Group Wrongs and Guilt Feelings Author(s): Margaret Gilbert Source: The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 1, No.

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MARGARET GILBERT

GROUP WRONGS AND GUILT FEELINGS*

(Received and accepted 21 September 1995) ABSTRACT. Can it ever be appropriate to feel guilt just because one's group has acted badly? Some say no, citing supposed features of guilt feelings as such. If one understands
to my plural subject account one can argue for of groups, however, group action according - a the appropriateness of feeling because one's acted has that group guilt just badly feeling account In so arguing I sketch the plural often occurs. intentions of groups, group subject

and group actions: for a group to intend (in the relevant sense) is for itsmembers to be
jointly committed to intend that such-and-such as a body. Individual group members need

not be directly involved in the formation of the intention in order to participate in such a joint commitment. The core concept of joint commitment is in an importantway holistic,
over which not being to a set of personal reducible commitments each party holds sway. so understood see the resulting can reasonably to a group intention Parties action as "ours" as opposed to "theirs" and thus appropriately to the action's badness with a feeling respond are matter. I label the feeling in of guilt, even when themselves innocent the they morally

in question a feeling of "membership guilt." A number of standard philosophical claims

about the nature of guilt collective feelings action, are thrown into question by my argument.

KEY

WORDS:

collective

responsibility,

groups,

group

action,

group

intention,

group membership

INTRODUCTION
a certain person, Jane, belongs to a group which has acted in Suppose a blameworthy manner. Because her group has acted in this way, Jane

experiences a feeling of guilt. Can Jane's feeling of guilt be justified? Can

it be appropriate
* Previous versions of

to feel guilt just because

this material have been

one's

group has acted badly?1

as part of an invited talk to

presented

members of the Philosophy Program, The Graduate Center of the City University of New York, March 3, 1995 (title: "The Concept of a Group and Some Problems in Political Philosophy"), and at theUniversity ofMassachusetts, Amherst (October 13,1995), and the University of Connecticut (November 8, 1995), and at Columbia University (November
9, 1995). Baxter, stages "in on these I am grateful comments for the probing I received A. Corlett, and F. Feldman for further discussion. This article of its topic. Further The comments would occasions, represents and to D. the initial

of an investigation

be welcomed.

In what follows, when I speak of a group acting badly I should be taken to mean
manner," culpably. same goes for my references to a group's

a blameworthy

"wrongdoing."

The Journal of Ethics 1: 65-84, 1997. 1997Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in theNetherlands. ?

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66 MARGARET GILBERT

Itmay be thought that it cannot.2 This is suggested by several common claims about the proper basis for guilt feelings and about what it is to feel guilt.3 A feeling of guilt, it has been said, is appropriate only in
relation to one's own actions.4 One can, after all, bear guilt of one's group's only for one's one

own wrongdoing.5 To feel guilt is to afflict oneself.6 How could it be

appropriate to do this on account bad action? Might

not be personally guiltless in thematter?

In this paper I sketch an argument to the effect that it can be appropriate to feel guilt because one's group has acted badly, even if one is personally a number of in the matter. The argument will put in question guiltless about guilt feelings. standard assumptions The a group's invokes a particular understanding of what a group and argument to meet action are. It therefore concerns cases that are assumed

on actual groups I do not argue for any judgements specified conditions. or particular people. The validity of such judgements depends on concrete and the such determination of facts the historical facts, any goes beyond of this paper. scope The paper has two main sections. The first section sketches the account invoke. I turn to the that my argument will of groups and group actions in the second and section. of group wrongs guilt feelings question

I.GROUPS AS PLURAL SUBJECTS

1. Plural The Subjects

term "group," even as applied to human populations, of is susceptible of the appropriateness of many different Any discussion interpretations. sense a make clear the of should therefore for action feeling guilt group's "group" 2 or type of group with which it will be concerned.

See, for instance, L. May, Sharing Responsibility (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 298-402; R J. Wallace, Responsibility and theMoral Sentiments (Cam bridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 244. 3 One feels guilt over something. That iswhat Imean by "the proper basis for guilt."
4 See R. J.Wallace, op. cit., p. 66, note 22, "Guilt is appropriate to one's own violations

[of moral obligation]" (my emphasis); G. Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of
cannot arise of guilt... Press, 1985), p. 91, "feelings (Oxford: Clarendon Self-Assessment of others." from the deeds or omissions 5 be vicarious"; J. Feinberg itself cannot loc. cit.: "Guilt Cf. Taylor, (on the state of "... there can be no such thing as vicarious "Collective guilt," Responsi bearing guilt)

bility," reprinted inL. May and S. Hoffman (eds.), Collective Responsibility (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991), p. 60, emphasis Feinberg's.
6 See P. Greenspan, Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 171 and elsewhere.

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GROUPWRONGS AND GUILT FEELINGS 67 groups understood argument will concern a that this is standard everyday understanding as plural I subjects. term of the "group,"

My believe Imean

though I shall not argue for thathere.7 In this section I briefly explain what
by a "plural subject."8 In order for a number of people to constitute a plural subject, it is

both necessary and sufficient for them to be jointly committed to doing

is here understood very broadly. something as a body. "Doing something" a a or certain belief certain principle, for instance, will Having accepting in the relevant sense. Those who are both constitute "doing something" jointly committed to believe that such-and-such plural subject of the belief that such-and-such, What do I have inmind when I speak of a joint idea is this. A joint commitment is not a "sum" ments - it is not, for instance, my commitment it is the commitment "of" you and me. Rather, "us."10 An rescinded Suppose important aspect as a body and so on.9 commitment? or aggregate constitute The basic of commit a

plus your commitment. It is the commitment of is that it can only be

of a joint commitment

something are understood to flow from a joint commitment. commitments," however, means that have This certain special properties. they are interdependent. can commitments" Neither First, our "individual exist on its own. They exist only as part of the joint commitment. Thus, in cannot antedate yours, this two-person commitment case, my individual

jointly. one with the other, to do that you and I are jointly committed, as a body. We are then, indeed, both committed. Our "individual

7 stood

In my

book

On Social I shall

Facts not repeat

in this way.

