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Neil Van Leeuwen Stanford University, Department of P ilosop y Abstract: I raise three puzzles concerning self-deception: (i) a conceptual paradox, (ii) a dilemma about how to understand human cognitive evolution, and (iii) a tension between the fact of self-deception and Davidson s interpretive view! I advance solutions to the first two and la" a groundwor# for addressing the third! $he capacit" for self-deception, I argue, is a spandrel, in %ould s and &ewontin s sense, of other mental traits, i!e!, a structural b"product! $he iron" is that the mental traits of which self-deception is a spandrel'b"product are themselves rational! !ntroduction" a Parado#, a Dilemma, and a $ension $hree puzzles plague the notion of self-deception! (irst, the classic paradox of self-deception points to an apparent incoherence in the ver" concept! If A deceives ), then A does not believe what she ma#es ) believe! *o if A deceives A, A must not believe what A believes! $hus the existence of self-deception seems to entail a contradiction! )ut manifold examples of human behavior are appropriatel" called cases of self-deception! *o how is self-deception possible+, *econd, #nowledge is prima facie critical to the evolutionar" success humans have had! -ur vision, hearing, other senses, and higher cognitive abilities largel" seem to owe their existence to the fitness value of #nowledge! $he widespread human capacit" for self-deception, however, undermines #nowledge! $he prominence of self-deception, therefore, creates a dilemma about how to understand the fitness value of #nowledge in general! If #nowledge enhances fitness, then the capacit" for self-deception shouldn t exist since it undermines #nowledge! )ut it does exist! If #nowledge does not enhance fitness, then the existence of self-deception is not a problem for evolutionar" theor"! )ut
we are then deprived of the most obvious explanation of our most complicated and interesting traits! .ow shall we solve this dilemma+ $he third puzzle is motivated b" the wor# of Donald Davidson, who indeed recognized it: the widel" held interpretive view of the mental holds that rationalit" is constitutive of the mental, including beliefs!/ -ne cannot sensibl" attribute beliefs to an agent unless those beliefs ma#e rational sense to the person attributing them! )ut selfdeception is an irrational belief state that people, with apparent 0ustification, attribute often! $hus there is a tension between holding that rationalit" is constitutive of belief and holding that belief can come about b" self-deception! .ow shall we resolve this tension between the force of the interpretive view and the fact of self-deception+1 In this paper, I advance solutions to the first two puzzles! I also, b" explaining how self-deception relates to rational capacities and evidence, la" a groundwor# for addressing the third! I do this b" advocating three theses! ,! I offer a new definition of self-deception 2$hesis ,3, one that captures the epistemic tension inherent in sa"ing one deceives oneself, while avoiding the absurdit" of sa"ing one believes what one doesn t! I state the definition full" in section ,! /! I advance the byproduct view of self-deception 2$hesis /3, which runs as follows: The capacity for self-deception is a byproduct of a number of critical abilities humans have that enable us to cognize and behave rationally given finite minds! *elf-deception, in short, is a b"product of finite rationalit"! $he b"product view ta#es a s"nchronic perspective on the capacit" for self-deception, but it also ma#es salient a diachronic explanation of that capacit"! 1! I advance the view 2$hesis 13 that the capacit" for self-deception is what biologists *teven 4! %ould and 5ichard &ewontin call a spandrel! $he thesis, precisel", is: The capacity for self-deception is a structural byproduct of features that were not selected for their role in the production of that capacity! I do not claim here that the features I cite are themselves adaptations6 it is enough for m"
view that there is independent 0ustification for positing their existence apart from their role in self-deception! $heses / and 1 are identical as to the features the" claim the capacit" for self-deception is a b"product of, but the" differ as to the claims the" ma#e about those features! $hesis / claims that the" are critical to finite rational cognition and behavior! $hesis 1 claims that the" did not arise in natural selection for producing self-deception! $he definition is meant to solve the paradox! $heses / and 1, the b"product and spandrel theses, solve the second puzzle in a wa" that does not force one to den" the fitness value of #nowledge! As a spandrel, the historical existence of the capacit" for selfdeception rode pigg"-bac# on the evolution of those features of which it is a spandrel! *ince those features are rational, we can explain the capacit" for self-deception as the downside of a tradeoff: selection favored a pac#age of features that are themselves rational, but have an irrational b"product! $he whole pac#age will then have to have been more fit than competing pac#ages, but it will be the rationalit" of it that contributes to the fitness7not the self-deception! It should be apparent that the b"product view is of independent philosophical interest! 5ationalit" is of course a contested concept, but for clarit" I offer the following wor#ing definition: a capacit" is rational if it is (a) conducive to truth and coherence in an agent s belief set or (b) conducive to means-end coherence in practical planning, and (c) is not directl" detrimental to either (a) or (b)8! $he cluster of features I identif" constitute one wa" of having rationalit" in a finite mind with practical pro0ects, but that cluster "ields the capacit" for self-deception as a b"product! Is there some other wa" of having rationalit" in a finite mind+ 9" discussion will suggest that, for an" finite creature with human-li#e desires, rationalit" brings with it the capacit" for self-deception!
I structure this paper as follows! In section ,, I present m" definition of selfdeception and explain how it resolves the paradox! In section /, I defend m" theses about the capacity for self-deception, arguing for both theses in parallel! I then describe, in section 1, a paradigm case of self-deception and appl" m" framewor# to it! $o explore the wider implications m" theor" has, I argue in section 8 that the spandrel view of selfdeception challenges the dominant adaptationist paradigm in evolutionar" ps"cholog"! *ection : concludes with implications about self-deception and human rationalit"! % Definin& Self-Deception and Resolvin& t e Parado# -n the wa" to defining self-deception, I start with three paradigm cases! Imagine a college dropout who s aware of several important pieces of evidence that suggest finishing his degree will improve his 0ob prospects! .e s seen statistics on earnings6 his brother who graduated has fared much better at getting 0obs6 and several positions he wants re;uire a degree! )ut he wants it to be the case that his chances are good even without finishing6 he becomes self-deceived that the" are! <ow imagine a soccer pla"er who s made nervous b" the possibilit" that her coach will be angr" if she pla"s poorl"! *he might thin#: =I wish I believed coach wouldn t be mad! $hen I wouldn t be nervous and could pla" better!> $he weight of evidence suggests coach is the angr" t"pe, but b" focusing on the scant" evidence that coach is nice our soccer pla"er deceives herself into believing the coach won t be angr"! As a last example, recall -thello, who deceives himself into believing that Desdemona isn!t faithful! .e wants her to be faithful and has evidence that largel" suggests she is! )ut he self-deceptivel" believes she s unfaithful6 disaster ensues!
