducted by several mental health professionals which were all favorable to him. The first three evaluations were in connection with his application as RTC Judge of Malabon City in 1998 brought about by him having "failed" the examination given by the Supreme Court Clinic. The report dated 04 September 1998 by staff psychologist, Rowena A. Reyes as noted by clinical Psychologist, Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villasor of the Metropolitan Psychological Corporation (MPC), states in part: I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS 1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual resources to cope with everyday demands. He is able to handle both concrete and abstract requirements of tasks. Alert to details, he has a logical approach in evaluating the relationship between things and ideas. 2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations, where he can consider solid facts to arrived (sic)at concrete, tangible outcomes. Task-oriented, he can organize procedures and details so as to get things done correctly and on schedule. He uses conventional standards to determine personal progress. Set in his views, he may not readily accept others ideas and contributions especially if these oppose his own. 3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments is expected of FFJ. Generally, he prefers to control his emotions and does not let this get in the way of his judgment and decisions. II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and respected for his undertakings. Achievementoriented, he sets high personal standards and tends to judge himself and others according to these standards. When things do not develop along desired lines, he may become restless and impatient. Nevertheless, he is careful of his social stature and can be expected to comply with conventional social demands. 109 Testifying as one of Judge Floros witnesses, Rowena A. Reyes opined on cross -examination that "psychologically speaking," Judge Floro was not fit to be a judge. Thus: JUDGE AQUINO: Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on his testimony here and on every available records of the proceedings, has been claiming that he [is] possessed with Psychic Powers and he did not tell you that in the interview. Would you consider his failure to tell you about his Psychic Powers to be a fatal [flaw]? xxxx A: Yes, Sir. Q: Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological outlook of the patient? A: Yes, Sir. xxxx Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these] proceedings and you were here when we were cross-examining Mr. Licaoco and you heard that we mentioned in the course of our cross-examination. Would you consider his failure to tell you about his power of by location to be a fatal [flaw] and your assessment of his psychological outlook? xxxx A: Yes, Sir. Q: Fatal [flaw]? A: Yes, Sir. Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the interview that he is capable of being in a trance? A: He did not. Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could type letters? A: He did not. xxxx Q: And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one who will not be pronouncing or making pronouncement concerning his psychic powers. Is this not correct? xxxx A: Yes sir. Q: A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim that he is capable of having trances in the course of his private activities and even in the course of the performance of his official duty as a Judge. Will you not agree with that? A: I agree with you, Sir.

29 Q: And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality oriented person. Meaning tatagalugin ko na po nakukuha naman "na ako ay psychic, na ako ay pwedeng ipower ng by location, na kaya kong mag trance. Gumawa pa ng ibat iba pang bagay at the same time." Yan ay hindi compatible sa pagiging reality oriented? A: Yes, Sir. Q: And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit as a Judge. xxxx Q: I will add the phrase Psychologically speaking. xxxx A: Yes, Sir. 110 Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior Consultant Psychiatrist of the Makati Medical Center, stated in her report dated 3 September 1998 that at the time of the interview Judge Floro [W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about current issues, able to discuss a wide variety of topics intelligently without hesitation. His thinking is lucid, rational, logical and reality based. He is well oriented, intelligent, emotionally stable, with very good judgment. There is no previous history of any psychological disturbances. 111 This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla, M.D., dated September 1998, who stated in his report that Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed, be-spectacled person with graying hair. When interviewed he was somewhat anxious, elaborative and at times approximate in his answers. He was alert, oriented, conscious, cooperative and articulate in Pilipino and English. He denied any perceptual disturbances. Stream of thought was logical and goal-directed. There was pressure of speech with tendency to be argumentative or defensive but there were no flight of ideas, thought blocking, looseness of associations or neologisms. Delusions were not elicited. Affect was broad and appropriate but mood was anxious. There were no abnormal involuntary movements or tics. Impulse control is good. Cognition is intact. Judgment, insight, and other test for higher cortical functions did not reveal abnormal results. Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. do not contradict his nomination and appointment to the post he is seeking. 112 On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge Floros witness, Dr. Jurilla clarified that the interview had its limitations 113 and he might have missed out certain information left out by his patient. 114 The following exchange is thus instructive: JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the interview that he has little unseen, unheard friends known as duwendes? DR. JURILLA: He did not. xxxx Q: Did you interview Judge Floro or did he [volunteer] to you information about his claim to be the number five psychic in the country? xxxx A: No, Your Honor. Q: He did not tell you also that he is gifted also with this so called, psychic phenomena? A: He did not. xxxx Q: He did not tell you also that in [traveling] from one place to another, at least four (4) kilometers apart, he used to ride on a big white or whatever it is, horse? A: Not during our interview. xxxx A: It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health doctor you might have missed some information or it is possible that our clients or patients might not [have] told us everything. Q: And if your clients or patients did not tell you things such as those that Judge Floro did not admittedly tell you in the course of the interview, your opinion of the patient would be altered a little? xxxx A: The answer has something to do whether my evaluation may be altered. Yes, Your Honor in the absence of any corroborative contradiction. Q: More so, if the presence of confirming events that transpired after the interview, would that be correct? A: The interview has its limitations. Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during the interview are confirmed by events that transpired after the interview, would you not say you have more reason to have your evaluation altered? A: Yes. Q: Especially so if you will now know that after that interview Judge Floro has been proclaiming himself as the number five psychic in the country [where] no one has called him as a psychic at all? xxxx Q: Would it be really more altered? A: I would say so. xxxx Q: Returning to the confirming proofs, meaning after the interview, which are confirmations of what Judge Floro did not tell you during the interview, would your finding of [J]udge Floro be drastically altered if he will tell you that he is capable or possessed of the power of bilocation? xxxx A: I would probably try to for a diagnosis. Q: Which may make a drastic alteration of your evaluation of Judge Floros mental and psychological x x x? A: My diagnosis I will be seeking for an abnormal condition. Q: When you said abnormal something would have made you suspect that there was abnormality in the person of Judge Floro? A: Given the data. Q: We will give you the data or additional information. Would you also have your evaluation favorable to Judge Floro drastically altered if I tell you that based on record Judge Floro has claimed that while in a trance he is capable of typing a letter? xxxx A: If there is data toward that effect prior to September 1998, probably drastically altered. 115 Lastly, Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of Eduardo T. Maaba, M.D., 116 dated 3 January 2001, the relevant portions of which state: Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was observed. Content of thought did not reveal delusional thought. He was proud of his achievements in line with his profession and expressed his frustration and dissatisfaction with the way his colleagues are handling his pending administrative cases. He was observed to be reality-oriented and was not suffering from hallucinations or abnormal perceptual distortions. Orientation, with respect to time, place and person, was unimpaired. Judgment and decision-making capacity were adequately functioning. xxxx An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our clinic on December 26, 2000. He talked about his family and academic achievements. He claimed to possess a divine gift for prophecy and a gift of healing. He also talked about a "covenant" made during a dream between him and 3 dwarf friends named Luis, Armand and Angel. He reported that the first part of his ministry is to cast illness and/or disease and the second part is to heal and alleviate sufferings/pain from disease. A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro on December 28, 2000. The battery of test consisted of the following: (1) Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test (2) SRA Language Test (3) Purdue NonLanguage Test (4) Sacks Sentence Completion Test and (5) Draw A Person Test. Test results and evaluation showed an individual with an Above Average Intelligence. Projective data, showed an obsessivecompulsive person who is meticulous to details and strive for perfection in tasks assigned to him. He is reality-oriented and is deemed capable of making day-to-day decisions in his personal as well as professional decisions. Confusion with regard to sexual identification, was further observed. Based on the clinical observation and the results of the psychological tests, respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr., was found to be a highly intelligent person who is reality-oriented and is not suffering from any major psychotic disorder. He is not deluded nor hallucinated and is capable of utilizing his superior intellect in making sound decisions. His belief in supernatural abilities is culture-bound and needs further studies/work-ups. On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also stated that Judge Floro was unfit to be a judge. 117 The relevant exchanges between Dr. Maaba and Judge Aquino are hereunder reproduced: JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is wrong with a judge who shall claim that he is possessed with power of [bi-location]? xxxx DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim to be in two (2) places at one time. Q: And that something must be wrong? A: Yes.

30 Q: Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with a judge claiming in the course of his testimony and in this very case that while [he] was so testifying there is another spirit, another person, another character unseen who is with him at the same time or in tagalog "sumapi sa kanya". xxxx A: The observation that Judge Floro had unseen companion "sumapi" to me is unbelievable. Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering from some delusion? xxxx A: It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual distortion, your Honor. Q: No, Delusion. A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes. Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse? A: Both are on the same footing. Q: Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a proceeding as a witness about hallucinatory matters would turn out to be fit to become a judge? xxxx A. If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel of a major psychiatric disorder like schizophrenia or an organic mental disorder, this individual suffering from hallucinations or delusions is unfit to sit as a judge, however, there is, this symptom might also exi[s]t in a non-psychotic illness and the hallucinations and delusions could be transient and short in duration. Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge? A: Yes, doubtful capacity. Q: Now, trance is something covered by the field of which you are practicing with psychiatry. A: Yes. Q: Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings particularly in the course of his testimony that while he was doing so, he was under trance normal. xxxx A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually considered in the Philippines as part of a culture bound syndrome and it could also be an indication Basically the phenomen on of trance are often seen in cases of organic mental disorder. It is also common in culture bound syndrome and the effect of person is usually loss of concentration in a particular settings or situations so that a person or a judge hearing a case in court would [lose] concentration and would not be able to follow up testimony of witnesses as well as arguments given by the counsel for the defense and also for the prosecution, so I would say that there is this difficulty in manners of attention span and concentration if that person sitting as a judge experience trance as in the case of Judge Floro, this trance is manifested by flashing of lights and he might not be able to rationalize or to control expressions or as well as physical when he is in a trance. Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of a proceeding, he was in a trance? A: No, I have not encountered any. Q: And if you hear one and will be shown records of one maybe such claim you will call that person not a normal person. A: Maybe weird. Q: I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes of the proceedings in these cases held on October 10, 2000, afternoon session, page 30 we start with the question of Atty. Dizon. "Atty. Dizon: Mr. witness, can you tell us? Are you in trance at this very precise moment? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: "Nakalakip sila". I call it a trance, but I distinguished not the trance that you see the nag-sa-Sto., Nino, naninigas. Thats a trance that is created by the so called Because Fr. Jaime Bulatao, multi awarded Jesuit priest, considered that as mind projection. He is correct in a sense that those nagta-trance na yan, naninigas, the mind projection or the hypnosis do come, and there is a change in the psychological aspect of the person. But in my case I never was changed physically or mentally. Only the lights and heat will penetrate that person. ATTY. DIZON: That will do. So at this very moment, Mr. witness, "meron kayong kalakip ngayon?"" "Ngayong oras na ito?" JUDGE FLORO: Yes, they are here. Atty. DIZON: Where are they? Judge Floro, Jr.: They cannot be seen but ATTY. DIZON: No, can you see them?" To point to us where are they in this room?", Now that you have read and seen this portion wherein Judge Floro himself admitted that in the course of his testimony in these cases he was in a trance, would you still consider him at least insofar as this claim of his to be a normal person? A: No. Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these proceedings also and I will show to you the transcript of stenographic notes later have claimed that he had, always had and still had a socalled counter part, his other side, other self, what can you say to that claim, would that be the claim of a normal, mental sound person? A: No. Q: And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of course not fit to sit as judge? xxxx A: Yes. 118 Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez, reported that: Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T. Maaba, Ma. Nieves Celeste and Eduardo L. Jurilla, respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. is unfit because of insanity to remain in office as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73. It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his pleadings in this case that President Estrada would not finish his term as President. It is unusual and queer of him to state in his calling card that he is a graduate of Ateneo de Manila, second honors, bar topnotcher with a grade of 87.55% and include in his address the name Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan who was involved in a coup detat attempt. So is it strange of him to make use of his alleged psychic powers in writing decisions in the cases assigned to his court. It is improper and grandiose of him to express superiority over other judges in the course of hearings he is conducting and for him to say that he is very successful over many other applicants for the position he has been appointed. It is abnormal for a Judge to distribute self-serving propaganda. One who distributes such self-serving propaganda is odd, queer, amusing, irresponsible and abnormal. A judge suffering from delusion or hallucination is unfit to be one. So is he who gets into a trance while presiding at the hearing of a case in court. One need not be a doctor of medicine, a psychiatrist and a psychologist to determine and conclude that a person in such circumstances is mentally unfit or insane and should not be allowed to continue discharging the duties and functions of a judge. The life, liberty and property of the litigants in the court presided by such judge are in his hands. Hence, it is imperative that he is free from doubt as to his mental capacity and condition to continue discharging the functions of his office. RECOMMENDATION WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73, respondent Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED and DISMISSED from such office. 119 We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC Judge because of the findings of mental impairment that renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office. We hasten to add, however, that neither the OCA nor this Court is qualified to conclude that Judge Floro is "insane" as, in fact, the psychologists and psychiatrists on his case have never said so. When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be dismissed from the service due to "insanity," he was apparently using the term in its loose sense. Insanity is a general laymans term, a catchall word referring to various mental disorders. Psychosis is perhaps the appropriate medical term 120 as this is the one used by Drs. Vista and Villegas of the Supreme Court Clinic. It is of note that the 1995, 1998 and 2000 psychological evaluations all reported signs and symptoms of psychosis. Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the contentment and happiness of the people. 121 An honorable, competent and independent judiciary exists to administer justice in order to promote the stability of government, and the well-being of the people. 122 Carrying much of the weight in this daunting task of administering justice are our front liners, the judges who preside over courts of law and in whose hands are entrusted the destinies of individuals and institutions. As it has been said, courts will only succeed in their tasks if the judges presiding over them are truly honorable men, competent and independent. 123 There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man. And, in fact, in our disposition of the 13 charges against him, we have not found him guilty of gross misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the findings of psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to his case indicate gross deficiency in competence and independence. Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in "psychic visions," of foreseeing the future because of his power in "psychic phenomenon." He believes in "duwendes" and of a covenant with his "dwarf friends Luis, Armand and Angel." He believes that he can write while on trance and that he had been seen by several people to have been in two places at the same time. He has likened himself to the "angel of death" who can inflict pains on people, especially upon those he perceived as corrupt officials of the RTCs

