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INTRODUCTION Rights and duties, these are words that we come across in our everyday life.

We can hear mothers saying it is my duty to ta!e care of my children , students saying it is my duty to do my wor! , N"O#s and other institutions that su$$ort a few sections of the society saying it is our right and duty to $rotect the concerned sections. What are the Rights and Duties that these $eo$le are referring to% &re rights and duties correlated % &re rights and duties availa'le to each and every living 'eing % "enerally, a duty is an o'ligation and a right is an entitlement. They may e(ist as a moral or legal matter. )or e(am$le, morally, a $erson has the duty not to hurt another#s feelings. Rights may also e(ist on a moral or legal matter. )or e(am$le, an em$loyee has a moral right to 'e treated with a$$reciation and res$ect 'y an em$loyer and his duty under the same his to $erform all the tas!s $rovided to him 'y his em$loyer in a $ro$er manner. & moral right cannot 'e the 'asis for see!ing relief through the legal system. There must 'e a law creating a right 'efore that right can 'e enforced though the legal system. This $a$er is going to give you an insight into these *uestions. It is going to $rovide you with information regarding legal definition of rights, $hiloso$hical view of rights and duties and conce$t relating to them and also various views

of great scholars on rights and duties. +eaning Of Rights Ordinary, right means that to which one is morally or legally entitled. Right means something that is due to a $erson 'y claim, legal guarantee or moral $rinci$les. Right in its 'road sense means what a $erson is entitled to 'y virtue of a s$ecial $erson or relations with a $osition or with the state or a $erson. Therefore right is a legally enforcea'le claim of a $erson against another. It is a $ower, $rivilege or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, as a result of long usages. & right may 'e classified in various ways and style. Thus, a right may 'e $erfect or im$erfect according to whether the action or sco$e is clear, settled or vague. Rights are also either in $ersonam or inrem. The former im$oses an o'ligation on a define $erson or im$osed on $ersons generally ,in-rem.. They may 'e $rimary. These can 'e created without reference to rights already e(isting, or secondary / arising only for the $ur$ose of $rotecting $rimary rights. Other classes are 0udicial or e(tra 0udicial, a'solute and *ualified, legal or e*uita'le. 1egal rights are where the $erson see! to enforce the right for his own 'enefit as the legal title and a remedy at law or enforcea'le in e*uity as in e*uita'le right. Rights could 'e civil, natural, constitutional, $olitical $ersonal, a'solute or relative. & negative right is a right for a $erson to 'e

$rotected from harm if I try to get something for myself. & $ositive right would 'e my right to have something $rovided for me. If health care is a negative right, then the state has an o'ligation to !ee$ $eo$le from $reventing me from getting health care and discriminating against me. If health care2s a $ositive right, then the state has an o'ligation to $rovide it for me. +eaning Of Duties &ny human action which e(actly conform to the laws which re*uires us to o'ey them or any legal or moral o'ligation that one has 'y law or contract ,or agreement. or an o'ligation to conform to legal standard of reasona'le conduct in light of an a$$arent ris!, an o'ligatory conduct or service. It is a mandatory o'ligation to $erform an o'ligation recogni3ed 'y law. It is s$ecie of o'ligation. The 4lac! 1aw Dictionary defines a legal o'ligation that is owned or due to another and that need to 'e satisfied5 an o'ligation for which some'ody else has a corres$onding right. The 1aw Dictionary defines a duty as 6a thing due, that which is due from a $erson that which a $erson owes to another. & legal o'ligation that own or due to another and that need to 'e satisfied5 an o'ligation which some'ody else has a corres$onding right. It has several uses, 'ut in its 0uris$rudential usage, the word is the correlative of right. Thus, where there e(ist a right any $erson. There also e(ists a corres$onding duty u$on some other

