Introduction

The 2006 military coup of September 19 in Thailand has once again raised questions about the process of democratization in Thailand and the nature of the countrys political system in general.1 From the reactions towards the coup it is clear that democracy in Thailand is interpreted quite differently by both local and foreign observers. While some have argued the coup was a necessary step to restore democracy, others claim it was a set-back for Thai democracy.2 The arrival of Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thai, TRT henceforth) Party onto the political stage was applauded by observers as a new turning point in Thai political history, with unprecedented voter turn-out and successive electoral victories. According to one analyst democracy was consolidating in Thailand, despite some minor set-backs (Albritton 2005). However, while the TRT government turned increasingly authoritarian and corrupt toward 2005 and a peoples movement (the Peoples Alliance for Democracy, PAD henceforth) was formed demanding Thaksins resignation, the military coup which finally ousted Thaksin in 2006 was condemned because of the inability to solve the political crisis by democratic and constitutional means. Such opposing and conflicting interpretations of the coup and of Thai politics more generally, naturally begs for a detailed analysis of the events, but also questions the usability of the term democracy as an analytical category. The aim of this essay is to show how the conventional political science approach as a method to analyse democracy, fails to adequately address the complexities of the 2006 coup in Thailand and describe the nature of Thailands political system more generally.3 Many academics consider the coup to be the outcome of growing tension between not only the Thai people and the TRT government, but more significantly between the TRT and other elites, notably former TRT supporters, the military, and the monarchy.4 This inter-elitist tension and struggle of power was reflected in two opposing discourses about democracy; Thaksinocracy and Royalist Democracy.5 By analysing these discourses and showing that the term democracy is a contested concept with multiple meanings, it is clear that the conventional approach fails to accurately describe Thai
1 2

The notion of democratization is, as this present paper attempts to show, a highly contested and debated issue. For background on the contradictory reactions to the coup, see Crispin (2006), Tasker (2006), and Handley (2006a). 3 The term conventional approach here is the authors own and it will be explained in the following section. 4 Further details about these authors, their arguments and references will be provided below. 5 The term Thaksinocracy is taken from Thirayuth Bunmi (2006:9-11). The term Royalist Democracy is borrowed from Thongchai (2008:12).

political culture, and thus to provide a comprehensive understanding of the recent coup. Rather than analysing democracy strictly in terms of processes and behaviour of citizens and institutions, and how these comply with what I will call international consensus democracy, an alternative approach which focuses on circulating discourses of democracy and how these discourses relate to struggles of power, and examines these within a local cultural and historical context, can prove more insightful.6 The important political role of the Thai monarch makes Thailand a special case study as democracy and kingship under the formula democracy with the King as Head of State go together in a manner perhaps unique in comparison to other political systems around the world. By breaking away from the conventional approach this essay finally proposes some ideas and guidelines for rethinking an alternative framework for identifying the existence of alternative democratic political systems. 7

Toward a Redefinition of a Framework for Analysing Democracy8

The primary objective of this essay to show that the conventional approach inadequately describes the coup and the political system of Thailand in general, suggests that the term democracy referring to both a form of government and a political philosophy, by no means has a universally accepted standard definition and thus is a poor analytical tool, especially when used to describe political systems in non-Western cultures. The ideology or philosophy of democracy refers to both a set of principles and processes. In principle, ideally, governments must provide for the physical and mental well-being of the majority of people in a society without jeopardising the general good (Kobkua 2004:4). Theoretically, members of a democratic society have individual (often considered to be universal) rights which the ideal government should try to nurture, rather than limit. The principle in turn is fulfilled by the democratic process (elections, political parties, parliament, and constitutions) through which all individuals of society participate and by means of which everyone has equal access to power (ibid:5). From this vantage point, the principle and process of democracy become the primary focal points when analysing political systems and their democratic nature, although the principle and processes may vary considerably from one political
The term international consensus democracy is the authors own. It will be outlined in the following section. The term alternative here is of course unfortunate as it hints at a deviation from a standard democracy, but in lack of a better term, it has been chosen for the time being. 8 Due to constraints on the length of this essay a comprehensive theoretical outline of democracy has deliberately been omitted.
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system to the other. This is basically why the theoretical framework and the conventional approach as an approach to analyse democracy is problematic. Attempts to analyse the concept of democracy by an anthropological/ethnographic approach have recently been undertaken by a number of scholars compiled in Paley (2002). These contributions taken together can be considered an alternative to the conventional approach of the political sciences. According to Paley (ibid:469-72), rather than focusing on the democratic processes and principles of political systems outside the Western cultural hemisphere, and analysing how these comply with democratic political systems in the West, studying the local meaning and circulating discourses of democracy within the socio-cultural and historical context, and their relationship to changing forms and struggles of power, proves more insightful. The conventional approach is problematic because it is highly Euro-centric or Western-centric as it presupposes an idealized prototype of democracy which in turn is considered universally applicable and the destined outcome or final stage of development of all political systems worldwide. This prototype may be termed international consensus democracy and will be used henceforth in the present paper. As Paley (ibid:470) points out this sort of international consensus about democracy is imagined as one only have to compare a few democratic political systems in the West to realize that in terms of process and principle these vary considerably. The implications are that these countries tend to be seen as undemocratic, underdeveloped, and uncivilized. By extension, the principle of democracy becomes a universal right or privilege. One particular problem about the conventional approach and its tendency to focus entirely on the processes of democracy, constitutions in particular, is the failure to see the underlying struggles of power hidden beneath these documents. As Surin (1999a:358) points out, constitutions tend to be sites of political struggle, and do not necessarily represent endpoints in these struggles. Thus it is important to note to what extent constitutions serve as ideological tools, and how they are sites of contests, but also to look beyond them and put them into a wider historical context. Paleys alternative approach does not offer an alternative theoretical framework within which to explore the political system of Thailand. This naturally begs the question whether it is possible to identify distinct democratic political systems as being neither subsystems of, or subordinate to international consensus democracy. The case of Thailand where the monarchy

