"Defend Your Integrity" - Robert Gates & The Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystal Ver. 1.2 (April 2, 2014 Updated 4-20-14)

DEFEND YOUR INTEGRITY
Robert Gates Leadership of the Bipartisan Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystals CoverUp of Pat Tillmans 2004 Friendly-Fire Death in Afghanistan & Command of JSOC Torture (& Robert Gates Leadership of the Failed Afghan War COIN Surge) Guy Montag @ feralfirefighter.blogspot.com April 2, 2014 [Ver. 1.2; Updated April 20, 2014]
I had come to know and admire [Gen. Stanley] McChrystal and I believed he was perhaps the finest warrior and leader of men in combat I had ever met. I had looked into McChrystals actions in the Tillman case and the allegations of detainee abuse and determined to move forward with his advancement. The Senate Armed Services Committee intended to fight McChrystals nomination. I told the president McChrystal is one of the heroic figures of these wars, and if we wont stand and fight for him, then who? And so we fought. -- Robert Gates, Duty (2014) The cover-up of Pats death was orchestrated at the very highest levels of the Pentagon McChrystals actions should have been grounds for firing. That is why it was so disturbing to us when President Obama [on Gates recommendation] instead promoted McChrystal to the position of top commander in Afghanistan Sadly, McChrystals promotion had been sanctioned long before the [2009 Senate] hearing. None of the congressmen [e.g. Senators Carl Levin, James Webb, and John McCain] pressed McChrystal about Pats case or detainee abuse and [JSOC] torture at Camp Nama -- Mary Tillman, Boots on the Ground by Dusk (2010) Gates admonished the cadets to, Defend your integrity as you would your life. Thats Secretary of Defense talk for, You guys need to end this U.S. military officer habit of lying routinely in official business. But then Gates expressed complete confidence in General McChrystal [the main liar in the Pat Tillman cover-up] indicating that Gates words at West Point were just the usual do as I say not as I do hypocrisy. If Gates would defend his integrity as he would his career, then we would have something. -- John T. Reeds post Secretary Of Defense Gates Comments on Military Integrity and Careerism "Pat was all about integrity There is absolutely no integrity in any of this [pointing to large plastic tub filled with binders of Pentagon investigation documents]. The American public needs to be aware of what's going on, and they can't take their politicians or figures of authority at face value" -- Mary Tillman, After Mother Mary Tillman's Loss Came 'No Integrity' (USA Today, May 5, 2008)
Defend Your Integrity
PAT TILLMAN
November 6, 1976 April 22, 2004
The Tillman Family (May 2004)
Patrick Tillman, Sr. (May 2004) Richard Tillman (May 2004)
That afternoon we helicoptered to Forward Operating Base Tillman ... in eastern Afghanistan. fortified outpost in the mountains, named for Corporal Patrick Daniel Tillman, a professional football player who had enlisted in the Army and was killed in Afghanistan in a friendly-fire tragedy in 2004. nothing made me madder than when I learned that one of them [troops] was being badly treated by his or her service or the Pentagon bureaucracy if I could make time to try to help a single soldier, then by God so could everyone else in authority. -- Robert Gates, Duty (2014) There was no mention of his [Gen. McChrystals] role in the cover-up of the friendly-fire slaying of Pat Tillman, including issuing a bogus Silver Star citation for the Ranger. No one asked him about the pattern of detainee abuse in Iraq by units overseen by McChrystals command McChrystal fizzled badly in Afghanistan, and everyone seems to want to dub him a 21st century Sir Gawain No matter how much the Tillman family and our Army suffered during his leadership in Iraq and Afghanistan -- Carl Prine, McChrystal Clear (Line of Departure blog, June 3, 2012) while I have nothing but respect for the Tillman Family their personal grief should not be a veto on the nomination of the man [Gen. McChrystal] the President, the Secretary of Defense [Gates], and General Petraeus all feel gives the United States the best chance of victory in Afghanistan These are serious questions and are more important than either the death of Pat Tillman or the alleged abuse of detainees. -- CNAS Fellow Andrew Exum, Abu Muqawama blog, Confirm Him (June 2, 2009) Not only is he [McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding Pats death he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. His statement [P4 memo] indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the public, that Pat was killed by fratricide unless forced to do so -- Mary Tillman, Boots on the Ground by Dusk (2008) while each investigation gathered more information, the mountain of evidence was never used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion To falsify a witness statement in a Silver Star award, fabricating it How come no one is held accountable for this? The whole thing [Gates DoD IG report] is riddled with nonsense Writing a Silver Star award before a single eye witness account is taken is not a misstep. Falsifying soldier witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep. are deliberate acts of deceit. -- Kevin Tillman, Congressional testimony (April 24, 2007) 2
When I arrived, [the West Point honor] code had been distilled to a simple directive: A cadet will not lie, cheat, or steal, nor tolerate those who do so ... honor was sacrosanct to me a clear, bright line dividing shenanigans from transgressions against integrity Lying to anyone was a violation of your honor The code existed to ensure that the words of cadets and officers alike could always, in all situations, be taken as truth. -- Gen. Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task
Called one of Americas greatest warriors by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, General Stan McChrystal is a one-of-a-kind commander known for his candor ... His entire career has been guided by his sense of duty a hunger to know the truth on the ground, the courage to find it -- From the inside cover of Stanley McChrystals My Share of the Task (2013) I love the ideals of West Point and the Army. West Point lived up to them in my experience. The Army did not even try. To them, honor is just so much public relations eyewash. military officers put on such a big show of self-righteous indignation when the subject of their honor comes up set themselves up for far more extreme embarrassment when they are revealed to be hypocrites as well as liars. politicians are hypocrites. But career military officers are much bigger hypocrites. -- John T. Reed, Is Military Integrity A Contradiction In Terms? I am concerned about General McChrystals public [Senate] testimony, which sought to convey that he was uncomfortable with various interrogation [torture] techniques and sought to reduce their use. Gi ven the full history of his approach to interrogations, this testimony appears to be incomplete, at best. -- Senator Russ Feingold, Congressional Record (June 11, 2009) Of the several occasions when he himself attracted critical attention the Pat Tillman affair, for example, or the leaking of his Afghan strategic assessment McChrystal offers explanations [in his memoir My Share of the Task] that fall somewhere between perfunctory and disingenuous. -- Andrew Bacevich, New York Times book review Avoiding Defeat (February 8, 2013) Senior ranking US military leaders have so distorted the truth when communicating with the US Congress and American people in regards to conditions on the ground in Afghanistan that the truth has become unrecognizable. There are some brilliant, wonderful, moral guys with integrity who you would like your son or daughter to be like, he says. Unfortunately, as they start moving up, those arent the characteristics theyre now looking for in four-stars. That certainly goes for our most popular generals of recent history, Petraeus and McChrystal, who, Davis believes, should be the first ones censured for the failures of Afghanistan. Lessons from a Surge Skeptic (Kelley Vlahos American Conservative, March 7, 2014) You are a General. On paper you subscribe to this [West Point] motto [Duty, Honor, Country] and honor code There is no way a man like you believes the conclusions [of the 3rd Army 15-6 investigation into Pat Tillmans death]. But your signature is on it. I assume, therefore, that you are part of this shameless bullshit. The Rangers stand for something to this day, in my mind, the best. [No one] involved in this deserve to be affiliated with the Rangers. If your uniforms are so decorated, [with the Ranger Tab] you should remove those items. In sum: Fuck you . And yours. -- Patrick Tillman, Sr. (April 2005 letter to BG Gary Jones) 3
I had come to know and admire McChrystal during my first year as secretary, and I believed he was perhaps the finest warrior and leader of men in combat I had ever met. I had looked into McChrystals actions in the Tillman case and the allegations of detainee abuse and determined to move forward with his advancement. I told the president [Bush] McChrystal is one of the heroic figures of these wars, and if we wont stand and fight for him, then who? And so we fought. -- Robert Gates, Duty (2014) In my commencement speech at the Naval Academy on May 25, 1997 the obligation we owe the
Congress to be honest and true in our reporting to them. Especially if it involves admitting mistakes or problems. When it [the press] identifies a problem the response of senior leaders should be to find out if the allegations are true -- Robert Gates, Duty (2014) Gates admonished the [West Point] cadets to, Defend your integrity as you would your life. Thats Secretary of Defense talk for, You guys need to end this U.S. military officer habit of lying routinely in official business. See my article, Is Military Integrity A Contradiction In Terms? But then Gates expressed complete confidence in General McChrystal [the main liar in the Pat Tillman cover-up] indicating that Gates words at West Point were just the usual do as I say not as I do hypocrisy. If Gates would defend his integrity as he would his career, then we would have something. -- John T. Reed, Secretary Of Defense Gates Comments on Military Integrity and Careerism Who is responsible for this continuing outrage with regard to the treatment of Pat Tillmans death and the never-ending cover-up of it? Defense Secretary Robert Gates who said we need fresh eyes in Afghanistan. After five official inquiries into the Tillman incident, we could not find any honest eyes in the whole U.S. military. Perhaps the lack of integrity in the military is a higher priority than the freshness of the four-star general in charge of Afghanistan. As far as the wonderfulness of the military and congressional investigations, Senator John McCain said, [the Armys actions were] inexcusable and unconscionable. Nevertheless, McCain [and Webb & Levin] supports the promotion McChrystals promotion turns out to be an integrity litmus test. Those opposed to the promotion (the Tillman family) have integrity; those in favor of promoting McChrystal, do not. -- John T. Reed, The General Who Lied About Pat Tillman Gets Promoted to the Highest Rank He knows the administrations position on the matter was a cover-up a mistake. But it worked. And they didnt want the president to look bad. [The Secretary of Defense] never told a lie, at least not in the way he could be caught in it. And anyway, his version could never be challenged [it] would become the governments official pronouncement. And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their allegations were borne out by facts if not the truth. -- [Senator] James Webb, Something to Die For (1991) Somehow that overt policy of torture became the fault of a few bad apples in the military Somehow torture is tolerated. Somehow lying is tolerated. Somehow faking character, virtue and strength is tolerated. Somehow a narrative is more important than reality Somehow this is tolerated. Somehow nobody is accountable for this. -- Kevin Tillman, After Pats Birthday (November 6, 2006)
As he did with the Iraq surge over the past two years, Gates now is talking up the prospects for an Afghan surge. Defense Secretary Gates emphasized to reporters there is a shared interest in surging as many forces as we can into Afghanistan before the elections there in late September 2009 Its important that we have a surge of forces.
-- Ray McGovern, Gates and the Urge to Surge (Consortium News, Nov. 23, 2008) Oops! Within a week, Gen. David McKiernan, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan undercut [Gates & others] insisting emphatically that no Iraq-style surge of forces will end the conflict in Afghanistan what is required is a sustained commitment to a counterinsurgency effort that could last many years and would ultimately require a political, not military, solution. It will be interesting to see what McKiernan actually does, if and when more troops are surged down his throat. If he has the courage of his convictions, maybe hell quit. I would love to see an Army general display the courage that one saw in Admiral William Fallon who openly refused to do Iran on his watch, and got cashiered for it. -- Ray McGovern, Gates and the Urge to Surge (Consortium News, Nov. 23, 2008) "A new general [McChrystal promoted in May 2009] ... presents a new opportunity to ask for more boots on the ground. 'Gates was the mastermind behind the whole thing [the May 2009 firing of Gen. McKiernan & the Afghan War surge]' ... Maybe Obama's Yoda has a bit of Vader in him after all." -- Michael Hastings, The Operators (2012) I wanted Barack Obama to win the presidency in 2008. Among my reasons was his outspoken opposition to Bushs disastrous, unnecessary and probably illegal war in Iraq. So what does Obama do? He sends 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan. Having interviewed Patrick Tillman, Sr. (father of Pat Jr.) I called him for a quote. My condolences to the families in advance, he said. -- Jack Neworth, Careful What You Wish For, Santa Monica Daily Press, (Jan. 29, 2011) Before Obama made his decision about the surge, the Pentagon tried to box him in. McChrystal, the field commander, issued a report, which Gates reveals was leaked to Bob Woodward by McChrystals staff They were upset that Obama didnt automatically accept their recommendations, as Bush had. The Pentagon was used to getting what it wanted, Obama told me at the time. --- Jonathan Alter, The Wars Robert Gates Got Wrong (The New Yorker, February 3, 2014) The Fawning Corporate Media (FCM) is always ready with fulsome praise for his candor and leadership and even for his belated recognition that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were nuts. the savvy Gates appears to have made a new calculation, that it is the right time to join the rats leaving the sinking ship of the Iraq and Afghan war policies. was Gates signaling that he knew the conflicts would come to no good end and thus was he creating a public record for himself as something of a war skeptic? Was he preparing for his next career move, an elevation to a Washington wise man to be consulted by presidents and other important personages in his later years while being named to prestigious commissions? He may have greased the skids for his slide into wise-man-dom. I can visualize a new chapter in Gatess second memoir, How I Issued MacArthur-Type Warnings All Along. --- Ray McGovern, How to Read Gates's Shift on the Wars (Consortium News, March 2, 2011) 5
Throughout the book, Gates brings the story back to the troops. Being called the soldiers secretary because I cared so much about them was the highest compliment imaginable. It never seems to have occurred to him that he could best protect the troops by removing them from situations in which they could not possibly succeed.
-- Christopher Preble, Robert Gates: The Soldiers Secretary? (American Conservative, March 19, 2014) Gates and the military did not take seriously the other constraints on his Afghan strategy. The military part of the strategy was only a part, and the strategy as a whole could not work without the rest of the pieces falling into place. The logical conclusion was simple: Cut our losses. The reason he never seriously considered that option is both telling and disturbing: In the end, Gates couldnt bring himself to embrace a different strategy if it would look like a retreat. So the nation, following Gatess advice, persisted in a costly strategy without any of the essential elements in place and without any reasonable expectation that they would ever get there. It was not victory per se that he was seeking, but rather avoiding the appearance of defeat not exactly the sort of epitaph likely to adorn any war memorials 50 or 100 years hence. the United States paid a price in additional lives lost, and hundreds of billions of dollars spent, to secure that meager reward. Throughout the book, Gates brings the story back to the troops. Being called the soldiers secretary because I cared so much about them was the highest compliment imaginable. It never seems to have occurred to him that he could best protect the troops by removing them from situations in which they could not possibly succeed. -- Christopher Preble, Robert Gates: The Soldiers Secretary? (American Conservative, March 19, 2014) his appeal to the West Point cadets about duty, honor, country was a little much for this former Army officer. And my outrage would be heightened at hearing Gates "protest too much" you need to know that I feel personally responsible for each and every one of you, as if you were my own sons and daughters Were I the parent of one of the nearly 6,000 other U.S. soldiers killed in Bushs two wars, well, I cannot imagine how I could control my anger. They surely deserve the truth about Gatess self serving role in prolonging the agony, the killing, and the maiming in both Iraq and Afghanistan for which Gates bears huge responsibility. -- Ray McGovern, How to Read Gates's Shift on the Wars (March 2, 2011) The many pages of his [Gates] memoir devoted to how much he loved those troops amounted to an attempt to anticipate and deflect accusations that he, in actuality, betrayed those young men and women by sending more of them to die [in the Iraq & Afghan War Surges] just to buy time for President Bush and other politicians to slip out of Washington before the ultimate defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan. -- Ray McGovern, No Tears for the Real Robert Gates (January 27, 2014) I wanted Barack Obama to win the presidency in 2008. Among my reasons was his outspoken opposition to Bushs disastrous, unnecessary and probably illegal war in Iraq. So what does Obama do? He sends 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan. Having interviewed Patrick Tillman, Sr. (father of Pat Jr.) I called him for a quote. My condolences to the families in advance, he said. -- Jack Neworth, Careful What You Wish For, Santa Monica Daily Press, (Jan. 29, 2011) 6
Pat was an iconoclast. He was his own man and would back down from nothing, and no one, if he thought he was right. This is what made him an odd fit for the military. He had every ounce of the heroism, valor, trust and honesty that the military has always purported to stand for, and then some. He was everything he has been made out to be and more. The nation, and the world, lost a lot with Pat Tillmans death. Honor and fight what he stood for, and what he wanted the country to stand for
-- bmaz, from Marcy Wheelers Emptywheel post Pat Tillman's Super Bowl (Jan. 31, 2009)
There are people who dont respond strongly to words like honor, but Pat did. Those five small letters strung together meant the world to him.
We felt it [the Iraq War] was illegal and unjust. Ill do my job, Pat told me one night before he left But I dont think our role there is virtuous at all. his feelings on the matter certainly dampened his enthusiasm about service at the time I felt that any absence would be tolerable due to the cause or whatever concept I deluded myself into believing I was standing for. Im a fool. -- Marie Tillman , The Letter (2012) I was so ready, so eager to fight and now I pay, richly pay, for having fought. I guess thats what the world does to you. It makes you realize that honor and loyalty are traps with no reward. -- James Webb, A Sense of Honor (1981) I want to thank anybody involved in the military, especially the Rangers I dont know a lot about what happened but Pat was doing his job. And I dont even know what the Ranger motto is, but Ill bet you a buck that he upheld it. -- Patrick Tillman, Sr. (at his sons Memorial Service, May 4, 2004) The Ranger Creed [3rd stanza] Never shall I fail my comrades. ... neither a poem nor a mindless mantra chanted by masses. It was a promise, a solemn vow made by each Ranger to every other Ranger. -- Gen. McChrystal, My Share of the Task (2013) I started hearing about the false award recommendations, spinning the facts, changing their stories The dishonor the Army is doing to Pat's family ... [In the Rangers] its ingrained in you that you will always do the right thing. always tell the truth. Then you see something like what theyre doing to Pat what [McChrystal &] officers in the Ranger Regiment are doing and you stop being so nave. -- Pat Tillmans Ranger Team Leader SGT Mel Ward, from Krakauers Where Men Win Glory (2009) For Mary Tillman, what the army did to her son made a mockery of everything he went to war for honesty, integrity, the defence of the truth. 'If you ask me if I trust our system now, the answer is Im pretty disgusted by it. Unfortunately in our culture people survive more effectively through lies and deception and dishonourable behaviour than they do the reverse. And thats very sad. -- Mick Brown, Betrayal of an All-American Hero, UK Guardian (Oct. 7, 2010) Pat would have wanted to be remembered as an individual, not as a stock figure or political prop. Pat was a real hero, not what they used him as. -- Mary Tillman (2004) 7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page #:
Foreword Description of Updates & Revisions ... The [Untold] Tillman Story The Bipartisan Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystal
The Official Tillman Story The Tillman Story Secretary Gates & The [Untold] Tillman Story
11 24
25
26 27 30
If We Wont Stand & Fight for Him, Then Who? -- Gates Led Stans Whitewash 48
McChrystal Had a Bright Future, But Baggage Despite Torture & Tillman Cover-Up, Gates Moves to Give Him a Clean Slate McChrystal is Heroic Figure And So We [Gates & President Bush] Fought 50 54 56
Defend Your Integrity, As You Would Your Life The Hypocrisy of Bob Gates 59
Is Military Integrity a Contradiction in Terms? Defend Your Integrity, As You Would Your Life 60 63
... Something to Die For Gates & McChrystals Failed Afghan War COIN Surge 67
Michael Hastings Book The Operators -- Inside Story Of Americas War In Afghanistan 68 Obamas General -- Why Hes Losing the War. 73 Team America (America Fuck Yeah!) An Unfortunate Deficit of Trust I Was Selling an Unsellable Position A Bleeding Ulcer It Would Be Folly The Sons-of-Bitches with All the Fruit Salad The Costs Would Rise I Was Responsible
8
74 75 76 77 78 80 82
Bob Gates Urge To Surge -- How I Issued MacArthur-Type Warnings All Along.
Gaming Obama On Afghan War Commentary on Gates & His Memoir "A New General ... a New Opportunity to Ask for More Boots On the Ground Gates Picks McChrystal as Afghan War Commander Despite Cover-Up & Torture Gates Tells McChrystal to Conduct Assessment of Afghanistan War McChrystals Staff Leaks Afghan War Assessment to Box In Obama President Obama OKs Generals Surge, But Sets Withdrawal Deadlines
85
86 91 93 94 96 99
LeAffair Rolling Stan -- Gates Backstory to the Firing of Gen. McChrystal

LeAffair Rolling Stan -- Michael Hastings Team America Road Trip Admiral Fox Fallon Had Done the Right Thing McChrystal Calls his Proof of Concept at Marjah A Bleeding Ulcer What the Fuck Were You Thinking? LeAffair Rolling Stan Obama Fires McChrystal, Demotes Petraeus, and Sticks Him with Afghan War
101
102 107 108 110 112
The Soldiers Secretary?
-- Gates Betrayal of Our Soldiers
115
116 120
Called The Soldiers Secretary Because I Cared So Much Something to Die For
... About the Author 123
APPENDICES
PAGE #:
Appendix A: Senator James Webb -- Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet? Appendix B: Bob Woodwards Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystal s Central
Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillmans Friendly Fire Death
124 127
... Appendix C: "Throwing My Shoe at Bob Woodward ... Not" -- Notes from
Woodwards Obamas Wars about the Tillman Story & the Backstory of the Afghan War Surge 143
Appendix D: Something To Die For -- TOC to my Notes & Annotations on

Michael Hastings The Operators about McChrystal, the Tillman Story, and the Afghan War Surge
156
... Appendix E: The Feral Firefighters Blog Table of Contents -- 2008 to 2014
159
10
FOREWORD
Not only is he [McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding Pats death he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. His statement [P4 memo] indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the public, that Pat was killed by fratricide unless forced to do so -- Mary Tillman, Boots on the Ground by Dusk (2008)
Pat Tillman1 was the NFL football player who joined the U.S. Army in 2002. Pat (along with his brother Kevin) enlisted with the Army Rangers, did a tour in Iraq in 2003, and the following year he was killed by friendly-fire in Afghanistan on April 22, 2004. However, instead of telling his family the truth about his death, Gen. Stanley McChrystal supervised the cover-up of Tillmans friendly-fire death and approved his fraudulent Silver Star medal. Tillman was touted as a war hero and his May 4, 2004 memorial service was televised live (mostly) with celebrities such as Senator John McCain in attendance. Five weeks later, with the Rangers returning home, the Army finally had to tell the Tillman family his death was fratricide. Over the next three years, a series of investigations were conducted by the Army, Department of Defense, and the Congress. However, these investigations largely served to whitewash McChrystal and others involved in the cover-up. Although Gen. McChrystal was at the center of the Armys cover-up of Pat Tillmans friendly-fire death and commanded JSOC forces that tortured detainees, he has never taken responsibility or been held accountable for his actions. Retired Gen. Kensinger was made the official scapegoat for the Tillman cover-up and took the fall for McChrystal (he lost a star and a little pension money). The other officers involved were given slaps on the wrist (not even a permanent letter in their files!) for their perfect storm of mistakes (several were later promoted to general rank).
For an introduction to the Tillman story, Id suggest reading Gary Smiths 2006 Sports Illustrated profile Remember His Name, Mike Fishs 2006 series at ESPN.com E-Ticket: An Un-American Tragedy or watching Amir Bar-Levs documentary The Tillman Story (original title: Im Pat Fucking Tillman, his last words). For more details, Id suggest reading Mary Tillmans 2008 memoir Boots on the Ground by Dusk (paperback with new Foreword at blurb.com), the revised 2010 paperback edition of Jon Krakauers book Where Men Win Glory (its a flawed book, but it presents the best account of the friendly-fire incident & the Armys cover-up), Michael Hastings 2012 book The Operators, John T. Reeds free articles on military matters about Pat Tillman & McChrystal, and my Feral Firefighter blog posts. 11
At the time of his death in 2004, I believed Pat Tillman was a blindly patriotic dumb jock. I purposely avoided watching his memorial service that seemed to be a distraction2 from the breaking news of torture at Abu Ghraib. However, after reading David Zirins profile, Our Hero, in October 2005 I was pulled into the periphery of his orbit. I learned that Pat was a remarkable man with a core of honesty & integrity, who led by personal example, and lived his life intensely. His iconoclastic reality was much deeper than that of the patriotic icon portrayed by the press. Like the former soldier (173rd/Delta/SF/Ranger) Stan Goff, I also felt a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman. ... Since October 2005, Ive continued to follow the twists and turns of the Tillman story. Just before the 2006 mid-term elections, on what would have been Pats 30th birthday on November 6, 2006, Kevin Tillman published his eloquent letter, After Pats Birthday at Truthdig.com: Somehow our elected leaders were subverting international law and humanity by setting up secret prisons around the world, secretly kidnapping people, secretly holding them indefinitely, secretly not charging them with anything, secretly torturing them. Somehow that overt policy of torture became the fault of a few bad apples in the military. Somehow subversion of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution is tolerated. Somehow suspension of Habeas Corpus is supposed to keep this country safe. Somehow torture is tolerated. Somehow lying is tolerated. Somehow faking character, virtue and strength is tolerated. Somehow a narrative is more important than reality. Somehow American leadership, whose only credit is lying to its people and illegally invading a nation, has been allowed to steal the courage, virtue and honor of its soldiers on the ground. Somehow the same incompetent, narcissistic, virtueless, vacuous, malicious criminals are still in charge of this country. Somehow this is tolerated. Somehow nobody is accountable for this. In 2006, Kevin had hoped the election of a majority Democratic Congress would bring back accountability to our country. But, just as with the cover-up of his brothers friendly-fire death, those responsible for ordering CIA and Army torture (e.g. President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, Gen. McChrystal, Admiral McRaven) have never been held accountable for their actions (as the Obama administration is fond of saying, Theyre moving forward, not looking backward).
It was. And, McChrystal participated in the formation of policy and the command of JSOC torture, of which Abu Gharib was just one cog in the machinery of a torture system. See the chapter No Blood, No Foul in the Dec. 2012 Feral Firefighter post Never Shall I Fail My Comrades. 12
while I have nothing but respect for the Tillman Family their personal grief should not be a veto on the nomination of the man [General McChrystal] the President, the Secretary of Defense [Gates], and General Petraeus all feel gives the United States the best chance of victory in Afghanistan These are serious questions and are more important than either the death of Pat Tillman or the alleged abuse of detainees. -- CNAS Fellow Andrew Exum, Abu Muqawama blog, Confirm Him (June 2, 2009)
In February 2008, I was pulled entirely into the orbit of the Pat Tillman story after Mary Tillman called me on the phone. Her call motivated me to write Senator James Webb to ask for his help with her battle for the truth. But, the following year, after President Obama nominated Gen. Stanley McChrystal to command the Afghan War, I finally realized Senator Webb had instead helped to whitewash Gen. McChrystals key role in the cover-up of Pat Tillmans friendly-fire death. I had stumbled upon what Ive called The [Untold] Tillman Story. That is, the Democratic Congress and President Obama betrayed the Tillman family by continuing the Bushs administrations McChrystal whitewash: In 2005, Pat Tillman, Sr. (fed up with the shameless bullshit of the Armys investigations) wrote his Fuck you, and yours letter that prompted a Dept. of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) investigations (on top of the Armys previous three investigations). In March 2007, under Secretary Gates command, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) issued their report. However, the Tillman family was furious with being presented with yet another deceitful briefing riddled with nonsense.3 In April & August 2007, unsatisfied with the DoD IG report, Congress (with a newly elected Democratic majority) held two hearings. However, Congressman Waxmans Oversight Committee only pretended to investigate the Tillman cover-up, while in reality they shielded Gen. McChrystal (and others involved) from public scrutiny. But, his report
3
The Tillman Family wrote, In three years of struggling with the Pentagons public affairs apparatus, we have never been dealt with honestly. The DoD IG investigation began in 2005 during Rumsfelds reign as Secretary and its report was published a few months after Gates became Secretary of Defense. Id speculate that Gates desire that McChrystal be whitewashed and/or Kensinger be scapegoated went down the DoD chain of command to the IG investigators and/or their bosses.
13
did say that Gates the Dept. of Defense stonewalled his committees request for documents. In May 2008, the Senate Armed Services committee (led by Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb) held a secret confirmation hearing for McChrystals (and Admiral William McRavens) 2008 promotion where (behind closed doors) they discussed the Tillman cover-up & their command of JSOC torture. But, instead of punishing them, they promoted them! In July 2008, Rep. Henry Waxmans Oversight Committees final report on the Tillman case complained that Gate and his Dept. of Defense had stonewalled their requests for documents on the Tillman case. In 2009, despite McChrystals key role in the Tillman cover-up and torture, President Obama and the Senate unanimously promoted McChrystal to be the new commander of the Afghan War. Gates said he had full confidence in McChrystal. Over the past five years4, Ive documented this The [Untold] Tillman Story in detail (and also discussed JSOC torture, the failed Afghan War COIN Surge, Jon Krakauers credibility problem, and the death of Michael Hastings) at my Feral Firefighter blog (http://www .feralfirefighter.blogspot.com). ...
I had come to know and admire McChrystal during my first year as secretary, and I believed he was perhaps the finest warrior and leader of men in combat I had ever met. I had looked into McChrystals actions in the Tillman case and the allegations of detainee abuse and determined to move forward with his advancement. I told the president [Bush] McChrystal is one of the heroic figures of these wars, and if we wont stand and fight for him, then who? And so we fought. -- Robert Gates, Duty (2014)
In the past decade, several books (and several documentaries including Amir Bar-Levs film The Tillman Story) have told the Pat Tillman story. However, none of these accounts have described the untold story of the bi-partisan whitewash of those responsible for the cover-up of Tillmans friendly-fire death (although Mary Tillman alluded to it in her Foreword to the 2010 edition of Boots on the Ground by Dusk and Michael Hastings briefly mentioned it in his book, The Operators).
See Appendix H for a Table of Contents of my Feral Firefighter blog. These post document the Untold Tillman Story in detail. 14
In his 2013 memoir, My Share of the Task, Gen. McChrystal briefly (albeit disingenuously) discussed his 2009 Senate confirmation hearing and the Tillman story, but only mentioned his secret 2008 Senate confirmation hearing in passing. None of the books written by former Bush administration officials even mentioned Pat Tillmans name; hes not even a footnote in the big-name biographies (e.g. President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, White House press secretaries, etc.). But now, in his 2014 memoir, Duty: A Secretary at War, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote about his leadership of the bipartisan whitewash of Gen. McChrystals command of the Tillman cover-up & JSOC torture (what Ive called The [Untold] Tillman Story). In June 2008, Gen. Stanley McChrystal was ending his five-year command of JSOC. Gate wanted to get McChrystal promoted to higher rank since he believed he was perhaps the finest warrior and leader of men in combat I had ever met, despite McChrystals baggage of his supervision of the Tillman cover-up (for which Senator John McCain opposed him) and his command of JSOC torture in Iraq (which Senator Carl Levin, head of the Senate Armed Service Committee (SASC) was investigating). Gates claimed that [Senator] Levin was strongly partisan his investigations were attempts to scapegoat my predecessor [Rumsfeld] and others. based on personal experience, this was all about politics. I guess he could try to make that argument since Levin is a Democrat (although Levins concerns were legitimate and based on fact5). But, I would love to hear Gates try to explain exactly how Senator John McCains opposition to McChrystal was political? McCain was a Republican last time I checked! Gates wrote that he had looked into McChrystals actions in the Tillman case6 and the allegations of detainee abuse and determined to move forward with his advancement. Then, Gates went to President Bush and told him, McChrystal is one of the heroic figures of these wars, and if we wont stand and fight for him, then who? And then Gates added, And so we fought What exactly does that mean? I would speculate that Bush and Gates put heavy pressure (and/or called in some markers) on Senators Levin and McCain (and Senator Webb) to get them to roll over and back down. In Webbs case, I would
5
See the chapter No Blood, No Foul in the Feral Firefighter post Never Shall I Fail My Comrades
Note that in his memoir Gates side-stepped the issue of McChrystals guilt. However, in response to Mary Tillmans objection to McChrystals promotions, Geoff Morrell (Gates Press Secretary) wrote: "this matter has been investigated thoroughly by the Pentagon, by the Congress, by outside experts, and all of them have come to the same conclusion: that there was no wrongdoing by Gen. McChrystal." 15
presume that he relented so that his precious New GI Bill could get passed through Congress and get Bushs signature (it did).7 Perhaps McCain rolled over since he was running for President that year and didnt want to cross Bush? During the Spring of 2008, Senator Webb conducted a secret review of Gen. McChrystals actions in the Tillman case. On May 15, 2008, the SASC held a secret executive session where McChrystal (and Admiral William McRaven who had commanded torture by TF 121 and succeeded McChrystal as JSOC commander) testified in detail about his actions behind closed doors. Shortly afterwards, the Senate promoted him to Director of the Joint Staff. Gates wrote, The path was clear for more senior command and a fourth star, which would follow in less than a year. That June 2009 Senate hearing to promote McChrystal to commander of the Afghan War was strictly pro-forma. Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb tossed McChrystal a few softball questions. The real hearing had been conducted the previous year, behind closed doors. Gates wrote, My strategy of getting him confirmed as director of the Joint Staff and taking care of any potential Senate issues at that time [2008] paid off. In the Forward to her revised paperback (at blurb.com) of her 2008 book, Boots on the Ground by Dusk, Mary Tillman mentioned how President Obama and the Democratic Congress had continued Gates & Bushs McChrystal whitewash: I had sent the President an email and a letter reminding him of McChrystals involvement in the cover-up of Pats death. I also contacted the staffs of Senator Patrick Leahy and Senator James Webb but it was clear that neither senator wanted to get involved. McCain was already publicly endorsing the McChrystal appointment before the hearing even began. Sadly, McChrystals promotion had been sanctioned long before the hearing. None of the congressmen pressed McChrysal about Pats case or detainee abuse and torture at Camp Nama ... I find it rather galling that Gates had the audacity to practically brag in his memoir about how he stood and fought for McChrystal and led the bipartisan whitewash of McChrystal. I would prefer, instead, that he would take his own advice (p. 545) and Shut the fuck up!8
See Appendix B of this post.
Gates, p. 545: I was outraged [about Bin Laden raid leaks] and, at one point, told Donilon, Why doesnt everybody just shut the fuck up? To no avail. 16
As he did with the Iraq surge over the past two years, Gates now is talking up the prospects for an Afghan surge. Defense Secretary Gates emphasized to reporters there is a shared interest in surging as many forces as we can into Afghanistan before the elections there in late September 2009 Its important that we have a surge of forces. -- Ray McGovern, Gates and the Urge to Surge (Consortium News, Nov. 23, 2008)
In June 2010, just a year after General Stanley McChrystal was promoted to head up the Afghan War surge, President Obama fired him after the publication of an embarrassing Rolling Stone profile by reporter Michael Hastings. McChrystal only briefly (and disingenuously) discussed LeAffair Rolling Stan in his 2013 memoir casting doubt on the fairness and accuracy of the story.9 In contrast, Robert Gates in his 2014 memoir, actually discussed the backstory to the affair and revealed several new details. First, he wrote that someone on McChrystals staff leaked the Afghan War assessment as part of the effort to box in President Obama into approving the Afghan War surge. Second, he disclosed his private conversation with the President during which Obama said I dont have the sense its going well in Afghanistan. He doesnt seem to be making progress. Maybe his strategy is not working. Third, although McChrystal has implied that Hastingss profile was unfair, Gates writes that McChrystal didnt say he or his staff had been misquoted or that the article was distorted in any way. Fourth, although McChrystal claims he resigned, Gates wrote the president called to tell me he had relieved [i.e. fired] McChrystal. ... Amidst all the hoopla of McChrystals firing, the small title on the cover of Rolling Stone went unnoticed: Obamas General: Why Hes Losing the War (Lady Gaga beat out Stan for the cover picture; he didnt get to share a heart-shaped tub with her). At the time, I didnt know squat about the Afghanistan War or the policy deliberations that had led up to the Afghan Surge. I was puzzled that McChrystal was supposedly fired just for a bit of trash talking banter by his staff. Later, as I dug into the story and read about the Afghan War, it appeared much of the back story was that he was losing the war (As Ron Paul said, If we were on the verge of a great success, do you think wed fire the general?). Since then, Ive read up quite a bit on the Afghan War and the decision-making story of the Afghan Surge. I now believe that Afghan War commander Gen. David McKiernan wouldnt ask for more troops, so Gates (& Petraeus, Kean) fired him and replaced him with McChrystal who
9
For details, see the Feral Firefighter post Never Shall I Fail My Comrades and More Lies Borne Out by Facts If Not the Truth. 17
would ask for the troops needed according to their best military advice. Michael Hastings wrote in his book, The Operators, that A new general [McChrystal] ... presents a new opportunity to ask for
more boots on the ground. 'Gates was the mastermind behind the whole thing [the May 2009 firing of Gen. McKiernan & the Afghan War surge]' ... Maybe Obama's Yoda has a bit of Vader in him after all.
... But, once the Pentagon (Gates, Petraeus, Mullen, McChrystal) realized that Obama didnt want to win but instead wanted to head for the exit, the Pentagon10 leaked the assessment report to try to box-in Obama. Eventually, Obama approved a strategically flawed COIN Afghan surge compromise; probably acting largely out of political calculation (That is: if the surge works, we can draw down troops. Doesnt work? Say it did, so we can draw down the troops). Obama gave the Pentagon most of the troops they wanted, but set a deadline. Secretary Robert Gates and the Pentagon figured they could use Gates conditions on the ground loophole to keep a lot of troops there for a long time. But, After LeAffair Rolling Stan, McChrystal got fired, and even the vaunted Petreaus couldnt make the surge work. But, McChrystal & Gates should have known it was folly from the beginning. Their best military advice wasnt worth shit and got a lot of troops killed or wounded. During her 2011 Harvard speech Marie Tillman (widow) said, When you sign up and decide to serve, you give your lives up to the American people and politicians. What we needed was for them (e.g. McChrystal, Gates) to not needlessly put their lives in harms way. Exactly. ... Throughout his memoir, Robert Gates writes about how much he loves the troops and claims he was the Soldiers Secretary. I felt that Gates statements were a bunch of hypocritical, insincere sentimental BS. I agree with Ray McGovern, who argued that Gates assertions amounted to an attempt to anticipate and deflect accusations that he, in actuality, betrayed those young men and women by sending more of them to die just to buy time for President Bush and other politicians to slip out of Washington before the ultimate defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan.
10
In his memoir, Gates wrote that a member of McChrystals staff leaked the report. Maybe Dave Silverman?
18
God save me from manipulative bureaucrats in polyester-wool suits, button down collars and power ties, and the kiss ass officers who let them get away with it. Having spent three years watching the Wizards of Oz in Washington, he [Marine COL Bill Fogarty] stayed up nights wondering about the uses to which they would be put. its going to cost us. And Id like to be able to tell my men that the price theyre going to pay is worth it. That its important to the country. Vital. Something to die for. -- [Senator] James Webb, Something to Die For (1991)
In Marie Tillmans 2012 book, The Letter, she extolled the value of military service. During her USO trip to Afghanistan, she sat by a soldier for breakfast. She wrote that she wanted to instill in this soldier the same confidence that as hard as it was, he was doing a great thing. Really? Instead, I believe that thousands of the 9/11 generation lives have been wasted in the Iraq & Afghan wars of the past decade; killed, wounded, and or suffering from TBIs & PSTD. A large percentage of these losses were suffered in the Iraq & Afghan War surges that Gates pushed. For nothing. As Michael Hastings wrote in his book, The Operators, Wed been fighting the wrong war, in the wrong way, in the wrong country. Seven years ago, the Afghan War was just an abstraction to me. Now, my step-brother, an Army Colonel, has returned from his hopeless task of trying to train the Afghan police. His boy (a newborn baby when I crashed at his place at Ft. Benning after I graduated from Ranger School in 85) is young and dumb (as I was then) and joined the Infantry. He deployed with a Stryker unit from Fort McChord to Kandahar province. The wrong war, in the wrong way, in the wrong country became personal to me. I believe the Pat Tillman story can be viewed as a metaphor for the betrayal of all the patriotic young Americans whose lives have been wasted in the so-called Global War on Terror of the past decade. Like others, after 9/11 he answered the call to service. However, Marie wrote that Pat had second-thoughts about his decision to enlist in the Army (He wondered if he could have contributed to the cause in another way). The reality of his service didnt match his ideals (felt it was illegal and unjust I dont think our role there is virtuous at all the cause I deluded myself into believing I was standing for. Im a fool). If he had the chance to do it again, I dont believe Pat Tillman would have enlisted or encouraged others to seek the honor of military service. Unfortunately, Maries Pat Tillman Foundation (along with the NFL & the White Houses Joining Forces program) have enshrined Pat Tillman as a patriotic icon11, while the man has fallen by the wayside, his name & image used as a fundraising prop at NFL football games, to celebrate the heroic sacrifice of military service, and to promote mindless patriotism.
11
For details, see the Dec. 2012 Feral Firefighter post The [Missing] Pat Tillman Legacy. 19
Pat was an iconoclast. He was his own man and would back down from nothing, and no one, if he thought he was right. This is what made him an odd fit for the military. He had every ounce of the heroism, valor, trust and honesty that the military has always purported to stand for, and then some. -- bmaz, from Marcy Wheelers Emptywheel post Pat Tillman's Super Bowl (Jan. 31, 2009)
In his memoir, Gen. McChrystal mentioned the 1976 Raid on Entebbe [p.25]: Id been impressed in July 1976 when Israeli commandos had reached deep into Africa to rescue passengers in Entebbe. The commander of the IDF The Unit (equivalent to the U.S. Army Delta), Yoni (Jonathan) Netanyahu was killed heroically leading the assault after it went FUBAR and stalled. Yoni was cast from the same mold as Pat Tillman. When I first learned of Pat the iconoclast in 2005 (vs. the media icon), I was immediately reminded of Yoni. Although they were separated by 27 years (one died/born the same year), both were charismatic individuals driven who lived and died with intensity and integrity. Both Achilles-like and slain in the high places. The similarities, despite the obvious differences, between their stories is eerie. Ironically, Yoni truly died heroically, killed while saving hostages at Entebbe. But it would have been embarrassing to mention the friendly fire deaths of hostages and that Yoni died because the mission went FUBAR, so the IDF instead told the lie he was shot in the back by a stray burst of fire. Like Kevin Tillman, Iddo Netanyahus oldest brother Yoni died in battle, became a national icon, and had the truth of the nature of his death covered up by his government. Iddo also engaged in a long battle for the truth about his brothers death.12 And, like Pat Tillman, Yoni Netanyahu was also a remarkable man. The reality of both Pat and Yoni was much deeper than their iconic images. Both possessed a core of honesty and integrity, led by personal example, and lived their lives intensely. Neither cared much about money or personal comfort. Both were mavericks, intellectuals and avid readers. For example, from the foreword to the 1980 book The Letters of Jonathan Netanyahu: Of all the aspects of his character one predominates integrity. By this we do not mean only honesty toward ones fellow man, but, above all, honesty toward oneself. An inner wholeness marked Yonis entire behavior, inspired his way of life and determined his objectives. That wholeness resulted from a great need for absolute harmony between his thoughts and deeds. For Yoni, unlike many of us, could not hold beliefs without living them to the full. Once convinced of the rightness of an idea, whether in the personal or national sphere, he had to do what he could to actualize it, regardless of the hardships or risks involved. Again and again he asked himself whether he was working toward the realization of his lifes aims.
12
For details, see my February 2008 Feral Firefighter post, Battle for the Truth". 20
Similarly, Pat Tillmans widow, Marie, wrote (in her book The Letter) There are people who dont respond strongly to words like honor, but Pat did. Those five small letters strung together meant the world to him. But, I believe that for Pat Tillman, his sense of integrity, honor, courage, and loyalty were traps with no reward. I would count him among the beautiful souls that Eyal Press wrote about in his 2012 book, Beautiful Souls Saying No, Breaking Ranks, and Heeding the Voice of Conscience in Dark Times (2012): [he] was not a rebel but a true believer, a conservative, a patriotic man who subscribed wholeheartedly to the tenets of a belief system that his subsequent downfall indeed revealed to be a myth. believed in those ideals too much They were nave to believe these things, a cynic with a more jaded outlook might aver. But had they been more cynical or jaded, they would not have felt so committed to the principles they assumed should be guiding them [Yet] he had managed to avoid betraying the one person whose judgment he knew he would not be able to evade: his own. Pat Tillman possessed that sense of honor & integrity that Secretary Gates, Gen. McChrystal, and Senator Webb (among others) profess, but whose actions display their do as I say not as I do
hypocritical bullshit lack of character.
...
It's a damn shame that Pat Tillman, killed by friendly fire in an Afghanistan mountain pass, the truth of his death covered up by the Pentagon, tends to be used as a symbol for the exact opposite of what he should be remembered for. -- Barry Petchesky (Deadspin September 6, 2013)
Today, ten years after his death, how is Pat Tillman remembered? (if at all, Pat who?). When he is mentioned, most press accounts describe him as: the NFL star who left behind an NFL career to serve his country. so moved by the tragedy of 9/11 that he walked away from his multimillion-dollar contract with the Arizona Cardinals to become a U.S. Army Ranger. killed in the line of duty in Afghanistan in 2004. Now, the Press usually neglects to mention he was killed in a friendly fire incident. The mainstream press never (?) mentions the untold story of Gen. Stanley McChrystals key role in the cover-up of Tillmans death (or his command of JSOC torture at Camp Nama, etc). After all, McChrystal has been officially cleared of all wrong doing by the Army, Secretary Gates press secretary Geoff Morell ("this matter has been investigated thoroughly by the Pentagon, by the
21
Congress, by outside experts, and all of them have come to the same conclusion: that there was no wrongdoing by Gen. McChrystal") and by The New York Times reporter Thom Shanker13. The mainstream media (along with the NFL, Michelle Obamas Joining Forces program, and the Pat Tillman Foundation) continue to portray Pat Tillmans legacy as an inspiring example of patriotic sacrifice. They have reduced the legacy14 of Pat Tillman to a patriotic icon (whose name is used as a fund-raising tool to raise money for military scholars, to celebrate military service, and promote mindless patriotism). But, instead of blindly answering the call to serve, I believe both soldiers and citizens should first question the call to serve (and consider other ways to serve a larger calling) and not blindly follow our politicians and generals. I believe we should remember Pats legacy as a cautionary tale of secrets, lies, and death, instead of as a patriotic fable. We should remember that the armed forces is not all about glory. It's about secrets, lies and death, too. I believe we should remember Pat Tillman as an iconoclast, instead of a patriotic icon. The blogger bmaz (who writes for Marcy Wheelers Emptywheel blog), in his comment to the Emptywheel post, Pat Tillman's Super Bowl (January 31, 2009), wrote about his personal experience with him: Pat didnt give a damn about money and the trappings of celebrity Pat was an avid reader there was nothing he loved more than spirited discussion And he could discuss all intelligently, deeply and passionately. Pat was an iconoclast. He was his own man and would back down from nothing, and no one, if he thought he was right. This is what made him an odd fit for the military. He had every ounce of the heroism, valor, trust and honesty that the military has always purported to stand for, and then some. I had the privilege of knowing Pat Tillman a little had a few long lunch conversations with him ... well enough to get the measure of the man he was He was everything he has been made out to be and more. The nation, and the world, lost a lot with Pat Tillmans death. Honor and fight what he stood for, and what he wanted the country to stand for, that is what he would want. I agree with Pat Tillmans mother, Mary, who said in 2004 that, Pat would have wanted to be remembered as an individual, not as a stock figure or political prop. Pat was a real hero, not what they used him as.
13
Thom Shanker has repeatedly whitewashed Gen. McChrystals central role in the Armys cover-up of Pat Tillmans friendly-fire death. In 2009, just prior to McChrystals Senate Confirmation hearing Thom Shanker exonerated him (ignoring clear evidence of McChrystals hands-on role that I sent him). Shortly afterwards, McChrystal gave Shanker a personal tour of his new Pentagon headquarters! see the post Lies Borne Out by Facts, If Not the Truth.
14
For details, see the Dec 2012 post The [Missing] Pat Tillman Legacy. 22
... As Marie Tillman pointed out in her memoir, its easy to get stuck in bitterness and anger. For example, the parents of Rachel Corrie15 are still tied up in the Israel courts ten years after the death of their daughter. Unfortunately, I dont believe most members of the Tillman family have reached much closure ten years after their betrayal by our government. And perhaps Ive also been stuck to some degree in anger & bitterness, although I hope Ive acted out of my own sense of honor, integrity and loyalty to Pat Tillman. Nine years (9!) ago, I wrote my first commentary on the Tillman story in a (unpublished) letter to the editor of my newspaper: I was angered the truth about Pats life and death had been buried by the media and government. Tillman was enshrined as an icon while the man fell by the wayside Pat Tillman, never at a loss for words himself, is now silent. Of the many tragic aspects surrounding his death, one is that he cannot define his own legacy. Now, its up to his family and friends to reclaim the truth and integrity of Pats life and death. I hope my Tillman Files at the Feral Firefighter blog have done my share of the task toward reclaiming the truth about Pat Tillman and exposing the lies and hypocrisy of those politicians and generals whove betrayed Pat Tillman (and the thousands of soldiers killed or wounded by the stupid wars of the 21st century).
Guy Montag, April 2, 2014 SGT, Co. F (Ranger) 425th Infantry MI ARNG, 1983 1991 Firefighter, 1991 Present
15
Rachel Corrie was Pats hero: Mary Tillman wrote in her memoir about, his special keepsakes displayed in the dining room hutchI find a small newspaper Whos this? [asks Mary]. Thats my hero, Pat said. She was a stud; she had a lot of guts]. For details, see the Feral Firefighter June 2010 post ""That's My Hero" -- Pat Tillman, Rachel Corrie, and Yoni Netanyahu. 23
DESCRIPTION OF UPDATES & REVISIONS:

Update Draft 1.1 (April 18, 2014): Added integrity quote from Mary Tillman; revised Foreword; added Guy Montag annotations to If We Wont Stand & Fight for Him, Then Who? section; added section Its a Slap in the Face to Appoint this Man to Foreword about the Joining Forces program; moved old Appendix A & B material into body. Update 1.2 (April 22, 2014):
To Do List:
Add more stuff from handwritten list Add annotations from STDF about Tillman story. Add annotations from Michael Hastingss book The Operators (see index for Gates) Re-read Gates role in Obamas Wars (see index for Gates) & finish BW annotations. Add summary comments at start/end of each chapter Update STDF, MST FF posts with Gates UTS and links
24
THE [UNTOLD] TILLMAN STORY

The Bipartisan Whitewash of Gen. McChrystals Command of the Cover-Up of Pat Tillmans 2004 Friendly-Fire Death in Afghanistan
________________________________________________ There will be a meeting of the Committee on
ARMED SERVICES
Thursday, May 15, 2008 2:30 PM SR-222 Russell Senate Office Building EXECUTIVE* To consider pending military nominations. *Staff attendance will be restricted. ________________________________________________
Gen. Stanley McChrystal
Adm. William McRaven
Chairman Senator Carl Levin
Senator James Webb
Ranking Member Senator John McCain
The cover-up of Pats death was orchestrated at the very highest levels of the Pentagon McChrystals actions should have been grounds for firing. That is why it was so disturbing to us when President Obama [on the recommendation of Gates] instead promoted McChrystal to the position of top commander in Afghanistan Sadly, McChrystals promotion [to lead the Afghan War] had been sanctioned long before the [2009 Senate] hearing. None of the congressmen [Senators Carl Levin, James Webb, John McCain] pressed McChrystal [in 2008 or 2009] about Pats case or detainee abuse and torture at Camp Nama -- Mary Tillman, Boots on the Ground by Dusk (2010) 25
THE OFFICIAL TILLMAN STORY

In 2002, Pat Tillman was the NFL football player who walked away from a $3.6 million contract with the Arizona Cardinals to join the U.S. Army. Pat Tillman (with his brother Kevin) served with the Army Rangers in Iraq during 2003. The following year he deployed to Afghanistan, where he was killed in action during an intense enemy ambush in Afghanistan on April 22, 2004. He was awarded the Silver Star medal and was praised for his heroism during his May 4, 2004 nationally-televised memorial service. Five weeks later, on Memorial Day weekend, the Tillman family was informed that Pat had actually been killed by friendly fire. During a press conference, Gen. Kensinger said the Army investigation had concluded, Tillman probably died as the result of friendly fire. He didnt take questions and the Army did not release any details. During the next four years, four more investigations were completed by the Army and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG). Unsatisfied with the DoD IG report, Congress (with a newly elected Democratic majority) held two hearings in April & August 2007. Gen. William Wallace reviewed the previous investigations and on August 31, 2007 recommended discipline for several officers, demoting retired Gen. Kensinger, but cleared Gen. Stanley McChrystal of all wrongdoing in the matter. Secretary of the Army Pete Geren apologized for a perfect storm of mistakes that created in the mind of many a perception that the Army intended to deceive the public and the Tillman family. In July 2008, the House Oversight Committees final report blamed stonewalling by the Bush administration for no one being held accountable. In May 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recommended that President Obama nominate McChrystal as his new Afghan war commander. In response to accusations by the Tillman family that McChrystal had been involved in a cover-up of Pat Tillmans friendly-fire death, Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said: "this matter has been investigated thoroughly by the Pentagon, by the Congress, by outside experts, and all of them have come to the same conclusion: that there was no wrongdoing by Gen. McChrystal." At his SASC committee hearing, Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb briefly questioned McChrystal on the Tillman case and allegations of detainee abuse. On June 10th, the Senate unanimously confirmed McChrystal. But, just a year later, on June 23, 2010, McChrystal offered his resignation to President Obama after members of his staff supposedly made inappropriate remarks to a Rolling Stone reporter. A month later, McChrystal retired from the Army. In April 2011, The New York Times reporter Thom Shanker wrote that McChrystal had been cleared of all wrongdoing in the Rolling Stone case by a DoD IG investigation and President Obama appointed McChrystal to head the new Joining Forces program to help military veterans and their families. Now, he heads the McChrystal Group, teaches at Yale, sits on several boards, and speaks on the lecture circuit.
26
THE TILLMAN STORY
L to R: Marie Tillman (widow), Mary Tillman (mother), Richard Tillman (brother), Kevin Tillman (brother), Patrick Tillman, Sr. (father)
in Afghanistan I watched the Rangers deal with the loss of a comrade I saw nothing but genuine efforts to take care of a fallen Ranger and his family in ways that reflected the deep values of the force. controversy arose and continued over the circumstances of Pat Tillmans death by friendly fire Sadly, truth and trust were lost in the process Concerns were raised over the wording in the Silver Star narrative, which some found misleading Any errors, which I should have caught, were not the result of any intention to misrepresent or mislead To this day, I am saddened by Ranger Tillmans death, as I am for the loss of every service member I served with, and for the pain such losses cause each family. -- Gen. Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task (2013)
...
Through his little brothers cameo appearance, Pat Tillman appeared in full view, complete with the candor, the nonconformity and the love of dropping cuss words at the most inopportune time. Especially when they can soil an elaborate broadcast [networks cut away from live broadcast after his F-bombs]. -- Mary Tillman, Boots on the Ground by Dusk (2008) Revealing that Pats death was a fratricide would have been yet another political disaster [e.g. First Battle of Fallujah, April 2004 release of Abu Gharib photos] ... So the facts needed to be suppressed. An alternative narrative had to be constructed. Crucial evidence was destroyed including Pats uniform, equipment and notebook. The autopsy was not done according to regulation, and a field hospital report was falsified. An initial investigation completed [by CPT Scott 1st 15-6 investigator] before testimony could be changed [and which hit disturbingly close to the mark] disappeared into thin air and was conveniently replaced by another investigation with more palatable findings. while each investigation gathered more information, the mountain of evidence was never used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion To falsify a witness statement in a Silver Star award, fabricating it How come no one is held accountable for this? The whole thing is riddled with nonsense Writing a Silver Star award before a single eye witness account is taken is not a misstep. Falsifying soldier witness statements for a Silver Star is not a misstep. These are deliberate acts of deceit. -- Kevin Tillman (April 24, 2007 Congressional testimony) The truth may be painful, but its the truth If you feel youre being lied to, you can never put it to rest. -- Mary Tillman (2004) 27
THE TILLMAN STORY

Of the several occasions when he himself attracted critical attention the Pat Tillman affair, for example McChrystal offers explanations [in his memoir My Share of the Task] that fall somewhere between perfunctory and disingenuous. -- Andrew Bacevich, New York Times book review Avoiding Defeat (February 8, 2013)
In his memoir, My Share of the Task (pp. 132-134, 278-279, & 288-289), Gen. Stanley McChrystal has written the official story of his actions in the controversial aftermath of Pat Tillmans 2004 friendly fire death in Afghanistan. He bemoans that truth and trust were lost in the process and claims that he saw nothing but genuine efforts to take care of a comrade a fallen Ranger and his family. ... However, the Tillman family and others (e.g. see Mary Tillmans Boots on the Ground by Dusk, Amir Bar-Levs documentary The Tillman Story, Marie Tillmans memoir The Letter, or Jon Krakauers paperback edition of Where Men Win Glory describe the cover-up pf Pat Tillmans friendly-fire death. In April 2007, Kevin Tillman testified before Congress, saying: Revealing that Pats death was a fratricide would have been yet another political disaster ... So the facts needed to be suppressed. An alternative narrative had to be constructed. Crucial evidence was destroyed including Pats uniform, equipment and notebook. The autopsy was not done according to regulation, and a field hospital report was falsified. An initial investigation completed [by CPT Scott 1st 15-6 investigator] before testimony could be changed [and which hit disturbingly close to the mark] disappeared into thin air and was conveniently replaced by another investigation with more palatable findings. It appears General McChrystal played the key role in the Armys cover up: McChrystal received confirmation of Tillmans fratricide within two days, he had the responsibility to pass on notification to the family, made a decision not to tell the family, he supervised the preparation of a misleading Silver Star recommendation (no mention of fratricide, with two witness statements apparently altered by the Ranger RGT COs, and with inaccurate assertions in the citation & supporting narrative), approved the misleading Silver Star citation, and apparently directed others to conceal friendly fire from the medical examiner and a CID investigator (McChrystals JAG officer congratulated the Ranger RGT JAG for keeping the CID at bay). Mary Tillman testified that the Army and Pentagon investigations were a whitewash, saying: They [Army investigators] are dodging us, and the (Gates Department of Defense) IG condoned
28
that [with their investigation) even though they make the public believe they did such a grand job because they pointed the finger at four generals and five other officers. That is a smokescreen. These officers [e.g. Gen. Kensinger] are scapegoats ...
Note: This section was excerpted & modified from the chapter, Gen. McChrystals Tillman Story, from the Dec. 2012 Feral Firefighter post Never Shall I Fail My Comrades. In that chapter, I also quoted
McChrystals account (slightly edited) of his actions during the Tillman story, followed b y my own commentary debunking his claims. There, I did not make an attempt to exhaustively document my assertions or address every point. If youre interested in more detail and supporting arguments & evidence, see my previous Feral Firefighter posts which have extensive appendices with links to source material such as The [Untold] Tillman Story, Lies Borne Out By Facts, If Not the Truth," or Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?
29
SECRETARY ROBERT GATES & THE [UNTOLD] TILLMAN STORY

Note: Adapted from the more detailed version found in the April 2012 post Something to Die For.
Gen. McChrystal supervised much of the Armys cover-up of Pat Tillmans 2004 friendly-fire death. Why? Well, the Army (almost) always lies about bad news. And, I would presume that SecDef Donald Rumfeld or VP Dick Cheney told him to. In 2004, the Bush Administration used Tillmans heroic death to distract attention from the Abu Gharib images that were broadcast shortly afterwards. Afterwards, the Defense Dept. dragged out their so-called investigations over the course of the next three years until the Tillman story was no longer a PR threat to the Army or the Bush administration. In 2007, the Democratic Congress whitewashed McChrystal because he was the hero of the dark side of the Iraq Surge. In 2008, the Senate whitewashed McChrystal so he could continue his rise as one of the stars in the Army by being promoted to the Director of the Joint Staff, the righthand to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 2009, McChrystals actions (Camp NAMA torture & Tillman cover-up) were whitewashed by President Obama and (once again) by Senators McCain, Levin, and Webb so he could be the savior of the Afghan War. But, in 2010, after McChrystal & his staff trash-talked Obamas administration in a Rolling Stone magazine profile, Obama fired him to show the Army brass he was the Boss (and for failing to make his promised Afghan war progress, and for previously boxing in Obama). In 2011, President Obama whitewashed McChrystal by appointing him to head Joining Forces. Our government and media have continued the whitewash of Gen. McChrystals (among others) key role in the cover-up of Pat Tillmans friendly-fire death & detainee abuse at Camp Nama up to the present day. On the lecture circuit, Stanley McChrystal keeps trotting out his line of bullshit, and no one in the press has called him out on it. On January 7, 2013, McChrystals disingenuous memoir, My Share of the Task, was published with more of his same BS on the Tillman story, JSOC torture, LeAffair Rolling Stan, and on his failed Afghan War COIN surge (for details, see my January 2012 Feral Firefighter post Never Shall I Fail My Comrades). On January 14, 2014, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates published his memoir Duty that fills in the blanks of the [Untold] Tillman Story. Gates writes of his leadership (along with President Bush) of the 2008-09 whitewash of McChrystal, he reveals that McChrystals staff leaked the Afghan war assessment to Bob Woodward, and he describes the back-story behind Obamas firing McChrystal during LeAffair Rolling Stan. But, Gates claim that he only reluctantly came to support the Afghan War surge appears rather disingenuous.
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May 2004 -- Tillman Probably Died as the Result of Friendly Fire

In 2002, Pat Tillman was the NFL football player who walked away from a $3.6 million contract with the Arizona Cardinals to join the U.S. Army. Pat Tillman (with his brother Kevin) enlisted with the Army Rangers, did a tour in Iraq in 2003, and was killed by friendly-fire in Afghanistan on April 22, 2004. He was awarded the Silver Star medal and was praised for his supposed heroism during a May 4, 2004 nationally-televised memorial service. Within just two days of his death, on April 24th, the first investigating officer confirmed Tillman was killed by friendly-fire and passed that information up his chain of command to Gen. McChrystal. However, a decision was made (presumably by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and/or Vice President Cheney who had an extremely cozy relationship with Gen. McChrystal) to cover up Tillmans friendly-fire death and award him a fraudulent Silver Star medal (probably to avoid yet more bad PR, as they knew the Abu Gharib images were about to be released to the public). From the citation (the narrative has even more BS): Caught between the crossfire of an enemy near ambush, Corporal Tillman put himself in the line of devastating enemy fire as he maneuvered his fire team to a covered position from which they could effectively employ their weapons on known enemy positions. His audacious leadership and courageous example under fire inspired his men to fight at great risk to their own personal safety, resulting in the enemy's withdrawal, his platoon's safe passage from the ambush kill zone, and his mortal wound In making the ultimate sacrifice for his team and platoon, Corporal Patrick D. Tillman reflected great credit upon himself, the Joint Task Force, and the United States Army. Note: maneuvered! In his book, McChrystal claims that Tillman was awarded a Silver Star for merely running up a hill to a covered position (not under fire) along with the rest of his Ranger squad. How come they didnt get decorated when they all did the same thing? Five weeks later, just after Tillmans Ranger company returned to the U.S., the Tillman family was finally told Pat had actually been killed by friendly fire. During the press conference, Gen. Kensinger said the Army 15-6 investigation had concluded Tillman probably died as the result of friendly fire. But, Kensinger didnt take any questions and the Army didnt release any further details.
31
April 2005 -- "Shameless Bullshit Fuck you and Yours.

Five weeks after Pats death, the Tillman family received an informal briefing from LTC Bailey on his friendly-fire death. [adapted from Mary Tillmans account pp. 41-45 Boots on the Ground by Dusk (2008)] that contradicted the portrayal in the Silver Star citation: The commander wanted boots on the ground in Manah before dark. The only way to accomplish this was to split the platoon into two sections, Serial One which would move directly to Manah, and Serial Two which would take a different route to drop off the disabled Humvee. Serial One moved through the canyon safely. Serial Two had to backtrack, and unexpectedly ended up going through the same canyon. Serial Two came under attack in the canyon (ineffective fire from a few men from several hundred meters away; none of the vehicles was even hit). Serial One dismounted and maneuvered through Manah up a hill (not under enemy fire) to covered positions on a ridgeline. Pat went over the ridge behind some boulders with an AMF soldier and PFC ONeal. When SGT Bakers Humvee came through the canyon, they saw the AMF soldier and shot him from 200 meters away and shot up Pats position and the ridgeline. Pat took cover and threw smoke. The firing stopped. Thinking it was safe, Pat and ONeal stood up, and the Humvee fired again from only 35 meters away, hitting Pat in the legs (His last words, Cease Fire! Friendlies! Im Pat Fucking Tillman!), and then he was killed by a SAW burst to his head. Bakers vehicle continued shooting up the ridgeline at the rest of Serial One and into the village of Manah, hitting LT Uthlaut and RO Lane. However, just two weeks later COL Nixon presented the official briefing in which major details of the story had been changed. The family pressed for answers, and the Secretary of the Army ordered yet another Army 15-6 investigation by Gen. Jones. Pat Tillmans fathers response to the results of that third 15-6 investigation is memorable: "You are a General. There is no way a man like you, with your intelligence, education and rank ... believes the conclusions reached. But your signature is on it. I assume, therefore, that you are part of this shameless bullshit. In sum -- Fuck you and yours.
32
April 2007 -- The Whole Thing Is Riddled with Nonsense

Pat Tillman, Sr.s response apparently prompted yet another set of investigations. Two years later, in March 2007, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) and the Armys Criminal Investigation Division (CID) finally completed their investigations. However, the Tillman family was furious with being presented with yet another deceitful briefing.16 Shortly afterwards, Congress (with a newly elected Democratic majority) held their first Tillman hearing on April 24, 2007. Kevin Tillman said, while each investigation gathered more information, the mountain of evidence was never used to arrive at an honest or even sensible conclusion To falsify a witness statement in a Silver Star award, fabricating it How come no one is held accountable for this? The whole thing is riddled with nonsense. And Mary Tillman said, we shouldnt be allowed to have smokescreens thrown in our face. in every way, they [Army investigators] dodged. They are dodging us, and the [Department of Defense] IG [March 31, 2007 report] condoned that and your job is to find out what happened to Pat.
July 2007 -- A Perfect Storm of Mistakes

Gates wrote, (p.254, Duty): McChrystal had also been one of the subjects of an investigation into the death by friendly fire of Corporal Pat Tillman because he signed off17 on a Silver Star medal for valor as the cause of his death. The [2007 Dept. of Defense Inspector General] Pentagon investigation of the case recommended that eight officers be disciplined, one of them McChrystal. The Army [Army Secretary Pete Geren] did not agree and took no action against him. ...
16
Postscript Note 3-21-14: The DoD IG investigation began in 2005 during Rumsfelds reign as Secretary and its report was published a few months after Gates became Secretary of Defense. Its not clear me what influence Gates had upon this investigation and/or its report. Id speculate that Gates desire that the DoD & McChrystals role in the Tillman case be whitewashed trickled down to the DoD investigators.
17
McChrystal did not merely "sign off" on a piece of paper that landed on his desk as it worked its way up the chain of command. Jon Krakauer in his book, "Where Men Win Glory" (pp. 334 347 paperback edition wrote that Gen. McChrystal personally "administered the medal recommendation process" with a false narrative that "was painstakingly written to create the impression Pat Tillman was killed by enemy fire" and directly supervised the Ranger RGT commanding officers in Afghanistan who apparently altered the two Silver Star witness statements to remove any mention of friendly fire and contained false statements. The Silver Star recommendation was "fraudulent" by "any objective measure." 33
On July 31, 2007, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren18 briefed the press on Gen. Wallaces review of the Army & DoD IG investigations. Geren apologized for a perfect storm of mistakes that created in the mind of many a perception that the Army intended to deceive the public and the Tillman family. Despite much of its nonsense the DoD IGs report had admitted that Gen. McChrystal was accountable for the inaccurate [Silver Star] award recommendation. IG Gimble testified before Congress that the Silver Star witness statements were altered somewhere in the approval chain (COL Nixon, LTC Kauzlarich, and/or LTG McChrystal were that chain). The citation itself was carefully written to falsely imply that Tillman was killed by devastating enemy fire. However, Wallace & Geren cleared McChrystal of all wrongdoing in the Tillman cover-up without convincing reasons. The other officers involved were given slaps on the wrist (several have since been promoted to General rank). Retired Gen. Kensinger was made the official scapegoat (he was the worst liar); he lost a star and a little pension money. But, in reality, McChrystal had orchestrated the Tillman cover-up. Although he had early knowledge of the friendly-fire death & was responsible to notify the family, he failed to inform the Tillman family of the friendly-fire, he supervised the writing of the fraudulent Silver Star recommendation, Tillmans uniform and equipment were destroyed, and McChrystals own legal officer concealed the fratricide from the medical examiner and a CID investigator). Note: see the posts The [Untold] Tillman Story and Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet? for more detailed discussion of McChrystals role in the Armys cover-up.
18
From pp. 279 282 of Fred Kaplans book, The Insurgents):
Back in the fall of 2004 [Pete] Geren was one of Rumsfelds special assistants Geren was confirmed as Secretary of the Army on July 16, 2007. Not long after, he received [the memo] listing the generals whod be nominated to sit on the upcoming promotion board. he sent it back with a rejection note and said hed pick them himself. Geren spent the next week assembling a list of the Armys most dynamic generals. He whittled that list down to fifteen and asked them all to serve on his promotion board. They included. Stanley McChrystal I assume Geren asked Congressman Waxman to drop McChrystal from August 1, 2007 witness list and held his August 31st press briefing to officially clear McChrystal and make Gen. Kensinger the official scapegoat. Its worth noting that in 2002, Geren was working for Rumsfelt and received a snowflake asking him to keep his eye on Tillman. Update 3-06-14: Its worth noting that after Gates became Defense Secretary in 2006, he kept most of Rumsfelds staff. Gates wrote about his admiration of McChrystal. Did Gate hire Geren as part of the process to protect McChrystal? I would speculate that Gates had some influence over Geren. And it appears that Gates Dept. of Defense stonewalled the Congressional investigators . 34
In her 2008 book, Boots on the Ground by Dusk, Mary responded to the Wallaces review: Not only is he [McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding Pats death, he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. His statement [P4 memo] indicates that no one had any intention of telling us, or the public, that Pat was killed by fratricide unless forced to do so. And shortly after General Wallaces findings were released in July 2007, Mary said: "That memo [P4] is damming as hell. And yet, nothing happens to [McChrystal]. He is writing fraudulent language in that memo. He is giving examples of how they can script the Silver Star award, even though Pat was killed by fratricide. And he is saying we need to keep our leadership abreast of things so they don't embarrass themselves, IF the circumstances of Pat's death should become public He should be saying 'We're going to have to put a hold to the Silver Star and we're going to have to notify the family [of suspected friendly fire].' That is what he would say if he was innocent, but he is not. He is trying to find a way that they can continue this false, elaborate story of theirs. And the fact that he is off the hook is atrocious. In his July 2010 revised paperback edition of Where Men Win Glory, Jon Krakauer described how McChrystal had "orchestrate[d] what can only be described as a broad conspiracy to conceal Tillman's fratricide ..." He wrote how Gen. McChrystal personally "administered the medal recommendation process" with a false narrative that "was painstakingly written to create the impression Pat Tillman was killed by enemy fire" and directly supervised the Ranger RGT commanding officers in Afghanistan who appear to have altered the two Silver Star witness statements to remove any mention of friendly fire (and which contained false statements). The Silver Star recommendation was "fraudulent" by "any objective measure." .
August 2007 -- " Another Man Who Will Not Be in the Room
The next day, August 1, 2007, Congressman Henry Waxmans House Oversight Committee held their second Tillman hearing.19 Mary Tillman wrote, They [Rumsfeld & generals] have collective amnesia. Rumsfeld was asked several times in various ways when he learned of Pats death, but he couldnt recall. Mary continued, we were not happy with the hearing at all. The Republicans on the committee were at best indifferent Most of the Democrats disappointed us as well. They were not prepared . We expected more from Congress. However, unnoted by anyone (except for a slip by CNNs Barbara Starr) Waxman had allowed Gen. McChrystal to decline to appear at his hearing.
19
Update 3-21-14: In his memoir, Gates doesnt explicitly mention either the April or the August Congressional hearings into the Tillman case 35
Chairman Waxman closed his hearing by saying, We are obviously trying to find out what went on and who had responsibility. But, its not obvious that he and his Committee made a good faith effort to uncover the truth. They failed to question Gen. McChrystal about his key role in writing the fraudulent Silver Star, altered witness statements, early knowledge of fratricide, failure to inform the family, and his deceptive P4 memo. Most importantly, they chose not to have Gen. McChrystal testify. Waxman has never explained why McChrystal was dropped from the hearing witness list (and never interviewed). If the Committee was obviously trying to find out what went on they would have looked into McChrystals key role in the cover-up. Instead, it appears the Committee chose to shield McChrystal from public scrutiny. Why? Well, during the summer of 2007 the Iraq surge was at its peak. McChrystal was a rising star in the Army who led the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) forces to whom many attributed much of the success of the Iraq Surge. It appears leaders of the Democratic Congress made a decision to shield Gen. McChrystal from accountable for his central role in the Tillman cover-up because of his key role in the Iraq war and because of the influence of his friends in high places.20
20
3-06-14 Update: Ive noted previously that McChrystal was Vice President Cheney and Secretary Rumsfelds golden boy. Gates wrote (p.55, Duty) that he and President Bush fought to get McChrystal promoted in 2008. Perhaps they also put pressure on Congressional leaders in 2007 to shield McChrystal with a pro forma investigation? 36
May 2008 -- Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?

Gates wrote (p. 254, Duty): I had come to know and admire McChrystal during my first year [2007] as secretary, and I believed he was perhaps the finest warrior and leader of men in combat I had ever met. But I thought Stan would have some difficulty getting confirmed for higher rank and position. been one of the subjects of an investigation into the death by friendly fire of Corporal Pat Tillman Senator [Carl] Levin expressed concern about abuse of detainees in Afghanistan by troops under McChrystals command. Levin let me know that he intended to bring McChrystal in for a hearing. McChrystal wrote (My Share of the Task, pp.278-279): On Friday, June 13, 2008 I passed command of TF 714 (JSOC) to my friend and former deputy, then Vice Admiral Bill McRaven. A few weeks earlier [May 22nd], I had been confirmed by the Senate to become director of the Joint Staff, essentially chief of staff to the chairman of the joint chiefs. DJS was a prestigious post, one John Abizaid and then George Casey had held Id been told that the chairman, Admiral Mike Mullen, had sought me for the position. Gates wrote (pp. 254-255, Duty): I had looked into McChrystals actions in the Tillman case and the allegations of detainee abuse21 and, after extensive discussions with [Chairman of Joint Chiefs Admiral] Mullen and others22, determined to move forward with his advancement. I believed that I first needed to get McChrystal confirmed by the Senate for an unobtrusive, noncontroversial staff job, a confirmation that, in effect, would give him a clean slate. Then, my thinking went, when I pushed him for a higher-visibility job and a fourth star, it would be hard for the Senate to oppose him without suggesting they had done an inadequate job of vetting him previously. I so I enthusiastically supported Mullens recommendation that Stan be nominated as director of the Joint Staff. ... In February 2008, we moved on this plan. Senator McCain23 initially opposed McChrystal because of the Tillman case and Levin was opposed because of the detainee issue. The Senate Armed Services Committee intended to fight McChrystals nomination.
21
In response to Mary Tillmans objection to McChrystals May 2009 nomination to head the Afghan War, Geoff Morrell (Gates Press Secretary) wrote: "this matter has been investigated thoroughly by the Pentagon, by the Congress, by outside experts, and all of them have come to the same conclusion: that there was no wrongdoing by Gen. McChrystal." What BS! What outside experts? No wrong doing? Even the DoD IG report said McChrystal was accountable for the inaccurate [Silver Star] award recommendation! Apparently Gates agrees with Morrells BS since he wrote, I trust this guy to do and say what I want (p. 275, Duty)
22
Who were the others consulted? President Bush? Leaders in Congress? And Senator James Webb? 37
23
I told the president [Bush] McChrystal is one of the heroic figures of these wars, and if we wont stand and fight for him, then who? And so we fought.24 I called Stan in early June I told him that the president [Bush] and I were prepared to fight for him. ... In a very rare [Senate] Armed Services Committee hearing for a nominee [Admiral McRaven also testified] to a three-star position, McChrystal did well in responding to the senators questions [in the secret, closed executive session hearing held on May 15, 2008]. In August he became the director of the Joint Staff. The path was clear for more senior command and a fourth star, which would follow in less than a year. McChrystal wrote (My Share of the Task, pp.278-279): Questions surrounding the death of Pat Tillman were raised [May 2008] and I addressed them. The major issue regarded TF 714s [JSOCs] detention operations. Legitimate questions and concerns were intertwined with an ongoing inquiry [SASC 11/08 Torture Report] into the Bush administrations overall detention policies led by Senator Levin. Id been happy for the opportunity to address any questions about TF 714 head-on, but it felt as though the delay was the product of a larger political issue. Gates wrote (p. 254, Duty): Levin was strongly partisan, and I thought some of his investigations were attempts to scapegoat my predecessor [Rumsfeld] and others. I called Stan to let him know that, based on personal experience, this was all about politics25 and that every senior officer who had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan was likely to face the same kind of challenge a disgraceful reality. McChrystal wrote (My Share of the Task, pp.278-279): The Senate confirmation process had been unexpectantly jarring. my experience prior to that point in my career had been as a name of a long promotion lists that the White House recommended and the Senate confirmed.. had not involved individual testimony or significant issues. This time the experience was much different. . In the end the process took until the first week of June. I reported for duty to the Joint Staff on August 13, 2008.
...
During the Spring of 2008 (after receiving my April 3rd letter asking him to help Mary Tillman), Senator James Webb conducted a secret review of McChrystals role.
24
Update 3-21-14: Gates wrote that he and President Bush stood and fought for McChrystal. Id speculate that pressure by Bush & Gates was placed on Senators Levin, Webb, and McCain to get them to cave-in and reverse their opposition. With Senator Webb, it was probably so he could get his GI Bill passed.
25
Update 3-21-14: Just how was all about politics when Republican Senator McCain was opposed to McChrystal? 38
On May 15th 2008, just after Mary Tillman was in Washington, D.C. on her book tour, the Senate Armed Services Committee (headed by Levin and McCain)26 held a secret executive session where McChrystal testified in detail about his actions in executive session behind closed doors. Shortly afterwards, the Senate promoted him to Director of the Joint Staff. But, exactly how did Webbs secret review, followed by a closed hearing, and a vote without discussion wipe away McChrystals role in the Tillman cover-up? There was no public testimony or public discussion by the Senate. What was said during that closed hearing? Senator Webb and SASC Counsel Gary Leeling refused to answer any of my questions about the hearing, only saying it was in executive session. Senator Jamess Webb betrayal27 of the Tillman family cuts the deepest. Ive trusted his sense of honor for thirty years. If anyone in Congress should have cared, it would have been him. Webb, as a young Marine veteran, spent 8 years to clear the name of a dead Marine for his mothers sake! Im hard on Webb not because I dislike the man, but that Im disillusioned by him. As an old man and politician, hes turned into exactly what he once reviled as a young veteran!
July 2008 Why is It So Hard to Find Out Who Did It?