$ersons. It should 'e stated that in certain e(traneous circumstance, it may ha$$en that after a duty has 'een created, its moral disa$$ear. In which case, the duty se$arates itself from the $revailing morality and the $ressure then solely res$ect for law. In general, what constitutes a duty has to $ass through a litmus test. Thus, a duty has to 'e general ,not design for an individual, $romulgated 'y an authority, $ros$ective, intelligi'le ,$rescri'ed and !nown., consistent in itself, ca$a'le of fulfillment, constant through time and congruent with official action. & legal duty differs from a moral duty 'ecause the former is visited with letter sanction if a 'reach. In the letter, there are no clear cut $unishment e(ce$t loss of $restige and $ride. Duty li!e right is created from the outcome of a s$ecial relationshi$ or a contract as a result of the direct or indirect $rovision of a law as the case of the citi3enshi$ as in the constitution. 4y virtue of this s$ecial relation with the 7tate, the citi3en is $rotected and from which certain rights and duties are accrued. 89I1O7O89IC&1 +:&NIN" O) RI"9T - 7T&N1:; 4:NN , :NC;C1O8:DI& O) 89I1O7O89; . RI"9T7. 7ince the seventeenth century, $ro'lems connected with rights have steadily engaged the attention of $olitical and legal $hiloso$hers. )or medieval $hiloso$hers the $ro'lems of $olitical ethics were $ro'lems not of

rights 'ut, rather, of the duties a man owed to his lord, his !ing, his church, or his "od, 'y virtue of his role and function in the universal order. +edieval lawyers, it is true, might challenge encroaching authority 'y a$$ealing to the ancient and customary $rivileges or li'erties a$$ertaining to status or to cor$orate communities li!e cities and guilds. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, such considerations gave way to notions li!e an :nglishman#s 'irthright or, still more $ersonal and universal, natural rights. Thereafter it was commonly held that it was the $ro$er tas! of the state and of $ositive law to safeguard such rights, lists of which were drawn u$ in documents li!e the &merican 4ill of Rights and the )rench Declaration of the Rights of +an for the guidance and control of governments. The idea that a man could have a right which, as natural, inaliena'le, and indefeasi'le, had some !ind of sanctity and validity transcending that of ordinary $ositive law led $hiloso$hers to s$eculate a'out what !ind of thing a right might 'e. What sort of assertion is it to say that < has a right to R, and what !ind of criteria would have to 'e satisfied for such a $ro$osition to 'e true% =uristic theories of rights. +any $hiloso$hers and 0urists have treated *uestions a'out the nature and criteria of rights as if they as!ed what facts were referred to when one said < has a right to R. 7$ino3a, for instance, tried to give a consistent account, in terms of $ower, of all

instances where rights were ascri'ed. Thus a man#s natural right amounted to the $ower he could e(ercise over another> a sovereign#s right was the $ower he e(ercised 'y virtue of the com'ined $ower of all the individuals who were $re$ared to su$$ort him> and the individual#s legal rights were the $owers he had 'y virtue of the sovereign#s su$$ort in u$holding the law. &gain, T.9. "reen descri'ed an individual#s right as a $ower of acting for...what he conceives to 'e his own good, secured to an individual 'y the community. & right, however, is not and does not necessarily im$ly a $ower ,e(ce$t, $erha$s, in the sense of a legal com$etence li!e, for instance, the $ower to ma!e a will.. )or a man may have rights he is $owerless to enforce if the courts are corru$t or his o$$onents too $owerful to ris! offending. One might say $erha$s that his rights are hy$othetical $owers -- what he would 'e a'le to achieve if he were a'le and chose to a$$eal to the courts and if the courts acted according to the law. 4ut this would 'e the same as saying that his rights are the $owers he would en0oy if he had his rights. Rights, in other words, may e($lain why $ersons have the $owers they do, 'ut they are not identical with these $owers. Rights and duties. 4entham and &ustin defined rights in terms of duties. :very right, says &ustin, ...rests on a relative duty...lying on a $arty or $arties other than the $arty or $arties in whom the right rests ,8rovince, ?@AB ed.,