31 of Malabon. He took to wearing blue robes during court sessions, switching only to black on Fridays. His own witness testified that Judge Floro explained that he wore black from head to foot on Fridays to recharge his psychic powers. Finally, Judge Floro conducted healing sessions in his chambers during his break time. All these things validate the findings of the Supreme Court Clinic about Judge Floros uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs have spilled over to action. Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However, such beliefs, especially since Judge Floro acted on them, are so at odds with the critical and impartial thinking required of a judge under our judicial system. Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floros reference to psychic phenomena in the decision he rendered in the case of People v. Francisco, Jr. 124 sticks out like a sore thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro discredited the testimony of the prosecutions principal witness by concluding that the testimony was a "fairytale" or a "fantastic story." 125 He then went to state that "psychic phenomena" was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed the testimony of the witness. The pertinent portion of Judge Floros decision is quoted hereunder: 3. The testimony of the prosecutions PRINCIPAL witness (sole eyewitness of the incident) NORMANDY is INCREDIBLE, is full of inconsistencies (major and not regarding minor points), ergo, the court concludes that due to several indicia of fraud/perjury (flagrant/palpable deception of the Court), his testimony is not worthy of belief, assuming ex-gratia argumenti, that the same may be admissible, and his Court narrative is hereby declared a FAIRY TALE or a FANTASTIC STORY of a crime scene that is acceptable only for SCREEN/cinematic viewing. The following details, are proof of the foregoing conclusion: a.) NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and Raul Ineria were "sinalubong" by Lando/accused on June 21, 1987 at 2:30 a.m. at alley Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas, and that he saw the "nagpambuno" between Raul and Ando, and that HE SAW P. INERIA dead, but HE WAS NO LONGER THERE, but he still saw the "nagpambuno"; MORE IMPORTANTLY, he SWORE that HE NOTICED the ACCUSED P. Francisco THE FOLLOWING DAY; b.) The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11th HOUR CONCOCTION (Big Lie, having been asked to submit false testimony); for how could have he witnessed the stabbing by accused when he NOTICED him the following day? (TSN dated May 2, 1995, pp. 1-2); assuming arguendo that the TSN was incorrect due to typographical error, or maybe the Court Stenographer III Eloisa B. Domingo might have been SLEEPING during the testimony, so that the word DAY should have been corrected to another word SUITABLE to Normandys FAIRY TALE, still, the Court had synthesized the entire NARRATIVE of Normandy, but the Court found no reason that the seeming error DAY should be corrected; the Courts sole/remaining conclusion is that EVEN the STENOGRAPHIC NOTES cooperated by PSYCHIC PHENOMENA perhaps of FOR SURE, in having BEEN DESTINED to be FATEFULLY INSCRIBED WITH THE WORDS FOLLOWING DAY (line 3, p. 3 TSN, id.) 126 (Emphasis supplied) In State Prosecutors v. Muro 127 we held that What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law. 128 The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knighterrant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the "primordial necessity of order in the social life." 129 Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his competence for judicial tasks leaves much to be desired. As reported by the Supreme Court Clinic: Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. x x x 130 Judge Floros belief system, as well as his actuations in the eight months that he served as RTC judge, indubitably shows his inability to function with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of government. Thus: Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted and identified himself with large components of the judges role. Especially if he has aspired to a judges status, he is likely to have conducted himself, more or less unconsciously, in the fashion of one who is said to have "the judicial temperament." He is likely to have displayed the kinds of behavior that the judges role demands. A large proportion of his experiences on the bench develop and reinforce such conformity, moreover. The ritualistic elements of investiture and of court procedure, the honorific forms of address, and even the imposing appearance of some court buildings serve to emphasize the demands upon his behavior. Even the most unscrupulous former ambulance chaser who owes his position to a thoroughly corrupt political organization must conform at least in part to the behaviors expected of him as a judge. 131 The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those expected of other public officials. Judges are seen as guardians of the law and they must thus identify themselves with the law to an even greater degree than legislators or executives. 132 As it has been said, "[j]udges administer justice judicially, i.e., not according to some abstract ideas of right and justice, but according to the rules laid down by society in its Code of Laws to which it gives its sanctions. The function of the judge is primarily adjudication. This is not a mechanical craft but the exercise of a creative art, whether we call it legislative or not, which requires great ability and objectivity." 133 We, thus, quote Justice Frankfurter, in speaking of the functions of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States: To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no doubt demands of judges the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that ones own views are incontestable and alert tolerance toward views not shared. But these are precisely the presuppositions of our judicial process. They are precisely the qualities society has a right to expect from those entrusted with judicial power. xxxx The judicial judgment must move within the limits of accepted notions of j ustice and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. 134 In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental requirements of competence and objectivity expected of all judges. He cannot thus be allowed to continue as judge for to do so might result in a serious challenge to the existence of a critical and impartial judiciary. Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and other economic benefits for a period of three (3) years. In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have joined the judiciary as RTC judge. However, we have assiduously reviewed the history of this case and we cannot hold anyone legally responsible for such major and unfortunate faux pas. Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his application for judgeship. He went through the entire gamut of tests and interviews and he was nominated by the JBC on the strength of his scholastic achievements. As to having failed the psychological examinations given by the SC Clinic, it must be pointed out that this was disregarded by the JBC upon Judge Floros submission of psychiatric evaluations conducted by mental health professionals from the private sector and which were favorable to him. Nowhere is it alleged that Judge Floro acted less than honorably in procuring these evaluations. The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro to a private clinic for a second opinion of his mental and psychological fitness. In performing its functions, the JBC had been guided primarily by the Constitution which prescribes that members of the Judiciary must be, in addition to other requirements, persons of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. 135 It was only on 18 October 2000 when it promulgated JBC-009, the "Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council," that the JBC put down in writing guidelines or criteria it had previously used in ascertaining "if one seeking such office meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of the Judiciary." 136 Rule 6 thereof states: SECTION 1. Good health. Good physical health and sound mental/psychological and emotional condition of the applicant play a critical role in his capacity and capability to perform the delicate task of administering justice. x x x SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. The applicant shall submit to psychological/psychiatric tests to be conducted by the Supreme Court Medical Clinic or by a psychologist and/or psychiatrist duly accredited by the Council.

32 It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely on the evaluation of a private psychologist or psychiatrist not accredited by the JBC. Thus, the JBC cannot be faulted for accepting the psychological evaluations of mental health professionals not affiliated with the Supreme Court Clinic. It goes without saying that Judge Floros appointment as RTC judge is fait accompli. What awaits us now is the seemingly overwhelming task of finding the PROPER, JUST AND EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floros almost seven years of suspension in the light of the fact that the penalty imposed herein does not merit a suspension of seven years. Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. 137 The Constitution limits this power through the admonition that such rules "shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights." 138 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in administrative cases against judges. Glaringly, Rule 140 does not detail the steps to be taken in cases when the judge is preventively suspended pending investigation. This is the state of things even after its amendment by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which took effect on 1 October 2001. The Supreme Courts power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its power of admi nistrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. 139 This power -- consistent with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts -- is hemmed in only by the Constitution which prescribes that an adjective law cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro under preventive suspension resolved to: (1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer the foregoing charges against him within ten (10) days from notice; (2) REFER this case to Retired Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator for investigation, report and recommendation, within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records thereof; (3) SUBJECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. for appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution. Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino Floro, effective immediately under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION for the duration of the investigation of the administrative charges against him. 140 As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge Floros suspension, albeit indefinite, was for the duration of the investigation of the 13 charges against him which the Court pegged at 60 days from the time of receipt by the investigator of the records of the case. Rule 140, as amended, now states that "(t)he investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its commencement or within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant" 141 and, "(w)ithin thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing findings of fact and recommendation." 142 From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be preventively suspended not only for the entire period of his investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it would take the investigating judge or justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the Court may preventively suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or her.143 This is because [U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are charged with a serious offense warranting preventive suspension are not automatically reinstated upon expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as mandated above. The Court may preventively suspend a judge until a final decision is reached in the administrative case especially where there is a strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged. Indeed, the measure is intended to shield the public from any further damage or wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued assumption of office by the erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts image as temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed. This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of occupying an exalted position. Among civil servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the vast government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights looked upon as the embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against justice and oppression. 144 In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive suspension up to the present because of the serious charge of mental unfitness aggravated by the fact that the actual investigation into his cases dragged on for a much longer period than 90 days. And the reasons for the delay, for the most part, can be directly ascribed to Judge Floro himself. From the records, it would seem that not only did Judge Floro move for several re-settings of the hearings of his cases; he likewise dragged his feet with respect to the order to submit himself to the appropriate psychological/mental examination. Worse, what started out as single case against him ballooned into 10 cases which were consolidated into one due to common questions of fact and law. 145 All in all, Judge Floro filed seven cases against those he perceived had connived to remove and/or suspend him from office, the last of which he filed on 19 May 2003 against Justice Ramirez. 146 Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost compassion in this case considering that the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. We have ruled similarly in the case of Judge Philbert Iturralde, thus: Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a judge who was placed under preventive suspension pending investigation is not entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive suspension. The inequity of the doctrine as applied to judges is clearly apparent, given the peculiar circumstance in which a judge finds himself preventively suspended by the Court "until further orders". In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively suspended for 13 months, during which period he was not paid his salaries, allowances and other benefits. Except for a teaching job that the Court permitted him to undertake pending resolution of the administrative case, Judge Iturralde had no other source of income. He thus incurred several loans to provide for his familys basic needs. It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of his back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for the entire period that he was preventively suspended. As we have said in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty but only a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered formal investigation. We held that ninety (90) days is ample time to conclude the investigation of an administrative case. Beyond ninety (90) days, the preventive suspension is no longer justified. Hence, for purposes of determining the extent of back salaries, allowances and other benefits that a judge may receive during the period of his preventive suspension, we hold that the ninety-day maximum period set in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, should likewise be applied. Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation would extend beyond ninety (90) days and such may not be entirely unjustified. Nevertheless, we believe that in such a situation, it would be unfair to withhold his salaries and other economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive suspension, moreso if the delay in the resolution of the case was not due to his fault. Upon being found innocent of the administrative charge, his preventive suspension exceeding the ninety-day (90) period actually becomes without basis and would indeed be nothing short of punitive. It must be emphasized that his subsequent acquittal completely removed the cause for his preventive suspension in the first place. Necessarily, therefore, we must rectify its effects on just and equitable grounds. 147 Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that Judge Floro is likewise entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits being at the receiving end of a rule peculiar to judges who find themselves preventively suspended by the Court "until further orders" or, as this case, "for the duration of the investigation." Judge Iturraldes suspension of 13 months even pales in comparison to Judge Floros suspension of 81 months, more or less. During this entire excruciating period of waiting, Judge Floro could not practice his profession, thus putting him solely at the mercy of his brothers largesse. And, though he was given donations by those who came to him for healing, obviously, these could not compensate for his loss of income as Judge. Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held that the period of suspension exceeding 90 days should be the basis for the payment of back salaries, we hold that, as a matter of equity, Judge Floro is entitled to back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding to three of his almost seven years suspension. We cannot apply the ruling in Gloria that any suspension served beyond 90 days must be compensated as we would be, in effect, rewarding Judge Floros propensity to delay the resolution of his case through the indiscriminate filing of administrative cases against those he perceived connived to oust him out of office. In Judge Iturraldes case, the investigation was not delayed through any fault of his. More importantly, Judge Iturralde was ultimately held innocent, thus, using by analogy Gloria v. Court of Appeals, his suspension in excess of 90 days was already in the nature of a penalty which cannot be countenanced precisely because, being innocent, he cannot be penalized. Judge Floro, on the other hand, and as already discussed, contributed to the delay in the investigation of his cases. Moreover, unlike Judge Iturralde, Judge Floro has not been adjudged innocent of all the 13 charges against him.