I argue that the term "social is standardly under group" the argument here. I take it that the term "group" is

often used as short for "social group" interpreted in theway in question. SeeM. Gilbert, On Social Facts (London: Routledge, 1989; second printing, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), especially Chap. 4. 8 The material on plural subjects that follows here draws on On Social Facts and a
number of related articles. Many more of these can be found in a forthcoming are given essay collection,

M. Gilbert, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality, and Obligation (Lanham,MD: Rowman

and Littlefield,

1996).

Some

specific Collective

references

in later notes.

I have discussed plural subjects of belief

Facts, Chap. 5, "Modelling

in a number of places
1987, Synthese,

including On
recently,

Social

Belief,"

and, most

"Remarks on Collective Belief," inF. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge (Lanham,MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993). The articles are to be reprinted, with some amendments, inLiving Together. InOn Social Facts, Chap. 6,1 argue that social conventions are jointly accepted principles with the form of a simple fiat,
in other 10 words, those with a convention are jointly committed to accept as a body some

simple fiat (373ff.).

For more on the first person plural pronoun see below in the text.

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68 MARGARETGILBERT nor to exist unless yours does. The same is true mutatis ] for your individual commitment.1 I cannot unilaterally rescind my "individual commitment" and Second, rescind yours. What has to be rescinded is the joint you cannot unilaterally can commitment, an important sense bound not "own" notion and that can only be rescinded jointly. it cease

mutandis

The fact thatjoint commitments can only be rescinded jointly brings out
Each of us is in an important aspect of our joint commitment. to the other. Each is subject to a commitment he (or she) does cannot release himself.12 and from which he

As the above discussion indicates, there is an ineradicable holism in the

cannot a sense in which my "part" and your "part" of a joint commitment, a certain holism built be separated out. There is, in consequence, as a plural subject. into the notion of a group understood When subjects, and vice as plural I say that my argument will concern groups understood a group, Imean that I shall take any plural subject to constitute us versa. Thus our participation in a joint commitment makes

to believe Those who are jointly committed group members. something as a body, or to accept a certain principle as a body, and so on: these are of a group. thereby members 2. Large Populations How as Plural

Subjects

are joint commitments is formed? As I understand it, what is needed one to their that the another individual readiness parties express (roughly) to be jointly committed in a certain way. To be less rough, one should are "common knowledge" the add that these mutual expressions between in something like the sense introduced by David Lewis.13

parties,
11 I take

it that there must two. In every

be at least case, insofar cannot

be more one's

than

"individual

commitment"

to a joint commitment, two parties and there can a as one is committed through joint commitment, exist on its own (this is the "interdependence" parties to a given joint commitment, neither can

property). commitments" other cases

If there are just must both more

two potential and

be committed through the joint commitment unless the other is. Hence
arise, cease, and requires score here. 12 that joint of places, relatedly, I argue in a number sense of "obligation." in an important and distinctive discussion,

the "individual
respect on to this

The with situation simultaneously. I shall not attempt any pronouncements commitments See, for involve instance,

obligations "Agreements,

Coercion, and Obligation," Ethics, 1993,reprinted inLiving Together. 13 D.K. Lewis, Convention (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1969). Precisely
how to define "common knowledge" in P knows different is somewhat moot. According to one now standard

definition, it is common knowledge thatp in some population P, if and only if everyone inP
knows I discuss that/?, everyone a somewhat that everyone in P knows Facts, that/?, and so on Chap. 4, pp. (ad infinitum). proposal in On Social 188-195.

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GROUPWRONGS AND GUILT FEELINGS 69 two people who are face first a simple case involving Jack may say "Would you like to dance?" and Cindy may answer Or Jack may beckon to Cindy, and she may come forward to meet Consider is understood that when on both to face. "Yes!" him. It

the relevant expressions of readiness have been the in is commitment sides, given joint place. Jack and Cindy are to committed jointly dancing together. that "spans" a large population Could a joint commitment be formed? are often in the present context insofar as wrongs This question is pertinent ascribed Given to large groups, to whole nations, for instance.14 a population-wide one can imagine referendum that there could

be grounds for ascribing a joint commitment to the population in question, more seem to however be There would also informal mechanisms large. a joint commitment can be formed. whereby spanning a large population In On Social Facts, I argued that there is a central sense of the first in which its proper referent is a plural subject.15 person plural pronoun uses sense may be tendentious or initiatory in of "we" this Sporadic, early that in a given large population it is common however, Suppose, in that of that conversation members knowledge regularly and population of "we" and "us" and "our" in spontaneously speak referring to the popu uses.16 for example, that they regularly lation. Suppose, to "our leader, Clovis." I suggest that this comes existence of something like a joint commitment
over us.

