The Philosophy of Ingenium: Concept and Ingenious Method in Baltasar Gracian^ Emilio Hidalgo Serna Every human undertaking

arises from a certain set of historical circumstances. The impetus for this essay is the recent discussion of the notion of ingenium at congresses on Giambattista Vico in New York and Venice, especially by Ernesto Grassi and Donald Verene. I propose to carry tbe discussion a step further by examining the place of ingenium in the work of the Spanish Jesuit, Baltasar Gracian (1601-1658), for whom the concept is also a central concern. In the discussion of Gracian's Agudeza y arte de ingenio of 1642 the critics reduced the implications of ingenium to purely formal and aesthetic aspects. For Menendez y Pelayo the work embodies "the codex of poetic intellectualism."^ Croce adjudges Gracian a theoretician of literary conceptismo, whose principle, in his opinion, is "the literary form considered as ingenious and pleasant ornament, added to the naked expression of thought."' But I do BOt believe that ingenium and its concepts can be so easily relegated to the category of mere formal and decorative additions to rational expression. According to Gracian, ingenium comprehends the true essence of things by taking into account the relationships and differences between them. For this reason it is necessary before analyzing the method of ingenium to discuss briefly the traditional Aristotelian logic. When the two thought structures have been contrasted and we can differentiate between them we shall be able to understand more clearly the characteristics of ingenium as a method of cognition. 1. The Rational Method and the Rational Concept in the Philosophy of Aristotle. It is agreed generally that Aristotelian and traditional logic revolve around the concept. R. Verneaux, for example, says, "The basis of classical logic is the theory of the concept. It presupposes realism.'"* And C. Prantl observes, "The concept is the
Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 13, No. 4, Fall 1980. Published by the Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park and London,
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principle of Aristotelian logic. "^ Since it is in the concept' that the encounter between Aristotle's logic and his ontology takes place, it would not be proper to deal only with the Organon and neglect the Metaphysics. Further, in the concept can be perceived the key to the force and extent of the ratioeal method. Only in the concept (horos), taking as a point of departure the expressed or expounded concept (logos), can the true nature ofthe premiss (protasis), the syllogism (syllogismos), the demonstration {apodeixis), and demonstrative knowledge {episteme apodeiktike) be arrived at.^ Aristotle's definition of "concept" is the following: "that into which the premiss can be analyzed, viz., the predicate and the subject, with the addition or removal of the verb to be or not tO' be."* This definition is somewhat ,ambiguous and inexact. It is significant that Aristotle did not leave us any tractate which deals specifically with the key elements of his logic' In books I, II, and VI of the Prior Analytics the expression, horos, occurs twenty times.'" Translators of the book into Latin and into modern languages have made use of three renderings of the word, which they have used without distinction"term," "concept," and "definition." Especially interesting is the etymological and semantic relationship between "concept" {horos) and "definition" (horismos). The close relationship between these two words and between "concept" and "term," in the sense of "fixed," and "delineated," becomes evident from the derivation from horizo and the middle form of the same word, horizomai. Moerbeke translates horizo as determino (to limit, restrict) and as termino (to divide, terminate, finish). The verb, horizomai (fix, define, explain) expresses a somewhat sharper delimitation and is translated as definio.^^ But if the Aristotelian concept is a definition of being, positive or negative, the essential character and original goal of this knowledge would involve a restriction of being; it is thus possible to comprehend being and to define it, in order to know it better. Aristotle says, "All men by nature desire to know (eidenai)," and he adds, "knowledge and understanding belong to art rather than to experience,"'^ because "experience is knowledge of individuals [hekaston], but art is perception of the universal [katholou]."'* Aristotle, of course, strives to attain knowledge of