33 These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not put Judge Floro beyond the reach of equity. To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, equity does not demand that its suitors are free of blame. As we are wont to say: Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts. 148 In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for the delay in the resolution of his case, equitable considerations constrain us to award him back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding to three years. This is because Judge Floros separation from the service is not a penalty as we ordinarily understand the word to mean. It is imposed instead upon Judge Floro out of necessity due to a medically disabling condition of the mind which renders him unfit, at least at present, to continue discharging the functions of his office. The period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the circumstances. As discussed, if we were to give him more than three years of back salaries, etc., then it would seem that we are rewarding him for his role in delaying the resolution of these cases (as well as the seven cases he filed which were only dismissed on 14 February 2006 at his own bidding). On the other hand, if we were to peg the period at less than three years then the same would only be a pittance compared to the seven years suspension he had to live through with Damocles sword hanging over his head and with his hands bound as he could not practice his profession. Judge Floros separation from the service moots the case against him docketed as A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.), on the other hand, is dismissed for lack of merit. A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floros separation from the service renders moot the complaint in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC. As it is, even the most favorable of resolutions in this case will not cause a ripple on the Courts decision to separate Judge Floro from the service. Thus, this charge is dismissed for being moot and academic. A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 Considering that this case is a replica of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 and considering that charge "h" is without basis, this particular complaint filed by Luz Arriego must necessarily be dismissed for lack of merit. Judge Floros separation from the service does not carry with it forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other public office including government-owned or controlled corporations. As Judge Floros separation from the service cannot be considered a penalty, such separation does not carry with it the forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other public office including government-owned or controlled corporations. In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the bedrock of the finding of mental impairment against Judge Floro, cannot be used to disqualify him from re-entering government service for positions that do not require him to dispense justice. The reports contain statements/findings in Judge Floros favor that the Court cannot overlook in all fairness as they deserve equal consideration. They mention Judge Floros assets and strengths and capacity for functionality, with minor modification of work environment. Thus: a. High intellectual assets as a result of "self-discipline and self- organization." 149 b. "(I)mpressive academic achievements" with "no drastic change in his personality and level of functioning as a lawyer in private practice." 150 c. "(C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness, pre-occupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena not detrimental to his role as a lawyer." 151 d. "Everyday situations can be comprehended and dealt with in moderate proficiency . His concern for the details that make up a total field represents his attempts at being systematic and cautious." 152 e. "(E)quipped with analytical power." 153 Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge because of the sensitive nature of said position, he may still be successful in other areas of endeavor. Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge Floros current administrative and medical problems are not totally of his making. He was duly appointed to judgeship and his mental problems, for now, appear to render him unfit with the delicate task of dispensing justice not because of any acts of corruption and debasement on his part but clearly due to a medically disabling condition. Finally, if Judge Floros mental impairment is secondary to genetics 154 and/or adverse environmental factors (and, unfortunately, such essential information is not available), we cannot condemn people for their faulty genes and/or adverse environment factors they have no control over. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to: 1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS for seven of the 13 charges against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460; 2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City and consider him SEPARATED from the service due to a medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office, effective immediately; 3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits corresponding to three (3) years; 4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for LACK OF MERIT; and 5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for MOOTNESS. SO ORDERED. EN BANC [A.M. No. RTJ-99-1431. January 23, 2002] JUDGE FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., RTC, Branch 253, Las Pias City, respondent. DECISION MELO, J: Upon his assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary citizen. He becomes the visible representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. Thus, a magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. He must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow. He must studiously avoid even the slightest infraction of the law. Sadly, the actions in the instant case of complainant and respondent, both of whom are members of the Judiciary, fall far short of this exacting standard. Judge Jose F. Caoibes Jr., the Presiding Judge of Branch 253 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, stands charged with Grave Misconduct/Conduct Unbecoming to a Judicial Officer for allegedly inflicting fistic blows one to the right forehead and another to the left side of the jaw on Judge Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City on May 20, 1997 outside the Staff Room of Branch 253, in plain view of several lawyers and litigants. The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: Branch 253 was a newly-created branch of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City. Thus, when respondent Caoibes was appointed presiding judge thereof, he had the privilege of recommending to the Supreme Court the appointment of employees of his own choice. Complainant Alumbres, who was then the executive judge of the court, saw in this a golden opportunity to secure employment for his son. Learning that Caoibes office furniture had yet to be delivered by the Supreme Court, Alumbres lent an executive table to the former for his temporary use. When Caoibes assumed office on September 16, 1996, Alumbres invited the former to lunch, during which he proposed that Caoibes recommend his son for appointment as utility man for Branch 253. Caoibes agreed. The next day, however, Alumbres proposed that instead of utility man, Caoibes should recommend his son for appointment as process server of Branch 253. Again, Caoibes agreed. Alumbres, as executive judge, favorably endorsed the appointment of his son, as recommended by Caoibes. However, his son was not appointed as process server because the Court Administrator found it inappropriate for Alumbres to endorse the appointment of his own son, rendering therefore such recommendation nepotistic in character.

34 When Alumbres was replaced as executive judge by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, he asked his replacement to favorably endorse his sons appointment as process server of Branch 253. Judge Maceda did so. This time, however, Caoibes reneged on his agreement with Alumbres. Caoibes withdrew his earlier recommendation of Alumbres son and, instead, recommended David Cario for process server of Branch 253. Learning that an executive table had already been delivered to Caoibes, Alumbres, in the morning of May 20, 1997, sent his deputy sheriff to the chambers of Caoibes to take back the table earlier lent to Caoibes. Respondent Caoibes told the deputy sheriff that he would continue using the table until his office furniture was delivered by the Supreme Court. The deputy sheriff left to convey this message to Alumbres. Caoibes, thereafter went to Judge Maceda to ask that he be allowed to continue using the table lent to him by Alumbres. Judge Maceda opined that Caoibescould continue using the table, adding that if Alumbres needed a table, he (Judge Maceda) could lend one of his own tables to Alumbres. In the meantime, Alumbres had been informed of Caoibes refusal to return the table. Alumbres suspended court proceedings and, accompanied by his process server and the deputy sheriff, went to chambers of Caoibes to reclaim the table. Informed of their purpose, the deputy sheriff of Branch 253 informed the group to wait for the return of Caoibes since the latter still had some official papers on the table. Since the Staff Room of Branch 253 was in front of the chambers of Judge Maceda, Alumbres decided to wait for Caoibes in front thereof. Several lawyers and litigants who had hearings were all along the hallway. Informed by his utility man that Alumbres was in his staff room to recover the table, Caoibes left Judge Maceda to see Alumbres. Caoibes saw Alumbres, with hands on his hips, standing along the hallway. Caoibes greeted Alumbres Hoy, ano ba ang atin? The latter replied in an angry tone Joey, kukunin ko na ang table ko. Akin naman iyun, eh. In response, Caoibes put his left arm around Alumbres shoulder, extended his right hand to shake the latters right hand, at the same time saying Huwag naman. Halika, pag-usapan natin dine. Despite the cordial gesture,Alumbres held Caoibes right wrist and forcefully jerked it. Incensed at the fierce reaction of Alumbres, Caoibes shouted Tarantado ito, ah, and swung his left arm towards Alumbres, hitting him on the right temple. Caoibes also delivered a right hook, grazing Alumbres lower jaw. The latter felt dazed and the right lens of his eyeglass dropped to the floor. Before the incident could worsen, Judge Maceda, who had just emerged from his chambers, and one of the deputy sheriffs, placed themselves between the two. Alumbres swung at Caoibes while the latter was being led away by Judge Maceda but the blow missed. The incident, involving as it did members of the judiciary, was given extensive coverage by the media. According to the medical certificate issued by the City Health Officer, the left side of Alumbres chin was swollen and had a laceration about 1 cm. wide, while his right temporal region, anterior aspect, had a pin-head sized laceration as well as slight swelling and reddening. In his defense, Caoibes denied having dealt fistic blows to Alumbres. He claimed that when his right wrist was jerked by Alumbres, he struggled to free himself and that, in the process, his right palm slightly hit the face of Alumbres. Moreover, he asserted that when he was being led away by Judge Maceda, Alumbres managed to extricate himself from those pacifying him (Alumbres), and threw several punches at Caoibes, all of which missed. He claimed that during this event, he instinctively thrust his right arm, implying that his right hand may have hit the complainants jaw. As succinctly defined by Justice Romeo J. Callejo, the Justice to whom this case was assigned for investigation, the threshold issue to be determined is whether or not Judge Caoibesdeliberately inflicted fistic blows to complainant Judge Alumbres. We agree with the Investigating Justice that, indeed, Caoibes threw two punches at Alumbres, the first hitting his right temple and the second, the left side of his jaw. In the trenchant words of Justice Callejo: The investigating Justice is not convinced of the claim of the respondent that he unintentionally and slightly hit the face of the complainant as the respondent struggled to free himself from the grip of the complainant. We did find it incredible, if not preposterous, that, as the respondent struggled to free himself from the grip of the complainant, the left hand of the respondent would go astray and hit slightly the face of the complainant. For, in such a situation, it would have been instinctive for the respondent to hold, with his left hand, the hand of the complainant holding on to the right hand of the respondent to free his right hand from the grip of the complainant. Equally implausible is respondents claim that he thrusted his hand towards the complainant as the latter threw punches at the respondent as the latter was being brought by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda to his chambers. The respondent did not specifically declare whether or not he hit any part of the body of the complainant and, if so, what part of the body of the complainant was hit. Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda was equally nebulous when he merely declared that the respondent was able to reach the complainant. (Investigation Report, p. 10). We also concur with Justice Callejo when he states that contrary to the claim of Alumbres, the punches of Caoibes were not severe as the injuries sustained by Alumbres were merely superficial, the size of a pinhead similar to a mosquito bite. Nonetheless, the slightness of the injuries suffered by Alumbres do not detract from the gravity of the offense committed. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. In amplification, Rule 2.01 provides that A judge should behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Similarly, the Canon of Judicial Ethics provide that a judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only on the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach (Marces, Sr. vs. Arcangel, 258 SCRA 503 [1996]). Being the visible representation of the law and the embodiment of the peoples sense of justice, he must be studiously careful himself to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing example to others (Canon 22, Canon of Judicial Ethics). Judge Caoibes has failed to live up to the standards of morality and uprightness demanded of a judge. As Justice Callejo observes: In this case, the respondent used his hands and inflicted physical injuries on the complainant, a felony in Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code and during office hours at that. And the respondent did so in full view of lawyers and litigants who were in the vicinity of the court and while judicial proceedings were ongoing. The respondent took the law unto his own hands and subjected the complainant with physical injuries. By his felonious acts, the respondent downgraded himself to an ordinary criminal, not a dispenser of justice. The respondent ignored the law he swore to uphold and defend and hid behind the law of the jungle. (Investigation Report, p. 11). Caoibes use of physical violence against a colleague reveals a marked lack of judicial temperament and self-restraint, traits not only desirable, but indispensable, for every judge to possess besides the basic equipment of learning in the law. Such behavior puts the judiciary into disrepute. While Alumbres himself may have provoked the incident in question by his forceful reaction to Caoibes attempt to settle their differences, the unruly behavior and/or violent reaction of Alumbres may not be used to justify the felonious act of respondent. As incisively observed by the Investigating Justice, no judge, from the lowest to the highest, should be allowed to take the law into his own hands. That is the law of the jungle, not the law of a civilized society to which [Alumbres] and [Caoibes] belong. Moreover, courts are looked upon by the people with high respect and are regarded sacred places, where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed. Misbehavior within and around their vicinity diminishes their sanctity and dignity (Bedural vs. Edroso, AM No. 00-1395, October 12, 2000). By fighting within court premises, the parties have failed, not only to observe the proper decorum expected of members of the judiciary, they have failed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. More contemptible, the altercation arose out of a squabble involving a mere table. In Quiroz vs. Orfila (272 SCRA 324 [1997]), we declared: Fighting between court employees during office hours is disgraceful behavior reflecting adversely on the good image of the judiciary. It displays a cavalier attitude towards the seriousness and dignity with which court business should be treated. Shouting at one another in the workplace and during office hours is arrant discourtesy and disrespect not only towards co-workers, but to the court as well. The behavior of the parties was totally unbecoming members of the judicial service. Such conduct cannot be countenanced. In fine, we find the infliction by Judge Caoibes of fistic blows on Judge Alumbres to be acts of serious impropriety unbecoming a judge, in violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Section 2 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies administrative charges as serious, less serious, or light. Section 3 of Rule 140 considers violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct to be serious charges. For a serious charge, the respondent found culpable therefor may be imposed the sanction of either: (1) dismissal from the service and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office; (2) suspension for three months without salary or benefits; or (3) a fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00.