has a significant political role and the notion of a Royalist Democracy claimed to be rooted in Buddhist concepts of kingship, and fundamentally different from international consensus democracy, is particular interesting. Attempts to address this question can be found in existing literature on the topic of Asian Values and the debate about Asian-style or, in the case of Thailand, Thai-style democracy (Hood 1998, Nehrer 1999, Surin 1999b, Hewison 1999, and Thompson 2004). While particular socio-cultural characteristics and values of Thai society have been identified, the claim that these characteristics justify the countrys political culture as being distinct from its Western counterparts, is considered to be a rejection of liberal democracy, and a discourse of power and an excuse for elitist rule by most scholars (Hood ibid:866, Nehrer ibid:958, Surin ibid:412, Hewison ibid:231, and Thompson ibid:1068). Attempts to identify a religious dimension of democratization in Asia have recently been undertaken by a research team conducted by the Danish scholar Bubandt (2006), but to the present authors knowledge, no such study on Thailands political system and its religious context has been undertaken so far. Thus, while the present author is still in the process of exploring a framework for defining such alternative democratic political systems, due to constraints on the length of this essay, only some ideas and guidelines as to how one would go about framing an alternative approach will be presented here, and will be open to further discussion elsewhere.

Methodology
Before any discussion on the meaning of democracy in Thai society can begin, a historical outline of the local meanings and circulating discourses of democracy in Siam and Thailand is necessary.9 Next, moving on to discuss the political ideology of democracy in a contemporary setting, an outline of the two circulating discourses in the context of the coup, referred to as Thaksinocracy and Royalist Democracy, will be presented. This section is followed by an outline of the inter-elitist power struggle, highlighting the fault lines along which this power struggle unfolded in the 2006 coup. Turning to the main discussion of this paper the analytical problems of the conventional approach will be examined by analysing Thaksinocracy and Royalist Democracy by using Paleys alternative approach. In turn, it will be examined how these discourses relate to the inter-elitist
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Siam was renamed Thailand in 1939 under Phibun Songkhrams first term (1939-44).

power struggle. This analysis will focus on two sites of contestation between them: (1) attitudes toward elections, the electoral mandate, and the behaviour of the electorate, and (2) the constitutional framework. Based on this analysis and how Thaksinocracy and Royalist Democracy differ according to these two sites of contestation, it will be discussed how the conventional approach fails to fully address not only the complexities of the coup, and its inadequacy as a tool to analyse political systems more generally. Finally, using Thailand and the coup as a point of departure, some ideas and guidelines how to rethink and reframe a theoretical approach to identify the existence of alternative democratic political systems will be presented. I have chosen to use Royal Powers (2006) by Pramuan Ruchanaseri as a primary source in Thai as this book reflects the political crisis of 2006. Pramuan was a former associate of Thaksin, but he decided to break with TRT and became a pro-royalist. His text is supportive of Royalist Democracy and sceptic of Western democracy and became the inspiration for the Royal Power discourse (see below). Thus this text perfectly illustrates how democracy was being redefined in the context of the coup.

Meaning and Circulating Discourses of Democracy in the Political History of Siam and Thailand
Ever since democracy or prachathipatay (meaning peoples sovereignty) as the political ideology came to be known in Siam and Thailand, was introduced as a result of interaction with British and French colonial presence in the region at the turn of the nineteenth century, it was rejected first by the Chakri kings who considered it an alien ideology which could not be implemented in its pure form. As nationalistic revolutions swept across the globe and monarchies fell, and despite the Chakri Kings attempts of constitutional reform, democracy eventually became the principal ideology and the inspiration for the Peoples Party to overthrow the absolute monarchy in 1932. Despite the Peoples Partys intention to surrender power to the people, their fear of being ousted by their political opponents never made this happen. Since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1932 competition over power between Siam and Thailands elites (the bureaucracy, the military and the monarchists in various constellations), has been a recurrent theme throughout the countrys twentieth century political history. The many coups and counter-coups and constitutions (the 2007 constitution is the countrys 29th constitution) is the outcome of this on-going power struggle.

From 1932 until 1973, from 1976-77, and again from 1991-92, the political system was in the hands of the military and bureaucrats. From 1977 to 1997 it was dominated by politicians and businessmen with military support. Thus only in the brief interval 1973-76 is Thailand considered to have had a true political system of representative democracy (Kobkua 2004:8). Once in power every new faction or coalition of factions quickly scrapped the old constitution and wrote a new one. In addition, while the formation of political parties and parliament and elections would be allowed at times, it did not necessarily guarantee that public participation in decision-making and public interests would be embedded. For these reasons, democracy is considered to have been practiced predominantly in process rather than principle, and the ideology is considered mainly to have supported the agenda of the ruling elites, rather than the people whose interests the ideology essentially, according to its Western ideal, was designed to serve (ibid:7). After 1932 the attempt to change Siams political system into a democratic system along Western lines failed miserably and in 1939 Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram ousted the Peoples Party, and turned Thailand into a Fascist regime and led the country into wartime collaboration with the Japanese under military rule. From the late 1950s and onwards the factions in power would legitimise their rule by redefining democracy according to local socio-cultural traits and their opposition to the regimes they replaced. Kobkua (ibid:9) argues three principal types of democracy can be identified: (1) the Phor Khun-style (meaning paternal) Democracy or Thai Buddhist-style democracy, (2) the Limited/Guided Democracy, and (3) the Traditionalist-style Democracy. These will be outlined below. The Phor Khun-style Democracy was introduced by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat after he had ousted Phibun in a coup in 1957. Sarits political philosophy termed despotic paternalism claimed to have roots in traditional Thai social and cultural values and Buddhism, and his intention was to install democracy from above. Sarits chief ideologue, Luang Wichit Wathakan, created the myth about the glory of the kingdom of Sukhothai as a model for Thailand to strive to become again. In turn, Sarits leadership was compared to the patriarchal administration of the former kingdom, which combined both elements of the benevolent and affectionate paternal love and care of a father to his children, but also of a cruel and capable leader who would sacrifice himself for the benefit of the common good or patthana (development or progress). In return, he expected every Thai citizen to do the same and play their role according to the social hierarchy.