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the universal, that is, demonstrative knowledge, which may make the claim of having perceived the basis (dioti) and the cause (ten aitian) of things.'^ Taking philosophy as wisdom, he writes, "clearly then wisdom is knowledge about certain principles and causes.""' If the goal of this knowledge is to be the universal, it follows that the Aristotelian concept on which such cognition is based will also be universal and abstract and, thus, rational, that is, neither imaginative nor representative of the individual and the unique res. In this realm of rational knowledge is realized all learning (mathesis) by means of previous knowledge, as well as learning by means of demonstration (apodeixeos) and learning by definitions (horismon). The same is true of learning through induction (epagoges)." But when knowledge presupposes other knowledge, in the same way as the conclusion presupposes the premisses, how and where does this previous knowledge emerge, and how valid is it? On what are the premisses based? The premiss is "an affirmative or negative statement (logos) of something about some subject""* and this logos as an expressed concept of horos, or the content of the concept is, like the proof of an "ultimate faith" (eschate doxa), based on a first and ultimate principle (arche): the principle of contradiction. This principle, which in itself is something defined, therefore needs no proof; "for this principle according to its nature is at the same time the principle of the other axioms."'' Determining the premisses, the principle of contradiction fixes the concepts and their generative ability and at the same time circumscribes them. Rational Aristotelian knowledge is based ultimately not only on this principle of contradiction but also on other principles or a priori presuppositions. It is possible to discover the rational and universal nature of the concept in direct relationship with reason. In Aristotelian concepts the essences of things and such expressions are reductions or generalizations of that which reason presupposes and determines as essential in things. The being of things, that is, their substance, is identical with their essence,,. But if rational cognition remains limited to its essence, since "to know each thing, at least is just to know its essence,""" then we would say that reason's knowledge is concerned only with the universal in

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essences. Thereby reason forgets the extraordinary and the concrete and in its concepts expresses only genus and species. Aristotle adds that "for both the essence and the universal and the genus, are thought to be the substance of each thing."-' Possession of the truth of being, that is, the goal of all knowledge, seems to us impossible in the framework of the Aristotelian method. Reason, commencing with universal concepts and with the assistance of laws and principles which need no proof, because they are accepted a priori, is unable to represent the unique truth of things. Within this cognitive structure nothing proves clearer than the universal character of the concept, since this horos expresses itself about substances which, like the genus, have been conceived of as universal (Cf. Meta. 1069a, 26-27). Aristotle proclaims that "knowledge is of uoiversals"^^ and builds on universal principles. In his philosophical search for first principles and for the causes of substances, he insists on the art of the universal: "since the science of the philosopher treats of being qua being universally and not in respect to a part of it."^"' In spite of the "logical purity" and the "model strictness" of the Prior /incfyftc,^'* deductive and rational knowledge, commencing with universals, is oot able to make known the real. The same is true if "it is from universal premises that the syllogism proceeds."'" In that case nothing new will be produced in the conclusion. That means that nothing can be expressed which is not either affirmed or presupposed already in the premisses. This sort of logic does not lead to inventio, for in the framework of deductive method invention is not possible. The value and the character of difference (diaphora) in the Aristotelian system derives from the verbal root common to the concept (horos) and the definition (horismos). The philosopher asserts, "clearly the definition is the formula which comprises the differentiae. But it is also necessary that the division be by the differentia of the differentia. "^'' Apparently what is at stake here is not real, but only logical and rational differences between things,. If we affirm that "man is a rational animal," the difference is expressed in the concept "rational," whereby "rational" is to be understood as the species or the specific difference.

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We shall keep the universal and abstract characteristic of the rational concept in mind. Since Aristotelian science is concerned only with knowledge of universals (katholou) the question must be allowed whether another valid, non-rational method of philosophizing may be permitted. Is it possible to express the essence and being of individual things (he kaston)? Must we give up the individual, or should we decide, rather, that the Aristotelian need not be the only valid science? 2. The Concept of Imaginative Language as Creations of Ingenium. The goal which Baltasar Gracian set for himself in his Agudeza y arte de ingenio is very clear. He attempts to explain "all forms and differences of concepts"^^ by means of concrete examples. But what does Gracian understand by "concept?" What human ability produces concepts? What is specific to the concept, and how does it differ from the rational and Aristotelian concept? These problems and questions can be dealt with only by means of an interpretation of the Gracian definition of concepto. For Gracian, "The concept is an act of understanding which expresses the existing and present correspondence between objects."^* The first difficulty is to determine whether this "act of understanding" is a consequence of reason, judgment, or of ingenium. Graciao makes a distinction within understanding between two qualities, judgment and ingenium. In his first book he writes, "Of everything in the world which can be seen, man is the best, and within man himself it is enderstanding . . . this main faculty finds its expression in two othersdepth of Judgment and elevation of ingenium."-' Since attention here is concentrated on the concept in order to detect within it already objectivized or concentrated truth, it must be asked which of these qualities, judgment or ingenium, is the cause and source of the formation of concepts. Gracian differentiates between them: "Judgment is the throne of prudence; ingenium is the sphere of agudeza."^ Here the reciprocal relationship between ingenium and agudeza is affirmed, for the latter is conditioned by ingenium. That means that agudeza can appear and move only within the action radius of ingenium. Judgment is