35 While the Court is convinced that, based on the evidence on record, Judge Caoibes is culpable of a serious charge, it is likewise clear that he was provoked into the fracas that ensued. This circumstance leads us to temper the penalty imposable. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Judge Jose F. Caoibes Jr. GUILTY of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and hereby impose upon him a fine of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-27934 September 18, 1967 CONSTANTE PIMENTEL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINO C. SALANGA, respondent. Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner. Constante P. Pimentel for and in his behalf as petitioner. Respondent Judge for and in his behalf as respondent. RESOLUTION SANCHEZ, J.: Challenged here in an original petition for certiorari and/or prohibition is the right of respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Branch IV) to sit in judgment in cases where petitioner, a practicing attorney, appears as counsel. Petitioner's petition recites the facts that follow: Petitioner is counsel of record in cases pending before respondent judge, viz: (1) Civil Case 21-C, entitled "Pablo Festejo et al., petitioners, vs. Marciano Cabildo et al., respondents," a special civil action for mandamus to compel payment of salaries of elective and appointive municipal officials; petitioner is counsel for principal respondent, Acting Mayor Brigido Vilog; (2) Criminal Case 4898 and C-5, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Constante Anies, accused," for frustrated murder; petitioner is the private prosecutor therein; (3) Criminal Case C-93, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Romeo Pimentel, accused," for frustrated homicide; petitioner is defense counsel therein; (4) Election Case 2470, entitled "Avelino Balbin, protestant, vs. Clemente Abaya, protestee," an election protest involving the office of mayor of Candon, Ilocos Sur; petitioner is counsel for protestant therein. Petitioner's misgivings stem from the fact that he is complainant in an administrative case he himself lodged in this Court on May 12, 1967, against respondent judge upon averments of "serious misconduct, inefficiency in office, partiality, ignorance of the law and incompetence." 1 Petitioner seeks in the complaint therein to have respondent judge immediately suspended from office, and, after due notice and hearing, removed therefrom. The judge's return traversed the factual averments. Whereupon, this Court, on July 13, 1967, referred the administrative case to Mr. Justice Eulogio Serrano of the Court of Appeals "for investigation, report and recommendation." That case is still pending. On July 31, 1967, petitioner moved in the court below to have respondent judge disqualify himself from sitting in Civil Case 21-C, Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5, and Election Case 2470 aforesaid. He there prayed that the records of those cases be transferred to another sala, either at Narvacan or Vigan, both of Ilocos Sur. On August 1, 1967, respondent judge rejected the foregoing motion. He stood his ground with the statement that the administrative complaint against him is no cause for disqualification under the Rules of Court; that Civil Case 21-C and Electoral Case 2470 "are now on the final stages of termination" and transfer thereof to another sala "would only delay their final disposition, make the parties suffer [from] further efforts and expenses", and "would be violative" of Administrative Order 371 of the Department of Justice defining the court's territorial jurisdiction; and that he is "sworn to administer justice in accordance with the law and the merits of the cases to be heard and decided by him." Civil Case 21-C was then calendared for August 10 and 11, 1967. A move to reconsider the foregoing resolution failed of its purpose. Civil Case 21-C was rescheduled for hearing from August 10 and 11, 1967 to August 22 and 23, 1967. Hence, the present petition. Petitioner makes his exercise along the following lines: Immediate resolution of the problem of disqualification "is a matter of profound importance, particularly on his career and potential as a practitioner of law; his cases "may fall by the accident of raffle into the sala of respondent Judge" and he cannot "resign from an accepted case every time it falls" therein; his clients will have "the natural hesitation to retain as counsel one who is sort of unacceptable to the presiding judge." Petitioner winds up with a prayer that respondent judge be stopped from further sitting in or otherwise trying or deciding the cases heretofore mentioned. He asks for the issuance forthwith of a writ of preliminary injunction ex parte.1awphl.nt We now resolve the petition. Is a judge disqualified from acting in litigations in which counsel of record for one of the parties is his adversary in an administrative case said counsel lodged against him? The answer is to be sought within the terms of Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, 2 which reads in full: Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consaguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which be has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. Petitioner says that, arguably, his case comes within the coverage of the second paragraph of the rule just quoted. The theory advocated is that the present (1964) rules for the first time provide a broad policyoriented ground for disqualification of judges. It is his submission that a judge may now be barred from the bench in specific cases for reasons other than those enumerated in the law. He stresses that respondent judge, in the factual environment presented, did not make use of his sound discretion when he refused to disqualify himself from acting in the cases referred to. Before the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules, came into being, law and early jurisprudence gave no room for a judge, on objection of a party, to disqualify himself, absent any of the specific grounds for disqualification set forth in the law. The following from People vs. Moreno [1949], 83 Phil. 286, 294, is expressive of the rule: "To take or not to take cognizance of a case, does not depend upon the discretion of a judge not legally disqualified to sit in a given case. It is his duty not to sit in its trial and decision if legally disqualified; but if the judge is not disqualified, it is a matter of official duty for him to proceed with the trial and decision of the case. He cannot shirk the responsibility without the risk of being called upon to account for his dereliction."3 Then came Del Castillo vs. Javelona, L-16742, September 29, 1962, from which sprang the added second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, aforequoted. In Del Castillo, the judge inhibited himself from the case because the lawyer of the party defendant was his first cousin. 4 The judge felt that if defendant should win, his blood relationship with defendant's lawyer might cast some suspicion on his integrity; but, if defendant be the defeated party, it might bring unpleasant consequences. Plaintiff protested the judge's posture. In upholding the judge, we declared: . . . Obviously, Rule 126 [of the old Rules] enumerates the grounds for disqualification of a judge upon being challenged and under which he should disqualify himself. The rule, however, has never been interpreted to prohibit a judge from voluntarily inhibiting himself, in the absence of any challenge by either party, due to his close blood relationship with counsel for one of said parties. Considering the spirit of the Rule, it would seem that cases of voluntary inhibition, based on good, sound and/or ethical grounds, is a matter of discretion on the part of the judge and the official who is empowered to act upon the request for such inhibition. xxx xxx xxx . . . In other words, while Rule 126 provides for disqualification, it does not include nor preclude cases and circumstances for voluntary inhibition which depends upon the discretion of the officers concerned.5 The Del Castillo opinion made the pointed observation that the cases cited by plaintiff are instances where the judge was challenged not cases of voluntary inhibition. Indeed, as early as 1931, clear intimation there was that voluntary inhibition upon sound grounds may be recognized, when this Court said in one