<ow let me present some theor"-neutral terminolog" that will allow us to discuss aspects of self-deception! (irst, the product of self-deception is the mental state that results from self-deception and in some sense accepts the content that the self-deception is about6 I hold the product is a belief! *econd, the deceptive element is the state or attitude in one s own mind that subverts the normal belief formation processes! I hold this is a form of motivation and will use the word =desire> for most of m" discussion as a general wa" of referring to this motivational component!: $hird, the doxastic alternative is the proposition that the agent in some sense should believe! $he doxastic alternative for the college dropout is: finishing my degree is needed to improve my #ob prospects! If we return to the paradox, we find two ma0or classes of views aimed at defining self-deception in a wa" that resolves it! (irst, there s the class of views that holds the product of self-deception is a belief6 when I m self-deceived that p, I believe that p! $he paradox is then resolved either b" drawing a division in the mind between the deceived part (which believes p) and deceiving part (which believes $p), or b" den"ing the re;uirement that the self-deceiver also believes $p!? $he second class of views holds that the product of self-deception is an avowal or avowed belief, a mental state underl"ing verbal behavior, but lac#ing important properties of genuine beliefs, such as deep connections to actions aside from merel" verbal ones! $he belief view is more common, and is held b", among others, Davidson (,@@A), &azar (,@@@), 9ele (/BB,), Cears (,@A8), $albott (,@@:), and m"self! Dariants of the avowal view are held b" Audi (,@AA), 5e" (,@AA), and (un#houser (/BB:)!
$he avowal view seems to provide an easier solution to the paradox: the selfdeceiver doesn t both believe that p and believe that $p, since the wa" in which p is held is merel" an avowal! $he problem with the avowal view is that it resolves the paradox b" den"ing deep connections between self-deception and action! )ut consider a gambler who marches to the casino self-deceived that he can climb his wa" out of debt6 he s acting on his selfdeception! I hold the belief view, because the self-deceived gambler wants to get out of debt and believes that he can do so b" gambling! &i#ewise, -thello s self-deception explains not merel" his verbal behavior, but also his action of #illing his wife! $he product of self-deception pla"s the same role in action explanation as other beliefs, so it is best viewed as a belief!E &et us then hold fixed that the product of self-deception is a belief, and see what our paradigm cases have in common! (irst, the agents aren t forming the self-deceptive belief out of lac# of intelligence or relevant evidence6 the belief goes contrary to their epistemic norms (rational rules for belief formation) and the evidence the" haveA! If the soccer pla"er had similar evidence about someone else s coach, she would correctl" conclude that coach was the angr" t"pe! *econd, a desire, with content related to the belief formed, is ma#ing the causal difference in the belief formation process! $hat the desire ma#es the causal difference will be clear from a thought experiment6 suppose -thello 0ust didn t care whether Desdemona was faithful! $hen, I thin#, his self-deceptive belief wouldn t have arisen! -n the basis of these considerations, I give this definition 2$hesis ,3:
'n agent is in a state of self-deception if and only if (i) she holds a belief* (ii) that belief is contrary to what her epistemic norms in con#unction with what evidence she has would usually dictate* and (iii) a desire* with content appropriately related to the belief formed* causally ma+es the difference to what belief is held in an epistemically illegitimate fashion!@ =Fpistemicall" illegitimate> here is to be understood as illegitimate relative to the epistemic norms that the agent actually has, since believing contrar" to norms one doesn t have shouldn t count as self-deception (although perhaps it would be wishful thin#ing)!,B A self-deceived agent, I hold, does not 0ust violate standards of rationalit"6 she violates her own standards of rationalit"!,, 9" definition is meant to resolve the paradox of self-deception as follows: it captures the epistemic tension,/ involved in selfdeception b" re;uiring that the agent have compelling evidence to the contrar" of the belief formed, but b" not re;uiring both beliefs be held it escapes positing the ps"chological absurdit" (if it is absurd) of holding two contradictor" beliefs! Ghat relation must obtain between the content of the deceptive element (the desire) and the product of self-deception (the belief)+ $here are three possibilities and thus three main t"pes of self-deception! (irst, the content of the desire can be the same as the content of the resulting belief6 I call this wis ful self-deception, or self-deception that s continuous with wishful thin#ing! $he college dropout, for example, has wishful self-deception! .e believes what he wants to be the case! $his #ind of self-deception isn t planned6 one slides into it! *econd, the desire can be to have the belief that s ultimatel" formed, as with the nervous soccer pla"er6 I call this willful self-deception! Cascal, it seems, was willful! (inall", the content of the desire can be contrar" to the content of the resulting belief, as in -thello6 I call this dreadful self-deception,1!,8
$he chart below summarizes forms of self-deception and related phenomena! Dip means i desires that p6 'ip means i has evidence that b" her epistemic norms on the whole favors believing p! $hese are all different forms of irrationalit" agent i can have in believing that p ((ip)! $he far left column refers to the deceptive element! Non-self-deceptive )elief *'ip, *'i*p, (ip wishful thin#ing willful thin#ing dreadful thin#ing Self-deceptive )elief 'i*p, (ip wishful self-deception willful self-deception dreadful self-deception
$he idea behind the wishful thin#ing, willful thin#ing, and dreadful thin#ing column is that the agent, with desire pla"ing a causal role, forms a belief without having compelling evidence that it s true or compelling evidence it s false! $he various forms of selfdeception are stronger forms of irrationalit", for in those cases the agent has evidence that supports the belief that runs contrary to the belief that s formed7in fact, evidence that supports the negation of what s believed! Ge can see, then, that there is a continuum between wishful thin#ing and self-deception, with the line being crossed when the evidence contrar" to the product is sufficient b" the agent s epistemic norms to support the doxastic alternative! In what follows, I assume m" definition and conceptual framewor# are plausible and address what the capacit" for self-deception consists in and wh" it exists, focusing on wishful self-deception, which seems the most common form!,: + $ e 'tiolo&y of Self-Deception $he second puzzle of self-deception, the dilemma about the fitness value of #nowledge, raises the ;uestion of wh" the capacit" for self-deception exists!