and spontaneously close to establishing to grant Clovis

refer the

authority

some such as "our leader" could, of course, be used to mean we are to than "that other committed person thing jointly granting authority over us" or the like. In some mouths, perhaps, "our leader" could mean "that person whom we habitually follow," for instance. Phrases People do more than use pronouns, however. They talk to one another about the matters of the day, they make clear what they consider appro and what not. The detail of conversations the priate behavior throughout can confirm the plural subject interpretation of "our leader" and population the like, both for observers, and the participants themselves.17 a in who accepts the plural subject Someone that, given population, correct is the one, may object that, nonetheless, interpretation people may 14 There is some discussion of the case of large group plural subjecthood inOn Social
Facts, and elsewhere. The discussion pp. 212-213, subject merits more or can give here. 15 See Chap. 4, Sec. 3; also Chap. 7, Sec. 2. 16 On such uses see On Social Facts, p. 178. 17 were prompted The last two paragraphs from A. Kuflik by comments than I gave there

* my paper "Reconsidering the Actual Contract' Theory of Political Obligation" presented at theNew Jersey Regional Philosophical Association Conference, April 22,1995.

on

the version

of

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70 MARGARET GILBERT have been more or less brainwashed into talking about "our leader" in the into using this language by parents, teachers,

sense in question, pressured to be and peers. How can such talk go so far as to express one's readiness a the for to be one's basis and, indeed, party joint commitment, participation

in a joint commitment itself?18

how particular people come to refer to a leader as "ours" or a they particular group as "we," in the relevant sense, is one question. What mean and what they achieve when they do so refer, is another. I suggest that Precisely we the relevant should not deny that their use expresses it was to be party to a joint commitment, because just pressure. One need not, then, deny to them the ability commitment.19 3. The Action What of a Group as a plural subject to perform an type of readiness arrived at under to create a joint

is it for a group understood that follow first

action? This is a large question, and I cannot hope to do it justice here. The
remarks will, I hope, suffice for present purposes. human being, Rose, who is the case of an individual an to is the action of Atlanta. She action, performing travelling travelling to Atlanta. What to? A first stab at an answer might does this amount Consider Rose intends to travel to Atlanta, and her current behavior and so on) is guided by this intention. Let an intention and behavior guided by that of an intention. as a body to do intend as a body of an intention

run as follows:

(boarding this particular plane, us focus on these two elements: intention. Two or more

the plural subject people can constitute to intend in other committed be words, They can, jointly to Rose and Lily may be jointly committed such-and-such. to meet in Atlanta. They then constitute the plural subject to meet in Atlanta.

18 Cf. V. Medina, Social Contract Theories (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1990), p. 139: "Even to acquiesce and not openly challenge the authority of the state is not
can be a matter to generate since our acquiescence of habit, political obligations, or intimidation, apathy." simply 19 On the question whether and, indeed, coercion, pressure joint commitment precludes see "Agreements, and Obligation." Coercion, sufficient

Clearly, I am not attempting a complete discussion of what it is for an individual human being toperform an action. I aim only to show that ifwe take an individual tobe performing an action (more or less) when that individual's behavior is guided by an intention, then groups can fulfill analogous conditions: the behavior of the group's members can be guided
by the group's intention, as opposed to the personal intentions of the individual members.

20

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GROUPWRONGS AND GUILT FEELINGS 71 people refer to "our" intention they standardly refer to of a plural subject, namely "us."21 Suppose, then, that guided by their intention, Lily boards an Atlanta-bound plane in New York, and Rose boards an Atlanta-bound in San Francisco. I suggest that at plane I take it that when the intention

something like this point, we could say that the group comprising Lily and
Rose is travelling to Atlanta. to intend as a body to such-and-such. because, along with Rose, she is party to intend as a body to meet in Atlanta. The same is

To be guided by a group intention is, in effect, to be guided by a specific

joint Lily to a joint commitment true of Rose, mutatis mutandis. Two or more people may, the commitment commitment, boards an Atlanta-bound plane

the plural subject of an then, constitute intention, and each one's behavior may then be guided by that intention, so that the intention be carried out. When like these conditions something is directly is required

are fulfilled, it seems appropriate to say that a group is acting. In the case just envisaged each of the group's members involved in the creation of the group's intention and each one for its implementation. for group action. The members ing some decisions one member Neither of these features appears

to be necessary

of a population or group

to authoriz may be jointly committed to form intentions or make of members

or subject for them, perhaps in certain specified circumstances to special conditions. A mechanism is then in place for the formation of a group intention without the direct involvement of all group members. even not know of the Some members existence of a given group may intention. A group's intention need not require the action of all members for its The group's fulfillment. intention may be achievable the action through to form an of some small portion of the population. authorized Those 21 The account Iwould give of "our" intention (sometimes referred to as shared or joint
is not, or therefore, a "summative" account: our intention to do such-and-such corresponding non-summative is wholly in part constituted one for each of or "sum" of closely by an aggregate the people I argue for my concerned.

intention) neither personal

intentions,

account in "Shared Intention" (1993ms), invited contribution to a symposium on "Shared or Joint Intention," American Philosophical Association Meetings, Pacific Division, San
Francisco, 113.1 sense March 25,1993. Cf. M. Bratman, "Shared Intention," Ethics in mind, take Bratman of "our to have the same analysandum and myself to Bratman, intention." it is a logically According the house together "our that each Thus for Bratman 104 (1993), pp. 97 a certain standard condition of our

intending house

to paint

together.

necessary intends of us personally to do such-and-such" intention

that we paint the is in part a "sum"

of closely corresponding personal intentions. For discussion and criticism of a number of summative views of shared, joint or (what I call) collective belief see On Social Facts,
Chap. 5, and elsewhere.

