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This etext was prepare! by -ue 2sscher =asschers>aia%net%au?

T,E2ETET:by Plato

Translate! by +enja$in Sowett

19T*8':CT189 29' 292<P-1-% -o$e !ialogues of Plato are of so arious a character that their relation to the other !ialogues cannot be !eter$ine! with any !egree of certainty% The Theaetetus, li"e the Par$eni!es, has points of si$ilarity both with his earlier an! his later writings% The perfection of style, the hu$our, the !ra$atic interest, the co$plexity of structure, the fertility of illustration, the shifting of the points of iew, are characteristic of his best perio! of authorship% The ain search, the negati e conclusion, the figure of the $i!wi es, the constant profession of ignorance on the part of -ocrates, also bear the sta$p of the early !ialogues, in which the original -ocrates is not yet Platoni7e!% ,a! we no other in!ications, we shoul! be !ispose! to range the Theaetetus with the 2pology an! the Phae!rus, an!

perhaps e en with the Protagoras an! the <aches% +ut when we pass fro$ the style to an exa$ination of the subject, we trace a connection with the later rather than with the earlier !ialogues% 1n the first place there is the connexion, in!icate! by Plato hi$self at the en! of the !ialogue, with the -ophist, to which in $any respects the Theaetetus is so little a"in% A.B The sa$e persons reappear, inclu!ing the younger -ocrates, whose na$e is just $entione! in the TheaetetusK A2B the theory of rest, which -ocrates has !ecline! to consi!er, is resu$e! by the Eleatic -trangerK AFB there is a si$ilar allusion in both !ialogues to the $eeting of Par$eni!es an! -ocrates ATheaet%, -oph%BK an! AEB the inTuiry into notD being in the -ophist supple$ents the Tuestion of false opinion which is raise! in the Theaetetus% ACo$pare also Theaet% an! -oph% for parallel turns of thought%B -econ!ly, the later !ate of the !ialogue is confir$e! by the absence of the !octrine of recollection an! of any !octrine of i!eas except that which !eri es the$ fro$ generali7ation an! fro$ reflection of the $in! upon itself% The general character of the Theaetetus is !ialectical, an! there are traces of the sa$e ;egarian influences which appear in the Par$eni!es, an! which later writers, in their $atter of fact way, ha e explaine! by the resi!ence of Plato at ;egara% -ocrates !isclai$s the character of a professional eristic, an! also, with a sort of ironical a!$iration, expresses his inability to attain the ;egarian precision in the use of ter$s% Pet he too e$ploys a si$ilar sophistical s"ill in o erturning e ery concei able theory of "nowle!ge% The !irect in!ications of a !ate a$ount to no $ore than this@ the con ersation is sai! to ha e ta"en place when Theaetetus was a youth, an! shortly before the !eath of -ocrates% 2t the ti$e of his own !eath he is suppose! to be a fullDgrown $an% 2llowing nine or ten years for the inter al between youth an! $anhoo!, the !ialogue coul! not ha e been written earlier than F/6, when Plato was about thirtyDnine years of age% 9o $ore !efinite !ate is in!icate! by the engage$ent in which Theaetetus is sai! to ha e fallen or to ha e been woun!e!, an! which $ay ha e ta"en place any ti$e !uring the Corinthian war, between the years F/6DFO0% The later !ate which has been suggeste!, F4/, when the 2thenians an! <ace!ae$onians !ispute! the 1sth$us with Epa$inon!as, woul! $a"e the age of Theaetetus at his !eath fortyDfi e or fortyDsix% This a little i$pairs the beauty of

-ocratesL re$ar", that Lhe woul! be a great $an if he li e!%L 1n this uncertainty about the place of the Theaetetus, it see$e! better, as in the case of the *epublic, Ti$aeus, Critias, to retain the or!er in which Plato hi$self has arrange! this an! the two co$panion !ialogues% &e cannot exclu!e the possibility which has been alrea!y notice! in reference to other wor"s of Plato, that the Theaetetus $ay not ha e been all written continuouslyK or the probability that the -ophist an! Politicus, which !iffer greatly in style, were only appen!e! after a long inter al of ti$e% The allusion to Par$eni!es co$pare! with the -ophist, woul! probably i$ply that the !ialogue which is calle! by his na$e was alrea!y in existenceK unless, in!ee!, we suppose the passage in which the allusion occurs to ha e been inserte! afterwar!s% 2gain, the Theaetetus $ay be connecte! with the Gorgias, either !ialogue fro$ !ifferent points of iew containing an analysis of the real an! apparent A-chleier$acherBK an! both $ay be brought into relation with the 2pology as illustrating the personal life of -ocrates% The Philebus, too, $ay with eTual reason be place! either after or before what, in the language of Thrasyllus, $ay be calle! the -econ! Platonic Trilogy% +oth the Par$eni!es an! the -ophist, an! still $ore the Theaetetus, ha e points of affinity with the Cratylus, in which the principles of rest an! $otion are again contraste!, an! the -ophistical or Protagorean theory of language is oppose! to that which is attribute! to the !isciple of ,eracleitus, not to spea" of lesser rese$blances in thought an! language% The Par$eni!es, again, has been thought by so$e to hol! an inter$e!iate position between the Theaetetus an! the -ophistK upon this iew, the -ophist $ay be regar!e! as the answer to the proble$s about 8ne an! +eing which ha e been raise! in the Par$eni!es% 2ny of these arrange$ents $ay suggest new iews to the stu!ent of PlatoK none of the$ can lay clai$ to an exclusi e probability in its fa our% The Theaetetus is one of the narrate! !ialogues of Plato, an! is the only one which is suppose! to ha e been written !own% 1n a short intro!uctory scene, Eucli!es an! Terpsion are !escribe! as $eeting before the !oor of Eucli!esL house in ;egara% This $ay ha e been a spot fa$iliar to Plato Afor ;egara was within a wal" of 2thensB, but no i$portance can be attache! to the acci!ental intro!uction of the foun!er of the ;egarian philosophy% The real intention of the preface is to create an interest about the person

of Theaetetus, who has just been carrie! up fro$ the ar$y at Corinth in a !ying state% The expectation of his !eath recalls the pro$ise of his youth, an! especially the fa$ous con ersation which -ocrates ha! with hi$ when he was Tuite young, a few !ays before his own trial an! !eath, as we are once $ore re$in!e! at the en! of the !ialogue% Pet we $ay obser e that Plato has hi$self forgotten this, when he represents Eucli!es as fro$ ti$e to ti$e co$ing to 2thens an! correcting the copy fro$ -ocratesL own $outh% The narrati e, ha ing intro!uce! Theaetetus, an! ha ing guarantee! the authenticity of the !ialogue Aco$pare -y$posiu$, Phae!o, Par$eni!esB, is then !roppe!% 9o further use is $a!e of the !e ice% 2s Plato hi$self re$ar"s, who in this as in so$e other $inute points is i$itate! by Cicero A'e 2$icitiaB, the interlocutory wor!s are o$itte!% Theaetetus, the hero of the battle of Corinth an! of the !ialogue, is a !isciple of Theo!orus, the great geo$etrician, whose science is thus in!icate! to be the propae!eutic to philosophy% 2n interest has been alrea!y excite! about hi$ by his approaching !eath, an! now he is intro!uce! to us anew by the praises of his $aster Theo!orus% ,e is a youthful -ocrates, an! exhibits the sa$e contrast of the fair soul an! the ungainly face an! fra$e, the -ilenus $as" an! the go! within, which are !escribe! in the -y$posiu$% The picture which Theo!orus gi es of his courage an! patience an! intelligence an! $o!esty is erifie! in the course of the !ialogue% ,is courage is shown by his beha iour in the battle, an! his other Tualities shine forth as the argu$ent procee!s% -ocrates ta"es an e i!ent !elight in Lthe wise Theaetetus,L who has $ore in hi$ than L$any bear!e! $enLK he is Tuite inspire! by his answers% 2t first the youth is lost in won!er, an! is al$ost too $o!est to spea", but, encourage! by -ocrates, he rises to the occasion, an! grows full of interest an! enthusias$ about the great Tuestion% <i"e a youth, he has not finally $a!e up his $in!, an! is ery rea!y to follow the lea! of -ocrates, an! to enter into each successi e phase of the !iscussion which turns up% ,is great !ialectical talent is shown in his power of !rawing !istinctions, an! of foreseeing the conseTuences of his own answers% The enTuiry about the nature of "nowle!ge is not new to hi$K long ago he has felt the Lpang of philosophy,L an! has experience! the youthful intoxication which is !epicte! in the Philebus% +ut he has hitherto been unable to $a"e the transition fro$ $athe$atics to $etaphysics% ,e can for$ a general conception of sTuare an! oblong nu$bers, but he is unable to attain a si$ilar expression of "nowle!ge in the abstract% Pet at length he begins

to recogni7e that there are uni ersal conceptions of being, li"eness, sa$eness, nu$ber, which the $in! conte$plates in herself, an! with the help of -ocrates is con!ucte! fro$ a theory of sense to a theory of i!eas% There is no reason to !oubt that Theaetetus was a real person, whose na$e sur i e! in the next generation% +ut neither can any i$portance be attache! to the notices of hi$ in -ui!as an! Proclus, which are probably base! on the $ention of hi$ in Plato% 2ccor!ing to a confuse! state$ent in -ui!as, who $entions hi$ twice o er, first, as a pupil of -ocrates, an! then of Plato, he is sai! to ha e written the first wor" on the (i e -oli!s% +ut no early authority cites the wor", the in ention of which $ay ha e been easily suggeste! by the !i ision of roots, which Plato attributes to hi$, an! the allusion to the bac"war! state of soli! geo$etry in the *epublic% 2t any rate, there is no occasion to recall hi$ to life again after the battle of Corinth, in or!er that we $ay allow ti$e for the co$pletion of such a wor" A;ullerB% &e $ay also re$ar" that such a supposition entirely !estroys the pathetic interest of the intro!uction% Theo!orus, the geo$etrician, ha! once been the frien! an! !isciple of Protagoras, but he is ery reluctant to lea e his retire$ent an! !efen! his ol! $aster% ,e is too ol! to learn -ocratesL ga$e of Tuestion an! answer, an! prefers the !igressions to the $ain argu$ent, because he fin!s the$ easier to follow% The $athe$atician, as -ocrates says in the *epublic, is not capable of gi ing a reason in the sa$e $anner as the !ialectician, an! Theo!orus coul! not therefore ha e been appropriately intro!uce! as the chief respon!ent% +ut he $ay be fairly appeale! to, when the honour of his $aster is at sta"e% ,e is the Lguar!ian of his orphans,L although this is a responsibility which he wishes to throw upon Callias, the frien! an! patron of all -ophists, !eclaring that he hi$self ha! early Lrun awayL fro$ philosophy, an! was absorbe! in $athe$atics% ,is extre$e !isli"e to the ,eraclitean fanatics, which $ay be co$pare! with the !isli"e of Theaetetus to the $aterialists, an! his rea!y acceptance of the noble wor!s of -ocrates, are noticeable traits of character% The -ocrates of the Theaetetus is the sa$e as the -ocrates of the earlier !ialogues% ,e is the in incible !isputant, now a! ance! in years, of the Protagoras an! -y$posiu$K he is still pursuing his !i ine $ission, his L,erculean labours,L of which he has !escribe! the origin in the 2pologyK an! he still hears the oice of his oracle, bi!!ing hi$ recei e or not

recei e the truant souls% There he is suppose! to ha e a $ission to con ict $en of selfDconceitK in the Theaetetus he has assigne! to hi$ by Go! the functions of a $anD$i!wife, who !eli ers $en of their thoughts, an! un!er this character he is present throughout the !ialogue% ,e is the true prophet who has an insight into the natures of $en, an! can !i ine their futureK an! he "nows that sy$pathy is the secret power which unloc"s their thoughts% The hit at 2risti!es, the son of <ysi$achus, who was specially co$$itte! to his charge in the <aches, $ay be re$ar"e! by the way% The atte$pt to !isco er the !efinition of "nowle!ge is in accor!ance with the character of -ocrates as he is !escribe! in the ;e$orabilia, as"ing &hat is justiceR what is te$peranceR an! the li"e% +ut there is no reason to suppose that he woul! ha e analy7e! the nature of perception, or trace! the connexion of Protagoras an! ,eracleitus, or ha e raise! the !ifficulty respecting false opinion% The hu$orous illustrations, as well as the serious thoughts, run through the !ialogue% The snubnose!ness of Theaetetus, a characteristic which he shares with -ocrates, an! the $anD $i!wifery of -ocrates, are not forgotten in the closing wor!s% 2t the en! of the !ialogue, as in the Euthyphro, he is expecting to $eet ;eletus at the porch of the "ing 2rchonK but with the sa$e in!ifference to the result which is e erywhere !isplaye! by hi$, he proposes that they shall reasse$ble on the following !ay at the sa$e spot% The !ay co$es, an! in the -ophist the three frien!s again $eet, but no further allusion is $a!e to the trial, an! the principal share in the argu$ent is assigne!, not to -ocrates, but to an Eleatic strangerK the youthful Theaetetus also plays a !ifferent an! less in!epen!ent part% 2n! there is no allusion in the 1ntro!uction to the secon! an! thir! !ialogues, which are afterwar!s appen!e!% There see$s, therefore, reason to thin" that there is a real change, both in the characters an! in the !esign% The !ialogue is an enTuiry into the nature of "nowle!ge, which is interrupte! by two !igressions% The first is the !igression about the $i!wi es, which is also a lea!ing thought or continuous i$age, li"e the wa e in the *epublic, appearing an! reappearing at inter als% 2gain an! again we are re$in!e! that the successi e conceptions of "nowle!ge are extracte! fro$ Theaetetus, who in his turn truly !eclares that -ocrates has got a great !eal $ore out of hi$ than e er was in hi$% -ocrates is ne er weary of wor"ing out the i$age in hu$orous !etails,DD!iscerning the sy$pto$s of labour, carrying the chil! roun! the hearth, fearing that Theaetetus will bite hi$, co$paring his conceptions to win!Deggs, asserting

an here!itary right to the occupation% There is also a serious si!e to the i$age, which is an apt si$ilitu!e of the -ocratic theory of e!ucation Aco$pare *epublic, -ophistB, an! accor!s with the ironical spirit in which the wisest of $en !elights to spea" of hi$self% The other !igression is the fa$ous contrast of the lawyer an! philosopher% This is a sort of lan!ingDplace or brea" in the $i!!le of the !ialogue% 2t the co$$ence$ent of a great !iscussion, the reflection naturally arises, ,ow happy are they who, li"e the philosopher, ha e ti$e for such !iscussions Aco$pare *epublicB# There is no reason for the intro!uction of such a !igressionK nor is a reason always nee!e!, any $ore than for the intro!uction of an episo!e in a poe$, or of a topic in con ersation% That which is gi en by -ocrates is Tuite sufficient, i7% that the philosopher $ay tal" an! write as he pleases% +ut though not ery closely connecte!, neither is the !igression out of "eeping with the rest of the !ialogue% The philosopher naturally !esires to pour forth the thoughts which are always present to hi$, an! to !iscourse of the higher life% The i!ea of "nowle!ge, although har! to be !efine!, is realise! in the life of philosophy% 2n! the contrast is the fa ourite antithesis between the worl!, in the arious characters of sophist, lawyer, states$an, spea"er, an! the philosopher,DDbetween opinion an! "nowle!ge,DDbetween the con entional an! the true% The greater part of the !ialogue is !e ote! to setting up an! throwing !own !efinitions of science an! "nowle!ge% Procee!ing fro$ the lower to the higher by three stages, in which perception, opinion, reasoning are successi ely exa$ine!, we first get ri! of the confusion of the i!ea of "nowle!ge an! specific "in!s of "nowle!ge,DDa confusion which has been alrea!y notice! in the <ysis, <aches, ;eno, an! other !ialogues% 1n the infancy of logic, a for$ of thought has to be in ente! before the content can be fille! up% &e cannot !efine "nowle!ge until the nature of !efinition has been ascertaine!% ,a ing succee!e! in $a"ing his $eaning plain, -ocrates procee!s to analy7e A.B the first !efinition which Theaetetus proposes@ LVnowle!ge is sensible perception%L This is spee!ily i!entifie! with the Protagorean saying, L;an is the $easure of all thingsKL an! of this again the foun!ation is !isco ere! in the perpetual flux of ,eracleitus% The relati eness of sensation is then !e elope! at length, an! for a $o$ent the !efinition appears to be accepte!% +ut soon the Protagorean thesis is pronounce! to be suici!alK for the a! ersaries of Protagoras are as goo! a $easure as he is, an! they !eny his !octrine% ,e

is then suppose! to reply that the perception $ay be true at any gi en instant% +ut the reply is in the en! shown to be inconsistent with the ,eraclitean foun!ation, on which the !octrine has been affir$e! to rest% (or if the ,eraclitean flux is exten!e! to e ery sort of change in e ery instant of ti$e, how can any thought or wor! be !etaine! e en for an instantR -ensible perception, li"e e erything else, is tu$bling to pieces% 9or can Protagoras hi$self $aintain that one $an is as goo! as another in his "nowle!ge of the futureK an! Lthe expe!ient,L if not Lthe just an! true,L belongs to the sphere of the future% 2n! so we $ust as" again, &hat is "nowle!geR The co$parison of sensations with one another i$plies a principle which is abo e sensation, an! which resi!es in the $in! itself% &e are thus le! to loo" for "nowle!ge in a higher sphere, an! accor!ingly Theaetetus, when again interrogate!, replies A2B that L"nowle!ge is true opinion%L +ut how is false opinion possibleR The ;egarian or Eristic spirit within us re i es the Tuestion, which has been alrea!y as"e! an! in!irectly answere! in the ;eno@ L,ow can a $an be ignorant of that which he "nowsRL 9o answer is gi en to this not unanswerable Tuestion% The co$parison of the $in! to a bloc" of wax, or to a !ecoy of bir!s, is foun! wanting% +ut are we not in erting the natural or!er in loo"ing for opinion before we ha e foun! "nowle!geR 2n! "nowle!ge is not true opinionK for the 2thenian !icasts ha e true opinion but not "nowle!ge% &hat then is "nowle!geR &e answer AFB, LTrue opinion, with !efinition or explanation%L +ut all the !ifferent ways in which this state$ent $ay be un!erstoo! are set asi!e, li"e the !efinitions of courage in the <aches, or of frien!ship in the <ysis, or of te$perance in the Char$i!es% 2t length we arri e at the conclusion, in which nothing is conclu!e!% There are two special !ifficulties which beset the stu!ent of the Theaetetus@ A.B he is uncertain how far he can trust PlatoLs account of the theory of ProtagorasK an! he is also uncertain A2B how far, an! in what parts of the !ialogue, Plato is expressing his own opinion% The !ra$atic character of the wor" ren!ers the answer to both these Tuestions !ifficult% .% 1n reply to the first, we ha e only probabilities to offer% Three $ain

points ha e to be !eci!e!@ AaB &oul! Protagoras ha e i!entifie! his own thesis, L;an is the $easure of all things,L with the other, L2ll "nowle!ge is sensible perceptionLR AbB &oul! he ha e base! the relati ity of "nowle!ge on the ,eraclitean fluxR AcB &oul! he ha e asserte! the absoluteness of sensation at each instantR 8f the wor" of Protagoras on LTruthL we "now nothing, with the exception of the two fa$ous frag$ents, which are cite! in this !ialogue, L;an is the $easure of all things,L an!, L&hether there are go!s or not, 1 cannot tell%L 9or ha e we any other trustworthy e i!ence of the tenets of Protagoras, or of the sense in which his wor!s are use!% (or later writers, inclu!ing 2ristotle in his ;etaphysics, ha e $ixe! up the Protagoras of Plato, as they ha e the -ocrates of Plato, with the real person% *eturning then to the Theaetetus, as the only possible source fro$ which an answer to these Tuestions can be obtaine!, we $ay re$ar", that Plato ha! LThe TruthL of Protagoras before hi$, an! freTuently refers to the boo"% ,e see$s to say expressly, that in this wor" the !octrine of the ,eraclitean flux was not to be foun!K Lhe tol! the real truthL Anot in the boo", which is so entitle!, butB Lpri ately to his !isciples,LDDwor!s which i$ply that the connexion between the !octrines of Protagoras an! ,eracleitus was not generally recogni7e! in Greece, but was really !isco ere! or in ente! by Plato% 8n the other han!, the !octrine that L;an is the $easure of all things,L is expressly i!entifie! by -ocrates with the other state$ent, that L&hat appears to each $an is to hi$KL an! a reference is $a!e to the boo"s in which the state$ent occursKDDthis Theaetetus, who has Loften rea! the boo"s,L is suppose! to ac"nowle!ge Aso CratylusB% 2n! Protagoras, in the speech attribute! to hi$, ne er says that he has been $isun!erstoo!@ he rather see$s to i$ply that the absoluteness of sensation at each instant was to be foun! in his wor!s% ,e is only in!ignant at the Lre!uctio a! absur!u$L !e ise! by -ocrates for his Lho$o $ensura,L which Theo!orus also consi!ers to be Lreally too ba!%L The Tuestion $ay be raise!, how far Plato in the Theaetetus coul! ha e $isrepresente! Protagoras without iolating the laws of !ra$atic probability% Coul! he ha e preten!e! to cite fro$ a wellD"nown writing what was not to be foun! thereR +ut such a sha!owy enTuiry is not worth pursuing further% &e nee! only re$e$ber that in the criticis$ which follows of the thesis of Protagoras, we are critici7ing the Protagoras of Plato, an! not atte$pting to !raw a precise line between his real senti$ents an! those which Plato has attribute! to hi$%

2% The other !ifficulty is a $ore subtle, an! also a $ore i$portant one, because bearing on the general character of the Platonic !ialogues% 8n a first rea!ing of the$, we are apt to i$agine that the truth is only spo"en by -ocrates, who is ne er guilty of a fallacy hi$self, an! is the great !etector of the errors an! fallacies of others% +ut this natural presu$ption is !isturbe! by the !isco ery that the -ophists are so$eti$es in the right an! -ocrates in the wrong% <i"e the hero of a no el, he is not to be suppose! always to represent the senti$ents of the author% There are few $o!ern rea!ers who !o not si!e with Protagoras, rather than with -ocrates, in the !ialogue which is calle! by his na$e% The Cratylus presents a si$ilar !ifficulty@ in his ety$ologies, as in the nu$ber of the -tate, we cannot tell how far -ocrates is seriousK for the -ocratic irony will not allow hi$ to !istinguish between his real an! his assu$e! wis!o$% 9o one is the superior of the in incible -ocrates in argu$ent Aexcept in the first part of the Par$eni!es, where he is intro!uce! as a youthBK but he is by no $eans suppose! to be in possession of the whole truth% 2rgu$ents are often put into his $outh Aco$pare 1ntro!uction to the GorgiasB which $ust ha e see$e! Tuite as untenable to Plato as to a $o!ern writer% 1n this !ialogue a great part of the answer of Protagoras is just an! soun!K re$ar"s are $a!e by hi$ on erbal criticis$, an! on the i$portance of un!erstan!ing an opponentLs $eaning, which are concei e! in the true spirit of philosophy% 2n! the !istinction which he is suppose! to !raw between Eristic an! 'ialectic, is really a criticis$ of Plato on hi$self an! his own criticis$ of Protagoras% The !ifficulty see$s to arise fro$ not atten!ing to the !ra$atic character of the writings of Plato% There are two, or $ore, si!es to TuestionsK an! these are parte! a$ong the !ifferent spea"ers% -o$eti$es one iew or aspect of a Tuestion is $a!e to pre!o$inate o er the rest, as in the Gorgias or -ophistK but in other !ialogues truth is !i i!e!, as in the <aches an! Protagoras, an! the interest of the piece consists in the contrast of opinions% The confusion cause! by the irony of -ocrates, who, if he is true to his character, cannot say anything of his own "nowle!ge, is increase! by the circu$stance that in the Theaetetus an! so$e other !ialogues he is occasionally playing both parts hi$self, an! e en charging his own argu$ents with unfairness% 1n the Theaetetus he is !esigne!ly hel! bac" fro$ arri ing at a conclusion% (or we cannot suppose that Plato concei e! a !efinition of "nowle!ge to be i$possible% +ut this is his $anner of approaching an! surroun!ing a Tuestion% The lights which he

throws on his subject are in!irect, but they are not the less real for that% ,e has no intention of pro ing a thesis by a cutDan!D!rie! argu$entK nor !oes he i$agine that a great philosophical proble$ can be tie! up within the li$its of a !efinition% 1f he has analy7e! a proposition or notion, e en with the se erity of an i$possible logic, if halfDtruths ha e been co$pare! by hi$ with other halfDtruths, if he has cleare! up or a! ance! popular i!eas, or illustrate! a new $etho!, his ai$ has been sufficiently acco$plishe!% The writings of Plato belong to an age in which the power of analysis ha! outrun the $eans of "nowle!geK an! through a spurious use of !ialectic, the !istinctions which ha! been alrea!y Lwon fro$ the oi! an! for$less infinite,L see$e! to be rapi!ly returning to their original chaos% The two great speculati e philosophies, which a century earlier ha! so !eeply i$presse! the $in! of ,ellas, were now !egenerating into Eristic% The conte$poraries of Plato an! -ocrates were ainly trying to fin! new co$binations of the$, or to transfer the$ fro$ the object to the subject% The ;egarians, in their first atte$pts to attain a se erer logic, were $a"ing "nowle!ge i$possible Aco$pare Theaet%B% They were asserting Lthe one goo! un!er $any na$es,L an!, li"e the Cynics, see$ to ha e !enie! pre!ication, while the Cynics the$sel es were !epri ing irtue of all which $a!e irtue !esirable in the eyes of -ocrates an! Plato% 2n! besi!es these, we fin! $ention in the later writings of Plato, especially in the Theaetetus, -ophist, an! <aws, of certain i$penetrable go!less persons, who will not belie e what they Lcannot hol! in their han!sLK an! cannot be approache! in argu$ent, because they cannot argue ATheatK -oph%B% 9o school of Gree" philosophers exactly answers to these persons, in who$ Plato $ay perhaps ha e blen!e! so$e features of the 2to$ists with the ulgar $aterialistic ten!encies of $an"in! in general Aco$pare 1ntro!uction to the -ophistB% 2n! not only was there a conflict of opinions, but the stage which the $in! ha! reache! presente! other !ifficulties har!ly intelligible to us, who li e in a !ifferent cycle of hu$an thought% 2ll ti$es of $ental progress are ti$es of confusionK we only see, or rather see$ to see things clearly, when they ha e been long fixe! an! !efine!% 1n the age of Plato, the li$its of the worl! of i$agination an! of pure abstraction, of the ol! worl! an! the new, were not yet fixe!% The Gree"s, in the fourth century before Christ, ha! no wor!s for LsubjectL an! Lobject,L an! no !istinct conception of the$K yet they were always ho ering about the Tuestion