.rima facie, the capacit" for self-deception loo#s bad for fitness, so it s puzzling that it hasn t been selected out! 9an" examples of self-destructive behavior caused b" self-deception support the intuition that it has negative fitness value: people get ta#en advantage of in relationships the" self-deceptivel" believe are good, get in fights the" can t win but self-deceptivel" believe the" can, fail to fix serious problems the" re selfdeceived about, and so on! <evertheless, one approach to this puzzle is to argue that selfdeception is not reall" of negative fitness value7or is even of positive fitness value! $his is the approach that $rivers (/BBB) ta#es in arguing that self-deception enhances our abilit" to lie! <ote, however, that this thesis relies on the controversial empirical h"pothesis that the capacit" for self-deception enhances fitness, or at least did in the ancestral environment! 9" approach, represented in the spandrel thesis, will have two ma0or advantages over the other! (irst, insofar as the capacit" for self-deception arises from features of mind whose existence is independentl" plausible, m" solution is more parsimonious for not having to posit additional functions! Ge won t have to posit an"thing besides what we alread" #now exists6 the wor# comes in showing how these features give rise to selfdeception! *econd, m" approach does not rel" on a dubious empirical postulate: that selfdeception enhances fitness! &et me now develop the spandrel view! %ould and &ewontin (,@E@) begin their criti;ue of adaptationism in biolog" with the observation that an" architectural structure with a dome mounted on top of rounded arches will have as a b"product of this design what are called spandrels, tapered triangular surfaces that reside beneath the dome in the space between the arches!
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$heir point is that man" phenot"pic traits are analogous to spandrels6 the" are the result of the organism s structure6 it would be wrong to construe them as adaptations that were selected for in their own right, 0ust as it would be wrong to construe the spandrels of a cathedral as spaces that the architect decided to include independently of the overall structural design! $he" give the example of the chin, which results from other structural and developmental features of the 0aw and wasn t selected for its fitness value! I hold that the capacit" for self-deception is an evolutionar" spandrel! $his thesis ma" be bro#en into two components! (irst, the capacit" for self-deception is a structural b"product of other features of mind! *econd, the existence of those features in evolutionar" histor" is most plausibl" construed as due to functions other than their contribution to self-deception! $o argue the first, I demonstrate in the following sections what mental features the capacit" for self-deception is a b" product of! $o argue the second, I develop7concurrentl" with m" explanation of how those features contribute to self-deception7the byproduct view: the features in ;uestion contribute in #e" wa"s to the abilit" we have as finite creatures, insofar as we have that abilit", to cognize and behave rationall"! &et me flesh out the outline of this argument in slightl" more detail! 9" central argument for the spandrel thesis will be to define what I thin# is the essential complex of features of mind out of which self-deception7wishful self-deception in particular7
arises! I show that the operation of the features in this complex to produce self-deception is wholl" intelligible without appeal to an" mechanism whose =purpose> (evolutionaril" or otherwise) is to produce self-deception! I then highlight other features that aid the process of self-deception6 these can be divided into epistemic facilitators, factors that in certain contexts ma#e it easier to believe contrar" to usual epistemic norms, and desire sources, aspects of mind that give rise to the sorts of desires that easil" figure in selfdeception! $hroughout I will ma#e the case that the features identified are conducive to rational cognition, goal-setting, and goal attainment given finite limits! If this is true, then the capacit" for self-deception is not merel" a ;uir# that arises out of unimportant features of what our brains are li#e6 it s rather a capacit" that arises from features essential to human rationalit"! ,E +.% $ e 'ssential ,omple# *even features of the human mind comprise the essential complex that "ields selfdeception! $he first three are: ',%: Desires have a characteristic sting that accompanies anticipation or evidence of their non-satisfaction2,A ',+: 3umans have the ability to attend selectively to inputs and evidence2 ',-: 3umans have a general inclination to avoid discomfort2,@ .ow do these features of mind contribute to self-deception+ *a" I desire that p! $hus I also have the disposition to feel a sting when $p is anticipated! )ecause of this desire that p, when I encounter evidence of $p, I have a feeling of discomfort or ;ueasiness (FH,)! $his evidence must be cognized as evidence of $p in order for it to cause the discomfort7otherwise it simpl" wouldnIt bother me! $his discomfort is there especiall" when m" attention is on the $p evidence, but abates when m" attention shifts
7especiall" when it shifts (FH/) to p evidence (what little there ma" be)!/B Against a bac#ground inclination to avoid discomfort (FH1), m" attention shifts to the p evidence! *elf-deception ensues, for the focus of attention on the p evidence gives rise to the p belief, even though the total evidence possessed in con0unction with epistemic norms would dictate believing $p! $hus runs the basic causal chain from the desire that p to the belief that p, despite compelling evidence that $p! Importantl", it isn t the case that the normal functions/, of FH,-FH1 are to produce self-deception! FH,, the sting of desires, is conducive to goalattainment6 it prods us out of situations in which our desires are unli#el" to be satisfied! FH/, selective attention, is an essential feature of an" finite cognitive s"stem with interests6 without it the mind would be mired in a wash of inputs, most of which would be irrelevant to the organism s ends! FH1, general inclination to avoid discomfort, t"picall" has the function of #eeping one out of situations that ma" be harmful and is thus generall" conducive to goal attainment! $he iron" of FH1 is that, b" helping ma#e selfdeception possible, it sometimes contributes to #eeping one in harmful situations about which one is self-deceived!// $he essential complex also includes: ',.: 4vidence in the human mind is structurally organized2 Ge wouldn t be able to attend to evidence selectivel" if that evidence weren t organized in wa"s that allow us to search through it! $he structure of the Fvidence )ox, so to spea#, is essential to our abilit" to cognize rationall", for without it selective attention would be aimless! )ut it also is an essential component in our capacit" for self-deception! $hus, to relate this point explicitl" to $hesis /, we have the surprising result that self-deception is,