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72 MARGARET GILBERT

intention for the group may also be authorized to see to it that it is carried
out, giving Thus we orders as necessary a situation even to various in which people it seems and groups within the

main group. Relatively few people need be directly involved altogether.

can have group did such-and-such relevant group intention
out.

to say that a appropriate did not know of any though many members in carrying and few were involved the intention

introduced the plural subject account of groups, I want to set Having some questions it aside for the time being, and to consider that arise pretheoretically.

n. GUILT FEELINGS AND GROUP WRONGS

1. Some Cases Can to feel guilt because it be appropriate one's group has acted badly? can one's action itself is, by group's justify a feeling of guilt? A cases can help to sharpen the question. variety of possible In each of the following situations, my group has acted badly but itmay seem

That

that I, for one, cannot be justified in feeling guilt as a result. to prevent or curtail it. I did as 1)1 knew of the action and attempted as I could reasonably much to do, given my situation and be expected a have may organized capacities.221 large public protest against the action. I may have participated in such a protest. Unable to participate, I may have spoken warmly of the protest, encouraged others to go on it, loudly condemned to move or speak, but knowing the action, and so on. Unable of the action, Imay have condemned it roundly in my heart.23 Can it be for me to feel guilt about the group's action? a member it performed of the group when the action, I did 2) Though not learn of the action until it was too late to do anything to prevent or appropriate curtail action
22

at the time

it. I am in no way culpable for my lack of information about the it occurred.24 Had I learnt of the action in time to do

what a given person could "reasonably to do" in a given have been expected Precisely case may not be clear. This may be the occasion of serious moral In what debate. I follows take it that there are some relatively shall simply clear cases of doing what one reasonably to do in the circumstances. could have been expected 23 this does not count as "doing everything to prevent I could the action," since Perhaps to prevent it is not clear that unexpressed condemnation the action. On the goes any way other hand, in these action. Condemnation 24 This point added circumstances this is as far as I can go towards special is the first step to deliberate action. preventive to a conversation in response with D. Luban, October preventing 1995. Precisely the

when and why some ignorance is culpable is amatter of some delicacy intowhich Imake

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GROUPWRONGS AND GUILT FEELINGS 73

something, Iwould have tried to prevent it. Iwould have done as much
as I could reasonably have been expected to do. Perhaps I would have

succeeded in preventing the action. Can it be appropriate for me to feel

guilt about the group's action?25 Now it seems that people do feel guilt over their group's actions even in circumstances such as these.26 If this is so, that is in itself a reason for some basis can be found for the feeling. At the same whether considering time, itmay be tempting to write it off as irrational, as going too far.27 as a form of negative The feeling of guilt has been characterized self and as suggesting that reparative action may be appropriate.28 assessment, Itmay already incorporate an element of self-punishment?9 Even this relatively thin characterization of the feeling of guilt suggests the problem.30 The people in question here appear to be personally blame less with respect to their group's action: they tried as best they could to indeed, that prevent it, they knew nothing of it, and so on. Let us assume, we can amplify are in the matter of their position further: they blameless being could at the time in question. and remaining group members the action of the group justify a negative self-assessment How, then, or, if feeling

to enter here. Evidently sometimes experience guilt because they ignored people was on. that bad signs something going 25 seem act may to be sufficient The of one's simple ignorance country's wrongful in the text of the appropriateness The case of feeling rebuttal, already, guilt in its regard. will,

no attempt

Cf. J.G. Gray, "The Stains ofWar," inR.W. Smith (ed.), Guilt: Man and Society (Gar den City, New York: Anchor Books, 1971), pp. 291-293; J. Horton, Political Obligation (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1992), p. 153; P. Greenspan, op.
cit., p. 162. Greenspan here consider a member. different gives the example of "white American guilt about slavery or guilt

26

if anything,

be even more

persuasive.

felt for various other misdeeds

shall before perhaps misdeed not the case The one was not wholly occurred.

that occurred before the birth of those who felt guilty." I

of guilt over "misdeeds" of one's group which at here be least somewhat different may story from that of those who were group members occurred though at the time the

27
feels

As Iread K. Jaspers in his fine, probing essay The Question of German Guilt, he
that this is so. He writes refutable, that"... I feel in a way co-responsible which rationally not conceivable, which is rationally do and have done for what Germans

is even

a philosopher I now seem to have strayed completely into therealm of feeling _As and to have abandoned conception", tr.E.B. Ashton (New York: Capricorn Books, 1947), pp. 80-81. My argument in Sections 4 and following suggest that he may, after all, not
have or strayed from what is rationally conceivable. "abandonedconception" more work and in in another greater directly length place. Jaspers's 28 op. cit, pp. 91 and 93. Taylor, 29 As proposed op. cit., p. 171 and elsewhere. by Greenspan, I hope to treat

30

"Thin" in part because it does not go so far as to say that a feeling of guilt over a
act presumes that the act is one's own.

blameworthy

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74 MARGARET GILBERT guilt comes to that, a form of self-punishment? In a word, why should

they

tell themselves off? How could thatbe appropriate?

