The Dual Nature of European Identity

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Journal of European Public Policy

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The dual nature of European identity: subjective awareness and coherence

James A. Caporaso & Min-hyung Kim Published online: 04 Dec 2008.
To cite this article: James A. Caporaso & Min-hyung Kim (2009) The dual nature of European identity: subjective awareness and coherence, Journal of European Public Policy, 16:1, 19-42, DOI: 10.1080/13501760802453155 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760802453155
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Journal of European Public Policy 16:1 January 2009: 19 42
The dual nature of European identity: subjective awareness and coherence

James A. Caporaso and Min-hyung Kim
ABSTRACT We conceptualize European identity as a dual concept (subjective awareness and coherence) that contains both perceptual and behavioral components. We provide a set of indicators for European identity and analyze the data to assess changes in European identity over the last 50 years. Our goal is to offer a conceptual framework and method of assessing identity in an empirically sensitive way. Our ndings show that EU citizens have multiple identities of which EU identity is part and that there is strong evidence for the development of a coherent EU. We suggest that future research pay attention to a broader range of indicators than examined here. KEY WORDS Coherence; European identity; European integration; European Union; subjective awareness.
I. INTRODUCTION The concept of identity has played an increasingly central role in the study of European integration, especially in the last 15 years or so (Weiler 1997; Herrmann et al. 2004; Bruter 2005; Green 2007). There have been numerous efforts to dene European identity (Habermas 1992; Cerutti 1992; Wintle 1996; Risse 2004; Bruter 2005), resulting in distinctions between personal and social identity (Breakwell 2004: 28 31), civic and cultural identity (Bruter 2005), and patriotism versus nationalism (Li and Brewer 2004: 728). It is not surprising, nor is it necessarily a bad thing, that the concept of European identity has meant different things to different people. The distinction between civic and cultural identity is an important one. Bruter (2005) distinguishes a civic component of European identity (referring to the European Union (EU)) from a cultural one (referring to Europe as a whole) and argues that when European citizens explain they feel European, they have more a civic conception in mind. On the other hand, Wintle et al. (1996) conceptualize European identity in more general cultural terms as based on a shared historical heritage among Europeans. We accept this distinction and attempt to build on the concept of civic identity in this paper. Also, as bets a concept newly applied to the eld of integration, there is disagreement about the usefulness of the concept. Some analysts think that it will play an increasingly important role in the process of integration (Follesdal and
Journal of European Public Policy ISSN 1350-1763 print; 1466-4429 online # 2009 Taylor & Francis http://www.informaworld.com/journals DOI: 10.1080/13501760802453155
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Hix 2006; Schmidt 2006). It is plausible that, as the easy phase of market-making and collective gains is exhausted, and as questions of redistribution become prominent, citizens of the EU will be called upon to make sacrices for the common good. The move to redistributive politics, should it occur, would require widespread trust and recognition of commonalities, if not affection, across 27 states and diverse peoples. Other analysts are more skeptical about identity and perhaps some even see identity talk as the misguided efforts of academics and Euro-enthusiasts to conjure this concept up before it becomes a reality (Majone 2006; Duchesne and Frognier 1995). In this paper, our goal is a modest yet important one. First, we attempt to conceptualize identity as a dual concept, distinguishing this term from its close relatives such as interests and preferences. Second, we offer a set of indicators of identity that contains both perceptual and behavioral components a subjective and objective side to the integration process. We refer to the former as subjective awareness and the latter as coherence. Third, we provide evidence for these indicators to assess whether there is change in the development of Europes subjective identity and coherence. Fourth, we assess the evidence for subjective identity and coherence and speculate about what it means for European integration today and in the near future.
II. BACKGROUND Before our comments on identity, a few words on the increasing prevalence of usage of this concept may be helpful. First, as the borders of the EU have expanded (1973, 1981, 1986, 1995, 2004, and 2007) the question of what is Europe? has acquired a sharper edge. Far from being a unied or homogenous entity, Europe is a large, diverse, and complex place. The European Commissions map of Europe shows at least 35 European countries, 27 of which are presently in the EU. The EU grouping does not include Turkey, Belarus, Bosnia, Ukraine, Moldova, Croatia, Albania, Serbia, or the micro states of Andorra, San Marino, and the Vatican City. A comprehensive list of European states would exceed 40. As the EU has expanded, it has taken in much of what used to be called Central Europe before the Cold War, Eastern Europe, parts of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia), three Republics of the former Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and several Balkan countries (Greece and Bulgaria). In doing so, it has moved its external borders right up to Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Turkey. The EU has become a sprawling entity with little resemblance to its original Carolingian core (Ash 1994) comfortably situated in a small corner of north-west Europe. The EU has a presence in places where Catholic and Orthodox Christianity meet, and where Western Christianity and Islam adjoin one another. Multiple languages are spoken in the member countries and different traditions are observed. As the EU expands, its members are bound to ask, Who are we? and where does Europe begin and end?