Opposition in government was deemed counter-productive to the common good, and the military were assigned a political role as protectors of the nations stability and security. Sarit, in contrast to his predecessor Phibun, revived the monarchy and used it primarily as a source of legitimacy. Despite the Sarit regimes inherent authoritarianism and military rule, referred to as the Dark Age of Thai political history, Sarits development agenda combined with Buddhism, is still remembered by many Thais as a time of progress and change. 10 After Sarits death in 1963 his successors Thanom and Praphat carried on Sarits political project, however, with less success.11 The population became increasingly critical of military rule and demanded more democratic space. Following violent clashes between protestors and the military in 1973, the king intervened to stop the conflict. The kings sympathy for the protestors and criticism of the violence subsequently sent Thanom and Praphat into exile, and military rule ceased. From 1973 to 1976, Thailand experienced what is often referred to as a brief experiment in democracy (ibid:8). Amidst growing Communist activity in the region, however, the political space granted and domestic sympathy for the movement soon became an increasing concern for the monarchy which feared that too much liberalism would bring about its overthrow like its counterparts in the neighbouring countries of Laos and Cambodia. The militarys massacre of protesting students on 6 October 1976 which killed an unknown number of students and sent hundreds to join the Communist insurgents in the jungle was supported by the palace. From the tragedy of 1976 emerged the Limited/Guided Democracy which once again restored power to the military and bureaucratic elite, the former assuming a primary political role while parliament only had a secondary function. Their power was, however, challenged by local chao phor (strongmen or godfathers) who were able to buy their way into parliament. From 1980-88 Prem Tinsulanond served as unelected Prime Minister (PM, henceforth), but with popular support. While Prem allowed parliament to function during this time, it was kept in check by the military. 12 The governments, however, were often too corrupt to survive even a single term. With the socio-economic transformations of the 1980s and the emergence of a
For more background on the Sarit regime and the ideology of Phor Khun-style Democracy or Despotic Paternalism, see Thak Chaloemtiarana (2007). 11 After Sarits death the corruption of his regime was fully exposed. As a result, Sarits political ideology in the hands of his successors lost its legitimacy. 12 Premocracy has been used as a term to define this political system, referring to Prems charisma and popular appeal despite the fact that he was never elected. When Prem resigned he was subsequently elevated to member of the kings Privy Council and is head of the council today. For more background on the Privy Council, see McCargo (2005).
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political aware middle class, the demand for more political space and public participation led to Prems resignation. Like many of its predecessors, the Chatichai government which replaced Premocracy was so heavily engaged in corruption that it earned its nickname: the Buffet Cabinet, and was ousted in a military coup in 1991 supported by the middle class and the palace.13 The king appointed Anand Panyarachun as caretaker PM, but following Suchindas refusal to resign and surrender power in the hands of a PM, violent clashes between the military and protestors ensued on May 17 1992. Once again the king intervened directly and summoned the leaders of the two factions, Suchinda and Chamlong Srimuang. After the incident Anand was reappointed interim PM by the king, and parliamentary politics resumed. While parliamentary politics resumed in the 1990s the problem of Money Politics and corruption still made Thai politics function ineffectively and governments lasted only briefly.14 The governments of Chuan Leekpai, Banharn and Chavalit were brought down in 1995, 1996 and 1997, respectively with palace approval.15 Toward the late 1990s a broad reform movement took shape to rewrite the constitution and provide a system of check and balances to prevent corrupt governments from abusing power for profitable gains. The new constitution coincided with the economic crisis of 1997. Although considered a peoples constitution based on the fact that a broad segment of the population was invited to participate in drafting the document, and the new constitution was regarded as a safeguard for the people against future corrupt governments, it was also considered a palace constitution owing to the Royal Prerogative of Article 7. This article enabled the king to dissolve parliament and appoint an interim PM whenever the provision of the constitution did not apply.16 Amidst the drafting process of the new constitution, the 1997 economic crisis dealt a blow to the Thai economy and the ruling Democrat Party led by Chuan Leekpai. As will be explained more thoroughly below, these events and Thaksins clever manipulation of them knocked the
The term political schizophrenia has been used to refer to the middle class support of the military, while they had previously been resisting military rule (Surin 1999:362). During the 1990s, however, the saying rural people elect governments, the urban people overthrow them referring to the vicious circle of election and corruption, coups came to be considered normal and legitimate. For background see Anek Laothamatas Tale of Two Democracies (Anon. 2006). 14 Money Politics is a term used to refer to Thai political culture in the 1990s when many businessmen bought their way into parliament. 15 McCargo (2005:517, note 17) argues the palace was involved in the ousting of the latter two premiers. 16 For more background on the 1997 Constitution, see Klein (1998) and Kobkua (2004), and Connors (2008:148) for details on the origin of Article 7.
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Democrats off the political arena, and paved the way for TRTs rise to power. With the passing of the 1997 constitution, a new area of parliamentary politics seemed to have begun, but as will be discussed more thoroughly below, the constitution did not put an end to Money Politics and corruption. The third and final Traditionalist-style Democracy has emerged alongside the other ideologies outlined above, and according to most scholarship is linked to the restoration of the power of the throne. It emerged under the Sarit era as the Democratic Government with the King as Head of State and evolved under Prem in the 1980s. The political system of Thailand today is still officially recognised under this formula. Traditionalist Democracy will be outlined in the Royalist Democracy section below.17 In summary, the outline above shows that the political apparatus in Thailand has remained in the hands of competing elites throughout most of the twentieth century, and only in brief intervals have the government been representative of the people. Democracy has been rejected as a foreign ideology by successive regimes which in turn have opted for a local approach for democracy based on Thai socio-cultural values and Buddhism.

Thaksinocracy
Thaksin Shinawatra, a former policeofficer turned businessman in the telecommunications business and his Shin Corp. was one of the few companies to survive the 1997 economic crisis and avoid bankruptcy. Entering politics with the ambition to form a party which could respond to the needs of businesses in the aftermath of the economic crisis, TRT designed a political programme which by many commentators was labelled populist referring to its appeal to mainly poor urban and rural Thais, providing 30 Baht healthcare, cheap loans for farmers and village funds programme. On an ideological level TRT presented a significant contrast to the Democrat led government of Chuan Leekpai at the time which, to the displeasure of many owners of Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs) followed the advice of the International Monetary Fund blindly, allowing foreign investors to buy up companies left bankrupt by the crisis. Thaksin criticised this approach for leading to neo-colonisation of Thailand and wanted to support local

Traditionalist-style Democracy and Royalist Democracy refer to the same concept, but the latter term is used in the present paper.

