PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and FARMERS COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION (FACOMA), San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioners, vs.

THE HON. EMILIO L. LEACHON, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 46, 4th Judicial Region, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, respondents. DECISION PURISIMA, J.: The People of the Philippines, represented by the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro, and the private complainant, Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association (FACOMA), brought this special civil action for certiorari and mandamus, to annul the orders, dated January 18 and February 4, 1993, respectively, of Presiding Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, who dismissed Criminal Case Nos. R-2877 and R-2828, and denied herein petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioners further pray that respondent Judge be ordered to proceed with the trial of said cases. The antecedent facts that matter are, as follows: On August 7, 1990, pursuant to the Resolution of the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate informations for violation of P. D. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law, against Noli Hablo, Edmundo Mapindan and Diego Escala, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. R-2877 and R-2828, before the Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro presided over by respondent judge. The cases proceeded to trial. After presenting its evidence, the prosecution rested the cases, sending in a written offer of evidence on November 14, 1991. On August 18, 1992, almost a year after the prosecution had rested, the respondent Judge issued an Order dismissing the said cases motu proprio on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. From the aforesaid order of dismissal, petitioners appealed to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, which was referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. On December 24, 1992, the 12th Division of the Court of Appeals came out with a decision reversing the appealed Order of dismissal, ordering continuation of trial of subject criminal cases, and disposing, thus: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING considerations, the petition is given due course and the orders of respondent judge dated August 19, 1992 and September 1, 1992 are set aside and declared null and void. Respondent judge is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of the case, i.e., with the presentation of evidence by the accused, then the rebuttal or surrebuttal evidence, if necessary and thereafter, to decide the case on the basis of the evidence adduced. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. On January 19, 1993, instead of conducting the trial, as directed by the Court of Appeals, the respondent judge dismissed the cases motu proprio, once more,opining that P.D. 772 is rendered obsolete and deemed repealed by Sections 9 and 10, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provide that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration interposed on January 29, 1993, having been denied by the respondent Judge on February 4, 1993, petitioners found their way to this court via the instant petition. The issue posited here is whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing subject criminal cases for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law, and in declaring the said law as repugnant to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution. To begin with, to every legislative act attaches the presumption of constitutionality. (Misolas vs.Panga, 181 SCRA 648; Alvarez vs. Guingona, Jr., 252 SCRA 695). Unless otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged

unconstitutional by this Court, a law will always be presumed valid and the first and fundamental duty of the court is to apply the law. (Lim vs. Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649; National Federation of Labor vs. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419) Then, too, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored unless it is manifest that such is the legislative intent. (Napocor vs. Province of Lanao del Sur, 264 SCRA 271) This doctrine is premised on the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and interpretation. (Ty vs. Trampe, 250 SCRA 500; Frivaldo vs. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727; Agujetas vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 17) Presidential Decree No. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law, enjoys this presumption of constitutionality. At the time the respondent Judge rendered the questioned Decision and issued the orders of dismissal in 1993, Presidential Decree No. 772, Anti-Squatting Law, was still effective. Neither has this Court declared its unconstitutionality, notwithstanding the social justice provision of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, specifically on urban land reform and housing. Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: Section 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property owner s. Sec. 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation with them and the communities where they are to be relocated." Presidential Decree No. 772, on the other hand, states: Sec. 1. Any person, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine not less than one thousand or more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the Court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. If the offender is a corporation or association, the maximum penalty of five years and the fine of thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the president, director, manager or managing partners thereof. In dismissing subject criminal cases for anti-squatting, respondent Judge ratiocinated that if all the accused in these cases were convicted and ordered evicted, it will run counter to the said specific constitutional provisions because the conviction and eviction will not be in a just and humane manner as the government has not yet undertaken the resettlement of urban and rural dwellers (referring to all accused in the cases at bar) and neither has the government consulted all the accused as to where they should be relocated. From the aforequoted portion of the questioned disposition below, it can be gleaned that the reason of respondent Judge in dismissing subject cases is that the eviction of the accused was not effected in a just and humane manner as the government has not yet established a resettlement area for the accused, and those who would be evicted have not been consulted as to the place of their relocation. The import of the Order of dismissal under scrutiny is that- should the eviction be in a just and humane manner, the same shall be valid and upheld. The Court holds that the respondent judge did not err in so construing the aforecited constitutional provision. Under the Constitution, what makes the eviction and demolition of urban or rural poor dwellers illegal or unlawful is when the same are not done in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. However, respondent Judge erred in predicating the validity or legality of eviction on the existence of a resettlement plan and area. The constitutional requirement that the eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and conducted in a just and humane manner does not mean that the validity or legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence of a resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government. What is meant by in accordance with law and just and humane manner is that the person to be evicted be accorded due

process or an opportunity to controvert the allegation that his or her occupation or possession of the property involved is unlawful or against the will of the landowner; that should the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven, the occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or demolition is done; and that there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or damage to properties. Precisely, the enactment of an anti-squatting law affords the alleged squatters the opportunity to present their case before a competent court where their rights will be amply protected and due process strictly observed. By filing the proper informations in court, complainants have complied with the first requirement of due process, that is, the opportunity for the accused to be heard and present evidence to show that his or her occupation or possession of the property is not against the will or without the consent of the landowner and is not tainted by the use of force, intimidation, threat or by the taking advantage of the absence of or tolerance by the landowners. Furthermore, what gives impetus to P. D. 772 is the constitutional mandate that - no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. Far from contravening, P. D. 772 conforms with the 1987 Constitution, in that it protects the rights of a property owner against unlawful and illegal intrusion. It should likewise be noted that a constitutional question will not be decided unless it is properly raised in appropriate cases (Tropical Homes Inc. vs. National Housing Authority, 142 SCRA 540). Before the court can assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question, the following requisites must first be met: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy, including a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary for the resolution of the case. (Board of Optometry vs Colet, 260 SCRA 88) In the case at bar, the respondent Judge dismissed subject cases motu proprio, after the prosecution had rested the same and without giving the three accused an opportunity to present their evidence. What is more, there is no showing that the issue of constitutionality of P. D. 772 was ever posed by the accused. Consequently, such an issue cannot be given due course for the simple reason that it was not raised by the proper party at the earliest opportunity. But the foregoing antecedent facts and proceedings notwithstanding, the petition cannot now prosper because on October 27, 1997, Republic Act No. 8368, entitled An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772 Entitled Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts was enacted. Section 3 of the said Act provides that all pending cases under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED, without any pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Romero, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. PT&T vs NLRC PT&T vs. NLRC 272 SCRA 596 FACTS: PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991. On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already

gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies. ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an employee. HELD: Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law. PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code: ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage. The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.

PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988]

Monday, February 02, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner,

Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged

principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male andfemale of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes

Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the SolicitorGeneral on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines andexisting mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue: Whether
challenged

or not there has been a valid classification in the Department Order No. 1.

Held: SC

in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid

classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only tofemale contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, 1. 2. 3. 4. Such That They They apply classification they are are equally provided rests to al not to on the confined members of substantial purpose the of that: distinctions the same law class

germane

to existing conditions

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions. Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to therequirements of

public

safety

as

may

be

provided

by

law.

Deployment

ban

of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enactlegislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL. Issue: The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor. Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc. That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead. The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions; For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. Held: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any

municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.