in ol e! in the$% The analysis of sense, an! the analysis of thought, were eTually !ifficult to the$K an! hopelessly confuse! by the atte$pt to sol e the$, not through an appeal to facts, but by the help of general theories respecting the nature of the uni erse% Plato, in his Theaetetus, gathers up the sceptical ten!encies of his age, an! co$pares the$% +ut he !oes not see" to reconstruct out of the$ a theory of "nowle!ge% The ti$e at which such a theory coul! be fra$e! ha! not yet arri e!% (or there was no $easure of experience with which the i!eas swar$ing in $enLs $in!s coul! be co$pare!K the $eaning of the wor! LscienceL coul! scarcely be explaine! to the$, except fro$ the $athe$atical sciences, which alone offere! the type of uni ersality an! certainty% Philosophy was beco$ing $ore an! $ore acant an! abstract, an! not only the Platonic 1!eas an! the Eleatic +eing, but all abstractions see$e! to be at ariance with sense an! at war with one another% The want of the Gree" $in! in the fourth century before Christ was not another theory of rest or $otion, or +eing or ato$s, but rather a philosophy which coul! free the $in! fro$ the power of abstractions an! alternati es, an! show how far rest an! how far $otion, how far the uni ersal principle of +eing an! the $ultitu!inous principle of ato$s, entere! into the co$position of the worl!K which coul! !istinguish between the true an! false analogy, an! allow the negati e as well as the positi e a place in hu$an thought% To such a philosophy Plato, in the Theaetetus, offers $any contributions% ,e has followe! philosophy into the region of $ythology, an! pointe! out the si$ilarities of opposing phases of thought% ,e has also shown that extre$e abstractions are selfD!estructi e, an!, in!ee!, har!ly !istinguishable fro$ one another% +ut his intention is not to unra el the whole subject of "nowle!ge, if this ha! been possibleK an! se eral ti$es in the course of the !ialogue he rejects explanations of "nowle!ge which ha e ger$s of truth in the$K as, for exa$ple, Lthe resolution of the co$poun! into the si$pleKL or Lright opinion with a $ar" of !ifference%L %%% Terpsion, who has co$e to ;egara fro$ the country, is !escribe! as ha ing loo"e! in ain for Eucli!es in the 2goraK the latter explains that he has been !own to the harbour, an! on his way thither ha! $et Theaetetus, who

was being carrie! up fro$ the ar$y to 2thens% ,e was scarcely ali e, for he ha! been ba!ly woun!e! at the battle of Corinth, an! ha! ta"en the !ysentery which pre aile! in the ca$p% The $ention of his con!ition suggests the reflection, L&hat a loss he will be#L LPes, in!ee!,L replies Eucli!K Lonly just now 1 was hearing of his noble con!uct in the battle%L LThat 1 shoul! expectK but why !i! he not re$ain at ;egaraRL L1 wante! hi$ to re$ain, but he woul! notK so 1 went with hi$ as far as Erineu$K an! as 1 parte! fro$ hi$, 1 re$e$bere! that -ocrates ha! seen hi$ when he was a youth, an! ha! a re$ar"able con ersation with hi$, not long before his own !eathK an! he then prophesie! of hi$ that he woul! be a great $an if he li e!%L L,ow true that has beenK how li"e all that -ocrates sai!# 2n! coul! you repeat the con ersationRL L9ot fro$ $e$oryK but 1 too" notes when 1 returne! ho$e, which 1 afterwar!s fille! up at leisure, an! got -ocrates to correct the$ fro$ ti$e to ti$e, when 1 ca$e to 2thensL%%%Terpsion ha! long inten!e! to as" for a sight of this writing, of which he ha! alrea!y hear!% They are both tire!, an! agree to rest an! ha e the con ersation rea! to the$ by a ser ant%%%L,ere is the roll, TerpsionK 1 nee! only obser e that 1 ha e o$itte!, for the sa"e of con enience, the interlocutory wor!s, Msai! 1,M Msai! heMK an! that Theaetetus, an! Theo!orus, the geo$etrician of Cyrene, are the persons with who$ -ocrates is con ersing%L -ocrates begins by as"ing Theo!orus whether, in his isit to 2thens, he has foun! any 2thenian youth li"ely to attain !istinction in science% LPes, -ocrates, there is one ery re$ar"able youth, with who$ 1 ha e beco$e acTuainte!% ,e is no beauty, an! therefore you nee! not i$agine that 1 a$ in lo e with hi$K an!, to say the truth, he is ery li"e you, for he has a snub nose, an! projecting eyes, although these features are not so $ar"e! in hi$ as in you% ,e co$bines the $ost arious Tualities, Tuic"ness, patience, courageK an! he is gentle as well as wise, always silently flowing on, li"e a ri er of oil% <oo"# he is the $i!!le one of those who are entering the palaestra%L -ocrates, who !oes not "now his na$e, recogni7es hi$ as the son of Euphronius, who was hi$self a goo! $an an! a rich% ,e is infor$e! by Theo!orus that the youth is na$e! Theaetetus, but the property of his father has !isappeare! in the han!s of trusteesK this !oes not, howe er, pre ent hi$ fro$ a!!ing liberality to his other irtues% 2t the !esire of -ocrates he in ites Theaetetus to sit by the$%

LPes,L says -ocrates, Lthat 1 $ay see in you, Theaetetus, the i$age of $y ugly self, as Theo!orus !eclares% 9ot that his re$ar" is of any i$portanceK for though he is a philosopher, he is not a painter, an! therefore he is no ju!ge of our facesK but, as he is a $an of science, he $ay be a ju!ge of our intellects% 2n! if he were to praise the $ental en!ow$ents of either of us, in that case the hearer of the eulogy ought to exa$ine into what he says, an! the subject shoul! not refuse to be exa$ine!%L Theaetetus consents, an! is caught in a trap Aco$pare the si$ilar trap which is lai! for Theo!orusB% LThen, Theaetetus, you will ha e to be exa$ine!, for Theo!orus has been praising you in a style of which 1 ne er hear! the li"e%L L,e was only jesting%L L9ay, that is not his wayK an! 1 cannot allow you, on that pretence, to retract the assent which you ha e alrea!y gi en, or 1 shall $a"e Theo!orus repeat your praises, an! swear to the$%L Theaetetus, in reply, professes that he is willing to be exa$ine!, an! -ocrates begins by as"ing hi$ what he learns of Theo!orus% ,e is hi$self anxious to learn anything of anybo!yK an! now he has a little Tuestion to which he wants Theaetetus or Theo!orus Aor whiche er of the co$pany woul! not be L!on"eyL to the restB to fin! an answer% &ithout further preface, but at the sa$e ti$e apologi7ing for his eagerness, he as"s, L&hat is "nowle!geRL Theo!orus is too ol! to answer Tuestions, an! begs hi$ to interrogate Theaetetus, who has the a! antage of youth% Theaetetus replies, that "nowle!ge is what he learns of Theo!orus, i%e% geo$etry an! arith$eticK an! that there are other "in!s of "nowle!geDD shoe$a"ing, carpentering, an! the li"e% +ut -ocrates rejoins, that this answer contains too $uch an! also too little% (or although Theaetetus has enu$erate! se eral "in!s of "nowle!ge, he has not explaine! the co$$on nature of the$K as if he ha! been as"e!, L&hat is clayRL an! instea! of saying LClay is $oistene! earth,L he ha! answere!, LThere is one clay of i$ageD$a"ers, another of potters, another of o enD$a"ers%L Theaetetus at once !i ines that -ocrates $eans hi$ to exten! to all "in!s of "nowle!ge the sa$e process of generali7ation which he has alrea!y learne! to apply to arith$etic% (or he has !isco ere! a !i ision of nu$bers into sTuare nu$bers, E, /, .4, etc%, which are co$pose! of eTual factors, an! represent figures which ha e eTual si!es, an! oblong nu$bers, F, 5, 4, 0, etc%, which are co$pose! of uneTual factors, an! represent figures which ha e uneTual si!es% +ut he has ne er succee!e! in attaining a si$ilar conception of "nowle!ge, though he has often trie!K an!, when this an! si$ilar Tuestions were brought to hi$ fro$ -ocrates, has been sorely !istresse! by the$%

-ocrates explains to hi$ that he is in labour% (or $en as well as wo$en ha e pangs of labourK an! both at ti$es reTuire the assistance of $i!wi es% 2n! he, -ocrates, is a $i!wife, although this is a secretK he has inherite! the art fro$ his $other bol! an! bluff, an! he ushers into light, not chil!ren, but the thoughts of $en% <i"e the $i!wi es, who are Lpast bearing chil!ren,L he too can ha e no offspringDDthe Go! will not allow hi$ to bring anything into the worl! of his own% ,e also re$in!s Theaetetus that the $i!wi es are or ought to be the only $atch$a"ers Athis is the preparation for a biting jestBK for those who reap the fruit are $ost li"ely to "now on what soil the plants will grow% +ut respectable $i!wi es a oi! this !epart$ent of practiceDDthey !o not want to be calle! procuresses% There are so$e other !ifferences between the two sorts of pregnancy% (or wo$en !o not bring into the worl! at one ti$e real chil!ren an! at another ti$e i!ols which are with !ifficulty !istinguishe! fro$ the$% L2t first,L says -ocrates in his character of the $anD$i!wife, L$y patients are barren an! stoli!, but after a while they Mroun! apace,M if the go!s are propitious to the$K an! this is !ue not to $e but to the$sel esK 1 an! the go! only assist in bringing their i!eas to the birth% ;any of the$ ha e left $e too soon, an! the result has been that they ha e pro!uce! abortionsK or when 1 ha e !eli ere! the$ of chil!ren they ha e lost the$ by an ill bringing up, an! ha e en!e! by seeing the$sel es, as others see the$, to be great fools% 2risti!es, the son of <ysi$achus, is one of these, an! there ha e been others% The truants often return to $e an! beg to be ta"en bac"K an! then, if $y fa$iliar allows $e, which is not always the case, 1 recei e the$, an! they begin to grow again% There co$e to $e also those who ha e nothing in the$, an! ha e no nee! of $y artK an! 1 a$ their $atch$a"er Asee abo eB, an! $arry the$ to Pro!icus or so$e other inspire! sage who is li"ely to suit the$% 1 tell you this long story because 1 suspect that you are in labour% Co$e then to $e, who a$ a $i!wife, an! the son of a $i!wife, an! 1 will !eli er you% 2n! !o not bite $e, as the wo$en !o, if 1 abstract your firstDbornK for 1 a$ acting out of goo!Dwill towar!s youK the Go! who is within $e is the frien! of $an, though he will not allow $e to !isse$ble the truth% 8nce $ore then, Theaetetus, 1 repeat $y ol! TuestionDDM&hat is "nowle!geRM Ta"e courage, an! by the help of Go! you will !isco er an answer%L L;y answer is, that "nowle!ge is perception%L LThat is the theory of Protagoras, who has another way of expressing the sa$e thing when he says, M;an is the $easure of all things%M ,e was a ery wise $an, an! we shoul! try to un!erstan!

hi$% 1n or!er to illustrate his $eaning let $e suppose that there is the sa$e win! blowing in our faces, an! one of us $ay be hot an! the other col!% ,ow is thisR Protagoras will reply that the win! is hot to hi$ who is col!, col! to hi$ who is hot% 2n! MisM $eans Mappears,M an! when you say Mappears to hi$,M that $eans Mhe feels%M Thus feeling, appearance, perception, coinci!e with being% 1 suspect, howe er, that this was only a Mfacon !e parler,M by which he i$pose! on the co$$on her! li"e you an! $eK he tol! Mthe truthM Ain allusion to the title of his boo", which was calle! MThe TruthMB in secret to his !isciples% (or he was really a otary of that fa$ous philosophy in which all things are sai! to be relati eK nothing is great or s$all, or hea y or light, or one, but all is in $otion an! $ixture an! transition an! flux an! generation, not Mbeing,M as we ignorantly affir$, but Mbeco$ing%M This has been the !octrine, not of Protagoras only, but of all philosophers, with the single exception of Par$eni!esK E$pe!ocles, ,eracleitus, an! others, an! all the poets, with Epichar$us, the "ing of Co$e!y, an! ,o$er, the "ing of Trage!y, at their hea!, ha e sai! the sa$eK the latter has these wor!sDD M8cean, whence the go!s sprang, an! $other Tethys%M 2n! $any argu$ents are use! to show, that $otion is the source of life, an! rest of !eath@ fire an! war$th are pro!uce! by friction, an! li ing creatures owe their origin to a si$ilar causeK the bo!ily fra$e is preser e! by exercise an! !estroye! by in!olenceK an! if the sun cease! to $o e, Mchaos woul! co$e again%M 9ow apply this !octrine of M2ll is $otionM to the senses, an! first of all to the sense of sight% The colour of white, or any other colour, is neither in the eyes nor out of the$, but e er in $otion between the object an! the eye, an! arying in the case of e ery percipient% 2ll is relati e, an!, as the followers of Protagoras re$ar", en!less contra!ictions arise when we !eny thisK e%g% here are six !iceK they are $ore than four an! less than twel eK M$ore an! also less,M woul! you not sayRL LPes%L L+ut Protagoras will retort@ MCan anything be $ore or less without a!!ition or subtractionRML L1 shoul! say M9oM if 1 were not afrai! of contra!icting $y for$er answer%L L2n! if you say MPes,M the tongue will escape con iction but not the $in!, as Euripi!es woul! sayRL LTrue%L LThe thoroughbre! -ophists, who "now all

that can be "nown, woul! ha e a sparring $atch o er this, but you an! 1, who ha e no professional pri!e, want only to !isco er whether our i!eas are clear an! consistent% 2n! we cannot be wrong in saying, first, that nothing can be greater or less while re$aining eTualK secon!ly, that there can be no beco$ing greater or less without a!!ition or subtractionK thir!ly, that what is an! was not, cannot be without ha ing beco$e% +ut then how is this reconcilable with the case of the !ice, an! with si$ilar exa$plesRDDthat is the Tuestion%L L1 a$ often perplexe! an! a$a7e!, -ocrates, by these !ifficulties%L LThat is because you are a philosopher, for philosophy begins in won!er, an! 1ris is the chil! of Thau$as% 'o you "now the original principle on which the !octrine of Protagoras is base!RL L9o%L LThen 1 will tell youK but we $ust not let the uninitiate! hear, an! by the uninitiate! 1 $ean the obstinate people who belie e in nothing which they cannot hol! in their han!s% The brethren whose $ysteries 1 a$ about to unfol! to you are far $ore ingenious% They $aintain that all is $otionK an! that $otion has two for$s, action an! passion, out of which en!less pheno$ena are create!, also in two for$sDDsense an! the object of senseDD which co$e to the birth together% There are two "in!s of $otions, a slow an! a fastK the $otions of the agent an! the patient are slower, because they $o e an! create in an! about the$sel es, but the things which are born of the$ ha e a swifter $otion, an! pass rapi!ly fro$ place to place% The eye an! the appropriate object co$e together, an! gi e birth to whiteness an! the sensation of whitenessK the eye is fille! with seeing, an! beco$es not sight but a seeing eye, an! the object is fille! with whiteness, an! beco$es not whiteness but whiteK an! no other co$poun! of either with another woul! ha e pro!uce! the sa$e effect% 2ll sensation is to be resol e! into a si$ilar co$bination of an agent an! patient% 8f either, ta"en separately, no i!ea can be for$e!K an! the agent $ay beco$e a patient, an! the patient an agent% ,ence there arises a general reflection that nothing is, but all things beco$eK no na$e can !etain or fix the$% 2re not these speculations char$ing, Theaetetus, an! ery goo! for a person in your interesting situationR 1 a$ offering you speci$ens of other $enLs wis!o$, because 1 ha e no wis!o$ of $y own, an! 1 want to !eli er you of so$ethingK an! presently we will see whether you ha e brought forth win! or not% Tell $e, then, what !o you thin" of the notion that M2ll things are beco$ingMRL L&hen 1 hear your argu$ents, 1 a$ $ar ellously rea!y to assent%L

L+ut 1 ought not to conceal fro$ you that there is a serious objection which $ay be urge! against this !octrine of Protagoras% (or there are states, such as $a!ness an! !rea$ing, in which perception is falseK an! half our life is spent in !rea$ingK an! who can say that at this instant we are not !rea$ingR E en the fancies of $a!$en are real at the ti$e% +ut if "nowle!ge is perception, how can we !istinguish between the true an! the false in such casesR ,a ing state! the objection, 1 will now state the answer% Protagoras woul! !eny the continuity of pheno$enaK he woul! say that what is !ifferent is entirely !ifferent, an! whether acti e or passi e has a !ifferent power% There are infinite agents an! patients in the worl!, an! these pro!uce in e ery co$bination of the$ a !ifferent perception% Ta"e $yself as an instance@DD-ocrates $ay be ill or he $ay be well,DDan! re$e$ber that -ocrates, with all his acci!ents, is spo"en of% The wine which 1 !rin" when 1 a$ well is pleasant to $e, but the sa$e wine is unpleasant to $e when 1 a$ ill% 2n! there is nothing else fro$ which 1 can recei e the sa$e i$pression, nor can another recei e the sa$e i$pression fro$ the wine% 9either can 1 an! the object of sense beco$e separately what we beco$e together% (or the one in beco$ing is relati e to the other, but they ha e no other relationK an! the co$bination of the$ is absolute at each $o$ent% A1n $o!ern language, the act of sensation is really in!i isible, though capable of a $ental analysis into subject an! object%B ;y sensation alone is true, an! true to $e only% 2n! therefore, as Protagoras says, MTo $yself 1 a$ the ju!ge of what is an! what is not%M Thus the flux of ,o$er an! ,eracleitus, the great Protagorean saying that M;an is the $easure of all things,M the !octrine of Theaetetus that MVnowle!ge is perception,M ha e all the sa$e $eaning% 2n! this is thy newD born chil!, which by $y art 1 ha e brought to lightK an! you $ust not be angry if instea! of rearing your infant we expose hi$%L LTheaetetus will not be angry,L says Theo!orusK Lhe is ery goo!Dnature!% +ut 1 shoul! li"e to "now, -ocrates, whether you $ean to say that all this is untrueRL L(irst re$in!ing you that 1 a$ not the bag which contains the argu$ents, but that 1 extract the$ fro$ Theaetetus, shall 1 tell you what a$a7es $e in your frien! ProtagorasRL L&hat $ay that beRL L1 li"e his !octrine that what appears isK but 1 won!er that he !i! not

begin his great wor" on Truth with a !eclaration that a pig, or a !ogDface! baboon, or any other $onster which has sensation, is a $easure of all thingsK then, while we were re erencing hi$ as a go!, he $ight ha e pro!uce! a $agnificent effect by expoun!ing to us that he was no wiser than a ta!pole% (or if sensations are always true, an! one $anLs !iscern$ent is as goo! as anotherLs, an! e ery $an is his own ju!ge, an! e erything that he ju!ges is right an! true, then what nee! of Protagoras to be our instructor at a high figureK an! why shoul! we be less "nowing than he is, or ha e to go to hi$, if e ery $an is the $easure of all thingsR ;y own art of $i!wifery, an! all !ialectic, is an enor$ous folly, if ProtagorasL MTruthM be in!ee! truth, an! the philosopher is not $erely a$using hi$self by gi ing oracles out of his boo"%L Theo!orus thin"s that -ocrates is unjust to his $aster, ProtagorasK but he is too ol! an! stiff to try a fall with hi$, an! therefore refers hi$ to Theaetetus, who is alrea!y !ri en out of his for$er opinion by the argu$ents of -ocrates% -ocrates then ta"es up the !efence of Protagoras, who is suppose! to reply in his own personDDLGoo! people, you sit an! !eclai$ about the go!s, of whose existence or nonDexistence 1 ha e nothing to say, or you !iscourse about $an being re!uce! to the le el of the brutesK but what proof ha e you of your state$entsR 2n! yet surely you an! Theo!orus ha! better reflect whether probability is a safe gui!e% Theo!orus woul! be a ba! geo$etrician if he ha! nothing better to offer%L%%%Theaetetus is affecte! by the appeal to geo$etry, an! -ocrates is in!uce! by hi$ to put the Tuestion in a new for$% ,e procee!s as follows@DDL-houl! we say that we "now what we see an! hear,DDe%g% the soun! of wor!s or the sight of letters in a foreign tongueRL L&e shoul! say that the figures of the letters, an! the pitch of the oice in uttering the$, were "nown to us, but not the $eaning of the$%L LExcellentK 1 want you to grow, an! therefore 1 will lea e that answer an! as" another Tuestion@ 1s not seeing percei ingRL L)ery true%L L2n! he who sees "nowsRL LPes%L L2n! he who re$e$bers, re$e$bers that which he sees an! "nowsRL L)ery true%L L+ut if he closes his eyes, !oes he not re$e$berRL L,e !oes%L LThen he $ay re$e$ber an! not seeK an! if seeing is "nowing, he $ay re$e$ber an! not "now% 1s not this a Mre!uctio a!

absur!u$M of the hypothesis that "nowle!ge is sensible perceptionR Pet perhaps we are crowing too soonK an! if Protagoras, Mthe father of the $yth,M ha! been ali e, the result $ight ha e been ery !ifferent% +ut he is !ea!, an! Theo!orus, who$ he left guar!ian of his Morphan,M has not been ery 7ealous in !efen!ing hi$%L Theo!orus objects that Callias is the true guar!ian, but he hopes that -ocrates will co$e to the rescue% -ocrates prefaces his !efence by resu$ing the attac"% ,e as"s whether a $an can "now an! not "now at the sa$e ti$eR L1$possible%L Uuite possible, if you $aintain that seeing is "nowing% The confi!ent a! ersary, suiting the action to the wor!, shuts one of your eyesK an! now, says he, you see an! !o not see, but !o you "now an! not "nowR 2n! a fresh opponent !arts fro$ his a$bush, an! transfers to "nowle!ge the ter$s which are co$$only applie! to sight% ,e as"s whether you can "now near an! not at a !istanceK whether you can ha e a sharp an! also a !ull "nowle!ge% &hile you are won!ering at his inco$parable wis!o$, he gets you into his power, an! you will not escape until you ha e co$e to an un!erstan!ing with hi$ about the $oney which is to be pai! for your release% +ut Protagoras has not yet $a!e his !efenceK an! alrea!y he $ay be hear! conte$ptuously replying that he is not responsible for the a!$issions which were $a!e by a boy, who coul! not foresee the co$ing $o e, an! therefore ha! answere! in a $anner which enable! -ocrates to raise a laugh against hi$self% L+ut 1 cannot be fairly charge!,L he will say, Lwith an answer which 1 shoul! not ha e gi enK for 1 ne er $aintaine! that the $e$ory of a feeling is the sa$e as a feeling, or !enie! that a $an $ight "now an! not "now the sa$e thing at the sa$e ti$e% 8r, if you will ha e extre$e precision, 1 say that $an in !ifferent relations is $any or rather infinite in nu$ber% 2n! 1 challenge you, either to show that his perceptions are not in!i i!ual, or that if they are, what appears to hi$ is not what is% 2s to your pigs an! baboons, you are yourself a pig, an! you $a"e $y writings a sport of other swine% +ut 1 still affir$ that $an is the $easure of all things, although 1 a!$it that one $an $ay be a thousan! ti$es better than another, in proportion as he has better i$pressions% 9either !o 1 !eny the existence of wis!o$ or of the wise $an% +ut 1 $aintain that wis!o$ is a practical re$e!ial power of turning e il into goo!, the bitterness of !isease into the sweetness of health, an! !oes not

consist in any greater truth or superior "nowle!ge% (or the i$pressions of the sic" are as true as the i$pressions of the healthyK an! the sic" are as wise as the healthy% 9or can any $an be cure! of a false opinion, for there is no such thingK but he $ay be cure! of the e il habit which generates in hi$ an e il opinion% This is effecte! in the bo!y by the !rugs of the physician, an! in the soul by the wor!s of the -ophistK an! the new state or opinion is not truer, but only better than the ol!% 2n! philosophers are not ta!poles, but physicians an! husban!$en, who till the soil an! infuse health into ani$als an! plants, an! $a"e the goo! ta"e the place of the e il, both in in!i i!uals an! states% &ise an! goo! rhetoricians $a"e the goo! to appear just in states Afor that is just which appears just to a stateB, an! in return, they !eser e to be well pai!% 2n! you, -ocrates, whether you please or not, $ust continue to be a $easure% This is $y !efence, an! 1 $ust reTuest you to $eet $e fairly% &e are professing to reason, an! not $erely to !isputeK an! there is a great !ifference between reasoning an! !isputation% (or the !isputer is always see"ing to trip up his opponentK an! this is a $o!e of argu$ent which !isgusts $en with philosophy as they grow ol!er% +ut the reasoner is trying to un!erstan! hi$ an! to point out his errors to hi$, whether arising fro$ his own or fro$ his co$panionLs faultK he !oes not argue fro$ the custo$ary use of na$es, which the ulgar per ert in all $anner of ways% 1f you are gentle to an a! ersary he will follow an! lo e youK an! if !efeate! he will lay the bla$e on hi$self, an! see" to escape fro$ his own preju!ices into philosophy% 1 woul! reco$$en! you, -ocrates, to a!opt this hu$aner $etho!, an! to a oi! captious an! erbal criticis$s%L -uch, Theo!orus, is the ery slight help which 1 a$ able to affor! to your frien!K ha! he been ali e, he woul! ha e helpe! hi$self in far better style% LPou ha e $a!e a $ost alorous !efence%L PesK but !i! you obser e that Protagoras ba!e $e be serious, an! co$plaine! of our getting up a laugh against hi$ with the ai! of a boyR ,e $eant to inti$ate that you $ust ta"e the place of Theaetetus, who $ay be wiser than $any bear!e! $en, but not wiser than you, Theo!orus% LThe rule of the -partan Palaestra is, -trip or !epartK but you are li"e the giant 2ntaeus, an! will not let $e !epart unless 1 try a fall with