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circumscribed by the practical and posterior activity of men, which cognition presupposes. If prudence has need of judgment, both have a common need for the primacy of ingenium, of agudeza and cognition. In the third chapter of El Heroe, "The Greatest Quality of the Hero," Gracian says nothing about judg^ ment but emphasizes the importance of ingenium and agudeza. Knowledge and the concepts constitute the flexible foundation and the first activity of ingenium. These concepts represent in themselves objective agudeza. As sender of agudeza, ingenium creates the concepts, and they reflect at the same time its power (agudeza). Therefore in Arte de ingenio, concept and agudeza are used interchangeably. Gracian maintains "that understanding without agudeza and without concepts is like a sun without light and without rays; and so many concepts, which glitter in heavenly light, are the materials of ingenium.''-^ By using rruetaphors, Gracian wants to communicate to us that these offspring of ingenium (agudeza and concepts) are the foundation of clarity and the true life of understanding. Only ingenium is able to send out light (agudeza) and rays (concepts). Thus the Gracian concept is not a rational act of understanding, or of "ratio," or of logos as we encounter in Aristotle. By no means can ingenium, agudeza, and "concept" be interpreted merely as ability, activity, and ornamental and literary expression in the service of rational expression. What Gracian suggests is a new model of thinking, of understanding and of expressing being. Gracian, representative of a special conceptismo, which until now has been interpreted only from a literary standpoint, differentiates three areas of agudeza de artifico viz., three "modi" or ways of expressing ingenium: agudeza of the concept, verbal agudeza, and agudeza of practical action.^^ "Verbal agudeza, which is based more on the word," is the aesthetic expression of ingenium, while the "agudeza of the practical action" represents Gracian's formula for practical and ingenious morals.^' We should not forget at this point our own concern, "the agudeza of the concept," which, according to Gracian, "is based more on the subtlety of thought than on words."*" This "subtlety of concept" is the object and the fundamental material of the work, Agudeza y arte de ingenio. Gracian does not forget his "soul" (the word)for, in contrast to judg-

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ment, ingenium is not satisfied with truth alone, but aspires to beauty.'^ The "agudeza of the concept" is also called the "subtlety of ingenium"^'' and the "subtlety of thought." Obviously "subtlety of thought" appears as a characteristic of man's ingenious activity in the service of cognition. In the work. El discreto, we read of ingenium as the "courage to understand," whose victory is represented through "that which is understood" (the concept).'" In this understanding we see the philosophical meaning of ingenium as a faculty which links one man cognitively with others and with the natural world. Not without reason was ingenium for the Latins synonymous with nature and the equivalent of the Greek physis. There exists in the totality of all things in nature a graduated and diverse complex. Nature implies a different grade of ontological ingenuity. Such differences do not, however, destroy the relationship between beings. In the case of ingenium, "subtlety of thinking" and the "courage to understand" are realized not through abstraction on the basis of universal principles, but through the vision and through the conceptual expression of correspondences, which unite individual objects. In his Criticon, Gracian maintains that plants and animals cannot progress beyond certain limits in the development of feelings and in growth. In the case of man, in contrast, ingenium appears as creative ability. With man appears a new and, in comparison with other creatures, higher structure, since "beyond growing and feeling are added judging, reflecting and comprehending."-"* Man develops as a "compendium of al! that nature is"'' and feels, but he goes beyond that, he transcends himself. That means that all his strivings are directed towards his appearance as mediator and as the ordering bridge of being. He is able to understand something in that, like Andrenio in the Grottohe differentiates, compares, observes, and recognizes the "palpable differences" which give to each being its individuality in existential fellowship with other beings. The Gracian equation between the "understood" and ingenium is instructive. In ingenium is made certain the mutual dependence of nature, of being, of man, and of truth. Gracian asserts that "every gain in understanding (ingenium) is also a gain in being."* Being, knowing, and inge-