On July 14, 2008, the Oversight Committee finally released their report. They blamed stonewalling by the Bush Administration for their failure to hold anyone accountable. At the
26
Update 3-21-14: During the Spring of 2008 Senator Webb conducted a secret review of Gen. McChrystals actions in the Tillman case. On May 15, 2008 Gen McChrystal met behind closed doors with the Senate Armed Services Committee (including Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and Senator Webb) and discussed in detail his role in the Tillman case. This meeting was held in executive session (i.e. closed hearing with no transcript) without listing the names of the participants in the hearing notice. A week later, on May 22nd 2008, the Committee held the confirmation hearing for General Petreauss promotion as CENTCOM CO. Chairman Levin recessed briefly to hold a voice vote to confirm 144 military nominations, without [open] discussion, including General McChrystals promotion to Director of the Joint Staff (and Admiral McRavens to JSOC CO). Exactly how did a secret review, followed by a closed hearing, and a vote without discussion wipe away McChrystals role in the Tillman cover-up? There was no public testimony or public discussion by the Senate. What was said during that closed hearing? Senator Webb and SASC Counsel Gary Leeling refused to answer any of my questions about the hearing when I spoke with him on the phone in June 2009.
27
For more details on Webbs betrayal of Pat Tillman, see Appendix B: Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet? 39
end of his April 2007 hearing, Congressman Waxman28 had stated in frustration, What we have is a very clear, deliberate abuse intentionally done. Why is it so hard to find out who did it? Well, his report said that lack of recollection made it impossible to assign responsibility and the intense interest that initially characterized the White Houses and Defense Departments reaction to Corporal Tillmans death was followed by a stunning lack of curiosity about emerging reports of fratricide (suggesting Gates was less than forthcoming with DoD documents requested by Congress). ESPN reporter Mike Fish wrote the the White House and Gates Department of Defense had effectively stonewalled the investigation. But, I would argue the biggest reason was that Waxmans so-called investigation was not an honest attempt to get at the truth. In reality, the Democratic Congress (and later, President Obama) had merely continued the Bush administration whitewash of Gen. McChrystal.
28
In her 2012 book, Classified Women, Sibel Edmonds wrote (pp. 306, 315-316) how Congressman Waxman had dropped support for the whistleblowers after the Democrats won the 2006 mid-term elections: We ended up gathering a handful of supporters in the House. The most ambitious and outspoken was Congressman Henry Waxman what we asked for was to have public hearings on our cases Our handful of minority supporters seemed to wholeheartedly agree, and promised to back out initiatives. In the end we got absolutely nothing. We were told repeatedly that as long as the Republican majority remained in Congress we had no chance whatsoever. the Democrats won [2006 midterms], and became the majority in both House and Senate. We thought we had won I called [in February 2007] and emailed our formerly fiery and supportive staff members from Henry Waxmans office many times. I received no response The new majority Democrats, including our handful of backers, didnt even want to hear about the hearings they had promised us except for that capital D, would continue to a tee the practice of their predecessors. 40
May 2009 -- The Emperors General

McChrystal wrote (McChrystal, pp.288-289): Senate confirmation [for President Obamas May 11, 2009 nomination to command the Afghan War] was required and it was easier than it had been coming out of TF 714 [JSOC] the year before, although I again addressed questions surrounding Corporal Tillmans death [and treatment of detainees]. I appreciated concerns raised by the Tillman family and others, but after multiple investigations and testimony the year prior, I knew that I had already provided full and forthright insights on my role and all I had observed. On June 2, 2009, I testified in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Gates wrote (p. 350, Duty): McChrystal was confirmed as commander [of the Afghan War] and authorized for a fourth star by the Senate [on June 10, 2009]. My strategy of getting him confirmed as director of the Joint Staff and taking care of any potential Senate issues at that time [2008] paid off it would be hard for the Senate to oppose him without suggesting they had done an inadequate job of vetting him previously.
...
In May 2009 Gates fired Gen. McKiernan from his command of the Afghan War. Michael Hastings wrote in his book, The Operators, that A new general [McChrystal] ... presents a new opportunity to ask for more boots on the ground. 'Gates was the mastermind behind the whole thing [the May 2009 firing of Gen. McKiernan & the Afghan War surge]' ... Maybe Obama's Yoda has a bit of Vader in him after all. On May 11, 2009 despite McChrystals key role in the Tillman cover-up & command of JSOC torture. President Obama nominated him (based on the recommendation of Gates & JCS Admiral Mullen) to become his new commander of the Afghan War. In response to accusations by the Tillman family that McChrystal had been involved in a cover-up of Pat Tillmans death, Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell29 said: "this matter has been investigated thoroughly by the Pentagon, by the Congress, by outside experts, and all of them have come to the same conclusion: that there was no wrongdoing by Gen. McChrystal."30
29
Update 3-21-14: I hired Geoff Morrell [as my press spokesman] He became a key member of my team. one of the very few around whom I could let down my hair and be myself, vent without worry of a leak, and just relax. I trust this guy to do and say what I want So, I think its safe to say that Gates agreed with Morrells BS position on the Tillman cover-up.
30
What BS! How about Mary Tillman, Kevin Tillman, Jon Krakauer, and myself? Even the official 2007 DoD IG report found wrongdoing by McChrystal and recommended discipline. 41
A few days later, on May 13th, Obama gave the Arizona State University commencement address at Sun Devil Stadium (where Pat had played college ball) without once mentioning his name (presumably to avoid embarrassing questions about his nomination of McChrystal). That same day, Obama back-pedaled on his previous decision to allow the court-ordered release of torture photos, presumably because they showed detainee abuse by JSOC forces under McChrystals command. On May 20th, Senators Lieberman, Graham, and McCain (working with the White House) introduced a bill to change the FOIA law to block the photo release. The Senate unanimously passed it the next day Conveniently, on May 25, 2009, shortly before McChrystals Senate confirmation hearing, The New York Times Pentagon reporter Thom Shanker exonerated McChrystal of all wrongdoing in the Tillman case. However, Shanker ignored clear evidence of McChrystals central hands-on role. During the week before the confirmation hearing, I corresponded with Shanker and sent him material which described how the Democratic Congress had whitewashed McChrystals role. However, Shanker's post-hearing piece continued to parrot the government's official line (interestingly, the NYT's editors disappeared his original June 2nd article from their website within a few hours after it was published). CNASs Andrew Exum31 (a former Army Ranger officer) failed to show genuine concern for the Tillman family in his Abu Mugawama blog Confirm Him" (June 2, 2009): The bottom line is, nothing is ever going to heal the wounds inflicted on the Tillman Family And while I have nothing but respect for the Tillman Family, their personal grief should not be a veto on the nomination of the man [Gen. Stanley McChrystal] more important than either the death of Pat Tillman or the alleged abuse of detainees [at Camp Nama]. ... On June 2nd 2009, The Senate Armed Services Committee held General McChrystals confirmation hearing for his promotion to four-star general and Afghan war commander. The hearing was strictly pro-forma. Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb tossed McChrystal a few softball questions. The real hearing had been conducted the previous year, behind closed doors.
31
Later that year, in September 2009, CNASs Andrew Exum whitewashed McChrystals role in the Tillman cover-up with his horribly biased Washington Post book review of Jon Krakauers book Where Men Win Glory The Odyssey of Pat Tillman (the WP ombudsman later chastised him for neglecting to reveal his numerous personal and professional conflicts of interest with Gen. McChrystal Exum practically swoons when talking up SM4 with Jeremy Scahill (p. 107, Scahill Dirty Wars: you are seeing everything you want to be in life: just a remarkable individual, a fantastic soldier the Pope Hes the man above whom is no one else.
42
General McChrystal denied the phony narrative of a raging firefight was anything more sinister than "mistakes" made to honor Tillman. "I didn't see any activity by anyone to deceive," he said. "We failed the family. And I was a part of that." He expressed his "deepest condolences" to Tillman's family. Mary Tillman said she neither accepted nor believed McChrystal's [non-apology] apology. "McChrystal was lying," she said. In the Forward to her August 2010 revised paperback (at blurb.com) of her 2008 book, Boots on the Ground by Dusk, Mary Tillman commented on McChrystals Senate confirmation: I had sent the President an email and a letter reminding him of McChrystals involvement in the cover-up of Pats death. I also contacted the staffs of Senator Patrick Leahy and Senator James Webb but it was clear that neither senator wanted to get involved. McCain was already publicly endorsing the McChrystal appointment before the hearing even began. Sadly, McChrystals promotion had been sanctioned long before the hearing. None of the congressmen pressed McChrysal about Pats case or detainee abuse and torture at Camp Nama On June 10th, General McChrystal was confirmed by the Senate after Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid made an impassioned plea on the Senate floor. Shortly afterward, the Senate approved President Barack Obama's nomination of McChrystal by unanimous consent (that evening, Gen. McChrystal gave NYT reporter Thom Shanker a personal tour of his new Pentagon headquarters that night. Isnt access grand!). The next day, Senator Russ Feingold wrote that he oppose[d] the nomination of LTG Stanley McChrystal because of a classified matter. But where was his opposition when it would have mattered the previous day?
43
July 2010 The Tillman Story

On July 24, 2010, Gen. McChrystal retired (after being fired by Obama in June 2010 for badmouthing him in a controversial Rolling Stone profile) from the Army. Since then, he consults, speaks on the lecture circuit, is on board of directors, and teaches leadership at Yale. A few days after McChrystals retirement, on July 27, 2010, Jon Krakauer published his revised paperback edition of his 2009 book Where Men Win Glory The Odyssey of Pat Tillman. The previous year, his September 2009 hardcover edition described his friendly-fire death & the Armys cover-up. Krakauers book has great epigrams, does a good job of reconstructing the actual friendly-fire incident (and the events leading up to it) and some aspects of the Armys cover-up of Tillmans friendly-fire death (but McChrystal was barely a footnote). However, in his updated edition, Krakauer described McChrystal as playing the central role in the scandal and included much more detail of the cover-up by McChrystal. But, Jon Krakauer wrote a deceitful Preface where he claimed I discovered new information. In reality, just two days after the release of his first edition, my Aunt Candy literally placed two binders of my research (about 200 pages) into Krakauers hands at his Boulder book signing (my detailed analysis shows my material was the source of Krakauers additional evidence of deceit). ... A few days after Krakauers revised paperback was released, in early August 2010 shortly before the theatrical release of Amir Bar-Levs documentary The Tillman Story, Mary Tillman published the revised paperback edition of her 2008 book, Boots on the Ground by Dusk. In her new Foreword, she alluded to this untold story: McChrystals actions should have been grounds for firing. That is why it was so disturbing to us when President Obama instead promoted McChrystal to the position of top commander in Afghanistan. I had sent the President an email and a letter reminding him of McChrystals involvement in the cover-up of Pats death. I also contacted the staffs of Senator Patrick Leahy and Senator James Webb and expressed my concerns but it was clear that neither senator wanted to get involved. [Senator] McCain was already publicly endorsing the McChrystal appointment before the hearing even began. Sadly, McChrystals promotion had been sanctioned long before the [June 2009 Senate hearing]. None of the congressmen pressed McChrystal about Pats case or detainee abuse and torture at Camp Nama Over the last five years, the Pentagon and Congress have had numerous opportunities to hold accountable those responsible for the cover-up of Pats death. Each time theyve failed. The Tillman Story [documentary] illustrates the corruption, deception, and indifference that is systemic in our government. The cover-up of Pats death was orchestrated at the very highest levels of the Pentagon, and elsewhere in our government the government didnt just lie to us; it lied to a nation.
44
April 2011 -- Its a Slap in the Face to Appoint this Man

Maybe more important I would accept First Lady Michelle Obamas request to serve my country again, this time on the board of advisors for Joining Forces, a White House initiative for service members and their families. -- from Gen. McChrystals My Share of the Task ... Just two days after NYTs reporter Thom Shanker supposedly cleared McChrystal of all wrongdoing in the Rolling Stone case, on April 10, 2011, Gen. McChrystals reputation was further restored by President Obamas appointment of him to head up the new Joining Forces program to support military veterans and their families. In response, Mary Tillman said, Its a slap in the face to appoint this man He deliberately helped cover up Pats death someone who has a heartfelt desire to help families would not have been involved in the cover-up of a soldiers death Michael Hastings wrote, They [White House] help to rehabilitate Stanley McChrystals image, appointing him [April 2011] to lead a high-profile initiative [Joining Forces] supporting military families no need to have a potential voice criticizing the administration in the upcoming election. When asked about Marys remarks, Michelle Obama said were proud to have him [McChrystal] on board and White House Press Secretary Carney said that [President] Obama is very aware of the generals rsum. Later he added, We have enormous respect for the service and sacrifice of Pat Tillman and his family. The circumstances surrounding Pat Tillman's death have been thoroughly investigated, and General McChrystal was found to have acted honorably despite the fact that this tragedy was mishandled. April 22, 2011 was the seventh anniversary of Pat Tillmans death. Ironically, that year, it happened to fall on Good Friday. On Easter Sunday morning, the smiling faces of Michelle Obama & Jill Biden appeared on the cover of "Parade Magazine (a puff piece interview about the Joining Forces program, without, of course, any mention of Mary Tillmans objections). That Easter, while taking Communion at my Episcopal church, a somewhat sacrilegious Eucharistic liturgy came to mind: Pat Tillman has died. General Stanley McChrystal has risen (from his Rolling Stone crucifixion), but . . . Pat Tillman will not come again. As his brother Richard said at his brothers memorial service in 200432, . thanks for your thoughts, but hes fucking dead. ...
32
See Remember the Icon, Not the Iconoclast (p. 179) in the April 2012 Feral Firefighter post 45
Joining Forces is administered out of the influential Washington think tank, Center for a New American Security (CNAS). CNAS had close ties with Gen. McChrystal and led the push in Washington for the Afghan War surge. After writing his May 2009 piece that exonerated McChrystal, New York Times Pentagon Reporter Thom Shanker spent 90 days as a writer in residence at CNAS to work on his book Counterstrike. It appears Shankers sabbatical was yet another perk for exonerating McChrystal and for being a loyal stenographer for the Pentagon and the Obama administration. (And guess who hosted his September 2011 book release party? CNAS, of course!) ... In September 2009, CNASs Andrew Exum (a former Army Ranger officer) whitewashed McChrystals role in the Tillman cover-up with his horribly biased Washington Post book review of Jon Krakauers book Where Men Win Glory The Odyssey of Pat Tillman (the WP ombudsman later chastised him for neglecting to reveal his numerous personal and professional conflicts of interest). Andrew failed to show genuine concern for the Tillman family in his blog post Confirm Him" (June 2, 2009): The bottom line is, nothing is ever going to heal the wounds inflicted on the Tillman Family And while I have nothing but respect for the Tillman Family, their personal grief should not be a veto on the nomination of the man [Gen. Stanley McChrystal] more important than either the death of Pat Tillman or the alleged abuse of detainees [at Camp Nama]. In other words, the Tillman family can go to hell. And CNAS runs this program to "support" military families! Considering their past betrayal of the Tillman family, Gen. McChrystal and CNAS was a shameful choice by President Obama to run the Joining Forces program. As Narda Zacchino said, It is bewildering and tasteless, after McChrystals callous disregard for the Tillman family throughout this entire episode, that Barack Obama should appoint him to a high-profile position having anything to do with helping military families.
46
April 2011 With Three Cups of Luck?

In April 2011, Jon Krakauer accused Greg Mortenson of deceit [see the chapter With Three Cups of Luck? in "Jon Krakauer's Credibility Problem]. However, it appears that Krakauers e-book, Three Cups of Deceit, was largely a publicity stunt timed with the 60 Minutes April 2011 broadcast to raise the buzz (and investment capital) for his friend Mark Bryants new on-line publishing startup Byliner.com] . However, Krakauer himself certainly displayed deceit by embellishing his story of how he discovered McCrystals central role. Was Krakauer embarrassed to admit that he had failed to uncover this new material by himself? And missed it the first time around? Like Mortenson, it appears that Jon Krakauer embellished his story to boost his esteem and protect his ego. I dont care (much) about Krakauer stealing my credit. But, his greater act of deceit was one of omission. After reading his book, youd believe the Democratic Congress was stonewalled by President Bush. But, even after being handed my untold story, Krakauer still failed to describe in his updated 2010 paperback edition how President Obama and the Democratic Congress continued the Bush administrations whitewash of McChrystals central role in the cover-up of Tillmans friendly-fire death. Furthermore, Where Men Win Glory is a flawed biography since (after losing their trust) Krakauer lost access to the Tillman family (except for his widow Marie). ...
47
IF WE WONT STAND AND FIGHT FOR HIM, THEN WHO?
Senator James Webb (June 2009)
President Obama & Gen. McChrystal (May 2009)
Robert Gates at McChrystals Retirement
I had come to know and admire McChrystal during my first year as secretary, and I believed he was perhaps the finest warrior and leader of men in combat I had ever met. I had looked into McChrystals actions in the Tillman case and the allegations of detainee abuse and determined to move forward with his advancement [in May 2008]. I told the president [Bush] McChrystal is one of the heroic figures of these wars, and if we wont stand and fight for him, then who? And so we fought. -- Robert Gates, Duty (2014) He knows the administrations position on the matter was a cover-up a mistake. But it worked. And they didnt want the president to look bad. [The Secretary of Defense] never told a lie, at least not in the way he could be caught in it. And anyway, his version could never be challenged [it] would become the governments official pronouncement. And the media gave them their forum, always ascertaining beforehand that their allegations were borne out by facts if not the truth. -- [Senator] James Webb, Something to Die For (1991) The cover-up of Pats death was orchestrated at the very highest levels of the Pentagon McChrystals actions should have been grounds for firing. That is why it was so disturbing to us when President Obama [on the recommendation of Gates] instead promoted McChrystal to the position of top commander in Afghanistan Sadly, McChrystals promotion had been sanctioned long before the [2009 Senate] hearing. None of the congressmen [Senators Carl Levin, James Webb, John McCain] pressed McChrystal about Pats case or detainee abuse and torture at Camp Nama -- Mary Tillman, Boots on the Ground by Dusk (2010) The McChrystal thing [fired after LeAffair Rolling Stan] that burns Gates up. [But] He tosses [Gen.] McKiernan without a word of remorse. at McChrystals retirement ceremony in July [2010], Gates will bemoan the fact that Americans have lost a hero, someone whose record of service is unmatched. (Forget Tillman, forget [JSOC torture at] Camp Nama, forget the negative command climate) -- Michael Hastings, The Operators (2012)
48
McChrystal is Heroic Figure If We Wont Stand & Fight for Him, Then Who?
Gates Hired Geoff Morrell as His Press Spokesman To Do and Say What I Want & Kept Rumsfelds Chief-of-Staff Robert Rangel Who Was Involved in the Tillman Cover-up:
272 I told [Robert] Rangel33 , press spokesman Geoff Morell, and Henry that I wanted them to stay on with me. 89 I wanted a press spokesman who had been a practicing journalist I hired Geoff Morrell34, who had been with ABC television news and had covered the Bush 43 White House. He became a key member of my team. 275 The one place he [Podesta] pushed back a bit was on the press spokesman I e-mailed him back that [Geoff] Morrell] was nonpolitical and I feel strongly about keeping him I trust this guy to do and say what I want35, and I want him to stay. I wanted Morrell to stay not only because of his competence but because he was also one of the very few around whom I could let down my hair and be myself, vent without worry of a leak, and just relax.
33
Rangel was also the Chief of Staff under Secretary Rumsfeld. Gates wrote in book that he kept most of Rumsfelds staff when he took over the DoD in Fall 2006. The same people involved in the 2007 whitewash of McChrystal and the original cover-up in 2004.
34
After four years as Gates spokeman, Morrell became the spokesman for BP just after the 2010 Gulf oil spill.
35
In response to Mary Tillmans objection to McChrystals May 2009 nomination to head the Afghan War, Geoff Morrell (Gates Press Secretary) said: "this matter has been investigated thoroughly by the Pentagon, by the Congress, by outside experts, and all of them have come to the same conclusion: that there was no wrongdoing by Gen. McChrystal." What BS! What outside experts? No wrong doing? Even the DoD IG report said McChrystal was accountable for the inaccurate [Silver Star] award recommendation! Apparently Gates agrees with Morrells BS since he wrote, I trust this guy to do and say what I want (p. 275, Duty) 49
General McChrystal Had a Bright Future, But Baggage

Two examples of unexpected challenges that consumed vast quantities of time and energy concern two individuals in uniform, one of whom had a bright future but baggage Lieutenant General Stan McChrystal the other a heroic Marine sergeant [Rafael Peralta, whose 2008 Medal of Honor recommendation became controversial]. [McChrystal] was the commander of JSOC from 2003 to 2008. His operations were remarkably successful, including the capture of Saddam Hussein and the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and [he] played a major role in the success of the surge in Iraq and the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. I had come to know and admire McChrystal during my first year [2007] as secretary, and I believed he was perhaps the finest warrior and leader of men in combat I had ever met. [he was a leader of] great flexibility, agility, resourcefulness, and imagination But I thought Stan would have some difficulty getting confirmed for higher rank and position. He had been the tip of the spear for nearly five years in two theaters of war McChrystal had also been one of the subjects of an investigation into the death by friendly fire of Corporal Pat Tillman because he signed off on a Silver Star medal for valor as the cause of his death. The [2007 Dept. of Defense Inspector General] Pentagon investigation of the case recommended that eight officers be disciplined, one of them McChrystal. The Army [Army Secretary Pete Geren] did not agree and took no action against him. On top of all this, Senator [Carl] Levin had been conducting an in-depth investigation of the treatment of detainees (which I thought had Rumsfeld as its target) and expressed concern about abuse of detainees in Afghanistan by troops under McChrystals command. Levin let me know that he intended to bring McChrystal in for a hearing. Levin was strongly partisan, and I thought some of his investigations were attempts to scapegoat my predecessor [Rumsfeld] and others. I called Stan to let him know that, based on personal experience, this was all about politics and that every senior officer who had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan was likely to face the same kind of challenge a disgraceful reality. ... The Feral Firefighters Annotations & Notes from Robert Gates Book Duty Memoirs of a Secretary at War: 254 The last two examples of unexpected challenges that consumed vast quantities of time and energy concern two individuals in uniform, one of whom had a bright future but baggage LTG Stan McChrystal was the commander of JSOC from 2003 to 2008. His operations were
50
remarkably successful, including the capture of Saddam Hussein and the killing of Abu Musab alZarqawi36 and played a major role in the success of the surge in Iraq and the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan37. I had come to know and admire McChrystal during my first year [2007] as secretary, and I believed he was perhaps the finest warrior and leader of men in combat I had ever met.38 466 leaders of great flexibility, agility, resourcefulness, and imagination precisely the qualities I had found in Petraeus, Odierno, McChrystal, Dempsey, Austin, Rodriquez39, and others. 254 But I thought Stan would have some difficulty getting confirmed for higher rank and position. He had been the tip of the spear for nearly five years in two theaters of war McChrystal had also been one of the subjects of an investigation40 into the death by friendly fire of Corporal Pat Tillman because he signed off41 on a Silver Star medal for valor as the cause of his death.
36
McChrystals memoir failed to credit the Tikrit Delta team & interrogator Eric Maddox (Mission Black List #1) for their efforts which directly led to Saddams capture (perhaps because it could raise questions about the role of torture in the death of a high-value detainee who had a heart attack shortly after arriving at Camp Nama resulting in Maddox facing a dead end). And, his inside story of the interrogations that led to the death of Abu Al-Zarqawi (head of AQ in Iraq) totally contradicts the accounts of Marc Bowden and Matthew Alexander (We found Zarqawi in spite of the way the task force did business
37
Success? At best, the Iraq surge bought enough time to Bush to ride off into the sunset. And, I dont think many people will argue that McChrystals Afghan War COIN strategy can be described as a success. For example, see Lessons from a Surge Skeptic (Kelley Vlahos American Conservative, March 7, 2014).
38
Ive previously written (see FF post Never Shall I Fail My Comrades) that McChrystal had been Vice President Cheney and Secretary Rumsfelds golden boy.
39
Rodriquez was Gates military assistant. McChrystal, as director of the Joint Staff, was essentially JCS Chair Admiral Mullens military assistant. In 2009, Gates fired Gen. McKiernan and put those two generals were put in charge of the Afghan War. Stan as the front man and Rod as the man actually running the show.
40
In 2005, Pat Tillman, Sr. (fed up with the shameless bullshit of the Armys investigations) wrote his Fuck You, and Yours letter that prompted a Dept. of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) investigations (on top of the Armys previous three investigations).
41
Signed off? In his book, Obamas Wars, Bob Woodward cites a 3-27-07 Washington Post article in support of his statement McChrystal had signed off. However, that article didnt say anything about McChrystal just signing off on the Silver Star. Instead, Tyson wrote that the DOD IG investigation found [Col.] Nixon [Commander of the Ranger RGT], along with Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, were responsible for submitting a Silver Star recommendation for Tillman that included "inaccurate information 51
254 The [2007] Pentagon investigation42 of the case recommended that eight officers be disciplined, one of them McChrystal. 254 The Army [Secretary Pete Geren]43 did not agree and took no action against him.44
and a misleading citation that implied CPL Tillman died by enemy fire" (i.e. false Silver Star citation, fabricated witness statements, etc). Then where did Woodward get the phrase signed off? Ironically, I believe it may have been from the New York Times. Gen. McChrystal directly supervised the Armys cover-up. McChrystal did not merely "sign off" on a piece of paper that landed on his desk as it worked its way up the chain of command. Jon Krakauer in his book, "Where Men Win Glory" (pp. 334 347 paperback edition), described how Gen. McChrystal had "orchestrate[d] what can only be described as a broad conspiracy to conceal Tillman's fratricide ..." The Silver Star recommendation hardly suggested Tillman had been killed by the enemy. The citation reads, for gallantry in action . against an armed enemy enemy fire Cpl. Tillman put himself in the line of devastating enemy fire known enemy positions enemy's withdrawal and his platoon's safe passage from the ambush kill zone. Only, there was no enemy fire, no enemy withdrawal and no ambush kill zone. The Silver Star citation was carefully edited to imply Tillman died by enemy fire without actually coming out and saying that. Anyone reading the citation would think Tillman was killed by enemy fire! Krakauer wrote that Gen. McChrystal personally "administered the medal recommendation process" with a false narrative that "was painstakingly written to create the impression Pat Tillman was killed by enemy fire" and directly supervised the Ranger RGT commanding officers in Afghanistan who apparently altered the two Silver Star witness statements to remove any mention of friendly fire and contained false statements. The Silver Star recommendation was "fraudulent" by "any objective measure." And, in response to President Obamas May 2009 nomination of Gen. McChrystal as Afghan war commander, Mary Tillman wrote in her book, Boots on the Ground by Dusk: Not only is he [McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding Pats death, he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. Krakauer's account was largely based upon McChrystals own testimony during his June 2, 2009 Senate confirmation hearing and from DOD IG interviews with Gen. McChrystal, COL Nixon, LTC Kauzlarich, and LTC Bailey obtained by FOIA.
42
In March 2007, under Secretary Gates command, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) finally issued their report. However, the Tillman family was furious with being presented with yet another deceitful briefing riddled with nonsense. They wrote, In three years of struggling with the Pentagons public affairs apparatus, we have never been dealt with honestly. Id speculate that Gates desire that McChrystal be whitewashed and/or Kensinger be scapegoated went down the DoD chain of command to the IG investigators and/or their bosses.
43
From pp. 279 282 of Fred Kaplans book, The Insurgents):
Back in the fall of 2004 [Pete] Geren was one of Rumsfelds special assistants Geren was confirmed as Secretary of the Army on July 16, 2007. Not long after, he received [the memo] listing the generals whod 52
254 On top of all this, Senator Levin had been conducting an in-depth investigation of the treatment of detainees (which I thought had Rumsfeld as its target) and expressed concern about abuse of detainees in Afghanistan45 by troops under McChrystals command46. Levin let me know that he intended to bring McChrystal in for a hearing.
be nominated to sit on the upcoming promotion board. he sent it back with a rejection note and said hed pick them himself. Geren spent the next week assembling a list of the Armys most dynamic generals. He whittled that list down to fifteen and asked them all to serve on his promotion board. They included. Stanley McChrystal I assume Geren asked Congressman Waxman to drop McChrystal from August 1, 2007 witness list and held his August 31st press briefing to officially clear McChrystal and make Gen. Kensinger the official scapegoat. Its worth noting that in 2002, Geren was working for Rumsfelt and received a snowflake asking him to keep his eye on Tillman. Update 3-06-14: Its worth noting that after Gates became Defense Secretary in 2006, he kept most of Rumsfelds staff. Gates wrote about his admiration of McChrystal. Did Gate hire Geren as part of the process to protect McChrystal? I would speculate that Gates had some influence over Geren. And it appears that Gates Dept. of Defense stonewalled the Congressional investigators.
44
On July 31, 2007 Secretary of the Army Pete Geren held a news conference to present the findings of Gen. William Wallace who recommended corrective action for the officers who made mistakes in the Tillman case. Gen. Kensinger, already retired, was the designated scapegoat and lost one of his stars (i.e. lost about $10K from his pension). None of the other officers involved got even so much as a letter of reprimand in their file. In fact, they have all been promoted since then: Gen. McChrystal twice, Nixon to general, Bailey to general, Kauzlarich to full bird colonel. Note that Gates fails to even mention Rep. Henry Waxmans Oversight Committee hearing held the next day on August 1st (or his previous hearing in April). However, it appears that Waxmans committee only pretended to investigate the Tillman cover-up, while in reality they shielded Gen. McChrystal (and others involved) from public scrutiny. And, its worth noting that in their July 2008 Tillman report, Rep. Henry Waxmans Oversight Committees complained that Gates stonewalled their requests for documents on the Tillman case.
45
Afghanistan? Levins torture inquiry primarily focused on the actions of Special Mission Units under McChrystals command in Iraq! See Appendix A Senate Armed Services Committees November 2008 Report -- Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody in the Dec 2012 Feral Firefighter post Never Shall I Fail My Comrades.
46
For detailed documentation of McChrystals command of torture by JSOC TF121, see the chapter, No Blood, No Foul, in my Dec 2012 Feral Firefighter blog post Never Shall I Fail My Comrades 53
Despite McChrystals Command of Torture & Tillman Cover-Up, Gates Plans to Give Him a Clean Slate at Secret Senate Hearing
I had looked into McChrystals actions in the Tillman case and the allegations of detainee abuse and, after extensive discussions with [Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral] Mullen and others [?], determined to move forward with his advancement. based on personal experience, this was all about politics I believed that I first needed to get McChrystal confirmed by the Senate for an unobtrusive, noncontroversial staff job, a confirmation that, in effect, would give him a clean slate. Then, my thinking went, when I pushed him for a higher-visibility job and a fourth star, it would be hard for the Senate to oppose him without suggesting they had done an inadequate job of vetting him previously. So I enthusiastically supported Mullens recommendation that Stan be nominated as director of the Joint Staff. ... The Feral Firefighters Annotations & Notes from Robert Gates Book Duty Memoirs of a Secretary at War: 88 [Senator Carl] Levin was strongly partisan, and I thought some of his investigations were attempts to scapegoat my predecessor [Rumsfeld] and others. 255 I called Stan in early June to let him know that, based on personal experience, this was all about politics47 and that every senior officer who had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan was likely to face the same kind of challenge a disgraceful reality. I told him that the president [Bush] and I were prepared to fight for him. 254 I had looked into McChrystals actions in the Tillman case48 and the allegations of detainee abuse and, after extensive discussions with Mullen and others49, determined to move forward with his advancement.
47
Just how was all about politics when Republican McCain was opposed to McChrystal? I could see trying to make that argument with Levin, a Democrat, but McCain?
48
Note that Gates side-stepped the issue of whether or not McChrystal was guilty or not. In response to the DoDs 2007 report, the Tillman family wrote: In three years of struggling with the Pentagons public affairs apparatus, we have never been dealt with honestly. Geoff Morrell was the head of DoDs PAs and Gates press secretary. In response to Mary Tillmans objection to McChrystals 2009 promotion, Geoff Morrell (Gates Press Secretary) wrote: "this matter has been investigated thoroughly by the Pentagon, by the Congress, by 54
254 I believed that I first needed to get McChrystal confirmed by the Senate for an unobtrusive, noncontroversial staff job, a confirmation that, in effect, would give him a clean slate. Then, my thinking went, when I pushed him for a higher-visibility job and a fourth star, it would be hard for the Senate to oppose him without suggesting they had done an inadequate job of vetting him previously. I so I enthusiastically supported Mullens recommendation that Stan be nominated as director of the Joint Staff.50
outside experts, and all of them have come to the same conclusion: that there was no wrongdoing by Gen. McChrystal." What BS! What outside experts? How about Mary Tillman, Kevin Tillman, Jon Krakauer, Amir Bar Lev, and myself? No wrong doing? Even the official 2007 DoD IG report said McChrystal was accountable for the inaccurate [Silver Star] award recommendation! Apparently Gates agrees with Morrells BS since he wrote (p. 275, Duty): I hired Geoff Morrell [as my press spokesman] He became a key member of my team. one of the very few around whom I could let down my hair and be myself, vent without worry of a leak, and just relax. I trust this guy to do and say what I want
49
What others? President Bush? Cheney?
50
McChrystal, as director of the Joint Staff, was essentially JCS Chair Admiral Mullens military assistant. Gen. David Rodriquez was Gates military assistant! In 2009, Gates fired Gen. McKiernan and put those two generals were put in charge of the Afghan War. Stan as the front man and Rod as the man actually running the show. 55
McChrystal is One of the Heroic Figures of These Wars, and If We Wont Stand and Fight For Him, Then Who? And So We [Secretary Gates & President Bush] Fought:
In February 2008, we moved on this plan. Senator McCain initially opposed McChrystal because of the Tillman case and Levin was opposed because of the detainee issue. The Senate Armed Services Committee intended to fight McChrystals nomination. I told the president [Bush] McChrystal is one of the heroic figures of these wars, and if we wont stand and fight for him, then who? And so we fought. I called Stan in early June I told him that the president and I were prepared to fight for him. In a very rare [Senate] Armed Services Committee hearing for a nominee [McRaven also testified] to a three-star position, McChrystal did well in responding to the senators questions [in the secret, closed executive session hearing held on May 15, 2008]. In August he became the director of the Joint Staff. The path was clear for more senior command and a fourth star, which would follow in less than a year. McChrystal was confirmed as commander [of the Afghan War] and authorized for a fourth star by the Senate [on June 2, 2009]. My strategy of getting him confirmed as director of the Joint Staff and taking care of any potential Senate issues at that time [2008] paid off it would be hard for the Senate to oppose him without suggesting they had done an inadequate job of vetting him previously. ... The Feral Firefighters Annotations & Notes from Robert Gates Book Duty Memoirs of a Secretary at War: 255 In February 2008, we moved on this plan. Senator McCain initially51 opposed McChrystal because of the Tillman case and Levin was opposed because of the detainee issue.52 The Senate Armed Services Committee53 intended to fight McChrystals nomination. I told the president54
51
During her May 28, 2008 The Nation interview with David Zirin, Mary Tillman said: He [McCain] was very helpful initially he started backing off. I think he thought that we were becoming sort of a political encumbrance to him, or could be. He definitely eased out of the situation. He didn't blatantly say he wouldn't help us, it's just that it became clear that he kind of drifted away.
52
Not mentioned was Senator James Webb. Did he initially oppose McChrystals promotion? He was a SASC member; one member placed a hold on McChrystals promotion in Spring 2008. Was it him?
53
The SASC leadership Was Senator Levin (Chairman) and Senator McCain (Ranking Minority leader). 56
[Bush] McChrystal is one of the heroic figures of these wars, and if we wont stand and fight for him, then who? And so we fought55. 255 I called Stan in early June to let him know that, based on personal experience, this was all about politics and that every senior officer who had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan was likely to face the same kind of challenge a disgraceful reality. I told him that the president [Bush] and I were prepared to fight for him. 255 In a very rare Armed Services Committee hearing for a nominee to a three-star position56, McChrystal57 did well in responding to the senators questions. In August he became the director of the Joint Staff. The path was clear for more senior command and a fourth star, which would follow in less than a year.
54
President Bush. The following year, President Obama continued the whitewash by nominating McChrystal for promotion to lead the Afghan War.
55
Gates wrote that he and President Bush stood and fought for McChrystal. Id speculate that political pressure by Bush & Gates was placed on Senators Levin, Webb, and McCain to get them to cave-in and reverse their opposition. With Senator Webb, perhaps it was so he could get his GI Bill passed (see Appendix B). With McCain, he was running for President that year; perhaps he didnt want to lose Bushs support. With Levin, I dont know since he was Democrat. Perhaps the Democratic leadership wanted McChrystal & McRaven shielded from scrutiny.
56
During the Spring of 2008 Senator Webb conducted a secret review of Gen. McChrystals actions in the Tillman case (for details, see the Feral Firefighter post "The [Untold] Tillman Story). On May 15, 2008 Gen McChrystal met behind closed doors with the Senate Armed Services Committee (including Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and Senator Webb) and discussed in detail his role in the Tillman case. This meeting was held in executive session (i.e. closed hearing with no transcript) without listing the names of the participants in the hearing notice. A week later, on May 22nd 2008, the Committee held the confirmation hearing for General Petreauss promotion as CENTCOM CO. Chairman Levin recessed briefly to hold a voice vote to confirm 144 military nominations, without [open] discussion, including General McChrystals promotion to Director of the Joint Staff (and Admiral McRavens to JSOC CO). Exactly how did a secret review, followed by a closed hearing, and a vote without discussion wipe away McChrystals role in the Tillman cover-up? There was no public testimony or public discussion by the Senate. What was said during that closed hearing? Senator Webb and SASC Counsel Gary Leeling refused to answer any of my questions about the hearing when I spoke with him on the phone in June 2009.
57
Admiral McRaven was also questioned about his command of JSOC TF 121s use of torture in Iraq & Afghanistan. This was his confirmation hearing before being promoted as head of JSOC in June 2008..
57
... *** McChrystal was confirmed as commander [of the Afghan War] and authorized for a fourth star by the Senate [on June 2, 2009].58 My strategy of getting him confirmed as director of the Joint Staff and taking care of any potential Senate issues at that time [2008] paid off.
58
On May 11, 2009 Gates fired Gen. McKiernan from his command of the Afghan War. Michael Hastings wrote in his book, The Operators, that A new general [McChrystal] ... presents a new opportunity to ask for more boots on the ground. 'Gates was the mastermind behind the whole thing [the May 2009 firing of Gen. McKiernan & the Afghan War surge]' ... Maybe Obama's Yoda has a bit of Vader in him after all. On May 11, 2009 despite McChrystals key role in the Tillman cover-up & command of JSOC torture. President Obama nominated him (based on the recommendation of Gates & JCS Admiral Mullen) to become his new commander of the Afghan War. A few days later, on May 13th, Obama gave the Arizona State University commencement address at Sun Devil Stadium (where Pat had played college ball) without once mentioning his name (presumably to avoid embarrassing questions about his nomination of McChrystal). That same day, Obama back-pedaled on his previous decision to allow the court-ordered release of torture photos, presumably because they showed detainee abuse by JSOC forces under McChrystals command. On May 20th, Senators Lieberman, Graham, and McCain (working with the White House) introduced a bill to change the FOIA law to block the photo release. The Senate unanimously passed it the next day Conveniently, on May 25, 2009, shortly before McChrystals Senate confirmation hearing, The New York Times Pentagon reporter Thom Shanker exonerated McChrystal of all wrongdoing in the Tillman case. However, Shanker ignored clear evidence of McChrystals central hands-on role. During the week before the confirmation hearing, I corresponded with Shanker and sent him material which described how the Democratic Congress had whitewashed McChrystals role. On June 2nd 2009, The Senate Armed Services Committee held General McChrystals confirmation hearing for his promotion to four-star general and Afghan war commander. The hearing was strictly pro-forma. Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb tossed McChrystal a few softball questions. The real hearing had been conducted the previous year, behind closed doors. On June 10th, General McChrystal was confirmed by the Senate after Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid made an impassioned plea on the Senate floor. Shortly afterward, the Senate approved President Barack Obama's nomination of McChrystal by unanimous consent (that evening, Gen. McChrystal gave NYT reporter Thom Shanker a personal tour of his new Pentagon headquarters that night. Isnt access grand!). The next day, Senator Russ Feingold wrote that he oppose[d] the nomination of LTG Stanley McChrystal because of a classified matter. But where was his opposition when it would have mattered the previous day?
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DEFEND YOUR INTEGRITY, AS YOU WOULD YOUR LIFE
(May 23, 2009 West Point Commencement)
(May 23, 2009 West Point Commencement)
the time will come when you will know that what superiors are telling the press or the Congress or the American people is inaccurate. There will be moments when your entire career is at risk. What will you do? Defend your integrity as you would your life. -- Robert Gates, from April 21, 2008 West Point speech There are some brilliant, wonderful, moral guys with integrity who you would like your son or daughter to be like, he says. Unfortunately, as they start moving up, those arent the characteristics theyre now looking for in four-stars. That certainly goes for our most popular generals of recent history, Petraeus and McChrystal, who, Davis believes, should be the first ones censured for the failures of Afghanistan. Lessons from a Surge Skeptic (Kelley Vlahos American Conservative, March 7, 2014) Gates admonished the [West Point] cadets to, Defend your integrity as you would your life. Thats Secretary of Defense talk for, You guys need to end this U.S. military officer habit of lying routinely in official business. See my article, Is Military Integrity A Contradiction In Terms? But then Gates expressed complete confidence in General McChrystal [the main liar in the Pat Tillman cover-up] indicating that Gates words at West Point were just the usual do as I say not as I do hypocrisy. If Gates would defend his integrity as he would his career, then we would have something. -- John T. Reed, Secretary Of Defense Gates Comments on Military Integrity and Careerism Who is responsible for this continuing outrage with regard to the treatment of Pat Tillmans death and the never-ending cover-up of it? Defense Secretary Robert Gates who said we need fresh eyes in Afghanistan. Perhaps the lack of integrity in the military is a higher priority than the freshness of the four-star general in charge of Afghanistan. As far as the wonderfulness of the military and congressional investigations, Senator John McCain said, [the Armys actions were] inexcusable and unconscionable. Nevertheless, McCain [and Webb & Levin] supports the promotion McChrystals promotion turns out to be an integrity litmus test. Those opposed to the promotion (the Tillman family) have integrity; those in favor of promoting McChrystal, do not. -- John T. Reed, The General Who Lied About Pat Tillman Gets Promoted to the Highest Rank and Made Head of Afghanistan 59
Is Military Integrity a Contradiction in Terms?