J. Caporaso & M. Kim: The dual nature of European identity
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Second, identity discussion is more prevalent because people (the people of the EU) have a greater stake in what the EU does. The passage of the Single European Act (SEA) and the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in striking down obstacles to free movement have led to the creation of a unied market. As the free movement provisions of the treaties are realized, individuals are increasingly affected by market and policy externalities, i.e. they increasingly have a stake in the EU. III. CONCEPTUALIZATION: SUBJECTIVE IDENTITY AND COHERENCE Our basic argument is that the term identity is most usefully seen as containing two separate but closely related components, which we call subjective identity and coherence. At the moment we simply stipulate this twofold denition of identity, recognizing that it departs from the standard approach. By subjective identity we refer to shared feelings about the we-group, shared values, and common mental frames. The subjective aspect of identity is often all that is meant by the term. The second aspect of identity is coherence. Coherence has to do with how the parts of the group t together in some orderly ensemble, how the group works together to solve problems and how interdependent its parts are (Li and Brewer 2004). We address each component in turn. Identity as subjective awareness If the most basic question people can ask is Who am I?, social identity theory (see Tajfel 1970; Tajfel and Turner 1986) provides an answer in terms of the social groupings to which individuals are attached and to which they feel some sense of belonging. Identity involves a conception of self rooted in attachments and feelings of belonging to a group. Social identities have two faces; one turning inward to the individual person, the other outward toward the group with which one identies (Mayer and Palmowski 2004: 577). In terms of basic orientations, identities can have cognitive, affective, and evaluative components (Risse 2001). Following Risse (2001: 201), individuals may hold many different identities which may or may not conict. Thus, it may be helpful to see identities as parts of a repertoire that can be selectively activated under different circumstances. Identities are different from related concepts in a number of ways. First, identities rest on a more stable core than preferences, which can change rapidly depending on varying situational factors. As Brubaker and Cooper put it, identity is often invoked to point to something allegedly deep, basic, abiding, or foundational (italics in original) in contrast to the more supercial, accidental, eeting, or contingent aspects or attributes of the self (2000: 7). This statement does not at all deny the mutable character of identities (see the extended discussion by Risse (2001: 2012). Second, following Brubaker and Cooper, identities are invoked to describe and explain the more non-instrumental modes of
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human interaction, as opposed to changing calculation of costs and benets (2000: 6). Bruter makes the non-instrumental nature of identities the methodological cornerstone of his attempt to construct an indirect (residual) measure of identity (see 2005: appendix 3, pages 195 210). Identity as coherence
We argue that we can usefully employ a second component of identity that is less subjective and more behavioral or process-oriented. We call this second component coherence. Taking the individuals, roles, institutions, and processes of the member states of the EU as the starting point, we can ask to what extent they t together in a coherent syndrome. To use the language of Karl Deutsch et al. (1966) in their study of national and international community formation, we can ask to what degree the separate parts have amalgamated, merged, and formed a distinct new entity at the supranational level. To the extent that amalgamation takes place, a new entity comes into existence with a problematic identity of its own.1 From this perspective, the question of identity is not exclusively subjective nor is the existence of the group taken as given. We are aware that this conceptual move in the direction of a bifocal view of identity is likely to be controversial. Since we are interested in accumulation of research ndings, we would be hesitant to strike out in new directions if we did not believe that doing so may be productive. Still, the departure requires a rationale. Our response comes in two parts. The rst has to do with the framing of identity and how we think about it. The second has to do with the conceptual and theoretical afnity of the two facets of identity. We argue, regarding the framing issue, that our move is not as radical as some might think, in that identity requires some external aspect. While it may be customary to think of identity as a purely internal concept, a good part of what we know about it comes from observations of peoples behavior in their relation to groups. Assertions about ties to a group, testimonials about the positive value of ones group, and demonstrations of loyalty inscribed in efforts on behalf of the collectivity sometimes quite costly efforts all allow us to make inferences about group attachments that are not directly observable. As formulated by social psychologists such as Roger Brown (1965: 421) and Donald Campbell (1988), attitudes and identities are inferences based on dispositions to act in certain ways. We trust we can say this without denying an individuals internal identity experience. Second, we argue that there is a solid basis for the position that group coherence and subjective identity are so closely related that it is best to either see them as tightly connected or as part of the same phenomenon. It is theoretically possible to detach these two properties from one another, as in the identities of people in diasporas, but in almost any other conceivable situation, group function and group perception are best seen together. Li and Brewer argue that there are two different bases for group formation, one having to do with perception of
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shared attributes and the other with regard to perception of common problems, joint or coordinated problem-solving, and the interdependence of parts (Li and Brewer 2004: 729). We hypothesize that the second form of group formation is more relevant for our purposes, because the diversity of the member states makes shared attributes a less likely candidate for group formation, and because the activities and civic practices of the EUs institutions highlight the connection between group function and group identity. IV. INDICATORS OF SUBJECTIVE IDENTITY AND COHERENCE In this section we offer some indicators of our two components of identity. Indicators serve as a bridge between conceptual denitions and empirical observations. We sense that there is a great deal of distance between concept and observation so we attempt to close the gap. Identity as subjective awareness The rst component of identity is a subjective awareness of individuals that they are members of a group. There are three indicators that, we hypothesize, tap into subjective awareness. We call them self-reference, presumption of relevant unit, and common attitudes and values. Before getting to each of these indicators, we would like to add a few words on the data we use. To measure subjective awareness of European identity, we use Eurobarometer survey data. Several scholars, most notably Michael Bruter (2003: 1154; 2005: 101 2), have identied problems with some of the questions in the Eurobarometer survey. One problem lies in the forced choice nature of some of the questions and response categories whereby individuals are forced to choose among several identities. This imposes a zero-sum structure on the overall pattern of identities whereby one is less European to the extent that one is more British or French. A second problem arises because of the time frame imposed by questions such as In the near future, will you see yourself as [nationality] only, [nationality] and then European? Questions like this assume that individuals can correctly predict their future attitudinal states, thus confusing predictive and attitudinal issues. We do share these concerns about Eurobarometer data. Nevertheless, we chose to use them to measure the subjective component of European identity for the following reasons: rst, despite some weaknesses, they are the best database we have at the moment, in terms of comprehensiveness, accessibility, and comparability; second, the repetition of some questions at least twice a year enables the analysis of trends that is critical for time-series analysis (Cautres 2007: 130); third, it is worth noting that a number of scholars (to name only several, Carey 2002; Citrin and Sides 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2004; Green 2007) still rely on Eurobarometer surveys to measure European identity. This enables us to carry out a conversation with other researchers.