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nium are united in a close natural relationship. Thereforeand because the universal is not present, that is, does not exist in naturethe concept of ingenium becomes only the expression of concrete knowledge and a measure for individual perception. The concept of ingenium appears and develops through keen differentiations within the real and the ontological, and not through logical distinctions between genus and species. Man attains to reflection and knowledge through the ingenious distinction. Gracian explains how ingenium is able to "build a concept": "The wise man constructs a concept with everything, and there where profundity and doubts occur, he digs with difference, and thinks that perhaps there is more than he first assumes; in such a fashion that the reflection arrives at a place where perception does not.'"" Accordingly, neither a superficial understanding of the external nor a rational abstraction of being is satisfactory. What is needed is a searching penetration and those distinctive properties of the ingenious "subtlety of thought." Before we turn to the investigation of value and the meaning of "correspondence" in the artistic doctrine of ingenium, it will be useful to take note of the difference between the rational concept and the ingenious concept. We have seen how the Aristotelian concept (horos) is based on demonstration and the rational affirmation of being. Its content was abstract, since it was concerned with an indirect predication of logically divided being, which men divide up into essenses, genera, and species. The Aristotelian method of proof made necessary a strength, which could make possible the "intellectual possession of the universal." Traditional logic recognized in "ratio" only its own mode of uniting concepts and of constructing alternating forms, in order to draw consequences from them for a new concept which, indeed, was already presupposed in the true, affirmative premises. In contrast, the Gracian concept is not demonstrative. The logic of the ingenious concept cannot be formal or rational. Its concepts cannot express logical relationships, but always only new, real relationships, which constitute the unique essence of things. Gracian attempts to show, not to demonstrate. Concepts therefore must be a re-representation of reality, in which the associations of the relative in the individual being are respected.

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Such concepts must be expressed; they need their own language, whose nature is similar to the ability to produce such concepts. Aristotelian perception of reality, or the vision of its content, was essentially ratioeal, and as such required a logical structure and the language of substantial logic. The subtle vision of ingenium is not satisfied with the idea, or with the essential justification of things, but is rather a direct view and a subtle apprehension of correspondences, relationships of similarity, dissimilarities, proportion, and the like. The author of the Criticon believes that only imaginative language can represent and squeeze out the truth of the unique individual. If in reality things exist bound up with each other and thus can have meaning and importance only in their "being-with" other beings, then the appropriate expression for such relationships is the metaphor and the ingenious expression. By means ofthe metaphor we are enabled to place individual things under the light of others; by the transference of images of the best-known things one can express the less well-known things. The code and the power of the image and the metaphor are in the ability to take account of the "relativity" of the object treated. In contrast, we observe in Aristotle that reason, the rational concept, and axiomatic language establish only abstraction and the predication of the universal. For the affirmation of its concepts reason needs premisses and formulations derived a priori. In the Criticon Gracian contends that the purpose of language, of the spoken or written concept, and of conversation is to produce "conceptual images of themselves in the spirit of the listener.'"*^ Imaginative language is the most suitable form by which to communicate reality in a symbolical form. Ingenium, by drawing out relationships, creates conceptual images which are a concretion of being in the word. In this sense the ingenious image is a "proper name" for the truth of things. Gracian speaks of the metaphor as "the normal workshop of conversation" in which are found "extr,aordinary concepts for the marvelous correspondence and comparison.'"'' With this "metaphorical comparison" ingenium counterposes two separate things over against each other and with images objectifies relationships or similarities between them which already are present.

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3. The Concept or the Ingenious Expression of Correspondence. We must now briefly analyze the mechanism or the artifice, by means of which ingenium fashions truth in the concept. Truth and fruitfulness of each concept depend not only on the grade of correspondence which ingenium has perceived or observed in the objects, but also on the skillfulness by which ingenium grasps and fixes in language the relationships stated. That the correspondence precedes the concept and the ingenious art is indisputable. This correspondence, which ingenium has discovered, will become the expressive basis of the concept; the correspondence is primarily the necessary conformity and the mutual ootological relationship between the things. As root, basis, and norm of the ontological, correspondence becomes the essential law of the cognitive ability of the ingenious artifice. "This artifice of ingenium [artificio del ingenioj," Gracian writes, "consists in a harmonic correlation between two or three outwardly recognizable objects; this reciprocal relationship is expressed by an act of understanding."** Respect for the correspondence or the genuine relationship between things is the cardinal principle of the logic of ingenium. The successive gradation of perceptions and truths (or of concrete correspondences) is the result of immediate and subtle intuitions, "first glance," or sudden rays of ingenium. Without such experienced relationships, accessible only to ingenium, neither reason nor judgment would find a stable foundation on which to build, on which reflection aod decision would be possible. Truth does not emerge from equating (adaequare) nor from the conformation of the intellect to the thing or vice-versa. It is not a coincidence (adaequatio) between intelligence and things. This truth appeairs and reveals itself by proceeding from the differences and similarities of objects. It is perceived by ingenium and expressed in the concept. Correspondence, concordance, or correlation are not exclusively properties of being. Ingenium, as human capability with its origin in nature, cannot remain separated from reality. And between it (ingenium) and the concepts arises a mutual affinity