Thats the one thing that nobody can take away from you, McChrystal said. Thats your understanding of what you believe is right and wrong. -- J.R. Reed, Yale Daily News, McChrystal Talks Leadership (January 24, 2013) When I arrived, [the West Point honor] code had been distilled to a simple directive: A cadet will not lie, cheat, or steal, nor tolerate those who do so to use a West Point phrase, choosing the easy wrong, not the hard right ... honor was sacrosanct to me there was a clear, bright line dividing shenanigans from transgressions against integrity Lying to anyone was a violation of your honor and meant explusion The code existed to ensure that the words of cadets and officers alike could always, in all situations, be taken as truth. Lies, even small ones, threatened that system of trust. -- Gen. Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task
In his memoir, Gen. McChrystal mentioned the 1976 Raid on Entebbe [McChrystal, p.25]: Id been impressed in July 1976 when Israeli commandos had reached deep into Africa to rescue passengers in Entebbe. The commander of the IDF The Unit (equivalent to the U.S. Army Delta), Yoni (Jonathan) Netanayahu was killed leading the assault. Yoni was cast from the same mold as Pat Tillman. When I first learned of Pat the iconoclast in 2005 (vs. the media icon), I was immediately reminded of Yoni. Although they were separated by 27 years, both were charismatic individuals driven who lived and died with intensity and integrity. Both Achilles-like and slain in the high places. The similarities, despite the obvious differences, between their stories is eerie. Ironically, Yoni truly died heroically, killed while saving hostages at Entebbe. But it would have been embarrassing to mention the friendly fire deaths of hostages and that Yoni died because the mission went FUBAR, so the IDF instead told the story he was shot in the back by a stray burst of fire. Like Kevin Tillman, Iddo Netanyahus oldest brother Yoni died in battle, became a national icon, and had the truth of the nature of his death covered up by his government. Iddo has also been engaged in a long battle for the truth about his brothers death [see my 2008 post, Battle for the Truth"]. And, like Pat Tillman, Yoni Netanyahu was also a remarkable man. The reality of both Pat and Yoni was much deeper than their iconic images. Both possessed a core of honesty and integrity, led by personal example, and lived their lives intensely. Neither cared much about money or personal comfort. Both were mavericks, intellectuals and avid readers. For example, from the foreword to book The Letters of Jonathan Netanyahu: Of all the aspects of his character one predominates integrity. By this we do not mean only honesty toward ones fellow man, but, above all, honesty toward oneself. An inner wholeness
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marked Yonis entire behavior, inspired his way of life and determined his objectives. That wholeness resulted from a great need for absolute harmony between his thoughts and deeds. For Yoni, unlike many of us, could not hold beliefs without living them to the full. Once convinced of the rightness of an idea, whether in the personal or national sphere, he had to do what he could to actualize it, regardless of the hardships or risks involved. Again and again he asked himself whether he was working toward the realization of his lifes aims. Similarly, Pat Tillmans widow, Marie, wrote (in her book The Letter) There are people who dont respond strongly to words like honor, but Pat did. Those five small letters strung together meant the world to him. ... Postscript Note 3-29-13: I recently discovered the blogger emptywheel aka Marcy Wheeler [emptywheel.net] and her post Pat Tillman's Super Bowl (January 31, 2009) [see my June 2010 post on the 2009 Superbowl "Barely a Footnote"]. In her post, Wheelers associate bmaz wrote a comment about Tillmans sense of honor: Earlier this morning, Marcy posted this serious and wonderful piece on Pat Tillman I would like to return for a moment to the subject of her post, namely who Pat was The contract he walked away from with the Cardinals was for about 3.6 million; he had turned down previously a 9 million dollar multi-year contract with the St. Louis Rams, right in the middle of their Super Bowl years, in order to stay with and build the Cardinals in what he considered to be his home at the time. That is the kind of man that Pat was. Pat didnt give a damn about money and the trappings of celebrity Pat was an avid reader. Of everything. there was nothing he he loved more than spirited discussion And he could discuss all intelligently, deeply and passionately. Pat was an iconoclast. He was his own man and would back down from nothing, and no one, if he thought he was right. This is what made him an odd fit for the military. He had every ounce of the heroism, valor, trust and honesty that the military has always purported to stand for, and then some. But he was not a yes man ... I had the privilege of knowing Pat Tillman a little. ... well enough to get the measure of the man he was. had a few long lunch conversations with him. He was everything he has been made out to be and more. He was twenty years younger than I, but you would never know it. He was such a deep and diverse thinker that he was almost the antithesis to the world as we currently know it. The nation, and the world, lost a lot with Pat Tillmans death. Honor and fight what he stood for, and what he wanted the country to stand for, that is what he would want. And, as you watch the Super Bowl tomorrow, remember Pat and his beliefs; for he, of all, should have been around to see the day. Note: For more about Pat Tillmans character, see my 2012 post The [Missing] Pat Tillman Legacy, the 2008 post Battle for the Truth"and the 2008 post Remember the Iconoclast, Not the Icon."
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Unfortunately, McChrystals lack of integrity is not an aberration among the officer corp. John T. Reed wrote about the lack of honor and the hypocricy of Army officers in his piece, Is military integrity a contradiction in terms?: I love the ideals of West Point and the Army. West Point lived up to them in my experience. The Army did not even try. To them, honor is just so much public relations eyewash. military officers put on such a big show of self-righteous indignation when the subject of their honor comes up set themselves up for far more extreme embarrassment when they are revealed to be hypocrites as well as liars. Hypocrisy: Although the politicians at the top are the cause of the lack of integrity in the military, they at least sort of admit their own lack of integrity. That sort of two-faced nonsense is part and parcel of being a politician. It is also part and parcel of working for politiciansas military officers do. military officers affect an indignant, holier-thanthou demeanor when the mere suggestion of dishonesty comes up. In other words, politicians are hypocrites. But career military officers are much bigger hypocrites. In contrast to Pat Tillman and other beautiful souls, Gen. McChrystal hasnt shown himself to be a man of integrity, honesty, or moral courage. Despite McChrystals platitudes about leadership, the Ranger Creed, and taking care of a fallen Ranger and his family, it appears this guy is a master of confabulation and bullshit who just wont genuinely admit a mistake, genuinely take responsibility, or be genuinely truthful about the controversies of his career. His hypocrisy is pathetic.
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Defend Your Integrity, as You Would Your Life:

In the spring of 2010 I began a speaking campaign My main messages were delivered in lectures to the entire student body of cadets [at West Point, etc.]. I talked about the great officers of the past how each of these officers had put his career on the line to speak truth to power. And I said that they must be willing to do so as well. I also warned them In most of these cases integrity and courage were ultimately rewarded professionally. In a perfect world, that should always happen. In my commencement speech at the Naval Academy on May 25, 1997 the obligation we owe the Congress to be honest and true in our reporting to them. Especially if it involves admitting mistakes or problems. When it [the press] identifies a problem the response of senior leaders should be to find out if the allegations are true
...
[At Gates April 21, 2008 West Point speech, he said:] the time will come when you must stand alone in making a difficult, unpopular decision, a time when you will know that what superiors are telling the press or the Congress or the American people is inaccurate. There will be moments when your entire career is at risk. What will you do? Defend your integrity as you would your life. If you do this, I am confident when you face these tough dilemmas, you will, in fact, know the right thing to do. ... The Feral Firefighters Annotations & Notes from Robert Gates Book Duty Memoirs of a Secretary at War: 90 In my commencement speech at the Naval Academy on May 25, 1997 the obligation we owe the Congress to be honest and true in our reporting to them. Especially if it involves admitting mistakes or problems. When it [the press] identifies a problem the response of senior leaders should be to find out if the allegations are true 258 nothing made me madder than when I learned that one of them [troops] was being badly treated by his or her service or the Pentagon bureaucracy if I could make time to try to help a single solider, then by God so could everyone else in authority.
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466 In the spring of 2010 I began a speaking campaign My main messages were delivered in lectures to the entire student body of cadets [at West Point59, etc.]. I talked about the great officers of the past how each of these officers had put his career on the line to speak truth to power. And I said that they must be willing to do so as well. I also warned them In most of these cases integrity and courage were ultimately rewarded professionally. In a perfect world, that should always happen.60 ... Heres some commentary by others on Gates integrity: How to Read Gates's Shift on the Wars (Ray McGovern Consortium News, March 2, 2011): In Establishment Washington, Defense Secretary Robert Gates enjoys a charmed life based on a charming persona. The Fawning Corporate Media (FCM) is always ready with fulsome praise for his candor and leadership
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From Gates April 21, 2008 West Point speech: the time will come when you must stand alone in making a difficult, unpopular decision, a time when you will know that what superiors are telling the press or the Congress or the American people is inaccurate. There will be moments when your entire career is at risk. What will you do? Defend your integrity as you would your life. If you do this, I am confident when you face these tough dilemmas, you will, in fact, know the right thing to do.
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From John T. Reeds post: Secretary of Defense Gates comments on military integrity and careerism:
Defense Secretary Robert Gates made comments in April [21,] 2008 that sound a lot like what I have been saying in these articles at this Web site. However, on 5/13/09 Gates revealed that he is just another sleazy politician when he said he had complete confidence in General Stanley A. McChrystal. McChrystal was the main liar in the Pat Tillman cover-up. The Armys own inquiry recommended that McChrystal be disciplined. He was not. Quite the contrary, on 5/11/09 he was promoted to four-star general, the highest rank in the U.S. military, and promoted to the most sought after job in the U.S. military, Afghanistan commander. Gates also admonished the cadets to, Defend your integrity as you would your life. Thats Secretary of Defense talk for, You guys need to end this U.S. military officer habit of lying routinely in official business. See my article, Is military integrity a contradiction in terms? But then Gates expressed complete confidence in General McChrystal, indicating that Gates words at West Point were just the usual do as I say not as I do hypocrisy. If Gates would defend his integrity as he would his career, then we would have something.
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Bob Gatess Mean, Misguided Memoir (Melvin A. Goodman -- January 22, 2014): [Gates memoir is ] vivid, colloquial, and seemingly straight-from-the shoulder, which easily lends itself to reportage. The memoir is also self-serving, duplicitous, arrogant, and even venal, but understanding this requires the kind of analysis that the mainstream media too often abhors. Gates is most resourceful in laundering his own credentials Gatess effort to craft his own legacy falls victim to the huge gap between his rhetoric and his actions As is often the case with Gates, it is not easy to distinguish which version of his contradictory statements he actually believes. No Tears for the Real Robert Gates (Ray McGovern, January 27, 2014 antiwar.com: I thought that anyone following the copious reporting on Consortiumnews.com regarding Gates would greet with appropriate skepticism his latest self-serving set of excuses. Five years ago Washington Post columnist David Broder, hailed Gates as incapable of dissembling. it would be much closer to the truth to say that Gates was incapable of not dissembling. Gates was a master at ingratiating himself to his superiors. someone who earned the title windsock Bobby because he was clever enough to position himself in whatever direction the powerful winds were blowing. The Wars Robert Gates Got Wrong (Jonathan Alter, The New Yorker Feb. 3, 2014): Gates was not a kiss-ass but one of the shrewdest public servants of his generationwhich helps to explain why his many failures and missed calls have been all but air-brushed out of accounts of his career. The best-known part of Duty comes when Gates writes that Biden was simply impossible not to like but wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades. As it happens, this verdict applies rather precisely to Gates himself.
Whistle-Blower Punches a Hole in Memoir From Robert Gates (Jeff Stein, Newsweek 2-27-14): One of SecDef's big themes is "speaking truth to power." One Marine who showed up was looking for a little clarification on that concept. Franz Gayl Gayl had serious issues with Gates's account of one of the war's darkest chapters, the Pentagon's unconscionable delay in getting mineresistant vehicles to young troops being shredded daily by insurgent land mines. In his memoir, Gates depicted himself as virtually single-handedly stampeding the military services into expediting the acquisition and delivery of the so-called MRAPs But according to Gayl - and the Congressional Record - it was Biden and Senator Christopher "Kit" Bond, R-Mo., who "worked directly (with Marine combat veterans) to pressure Gates to move faster on MRAP."
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Gayl planned to take issue with Gates on that, as well as the contribution of others like himself in getting the MRAPs rolling - who go unmentioned in his memoir - at his Pentagon book signing. Alas, when he finally got a chance to step up and introduce himself, the SecDef "brushed him aside".
My Way (According to Bob Gates) (Aubrey Sarvis, Huffington Post 2-24-14): Until I read Robert M. Gates's memoir Duty I considered the former secretary of defense one of the quiet heroes in repealing Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT). His own record reveals that he repeatedly stood in the way of repeal, although he assures us he really did support it. Secretary Gates omits from his book that he actively discouraged repeal legislation from even being introduced in the Senate. By his own account, Gates still believes that only he knew how to repeal DADT. The record -- his own record in his own book -- shows he came awfully close to torpedoing it. . If Mr. Gates was so wrong on this one aspect of events to which I was a witness and participant, can he be so very right on everything else in Duty?
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SOMETHING TO DIE FOR

The Failure of Secretary Gates Afghan War COIN Surge
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What did Mr. Tillman's sacrifice mean? It didn't mean anything. It speaks to the mythology of war ... There is nothing glamorous or romantic about war. It's mostly about random pointless death and misery the good aren't rewarded, there's no such thing as karma. -- Jeffery A. Trachtenberg , Jon Krakauers Inside Story of Pat Tillman (WSJ, Sept. 11, 2009) God save me from manipulative bureaucrats in polyester-wool suits, button down collars and power ties, and the kiss ass officers who let them get away with it. Having spent three years watching the Wizards of Oz in Washington, he [Marine COL Bill Fogarty] stayed up nights wondering about the uses to which they would be put. its going to cost us. And Id like to be able to tell my men that the price theyre going to pay is worth it. That its important to the country. Vital. Something to die for. -- [Senator] James Webb, Something to Die For (1991) I wanted Barack Obama to win the presidency in 2008. Among my reasons was his outspoken opposition to Bushs disastrous, unnecessary and probably illegal war in Iraq. So what does Obama do? He sends 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan. Having interviewed Pat Tillman, Sr. (father of Pat Jr.) I called him for a quote. My condolences to the families in advance, he said. -- Jack Neworth, Careful What You Wish For, Santa Monica Daily Press, (Jan. 29, 2011) Since Obama became president, a thousand soldiers were killed in Afghanistan, more than double the total in the years under Bush. lets declare victory and go home. It only took an additional 711 American lives for the White House to arrive at this conclusion. Wed been fighting the wrong war, in the wrong way, in the wrong country. -- Michael Hastings, The Operators (January 2012)
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Pat Tillman was awarded this Silver Star medal. McChrystal supervised the writing of this award with falsified witness statements and a narrative that bears no resemblance to reality .
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The Operators
[Adapted from Michael Hastings book The Operators. See my April 2012 post Something to Die For, for the full annotated version with page references and links to more detailed documentation]
For five years [2003 2008], McChrystal was Americas top hunter/killer. [JSOC & Gen.] Petraeus and counterinsurgency is able to take credit for creating the conditions for a facesaving withdrawal [from Iraq]. The surge becomes a modern military myth Petraeus and the COINdinistas, with a new leading figure in the guise of General Stanley McChrystal, would soon push their theories on Afghanistan in full force. [Secretary of Defense Robert] Gates says hell fire him [Gen. McKiernan] if he doesnt resign. He doesnt, and Gate fires him [May 11, 2009]. Privately, McKiernan will tell friends that it was Petraeus who was behind getting rid of him a dirty move to get a public relations bump that comes from the strong move of switching generals to win the war. In May 2009 President Obama nominated Gen. Stanley McChrystal to assume command of the Afghan War. McChrystal gets unanimous confirmation from the Senate. On June 9, 2009, he gets his fourth star. On June 26 [2009], Gates asks McChrystal to write a strategic assessment of the war. By early August, the assessment is close to being complete. McChrystal flies for a secret meeting with Gates, Mullen, and Petraeus. He tells them his stark assessment, tells them the situation is deteriorating, the serious next step is asking for more troops. The serious next step is what the assessment concludes: Were losing. [On September 21, 2009] Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward publishes McChrystals confidential assessment of the war. On September 27, six days after the leak, a McChrystal interview airs on 60 Minutes. The White House doesnt like what happened in London, either. McChrystals allies in the media rally to push his plan inviting influential thinkers to the assessment team pays dividends. In the end, Obama attempts to split the difference he gives the military the troops they want, but tells them they need to leave sooner than theyd like. Obama gives McChrystal what he wants, warning him over a VTC: Do not occupy what you cannot transfer. Obama chooses West Point to deliver his [Dec. 1, 2009] speech on his new strategy. Or, more accurately, McChrystal and Petraeuss strategy. He tells the audience of cadets all the reasons why fighting in Afghanistan is a bad idea. He tells them that were going to do it anyway. The escalation in Afghanistan is on an entirely different
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scale from the escalation in Iraq, however it creates a new war. The surge in Afghanistan triples the number of forces and more than quadruples the cost of the conflict. Its chances of success are low, almost nonexistent. ... By the fall of 2008 Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda were barely footnotes to what we were doing there. If it wasnt about Bin Laden, then what the fuck was it about? When I traveled with McChrystal, I was shocked when General Michael Flynn had told me that he didnt think wed ever get Bin Laden. Why are we here? Spending over a week [April 2010] with McChrystal and his team in Western Europe had caused me, briefly, to rethink my answers. The more time I spent outside the bubble I couldnt shake my own skepticism. No matter how professional or competent or dynamic McChrystal and his team were, the task they had set out for themselves was so obviously doomed. [SAS commander Sir Graeme Lamb] describing the situation [in Afghanistan] as like Apollo 13, heading out to the moon, with a bloody great hole in the side, bleeding oxygen. The simple and terrifying reality, forbidden from discussion in America, was that they were getting their asses kicked by illiterate peasants who made bombs out of manure and wood. The arena [p.279, from Teddy Roosevelts speech] acted as a barrier, protecting their sacrifices from the uncomfortable realities of the current war that it might be a total waste of time and resources that historians would look back on cringing What was happening in Marja [April 22, 2009; offensive started on February 12, 2009] didnt bode well for the next major offensive planned for Kandahar. Marja was supposed to be a proof of concept and the concept looked like a failure. McChrystal will describe it [Marja] as a bleeding ulcer. The White House will view it as a failure. A joke goes around: Yes, Afghanistan does have a government in a box. That box is Kabul. What McChrystal is doing in Kandahar doesnt seem to be what hed promised the White House earlier. He doesnt impress them and it will be held against him a few weeks later. They were still pissed about the leak of the strategic assessment and the failure to explain the rationale of the Kanadahar offensive to the president and his staff. ... The draft [of the June 22, 2010 Rolling Stone profile The Runaway General] expressed my conflicting feelings Id liked hanging out with McChrystal and his team, yet I hated the war. Everything Id seen and heard and knew about the war would not reflect well on them.
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The real problem wasnt just the content of the story it was who read it. High-ranking figures in Washington, mainly, proving that both shit and publicity rolls downhill. All that is bad [stupid things they said] its bad too, that they think were wimps, a White House insider will tell me. Petraeuss name comes up that solves a bunch of problems. The White House knows that if they are going to sack McChrystal, they cant put some no-name in his place. If Petraeus cant do it, no one can, or so the thinking goes. The president said it: This is Petraeuss plan too. He helped design and lead our new strategy. Obama doesnt mention he had worked along with Gates and Mullen to box in the president in the decision to escalate the war. The McChrystal thing that burns Gates up. [But] He tosses [Gen.] McKiernan without a word of remorse. at McChrystals retirement ceremony in July [2010], Gates will bemoan the fact that Americans have lost a hero, someone whose record of service is unmatched. (Forget Tillman, forget Camp Nama, forget the negative command climate) Petraeus didnt seem to want to get publicly attached to the war in Afghanistan. Hes had his triumph in Iraq, and military officials speculated that he knew there was no way the Afghanistan war was going to turn out well. That it was a loser, and he was happy enough to let McChrystal be left holding the bag. [Petraeus] needs to change the headlines Petraeus steps up the violence. He drastically ups the number of airstrikes triples the number of night raids by Special Forces keeps claiming progress, despite the fact that violence keeps going up. The metrics used to judge progress in Afghanistan are classified The general [Petraeus] set out to remake the NIE to his liking.
Note: One whistleblower, LTC Daniel Davis, published an article called "Truth, Lies and Afghanistan" where he wrote, "Senior ranking US military leaders have so distorted the truth when communicating with the US Congress and American people in regards to conditions on the ground in Afghanistan that the truth has become unrecognizable." In an interview, Active-Duty Army Whistleblower Lt. Col. Daniel Davis: U.S. Deceiving Public on Afghan War (Democracy Now, Apr. 11, 2012), LTC Davis said: I dont know why theyre dead. I dont know what benefit my country derived from the loss of their life. And if you cant tell me that theyre going to gain some benefit for my country, I just morally cannot keep quiet. I mean, the Army is built on whats called the Army Seven Values if you see something thats wrong, youve got to have the moral courage to do something about it. loyalty is one of those values, and I believe my loyalty to the soldiers I just owed it to them to do whatever I could to try to bring light to this
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White House officials start to make the case [Spring 2011]: The [Afghan] surge worked, lets declare victory and go home.62 In April, President Obama announces Petraeus will become his next CIA chief. In June, he returns home, his tour in Afghanistan complete. In August, a retirement ceremony is held for him. No top White House officials attend. Petraeus has exited gracefully. The plan Biden had called for a year earlier is the plan the Pentagon is going to be forced to adopt. It only took an additional 711 American lives and 2,777 Afghan lives for the White House to arrive at this conclusion. Since Obama became president, a thousand soldiers were killed in Afghanistan, more than double the total in the years under Bush.63 Strangely, Bin Ladens death [May 1, 2011] would have little impact on the actual war the war in Afghanistan hadnt been about capturing Bid Laden for years... But it would give Obama the political cover he needed to give his speech in June [2011] where he declared the war in Afghanistan was coming to an end, or at least the beginning of the beginning of the end. Right from the start, the idea of the War on Terror was a fuzzy one at best. Bin Ladens death revealed the biggest lie of the war, the safe haven myth, Afghanistans version of WMDs Wed been fighting the wrong war, in the wrong way, in the wrong country. War had been exposed as the Giant Lying Machine64, in Halberstams words. It was all, it seemed, a scam.
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The latest Gen. Petraeus biography, All In, had been sitting in a stack by my bed for over a month. I had glanced at it, but it looked like such a boring suckfest that I put off reading it. My instincts were collaborated by Micheal Hastings Rolling Stone review, The Legend of David Petraeus (Jan. 31, 2012). Heres Michael Hastings on the book: The genius of David Petraeus has always been his masterful manipulation of the media. But after reading the new biography about him Ive started to wonder if hes losing his touch. the Petraeus-approved All In is such blatant, unabashed propaganda, its as if the general has given up pretending theres a difference between the press and his own public relations team. Instead, for a more honest take on Petraeuss war, I would recommend Intel Wars (2012) by Matthew M. Aid or, of course, Michael Hastings book.
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And, heres Michael Hastings on the Giant Lying Machine [Robert Greenwald and Reporter Michael Hastings Take on the Wild and Terrifying Inside Story of America's War Machine (Alternet ,1-27-12): ... I called it the media military industrial complex, and one of the sort of insights that I have had is that they call it the Pentagon Press Corps, right? And you sort of think, oh, well it means the people who kind of watch over the Pentagon and perform the media's watchdog function, but no, it's an extension of the Pentagon. For the most part. I mean, when was the last time anyone at the Pentagon broke a story that wasn't pre-approved? It's very, very rare. And I noticed this first in Iraq when things were going horribly when I was there. And the spokespeople in the military public relations apparatus would just lie to your face. Every day they would lie. And God forbid you point this out. Yeah, we all know they're lying but you're not supposed to say it, you know? We know we're getting bullshit every day, but come on, man, don't point it out -- that's not classy. 71
... McChrystal ends Part III of his memoir, My Share of the Task, with a brief, disingenuous discussion of the controversial Rolling Stone profile by Michael Hastings which led to his June 2010 firing by President Obama. McChrystal claims he resigned instead of being fired (although he only issued an apology & hadnt submitted his resignation before meeting Obama). McChrystal still declines to confirm or deny the accuracy of the quotes and falsely implies they were off-the record. McChrystal claims he consulted no one (although the general's first action was to call his superiors such as Secretary of Defense Gates and Vice President Biden, etc). Finally, McChrystal claims he took full responsibility for the Rolling Stone piece (although before flying to DC his PR advisor Duncan Boothby offers his resignation McChrystal accepts). For a more critical and honest account of LeAffair Rolling Stan, I would suggest Michael Hastings 2012 book The Operators. ... For more details about the last whitewash of McChrystals military career see my post, More Lies Borne Out By Facts, If Not the Truth The New York Times Disingenuous Obituary of Michael Hastings & Their Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystals Role in LeAffair Rolling Stan and The Pat Tillman Story
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Obamas General: Why Hes Losing the War.

Michael Hastings Rolling Stone piece, The Runaway General, came out on June 22, 2010. Coincidentally, that morning I was just finishing up my new post, The Emperors General about President Obamas whitewash of McChrystals role in the Tillman cover up. In all the hoopla about McChrystal being called back and fired by Obama, the small title on the cover of Rolling Stone went unnoticed: Obamas General: Why Hes Losing the War (Lady Gaga beat out Stan for the cover picture; he didnt share a heart-shaped tub with her). At the time, I didnt know shit about the Afghanistan War or the policy deliberations that had led up to the Afghan Surge. I was puzzled that McChrystal was supposedly fired just for a bit of trash talking banter by his staff. Later, as I dug into the story and read about the Afghan War, it appeared much of the back story was that he was losing the war (As Ron Paul said, If we were on the verge of a great success, do you think wed fire the general?). Since then, Ive read quite a bit on the Afghan War and the decision-making story of the Afghan Surge. I found Woodwards account to be the most valuable (as have others) and I think Michael Hastings The Operators is a solid introduction to that story (along with my post Something to Die For, that goes over the same ground (in less detail). If I had the time, Id lay out the argument that McChrystal (along with Petraeus, Gates, and Mullen) boxed in Obama into a strategically flawed COIN Afghan surge. Gen. McKiernan wouldnt ask for more troops, so they fired him in May 2009 and put in McChrystal who (after his assessment with some think-tank gurus) asked for the troops needed according to their best military advice. In September 2009, once they realized that Obama didnt want to win but instead wanted to head for the exit, the Pentagon leaked the report to box-in Obama. Eventually, Obama compromised probably out of political calculation (if the surge works, great we can draw down troops. Doesnt work? Say it did, so we can draw down). Obama gave the Pentagon most of the troops they wanted, but set a deadline. But the Pentagon figured they could use the loophole that troop draw-downs would be based on conditions on the ground to keep a lot of troops in the Afghan War for a long time. The Surge didnt work. McChrystal got fired, and Petreaus couldnt make it work. But, McChrystal should have known it was folly from the beginning. His best military advice wasnt worth shit. A lot of troops have been killed or wounded because of it. ... In the following pages Ive pasted quotes from McChrystals book followed by quotes from books or articles that present a more critical account than that found in Gates and McChrystals memoirs that whitewash their command of the failed Afghan War COIN Surge.
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Team America (Fuck Yeah!)

I knew I had to build a team of talented, experienced, and deeply committed professionals A joke circulated that the bands getting back together. I knew the key to success was getting people to believe more than anything else, this was a war of perception and confidence I felt strongly we could succeed, and committed myself completely.
...
Despite all of the bad news, a small but determined group of officers at ISAF HQ in Kabul, snidely referred to by their colleagues as Team Victory, continued to resolutely believe in eventual victory in Afghanistan (Matthew M. Aid, p. 96Intel Wars). Team America the name McChrystals staff called themselves, referring to the comedic film65 about U.S. cluelessness (Michael Hastings, p. 110 The Operators) Gates said the war needed some fresh thinking. By fresh thinking, Gates meant a working knowledge of COIN. Several officers whod worked with McChrystal were puzzled by his appointment. As far as they knew, he had no skill set in counterinsurgency McChrystals experience in this die of insurgency warfare had been, literally, academic, derived strictly from reading books The consequences would soon show. (Fred Kaplan, p. 302; The Insurgents) McChrystals staff formed a tight clique. They were all Rangers and they all tried to act just like the boss: a groupthink seems to have taken hold, a shared conviction they were right about everything and that everyone else was wrong, nave or stupid The insularity of McChrystals staff suppressed the normal tendency to reassess the situation or modify a decision. His staff officers dismissed the pessimism out of hand. They were Rangers, flush with a can-do confidence, emboldened by their recent tours in Iraq. (Fred Kaplan, p. 328-329; The Insurgents) McChrystals command style represented an unprecedented departure from previous US military history a command made up of elite Special Forces soldiers Generally, theyd been in charge of a few thousand of the most brilliant people in the service, and they were now running an army that numbered in the hundreds of thousands. A drawback: McChrystal [was] used to dealing with the best of the best, high IQs, not the dumbness of the Big Army. The loyalty [of his staff] to McChrystal often ended up with the general getting an inaccurate picture of what was actually taking place Why are we here? Spending over a week [April 2010] with McChrystal and his team in Western Europe had caused me, briefly, to rethink my answers Their confidence and expertise were persuasive. If they believed in the mission, then why couldnt I? The more time I spent outside the bubble I couldnt shake my own skepticism. No matter how professional or competent or dynamic McChrystal and his team were, the task they had set out for themselves was so obviously doomed. (Michael Hastings, p. ** The Operators)
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Team America (2004); see soundtack for theme song America (Fuck Yeah)
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Unfortunate Deficit of Trust

the emergence of an unfortunate deficit of trust between the White House and the Department of Defense as I deployed to Afghanistan my gut feeling was that we needed a new approach, not additional forces Some in the White House felt as though the military had limited the presidents options before he had a chance to weigh our professional advice. This was never my intent, nor that of my staff. To me it appeared unintentional on both sides I knew that any perceptions of military incompetence or manipulation were unfounded I had to provide accurate, honest inputs. I viewed the troop calculation [40,000 needed] not as a request, but as providing what is termed best military advice I should have understood better that the presidents review process was reevaluating the mission itself ... [Mullen and Gates] were starting to wonder whether McKiernan really knew how many troops were needed. If McKiernan was serious about counterinsurgency, how could he not want more forces?... Mullen and Gates had settled on a replacement they felt confident he [McChrystal] would ask for the resources necessary to win. ( Chandrasekaran, pp. 52-53, Little America) Before McChrystal had departed Washington, Robert Gates had told him to take stock of the war effort within 60 days convinced that David McKiernan had underestimated the need for more U.S. troops, there was now an opening to campaign for more. All it required was for McChrystal to make a convincing case. (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, p. 59, Little America) Obamas uncertainly about the mission was evident in the questions he posed in the first meeting with the NSC on September 13, 2009 It was only then that some in the military began to discover this was not a review to bless the current strategy; it was a review meant to find a way to the exit [escalate and exit]. The jamming of the President began right away. Just after the first meeting, Gen. McChrystals secret reportwas leaked (David Sanders, p. 29 Confront & Conceal). McChrystal gave a speech in London made it clear [Vice President Bidens counterterrorism option] would lead to failure McChrystal had by then already participated in two meetings with Obamas war cabinet in which considerable skepticism had been voiced about the need for a large-scale counterinsurgency campaign the military now seemed to be staking out a hard position ahead of the conclusion of the formal Afghanistan review by Obama. (Peter Bergen, p.523; The Longest War) at every turn that fall, according to [Bob] Woodward, the military had sought to limit Obamas options. In turn, Petraeus, McChrystal and Mullen felt they were simply urging enough troops to defeat al-Queda and the Taliban. Does the President want to win or lose? they reportedly asked each other, believing they were forthrightly laying out what was required stood by the request for 40,000 more troops as the only way to make progress in Afghanistan We truly didnt try to box them in, [said Petraeus] Yeah, we were in all in league; we supported what we thought was the militarily sensible option we said that below 40,000 you cant accomplish the mission. (Paula Broadwell, p. 114; 118; 119 All In)
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I Was Selling an Unsellable Position

If Id felt like the decision to set a withdrawal date would have been fatal to the success of the mission, Id have said so often glacial speed of counterinsurgency unrealistic expectations Congressmen had told me repeatedly that I had, at most, a year to show convincing progress
...
Obama ultimately agreed to 30,000 additional troops But he also then insisted that Mullen, Petreaus, McChrystal and Gates agree to a secret terms sheet that stated; This approach is not fully resourced counterinsurgency or nation building, but a narrower approach what Obama personally added at the last minute was the provision that a drawdown of forces would begin in July 2011. (Paula Broadwell, p. 119-120 All In) With these additional forces, he [Obama] asked them [Mullen, Gates, Petraeus] will you be able to clear, hold, and transfer to the point wherewithin eighteen monthsthe Afghan security forces can take the lead in the fight?... If they said they could do this, and it turned out they couldnt, he wasnt going to double down. No serious scholar or practitioner in the field would promise that a campaign of this sort could succeed so rapidly. Counterinsurgency wars were by nature protracted wars; they usually took years, sometimes decades, to resolve. (Fred Kaplan, p. 317; The Insurgents) I asked one of Petreauss aides how he reconciled the generals plan with the presidents goal. We didnt pay much attention to that memo, he said. (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, pp. 319-321, Little America) Both sides could take from the July 2011 date that they had won the battle; for the Pentagon the important point about the timing of the withdrawal was that it would be conditions based. (Peter Bergen, p.328; The Longest War) Petraeuss assumptionwas that as in Iraq, the surge would yield some significant benefits significant enough that the president would not want to tinker with success. But Afghanistan wasnt Iraq, and change wasnt coming as quickly as the deadlines Washington had setthe Pentagon saying they could do it [18-month surge] in order to get the troopsThey all signed up to it They thought if we can establish this is working, we would not end up withdrawing. The way you do counterinsurgency is to do as much as it takes, for as long as it takes. (David Sanders, pp. 51-52 Confront & Conceal). The inability to hand off the [Garmser] district to the Afghans after two years raised fundamental questions about Americas war strategy The Marines werent ready to hand over Nawa Had the commanders made a false promise to the president?... If the Afghan government lacked the capacity and political will to provide security and civil administration in the districts, counterinsurgency seemed to be the wrong strategy. (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, pp. 319-321, Little America)
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A Bleeding Ulcer
Why are we here, Sir? Whats the Point?... ground truth I was asking soldiers to believe in something their ground-level perspective denied them. I was asking them to believe in a strategy impossible to guarantee, and in progress that was difficult to see, much less prove the fight for Marjah, never in doubt militarily, became a litmus test for the validity of our strategy in Afghanistan. [Richard Holbrooke said] there has always been a disconnect between what was being reported internally and the talking points You would never know we were talking about the same war. Truth is the first casualty of war. (Matthew M. Aid, pp. 13Intel Wars) With each trip, the war became less recognizable as the one being described from podiums in Kabul, Washington, and London. A positive spin could be expected but there was often such a gulf between what we were told was happening and what I was seeing with my own eyes that I sometimes questioned my recollections... This is a simple book an honest account of what the war looks like on the ground. (Ben Anderson, xvi No Worse Enemy; see also Andersons documentary, Battle for Marjah). If the Obama administration and Gen. McChrystal had seriously hoped that they could turn the tide in Afghanistan in 2009, they were sorely disappointed had failed to arrest the Taliban momentum Going into 2010 [McChrystal] promised Washington a quick, decisive victory that would publicly demonstrate that the tide was indeed turning The place chosenwas Marjah. (Matthew M. Aid, pp. 92-93 Intel Wars) The warMcChrystals warwasnt going so well. The clearest and most disturbing sign was the battle for Marja The ISAF troops could clear but not hold, and the build phase of the plan lay in the incalculably distant future there was no government in a box (Fred Kaplan, p. 331; The Insurgents) Panic over Marjah set in at ISAF HQ Gen. McChrystal flew down to Marjah He wanted results and he wanted them soon. This is a bleeding ulcer right now in June 2010, Gen. McChrystal admitted that only 5 of the 121 districts in Afghanistan that he deemed essential if the war in Afghanistan was to be won were rated as secure (Aid, pp. 95-97Intel Wars) The problem with Marjah, he [Carl Weston] said was not just McChrystals unattainable expectations. It was the surge itself the Afghan government lacked the willingness and capacity to seize the opportunity provided by American troops. We set ourselves up for an impossible model in the ninth year of the war We created our own strategic failure. (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, p. 147, Little America) [McChrystal;] That the military part of counterinsurgency works in Afghanistan. I dont think its proven yet that the government of Afghanistan could rise to meet what they have to do. Because if they cant do it, another pillar of counterinsurgency is missing, and you have to have it. (Gordon, Q. and A. With Former U.S. Commander in Afghanistan NYT, Jan. 8, 2013)
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It Would Be Folly
As a student of history, I was sensitive to the Vietnam analogy I re-read Stanley Karnows Vietnam: A History During a memorable night in Kabul. I spoke on the phone with Karnow66 When I arrived to take command of the war in June 2009, I found a creeping, fatalistic pessimism, as though the fight were over, the effort failed Indeed, in those early days, as I assessed the war, I wasnt sure it could be done. Although Id known it would be difficult, the situation was even worse than Id anticipated I wasnt sure a successful outcome was achievable, no matter what we did gauging our chances at fifty-fifty, and only then if we made serious changes. The obstacles were numerous, but the accrued problems were not insoluble, just incredibly difficult.. I understood the tendency of military leaders to be optimistic, often dangerously so. But both our analysis and my intuition told me our effort could succeed I thought that if we did smart analysis, got the strategy right, worked to exhaustion, and came into a bit of luck, the mission could be accomplished. I never would have sought additional forces to fight an effort I felt was doomed If Id felt like the decision to set a withdrawal date would have been fatal to the success of the mission, Id have said so ... the new [COIN] doctrine would harden into dogma. And its enthusiasts, emboldened in their confidence, wouldoften with good intentionslure the nation more deeply into another war that it lacked the ability or appetite to win. (Fred Kaplan, p. 4; The Insurgents) Even Fred Kagan, the most enthusiastic [McChrystal assessment] team member, put the chances of success at less than fifty-fifty. (Fred Kaplan, p. 306; The Insurgents) Wass de Czege worried that the COIN field manual was under representing the difficulty of doing this you need to know how difficult it is ahead of time, because if what you bring to the conflict isnt enough to win the battles, then its better to stay out. (Fred Kaplan, p. 162; The Insurgents) [David Kilcullen thought] that it was generally best not to undertake COIN campaigns in the first place. They took a long time, cost a lot of money, got a lot of people killed, and often didnt work The theme throughout his fifty-page guide was basically, dont do this! A glance at a map, a few villages, or some key passages from Galula would have revealed that Afghanistan and COIN made an unlikely match (Fred Kaplan, p. 347; The Insurgents) According to Galula, these prerequisites [for a successful insurgency] included a weak government, a neighboring country that offers safe havens, and a predominately rural, illiterate
Stanley Karnow, more than a mentor: Column: I asked Stanley [Karnow] what he told the U.S. commander [McChrystal] in Afghanistan. "Well, that we never should have been in Vietnam in the first place," he answered.
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populationprecisely the traits marking Karzais Afghanistan. an insurgents ideal situation was the topography and demography of Afghanistan. (Fred Kaplan, p. 342; The Insurgents) werent able to hold or build much not even after a year and a half of a COIN-driven surge. There was no reason to believe that another year and a half and thirty thousand troops would make much difference. Nor, probably, would another ten years and one hundred thousand troops. (Fred Kaplan, p. 354; The Insurgents) I argued against having the surge then, because I said that its not even close to being enough. There was a paper it was called "Go Big or Go Deep." the "Go Big" plan, which is what General McChrystal was recommending Forty thousand was never enough. Maybe 100,000 additional troops might have given you the ability to militarily pacify the insurgency. Im not advocating that was the answer; in fact, I was advocating the opposite: dont put those troops in there. (Active-Duty Army Whistleblower Lt. Col. Daniel Davis: U.S. Deceiving Public on Afghan War) the modern age itself has reduced much of the whole COIN concept to folly. The most oftencited models of successful counterinsurgenciesMalaya, Kenya, the Philippines, Algeria, and Northern Ireland-- were colonial wars. The successful COIN campaigns of lore were also wars of stunning brutality in Algeria, the routine use of torture in pacification campaigns. This was the dark side of counterinsurgency, but it had also been seen by its practitioners as an essential side. (Fred Kaplan, p. 364; The Insurgents) David Kilcullen wrote in his interagency guide on COIN that it would be folly to engage in counterinsurgency abroad unless there is a reasonable likelihood that the affected government will introduce necessary reforms and will demonstrate adequate willpower and capacity to defeat insurgents It is often the case that the less intrusive and more indirect the approach selected, the more likely it is to succeed a small footprint is often best (Fred Kaplan, p. 289-291; The Insurgents) If you send troops overseas to bolster a regime whose leaders lack legitimacy or the will to reform, the most brilliant strategyand strategistwill have little chance of prevailing In assessing the prospects of a COIN campaign, if the insurgents are out of reach, or if the government being challenged is too corrupt to reform, or if the war is likely to take longer and cost more than a president or a nation is willing to commit its the commanders responsibility to say so. David Petreaus [& McChrystal?] knew all these things were true of the war in Afghanistan, but he stopped short of saying so; he thought he could overcome the odds (Fred Kaplan, p. 363; The Insurgents) Overshadowed by the McChrystal controversy was the story Hastings really wanted to produce: an indictment of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, which Hastings considers a deadly folly [In his book The Operators] he argues that the Afghanistan war is a debacle and that counterinsurgency is a liberal-sounding sham that conceals a bloodthirsty agenda (Spencer Ackerman, Michael Hastings: McChrystal Was Complex, Obama Was Naive, Afghanistan Is Hopeless January 5, 2012)
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The Sons-of-Bitches With all the Fruit Salad