at least in part, a b"product of rational capacities! ()" wa" of contrast, an infinite rational being wouldn t need evidence in her mind to be structurall" organized, for infinite powers would allow attending to everything at once, with no need to search through the evidence!) $he essential complex, as I ve described it so far, presupposes the following feature: ',/: 3umans form beliefs on the basis of evidence in con#unction with epistemic norms2 $he deep iron" is that this rational feature of mind is both subverted and implicated in the same self-deception! It s subverted with respect to total evidence, but implicated in the formation of the self-deceptive belief b" the evidence selectivel" attended to!/1 (or completeness, I add: ',0" 3umans experience pleasure at evidence that their desires will be satisfied2 ',1" 3umans see+ pleasure2 An example of FH? in action is the exuberance felt at the end of a sports competition when victor" is in sight! It should be clear immediatel" how FH? and FHE contribute to attainment of the goals that one has, but the" are also implicated in the comfort-driven modulation of attention that produces self-deception!/8 +.+ Facilitators and Desire Sources A facilitator is a mental feature that ma#es easier the failure of epistemic norms and evidence in self-deception! A desire source gives rise to desires that are apt to cause self-deception! <ot 0ust an" cause of desire will do, because desires whose content concerns sub0ect matters it s hard to be self-deceived about for epistemic reasons will not t"picall" give rise to self-deception! .ere I present and explain (first) the most important
facilitators and (second) the most important desire sources in the capacit" for selfdeception! F%" The web of belief has inertia2 )eliefs t"picall" occur in relation to a web/: of other beliefs that 0ustif" them and give them content! -ne fact of human cognition is that the webs that constitute our belief sets have inertia! A s"stem of beliefs does not easil" change entirel" due to the existence of facts that are anomalous from the perspective of particular beliefs! $his aspect of our cognitive econom" is largel" advantageous to coherence in our belief sets6 for if our webs of beliefs underwent revolution with each discover" of anomalous fact, we would be in a perpetual state of cognitive flux! It would not ma#e sense to perform a massive modus tollens on our entire web simpl" because one belief encounters anomal"! $his explains to some extent wh" confirmation bias, when it involves the tendenc" to loo# for confirmation of things alread" believed, ma" be helpful6 it helps shield us from constant cognitive revolution! $he dar# side of the inertia of the web is that it facilitates self-deception! (irst, it ma#es it easier to hang on to beliefs under the influence of a desire even when the evidence available has become compelling in the other direction! $he essential complex ma" not alwa"s be sufficient b" itself to cause a cuc#old to hang on to the belief that his wife is faithful against the weight of the evidence! )ut given inertia of his alread" existing web of beliefs, self-deception becomes possible! Juhn (,@?/) discusses scientists who won t adopt a new paradigm even when the rest of the scientific communit" has signed on6 some of these are probabl" cases of inertia-aided selfdeception! (urthermore, the inertia of the web helps explain self-deception in the teeth of
strong evidence to the contrar" of the self-deceptive belief: multiple self-deceptions in a context can underlie the conscious reclassification of evidence and holding of beliefs6 in such cases the inertia of the web is the mental difference between a house of cards and a house of cards with glue! F+" Desires and other emotions generate con#ectures and thoughts2 Antonio Damasio, in Descartes! 4rror (,@@8), argues that two of the brain s emotional centers, the ventro-medial pre-frontal cortex and the am"gdala, are critical for reasoning! .e doesn t differentiate between theoretical reason, reasoning to form true beliefs, and practical reasoning, reasoning to form good actions6 his thesis is more plausible when ta#en to be about practical reasoning! )ut one of his points about the role of emotions in life planning suggests how emotions can influence theoretical reasoning as well! Fmotions, including desires, cause ideas to be suggested in our mind for consideration! Ghen one desires approval, for example, thoughts of oneself being approved of and accepted constantl" pass through consciousness! Fmotions themselves cause the appearance of representations in thought (=images,> as Damasio puts it) of the ob0ects at which the emotions are directed! $his, of course, facilitates planning and practical reasoning about life choices, and Damasio shows that patients with damaged emotional centers are incapacitated to act rationall": due to lac# of appropriate emotions the right ideas often don t occur to them for consideration! 5ut insofar as emotions and desires propose thoughts* con#ectures* and hypotheses for the agent to consider* they will also influence the formation of beliefs6theoretical reasoning! $his is simpl" because we can t form beliefs about contents that haven t occurred to us! $his mode of influence of desires and emotions on belief formation is beneficial for both cognitive and practical
goal-attainment, for without the guidance of emotion directing what we attend to our cognitive capacities would be mired in consideration of an infinitude of useless information! Ge often have desires for things intangible but felt to be important, such as what will happen in the future, the abilities of our children, the attitudes of friends and enemies, and events we won t ever see! In short, we have desires for things about which the beliefs fall far from the sensor" peripher" of the web of beliefs! Ghen such desires that p arise, the p-thoughts arise also, as explained! $he perpetual recurrence, however, of p-thoughts due to desires that p can be the first step in the self-deceptive formation of the belief that p6 for that same desire can, in virtue of the essential complex, cause selective attention to evidence in favor of the belief that p! *ince the p-thought is the first step in the formation of the p-belief, the propert" the desire has of proposing representations for thought, and of occup"ing the mind with them, thus ma#es it easier for self-deception to occur! F-" 3umans can apply differing degrees of s+epticism to different propositions2 *#epticism7the withholding of belief from a proposition that does not meet a certain level of 0ustification7comes in different degrees, ranging from refusing to believe a newspaper account without hearing it corroborated elsewhere to deep Hartesian s#epticism about the external world! 9ost humans can modulate the degree of s#epticism applied in given circumstances6 citizens of a democrac", for example, will t"picall" appl" a higher degree of s#epticism to information from a part" the" oppose than to information from the part" the" support! )eing s#eptical is a rational capacit", for it helps screen out belief in falsehoods! )ut appl"ing s#epticism differentiall" to different propositions can
ma#e us less truth-trac#ing, not more, whenever the differential application of s#epticism is caused b" desires other than the desire for truth! Discomfort with evidence in favor of believing that $p, caused b" a desire that p, can ma#e a person want to reclassif" that evidence6 differential application of s#epticism can aid in reclassif"ing evidence and thus in the self-deception that p! F." 3umans can suppress unwanted memories2 $he debate over whether there is suppression of unwanted memories, which seems to face a paradox similar to the one facing self-deception, has gone on for nearl" a centur"! It has, however, recentl" been put to rest b" Anderson et al2 (/BB8) who produced not onl" evidence that there is such suppression, but also f95I evidence concerning the neurobiolog" underl"ing it!