)ootnote $.CDA.> for 4entham and &ustin, a duty e(ists only where the law im$oses ,and enforces. a sanction for a 'reach of it. 4entham wrote in his )ragment on "overnment ,?EEF., Without the notion of $unishment...,no notion could we have of either right or duty. There are two $oints here5 first, whether duties really de$end on conse*uential sanctions for their meaning or only for their effectiveness, or $erha$s for neither> second, whether every right has its correlative duty, such that the right of < can always 'e stated without alteration of meaning as a duty of ;. &s to the first $oint, there is no internal contradiction in the notion of a duty without a sanction. Indeed, :nglish administrative law has fre*uently $laced statutory duties u$on authorities while 'arring 0udicial review and $roviding no alternative remedy or sanction. Outside the s$here of law, it certainly ma!es sense to tal! of moral duties without sanctions. What one ought to do cannot $ro$erly 'e e*uated with what one must do to avoid a $enalty. The correlation of rights and duties raises more difficult *uestions. If to ascri'e a right is not to attri'ute a socially su$$orted $ower or, indeed, todescri'e any actual or hy$othetical set of facts a'out human 'ehavior, can one say that it must 'e a way of stating the $rovisions of a system of rules and therefore a way of $rescri'ing conduct% ;et a right im$lies neither what a man must nor what he ought to do, 'ut what he may do if he chooses. It can 'e reconciled with an e(clusively

$rescri$tive conce$tion of law only 'y identifying every right with an o'ligation in reverse -- < has a right to G?H from ; 'eing e(actly e*uivalent to ; has a duty to ,that is, shall. $ay < G?H if < so chooses . & general statement of rights differs from a corres$onding conclusion of law in that a general statement cannot 'e elucidated in terms of a duty 'ut at 'est only in terms of an o'ligation of one class of $ersons to another, defeasi'le in $articular cases 'y any of a num'er of $leas or e(cuses. & general right is thus a ground of claim, not a license to infer what ought to 'e done. 89I1O7O89IC&1 +:&NIN" O) DUTI:7 , I&NT#7 +OR&1 89I1O7O89;. )or another, our motive in conforming our actions to civic and other laws is never unconditional res$ect. We also have an eye toward doing our $art in maintaining civil or social order, toward $unishments or loss of standing and re$utation in violating such laws, and other outcomes of lawful 'ehavior. Indeed, we res$ect these laws to the degree, 'ut only to the degree, that they do not violate values, laws or $rinci$les we hold more dear. ;et Iant thin!s in acting from duty that we are not at all motivated 'y a $ros$ective outcome or some other e(trinsic feature of our conduct. We are motivated 'y the mere conformity of our will to law as such.

What, then, is the difference 'etween 'eing motivated 'y a sense of duty in the ordinary sense, and 'eing motivated 'y duty in Iant#s sense% It is, $resuma'ly, this5 +otivation 'y duty is motivation 'y our res$ect for whatever law it is that ma!es our action a duty. 4ut we can rationally Jo$t out2 of our mem'ershi$ in the city, state, clu' or any other social arrangement and its laws K for instance, 'y *uitting the clu' or e($atriating. Those laws only a$$ly to us given we don#t rationally decide to o$t out, given the o$$ortunity. Our res$ect for the laws guiding us is *ualified, in the sense that the thought that the law gives us a duty is com$elling only if there is no law we res$ect more that conflicts with it5 +y res$ect for the laws of my clu' guides my action only insofar as those laws do not re*uire me to violate city ordinances. 4ut my res$ect for city ordinance guides me only insofar as they do not re*uire me to violate federal law. &nd so on. :ventually, however, we will come to laws that a$$ly to us sim$ly as mem'ers of the Jclu'2 of rational agents, so to s$ea!, as 'eings who are ca$a'le of guiding their own 'ehavior on the 'asis of directives, $rinci$les and laws of rationality. We cannot choose to lay aside our Jmem'ershi$2 in the category of such 'eings, or at least it is unclear what the status of such a choice would 'e. 7o, su$$ose that there is some law $rescri'ing what any rational agent must do. Then we have an idea of a duty that we cannot rationally o$t out of. When we do something 'ecause it is our moral duty, Iant argued, we are