36 case:6". . . It is true that if Judge Garduo had abstained from trying the case at bar, there would have been less susceptibility to suspicion. But, as a matter of law, the grounds for the motion of recusation do not constitute a legal cause for the disqualification of a judge." Thus, the genesis of the provision (paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 137), not to say the letter thereof, clearly illumines the course of construction we should take. The exercise of sound discretion mentioned in the rule has reference exclusively to a situation where a judge disqualifies himself, not when he goes forward with the case.7 For, the permissive authority given a judge in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, is only in the matter of disqualification, not otherwise. Better stated yet, when a judge does not inhibit himself, and he is not legally disqualified by the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, the rule remains as it has been he has to continue with the case.1awphl.nt So it is, that the state of the law, with respect to the situation before us, is unaffected by the amendment (paragraph 2 of Section 1, Rule 137) introduced in the 1964 Rules. And it is this: A judge cannot be disqualified by a litigant or his lawyer for grounds other than those specified in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. This is not to say that all avenues of relief are closed to a party properly aggrieved. If a litigant is denied a fair and impartial trial, induced by the judge's bias or prejudice, we will not hesitate to order a new trial, if necessary, in the interest of justice. Such was the view taken by this Court in Dais vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 897, 902-904. In that case, we found that the filing of charges by a party against a judge generated "resentment" or the judge's part that led to his "bias or prejudice, which is reflected in the decision." We there discoursed on the "principle of impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness on the part of the judge" which "is as old as the history of courts." We followed this with the pronouncement that, upon the circumstances obtaining, we did not feel assured that the trial judge's finding were not influenced by bias or prejudice. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment and directed a new trial.8 Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative approach to this ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to complain against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of his would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to assume what respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case before him.9 We have had occasion to rule in a criminal case that a charge made before trial that a party "will not be given a fair, impartial and just hearing" is "premature."10 Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if weighed against a judge's legal obligation under his oath to administer justice "without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich." 11 To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience. All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice. In the end we are persuaded to say that since respondent judge is not legally under obligation to disqualify himself, we may not, on certiorari or prohibition, prevent him from sitting, trying and rendering judgment in the cases herein mentioned.12 Upon the premises, the petition herein for certiorari and prohibition is denied. So ordered. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987 QUERY OF EXECUTIVE JUDGE ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAIOLOS, BULACAN, ON TIHE CONFLICTING VIEWS OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT JUDGES MASADAO and ELIZAGA RE: CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4954-M RESOLUTION GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: The issue before us brings to mind the words of Eugen Ehrlich, philosopher, who stated: "There is no guaranty of justice except the personality of a judge." (Ehrlich, "Freedom of Decision", The Science of Legal Method, 0 Mod. Leg. Philos, Ser. 65, 1917 trans. by Bruncken). Indeed, judicial integrity is the first and highest qualification a judge must possess integrity maintained especially in cognizance of the limits ofman. In this wise, we cite the oft quoted example of a judge voluntarily inhibiting himself so as to preserve the prized ideal of "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" implicit in the guarantee of due process (Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18). Submitted for the consideration of this Court is the question of who shall resolve a motion for reconsideration filed against the decision of Judge Roy A. Masadao, Jr., after he had voluntarily inhibited himself from further sitting in Criminal Case No. 4954-M of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 9, Malolos entitled "People of the Philippines v. Jaime Tadeo". The following facts gave rise to the present controversy: On May 4, 1987, Judge Roy A. Masadao, Jr., rendered a decision in the aforementioned criminal case finding the accused guilty of the crime of estafa as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused JAIME TADEO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of ESTAFA as charged in the Information and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate period of imprisonment of six (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, and all the accessory penalties provided by law, with costs de officio. (p. 10, Annex "A"). * On July 11, 1987, counsel for the accused, Atty. Efren C. Moncupa, filed a motion for reconsideration which was submitted without arguments. On July 23, 1987, retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes entered his appearance for the accused, wherefore, on July 30, 1987, Judge Masadao issued an order inhibiting himself from further sitting in the case on the ground that retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes had been among those who had recommended him to the Bench. Judge Masadao directed that the case be transmitted to Executive Judge Estrena T. Estrada for re-raffling among the other branches of the court for further proceedings. On August 6, 1987, a raffle was conducted and the case was assigned to Branch No. 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, presided over by Judge Luciano G. Elizaga. On August 7, 1987, Judge Elizaga returned the records of the case with an accompanying letter stating a refusal to act on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration and assailing the re-raffling of the case as impractical and uncalled for. On August 13, 1987, Judge Masadao replied by way of a second Indorsement justifying his decision and standing pat on his order of inhibition, unless and until overruled by judicial authorities of higher rank. Wherefore, Executive Judge Estrada certified the matter to us. Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court embodies the rule on disqualification and inhibition of judges. The rule on disqualification provides: No judge or judicial off icer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir. legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, in which he has

37 presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without written consent of an the parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record (Par. 1, Sec. 1, Rule 137, Revised Rules of Court). On the other hand, where no grounds for disqualification as above enumerated exist, as in the case at bar, the rule on inhibition provides: A judge may, in the exercise of his discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above (Par. 2, Sec. 1, Rule 137, supra). The exercise of this discretion and the validity of the reasons for inhibition are now put in issue before us. It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or friendship between a judge and an attorney of record of one of the parties to a suit is no ground for disqualification. In Vda. de Bonifacio v. B.L.T. Bus Co., Inc. (34 SCRA 618, 631), we held that the fact "that one of the counsels in a case was a classmate of the trial judge is not a legal ground for the disqualification of said judge. To allow it would unnecessarily burden other trial judges to whom the case would be transferred. Ultimately, confusion would result, for under a different rule, a judge would be barred from sitting in a case whenever one of his former classmates (and he could have many) appeared." Likewise, the rule applies when the lawyer of the defendant was a former associate of the judge, when he was practising law (Austria v. Masaquel, 20 SCRA 1247, 1255). Judge Elizaga correctly commented on the dilemma with which his colleague was faced: " ... this is one rare opportunity for the presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 9 to show (1) that Justice J.B.L. Reyes who recommended him to the Bench did not err in so recommending him for his competence and known probity; (2) that he has conducted himself with the cold impartiality of an impartial judge; and (3) that no one can sway his judgment whoever he may be." Indeed, as President Manuel L. Quezon had advised: "Once you are appointed, do not be influenced by the recommendations of your sponsor or patron. for if you do, he will be the first to lose confidence in you" and former Chief Justice Paras adds: ... that is good policy for our judges to remember" (Paras, Consent and Dissent, p. 38). However, where the relationship between the judge and an attorney for a party is such that there would be a natural inclination to prejudice the case, the judge should be disqualified in order to guarantee a fair trial (State Ex. Rel. Tumer v. Marshall, 176 N.E. 454, 123 Ohio St., 586). A judge should strive to be at all times wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity (Geotina v. Gonzales, 41 SCRA 73-74). However, men of the Bench are not without imperfections. A judge too, experiences the "tug and pull of purely personal preferences and prejudices which he shares with the rest of his fellow mortals" (Azucena v. Munoz, 33 SCRA 722, 723). The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court "made clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there may be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences or predilections are many and varied." (Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18) Among these may be the Filipino "utang na loob". Judge Masadao expounds on the matter thus: "For Filipinos, in particular, a sense of gratitude is one trait which invariably reigns supreme over any and all considerations in matters upon which such tender sentiment may somehow inexorably impinge. Generally, whoever owes a debt of favor endeavors to repay the same in any discernible fashion as soon as the opportunity therefore energes." Judge Masadao is not necessarily stretching the Filipino "utang an loob" gratitude which renders a man beholden to another, a sense of obligation which is valued as highly as pride and honor beyond its proper limits. The best way to show one's "utang na loob" to whoever recommended him is to do honor to the position, not only in rendering just, correct, and impartial decisions but doing so in a manner free from any suspicion as to their fairness and impartiality and as to the integrity of the judge. (See Martinez v. Gironella, 6 SCRA 245). Judge Elizaga is correct in rhetorically asking "In the remote possibility that a Motion for Reconsideration is filed in a case to every final order or decision of a judge by one who recommended him to the bench, should he escape responsibility by inhibiting himself from any further action and pass the buck to other judges?" The answer is a categorical NO.- The judge should not evade his responsibility. Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a friend, classmate, associate or patron of a presiding judge appears before him as counsel for one of the parties to a case. "Utang na loob", per se, should not be a hindrance to the administration of justice. Nor should recognition of such value in Philippine society prevent the performance of one's duties as judge. However, where, as in this case, the judge admits that he may be suspected of surrendering to the persuasions of utang na loob or he may even succumb to it considering that he "and the members of his family, no less, shall ever remain obliged in eternal gratitude to Justice Reyes", the negative answer to the question of judge Elizaga yields to exceptions in extraordinary cases. The circumstances before Judge Masadao are not ordinary ones. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, one of the most distinguished legal scholars of our country and a towering paragon (to use the words of Judge Masadao), highly respected during his stints in the Office of the Solicitor General, Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court and through his post-retirement life, is no ordinary sponsor. The accused is an activist leader of peasant and farmer groups involved in rather controversial confrontations. Compelled to act in this case, Judge Masadao may be inclined to rule against his sponsor to demonstrate independence, Either way, the resulting impressions would not be salutary to the judicial system. We apply the guideline expressed in Pimentel v. Salanga (21 SCRA 160, 167-168): xxx xxx xxx ... A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, this when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he, should conduct a careful selfexamination. He .shuold exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on ,he probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mnd the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously, tilted the scales of Justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge may he ge-nerated because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel. is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from asuit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved thereon. On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent that allimportant confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice. We repeat. There are certain circumstances when a case could well be heard by another judge and no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein, where a voluntary inhibition may prove to be the better course of action. In that case, his fellow judges should be ready to help preserve the reality and the appearance of an impartial administration of justice. The administrative matter before us differs from most petitions involving a judge's disqualification. here, a judge voluntarily inhibits himself and, instead of a party or both parties filing a motion on the matter, it is another judge who insists that he continue with the case. A judge's decision to refuse to act on account of some disqualification is not conclusive, and his competency may be determined on an application for mandamus to compel him to act, However, as much as possible, the judge to whom a case is transferred should not resist too much the order of recusation unless the motives for inhibition are suspect. The prerogative more properly pertains to the parties to a suit whose rights are directly affected thereby, To accommodate every objection which a judge, to whom a case is transferred, may have, after the voluntary inhibition of a presiding judge, would not only disrupt administrative procedures of courts but would likewise entail further delay ;n the final resolution of cases. Internal wranglings between judges questioning each other's motivations should be avoided. We are not unmindful though of the burdens that may be imposed on other trial judges to whom such caws may be reassigned. Judge Elizaga's objections are not without their own merits. In certain cases, inhibition could amount to judges being recreant to their trust. However, even with all such considerations in mind, there is still cogency in the approach that would look with favor in the exercise of discretion in favor of