you%L Pes, that is the nature of $y co$plaint% 2n! $any a ,ercules, $any a Theseus $ighty in !ee!s an! wor!s has bro"en $y hea!K but 1 a$ always at this rough ga$e% Please, then, to fa our $e% L8n the con!ition of not excee!ing a single fall, 1 consent%L -ocrates now resu$es the argu$ent% 2s he is ery !esirous of !oing justice to Protagoras, he insists on citing his own wor!s,DDL&hat appears to each $an is to hi$%L 2n! how, as"s -ocrates, are these wor!s reconcileable with the fact that all $an"in! are agree! in thin"ing the$sel es wiser than others in so$e respects, an! inferior to the$ in othersR 1n the hour of !anger they are rea!y to fall !own an! worship any one who is their superior in wis!o$ as if he were a go!% 2n! the worl! is full of $en who are as"ing to be taught an! willing to be rule!, an! of other $en who are willing to rule an! teach the$% 2ll which i$plies that $en !o ju!ge of one anotherLs i$pressions, an! thin" so$e wise an! others foolish% ,ow will Protagoras answer this argu$entR (or he cannot say that no one !ee$s another ignorant or $ista"en% 1f you for$ a ju!g$ent, thousan!s an! tens of thousan!s are rea!y to $aintain the opposite% The $ultitu!e $ay not an! !o not agree in ProtagorasL own thesis that L;an is the $easure of all thingsKL an! then who is to !eci!eR :pon his own showing $ust not his LtruthL !epen! on the nu$ber of suffrages, an! be $ore or less true in proportion as he has $ore or fewer of the$R 2n! he $ust ac"nowle!ge further, that they spea" truly who !eny hi$ to spea" truly, which is a fa$ous jest% 2n! if he a!$its that they spea" truly who !eny hi$ to spea" truly, he $ust a!$it that he hi$self !oes not spea" truly% +ut his opponents will refuse to a!$it this of the$sel es, an! he $ust allow that they are right in their refusal% The conclusion is, that all $an"in!, inclu!ing Protagoras hi$self, will !eny that he spea"s trulyK an! his truth will be true neither to hi$self nor to anybo!y else% Theo!orus is incline! to thin" that this is going too far% -ocrates ironically replies, that he is not going beyon! the truth% +ut if the ol! Protagoras coul! only pop his hea! out of the worl! below, he woul! !oubtless gi e the$ both a soun! castigation an! be off to the sha!es in an instant% -eeing that he is not within call, we $ust exa$ine the Tuestion for oursel es% 1t is clear that there are great !ifferences in the un!erstan!ings of $en% 2!$itting, with Protagoras, that i$$e!iate

sensations of hot, col!, an! the li"e, are to each one such as they appear, yet this hypothesis cannot be exten!e! to ju!g$ents or opinions% 2n! e en if we were to a!$it further,DDan! this is the iew of so$e who are not thoroughDgoing followers of Protagoras,DDthat right an! wrong, holy an! unholy, are to each state or in!i i!ual such as they appear, still Protagoras will not enture to $aintain that e ery $an is eTually the $easure of expe!iency, or that the thing which see$s is expe!ient to e ery one% +ut this begins a new Tuestion% L&ell, -ocrates, we ha e plenty of leisure% Pes, we ha e, an!, after the $anner of philosophers, we are !igressingK 1 ha e often obser e! how ri!iculous this habit of theirs $a"es the$ when they appear in court% L&hat !o you $eanRL 1 $ean to say that a philosopher is a gentle$an, but a lawyer is a ser ant% The one can ha e his tal" out, an! wan!er at will fro$ one subject to another, as the fancy ta"es hi$K li"e oursel es, he $ay be long or short, as he pleases% +ut the lawyer is always in a hurryK there is the clepsy!ra li$iting his ti$e, an! the brief li$iting his topics, an! his a! ersary is stan!ing o er hi$ an! exacting his rights% ,e is a ser ant !isputing about a fellowDser ant before his $aster, who hol!s the cause in his han!sK the path ne er !i erges, an! often the race is for his life% -uch experiences ren!er hi$ "een an! shrew!K he learns the arts of flattery, an! is perfect in the practice of croo"e! waysK !angers ha e co$e upon hi$ too soon, when the ten!erness of youth was unable to $eet the$ with truth an! honesty, an! he has resorte! to counterDacts of !ishonesty an! falsehoo!, an! beco$e warpe! an! !istorte!K without any health or free!o$ or sincerity in hi$ he has grown up to $anhoo!, an! is or estee$s hi$self to be a $aster of cunning% -uch are the lawyersK will you ha e the co$panion picture of philosophersR or will this be too $uch of a !igressionR L9ay, -ocrates, the argu$ent is our ser ant, an! not our $aster% &ho is the ju!ge or where is the spectator, ha ing a right to control usRL 1 will !escribe the lea!ers, then@ for the inferior sort are not worth the trouble% The lor!s of philosophy ha e not learne! the way to the !icastery or ecclesiaK they neither see nor hear the laws an! otes of the state, written or recite!K societies, whether political or festi e, clubs, an! singing $ai!ens !o not enter e en into their !rea$s% 2n! the scan!als of persons or their ancestors, $ale an! fe$ale, they "now no $ore than they can tell the nu$ber of pints in the ocean% 9either are they conscious of their own ignoranceK for they !o not practise singularity in or!er to gain

reputation, but the truth is, that the outer for$ of the$ only is resi!ing in the cityK the inner $an, as Pin!ar says, is going on a oyage of !isco ery, $easuring as with line an! rule the things which are un!er an! in the earth, interrogating the whole of nature, only not con!escen!ing to notice what is near the$% L&hat !o you $ean, -ocratesRL 1 will illustrate $y $eaning by the jest of the witty $ai!Dser ant, who saw Thales tu$bling into a well, an! sai! of hi$, that he was so eager to "now what was going on in hea en, that he coul! not see what was before his feet% This is applicable to all philosophers% The philosopher is unacTuainte! with the worl!K he har!ly "nows whether his neighbour is a $an or an ani$al% (or he is always searching into the essence of $an, an! enTuiring what such a nature ought to !o or suffer !ifferent fro$ any other% ,ence, on e ery occasion in pri ate life an! public, as 1 was saying, when he appears in a lawDcourt or anywhere, he is the jo"e, not only of $ai!Dser ants, but of the general her!, falling into wells an! e ery sort of !isasterK he loo"s such an aw"war!, inexperience! creature, unable to say anything personal, when he is abuse!, in answer to his a! ersaries Afor he "nows no e il of any oneBK an! when he hears the praises of others, he cannot help laughing fro$ the botto$ of his soul at their pretensionsK an! this also gi es hi$ a ri!iculous appearance% 2 "ing or tyrant appears to hi$ to be a "in! of swineDher! or cowDher!, $il"ing away at an ani$al who is $uch $ore troubleso$e an! !angerous than cows or sheepK li"e the cowDher!, he has no ti$e to be e!ucate!, an! the pen in which he "eeps his floc" in the $ountains is surroun!e! by a wall% &hen he hears of large lan!e! properties of ten thousan! acres or $ore, he thin"s of the whole earthK or if he is tol! of the antiTuity of a fa$ily, he re$e$bers that e ery one has ha! $yria!s of progenitors, rich an! poor, Gree"s an! barbarians, "ings an! sla es% 2n! he who boasts of his !escent fro$ 2$phitryon in the twentyDfifth generation, $ay, if he pleases, a!! as $any $ore, an! !ouble that again, an! our philosopher only laughs at his inability to !o a larger su$% -uch is the $an at who$ the ulgar scoffK he see$s to the$ as if he coul! not $in! his feet% LThat is ery true, -ocrates%L +ut when he tries to !raw the Tuic"Dwitte! lawyer out of his pleas an! rejoin!ers to the conte$plation of absolute justice or injustice in their own nature, or fro$ the popular praises of wealthy "ings to the

iew of happiness an! $isery in the$sel es, or to the reasons why a $an shoul! see" after the one an! a oi! the other, then the situation is re erse!K the little wretch turns gi!!y, an! is rea!y to fall o er the precipiceK his utterance beco$es thic", an! he $a"es hi$self ri!iculous, not to ser antD$ai!s, but to e ery $an of liberal e!ucation% -uch are the two pictures@ the one of the philosopher an! gentle$an, who $ay be excuse! for not ha ing learne! how to $a"e a be!, or coo" up flatteriesK the other, a ser iceable "na e, who har!ly "nows how to wear his cloa",DDstill less can he awa"en har$onious thoughts or hy$n irtueLs praises% L1f the worl!, -ocrates, were as rea!y to recei e your wor!s as 1 a$, there woul! be greater peace an! less e il a$ong $an"in!%L E il, Theo!orus, $ust e er re$ain in this worl! to be the antagonist of goo!, out of the way of the go!s in hea en% &herefore also we shoul! fly away fro$ oursel es to the$K an! to fly to the$ is to beco$e li"e the$K an! to beco$e li"e the$ is to beco$e holy, just an! true% +ut $any li e in the ol! wi esL fable of appearancesK they thin" that you shoul! follow irtue in or!er that you $ay see$ to be goo!% 2n! yet the truth is, that Go! is righteousK an! of $en, he is $ost li"e hi$ who is $ost righteous% To "now this is wis!o$K an! in co$parison of this the wis!o$ of the arts or the see$ing wis!o$ of politicians is $ean an! co$$on% The unrighteous $an is apt to pri!e hi$self on his cunningK when others call hi$ rogue, he says to hi$self@ LThey only $ean that 1 a$ one who !eser es to li e, an! not a $ere bur!en of the earth%L +ut he shoul! reflect that his ignorance $a"es his con!ition worse than if he "new% (or the penalty of injustice is not !eath or stripes, but the fatal necessity of beco$ing $ore an! $ore unjust% Two patterns of life are set before hi$K the one blesse! an! !i ine, the other go!less an! wretche!K an! he is growing $ore an! $ore li"e the one an! unli"e the other% ,e !oes not see that if he continues in his cunning, the place of innocence will not recei e hi$ after !eath% 2n! yet if such a $an has the courage to hear the argu$ent out, he often beco$es !issatisfie! with hi$self, an! has no $ore strength in hi$ than a chil!%DD+ut we ha e !igresse! enough% L(or $y part, -ocrates, 1 li"e the !igressions better than the argu$ent, because 1 un!erstan! the$ better%L

To return% &hen we left off, the Protagoreans an! ,eracliteans were $aintaining that the or!inances of the -tate were just, while they laste!% +ut no one woul! $aintain that the laws of the -tate were always goo! or expe!ient, although this $ay be the intention of the$% (or the expe!ient has to !o with the future, about which we are liable to $ista"e% 9ow, woul! Protagoras $aintain that $an is the $easure not only of the present an! past, but of the futureK an! that there is no !ifference in the ju!g$ents of $en about the futureR &oul! an untraine! $an, for exa$ple, be as li"ely to "now when he is going to ha e a fe er, as the physician who atten!e! hi$R 2n! if they !iffer in opinion, which of the$ is li"ely to be rightK or are they both rightR 1s not a ineDgrower a better ju!ge of a intage which is not yet gathere!, or a coo" of a !inner which is in preparation, or Protagoras of the probable effect of a speech than an or!inary personR The last exa$ple spea"s La! ho$inen%L (or Protagoras woul! ne er ha e a$asse! a fortune if e ery $an coul! ju!ge of the future for hi$self% ,e is, therefore, co$pelle! to a!$it that he is a $easureK but 1, who "now nothing, a$ not eTually con ince! that 1 a$% This is one way of refuting hi$K an! he is refute! also by the authority which he attributes to the opinions of others, who !eny his opinions% 1 a$ not eTually sure that we can !ispro e the truth of i$$e!iate states of feeling% +ut this lea!s us to the !octrine of the uni ersal flux, about which a battleDroyal is always going on in the cities of 1onia% LPesK the Ephesians are !ownright $a! about the fluxK they cannot stop to argue with you, but are in perpetual $otion, obe!ient to their textDboo"s% Their restlessness is beyon! expression, an! if you as" any of the$ a Tuestion, they will not answer, but !art at you so$e unintelligible saying, an! another an! another, $a"ing no way either with the$sel es or with othersK for nothing is fixe! in the$ or their i!eas,DDthey are at war with fixe! principles%L 1 suppose, Theo!orus, that you ha e ne er seen the$ in ti$e of peace, when they !iscourse at leisure to their !isciplesR L'isciples# they ha e noneK they are a set of une!ucate! fanatics, an! each of the$ says of the other that they ha e no "nowle!ge% &e $ust trust to oursel es, an! not to the$ for the solution of the proble$%L &ell, the !octrine is ol!, being !eri e! fro$ the poets, who spea" in a figure of 8ceanus an! TethysK the truth was once conceale!, but is now re eale! by the superior wis!o$ of a later generation, an! $a!e intelligible to the cobbler, who, on hearing that all is in $otion, an! not so$e things only, as he ignorantly fancie!, $ay be expecte! to fall !own an! worship his teachers% 2n! the opposite !octrine $ust not be forgotten@DD

L2lone being re$ains un$o e! which is the na$e for all,L as Par$eni!es affir$s% Thus we are in the $i!st of the frayK both parties are !ragging us to their si!eK an! we are not certain which of the$ are in the rightK an! if neither, then we shall be in a ri!iculous position, ha ing to set up our own opinion against ancient an! fa$ous $en% <et us first approach the ri erDgo!s, or patrons of the flux% &hen they spea" of $otion, $ust they not inclu!e two "in!s of $otion, change of place an! change of natureRDD2n! all things $ust be suppose! to ha e both "in!s of $otionK for if not, the sa$e things woul! be at rest an! in $otion, which is contrary to their theory% 2n! !i! we not say, that all sensations arise thus@ they $o e about between the agent an! patient together with a perception, an! the patient ceases to be a percei ing power an! beco$es a percipient, an! the agent a Tuale instea! of a TualityK but neither has any absolute existenceR +ut now we $a"e the further !isco ery, that neither white or whiteness, nor any sense or sensation, can be pre!icate! of anything, for they are in a perpetual flux% 2n! therefore we $ust $o!ify the !octrine of Theaetetus an! Protagoras, by asserting further that "nowle!ge is an! is not sensationK an! of e erything we $ust say eTually, that this is an! is not, or beco$es or beco$es not% 2n! still the wor! LthisL is not Tuite correct, for language fails in the atte$pt to express their $eaning% 2t the close of the !iscussion, Theo!orus clai$s to be release! fro$ the argu$ent, accor!ing to his agree$ent% +ut Theaetetus insists that they shall procee! to consi!er the !octrine of rest% This is !ecline! by -ocrates, who has too $uch re erence for the great Par$eni!es lightly to attac" hi$% A&e shall fin! that he returns to the !octrine of rest in the -ophistK but at present he !oes not wish to be !i erte! fro$ his $ain purpose, which is, to !eli er Theaetetus of his conception of "nowle!ge%B ,e procee!s to interrogate hi$ further% &hen he says that L"nowle!ge is in perception,L with what !oes he percei eR The first answer is, that he percei es sights with the eye, an! soun!s with the ear% This lea!s -ocrates to $a"e the reflection that nice !istinctions of wor!s are so$eti$es pe!antic, but so$eti$es necessaryK an! he proposes in this case to substitute the wor! LthroughL for Lwith%L (or the senses are not li"e the Trojan warriors in the horse, but ha e a co$$on centre of perception,

in which they all $eet% This co$$on principle is able to co$pare the$ with one another, an! $ust therefore be !istinct fro$ the$ Aco$pare *epublicB% 2n! as there are facts of sense which are percei e! through the organs of the bo!y, there are also $athe$atical an! other abstractions, such as sa$eness an! !ifference, li"eness an! unli"eness, which the soul percei es by herself% +eing is the $ost uni ersal of these abstractions% The goo! an! the beautiful are abstractions of another "in!, which exist in relation an! which abo e all others the $in! percei es in herself, co$paring within her past, present, an! future% (or exa$pleK we "now a thing to be har! or soft by the touch, of which the perception is gi en at birth to $en an! ani$als% +ut the essence of har!ness or softness, or the fact that this har!ness is, an! is the opposite of softness, is slowly learne! by reflection an! experience% ;ere perception !oes not reach being, an! therefore fails of truthK an! therefore has no share in "nowle!ge% +ut if so, "nowle!ge is not perception% &hat then is "nowle!geR The $in!, when occupie! by herself with being, is sai! to ha e opinionDDshall we say that LVnowle!ge is true opinionLR +ut still an ol! !ifficulty recursK we as" oursel es, L,ow is false opinion possibleRL This !ifficulty $ay be state! as follows@DD Either we "now or !o not "now a thing Afor the inter$e!iate processes of learning an! forgetting nee! not at present be consi!ere!BK an! in thin"ing or ha ing an opinion, we $ust either "now or not "now that which we thin", an! we cannot "now an! be ignorant at the sa$e ti$eK we cannot confuse one thing which we !o not "now, with another thing which we !o not "nowK nor can we thin" that which we !o not "now to be that which we "now, or that which we "now to be that which we !o not "now% 2n! what other case is concei able, upon the supposition that we either "now or !o not "now all thingsR <et us try another answer in the sphere of being@ L&hen a $an thin"s, an! thin"s that which is not%L +ut woul! this hol! in any parallel caseR Can a $an see an! see nothingR or hear an! hear nothingR or touch an! touch nothingR ;ust he not see, hear, or touch so$e one existing thingR (or if he thin"s about nothing he !oes not thin", an! not thin"ing he cannot thin" falsely% 2n! so the path of being is close! against us, as well as the path of "nowle!ge% +ut $ay there not be Lhetero!oxy,L or transference of opinionKDD1 $ean, $ay not one thing be suppose! to be anotherR Theaetetus is confi!ent that this $ust be Lthe true falsehoo!,L when a $an puts goo! for e il or e il for goo!% -ocrates will not !iscourage hi$ by attac"ing the para!oxical expression Ltrue falsehoo!,L

but passes on% The new notion in ol es a process of thin"ing about two things, either together or alternately% 2n! thin"ing is the con ersing of the $in! with herself, which is carrie! on in Tuestion an! answer, until she no longer !oubts, but !eter$ines an! for$s an opinion% 2n! false opinion consists in saying to yourself, that one thing is another% +ut !i! you e er say to yourself, that goo! is e il, or e il goo!R E en in sleep, !i! you e er i$agine that o!! was e enR 8r !i! any $an in his senses e er fancy that an ox was a horse, or that two are oneR -o that we can ne er thin" one thing to be anotherK for you $ust not $eet $e with the erbal Tuibble that oneDDeteronDDis otherDDeteron Aboth LoneL an! LotherL in Gree" are calle! LotherLDDeteronB% ,e who has both the two things in his $in!, cannot $isplace the$K an! he who has only one of the$ in his $in!, cannot $isplace the$DDon either supposition transplace$ent is inconcei able% +ut perhaps there $ay still be a sense in which we can thin" that which we !o not "now to be that which we "now@ e%g% Theaetetus $ay "now -ocrates, but at a !istance he $ay $ista"e another person for hi$% This process $ay be concei e! by the help of an i$age% <et us suppose that e ery $an has in his $in! a bloc" of wax of arious Tualities, the gift of ;e$ory, the $other of the ;usesK an! on this he recei es the seal or sta$p of those sensations an! perceptions which he wishes to re$e$ber% That which he succee!s in sta$ping is re$e$bere! an! "nown by hi$ as long as the i$pression lastsK but that, of which the i$pression is rubbe! out or i$perfectly $a!e, is forgotten, an! not "nown% 9o one can thin" one thing to be another, when he has the $e$orial or seal of both of these in his soul, an! a sensible i$pression of neitherK or when he "nows one an! !oes not "now the other, an! has no $e$orial or seal of the otherK or when he "nows neitherK or when he percei es both, or one an! not the other, or neitherK or when he percei es an! "nows both, an! i!entifies what he percei es with what he "nows Athis is still $ore i$possibleBK or when he !oes not "now one, an! !oes not "now an! !oes not percei e the otherK or !oes not percei e one, an! !oes not "now an! !oes not percei e the otherK or has no perception or "nowle!ge of eitherDDall these cases $ust be exclu!e!% +ut he $ay err when he confuses what he "nows or percei es, or what he percei es an! !oes not "now, with what he "nows, or what he "nows an! percei es with what he "nows an! percei es% Theaetetus is unable to follow these !istinctionsK which -ocrates procee!s to illustrate by exa$ples, first of all re$ar"ing, that "nowle!ge $ay exist

without perception, an! perception without "nowle!ge% 1 $ay "now Theo!orus an! Theaetetus an! not see the$K 1 $ay see the$, an! not "now the$% LThat 1 un!erstan!%L +ut 1 coul! not $ista"e one for the other if 1 "new you both, an! ha! no perception of eitherK or if 1 "new one only, an! percei e! neitherK or if 1 "new an! percei e! neither, or in any other of the exclu!e! cases% The only possibility of error is@ .st, when "nowing you an! Theo!orus, an! ha ing the i$pression of both of you on the waxen bloc", 1, seeing you both i$perfectly an! at a !istance, put the foot in the wrong shoeDDthat is to say, put the seal or sta$p on the wrong object@ or 2n!ly, when "nowing both of you 1 only see oneK or when, seeing an! "nowing you both, 1 fail to i!entify the i$pression an! the object% +ut there coul! be no error when perception an! "nowle!ge correspon!% The waxen bloc" in the heart of a $anLs soul, as 1 $ay say in the wor!s of ,o$er, who playe! upon the wor!s "er an! "eros, $ay be s$ooth an! !eep, an! large enough, an! then the signs are clearly $ar"e! an! lasting, an! !o not get confuse!% +ut in the Lhairy heart,L as the allDwise poet sings, when the wax is $u!!y or har! or $oist, there is a correspon!ing confusion an! want of retenti enessK in the $u!!y an! i$pure there is in!istinctness, an! still $ore in the har!, for there the i$pressions ha e no !epth of wax, an! in the $oist they are too soon efface!% Pet greater is the in!istinctness when they are all jolte! together in a little soul, which is narrow an! has no roo$% These are the sort of natures which ha e false opinionK fro$ stupi!ity they see an! hear an! thin" a$issK an! this is falsehoo! an! ignorance% Error, then, is a confusion of thought an! sense% Theaetetus is !elighte! with this explanation% +ut -ocrates has no sooner foun! the new solution than he sin"s into a fit of !espon!ency% (or an objection occurs to hi$@DD;ay there not be errors where there is no confusion of $in! an! senseR e%g% in nu$bers% 9o one can confuse the $an who$ he has in his thoughts with the horse which he has in his thoughts, but he $ay err in the a!!ition of fi e an! se en% 2n! obser e that these are purely $ental conceptions% Thus we are in ol e! once $ore in the !ile$$a of saying, either that there is no such thing as false opinion, or that a $an "nows what he !oes not "now% &e are at our witLs en!, an! $ay therefore be excuse! for $a"ing a bol!

!i ersion% 2ll this ti$e we ha e been repeating the wor!s L"now,L Lun!erstan!,L yet we !o not "now what "nowle!ge is% L&hy, -ocrates, how can you argue at all without using the$RL 9ay, but the true hero of !ialectic woul! ha e forbi!!en $e to use the$ until 1 ha! explaine! the$% 2n! 1 $ust explain the$ now% The erb Lto "nowL has two senses, to ha e an! to possess "nowle!ge, an! 1 !istinguish Lha ingL fro$ Lpossessing%L 2 $an $ay possess a gar$ent which he !oes not wearK or he $ay ha e wil! bir!s in an a iaryK these in one sense he possesses, an! in another he has none of the$% <et this a iary be an i$age of the $in!, as the waxen bloc" wasK when we are young, the a iary is e$ptyK after a ti$e the bir!s are put inK for un!er this figure we $ay !escribe !ifferent for$s of "nowle!geKDDthere are so$e of the$ in groups, an! so$e single, which are flying about e erywhereK an! let us suppose a hunt after the science of o!! an! e en, or so$e other science% The possession of the bir!s is clearly not the sa$e as the ha ing the$ in the han!% 2n! the original chase of the$ is not the sa$e as ta"ing the$ in the han! when they are alrea!y cage!% This !istinction between use an! possession sa es us fro$ the absur!ity of supposing that we !o not "now what we "now, because we $ay "now in one sense, i%e% possess, what we !o not "now in another, i%e% use% +ut ha e we not escape! one !ifficulty only to encounter a greaterR (or how can the exchange of two "in!s of "nowle!ge e er beco$e false opinionR 2s well $ight we suppose that ignorance coul! $a"e a $an "now, or that blin!ness coul! $a"e hi$ see% Theaetetus suggests that in the a iary there $ay be flying about $oc" bir!s, or for$s of ignorance, an! we put forth our han!s an! grasp ignorance, when we are inten!ing to grasp "nowle!ge% +ut how can he who "nows the for$s of "nowle!ge an! the for$s of ignorance i$agine one to be the otherR 1s there so$e other for$ of "nowle!ge which !istinguishes the$R an! another, an! anotherR Thus we go roun! an! roun! in a circle an! $a"e no progress% 2ll this confusion arises out of our atte$pt to explain false opinion without ha ing explaine! "nowle!ge% &hat then is "nowle!geR Theaetetus repeats that "nowle!ge is true opinion% +ut this see$s to be refute! by the instance of orators an! ju!ges% (or surely the orator cannot con ey a true "nowle!ge of cri$es at which the ju!ges were not presentK he can only

persua!e the$, an! the ju!ge $ay for$ a true opinion an! truly ju!ge% +ut if true opinion were "nowle!ge they coul! not ha e ju!ge! without "nowle!ge% 8nce $ore% Theaetetus offers a !efinition which he has hear!@ Vnowle!ge is true opinion acco$panie! by !efinition or explanation% -ocrates has ha! a si$ilar !rea$, an! has further hear! that the first ele$ents are na$es only, an! that !efinition or explanation begins when they are co$bine!K the letters are un"nown, the syllables or co$binations are "nown% +ut this new hypothesis when teste! by the letters of the alphabet is foun! to brea" !own% The first syllable of -ocratesL na$e is -8% +ut what is -8R Two letters, - an! 8, a sibilant an! a owel, of which no further explanation can be gi en% 2n! how can any one be ignorant of either of the$, an! yet "now both of the$R There is, howe er, another alternati e@DD&e $ay suppose that the syllable has a separate for$ or i!ea !istinct fro$ the letters or parts% The all of the parts $ay not be the whole% Theaetetus is ery $uch incline! to a!opt this suggestion, but when interrogate! by -ocrates he is unable to !raw any !istinction between the whole an! all the parts% 2n! if the syllables ha e no parts, then they are those original ele$ents of which there is no explanation% +ut how can the syllable be "nown if the letter re$ains un"nownR 1n learning to rea! as chil!ren, we are first taught the letters an! then the syllables% 2n! in $usic, the notes, which are the letters, ha e a $uch $ore !istinct $eaning to us than the co$bination of the$% 8nce $ore, then, we $ust as" the $eaning of the state$ent, that LVnowle!ge is right opinion, acco$panie! by explanation or !efinition%L Explanation $ay $ean, A.B the reflection or expression of a $anLs thoughtsDDbut e ery $an who is not !eaf an! !u$b is able to express his thoughtsDDor A2B the enu$eration of the ele$ents of which anything is co$pose!% 2 $an $ay ha e a true opinion about a waggon, but then, an! then only, has he "nowle!ge of a waggon when he is able to enu$erate the hun!re! plan"s of ,esio!% 8r he $ay "now the syllables of the na$e Theaetetus, but not the lettersK yet not until he "nows both can he be sai! to ha e "nowle!ge as well as opinion% +ut on the other han! he $ay "now the syllable LTheL in the na$e Theaetetus, yet he $ay be $ista"en about the sa$e syllable in the na$e Theo!orus, an! in learning to rea! we often $a"e such $ista"es% 2n! e en