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Self-reference, the we-group For a group identity to exist, it must think of itself as a group. The process of collective self-reection and collective self-reference is crucial. If there is no collective self-reection, then there is no group identity. This ts in with our understanding of the evolution of European identity as part of the process of community building. Deutsch emphasized that a crucial part of the protracted process of integration had to do with the development of a we-feeling. While conceptions of group identication are notoriously difcult to assess, since 1992 the Eurobarometer has included a question intended to measure European identity: In the near future, will you see yourself as [nationality] only, [nationality] and then European, European and then [nationality], or European only? Table 1 shows the change of Europeans identication with their own countries and Europe as a whole between 1992 and 2005. Some ndings are worth noting. To begin with, if we look at the bottom two rows, we see that the percentage of respondents who identify themselves as European rst is very low. We can easily see this if we compare the bottom two rows with the top two rows. Next, while there was no overall change in European identication between 1992 and 2005, the number of respondents who put their nationality rst and European next exceeded the number of respondents who say that they think of themselves only in terms of their nationality, except for the period between 1996 and 1999 (in 1998 and in 2001, the percentage of respondents for these two groups was the same). A couple of inferences can be drawn from this observation. First, despite the absence of strong evidence for European identity at the non-elite level, the data show that a majority of respondents do have either a primary or secondary identication with Europe. This was the case even when the overall support for European integration substantially declined in the 1990s (Citrin and Sides 2004: 167). Second, European and national identity go hand in hand most Europeans think country rst, but Europe, too. Since maintaining a European identity does not hurt peoples feeling about their own countries, it seems that European identity is compatible (as opposed to competitive) with national identity. Presumption of the relevant unit Closely related to self-reference is the question of what unit one thinks of when a problem presents itself. In any multi-level system, a given problem could end up at different levels of government. What we are trying to get at in our word presumption is the more or less automatic, presumptive tendency to turn to the EU to solve a broad range of problems previously within the purview of the member states. To assess Europeans preference for joint problem-solving, the Eurobarometer asked EU citizens the following question: For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the [nationality] government or made jointly within the European Union? Since the number as well as
Table 1
Europeans identication with their own countries and Europe as a whole in percentages 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 46 40 6 5 45 40 6 5 43 43 7 4 45 42 6 4 2000 2001 2002 38 49 6 3 44 44 6 3 38 49 7 3 2003 2004 2005 40 47 7 3 41 47 7 3 41 48 7 3
[Nationality] only [Nationality] and European European and [nationality] European only
38 48 6 4
40 45 7 4
33 46 10 7
40 46 6 5
Source: Eurobarometers 37, 40, 42, 44, 46, 47, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, and 64. Note: Percentage for dont know is not shown.