motivated 'y the thought that, insofar as we are rational 'eings, we must act only as this fundamental law of ,$ractical. reason $rescri'es, a law that would $rescri'e how any rational 'eing in our circumstances should act. Whatever else such a law might 'e, it is, in virtue of 'eing a $rinci$le of reason, true of all rational agents. +y res$ect for such a law is thus not *ualified5 my res$ect for the laws of my clu', city, constitution or religion guides me in $ractical affairs only insofar as they do not re*uire me to violate laws laid down 'y my own $ractical reason, 'ut my res$ect for the deliverances of my own reason does not de$end on whether it re*uires me to violate the former sorts of laws. In this case, it is res$ect for ,rational. lawfulness as such guides me. The forgoing line of argument reveals a distinctive as$ect of Iant#s a$$roach5 his account of the content of moral re*uirements and the nature of moral reasoning is 'ased on his analysis of the uni*ue force moral considerations have as reasons to act. The force of moral re*uirements as reasons is that we cannot ignore them no matter how circumstances might cons$ire against any other consideration. 7ince they retain their reason-giving force under any circumstance, they have universal validity. 7o, whatever else may 'e said of moral re*uirements, their content is universal. Only a universal law could 'e the content of a re*uirement that has the reason-giving force of morality.

RI"9T7 L7. DUTI:7 +any in &sia and the former 7oviet Union, for e(am$le, argue that rights are e*ually an entitlement and a duty. Individuals have a reci$rocal o'ligation to res$ect the rights of others if they e($ect to have their own rights res$ected in turn. Ta!e, for e(am$le, the right to religious e($ression. This right ensures that mem'ers of religious minorities are $rotected from interference in the e(ercise of their religious freedom> at the same time, it means that they must dis$lay the same tolerance when it comes to other religious $ractices that may differ from their own. In ta!ing advantage of one2s own freedoms, one acce$ts an o'ligation to res$ect the freedoms of others. Only in this way can the rights of all 'e $rotected and a measure of social harmony is achieved. 7ystems of social organi3ation that give e*ual $riority to 'oth the community and the individual tend to em$hasi3e the dual nature of rights as 'oth freedoms and duties. 7ociety as a whole can only thrive when everyone fulfills his or her o'ligations to their fellow citi3ens. Under this view, the a'ility to e(ercise rights must first 'e earned 'y res$ecting them in others.? This $rinci$le is enshrined in &rticle C@ of the Universal Declaration, which states, in its first

clause, that 6:veryone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full develo$ment of his $ersonality is $ossi'le.MA The doctrine of logical correlativity K that rights and duties are correlative K is dominant among $hiloso$hers.F This view conce$tuali3es rights and duties as fli$ sides of the same coin> one $erson2s right e(ists 'y e(erting a duty u$on others. )or e(am$le, the right of free s$eech 6is understood in terms of the recognition that an individual2s interest in self-e($ression is a sufficient ground for holding other individuals and agencies to 'e under duties of various sorts rather than in terms of the detail of the duties themselves.ME The doctrine of the logical correlativity of rights and duties is the doctrine that all duties entail other $eo$le2s rights and all rights entails other $eo$le2s duties. 1ogical correlativity affords a measure of fle(i'ility to the formulation of international human rights standards. Correlativity is crucial 'ecause it means that the framing of moral claims in terms other than rights is not necessarily $ro'lematic. The recognition of an o'ligation may well signify the $resence of an im$licit right> thus a moral theory couched in the language of duty can 'e a legitimate vehicle for the advancement of rights. )UND&+:NT&1 RI"9T7, DUTI:7 &ND DIR:CTIL: 8RINCI81:7

The )undamental Rights, Directive 8rinci$les of 7tate 8olicy and )undamental Duties are sections of the Constitution of India that $rescri'e the fundamental o'ligations of the 7tate to its citi3ens and the duties of the citi3ens to the 7tate.Nnote ?O These sections com$rise a constitutional 'ill of rights for government $olicyma!ing and the 'ehaviour and conduct of citi3ens. These sections are considered vital elements of the constitution, which was develo$ed 'etween ?@BE and ?@B@ 'y the Constituent &ssem'ly of India. The )undamental Rights are defined as the 'asic human rights of all citi3ens. These rights, defined in 8art III of the Constitution, a$$ly irres$ective of race, $lace of 'irth, religion, caste, creed or se(. They are enforcea'le 'y the courts, su'0ect to s$ecific restrictions. The Directive 8rinci$les of 7tate 8olicy are guidelines for the framing of laws 'y the government. These $rovisions, set out in 8art IL of the Constitution, are not enforcea'le 'y the courts, 'ut the $rinci$les on which they are 'ased are fundamental guidelines for governance that the 7tate is e($ected to a$$ly in framing and $assing laws. The )undamental Duties are defined as the moral o'ligations of all citi3ens to hel$ $romote a s$irit of $atriotism and to u$hold the unity of India. These duties, set out in 8art IL/& of the Constitution, concern individuals and the nation. 1i!e the Directive 8rinci$les, they are not legally enforcea'le.