9emor" suppression re;uires people to override or stop the retrieval process! &ateral prefrontal cortex is involved in stopping prepotent motor responses, switching tas# sets, and overcoming interference in a range of cognitive tas#s! It ma" be h"pothesized, therefore, that people suppress unwanted memories b" recruiting lateral prefrontal cortex to disengage hippocampal processing! (p! /1/)
*uppression is not tantamount to self-deception, since it can have the useful independent function of minimizing distraction when we must handle a situation to which the suppressed memor" does not pertain! 9emor" suppression can thus facilitate rational thought, whenever the item suppressed needs to be brac#eted in order for the agent to reason properl"! )ut memor" suppression can facilitate self-deception! *uppression ma" be used deliberatel" in willful self-deception to undermine memor" of evidence contrar" to the desired belief! )ut it ma" also figure into wishful self-deception without there being an" intention to self-deceive! Kuite simpl", the discomfort engendered b" certain memories can ma#e us wish to suppress them, which we do! Ghen that discomfort is
caused b" a desire that p, the suppression of memories that provide evidence that $p can facilitate self-deception b" lowering the epistemic bar for the p-belief! I now turn from epistemic facilitators to desire sources! DS%" 3umans form complicated intentions2 According to 9ichael )ratman (,@AE), an intention pla"s at least three roles in mental life! (irst, it causes one to engage in means-end reasoning about how to accomplish the intended goal! *econd, it causes one to screen out options that would undermine the intended goal! $hird, it causes one to trac+ the intended goal! I hold that intentions, in virtue of pla"ing these roles, engender what I ll call subsidiar" desires7 desires for states of affairs that would be conducive to the realization of the intended goal! $rac#ing engenders desires for information on the intended target6 means-end reasoning brings about desires for realization of means to the end6 screening creates desires to be rid of obstacles! Gh" are subsidiar" desires to intentions apt to give rise to self-deception+ -ften the" re not, as when an intention to travel to Hhicago involves a subsidiar" desire to get to the airport6 whether or not I ve arrived at the airport on time is not something it s eas" to be self-deceived about! )ut often, especiall" in the case of long-term intentions, subsidiar" desires of intentions will be for things not immediatel" tangible but still felt to be important! If a parent intends to send a child to a good college, this intention will be accompanied b" a subsidiar" desire for the child to do well when he gets to high school7 this is a means to an end! )ut suppose this subsidiar" desire arises when the child is badl" underperforming in eighth grade! In this sort of situation, the subsidiar" desire concerning the child s intelligence ma" be the sort that gives rise to self-deception, since evidence
about a person s intelligence is often mixed enough, even if it s heavil" weighted to one side, to enable the #ind of selective attending involved in the essential complex! Do the other two functions of intentions, trac#ing and screening, also generate desires li#el" to be implicated in self-deception+ It s less li#el" that the trac#ing function fre;uentl" brings about desires ripe for self-deception! $he main purpose of trac#ing is accurac" and #nowledge, so its subsidiar" desires won t be for states of affairs as much as information! Fven if the goal of the intention is not well-defined, such as sending a child to a =prestigious> universit", the trac#ing of related facts, such as admissions standards and tuition costs, will focus on concrete things about which self-deception occurs onl" rarel"/?! I also don t see that the screening function of intentions is a ma0or source of desires that produce self-deception, since it will mainl" be the source of desires not to do particular things! <onetheless, the means-end reasoning function of intentions on its own is sufficient for intentions to be an important desire source for self-deception! DS+" 3umans experience cognitive dissonance when their behavior diverges from the norms of their self-concepts2 Hognitive dissonance is the discomfort people feel when their behaviors don t conform to their conceptions of themselves as moral, competent, and consistent! As an aversive drive, we want to be rid of it6 thus we want circumstances in the world to be such that our behavior doesn t turn out to be immoral, incompetent, or inconsistent after all! *uch desiring ma" well be beneficial to accomplishing practical pro0ects, since it ma" motivate changing incompetent, inconsistent, or immoral behaviors! )ut such desiring is also conducive to self-deception, for it involves contents not near to the sensor" peripher" of the web of beliefs but nonetheless felt to be important! In Aronson et al2 (/BB:), Flliot
Aronson recalls an otherwise affable Dietnam veteran he met who believed the Dietnamese weren t human! Hlearl", the balance of evidence he has is on the side of the belief that the" are human6 this explains wh" he felt guilt" at first about the atrocities he committed! )ut because of dissonance he desired that it not be the case that the beings he #illed reall" were human6 this desire is the deceptive element in his self-deception that the" weren t! $o us, it s plain that the civilians he #illed were human6 it would have been plain to him too had it not been for self-deception! )ut the point is that the ;uestion of whether or not a certain entit" counts as human is sufficientl" metaph"sical and sufficientl" debatable, as we ve seen from debates on abortion, that it falls into the sphere of possible self-deception! Hases li#e that of the veteran can be multiplied! L L L
)efore moving to m" discussion of a paradigm case, let me re-cap the argument thus far! $he challenge was to explain wh" humans have the capacit" for self-deception! $he steps I too# to meeting this challenge were as follows!/E (,) I explained what features of mind are involved in the capacit" for self-deception! (/) I argued7concurrentl" with sa"ing what the" are7that those features are rational! $he b"product view follows: (1) the capacit" for self-deception is a b"product of rational features! -nce we ve come this far, two arguments will get us to favoring the evolutionar" view that the capacit" for selfdeception is a spandrel over the view that it is an adaptation! (8) .olding it is a spandrel is perfectl" consistent with the prima facie plausible view that #nowledge enhances fitness! (:) .olding that it is a spandrel is more parsimonious, for we don t need to posit an additional adaptive function for self-deception!
- 2pplication of t e Spandrel View to a Paradi&m ,ase 9" focus here has been to explain wh" and how wishful self-deception in particular exists (as opposed to willful or dreadful self-deception/A)! $he answer to the ;uestion of wh" we have the capacit" for self-deception is that the capacit" is a b"product of mental features, each with useful functions, which in combination "ield self-deception! $o see how the capacit" wor#s, let s consider a paradigm case! $he case of wishful self-deception that I gave in section , was that of the college dropout! $he case I discuss here is more tragic, but also common! 9" focus is abuse in familial or spousal relationships! Mnderstanding the ps"chological causes of the behavior of the abuser is utterl" important, but we should also as# about the ps"cholog" of the abused! Does self-deception ever pla" a role in #eeping a person in a relationship in which he or she is abused+ I #now personall" of two such cases6 I don t thin# the" re unusual! In one case, a woman abused b" her bo"friend admitted, after the relationship ended, that she was self-deceived that the abuse would end! In another case, a man explained, "ears into middle age, that he had been self-deceived up until age /: that his mother was a good parent, despite an ongoing pattern of abuse when he was a child! $here is no reason to doubt these people s accounts! .ow does self-deception arise in such cases+ I ll present m" understanding of the case of the abused romantic partner! $his person has man" cognitions7experience of abuse, #nowledge of patterns of abuse7that on her own epistemic norms should "ield the belief that her bo"friend will continue to hurt her if she sta"s in the relationship! )ut she has an intention (D*,) to have a health" relationship6 this intention has the subsidiar" desire that the abuse stop even with the relationship continuing! $his desire is the deceptive element! Although she has
compelling evidence for the belief that the abuse will continue, she also has some limited evidence (in the form of repeated promises from the bo"friend) that it will stop! )ecause of her desire for the abuse to stop and the relationship to be health", she feels the sting of disappointment (FH,) when attending to evidence suggesting abuse will continue and comfort when considering memories of promises that suggest it won t (FH/ and FH?)! $he general inclinations to avoid discomfort and find pleasure (FH1 and FHE) cause her attention (FH/) to be directed to the comforting evidence! Attention to this evidence, b" FH:, completes the self-deception! *he believes the abuse will stop even with the relationship continuing! $his process is aided b" the inertia of the web of belief ((,), because she started out the relationship believing there would be no abuse and having man" other beliefs about the goodness of her bo"friend supporting this belief! *ome of her memories of abuse, furthermore, become suppressed ((8)! *he greets her friends who tell her to get out of the relationship with a higher degree of s#epticism ((1) than she usuall" has! )ecause of her desire for the relationship to wor#, thoughts of relational harmon" repeatedl" occur to her ((/), ma#ing it easier for her to hold to the product of selfdeception! $he cognitive dissonance (D*/) arising from the tension between her conception of herself as a self-respecting person and her behavior of sta"ing in an abusive relationship adds to her desire that the abuse stop in a wa" that further facilitates selfdeception! $his is how, b" a spandrel of the mind, an intelligent woman with ample evidence of her bo"friend s abusive character becomes self-deceived! $here is no need to posit an intention to self-deceive or an adaptation that s designed for self-deception!