Gen. McKiernans request for new forcesa new president found himself facing a time-sensitive decision. It reminded me of President Kennedys experience with the Bay of Pigs [My father] talked about how hard it was to take responsibility for mistakes. He used President Kennedys leadership and courage after the Bay of Pigs fiasco as an example. [Daniel Ellsbergs] outrage stemmed from his conclusion that many of the failures in Vietnam owed not to flawed analysis but to politically driven decisions to ignore the difficult conclusions the analysis offered. The Pentagon Papers convinced him that decision makers had not been misled into disaster by ignorance or bad advice. Rather, faced with two politically toxic but militarily sound options -- withdrawal or full escalation -- they [slam at Obama?] chose to pursue other policies for political reasons, even though analysis told them these policies were likely to fail. [McChrystal;] I go back and think of President Kennedy, who had a military service background, but he comes into the presidency and hes faced with a decision on the Bay of Pigs, with the C.I.A. and the military giving him data, and it turns out very badly. It really set back their ability to build trust over time (Michael Gordon, Q. and A. With Former U.S. Commander in Afghanistan NYT, Jan. 8, 2013) ... The sons-of-bitches with all the fruit salad just sat there nodding, saying it would work -President Kennedy, on the bad advice he received from his generals, remarking on the colorful ribbons on their chests (from first page of Michael Hastings book The Operators). [Michael Hastings:] After he [JFK] got burned at the Bay of Pigs, he said, never again am I going to blindly trust these guys. He had learned in the Pacific that a lot of these admirals and generals running around were clowns. What did I learn in Iraq, seeing Iraqi police execute people on the streets and then having a two, three star general tell me how great the Iraqi police are? You realize these guys are clowns! But its really tough for people who havent served to stand up to all the shiny brass. And its tough for journalists as well just because someone has a uniform on doesnt mean you need to genuflect. You can be respectful and thank them. But one has to be able to be as critical of fourstar general as of Newt Gingrich. You have to treat these people like theyre flawed human beings like you (Spencer Ackerman, Michael Hastings: McChrystal Was Complex, Obama Was Naive, Afghanistan Is Hopeless January 5, 2012) Petraeus did not accept the new presidents desire to head for the nearest exit ramp on Afghanistan in 2009. The general began lobbying for a surge and undercutting the president Petraeus rolled the younger commander in chief into going ahead with a bound-to-fail surge in Afghanistan, just as, half a century earlier, the C.I.A. had rolled Jack Kennedy into going ahead with the bound-to-fail Bay of Pigs scheme. Both missions defied logic, but the untested presidents
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put aside their own doubts and instincts, caving to experience So many more American kids and Afghanistan civilians were killed and maimed in a war that went on too long. Thats the real scandal. (Maureen Dowd, Reputation, Reputation, Reputation Nov. 13, 2012) Obama should have gone long, not big But taking that path would have required a first-term Democratic president with no military experience to stand up to his troop-hungry generals. Surging was the easy thing to do, [Kael] Weston said. Its much harder to say no. (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, pp. 331, Little America) ... In Holbrookes opinion, the Pentagon had failed to candidly tell President Obama just how bad the situation was in Afghanistan and how poor the short term prospects were for turning the situation around if due consideration had been given to all the facts on hand, it might have been more statesmanlike to go back on the promises he made on the campaign trail and just walk away from the problem. (Matthew M. Aid, pp. 70-71 Intel Wars) Obama had to do this 18-month surge just to demonstrate, in effect, that it couldnt be done . Obama would have given the monolithic military its day in court and the United States would not be seen as having been driven off the battlefield. (Bob Woodward, p. 338; Obamas War) Does Obama really believe in the war? McChrystal and his team have their doubts. One of the reasons he agreed to the escalation in Afghanistan was because he felt he would be politically vulnerable if he didnt he might look weak on national security, he couldnt overrule his generals. Did he really go along with a war he didnt believe we could win so he wouldnt get criticized for losing it? (Michael Hastings, pp. 287-288; The Operators) ... I find it rather ironic that McChrystal chose to compare Obamas rubber-stamping of McKiernans request with the Bay of Pigs. I think it would have been more apt to compare the Bay of Pigs with McChrystals request for 40,000 troops. And, is it my imagination, or was McChrystal making a dig on Obama, blaming him for not choosing withdrawal or full escalation? On the contrary, I agree with Maureen Dowd that Gates, Petraeus, Mullen, and McChrystal67 succeeded in boxing in Obama into giving them the troops to try out their COIN folly in Afghanistan. McChrystals bad advice (bad assessment) has led to the death of a lot of American soldiers.
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Postscript 5-01-13: It also appears Admiral McRaven pushed for the surge (pp. 329-330, Scahill Dirty Wars: McChrystal and McRaven had pressed Obama to surge US forces in Afghanistan Obama and McRaven actually have a fairly good relationship, and McRaven worked hand in glove with McChrystal, designing the counter AQ strategies. McRaven played a significant hidden role in developing the McChrystal plan that Obama eventually signed off on. And McRaven and Robert Harward were brought into the WH Afghan strategy meetings in the fall of 2009. Like McChrystal, McChrystal and Harward pressed for a heavy, heavy COIN presence in major populations centers, while using CT teams to stalk targets throughout the country. 81
The Costs Would Rise I Was Responsible

I felt strongly we could succeed, and committed myself completely nothing was certain the costs would rise And I was responsible. ... The plan Biden had called for a year earlier is the plan the Pentagon is going to be forced to adopt. It only took an additional 711 American lives and 2,777 Afghan lives for the White House to arrive at this conclusion Since Obama became president, a thousand soldiers were killed in Afghanistan, more than double the total in the years under Bush. (Michael Hastings, The Operators) McChrystal was responsible? BS! Hes retired and earning the big bucks peddling his BS book on the lecture circuit. Those soldiers who have been killed or wounded in his war are the ones paying the price for his folly of a war. Hows war been going since McChrystal made his graceful landing? Not so well: The Battle for Marjah hasnt turned out so well: Taliban popular where US fought biggest battle For the number of Americans killed and wounded and the cost see The 13-Year War.
How about the results of McChrystals COIN surge? Take a look at the following articles:
Militarys Own Report Card Gives Afghan Surge an F Spencer Ackerman, Sept. 27, 2012 The Afghan war: Do the numbers add up to success? Matthew Schofield, Oct. 9, 2012 General David Petraeus's fatal flaw: not the affair, but his Afghanistan surge Nov. 13, 2012 Petraeuss COIN Gets Flipped Kelly Vlahos, American Conservative, Nov. 19, 2012
Top US General in Afghanistan Sees Uncertain Future -- John Glaser, Jan. 31, 2013
Face reality in Afghanistan -- Daniel L. Davis, February 13, 2013
The COIN of the RealmIs a Wooden Nickel C. Christine Fair, TIME March 13, 2013 The REAL reason the U.S. failed in Afghanistan - Stephen M. Walt, March 15, 2013 Trying to Do the Impossible Rory Stewart, Foreign Policy March/April 2013
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Finally, the Army has quietly closed down the Afghan based named in memory of Pat Tillman: An ending in Afghanistan: U.S. closes Forward Operating Base Tillman. The war was a waste of his life and all the other Americans who have died there. ... Two books critical of COIN & the Afghan surge were published at the end of the July 2014: COL Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War ...
Update April 2 , 2014: Iraq and Afghanistan: The physical and mental toll, by the numbers (Scott Clement The Washington Post, March 31, 2014)
Update March 29, 2014: Lessons from a Surge Skeptic [interview with Col. Daniel Davis] (Kelley Vlahos American Conservative, March 7, 2014): In 2009, at the risk of his own military career, Army Lt. Col. Daniel Danny Davis came forward to oppose the so-called surge of tens of thousands of new U.S. troops into Afghanistan. He predicted in a publicly released report that the proposed surge, which Gens. David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal were then dead-set on pursuing, could actually result in a worsening of the situation in Afghanistan. He was there at the height of the surge hed opposed. we were just moving the clock down the roadno success, because there was no unified strategy. There was no progress, as far as he could see, toward the stated goals of COIN. But casualties mounted just the same. this is a complete waste of American life for no gain in the country. Since the beginning of 2010, 1,857 U.S. and coalition troops have perished in Afghanistan, with thousands more injured, many for life. Back in Washington, there seems to be broad acknowledgement that the U.S. has achieved nothing of major strategic importance since 2009 theres no more boasting about rousting the Taliban from the country. Now, thanks to years of failure, Davis is afraid nothing will work. Nearly two years later Davis took another chance and publicly blasted senior commanders for not being truthful with the American people about how poorly the war was going overseas. Making headlines all over the globe, he published Truth, Lies and Afghanistan: How Our Military Leaders Let us Down, in the Armed Forces Journal in February 2012 [Rolling Stone then published an unclassified version of a report Davis had sent to Congress a month earlier, entitled, Dereliction of Duty II: Senior Military Leaders Loss of Integrity Wounds Afghan War Effort.]: Senior ranking US military leaders have so distorted the truth when communicating with the US Congress and American people in regards to conditions on the ground in Afghanistan that the truth
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has become unrecognizable. The single greatest penalty our Nation has suffered, however, has been that we have lost the blood, limbs and lives of tens of thousands of American Service Members with little to no gain to our country as a consequence of this deception. In August 2013, he wrote, Purge the Generals, highlighting 20 years of war and program failures that have only led to more promotions and more generals. Furthermore, he says, the wrong people are being promoted. There are some brilliant, wonderful, moral guys with integrity who you would like your son or daughter to be like, he says. Unfortunately, as they start moving up [the chain of command], those arent the characteristics theyre now looking for in four-stars. That certainly goes for our most popular generals of recent history, Petraeus and McChrystal, who, Davis believes, should be the first ones censured for the failures of Afghanistan. This isnt political, he says, this is about learning lessons for the future.
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BOB GATES URGE TO SURGE
Washington wise man chapter in Gatess second memoir, How I Issued MacArthur-Type Warnings All Along.
As he did with the Iraq surge over the past two years, Gates now [Fall 2008] is talking up the prospects for an Afghan surge. Defense Secretary Gates emphasized to reporters there is a shared interest in surging as many forces as we can into Afghanistan before the elections there in late September 2009 Its important that we have a surge of forces. -- Ray McGovern, Gates and the Urge to Surge (Consortium News, Nov. 23, 2008) "A new general [McChrystal promoted in May 2009] ... presents a new opportunity to ask for more boots on the ground. 'Gates was the mastermind behind the whole thing [the May 2009 firing of Gen. McKiernan & the Afghan War surge]' ... Maybe Obama's Yoda has a bit of Vader in him after all." -- Michael Hastings, The Operators (2012) The best-known part of Duty comes when Gates writes that Biden was simply impossible not to like but wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades. As it happens, this verdict applies rather precisely to Gates himself. Before Obama made his decision about the surge, the Pentagon tried to box him in. McChrystal, the field commander, issued a report, which Gates reveals was leaked to Bob Woodward by McChrystals staff They were upset that Obama didnt automatically accept their recommendations, as Bush had. --- Jonathan Alter, The Wars Robert Gates Got Wrong (The New Yorker, February 3, 2014) The Fawning Corporate Media (FCM) is always ready with fulsome praise for his candor and leadership and even for his belated recognition that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were nuts. the savvy Gates appears to have made a new calculation, that it is the right time to join the rats leaving the sinking ship of the Iraq and Afghan war policies. was Gates signaling that he knew the conflicts would come to no good end and thus was he creating a public record for himself as something of a war skeptic? Was he preparing for his next career move, an elevation to a Washington wise man to be consulted by presidents and other important personages in his later years while being named to prestigious commissions? He may have greased the skids for his slide into wise-man-dom. I can visualize a new chapter in Gatess second memoir, How I Issued MacArthur-Type Warnings All Along. --- Ray McGovern, How to Read Gates's Shift on the Wars (Consortium News, March 2, 2011) 85
GAMING OBAMA ON AFGHAN WAR

Commentary on Gates & his Memoir
From Robert Gates: The Soldiers Secretary? (Christopher Preble , American Conservative -March 19, 2014): George W. Bush brought Robert Gates into his administration in November 2006 to rescue a failing war effort in Iraq. Gates stayed under Obama to rescue the failing war in Afghanistan. Gates frequently engaged in subterfuge, misdirection, and the occasional bald-faced lie. The subterfuge was evident in his repeated hints of impending troop drawdowns needed, he believed, to sustain what meager public support there was. The American public wouldnt support openended wars, so he kept telling them that the wars would end. But he was careful not to say when. No Tears for the Real Robert Gates (Ray McGovern, January 27, 2014 antiwar.com: [Gates] was brought back into government in 2006 as Defense Secretary to oversee the wars escalation, the much-touted surge, which led to the deaths of another 1,000 U.S. soldiers and countless more Iraqis but failed to achieve the political and economic reconciliation that Bush had set as its top goal.
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Gates and the Urge to Surge (Ray McGovern Consortium News, November 23, 2008): It may become a biennial ritual. Every two years, if the commander-in-chief (or the commanderin-chief-elect) says he wants to throw more troops into an unwinnable war for no clear reason other than his political advantage, panderer-in-chief Robert Gates will shout Outstanding! Never mind what the commanders in the field are saying much less the troops who will die. Now, the perceived success of the [Iraq] surge is giving hawkish Washington Democrats an excuse to rally around Gates and urge President-elect Barack Obama to keep him on. As he did with the Iraq surge over the past two years, Gates now is talking up the prospects for an Afghan surge. Defense Secretary Gates emphasized to reporters there is a shared interest in surging as many forces as we can into Afghanistan before the elections there in late September 2009. Its important that we have a surge of forces. Oops! Within a week, Gen. David McKiernan, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan undercut McCain and Palin, insisting emphatically that no Iraq-style surge of forces will end the conflict in Afghanistan. The word I dont use for Afghanistan is surge, adding that what is required is a sustained commitment to a counterinsurgency effort that could last many years and would ultimately require a political, not military, solution. It will be interesting to see what McKiernan actually does, if and when more troops are surged down his throat. If he has the courage of his convictions, maybe hell quit. I would love to see
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an Army general display the courage that one saw in Admiral William Fallon, former commander of CENTCOM, who openly refused to do Iran on his watch, and got cashiered for it. The Wars Robert Gates Got Wrong (Jonathan Alter, The New Yorker Feb. 3, 2014): Before Obama made his decision about the surge, the Pentagon tried to box him in. McChrystal, the field commander, issued a report, which Gates reveals was leaked to Bob Woodward by McChrystals staff They were upset that Obama didnt automatically accept their recommendations, as Bush had. The Pentagon was used to getting what it wanted, Obama told me at the time. When it didnt, bad feelings arose. Bob Gatess Mean, Misguided Memoir (Melvin A. Goodman -- January 22, 2014): Time and again, the Pentagons senior leaders, particularly Admiral Mike Mullen and Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal, made public comments or leaked controversial statements that were designed to force greater military deployments to Afghanistan, when it was clear that the President was wisely looking for a way out. Gatess unwillingness to accept that policy toward Afghanistan had changed in the White House led him to lead his own campaign to win a war that simply isnt winnable. Gatess defiance of the President included allowing senior general officers to campaign publicly for a significant expansion of U.S. forces in Afghanistan long before any decision was actually made. Robert Gates Double-Crosses Obama (Robert Parry Consortium News, January 8, 2014): In 2009, as Obama insisted on a steady withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq along the lines of an agreement that the Iraqi government had forced on Bush the new President wanted another withdrawal plan for Afghanistan But Gates and Petraeus were set on guiding the inexperienced Obama into an Afghan surge, essentially by employing the old bureaucratic trick of presenting their desired outcome as the only realistic option. Mouse-trapped by this maneuver and realizing the political damage that he would face if he spurned the recommendations of Gates-PetraeusClinton Obama accepted a counterinsurgency surge of 30,000 more troops into Afghanistan but he pushed back by trying to limit the mission and insisting on withdrawal by the end of 2014. Gates continued to undercut the President by briefing reporters during a flight to Afghanistan that we are in this thing to win and presenting the war as essentially open-ended. Gaming Obama on Afghan War (Gareth Porter consortium news, January 10, 2014): The Gates account omits two crucial historical facts necessary to understanding the issue. The first is that Obama agreed to the escalation only under strong pressure from his top national security officials and with very explicit reservations. The second is that Gen. David Petraeus reneged on his previous commitment to support Obamas 2009 decision that troop withdrawal would begin by
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mid-2011. Gates makes only the most glancing reference in the newly published Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary of War to the issue of the beginning of troop withdrawals from Afghanistan. Robert Gates, former defense secretary, offers harsh critique of Obamas leadership in Duty (Bob Woodward Washington Post, January 7, 2014): Duty reflects the memoir genre That focus tends to give short shrift to the fuller, established record. For example, in recounting the difficult discussions that led to the Afghan surge strategy in 2009, Gates makes no reference to the six-page terms sheet that Obama drafted at the end, laying out the rationale for the surge and withdrawal timetable. Obama asked everyone involved to sign on, signaling agreement. According to the meeting notes of another participant, Gates is quoted as telling Obama, You sound the bugle . . . Mr. President, and Mike [Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and I will be the first to charge the hill. Gates does not include such a moment in Duty. .. He picks up the story a bit later, after Gen. David H. Petraeus, then the central commander in charge of both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, made remarks to the press suggesting he was not comfortable with setting a fixed date to start withdrawals. ... Gates: What He Really Thought About the Afghan War Douglas Ollivant, Foreign Policy February 6, 2014): It is well known (thanks to Bob Woodward, inter alia) that Gates was a proponent of the 2009 Afghanistan "Surge"- And Gates in his own words makes it clear that he was a proponent of the plans put forward by his generals. And yet, in little gems throughout the text, he offers a litany of reasons why he believes the Afghanistan endeavor will fail. When compiled, these make a convincing case. Gates sees clearly the obstacles to a successful outcome in Afghanistan. When all his doubts and concerns scattered throughout the book are assembled, they present a powerful condemnation of the Afghan strategy that Gates championed, one that expended not only considerable blood and treasure. Given these beliefs on Gates' part why did he support the proposed policy? Gates was in office for all the early "reviews"- If Gates (or any other principal) was unaware of any Afghan-related facts, it was not for a lack of staff energy spent trying to find them. The sum of all Gates' fears demonstrates that he had the available information to steer another course. While Gates ultimately stands by and defends his decision to support and champion the strategy shift and troop increase in Afghanistan, his own words betray him. The tension between these two sides of Gates-supporting a policy despite having a myriad of doubts about its efficacy-is never resolved and presents a somewhat interesting puzzle. From Robert Gates: The Soldiers Secretary? (Christopher Preble , American Conservative -March 19, 2014): if I had ever come to believe the military part of the strategy would not lead to success as I defined it, I could not have continued signing the deployment orders. This statement, and others
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like it, is striking not merely because of the admission that he was deceiving the American peopleit is obvious that Gates had also deceived himself. And it was not for a lack of study. but everyone had already made up their minds, as Gates had, that we couldnt walk away. So policymakers engaged in protracted discussions over what to do and never really grappled with whether to do it in the first place. Gates and the military did not take seriously the other constraints on his Afghan strategy. In sum, if the strategy that Gates proposed relied on resources that were not available and could not be made available, then the strategy would fail. The logical conclusion was simple: Cut our losses. The reason he never seriously considered that option is both telling and disturbing: For the United States to be perceived as defeated in Afghanistan would have grave implications for our standing in the world. It was not victory per se that he was seeking, but rather avoiding the appearance of defeatnot exactly the sort of epitaph likely to adorn any war memorials 50 or 100 years hence. the United States paid a price in additional lives lost, and hundreds of billions of dollars spent, to secure that meager reward. The military part of the strategy was only a part, and the strategy as a whole could not work without the rest of the pieces falling into place. In the end, Gates couldnt bring himself to embrace a different strategy if it would look like a retreat. So the nation, following Gatess advice, persisted in a costly strategy without any of the essential elements in place and without any reasonable expectation that they would ever get there. How to Read Gates's Shift on the Wars (Ray McGovern Consortium News, March 2, 2011): But in my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined, as General [Douglas] MacArthur so delicately put it. it would seem an odd swing for Gates to suggest now that psychiatric care is in order for anyone loony enough to commit U.S. ground forces to places like Iraq and Afghanistan. After all, that was pretty much what Gates had done. was Gates signaling that he knew the conflicts would come to no good end and thus was he creating a public record for himself as something of a war skeptic? Was he preparing for his next career move, an elevation to a Washington wise man to be consulted by presidents and other important personages in his later years while being named to prestigious commissions? Now, the savvy Gates appears to have made a new calculation, that it is the right time to join the rats leaving the sinking ship of the Iraq and Afghan war policies. He may have greased the skids for his slide into wise-man-dom. I can visualize a new chapter in Gatess second memoir, How I Issued MacArthur-Type Warnings All Along.
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Bob Gates Urge To Surge

I first publicly discussed my concerns about Afghanistan at a SASC hearing on September 22, 2008 By Fall 2008 the president [Bush] also concluded that the war in Afghanistan was not going well [the NIE would portray the situation in Afghanistan as very bleak]. I believed we had to succeed there because the stakes were higher than perhaps any other senior official in the government understood. For Islamic extremists to defeat a second superpower in Afghanistan would have devastating and long-lasting consequences across the entire Muslim world. For the United States to be perceived as defeated in Afghanistan would have grave implications for our standing in the world. To change both the direction of events on the ground in Afghanistan and perceptions at home, we reviewed a number of options. [including] concentrating our forces in those areas strategically most important the south and east and planning for a larger and longer-term U.S. troop commitment. And so, with some 33,000 troops in-country, several thousand more [12,000] en route and the commanders [Gen. McKiernan] request for another 20,000 troops or so, a troubled war in Afghanistan would be handed off to a new president. ... The Feral Firefighters Annotations & Notes from Robert Gates Book Duty Memoirs of a Secretary at War: 221 I first publicly discussed my concerns about Afghanistan at a SASC hearing on September 22, 2008 By Fall 2008 the president also concluded that the war in Afghanistan was not going well [the NIE would portray the situation in Afghanistan as very bleak]. 222 We ended up with reviews by a least three different organizations several in Defense (the Joint staff for the military [while McChrystal was the Director of the Joint Staff] 222 To change both the direction of events on the ground in Afghanistan and perceptions at home, we reviewed a number of options. concentrating our forces in those areas strategically most important the south and east and planning for a larger and longer-term U.S. troop commitment. 223 And so, with some 33,000 troops in-country, several thousand more en route, and the commanders [Gen. McKiernan] request for another 20,000 troops or so, a troubled war in Afghanistan would be handed off to a new president. ... 342 Nearly two and a half years later, when I left, we still had 100,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
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"A New General ... Presents a New Opportunity to Ask for More Boots on the Ground:
In June 2008, on my recommendation to the president, Gen. David McKiernan became the commander of ISAF in Afghanistan. by mid-fall, I was openly expressing concern to my immediate staff about whether I had made a mistake. To this day it is hard for me to put a finger on what it was exactly that concerned me There were some specific issues. Mullen and I agreed to replicate the [command] structure we had in Iraq a 4-star commander of all forces, with a subordinate 3-star commander to manage the war on a day-to-day basis. McKiernan strongly resisted such a change. Michele Flournoy told me of her concern Mullen, Petraeus, and I would unanimously recommend LG Stanley McChrystal to succeed McKiernan. Dave [McKiernan] made it clear he wanted to remain in place until the end of his tour in the spring of 2010. I couldnt wait that long. I flew to Kabul on May 6 [2009 and fired him] He acceded with extraordinary dignity and class. I would learn only later that this was the first time a wartime commander had been relieved since Truman fired Douglas MacArthur in 1951. On May 11, I announced that McKiernan was being relieved and that I would recommend McChrystal [as Director of Joint Staff he was essentially Mullens deputy] to take his place as senior commander. My senior military assistant, Rodriquez, would become the deputy commander in charge of the day-to-day fight. ... The Feral Firefighters Annotations & Notes from Robert Gates Book Duty Memoirs of a Secretary at War: 344 In June 2008, on my recommendation to the president68, Gen. David McKiernan become the commander of ISAF in Afghanistan. by mid-fall, I was openly expressing concern to my
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In response to McChrystals nomination, Mary Tillman wrote the President to express her concerns. In the foreword to the paperback edition of her book, Boots on the Ground by Dusk, she wrote, McChrystals actions should have been grounds for firing. That is why it was so disturbing to us when President Obama instead promoted McChrystal to the position of top commander in Afghanistan last year. [On May 12th,] I had sent the President an email and a letter reminding him of McChrystals involvement in the cover-up of Pats death. In the letter, I suggested McChrystal should be scrutinized very carefully by the Senate Armed Services Committee The Tillman Story [DVD] illustrates the corruption, deception, and indifference that is systemic in our government. The cover-up of Pats death was orchestrated at the very highest levels of the Pentagon, and elsewhere in our government the government didnt just lie to us; it lied to a nation. 91
immediate staff about whether I had made a mistake. To this day it is hard for me to put a finger on what it was exactly that concerned me seemed to lack the flexibility and understanding of the battlespace 345 There were some specific issues. Mullen and I agreed to replicate the [command] structure we had in Iraq a 4-star commander of all forces, with a subordinate 3-star commander to manage the war on a day-to-day basis. McKiernan strongly resisted such a change. 345 Michele Flournoy told me of her concern Mullen, Petraeus, and I would unanimously recommend LG Stanley McChrystal to succeed McKiernan. Dave made it clear he wanted to remain in place until the end of his tour in the spring of 2010. I couldnt wait that long. I flew to Kabul on May 6 [2009] He acceded with extraordinary dignity and class. I would learn only later that this was the first time a wartime commander had been relieved since Truman fired Douglas MacArthur in 1951. 346 On May 11, I announced that McKiernan was being relieved and that I would recommend McChrystal [as Director of Joint Staff he was essentially Mullens deputy] to take his place as senior commander. My senior military assistant, Rodriquez, would become the deputy commander in charge of the day-to-day fight. 272 LTG David Rod Rodriquez (who had succeeded Chiarelli as my senior military assistant in July).
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McChrystals Promotion to Afghan War Commander Confirmed by Senate Despite his Command of Tillman Cover-Up & JSOC Torture:
McChrystal was confirmed as commander [of the Afghan War] and authorized for a fourth star by the Senate [on June 2, 2009]. My strategy of getting him confirmed as director of the Joint Staff and taking care of any potential Senate issues at that time [2008] paid off it would be hard for the Senate to oppose him without suggesting they had done an inadequate job of vetting him previously. ... The Feral Firefighters Annotations & Notes from Robert Gates Book Duty Memoirs of a Secretary at War: 254 I believed that I first needed to get McChrystal confirmed by the Senate for an unobtrusive, noncontroversial staff job, a confirmation that, in effect, would give him a clean slate. Then, my thinking went, when I pushed him for a higher-visibility job and a fourth star, it would be hard for the Senate to oppose him without suggesting they had done an inadequate job of vetting him previously. I so I enthusiastically supported Mullens recommendation that Stan be nominated as director of the Joint Staff [in 2008]. 350 McChrystal was confirmed as commander [of the Afghan War] and authorized for a fourth star by the Senate [on June 2, 2009].69 My strategy of getting him confirmed as director of the Joint Staff and taking care of any potential Senate issues at that time [2008] paid off.
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The hearing was strictly pro forma. The real hearing had been held the previous year, behind closed doors on May 15, 2008. For details on both hearings, see my August 2010 Feral Firefighter post The [Untold] Tillman Story. Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb didn't press McChrystal aggressively during the nearly three-hour hearing. As David Corn commented on PBSs News Hour: And so the Pat Tillman questioning, the questioning about detainee abuse, I thought, seemed very orchestrated and didn't give a full airing to these very, I think, hot-button issues. You know, he came up with what sounded to be a plausible explanation, but, again, a lot of what happened today made it clear to me that Democrats and Republicans had both decided, "He's our guy in Afghanistan Mary Tillman said, "I think more effort should have been made on the part of the committee to find out more about his true nature, his true character and his true actions in terms of the detainee abuse and Pat's situation. She criticized Sen. John McCain for "playing dumb" by not following up on McChrystal's explanations. 93
Gates Set Stage for Afghan Surge By Telling McChrystal to Conduct Assessment of Afghanistan War:
Even before McChrystal was confirmed by the Senate [on June 2, 2009], I was hearing from Mullen and others about the need for more troops On June 8, I met with McChrystal I told Stan I wanted him to do a sixty-day review of the situation in Afghanistan before I approached the president about any more forces the next day was my worst so far with the Obama administration the room exploded I was aware of Bidens conviction the McChrystal assessment was part of an orchestrated squeeze play by the military to get the president to approve a lot more troops. ... The Feral Firefighters Annotations & Notes from Robert Gates Book Duty Memoirs of a Secretary at War: 346 Even before McChrystal was confirmed by the Senate [on June 2, 2009], I was hearing from Mullen and others70 about the need for more troops 348 On June 8, I met with McChrystal, Rodriquez, Mullen, Cartwright, and Flourney I told Stan I wanted him to do a sixty-day review of the situation in Afghanistan before I approached the president about any more forces the next day was my worst so far with the Obama administration the room exploded I was aware of Bidens conviction the McChrystal assessment was part of an orchestrated squeeze play by the military to get the president to approve a lot more troops.
On June 10, 2009 Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid made an impassioned plea on the Senate floor to move on McChrystals confirmation. Shortly afterward, the Senate approved President Barack Obama's nomination of McChrystal with a voice vote by unanimous consent.
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In his book Obamas Wars Bob Woodward wrote (p. 82): A few days after the inaugural [Jan. 2009] [retired Gen.] Keane known as the father of the Iraq surge played effectively behind the scenes for the promotions of Gen. David Petreaus He told Clinton McKiernan , the Afghanistan commander, was the wrong man for the job The only way out of Afghanistan was an intensive counterinsurgency I think he should be fired I believe the late Michael Hastings wrote one of the best (and most entertaining) accounts of the backstory to the Afghan War surge in his 2012 book "The Operators. I recently re-read his account of Gate's May 2009 firing of Gen. McKiernan [pp. 33-40]: "A new general [McChrystal] ... presents a new opportunity to ask for more boots on the ground. 'Gates was the mastermind behind the whole thing [Afghan War surge]...' Maybe Obama's Yoda has a bit of Vader in him after all." 94
353 I decided to meet him [McChrystal] secretly in Europe on Aug 2 and hear firsthand what he had to say. All the key players were there as well: Mullen, Petraeus, Admiral Jim Stravridis, Michele Flournory, Rodriquez, and of course, a number of their staff.
496 I believed we had to succeed there because the stakes were higher than perhaps any other senior official in the government understood. For Islamic extremists to defeat a second superpower in Afghanistan would have devastating and long-lasting consequences across the entire Muslim world. For the United States to be perceived as defeated in Afghanistan would have grave implications for our standing in the world.
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McChrystals Staff Leaks Afghan War Assessment to Box In Obama into Approving Afghan War Surge:
I formally sent McChrystals assessment to the president on September 10 I gave the president the written endorsements and comments from Petreus, the Joint Chiefs, and Mike Mullen. I said that they are essentially of one mind: that McChrystal is the right man, has the right military approach and should receive proper resourcing to carry out his plans. Gates letter to Obama]: our troops dont want to retreat, or to lose, or for their sacrifices and those of their buddies to be in vain. I am loath to take on another [domestic battle for the Afghan War surge]. But I am more loath to contemplate a Taliban/al Qaeda victory or the implications for us around the world if we are seen to retreat.71 On Monday, September 21, the Washington Post published a detailed story by Bob Woodward on McChrystals assessment, clearly based on a leaked copy. After I left office, I was chagrined to hear from an insider I trust that McChrystals staff had leaked the assessment out of impatience with both the President and the White House. If so, Id be very surprised if Stan knew about it. An infuriated president, Mullen, and I repeatedly discussed what he regarded as military pressure on him. Again and again I tried to persuade Obama that there was no plan, no coordinated effort by the three military men [McChrystal, Petreus, Mullen] to jam him. Emanuel told me that, according to reporters, there were four different sources saying McChrystal would quit if he didnt get his way. ... I believe the major reason the protracted, frustrating Afghan review that fall [2009] had created so much ill will was due to the fact it was forced on an otherwise controlling White House by the theater commanders [McChrystal] unexpected [!] request for a large escalation of U.S. involvement. provoked a debate the White House neither sought nor wanted, especially when it became public. I think Obama and his advisors were incensed that the Department of Defense specifically the military [not Gates?!] had taken control of the policy process from them and threatened to run
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Bob Woodward wrote (p. 338, Obamas Wars) that [Gen.] Lute surmised the following: Obama had to do this 18-month surge just to demonstrate, in effect, that it couldnt be done . Obama would have given the monolithic military its day in court and the United States would not be seen as having been driven off the battlefield. 96
away with it [i.e. The Runaway General]. The Pentagon and the military did not consciously [?] intend to snatch the initiative and control of war policy from the president, but in retrospect, I can now see how easily it could have been perceived [?] that way. The White House saw it as a calculated move. The leak of McChrystals assessment and subsequent public commentary by Mullen, Petraeus, and McChrystal only reinforced that view. I was never able to persuade the president and others it was not a plot. ... The Feral Firefighters Annotations & Notes from Robert Gates Book Duty Memoirs of a Secretary at War: 366 [Gates letter to Obama]: our troops dont want to retreat, or to lose, or for their sacrifices and those of their buddies to be in vain. I am loath to take on another [domestic battle for the Afghan War surge]. But I am more loath to contemplate a Taliban/al Qaeda victory or the implications for us around the world if we are seen to retreat. 364 I formally sent McChrystals assessment to the president through Jim Jones on September 10 Along with the assessment, I gave the president the written endorsements and comments from Petreus, the Joint Chiefs, and Mike Mullen. I said that they are essentially of one mind: that McChrystal is the right man, has the right military approach and should receive proper resourcing to carry out his plans. 368 On Monday, September 21, the Washington Post published a detailed story by Bob Woodward on McChrystals assessment, clearly based on a leaked copy. After I left office, I was chagrined to hear from an insider I trust that McChrystals staff72 had leaked the assessment out of impatience with both the President and the White House. If so, Id be very surprised if Stan knew about it.73 368 An infuriated president, Mullen, and I repeatedly discussed what he regarded as military pressure on him. Again and again I tried to persuade Obama that there was no plan, no
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I would speculate that former Navy Seal Dave Silverman leaked it (hes now McChrystals business partner); I dont know for sure. He was also the source of some of the most damning quotes to Michael Hastings that led to McChrystal being fired by President Obama.
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In his own memoir, McChrystal wrote (p. ***) something like, I didnt leak the assessment, and nobody on my staff leaked it. But after Gates published his book, McChrystal changed his tune. In a January 12, 2014 interview [at 15:08], Charlie Rose asked him, Who leaked the memo? McChrystal replied: I know that I didnt [personally] leak it, and Im almost 100% sure that nobody on my staff did [Somebody did]. It was back in DC for 3 weeks and leaked. We had no reason to leak it. The speculation is completely incorrect. Leaks undercut trust. 97
coordinated effort by the three military men [McChrystal, Petreus, Mullen] to jam him. Emanuel told me that, according to reporters, there were four different sources saying McChrystal would quit if he didnt get his way. 586 I believe the major reason the protracted, frustrating Afghan review that fall [2009] had created so much ill will was due to the fact it was forced on an otherwise controlling White House by the theater commanders [McChrystal] unexpected [!] request for a large escal ation of U.S. involvement. provoked a debate the White House neither sought nor wanted, especially when it became public. I think Obama and his advisors wre incensed that the Department of Defense specifically the military [not Gates?!] had taken control of the policy process from them and threatened to run away with it [i.e. The Runaway General]. 586 That partly accounts for the increased suspicion of the military at the White House and the NSS. The Pentagon and the military did not consciously intend to snatch the initiative and control of war policy from the president, but in retrospect, I can now see how easily it could have been perceived [?] that way. The White House saw it as a calculated move. The leak of McChrystals assessment and subsequent public commentary by Mullen, Petraeus, and McChrystal only reinforced that view. I was never able to persuade the president and others it was not a plot.
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President Obama Gives the Generals Their Surge, But Sets Troop Withdrawal Deadlines & Tells Them, Dont Overextend Us:
Obama had embraced that [July 2014 combat troops withdrawal] date On November 27 [2009] the president asked me to return to Washington early for a meeting with him, Mullen, Cartwright, and Petraeus to make sure they were on board I thought it was imperative to pledge that we would review progress at the end of 2010 and, if necessary, adjust or change our approach. He went around the room. Mullen and Petraeus said what he wanted to hear The U.S. senior military leadership had pledged to the president that they should be able to clear, hold, and transition to Afghan security forces places where our troops had been deployed within two years. he had, for all practical purposes, made me, Mullen, Petraeus, and McChrystal swear a blood oath that we would support his decision. Thats an order. Although these deadlines grated on the military, that was the deal we had made with the president. If we couldnt get the job done in two years, how many years would it take? Contrary to the advice of his generals [!], he [Obama] imposed deadlines to avoid the impression (and potential reality) of endless war. In both [May 2010] hearings [Petraeus & Flournoy] the July 2011 drawdown was hotly debated, with all of us saying that drawdowns would begin on that date, the pace to be determined by conditions of the ground. the Lute-directed paper prepared for the December [2010 Afghan War] review basically questioned whether any progress had been made at all when I left [in 2011], we still had 100,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan [up from 33,000 in 2008]. ... The Feral Firefighters Annotations & Notes from Robert Gates Book Duty Memoirs of a Secretary at War: 382 On November 27, the day after Thanksgiving, the president called me at home He asked me to return to Washington early for a meeting with him, Mullen, Cartwright, and Petraeus to make sure they were on board: If they arent, I will revert to McChrystals option of 10,000 mostly trainers. [Gates told Petraeus and Cartwright] Stan needs to grasp that there has been a change in mission.
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375 To assure American this wasnt an open-ended commitment I thought it was imperative to pledge that we would review progress at the end of 2010 and, if necessary, adjust or change our approach. 498 Obama had embraced that date [Karzais proposal that foreign forces end their combat role by the end of 2014] in his December 2009 [West Point] announcement [of the Afghan surge]. 383 He went around the room. Mullen and Petraeus said what he wanted to hear.
474 he had, for all practical purposes, made me, Mullen, Petraeus, and McChrystal swear a blood oath that we would support his decision.74 497 The U.S. senior military leadership had pledged to the president that they should be able to clear, hold, and transition to Afghan security forces places where our troops had been deployed within two years. Although these deadlines grated on the military, that was the deal we had made with the president75. If we couldnt get the job done in two years, how many years would it take?76 574 contrary to the advice of his generals [!], he [Obama] imposed [the July 2011 2014 troop drawdown] deadlines to avoid the impression (and potential reality) of endless war 487 In both [May 2010] hearings [Petraeus & Flournoy] the July 2011 drawdown was hotly debated, with all of us saying that drawdowns would begin on that date, the pace to be determined by conditions of the ground.
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Gates omits mentioning that they signed a document approving the July 2011 troop drawdown .] I am giving an order. Bob Woodward wrote (p. 324 -25, Obamas Wars) that Obama issues his six-page terms sheet outlining his decision. Turning to Petreaus, he [Obama] said, Dont clear and hold what you cannot transfer. Dont overextend us. If you have any personal misgivings or any professional doubts about what were about to do, tell me now
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Gareth Porter wrote in Gaming Obama on Afghan War (consortium news, January 10, 2014), that the Gates account omits two crucial historical facts The first is that Obama agreed to the escalation only under strong pressure from his top national security officials and with very explicit reservations. The second is that Gen. David Petraeus reneged on his previous commitment to support Obamas 2009 decision that troop withdrawal would begin by mid-2011.
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Bob Woodward wrote (p. 338, Obamas Wars) that [Gen.] Lute surmised the following: Obama had to do this 18-month surge just to demonstrate, in effect, that it couldnt be done . Obama would have given the monolithic military its day in court and the United States would not be seen as having been driven off the battlefield.
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LEAFFAIR ROLLING STAN
RIP Michael Hastings 1980 -- 2013
OBAMAS GENERAL -- Why Hes Losing the War Gen. Stanley McCrystal (June 23, 2010)
In the summer of 2010, Stanley McChrystal, U.S. Army general and Afghan war commander, reportedly trashed the U.S. civilian military leadership the display of disrespect was striking, but more telling were the details about McChrystals handling of smaller matters. -- Aaron James, Assholes: A Theory (2012) Over the past year, journalists had regularly been given intimate access to McChrystal and his staff. A reporter for the NYT a profile that found McChrystals only fault was that he worked so hard Time magazine had put him as runner-up for Person of the Year all told the same story: McChrystal as a modern combination of saint and ninja, a Jedi Knight Special Forces operators had a healthy disrespect for authority; Rolling Stone fit this self-styled image perfectly. They were building Brand McChrystal ballsy, envelope-pushing, risk-taking. It was the natural evolution of a very aggressive media strategy to establish McChrystal as a contender for the greatest general of his generation, on a par with Petraeus. I dont care about the article Just put me on the cover. I paused. He was joking, sort of Its between you and Lady Gaga, sir. McChrystal looked at me and smiled. Put me in the heart-shaped bathtub with Lady Gaga, he said. Maybe some rose petals. I just want to get on the cover so I can finally gain my sons respect. (His son was in a band.) I was starting to like them, and they seem to like me. They were cool. They had a reckless, who-gives-afuck attitude. I was getting inside the bubble This is beginning to sound like fucking Almost Famous. . The movie his one-day story turned into a lengthy road trip on tour with the band. there wasnt always a happy ending if you wrote about people with brutal honestly. -- Michael Hastings, The Operators (2012) The McChrystal thing [fired after LeAffair Rolling Stan] that burns Gates up. [But] He tosses [Gen.] McKiernan without a word of remorse. at McChrystals retirement ceremony in July [2010], Gates will bemoan the fact that Americans have lost a hero, someone whose record of service is unmatched. (Forget Tillman, forget [JSOC torture at] Camp Nama, forget the negative command climate) -- Michael Hastings, The Operators (2012) 101
LeAffair Rolling Stan