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the content of key policy areas included in the survey varies over time, we categorize them into two groups the EU policy domain and the national policy domain. The EU policy domain refers to the policy areas that the plurality of citizens prefer to be decided at the Union level whereas the national policy domain points to the policy areas in which the public is least likely to support EU decision-making. Table 2 presents Europeans support for the level (joint or national) of decision-making in the EU policy domain whereas Table 3 illustrates Europeans support for the level of decision-making in the national policy domain since 1992. A few points need to be made. First, support for joint decision-making has generally decreased in most policy areas of the EU domain (currency is an exception here). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the number of policies in the EU domain (i.e. a Union responsibility) has always exceeded that in the national domain (i.e. a national responsibility) from 1992 to 2006. Second, a majority of Europeans favor joint decision-making in the policy areas that were traditionally regarded as the core of national sovereignty. These areas include foreign policy,2 currency, immigration, defense, and political asylum. Third, while EU citizens favor the European level decision-making in many policy areas, they still want national governments to decide in the areas where consideration of local contexts is necessary (e.g. education, health and social welfare, cultural policy, broadcasting rules of the media, justice, and police). Indeed, the data show that support for national decision-making in these areas increased if we compare the starting and end year. In sum, this tension between desired institutional level of decision-making/ problem-solving and the level at which loyalties and identications are primarily lodged may be important for understanding the EU in the years ahead. Common attitudes and value As much of the literature on social identity theory illustrates, the process of forming a group identity is a process that involves not only an in-group but an out-group. While there is controversy about the extent to which an ingroup needs to have an out-group which it can disparage, there is general agreement that the existence of an Other reinforces group solidarity. There are a number of candidate out-groups that could be used for comparison. When comparing themselves against large swathes of the rest of the globe, Western Europeans are likely to frame the comparison in terms of civilizations, to see themselves as representing Christendom and to set themselves apart from Orthodox Christianity, Hindu civilization, and Islam. If civilization is not the point of reference but rather economic and social differences with political rivals, then the United States may be used as the other (Ash 2004; Reid 2004). Despite the underlying commonalities between Europe and the US, there is a growing sense that Europe considers the US to be different on economic, ideological, and political grounds. For instance, while the US is sometimes held up as a model of jungle capitalism where there are few protections for workers
Table 2
Support for community or national decision-making in the EU policy domain
% Community (national) Science and technology Protecting environment Foreign policy Defense Currency Immigration Unemployment Political asylum Regional support
1992 1993 1994 1995 77 (17) 72 (24) 70 (21) 58 (40) 56 (38) 58 (38) 49 (47) 58 (36) 71 (22) 66 (30) 67 (24) 44 (51) 49 (44) 54 (40) 46 (50) 54 (38) 71 (22) 64 (31) 68 (22) 50 (45) 51 (41) 54 (40) 52 (44) 55 (38) 76 (18) 69 (27) 70 (20) 55 (40) 58 (36) 58 (36) 62 (34) 59 (33) 67 (26)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 71 (22) 69 (26) 67 (23) 45 (49) 54 (39) 59 (34) 59 (37) 56 (35) 62 (30) 67 (26) 64 (32) 68 (22) 50 (44) 54 (39) 54 (40) 55 (41) 53 (58) 61 (31) 70 (24) 66 (31) 71 (21) 50 (44) 67 (28) 58 (37) 57 (40) 55 (37) 64 (29) 66 (29) 59 (37) 69 (22) 48 (46) 60 (35) 49 (46) 52 (44) 51 (43) 60 (33) 67 (28) 60 (37) 69 (23) 47 (48) 57 (39) 46 (49) 51 (45) 48 (46) 60 (34) 68 (27) 64 (33) 71 (22) 51 (45) 65 (31) 49 (48) 53 (44) 51 (45) 63 (32) 68 (27) 61 (35) 71 (20) 51 (45) 67 (29) 48 (47) 50 (46) 50 (44) 59 (34) 66 (28) 62 (34) 72 (20) 50 (45) 63 (32) 51 (45) 44 (53) 53 (41) 58 (36) 67 (28) 67 (29) 68 (25) 57 (38) 63 (32) 58 (37) 47 (50) 58 (37) 60 (35) 69 66 70 64
57 39
57 38
57
57
Source: Eurobarometers 37, 40, 41, 43, 45, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 60, 62, 64, and 66. Note: Several areas in the EU policy domain were omitted here owing to space concerns as well as lack of over-time data. These include information on the EU, the ght against drugs, Third World cooperation, the ght against international terrorism, and agriculture and shing.
Table 3
Support for community or national decision-making in the national policy domain
% Community (national) Justice Police Health and social welfare Education Rules for media Cultural policy
1992 1993 1994 1995
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 38 (58) 33 (63) 34 (62) 34 (62) 34 (58) 39 (53) 34 (62) 30 (67) 32 (64) 32 (64) 34 (60) 36 (57) 38 (58) 34 (63) 37 (59) 36 (61) 38 (56) 44 (49) 35 (61) 30 (66) 36 (60) 34 (61) 36 (58) 44 (48) 32 (65) 27 (70) 29 (67) 32 (64) 34 (60) 42 (51) 36 (60) 30 (66) 33 (63) 33 (62) 34 (59) 34 (60)
40 (56) 40 (55) 46 (46) 51 (42)
31 (65) 32 (64) 40 (51) 38 (55)
31 (64) 30 (65) 40 (51) 36 (58)
41 (54) 40 (56) 45 (46) 42 (50)
39 (56) 37 (58) 37 (54) 34 (57)
33 (62) 33 (62) 42 (50) 35 (57)
35 (61) 35 (60) 38 (55) 37 (56)
29 29
29 29
Source: Eurobarometers 37, 40, 41, 43, 45, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 60, 62, 64, and 66. Note: Some areas in the national policy domain omitted here are workers representation, taxation, pensions, urban crime prevention, juvenile crime prevention, etc.