Self-Deception, Spandrels, and 3et odolo&y in 'volutionary Psyc olo&y I hold that the theor" of self-deception presented here has significant implications
for the field of evolutionar" ps"cholog"! It s no secret that the dominant paradigm in evolutionar" ps"cholog" is adaptationist! Honsider this passage from $oob" and Hosmides (,@@:):
-ur cognitive architecture resembles a confederation of hundreds or thousands of functionall" dedicated computers (often called modules) designed to solve adaptive problems endemic to our hunter-gatherer ancestors! Fach of these devices has its own agenda and imposes its own exotic organization on different fragments of the world! (p! xiv)
If this is representative, then the program of evolutionar" ps"cholog" has been to explain basic mental phenomena as features that were advantageous in the ancestral environment! Githin this paradigm, 5obert $rivers (/BBB) attempts to explain self-deception as an adaptation to help other-deception! I criticize $rivers theor" extensivel" elsewhere/@ on grounds of internal difficulties! )ut m" main criticism of the dominant paradigm in evolutionar" ps"cholog" at present7which also applies to $rivers7is that there is not enough serious consideration of alternative evolutionar" h"potheses to adaptation! $here are some examples of b"product views within evolutionar" ps"cholog"6 art, fiction, religion, and music have all been claimed to be b"products!1B (<ote that byproduct b" itself is a wider categor" than spandrel, since something can be a b"product of phenot"pic traits combined with cultural facts! =*pandrel,> on m" understanding, denotes a b"product of phenot"pic traits!) )ut those b"product claims tend to be about cultural phenomena restricted to specific content domains and to not basic, highl" general mental processes li#e self-deception! $he structural complexit" of the human mind should prompt us to consider the possibilit" that man" more prominent features of mind than have been recognized so far are structural b"products7spandrels!1, I hope that this essa"
not onl" explains the capacit" for self-deception in particular as a spandrel, but also provides an example of how one might construct a spandrel theor" in general! $here are man" critics of evolutionar" ps"cholog"! )ut there is a fallacious implicit assumption that man" of them seem to share with those the" criticize: either a prominent mental tendenc" is an adaptation or it is the result of environmental influence! $his is no doubt simplif"ing the dialectic, but one gets the impression all traits are either li#e teeth (adaptations) or li#e hairst"les (environmental)! $he battle is then fought over which traits fall into which categor", with evolutionar" ps"chologists advocating adaptations, their critics advocating environment, and moderates advocating a =complex interpla"> of the two! In this dialectic, spandrels are often ignored! Ghen the possibilit" of spandrels does come up, rarel" is a s"stematic theor" developed of how the spandrel in ;uestion actuall" wor#s!1/ I suspect the problem might be that no compelling general approach to constructing ps"chological spandrel theories has been exemplified! In an Appendix on evolutionar" ps"cholog" that summarizes the views of evolutionar" ps"chologists 5obert Gright and 5ichard Grangham, a 5A<D 9onograph 5eport presents Gright s defense of evolutionar" ps"cholog" against some spandrel-t"pe criticisms that have been made b" *teven 4a" %ould: =Gright responds that, while the criticism must be well-ta#en, %ould has never given an example of such a Nspandrel in the literature> (p! ?@)! &ac#ing a good example of a mental spandrel, it seems, man" evolutionar" ps"chologists have felt free to pursue the adaptationist paradigm unencumbered! (urthermore, a close examination of this Appendix reveals an important and curious presupposition of the authors! %ould s arguments about spandrels are presented as criticisms of =evolutionar" ps"cholog",>
without appending an" ;ualifier to the phrase =evolutionar" ps"cholog"> such as =adaptationist!> $his shows that the authors implicitl" e;uate evolutionar" ps"cholog" with adaptationist evolutionar" ps"cholog"! I thin# there is no good reason for this! Mnderstanding the evolution of the mind'brain should involve both spandrel and adaptationist explanations7and probabl" man" other #inds as well! <ow an example of a mental spandrel has been given6 I have not onl" claimed that self-deception is a spandrel, but also shown what features self-deception is a conse;uence of and how self-deception follows from them! If the methodolog" I recommend is ta#en seriousl", this could change the landscape of evolutionar" ps"cholog" significantl"! 9" methodological recommendation is this: in see#ing to explain the etiolog" of a certain mental phenomenon, consider first in detail what other features of mind (or bod") that mental phenomenon ma" depend upon6 ta#e seriousl" the possibilit" that the phenomenon in ;uestion is merel" a b"product of those other features without having been selected for in its own right6 onl" after such consideration should one attempt to reconstruct an evolutionar" histor"! $his recommendation reall" amounts to this: understand the anatomy of a phenomenon before attempting to reconstruct its evolutionary history! Doing so will "ield a picture of mind that is less modular, richer, and more accurate! Ironicall", following these recommendations could lead to better and more developed adaptationist theories as well, for the interconnectedness of various adaptations would become much more apparent! / Self-Deception and 4uman Nature Ghat is the human mind such that it deceives itself+ -r, what are the fundamental properties central to the capacit" for this mental state+ 9" answer is this: we have
capacities for rational logico-mathematical and evaluative 0udgment, but we need to cognize and survive with finite powers in the limits of finite time! If we had infinite rational processing that allowed total ob0ective formation of 0udgments of good and bad and true and false, then we wouldn t self-deceive! In the theoretical ideal of a perfectl" rational angel, such 0udgments form the basis for all actions! In animals, finite perception, memor", and processing necessitate a much more immediate cause of action in the context of hostile environments: desires! Desires alone, however, don t give rise to self-deception! Self-deception comes from rationality in the context of a finite desiring mind! As I ve stressed, man" of the features of which self-deception is a b"product are rational! $he abilit" to attend selectivel" to evidence is rational6 it allows us to sift through the wash of inputs and attend to the relevant ones! $he formation of beliefs on the basis of evidence is rational! $he inertia of the web of beliefs is rational6 it prevents perpetual cognitive flux and ma" be seen as characteristic of finite rational cognition as such! $he abilit" to appl" differing degrees of s#epticism is rational6 it can be used to help us screen out falsehood! And the abilit" to form complex intentions is rational6 it facilitates theoretical and practical achievements! )ut all of these rational abilities are implicated in the pervasive form of human irrationalit" called self-deception! $hus the capacit" for self-deception is not an incidental addition to our cognitive ma#e-up! It comes from rationalit" in the context of finitude, two features thought central to being human since the ancient %ree#s! $o summarize, our finitude contributes to our capacit" for self-deception in two wa"s: (i) it necessitates desires for the sa#e of survival6