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entrepreneurship instead, to build a strong nationalist economy. This pro-nationalist rhetoric found a strong appeal among many affected by the economic crisis, and the TRT Party gained support from different segments of Thai society, including intellectuals and former political activists and ex-communists. Thus Thaksins political programme was designed to craft a new social contract between the people and the state (Pasuk and Baker 2004:135-39). Whether intentionally or not Thaksins rising popularity challenged the traditional existing social contract between the monarchy and the people. Thaksins promises of a way out of poverty, seriously contrasted the sufficiency economy philosophy proscribed by the king, urging people to make the most of what they have. As Police Lieutenant Colonel, Thaksin had influential contacts and an important network within the police force which he used to strengthen his power-base. He also began to build alliances with the military by interfering with military appointments which constitutionally is a privilege reserved for the king.18 As will be discussed below, this led to growing tension between the TRT government and the palace. The TRT Partys popularity translated into two electoral victories which marked a watershed in Thai political history. The TRT government was the first to serve a full term, and twice elected in 2001 and 2005 with strong mandates. Owing to the restructuring of the democratic process of the new 1997 constitution, the TRTs overwhelming majority in parliament was able to ease out opposition. Soon, however, Thaksin seemed to be hated by his opponents as much as he was loved by his supporters. The corruption scandal which nearly barred Thaksins rise to power was soon replaced by other controversial incidents.19 Among these include Thaksins War on Drugs and his mishandling of the Muslim separatism in the Southern provinces (highlighted in the Krue Se Mosque and Tak Bai incidents) with extra-judicial killings numbering in thousands of deaths. In turn, critical media and respected intellectuals who pointed out the human rights abuse were effectively silenced (Pasuk and Baker 2004:144-57).

According to Article 70 of the 1997 constitution the king is the superior commander of the armed forces. They must obey the king only, and their duty is to secure the stability and independence of the nation and protect the democratic system with the King as Head of State (cited in Pramuan 2006:20). Hewison (2007:938) argues Thaksin had learned from Chatichais experience that a military support base was important. 19 The 1997 constitution and its anti-corruption charter compelled all newly elected PMs to declare their assets upon taking office. Thaksin was the first PM to face charges of corruption, but he was found nonguilty. For more background on this case and Thaksin in general, see Pasuk and Baker (2004).

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In summary, Thaksins political project despite its popular appeal seemed to put the democratic process above principles of individual rights and freedom as his political legacy shows. While Thaksinocracy resembled international consensus democracy, he openly declared that democracy was simply a tool and not a goal (Thai Nation 11 December 2003). Despite its broad popular appeal the TRT Party was first and foremost a party by the rich and for the rich.

Royalist Democracy
Royalist Democracy can be considered an alternative political philosophy or para-political institution to elected parliament. The Thai monarch is unique because he maintains a highly influential political role compared to other constitutional monarchies around the world. Royalist Democracy is first and foremost supported by the king and members of the palace, but also by a large segment of the Thai population and by various elitist groups in Thai society. While the monarchs political influence seems to have little to do with international consensus democracy or somewhat anachronistic in the eyes of a Westerner, there are several cultural and historical reasons why a Royalist Democracy has evolved in the Thai context. The Thai monarchs political role is partly based on ancient notions of kingship and by asserting the monarchs necessity in the contemporary setting amidst a dysfunctional political system haunted by corruption. This will be explained more in detail below. The Thai monarch, King Rama IX Bhumipol Adulyadet, unquestionably enjoys more popularity and support than any other monarch in the world. The current political role of the monarch, however, is the outcome of decades of alliance-building with different sections of the Thai elite, most notably the military.20 While the survival of the monarchy looked bleak after its overthrow in 1932 and Prajadhipoks abdication in 1935, the monarchists tried to regain political influence by joining the anti-Fascist/anti-Japanese resistance against Phibun. After the war, the monarchy regained foothold under Phibun, but was only allowed a very marginal symbolic role. However, after Phibuns expansionist project of annexing lost territories in the neighbouring countries had failed, he turned to the monarchy as an alternative source of political legitimacy
The term network monarchy has been coined by McCargo (2005) as a model to describe how the monarch by means of the Privy Council, most notably through Prem, has been able to control the political apparatus and the military. While the network monarchy according to McCargo has had significant influence on Thai politics since 1973, it has never achieved full dominance. This term will be used henceforth to refer to the monarchical-military alliance.
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during his second term (1948-57). The young king Bhumipol, however, distanced himself from Phibun and joined forced with Sarit who ousted Phibun. Whereas Phibun had failed to gain legitimacy from the monarchy, Sarit promoted the young royal couple and made the king a source of legitimacy for his military dictatorship of despotic paternalism. The young royal couple began to appear in public, blessing Sarits many development projects. After Sarits death in 1963 and the corruption of his regime had been exposed, the young monarch gradually distanced himself from the Praphat-Thanom military regime. He began to express sympathy for parliamentary rule and visited universities to discuss politics with students (Gray 1999). He also embarked on Royal Tours around the kingdom which became the inspiration for the many royally initiated development projects, which to this day make up the official narrative about the kings meritorious deeds and support for his country.21 Many of the royal rituals and ceremonial performances and the use of rachasap (royal vocabulary) revived under Sarit, enhanced the image of the young king as being a righteous and morally just God-king, or Dhammaraja, and the Royal Projects in turn were considered meritorious deeds and proof of his barami possession of the 10 virtues. These notions linked the present monarch to ancient notions of Buddhist kingship and have served as crucial elements in creating an image of the monarch as being a moral authority. As Thongchai (2008:21) notes because every Thai citizen aged sixty or younger grew up under the pervasive aura of an unprecedented royal cult, his image as being truly divine has gained substantial foothold. King Bhumipol has gradually risen to become the moral authority of Thai society, the icon of the nation, the protector of its stability and unity, and the vehicle of democratic reform. This is the outcome of two main factors: royalist historiography glorifying the deeds of the present king and his interventions in times of political crisis, his efforts to eradicate the corruption of various governments throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and the kings strong criticism of them, as evident in the discourse of Clean Politics.22 According to Thongchai (ibid:34, note 9) the kings democratic image in official narrative is based on royalist historiographys commemoration of the present monarchs interventions in 1973 and 1992, and omission of palace involvement in the tragic event of 1976. Palace historiography presents a uni-linear process of democratization attributed to the
One such account is the book Royal Powers by Pramuan (2006:45-46) cited in this paper. For more background on the Royal Projects, in particular their ideological function; see Chanida Chitbundid (2004). 22 Clean Politics is another term borrowed from Thongchai (ibid:24). The main features of this discourse will be outlined below.
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kings of the Chakri dynasty who are honoured for initiating democratic reform before the 1932 revolution. However, as the Siamese people were not yet ready for democracy, they were enslaved under military dictatorship by Pridi and later Phibun (Pramuan 2006:7-9). In turn, the monarchy became a vehicle for democratic reform saving the people from the clutches of military rule, epitomized in the aforementioned interventions in 1973 uprising and overthrow of the Praphat-Thanom regime, and again in 1992 when the present monarch intervened to stop Suchinda. Despite the massacre on October 6 1976, the three years prior to the event is considered an important era in Thailands democratic history bestowed by the king. As Thongchai (2008:13) points out because few Thais have a living memory of the 1932 revolution, Royalist historiography has become official narrative. With the socio-economic changes of the 1980s and the demand for parliamentary politic, and as anti-Communism lost its relevance as a source of legitimacy for limiting political space, the discourse of Clean Politics emerged. Clean Politics can be considered a response to the rise of Money Politics and retired generals and businessmen buying their way into parliament. The Clean Politics discourse portrayed all politicians as corrupt and as lacking moral. In turn, by showing his contempt for elected politicians, using the annual Birthday speech as an opportunity to criticise politicians for their selfishness, the monarch gradually rose to become a moral authority above or beyond the dirty business of politics. The combination of heavy corruption and successive dysfunctional governments throughout the 1980s and 1990s supported this belief. The Royal Prerogative as of Article 7 of the 1997 constitution was an important outcome of this tendency and the power granted to the king can therefore be considered as both a safeguard against corruption as well as a manifest of the monarchs powerful ideological and political role. However, besides the written words of the constitutions, the kings extra-constitutional powers are recognized among members of Thai society as being natural, and the palace has long promoted the idea of an unwritten constitution or social contract between him and his people being more important than the written ones. The many coups and counter-coups throughout the twentieth century and the large turn-over in the number of constitutions can be considered to have supported this belief (Pramuan 2006:13). Royalist Democracy is essentially a political ideology or philosophy based on traditional notions of Buddhist kingship, and the monarchy functions as a political institution parallel to or