)UND&+:NT&1 RI"9T7 C.? Right to :*uality C.C Right to )reedom C.P Right against :($loitation C.B Right to )reedom of Religion C.A Cultural and :ducational Rights C.F Right to constitutional remedies DIR:CTIL: 8RINCI81:7 The Directive 8rinci$les of 7tate 8olicy, em'odied in 8art IL of the Constitution, are directions given to the 7tate to guide the esta'lishment of an economic and social democracy, as $ro$osed 'y the8ream'le &rticle P@ lays down certain $rinci$les of $olicy to 'e followed 'y the 7tate, including $roviding an ade*uate means of livelihood for all citi3ens, e*ual $ay for e*ual wor! for men and women, $ro$er wor!ing conditions, reduction of the concentration of wealth and means of $roduction from the hands of a few, and distri'ution of community resources to su'serve the common good . These clauses highlight the Constitutional o'0ectives of 'uilding an egalitarian social order and esta'lishing a welfare state, 'y 'ringing a'out a social revolution assisted 'y the 7tate, and have 'een used to su$$ort the nationalisation of mineral resources as well as $u'lic utilities. )urther, several legislations $ertaining to agrarian reform and land tenure have 'een enacted 'y the federal and state governments, in order to ensure e*uita'le

distri'ution of land resources. &rticles B?/BP mandate the 7tate to endeavour to secure to all citi3ens the right to wor!, a living wage, social security, maternity relief, and a decent standard of living. These $rovisions aim at esta'lishing a socialist state as envisaged in the 8ream'le. &rticle BP also $laces u$on the 7tate the res$onsi'ility of $romoting cottage industries, and the federal government has, in furtherance of this, esta'lished several 4oards for the $romotion of !hadi, handlooms etc., in coordination with the state governments.&rticle P@& re*uires the 7tate to $rovide free legal aid to ensure that o$$ortunities for securing 0ustice are availa'le to all citi3ens irres$ective of economic or other disa'ilities. &rticle BP& mandates the 7tate to wor! towards securing the $artici$ation of wor!ers in the management of industries.The 7tate, under &rticle BF, is also mandated to $romote the interests of and wor! for the economic u$lift of the scheduled castes and scheduled tri'es and $rotect them from discrimination and e($loitation. 7everal enactments, including two Constitutional amendments, have 'een $assed to give effect to this $rovision. &rticle BB encourages the 7tate to secure a uniform civil code for all citi3ens, 'y eliminating discre$ancies 'etween various $ersonal laws currently in force in the country. 9owever, this has remained a dead letter des$ite numerous reminders from the 7u$reme Court to im$lement the $rovision. &rticle BA originally mandated the

7tate to $rovide free and com$ulsory education to children 'etween the ages of si( and fourteen years, 'ut after the DFth &mendment in CHHC, this has 'een converted into a )undamental Right and re$laced 'y an o'ligation u$on the 7tate to secure childhood care to all children 'elow the age of si(. &rticle BE commits the 7tate to raise the standard of living and im$rove $u'lic health, and $rohi'it the consum$tion of into(icating drin!s and drugs in0urious to health. &s a conse*uence, $artial or total $rohi'ition has 'een introduced in several states, 'ut financial constraints have $revented its full-fledged a$$lication.The 7tate is also mandated 'y &rticle BD to organise agriculture andanimal hus'andry on modern and scientific lines 'y im$roving 'reeds and $rohi'iting slaughter of cattle. &rticle BD& mandates the 7tate to $rotect the environment and safeguard the forests and wildlife of the country, while &rticle B@ $laces an o'ligation u$on the 7tate to ensure the $reservation of monuments and o'0ects of national im$ortance. &rticle AH re*uires the 7tate to ensure the se$aration of 0udiciary from e(ecutive in $u'lic services, in order to ensure 0udicial inde$endence, and federal legislation has 'een enacted to achieve this o'0ective.The 7tate, according to &rticle A?, must also strive for the $romotion of international $eace and security, and 8arliament has 'een em$owered under &rticle CAP to ma!e laws giving effect to international treaties.