38 disqualification, given the likelihood that bias or prejudice is unavoidable (Palang v. Zosa, 58 SCRA 776). The dictates of the due process guarantee of a fair and impartial tribunal override these concerns. Judge Masadao's actuations are within the terms of Paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court. The records do not indicate any improper exercise of a prerogative conferred on him by law. And, absent any abuse of discretion or manifest error, we hesitate to reverse his decision holding himself disqualified. Nor will the wisdom of such inhibition be delved into where the reasons therefor are concededly subjective. We also suggest that judges of equal standing should be reticent in passing judgment upon a matter of discretion and in refusing to act on cases referred to them on account of such discretion. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Judge Roy A. Masadao, Jr.'s order of voluntary inhibition in an further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 4954-M of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 9, is hereby upheld. Judge Luciano G. Elizaga is hereby ordered to take cognizance of the said case as re-raffled to his sala. SO ORDERED. EN BANC [A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999] LUALHATI M. LIWANAG, complainant, vs. JUDGE PATERNO H. LUSTRE, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, respondent. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: On September 19, 1995, complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag sent a letter to the Court [1] praying that respondent Judge Paterno H. Lustre be dismissed from the service due to gross immorality and grave misconduct unbecoming of his profession.[2] Attached to her letter was a sworn statement, reproduced verbatim hereunder, which details how respondent allegedly molested her sexually. SWORN STATEMENT I, LUWALHATI LIWANAG, of legal age, Filipino and a resident of Karunungan Road, Pamana Homes, Calamba, Laguna, after being duly sworn, according to law, hereby depose and state: 1. Prior to July, 1994, my husband, Jose B. Zafra filed twelve (12) counts of violation of B.P. 22 against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena Chua for issuing checks amounting to approximately 3.5 million pesos, that were dishonored when presented for payment. 2. On July 22, 1994, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna filed twelve (12) informations for violation of BP 22 against Oscar Chua, Dante Chua and Rowena Chua, charging each of them with three (3) counts of Violation of BP 22. Copies of the informations are hereto attached for reference. 3. The said cases were assigned at the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided by Judge Paterno Lustre. 4. After the informations were filed, the accused posted bail. However, their arraignment were (sic) postponed several times at the instance of the accused. 5. The case was set for hearing for November 16, 1994. However, when the date came, Judge Lustre was not present. Hence, the hearing was reset to December 15, 1994. 6. On November 17, 1994 at about 8:30 A.M., I went to see Judge Lustre at his chamber to inquire about the case filed by my husband, why the accused have not yet been arraigned. At that point, I asked Judge Lustre if it is possible to schedule hearings in January and February, 1995 and every month thereafter and to order the arraignment of the accused. He responded in the affirmative and told me to come back after the hearing on December 15, 1994, at about 7:00 A.M. in his chamber. 7. The date of the hearing arrived, Dec. 15, 1994 at 1:30 P.M. The representative of Atty. Buted, counsel for the accused, arrived with a Motion to Transfer the scheduled hearing. Judge Lustre then reset the hearing on Jan. 17, Feb. 1, 9 and 23, 1995. 8. As requested, on December 16, 1994, one day after the hearing, at about 7:00 A.M., I went to see Judge Lustre at his chamber. There, he told me that he prepared an order for the accused. I thanked him and I told him that if the accused will pay us, my husband and I will give him five (5%) percent of it as token of gratitude. At that point, he stood up and told me he does not need money. While he was giving me a copy of the order, he touched my shoulder, down to my breast. I froze and could not do anything. He was telling me that he acceded to my request. Later, he told me that he is available during Mondays and Fridays as there are no scheduled hearings and for me to come back to him before the hearing on January 17, 1995. 9. I did not go back to see Judge Lustre as per his request before the hearing on Jan. 17, 1995 because of what he did to me, he took advantage of the situation to molest me. 10. Came the date of the hearing on Jan. 17, 1995. Despite the previous order setting the case for hearing for Feb. 1, 9 and 23, 1995, he cancelled hearings on all dates as per request of the counsel for the accused. Instead, he reset the same on Feb. 22, 28 and March 7, 1995. 11. When the hearing on Feb. 22, 1995 came, Judge Lustre cancelled the one set on Feb. 28, 1995. 12. By the way things were going, I could sense that Judge Lustre is delaying the case, granting postponement after postponement, despite objections from our lawyer. The case was already dragging and nothing was happening. We were running out of money and we needed to have the case terminated right away in order to get paid for the money the accused have swindled us. Because of this dilemma, I decided to see Judge Lustre. 13. On March 6, 1995, Monday, at about 10:00 A.M., I went to see Judge Lustre. I asked him why he cancelled the hearings. He responded that I fooled him since I did not come to him as per his request, whereas he acceded to my earlier request. He then told me that I must obey his wishes if I want our case to go smoothly since he is the only one who will decide our cases. After that, he told me that he was already free and for me to wait for him outside the courtroom. We boarded his white Toyota car, with Plate No. PLN-513 and he brought me to Canlubang Tollway. While in the car, he kissed me on the lips and caressed my breast. I was repulsed and disgusted but I could not do anything since our cases are with him and he was deliberately delaying the hearings. At that instant, I told him to set hearings for April and May, 1995 since according to his staff, there would be no hearings in May and in April. He told me, he will take care of it and ordered me to come to his office on March 13, 1995 at 7:00 A.M. and we will talk about the settings. 14. On March 13, 1995, Monday, as ordered, I went to see Judge Lustre at his office at around 7:10 A.M. There was no one there except him. I saw him waiting just outside his chamber. He ushered me inside, but I had barely entered the room, when he kissed me on the lips and caressed my body, particularly my breast. He exposed his penis and ordered me to masturbate him. I could not do anything but obey. There was a fluid that oozed from his penis, which was somewhat bloody. I felt dirty. While doing that, he told me to tell my lawyer to file a motion to set hearing for April and May, 1995. He then asked me to go with him to Laguna de Bay Inn. I refused, he got angry. He retorted that the fate of our case is on his hands and told me to see him on March 23, 1995 at 7:00 A.M. at Laguna de Bay Inn in Sucat since his house is near the area. 15. After that, my lawyer filed a Motion to Set Case for Hearing. But I did not go and see Judge Lustre at Laguna de Bay Inn. Thus, on March 28, 1995 hearing, no schedule was set for April and May. Instead, he made the setting in June, 1995. 16. On April 10, 1995 I received a new subpoena for pre-trial and arraignment of the new cases we filed, scheduling the same for May 3, 1995. The following day, April 11, Tuesday, I went to see Judge Lustre to inquire why our case was not scheduled on May 3, at any rate, there is arraignment of our new case filed on the same date. He responded that he was early at Laguna de Bay Inn on March 23, and he waited for me at 7:00 A.M. but I did not come. He told me not to fool him, "masama daw siyang magalit." 17. The June 6 hearing proceeded, that of June 13 was cancelled at the instance of the accused's lawyer. 18. On June 15, 1995, Thursday, at around 7:00 A.M., I went to Judge Lustre in his office because I was told that our next hearing would be in September despite previous settings. I requested Judge Lustre to give us monthly hearings, in July and August. He told me that he would oblige if I would follow his wishes. As he was saying that, he was already touching my breast. He exposed his penis at told me to perform "fellatio." I refused. I was then told to return the following day, the same time and he will wait for me. 19. I came back on June 16, around 7:00 A.M. As ordered, I proceeded to the Calamba Church to wait for Judge Lustre. He fetch (sic) me from there on board his white Toyota car and he brought me to Riverview Resort and Sports Complex in Crossing, Calamba,

39 Laguna. I could not refuse because of the threat about our case. Inside the room at Riverview, he told me there will be a setting for July and August. Then he undressed himself and ordered me to do the same. I knew I was selling myself to the devil but our blood money is at stake. It is for the future of my son and I was willing to do anything for my family. Perhaps I was too stupid to do it, but at that time, I felt helpless. He ordered me to perform "fellatio" on him and I obeyed. There was blood that oozed from his penis. I also saw black rashes on his body, especially on his legs. Before we left, he told me to see him again on July 10 in his office. 20. On June 23, 1995, the same thing happened. I went to his office at 7:00 A.M. Judge Lustre brought me to Riverview Resort and Sports Complex and I was again ordered to perform "fellatio" on him. 21. The June 28 hearing proceeded. But I did not go and see Judge Lustre on July 10 as requested. I just called him and presented an alibi. He told me to just come the following day, July 11 at 7:00 A.M. at Jollibee, Calamba and he will wait for me. As parting words, he told me not to fool him. 22. I did not see him on July 11 because I already felt so dirty and used. I never realized before I was capable of doing such a thing for my family, until the time came. But I could not take it anymore. 23. On July 27, the hearing proceeded. But the previous schedules were cancelled and instead hearing was set in November, 1995. 24. On August 15, 1995 at 7:00 A.M., I went to his office to get an order for the referral of the specimen signatures of Rowena Chua to the NBI. Again, he kissed me and touched me. I could not refuse for fear of retaliation. 25. I could see that Judge Paterno H. Lustre is deliberately delaying the prosecution of our cases to prolong his abusive acts towards me. As can be seen from the transcript of the hearings, he is not leaning in our favor. What we are asking only is for the continuous setting of the trial because we cannot afford a long drawn out proceedings. But instead, he is delaying the trial. He has even shown hostility towards my husband when he was testifying and towards my lawyer, allegedly because he was jealous. 26. This kind of judge gives the judiciary a bad name. There must be a stop to this evil doings. I am not the only victim of Judge Lustre. I know at least two (2) other women who are similarly situated are being used and abused by him. But they do not want to complain because of fear and the possible consequence to their cases. As for me, I am emboldened by disgust and frustration. I now seek the intervention of the Honorable Supreme Court to give justice to the victims and rid the judiciary of the likes of Judge Paterno H. Lustre. 27. I know the shame I have to bear but I have to expose the wrong doings of a judge who is supposed to uphold the law and morality. But instead, he preys on hapless and those who are not learned in law as his victims. 28. What I have narrated here are true, which I would never have revealed were it not for my better sense of judgment. I know I made a mistake by becoming a willing victim. But I did it for my family as I thought that is the only way I can help my husband get back his money for our future.[3] Apart from the letter and the sworn statement, complainant also sent the Court 11 photographs showing her and respondent together in various places. Five of these were allegedly taken at the Riverview Resort in Calamba, Laguna. She also submitted a receipt issued by said resort dated June 23, 1995 and two transcripts of phone conversations she had with respondent.[4] Respondents defense is anchored on denial. In a 2nd Indorsement[5] he sent to the Court, by way of answer to the complaint, he strongly denie(d)[6] the charges leveled against him and dismissed them as the vile products of (complainant's) malicious and prejudiced mind.[7] According to him, complainant and her common-law husband thought of filing charges against him when he refused to bend to, and accommodate, (their) haughty and arrogant demands to hastily schedule, try continuously, finish and decide arbitrarily within a very short period of time [8] the B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) cases filed by complainants husband. The complaint was, according to respondent, likewise prompted by respondents refusal to accept complainants offer to reward him with five percent of the P3.5 million her husband seeks to recover. Respondent claimed that he could not have been in his chambers as early as 7:00 in the morning as alleged by complainant since he usually arrives for work some five to ten minutes before 8:00 in the morning. Moreover, he said the door to his room is never locked -- thus, the impossibility of him engaging in illicit sexual conduct within its confines -- since the only comfort room in the courtroom is inside his room and anyone who wants to use it may enter his room freely. Respondent further pointed out that at age 67, with a heart ailment and diabetes, (s)ex is beyond (his) physical capacity.[9] He said he is no longer capable of what ordinary men indulge in, lest (he) die in the attempt.[10] He sought the dismissal of the complaint filed against him. In support of his claims, respondent submitted the following documentary evidence: (1) affidavit executed by Rodelio A. Alcaraz, a utility worker, stating that respondent usually arrives at the office at 7:45 in the morning; (2)affidavit executed by Atty. Benjamin A. Alonzo, Sr., a private practitioner based in Calamba, attesting to respondents fine work ethics and moral uprightness; and (3) certification from Dr. Elmer S. Sayoc stating that respondent is being treated for coronary artery diseases, atrial fibrillation, and diabetes mellitus.[11] In response to respondents averments, complainant alleged that respondent had set their meetings at 7:00 in the morning since he knew that nobody from his staff reported for work that early. She said respondent was very particular about the time she left his office, which must be before 7:30 in the morning. As for respondents health condition, complainant pointed out that, indeed, he did not engage in sexual intercourse with her but only engaged in foreplay and asked her to perform oral sex on him; and while diabetes might have diminished respondents sexual urge, it did not totally erase the same.[12] In a resolution dated January 17, 1996, this Court resolved to refer the matter to Judge Norberto Geraldez, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna, for investigation, report and recommendation. In the same resolution, respondent was directed to inhibit himself from hearing the B.P. 22 cases filed by complainants husband. On January 8, 1997, Judge Geraldez requested that he be allowed to inhibit himself from hearing the case because complainant raised the matter of his friendship with respondent. [13] The Court, however, in a Resolution dated June 9, 1997, denied his request and directed him to resolve the case with dispatch. [14] In his report dated October 6, 1997, Judge Geraldez recommended dismissal of the complaint against respondent since complainant failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Judge Geraldez observed that: In the B.P. 22 cases pending before Judge Lustre, Jose Zafra was never assured that he could recover the amount of P3.5 million even if the sexual demands were satisfied. Jose Zafra and Ms. Liwanag were aware of this. Consequently, it is surprising why the complainant, no matter how desperate she may have been, would submit to oral sex. And, why Jose Zafra allowed it. The B.P. 22 cases are simply not classic cases where the courts decision would be so vital, that the judge can demand his price. There is a rather large disparity in the value of the B.P. 22 cases vis-a-vis the seriousness and mess of the sexual demand. Ms. Liwanags allegations are beyond comprehension. It borders on the very credibility of the sexual allegations. This is specially true with respect to the allegations of oral sex with its blood secretions. And, according to her she did it more than once. If indeed there were blood secretions the first time, the claim of a second time is beyond relief (sic). Ms. Liwanag claimed that Judge Lustre, on August 15, 1995, simply kissed and touched her. But human nature would demand another oral sex as they had done before. Moreover, in her complaint dated September 19, 1995, Ms. Liwanag failed to advance any reason why they stopped at oral sex. [15] Judge Geraldez concluded that the evidence presented by complainant is not credible in itself. Moreover, Judge Geraldez pointed out that complainant merely relied on the photographs showing her and respondent together, which, however, do not establish the acts complained of. Despite having the opportunity to do so, according to the report, complainant failed to testify to substantiate her claims, thereby depriving respondent of his right to cross-examine her. Judge Geraldez recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of evidence. The Court thereafter referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report, and recommendation. The OCA, in its Memorandum dated September 1, 1998, took a position directly opposite that of Judge Geraldez. The OCA noted that:

40 xxx we cannot help discerning here an effort to gloss over a charge against respondent which the investigating judge himself admitted to be serious. His investigative work and his subsequent report reveal a perfunctory treatment and analysis of the submissions of the parties, particularly the complainant herein, and an egregious misapplication of the law and jurisprudence. xxx We find credible the allegations of complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag. Her narration bears the earmarks of truth, for the incidents giving rise to the acts complained of are so finely etched by her as to preclude any suspicion of wild imagining or other similar fictive handiwork. It is an essential baring of rage, revulsion and disgust: xxx The OCA recommended that the case be formally docketed as an administrative complaint and that respondent be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government, including government-owned and -controlled corporations. Clearly, we have to review the records of this case for a comprehensive view of the entire controversy. Moreover, it is essential to lay stress on basic canons of conduct applicable to judges, in whatever level of the judicial hierarchy they may be. As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases. Only substantial evidence is required,[16] as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence:[17] Sec 5. Substantial evidence. -- In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Given this requirement, we find that there is enough evidence on record to sufficiently establish complainants case against respondent. The photographs submitted by complainant to this Court show her and respondent in various places. The first two show them talking beside an outlet of Andoks Litson Manok, another shows respondents car parked by a sidewalk, its front passenger door open. The car is seen leaving in the next photograph. In the next two photographs, the car is seen in the driveway of what appears to be one of a row of rooms. On top of this rooms doorway is the letter "D". Next are five photographs which show complainant and respondent coming out of the room together and heading t owards respondents parked car. [18] Complainant claims that the photographs were taken when respondent took her to the Riverview Resort in Calamba, Laguna. In a Manifestation dated September 2, 1996, respondent pointed out that nothing indecent is portrayed in the photographs. They did not show any act constituting immorality or grave misconduct. He denied that the pictures showing him and complainant leaving a room together were taken at the Riverview Resort. He added that the receipt issued by the resort did not indicate that he was with complainant at said resort. Respondent took his own set of photographs at the Riverview Resort. [19] On the basis of his own pictures, he concluded that complainants photographs could not have been taken at that resort. When he testified on his behalf, he said: " when I went to the place those letters were not there, I have photographs there because I personally went there to have these photographs but this (sic) sign boards were not there, sir."[20] A sign prohibiting vandalism, noticeable in complainant's pictures, was missing in respondents pictures. Respondent avers that the real intention of complainant in filing the complaint -- which she has denied -- is to extort money from him as she allegedly made an outrageous demand [21] for P3.5 million to settle the case. We are not convinced, however, that respondents conduct in this case is entirely blameless, nor that complainants alleged intent would excuse respondents wrongdoing. It is true that the pictures do not show respondent and complainant actually engaging in any form of sexual congress. However, this is understandable since by their very nature, such acts are not proper subjects of photographs. Often, as in this case, what is available to us is only the narration of the parties involved. Respondent denies that the photographs were taken at Riverview. He took pictures of the resort himself to prove his contention. He said his pictures are different from those of complainants. We note, however, that respondent does not deny that he is the one appearing with complainant in the photographs. He conveniently testified that somebody else had posed for the photograph, [22] but this is obviously an afterthought. Respondent made this assertion almost a year after complainant filed her complaint. He could have done it as early as October 1995 in his comment to complainants charges. If the pictures were not taken at Riverview, where were they taken and why was respondent with complainant at that time? If, indeed, there was a legitimate reason for complainant and respondent to be seen together at the time and place depicted in the photographs, respondent would have wasted no time explaining where they were taken and under what circumstances, in order to extricate himself from his present predicament. This, he failed to do. The reason for this, we believe, is that he could not simply offer any plausible explanation why he was seen with complainant coming out of what is apparently a private room. Respondent claims that the charges hurled against him are products of complainants vindictiveness. Again, this claim raises more questions than it answers. It opens the door to undue speculation. Thus, why should she resent his actions? Was it only because of repeated postponements of the hearing of her cases? Complainant may have harbored ill feelings towards respondent due to the unjustifiable delays in the hearing of their B.P. 22 cases. But would she falsely accuse respondent with sexual molestation only to get back at him? This goes against the grain of human nature and therefore unlikely. She should know that by revealing her sexual misadventures with respondent, graphically describing each and every detail, she would only be exposing herself and her family to shame and ridicule. She would stand to gain nothing from the exercise, save the hope that her dignity may somehow be vindicated in the process. As for complainants failure to testify on her own behalf, this is of no moment. Complainants affidavit stands in lieu of her testimony; the investigating judge even had her re-subscribe and re-affirm her sworn statement and let the same be adopted as part of complainants evidence. [23] Complainant could have been cross-examined based on her affidavit. That she was not crossexamined by respondent is not her fault but respondents. As the records now stand, we are constrained to agree with the Court Administrators assessment that respondent has failed to live up to the high standard of conduct required of members of the bench. He grossly violated his duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary and to avoid impropriety not only in his public but in his private life as well.[24] All to the grave prejudice of the administration of justice, indeed. The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of the officials at every level in the administration of justice, which erodes rather than enhances the publics faith and trust in the judiciary. Respondents disgraceful conduct surely merits sanctions even if he has already retired a s of November 1, 1998.[25] For the serious misconduct of respondent, the penalty provided for in Rule 140, Section 10, of the Rules of Court, by way of fine in the maximum amount should be imposed.[26] We are not in accord with the OCAs recommendation, however, as regards forfeiture of all retirement benefits due respondent. We note that implementation of this penalty, while directed at respondent, might adversely affect innocent members of his family, who are dependent on him and his retirement gratuity. It is our considered view that, given the circumstances of this case, the maximum fine of P40,000.00 would be sufficient penalty. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby find respondent GUILTY of gross misconduct. As he has already retired from the service and thus could no longer be dismissed nor suspended, we hereby order that a FINE of P40,000.00 be imposed upon him, to be deducted from his retirement benefits. Further, he is hereby barred from any employment in all branches of the government including government-owned and -controlled corporations. SO ORDERED. HILADO VS JUDGE REYES DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The present petition is one for mandamus and prohibition. Julita Campos Benedicto (private respondent), the surviving spouse of the deceased Roberto S. Benedicto, filed on May 25, 2000 a petition for issuance of letters of administration, docketed as Special

41 Proceeding No. 00-97505, Intestate Estate of Roberto S. Benedicto (the case), before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The case was raffled to Branch 21 presided by Judge Amor A. Reyes (public respondent). Private respondent was, by Order[1] of August 2, 2000, appointed Administratrix of the estate of Benedicto (the estate), and letters of administration were thereafter issued in her favor. Herein petitioners, Alfredo Hilado, Manuel Lacson, Jose M. Tuvilla, Joaquin Limjap, Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation had, during the lifetime of Benedicto, filed before the Bacolod City RTC two complaints for damages or collection of sums of money, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-9137 and Civil Case No. 111718, against Roberto Benedicto et al.[2] In the initial inventory of the estate which private respondent submitted on January 18, 2001[3] in the case before the Manila RTC, she listed, among other liabilities of the estate, the claims of petitioners subject of the above-said Bacolod RTC cases as follows: LIST OF LIABILITIES AMOUNT On February 2, 2004, petitioners counsel was served with a notice of hearing of the case on February 13, 2004.[8] Petitioners counsel thus attended such scheduled hearing during which he filed a Motion for Inhibition[9] of public respondent on the ground of gross ignorance, dereliction of duty, and manifest partiality towards the administratrix. Public respondent, noting that an error was committed in the service to petitioners of the notice of hearing, ignored the motion of petitioners counsel. [10] Intending to compare the list of properties in the estates inventory all of which properties were appraised at a fair value of P100 million with the list of assets valued at P1 Billion said to have been ceded in 1990 to the decedent under his Compromise Agreement with the Presidential Commission on Good Government,[11] petitioners counsel sent the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 21 of the Manila RTC a letter[12] requesting to be furnished with certified true copies of the updated inventory. By still another letter,[13] petitioners counsel requested to be furnished with certified true copies of the order issued by the court during the hearing of February 13, 2004, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken thereon.[14] By Order[15] of March 2, 2004, public respondent indicated why petitioners had no standing to file the Motion for Inhibition as well as to request for certified true copies of the above-indicated documents. Read the Order of March 2, 2004: Perusal of the motion shows that the movant is asking this Court to act on their motion despite the denial of their Omnibus Motion to Intervene which to date remains pending resolution with the Court of Appeals. As correctly pointed out by the Administratrix, said motion is filed by persons/entities who have no legal standing in the above-entitled case, hence they cannot ask anything from this Court, much more for this Court to act on pleadings filed or soon to be filed. P35,198,697.40 [at P50.00 per US $1.00] For the record, the Court received two (2) letters dated February 17 and 27, 2004 addressed to Atty. Maria Luisa Lesle G. Gonzales, the Branch Clerk of Courtasking that he be furnished with certified true copies of the updated inventory and Order issued by this Court on February 13, 2004 hearing as well as the corresponding transcript of stenographic notes within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said letters. Considering that the movants were not allowed to intervene in the proceedings per order of this Court dated January 2, 2002, copies of all pleadings/orders filed/issued relative to this case may only be secured from the [Administratrix] and/or counsel.[16] (Underscoring supplied)

DESCRIPTION xxx x

A claim of several sugar planters which is presently the subject of Civil Case No. 95-9137 entitled Lacson et al. v. R.S. Benedicto et al., pending before Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City. A claim filed by various sugar planters which is presently the subject of Civil Case No. 11178 entitled Lopez Sugar Corporation et al. v. R.S. Benedicto, et al., pending before Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City.[4]

P136,045,772.50 [at P50.00 per US $1.00]

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

From January 2002 until November 2003, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 21 of the Manila RTC allowed petitioners through counsel Sedigo and Associates to regularly and periodically examine the records of the case and to secure certified true copies thereof. By December 2003, however, Atty. Grace Carmel Paredes, an associate of petitioners counsel, was denied access to the last folder-record of the case which, according to the courts clerical staff, could not be located and was probably inside the chambers of public respondent for safekeeping. [5] Petitioners counsel thus requested public respondent, by letter [6] of January 15, 2004, to allow Atty. Paredes to personally check the records of the case. Acting on the letter, the Officer-In- Charge/Legal Researcher of Branch 21 advised petitioners counsel in writing that per instruction of the Hon. Presiding Judge[,] only parties or those with authority from the parties are allowed to inquire or verify the status of the case pending in this Court, and that they may be allowed to go over the records of the above -entitled case upon presentation of written authority from the [administratrix].[7]