if he coul! write out all the letters an! syllables of your na$e in or!er, still he woul! only ha e right opinion% Pet there $ay be a thir! $eaning of the !efinition, besi!es the i$age or expression of the $in!, an! the enu$eration of the ele$ents, i7% AFB perception of !ifference% (or exa$ple, 1 $ay see a $an who has eyes, nose, an! $outhKDDthat will not !istinguish hi$ fro$ any other $an% 8r he $ay ha e a snubDnose an! pro$inent eyesKDDthat will not !istinguish hi$ fro$ $yself an! you an! others who are li"e $e% +ut when 1 see a certain "in! of snubDnose!ness, then 1 recogni7e Theaetetus% 2n! ha ing this sign of !ifference, 1 ha e "nowle!ge% +ut ha e 1 "nowle!ge or opinion of this !ifferenceK if 1 ha e only opinion 1 ha e not "nowle!geK if 1 ha e "nowle!ge we assu$e a !ispute! ter$K for "nowle!ge will ha e to be !efine! as right opinion with "nowle!ge of !ifference% 2n! so, Theaetetus, "nowle!ge is neither perception nor true opinion, nor yet !efinition acco$panying true opinion% 2n! 1 ha e shown that the chil!ren of your brain are not worth rearing% 2re you still in labour, or ha e you brought all you ha e to say about "nowle!ge to the birthR 1f you ha e any $ore thoughts, you will be the better for ha ing got ri! of theseK or if you ha e none, you will be the better for not fancying that you "now what you !o not "now% 8bser e the li$its of $y art, which, li"e $y $otherLs, is an art of $i!wiferyK 1 !o not preten! to co$pare with the goo! an! wise of this an! other ages% 2n! now 1 go to $eet ;eletus at the porch of the Ving 2rchonK but toD $orrow 1 shall hope to see you again, Theo!orus, at this place% %%% 1% The saying of Theaetetus, that LVnowle!ge is sensible perception,L $ay be assu$e! to be a current philosophical opinion of the age% LThe ancients,L as 2ristotle A'e 2ni$%B says, citing a erse of E$pe!ocles, Laffir$e! "nowle!ge to be the sa$e as perception%L &e $ay now exa$ine these wor!s, first, with reference to their place in the history of philosophy, an! secon!ly, in relation to $o!ern speculations% AaB 1n the age of -ocrates the $in! was passing fro$ the object to the

subject% The sa$e i$pulse which a century before ha! le! $en to for$ conceptions of the worl!, now le! the$ to fra$e general notions of the hu$an faculties an! feelings, such as $e$ory, opinion, an! the li"e% The si$plest of these is sensation, or sensible perception, by which Plato see$s to $ean the generali7e! notion of feelings an! i$pressions of sense, without !eter$ining whether they are conscious or not% The theory that LVnowle!ge is sensible perceptionL is the antithesis of that which !eri es "nowle!ge fro$ the $in! ATheaet%B, or which assu$es the existence of i!eas in!epen!ent of the $in! APar$%B% Pet fro$ their extre$e abstraction these theories !o not represent the opposite poles of thought in the sa$e way that the correspon!ing !ifferences woul! in $o!ern philosophy% The $ost i!eal an! the $ost sensational ha e a ten!ency to pass into one anotherK ,eracleitus, li"e his great successor ,egel, has both aspects% The Eleatic isolation of +eing an! the ;egarian or Cynic isolation of in!i i!uals are place! in the sa$e class by Plato A-oph%BK an! the sa$e principle which is the sy$bol of $otion to one $in! is the sy$bol of rest to another% The 2to$ists, who are so$eti$es regar!e! as the ;aterialists of Plato, !enie! the reality of sensation% 2n! in the ancient as well as the $o!ern worl! there were reactions fro$ theory to experience, fro$ i!eas to sense% This is a point of iew fro$ which the philosophy of sensation presente! great attraction to the ancient thin"er% 2$i! the conflict of i!eas an! the ariety of opinions, the i$pression of sense re$aine! certain an! unifor$% ,ar!ness, softness, col!, heat, etc% are not absolutely the sa$e to !ifferent persons, but the art of $easuring coul! at any rate re!uce the$ all to !efinite natures A*epublicB% Thus the !octrine that "nowle!ge is perception supplies or see$s to supply a fir$ stan!ing groun!% <i"e the other notions of the earlier Gree" philosophy, it was hel! in a ery si$ple way, without $uch basis of reasoning, an! without suggesting the Tuestions which naturally arise in our own $in!s on the sa$e subject% AbB The fixe!ness of i$pressions of sense furnishes a lin" of connexion between ancient an! $o!ern philosophy% The $o!ern thin"er often repeats the parallel axio$, L2ll "nowle!ge is experience%L ,e $eans to say that the outwar! an! not the inwar! is both the original source an! the final criterion of truth, because the outwar! can be obser e! an! analy7e!K the inwar! is only "nown by external results, an! is !i$ly percei e! by each $an for hi$self% 1n what !oes this !iffer fro$ the saying of TheaetetusR

Chiefly in thisDDthat the $o!ern ter$ Lexperience,L while i$plying a point of !eparture in sense an! a return to sense, also inclu!es all the processes of reasoning an! i$agination which ha e inter ene!% The necessary connexion between the$ by no $eans affor!s a $easure of the relati e !egree of i$portance which is to be ascribe! to either ele$ent% (or the in!ucti e portion of any science $ay be s$all, as in $athe$atics or ethics, co$pare! with that which the $in! has attaine! by reasoning an! reflection on a ery few facts% 11% The saying that L2ll "nowle!ge is sensationL is i!entifie! by Plato with the Protagorean thesis that L;an is the $easure of all things%L The interpretation which Protagoras hi$self is suppose! to gi e of these latter wor!s is@ LThings are to $e as they appear to $e, an! to you as they appear to you%L +ut there re$ains still an a$biguity both in the text an! in the explanation, which has to be cleare! up% 'i! Protagoras $erely $ean to assert the relati ity of "nowle!ge to the hu$an $in!R 8r !i! he $ean to !eny that there is an objecti e stan!ar! of truthR These two Tuestions ha e not been always clearly !istinguishe!K the relati ity of "nowle!ge has been so$eti$es confoun!e! with uncertainty% The untutore! $in! is apt to suppose that objects exist in!epen!ently of the hu$an faculties, because they really exist in!epen!ently of the faculties of any in!i i!ual% 1n the sa$e way, "nowle!ge appears to be a bo!y of truths store! up in boo"s, which when once ascertaine! are in!epen!ent of the !isco erer% (urther consi!eration shows us that these truths are not really in!epen!ent of the $in!K there is an a!aptation of one to the other, of the eye to the object of sense, of the $in! to the conception% There woul! be no worl!, if there neither were nor e er ha! been any one to percei e the worl!% 2 slight effort of reflection enables us to un!erstan! thisK but no effort of reflection will enable us to pass beyon! the li$its of our own faculties, or to i$agine the relation or a!aptation of objects to the $in! to be !ifferent fro$ that of which we ha e experience% There are certain laws of language an! logic to which we are co$pelle! to confor$, an! to which our i!eas naturally a!apt the$sel esK an! we can no $ore get ri! of the$ than we can cease to be oursel es% The absolute an! infinite, whether explaine! as selfDexistence, or as the totality of hu$an thought, or as the 'i ine nature, if "nown to us at all, cannot escape fro$ the category of relation% +ut because "nowle!ge is subjecti e or relati e to the $in!, we are not to

suppose that we are therefore !epri e! of any of the tests or criteria of truth% 8ne $an still re$ains wiser than another, a $ore accurate obser er an! relater of facts, a truer $easure of the proportions of "nowle!ge% The nature of testi$ony is not altere!, nor the erification of causes by prescribe! $etho!s less certain% 2gain, the truth $ust often co$e to a $an through others, accor!ing to the $easure of his capacity an! e!ucation% +ut neither !oes this affect the testi$ony, whether written or oral, which he "nows by experience to be trustworthy% ,e cannot escape fro$ the laws of his own $in!K an! he cannot escape fro$ the further acci!ent of being !epen!ent for his "nowle!ge on others% +ut still this is no reason why he shoul! always be in !oubtK of $any personal, of $any historical an! scientific facts he $ay be absolutely assure!% 2n! ha ing such a $ass of ac"nowle!ge! truth in the $athe$atical an! physical, not to spea" of the $oral sciences, the $o!erns ha e certainly no reason to acTuiesce in the state$ent that truth is appearance only, or that there is no !ifference between appearance an! truth% The relati ity of "nowle!ge is a truis$ to us, but was a great psychological !isco ery in the fifth century before Christ% 8f this !isco ery, the first !istinct assertion is containe! in the thesis of Protagoras% Probably he ha! no intention either of !enying or affir$ing an objecti e stan!ar! of truth% ,e !i! not consi!er whether $an in the higher or $an in the lower sense was a L$easure of all things%L <i"e other great thin"ers, he was absorbe! with one i!ea, an! that i!ea was the absoluteness of perception% <i"e -ocrates, he see$e! to see that philosophy $ust be brought bac" fro$ LnatureL to Ltruth,L fro$ the worl! to $an% +ut he !i! not stop to analy7e whether he $eant L$anL in the concrete or $an in the abstract, any $an or so$e $en, LTuo! se$per Tuo! ubiTueL or in!i i!ual pri ate ju!g$ent% -uch an analysis lay beyon! his sphere of thoughtK the age before -ocrates ha! not arri e! at these !istinctions% <i"e the Cynics, again, he !iscar!e! "nowle!ge in any higher sense than perception% (or LtruerL or LwiserL he substitute! the wor! Lbetter,L an! is not unwilling to a!$it that both states an! in!i i!uals are capable of practical i$pro e$ent% +ut this i$pro e$ent !oes not arise fro$ intellectual enlighten$ent, nor yet fro$ the exertion of the will, but fro$ a change of circu$stances an! i$pressionsK an! he who can effect this change in hi$self or others $ay be !ee$e! a philosopher% 1n the $o!e of effecting it, while agreeing with -ocrates an! the Cynics in the i$portance which he attaches to practical life, he is at ariance with both of the$% To suppose that practice can be !i orce! fro$ speculation, or that we $ay

!o goo! without caring about truth, is by no $eans singular, either in philosophy or life% The singularity of this, as of so$e other AsoDcalle!B sophistical !octrines, is the fran"ness with which they are a owe!, instea! of being eile!, as in $o!ern ti$es, un!er a$biguous an! con enient phrases% Plato appears to treat Protagoras $uch as he hi$self is treate! by 2ristotleK that is to say, he !oes not atte$pt to un!erstan! hi$ fro$ his own point of iew% +ut he entangles hi$ in the $eshes of a $ore a! ance! logic% To which Protagoras is suppose! to reply by ;egarian Tuibbles, which !estroy logic, L9ot only $an, but each $an, an! each $an at each $o$ent%L 1n the argu$ents about sight an! $e$ory there is a palpable unfairness which is worthy of the great Lbrainless brothers,L Euthy!e$us an! 'ionyso!orus, an! $ay be co$pare! with the eg"e"alu$$enos ALob elatusLB of Eubuli!es% (or he who sees with one eye only cannot be truly sai! both to see an! not to seeK nor is $e$ory, which is liable to forget, the i$$e!iate "nowle!ge to which Protagoras applies the ter$% Theo!orus justly charges -ocrates with going beyon! the truthK an! Protagoras has eTually right on his si!e when he protests against -ocrates arguing fro$ the co$$on use of wor!s, which Lthe ulgar per ert in all $anner of ways%L 111% The theory of Protagoras is connecte! by 2ristotle as well as Plato with the flux of ,eracleitus% +ut 2ristotle is only following Plato, an! Plato, as we ha e alrea!y seen, !i! not $ean to i$ply that such a connexion was a!$itte! by Protagoras hi$self% ,is $etaphysical genius saw or see$e! to see a co$$on ten!ency in the$, just as the $o!ern historian of ancient philosophy $ight percei e a parallelis$ between two thin"ers of which they were probably unconscious the$sel es% &e $ust re$e$ber throughout that Plato is not spea"ing of ,eracleitus, but of the ,eracliteans, who succee!e! hi$K nor of the great original i!eas of the $aster, but of the Eristic into which they ha! !egenerate! a hun!re! years later% There is nothing in the frag$ents of ,eracleitus which at all justifies PlatoLs account of hi$% ,is philosophy $ay be resol e! into two ele$entsDDfirst, change, secon!ly, law or $easure per a!ing the change@ these he saw e erywhere, an! often expresse! in strange $ythological sy$bols% +ut he has no analysis of sensible perception such as Plato attributes to hi$K nor is there any reason to suppose that he pushe! his philosophy into that

absolute negation in which ,eracliteanis$ was sun" in the age of Plato% ,e ne er sai! that Lchange $eans e ery sort of changeKL an! he expressly !istinguishe! between Lthe general an! particular un!erstan!ing%L <i"e a poet, he sur eye! the ele$ents of $ythology, nature, thought, which lay before hi$, an! so$eti$es by the light of genius he saw or see$e! to see a $ysterious principle wor"ing behin! the$% +ut as has been the case with other great philosophers, an! with Plato an! 2ristotle the$sel es, what was really per$anent an! original coul! not be un!erstoo! by the next generation, while a per erte! logic carrie! out his chance expressions with an illogical consistency% ,is si$ple an! noble thoughts, li"e those of the great Eleatic, soon !egenerate! into a $ere strife of wor!s% 2n! when thus re!uce! to $ere wor!s, they see$ to ha e exercise! a far wi!er influence in the cities of 1onia Awhere the people Lwere $a! about the$LB than in the lifeDti$e of ,eracleitusDDa pheno$enon which, though at first sight singular, is not without a parallel in the history of philosophy an! theology% 1t is this per erte! for$ of the ,eraclitean philosophy which is suppose! to effect the final o erthrow of Protagorean sensationalis$% (or if all things are changing at e ery $o$ent, in all sorts of ways, then there is nothing fixe! or !efine! at all, an! therefore no sensible perception, nor any true wor! by which that or anything else can be !escribe!% 8f course Protagoras woul! not ha e a!$itte! the justice of this argu$ent any $ore than ,eracleitus woul! ha e ac"nowle!ge! the Lune!ucate! fanaticsL who appeale! to his writings% ,e $ight ha e sai!, LThe excellent -ocrates has first confuse! $e with ,eracleitus, an! ,eracleitus with his Ephesian successors, an! has then !ispro e! the existence both of "nowle!ge an! sensation% +ut 1 a$ not responsible for what 1 ne er sai!, nor will 1 a!$it that $y co$$onDsense account of "nowle!ge can be o erthrown by unintelligible ,eraclitean para!oxes%L 1)% -till at the botto$ of the argu$ents there re$ains a truth, that "nowle!ge is so$ething $ore than sensible perceptionKDDthis alone woul! not !istinguish $an fro$ a ta!pole% The absoluteness of sensations at each $o$ent !estroys the ery consciousness of sensations Aco$pare Phileb%B, or the power of co$paring the$% The senses are not $ere holes in a LTrojan horse,L but the organs of a presi!ing nature, in which they $eet% 2 great a! ance has been $a!e in psychology when the senses are recogni7e! as organs of sense, an! we are a!$itte! to see or feel Lthrough the$L an! not

Lby the$,L a !istinction of wor!s which, as -ocrates obser es, is by no $eans pe!antic% 2 still further step has been $a!e when the $ost abstract notions, such as +eing an! 9otDbeing, sa$eness an! !ifference, unity an! plurality, are ac"nowle!ge! to be the creations of the $in! herself, wor"ing upon the feelings or i$pressions of sense% 1n this $anner Plato !escribes the process of acTuiring the$, in the wor!s LVnowle!ge consists not in the feelings or affections Apathe$asiB, but in the process of reasoning about the$ Asullogis$oB%L ,ere, is in the Par$eni!es, he $eans so$ething not really !ifferent fro$ generali7ation% 2s in the -ophist, he is laying the foun!ation of a rational psychology, which is to superse!e the Platonic re$iniscence of 1!eas as well as the Eleatic +eing an! the in!i i!ualis$ of ;egarians an! Cynics% )% ,a ing rejecte! the !octrine that LVnowle!ge is perception,L we now procee! to loo" for a !efinition of "nowle!ge in the sphere of opinion% +ut here we are $et by a singular !ifficulty@ ,ow is false opinion possibleR (or we $ust either "now or not "now that which is presente! to the $in! or to sense% &e of course shoul! answer at once@ L9oK the alternati e is not necessary, for there $ay be !egrees of "nowle!geK an! we $ay "now an! ha e forgotten, or we $ay be learning, or we $ay ha e a general but not a particular "nowle!ge, or we $ay "now but not be able to explainKL an! $any other ways $ay be i$agine! in which we "now an! !o not "now at the sa$e ti$e% +ut these answers belong to a later stage of $etaphysical !iscussionK whereas the !ifficulty in Tuestion naturally arises owing to the chil!hoo! of the hu$an $in!, li"e the parallel !ifficulty respecting 9otDbeing% ;en ha! only recently arri e! at the notion of opinionK they coul! not at once !efine the true an! pass beyon! into the false% The ery wor! !oxa was full of a$biguity, being so$eti$es, as in the Eleatic philosophy, applie! to the sensible worl!, an! again use! in the $ore or!inary sense of opinion% There is no connexion between sensible appearance an! probability, an! yet both of the$ $et in the wor! !oxa, an! coul! har!ly be !isengage! fro$ one another in the $in! of the Gree" li ing in the fifth or fourth century +%C% To this was often a!!e!, as at the en! of the fifth boo" of the *epublic, the i!ea of relation, which is eTually !istinct fro$ either of the$K also a fourth notion, the conclusion of the !ialectical process, the $a"ing up of the $in! after she has been Ltal"ing to herselfL ATheat%B% &e are not then surprise! that the sphere of opinion an! of 9otDbeing

shoul! be a !us"y, halfDlighte! place A*epublicB, belonging neither to the ol! worl! of sense an! i$agination, nor to the new worl! of reflection an! reason% Plato atte$pts to clear up this !ar"ness% 1n his accusto$e! $anner he passes fro$ the lower to the higher, without o$itting the inter$e!iate stages% This appears to be the reason why he see"s for the !efinition of "nowle!ge first in the sphere of opinion% ,ereafter we shall fin! that so$ething $ore than opinion is reTuire!% (alse opinion is explaine! by Plato at first as a confusion of $in! an! sense, which arises when the i$pression on the $in! !oes not correspon! to the i$pression $a!e on the senses% 1t is ob ious that this explanation Asupposing the !istinction between i$pressions on the $in! an! i$pressions on the senses to be a!$itte!B !oes not account for all for$s of errorK an! Plato has exclu!e! hi$self fro$ the consi!eration of the greater nu$ber, by !esigne!ly o$itting the inter$e!iate processes of learning an! forgettingK nor !oes he inclu!e fallacies in the use of language or erroneous inferences% +ut he is struc" by one possibility of error, which is not co ere! by his theory, i7% errors in arith$etic% (or in nu$bers an! calculation there is no co$bination of thought an! sense, an! yet errors $ay often happen% ,ence he is le! to !iscar! the explanation which $ight ne ertheless ha e been suppose! to hol! goo! Afor anything which he says to the contraryB as a rationale of error, in the case of facts !eri e! fro$ sense% 2nother atte$pt is $a!e to explain false opinion by assigning to error a sort of positi e existence% +ut error or ignorance is essentially negati eDDa notD"nowingK if we "new an error, we shoul! be no longer in error% &e $ay eil our !ifficulty un!er figures of speech, but these, although telling argu$ents with the $ultitu!e, can ne er be the real foun!ation of a syste$ of psychology% 8nly they lea! us to !well upon $ental pheno$ena which if expresse! in an abstract for$ woul! not be reali7e! by us at all% The figure of the $in! recei ing i$pressions is one of those i$ages which ha e roote! the$sel es for e er in language% 1t $ay or $ay not be a Lgracious ai!L to thoughtK but it cannot be got ri! of% The other figure of the enclosure is also re$ar"able as affor!ing the first hint of uni ersal allDper a!ing i!eas,DDa notion further carrie! out in the -ophist% This is i$plie! in the bir!s, so$e in floc"s, so$e solitary, which fly about anywhere an! e erywhere% Plato !iscar!s both figures, as not really sol ing the Tuestion which to us appears so si$ple@ L,ow !o we

$a"e $ista"esRL The failure of the enTuiry see$s to show that we shoul! return to "nowle!ge, an! begin with thatK an! we $ay afterwar!s procee!, with a better hope of success, to the exa$ination of opinion% +ut is true opinion really !istinct fro$ "nowle!geR The !ifference between these he see"s to establish by an argu$ent, which to us appears singular an! unsatisfactory% The existence of true opinion is pro e! by the rhetoric of the law courts, which cannot gi e "nowle!ge, but $ay gi e true opinion% The rhetorician cannot put the ju!ge or juror in possession of all the facts which pro e an act of iolence, but he $ay truly persua!e the$ of the co$$ission of such an act% ,ere the i!ea of true opinion see$s to be a right conclusion fro$ i$perfect "nowle!ge% +ut the correctness of such an opinion will be purely acci!entalK an! is really the effect of one $an, who has the $eans of "nowing, persua!ing another who has not% Plato woul! ha e !one better if he ha! sai! that true opinion was a contra!iction in ter$s% 2ssu$ing the !istinction between "nowle!ge an! opinion, Theaetetus, in answer to -ocrates, procee!s to !efine "nowle!ge as true opinion, with !efinite or rational explanation% This -ocrates i!entifies with another an! !ifferent theory, of those who assert that "nowle!ge first begins with a proposition% The ele$ents $ay be percei e! by sense, but they are na$es, an! cannot be !efine!% &hen we assign to the$ so$e pre!icate, they first begin to ha e a $eaning Aono$aton su$plo"e logou ousiaB% This see$s eTui alent to saying, that the in!i i!uals of sense beco$e the subject of "nowle!ge when they are regar!e! as they are in nature in relation to other in!i i!uals% Pet we feel a !ifficulty in following this new hypothesis% (or $ust not opinion be eTually expresse! in a propositionR The !ifference between true an! false opinion is not the !ifference between the particular an! the uni ersal, but between the true uni ersal an! the false% Thought $ay be as $uch at fault as sight% &hen we place in!i i!uals un!er a class, or assign to the$ attributes, this is not "nowle!ge, but a ery ru!i$entary process of thoughtK the first generali7ation of all, without which language woul! be i$possible% 2n! has Plato "ept altogether clear of a confusion, which the analogous wor! logos ten!s to create, of a proposition an! a !efinitionR 2n! is not the confusion increase! by the use of the analogous

ter$ Lele$ents,L or LlettersLR (or there is no real rese$blance between the relation of letters to a syllable, an! of the ter$s to a proposition% Plato, in the spirit of the ;egarian philosophy, soon !isco ers a flaw in the explanation% (or how can we "now a co$poun! of which the si$ple ele$ents are un"nown to usR Can two un"nowns $a"e a "nownR Can a whole be so$ething !ifferent fro$ the partsR The answer of experience is that they canK for we $ay "now a co$poun!, which we are unable to analy7e into its ele$entsK an! all the parts, when unite!, $ay be $ore than all the parts separate!@ e%g% the nu$ber four, or any other nu$ber, is $ore than the units which are containe! in itK any che$ical co$poun! is $ore than an! !ifferent fro$ the si$ple ele$ents% +ut ancient philosophy in this, as in $any other instances, procee!ing by the path of $ental analysis, was perplexe! by !oubts which warre! against the plainest facts% Three atte$pts to explain the new !efinition of "nowle!ge still re$ain to be consi!ere!% They all of the$ turn on the explanation of logos% The first account of the $eaning of the wor! is the reflection of thought in speechDDa sort of no$inalis$ L<a science est une langue bien faite%L +ut anybo!y who is not !u$b can say what he thin"sK therefore $ere speech cannot be "nowle!ge% 2n! yet we $ay obser e, that there is in this explanation an ele$ent of truth which is not recogni7e! by PlatoK i7% that truth an! thought are inseparable fro$ language, although $ere expression in wor!s is not truth% The secon! explanation of logos is the enu$eration of the ele$entary parts of the co$plex whole% +ut this is only !efinition acco$panie! with right opinion, an! !oes not yet attain to the certainty of "nowle!ge% Plato !oes not $ention the greater objection, which is, that the enu$eration of particulars is en!lessK such a !efinition woul! be base! on no principle, an! woul! not help us at all in gaining a co$$on i!ea% The thir! is the best explanation,DDthe possession of a characteristic $ar", which see$s to answer to the logical !efinition by genus an! !ifference% +ut this, again, is eTually necessary for right opinionK an! we ha e alrea!y !eter$ine!, although not on ery satisfactory groun!s, that "nowle!ge $ust be !istinguishe! fro$ opinion% 2 better !istinction is !rawn between the$ in the Ti$aeus% They $ight be oppose! as philosophy an! rhetoric, an! as con ersant respecti ely with necessary an! contingent $atter% +ut no true i!ea of the nature of either of the$, or of their relation to one another, coul! be fra$e! until science obtaine! a content%