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and relationship. "This accord or sympathy between the concepts and ingenium is based on another perfection, in a most subtle artifice. It is the basic cause, in which agudeza is rooted, and the cause also, of its differing so much from the reason [ratio] which is its opposite; that constitutes the concept.'"*^ This "subtle artifice of ingenium" the cause of the agudeza and fundamental part of the conceptis nothing other than a careful differentation of objects or the subtle perception of correspondences. Gracian writes, "All intentional capabilities of the soul I refer to those which can perceive objects, make use of some artifice in them; the proportion between the parts of the visible is beauty, between sounds is harmony. . . . Understanding (ingenium) as primary capability, arises with the triumph of artifice, with the marvelous masterpiece, in each of the differences of the objects."*'' The only possible manner in which to approach being cognitively and to reach truth in the concept is in differentiating artificially between objects, to the end of perceiving and expressing with precision the correspondences in the ingenious act of placing in relationship and comparing. That implies that the highest goal of ingenium is to attain truth by proceeding from the correspondence, the context. Thus the concept, the agudeza, the "Gracian conceptismo,'^ and ingenium are neither literary nor aesthetic, but primarly acts, method, and possibility of perception. Agudeza and subtlety are powers created by ingenium, which are expressed in the concept and reveal the correspondence and the relationships which ingenium is able to perceive in objects. In this fashion ingenium engenders concepts and on the basis of the expressed correspondence, truth, agudeza, and subtlety become evident and objective for us. Gracian confirnsis this in the continuation of his definition of the concept: "The same consonance or expressed artificial correlation is the objective subtlety, as seen and admired in the well-known sonnet which Luis de Gongora, in competition with many others, wrote on the rose."*^ This passage, in which Graci,an speaks of "objective subtlety" (sutileza objetiva) we can equally correctly read or interpret as objective truth or objective agudeza. From this correspondence, which through ingenium is objectified in the concept and which is an

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imaginative and metaphorical representation of the correspondence or correlation between the individual beings, is brought out the philosophical truth of its objects. For example, let us turn now to Gongora's sonnet, Vana Rosa ("The Vaio Rose") to see how truth, expressed in a beautiful form, appears in practice in the correlation which the ingenious poet is able to detect and fashion between the considered object (the rose), its environs, and the existential situation of the objects to which the rose stands in relationship. The complete truth of this work, the truth of the rose, the object of Gongora's ingenium, comes out of the totality of concepts and objective subtleties in the sonnet. If the correspondences and correlations expressed in the concepts conform to reality, then the degree of truth about the rose achieved by Gongora is proportional to the sum of the relationships he has grasped and has expressed in a poetic and imaginative way by means of ingenium.
Ayer naciste, y irtoriras m,anana; para tan breve ser, ^quieti te did vida? para vivir tan poco, estas lucida, y para nada ser, estas lozana. Si tu hermosura te engaiio mas v,ana, bien presto la veras desvanedda, porque en esa hermostira esta escondida la ocasion de morir muerte temprana. Cuando te corte ia robusta mano, ley de la agricultura perrnitida, grosero ,aliento acabara tti suerte. No saigas, que te aguarda algun tirarto, dilata tu nacer para tu vida, que anticipas tu ser para tu mtierte. Born yesterday, you will die tomorrow To live so little you are splendid And to be nothing, you are luxuriant. If your beauty tempts yo to more vanity You will see it soon destroyed For in this beauty is hidden The possibility of dying an early death.

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And if a harsh hand plucks you. The norm of usual gardening, A coarse breath completes your fate. Do not come otit, some tyrant awaits Delay birth life-long For your being anticipates your death.'"*