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above the parliamentary system. In official discourse the king is regarded as a vehicle of democratic reform against military rule of the past, and against the corrupt politicians of the present. These developments and the kings popularity have secured the ideological position of the monarch as a moral authority in Thai society. While officially the monarchy is a constitutional monarchy, the king is considered to have extra-constitutional powers according to his rule by the teachings of Buddha, the dharma, which among supporters of the palace and traditionalists are considered above the rule of law of the written constitutions (Pramuan 2006:11,14). This political arrangement with the king playing a central role is officially named a democracy with King as Head of State, and is considered by Royalists to be fundamentally different from Western democracies (ibid:introduction). As this system has deep historical roots and predates the arrival of democracy in the region, it is often claimed to be better suited to the Thai context, and that Thais are better accustomed to it (ibid). Based on the Dhammaraja myth about the morally righteous and just leader, the king has a responsibility to nurture the well-being of his people and relieve their sorrows with the compassion and affection as a father to his children (ibid:7,21). In turn the people must respect and revere the king. This intimate relationship between the king and his people are among supporters of Royalist Democracy superior to electoral mandates, especially since governments historically have proven unresponsive to peoples need (ibid:31,57). Despite the Thai monarchs far-reaching political influence, his role has until recently been overlooked in academic work on Thai politics.23 Many academics, Thai in particular, have exercised considerable self-censorship due to the strict lse-majest law (Streckfuss 1995).

Outline of the 2006 Political Crisis and Coup and the Inter-elitist Power Struggle
The political crisis prior to the 2006 coup was first and foremost a clash between the TRT government and those disaffected by it. However, it is also now generally accepted among academics that the coup was the outcome of an on-going inter-elitist power struggle between the network monarchy and Thaksins own network. As Pye and Schaffar (2008:54) note the historical anti-Thaksin movement which emerged prior to the coup is not to be confused with the elitist effort to remove Thaksin. They argue Thaksins opponents seized the momentum of the political
23

One such effort is the controversial book by Paul Handley (2006b) The King Never Smiles.

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crisis as an opportunity to get rid of Thaksin for the sake of their own interests. Among these count succession and Thaksins increasing politicization of the military, and interference with royal business interests.24 Many social groups, labour unions, and pro-democracy NGOs had long been criticising Thaksin for his human rights abuse and suppression and silencing of critical media (Pye and Schaffar 2008:39). Many farmers protested against the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) which the TRT Government was about to sign with Japan (ibid). Despite the TRTs populist agenda, their policies seemed to do downright harm to those they were designed to help, and departed from Thaksins own anti-globalist and pro-nationalist rhetoric. Although the anti-Thaksin protestors were significant in numbers, they were largely overlooked until media mogul and former Thaksin aide, Sondhi Limthongkul, who had himself launched his own protests against Thaksin, joined them and helped reorganise the anti-Thaksin campaign into the PAD, and most importantly provided it with enough funds to make it visible and heard. While Thaksin and Sondhi had been business partners in the past, and Sondhi owed the survival and success of his Manager Group to Thaksin in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, Sondhis public criticism of Thaksin after the fall-out between the two was considered more than anything to be driven by desire for personal revenge and thus did not gain much currency in the population. However, when Thaksin announced the sale of his Shin Corp. to the Singaporean investment arm Temasek Holdings, avoiding taxation in Thailand, Sondhis criticism of the TRT governments corruption found resonance within a broad segment of the population. The issue was particularly sensitive to many Thais as Shin Corp. had been built on generous state concession and thus was considered national property. The sale seemed to contradict Thaksins own nationalist agenda, namely the policy to support Thai enterprises and keep them on Thai hands. Also, the Thaksin administration had changed the law on foreign ownership from 25% to 49% just a few weeks prior to announcement of the sale. These factors combined made Thaksin appear no less corrupt than previous governments and caused considerably public outrage against his administration.