(ii) it necessitates several forms selectivity in cognitive processing! Ghen the desires (i) influence the selectivit" (ii), one is on the road to self-deception! .umans are finite rational self-deceivers! Does this mean self-deception is inevitable for humans+ I don t #now either wa", but I do thin# the propensity to selfdeceive is inevitable! *elf-deception can, however, be better avoided b" cultivating cognitive habits that neutralize the aspects of mind that give rise to self-deception! -ne can confront discomforting evidence and accept it for what it is! I have also argued that there are #inds of desires that humans characteristicall" have that are more li#el" to engender self-deception: moral desires, desires for dispositional states of mind to obtain, and desires for intangibles that are felt to be important! -ne can be aware of these! A person with such desires and mixed evidence is in a context ripe for self-deception!11 'ndnotes
$here are actuall" different formulations of the paradox! $he one I give here presents self-deception as apparentl" involving a straightforward contradiction: belief and not belief! )ut, on a wea#er formulation, attributing self-deception involves attributing a belief that p and a belief that $p, which seems to involve positing something ps"chologicall" absurd without directl" resulting in logical contradiction on the part of the attributer! (or either formulation the strateg" for resolution will be the same: give a definition that captures the phenomenon without positing something absurd! / *ee Davidson (,@A/, ,@A:, ,@@A)! 1 $here are not onl" these three puzzles! $hese are the most visible tip of the philosophical iceberg of problems surrounding self-deception! *elf-deception raises ;uestions about: agenc", moral responsibilit", self-#nowledge, the role of emotion in cognition, the distinction between what is perceived and what is inferred, what beliefs are in general, doxastic voluntarism, the distinction between tacit and explicit beliefs, belief attribution, and the value of truth! 8 It s important to note that this is a wor#ing definition! I m sure possible situations could be imagined in which this definition is satisfied b" an irrational capacit" and a deviant causal chain, but this should do for now! Also, the word =directl"> in clause (c) is important, since, as we ll see, rational capacities are indirectl"7via self-deception7implicated in decrease in truth in the belief set! : Gh" can t other #inds of emotional pollution besides desires muddle the epistemic process in a wa" that counts as selfdeception+ 5eflection suggests that self-deception ma" be caused b" fear, 0ealous", love, hate, shame, and even values and ideolog"! 9" response in defense of m" definition will not be to exclude these, but to include them insofar as the" have a motivational aspect! An aimless fear or paranoia cannot be the deceptive element in self-deception, although the" can cause other cognitive foibles! )ut love or fear can be if the" are directed in certain wa"s and motivates! ? *ee note ,! E I ve recentl" become aware of empirical data that supports the belief view! 5amachandran (,@@A) discusses an experiment he does in which a patient in denial about her left side paral"sis grasps a tra" on one side with her right hand instead of in the middle, suggesting she believes that she could use her left hand to pic# up the other side! I also argue against the avowal view in other wor#! A Ghen I sa" that an agent has evidence that p, I mean that she has cognitions that b" her own epistemic norms constitute evidence that favors believing p! @ $here are several other definitions of self-deception on offer in the philosophical literature! $he one closest to m" own is 9ele s (/BB,)! *ee also 5obert Audi (,@AA), Jent )ach (,@A,), and %eorge %raham (,@A?), to name a few! ,B $his naturall" raises the ;uestion of what it means to have an epistemic norm! $here are man" complications lur#ing that do not fit into the scope of this essa"! In general, however, I thin# that self-deceivers count as self-deceived because the" believe contrar" to patterns of belief formation (i) that the" t"picall" follow and (ii) that are rationall" 0ustifiable! In other wor#, I define a ver" wea# form of self-deception in which a person believes contrar" to norms that she does hold but that are not rational in the first place! I suspect intuitions will diverge as to whether such a state is appropriatel" labeled =selfdeception!> I avoid these complications here, however, and focus on paradigm cases! ,, $he sentence to which this is an endnote raises an important point! -ne cannot simpl" eliminate the m"ster" of the existence of self-deception b" sa"ing that the human mind is not that rational6 for in self-deception one violates epistemic norms that one actuall" has! Diolating one s own norms, I hold, is more m"sterious than violating abstract cannons! $hat s wh" the relativization of self-deception to the agent s norms is so important! As far as I #now, I am the first to define selfdeception in a wa" that ma#es use of this #ind of relativization! ,/ *ee Audi (,@@E), who argues that capturing such a tension is critical to a good definition of self-deception! Audi criticizes 9ele for not re;uiring an"thing that entails the tension! 9" definition, I hold, is not susceptible to such criticism! ,1 9ele (/BB,) refers to it as =twisted self-deception!> In labeling this =dreadful,> I mean to suggest that the person engaged in this t"pe of thin#ing or self-deception is motivated b" some form of dread or fear! I am not suggesting that these t"pes of irrationalit" are, from an outside perspective, in an" wa" worse than the other forms! ,8 It ma" be that there are more #inds of self-deception than the three discussed here that one can categorize on the basis of relation between content of motivational element and content of belief! It is m" impression that most cases of self-deception will be classifiable as one of these three t"pes! )ut the =appropriatel"> in the content clause of m" definition is meant to leave open the possibilit" of other t"pes ,: &azar (,@@@) and 9ele (/BB,) agree that non-intentional forms of self-deception are the most common! ,? Image: The 'merican 3eritage Dictionary of the 4nglish 7anguage: (ourth Fdition, /BBB! ,E Alfred 9ele (,@@E, /BB,) also has put forth developed views on the etiolog" of self-deception! In other wor#, I compare our theories in detail, but a detailed comparison would be out of place in this essa"! *o I ll confine m"self to pointing out the two most important differences! (irst, 9ele does not address an"thing resembling the b"product or spandrel theses, so m" wor# spea#s more directl" to the second two puzzles identified in the Introduction! In fact, he doesn t raise these two puzzles at all! *econd, 9ele s ($& model will have difficult" accounting for cases of self-deception that the spandrel model handles well, i!e!, cases in which the self-deceived agent comes to have a belief, the holding of which can onl" be seen as having high sub0ective costs!