Gongora intends to show the fragile vanity of the rose. To this purpose he contrasts the short time of its existence with its beauty. The relationship achieved in the concept results from the non-conformity or the antagonism between the objects. "Born yesterday, you will die tomorrow." In these first lines of the sonnet Gongora has expressed briefly and ingeniously the temporal-existential relationship of the rose. He has used six terms to achieve this concept of the shortness of life of the observed object. Four of them, yesterday, being born, tomorrow, dying, are stated explicitly. The other twoliving, todayalthough they are already implied, appear spontaneously from the contrast between the first four. The rose lives today, and this is the moment in which Gongora directs to it his imaginative word. From the correspondence between the temporal terms, "yesterday," "today," "tomorrow," which are connected respectively with the three situations of life, "being born," "living," "dying," originate here the concept and the truth about the shortness of the rose's life. To this short existence of the opulent growth is contrasted its elegance, qualities which pertain to the rose's beauty. "To live so little, you are splendid/ And to be nothing, you are luxuriant." The poet is grasping for the comparison between contraries, between brevity, a negative aspect and beauty, a positive aspect. He succeeds in constructing a concept (hacer concepto) by means of which he is able to express the truth of an object from a new perspective. The correspondence which we perceive in these verses Graciao calls "contraposition" or "dissonance." Thus he gives to the being of the rose its own plastic and ingenious form by counterposing its evanescence to its beauty. In his contraposition of imaginative concepts and his agudeza Gongora achieves the truth of being.

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In Gracian one senses a special revereoce for Horace, Martial, Gongora, Marino, etc. Whence this inclination? They were for him "philosophers in verse." In their verses Gracian discovers the ingenious method of searching out truth and correspondence by the use of images. In the metaphorical language of the poem Gracian finds the best means of philosophizing and learning. He says, "A good method of learning consists in the combining the useful (truth) with the sweet (beauty). Other works of poetry only entertain, but leave the spirit and the soul empty."*' The metaphorical and ingenious expression of correspondences is not merely empty or beautiful representation, but primarily an affirmation of the truth of being. Gracian writes on Gongora: "This educated poet was in concentos like a swan, in concepts like an eagle; outstanding in every kind of agudeza, but in this kind of contraposition consists the triumph of his great ingenium."^" Concento or harmonious music is the term for the harmonic song of several voices; and if it can be said that pleasant harmony is produced through the combination of sounds in accord, then Gongora can be said to sing io a philosophical fashion, the harmonic agreement between the objects achieved with the assistance of the concepts of his ingenium. Contrast is for Gongora a clear perception and a philosophical comparison; he compares an object with its contrary, as we have seen in his sonnet oo the rose. The manner in which this relationship and the contrast is expressed is at the same time philosophical and aesthetic. This kind of ingenium, of contrasting the unique and the real, contradicts "ratio" and the rational method. "Ratio" neglects comparison of things; it affirms and establishes them in deriving a conclusion, a logical concept, or a definition of being generally from premisses. In the sonnet we have seen that the rose is no isolated object aod does oot appear so. Gongora captures the relationship which obtains between the rose aod the man and calls attention to it. The short life and the death of the rose are dependent not only oo its natural constitution. Its fate is also subordinated to the human will. The beauty of the rose seduces the man to curiosity and attention. He can pluck it and own it; and in this sense it is precisely the rose's beauty which can hasten

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its death; it becomes the cause of the shortness of its life. In the tercets Gongora pursues this relationship. Being boro presupposes a real contradictioodying. To prefer its being, its life, means for the rose to hasten its non-being, its death. If we were to define the rose rationally as Aristotle does in calling man a "rational being," we would have to say that "the rose is a dicotyledonary plant." Our formulation is abstract; iri a general fashion we express the genus and the species of the rose. The concept "plant" can be applied indifferently to "everything that lives and which is bound by roots to the earth." In this sense, bamboo and soybeans are plants, though they are not roses. But if we add the word, "dicotyledonary," the rational and specific scientific differentiation of the rose, we are still not outside the terrain of the general, since strawberries, almood trees, and pear trees are also dicotyledonary. Also dicotyledoo,ary are the various kinds of roses.^' How can we find a suitable way to express the essence of the rose, aod from it to build a concept? Will it be necessary to reach for the syllogism to express the truth of the object? Which method and language must be used to recognize and to express the truth of being? Is it possible to reduce knowledge to the definition? Is there another kind of concept, which is not rational and is yet philosophical? The language of the syllogism for Aristotle is an expression and a relationship of logical concepts with universal validity. According to the Greek philosopher at least one premiss must be general in order that a conclusion can be drawn (Prim. AnaL 41b, 8). The objects are grasped by understanding in their totality, abstracted iotellectually according to a priori schemata and unprovable principles. This language, which canoot be an expression for the unique aod the relative, blocks the possibility of any unification and relationship among real objects. Otherwise than in the value judgment of Maier^' we recognize in neither the syllogism nor the logical, rational language the power on which objective progress which recognizes the human factor can be based. In contrast, for Gracian, the metaphor, the image, and the ingenious concepts are re-expressions of the related, the individual, the relative, aod the coocrete. Ingenium comprehends that which rationality rejects or which evades its laws. In the language of