)UND&+:NT&1 DUTI:7 The )undamental Duties of citi3ens were added to the Constitution 'y the BCnd &mendment in ?@EF, u$on the recommendations of the 7waran 7ingh Committee that was constituted 'y the government earlier that year. Originally ten in num'er, the )undamental Duties were increased to eleven 'y the DFth &mendment in CHHC, which added a duty on every $arent or guardian to ensure that their child or ward was $rovided o$$ortunities for education 'etween the ages of si( and fourteen years. The other )undamental Duties o'ligate all citi3ens to res$ect the national sym'ols of India, including the Constitution, to cherish its heritage, $reserve itscom$osite culture and assist in its defense. They also o'ligate all Indians to $romote the s$irit of common 'rotherhood, $rotect the environment and $u'lic $ro$erty, develo$ scientific tem$er, a'0ure violence, and strive towards e(cellence in all s$heres of life. Citi3ens are morally o'ligated 'y the Constitution to $erform these duties. 9owever, li!e the Directive 8rinci$les, these are non-0ustifia'le, without any legal sanction in case of their violation or non-com$liance. There is reference to such duties in international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of 9uman Rights and International Covenant on Civil and 8olitical Rights, and &rticle A?& 'rings the Indian Constitution into conformity with these treaties. R:1&TION79I8

The Directive 8rinci$les have 'een used to u$hold the Constitutional validity of legislations in case of a conflict with the )undamental Rights. &rticle P?C, added 'y the CAth &mendment in ?@E?, $rovided that any law made to give effect to the Directive 8rinci$les in &rticle P@,'./,c. would not 'e invalid on the grounds that they derogated from the )undamental Rights conferred 'y &rticles ?B, ?@ and P?. The a$$lication of this article was sought to 'e e(tended to all the Directive 8rinci$les 'y the BCnd &mendment in ?@EF, 'ut the 7u$reme Court struc! down the e(tension as void on the ground that it violated the 'asic structure of the Constitution.The )undamental Rights and Directive 8rinci$les have also 'een used together in forming the 'asis of legislation for social welfare. The 7u$reme Court, after the 0udgment in the Iesavananda 4harati case, has ado$ted the view of the )undamental Rights and Directive 8rinci$les 'eing com$lementary to each other, each su$$lementing the other#s role in aiming at the same goal of esta'lishing a welfare state 'y means of social revolution. 7imilarly, the 7u$reme Court has used the )undamental Duties to u$hold the Constitutional validity of statutes which see!s to $romote the o'0ects laid out in the )undamental Duties.N??FO These Duties have also 'een held to 'e o'ligatory for all citi3ens, su'0ect to the 7tate enforcing the same 'y means of a valid law. The 7u$reme Court has also issued directions to the 7tate in this regard, with a view towards ma!ing the $rovisions

effective and ena'ling a citi3ens to $ro$erly $erform their duties. N&TUR&1 &ND 1:"&1 RI"9T7 &s citi3ens of our country, we en0oy legal rights which are conveyed 'y the statutes or enacted laws our legislature. These legal rights are otherwise called civil rights or statutory rights. Thus legal rights e(ist in the legal system of our country. Rights arising out of customs and conventions also form $art of these legal rights. Natural Rights are Unaliena'le Natural rights, on the contrary, are not arising out of the statutes or customs or conventions of our society or country. Natural rights are also called moral rights or unaliena'le rights. These rights are unaliena'le in nature. They cannot 'e alienated from the individual. They are not created or conferred 'y any government or statute or custom or convention of any $olitical system. They are moral rights which are universally a$$lica'le. Natural rights do not have any territorial or 0urisdictional limits. Naturally rights are morally universal. On the other hand, legal rights are su'0ect to the $olitical and cultural system of the territory in which the individual is domicile. C1&I+ &ND 1I4:RT; RI"9T & claim right is a right which entails that another $erson has a duty to the right-holder.