The ancient philosophers in the age of Plato thought of science only as pure abstraction, an! to this opinion stoo! in no relation% <i"e Theaetetus, we ha e attaine! to no !efinite result% +ut an interesting phase of ancient philosophy has passe! before us% 2n! the negati e result is not to be !espise!% (or on certain subjects, an! in certain states of "nowle!ge, the wor" of negation or clearing the groun! $ust go on, perhaps for a generation, before the new structure can begin to rise% Plato saw the necessity of co$bating the illogical logic of the ;egarians an! Eristics% (or the co$pletion of the e!ifice, he $a"es preparation in the Theaetetus, an! crowns the wor" in the -ophist% ;any A.B fine expressions, an! A2B re$ar"s full of wis!o$, AFB also ger$s of a $etaphysic of the future, are scattere! up an! !own in the !ialogue% -uch, for exa$ple, as A.B the co$parison of TheaetetusL progress in learning to the Lnoiseless flow of a ri er of oilLK the satirical touch, Lfla ouring a sauce or fawning speechLK or the re$ar"able expression, Lfull of i$pure !ialecticLK or the li ely i$ages un!er which the argu$ent is !escribe!,DDLthe floo! of argu$ents pouring in,L the fresh !iscussions Lbursting in li"e a ban! of re ellers%L A2B 2s illustrations of the secon! hea!, $ay be cite! the re$ar" of -ocrates, that L!istinctions of wor!s, although so$eti$es pe!antic, are also necessaryLK or the fine touch in the character of the lawyer, that L!angers ca$e upon hi$ when the ten!erness of youth was uneTual to the$LK or the !escription of the $anner in which the spirit is bro"en in a wic"e! $an who listens to reproof until he beco$es li"e a chil!K or the punish$ent of the wic"e!, which is not physical suffering, but the perpetual co$panionship of e il Aco$pare GorgiasBK or the saying, often repeate! by 2ristotle an! others, that Lphilosophy begins in won!er, for 1ris is the chil! of Thau$asLK or the superb conte$pt with which the philosopher ta"es !own the pri!e of wealthy lan!e! proprietors by co$parison of the whole earth% AFB 1$portant $etaphysical i!eas are@ a% the conception of thought, as the $in! tal"ing to herselfK b% the notion of a co$$on sense, !e elope! further by 2ristotle, an! the explicit !eclaration, that the $in! gains her conceptions of +eing, sa$eness, nu$ber, an! the li"e, fro$ reflection on herselfK c% the excellent !istinction of Theaetetus Awhich -ocrates, spea"ing with e$phasis, Llea es to growLB between seeing the for$s or hearing the soun!s of wor!s in a foreign language, an! un!erstan!ing the $eaning of the$K an! !% the !istinction of -ocrates hi$self between Lha ingL an! LpossessingL "nowle!ge, in which the answer to the whole !iscussion appears to be

containe!% %%% There is a !ifference between ancient an! $o!ern psychology, an! we ha e a !ifficulty in explaining one in the ter$s of the other% To us the inwar! an! outwar! sense an! the inwar! an! outwar! worl!s of which they are the organs are parte! by a wall, an! appear as if they coul! ne er be confoun!e!% The $in! is en!ue! with faculties, habits, instincts, an! a personality or consciousness in which they are boun! together% 8 er against these are place! for$s, colours, external bo!ies co$ing into contact with our own bo!y% &e spea" of a subject which is oursel es, of an object which is all the rest% These are separable in thought, but unite! in any act of sensation, reflection, or olition% 2s there are arious !egrees in which the $in! $ay enter into or be abstracte! fro$ the operations of sense, so there are arious points at which this separation or union $ay be suppose! to occur% 2n! within the sphere of $in! the analogy of sense reappearsK an! we !istinguish not only external objects, but objects of will an! of "nowle!ge which we contrast with the$% These again are co$prehen!e! in a higher object, which reunites with the subject% 2 $ultitu!e of abstractions are create! by the efforts of successi e thin"ers which beco$e logical !eter$inationsK an! they ha e to be arrange! in or!er, before the sche$e of thought is co$plete% The fra$ewor" of the hu$an intellect is not the peculiu$ of an in!i i!ual, but the joint wor" of $any who are of all ages an! countries% &hat we are in $in! is !ue, not $erely to our physical, but to our $ental antece!ents which we trace in history, an! $ore especially in the history of philosophy% 9or can $ental pheno$ena be truly explaine! either by physiology or by the obser ation of consciousness apart fro$ their history% They ha e a growth of their own, li"e the growth of a flower, a tree, a hu$an being% They $ay be concei e! as of the$sel es constituting a co$$on $in!, an! ha ing a sort of personal i!entity in which they coexist% -o co$prehensi e is $o!ern psychology, see$ing to ai$ at constructing anew the entire worl! of thought% 2n! prior to or si$ultaneously with this construction a negati e process has to be carrie! on, a clearing away of useless abstractions which we ha e inherite! fro$ the past% ;any erroneous conceptions of the $in! !eri e! fro$ for$er philosophies ha e foun! their

way into language, an! we with !ifficulty !isengage oursel es fro$ the$% ;ere figures of speech ha e unconsciously influence! the $in!s of great thin"ers% 2lso there are so$e !istinctions, as, for exa$ple, that of the will an! of the reason, an! of the $oral an! intellectual faculties, which are carrie! further than is justifie! by experience% 2ny separation of things which we cannot see or exactly !efine, though it $ay be necessary, is a fertile source of error% The !i ision of the $in! into faculties or powers or irtues is too !eeply roote! in language to be got ri! of, but it gi es a false i$pression% (or if we reflect on oursel es we see that all our faculties easily pass into one another, an! are boun! together in a single $in! or consciousnessK but this $ental unity is apt to be conceale! fro$ us by the !istinctions of language% 2 profusion of wor!s an! i!eas has obscure! rather than enlightene! $ental science% 1t is har! to say how $any fallacies ha e arisen fro$ the representation of the $in! as a box, as a Ltabula rasa,L a boo", a $irror, an! the li"e% 1t is re$ar"able how Plato in the Theaetetus, after ha ing in!ulge! in the figure of the waxen tablet an! the !ecoy, afterwar!s !iscar!s the$% The $in! is also represente! by another class of i$ages, as the spring of a watch, a $oti e power, a breath, a strea$, a succession of points or $o$ents% 2s Plato re$ar"s in the Cratylus, wor!s expressi e of $otion as well as of rest are e$ploye! to !escribe the faculties an! operations of the $in!K an! in these there is containe! another store of fallacies% -o$e sha!ow or reflection of the bo!y see$s always to a!here to our thoughts about oursel es, an! $ental processes are har!ly !istinguishe! in language fro$ bo!ily ones% To see or percei e are use! in!ifferently of bothK the wor!s intuition, $oral sense, co$$on sense, the $in!Ls eye, are figures of speech transferre! fro$ one to the other% 2n! $any other wor!s use! in early poetry or in sacre! writings to express the wor"s of $in! ha e a $aterialistic soun!K for ol! $ythology was allie! to sense, an! the !istinction of $atter an! $in! ha! not as yet arisen% Thus $aterialis$ recei es an illusi e ai! fro$ languageK an! both in philosophy an! religion the i$aginary figure or association easily ta"es the place of real "nowle!ge% 2gain, there is the illusion of loo"ing into our own $in!s as if our thoughts or feelings were written !own in a boo"% This is another figure of speech, which $ight be appropriately ter$e! Lthe fallacy of the loo"ingD glass%L &e cannot loo" at the $in! unless we ha e the eye which sees, an! we can only loo", not into, but out of the $in! at the thoughts, wor!s,

actions of oursel es an! others% &hat we !i$ly recogni7e within us is not experience, but rather the suggestion of an experience, which we $ay gather, if we will, fro$ the obser ation of the worl!% The $e$ory has but a feeble recollection of what we were saying or !oing a few wee"s or a few $onths ago, an! still less of what we were thin"ing or feeling% This is one a$ong $any reasons why there is so little selfD"nowle!ge a$ong $an"in!K they !o not carry with the$ the thought of what they are or ha e been% The soDcalle! Lfacts of consciousnessL are eTually e anescentK they are facts which nobo!y e er saw, an! which can neither be !efine! nor !escribe!% 8f the three laws of thought the first A2ll 2 I 2B is an i!entical propositionDDthat is to say, a $ere wor! or sy$bol clai$ing to be a proposition@ the two others A9othing can be 2 an! not 2, an! E erything is either 2 or not 2B are untrue, because they exclu!e !egrees an! also the $ixe! $o!es an! !ouble aspects un!er which truth is so often presente! to us% To assert that $an is $an is un$eaningK to say that he is free or necessary an! cannot be both is a half truth only% These are a few of the entangle$ents which i$pe!e the natural course of hu$an thought% <astly, there is the fallacy which lies still !eeper, of regar!ing the in!i i!ual $in! apart fro$ the uni ersal, or either, as a selfDexistent entity apart fro$ the i!eas which are containe! in the$% 1n ancient philosophies the analysis of the $in! is still ru!i$entary an! i$perfect% 1t naturally began with an effort to !isengage the uni ersal fro$ senseDDthis was the first lifting up of the $ist% 1t wa ere! between object an! subject, passing i$perceptibly fro$ one or +eing to $in! an! thought% 2ppearance in the outwar! object was for a ti$e in!istinguishable fro$ opinion in the subject% 2t length $an"in! spo"e of "nowing as well as of opining or percei ing% +ut when the wor! L"nowle!geL was foun! how was it to be explaine! or !efine!R 1t was not an error, it was a step in the right !irection, when Protagoras sai! that L;an is the $easure of all things,L an! that L2ll "nowle!ge is perception%L This was the subjecti e which correspon!e! to the objecti e L2ll is flux%L +ut the thoughts of $en !eepene!, an! soon they began to be aware that "nowle!ge was neither sense, nor yet opinionDDwith or without explanationK nor the expression of thought, nor the enu$eration of parts, nor the a!!ition of characteristic $ar"s% ;otion an! rest were eTually ill a!apte! to express its nature, although both $ust in so$e sense be attribute! to itK it $ight be !escribe!

$ore truly as the $in! con ersing with herselfK the !iscourse of reasonK the hy$n of !ialectic, the science of relations, of i!eas, of the soDcalle! arts an! sciences, of the one, of the goo!, of the all@DDthis is the way along which Plato is lea!ing us in his later !ialogues% 1n its higher signification it was the "nowle!ge, not of $en, but of go!s, perfect an! all sufficing@DDli"e other i!eals always passing out of sight, an! ne ertheless present to the $in! of 2ristotle as well as Plato, an! the reality to which they were both ten!ing% (or 2ristotle as well as Plato woul! in $o!ern phraseology ha e been ter$e! a $ysticK an! li"e hi$ woul! ha e !efine! the higher philosophy to be LVnowle!ge of being or essence,LDD wor!s to which in our own !ay we ha e a !ifficulty in attaching a $eaning% Pet, in spite of Plato an! his followers, $an"in! ha e again an! again returne! to a sensational philosophy% 2s to so$e of the early thin"ers, a$i! the fleetings of sensible objects, i!eas alone see$e! to be fixe!, so to a later generation a$i! the fluctuation of philosophical opinions the only fixe! points appeare! to be outwar! objects% 2ny pretence of "nowle!ge which went beyon! the$ i$plie! logical processes, of the correctness of which they ha! no assurance an! which at best were only probable% The $in!, tire! of wan!ering, sought to rest on fir$ groun!K when the i!ols of philosophy an! language were strippe! off, the perception of outwar! objects alone re$aine!% The ancient Epicureans ne er as"e! whether the co$parison of these with one another !i! not in ol e principles of another "in! which were abo e an! beyon! the$% 1n li"e $anner the $o!ern in!ucti e philosophy forgot to enTuire into the $eaning of experience, an! !i! not atte$pt to for$ a conception of outwar! objects apart fro$ the $in!, or of the $in! apart fro$ the$% -oon objects of sense were $erge! in sensations an! feelings, but feelings an! sensations were still unanaly7e!% 2t last we return to the !octrine attribute! by Plato to Protagoras, that the $in! is only a succession of $o$entary perceptions% 2t this point the $o!ern philosophy of experience for$s an alliance with ancient scepticis$% The higher truths of philosophy an! religion are ery far re$o e! fro$ sense% 2!$itting that, li"e all other "nowle!ge, they are !eri e! fro$ experience, an! that experience is ulti$ately resol able into facts which co$e to us through the eye an! ear, still their origin is a $ere acci!ent which has nothing to !o with their true nature% They are uni ersal an! unseenK they belong to all ti$esDDpast, present, an! future% 2ny worthy

notion of $in! or reason inclu!es the$% The proof of the$ is, .st, their co$prehensi eness an! consistency with one anotherK 2n!ly, their agree$ent with history an! experience% +ut sensation is of the present only, is isolate!, is an! is not in successi e $o$ents% 1t ta"es the passing hour as it co$es, following the lea! of the eye or ear instea! of the co$$an! of reason% 1t is a faculty which $an has in co$$on with the ani$als, an! in which he is inferior to $any of the$% The i$portance of the senses in us is that they are the apertures of the $in!, !oors an! win!ows through which we ta"e in an! $a"e our own the $aterials of "nowle!ge% *egar!e! in any other point of iew sensation is of all $ental acts the $ost tri ial an! superficial% ,ence the ter$ LsensationalL is rightly use! to express what is shallow in thought an! feeling% &e propose in what follows, first of all, li"e Plato in the Theaetetus, to analyse sensation, an! secon!ly to trace the connexion between theories of sensation an! a sensational or Epicurean philosophy% Paragraph 1% &e, as well as the ancients, spea" of the fi e senses, an! of a sense, or co$$on sense, which is the abstraction of the$% The ter$ LsenseL is also use! $etaphorically, both in ancient an! $o!ern philosophy, to express the operations of the $in! which are i$$e!iate or intuiti e% 8f the fi e senses, twoDDthe sight an! the hearingDDare of a $ore subtle an! co$plex nature, while two othersDDthe s$ell an! the tasteDDsee$ to be only $ore refine! arieties of touch% 2ll of the$ are passi e, an! by this are !istinguishe! fro$ the acti e faculty of speech@ they recei e i$pressions, but !o not pro!uce the$, except in so far as they are objects of sense the$sel es% Physiology spea"s to us of the won!erful apparatus of ner es, $uscles, tissues, by which the senses are enable! to fulfil their functions% 1t traces the connexion, though i$perfectly, of the bo!ily organs with the operations of the $in!% 8f these latter, it see$s rather to "now the con!itions than the causes% 1t can pro e to us that without the brain we cannot thin", an! that without the eye we cannot see@ an! yet there is far $ore in thin"ing an! seeing than is gi en by the brain an! the eye% 1t obser es the Lconco$itant ariationsL of bo!y an! $in!% Psychology, on the other han!, treats of the sa$e subject regar!e! fro$ another point of iew% 1t spea"s of the relation of the senses to one anotherK it shows how they $eet the $in!K it analy7es the transition fro$ sense to thought% The one

!escribes their nature as apparent to the outwar! eyeK by the other they are regar!e! only as the instru$ents of the $in!% 1t is in this latter point of iew that we propose to consi!er the$% The si$plest sensation in ol es an unconscious or nascent operation of the $in!K it i$plies objects of sense, an! objects of sense ha e !ifferences of for$, nu$ber, colour% +ut the conception of an object without us, or the power of !iscri$inating nu$bers, for$s, colours, is not gi en by the sense, but by the $in!% 2 $ere sensation !oes not attain to !istinctness@ it is a confuse! i$pression, sug"echu$enon ti, as Plato says A*epublicB, until nu$ber intro!uces light an! or!er into the confusion% 2t what point confusion beco$es !istinctness is a Tuestion of !egree which cannot be precisely !eter$ine!% The !istant object, the un!efine! notion, co$e out into relief as we approach the$ or atten! to the$% 8r we $ay assist the analysis by atte$pting to i$agine the worl! first !awning upon the eye of the infant or of a person newly restore! to sight% Pet e en with the$ the $in! as well as the eye opens or enlarges% (or all three are inseparably boun! togetherDDthe object woul! be nowhere an! nothing, if not percei e! by the sense, an! the sense woul! ha e no power of !istinguishing without the $in!% +ut prior to objects of sense there is a thir! nature in which they are containe!DDthat is to say, space, which $ay be explaine! in arious ways% 1t is the ele$ent which surroun!s the$K it is the acuu$ or oi! which they lea e or occupy when passing fro$ one portion of space to another% 1t $ight be !escribe! in the language of ancient philosophy, as Lthe 9otD beingL of objects% 1t is a negati e i!ea which in the course of ages has beco$e positi e% 1t is originally !eri e! fro$ the conte$plation of the worl! without usDDthe boun!less earth or sea, the acant hea en, an! is therefore acTuire! chiefly through the sense of sight@ to the blin! the conception of space is feeble an! ina!eTuate, !eri e! for the $ost part fro$ touch or fro$ the !escriptions of others% 2t first it appears to be continuousK afterwar!s we percei e it to be capable of !i ision by lines or points, real or i$aginary% +y the help of $athe$atics we for$ another i!ea of space, which is altogether in!epen!ent of experience% Geo$etry teaches us that the innu$erable lines an! figures by which space is or $ay be intersecte! are absolutely true in all their co$binations an! conseTuences% 9ew an! unchangeable properties of space are thus !e elope!, which are pro e! to us in a thousan! ways by $athe$atical reasoning as well as by

co$$on experience% Through Tuantity an! $easure we are con!ucte! to our si$plest an! purest notion of $atter, which is to the cube or soli! what space is to the sTuare or surface% 2n! all our applications of $athe$atics are applications of our i!eas of space to $atter% 9o won!er then that they see$ to ha e a necessary existence to us% +eing the si$plest of our i!eas, space is also the one of which we ha e the $ost !ifficulty in ri!!ing oursel es% 9either can we set a li$it to it, for where er we fix a li$it, space is springing up beyon!% 9either can we concei e a s$allest or in!i isible portion of itK for within the s$allest there is a s$aller stillK an! e en these inconcei able Tualities of space, whether the infinite or the infinitesi$al, $ay be $a!e the subject of reasoning an! ha e a certain truth to us% &hether space exists in the $in! or out of it, is a Tuestion which has no $eaning% &e shoul! rather say that without it the $in! is incapable of concei ing the bo!y, an! therefore of concei ing itself% The $in! $ay be in!ee! i$agine! to contain the bo!y, in the sa$e way that 2ristotle Apartly following PlatoB supposes Go! to be the outer hea en or circle of the uni erse% +ut how can the in!i i!ual $in! carry about the uni erse of space pac"e! up within, or how can separate $in!s ha e either a uni erse of their own or a co$$on uni erseR 1n such conceptions there see$s to be a confusion of the in!i i!ual an! the uni ersal% To say that we can only ha e a true i!ea of oursel es when we !eny the reality of that by which we ha e any i!ea of oursel es is an absur!ity% The earth which is our habitation an! Lthe starry hea en abo eL an! we oursel es are eTually an illusion, if space is only a Tuality or con!ition of our $in!s% 2gain, we $ay co$pare the truths of space with other truths !eri e! fro$ experience, which see$ to ha e a necessity to us in proportion to the freTuency of their recurrence or the truth of the conseTuences which $ay be inferre! fro$ the$% &e are thus le! to re$ar" that the necessity in our i!eas of space on which $uch stress has been lai!, !iffers in a slight !egree only fro$ the necessity which appears to belong to other of our i!eas, e%g% weight, $otion, an! the li"e% 2n! there is another way in which this necessity $ay be explaine!% &e ha e been taught it, an! the truth which we were taught or which we inherite! has ne er been contra!icte! in all our experience an! is therefore confir$e! by it% &ho can resist an i!ea which is presente! to hi$ in a general for$ in e ery $o$ent of his life an! of which he fin!s no instance to the contraryR The

greater part of what is so$eti$es regar!e! as the a priori intuition of space is really the conception of the arious geo$etrical figures of which the properties ha e been re eale! by $athe$atical analysis% 2n! the certainty of these properties is i$$easurably increase! to us by our fin!ing that they hol! goo! not only in e ery instance, but in all the conseTuences which are suppose! to flow fro$ the$% 9either $ust we forget that our i!ea of space, li"e our other i!eas, has a history% The ,o$eric poe$s contain no wor! for itK e en the later Gree" philosophy has not the Vantian notion of space, but only the !efinite LplaceL or Lthe infinite%L To Plato, in the Ti$aeus, it is "nown only as the Lnurse of generation%L &hen therefore we spea" of the necessity of our i!eas of space we $ust re$e$ber that this is a necessity which has grown up with the growth of the hu$an $in!, an! has been $a!e by oursel es% &e can free oursel es fro$ the perplexities which are in ol e! in it by ascen!ing to a ti$e in which they !i! not as yet exist% 2n! when space or ti$e are !escribe! as La priori for$s or intuitions a!!e! to the $atter gi en in sensation,L we shoul! consi!er that such expressions belong really to the LpreDhistoric stu!yL of philosophy, i%e% to the eighteenth century, when $en sought to explain the hu$an $in! without regar! to history or language or the social nature of $an% 1n e ery act of sense there is a latent perception of space, of which we only beco$e conscious when objects are with!rawn fro$ it% There are arious ways in which we $ay trace the connexion between the$% &e $ay thin" of space as unresisting $atter, an! of $atter as !i i!e! into objectsK or of objects again as for$e! by abstraction into a collecti e notion of $atter, an! of $atter as rarefie! into space% 2n! $otion $ay be concei e! as the union of there an! not there in space, an! force as the $ateriali7ing or soli!ification of $otion% -pace again is the in!i i!ual an! uni ersal in oneK or, in other wor!s, a perception an! also a conception% -o easily !o what are so$eti$es calle! our si$ple i!eas pass into one another, an! !ifferences of "in! resol e the$sel es into !ifferences of !egree% &ithin or behin! space there is another abstraction in $any respects si$ilar to itDDti$e, the for$ of the inwar!, as space is the for$ of the outwar!% 2s we cannot thin" of outwar! objects of sense or of outwar! sensations without space, so neither can we thin" of a succession of

sensations without ti$e% 1t is the acancy of thoughts or sensations, as space is the oi! of outwar! objects, an! we can no $ore i$agine the $in! without the one than the worl! without the other% 1t is to arith$etic what space is to geo$etryK or, $ore strictly, arith$etic $ay be sai! to be eTually applicable to both% 1t is !efine! in our $in!s, partly by the analogy of space an! partly by the recollection of e ents which ha e happene! to us, or the consciousness of feelings which we are experiencing% <i"e space, it is without li$it, for whate er beginning or en! of ti$e we fix, there is a beginning an! en! before the$, an! so on without en!% &e spea" of a past, present, an! future, an! again the analogy of space assists us in concei ing of the$ as coexistent% &hen the li$it of ti$e is re$o e! there arises in our $in!s the i!ea of eternity, which at first, li"e ti$e itself, is only negati e, but gra!ually, when connecte! with the worl! an! the !i ine nature, li"e the other negati e infinity of space, beco$es positi e% &hether ti$e is prior to the $in! an! to experience, or coe al with the$, is Ali"e the parallel Tuestion about spaceB un$eaning% <i"e space it has been reali7e! gra!ually@ in the ,o$eric poe$s, or e en in the ,esio!ic cos$ogony, there is no $ore notion of ti$e than of space% The conception of being is $ore general than either, an! $ight therefore with greater plausibility be affir$e! to be a con!ition or Tuality of the $in!% The a priori intuitions of Vant woul! ha e been as unintelligible to Plato as his a priori synthetical propositions to 2ristotle% The philosopher of Vonigsberg suppose! hi$self to be analy7ing a necessary $o!e of thought@ he was not aware that he was !ealing with a $ere abstraction% +ut now that we are able to trace the gra!ual !e elope$ent of i!eas through religion, through language, through abstractions, why shoul! we interpose the fiction of ti$e between oursel es an! realitiesR &hy shoul! we single out one of these abstractions to be the a priori con!ition of all the othersR 1t co$es last an! not first in the or!er of our thoughts, an! is not the con!ition prece!ent of the$, but the last generali7ation of the$% 9or can any principle be i$agine! $ore suici!al to philosophy than to assu$e that all the truth which we are capable of attaining is seen only through an unreal $e!iu$% 1f all that exists in ti$e is illusion, we $ay well as" with Plato, L&hat beco$es of the $in!RL <ea ing the a priori con!itions of sensation we $ay procee! to consi!er acts of sense% These a!$it of arious !egrees of !uration or intensityK they a!$it also of a greater or less extension fro$ one object, which is percei e! !irectly, to $any which are percei e! in!irectly or in a less