[Adapted from Michael Hastings book The Operators. See my April 2012 post Something to Die For, for the full annotated version with page references and links to more detailed documentation]
[Rear Admiral Gregory Smith had] just gotten involved into a nasty exchange with a popular freelance journalist named Michael Yon [Yon] had just gotten kicked off an embed. Next time military generals talk about poor press performance in Afghanistan, Yon wrote that April, please remember that McChrystal and crew lacked the dexterity to handle a single, unarmed writer How can McChrystal handle the Taliban? Over the past year, journalists had regularly been given intimate access to McChrystal and his staff. A reporter for the NYT a profile that found McChrystals only fault was that he worked so hard A writer from The Atlantic asked if McChrystal was Afghanistans only hope Time magazine had put him as runner-up for Person of the Year all told the same story: McChrystal as a modern combination of saint and ninja, a Jedi Knight ... Special Forces operators had a healthy disrespect for authority; Rolling Stone fit this self-styled image perfectly. They were building Brand McChrystal ballsy, envelope-pushing, risk-taking. It was the natural evolution of a very aggressive media strategy to establish McChrystal as a contender for the greatest general of his generation, on a par with Petraeus. I dont care about the article, McChrystal said, Just put me on the cover. I paused. He was joking, sort of. I didnt have a clue who was going to be on the cover though. The name Bono flashed through my mind. I reached for something a little more current Its between you and Lady Gaga, sir. McChrystal looked at me and smiled. Put me in the heart-shaped bathtub with Lady Gaga, he said. Maybe some rose petals. I just want to get on the cove so I can finally gain my sons respect. (His son was in a band.) Id spent many weeks around the countrys most senior military officials, and Id never heard them talk like this before. It was the kind of banter Id heard on the front lines, but not inside headquarters, where blandness and discretion often trumped colorful language and obscene hand gestures, at least in front of reporters. I was starting to like them, and they seem to like me. They were cool. They had a reckless, whogives-a-fuck attitude. I was getting inside the bubble ...This is beginning to sound like fucking Almost Famous. . The movie his one-day story turned into a lengthy road trip on tour with the band. there wasnt always a happy ending if you wrote about people with brutal honestly.
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McChrystals command style represented an unprecedented departure from previous US military history a command made up of elite Special Forces soldiers Generally, theyd been in charge of a few thousand of the most brilliant people in the service, and they were now running an army that numbered in the hundreds of thousands. A drawback: McChrystal and Lamb were used to dealing with the best of the best, high IQs, not the dumbness of the Big Army. The loyalty [of his staff] to McChrystal often ended up with the general getting an inaccurate picture of what was actually taking place. Over the past few weeks, hed been comfortable with allowing almost everything to be out there, transparent and open. Hed never tried to take anything back or personally spin me. Even if his staff thought hed nailed it, McChrystal knew what I had seen That was a raw wound back there. The talk [to soldiers in Afghanistan] had been an outright disaster. Israel Arroyo, the soldier whod invited McChrystal down, had been evacuated with another soldier for post-traumatic stress. Mikie Ingram, the soldier hed gone on his well-publicized patrol with, had been killed. The platoon was borderline mutinous. Yet McChrystal and Duncan were worried that I was going to write that the soldiers didnt understand the war. Why are we here? Spending over a week [April 2010] with McChrystal and his team in Western Europe had caused me, briefly, to rethink my answers. The excitement and the feeling of being on the inside made me give them the benefit of the doubt. Sure, the war had become morally dubious, ridiculously expensive, and would likely fuel anti-American terrorism for years to come but they were such cool guys, and they were nice to me Why not just give them a chance, like a number of my colleagues always did? Their confidence and expertise were persuasive. If they believed in the mission, then why couldnt I? The more time I spent outside the bubble I couldnt shake my own skepticism. No matter how professional or competent or dynamic McChrystal and his team were, the task they had set out for themselves was so obviously doomed. What Tom Hanks said to Private Ryan. He saved his life. He [Dave Silverman] said, Earn it. With your story. Earn it. The vision: McChrystal on the cover of Rolling Stone. How could you not write a 110 percent blowjob profile that just plainly fucking rocked? Earn it. On a personal level, part of me didnt want to disappoint McChrystal and Dave and Casey and Flynn and Duncan The month I spent with them was exciting, and Id gotten a privileged view from the inside of a top military command. If I wrote the story I wanted to write, it would be years before I ever had that view again. The access Id gotten was unprecedented. But what do you do with it? Bury the story? Write a puff piece to ensure further access? Or write what actually
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happened? I knew, too, that McChrystal and his team could play rough with reporters and hadnt hesitated in the past to launch personal smear campaigns against them.77 The draft [of The Runaway General] expressed my conflicting feelings Id liked hanging out with McChrystal and his team, yet I hated the war. Everything Id seen and heard and knew about the war would not reflect well on them they were an unchecked force, steamrolling the civilian leadership, flipping them the giant bird along the way. Not that I didnt think all of their complaints unjustified --- Id probably be pissed if I thought that the civilians who gave the orders didnt actually appear to be committed to the war. On the other hand, McChrystal and other military officials had pushed Obama to get the mission they wanted. The military leadership pushed hard and played dirty to get the war in Afghanistan they wanted. Men like [SAS Commander Graeme] Lamb and McChrystal told themselves they operated within a strict code of honor ... And this is where I saw the flaw. How could they, at the same time, be involved in cover-ups with Tillman, with torture, with endless allegations of reckless civilian killings? The answer, I believe, was that they considered the loyalty that they felt for one another as the highest measure of integrity. any action to complete the mission and protect their pack whether it was leaking to the press or forcing a president down a path he didnt want to take they saw as acceptable. Id seen another side of his personality. Maybe the side Id been shown had been there all along, and no one else had decided to write about it? Wed grown accustomed to seeing the general as a superman and the press rarely challenged this narrative in their coverage. Wed been bombarded with hagiographic profiles and heroic narratives When there were criticisms of generals, it usually came too late Here, I realized, was a chance to tell a different story, to capture what the men running the war actually said and did. Duncan was worried about what the story would say either be fun, or end my career. Rolling Stone closed the story. It was set for publication next week [June 22, 2010]. Lady Gaga, not Stan McChrystal, was going to be on the cover. ... I assumed the [Runaway General] story would get some attention in Washington, maybe get in the news for a few hours. But I didnt expect much else. Id been writing about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for the past five years. Usually, most news stories and the wars themselves were ignored The real problem wasnt just the content of the story it was who read it. Highranking figures in Washington, mainly, proving that both shit and publicity rolls downhill.
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Referring to Admiral Smiths briefing against the journalist Jerome Starkey who uncovered the coverup of JSOCs botched night-raid at Gardez. For more details, see The Operators, Jeremy Scahills Dirty Wars (both book and film), and my June 2012 post More Lies Borne Out by Facts, If Not the Truth. 104
Note: Just a year after McChrystals Senate confirmation, on June 23, 2010, President Obama fired McChrystal supposedly for inappropriate remarks made by his staff to a Rolling Stone reporter. However, it appears other factors were: to show the generals he was the Boss, because McChrystal was losing the war (subtitle of the cover of Rolling Stone) by failing to show progress in Marja, etc. and to punish Gen. McChrystal & Petraeus for promising what they couldnt deliver with his COIN strategy. The story had terrified them [the Washington crowd], striking deep-seated fears in the Washington psyche. It demonstrated just how tenuous ones own position could be careers could flame out overnight. And the political and media class saw the story as a threat to their schmoozy relationship78 The unwritten rule Id broken was a simple one: You really werent supposed to write honestly about people in power. Especially those the media deemed untouchable. Trash Sarah Palin all you want, but tread carefully when writing about the sacred cows like McChrystal and Petraeus. Youre supposed to keep the myths going. Id fucked up I wasnt to be trusted because I had told the truth. A few of my colleagues in the media eventually got around to attacking Rolling Stone. It was the beginning of a whispering campaign that would continue throughout the next year... I could understand why the government officials would be pissed. I was telling them their whole strategy was a waste of time. But the reaction from a number of journalists on the national security beat seemed twisted They seemed to take my criticism of the military-industrial complex personally. It might as well be called, I thought, the media-military-industrial complex The press had been complicit enablers before the Iraq invasion, failing in their watchdog role, focusing less on truth and accuracy and more on whether the campaign [to sell the war] was succeeding. The Armys investigation [of the Rolling Stone article] concluded that no one in the Army was at fault. In September, the Pentagon decided to launch a second investigation. They would spend eight months looking for answers, when all they really had to do was reread the story. To me, both the investigations seemed absurd. My story had never claimed McChrystal and his staff had violated any laws, yet the press coverage of the investigation made it appear as if the men were all
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Reporter Carl Prine wrote in his column (Greenwald Is Wrong!, Line of Departure - January 7th, 2012): The confluence of celebrity generals and sycophantic DC reporters has served poorly our democracy and contributed to some of the worst journalism on battle in a half century. Too many reporters in and out of DC are stenographers, and they play to their sources instead of working hard on behalf of their readers. This is true not only of many reporters covering defense issues, but also those on every beat at every news outlet in the country. Thats one reason why ESPN did better reporting on the death of Pat Tillman than everyone in DC Mike Fish and the sports guys were outsiders not only to defense reporting but also the failed Beltway nexus of journos and generals, so they had no sacred cows to spare or VIPs to curry. They cared only about the truth. 105
being exonerated.79 Exonerated from what? From looking like jerks? For being illegally, rather than casually, insubordinate? Pentagon officials would privately tell journalists that the intent of the investigation wasnt even to find wrongdoing; it was to damage my credibility. On April 8, 2011 the Defense Department investigation into McChrystal and his staff is completed. The investigation reads comically80 It [Rolling Stone exoneration] is the last whitewash of McChrystals military career.81 Two days after the [Dept. of Defense] report is finished, the White House announces that President Obama appointed McChrystal as an unpaid advisor to military families. They [White House] help to rehabilitate Stanley McChrystals image, appointing him [April 2011] to lead a high-profile initiative [Joining Forces] supporting military families no need to have a potential voice criticizing the administration in the upcoming election. Mary Tillman, Pat Tillmans mother, is outraged. Its a slap in the face to all soldiers, she says of the choice. He deliberately helped cover up Pats death. And he has never adequately apologized to us. ...
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Once again, the NYT reporter Thom Shanker carried water for the powers-that-be: An inquiry by the Defense Department inspector general into a magazine profile has cleared the general of all wrongdoing. [Pentagon Inquiry Into Article Clears McChrystal and Aides , NYT Apr. 18, 2011]. A reprise of Shankers previous exoneration(NYT May 26, 2009), just before his June 2009 Senate confirmation hearing, where his analysis found McChrystal was cleared of wrongdoing in the Pat Tillman case. Michael Hastings said, [Thom Shanker] literally just published the Pentagon spokesperson's anonymous quotes when he was reporting on my stories. And he didn't bother to call Rolling Stone for a comment, of course, because, well, he's got the official line from the Pentagon. [Robert Greenwald and Reporter Michael Hastings Take on the Wild and Terrifying Inside Story of America's War Machine, Alternet 1/27/12)]
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In an interview with Scott Horton (The Operators; Six Questions for Michael Hastings, Jan. 20, 2012), Michael Hastings said: The multiple Pentagon investigations into the Rolling Stone story were particularly absurd. Of course, the results of these investigations were invariably reported with pro-Pentagon spin. Thom Shanker [no surprise!] the New York Timess Pentagon correspondent, didnt even bother calling us for comment before he ran with the Pentagon spokespersons story clearing McChrystal, whatever that meant. (I refer you to the statement Obama made when he fired McChrystalthats why he got fired, not because he explicitly broke any laws. The Pentagons attempt at rewriting this history has been disturbing to observe.) I suggest reading the report of the investigations in full, if you want some comic relief.
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Michael Hastings said, Is whitewash one or two words? In my experience, when the DoD investigates itselfespecially when powerful people are involvedthey find they did nothing wrong. Or, they find some low-level asshole to hang out to dry [Scott Hortons, The Operators; Six Questions for Michael Hastings, Jan. 20, 2012]. 106
Prologue -- Admiral Fox Fallon Had Done the Right Thing:

For some reason, more and more senior officers seem compelled to seek a high public profile and to speak out The trend accelerated when Petreaus achieved superstar status during the Iraq war. The Esquire (Fallon) and Rolling Stone (McChrystal) episodes represented the most damaging end of the spectrum. Bush was clearly miffed at some of the things Fallon had been saying about how the US must not go to war with Iran A few weeks later Fallon called late in the afternoon to warn me that Esquire was going to publish an article about him that would cause some heartburn. When Mullen said that Fallon should volunteer to resign, Bush said, But no signals, no coaching wait and see if Fallon did the right thing. I received a very gracious, hand-written letter of apology from Fox on March 7 [2008] that also made clear he hoped to retain his command. However, Admiral Fallon, probably with a nudge from Mullen, on March 11 [2008] sent the chairman and me an e-mail requesting approval to step aside Later in the day at a press conference [I concluded] perhaps stretching the truth a bit [!], that Admiral Fallon reached this difficult decision entirely on his own Fallon, with great class, had done the right thing. The Feral Firefighters Annotations & Notes from Robert Gates Book Duty Memoirs of a Secretary at War: 575 For some reason, more and more senior officers seem compelled to seek a high public profile and to speak out The trend accelerated when Petreaus achieved superstar status during the Iraq war. The Esquire (Fallon) and Rolling Stone (McChrystal) episodes represented the most damaging end of the spectrum. 187 Bush was clearly miffed at some of the things Fallon had been saying about how the US must not go to war with Iran A few weeks later Fallon called late in the afternoon to warn me that Esquire was going to publish an article about him that would cause some heartburn. When Mullen said that Fallon should volunteer to resign, Bush said, But no signals, no coaching wait and see if Fallon did the right thing. 188 I received a very gracious, hand-written letter of apology from Fox on March 7 [2008] that also made clear he hoped to retain his command. However, Admiral Fallon, probably with a nudge from Mullen, on March 11 sent the chairman and me an e-mail requesting approval to step aside Later in the day at a press conference [I concluded] perhaps stretching the truth a bit [!], that Admiral Fallon reached this difficult decision entirely on his own Fallon, with great class, had done the right thing.
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McChrystal Calls Marjah Proof of Concept A Bleeding Ulcer:

Obamas skepticism toward McChrystals implementation of the [Afghan war] strategy was apparent in virtually every meeting that spring [2010]. In a videoconference with Mullen and me in early May, Stan expressed his frustration with an NSC meeting the previous day. He told us he was struck by the negativity and confusion over counterinsurgency expressed there. I told McChrystal I would try to get him some time with the president to talk about the plan. In Afghanistan, McChrystal continued executing his plan to devastate the Taliban on their home turf in southern Afghanistan, first in Helmand and then in Kandahar province The surge forces were just beginning to arrive but the pessimists were in full cry. They had plenty of ammunition. The operation to clear Marjah had taken longer than planned (and touted) by the military, and the campaign to clear Kandahar was also unfolding more slowly than expected. By early June [2010], Biden and others in the White House were already pushing us to rethink the strategy. mounting political pressure both in Washington and in Europe to show security progress ... The Feral Firefighters Annotations & Notes from Robert Gates Book Duty Memoirs of a Secretary at War: 483 Obamas skepticism toward McChrystals implementation of the [Afghan war] strategy was apparent in virtually every meeting that spring [2010].82 483 In a videoconference with Mullen and me in early May83, Stan expressed his frustration with an NSC meeting the previous day. He told us he was struck by the negativity and confusion over counterinsurgency expressed there.
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From Bob Woodwards book Obamas Wars (p. 348): On April 16, the president met with the NSC Obama asked, by the way, what about the areas we cleared in the summer of 2009? Any of them close to transferring? Not a single one, sir. The model had become clear, hold, hold, hold, and hold. Hold for years. There was no build, no transfer.
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From Bob Woodwards book Obamas Wars (p. 349, 351): During the Presidents Thursday, May 6, secure video with McChrystal for the 90-minute monthly review the operation to gain full control of the city was beginning that month. It was impossible to escape the conclusion that Kandahar would be a litmus test for the war Afterward, the president indicated to several close aides that the briefing had a clarifying effect on him. What makes us think that given the description of the problem, that were going to design a solution to this? 108
483 I told McChrystal I would try to get him some time with the president to talk about the plan84. 485 In Afghanistan, McChrystal continued executing his plan to devastate the Taliban on their home turf in southern Afghanistan, first in Helmand and then in Kandahar province The surge forces were just beginning to arrive in May and June, but the pessimists were in full cry. They had plenty of ammunition. The operation to clear Marjah85 had taken longer than planned (and touted) by the military, and the campaign to clear Kandahar was also unfolding more slowly than expected. 485 By early June [2010], Biden and others in the White House were already pushing us to rethink the strategy. mounting political pressure both in Washington and in Europe to show security progress
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From Bob Woodwards book Obamas Wars (p. 351): if youre not fully satisfied with Gen. McChrystals description here, he will be in Washington next week. You should invite him to come see you and continue the discussion in a smaller, more intimate setting. In other words, if the meeting had amounted to a strike one for the commanding general, the president ought to give McChrystal another swing. He agreed. On May 11, the president took Donilon and Lute up on their proposal that McChrystal be invited to continue the discussion. Obama assembled a small group in the Oval Office to hear the Afghanistan commander. It included Biden, Gates, Mullen, Jones, Donilon and Colonel John Tien, the NSC Afghanistan director Tien was a COINista at heart but he also saw reason for skepticism. After the session, Lute who had missed the White House meeting , caught up with Col Tien. John, Lute asked, how did Stan do? Strike two, Tien said. Curiously, Woodward provided no details of this meeting with a 2nd strike against McChrystal (Woodward had talked to most of those guys before). What happened during that key meeting? Was McChrystals lack of progress a big factor in his being fired just a month later? I tried asking Woodward on NPR about this, but he merely talked about the London speech.
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From Bob Woodwards book Obamas Wars (p. 353, 358, 360):
May 10: Holbrooke asked if there was an Afghan example of clear, hold, build, and transfer actually happening. Not yet, McChrystal said. No, were not ready yet. Marjah after all that work and firepower McChrystal was saying they werent ready to transfer sole responsibility to a single Afghan company. May 14: Larry [Nicholson], Lute said, forget Marja, this years adventure. Lets go to last years adventure. So now were at the 12-month mark. So tell meWhere are we in Nawa in this four-step model that leads to T transfer At least another 12 months. And that was for the best district. if thats as good as it gets, then we cant connect the dots here. 109
What the Fuck Were You Thinking? Michael Hastings Rolling Stone Magazine Profile of The Runaway General:
We were barely holding our own. Then disaster struck. Mullen called [on June 22, 2009] to tell me the magazine Rolling Stone was publishing an article, The Runaway General, that was potentially very damaging. About 5 pm, Stan called me to apologize for the article. What the fuck were you thinking? McChrystal offered no explanation, didnt say he or his staff had been misquoted or that the article was distorted in any way. No excuses sir. Whatever actually happened or was said, McChrystals refusal to defend himself to give me any ammunition to use on his behalf made it impossible for me to save his job. ... The Feral Firefighters Annotations & Notes from Robert Gates Book Duty Memoirs of a Secretary at War: 486 We were barely holding our own. Then disaster struck. Late in the afternoon of Monday, June 21 [2010], Mullen called to tell me the magazine Rolling Stone was publishing an article, The Runaway General, that was potentially very damaging. About 5 pm, Stan called me to apologize for the article. What the fuck were you thinking? McChrystal offered no explanation, didnt say he or his staff had been misquoted or that the article was distorted in any way. No excuses sir. 491 Absent any effort by McChrystal to explain or offer mitigating circumstances, I believe the president had no choice but to relieve him [?]. The article simply was the last of several public missteps by the general in the political minefield where he had little experience. 491 Whatever actually happened or was said86, McChrystals refusal to defend himself to give me any ammunition to use on his behalf made it impossible for me to save his job. But to this day I believe he was given the bums rush [by those] who harbored deep resentment toward his unyielding advocacy the previous fall of counterinsurgency and a huge troop surge in Afghanistan; who interpreted his public comments as boxing in the president; and who continued to oppose the strategy
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Michael Hastings widow, Elise Jordan, has the notes and tapes to prove what actually happened: She sent an email to the NYT objecting to their obituary. She wrote, I personally transcribed and have all the tape recordings of Michaels interviews during his time with McChrystal and his staff. I can personally verify that some of the most damning comments were made by McChrystal himself, and many others made by his aides in his presence were greeted with his enthusiastic approval. See the June 2013 Feral Firefighter post More Lies Borne Out by Facts, If Not the Truth. 110
491 An Army inspector general investigation later concluded that the Army officers on McChrystals staff had not made the derogatory comments; nor had the general heard directly the statements in question. (I would hear subsequently that some of the comments in the article were attributable to non-Army members87 of his staff). The Department of Defense IG reviewed the Army report and concluded that not all of the events at issue occurred as reported in the article.88 The magazine stuck by its story.
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e.g. former Navy SEAL Dave Silverman (who is now McChrystals partner).
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Total BS. See the June 2013 Feral Firefighter post More Lies Borne Out by Facts, If Not the Truth. Michael Hastings wrote about this in his 2012 book, The Operators: On April 8, 2011 the Defense Department investigation into McChrystal and his staff is completed. The investigators didnt talk to McChrystal or Rolling Stone. The investigation reads comically--no one the investigators spoke to admits to saying what they said, but they also dont admit to the quotes not having been said. It also contradicts the findings of the earlier Army investigation. In some instances, we found no witness who acknowledged making or hearing the comments as reported. In other instances, we confirmed that the general substance of the incident at issue occurred, but not in the exact context described in the article, the report states. McChrystal says he doesnt remember hearing the bite me response (though he laughed when he heard it Witnesses deny that McChrystal shared his private interactions with Obama (Though I had witnessed him share the contents of those discussions with his staff, and hed shared them with me as well). Dave Silverman wouldnt admit to calling the French fucking gay The report found insufficient evidence that they called themselves Team America. (Though Dave, Casey, Duncan, and a few others on his staff had called themselves that) It [the DoDs & New York Times exoneration] is the last whitewash of McChrystals military career.88 111
President Obama Uses LeAffair Rolling Stan to Fire Gen. McChrystal, Demote Gen. Petraeus, and Drop the Afghan War Tar Baby into Petraeuss Lap:
I went in to see the president on the 22nd. The first words out of his mouth were Im leaning toward relieving McChrystal. I said I was going to see Stan the next morning I believe if we lose McChrystal, we lose the war. The president told me my concerns were valid, but I dont have the sense its going well in Afghanistan. He doesnt seem to be making progress. Maybe his strategy is not working. These feelings did not spring from a magazine article but had been there all along. What if Petreaus took command? I still urged the president to hear out McChrystal. I said McChrystal would offer a letter of resignation I urged the president to turn down the resignation, and tell Stan he had one last chance. I was pretty sure the president would not do as I had suggested. At 8:30 the next morning, Mullen and I met with McChrystal. I told him the president was leaning toward relieving him and that the proper thing to do was to offer to resign. Stan only said, Ill do whats best for the mission. He then left to see Obama. Just after 10 a.m., the president called to tell me he had relieved McChrystal the president came in and told the assembled senior team that Petraeus was the new commander. Whatever actually happened or was said, McChrystals refusal to defend himself to give me any ammunition to use on his behalf made it impossible for me to save his job. I am convinced the Rolling Stone article gave the president an opportunity he welcomed to demonstrate vividly to the public and the Pentagon that he was commander in chief and fully in control of the military. McChrystal had handed Biden and his other adversaries at the White House and the NSS the opportunity to drive him from command. Giving access to the reporter [Michael Hastings] writing for Rolling Stone was a terrible blunder. to this day I believe he was given the bums rush [by those] who harbored deep resentment toward his unyielding advocacy the previous fall of counterinsurgency and a huge troop surge in Afghanistan; who interpreted his public comments as boxing in the president; and who continued to oppose the strategy Absent any effort by McChrystal to explain or offer mitigating circumstances, I believe the president had no choice but to relieve him. The article simply was the last of several public missteps by the general in the political minefield where he had little experience. ...
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The Feral Firefighters Annotations & Notes from Robert Gates Book Duty Memoirs of a Secretary at War: 487 I went in to see the president a little after 3 p.m. on the 22nd. The first words out of his mouth were Im leaning toward relieving McChrystal. I said I was going to see Stan the next morning I believe if we lose McChrystal, we lose the war. 488 The president told me my concerns were valid, but I dont have the sense its going well in Afghanistan. He doesnt seem to be making progress. Maybe his strategy is not working. These feelings did not spring from a magazine article but had been there all along. What if Petreaus took command? I still urged the president to hear out McChrystal. I said McChrystal would offer a letter of resignation I urged the president to turn down the resignation, and tell Stan he had one last chance. I was pretty sure the president would not do as I had suggested. 489 At 8:30 the next morning, Mullen and I met with McChrystal. I told him the president was leaning toward relieving him and that the proper thing to do was to offer to resign. Stan only said, Ill do whats best for the mission. He then left to see Obama.89 490 Just after 10 a.m., the president called to tell me he had relieved McChrystal At 10:50, the president came in and told the assembled senior team that Petraeus was the new commander.90 491 McChrystal had handed Biden and his other adversaries at the White House and the NSS the opportunity to drive him from command. Giving access to the reporter [Michael Hastings] writing for Rolling Stone was a terrible blunder. 491 I am convinced the Rolling Stone article gave the president and opportunity he welcomed to demonstrate vividly to the public and the Pentagon that he was commander in chief and fully in control of the military.
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From Gates Wanted McChrystal to Fight for His Job (Richard Sisk, Military .com -- Feb 03, 2014): "I wish Stan had given me something to defend him with," Gates said McChrystal offered his resignation and it was quickly accepted by President Obama. The decision had already been made to replace McChrystal McChrystal's office declined comment on Gates' account of the resignation
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From Bob Woodwards book Obamas Wars (p. 373): The next day [June 23] Obama accepted McChrystals resignation, and he proposed that Petraeus take over. Though it would involve a technical demotion because as central [CENTCOM] commander Petraeus was the boss, it was an idea that would address both the military and political problems. The Iraq hero would come to the rescue of Afghanistan. I noted it was a demotion. He certainly doesnt consider it a demotion, the president said.
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... 223 And so, with some 33,000 troops in-country, several thousand more en route, and the commanders [Gen. McKiernan] request for another 20,000 troops or so, a troubled war in Afghanistan would be handed off to a new president [in 2009]. 200 That afternoon we helicoptered to Forward Operating Base Tillman91 ... in eastern Afghanistan. this fortified outpost in the mountains, named for Corporal Patrick Daniel Tillman, a professional football player who had enlisted in the Army and was killed in Afghanistan in a friendly-fire tragedy in 2004. 499 the Lute-directed paper prepared for the December [2010 Afghan War] review basically questioned whether any progress had been made at all92 342 when I left [in 2011], we still had 100,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan [up from 33,000 in 2008].
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The Army has quietly closed down the Afghan based named in memory of Pat Tillman: An ending in Afghanistan: U.S. closes Forward Operating Base Tillman. The war was a waste of his life and all the other Americans who have died there.
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From Bob Woodwards book Obamas Wars (p. 360): If Nawa is on the best case a 24 month timeline, Lute said, were screwed. Were not going to demonstrate progress this year. for this years version in Marja, McChrystal was advertising an improvement when you dug into the numbers the reality was very different. Can pretty much predict that Kandahars going to look a lot like it looks today. Theres no reason to work the weekends in November. We might as well do it during the workday in May and June. The president had directed that the military not go anywhere unless they could transfer in 18 to 24 months Well, the best case, with big caveats, the guy on the ground is saying 24 months. this is a house of cards. 114
THE SOLDIERS SECRETARY?
Pat and Kevin Tillman (March 2003)
Bob Gates at Wichita State (March 2014)
Memorial Service (May 2004)
I wanted Barack Obama to win the presidency in 2008. Among my reasons was his outspoken opposition to Bushs disastrous, unnecessary and probably illegal war in Iraq. So what does Obama do? He sends 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan. Having interviewed Patrick Tillman, Sr. (father of Pat Jr.) I called him for a quote. My condolences to the families in advance, he said. -- Jack Neworth, Careful What You Wish For, Santa Monica Daily Press, (Jan. 29, 2011) his appeal to the West Point cadets about duty, honor, country was a little much for this former Army officer. And my outrage would be heightened at hearing Gates "protest too much" you need to know that I feel personally responsible for each and every one of you, as if you were my own sons and daughters Were I the parent of one of the nearly 6,000 other U.S. soldiers killed in Bushs two wars, well, I cannot imagine how I could control my anger. They surely deserve the truth about Gatess self serving role in prolonging the agony, the killing, and the maiming in both Iraq and Afghanistan for which Gates bears huge responsibility. -- Ray McGovern, How to Read Gates's Shift on the Wars (March 2, 2011) Throughout the book, Gates brings the story back to the troops. Being called the soldiers secretary because I cared so much about them was the highest compliment imaginable. It never seems to have occurred to him that he could best protect the troops by removing them from situations in which they could not possibly succeed. It was not victory per se that he was seeking, but rather avoiding the appearance of defeat not exactly the sort of epitaph likely to adorn any war memorials 50 or 100 years hence. the United States paid a price in additional lives lost, and hundreds of billions of dollars spent, to secure that meager reward. -- Christopher Preble, Robert Gates: The Soldiers Secretary? (Am. Conservative, March 19, 2014) The many pages of his [Gates] memoir devoted to how much he loved those troops and how he has asked to be buried among them at Arlington National Cemetery amounted to an attempt to anticipate and deflect accusations that he, in actuality, betrayed those young men and women by sending more of them to die [in the Iraq & Afghan War Surges] just to buy time for President Bush and other politicians to slip out of Washington before the ultimate defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan. -- Ray McGovern, No Tears for the Real Robert Gates (January 27, 2014)
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Called The Soldiers Secretary Because I Cared So Much

God help me do my duty! I wrote out that passage and kept it in my desk. Sometime in 2008 I began telling troops that I felt a sense of responsibility for them as if they were my own sons and daughters. [e.g. 2008 West Point speech] I told them I was the guy who signed the orders that sent them here, and so I feel a personal sense of responsibility for each and every one of you. I feel the sacrifice and hardship and losses more than youll ever imagine. You doing what you do is what keeps me doing what I do. Choking up, I then said something I had never said before, and, embarrassed, never said again: I just want to thank you and tell you how much I love you. I would fly home with my heart aching for the troops and their distant families. With each visit, I grew increasingly impatient and angry as I compared their selflessness with the self-promotion and selfishness of power-hungry politicians and others One young soldier in Afghanistan asked what kept me awake at night. I said, You do. images of the troops weighted on me constantly. The troops were the reason I took the job, and they became the reason I stayed. Being called the soldiers secretary93 because I cared so much about them was the highest compliment imaginable. I never, for one moment, forgot that tearful mothers plea For Gods sake, bring them back alive. That plea drove me, just as the troops inspired me. There will always be a special place in my heart for all those who served on the front lines in Iraq and Afghanistan I could only contrast their selfless service and sacrifice with so many selfserving elected and nonelected officials back home. because all those kids out there were doing their duty, I had no choice but to do mine. nothing made me madder than when I learned that one of them [troops] was being badly treated by his or her service or the Pentagon bureaucracy if I could make time to try to help a single soldier, then by God so could everyone else in authority.
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Christopher Preble wrote in his piece, Robert Gates: The Soldiers Secretary? (Am. Conservative, March 19, 2014): Throughout the book, Gates brings the story back to the troops. Being called the soldiers secretary because I cared so much about them was the highest compliment imaginable. It never seems to have occurred to him that he could best protect the troops by removing them from situations in which they could not possibly succeed.
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Even thinking about the troops, I would lose my composure with increasing frequency. 94 I realized I was beginning to regard protecting them avoiding their sacrifice as my highest priority. And I knew that this loss of objectivity meant it was time to leave. I am eligible to be buried at Arlington National Cemetery. I have asked to be buried in Section 60, where so many of the fallen from Iraq and Afghanistan have been laid to rest. The greatest honor possible would be to rest among my heroes for all eternity. ... The Feral Firefighters Annotations & Notes from Robert Gates Book Duty Memoirs of a Secretary at War: 499 I told them I was the guy who signed the orders that sent them here, and so I feel a personal sense of responsibility for each and every one of you. I feel the sacrifice and hardship and losses more than youll ever imagine. You doing what you do is what keeps me doing what I do. Choking up, I then said something I had never said before, and, embarrassed, never said again: I just want to thank you and tell you how much I love you. 258 God help me do my duty! I wrote out that passage and kept it in my desk. Sometime in 2008 I began telling troops that I felt a sense of responsibility for them as if they were my own sons and daughters. [e.g. 2008 West Point speech] 593 The troops were the reason I took the job, and they became the reason I stayed. Being called the soldiers secretary because I cared so much about them was the highest compliment imaginable. I never, for one moment, forgot that tearful mothers plea For Gods sake, bring them back alive. That plea drove me, just as the troops inspired me.
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Ray McGovern in his piece, No Tears for the Real Robert Gates (January 27, 2014 antiwar.com), wrote: I read Dan Zaks sympathetic-to-Gates feature story in the Washington Post, describing how Gates wells up with tears when he thinks of the 11,000 troops (Gatess own count) killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan on his watch as Defense Secretary. The many pages of his memoir devoted to how much he loved those troops and how he has asked to be buried among them at Arlington National Cemetery amounted to an attempt to anticipate and deflect accusations that he, in actuality, betrayed those young men and women by sending more of them to die just to buy time for President Bush and other politicians to slip out of Washington before the ultimate defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan. They surely deserve the truth about Gatess self-serving role in prolonging the agony, the killing, and the maiming in both Iraq and Afghanistan the unconscionable waste of life, the trauma and the missing limbs for which Gates bears huge responsibility. that what happened during the celebrated surges in Iraq and Afghanistan amounted to little more than a sacrifice of thousands of U.S. troops on the altar of the unbridled ambition that I observed in the first Efficiency Report that I wrote on Gates [in 1970]. 117
220 I would fly home with my heart aching for the troops and their distant families. With each visit, I grew increasingly impatient and angry as I compared their selflessness with the selfpromotion and selfishness of power-hungry politicians and others One young soldier in Afghanistan asked what kept me awake at night. I said, You do. images of the troops weighted on me constantly. 593 There will always be a special place in my heart for all those who served on the front lines in Iraq and Afghanistan I could only contrast their selfless service and sacrifice with so many self-serving elected and nonelected officials back home. because all those kids out there were doing their duty, I had no choice but to do mine. 594 Even thinking about the troops, I would lose my composure with increasing frequency. I realized I was beginning to regard protecting them avoiding their sacrifice as my highest priority. And I knew that this loss of objectivity meant it was time to leave. I am eligible to be buried at Arlington National Cemetery. I have asked to be buried in Section 60, where so many of the fallen from Iraq and Afghanistan have been laid to rest. The greatest honor possible would be to rest among my heroes for all eternity. ... 223 And so, with some 33,000 troops in-country, several thousand more en route, and the commanders [Gen. McKiernan] request for another 20,000 troops or so, a troubled war in Afghanistan would be handed off to a new president. 342 when I left [in 2011], we still had 100,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan [up from 33,000 in 2008]. ... Heres some commentary from others about Gates as the Soldiers Secretary: From Robert Gates: The Soldiers Secretary? (Christopher Preble , American Conservative -March 19, 2014): Throughout the book, Gates brings the story back to the troops. Being called the soldiers secretary because I cared so much about them was the highest compliment imaginable. It never seems to have occurred to him that he could best protect the troops by removing them from situations in which they could not possibly succeed. Gatess genuine [?] affection for the troops and love of country is revealed vividly in this book. He challenged those who failed to look out for our men and women in uniform and who put party or self above the nation. He took great pride in being known as the soldiers secretary. But he didnt
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stop the two wars that he inherited, and he must ultimately bear some responsibility for the additional lives lost, and hundreds of billions of dollars spent, on those two dubious enterprises. How to Read Gates's Shift on the Wars (Ray McGovern Consortium News, March 2, 2011): Still, his appeal to the West Point cadets about duty, honor, country was a little much for this former Army officer. Were I the parent of Casey Sheehan or one of the nearly 6,000 other U.S. soldiers killed in Bushs two wars, well, I cannot imagine how I could control my anger. And my outrage would be heightened at hearing Gates "protest too much" as he finished his Farewell Address Friday at West Point: As some of you have heard me say before, you need to know that I feel personally responsible for each and every one of you, as if you were my own sons and daughters; for as long as I am secretary of defense that will remain true.
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Something to Die For