7ome'ody else must do or refrain from doing something to or for theclaim holder, such as $erform a service or su$$ly a $roduct for him or her> that is, he or she has a claim to that service or $roduct ,another term is thing in action.. In logic, this idea can 'e e($ressed as5 8erson & has a claim that $erson 4 do something if and only if 4 has a duty to & to do that something. :very claim-right entails that some other duty'earer must do some duty for the claim to 'e satisfied. This duty can 'e to act or to refrain from acting. )or e(am$le, many 0urisdictions recogni3e 'road claim rights to things li!e life, li'erty, and $ro$erty > these rights im$ose an o'ligation u$on others not to assault or restrain a $erson, or use their $ro$erty, without the claimholder#s $ermission. 1i!ewise, in 0urisdictions where social welfare services are $rovided, citi3ens have legal claim rights to 'e $rovided with those services. & li'erty right or $rivilege, in contrast, is sim$ly a freedom or $ermission for the rightholder to do something, and there are no o'ligations on other $arties to do or not do anything. This can 'e e($ressed in logic as5 8erson & has a $rivilege to do something if and only if & has no duty not to do that something. )or e(am$le, if a $erson has a legal li'erty right to free s$eech, that merely means that it is not legally for'idden for them to s$ea! freely5 it does not mean that anyone has to hel$ ena'le their s$eech, or to listen to their s$eech> or even, $er se, refrain from sto$$ing them from s$ea!ing,

though other rights, such as the claim right to 'e free from assault, may severely limit what others can do to sto$ them. 1i'erty rights and claim rights are the inverse of one another5 a $erson has a li'erty right $ermitting him to do something only if there is no other $erson who has a claim right for'idding him from doing so. 1i!ewise, if a $erson has a claim right against someone else, then that other $erson#s li'erty is limited. )or e(am$le, a $erson has a li'erty right to wal! down a sidewal! and can decide freely whether or not to do so, since there is no o'ligation either to do so or to refrain from doing so. 4ut $edestrians may have an o'ligation not to wal! on certain lands, such as other $eo$le#s $rivate $ro$erty, to which those other $eo$le have a claim right. 7o a $erson#s li'erty right of wal!ing e(tends $recisely to the $oint where another#s claim right limits his or her freedom. INDILIDU&1 &ND "ROU8 RI"9T7 Individual rights are rights held 'y individual $eo$le regardless of their grou$ mem'ershi$ or lac! thereof. . "rou$ rights have 'een argued to e(ist when a grou$ is seen as more than a mere com$osite or assem'ly of se$arate individuals 'ut an entity in its own right. In other words, it#s $ossi'le to see a grou$ as a distinct 'eing in and of itself> it#s a!in to an enlarged individual which

has a distinct will and $ower of action and can 'e thought of as having rights. )or e(am$le, a $latoon of soldiers in com'at can 'e thought of as a distinct grou$, since individual mem'ers are willing to ris! their lives for the survival of the grou$, and therefore the grou$ can 'e conceived as having a right which is su$erior to that of any individual mem'er> for e(am$le, a soldier who diso'eys an officer can 'e $unished, $erha$s even !illed, for a 'reach of o'edience. 4ut there is another sense of grou$ rights in which $eo$le who are mem'ers of a grou$ can 'e thought of as having s$ecific individual rights 'ecause of their mem'ershi$ in a grou$. In this sense, the set of rights which individuals-asgrou$-mem'ers have is e($anded 'ecause of their mem'ershi$ in a grou$. )or e(am$le, wor!ers who are mem'ers of a grou$ such as ala'or union can 'e thought of as having e($anded individual rights 'ecause of their mem'ershi$ in the la'or union, such as the rights to s$ecific wor!ing conditions or wages. &s e($ected, there is sometimes considera'le disagreement a'out what e(actly is meant 'y the term grou$ as well as 'y the term grou$ rights.