According to Ockey (2005) the palace wanted to get rid of Thaksin to prepare for royal succession and the transition of power from the present monarch to his son, Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn. For background on Thaksins politicisation of military appointment see Ukrist (2008). For Thaksins conflict with the Royal familys investment arm, the Crown Property Bureau, see Handley (2006c).

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The PAD initially demanded Thaksins resignation, but Thaksin refused to do so. Instead he called for new elections to be held in April 2006, and the opposition responded with a boycott. As a result, the TRT candidates in the majority of the constituencies ran against no other candidates, and the TRT won a majority of seats in parliament. However, the election was widely believed to be unfair and thus the political crisis continued. This led the PAD to change strategy and support Sondhis idea of asking for royal intervention (ibid:54). Based on the book Royal Powers (Pramuan 2006), Sondhi had since his fall-out with Thaksin adopted a pro-royalist rhetoric and argued for the return of royal powers to the king and for him to use the Royal Prerogative of Article 7 of the 1997 Constitution and ask Thaksin to resign. The king, however, rejected these demands as irrational and undemocratic, and asked the judges to solve the mess (The Nation 26 April 2006). The judges subsequently annulled the election. At first, the Royal Power discourse did not seem to have any impact on the palace. Later, however, it became clear that the palace was supporting the discourse. Prem, on behalf of the king, met with high-ranking military officers and reminded the soldiers of their duty and sworn allegiance to the king (Bangkok Post 15 July 2006). As the TRT government prepared for new elections to be held in October 2006, the coup circumvented this on September 19 while Thaksin was overseas attending a UN meeting in New York. He subsequently went into self-imposed exile in London, but has returned to Thailand recently. The coup group first appeared as the Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy. However, as the name sent the wrong message to foreign media and the international community, the coup group soon renamed itself, dropping Constitutional Monarchy to avoid any confusion that the king should be behind or involved in the coup (Hewison 2007:994, note 65 ). The king, however, did in fact appear in public shortly after the take-over, and approved the coup (CNN 20 September 2006), and despite the name change, the coup groups name in Thai remained the same. Thus the coup was considered to be a royalist coup. Evidence of an inter-elitist struggle is also reflected in several passages mentioned in Royal Powers (Pramuan 2006) which contains indirect criticism of Thaksin and his government, in particular politicians disrespect of the monarchy (ibid:56), the controversy over the appointment of Khunying Jaruwan Maintaka as auditor-general, considered to be unconstitutional by critics despite palace support (ibid:52,59), the lack of morality and corruption of the TRT government

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(ibid:51,54), and Thaksins politicization of military appointments which is a Royal Privilege (ibid:20,30).

Democracy as a Problematic Analytical Term

According to the official statement of the coup group the purpose was to restore democracy and remove an authoritarian and morally corrupt PM, who had abused power in office for his own benefit. Thaksin faced charges of corruption, lse-majest for disrespecting the monarch, and for being a threat to stability and causing national disunity (BBC News 20 September 2006). As outlined above, the coup basically transferred power from Thaksin to the network monarchy. Gradually, Royalist Democracy replaced Thaksinocracy and thus the meaning of democracy was significantly redefined over a short period of time. This change of power and of the meaning of democracy is important to keep in mind, and presents a range of analytical problems when discussing the coup and its democratic nature. This is the subject of discussion below. There were two main sites of contestation which showed the friction between Thaksin and the network monarchy and the difference between the meaning of democracy in Thaksinocracy and Royal Democracy. These were: (1) the attitude toward elections, the electoral mandate, and the democratic behaviour of the electorate, and (2) the constitutional framework.

Elections, Electoral Mandates and Democratic Behaviour of the Electorate Thaksins strong electoral mandate served as his main source of political legitimacy. As elections are a basic process of international consensus democracy, a strong electoral mandate could silence critics in Thailand and mobilize support from the international community if needed. Thaksin firmly insisted on his electoral mandate throughout his time in office and after being ousted.25 Under Thaksinocracy it was only the voice of the majority that mattered which became increasingly evident as Thaksin sought to silence all criticism by reference to his electoral mandate. To Thaksin appropriate democratic behaviour was kaanmueang ning (quiet politics) which meant keeping your mouth shut, if you had an opinion different from that of the majority (Pasuk and Baker 2004:139).
In a letter published in several international and Thai newspapers 1 year after the coup, Thaksin maintained his electoral mandate had been taken from him in an illegal military coup. He also bemoaned Thailands undemocratic political culture and urged Thais to resist the military dictatorship (Thaksin 2007:11).
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In Royalist Democracy elections, electoral mandates and the attitude toward proper democratic behaviour of citizens, governments and institutions are fundamentally different from international consensus democracy and Thaksinocracy. While parliamentary politics and a PM can operate under Royalist Democracy, the king is considered the ultimate authority. This is based on the traditionalists belief in a political system founded on Buddhist notions of kingship according to which the king has a direct mandate from the people, as outlined above. By extension, the king does not need an electoral mandate to be king. What matters the most is the kings observance of the dharma. The emergence of the Royal Power discourse gradually shifted attention from Thaksins legal wrong-doings toward his moral conduct. While in the beginning Sondhis criticism of Thaksin, revolving around Thaksins alleged disrespect of the monarch had not gained significant support from the peoples sector, the announcement of the Shin Corp sale and Sondhis subsequent criticism of the TRT government did. Although Royal Powers and Sondhis criticism of Thaksin emerged independently of palace interests, it supported its cause. The image of Thaksin as being morally corrupt was suddenly taken to a new level. Thaksins mishandling of the problems in the South made him a threat to national security and stability. The protest against the Thaksin government and its policies divided people to such an extent that Thaksin was blamed for causing national disunity. By highlighting Thaksins immoral conduct Thaksins electoral mandate was gradually undermined, and Royalist Democracy replaced Thaksinocracy as the most legitimate political system in the eyes of many Thais. Against Thaksins strong electoral mandate this turn of events was most desirable to his political opponents. The Royal Power discourse finally gave the network monarchy incentive to step in and act on legitimate grounds. Parallel to the Royal Power discourse, but an important element of it, was the discourse of Clean Politics which re-emerged and intensified during the political crisis. It was voiced by Sondhi, the king, and not surprisingly was also used by the coup groups leader, Sonthi Boonyaratklin, as justification for the coup subsequently (Kate 2007). According to the Clean Politics discourse the predominantly rural and urban poor segment of the electorate were criticised for their lack of understanding of democracy. They were blamed for brining Thaksin to power, because of their selfishness tempted by Thaksins populist agenda. Implicitly, the elections which had brought Thaksin to power were considered illegitimate. In this context, the