2. Larry May on "Metaphysical" Guilt

In a recent discussion May alludes to what, guilt. Like As May

Jaspers, understands

to his group's wrongs, Larry of a person's relationship Karl using Jaspers's phrase, he calls "metaphysical" he contrasts this with "moral" guilt.31 it, the distinction between metaphysical and moral

guilt is intended to distinguish between a form of guilt which presupposes moral responsibility for an act (moral guilt) and a form of guilt which does
not presuppose May refers moral responsibility taint." Could in relation to that act (metaphysical be to

guilt). Metaphysical guilt is distinct from moral guilt but involves what
to as "moral responses appropriate to metaphysical at issue here the guilt feelings sense, as opposed guilt inMay's

moral guilt?
I think, deny this. He writes: "As I will understand it in May would, ... the fact that each out this chapter, metaphysical arises of person guilt in what any member of the group does."32 is at least somewhat implicated as it understands is not, however, May Metaphysical guilt "merely based on group membership. Rather it arises from the fact that a person did not but could have (and should have) responded differently_"33 In order to avoid metaphysical and sufficient guilt, it is both necessary to "disassociate" for group members themselves from their group's action. What be sufficient for the relevant type of disassociation? one could reasonably be expected to do to prevent the action what Doing to inMay's view.34 Were one powerless would certainly count as sufficient do anything, even speak out, merely the action in one's heart condemning would also be sufficient.35 May writes: would L. May, Sharing Responsibility. Page references that follow will be to the excerpt from this book inL. May and S. Hoffman (eds.), Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate inTheoretical and Applied Ethics (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991). I shall not discuss therelationship of May's notion of metaphysical guilt to that found in
I understand in his sense has to do with essay. As Jaspers's Jaspers, metaphysical guilt as opposed to membership human in particular human such as families, groups solidarity

31

and would not appropriately be invoked to explain the kind of case at issue here. Jaspers's
notion to our topic. On the other hand, not to of "political it appears guilt" may be closer a group's wrongdoing as its vanquished so much status. I shall not pursue Jasper's further here. discussion 32 and Hoffman, p. 240. May involve

33

Ibid.
Cf. op. cit., p. 241. cit., p. 247.

34 35

Op.

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GROUPWRONGS AND GUILT FEELINGS

or disavowing what one's community to regard is based on how one chooses has done, oneself. one Such

75
that part of disassociate

By one's

condemning self which

changes changes

oneself from one's fellow group members and diminish one's shared responsibility for what
those others have done.36

Shortly after thisMay claims that it is not appropriate to feel guilt when
one has (appropriately) distanced oneself from one's group.37 the fact that as May allows What, though, of people may experience a feeling of guilt in relation to their group's act even after the kind of disassociation from the act to which he refers? Is there that this feeling showing the response of the people There irrational is no need or ill-founded. is or could concerned? be appropriate, some way of and hence to respect

flaws, however, that we search quite 3. The Appeal In this context

to deny the possibility are of guilt feelings which are Insofar as irrationality and ill-foundedness respect for a response and the people who have it demands seriously for an account that avoids irrationality.

to Identification some authors

appeal to what they refer to as "identification" with one's group.38 I am not sure that the bare appeal to "identification" or our understanding we are considering, advances of the phenomenon our concern addresses about its appropriateness. adequately In discussions writes, "feelings others."39 Given guilt in relation of guilt it is standard to assume that, as Gabriele Taylor cannot arise from the deeds or omissions of guilt... of - to feel that this is so and I shall not dispute it here to the acts of one's country in some sense to is already it is to reject the idea that to "identification"

identify with one's country. More tentatively, other than oneself. one's country is something The question immediately arising from the reference

is this: how is the relevant identification possible? How could identifica tion be intelligible, let alone appropriate?Louis XIV notoriously claimed
"L'Etat, cfest moi." Whatever not claim that, literally would precisely he had in mind, most citizens is no more than their country speaking, "me." What, is the relevant way of perceiving then, is at issue here? When one's relation to one's country - identification legitimate? Can we go a to more the of identification beyond metaphor precise account of what is - or may be going on?40 36
37 38 39 40 Taylor, Op. See, cit., p. 247, for instance, loc. cit. cites "solidarity" as a "necessary condition of the vicarious emotions" (he

Ibid.
second Horton, full paragraph. op. cit., pp. 15Iff.

J. Feinberg

refers to pride and shame), "Collective Responsibility," p. 65. Feinberg gives a complex

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76 MARGARET GILBERT 4. The Intuitive Picture

At a simple intuitive level, first, there is a difference between accepting

that "We did it." I am not one of them, that "They did it" and accepting but I am "one of us." I cannot detach myself from "us" while I regard "us" as "us." precisely If I am The intuitive picture goes further than this, somewhat as follows. one of us, and we did something, / am part of what did it.More precisely, I am part of the agent that did it, part of the subject of the action. Whereas / am the subject of my action, I am part of the subject of our action. In my of "us," I am on a par with every other member. capacity as a member to this or that person doing it, we thing, as opposed to the doing of it.41 If we bear guilt, may bear moral guilt with respect ours. Not mine, nor mine and yours, but the guilt in question is, precisely, ours itmay be referred to as collective then ours, guilt. together. Perhaps If we did this bad This guilt will
of

be participated
"us."

in, or shared,

by all of us,

in our capacity degrees of act. Some have efforts been into this

as members

can still bear different this picture, different members to be "our" to what they understand personal guilt in relation members might have done all they could to stop it, others may some may have put all their blamelessly ignorant of it, whereas Given its performance.
is so.

It is clear enough

where

the personal

guilt

lies when

5. Plural

Subject

Theory

and

the Intuitive

Picture

to the intuitive picture, if we did something bad, and bear moral According our It bad action, each one of us shares in the guilt as a member. guilt for seem that, if this is right, it can be appropriate to feel would for someone war a when his over, say, by hypothesis starting particular guilt country's in relation to this act of war-making. If the blameless he was personally can it have any validity? intuitive picture has this consequence, account of what he calls "solidarity" (p. 62). Some elements of this (for instance "sharing
a common describe It is not "vicarious some affinity with have the background purpose") cooperative to "the plural possessive See also his brief allusion in the text below. as opposed to shame, that Feinberg would allow that guilt, clear emotion." I shall not attempt here any close comparison to the This of my conditions 'our'," p. 63. I

is a possible with views

Feinberg's. 41 "We may bear moral guilt

bear moral for our

guilt_"I bad actions

take in some

it that according circumstances.

intuitive does

picture we do not mean that we

will always do so. It could be that ifwe were forced to act badly, for instance, thiswould preclude our bearing moral guilt for the our bad action. Or perhaps we did not and could
not have been expected to believe that what we were doing was wrong.