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ingenium the conceptual images are results and living visions of similarities. The metaphorical transference of the normal sense of words into another,figurativeone has, io Gracian, an aim which at the same time is practical, illuminating, plastic, cognitive, and aesthetic. The Gracian researchers (critics) affirm only the aesthetic aspect of the Graciao concepto and correspondences, expressed through ingenium. We have seen that the chief characteristic of the imaginative concept and of ingenium is something else. According to Graciao both achieve a philosophical dimension. He affirms in his work, Agudeza y arte de ingenio, that "All wise men have aimed for one and the same goal of philosophical truth, albeit in different ways, of discovery and agudeza.''^^ The metaphor aod the concepto of Gracian seek and ioform the sense and make the truth of being perceptible "in a pathetic way" through the correspondences between objects. Gracian'^s idea of truth, thus, is not rational or logical, but imaginative and ingenious. Ooly ingenium is able, through images, to perceive and to represent the most varied and distant relationships between individual beings. Pierre Reverdy affirms that "the more distant and fitting are the relationships between two realities we approach, the stronger the image will be, and the more it will possess powerful feelings and poetic reahty."''' The axiomatic language of premisses, a blank form for "ratio" and the demonstrative science, is, to the extent that it is rational and logical, opposed to the language of ingenium. The former is cold, intellectual, rigorous, and sterile; aod, to the extent that it is concerned with an outmoded language, foreign and conventional.'^ The imaginative and metaphorical language proceeds from the fertility of ingenium and is dynamic, suggestive, aod plastic. It directly stimulates the wheels of imagination and creativity in the human spirit.'' Translated by Oliver Olson Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbuttel, West Germany

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NOTES
'Cl Emilio Hidalgo Sern,a, Filosofia del ingenio y del concepto en Baltasar Gracian (Rome, 1976). ^M. Menendez y Pelayo, "Poetica conceptista: Baltasar Gracian." Obras completas, Historia de las ideas esteticas en Espana, Vol. 2. (Madrid, 1950), p. 355. ^B, Croce, "I trattatisti italiani del Concettismo e Baltasar Gracian." Problemi di Estetica e contributi alia storia dell'estetica itatiana (B,ari, 1940), p. 313. 'R. Verneaux, Les sources cartesiermes et kantiennes de ridealisme Frangais (Paris, 1936), p. 19. *C. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, Vol, 1 (Graz, 1955), p. 135. '"Dass hier (im Begriff) das logische und das ontologisehe Moment zusammentreffen. , . . So muss unsere Untersuchung iiber die aristotelische Lehre vom Begriffe. . . . Notweodig auch die metaphysische Geltung des, begrifflichen Denkens in sich eioschliessen." C, Prantl, ibid., pp, 210-11. 'Thus at the beginning of the Prior Analytics when Aristotle sets his goals he is flrst forced to make precise definitions of the concept, premisses, and the s,yllogism: "Our first duty is to state the scope of our inquiry, aod to what science it pertains: that it is concerned with demonstration, and pertains to a demonstrative science. Next-we must define the meaning of 'premiss' and 'term' and 'syllogism' and distinguish between a perfect and an imperfect syllogism," Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 24 a 10-13. %id., 24b 16-18. 'Horn is justifiably disturbed by the secondary position of the concept in traditional logic: "In der traditionelien Logik erscheint der Begriff zumeist als ein einfaches Gebilde. So wurde er zum Stiefkind der Logik, das sich in den logischen Systemen eine sehr untergeordnete Behandlung gegeniiber dem Urteil, dem Schluss Oder der Methodenlehre gef alien lassen muj3te." J.H. Horn, Widerspiegelung und Begriff. Eine togisch-erkenntnistheoretisehe Untersuchung (Berlin. 1958), p. 13, '"Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 24a 12; 24b 16,22,26; 25a 6; 25b 32; 26a 8,12, 14, 15,17,21,35,38; 26b 7,12,17,19,25,28. "Aristotle, Metaphysics, 989b 18; 1000a 2; 1008a 34; 1009a 5; In these four places Moerbeke translates horizo by determino. In 1017b 17 and 1033b 22 he expresses the same verbal form with the Latin termino. In 987a 21; 1002a 6 and 10! Ib 25 Moerbeke translates horizomai as definio. "Ibid., 980a 21. "Ibid., 981a 24-25. 'Ibid., 981a 15-16. "Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 71b 9-12. "Aristotle, Metaphysics, 982a 1-2, "Ibid,, 992b ,30-33 and Posterior Analytics, 71a 1-2. "Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 24a 16-17, "Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1005b 33-34. "Ibid., 1031b 20-21. "Ibid., 1028b 34-35. ^'Ibid., 10i86b33. '^ftid., 1060b 31-32. ^""Die Bedeutung der aristotelischen Logik liegt weder in ihrer AUgemeinheit (denti sie ist eine spezielle Theorie) noch in ihrem philosophischen Tiefsinn (denn sie gerade sorgfaltig vermeidet), noch in ihrer Anwendbarkeit auf konkrete Probleme (von der Aristoteles selbst herzlich wenig Gebrauch macht), sondern in ihrer