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Clean Politics discourse can also be considered to serve as an important strategy to undermine Thaksins mandate. Finally, the Royal Power discourse also had strong nationalistic connotations. According to Pramuan (2006:31), Royalist Democracy is a unique political system which falls out of any analytical category of Western political sciences. By emphasising this local approach to democracy in times of political crisis, especially after Thaksin had exposed his neo-liberal agenda highlighted in the Shin Corp sale which contradicted his own nationalist rhetoric, it turned popular sentiment in favour of Royalist Democracy and away from Thaksins global approach of international consensus democracy. In summary, Thaksinocracy was replaced by Royalist Democracy helped by the Royal Power and Clean Politics discourses which argued for the return of moral politics based on traditionalist notions of Buddhist kingship which put less emphasis on elections, mandates and democratic behaviour as opposed to moral leadership.

Constitutional Framework The change from Thaksinocracy to Royalist Democracy and its relation to the inter-elitist struggle was also evident in how both parties related to the constitutional framework. As noted above Article 7 of the 1997 constitution gave the monarch special powers and could therefore be regarded as a palace constitution. While the constitution was intended to prevent corrupt governments from abusing power and provide a system of check and balances, there were some holes in it which unintentionally made the executive strong and independent. Ironically, while the 1997 charter was designed to prevent Money Politics and the rise of corrupt politicians, the constitution paved the way for Thaksins rise to power (Pasuk and Baker 2004:62). Once in power it became clear that Thaksin did not want to play according to the rules of the 1997 constitution, and regarded it as a highly undemocratic document. He openly criticised that members of the so-called independent bodies (the Constitutional Court) were handpicked rather than elected when he faced charges in the Assets Declaration case (Pasuk and Baker 2004:5) and he became increasingly antagonistic towards additional 1997 bodies afterwards (ibid:173-6). In this sense, international consensus democracy served as an extra-constitutional source of legitimacy for Thaksinocracy, by pointing out some principal democratic failures in the

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1997 constitution. It is in this context that Thaksins challenge to Royalist Democracy was most clear. While the 1997 constitution provided significant legitimacy for a Royalist Democracy as highlighted in the Royal Prerogative of Article 7, the king was reluctant to exercise the use of Article 7. Possibly, the monarch already considered the 1997 constitution dead or feared the reaction from Thaksins many supporters if he demanded Thaksins resignation, and its potential impact on his own democratic image. This explains why the monarch referred to the PADs demands for a royal intervention as irrational and undemocratic, and reflects that Thaksins threat to Royalist Democracy was taken serious by the palace (Connors 2008:160). While the monarch technically is confined by the legal framework he is also considered to have extraconstitutional powers, and as mentioned above, he must obey the dharma rather than the rule of law of the written constitutions. In this sense, Royalist Democracy does not need a written constitution for the king to exercise his powers. According to Pramuan (2006:33) the 1997 constitution clearly had some inherent failures which were the root of the political crisis. That the legal mechanisms of check and balances according to Pramuan (2006:26) had also failed was clear from his remark that the king is the peoples last refuge in their pursuit of justice. The Thai people would eventually have to turn to the king to ask for help to solve the political crisis (ibid:57). In summary, Royalist Democracy gradually replaced Thaksinocracy and as a result the meaning of democracy was significantly redefined. Democracy in the sense of Royalist Democracy is one where the kings moral authority is above a dysfunctional and corrupt political system. While the constitutions function primarily as sources of legitimacy, the unwritten constitution and social contract between the king and his people is always superior to them. As both Thaksinocracy and Royalist Democracy were seeking legitimacy outside the 1997 constitution, using the 1997 constitution as a reference point when discussing the democratic nature of the coup is problematic. Finally, the arrival of Pramuans book inspiring Sondhi to openly criticise Thaksin, the Royal Power discourse promoted Royalist Democracy to such an extent that the coup could be carried out with sufficient legitimacy.

Reactions and Interpretations of the Coup

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Having outlined how Thaksinocracy and Royalist Democracy differed in terms of their use of the notion democracy based on the two sites of contestation mentioned above, it is clear that using these sites as points of departure, presents some problems analytically when discussing democracy in the context of the coup, and the nature of the Thai political system more generally. The contradictory nature of the interpretations by the observers referred to below reflects how these analyses are based on the two sites of contestation outlined above. The implications of focusing on these sites according to the conventional approach will be discussed below. Thaksins removal from power was considered a catastrophe and a breakdown for Thai democracy by some observers (Case 2007). The urban middle class earned the nickname Tank Liberals for their support for the military intervention to solve the political crisis (Ungpakorn 2007:11). To some observers it was a disappointment to see Thailands recent consolidated democracy being wound up in such a short time (Ockey 2006). Much to the dismay of some observers the PAD demonstrations were considered a return to street politics and mob rule and the protestors were criticised for their undemocratic behaviour, unsuitable for a proper democracy (Nelson 2007:18). Rather, many argued, the crisis should have been solved by democratic means. If people disliked Thaksin, he should have been defeated in an election and if his conduct was illegal, he should have been judged by the legal mechanisms of check and balances. As discussed briefly above, however, it is questionable whether the constitutional bodies of the 1997 constitution were able to serve the purpose of check and balances against Thaksin, as he openly defied them. By criticising their inherent undemocratic nature, they lost their legitimacy. Despite public pressure on Thaksin to resign, there seemed to be no means within the constitutional framework to stop him. This highlighted the need for an alternative, extraconstitutional approach. When Thaksin refused to resign, those opposed to his regime were faced with no other choice than to support the Royal Power discourse. Thus the support of the military intervention by the middle class and people of the lower strata of society may be regarded as last resort. In this context, however, it is also important to note that the majority of the PAD actually opposed support for a royal intervention, suggesting that attempts were made to solve the political crisis by other means, bypassing the Royal Prerogative and the use of Article 7 (Pye and Schaffar 2008:54).