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built into the labor market, Europe presents its social model as relentlessly egalitarian and a unifying force among Europeans. Also, ideological opposition across the Atlantic has occurred with regard to the International Criminal Court, capital punishment, the end of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, and, most recently, the Iraq War. In addition, the presumed efforts of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons and the realization of such nuclear ambitions by North Korea evoke different responses from Europe and the US. To assess Europeans perception about the international role of the US and the EU, the Eurobarometer asked the following question: In your opinion, would you say that the United States (or the European Union3) tends to play a positive role, a negative role, or neither a positive nor a negative role regarding. . .? Table 4 presents the trends of Europeans perception of the role of the US and the EU in ve issue areas between 2002 and 2006. First, in all the ve issue areas, EU citizens think that the role played by the EU is much more positive than that of the US. Second, the proportion of EU citizens who feel that the US plays a positive role substantially decreased in the areas of the ght against terrorism (from 54 percent in 2002 to 37 percent in 2006) and peace in the world (from 32 percent in 2002 to 23 percent in 2006). While there was no big change in the other three areas (the protection of the environment, the growth of the world economy, and the ght against poverty in the world) between 2003 and 2006, EU citizens perception of the positive role of the US in these areas was very negative (e.g. 18 percent, 38 percent and 21 percent, respectively in 2006). Third, EU citizens positive perception of the international role played by the EU had increased to a large extent since 2003, except for the area of peace in the world (which was high to start with). In sum, the trend data presented here for subjective awareness are partly contradictory. The data do not provide strong evidence for the existence of
Table 4 EU citizens perception of the positive role of the US and the EU in the world The US (the EU) in % Peace in the world The protection of the environment The ght against terrorism The growth of the world economy The ght against poverty in the world Fall 2002 32 16 54 38 20 Spring 2003 23 14 45 34 18 Fall 2003 27 (60) 14 (46) 43 (54) 34 (40) 17 (36) Fall 2004 22 (61) 17 (58) 39 (59) 35 (49) 18 (45) Spring 2005 25 (63) 18 (62) 43 (60) 38 (50) 20 (49) Fall 2005 24 (63) 17 (61) 38 (61) 37 (49) 20 (49) Fall 2006 23 (60) 18 (60) 37 (59) 38 (53) 21 (49)
Source: Eurobarometers 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, and 66.
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European identity at the mass public level.4 Despite the fact that the majority of EU citizens identied themselves not just in terms of their nationality but as Europeans, the proportion with primarily national identity generally increased while that of European identity did not really change between 1992 and 2005. However, this does not necessarily imply that the deepening process of European integration since the early 1990s has had a negative impact on Europeans sense of belonging. Above all, Europeans taken-for-granted presumptions of the EU as the relevant unit for problem-solving as well as their increasingly positive perception about the role of the EU (in contrast with their increasingly negative perception about the role of the United States) regarding critical global issues indicate that the EU is developing its own sense of self. In addition, the fact that EU citizens attachment to Europe has substantially increased5 since the mid-1990s, despite a remarkable decline of public support for European integration in the same period, may illustrate that the EU is gradually becoming a part of Europeans multiple identities. The discussion so far has to do with one (perceptual) component of our conceptualization of European identity, i.e. subjective awareness assessed by shared feelings of European and common attitudes/values. Now, we turn to the other (behavioral) component of European identity, which is coherence. Identity as coherence As mentioned, Karl Deutsch and his collaborators talked about the formation of political communities as a process of amalgamation and blending of the parts (1966: 26 38). The actual process of amalgamation, i.e. the adoption of distinctive and autonomous institutions, is facilitated by a number of factors, including a compatibility of main values, the weakening of discordant competing values, and the development of a distinctive conception of ones political unit as separate from related political entities of which the new units may have been a part. We read Deutsch and his collaborators as saying that the values and subjective identity dimensions are closely related to the formation of autonomous political entities. The formation of these autonomous entities seems similar to our basic notion of coherence. But how can coherence be observed and measured? Donald Campbell (1958) held out a research method for assessing the degree of coherence, or what he called entitativity, in complex social aggregates. While we usually take the entities on which we base our analysis as given,6 Campbell argued that the degree to which something (an aggregate) constitutes an entity should be treated as a testable hypothesis. Campbell proposed common fate and similarity as indicators of the coherence of a complex social aggregate (1958: 17 8).7 These indicators suggest a number of questions. Concerning common fate, do the components exhibit covariation whereby the parts prosper and suffer together, or where parts sacrice for the good of the whole? Second, are the parts similar in key economic and political aspects, i.e. are they convergent as one expects in an increasingly unied area? What role does diffusion (imitation, interdependence, and competition)