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GROUPWRONGS AND GUILTFEELINGS 77 I referred earlier to the view that in a central sense - or standard use -

the first person plural pronoun refers to a plural subject. To say that "We did it," given this usage, is to say that "I am the member of a plural subject which did'it'." Now be used "We did it" could have other construals. use, where "Some itmeans to mean Sometimes it could have a "distributive" the intuitive to "what we Consider in plural involved it could even "We all did it." Perhaps our I want to argue is that of number did it."What

in it picture need not be rejected if we interpret the references did" in terms of plural subject theory.42 is a matter of participation that, if one's group membership then one

as an individual, is oneself, genuinely one comes This understanding (as understands). nature from one's understanding of the of joint commitment. an which Joint commitment involvement is "deep" in two produces subjecthood, in tfie group ways. in a "deep," psychological affected First, one is personally way. this it commitment is foundational for a group's actions: Second, joint these actions as it does the group itself. It is true that many have underpins contributed contribution. on Country X" when one sees "us" as a continuing one is a member, is to understand plural subject of which area were "I like this: and other this residents of something geographical as a war on to to committed intend make jointly body Country X, and this, our intention, was carried out accordingly by appropriate persons_" To say that "We made One might add: "The action in question is no more any other member's than it is mine: it is ours, period." to do to prevent But suppose I did all I could reasonably be expected our going to war? Suppose, for instance, I organized a large protest march? Would the act of war still properly be said to be "ours, period" where I am one of us, on a par, qua member, with all the rest? I take the question to amount to this: would a personal protest against the intended war the war war to this foundation, but to say that is not to deny one's own

to intend somehow free me from the joint commitment as a body? Would it somehow do away with my participation in the joint commitment? to do, given that we intend to make Let us consider what I am supposed war on Country X. Does this mean that I am required personally to approve this war-making? That like belief, disapproval, seems if only because implausible, are not clearly within our voluntary approval control. and

42
here.

Should it be rejected otherwise? I shall neither explore nor pronounce upon that issue

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78 MARGARET GILBERT

If the requirements imposed by the joint commitment do not go that far,

Imay feel? There is required not to express any disapproval to think that this, too, is not a requirement. More precisely, there war is reason to think that I can express my personal of the disapproval the joint commitment. without violating reason at our disposal avowals of the following form: "Personally, I or our our to "In war" to of my personal opinion, disapprove going going war is a bad thing." Avowals of this sort, in particular, can be argued not to run counter to the joint commitment to which I am party. The qualifiers We have "In my personal and the like appear to put the "Personally," opinion," a avowal in space not covered by that commitment: my personal space, so not speaking qua group member to speak. I am expressly here, but in my own voice. to suppose, then, that generally speaking I can express even my personal towards our act, revulsion my personal disapproval, in the relevant joint commit without putting in question my participation There ment. similar appears to be true of some of the more active Something a protest march to the group's act, such as organizing forms of opposition to be and be understood of against the act. These may be expressions one's personal attitudes.43 as an expression A joint act, like a protest march, may be understood of the attitude of a subgroup within the larger group. Such a statement as "In the view of this assembly, to embark on such the country is wrong a war" indicates as members as that in their capacity of this assembly, to their capacity as members of the society as a whole, or, indeed, opposed their personal capacity, these people oppose the war. A variety of forms of personal reaction and protest, then, appear not to go against the terms of the joint commitment under discussion. to do was make be expected Suppose now that all I could reasonably some personal protest that does not violate our joint commitment to intend as a body to go to war, and that I made that protest. I could still accept the "participation" to the effect that we started the war. Insofar argument as this was a culpable act on our part, I can then accept and that we bear guilt for our action.44
It is possible, of course, sion of personal disapproval 43 that in some of the group's groups actions. a rule of According

am I perhaps

is reason

that we did wrong

the group may forbid the expres to the present such argument,

a rule would be needed to supplement the understandings implicit in the joint commitment underlying the intention of a plural subject: it is not implicitly present. I discuss group
conventions and rules in On Social Facts, Chap. 6, and an essay "On Social Rules: Some

Problems forHart's Account and a New Proposal" (ms). 44 I shall not attempt to explore here the conditions under which it is appropriate to
ascribe guilt or blameworthiness to a group in relation to a given action of the group. The

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GROUPWRONGS AND GUILT FEELINGS It seems, basis then, that Imay in which, be personally blameless

79 in the matter of my

group's act yet have a basis forfeeling guilt in relation to that act. That
so far on the question of when one will count as default a on that one can go quite far by way suggesting joint commitment, ing or is also the such default. There of personal subgroup protest without in if one does default on a joint commitment question of what is achieved rid one of the commit automatically one rescinded that had unilaterally ment? it, since has to be a joint act. Is default a way of doing away with a joint rescension it? without commitment rescinding which one participates. Does This would not mean default is our guilt, I have focussed as one of us, I share.