Petitioners thus filed on April 30, 2004 before this Court the present petition for mandamus and prohibition to compel public respondent to allow them to access, examine, and obtain copies of any and all documents forming part of the records of the case and disqualify public respondent from further presiding thereover. In their petition, petitioners contend that the records of the case are public records to which the public has the right to access, inspect and obtain official copies thereof, [17]recognition of which right is enjoined under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution and Section 2, Rule 135 and Section 11, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners further contend that public respondent manifested her arbitrariness, malice and partiality through her blatant disregard of basic rules in the disposition and safekeeping of court records, and her denial of their right to access the records suffices to bar her from presiding over the case; [18] and public

42 respondents incompetence, malice, bad faith and partiality are underscored by her failure to enforce for more than three years the requirement of the Rules of Court on the prompt submission by the administratrix of her final inventory and the filing of a periodic accounting of her administration.[19] By Comment[20] filed on September 21, 2004, private respondent submits that the petition is fatally defective since petitioners failed to disclose in their certification of non-forum shopping that they had earlier instituted an administrative complaint against public respondent which prayed for the same reliefs[21] for the disqualification of public respondent from presiding over the case and for the court docket to be opened for examination. Private respondent further submits that the petition for prohibition should be dismissed since petitioners are not parties to the case, hence, they have no personality to file a motion for inhibition. [22] As to the alleged denial of petitioners right to examine court records and participate in the proceedings, private respondent submits that this is not unqualifiedly true for petitioners must have secured a copy of the inventory of the assets and liabilities of the estate, they being aware of the declared fair value of the estate and their counsel was present during the February 13, 2004 hearing. [23] For consideration then are the following issues: (1) whether the present petition is fatally defective for failure of petitioners to disclose in the certificate of non-forum shopping that they had priorly instituted an administrative complaint against public respondent which prays for the same reliefs; (2) whether a writ of mandamus may issue to compel public respondent to allow petitioners to examine and obtain copies of any or all documents forming part of the records of the case; and (3) whether a writ of prohibition will issue in favor of petitioners, who are not parties to the case, to inhibit public respondent from presiding over the case. As reflected above, petitioners had, before the filing of the present petition, filed an administrative complaint before this Court against public respondent, Alfredo Hilado, Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation v. Judge Amor A. Reyes, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-05-1910. Petitioners subsequently filed a supplemental[24] and a second supplemental administrative complaint[25] praying for 1) the imposition of appropriate disciplinary sanctions against public respondent for, among other things, denying them their right to access the docket of the case, and 2) the disqualification of public respondent from presiding over the case, which latter prayer was, however, subsequently withdrawn in a motion[26] filed on April 30, 2004, the same day that the present petition was filed. Denying the existence of forum shopping, petitioners argue that it exists only where the elements of litis pendencia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the [27] other. It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers.[28] The non-existence of forum shopping notwithstanding, this Court proscribes the filing of an administrative complaint before the exhaustion of judicial remedies against questioned errors of a judge in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Resort to and exhaustion of judicial remedies are prerequisites for the taking of, among other measures, an administrative complaint against the person of the judge concerned. So Atty. Flores v. Hon. Abesamis[29] teaches: x x x [T]he law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.

x x x Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed. x x x Law and logic decree that "administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof"Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions; x x x[30] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

It is thus only after a questioned action of a judge in a pending case has been judicially resolved with finality that the door to an inquiry into his or her administrative liability may be said to have opened. Parenthetically, during the pendency of the present petition or on April 15, 2005, the Second Division of this Court rendered a decision[31] on the above-said administrative complaint filed by petitioners against public respondent. On the merits of the petition for mandamus, Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution provides: SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The above-quoted constitutional provision guarantees a general right the right to information on matters of public concern and, as an accessory thereto, the right of access to official records and the like. The right to information on matters of public concern or of public interest is both the purpose and the limit of the constitutional right of access to public documents.[32] Insofar as the right to information relates to judicial records, an understanding of the term judicial record or court record is in order. The term judicial record or court record does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the courts. It comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony[33] which took place during the trial and which are in the possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of rendering court decisions. It has also been described to include any paper, letter, map, book, other document, tape, photograph, film, audio or video recording, court reporters notes, transcript, data compilation, or other materials, whether in physical or electronic form, made or received pursuant to

43 law or in connection with the transaction of any official business by the court, and includes all evidence it has received in a case.[34] In determining whether a particular information is of public concern, there is no right test. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance as it relates to or affect the public.[35] It bears emphasis that the interest of the public hinges on its right to transparency in the administration of justice, to the end that it will serve to enhance the basic fairness of the judicial proceedings, safeguard the integrity of the fact-finding process, and foster an informed public discussion of governmental affairs. Thus in Barretto v. Philippine Publishing Co.,[36] this Court held: x x x The foundation of the right of the public to know what is going on in the courts is not the fact that the public, or a portion of it, is curious, or that what is going on in the court is news, or would be interesting, or would furnish topics of conversation; but is simply that it has a right to know whether a public officer is properly performing his duty. In other words, the right of the public to be informed of the proceedings in court is not founded in the desire or necessity of people to know about the doing of others, but in the necessity of knowing whether its servant, the judge, is properly performing his duty. x x x The case in Cowley vs. Pulsifer (137 Mass. 392) is so pertinent to the questions presented for our decision in the case at bar that we cannot refrain from quoting extensively therefrom. x x x x x x The general advantage to the country in having these proceedings made public more than counterbalances the inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may be the subject of such proceedings. x x x The chief advantage to the country to which we can discern, and that which we understand to be intended by the foregoing passage, is the security which publicity gives for the proper administration of justice. x x x It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under the public eye, not because the controversies of one citizen with another are of public concern, but because it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice should act under the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed. From this quotation it is obvious that it was not the idea of the supreme court of Massachusetts to lay down the proposition that simply because a pleading happened to be filed in a public office it becomes public property that any individual, whether interested or not, had the right to publish its contents, or that any newspaper was privileged to scatter the allegations contained therein to the four corners of the country. The right of the public to know the contents of the paper is the basis of the privilege, which is, as we have said, the right to determine by its own senses that its servant, the judge, is performing his duties according to law. x x x[37] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted) judges and justices, and it would be against sound public policy to prevent, suppress or keep the earliest knowledge of these from the public.[39] Thus, in Lantaco Sr. et al. v. Judge Llamas,[40] this Court found a judge to have committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to furnish Lantaco et al. a copy of his decision in a criminal case of which they were even the therein private complainants, the decision being already part of the public record which the citizen has a right to scrutinize. Unlike court orders and decisions, however, pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a case need not be matters of public concern or interest. For they are filed for the purpose of establishing the basis upon which the court may issue an order or a judgment affecting their rights and interests. In thus determining which part or all of the records of a case may be accessed to, the purpose for which the parties filed them is to be considered. In intestate proceedings, the heirs file pleadings and documents for the purpose of establishing their right to a share of the estate. As for the creditors, their purpose is to establish their claim to the estate and be paid therefor before the disposition of the estate. Information regarding the financial standing of a person at the time of his death and the manner by which his private estate may ultimately be settled is not a matter of general, public concern or one in which a citizen or the public has an interest by which its legal rights or liabilities maybe affected. Granting unrestricted public access and publicity to personal financial information may constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy to which an individual may have an interest in limiting its disclosure or dissemination. If the information sought then is not a matter of public concern or interest, denial of access thereto does not violate a citizens constitutional right to information. Once a particular information has been determined to be of public concern, the accessory right of access to official records, including judicial records, are open to the public. The accessory right to access public records may, however, be restricted on a showing of good cause. How good cause can be determined, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Republican Company v. Appeals Court teaches:[41] The publics right of access to judicial records, including transcripts, evidence, memoranda, and court orders, maybe restricted, but only on a showing of good cause. To determine whether good cause is shown, a judge must balance the rights of the parties based on the particular facts of each case . In so doing, the judge must take into account all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the nature of the parties and the controversy, the type of information and the privacy interests involved, the extent of community interest, and the reason for the request.[42] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

And even then, the right is subject to inherent supervisory and protective powers of every court over its own records and files.[43] The Supreme Court of Canada, expounding on the right of the court to exercise supervisory powers over materials surrendered into its care, held: It follows that the court, as the custodian of the exhibits, is bound to inquire into the use that is to be made of them and, in my view, is fully entitled to regulate that use by securing appropriate undertakings and assurances if those be advisable to protect competing interests. x x x In exercising its supervisory powers over materials surrendered into its care, the court may regulate the use made of it. In an application of this nature, the court must protect the respondent and accommodate public interest in access. x x x In

Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public concern or interest for these are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, binding upon all citizens, of which every citizen is charged with knowledge.[38] Justice thus requires that all should have free access to the opinions of

44 an application of this nature the court must protect the respondent and accommodate the public interest in access. This can only be done in terms of the actual purpose, and in the face of obvious prejudice and the absence of a specific purpose, the order for unrestricted access and reproduction should not have been made. [44] (Underscoring supplied) In fine, access to court records may be permitted at the discretion[45] and subject to the supervisory and protective powers of the court,[46] after considering the actual use or purpose for which the request for access is based and the obvious prejudice to any of the parties. In the exercise of such discretion, the following issues may be relevant: whether parties have interest in privacy, whether information is being sought for legitimate purpose or for improper purpose, whether there is threat of particularly serious embarrassment to party, whether information is important to public health and safety, whether sharing of information among litigants would promote fairness and efficiency, whether party benefiting from confidentiality order is public entity or official, and whether case involves issues important to the public.[47] By the administratrix-private respondents own information, petitioners are the plaintiffs in two complaints (against Roberto Benedicto et al.) for damages and/or sums of money, Civil Case No. 95-9137 and Civil Case No. 11178, filed before the Bacolod RTC. She contends, however, that if the motion to dismiss [these RTC Bacolod cases is] granted, . . . petitioners would have absolutely no interest of any kind [over] the [e]state of the [d]eceased Roberto S. Benedicto.[48] Petitioners stated main purpose for accessing the records to monitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting[49] appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact interested persons under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court reading: Rule 135, SEC. 2. Publicity of proceedings and records. x x x x The records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person, at all proper business hours, under the supervision of the clerk having custody of such records, unless the court shall, in any special case, have forbidden their publicity, in the interest of morality or decency. (Underscoring supplied), entitled to be informed of the inventory as well as other records which are relevant to their claims against Benedicto. In fine, this Court finds the petition for mandamus meritorious, petitioners being interested persons who have a legitimate reason or purpose for accessing the records of the case. Respecting the prohibition aspect of the petition, the same fails. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court which govern disqualification of judges provide: SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he was presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above. SECTION 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. - If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Since petitioners are not parties to the case, they may not seek public respondents inhibition, whether under the first paragraph of above-quoted Section 1 which constitutes grounds for mandatory disqualification, or under the second paragraph of the same section on voluntary disqualification. WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is GRANTED. Public respondent is ORDERED to allow petitioners to access, examine, and obtain copies of any and all documents-part of the records of Special Proceeding No. 00-97505 bearing on the inventory of assets and liabilities of the estate and the hearing conducted by the trial court on February 13, 2004, subject to precautionary measures to prevent tampering or alteration thereof. The petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

As long then as any party, counsel or person has a legitimate reason to have a copy of court records and pays court fees,[50] a court may not deny access to such records. Of course as this Court held in Beegan v. Borja,[51] precautionary measures to prevent tampering or alteration must be observed: We are not unaware of the common practice in the courts with respect to the photocopying or xeroxing of portions of case records as long as the same are not confidential or disallowed by the rules to be reproduced. The judge need not be bothered as long as the permission of the Clerk of Court has been sought and as long as a duly authorized representative of the court takes charge of the reproduction within the court premises if warranted or if not, the said court representative must bring along the case records where reproduction takes place and return the same intact to the Clerk of Court.[52]