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play in the convergence process? (Botcheva and Martin 2001; Knill 2005; Holzinger 2006). Common fate, or interdependence of parts Our rst measure of common fate is a proxy based on export reliance between member states and others within the region. When countries import and export, they send and receive price movements, share cyclical economic activity, add and subtract jobs from the economy, increase competition among rms, and entangle themselves through nancial movements associated with the balance of payments. Our export gures were obtained by calculating each countrys exports to the other ve (or 11) in the EU and dividing by total exports. As we follow these shares through time, we can trace the degree of concentration of trade within the area. We use two membership groupings, based on the original six membership and the EU of 12. Table 5 shows that it is not universally true that the original six members of the European Economic Community increased their share of export reliance on one another. Belgiums share increased from 0.59 in 1950 to a high of 0.71 in 1970 but steadily declined to 0.55 in 2000. Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg increased their reliance on the original six, if we compare 1950 with 2000, but the high-water mark for these three countries was 1970 after which export shares declined. Perhaps surprisingly, France and Germany show a non-dramatic pattern no huge change either way. The high-water mark is 50 percent for France and 40 percent for the Federal Republic of Germany, both again in 1970, just three years before the rst oil crisis. Based on the export data for the Six, there is no clear evidence for the conclusion that the original six members are moving more closely together. However, there is evidence of growing interdependence within two distinct sub-groups of the six member states. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg increasingly form one group and Italy, France, and Germany form another. We can clearly see this if we examine the variation within these subgroups in the earlier periods and compare with the later periods. In 1950, there was a signicant disparity among the members in terms of their export reliance. By 1980, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg had identical shares of within-EU exports (63 percent) while Italy, France, and Germany came in at 41 percent, 44 percent, and 39 percent respectively. This pattern holds up rather rmly to the year 2000. Table 6 provides additional evidence for the trade patterns among the 12 and the original six. In contrast to the gures for the original six, export patterns for the 12 show that all countries except Ireland, Denmark, and Greece increased their export reliance on the 12. Of course, we expect the absolute values of exports to be larger, because we have added six countries to our denition of the EU. However, it is still valid to look at trends because whatever ination takes place by adding these six members should take place throughout the time period. This table suggests not so much a weakening of the Carolingean core (Ash 1994), the original six members, as a broadening of it to incorporate
Table 5 Country
The proportion of exports to EU-6 among total exports, 1950 2000 1950 0.59 0.44 0.49 0.24 0.32 0.36 1955 0.50 0.42 0.52 0.25 0.35 0.30 1960 0.60 0.48 0.54 0.31 0.37 0.30 1965 0.67 0.57 0.64 0.41 0.42 0.35 1970 0.71 0.64 0.70 0.44 0.50 0.40 1975 0.65 0.61 0.64 0.40 0.42 0.36 1980 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.41 0.44 0.39 1985 0.60 0.61 0.59 0.37 0.40 0.35 1990 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.43 0.45 0.37 1995 0.61 0.58 0.61 0.39 0.42 0.33 2000 0.55 0.56 0.64 0.34 0.36 0.31
Belgium Netherlands Luxembourg Italy France Germany
Source: Expanded Trade and GDP Data by Gleditsch. Note: Owing to some abnormal values of the Gleditsch data, the gures for France 2000 were reproduced by Xun Cao using the IMF DOT data.
Table 6 Country
The proportion of exports to EU-12 among total exports, 1950 2000 1950 0.69 0.64 0.62 0.41 0.53 0.48 0.25 0.96 0.73 0.51 0.56 0.46 1955 0.69 0.60 0.64 0.39 0.53 0.41 0.28 0.95 0.65 0.63 0.58 0.56 1960 0.68 0.65 0.64 0.42 0.48 0.41 0.26 0.88 0.57 0.43 0.51 0.61 1965 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.52 0.53 0.47 0.31 0.88 0.53 0.46 0.59 0.54 1970 0.78 0.75 0.77 0.53 0.59 0.50 0.34 0.81 0.45 0.53 0.59 0.51 1975 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.50 0.54 0.47 0.36 0.82 0.48 0.51 0.54 0.49 1980 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.53 0.57 0.51 0.48 0.77 0.53 0.49 0.60 0.53 1985 0.73 0.75 0.72 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.49 0.70 0.46 0.54 0.64 0.53 1990 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.59 0.65 0.53 0.54 0.76 0.53 0.65 0.75 0.72 1995 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.55 0.63 0.49 0.53 0.71 0.52 0.59 0.78 0.71 2000 0.72 0.74 0.78 0.52 0.60 0.48 0.54 0.59 0.51 0.40 0.76 0.68
Belgium Netherlands Luxembourg Italy France Germany United Kingdom Ireland Denmark Greece Portugal Spain
Source: Expanded Trade and GDP Data by Gleditsch.