It could well be thatdifferent things are true for different kinds of joint
commitment. cases. renders of To use One rather subtle possibility could be right for at least some in some cases at least default it could be that legal jargon, not void, in concert. defaults but rather voidable In other words, from their number. at the pleasure they are now in a

a joint commitment the other parties acting to exclude now

position

the one who

Suppose be expected the relevant

that in a particular case my doing what I can reasonably on to do to prevent a group wrong does count as defaulting rather is now voidable If the commitment joint commitment.

than void, then, unless others take action, I am not yet "out of the group," and my feeling guilt over subsequent appears to have an group wrongs appropriate basis. 6. Self and Others Versus Group

Confusion as to the possibility of appropriately feeling guilt for the acts of

one's group could be generated by the common claim that feelings of guilt of others." This may suggest "cannot arise from the deeds or omissions that guilt must arise from one's own actions (another common claim). For contrast to "others" is "self."45 the obvious The contrast between "self" and "others," emotions, side. Even the possible one's group one of our reactive however, as might be thought does not exhaust with

taking "group" quite widely, is part of one's own group. In the case of groups as plural subjects, one is integrated with the others in one's group in a special way. however,
intuitive picture this. assumes that there are such conditions, and for present purposes I shall not

objects located on the "other"

question 45 Similarly,

"altruism" concern

"egoism" (roughly, in the following paragraphs, pp. 621-22.

contrast in concern finds its natural for "others") (roughly, on this contrast which those For thoughts for "self). parallel see M. Gilbert, "Me, You, and Us: Distinguishing 'Egoism,'

'Altruism,' and 'Groupism'," inBehavioral and Brain Sciences 17(4) (December 1994),

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80 MARGARET GILBERT One's fellow other which than oneself, functions as

group members, though individually together with oneself a single joint commitment a motivating force for all.46 It creates the conditions create of the term "we" which joined together through a joint commitment. to the deeds Reaction reaction refers

of appropriateness to self and others only insofar as they are the medium of a single supra-individual thing,

of one's group is thus not best characterized as to others, or as even to self plus others, but to self, as reaction to a distinct and distinctive rather as reaction the plural subject entity to both self and others. A feeling of guilt relation with a sui generis to one's own that arises out of one's group's bad action relates neither wrongdoing involving nor to that of "others." or se/f-punishment? In the case on

If this is right, can feeling guilt be characterized quite generally as

negative .^//-assessment

which I am focussing the feeling of guilt would most appropriately be

expressed not by the words "I am guilty" but by the words "We are guilty." or punishment If it involves negative self-assessment of a sort, it involves or or of the assessment of the punishment negative self-as-group-member group-insofar-as-it-exists-in-my-person, rather than of me personally.47 To

give this kind of guilt feeling a special name we might call it a feeling of
"membership guilt." I have just argued, in effect, that certain widely held views, "truisms" are either false or misleading as usually stated. even, about guilt feelings The truisms concern both the proper basis or object for guilt feeling what feel guilty aboutand what the feeling of guilt amounts to. to one's own moral These is only appropriate truisms are "[Moral] Guilt "Guilt is an emotion of negative ^//-assessment," and "Guilt violations," involves ^//-punishment." I have not challenged the deeds or omissions one's tomean the claim seen as either challenged is understood own the claim of others" action that "Guilt that guilt feelings "cannot arise from insofar as one's group's action is not best of "others." Nor insofar have I be vicarious" as this one must

or as the action itself cannot

that one cannot bear guilt for another's wrongdoing. But can one bear guilt for the wrongdoing of any person or thing other than oneself? Can one bear guilt as a result of one's group's wrongdoing?
46

so that "their to people I consciously echo J J. Rousseau's reference uniting are directed a means to act and made in of concert." The power by single moving translated rather Here I in been and echo the has from passage question quote variously. Here forces

translation of D.A. Cress, On the Social Contract (Indianapolis, IN:Hackett, 1983), p. 23.
47 Punishment-of-oneself-as-a-member may be an example of something which

inevitably has a "double effect," one of which (^//-affliction)

is not intended.

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GROUPWRONGS AND GUILT FEELINGS 81 This leads to an important about who bears the guilt when the guilt

point

is collective. 7. Collective According Guilt Is Not a "Sum" picture, there is such a thing as collective guilt.

to the intuitive

This is the guilt of the group. According to the intuitive picture, if there is collective guilt itwill be shared by members of the collective in question
as group members. on behalf of the intuitive picture is that if groups are My suggestion to be plural subjects, and the guilt of a particular group has understood sense to say? as the intuitive picture has it been established, then itmakes - that each member in this guilt in his or her capacity shares or participates in their capacity as a group member. But what is it to share As I understand in collective guilt in one's capacity as a member? not to in bear guilt as an individual person: this is itself it, guilt is not a kind of "sum" involving the

it is not to bear personal guilt. Let me explain. Collective

personal guilt of many individuals. First, it is not built up of guilt indepen

A group can accrue guilt without dently accrued by particular members. for all or most members being personally guilty. It may even be possible are per a group to accrue guilt though none of the individual members sonally guilty guilty. group guilt personally the guilt of a group Second, If we born by its members. cannot be broken down into of a think of all the members

as bearing "membership that guilt," we have to understand not It neither is derives from guilt. personal membership guilt personal guilt is not a sharing in collective guilt nor results in it. In other words, matter of bearing personal guilt. are we to understand such sharing? share in members collective way: equally guilt, shares. Nor do they have unequal shares. In breaking collective guilt down into quantifiable But how In case this situation some seems hard to grasp, analogy bears in their joint equally" it is not clear that it makes indeed, "unequal to it. Two similarity bank account - it sense We might put things this but they do not have equal short, there is no way of shares.

humdrum the following to "share said be people may but is, after all, a joint account "equal shares" or,

to say that they have

shares."48

48
bank

Possibly my thought of this example was influenced by J. Feinberg's reference to joint

accounts, op. cit., p. 63.