!egree, an! to the arious associations of the object which are latent in the $in!% 1n general the greater the intension the less the extension of the$% The si$plest sensation i$plies so$e relation of objects to one another, so$e position in space, so$e relation to a pre ious or subseTuent sensation% The acts of seeing an! hearing $ay be al$ost unconscious an! $ay pass away unnote!K they $ay also lea e an i$pression behin! the$ or power of recalling the$% 1f, after seeing an object we shut our eyes, the object re$ains !i$ly seen in the sa$e or about the sa$e place, but with for$ an! linea$ents half fille! up% This is the si$plest act of $e$ory% 2n! as we cannot see one thing without at the sa$e ti$e seeing another, !ifferent objects hang together in recollection, an! when we call for one the other Tuic"ly follows% To thin" of the place in which we ha e last seen a thing is often the best way of recalling it to the $in!% ,ence $e$ory is !epen!ent on association% The act of recollection $ay be co$pare! to the sight of an object at a great !istance which we ha e pre iously seen near an! see" to bring near to us in thought% ;e$ory is to sense as !rea$ing is to wa"ingK an! li"e !rea$ing has a waywar! an! uncertain power of recalling i$pressions fro$ the past% Thus begins the passage fro$ the outwar! to the inwar! sense% +ut as yet there is no conception of a uni ersalDDthe $in! only re$e$bers the in!i i!ual object or objects, an! is always attaching to the$ so$e colour or association of sense% The power of recollection see$s to !epen! on the intensity or largeness of the perception, or on the strength of so$e e$otion with which it is inseparably connecte!% This is the natural $e$ory which is allie! to sense, such as chil!ren appear to ha e an! barbarians an! ani$als% 1t is necessarily li$ite! in range, an! its li$itation is its strength% 1n later life, when the $in! has beco$e crow!e! with na$es, acts, feelings, i$ages innu$erable, we acTuire by e!ucation another $e$ory of syste$ an! arrange$ent which is both stronger an! wea"er than the first DDwea"er in the recollection of sensible i$pressions as they are represente! to us by eye or earDDstronger by the natural connexion of i!eas with objects or with one another% 2n! $any of the notions which for$ a part of the train of our thoughts are har!ly reali7e! by us at the ti$e, but, li"e nu$bers or algebraical sy$bols, are use! as signs only, thus lightening the labour of recollection% 2n! now we $ay suppose that nu$erous i$ages present the$sel es to the $in!,

which begins to act upon the$ an! to arrange the$ in arious ways% +esi!es the i$pression of external objects present with us or just absent fro$ us, we ha e a !i$$er conception of other objects which ha e !isappeare! fro$ our i$$e!iate recollection an! yet continue to exist in us% The $in! is full of fancies which are passing to an! fro before it% -o$e feeling or association calls the$ up, an! they are uttere! by the lips% This is the first ru!i$entary i$agination, which $ay be truly !escribe! in the language of ,obbes, as L!ecaying sense,L an expression which $ay be applie! with eTual truth to $e$ory as well% (or $e$ory an! i$agination, though we so$eti$es oppose the$, are nearly allie!K the !ifference between the$ see$s chiefly to lie in the acti ity of the one co$pare! with the passi ity of the other% The sense !ecaying in $e$ory recei es a flash of light or life fro$ i$agination% 'rea$ing is a lin" of connexion between the$K for in !rea$ing we feebly recollect an! also feebly i$agine at one an! the sa$e ti$e% &hen reason is asleep the lower part of the $in! wan!ers at will a$i! the i$ages which ha e been recei e! fro$ without, the intelligent ele$ent retires, an! the sensual or sensuous ta"es its place% 2n! so in the first efforts of i$agination reason is latent or set asi!eK an! i$ages, in part !isor!erly, but also ha ing a unity Ahowe er i$perfectB of their own, pour li"e a floo! o er the $in!% 2n! if we coul! penetrate into the hea!s of ani$als we shoul! probably fin! that their intelligence, or the state of what in the$ is analogous to our intelligence, is of this nature% Thus far we ha e been spea"ing of $en, rather in the points in which they rese$ble ani$als than in the points in which they !iffer fro$ the$% The ani$al too has $e$ory in arious !egrees, an! the ele$ents of i$agination, if, as appears to be the case, he !rea$s% ,ow far their powers or instincts are e!ucate! by the circu$stances of their li es or by intercourse with one another or with $an"in!, we cannot precisely tell% They, li"e oursel es, ha e the physical inheritance of for$, scent, hearing, sight, an! other Tualities or instincts% +ut they ha e not the $ental inheritance of thoughts an! i!eas han!e! !own by tra!ition, Lthe slow a!!itions that buil! up the $in!L of the hu$an race% 2n! language, which is the great e!ucator of $an"in!, is wanting in the$K whereas in us language is e er presentDDe en in the infant the latent power of na$ing is al$ost i$$e!iately obser able% 2n! therefore the !escription which has been alrea!y gi en of the nascent power of the faculties is in reality an anticipation% (or si$ultaneous with their growth in $an a growth of

language $ust be suppose!% The chil! of two years ol! sees the fire once an! again, an! the feeble obser ation of the sa$e recurring object is associate! with the feeble utterance of the na$e by which he is taught to call it% -oon he learns to utter the na$e when the object is no longer there, but the !esire or i$agination of it is present to hi$% 2t first in e ery use of the wor! there is a colour of sense, an in!istinct picture of the object which acco$panies it% +ut in later years he sees in the na$e only the uni ersal or class wor!, an! the $ore abstract the notion beco$es, the $ore acant is the i$age which is presente! to hi$% ,enceforwar! all the operations of his $in!, inclu!ing the perceptions of sense, are a synthesis of sensations, wor!s, conceptions% 1n seeing or hearing or loo"ing or listening the sensible i$pression pre ails o er the conception an! the wor!% 1n reflection the process is re erse!DDthe outwar! object fa!es away into nothingness, the na$e or the conception or both together are e erything% <anguage, li"e nu$ber, is inter$e!iate between the two, parta"ing of the !efiniteness of the outer an! of the uni ersality of the inner worl!% (or logic teaches us that e ery wor! is really a uni ersal, an! only con!escen!s by the help of position or circu$locution to beco$e the expression of in!i i!uals or particulars% 2n! so$eti$es by using wor!s as sy$bols we are able to gi e a Llocal habitation an! a na$eL to the infinite an! inconcei able% Thus we see that no line can be !rawn between the powers of sense an! of reflectionDDthey pass i$perceptibly into one another% &e $ay in!ee! !istinguish between the seeing an! the close! eyeDDbetween the sensation an! the recollection of it% +ut this !istinction carries us a ery little way, for recollection is present in sight as well as sight in recollection% There is no i$pression of sense which !oes not si$ultaneously recall !ifferences of for$, nu$ber, colour, an! the li"e% 9either is such a !istinction applicable at all to our internal bo!ily sensations, which gi e no sign of the$sel es when unacco$panie! with pain, an! e en when we are $ost conscious of the$, ha e often no assignable place in the hu$an fra$e% &ho can !i i!e the ner es or great ner ous centres fro$ the $in! which uses the$R &ho can separate the pains an! pleasures of the $in! fro$ the pains an! pleasures of the bo!yR The wor!s Linwar! an! outwar!,L Lacti e an! passi e,L L$in! an! bo!y,L are best concei e! by us as !ifferences of !egree passing into !ifferences of "in!, an! at one ti$e an! un!er one aspect acting in har$ony an! then again oppose!% They intro!uce a syste$

an! or!er into the "nowle!ge of our beingK an! yet, li"e $any other general ter$s, are often in a! ance of our actual analysis or obser ation% 2ccor!ing to so$e writers the inwar! sense is only the fa!ing away or i$perfect reali7ation of the outwar!% +ut this lea es out of sight one half of the pheno$enon% (or the $in! is not only with!rawn fro$ the worl! of sense but intro!uce! to a higher worl! of thought an! reflection, in which, li"e the outwar! sense, she is traine! an! e!ucate!% +y use the outwar! sense beco$es "eener an! $ore intense, especially when confine! within narrow li$its% The sa age with little or no thought has a Tuic"er !iscern$ent of the trac" than the ci ilise! $anK in li"e $anner the !og, ha ing the help of scent as well as of sight, is superior to the sa age% +y use again the inwar! thought beco$es $ore !efine! an! !istinctK what was at first an effort is $a!e easy by the natural instru$entality of language, an! the $in! learns to grasp uni ersals with no $ore exertion than is reTuire! for the sight of an outwar! object% There is a natural connexion an! arrange$ent of the$, li"e the association of objects in a lan!scape% Sust as a note or two of $usic suffices to recall a whole piece to the $usicianLs or co$poserLs $in!, so a great principle or lea!ing thought suggests an! arranges a worl! of particulars% The power of reflection is not feebler than the faculty of sense, but of a higher an! $ore co$prehensi e nature% 1t not only recei es the uni ersals of sense, but gi es the$ a new content by co$paring an! co$bining the$ with one another% 1t with!raws fro$ the seen that it $ay !well in the unseen% The sense only presents us with a flat an! i$penetrable surface@ the $in! ta"es the worl! to pieces an! puts it together on a new pattern% The uni ersals which are !etache! fro$ sense are reconstructe! in science% They an! not the $ere i$pressions of sense are the truth of the worl! in which we li eK an! Aas an argu$ent to those who will only belie e Lwhat they can hol! in their han!sLB we $ay further obser e that they are the source of our power o er it% To say that the outwar! sense is stronger than the inwar! is li"e saying that the ar$ of the wor"$an is stronger than the constructing or !irecting $in!% *eturning to the senses we $ay briefly consi!er two TuestionsDDfirst their relation to the $in!, secon!ly, their relation to outwar! objects@DD .% The senses are not $erely Lholes set in a woo!en horseL ATheaet%B, but

instru$ents of the $in! with which they are organically connecte!% There is no use of the$ without so$e use of wor!sDDso$e natural or latent logicDD so$e pre ious experience or obser ation% -ensation, li"e all other $ental processes, is co$plex an! relati e, though apparently si$ple% The senses $utually confir$ an! support one anotherK it is har! to say how $uch our i$pressions of hearing $ay be affecte! by those of sight, or how far our i$pressions of sight $ay be correcte! by the touch, especially in infancy% The confir$ation of the$ by one another cannot of course be gi en by any one of the$% ;any intuitions which are inseparable fro$ the act of sense are really the result of co$plicate! reasonings% The $ost cursory glance at objects enables the experience! eye to ju!ge approxi$ately of their relations an! !istance, although nothing is i$presse! upon the retina except colour, inclu!ing gra!ations of light an! sha!e% (ro$ these !elicate an! al$ost i$perceptible !ifferences we see$ chiefly to !eri e our i!eas of !istance an! position% +y co$parison of what is near with what is !istant we learn that the tree, house, ri er, etc% which are a long way off are objects of a li"e nature with those which are seen by us in our i$$e!iate neighbourhoo!, although the actual i$pression $a!e on the eye is ery !ifferent in one case an! in the other% This is a language of Llarge an! s$all lettersL A*epublicB, slightly !iffering in for$ an! exTuisitely gra!uate! by !istance, which we are learning all our life long, an! which we attain in arious !egrees accor!ing to our powers of sight or obser ation% There is nor the consi!eration% The greater or less strain upon the ner es of the eye or ear is co$$unicate! to the $in! an! silently infor$s the ju!g$ent% &e ha e also the use not of one eye only, but of two, which gi e us a wi!er range, an! help us to !iscern, by the greater or less acuteness of the angle which the rays of sight for$, the !istance of an object an! its relation to other objects% +ut we are alrea!y passing beyon! the li$its of our actual "nowle!ge on a subject which has gi en rise to $any conjectures% ;ore i$portant than the a!!ition of another conjecture is the obser ation, whether in the case of sight or of any other sense, of the great co$plexity of the causes an! the great si$plicity of the effect% The sy$pathy of the $in! an! the ear is no less stri"ing than the sy$pathy of the $in! an! the eye% 'o we not see$ to percei e instincti ely an! as an act of sense the !ifferences of articulate speech an! of $usical notesR Pet how s$all a part of speech or of $usic is pro!uce! by the i$pression of the ear co$pare! with that which is furnishe! by the $in!#

2gain@ the $ore refine! faculty of sense, as in ani$als so also in $an, see$s often to be trans$itte! by inheritance% 9either $ust we forget that in the use of the senses, as in his whole nature, $an is a social being, who is always being e!ucate! by language, habit, an! the teaching of other $en as well as by his own obser ation% ,e "nows !istance because he is taught it by a $ore experience! ju!g$ent than his ownK he !istinguishes soun!s because he is tol! to re$ar" the$ by a person of a $ore !iscerning ear% 2n! as we inherit fro$ our parents or other ancestors peculiar powers of sense or feeling, so we i$pro e an! strengthen the$, not only by regular teaching, but also by sy$pathy an! co$$union with other persons% 2% The secon! Tuestion, na$ely, that concerning the relation of the $in! to external objects, is really a trifling one, though it has been $a!e the subject of a fa$ous philosophy% &e $ay if we li"e, with +er"eley, resol e objects of sense into sensationsK but the change is one of na$e only, an! nothing is gaine! an! so$ething is lost by such a resolution or confusion of the$% (or we ha e not really $a!e a single step towar!s i!ealis$, an! any arbitrary in ersion of our or!inary $o!es of speech is !isturbing to the $in!% The youthful $etaphysician is !elighte! at his $ar ellous !isco ery that nothing is, an! that what we see or feel is our sensation only@ for a !ay or two the worl! has a new interest to hi$K he alone "nows the secret which has been co$$unicate! to hi$ by the philosopher, that $in! is allDDwhen in fact he is going out of his $in! in the first intoxication of a great thought% +ut he soon fin!s that all things re$ain as they were DDthe laws of $otion, the properties of $atter, the Tualities of substances% 2fter ha ing inflicte! his theories on any one who is willing to recei e the$ Lfirst on his father an! $other, secon!ly on so$e other patient listener, thir!ly on his !og,L he fin!s that he only !iffers fro$ the rest of $an"in! in the use of a wor!% ,e ha! once hope! that by getting ri! of the soli!ity of $atter he $ight open a passage to worl!s beyon!% ,e li"e! to thin" of the worl! as the representation of the !i ine nature, an! !elighte! to i$agine angels an! spirits wan!ering through space, present in the roo$ in which he is sitting without co$ing through the !oor, nowhere an! e erywhere at the sa$e instant% 2t length he fin!s that he has been the icti$ of his own fanciesK he has neither $ore nor less e i!ence of the supernatural than he ha! before% ,e hi$self has beco$e unsettle!, but the laws of the worl! re$ain fixe! as at the beginning% ,e has !isco ere! that his appeal to the fallibility of sense

was really an illusion% (or whate er uncertainty there $ay be in the appearances of nature, arises only out of the i$perfection or ariation of the hu$an senses, or possibly fro$ the !eficiency of certain branches of "nowle!geK when science is able to apply her tests, the uncertainty is at an en!% &e are apt so$eti$es to thin" that $oral an! $etaphysical philosophy are lowere! by the influence which is exercise! o er the$ by physical science% +ut any interpretation of nature by physical science is far in a! ance of such i!ealis$% The philosophy of +er"eley, while gi ing unboun!e! license to the i$agination, is still gro elling on the le el of sense% &e $ay, if we please, carry this scepticis$ a step further, an! !eny, not only objects of sense, but the continuity of our sensations the$sel es% &e $ay say with Protagoras an! ,u$e that what is appears, an! that what appears appears only to in!i i!uals, an! to the sa$e in!i i!ual only at one instant% +ut then, as Plato as"s,DDan! we $ust repeat the Tuestion,DD&hat beco$es of the $in!R Experience tells us by a thousan! proofs that our sensations of colour, taste, an! the li"e, are the sa$e as they were an instant agoDDthat the act which we are perfor$ing one $inute is continue! by us in the nextDDan! also supplies abun!ant proof that the perceptions of other $en are, spea"ing generally, the sa$e or nearly the sa$e with our own% 2fter ha ing slowly an! laboriously in the course of ages gaine! a conception of a whole an! parts, of the constitution of the $in!, of the relation of $an to Go! an! nature, i$perfect in!ee!, but the best we can, we are as"e! to return again to the Lbeggarly ele$entsL of ancient scepticis$, an! ac"nowle!ge only ato$s an! sensations !e oi! of life or unity% &hy shoul! we not go a step further still an! !oubt the existence of the senses of all thingsR &e are but Lsuch stuff as !rea$s are $a!e ofKL for we ha e left oursel es no instru$ents of thought by which we can !istinguish $an fro$ the ani$als, or concei e of the existence e en of a $ollusc% 2n! obser e, this extre$e scepticis$ has been allowe! to spring up a$ong us, not, li"e the ancient scepticis$, in an age when nature an! language really see$e! to be full of illusions, but in the eighteenth an! nineteenth centuries, when $en wal" in the !aylight of in!ucti e science% The attracti eness of such speculations arises out of their true nature not being percei e!% They are eile! in graceful languageK they are not pushe! to extre$esK they stop where the hu$an $in! is !ispose! also to stopDDshort of a $anifest absur!ity% Their inconsistency is not obser e! by their authors or by $an"in! in general, who are eTually inconsistent the$sel es%

They lea e on the $in! a pleasing sense of won!er an! no elty@ in youth they see$ to ha e a natural affinity to one class of persons as poetry has to anotherK but in later life either we !rift bac" into co$$on sense, or we $a"e the$ the startingDpoints of a higher philosophy% &e are often tol! that we shoul! enTuire into all things before we accept the$KDDwith what li$itations is this trueR (or we cannot use our senses without a!$itting that we ha e the$, or thin" without presupposing that there is in us a power of thought, or affir$ that all "nowle!ge is !eri e! fro$ experience without i$plying that this first principle of "nowle!ge is prior to experience% The truth see$s to be that we begin with the natural use of the $in! as of the bo!y, an! we see" to !escribe this as well as we can% &e eat before we "now the nature of !igestionK we thin" before we "now the nature of reflection% 2s our "nowle!ge increases, our perception of the $in! enlarges also% &e cannot in!ee! get beyon! facts, but neither can we !raw any line which separates facts fro$ i!eas% 2n! the $in! is not so$ething separate fro$ the$ but inclu!e! in the$, an! they in the $in!, both ha ing a !istinctness an! in!i i!uality of their own% To re!uce our conception of $in! to a succession of feelings an! sensations is li"e the atte$pt to iew a wi!e prospect by inches through a $icroscope, or to calculate a perio! of chronology by $inutes% The $in! ceases to exist when it loses its continuity, which though far fro$ being its highest !eter$ination, is yet necessary to any conception of it% E en an inani$ate nature cannot be a!eTuately represente! as an en!less succession of states or con!itions% Paragraph 11% 2nother !i ision of the subject has yet to be consi!ere!@ &hy shoul! the !octrine that "nowle!ge is sensation, in ancient ti$es, or of sensationalis$ or $aterialis$ in $o!ern ti$es, be allie! to the lower rather than to the higher iew of ethical philosophyR 2t first sight the nature an! origin of "nowle!ge appear to be wholly !isconnecte! fro$ ethics an! religion, nor can we !eny that the ancient -toics were $aterialists, or that the $aterialist !octrines pre alent in $o!ern ti$es ha e been associate! with great irtues, or that both religious an! philosophical i!ealis$ ha e not unfreTuently parte! co$pany with practice% -till upon the whole it $ust be a!$itte! that the higher stan!ar! of !uty has gone han! in han! with the higher conception of "nowle!ge% 1t is Protagoras who is see"ing to a!apt hi$self to the opinions of the worl!K it is Plato who rises abo e the$@ the one $aintaining that all "nowle!ge is sensationK the

other basing the irtues on the i!ea of goo!% The reason of this pheno$enon has now to be exa$ine!% +y those who rest "nowle!ge i$$e!iately upon sense, that explanation of hu$an action is !ee$e! to be the truest which is nearest to sense% 2s "nowle!ge is re!uce! to sensation, so irtue is re!uce! to feeling, happiness or goo! to pleasure% The !ifferent irtuesDDthe arious characters which exist in the worl!DDare the !isguises of selfDinterest% ,u$an nature is !rie! upK there is no place left for i$agination, or in any higher sense for religion% 1!eals of a whole, or of a state, or of a law of !uty, or of a !i ine perfection, are out of place in an Epicurean philosophy% The ery ter$s in which they are expresse! are suspecte! of ha ing no $eaning% ;an is to bring hi$self bac" as far as he is able to the con!ition of a rational beast% ,e is to li$it hi$self to the pursuit of pleasure, but of this he is to $a"e a farDsighte! calculationKDDhe is to be rationali7e!, seculari7e!, ani$ali7e!@ or he is to be an a$iable sceptic, better than his own philosophy, an! not falling below the opinions of the worl!% 1$agination has been calle! that Lbusy facultyL which is always intru!ing upon us in the search after truth% +ut i$agination is also that higher power by which we rise abo e oursel es an! the co$$onplaces of thought an! life% The philosophical i$agination is another na$e for reason fin!ing an expression of herself in the outwar! worl!% To !epri e life of i!eals is to !epri e it of all higher an! co$prehensi e ai$s an! of the power of i$parting an! co$$unicating the$ to others% (or $en are taught, not by those who are on a le el with the$, but by those who rise abo e the$, who see the !istant hills, who soar into the e$pyrean% <i"e a bir! in a cage, the $in! confine! to sense is always being brought bac" fro$ the higher to the lower, fro$ the wi!er to the narrower iew of hu$an "nowle!ge% 1t see"s to fly but cannot@ instea! of aspiring towar!s perfection, Lit ho ers about this lower worl! an! the earthly nature%L 1t loses the religious sense which $ore than any other see$s to ta"e a $an out of hi$self% &eary of as"ing L&hat is truthRL it accepts the Lblin! witness of eyes an! earsKL it !raws aroun! itself the curtain of the physical worl! an! is satisfie!% The strength of a sensational philosophy lies in the rea!y acco$$o!ation of it to the $in!s of $enK $any who ha e been $etaphysicians in their youth, as they a! ance in years are prone to acTuiesce in things as they are, or rather appear to be% They are

spectators, not thin"ers, an! the best philosophy is that which reTuires of the$ the least a$ount of $ental effort% 2s a lower philosophy is easier to apprehen! than a higher, so a lower way of life is easier to followK an! therefore such a philosophy see$s to !eri e a support fro$ the general practice of $an"in!% 1t appeals to principles which they all "now an! recogni7e@ it gi es bac" to the$ in a generali7e! for$ the results of their own experience% To the $an of the worl! they are the Tuintessence of his own reflections upon life% To follow custo$, to ha e no new i!eas or opinions, not to be straining after i$possibilities, to enjoy toD!ay with just so $uch forethought as is necessary to pro i!e for the $orrow, this is regar!e! by the greater part of the worl! as the natural way of passing through existence% 2n! $any who ha e li e! thus ha e attaine! to a lower "in! of happiness or eTuani$ity% They ha e possesse! their souls in peace without e er allowing the$ to wan!er into the region of religious or political contro ersy, an! without any care for the higher interests of $an% +ut nearly all the goo! Aas well as so$e of the e ilB which has e er been !one in this worl! has been the wor" of another spirit, the wor" of enthusiasts an! i!ealists, of apostles an! $artyrs% The lea!ers of $an"in! ha e not been of the gentle Epicurean typeK they ha e personifie! i!easK they ha e so$eti$es also been the icti$s of the$% +ut they ha e always been see"ing after a truth or i!eal of which they fell shortK an! ha e !ie! in a $anner !isappointe! of their hopes that they $ight lift the hu$an race out of the slough in which they foun! the$% They ha e !one little co$pare! with their own isions an! aspirationsK but they ha e !one that little, only because they sought to !o, an! once perhaps thought that they were !oing, a great !eal $ore% The philosophies of Epicurus or ,u$e gi e no a!eTuate or !ignifie! conception of the $in!% There is no organic unity in a succession of feeling or sensationsK no co$prehensi eness in an infinity of separate actions% The in!i i!ual ne er reflects upon hi$self as a wholeK he can har!ly regar! one act or part of his life as the cause or effect of any other act or part% &hether in practice or speculation, he is to hi$self only in successi e instants% To such thin"ers, whether in ancient or in $o!ern ti$es, the $in! is only the poor recipient of i$pressionsDDnot the heir of all the ages, or connecte! with all other $in!s% 1t begins again with its own $o!icu$ of experience ha ing only such ague conceptions of the wis!o$ of the past as are inseparable fro$ language an! popular

opinion% 1t see"s to explain fro$ the experience of the in!i i!ual what can only be learne! fro$ the history of the worl!% 1t has no conception of obligation, !uty, conscienceDDthese are to the Epicurean or :tilitarian philosopher only na$es which interfere with our natural perceptions of pleasure an! pain% There see$ then to be se eral answers to the Tuestion, &hy the theory that all "nowle!ge is sensation is allie! to the lower rather than to the higher iew of ethical philosophy@DD.st, +ecause it is easier to un!erstan! an! practiseK 2n!ly, +ecause it is fatal to the pursuit of i!eals, $oral, political, or religiousK Fr!ly, +ecause it !epri es us of the $eans an! instru$ents of higher thought, of any a!eTuate conception of the $in!, of "nowle!ge, of conscience, of $oral obligation% %%% 89 T,E 92T:*E 29' <1;1T- 8f P-PC,8<8GP% 8 gar arche $en o $e oi!e, teleute !e "ai ta $etaxu ex ou $e oi!e su$peple"tai, tis $echane ten toiauten o$ologian pote episte$en genesthaiK Plato *epublic% ;onon gar auto legei , osper gu$non "ai apere$o$enon apo ton onton apanton, a!unaton% -oph% -ince the abo e essay first appeare!, $any boo"s on Psychology ha e been gi en to the worl!, partly base! upon the iews of ,erbart an! other Ger$an philosophers, partly in!epen!ent of the$% The subject has gaine! in bul" an! extentK whether it has ha! any true growth is $ore !oubtful% 1t begins to assu$e the language an! clai$ the authority of a scienceK but it is only an hypothesis or outline, which $ay be fille! up in $any ways accor!ing to the fancy of in!i i!ual thin"ers% The basis of it is a precarious one,DD consciousness of oursel es an! a so$ewhat uncertain obser ation of the rest of $an"in!% 1ts relations to other sciences are not yet !eter$ine!@ they see$ to be al$ost too co$plicate! to be ascertaine!% 1t $ay be co$pare! to an irregular buil!ing, run up hastily an! not li"ely to last, because its foun!ations are wea", an! in $any places rest only on the surface of the groun!% 1t has sought rather to put together scattere! obser ations an! to $a"e the$ into a syste$ than to !escribe or pro e the$% 1t has ne er

se erely !rawn the line between facts an! opinions% 1t has substitute! a technical phraseology for the co$$on use of language, being neither able to win acceptance for the one nor to get ri! of the other% The syste$ which has thus arisen appears to be a "in! of $etaphysic narrowe! to the point of iew of the in!i i!ual $in!, through which, as through so$e new optical instru$ent li$iting the sphere of ision, the interior of thought an! sensation is exa$ine!% +ut the in!i i!ual $in! in the abstract, as !istinct fro$ the $in! of a particular in!i i!ual an! separate! fro$ the en iron$ent of circu$stances, is a fiction only% Pet facts which are partly true gather aroun! this fiction an! are naturally !escribe! by the help of it% There is also a co$$on type of the $in! which is !eri e! fro$ the co$parison of $any $in!s with one another an! with our own% The pheno$ena of which Psychology treats are fa$iliar to us, but they are for the $ost part in!efiniteK they relate to a so$ething insi!e the bo!y, which see$s also to o erleap the li$its of space% The operations of this so$ething, when isolate!, cannot be analy7e! by us or subjecte! to obser ation an! experi$ent% 2n! there is another point to be consi!ere!% The $in!, when thin"ing, cannot sur ey that part of itself which is use! in thought% 1t can only be conte$plate! in the past, that is to say, in the history of the in!i i!ual or of the worl!% This is the scientific $etho! of stu!ying the $in!% +ut Psychology has also so$e other supports, specious rather than real% 1t is partly sustaine! by the false analogy of Physical -cience an! has great expectations fro$ its near relationship to Physiology% &e truly re$ar" that there is an infinite co$plexity of the bo!y correspon!ing to the infinite subtlety of the $in!K we are conscious that they are ery nearly connecte!% +ut in en!ea ouring to trace the nature of the connexion we are baffle! an! !isappointe!% 1n our "nowle!ge of the$ the gulf re$ains the sa$e@ no $icroscope has e er seen into thoughtK no reflection on oursel es has supplie! the $issing lin" between $in! an! $atter%%%These are the con!itions of this ery inexact science, an! we shall only "now less of it by preten!ing to "now $ore, or by assigning to it a for$ or style to which it has not yet attaine! an! is not really entitle!% Experience shows that any syste$, howe er baseless an! ineffectual, in our own or in any other age, $ay be accepte! an! continue to be stu!ie!, if it see"s to satisfy so$e unanswere! Tuestion or is base! upon so$e ancient tra!ition, especially if it ta"es the for$ an! uses the language of