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On the other hand, those observers who welcomed the military coup because it brought down Thaksinocracy, mindful of the saying that Thai democracy sometimes needs to take two steps back, to move one forward probably had too high expectations to the military juntas democratic intentions.26 While elections were held in December 2007 and parliamentary politics have resumed, according to Ukrist (2008) the network monarchy is now in a more desirable position with its political opponents out of the way and its agenda fulfilled. Stability prior to Royal succession has been secured and the military has received a 50-60% budget increase. Bodies like the International Security Operation Command and Council of National Security have been strengthened and are likely to maintain influence on the course of politics in the future (ibid:139).
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These bodies can take pre-emptive measures against anything which can be labelled a threat to

the stability of the nation, most notably the survival of the monarchy (ibid). With Thaksin and former TRT members abolished from politics, and although the newly elected Peoples Power Party (PPP) continues the Thaksin legacy of populist policy programmes, its leader, Samak Sundaravej, is a staunch royalist and likely to be more compliant with the will of the palace and the network monarchy. From the contradictory nature of the reactions from the observers listed above, it is clear that focusing too much on the processes of democracy; elections, electoral mandates and on democratic behaviour is problematic as the approach tends to see democracy as a single entity, and not as multiple contesting discourses. By comparison to international consensus democracy it is possible to see both Thaksinocracy and Royalist Democracy as falling short of democratic ideals. And yet while Thaksinocracy was somewhat reminiscent of international consensus democracy at least in appearance, the Thaksin administration seriously violated human rights and limited individual freedom and its policies adversary effects which caused considerable outrage among many Thais and led to demands for his resignation. Despite Thaksinocracys inherent authoritarianism, its resemblance with international consensus democracy, however, helped it gain support from the international community and thus the coup was widely perceived to move Thailand in an anti-democratic direction.

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Surachat Bamrungsuk (2007:36) for instance argued how democracy could still function in a controlled form by the military. 27 The Council for Democratic Reform (under Constitutional Monarchy) renamed itself The Council of National Security after the coup.

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As neither Thaksinocracy nor Royalist Democracy seemed to adhere to the constitutional framework and both were based on extra-constitutional sources of legitimacy, it is clear that the 1997 constitution is also problematic as a point of departure for any discussion about democracy in the context of the 2006 coup. Thus another shortcoming of the conventional approach when analysing democracy is the tendency to see constitutions as the legal framework within which all actors must play, which is not necessarily the case. In this context, an important feature of Royalist Democracy is the emphasis of moral politics and the kings extra-constitutional rights. This presents an analytical problem when using the conventional approach according to which these extra-constitutional powers may simply be regarded as an excuse by the ruling elite to bypass the rule of law.

Toward an Approach of Recognising Political Systems as Alternative Democracies

Having examined the inadequacy of the conventional approach as a method to fully address and understand the context of the coup and the Thai political system, some ideas and guidelines as to how one would go about constructing an alternative theoretical approach for studying political systems with the possibility of recognising alternative democratic political systems in non-Western cultures based on the present case study will be presented below. To formulate an alternative approach to the study of political systems and alternative democracies, one would have to ask the following two questions; (1) can an existing system of democratic processes and principles already be identified within the local socio-cultural context which is fundamentally different from the standard definitions of international consensus democracy, and (2) what is the basic source of legitimacy upon which the political system under study is built? For political systems to function they must be based on a social contract between members of that particular society in which a compromise about the distribution of power and protection of individual rights (although these might differ from one culture to another) has to be settled with popular acceptance. According to international consensus democracy the democratic processes of election, parliament and constitution ensures that the rights of people are maintained and thus that the social contract is followed by all parties. The democratic process

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in turn provides the legitimacy of this system. If the system breaks down (if a government collapses due to scandals, corruption, vote of censure etc.), the social contract functions as the nexus of renegotiation. In the case of Thailand, the democratic processes of international consensus democracy do not necessarily guarantee that peoples rights are protected, as the case study of the present essay has made clear. In a historical context, the large turn-over in the number of constitutions is probably one reason why these documents have never acquired the status of being more than temporary social contracts. In the event the political system breaks down (as it often has due to corruption), the present monarch functions as an unofficially elected Head of State who can check the abuse of power and appoint an interim PM. This extra-constitutional power and role of the monarch is based on the belief and consensus about his moral authority. In this sense, the king must act in the best service of his people as he is morally obliged to do, according to the rules proscribed for the Dhammaraja. Thus the social contract is basically one between the king and his people, and the source of legitimacy of the political system is ultimately religion, and not the democratic processes of a political ideology. While this traditionalist political arrangement in contemporary scholarship is analysed as a hegemonic ideology which maintains the rule of the network monarchy, an examination of its role as a distinct political system alongside the established international consensus democracy according to the guidelines above, could perhaps acknowledge the existence of distinct democratic political systems.

Conclusion
The intention of this essay was to show how the term democracy as an analytical category proves problematic when used conventionally to examine political events such as the 2006 coup in Thailand and assess its democratic nature and as an approach to understand the political system of Thailand more generally. Focusing on elections, electoral mandates, the democratic behaviour of citizens, institutions and governments, and the constitutional framework, ignores the fact that the principles and processes of international consensus democracy may be interpreted differently locally, and identify the existence of several contesting discourses of democracy. These differences can be attributed to local socio-cultural and historical characteristics. Taking these factors into account as well as analysing how these circulating discourses of democracy are linked

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to political struggles of power between contesting elites, proves a better way to understand not only why democracies may be substantially different in specific cultures, but also how they came to be that way. Democracy should not be seen as a specific entity which is globally homogeneous. There is a tendency in much contemporary scholarship to analyse and understand democracy according to an imagined international consensus democracy. Rather, democracy can be a contested concept among competing elites, and social groups, and can be considered to serve as the principal ideology of those who are in power, as well as those who struggle to attain it. Finally, as an alternative approach to the study of democracies in other cultures, this paper presented some ideas and guidelines how one would go about such a task. One such approach may begin by identifying democratic processes and social contracts embedded in existing socio-cultural traits of political systems, and by examining what the sources of legitimacy are on which these political systems are built.

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