,A
Different desires have their own characteristic stings6 for some the sting is anno"ance, for others anxiet", and for still others simple disappointment! I ta#e the features I identif" here to be normal aspects of the human mind: the" obtain for the vast ma0orit" of adult people! ,@ &eDoux (,@@?) ma#es the point in the cases of fear and anxiet", for example, that it s not 0ust the anxiet"-causing stimulus that people see# to avoid, but the anxiet" itself! /B $he fact that evidence needs to be mixed in order for self-deception to happen is crucial for explaining a ver" important feature of self-deception! *elf-deception ver" rarel" occurs concerning perceptual beliefs6 in occurs much more often concerning what might be called intangibles! $he reason for this is that evidence for or against perceptual beliefs is mixed far less often! /, Ghen I use the word =function,> I am using it in the pre-theoretic sense without a commitment to the functions being adaptations (although, as indicated, I thin# the" might be)! // $he ;uestion naturall" arises why the modulation of attention should be sub0ect to the general inclination to avoid discomfort! -ne answer is that ps"chological discomfort of an" sort is ver" often distracting in a wa" that prevents accomplishment of goals, so one ma" need to attend awa" from what causes discomfort to accomplish something else! /1 $his point is also important for addressing the third puzzle! -ne might argue that the fact of self-deception is a reductio of Davidson s interpretive view! (Hf! 4ohnston (,@AA, p! AA): =5ational connections are not constitutive and exhaustive of the mental!>) )ut this inference would be too ;uic#, for the involvement of FH: in self-deception shows that there is a rational step in this (overall) irrational phenomenon! /8 $hroughout this discussion, I ve been tal#ing about desires as the form of motivation that gives rise to self-deception! -ne might reasonabl" wonder to what extent m" account will generalize to cases in which emotions li#e anger, love, or 0ealous" constitute the motivational element behind the self-deception! I hold there are three relevant possibilities! (irst, desires are often associated with emotions and caused b" them, so that in such cases the explanation I can give will simpl" have the added clause that an emotion was the source of the deceptive element desire! (or example, if I am 0ealous of a rival, I ma" want him to be unworth"6 this wanting will then be the deceptive element in self-deception that he is unworth"! *econd, often intense emotions can cloud 0udgment without intervening desires, causing one to have un0ustified beliefs! *ome might loosel" call this self-deception, but it is far enough from paradigm cases of self-deception that such tal# stri#es me as misleading! $he phenomenon of simpl" having worse 0udgment when one is angr", for example, is no doubt interesting, but it is not appropriatel" labeled self-deception! $hird, however, it is at least a conceptual possibilit" that an emotion should constitute the motivational'deceptive element in self-deception without and associated desire doing the causal wor# that I posit here! $he important ;uestion, then, will be: to what extent does m" account generalize to those cases+ *uppose, for example, .arr" s disgust with 4ennifer for stealing in the past leads him to believe self-deceptivel" that her children are morall" blameworth" also! 9atters are tric#" here, for this sounds li#e a somewhat borderline case of self-deception! )ut I do thin# that important aspects of m" account will generalize! *elective attention will still, in this case, be driven b" finding some evidence comfortable to attend to and other evidence not, and what causes the difference in what s comfortable will still be the motivational state, i!e!, the emotion! (urthermore, the facilitators I discuss in following sections, li#e the inertia of the web of belief, can all still come into pla"! I will have to leave a fuller discussion of this topic, however, to another occasion! /: -f the sort Kuine (,@:1) tal#s about! 5amachandran (,@@A, ch! E) discusses clinical cases of denial in wa"s that suggest the sort of view I m advocating! /? $his comment raises the following difficult philosophical issue: what is the difference between perceptual beliefs and beliefs arrived at via inference+ $his paper is not the place to address this topic! )ut it seems to be that self-deception does not t"picall" occur for perceptual beliefs7although see 5amachandran (,@@A, ch! E) for some extreme cases! /E $hese steps are not meant to represent the order of presentation! 5ather this is one wa" of representing the logical structure of the argument! /A Fxtending this model to cases of willful and dreadful self-deception will involve examining how the #inds of desire constituitivel" involved in those t"pes can trigger the sorts of selective attention and other processes here identified! (or reasons of space, I have not explored such an extension in this paper! /@ Dan &eeuwen (forthcoming)! 1B *ee, for example, )loom (/BB:) and Cin#er (,@@E)! 1, Caul )loom has pointed out to me in email that, 0ust as a matter of logic, the adaptations there are (however man" this happens to be) will have as a conse;uence man" more b"products6 furthermore, most mainstream evolutionar" ps"chologists are well aware of this! Ghile this is true, the point doesn t exempt the dominant paradigm from the criticisms I offer here6 it is one thing to observe that there must be spandrels and another thing to wor# out rigorous theories of how the" might wor#! (urthermore, the centralit" of the mental processes h"pothesized to be spandrels is also being raised here6 m" point is that central mental processes li#e self-deception that greatl" and generall" influence behavior have been largel" exempt from the #ind of theorizing offered in this paper! 1/ I am also not suggesting that =adaptation or environment or spandrel> is an exhaustive dis0unction6 there is drift and other factors that ma" influence phenot"pe as well!
11
Gor# on this paper has benefited from exchanges with Jenneth $a"lor, 4ohn Cerr", Jrista &awlor, Dagfinn (Ollesdal, Frica 5oeder, 4ohn %abrieli, Flliott *ober, 4oanna (idducia, &anier Anderson, 9ichael (riedman, <adeem .ussain, .elen &ongino, 9arc Caul", 4oshua &and", Al 9ele, 5obin 4eshion, 4esse Crinz, 5on *un", .ans Mlrich %umbrecht, Caul )loom, and 5obert $rivers!
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