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beispieihaften Stretige utid logischen Reinheit." G. Patzig, Die aristotelische Sytlogisdk. Logisch-phiMogische Vntersuchungen iiber das Buck a der 'Ersten Analytiken" (Gottingen, 1959), p, 199. ^Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 43b 14. ^Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1038a 8-9. "The object of Gracian's art comes to expression in the complete title of his work: Agudeza y arte de ingenio. En que se explkan todos los modos y diferencias de eonceptos. Cf. Baltasar Gracian, Obras Completas, ed. Arturo del Hoyo (Madrid: Aguilar, 1967), p. 236. In the following Gracian is cited only from this edition. ^Ibid., p. 242a. ^Gracian, El Heroe, p, 9b. Ibid ^'Gracian, Agudeza y arte de ingenio, pp, 238b.^239a. ^%id., p.244a. ''Ibid. "Ibid. ''Ibid., p. 241a. *Ibid., p. 237b. ''Gracian, El Discreto, p.80b. '"Graciati, El Criticon, Parte I, Crisi III, p. 537a. "Gracian, Oraculo manual y arte de prudencia, Nr. 93, p. 179a, *Gracian, El Discreto, p.80b. "Gracian, Oraculo mantml y arte de prudencia, Nr. 35, 162b. ^Gracian, Ei Criticon, Parte I, Crisi I, p. 524a. ""Gradan, Agudeza y arte de ingenio, p. 467b. "Ibid., p. 241b. "Ibid., p, 240a. *Ibid., p. 240b. "Ibid., p. 240a. "'This sonnet, ascribed to Gongora, is cited by Gracian in his Agudeza y arte de ingenio, p. 242a. *Ibid., p.434a. *Ibid., p. 257,a. "Approximately 3000 varieties of rose are known to botany. Cf. Rororo Pfianzenlexikon. Vol. 3 (Hambtirg, 1969), p. 687. '^"Er [Aristotle] war der erste, der im Syllogismus die begrundende Kraft des GedankenfoTtschritts erkaunte, sein eigentCimliches Wesen aufsuchte und seine versciiiedenen Formen zusammenstellte." H. Maier, Die Syliogistik des Aristoteles, Tei! 1, Die logische Theorie des Urteils bei Aristoteles (Tubingen, 1896), p.i, Gracian, Agtideza y arte de ingenio, p. 478a. ''R, Gomez de la Serna, Greguerias (Madrid, 1972), p. 10. ''"But while every sentence has meaning, though not as an instrument of nature but, as we observed, by convention, not all can be called propositions," Aristotle, De Interpretatione, p, 17a 1-2. *In his Macht des Bildes: Ohnmaeht der rationalen Sprache (Cologne: DuMont, 1970) Ernesto Grassi makes ,a clear distinction between the two are,as. Especially interesting is part three of his book, in which he interprets the pathetic, moving power of the image in Gorgias' Praise of Helena. He then treats ingenium, the metaphor, and the unity of "res" and "verba" in the humanistic tradition, defending the worth of rhetoric. In Marxismus und Humanismm (Hamburg: Rowohit, 1973) Grassi brings the philosophical questions of Italian humanism up to date by

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criticizing a priori sdence and thought and develops the function of imagination in thought according to Giambattista Vieo out of the confrontation with the Marxist point of view. Grassi dedicates another work to the imagination, the language of images, and the metaphor: Die Macht der Phantasie. Zur Geschichte abendlandischen Denkens (Konigstein: Athenaum, 1979). fSee review in this issue.ED. j