NOTES ON MORAL RELATIVISM

Defining the issue The main question: Are there any objective moral standards? Are there any standards that apply to everyone whether they know it or not? The moral relativist says no. Is she right? Is morality on the same level as etiquette or taste?

Two kinds of mora re ati!ism:

1 . Cultural moral relativism: Right and wrong good and evil are relative to a culture to a way o! li!e that is practiced by a whole group o! people. 2 . Individual moral relativism: Right and wrong good and evil are relative to the pre!erences o! the individual. It is very di!!icult not to slide !rom 1 to 2. "or one thing it is di!!icult to see where to draw the boundaries. An individual belongs to lots o! di!!erent social groups and the standards o! one group may con!lict with those o! another. #hich set o! standards is the individual supposed to regard as authoritative when she is trying to decide what to do? A consistent moral relativist is probably going to have to say $It%s just up to her. $ &ere is another consideration. 'uppose that someone wants to live in accordance with the standards o! a di!!erent group. 'uppose !or e(ample that some guy wants to live in accordance with the standards o! a group that treats women as property. I! relativism is the truth about morality there just doesn%t seem to be any very interesting sense in which he shouldn%t. $It%s just up to him. $ That%s all we can say. The upshot is that !or a moral relativist group boundaries can%t be very important. )onsequently I will not be making a lot o! the distinction between 1 and 2 .

It isn't all or nothing.

'ome o! our $moral$ standards might be objective even i! others aren%t. "or e(ample it might be true that I ought to "are a#out other $eo$ e for their own sakes% and not &ust for what the' "an do for me( And this might be true even i! relativism is the truth about other issues such as the question $Is premarital se( wrong?$ 'ometimes when people think they don%t believe in objective values it is because they are equating the belie! in objective values with adherence to some $standard$ o! conduct that they strongly disagree with. "or e(ample they may not want the )hristian Right telling them what to do in their bedrooms. 'o they say things like $That%s just your view. It%s !ine !or you but not !or me. $ "air enough. The )hristian Right may be wrong about some things. *ut it doesn%t !ollow that there are no objective standards at all.

)i!e things the question is NOT a#out(

*( The question is not whether there are in fa"t ots different and "onf i"ting o$inions a#out mora it' and lots o! di!!erent and con!licting moral systems in di!!erent societies. +! course there are. *ut even so one individual%s or one society%s standards might be objectively superior to those o! another. ,(ample: +bviously many people used to think that slavery was not wrong. They were mistaken. ,(ample: It had not occurred to the ancient &ebrews -or to their neighbors. that genocide is wrong. They were mistaken. +( The issue is not whether our moral views are socially and culturally conditioned . +! course they are. All our views about everything are conditioned by the time and place in which we live the in!luences to which we are e(posed. That doesn%t mean that none o! them are objectively true or !alse. ,( /or does the issue have anything to do with the desirability o! tolerance. +ne may per!ectly well think that tolerance is an objective value. /ote that a consistent relativist has to relativi0e the claims o! tolerance. -It should also be noted that there are some things we should be intolerant o!. . -( It is also not a question about what judgments we should make about the mora "hara"ter of indi!idua $eo$ e in distant times and places. ,ven a non1relativist may say: $#hat is e(cusable in Abraham or the prophet 'amuel may not be e(cusable !or us who know better. $ .( "inally the question is not whether there are any a#so ute ' e/"e$tion ess mora aws . It is surprisingly di!!icult to state an e(ceptionless moral principle. #e are usually able to imagine a situation in which the claim o! one such principle is outweighed by the claim o! another. *ut it doesn%t !ollow that these standards are not objective. "irst e(ample: I have to kill someone in order to protect my !amily. 2illing another human being is a bad thing. *ut it would also be a bad thing to let him kill my !amily. *oth may be genuine moral requirements3 but it may be impossible to satis!y both and one may take precedence over the other. 'econd e(ample: A woman has a right to control her own body. A !etus -some say. has a right to li!e. *oth rights might be $objective. $*ut there are situations in which one has to give way to the other. There may also be objectively ambiguous situations in which there is no right answer. *ut even here the moral standards that create the ambiguity may be objective. ,(ample: In the #illiam 'tyron novel o! that name 'ophie has to choose between letting both her children go to the gas chamber at Auschwit0 and selecting one o! them !or the gas chamber. *oth alternatives are morally intolerable. To !avor one child over another in a situation like that is intolerable. To re!rain !rom saving at least one is intolerable. +ur moral standards may not tell us what to do in a situation like this one. It hardly !ollows that they are not objective. The most im$ortant argument in fa!or of mora re ati!ism(