[Adapted from my letter to Marie Tillman in The [Missing] Pat Tillman Legacy] Pat [Tillman] died for this country, and he believed it was a great country that had a system that worked. But we never thought that they would use him the way they did -- Mary Tillman, Congressional testimony (April 24, 2007) Since Obama became president, a thousand soldiers were killed in Afghanistan, more than double the total in the years under Bush. lets declare victory and go home. It only took an additional 711 American lives for the White House to arrive at this conclusion. Wed been fighting the wrong war, in the wrong way, in the wrong country. -- Michael Hastings, The Operators (January 2012)
... In Marie Tillmans (Pat Tillmans widow) book, The Letter, she extolled the value of military service (something that people should value and take pride in its great purpose and potential sense of values and character in the men and woman who volunteered to serve I had been proud of him, and I was now proud of them reminded me of what had been at the core of Pats decision to serve). During her USO trip to Afghanistan, she sat by a soldier for breakfast. She wrote that you wanted to instill in this soldier the same confidence that as hard as it was, he was doing a great thing. doing a great thing. Really? Instead, I believe the lives of the 9/11 generation have been wasted in the Iraq & Afghan wars of the past decade. Thousands of young soldiers have been killed, wounded, and or suffer from TBIs & PSTD. For nothing. As Michael Hastings wrote in his book, The Operators, Wed been fighting the wrong war, in the wrong way, in the wrong country (my April 2012 post Something to Die For adds my annotations to his book about the Afghan War and his road trip with Gen. McChrystal). Seven years ago, the Afghan War was just an abstraction to me. Now, my step-brother, an Army Colonel, just returned from his hopeless task of trying to train the Afghan police. His boy (a newborn baby when I crashed at his place at Ft. Benning after graduating from Ranger School in 85) is young and dumb (as I was then) and joined the Infantry. Hes now deployed with a Stryker unit from Fort McChord in Kandahar province (I talked to him after he returned from patrol on Thanksgiving Day). I pray he doesnt become another statistic. The wrong war, in the wrong way, in the wrong country has now become personal to me. I believe the Pat Tillman story can be viewed as a metaphor for the 9/11 generation. Like others, after 9/11 he answered the call to service. However, the reality of his service didnt match his
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ideals (felt it was illegal and unjust I dont think our role there is virtuous at all). Tillman didnt die heroically sacrificing himself to save his comrades (after senseless orders to split his platoon and get boots on the ground he was killed by his mates in a FUBAR minor ambush in a strategically botched war). Afterwards, the Army and our government betrayed him and his family (just as many returning veterans and their families havent gotten the proper support to help them rebuild their lives). Both Marie and Kevin Tillman (Pats brother who did a tour with him in both Iraq & Afghanistan) [in his 2006 Truthdig essay After Pats Birthday] wrote that Pat understood that soldiers lose their public voice after they sign up for the military. Marie wrote, I read up on what was going on politically, now these decisions were personally affecting me. But everybody was really apathetic and not engaged. far from feeling I needed to be loyal, I felt I needed to remind removed decision makers that there were flesh-and-blood individuals lives at stake. I agree with Marie that we ought to be more engaged with the decisions our government makes about war; blind patriotic support, slapping a ribbon on your car isnt enough. Marie wrote how she even considered joining an antiwar protest in 2003, Once, after Pat and Kevin had left, I was driving home and I passed an antiwar protest outside Fort Lewis. I was struck by a protester who identified herself as the mother of a soldier. Could I stand with her? I wanted to I fully felt you could support the troops and yet not the military actions. But at this point in time, the antiwar platform was raw, shaky ground to stand on. Pat was already treated differently I didnt want to make it worse for him. I drove past and went home. In my 2008 letter to Mary Tillman I wrote: When I was young and dumb I joined an Airborne Ranger Long-Range Recon (LRRP) unit. I was 17 years old when I enlisted. I grew up in the Army, enjoyed the challenges, and being with the guys. But, the lies of the first Gulf War were the last straw for me. I no longer wanted to be in what Donald Duncan [Special Forces LRRP, one of the first veterans to protest Vietnam] called The New Legions]. A slave who would be told who to kill for oil or other national interests. I didnt re-enlist for the third time, instead I chose to spend my life doing something more worthwhile [being a firefighter has worked for me]. Marie wrote that Pat Tillman also had second-thoughts about his decision to enlist in the Army (He wondered if he could have contributed to the cause in another way). If he had the chance to do it again, do you believe Pat Tillman would have enlisted? Or encourage others to seek the honor of military service? She quoted his letter from Iraq, the cause I deluded myself into believing I was standing for. Im a fool. How I managed to find a way out of our perfect existence is incredible.
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During her Harvard speech she said, When you sign up and decide to serve, you give your lives up to the American people and politicians. What we needed was for them to not needlessly put their lives in harms way. ...
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Patience, Montag. Our civilization is flinging itself to pieces. Stand back from the centrifuge. Remember the firemen are rarely necessary. The public itself stopped reading of its own accord. You firemen provide a circus now and then at which buildings are set off and crowds gather for the pretty blaze, but its a small sideshow indeed, and hardly necessary to keep things in line. So few want to be rebels anymore. -- Ray Bradbury, Fahrenheit 451
Guy Montag, M.F.L.F. Local #451
Fire gear with Tillman NFL #40 Helmet Sticker
After three years of JROTC, when he was a young & dumb seventeen year-old boy, Guy Montag enlisted with Co. F (Ranger) 425th Infantry. He spent eight years with Co. F from 1983 to 1991, completed Airborne and Ranger School, and left as a SGT leading a LRRP patrol. He earned two engineering degrees and was a yuppie for a couple of years with Andersen Consulting (now Accenture). He abandoned the life of a cubicle rat, and for the past twenty-three years has been a professional firefighter (only 6 - 10 more years to go til retirement!). Since October 2005, Montag has closely followed the Pat Tillman story. Since 2009, hes been an amateur feral scholar (hat tip to Stan Goff) of the untold Pat Tillman story. His extensive Tillman files are at http://www.feralfirefighter.blogspot.com When hes not wasting spending time on the Tillman story, Guy Montag is an eclectic reader, works on his homestead, is a soccer mom for his son, helps (when she permits it) his bookworm daughter find new sci-fi to read, and generally neglects his long-suffering wife who is appalled at the amount of time her husband has spent on his blog over the past five years. Hes doing his part to try to avert the worst of global warming (but saving the world is only his hobby).
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APPENDIX A: Senator James Webb Did They Teach You How To Lie Yet?
[Adapted from A Sense of Honor", "Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?", and "The [Untold] Tillman Story" [pp. 16 35, pp. 102 128] Military service was prevalent and respected in the Tillman family. Mary Tillmans uncles were at Pearl Harbor, her brother was a Marine, and her father was a Marine during the Korean War. Ive read the novels of James Webb over the past thirty 30 years, long before he became a U.S. Senator from Virginia in 2006. His novels have dealt with themes of honor, integrity, loyalty and betrayal. With Senator Webbs background as a decorated Vietnam Marine, I believed he would feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family. On April 3rd 2008, I sent a letter to Senator Webb asking him to become a Senate advocate for Mary Tillmans struggle to learn the truth about her sons death. His Military Legislative Affairs Assistant Gordon Peterson blew me off, I have alerted the senators scheduling director to the information on the Washington leg of her tour and provided her with your letter to the senator. The following month, I spoke briefly with Senator Webb on NPR radio during the call-in portion of The Diane Rhem Show. Webb mentioned his recent Senate review of the Tillman fratricide. Huh? Id followed the Tillman case very closely during the past four years. I hadnt read anything at all in the news about a Senate investigation. But, Gordon Peterson stone-walled my attempts to learn more about the Senate review. The following year, President Obama nominated General Stanley McChrystal to become his new commander of the Afghanistan War. On May 14th, The New York Times published their editorial, New Commander for Afghanistan. I finally realized (just after receiving my letter and while Mary Tillman was in Washington DC on her book tour) Senator Webb had participated in a secret Senate 2008 review that shielded General McChrystals role in the Tillman cover-up from public scrutiny! And instead of punishing McChrystal for his actions, the Senate promoted him! . So, during the final two weeks of May 2009, I wrote another letter to Senator Webb. I asked the Senator to place a hold on General McChrystals confirmation and to take a closer look at McChrystals role in the aftermath of the Tillman fratricide. Heres an excerpt: Four decades ago, you were drawn into the Randy Herrod case. A Marine patrol was accused of killing sixteen Vietnam Villagers. Herrod, the patrol leader and veteran of five months, had been found not guilty. Yet Sam Green, a black eighteen year old with eleven days in Vietnam had been convicted even though no testimony had been presented that he had actually killed anyone.
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From Robert Timbergs The Nightingales Song: The case continued to bedevil Webb . He wanted to help Green, but wasnt sure what he could do. He joined forces, pro bono, to try to get the conviction overturned in a civilian court. The secretary [of the Navy] declined to act. About two weeks later, in August 1975, Webb received a telegram : TRAGIC CONCLUSION SAM GREEN DESTROYED HIMSELF. He had never met Green, spoken to him only once by phone, but he had committed himself to clearing his name. He felt helpless, his sense of futility laced with outrage. Isnt any of this going to come out right? Green was dead, but Webb couldnt let the case go. He filed an appeal asking that Greens dishonorable discharge be upgraded to honorable. Webb personally argued the case before the board. In December 1978, eight years after the shootings and three years after Greens suicide, Webb wrote to Mrs. Green: At last, Sams name is cleared. He explained that her sons discharge had been upgraded to a general discharge. This is small solace, I know, wrote Webb, I only regret we were unable to do more for him sooner. Ive been bedeviled by the Tillman case. For years, I havent been able to let the case go. I hoped this could be one small cause I might be able to make a difference with all the other shit going on the past few years. It would be nice if this letter of mine would make a difference. For thirty years your books have dealt with themes of honor, integrity, loyalty, and betrayal. Rereading your books, I noticed many parallels between your books and the story of Pat Tillmans death. I believed you would feel a sense of kinship with Pat Tillman and his family. Five years ago, Pat Tillmans family were handed a tarnished Silver Star. It will be a travesty of justice if McChrystal is confirmed by the Senate Armed Services Committee, promoted to the Armys highest rank, and handed his fourth star. I feel you owe a duty to Pat Tillman and his family. A duty to place a hold on General McChrystals nomination and stop his confirmation on June 2nd. Yeah, that could be a lost cause. Youd piss off a lot of people. But, at least you would give Mary Tillman the small solace of knowing there is one man of integrity in the Senate willing to stand as her advocate. Someone willing to be a lonely champion of lost causes Perhaps you need to take a long look at the picture [Grandfather Hodges95] staring at you from your office wall? Youve been a hero to me for three decades, since I was a teenager, through my years as an Airborne Ranger LRRP, to the present day as a firefighter. I havent always agreed with your
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Across the room my mothers father, B.H. Hodges, stares out at me as he has done in every office I have occupied for more than twenty years. Defiant he was, and tragic too. He was a fighter, a lonely champion of lost causes who himself lost everything because of the causes he championed. [p. 5, A Time to Fight]
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positions on the Vietnam War, etc. But Ive never before doubted your integrity. Ive always trusted your sense of honor. Id like to think that, after three years in Congress, you are still able to answer No to the question your great-aunt Lena asked of you in 1975; So youve been to law school. Did they teach you how to lie yet? ... I guess they have. Instead of acting as the Senate champion for the Tillman family, Senator Webb played his role (outraged veteran chewing out McChrystal) in the Senates pro forma political theater of the confirmation hearing. Like Pat Tillman, Jame Webbs been a maverick and a fascinating character. Senator Webbs betrayal of the Tillman family cuts the deepest. Id trusted in his sense of honor. If anyone in Congress should have cared, it would have been him. Webb, as a young Marine veteran, spent 8 years to clear the name of a dead Marine for his mothers sake! Im hard on Webb not because I dislike the man, but that Im disillusioned by him. As an old man and politician, hes turned into exactly what he once reviled as a young veteran! And Im certainly not casting all the blame for the sins of Congress onto him. Henry Waxman, Chairman Carl Levin, Senator McCain, Nancy Pelosi, and Harry Reid and others in Congress share in the blame. It just happens I know more about Webb and his role and had personal interactions with his office. ... In his 2008 book, A Time to Fight, Webb wrote: Where are the leaders? even the best among us will not dare to speak honestly ... Sometimes the times are simply ready for a change. And sometimes it takes smart, tough leaders to change the times. And sometimes, like the present, we need the times and the leaders to coincide. When that happens, it is a time to fight. Similarly, in his April 24, 2012 fundraising email, Webb wrote, Bob Kerrey and I share a common view of standing up and fighting where others see only long odds. a willingness to speak out when others choose to remain silent. Id like to ask Senator Webb, just when is it going to be A Time to Fight? He wasnt willing to stand up and speak out in support of the Tillman family (nor has he done much to speak out for economic justice as the Obama administration has thrown in its lot with the banksters). Its rather discouraging that even the best Senators are unwilling to buck the system. Perhaps Pat Tillman died for the New GI Bill? Senator Webb was shepherding his bill through the Senate at the same time as he was reviewing Gen. McChrystals role in the Tillman cover-up. Perhaps he participated in the Senate whitewash of McChrystal in return for his bill passing into law?
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APPENDIX B: Bob Woodwards Whitewash of Gen. McChrystals Role In The Tillman Cover-Up
Woodwards Portrayal of McChrystals Role in the Tillman Cover-Up:
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs [Adm. Michael] Mullen revered Gen. McChrystal, and had made him director of the Joint Staff his previous assignment in part so that the 2008 Senate confirmation could wipe away the role McChrystal had played in the cover-up of the 2004 friendly-fire death in Afghanistan of Pat Tillman. Of course, McChrystal was in the chain of command. But he was not the hands-on person making that decision McChrystal had signed off*on the Silver Star recommendation that suggested Tillman had been killed by the enemy, a choice he regretted. McChrystal was essentially the chairmans deputy. Director of the Joint Staff was the premier assignment for a three-star, an almost certain path to four-star rank. Among McChrystals predecessors in the post were DNI Dennis Blair, former Centcom commander Abiziad, and the current Army chief Gen Casey. Mullen realized that the solution to Afghanistan was right before his eyes. On Monday May 11, 2009 [Defense Secretary] Gates announced McChrystal would be the new commander. A week later, Obama met for 10 minutes in the Oval Office with McChrystal. The Pat Tillman issue resurfaced during McChrystals confirmation hearings for ISAF. On Tuesday June 2, 2009, McChrystal sat down for his Senate confirmation hearing. McChrystal assured the Senate Armed Services Committee that he had recommended the Silver Star with the best of intentions, but he had been too hasty in the investigative process and I think he apologized for what he did in this. Well, they [Washington establishment] didn't. [dig into McChrystals role in the cover-up very much, just held some pro forma hearings]. But that whole thing is a sad chapter in Army history. *Citation: p. 154 McChrystal had signed off: Ann Scott Tyson, 9 Officers Blamed in Tillman Death, but No Coverup Found, The Washington Post, March 27, 2007, p.A2 Note: This description was assembled using quotes from Obamas Wars and his remarks made on NPRs Talk of the Nation). See my Notes from Obamas Wars and Clashes with Pentagon (NPRs Talk of the Nation 12-13-10) for page citations.
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Guy Montags Rebuttal of Bob Woodwards Portrayal of Gen. McChrystals Role in the Tillman Case:
1.) Mullen revered Gen. McChrystal, and had made him director of the Joint Staff his previous assignment in part so that the 2008 Senate confirmation could wipe away the role McChrystal had played in the cover-up of the 2004 friendly-fire death in Afghanistan of Pat Tillman: During Spring 2008 Senator Webb conducted a secret review of Gen. McChrystals actions in the Tillman case. On May 15, 2008 Gen McChrystal met behind closed doors with the Senate Armed Services Committee (including Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and Senator Webb) and discussed in detail his role in the Tillman case. This meeting was held in executive session (i.e. closed hearing with no transcript) without listing the names of the participants in the hearing notice. A week later, on May 22nd 2008, the Committee held a confirmation hearing for General Petreaus. Chairman Levin recessed briefly to hold a voice vote to confirm 144 military nominations, without discussion, including General McChrystals promotion to Director of the Joint Staff. Exactly how did a secret review, followed by a closed hearing, and a vote without discussion wipe away McChrystals role in the Tillman cover-up? There was no public testimony or public discussion by the Senate. What was said during that closed hearing? Senator Webb and SASC Counsel Gary Leeling refused to answer any of my questions about the hearing.
2.) the role McChrystal had played in the cover-up of the 2004 friendly-fire death in Afghanistan of Pat Tillman. McChrystal had signed off* on the Silver Star recommendation *p. 154 McChrystal had signed off: Ann Scott Tyson, 9 Officers Blamed in Tillman Death, but No Coverup Found, The Washington Post, March 27, 2007, p.A2 Woodward cites a 3-27-07 Washington Post article in support of his statement McChrystal had signed off. However, that article didnt say anything about McChrystal just signing off on the Silver Star. Instead, Tyson wrote that the DODIG investigation found [Col.] Nixon [Commander of the Ranger RGT], along with Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, were responsible for submitting a Silver Star recommendation for Tillman that included "inaccurate information and a
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misleading citation that implied CPL Tillman died by enemy fire" (i.e. false Silver Star citation, fabricated witness statements, etc). Then where did Woodward get the phrase signed off? Ironically, I believe it may have been from the New York Times! Another irony is the title of the cited article isNo Coverup Found (Tyson wrote, Despite finding several errors, the report did not find evidence of a coverup instead, the Army committed critical errors in judgment in handling the friendly fire of Pat Tillman). So, Woodward wrote of the coverup of the 2004 friendly-fire death in Afghanistan of Pat Tillman while citing a Washington Post article entitled No Coverup. So which is it? You would think that Woodward knew what he was talking about when he calls it a coverup.
3.) Gen. McChrystal was not the hands-on person making that decision. What decision? The decision to cover up Pat Tillmans friendly-fire death and award him a false Silver Star? I agree with Woodward that McChrystal didnt make that decision to cover-up Tillmans death. However, McChrystal was the hands on general who supervised the cover-up on the ground in Afghanistan and made it happen. Who made that decision? Well, during the Bush administration, McChrystal commanded JSOC special operation forces from 2003 to 2008 that acted outside the military chain of command doing things the executive branch -- read: [Vice President] Cheney and [Secretary of Defense] Rumsfeld -- wanted it to do. It certainly appears that Rumsfeld and Cheney gave McChrystal his marching orders Perhaps President Bush was in the loop as well to some extent. How much does Bob Woodward know about Rumsfeld and Cheneys role that hes not telling?
4.) the role McChrystal had played in the cover-up of the 2004 friendly-fire death in Afghanistan of Pat Tillman. of course, McChrystal was in the chain of command. But he was not the hands-on person making that decision McChrystal had signed off* on the Silver Star recommendation that suggested Tillman had been killed by the enemy Not the hands on person! Actually, Gen. McChrystal directly supervised the Armys cover-up. McChrystal did not merely "sign off" on a piece of paper that landed on his desk as it worked its way up the chain of command. Jon Krakauer in his book, "Where Men Win Glory" (pp. 334 347 paperback edition), described how Gen. McChrystal had "orchestrate[d] what can only be described as a broad conspiracy to conceal Tillman's fratricide ..."
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The Silver Star recommendation hardly suggested Tillman had been killed by the enemy. The citation reads, for gallantry in action . against an armed enemy enemy fire Cpl. Tillman put himself in the line of devastating enemy fire known enemy positions enemy's withdrawal and his platoon's safe passage from the ambush kill zone. Only, there was no enemy fire, no enemy withdrawal and no ambush kill zone. The Silver Star citation was carefully edited to imply Tillman died by enemy fire without actually coming out and saying that. Anyone reading the citation would think Tillman was killed by enemy fire! Krakauer wrote that Gen. McChrystal personally "administered the medal recommendation process" with a false narrative that "was painstakingly written to create the impression Pat Tillman was killed by enemy fire" and directly supervised the Ranger RGT commanding officers in Afghanistan who apparently altered the two Silver Star witness statements to remove any mention of friendly fire and contained false statements. The Silver Star recommendation was "fraudulent" by "any objective measure." And, in response to President Obamas May 2009 nomination of Gen. McChrystal as Afghan war commander, Mary Tillman wrote in her book, Boots on the Ground by Dusk: Not only is he [McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding Pats death, he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative. Note: Krakauer's account was largely based upon McChrystals own testimony during his June 2, 2009 Senate confirmation hearing and from DOD IG interviews with Gen. McChrystal, COL Nixon, LTC Kauzlarich, and LTC Bailey obtained by FOIA. . 5.) Director of the Joint Staff was the premier assignment for a three-star, an almost certain path to four-star rank. Among McChrystals predecessors in the post were DNI Dennis Blair, former Centcom commander Abiziad, and the current Army chief Gen Casey. It appears that Gen. Abizaid perjured himself when he testified before Congress about when he first heard of Tillmans fratricide. For example, Gen Abizaid and Gen McChrystals testimony about when they learned Tillmans fratricide are contradictory. General Abiziad testified that General McChrystal only told him that Pat Tillman was KIA, and never told him about the potential fratricide: On the 22nd, the incident occurred. I believe on about the 23rd, General McChrystal called me and told me that Corporal Tillman had been killed in combat, and that the circumstances surrounding his death were heroic. I called the chairman and discussed that with the chairman Abizaid testified that he learned about potential fratricide when he finally found McChrystals P4 memo after a weeks delay.
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Yet Gen. McChrystal testified, Corporal Tillman was killed on the 22nd of April I arrived back into Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about the 23rd, and I was informed, at that point, that they suspected that friendly fire might have been the cause of death, and that they had initiated what we call a 15-6, or an investigation of that. Note: Previously, McChrystal had testified that he had learned of friendly-fire while in Qatar (with Abizaid), not after returning to Afghanistan . So, McChrystal says he learned of fratricide on the 23rd, yet Abizaid says McChrystal told him only that Tillman was killed in action. Someone was not telling the truth. And, as discussed below in point #8, on April 24th McChrystal was given verbal confirmation of fratricide, making all the talk by the generals about potential fratricide sheer nonsense! For a more detailed argument, See Appendix J1 -- Gen. McChrystals Contradictory Congressional Testimony in the The [Untold] Tillman Story
6.) On Monday May 11, 2009 Gates announced McChrystal would be the new commander [of ISAF]. In response, Mary Tillman wrote the President to express her concerns. In the foreword to the paperback edition of her book, Boots on the Ground by Dusk, she wrote, McChrystals actions should have been grounds for firing. That is why it was so disturbing to us when President Obama instead promoted McChrystal to the position of top commander in Afghanistan last year. [On May 12th,] I had sent the President an email and a letter reminding him of McChrystals involvement in the cover-up of Pats death. Just a few weeks earlier, on April 23, 2009, the Obama administration had announced that it would turn over to the ACLU photographs showing detainee abuse of prisoners in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, President Obama back pedaled and decided to block the court-ordered release of photos after meeting with Gen Petreaus and other military leaders on May 12th. President Obamas decision represented a sharp reversal from his repeated pledges for open government, and in particular from his promise to be forthcoming with information that courts have ruled should be publicly available.
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In light of Gen. McChrystals alleged ties to torture at Camp Nama, it is worth noting the dates of McChrystal's nomination and President Obama's decision not to release the photos of prisoner abuse in Iraq: May 11th and 12th, respectively. On May 13th, obviously anticipating that the Government was likely to lose its court appeal, Obama asked Congress to change FOIA by retroactively narrowing its disclosure requirements to prevent a legal ruling by the courts. Senator Graham said the White House helped them draft the bill. On May 20th, U.S. Senators Lindsey Graham, Joe Lieberman, and Senator John McCain introduced the Detainee Photographic Records Protection Act to block the release of the detainee photos. The very next day, on May 21st, the act was offered as an amendment to the Supplemental Appropriations bill and the U.S. Senate unanimously passed it (I like to refer to the bill as the 2009 McChrystal Protection Act!).
7.) The Pat Tillman issue resurfaced during McChrystals confirmation hearings for ISAF (Afghan war command). On Tuesday June 2, 2009, McChrystal sat down for his Senate confirmation hearing. The hearing was strictly pro forma. The real hearing had been held the previous year, behind closed doors on May 15, 2008. Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb didn't press McChrystal aggressively during the nearly threehour hearing. As David Corn commented on PBSs News Hour: And so the Pat Tillman questioning, the questioning about detainee abuse, I thought, seemed very orchestrated and didn't give a full airing to these very, I think, hot-button issues. You know, he came up with what sounded to be a plausible explanation, but, again, a lot of what happened today made it clear to me that Democrats and Republicans had both decided, "He's our guy in Afghanistan Mary Tillman said, "I think more effort should have been made on the part of the committee to find out more about his true nature, his true character and his true actions in terms of the detainee abuse and Pat's situation. She criticized Sen. John McCain for "playing dumb" by not following up on McChrystal's explanations. On June 10, 2009 Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid made an impassioned plea on the Senate floor to move on McChrystals confirmation. Shortly afterward, the Senate approved President Barack Obama's nomination of McChrystal with a voice vote by unanimous consent.
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8.) McChrystal assured the Senate Armed Services Committee that he had recommended the Silver Star with the best of intentions, but he had been too hasty in the investigative process. A hasty investigative process had nothing to do with the false Silver Star. The Ranger Battalion Commander LTC Bailey said, Sir, within three or four hours of being out here on the ground by the incident, I went back and I told [COL Nixon] that I was certain that we had killed him. In fact, I think just about everybody around knew that. And certainly, by the next day when we did the investigations, I confirmed it. So, after [CPT Scot 15-6 investigator] did his first five interviews, he came back to me and said, Sir, Im certain. Im sure. And then I called [COL Nixon]. I think it was the 24th [of April]. . . . Gen. McChrystal was next in the chain of command. On April 29th, the day after sending up his Silver Star recommendation, Gen. McChrystal sent a high-priority P4 memo to top generals supposedly warning them of the potential friendly fire death of Pat Tillman. But, McChrystal testified he learned of friendly-fire on April 23rd. Then why did he wait six days until he sent his timely P4 message? And knowing of confirmed friendly-fire, why was all mention of that removed from the Silver Star citation and witness statements? And I dont understand how the best of intentions can explain the fabrication of two Silver Star witness statements, a false Silver Star citation, etc.
9.) McChrystal had signed off on the Silver Star recommendation that suggested Tillman had been killed by the enemy, a choice he regretted. I think he apologized for what he did in this. But that whole thing is a sad chapter in Army history. General McChrystal denied the phony narrative of a raging firefight was anything more sinister than "mistakes" made to honor Tillman. "I didn't see any activity by anyone to deceive," he said. "We failed the family. And I was a part of that." He earlier expressed his "deepest condolences" to Tillman's family and fellow rangers. Mary Tillman said she neither accepts nor believes McChrystal's apology. "McChrystal was lying," she said. And McChrystal never actually apologized for orchestrating the cover-up. If McChrystal has any regrets its for any trouble the Tillman cover-up scandal resulted for him and his reputation. I doubt he gives a damn about the never-ending heartache hes caused the Tillman family over the years.
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10.) Well, they [Washington establishment] didn't. [dig into McChrystals role in the cover-up very much, just held some pro forma hearings]. In the foreword to the paperback edition of her book, Boots on the Ground by Dusk, Mary Tillman wrote, I had sent the President an email and a letter reminding him of McChrystals involvement in the cover-up of Pats death. In the letter, I suggested McChrystal should be scrutinized very carefully by the Senate Armed Services Committee. I also contacted the staffs of Senator Patrick Leahy and Senator James Webb and expressed my concerns. I had several conversations with members of the staffs of both senators, but it was clear that neither senator wanted to get involved. I had always believed Pats case was politically awkward for him [Senator McCain] and so hed chosen to distance himself from the entire affair. McCain was already publicly endorsing the McChrystal appointment before the hearing even began. Sadly, McChrystals promotion had been sanctioned long before the hearing. None of the congressmen pressed McChrysal about Pats case or detainee abuse and torture at Camp Nama Over the last five years, the Pentagon and Congress have had numerous opportunities to hold accountable those responsible for the cover-up of Pats death. Each time theyve failed. The Tillman Story illustrates the corruption, deception, and indifference that is systemic in our government. The cover-up of Pats death was orchestrated at the very highest levels of the Pentagon, and elsewhere in our government the government didnt just lie to us; it lied to a nation. ... At the end of his April 2007 Tillman hearing, Congressman Waxman stated in frustration, What we have is a very clear, deliberate abuse intentionally done. Why is it so hard to find out who did it? Blaming the Bush administration and the Army for the cover-up is too simple. In reality, the cover-up has been a thoroughly bipartisan affair, with the Democratic Congress and the Obama Presidency continuing to protect General McChrystal. It wasnt just a case of the White House stonewalling the Congress. It wasnt a lack of courage or will. It wasnt a loathing to call them out on their bullshit. In actuality, Congress didnt just fumble the ball, they threw the game.
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Congressman Waxmans so-called investigation was not an honest attempt to get at the truth. The Committee blamed its failure to uncover those responsible on stone-walling by the Bush Administration. However, its investigation was perfunctory and failed to question Gen. McChrystal about his key role in writing the fraudulent Silver Star, altered witness statements, early knowledge of fratricide, failure to inform the family, and his deceptive P4 memo. Waxman has never explained why McChrystal was permitted to decline to appear before his committee and dropped from the hearing witness list (and theres a possibility McChrystal testified during a secret closed hearing before the Committee). During Spring 2008, Senator James Webb conducted such a secret review of McChrystals role for the Senate. Senator Jamess Webb betrayal of the Tillman family cuts me the deepest. Ive trusted his sense of honor for thirty years. If anyone in Congress should have cared, it would have been him. Webb, as a young Marine veteran, spent 8 years to clear the name of a dead Marine for his mothers sake! Im hard on Webb not because I dislike the man, but that Im disappointed in him. As an old man and politician, hes turned into exactly what he once reviled as a young veteran! On May 15th 2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee (headed by Senator Levin and McCain) held a secret executive session where McChrystal testified behind closed doors about his actions after Tillmans fratricide in detail. Shortly afterwards, the Senate promoted him to Director of the Joint Staff. The following year, on May 11th 2009, President Obama nominated McChrystal to be his new commander of the Afghan War despite McChrystals key role in the Tillman cover-up (two days later, Obama gave the ASU commencement address at Sun Devil Stadium without once mentioning Pat Tillman to avoid embarrassing questions). On May 20th, Senators Lieberman, Graham, and McCain (working with the White House) introduced a bill to change the FOIA law to block the release of photos that probably showed detainee abuse by JSOC forces under McChrystals command. The Senate unanimously passed it the next day. On June 2nd 2009, The Senate Armed Services Committee held General McChrystals confirmation hearing for his promotion to four-star general and Afghan war commander. The hearing was strictly pro-forma. Senators Levin, McCain, and Webb didn't press McChrystal aggressively. The real hearing had been conducted the previous year, behind closed doors. General McChrystals confirmation came only after the Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid made an impassioned plea on the Senate floor. Shortly afterward, the Senate approved President Barack Obama's nomination of McChrystal by unanimous consent. ...
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Its not surprising that after the initial fratricide cover-up fell apart, Army officers and the Bush administration lied to protect their careers. But the Democratic Congress, after they took control of both Houses in 2006, could have gone after those responsible. Or at least not promoted them! Just before the 2006 mid-term elections, Kevin Tillman published his eloquent letter, After Pats Birthday: Somehow our elected leaders were subverting international law and humanity by setting up secret prisons around the world, secretly kidnapping people, secretly holding them indefinitely, secretly not charging them with anything, secretly torturing them. Somehow that overt policy of torture became the fault of a few bad apples in the military. Somehow torture is tolerated. Somehow lying is tolerated. Somehow faking character, virtue and strength is tolerated. Somehow a narrative is more important than reality. Somehow American leadership, whose only credit is lying to its people and illegally invading a nation, has been allowed to steal the courage, virtue and honor of its soldiers on the ground. Somehow the same incompetent, narcissistic, virtueless, vacuous, malicious criminals are still in charge of this country. Somehow this is tolerated. Somehow nobody is accountable for this. Kevin had hoped a Democratic Congress would bring accountability back to our country. But, just as with warrantless wiretapping and torture, those responsible for the cover-up of his brothers friendly-fire death have never been held accountable for their actions. As the Obama administration is fond of saying, Theyre moving forward, not looking backward. ...
Bob Woodwards Whitewash of McChrystals Role in the Tillman Cover-Up:

It appears to me that Bob Woodwards book Obamas Wars whitewashed Gen. McChrystals role in the Armys cover-up of Pat Tillmans friendly-fire death. Woodward wrote that McChrystal merely signed off on the false Silver Star citation. However, the evidence indicates that McChrystal actually directly supervised the writing of the false Silver Star and orchestrated the cover-up on the ground in Afghanistan. If I had the chance to question Woodward again, I would ask him: were you ignorant of the facts of the Tillman story, did your high-level sources deceive you about McChrystals role, or were you whitewashing Gen. Stanley McChrystals hands-on role in the cover-up of Pat Tillman friendlyfire death?
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Clashes With Pentagon Shaped Obamas Wars

Neal Conan Interview with Bob Woodward
(NPRs Talk of the Nation, December 13, 2010)
NEAL CONAN, host: This is TALK OF THE NATION. I'm Neal Conan in Washington. Barack Obama ran for president on a promise to focus on the war in Afghanistan and initiated a policy review as soon as he took office, then another a few months later. He's due to receive yet another, later this week. Over almost two years in office, the president's escalated U.S. troop levels twice, fired two commanders and extended the timeline for U.S. combat operations to 2014, a process documented by veteran journalist Bob Woodward in his most recent book. "Obama's Wars" describes White House and military officials determined to get it right amid mutual distrust and sometimes mutual incomprehension. ...
Part I: LAffair Rolling Stan

I just happened to turn on the radio in the kitchen to do dishes when I heard NPRs Talk of the Nation in progress with Bob Woodward. I went on the computer, got the phone number, then quickly glanced at my Obamas Wars notes I had typed a couple of months previously. Nothing (at the time) jumped out about what Woodward had written about the Tillman cover-up. What the hell, I may as well try to get on. I called up, and I connected on the first try. Shit! I dont even have a question! I got past Neal Conans screening, and then quickly sketched out a question in the few minutes before I was put on the air: ... [At 17:50 minutes into program] CONAN: We'll get David on the line from Grand Rapids, and then we'll go back to Ted. I apologize, Ted. David, you're on the air. Go ahead, please. DAVID (Caller): Yes, hi. Thanks for taking my call. CONAN: Sure.
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DAVID: Yeah, I was just wondering if Bob Woodward could elaborate a bit on the firing of General Stanley McChrystal last June. When I read the book, his account seemed a little bit sketchy and kind of hurried as to what actually transpired. He had mentioned a couple meetings I think in April and May of this year [actually May 6 & 11], in which he had a strike one and strike two against him. And it just seems to me there's some sort of backstory, which wasn't elaborated upon in his book or elsewhere. Mr. WOODWARD: Well, there is the backstory of the fall, when General McChrystal gave a speech in London indicating that he essentially had decided that we had to have a counterinsurgency strategy that was fully resourced before the president had decided that issue. Not only General McChrystal but General Petraeus and others, including Admiral Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, had kind of piled on well, this is the way we should do it. And the White House went ballistic and said, now wait a minute, this is the president's decision, the commander in chief's decision, and they felt they were being boxed in or really kind of cornered by the uniformed military. CONAN: And not just by that. There was a document, which you broke[9-21-09?] , in which General McChrystal says if we don't get essentially the troop levels I've asked for, we're going to lose as soon as this year. Mr. WOODWARD: That's right, we're going to have mission failure. And of course, that was a real shock to the White House. And so, McChrystal's already got two strikes against him and then there's the Rolling Stone article, which if you go back and read, has a lot of McChrystal aides and a lot of nasty talk but really not - it really was not high on the Richter Scale, as I look at it. But there was a feeling in the White House that they had to show Obama was in charge. And McChrystal realized he'd overstepped the line and I think was -quickly was telling people I've compromised the mission. He called Vice President Biden and said I've compromised the mission. And so in a sense, he almost fired himself. ...
Guy Montags Response to Woodwards First Answer: Woodward said, McChrystal's already got two strikes against him and then there's the Rolling Stone article, which if you go back and read it really was not high on the Richter Scale, as I look at it. But there was a feeling in the White House that they had to show Obama was in charge. Perhaps McChrystal was fired to show Obama was in charge. Hes fired several of his appointees merely because of a comment that threatened to cause some political embarrassment. I
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wouldnt be surprised that just the perception by others that Obama was once again being boxed in by his generals was enough to let McChrystal go. In a bizarre way, I actually had some sympathy for the devil. I agreed with Woodward that the Rolling Stone article really was not high on the Richter Scale. Hardly a firing offense. If McChrystal was really the best man to fight the Afghan War, it seems the President couldve put the good of the war over political considerations. I resented President Obama for firing McChrystal so lightly. Just last year, it appears the President considered him such a silver bullet for the Afghan War that he overlooked McChrystals central role in Armys cover-up of Pat Tillmans friendly-fire death (and the President even pushed through a law specifically to protect McChrystal from fallout from the release of photos showing torture at Camp Nama). Letting McChrystal go over a minor incident (instead of over the Pat Tillman cover-up) was, to my way of thinking, another insult to Pat Tillmans memory. ...
Guy Montags Response to Woodwards Remarks:

Bob Woodward either dodged or misunderstood my question. I knew the back story of the fall with the London speech. My question concerned the two high-level meetings that McChrystal held with the President on May 6th & 11th (the second with McChrystal showing up in-person) about the progress (or lack thereof) in Afghanistan. Curiously, Woodward said nothing in his book about what was discussed in those two meetings, other than McChrystal got a strike one and strike two. Either his sources held out on him, or Woodward was holding back in his book. Probably, it was a combination of the Afghan war not doing so well and the perception of once again boxing in Obama that got McChrystal fired. If McChrystal was clearly winning the war, I think he would still be there. Politically it worked. Obama showed that he was in charge, punished McChrystal for once again boxing him in (if he believed that was the case), and punished Gen. Petreaus for boxing him in by demoting him from CENTCOM and handing him the tar-baby of the Afghan War (COINs the trick, well be drawing down in a year? OK, now its your baby). Some have speculated that McChrystal set himself up for a fall by intentionally having his staff say embarrassing stuff. For example, heres Pave Low Johns take on the matter: Even McChrystal, god help us, pussed out in the end. Does anyone here REALLY think a crafty old operator like Stan the Man had no idea how stupid it was to let a Rolling Stone reporter watch his staff get hammered in Paris? He wanted out of the hot seat, plain and simple, and he used that
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douchebag reporter to do it. Now he can shrug and claim he's not a 'quitter' if the whole thing falls apart in the next couple of years. I wouldnt dismiss that line of thought out of hand. Micheal Hastings said in a radio interview that he had interviewed dozens of generals without having them (and their staff) talk so loosely. And remember, McChrystal did a stint early in the war as a Pentagon spokesman, spent time as the Director of the Joint Staff. As a general, he was no nave waif to the ways of journalists. And, remember the precedence of Admiral Fallon being fired from command of CENTCOM for remarks he made that appeared in a Vanity Fair profile a few years ago. ...
Part II: Woodwards Whitewash of Gen. McChrystals Role In the Cover-Up of Pat Tillmans Friendly-Fire Death
As Im listening to Bob Woodward not actually answer my question, my first instinct was to ask a follow-up. But, as I wait, I realize I should have asked him something about the Tillman cover-up. But, what question to ask to put him on the spot, to throw my shoe at him? At the time, I couldnt think of one. Unfortunately, I just tried to wing it. And I was a bit nervous: ... [20:08 minutes into program] CONAN: David, thanks very much for the call. DAVID: Thank you. Could I just say one more quick comment? CONAN: Sure.
DAVID: It seems like McChrystal's central role in the cover-up of Pat Tillman's fire death was passed over a bit in your book.
friendly-
He was apparently one of the favorites of Chief Mullen. But looking at it quite a bit myself, you had some stuff going on, like in May 15, 2008, an executive session hearing of the Senate after Senator Webb did an investigation, so-called, of his role. And that seemed to be passed over by the Washington establishment they did a pro forma hearings at various times but really didn't dig into that very much.
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And I just wondered if you could comment
Mr. WOODWARD: Well, they [Washington establishment] didn't [dig into McChrystals role in the Tillman cover-up very much]. And, of course, McChrystal was in the chain of command, and I think he apologized for what he did in this. But he was not the hands-on person making that decision. But that whole thing is a sad chapter in Army history.
Part II: Throwing My Shoe at Bob Woodward Not
Bob Woodward had responded,"... of course, McChrystal was in the chain of command, ... But he was not the hands-on person making that decision...." What! Gen. McChrystal was not the hands onguy? Of course, I didnt have the chance to try to sneak in yet another follow-up question. Heres the question I should have asked Bob Woodward, to throw my shoe at him o put the leading inside Washington journalist on the spot about the Tillman case: In your book, Obamas Wars (p.154), you wrote that Gen. McChrystal had merely "... signed off on the Silver Star recommendation that suggested Tillman had been killed by the enemy ..." However, Jon Krakauer in his book, "Where Men Win Glory" (pp. 334 347 paperback edition), described how Gen. McChrystal personally "administered the medal recommendation process" with a false narrative that "was painstakingly written to create the impression Pat Tillman was killed by enemy fire" and directly supervised the Ranger RGT officers who altered the two Silver Star witness statements. The Silver Star recommendation was "fraudulent" by "any objective measure." Instead of merely having "signed off" on a piece of paper that landed on his desk, Gen. McChrystal had "orchestrate[d] what can only be described as a broad conspiracy to conceal Tillman's fratricide ..." And, in response to President Obamas May 2009 nomination of Gen. McChrystal as Afghan war commander, Mary Tillman wrote in her book, Boots on the Ground by Dusk: Not only is he [McChrystal] lying about the circumstances surrounding Pats death, he is proposing false language for the Silver Star narrative.
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Mr. Woodward, my question for you is: were you ignorant of these facts of the Tillman story, did your high-level sources deceive you, or were you whitewashing Gen. Stanley McChrystals handson role in the cover-up of Pat Tillman friendly-fire death?
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APPENDIX C: Notes from Bob Woodwards Book Obamas Wars

Note: Adapted from Dec. 2010 Feral FF post "Throwing My Shoe at Bob Woodward ... Not"
Woodwards Portrayal of McChrystals Role in the Tillman Cover-Up:

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Adm. Michael Mullen revered Gen. McChrystal, and had made him director of the Joint Staff his previous assignment in part so that the 2008 Senate confirmation could wipe away the role McChrystal had played in the cover-up of the 2004 friendly-fire death in Afghanistan of Pat Tillman. Of course, McChrystal was in the chain of command. But he was not the hands-on person making that decision McChrystal had signed off96on the Silver Star recommendation that suggested Tillman had been killed by the enemy, a choice he regretted. McChrystal was essentially the chairmans deputy. Director of the Joint Staff was the premier assignment for a three-star, an almost certain path to four-star rank. Among McChrystals predecessors in the post were DNI Dennis Blair, former Centcom commander Abiziad, and the current Army chief Gen Casey. Mullen realized that the solution to Afghanistan was right before his eyes. On Monday May 11, 2009 Defense Secretary Gates announced McChrystal would be the new commander. A week later, Obama met for 10 minutes in the Oval Office with McChrystal. The Pat Tillman issue resurfaced during McChrystals confirmation hearings for ISAF. On Tuesday June 2, 2009, McChrystal sat down for his Senate confirmation hearing. McChrystal assured the Senate Armed Services Committee that he had recommended the Silver Star with the best of intentions, but he had been too hasty in the investigative process and I think he apologized for what he did in this. Well, they [Washington establishment] didn't. [dig into McChrystals role in the cover-up very much, just held some pro forma hearings] that whole thing is a sad chapter in Army history. Note: This description compiled using quotes from Obamas Wars and NPRs Talk of the Nation 12-13-10). My detailed rebuttal of Woodwards portrayal is found in Bob Woodwards Whitewash of Gen. McChrystals Role in the Tillman Cover-Up.
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Citation: p. 154 McChrystal had signed off: Ann Scott Tyson, 9 Officers Blamed in but No Coverup Found, The Washington Post, March 27, 2007, p.A2 143
Tillman Death,
May 2008: Promotion of Gen. McChrystal to Director of the Joint Staff:

32 [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Michael] Mullen was a 1968 graduate of the Naval Academy at Annapolis. Note: the same year as Senator James Webb. Webb was a friend of National Security Director Jim Jones (former Marine). Webb acquaintance with Mullen? 85 For the past five months [from before a few days after inaugural 1-09; July 2008], McChrystal had served as director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs, a high-profile job in which he interacted daily with Chairman Mullen and, often, Secretary Gates. 154 Mullen revered McChrystal, and had made him director of the Joint Staff his previous assignment in part so that the Senate confirmation [May 2008] could wipe away the role McChrystal had played in the cover-up of the 2004 friendly-fire death in Afghanistan of Pat Tillman Note: there was no discussion about McChrystal during the public 5-22-08 confirmation hearing for Gen. Petreaus; a secret closed executive session was held 5-15-08 where McChrystal testified in detail about the Tillman case and Camp Nama torture] 82 Clinton joined the Armed Services Committee. Note: Was she on for McChrystals 2008 promotion? 154 McChrystal had signed off on the Silver Star recommendation that suggested Tillman had been killed by the enemy, a choice he regretted Note: Suggested? McChrystal played the central hands-on role in the Tillman cover-up! He personally directed the writing of the fraudulent Silver Star and apparently the altering of two witness statements. Woodward describes the Armys actions as of coverup yet the title of his WP citation says No Coverup Found. So which is it? What else does Woodward know? Signed off? The cited WP article doesnt say that; it says McChrystal submitted a Silver Star recommendation with inaccurate information [e.g. two fabricated witness statements] and a misleading citiation [i.e. totally false, except for getting his name right]
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*Citation: 154 McChrystal had signed off: Ann Scott Tyson, 9 Officers Blamed in Tillman Death, but No Coverup Found, The Washington Post, March 27, 2007, p.A2 ...
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Excerpts from 9 Officers Blamed in Tillman Death, but No Coverup Found A Pentagon investigation found yesterday that four senior Army officers -- including a three-star general [Stanley McChrystal] now in charge of the military's most elite man-hunting units -committed "critical errors" in judgment in handling the "friendly fire" death of Cpl. Pat Tillman, a former pro football star. The report by the Pentagon inspector general recommended that four Army generals and five lower-ranking officers face "corrective action" for serious violations, including making false and misleading statements about what they knew about the Tillman fratricide, as well as inaccuracies in recommending Tillman, 27, for a Silver Star, the Army's third-highest combat award. [Col.] Nixon [Commander of the Ranger RGT], along with Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, who was the joint task force commander, were responsible for submitting a Silver Star recommendation for Tillman that included "inaccurate information [among other things, two fabricated witness statements] and a misleading [i.e. filled with lies] citation that implied [anyone reading it would assume he was KIA] CPL Tillman died by enemy fire," the report found. Despite finding several errors, the report did not find evidence of a coverup. "There was a series of mistakes made. We never decided that there was any attempt to cover up," because the friendlyfire investigation was started quickly, said Thomas F. Gimble, acting Pentagon inspector general. ... Note: On July 31, 2007 Secretary of the Army Pete Geren held a news conference to present the findings of Gen. Wallace who recommended corrective action for the officers who made mistakes in the Tillman case. Gen. Kensinger, already retired, was the designated scapegoat and lost one of his stars (i.e. lost about $10K from his pension). None of the other officers involved got even so much as a letter of reprimand in their file. In fact, they have all been promoted since then: Gen. McChrystal twice, Nixon to general, Bailey to general, Kauzlarich to full bird colonel.
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June 2009: Gen. McChrystals Promotion to Afghan War Commander:

82 A few days after the inaugural [retired Gen.] Keane known as the father of the Iraq surge played effectively behind the scenes for the promotions of Gen. David Petreaus He told Clinton McKiernan , the Afghanistan commander, was the wrong man for the job The only way out of Afghanistan was an intensive counterinsurgency I think he should be fired 85 The officer Keane had in mind was Gen. Lloyd Austin III, the second in command in Iraq, but he needed a rest. Theres another guy named McChrystal. 118 The chairman of the Joint Chiefs [Mullen] realized that the solution to Afghanistan was right before his eyes, McChrystal had been director of the Joint Staff for more than seven months. The Joint Staff director was essentially the chairmans deputy. It was the premier assignment for a three-star, an almost certain path to four-star rank. Among McChrystals predecessors in the post were DNI Dennis Blair, former Centcom commander Abiziad, and the current Army chief Gen Casey. Note: Gen. Abizaid perjured himself before Congress about his knowledge of the Tillman fratricide. 118 Gates, who often worked with McChrystal, agreed he was the man for the job. He and Mullen told the President they wanted to replace McKiernan. Obama said he would approve whoever the secretary and Mullen recommended. 119 On Monday May 11, 2009 Gates voice quivered slightely as he announced that McChrystal would be the new Afghanistan commander. Note: Obama reversed his decision to release torture photos on May 12, 2009, apparently to protect Gen. McChrystals from his role in torture at Camp Nama. Senator Lindsey Graham (regular meetings with Petreaus & Mullen) introduced bill Senate unamimously passed on May 20 to prevent court-ordered release. 120 A week later, Obama met for 10 minutes in the Oval Office with McChrystal. Well, it was ultimately my decision. But he was relying on Gates and Mullens judgment. They felt the fest person to do the job at this stage was Gen. McChrystal, Obama said. I had not had a personto-person conversation with him. 123 On Tuesday June 2 [2009], McChrystal sat down for his Senate confirmation hearing.
154 The issue [Pat Tillman cover-up] resurfaced during McChrystals confirmation hearings for ISAF. McChrystal assured the Senate Armed Services Committee that he had recommended the Silver Star with the best of intentions, but he had been too hasty in the investigative process. Note: strictly pro-forma hearing; real hearing held behind closed doors in 2008.
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Sept Oct 2009: Obama Felt Boxed-In by McChrystal, Petraeus, Mullen:

153 The Pentagon received McChrystals classified assessment of the Afghanistan War on Monday, August 31. 158 It angered Obama that Petraeus was publicly lobbying [9-02-09 Ignatius column] and prejudging a presidential decision. 159 The White House was upset because it looked like the generals were trying to box in the president. So Pretreus went to ground, but he hinted that the South Carolina Republican [Lindsey Graham] ought to weigh in publicly. 205 Oct 6: Petraeus and Senator Lindsey Graham had one of their regular conversations Around this time,Mullen also paid Graham a visit. 213 Oct. 8: Even with 80K troops, the US could only protect 60% of the population. A full counterinsurgency was impossible with these options. 232 Oct. 9: Obama: We have to show a plan that will actually enable us to show progress. .. I appreciate not reading about the meetings in the Washington Post 171 In the message war, Petraeus had allies outside the administration On September 14 [2009], a long op-ed appeared in the WSJ written by Senators Graham, Lieberman and McCain. 172 But when Obama heard about Mullens testimony [9-15-09], Mullen was publicly endorsing the McChrystal strategy The chairman was poking his finger in the presidents eye. The generals and admirals are systematically playing him, boxing him in. 182 Woodward publishes the leaked McChrystals assessment in the Wash Post 9-21-09. [appeared on CNAS Exum blog same day] This highly classified document was artfully leaked by those who wish to bulldoze Obama ... 196 [National Security Director Jim] Jones was dumbfounded by McChrystal. How could he give such a [London October 1, 2009] speech and answer so categorically while the president sought alternative strategies? The whole thing amazed him, particularly after the White House had scolded Mullen and Petreaus for their comments weeks earlier.
147
The NS adviser told Gates that McChrystals speech was an over-the-top moment and the president had demonstrated a lot of restraint. Youve simply got to stop this or the President is going to have to fire somebody. He called Admiral Mullen, McChrystals biggest booster. I dont know what you guys are doing. McChrystals speech was either insubordination or stupid. It read like a direct challenge to the president. It is a firing offense, but McChrystal wont be fired because we need him, Jones said. Referring to Mullen and Petraeus, Jones said, One of you is going to get fired and Im going to recommend it. 197 the president raised McChrystals remarks. This was something that really put me in a box, Obama said, and I dont like to be boxed in. Obama felt disrespected and trapped. The White House saw the [10-01-09] speech as a scheme on the part of McChrystal, Mullen, and Petraeus. 194 [10-02-09 Obama met with McChrystal after speech] I like him. I think hes a good man. McChrystal was the right man for the job, he said
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Nov -- Dec 2009 Obama OKs 30,000 Troop Afghan War Surge:
291 Nov. 23: If the two-year time frame for accomplishing these goals is not possible, I want to hear it now. Note: same day that CNASs Andrew Exum retired from blogging. Trying to avoid more fallout from his WashPost book review. 318: Nov 28: How many of these guys who are pushing that option are going to be here to see the effects by July of 2011 Lute lamented to Donilon. .. So, Lute summarized, the bottom line is, youre left with the President standing here, owning this thing that these guys sold to him but who have since exited stage right. 319 I dont see how you can defy your military chain here if you tell McChrystal Ive chosen to do something else, youre going to have to replace him. And then where does that stop? The colonel [Tien] did not have to elaborate. His implication was that not only McChrystal, but Petraeus, Mullen and even Gates might go 322 Lute felt that the military establishment was really rolling the president It wasnt deliberate on McChrystals part. As far as Lute could tell, McChrystal didnt have a conspiratorial bone in his body. If there was someone trying to roll Obama, it was Petraeus. But he had done so subtly and with a light touch. a President did have choices, and in this case his had been significantly limited Note: conspiratory bone referring to leak to pressure on troop surge, not Tillman case. Lute quote referred to by Andrew Exum in Oct? blog, but failed to mention Donilons comment below. Did Petraeus leak assessment in Sept? 323 For his part, Donilon was hugely skeptical of the entire uniformed military chain of command. McChrystal was hardly an innocent. He took command, got out first by writing his long, classified assessment, staking his ground and then hiding behind the uniform and the flag. Petraeus and Mullen had joined in after that. ... 324 Nov. 29: Obama issues his six-page terms sheet outlining his decision.
325 Turning to Petreaus, he [Obama] said, Dont clear and hold what you cannot transfer. Dont overextend us. If you have any personal misgivings or any professional doubts about what were about to do, tell me now
149
329 I want to be clear about what we are not doing. This is not a nationwide counterinsurgency strategy. The first reassessment will be in December 2010. That assessment will only be about the flexibility in how we draw down, not if we draw down. 332 Biden believed the president had put a stake in the heart of expansive counterinsurgency. Petreaus saw it differently. Counterinsurgency was alive and well. I dont think you win this war. I think you keep fighting. 338 All we have to do is begin to show progress, Petreaus said, and thatll be sufficient to add time to the clock and well get what we need [?more troops beyond 30K?]. Thats a dramatic misreading of this president, Lute said. ... 334 Dec. 1 West Point speech: He [Obama] announced he was sending 30,000 more US troops. begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011 we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground. 338 Lute surmised the following: Obama had to do this 18-month surge just to demonstrate, in effect, that it couldnt be done . Obama would have given the monolithic military its day in court and the United States would not be seen as having been driven off the battlefield.
150
May 2010: Gen. McChrystal Gets Strike One & Strike Two:
346 April 3: [Derek] Harvey [Petraeuss intelligence advisor, speaking to Petreaus] drew one of the most pessimistic pictures possible of the war. It is not going to work. Were not going to achieve the objectives that weve set ourselves On the ground he said, McChrystals forces had not finished clearing key areas. the Taliban senior leadership thought they were doing okay, even with the surge of 30,000 more US troops. 348 On April 16, the president met with the NSC McChrystal had committed his forces to clearing and holding operations because the ANSF werent ready to hold the territory themselves. It was bogging down the model of clear, hold, build and transfer. Obama asked, by the way, what about the areas we cleared in the summer of 2009? Any of them close to transferring? Not a single one, sir. The model had become clear, hold, hold, hold, and hold. Hold for years. There was no build, no transfer. Petreaus said they were misconstruing the approach for beginning a transfer. . Its not hand off, its thin out. 349 During the Presidents Thursday, May 6, secure video with McChrystal for the 90-minute monthly review the operation to gain full control of the city was beginning that month. It was impossible to escape the conclusion that Kandahar would be a litmus test for the war 350 One item [from briefing papers, with loaded questions] was, I got the diagnosis of the problem, and I see what youre prescribing for a cure, but the two dont connect. The dots dont connect. Why? Perhaps it was too stark and confrontational. He didnt ask it. 351 He [Obama] said he wanted sustainable progress and was still thinking about transfer. Be careful we dont start something for which we dont have resources to enable completion. Afterward, the president indicated to several close aides that the briefing had a clarifying effect on him. What makes us think that given the description of the problem, that were going to design a solution to this? if youre not fully satisfied with Gen. McChrystals description here, he will be in Washington next week. You should invite him to come see you and continue the discussion in a smaller, more intimate setting. In other words, if the meeting had amounted to a strike one for the commanding general, the president ought to give McChrystal another swing. He agreed. 353 May 10: Holbrooke asked if there was an Afghan example of clear, hold, build, and transfer actually happening. Not yet, McChrystal said. No, were not ready yet. Marja after all that work and firepower McChrystal was saying they werent ready to transfer sole responsibility to a single Afghan company.
151
354 On May 11, the president took Donilon and Lute up on their proposal that McChrystal be invited to continue the discussion. Obama assembled a small group in the Oval Office to hear the Afghanistan commander. It included Biden, Gates, Mullen, Jones, Donilon and Colonel John Tien, the NSC Afghanistan director Tien was a COINista at heart but he also saw reason for skepticism. After the session, Lute who had missed the White House meeting , caught up with Col Tien. John, Lute asked, how did Stan do? Strike two, Tien said. Note: Curiously, Woodward provided no details of this meeting with a 2nd strike against McChrystal (Woodward had talked to most of those guys before). What happened during that key meeting? Was McChrystals lack of progress a big factor in his being fired just a month later? I tried asking Woodward on NPR about this, but he merely talked about the London speech. 190 Counterterrorist decapitation doesnt work unless it is enabled by effective counterinsurgency. They complement each other [McChrystal, 9-30-09 during troop request review] 355 The Biden pillar the counterrrorism portion of the decision was the one that was really producing. McChrystal had tripled the number of JSOC teams, and the CIAs Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams were having superb results despite the lack of the troop density Petraeus had insisted would be necessary for successful counterterrorism. 356 Maybe the landing zone was not through the COINistas clear, hold, build and transfer?
358 May 14: Larry [Nicholson], Lute said, forget Marja, this years adventure. Lets go to last years adventure. So now were at the 12-month mark. So tell meWhere are we in Nawa in this four-step model that leads to T transfer At least another 12 months. And that was for the best district. if thats as good as it gets, then we cant connect the dots here. 360 If Nawa is on the best case a 24 month timeline, Lute said, were screwed. Were not going to demonstrate progress this year. for this years version in Marja, McChrystal was advertising an improvement when you dug into the numbers the reality was very different. Can pretty much predict that Kandahars going to look a lot like it looks today. Theres no reason to work the weekends in November. We might as well do it during the workday in May and June. The president had directed that the military not go anywhere unless they could transfer in 18 to 24 months Well, the best case, with big caveats, the guy on the ground is saying 24 months. this is a house of cards.
152
June 2010: President Obama Fires McChrystal, Replaces with Petreaus:

370 By May 2010, President Obama was telling Jones and others, isnt it about time to get rid of Blair? There had been too many fights with the CIA May 20: Fire me, Blair [DNI] basically said. Thats exactly what Obama did. 38 He [Obama] was unsentimental and ruthless. ...
371 About 5 PM on June 21, Gates called Jones, Theres an article coming out in Rolling Stone thats not very good about McChrystal. It contained some disparaging and mocking comments from McChrystal and his senior staff about administration officials. McChrystal himself was quoted as saying that Obamas strategy review was painful and I was selling an unsellable position. 372 Gates said he planned to release a statement reprimanding McChrystal, but hoped to salvage the situation and avoid a setback to the war strategy. Jones {NSC director] told Gates that protecting McChrystal was noble. But you dont want to put yourself between him and the President. Gates proposed that he issue the first two paragraphs of his statement criticizing McChrystal 373 The next day [June 23] Obama accepted McChrystals resignation, and he proposed that Petraeus take over. Though it would involve a technical demotion because as central commander Petraeus was the boss, it was an idea that would address both the military and political problems. The Iraq hero would come to the rescue of Afghanistan. I noted it was a demotion. He certainly doesnt consider it a demotion, the president said. Note: Woodwards 12-13-2010 NPR Talk of the Nation response seemed to be that his opinion was McChrystals actions werent that bad, but Obama felt he had to act lest it looked as though McChrystal was boxing him in again.
153
June 2010: Gen. Petraeus Becomes the Face of the Afghan War
16 Petraeus was the recipient of countless awards, and the celebrity selected to do the coin toss at the upcoming [2009] Superbowl. [Note: see my post Barely a Footnote] Obamas campaign aides saw his prominence through a political lens. A popular war hero like Petraeus, a registered Republican, was always a potential presidential candidate. 16 But Obamaland was potentially hostile. When candidate Obama had visited Iraq oer the summer, the conversation between the two had not gone well. The Obama presidency was going to dramatically alter Petraeuss status. He had direct access to President Bush, and his mentor, retired Gen. Jack Keane [, the former vice chief of staff of the Army, had an extraordinary pipeline to both Bush and Vice President Cheney. 379 The Afghanistan War was now in Gen. Petraeuss hands. Jones, for one, knew how bad the situation was and thought Petraeus was probably saying to himself, What have I gotten myself into? If Jones had the job he knew exactly what he would say to Obama The Taliban was taking full advantage of the safe havens in those circumstances, You cant win. You cant do counterinsurgency. It is a cancer in the plan. 379 But history had its cycles and ironies, he [Petreaus] knew all too well. When he arrived there [in Iraq] What in the world? he thought to himself that day in 2007 and on a number of occasions later. Why didnt I just take that Afghanistan job? 263 Nov. 9: Newsweek had put him [Petreaus] on its cover when he took over that command [Iraq], asking in its headline: Can This Man Save Iraq? The implied question bouncing around the Situation Room was: Can this man save Afghanistan 17 He was no expert on Afghanistan, but he had gone there four years earlier [2005] On this November trip [2008] he saw firsthand the lack of troops His bottom line was that without more troops, money and attention, Were not going to achieve our objectives. Petraeus told his closest aides that Afghanistan would be different from Iraq, where he had become the poster boy of the war. I do not want to be the face of policy. They cant dump it on me. Petraeus later deined this was his intent. He just wanted to be a good soldier, as he put it, and keep a very low public profile. Note: Was Petreaus demoted for promising more than could deliver with COIN and again boxing Obama in? And punished by sticking him with the tar baby of the Afghan War? (But, is Pretreaus sticking Obama by now saying the thin-out will be in 2014 vs. 2011?) Is Woodward not spelling things out to avoid contradicting Obamas public statements and to maintain his access?
154
CNASs Andrew Exum Tours Afghanistan by Periscope:

403 Members of McChrystals 14-person assessment team. Many from Washington thinktanks, including Andrew Exum from CNAS [Note: see He Who Shall Not Be Fact Checked]. 152 Stuck in armored vehicles, the [assessment team] could only catch periscope-like glimpses of Mazar-i-Sharifs streets the team was similarly sheltered in Kabul. The Toyotas raced around Kabul. Afghans who didnt jump out of the way could be plowed down. 152 After one of the SUVs ran a bicyclist off the road, Andrew Exum, a fellow at the CNAS and a former US Army Ranger, asked the driver, What are you doing, man? Exum wrote a one-pager for McChrystal about aggressive driving entitled Touring Afghanistan by Submarine. 153 McChrystal soon became the chief traffic cop and issued a written directive to all his troops in the theater to drive in ways that respect the safety and well-being of the Afghan people. 153 The Pentagon received McChrystals classified assessment of the Afghanistan War on Monday, August 31. 419 Acknowledgements: My assistants and I found the following [five] blogs helpful as well: Abu Muqawama, [Andrew Exums blog at CNAS was at the top of the list]
155
APPENDIX D: Something to Die For

Note: Adapted from the Introduction to my April 2012 Feral Firefighter post, Something to Die For -- The [Untold] Tillman Story Between-the-Lines of Michael Hastings Book The Operators. See that post for more details.
...
In January 2012, Michael Hastings published his second book, The Operators (an expansion of his June 2010 Rolling Stone profile which led to President Obama firing Gen. Stanley McChrystal). In his book, Michael Hastings tells two stories that are interwoven together. First, he describes his April 2010 month-long road trip with Gen. Stanley McChrystal and his staff across Europe & Afghanistan. Second, Hastings describes the politics behind President Obamas Afghan War surge and his experience as an embedded reporter on the ground in Afghanistan with US troops. Hastings portrayed McChrystal as the face of the Afghan War and used McChrystal as the hook upon which to hang his larger Afghan War narrative. Similarly, in this post Ive portrayed McChrystal as the face of the Tillman cover-up and used Hastings book as the hook upon which to hang my narrative of my untold Tillman story. Both Michael Hastings and I found Bob Woodwards book, Obamas Wars, to be a valuable source to understand the back-story behind President Obamas decision to surge troops into Afghanistan. However, Woodward scatters his dots throughout his book (but doesnt connects them for you) forcing you to read between-the-lines to make sense of the story. By contrast, Michael Hastings connects his dots, tells you what he thinks, and as a bonus, prints all the Fbombs (along with a bit of the Rolling Stone irreverent attitude). And, unlike the usual press hagiographies of McChrystal, Hastings actually mentions McChrystals involvement in torture at Camp Nama and his role in the Armys cover-up of Tillmans death. I believe Rolling Stone has published the Alpha & Omega accounts of the Iraq & Afghan Wars. Evan Wrights Generation Kill [both the book and HBO series are fantastic] is the Alpha; which chronicled the beginning of the Iraq War (with LT Nathaniel Fick, who is now CNASs CEO) with his account of his 2003 road-trip with a Marine Recon company that spearheaded the 2003 Iraq invasion. And, of course, Michael Hastings book The Operators is the Omega; Hastings describes the beginning of the end of the Afghan War with his account of his 2010 road-trip with Gen. McChrystal and his staff across Europe & Afghanistan.
156
What a country such as this when you find journalism with more integrity & honesty coming from Rolling Stone magazine reporters such as Matt Tabbi or Michael Hastings than from reporters from the big papers such as The New York Times. Perhaps, thats simply to be expected from our corrupt system. ...
Note: Following is a portion of the Table of Contents from the April 2012 post Something to Die For. This portion includes my book notes & annotations about the Tillman Story, McChrystal, and the Afghan War Surge. This discussion complements that found in Bob Woodwards book and Robert Gates book (see Appendix B and Bob Gates Urge to Surge).
The Feral Firefighters Annotations to Michael Hastings Book The Operators The Wild & Terrifying Inside Story of Americas War in Afghanistan:
Prologue: We Shouldnt Have Smokescreens Thrown in Our Face Apr. 22, 2004: Here is the Steak Dinner, but Were Giving It to You on This Garbage Can Cover. You Know, You Got It, You Work It. Apr. 24, 2007: The Whole Thing is Riddled with Nonsense July 31, 2007: A Perfect Storm of Mistakes Aug 1, 2007: The Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Dept. of Defense Knew May 15, 2008: Gen. McChrystals Secret 2008 Senate Hearing 69 71 73 75 67 68
Part I: Obamas War -- Gen. McChrystal & the Afghan War Surge 2003 -- 2008: May 11, 2009: The Emperors General -- Gen. Stanley McChrystal President Obama Fires Gen. McKiernan, Promotes Gen. McChrystal to New Commander of the Afghan War 77 81 85 92
June 10, 2009:Gen. McChrystals Promotion Confirmed by Senate June 23, 2009: Gen. McChrystal Invites CNASs Abu Muqawama to Help Write his Afghan War Assessement
157
Sept. 21, 2009: Nov. 1, 2009: Dec. 1, 2009:
Afghan War Assessment Leaked to Washington Posts Bob Woodward On Martial VirtueAnd Jon Krakauers Crappy New Book Report President Obama Boxed In By His Generals, Announces Afghan War Surge
96 99 103
Part II: LeAffair Rolling Stan April 15, 2010: April 21, 2010: April 29, 2010: Michael Hastings Almost Famous Road Trip Across Europe with Gen. McChrystal & Staff To Be Continued How Do You Ask a Man to Be the Last Man to Die for a Mistake? 105 107 108
May 24, 2010: McChrystal Calls Marja A Bleeding Ulcer112 ... June 22, 2010: June 23, 2010: Rolling Stone Publishes Michael Hastings Profile of Gen. McChrystal, The Runaway General President Obama Fires Gen. McChrystal, Drops Afghan War Tar Baby Onto Gen. Petraeuss Lap The Media-Military-Industrial Complex Backlash 113 115
July 30, 2010:
119
Epilogue: I Found Myself Awash with A Sense of Injustice April 10, 2011: Aug. 31, 2011: May 1, 2011: Gen. Stan the Man McChrystals Graceful Landing Gen. King David Petraeuss Graceful Exit Someday, This Wars Gonna End 124 132 135
158
APPENDIX E: The Feral Firefighter Blog Table of Contents -- 2008 To 2012

2014 Feral Firefighter Blog Posts:
Defend Your Integrity -- Robert Gates Leadership of the Failed Afghan War COIN Surge and the Bipartisan Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystals Cover-Up of Pat Tillmans 2004 Friendly-Fire Death in Afghanistan & Command of JSOC Torture (March 21, 2014)

What Burns Faster, Memories Or Flames? -- The LAPD & Media (Sept. 11, 2013) Character Assassination of Michael Hastings and His Fiery Car Crash (Accident or Assassination?) (Version 1.5, Nov 21, 2013) More Lies Borne Out By Facts, If Not The Truth -- The New York Times Disingenuous Obituary of Michael Hastings & Their Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystals Role in LeAffair Rolling Stan and The Pat Tillman Story Never Shall I Fail My Comrades -- The Dark Legacy of Gen. Stanley McChrystal & His Memoir My Share of the Task: His Betrayal of Pat Tillman, His Command of JSOC Torture, and His Failed Afghan War Surge (Ver. 2.2) Something to Die For -- The [Untold] Tillman Story Annotations to Michael Hastings book The Operators (Ver. 1.2) (June 23, 2013)
(May 19, 2013)
(Dec. 24, 2013)
2012 Feral Firefighter Blog Posts (continued):

Never Shall I Fail My Comrades -- The Dark Legacy of Gen. Stanley McChrystal: His Betrayal of Pat Tillman, His Command of JSOC Torture, and His Failed Afghan War Surge (Ver. 1.0)
159
(Dec. 28, 2012)
The [Missing] Pat Tillman Legacy: The Pat Tillman Foundation & The NFLs Betrayal of Pat Tillman Something to Die For -- The [Untold] Tillman Story Annotations to Michael Hastings book The Operators (Ver. 1.0)
(Dec. 3, 2012)
(Apr. 22, 2012)

"Jon Krakauer's Credibility Problem" (Ver. 2.4.1, Feb. 23, 2012) (and how he took down Greg Mortenson to launch Byliner.com) (Apr. 24, 2011)
"The Tillman Story" DVD Reviews, Comments, Director Interviews (Feb. 15, 2011) "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Ver. 1.1 ) -- President Obama & Congresss Bi-Partisan Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystals Central Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillmans Friendly Fire Death "The Emperor's General" (Ver. 1.1) -- President Barack Obama & the Whitewash of General Stanley McChrystals Role in the Cover Up of Pat Tillmans Friendly Fire Death "He Who Shall Not Be Fact Checked" (Draft) -- CNASS Andrew Exum and the Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystals Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillmans Friendly-Fire Death (Dec. 28, 2010)
(Jan. 29, 2011)
(Jan. 15, 2011)

"Throwing My Shoe at Bob Woodward ... Not" (Draft) Obamas (Dec. 29, 2010) Wars and the Washington Posts Bob Woodwards Whitewash of Gen. McChrystals Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillmans Friendly-Fire Death "The [Untold] Tillman Story" (Version 1.0) -- President Obama & (Aug. 15, 2010) Congresss Bi-partisan Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystals Central Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillmans Friendly Fire Death Appendix A1 Mar. 26, 2007 DoD IG Briefing, Tillman Response (July 14, 2010) Appendix B1 Apr. 24, 2007 Congressional Hearing Appendix C1 -- July 31, 2007 Gen. Wallace Briefing
160
(July 8, 2010) (July 6, 2010)
Appendix D1 -- July 13, 2007
Gen. McChrystal To Testify
(July 13, 2010) (July 6, 2010) (July 13, 2010) (July 14, 2010) (July 4, 2010) (July 10, 2010) (July 4, 2010) (July 4, 2010) (July 14, 2010) (July 15. 2010)
Appendix D2 -- August 1, 2007 Congressional Hearing Appendix D3 August 1, 2001 Gen. McChrystal "No-Show" Appendix E1 -- May 2008 Senate Hearings Appendix E2 -- Senator Webb on May 27, 2008 Diane Rhem Show Appendix F1 -- July 17, 2008 Congresss Final Tillman Report Appendix G1 -- May 15, 2009 Diane Rhem Show Appendix H1 -- Gen. McChrystal's June 2, 2009 Senate Hearing Appendix I1 -- McChrystal's Testimony Contradicts Gen. Abizaids Appendix J1 Gen. McChrystal Protection Act of 2009
...
"The Emperor's General" (Ver. 1.0) President Obama and the Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystals Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillmans Friendly-Fire Death (June 22, 2010)
"Barely a Footnote" -- Superbowl XLIII and the NFL's Betrayal of Pat (June 20, 2010) Tillman "That's My Hero" -- Pat Tillman, Rachel Corrie, and Yoni Netanyahu (June 20, 2010)
...
Introduction: Feral Firefighter's Tillman Files (Old Version) "Where Men Win Glory" -- Andrew Exum, CNAS and the Whitewash of Gen. McChrystal's Role in the Cover-Up of Pat Tillman's Friendly Fire Death (He Who Shall Not Be Fact-Checked is a completely revised version of this document) "Where Men Win Glory" -- Appendices (January 2010) (Jan. 27, 2010)
(Jan. 27, 2010)
161

Lies Borne Out By Facts, If Not the Truth" -- Senator James Webb, (Sept. 11, 2009) Thom Shanker & The New York Times and the Whitewash of General McChrystals Role in the Aftermath of Pat Tillmans Death "Lies Borne Out By Facts, If Not the Truth" -- Appendices "Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?" -- Senator James Webb, Gen. McChrystal, and their Betrayal of Pat Tillman (Updated 9/09/09) (Sept. 11, 2009) (May 27, 2009)
Appendix A: McChrystal Responsible for Fratricide Investigation & Family Notification Appendix B: McChrystal's Early Knowledge of Confirmation of Tillman Fratricide Appendix C: McChrystal Declines to Appear at Waxman August 1, 2007 Hearing Appendix D: McChrystal's Misleading P4 Memo Appendix E: McChrystal's Fraudulent Silver Star Recommendation Appendix F: McChrystal's Misleading June 2, 2009 Senate Testimony

A Sense of Honor" -- Letters to Mary Tillman & Senator James Webb Remember the Iconoclast, Not the Icon" -- Pat Tillman 1976 2004 Battle for the Truth" -- Iddo Netanyahu, Kevin Tillman and the Cover Up of their Brother's Deaths (Yoni & Pat) (April 3, 2008) (Feb. 15, 2008) (Feb. 4, 2008)
162

"Defend Your Integrity" - Robert Gates & The Whitewash of Gen. Stanley McChrystal Ver. 1.2 (April 2, 2014 Updated 4-20-14)

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DEFEND YOUR INTEGRITY

Defend Your Integrity

The Tillman Family (May 2004)

Patrick Tillman, Sr. (May 2004) Richard Tillman (May 2004)

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

LeAffair Rolling Stan -- Gates Backstory to the Firing of Gen. McChrystal

The Soldiers Secretary?

-- Gates Betrayal of Our Soldiers

... About the Author 123

Defend Your Integrity

Appendix D: Something To Die For -- TOC to my Notes & Annotations on

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

See Appendix B of this post.

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

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DESCRIPTION OF UPDATES & REVISIONS:

Defend Your Integrity

THE [UNTOLD] TILLMAN STORY

Gen. Stanley McChrystal

Adm. William McRaven

Chairman Senator Carl Levin

Senator James Webb

Ranking Member Senator John McCain

Defend Your Integrity

THE OFFICIAL TILLMAN STORY

Defend Your Integrity

THE TILLMAN STORY

Defend Your Integrity

THE TILLMAN STORY

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

SECRETARY ROBERT GATES & THE [UNTOLD] TILLMAN STORY

Defend Your Integrity

May 2004 -- Tillman Probably Died as the Result of Friendly Fire

Defend Your Integrity

April 2005 -- "Shameless Bullshit Fuck you and Yours.

Defend Your Integrity

April 2007 -- The Whole Thing Is Riddled with Nonsense

July 2007 -- A Perfect Storm of Mistakes

Defend Your Integrity

From pp. 279 282 of Fred Kaplans book, The Insurgents):

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

Defend Your Integrity

May 2008 -- Did They Teach You How to Lie Yet?

Defend Your Integrity