in!ucti e philosophy% The fact therefore that such a science exists an! is popular, affor!s no e i!ence of its truth or alue% ;any who ha e pursue! it far into !etail ha e ne er exa$ine! the foun!ations on which it rests% The ha e been $any i$aginary subjects of "nowle!ge of which enthusiastic persons ha e $a!e a lifelong stu!y, without e er as"ing the$sel es what is the e i!ence for the$, what is the use of the$, how long they will lastR They $ay pass away, li"e the authors of the$, an! Llea e not a wrac" behin!KL or they $ay sur i e in frag$ents% 9or is it only in the ;i!!le 2ges, or in the literary !esert of China or of 1n!ia, that such syste$s ha e arisenK in our own enlightene! age, growing up by the si!e of Physics, Ethics, an! other really progressi e sciences, there is a weary waste of "nowle!ge, falsely soDcalle!% There are sha$ sciences which no logic has e er put to the test, in which the !esire for "nowle!ge in ents the $aterials of it% 2n! therefore it is expe!ient once $ore to re iew the bases of Psychology, lest we shoul! be i$pose! upon by its pretensions% The stu!y of it $ay ha e !one goo! ser ice by awa"ening us to the sense of in eterate errors fa$iliari7e! by language, yet it $ay ha e fallen into still greater onesK un!er the pretence of new in estigations it $ay be wasting the li es of those who are engage! in it% 1t $ay also be foun! that the !iscussion of it will throw light upon so$e points in the Theaetetus of Plato,DDthe ol!est wor" on Psychology which has co$e !own to us% The i$aginary science $ay be calle!, in the language of ancient philosophy, La sha!ow of a part of 'ialectic or ;etaphysicL AGorg%B% 1n this postscript or appen!ix we propose to treat, first, of the true bases of PsychologyK secon!ly, of the errors into which the stu!ents of it are $ost li"ely to fallK thir!ly, of the principal subjects which are usually co$prehen!e! un!er itK fourthly, of the for$ which facts relating to the $in! $ost naturally assu$e% &e $ay preface the enTuiry by two or three re$ar"s@DD A.B &e !o not clai$ for the popular Psychology the position of a science at allK it cannot, li"e the Physical -ciences, procee! by the 1n!ucti e ;etho!@ it has not the necessity of ;athe$atics@ it !oes not, li"e ;etaphysic, argue fro$ abstract notions or fro$ internal coherence% 1t is $a!e up of scattere! obser ations% 2 few of these, though they $ay

so$eti$es appear to be truis$s, are of the greatest alue, an! free fro$ all !oubt% &e are conscious of the$ in oursel esK we obser e the$ wor"ing in othersK we are assure! of the$ at all ti$es% (or exa$ple, we are absolutely certain, AaB of the influence exerte! by the $in! o er the bo!y or by the bo!y o er the $in!@ AbB of the power of association, by which the appearance of so$e person or the occurrence of so$e e ent recalls to $in!, not always but often, other persons an! e ents@ AcB of the effect of habit, which is strongest when least !isturbe! by reflection, an! is to the $in! what the bones are to the bo!y@ A!B of the real, though not unli$ite!, free!o$ of the hu$an will@ AeB of the reference, $ore or less !istinct, of our sensations, feelings, thoughts, actions, to oursel es, which is calle! consciousness, or, when in excess, selfDconsciousness@ AfB of the !istinction of the L1L an! L9ot 1,L of oursel es an! outwar! objects% +ut when we atte$pt to gather up these ele$ents in a single syste$, we !isco er that the lin"s by which we co$bine the$ are apt to be $ere wor!s% &e are in a country which has ne er been cleare! or sur eye!K here an! there only !oes a glea$ of light co$e through the !ar"ness of the forest% A2B These frag$ents, although they can ne er beco$e science in the or!inary sense of the wor!, are a real part of "nowle!ge an! $ay be of great alue in e!ucation% &e $ay be able to a!! a goo! !eal to the$ fro$ our own experience, an! we $ay erify the$ by it% -elfDexa$ination is one of those stu!ies which a $an can pursue alone, by attention to hi$self an! the processes of his in!i i!ual $in!% ,e $ay learn $uch about his own character an! about the character of others, if he will L$a"e his $in! sit !ownL an! loo" at itself in the glass% The great, if not the only use of such a stu!y is a practical one,DDto "now, first, hu$an nature, an!, secon!ly, our own nature, as it truly is% AFB ,ence it is i$portant that we shoul! concei e of the $in! in the noblest an! si$plest $anner% &hile ac"nowle!ging that language has been the greatest factor in the for$ation of hu$an thought, we $ust en!ea our to get ri! of the !isguises, oppositions, contra!ictions, which arise out of it% &e $ust !isengage oursel es fro$ the i!eas which the custo$ary use of wor!s has i$plante! in us% To a oi! error as $uch as possible when we are spea"ing of things unseen, the principal ter$s which we use shoul! be few, an! we shoul! not allow oursel es to be ensla e! by the$% 1nstea! of see"ing to fra$e a technical language, we shoul! ary our for$s of speech, lest they shoul! !egenerate into for$ulas% 2 !ifficult philosophical

proble$ is better un!erstoo! when translate! into the ernacular% 1%a% Psychology is inseparable fro$ language, an! early language contains the first i$pressions or the ol!est experience of $an respecting hi$self% These i$pressions are not accurate representations of the truthK they are the reflections of a ru!i$entary age of philosophy% The first an! si$plest for$s of thought are roote! so !eep in hu$an nature that they can ne er be got ri! ofK but they ha e been perpetually enlarge! an! ele ate!, an! the use of $any wor!s has been transferre! fro$ the bo!y to the $in!% The spiritual an! intellectual ha e thus beco$e separate! fro$ the $aterialDD there is a cleft between the$K an! the heart an! the conscience of $an rise abo e the !o$inion of the appetites an! create a new language in which they too fin! expression% 2s the !ifferences of actions begin to be percei e!, $ore an! $ore na$es are nee!e!% This is the first analysis of the hu$an $in!K ha ing a general foun!ation in popular experience, it is $oul!e! to a certain extent by hierophants an! philosophers% A-ee 1ntro!% to Cratylus%B b% This pri$iti e psychology is continually recei ing a!!itions fro$ the first thin"ers, who in return ta"e a colour fro$ the popular language of the ti$e% The $in! is regar!e! fro$ new points of iew, an! beco$es a!apte! to new con!itions of "nowle!ge% 1t see"s to isolate itself fro$ $atter an! sense, an! to assert its in!epen!ence in thought% 1t recogni7es that it is in!epen!ent of the external worl!% 1t has fi e or six natural states or stages@DDA.B sensation, in which it is al$ost latent or Tuiescent@ A2B feeling, or inner sense, when the $in! is just awa"ening@ AFB $e$ory, which is !ecaying sense, an! fro$ ti$e to ti$e, as with a spar" or flash, has the power of recollecting or reani$ating the burie! past@ AEB thought, in which i$ages pass into abstract notions or are inter$ingle! with the$@ A5B action, in which the $in! $o es forwar!, of itself, or un!er the i$pulse of want or !esire or pain, to attain or a oi! so$e en! or conseTuence@ an! A4B there is the co$position of these or the a!$ixture or assi$ilation of the$ in arious !egrees% &e ne er see these processes of the $in!, nor can we tell the causes of the$% +ut we "now the$ by their results, an! learn fro$ other $en that so far as we can !escribe to the$ or they to us the wor"ings of the $in!, their experience is the sa$e or nearly the sa$e with our own% c% +ut the "nowle!ge of the $in! is not to any great extent !eri e! fro$ the obser ation of the in!i i!ual by hi$self% 1t is the growing consciousness of the hu$an race, e$bo!ie! in language, ac"nowle!ge! by

experience, an! correcte! fro$ ti$e to ti$e by the influence of literature an! philosophy% 2 great, perhaps the $ost i$portant, part of it is to be foun! in early Gree" thought% 1n the Theaetetus of Plato it has not yet beco$e fixe!@ we are still stu$bling on the threshol!% 1n 2ristotle the process is $ore nearly co$plete!, an! has gaine! innu$erable abstractions, of which $any ha e ha! to be thrown away because relati e only to the contro ersies of the ti$e% 1n the inter al between Thales an! 2ristotle were reali7e! the !istinctions of $in! an! bo!y, of uni ersal an! particular, of infinite an! infinitesi$al, of i!ea an! pheno$enonK the class conceptions of faculties an! irtues, the antagonis$ of the appetites an! the reasonK an! connecte! with this, at a higher stage of !e elop$ent, the opposition of $oral an! intellectual irtueK also the pri$iti e conceptions of unity, being, rest, $otion, an! the li"e% These !i isions were not really scientific, but rather base! on popular experience% They were not hel! with the precision of $o!ern thin"ers, but ta"en all together they ga e a new existence to the $in! in thought, an! greatly enlarge! an! $ore accurately !efine! $anLs "nowle!ge of hi$self an! of the worl!% The $ajority of the$ ha e been accepte! by Christian an! &estern nations% Pet in $o!ern ti$es we ha e also !rifte! so far away fro$ 2ristotle, that if we were to fra$e a syste$ on his lines we shoul! be at war with or!inary language an! untrue to our own consciousness% 2n! there ha e been a few both in $e!iae al ti$es an! since the *efor$ation who ha e rebelle! against the 2ristotelian point of iew% 8f these eccentric thin"ers there ha e been arious types, but they ha e all a fa$ily li"eness% 2ccor!ing to the$, there has been too $uch analysis an! too little synthesis, too $uch !i ision of the $in! into parts an! too little conception of it as a whole or in its relation to Go! an! the laws of the uni erse% They ha e thought that the ele$ents of plurality an! unity ha e not been !uly a!juste!% The ten!ency of such writers has been to allow the personality of $an to be absorbe! in the uni ersal, or in the !i ine nature, an! to !eny the !istinction between $atter an! $in!, or to substitute one for the other% They ha e bro"en so$e of the i!ols of Psychology@ they ha e challenge! the recei e! $eaning of wor!s@ they ha e regar!e! the $in! un!er $any points of iew% +ut though they $ay ha e sha"en the ol!, they ha e not establishe! the newK their iews of philosophy, which see$ li"e the echo of so$e oice fro$ the East, ha e been alien to the $in! of Europe% !% The Psychology which is foun! in co$$on language is in so$e !egree

erifie! by experience, but not in such a $anner as to gi e it the character of an exact science% &e cannot say that wor!s always correspon! to facts% Co$$on language represents the $in! fro$ !ifferent an! e en opposite points of iew, which cannot be all of the$ eTually true Aco$pare CratylusB% Pet fro$ !i ersity of state$ents an! opinions $ay be obtaine! a nearer approach to the truth than is to be gaine! fro$ any one of the$% 1t also ten!s to correct itself, because it is gra!ually brought nearer to the co$$on sense of $an"in!% There are so$e lea!ing categories or classifications of thought, which, though un erifie!, $ust always re$ain the ele$ents fro$ which the science or stu!y of the $in! procee!s% (or exa$ple, we $ust assu$e i!eas before we can analy7e the$, an! also a continuing $in! to which they belongK the resolution of it into successi e $o$ents, which woul! say, with Protagoras, that the $an is not the sa$e person which he was a $inute ago, is, as Plato i$plies in the Theaetetus, an absur!ity% e% The growth of the $in!, which $ay be trace! in the histories of religions an! philosophies an! in the thoughts of nations, is one of the !eepest an! noblest $o!es of stu!ying it% ,ere we are !ealing with the reality, with the greater an!, as it $ay be ter$e!, the $ost sacre! part of history% &e stu!y the $in! of $an as it begins to be inspire! by a hu$an or !i ine reason, as it is $o!ifie! by circu$stances, as it is !istribute! in nations, as it is reno ate! by great $o e$ents, which go beyon! the li$its of nations an! affect hu$an society on a scale still greater, as it is create! or renewe! by great $in!s, who, loo"ing !own fro$ abo e, ha e a wi!er an! $ore co$prehensi e ision% This is an a$bitious stu!y, of which $ost of us rather Lentertain conjectureL than arri e at any !etaile! or accurate "nowle!ge% <ater arises the reflection how these great i!eas or $o e$ents of the worl! ha e been appropriate! by the $ultitu!e an! foun! a way to the $in!s of in!i i!uals% The real Psychology is that which shows how the increasing "nowle!ge of nature an! the increasing experience of life ha e always been slowly transfor$ing the $in!, how religions too ha e been $o!ifie! in the course of ages Lthat Go! $ay be all an! in all%L E pollaplasion, eoe, to ergon e os nun 7eteitai prostatteis% f% <astly, though we spea" of the stu!y of $in! in a special sense, it $ay also be sai! that there is no science which !oes not contribute to our "nowle!ge of it% The $etho!s of science an! their analogies are new

faculties, !isco ere! by the few an! i$parte! to the $any% They are to the $in!, what the senses are to the bo!yK or better, they $ay be co$pare! to instru$ents such as the telescope or $icroscope by which the !iscri$inating power of the senses, or to other $echanical in entions, by which the strength an! s"ill of the hu$an bo!y is so i$$easurably increase!% 11% The new Psychology, whate er $ay be its clai$ to the authority of a science, has calle! attention to $any facts an! correcte! $any errors, which without it woul! ha e been unexa$ine!% Pet it is also itself ery liable to illusion% The e i!ence on which it rests is ague an! in!efinite% The fiel! of consciousness is ne er seen by us as a whole, but only at particular points, which are always changing% The eil of language intercepts facts% ,ence it is !esirable that in $a"ing an approach to the stu!y we shoul! consi!er at the outset what are the "in!s of error which $ost easily affect it, an! note the !ifferences which separate it fro$ other branches of "nowle!ge% a% (irst, we obser e the $in! by the $in!% 1t woul! see$ therefore that we are always in !anger of lea ing out the half of that which is the subject of our enTuiry% &e co$e at once upon the !ifficulty of what is the $eaning of the wor!% 'oes it !iffer as subject an! object in the sa$e $annerR Can we suppose one set of feelings or one part of the $in! to interpret anotherR 1s the introspecting thought the sa$e with the thought which is introspecte!R ,as the $in! the power of sur eying its whole !o$ain at one an! the sa$e ti$eRDD9o $ore than the eye can ta"e in the whole hu$an bo!y at a glance% Pet there $ay be a gli$pse roun! the corner, or a thought transferre! in a $o$ent fro$ one point of iew to another, which enables us to see nearly the whole, if not at once, at any rate in succession% -uch gli$pses will har!ly enable us to conte$plate fro$ within the $in! in its true proportions% ,ence the fir$er groun! of Psychology is not the consciousness of inwar! feelings but the obser ation of external actions, being the actions not only of oursel es, but of the innu$erable persons who$ we co$e across in life% b% The error of supposing partial or occasional explanation of $ental pheno$ena to be the only or co$plete ones% (or exa$ple, we are !isincline! to a!$it of the spontaneity or !iscontinuity of the $in!DDit see$s to us li"e an effect without a cause, an! therefore we suppose the train of our

thoughts to be always calle! up by association% Pet it is probable, or in!ee! certain, that of $any $ental pheno$ena there are no $ental antece!ents, but only bo!ily ones% c% The false influence of language% &e are apt to suppose that when there are two or $ore wor!s !escribing faculties or processes of the $in!, there are real !ifferences correspon!ing to the$% +ut this is not the case% 9or can we !eter$ine how far they !o or !o not exist, or by what !egree or "in! of !ifference they are !istinguishe!% The sa$e re$ar" $ay be $a!e about figures of speech% They fill up the acancy of "nowle!geK they are to the $in! what too $uch colour is to the eyeK but the truth is rather conceale! than re eale! by the$% !% The uncertain $eaning of ter$s, such as Consciousness, Conscience, &ill, <aw, Vnowle!ge, 1nternal an! External -enseK these, in the language of Plato, Lwe sha$elessly use, without e er ha ing ta"en the pains to analy7e the$%L e% 2 science such as Psychology is not $erely an hypothesis, but an hypothesis which, unli"e the hypotheses of Physics, can ne er be erifie!% 1t rests only on the general i$pressions of $an"in!, an! there is little or no hope of a!!ing in any consi!erable !egree to our stoc" of $ental facts% f% The parallelis$ of the Physical -ciences, which lea!s us to analy7e the $in! on the analogy of the bo!y, an! so to re!uce $ental operations to the le el of bo!ily ones, or to confoun! one with the other% g% That the progress of Physiology $ay throw a new light on Psychology is a !rea$ in which scientific $en are always te$pte! to in!ulge% +ut howe er certain we $ay be of the connexion between $in! an! bo!y, the explanation of the one by the other is a hi!!en place of nature which has hitherto been in estigate! with little or no success% h% The i$possibility of !istinguishing between $in! an! bo!y% 9either in thought nor in experience can we separate the$% They see$ to act togetherK yet we feel that we are so$eti$es un!er the !o$inion of the one, so$eti$es of the other, an! so$eti$es, both in the co$$on use of language an! in fact, they transfor$ the$sel es, the one into the goo! principle, the other into the e il principleK an! then again the L1L co$es in an! $e!iates

between the$% 1t is also !ifficult to !istinguish outwar! facts fro$ the i!eas of the$ in the $in!, or to separate the external sti$ulus to a sensation fro$ the acti ity of the organ, or this fro$ the in isible agencies by which it reaches the $in!, or any process of sense fro$ its $ental antece!ent, or any $ental energy fro$ its ner ous expression% i% The fact that $ental !i isions ten! to run into one another, an! that in spea"ing of the $in! we cannot always !istinguish !ifferences of "in! fro$ !ifferences of !egreeK nor ha e we any $easure of the strength an! intensity of our i!eas or feelings% j% 2lthough here!ity has been always "nown to the ancients as well as oursel es to exercise a consi!erable influence on hu$an character, yet we are unable to calculate what proportion this birthDinfluence bears to nurture an! e!ucation% +ut this is the real Tuestion% &e cannot pursue the $in! into e$bryology@ we can only trace how, after birth, it begins to grow% +ut how $uch is !ue to the soil, how $uch to the original latent see!, it is i$possible to !istinguish% 2n! because we are certain that here!ity exercises a consi!erable, but un!efine! influence, we $ust not increase the won!er by exaggerating it% "% The lo e of syste$ is always ten!ing to pre ail o er the historical in estigation of the $in!, which is our chief $eans of "nowing it% 1t eTually ten!s to hin!er the other great source of our "nowle!ge of the $in!, the obser ation of its wor"ings an! processes which we can $a"e for oursel es% l% The $in!, when stu!ie! through the in!i i!ual, is apt to be isolate!DD this is !ue to the ery for$ of the enTuiryK whereas, in truth, it is in!istinguishable fro$ circu$stances, the ery language which it uses being the result of the instincts of longDforgotten generations, an! e ery wor! which a $an utters being the answer to so$e other wor! spo"en or suggeste! by so$ebo!y else% 111% The ten!ency of the prece!ing re$ar"s has been to show that Psychology is necessarily a frag$ent, an! is not an! cannot be a connecte! syste$% &e cannot !efine or li$it the $in!, but we can !escribe it% &e can collect infor$ation about itK we can enu$erate the principal subjects which are inclu!e! in the stu!y of it% Thus we are able to rehabilitate

Psychology to so$e extent, not as a branch of science, but as a collection of facts bearing on hu$an life, as a part of the history of philosophy, as an aspect of ;etaphysic% 1t is a frag$ent of a science only, which in all probability can ne er $a"e any great progress or attain to $uch clearness or exactness% 1t is howe er a "in! of "nowle!ge which has a great interest for us an! is always present to us, an! of which we carry about the $aterials in our own boso$s% &e can obser e our $in!s an! we can experi$ent upon the$, an! the "nowle!ge thus acTuire! is not easily forgotten, an! is a help to us in stu!y as well as in con!uct% The principal subjects of Psychology $ay be su$$e! up as follows@DD a% The relation of $an to the worl! aroun! hi$,DDin what sense an! within what li$its can he with!raw fro$ its laws or assert hi$self against the$ A(ree!o$ an! 9ecessityB, an! what is that which we suppose to be thus in!epen!ent an! which we call oursel esR ,ow !oes the inwar! !iffer fro$ the outwar! an! what is the relation between the$, an! where !o we !raw the line by which we separate $in! fro$ $atter, the soul fro$ the bo!yR 1s the $in! acti e or passi e, or partly bothR 2re its $o e$ents i!entical with those of the bo!y, or only preconcerte! an! coinci!ent with the$, or is one si$ply an aspect of the otherR b% &hat are we to thin" of ti$e an! spaceR Ti$e see$s to ha e a nearer connexion with the $in!, space with the bo!yK yet ti$e, as well as space, is necessary to our i!ea of either% &e see also that they ha e an analogy with one another, an! that in ;athe$atics they often interpenetrate% -pace or place has been sai! by Vant to be the for$ of the outwar!, ti$e of the inwar! sense% ,e regar!s the$ as parts or for$s of the $in!% +ut this is an unfortunate an! inexpressi e way of !escribing their relation to us% (or of all the pheno$ena present to the hu$an $in! they see$ to ha e $ost the character of objecti e existence% There is no use in as"ing what is beyon! or behin! the$K we cannot get ri! of the$% 2n! to throw the laws of external nature which to us are the type of the i$$utable into the subjecti e si!e of the antithesis see$s to be eTually inappropriate% c% &hen in i$agination we enter into the closet of the $in! an! with!raw oursel es fro$ the external worl!, we see$ to fin! there $ore or less !istinct processes which $ay be !escribe! by the wor!s, L1 percei e,L L1 feel,L L1 thin",L L1 want,L L1 wish,L L1 li"e,L L1 !isli"e,L L1 fear,L L1

"now,L L1 re$e$ber,L L1 i$agine,L L1 !rea$,L L1 act,L L1 en!ea our,L L1 hope%L These processes woul! see$ to ha e the sa$e notions attache! to the$ in the $in!s of all e!ucate! persons% They are !istinguishe! fro$ one another in thought, but they inter$ingle% 1t is possible to reflect upon the$ or to beco$e conscious of the$ in a greater or less !egree, or with a greater or less continuity or attention, an! thus arise the inter$ittent pheno$ena of consciousness or selfDconsciousness% The use of all of the$ is possible to us at all ti$esK an! therefore in any operation of the $in! the whole are latent% +ut we are able to characterise the$ sufficiently by that part of the co$plex action which is the $ost pro$inent% &e ha e no !ifficulty in !istinguishing an act of sight or an act of will fro$ an act of thought, although thought is present in both of the$% ,ence the conception of !ifferent faculties or !ifferent irtues is precarious, because each of the$ is passing into the other, an! they are all one in the $in! itselfK they appear an! reappear, an! $ay all be regar!e! as the e erD arying phases or aspects or !ifferences of the sa$e $in! or person% !% 9earest the sense in the scale of the intellectual faculties is $e$ory, which is a $o!e rather than a faculty of the $in!, an! acco$panies all $ental operations% There are two principal "in!s of it, recollection an! recognition,DDrecollection in which forgotten things are recalle! or return to the $in!, recognition in which the $in! fin!s itself again a$ong things once fa$iliar% The si$plest way in which we can represent the for$er to oursel es is by shutting our eyes an! trying to recall in what we ter$ the $in!Ls eye the picture of the surroun!ing scene, or by laying !own the boo" which we are rea!ing an! recapitulating what we can re$e$ber of it% +ut $any ti$es $ore powerful than recollection is recognition, perhaps because it is $ore assiste! by association% &e ha e "nown an! forgotten, an! after a long inter al the thing which we ha e seen once is seen again by us, but with a !ifferent feeling, an! co$es bac" to us, not as new "nowle!ge, but as a thing to which we oursel es i$part a notion alrea!y present to usK in PlatoLs wor!s, we set the sta$p upon the wax% E ery one is aware of the !ifference between the first an! secon! sight of a place, between a scene clothe! with associations or bare an! !i este! of the$% &e say to oursel es on re isiting a spot after a long inter al@ ,ow $any things ha e happene! since 1 last saw this# There is probably no i$pression e er recei e! by us of which we can enture to say that the estiges are altogether lost, or that we $ight not, un!er so$e circu$stances, reco er it% 2 longDforgotten "nowle!ge $ay be easily renewe! an! therefore is ery !ifferent fro$ ignorance% 8f the language learnt in chil!hoo! not a wor!