/ot only are there lots o! con!licting moral systems but there seems to be no good non1 question1begging argument in !avor o! one system and against another. #hen pushed to the limit I can only say to someone who disagrees with me $This is where I stand. $ The simplest $e(planation$ o! this state o! a!!airs is that there is no objective subject matter here at all. I! there were you would e(pect it to e(ert some control over what we think about morality. )omment : It%s easy to e(aggerate the degree o! moral disagreement. "or e(ample something like the 4olden Rule can be !ound in lots o! di!!erent cultures in widely di!!erent times and places 1 that e(erted no in!luence on one another. 'ee the !ormulations at goldenrule.html *ut when all is said and done it must be admitted there is a lot o! moral disagreement and this argument does have some !orce. Three sour"es of uneasiness( The !irst point is not really an argument but it carries a lot o! weight with me. It%s what my heart tells me about some o! the evils I see in the world. ,(ample: I think o! the little *osnian girl who a!ter a shelling asked $5ommy where did my hands go?$ #hen I think o! such things I !ind mysel! wanting to say something stronger than $This is wrong1relative1to1my1moral1standards. $6on%t you?

It can be argued that relativism -as I have de!ined it. is contrary to the very idea o! morality. It is o! the essence o! moral claims that they are non1relative. #e say $7ou mustn%t be cruel $ and not $7ou mustn%t be cruel unless you -or your social group. thinks that cruelty is +2. $

It !ollows that i! moral relativism is true morality is a sham. 5oral relativism is indistinguishable !rom moral nihilism. It could still be true3 but it ought to make you squirm.

There is such a thing as moral progress. I! relativism were true then there wouldn%t be.

,(amples: 'lavery and genocide were always bad but lots o! people didn%t know it. #hen people o! greater moral insight came along they made genuine moral discoveries that resulted in genuine moral progress. The moral relativist cannot acknowledge this. All she can say about the slave owners !or e(ample is: $They had their pre!erences and we have ours. And that%s the end o! the matter. $ Man' different theories a#out the nature of o#&e"ti!e mora standards Roughly the theories divide up into naturalist theories and supernaturalist theories. -/ote that they don%t all involve an appeal to 4od. . Natura ist theories These theories attempt to ground morality in human nature. &uman beings have certain basic needs and desires. A satis!actory human li!e is one in which lots o! them are satis!ied. According to the ethical naturalist moral standards are those that we need to !ollow in order to live together and to !lourish as human beings. -Try to imagine a state o! a!!airs in which everyone !elt !ree to

do as he or she pleased to anyone else 1 a state o! a!!airs in which murder and the!t were the norm rather than the e(ception. It would be pretty bad !or everyone wouldn%t it?. /ote that the naturalist view doesn%t make morality subjective or relative. There is an objective !act o! the matter about whether certain patterns o! behavior are conducive to human !lourishing. The main problem !or naturalist theories is its lack o! an adequate response to the question $#hy should I be moral i! I don%t care about other people? #hy should I care about other people?$ Su$ernatura ist theories The 6ivine )ommand Theory is one such theory. There are also supernaturalist theories that do not involve any appeal to 4od. "or e(ample some philosophers think there are eternal moral truths just as there are eternal logical and mathematical truths. These truths are completely independent o! what anybody thinks. . . And i! 4od e(ists then he is subject to them just as we are. 8uestion: )ould 4od have made 9:9;<? 8uestion: )ould 4od have made cruelty right? The answer to both questions is /o.

There are also 4od1based theories other than the 6ivine )ommand Theory.

'ometimes it is claimed that 4od himsel! is the ultimate moral standard. +ur job is to try to be like 4od. 5orality is not based on a bunch o! arbitrary divine commands. Instead it is based on the eternal nature o! 4od.

A$$endi/
&ere is an e(ample o! $moral disagreement$ that are worth considering. An honor killing incident among the 6ruse 'toning adulterers in A!ghanistan