34
other members. Within-EU export shares increase for Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Spain. Germanys gures are exactly the same if we compare the starting and end dates, though they do show a small decline from the high-water mark of 1990 (the year of German reunication), from 0.53 to 0.48. This interpretation (broadening the core) seems strongest if we look at the trade patterns of the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Spain (three states which are progressively incorporated) and less so if we look at Denmark, Ireland and Greece (three states whose export reliance on the EU declines). Irelands substantial decline from 0.96 in 1950 to 0.59 in 2000 is not so surprising if we take into account the dramatic growth of the Irish economy over this time period, the diversication of their trade, and the decrease of their reliance on their former colonial master, England. Greeces export reliance on the EU declined from 0.51 in 1950 to 0.40 in 2000. Since 1990, Greeces exports have increasingly gone to the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, particularly Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania and Albania, not all EU countries, of course. Indeed, the Eastern and Central European countries now absorb about 25 percent of Greeces exports, compared to 14.5 percent in 1955 (Kakridis 2007).8 While international trade is important, it is just one part of the elaborate network of interdependence in Europe. The ow of capital across countries is also important in that it creates joint production facilities when capital ows take the form of foreign direct investments. We have analyzed foreign direct investment among EU countries in comparison to the world but space limitations prevent us from presenting this information here.9 Investment data support the same basic patterns found in the trade data. In summary, there is evidence from trade and investment data that there is a strong and growing tendency to direct economic activity toward EU members, in relation to the rest of the world. We believe such growth reects more than the high volume of trade accounted for by the EU. Rather, we think it reects increasingly a preference for intra-regional trade, a preference that is backed by the elaborate commercial rules and regulatory environment of the EU. Similarity and convergence If an emerging regional system has a coherent identity, it should display similarities in certain relevant aspects. When the European Economic Community formed, there were important differences. The south of Italy, along with Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece formed Europes semi-periphery. They were relatively poor members when they joined, though their economies (except for Greeces) grew rapidly and the gap was narrowed and sometimes closed. The arrival of the United Kingdom and Denmark in 1973 brought two quite Euro-skeptical members with strong ties to the European Free Trade Association into the fold. The entry of Austria, Sweden, and Finland in 1995 added three wealthy social democratic states whose welfare systems were much more developed than those of other member states. And the
35
expansion of the EU to include ten new members from Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 added difference and complexity on many different dimensions. Given these differences, we ask to what extent, and in what ways, have the member states converged or diverged along with the development of the EU. Our working hypothesis is that membership pushes countries more closely together. Since we want to capture the changes in similarities and differences over time, it makes sense to look at a measure of dispersion applied to various indicators, such as rates of unemployment. Following Holzinger (2006) and Holzinger and Knill (2005) we use changes in the standard deviation as our primary measure of convergence. Because of the possible bias introduced when comparing standard deviations based on different means, we also employ the coefcient of variability (which is obtained by dividing the standard deviation by the mean of the distribution). The rst indicator is unemployment rates for the member states from 1980 to 2004. If we look at Table 7 we can see that the standard deviations rise from 2.78 in 1980 to a high of 5.30 in 1986 and then they slowly but systematically decline until in 2004 the dispersion has dropped to 2.34. With autonomous national economic policies, measures of unemployment are expected to vary in accordance with national priorities regarding ination and unemployment as well as natural cyclical uctuations in the economy. To the extent that economies are insulated, divergences may be large. To the extent that countries are embedded in the same economic, political, and cultural networks, these gaps can be expected to narrow. Since passage of the SEA in 1986, there has been a steady convergence in unemployment rates, as measured by a decline in the standard deviations and coefcient of variability. This convergence seems to be robust in light of up and down movements in average unemployment rates. Similarly, if we analyze ination rates in Table 8 we see the same pattern the standard deviations reach a high of 6.32 in 1984 and then decline, not dramatically at any one point, but the overall pattern is that the dispersion drops with few small exceptions so that in 2004 it is 0.79 (or 0.42). The only substantial increase after 1984 occurs in 1990, the year of German reunication. The run-up to European monetary union narrowed ination rates even further, since the convergence criteria required individual national rates of ination not to exceed by more than 1.5 percent the ination rates of the three best performing members. By 2004, the standard deviation for national rates of ination was 0.79. Finally, Table 9 presents data on gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (constant dollars). Here we nd an increase in the standard deviation over time and almost no change in the coefcient of variability. The standard deviation increases from 4.88 in 1982 to 8.91 in 1990 to 12.04 in 2004 (though this may be a one-time increase). The coefcient of variability ends slightly below where it begins (0.37 in 2004 and 0.39 in 1980) Two of our measures (unemployment and ination) provide support for our hypothesis about convergence while the data for changes in GDP per capita do not provide conclusive support one way or the other.
Table 7 Year Mean S.D. COV
Means, standard deviations, and coefcients of variability of unemployment rates for EU-15 1980 6.16 2.78 0.45 1982 7.49 3.95 0.53 1984 9.52 4.88 0.51 1986 9.26 5.30 0.57 1988 8.39 5.02 0.60 1990 7.19 4.24 0.59 1992 8.49 4.40 0.52 1994 10.23 5.19 0.51 1996 9.75 4.55 0.47 1998 8.44 4.13 0.49 2000 6.87 3.46 0.50 2002 6.49 2.77 0.43 2004 7.31 2.34 0.32
Source: World Development Indicators. Note: COV the coefcient of variability which is the standard deviation divided by the mean.
Table 8 Year Mean S.D. COV
Means, standard deviations, and coefcients of variability of ination rates for EU-15 1980 11.35 5.48 0.48 1982 10.85 4.90 0.45 1984 8.22 6.32 0.77 1986 4.83 5.98 1.24 1988 4.30 3.50 0.81 1990 6.33 5.13 0.81 1992 4.75 3.63 0.76 1994 3.26 2.37 0.73 1996 2.47 1.71 0.69 1998 1.64 0.95 0.58 2000 2.57 1.04 0.40 2002 2.58 1.09 0.42 2004 1.89 0.79 0.42
Source: World Economic Outlook.