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82 MARGARET GILBERT 8. A Harsh If we Doctrine? in a group remaining can be enough to involve one a member, is this not simply

allow that mere membership one does while in guilt, whatever too harsh a doctrine? itself may apposite

One aspect of thematter which could help to spark such a question is

that one's membership may seem particularly societies. will. a large and enduring plural subject, a society, if you the members had little real of about becom Presumably, many option into mem They were "born into" the society, and pressured ing members. Assume we have itmay be that few members this could be brought about if we not be a voluntary matter. This question are considering or whole families

bership by family, teachers, and peers. Again, to leave the society. Perhaps have the means

by ceasing to be the residents of a particular territory. They may simply be

too poor to travel the required distance.49 Is it not harsh, then, to suppose quite generally that such people share

in the guilt of their group simply by being members? For many, their
was in a sense forced upon them and is now in a sense membership inalienable, Sartre has said that there are two ways a soldier mobilized in a war could or these ultimate possibles desertion; "always get out of it": "by suicide must always be present for us_" Not everyone has the of suicide. in for instance, are option Many patients hospitals, psychiatric so cannot kill monitored that they themselves. And some carefully easily people lack the physical capacity to do so even if no one interferes. In any seems a little harsh if the perennial case, it certainly option of suicide is as reason a war (as Sartre forward the citizens "deserve" put why generally or to share the guilt in a war. "deserve" puts it) I have not been arguing for the conclusion that members "deserve" accrue the special guilt of membership, that it. Suicide can, I they simply as rid them of it, insofar it rids them of membership itself. But suppose, they do not accrue it because option. They accrue it because One they had the option they are members. of suicide, or any other are those which

can accrue membership at the blameless guilt while being morally we more level. But social creatures exist, if you like, at than one personal level. 49
of

I have inmind the possibility that one is committed qua resident in a particular part
fellows so that leaving to agree having of membership that place would to a rescension see also bring one's commitment of the joint commitment. to an end without On the topic of the

the world,

one's

"alienablity"

the text, above.

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GROUPWRONGS AND GUILT FEELINGS 83 are group-forming creatures and our groups may act badly. If my means acts have some guilt that I and my fellow members that group badly to share. I'm not sure that that's a harsh doctrine. Perhaps, though, it is We a tragic doctrine, even though incorporating a tragic innocent. truth. There has to be something

tragic about group membership, if it can afflict people with a kind of guilt
they are personally

In spite of this disturbing thought, the feeling of guilt over a collective

action may can play a very positive role. Since feeling guilt is unpleasant, and it is liable to move one who have an inherently punishing character,

feels it to act, and to act in an appropriateway. This will not (necessarily)

be the personal undertaking of reparative action (such action may not be or In many cases, it will lead to political action, to feasible). appropriate or to to if the action it in the is group process, stop encouraging attempting as a can to it do what for its victims. Collective whole group guilt perceived can be the stimulus to improvement as such by individual members in group action and the moral quality of group life. A less grim aspect of the argument of this paper is that it can apparently make sense to feel not only guilt, but pride, on behalf of what one's group of the admirable one's precise role in the generation has done, whatever so pride is pleasant. Even someone of few action. As guilt is unpleasant,

achievements can legitimately (according to this argument) feel pride in

the achievements concern has been to avoid to focus of the relevant group.50 Insofar pain than to find pleasure, on collective and their relation wrongs as people have more the tendency of the literature to individual to individual

and their relation achievements guilt rather than on collective pride. But these appear to be but two sides of the same coin.

CONCLUSION
I startedwith the question, "Can it be appropriate to feel guilt just in case
one's group cases, seem quite has acted badly?" Many though we would judge them puzzling if we accept feel guilt in such people apparently to be personally This can blameless. some prevalent about understandings

guilt feelings. I have argued that a feeling of guilt can be an appropriate response for the some member of a plural subject that bears guilt. My argument challenges about feelings of guilt. It implies that something prevalent understandings other
50

than one's own wrongdoing

often concerns the achievements

is a proper basis
of those

for a feeling

of guilt.

It

Pride

"representing"

the group,

and guilt

may also. Iwill not be exploring this aspect of the question of collective guilt or glory here.

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84 MARGARET GILBERT implies, further, that insofar as feeling guilt involves a negative or intentional punishment it need not involve of something, or intentional punishment of the self as such. assessment assessment a negative

If a plural subject acts badly and bears guilt for its action, then a feel guilt over the action.51 of the plural subject can appropriately member That this is so does not touch the question of anyone's personal guilt or with respect to the action in question. The guilt itmakes blameworthiness sense to feel is guilt of the group. It is guilt in which one shares - but does
not own.

Philosophy University

Department of Connecticut

Storrs XT

06269

USA

I do not go so far as to say that a member should feel guilt in such a case. Probably this is not true in general. If thewrong in question is very minor, for instance, a feeling of guilt may not be called for because thewrong is too trivial (I owe this example to J.Raz, in discussion atColumbia University). In other cases theremay be a sense itwhich it is called for. This may not amount to its being the case thatmembers should feel guilt then, that it
is some someone sort of requirement feel guilt in some that they do. context would sure what that the requirement I am not entirely amount to. In any case, is great a if the wrong

51

feeling of membership guilt is not ruled out on the grounds of having an improper object, and is appropriate in the sense thatone's group has indeed acted very badly.

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