Table 9 Means, standard deviations, and coefcients of variability of GDP per capita for EU-15, in 2,000 constant dollars (in thousands) Year Mean S.D. COV 1980 21.79 8.52 0.39 1982 14.51 4.88 0.34 1984 12.40 4.46 0.36 1986 16.29 6.16 0.38 1988 21.10 7.86 0.37 1990 24.45 8.91 0.36 1992 24.73 8.60 0.35 1994 22.71 9.04 0.40 1996 26.99 10.10 0.37 1998 26.99 9.13 0.34 2000 23.22 8.49 0.37 2002 24.05 8.62 0.36 2004 32.66 12.04 0.37
Source: World Economic Outlook.
39
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION Identity is a complex concept. The method we propose involves a dual conceptualization of identity which includes subjective awareness and behavioral coherence. The former implies consciousness of a we and provides an answer to the question who are we? in terms of attributes that distinguish the group from those outside. The latter component (coherence) attempts to come to grips with the extent to which the we ts into a coherent syndrome. What did we nd? Summarizing radically, we nd that multiple identities exist among the people of the EU member states, including identication with the EU. When questions are of a forced choice nature (forcing respondents to pick one or the other level of identication), national identications trump EU identities. However, respondents are able to distinguish feelings of identication and attachment from the level of decision-making they deem most optimal. There are surprisingly high levels of support for Community decision-making, far in excess of what one would predict from levels of identity. We expect this gap between identity with the EU and belief that the EU is the right level to make many policies to be a source of tension and hence change in the years ahead. The evidence for the emergence and development of a coherent EU is substantial. Intra-EU trade and investment levels are quite high, and for the most part growing, though there are exceptions. The fact that levels of intraEU trade and investment are growing faster than trade and investment to other destinations suggests a specialized process of European integration that is not a simple regional spin-off of globalization (Verdier and Breen 2001). We nd that the gradual yet punctuated enlargement of the EU has not led to a weakening of economic integration but to a more encompassing scope of integration, often realigning economic patterns but in such a way as to keep most economic activity within the region. This is more than an accounting artifact of expanding membership. Further, there is strong evidence for growing convergence of EU economies with respect to national rates of ination and unemployment. This convergence is no doubt fueled by the passage of the SEA in 1986 and the move to monetary union during the 1990s. While we have not systematically explored the mechanisms of convergence, the progressive decrease of differences among countries is possibly due to intensied competition and the regulatory harmonization, institutional arbitrage, and adoption of best practices that such competition begets. We recognize that what we have attempted here is only a beginning. In terms of the subjective awareness side of the research agenda, recent rejections of the proposed constitution suggest closer attention to the differences between elite and mass attitudes toward the EU. Second, future research should pay attention to a much broader range of indicators than examined here. One could research the development of a single EU legal personality, the growth of a public sphere, the extent to which the EU speaks with one voice (as in commercial affairs), the
40
fashioning of a distinctive mission in world politics, perhaps centered around the projection of soft power in support of European ideals, and the construction and enactment of external borders, i.e. the outer borders of the EU as distinct from any of its members (Andreas 2003). Our limited effort suggests that the EU is increasing its performative powers and that its performance has had an effect on the attitudes and behavior of its member states and peoples, if not on European identity. Biographical note: James A. Caporaso is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Washington, USA. Min-hyung Kim is a Visiting Assistant Professor in Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Geneva, New York, USA. Addresses for correspondence: James A. Caporaso, Department of Political Science, Box 353530, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, 98195, USA. email: caporaso@u.washington.edu/Min-hyung Kim, Department of Political Science, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Geneva, NY, 14456, USA. email: mkim@hws.edu NOTES
1 Note that if a pluralistic community comes into being, with the separate parts maintaining autonomy and distinctiveness, the issue of identity does not arise. 2 The Transatlantic Trends in 2005 reports that a majority of Europeans (60 percent of EU-9), including 62 percent of French and 64 percent of German citizens, support a single EU seat on the United Nations Security Council even if it would replace the seats currently held by France and the UK. Only the majority of British respondents (55 percent) opposed. 3 The question on the EU was added in 2003 for the rst time and asked since then. 4 A different approach to the problem of measuring identity is taken by Michael Bruter in his book Citizens of Europe ? (2005). Bruter attempts to construct a measure of identity by a sophisticated process of cleaning (removing) the effects of several variables on an index of support for the EU, in effect leaving (as residual) the effect due to identity. For a thorough description of this approach, see appendix 3 of his book, pages 195 210. 5 We do not present our data on the degree of attachment of people to their city, their region, their country, and Europe here for space reasons, but are happy to provide them if requested by interested readers. 6 The working ontology of most social science research starts with entities (states, organizations, institutions), and then goes on to explore variables and their relations attached to these entities. The entities themselves do not enter the theoretical discussion. There are important exceptions, such as the work of Charles Ragins caseoriented analysis, but they are a distinct minority. 7 Campbell also proposed proximity as an indicator. We think proximity is at best a proxy for diffusion processes which should result in greater similarity and convergence of countries in the region over time. 8 Denmarks declining reliance on its EU partners remains a puzzle to us. 9 If readers are interested in these data, they are welcome to write to the authors who will be happy to provide a more complete version of the paper.
41
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