$ay be re$e$bere!, an! yet, when a new beginning is $a!e, the ol! habit soon returns, the neglecte! organs co$e bac" into use, an! the ri er of speech fin!s out the !rie!Dup channel% e% LConsciousnessL is the $ost treacherous wor! which is e$ploye! in the stu!y of the $in!, for it is use! in $any senses, an! has rarely, if e er, been $inutely analy7e!% <i"e $e$ory, it acco$panies all $ental operations, but not always continuously, an! it exists in arious !egrees% 1t $ay be i$perceptible or har!ly perceptible@ it $ay be the li ing sense that our thoughts, actions, sufferings, are our own% 1t is a "in! of attention which we pay to oursel es, an! is inter$ittent rather than continuous% 1ts sphere has been exaggerate!% 1t is so$eti$es sai! to assure us of our free!o$K but this is an illusion@ as there $ay be a real free!o$ without consciousness of it, so there $ay be a consciousness of free!o$ without the reality% 1t $ay be regar!e! as a higher !egree of "nowle!ge when we not only "now but "now that we "now% Consciousness is oppose! to habit, inattention, sleep, !eath% 1t $ay be illustrate! by its !eri ati e conscience, which spea"s to $en, not only of right an! wrong in the abstract, but of right an! wrong actions in reference to the$sel es an! their circu$stances% f% 2ssociation is another of the e erDpresent pheno$ena of the hu$an $in!% &e spea" of the laws of association, but this is an expression which is confusing, for the pheno$enon itself is of the $ost capricious an! uncertain sort% 1t $ay be briefly !escribe! as follows% The si$plest case of association is that of sense% &hen we see or hear separately one of two things, which we ha e pre iously seen or hear! together, the occurrence of the one has a ten!ency to suggest the other% -o the sight or na$e of a house $ay recall to our $in!s the $e$ory of those who once li e! there% <i"e $ay recall li"e an! e erything its opposite% The parts of a whole, the ter$s of a series, objects lying near, wor!s ha ing a custo$ary or!er stic" together in the $in!% 2 wor! $ay bring bac" a passage of poetry or a whole syste$ of philosophyK fro$ one en! of the worl! or fro$ one pole of "nowle!ge we $ay tra el to the other in an in!i isible instant% The long train of association by which we pass fro$ one point to the other, in ol ing e ery sort of co$plex relation, so su!!en, so acci!ental, is one of the greatest won!ers of $in!%%%This process howe er is not always continuous, but often inter$ittent@ we can thin" of things in isolation as well as in associationK we !o not $ean that they $ust all hang fro$ one

another% &e can begin again after an inter al of rest or acancy, as a new train of thought su!!enly arises, as, for exa$ple, when we wa"e of a $orning or after iolent exercise% Ti$e, place, the sa$e colour or soun! or s$ell or taste, will often call up so$e thought or recollection either acci!entally or naturally associate! with the$% +ut it is eTually noticeable that the new thought $ay occur to us, we cannot tell how or why, by the spontaneous action of the $in! itself or by the latent influence of the bo!y% +oth science an! poetry are $a!e up of associations or recollections, but we $ust obser e also that the $in! is not wholly !epen!ent on the$, ha ing also the power of origination% There are other processes of the $in! which it is goo! for us to stu!y when we are at ho$e an! by oursel es,DDthe $anner in which thought passes into act, the conflict of passion an! reason in $any stages, the transition fro$ sensuality to lo e or senti$ent an! fro$ earthly lo e to hea enly, the slow an! silent influence of habit, which little by little changes the nature of $en, the su!!en change of the ol! nature of $an into a new one, wrought by sha$e or by so$e other o erwhel$ing i$pulse% These are the greater pheno$ena of $in!, an! he who has thought of the$ for hi$self will li e an! $o e in a betterDor!ere! worl!, an! will hi$self be a betterDor!ere! $an% 2t the other en! of the Lglobus intellectualis,L nearest, not to earth an! sense, but to hea en an! Go!, is the personality of $an, by which he hol!s co$$union with the unseen worl!% -o$ehow, he "nows not how, so$ewhere, he "nows not where, un!er this higher aspect of his being he grasps the i!eas of Go!, free!o$ an! i$$ortalityK he sees the for$s of truth, holiness an! lo e, an! is satisfie! with the$% 9o account of the $in! can be co$plete which !oes not a!$it the reality or the possibility of another life% &hether regar!e! as an i!eal or as a fact, the highest part of $anLs nature an! that in which it see$s $ost nearly to approach the !i ine, is a pheno$enon which exists, an! $ust therefore be inclu!e! within the !o$ain of Psychology% 1)% &e a!$it that there is no perfect or i!eal Psychology% 1t is not a whole in the sa$e sense in which Che$istry, Physiology, or ;athe$atics are wholes@ that is to say, it is not a connecte! unity of "nowle!ge% Co$pare! with the wealth of other sciences, it rests upon a s$all nu$ber of

factsK an! when we go beyon! these, we fall into conjectures an! erbal !iscussions% The facts the$sel es are !isjointe!K the causes of the$ run up into other sciences, an! we ha e no $eans of tracing the$ fro$ one to the other% Pet it $ay be true of this, as of other beginnings of "nowle!ge, that the atte$pt to put the$ together has teste! the truth of the$, an! gi en a sti$ulus to the enTuiry into the$% Psychology shoul! be natural, not technical% 1t shoul! ta"e the for$ which is the $ost intelligible to the co$$on un!erstan!ing, because it has to !o with co$$on things, which are fa$iliar to us all% 1t shoul! ai$ at no $ore than e ery reflecting $an "nows or can easily erify for hi$self% &hen si$ple an! unpretentious, it is least obscure! by wor!s, least liable to fall un!er the influence of Physiology or ;etaphysic% 1t shoul! argue, not fro$ exceptional, but fro$ or!inary pheno$ena% 1t shoul! be careful to !istinguish the higher an! the lower ele$ents of hu$an nature, an! not allow one to be eile! in the !isguise of the other, lest through the slippery nature of language we shoul! pass i$perceptibly fro$ goo! to e il, fro$ nature in the higher to nature in the neutral or lower sense% 1t shoul! assert consistently the unity of the hu$an faculties, the unity of "nowle!ge, the unity of Go! an! law% The !ifference between the will an! the affections an! between the reason an! the passions shoul! also be recogni7e! by it% 1ts sphere is suppose! to be narrowe! to the in!i i!ual soulK but it cannot be thus separate! in fact% 1t goes bac" to the beginnings of things, to the first growth of language an! philosophy, an! to the whole science of $an% There can be no truth or co$pleteness in any stu!y of the $in! which is confine! to the in!i i!ual% The nature of language, though not the whole, is perhaps at present the $ost i$portant ele$ent in our "nowle!ge of it% 1t is not i$possible that so$e nu$erical laws $ay be foun! to ha e a place in the relations of $in! an! $atter, as in the rest of nature% The ol! Pythagorean fancy that the soul Lis or has in it har$onyL $ay in so$e !egree be reali7e!% +ut the in!ications of such nu$erical har$onies are faintK either the secret of the$ lies !eeper than we can !isco er, or nature $ay ha e rebelle! against the use of the$ in the co$position of $en an! ani$als% 1t is with Tualitati e rather than with Tuantitati e !ifferences that we are concerne! in Psychology% The facts relating to the $in! which we obtain fro$ Physiology are negati e rather than positi e% They show us, not the processes of $ental action, but the con!itions of which when !epri e! the $in! ceases to act% 1t woul! see$ as if the ti$e

ha! not yet arri e! when we can hope to a!! anything of $uch i$portance to our "nowle!ge of the $in! fro$ the in estigations of the $icroscope% The ele$ents of Psychology can still only be learnt fro$ reflections on oursel es, which interpret an! are also interprete! by our experience of others% The history of language, of philosophy, an! religion, the great thoughts or in entions or !isco eries which $o e $an"in!, furnish the larger $oul!s or outlines in which the hu$an $in! has been cast% (ro$ these the in!i i!ual !eri es so $uch as he is able to co$prehen! or has the opportunity of learning% T,E2ETET:by Plato Translate! by +enja$in Sowett PE*-89- 8( T,E '12<8G:E@ -ocrates, Theo!orus, Theaetetus% Eucli! an! Terpsion $eet in front of Eucli!Ls house in ;egaraK they enter the house, an! the !ialogue is rea! to the$ by a ser ant% E:C<1'@ ,a e you only just arri e! fro$ the country, TerpsionR TE*P-189@ 9o, 1 ca$e so$e ti$e ago@ an! 1 ha e been in the 2gora loo"ing for you, an! won!ering that 1 coul! not fin! you% E:C<1'@ +ut 1 was not in the city% TE*P-189@ &here thenR E:C<1'@ 2s 1 was going !own to the harbour, 1 $et TheaetetusDDhe was being carrie! up to 2thens fro$ the ar$y at Corinth%

TE*P-189@ &as he ali e or !ea!R E:C<1'@ ,e was scarcely ali e, for he has been ba!ly woun!e!K but he was suffering e en $ore fro$ the sic"ness which has bro"en out in the ar$y% TE*P-189@ The !ysentery, you $eanR E:C<1'@ Pes% TE*P-189@ 2las# what a loss he will be# E:C<1'@ Pes, Terpsion, he is a noble fellowK only toD!ay 1 hear! so$e people highly praising his beha iour in this ery battle% TE*P-189@ 9o won!erK 1 shoul! rather be surprise! at hearing anything else of hi$% +ut why !i! he go on, instea! of stopping at ;egaraR E:C<1'@ ,e wante! to get ho$e@ although 1 entreate! an! a! ise! hi$ to re$ain, he woul! not listen to $eK so 1 set hi$ on his way, an! turne! bac", an! then 1 re$e$bere! what -ocrates ha! sai! of hi$, an! thought how re$ar"ably this, li"e all his pre!ictions, ha! been fulfille!% 1 belie e that he ha! seen hi$ a little before his own !eath, when Theaetetus was a youth, an! he ha! a $e$orable con ersation with hi$, which he repeate! to $e when 1 ca$e to 2thensK he was full of a!$iration of his genius, an! sai! that he woul! $ost certainly be a great $an, if he li e!% TE*P-189@ The prophecy has certainly been fulfille!K but what was the con ersationR can you tell $eR E:C<1'@ 9o, in!ee!, not offhan!K but 1 too" notes of it as soon as 1 got ho$eK these 1 fille! up fro$ $e$ory, writing the$ out at leisureK an! whene er 1 went to 2thens, 1 as"e! -ocrates about any point which 1 ha! forgotten, an! on $y return 1 $a!e correctionsK thus 1 ha e nearly the whole con ersation written !own%

TE*P-189@ 1 re$e$berDDyou tol! $eK an! 1 ha e always been inten!ing to as" you to show $e the writing, but ha e put off !oing soK an! now, why shoul! we not rea! it throughRDDha ing just co$e fro$ the country, 1 shoul! greatly li"e to rest% E:C<1'@ 1 too shall be ery gla! of a rest, for 1 went with Theaetetus as far as Erineu$% <et us go in, then, an!, while we are reposing, the ser ant shall rea! to us% TE*P-189@ )ery goo!% E:C<1'@ ,ere is the roll, TerpsionK 1 $ay obser e that 1 ha e intro!uce! -ocrates, not as narrating to $e, but as actually con ersing with the persons who$ he $entione!DDthese were, Theo!orus the geo$etrician Aof CyreneB, an! Theaetetus% 1 ha e o$itte!, for the sa"e of con enience, the interlocutory wor!s L1 sai!,L L1 re$ar"e!,L which he use! when he spo"e of hi$self, an! again, Lhe agree!,L or L!isagree!,L in the answer, lest the repetition of the$ shoul! be troubleso$e% TE*P-189@ Uuite right, Eucli!% E:C<1'@ 2n! now, boy, you $ay ta"e the roll an! rea!% E:C<1'L- -E*)29T *E2'-% -8C*2TE-@ 1f 1 care! enough about the Cyrenians, Theo!orus, 1 woul! as" you whether there are any rising geo$etricians or philosophers in that part of the worl!% +ut 1 a$ $ore intereste! in our own 2thenian youth, an! 1 woul! rather "now who a$ong the$ are li"ely to !o well% 1 obser e the$ as far as 1 can $yself, an! 1 enTuire of any one who$ they follow, an! 1 see that a great $any of the$ follow you, in which they are Tuite right, consi!ering your e$inence in geo$etry an! in other ways% Tell $e then, if you ha e $et with any one who is goo! for anything% T,E8'8*:-@ Pes, -ocrates, 1 ha e beco$e acTuainte! with one ery re$ar"able 2thenian youth, who$ 1 co$$en! to you as well worthy of your attention% 1f he ha! been a beauty 1 shoul! ha e been afrai! to praise hi$, lest you shoul! suppose that 1 was in lo e with hi$K but he is no

beauty, an! you $ust not be offen!e! if 1 say that he is ery li"e youK for he has a snub nose an! projecting eyes, although these features are less $ar"e! in hi$ than in you% -eeing, then, that he has no personal attractions, 1 $ay freely say, that in all $y acTuaintance, which is ery large, 1 ne er "new any one who was his eTual in natural gifts@ for he has a Tuic"ness of apprehension which is al$ost unri alle!, an! he is excee!ingly gentle, an! also the $ost courageous of $enK there is a union of Tualities in hi$ such as 1 ha e ne er seen in any other, an! shoul! scarcely ha e thought possibleK for those who, li"e hi$, ha e Tuic" an! rea!y an! retenti e wits, ha e generally also Tuic" te$persK they are ships without ballast, an! go !arting about, an! are $a! rather than courageousK an! the stea!ier sort, when they ha e to face stu!y, pro e stupi! an! cannot re$e$ber% &hereas he $o es surely an! s$oothly an! successfully in the path of "nowle!ge an! enTuiryK an! he is full of gentleness, flowing on silently li"e a ri er of oilK at his age, it is won!erful% -8C*2TE-@ That is goo! newsK whose son is heR T,E8'8*:-@ The na$e of his father 1 ha e forgotten, but the youth hi$self is the $i!!le one of those who are approaching usK he an! his co$panions ha e been anointing the$sel es in the outer court, an! now they see$ to ha e finishe!, an! are co$ing towar!s us% <oo" an! see whether you "now hi$% -8C*2TE-@ 1 "now the youth, but 1 !o not "now his na$eK he is the son of Euphronius the -unian, who was hi$self an e$inent $an, an! such another as his son is, accor!ing to your account of hi$K 1 belie e that he left a consi!erable fortune% T,E8'8*:-@ Theaetetus, -ocrates, is his na$eK but 1 rather thin" that the property !isappeare! in the han!s of trusteesK notwithstan!ing which he is won!erfully liberal% -8C*2TE-@ ,e $ust be a fine fellowK tell hi$ to co$e an! sit by $e% T,E8'8*:-@ 1 will% Co$e hither, Theaetetus, an! sit by -ocrates%

-8C*2TE-@ +y all $eans, Theaetetus, in or!er that 1 $ay see the reflection of $yself in your face, for Theo!orus says that we are ali"eK an! yet if each of us hel! in his han!s a lyre, an! he sai! that they were tune! ali"e, shoul! we at once ta"e his wor!, or shoul! we as" whether he who sai! so was or was not a $usicianR T,E2ETET:-@ &e shoul! as"% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! if we foun! that he was, we shoul! ta"e his wor!K an! if not, notR T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! if this suppose! li"eness of our faces is a $atter of any interest to us, we shoul! enTuire whether he who says that we are ali"e is a painter or notR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly we shoul!% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! is Theo!orus a painterR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 ne er hear! that he was% -8C*2TE-@ 1s he a geo$etricianR T,E2ETET:-@ 8f course he is, -ocrates% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! is he an astrono$er an! calculator an! $usician, an! in general an e!ucate! $anR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 thin" so% -8C*2TE-@ 1f, then, he re$ar"s on a si$ilarity in our persons, either by way of praise or bla$e, there is no particular reason why we shoul! atten! to hi$% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 shoul! say not% -8C*2TE-@ +ut if he praises the irtue or wis!o$ which are the $ental

en!ow$ents of either of us, then he who hears the praises will naturally !esire to exa$ine hi$ who is praise!@ an! he again shoul! be willing to exhibit hi$self% T,E2ETET:-@ )ery true, -ocrates% -8C*2TE-@ Then now is the ti$e, $y !ear Theaetetus, for $e to exa$ine, an! for you to exhibitK since although Theo!orus has praise! $any a citi7en an! stranger in $y hearing, ne er !i! 1 hear hi$ praise any one as he has been praising you% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 a$ gla! to hear it, -ocratesK but what if he was only in jestR -8C*2TE-@ 9ay, Theo!orus is not gi en to jestingK an! 1 cannot allow you to retract your consent on any such pretence as that% 1f you !o, he will ha e to swear to his wor!sK an! we are perfectly sure that no one will be foun! to i$pugn hi$% 'o not be shy then, but stan! to your wor!% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 suppose 1 $ust, if you wish it% -8C*2TE-@ 1n the first place, 1 shoul! li"e to as" what you learn of Theo!orus@ so$ething of geo$etry, perhapsR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! astrono$y an! har$ony an! calculationR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 !o $y best% -8C*2TE-@ Pes, $y boy, an! so !o 1K an! $y !esire is to learn of hi$, or of anybo!y who see$s to un!erstan! these things% 2n! 1 get on pretty well in generalK but there is a little !ifficulty which 1 want you an! the co$pany to ai! $e in in estigating% &ill you answer $e a Tuestion@ L1s not learning growing wiser about that which you learnRL T,E2ETET:-@ 8f course%

-8C*2TE-@ 2n! by wis!o$ the wise are wiseR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! is that !ifferent in any way fro$ "nowle!geR T,E2ETET:-@ &hatR -8C*2TE-@ &is!o$K are not $en wise in that which they "nowR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly they are% -8C*2TE-@ Then wis!o$ an! "nowle!ge are the sa$eR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ ,erein lies the !ifficulty which 1 can ne er sol e to $y satisfactionDD&hat is "nowle!geR Can we answer that TuestionR &hat say youR which of us will spea" firstR whoe er $isses shall sit !own, as at a ga$e of ball, an! shall be !on"ey, as the boys sayK he who lasts out his co$petitors in the ga$e without $issing, shall be our "ing, an! shall ha e the right of putting to us any Tuestions which he pleases%%%&hy is there no replyR 1 hope, Theo!orus, that 1 a$ not betraye! into ru!eness by $y lo e of con ersationR 1 only want to $a"e us tal" an! be frien!ly an! sociable% T,E8'8*:-@ The re erse of ru!eness, -ocrates@ but 1 woul! rather that you woul! as" one of the young fellowsK for the truth is, that 1 a$ unuse! to your ga$e of Tuestion an! answer, an! 1 a$ too ol! to learnK the young will be $ore suitable, an! they will i$pro e $ore than 1 shall, for youth is always able to i$pro e% 2n! so ha ing $a!e a beginning with Theaetetus, 1 woul! a! ise you to go on with hi$ an! not let hi$ off% -8C*2TE-@ 'o you hear, Theaetetus, what Theo!orus saysR The philosopher, who$ you woul! not li"e to !isobey, an! whose wor! ought to be a co$$an! to a young $an, bi!s $e interrogate you% Ta"e courage, then, an! nobly say what you thin" that "nowle!ge is%

T,E2ETET:-@ &ell, -ocrates, 1 will answer as you an! he bi! $eK an! if 1 $a"e a $ista"e, you will !oubtless correct $e% -8C*2TE-@ &e will, if we can% T,E2ETET:-@ Then, 1 thin" that the sciences which 1 learn fro$ Theo!orusDD geo$etry, an! those which you just now $entione!DDare "nowle!geK an! 1 woul! inclu!e the art of the cobbler an! other crafts$enK these, each an! all of, the$, are "nowle!ge% -8C*2TE-@ Too $uch, Theaetetus, too $uchK the nobility an! liberality of your nature $a"e you gi e $any an! !i erse things, when 1 a$ as"ing for one si$ple thing% T,E2ETET:-@ &hat !o you $ean, -ocratesR -8C*2TE-@ Perhaps nothing% 1 will en!ea our, howe er, to explain what 1 belie e to be $y $eaning@ &hen you spea" of cobbling, you $ean the art or science of $a"ing shoesR T,E2ETET:-@ Sust so% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! when you spea" of carpentering, you $ean the art of $a"ing woo!en i$ple$entsR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 !o% -8C*2TE-@ 1n both cases you !efine the subject $atter of each of the two artsR T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ +ut that, Theaetetus, was not the point of $y Tuestion@ we wante! to "now not the subjects, nor yet the nu$ber of the arts or sciences, for we were not going to count the$, but we wante! to "now the

nature of "nowle!ge in the abstract% 2$ 1 not rightR T,E2ETET:-@ Perfectly right% -8C*2TE-@ <et $e offer an illustration@ -uppose that a person were to as" about so$e ery tri ial an! ob ious thingDDfor exa$ple, &hat is clayR an! we were to reply, that there is a clay of potters, there is a clay of o enD $a"ers, there is a clay of bric"D$a"ersK woul! not the answer be ri!iculousR T,E2ETET:-@ Truly% -8C*2TE-@ 1n the first place, there woul! be an absur!ity in assu$ing that he who as"e! the Tuestion woul! un!erstan! fro$ our answer the nature of Lclay,L $erely because we a!!e! Lof the i$ageD$a"ers,L or of any other wor"ers% ,ow can a $an un!erstan! the na$e of anything, when he !oes not "now the nature of itR T,E2ETET:-@ ,e cannot% -8C*2TE-@ Then he who !oes not "now what science or "nowle!ge is, has no "nowle!ge of the art or science of $a"ing shoesR T,E2ETET:-@ 9one% -8C*2TE-@ 9or of any other scienceR T,E2ETET:-@ 9o% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! when a $an is as"e! what science or "nowle!ge is, to gi e in answer the na$e of so$e art or science is ri!iculousK for the Tuestion is, L&hat is "nowle!geRL an! he replies, L2 "nowle!ge of this or that%L T,E2ETET:-@ True%

-8C*2TE-@ ;oreo er, he $ight answer shortly an! si$ply, but he $a"es an enor$ous circuit% (or exa$ple, when as"e! about the clay, he $ight ha e sai! si$ply, that clay is $oistene! earthDDwhat sort of clay is not to the point% T,E2ETET:-@ Pes, -ocrates, there is no !ifficulty as you put the Tuestion% Pou $ean, if 1 a$ not $ista"en, so$ething li"e what occurre! to $e an! to $y frien! here, your na$esa"e -ocrates, in a recent !iscussion% -8C*2TE-@ &hat was that, TheaetetusR T,E2ETET:-@ Theo!orus was writing out for us so$ething about roots, such as the roots of three or fi e, showing that they are inco$$ensurable by the unit@ he selecte! other exa$ples up to se enteen DDthere he stoppe!% 9ow as there are innu$erable roots, the notion occurre! to us of atte$pting to inclu!e the$ all un!er one na$e or class% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! !i! you fin! such a classR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 thin" that we !i!K but 1 shoul! li"e to ha e your opinion% -8C*2TE-@ <et $e hear% T,E2ETET:-@ &e !i i!e! all nu$bers into two classes@ those which are $a!e up of eTual factors $ultiplying into one another, which we co$pare! to sTuare figures an! calle! sTuare or eTuilateral nu$bersKDDthat was one class% -8C*2TE-@ )ery goo!% T,E2ETET:-@ The inter$e!iate nu$bers, such as three an! fi e, an! e ery other nu$ber which is $a!e up of uneTual factors, either of a greater $ultiplie! by a less, or of a less $ultiplie! by a greater, an! when regar!e! as a figure, is containe! in uneTual si!esKDDall these we co$pare! to oblong figures, an! calle! the$ oblong nu$bers%

-8C*2TE-@ CapitalK an! what followe!R T,E2ETET:-@ The lines, or si!es, which ha e for their sTuares the eTuilateral plane nu$bers, were calle! by us lengths or $agnitu!esK an! the lines which are the roots of Aor whose sTuares are eTual toB the oblong nu$bers, were calle! powers or rootsK the reason of this latter na$e being, that they are co$$ensurable with the for$er 3i%e%, with the soDcalle! lengths or $agnitu!es5 not in linear $easure$ent, but in the alue of the superficial content of their sTuaresK an! the sa$e about soli!s% -8C*2TE-@ Excellent, $y boysK 1 thin" that you fully justify the praises of Theo!orus, an! that he will not be foun! guilty of false witness% T,E2ETET:-@ +ut 1 a$ unable, -ocrates, to gi e you a si$ilar answer about "nowle!ge, which is what you appear to wantK an! therefore Theo!orus is a !ecei er after all% -8C*2TE-@ &ell, but if so$e one were to praise you for running, an! to say that he ne er $et your eTual a$ong boys, an! afterwar!s you were beaten in a race by a grownDup $an, who was a great runnerDDwoul! the praise be any the less trueR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly not% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! is the !isco ery of the nature of "nowle!ge so s$all a $atter, as just now sai!R 1s it not one which woul! tas" the powers of $en perfect in e ery wayR T,E2ETET:-@ +y hea en, they shoul! be the top of all perfection# -8C*2TE-@ &ell, then, be of goo! cheerK !o not say that Theo!orus was $ista"en about you, but !o your best to ascertain the true nature of "nowle!ge, as well as of other things% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 a$ eager enough, -ocrates, if that woul! bring to light the truth%

-8C*2TE-@ Co$e, you $a!e a goo! beginning just nowK let your own answer about roots be your $o!el, an! as you co$prehen!e! the$ all in one class, try an! bring the $any sorts of "nowle!ge un!er one !efinition% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 can assure you, -ocrates, that 1 ha e trie! ery often, when the report of Tuestions as"e! by you was brought to $eK but 1 can neither persua!e $yself that 1 ha e a satisfactory answer to gi e, nor hear of any one who answers as you woul! ha e hi$K an! 1 cannot sha"e off a feeling of anxiety% -8C*2TE-@ These are the pangs of labour, $y !ear TheaetetusK you ha e so$ething within you which you are bringing to the birth% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 !o not "now, -ocratesK 1 only say what 1 feel% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! ha e you ne er hear!, si$pleton, that 1 a$ the son of a $i!wife, bra e an! burly, whose na$e was PhaenareteR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes, 1 ha e% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! that 1 $yself practise $i!wiferyR T,E2ETET:-@ 9o, ne er% -8C*2TE-@ <et $e tell you that 1 !o though, $y frien!@ but you $ust not re eal the secret, as the worl! in general ha e not foun! $e outK an! therefore they only say of $e, that 1 a$ the strangest of $ortals an! !ri e $en to their witsL en!% 'i! you e er hear that tooR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ -hall 1 tell you the reasonR T,E2ETET:-@ +y all $eans% -8C*2TE-@ +ear in $in! the whole business of the $i!wi es, an! then you

will see $y $eaning better@DD9o wo$an, as you are probably aware, who is still able to concei e an! bear, atten!s other wo$en, but only those who are past bearing% T,E2ETET:-@ Pes, 1 "now% -8C*2TE-@ The reason of this is sai! to be that 2rte$isDDthe go!!ess of chil!birthDDis not a $other, an! she honours those who are li"e herselfK but she coul! not allow the barren to be $i!wi es, because hu$an nature cannot "now the $ystery of an art without experienceK an! therefore she assigne! this office to those who are too ol! to bear% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 !are say% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! 1 !are say too, or rather 1 a$ absolutely certain, that the $i!wi es "now better than others who is pregnant an! who is notR T,E2ETET:-@ )ery true% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! by the use of potions an! incantations they are able to arouse the pangs an! to soothe the$ at willK they can $a"e those bear who ha e a !ifficulty in bearing, an! if they thin" fit they can s$other the e$bryo in the wo$b% T,E2ETET:-@ They can% -8C*2TE-@ 'i! you e er re$ar" that they are also $ost cunning $atch$a"ers, an! ha e a thorough "nowle!ge of what unions are li"ely to pro!uce a bra e broo!R T,E2ETET:-@ 9o, ne er% -8C*2TE-@ Then let $e tell you that this is their greatest pri!e, $ore than cutting the u$bilical cor!% 2n! if you reflect, you will see that the sa$e art which culti ates an! gathers in the fruits of the earth, will be $ost li"ely to "now in what soils the se eral plants or see!s shoul! be !eposite!% T,E2ETET:-@ Pes, the sa$e art%

-8C*2TE-@ 2n! !o you suppose that with wo$en the case is otherwiseR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 shoul! thin" not% -8C*2TE-@ Certainly notK but $i!wi es are respectable wo$en who ha e a character to lose, an! they a oi! this !epart$ent of their profession, because they are afrai! of being calle! procuresses, which is a na$e gi en to those who join together $an an! wo$an in an unlawful an! unscientific wayK an! yet the true $i!wife is also the true an! only $atch$a"er% T,E2ETET:-@ Clearly% -8C*2TE-@ -uch are the $i!wi es, whose tas" is a ery i$portant one, but not so i$portant as $ineK for wo$en !o not bring into the worl! at one ti$e real chil!ren, an! at another ti$e counterfeits which are with !ifficulty !istinguishe! fro$ the$K if they !i!, then the !iscern$ent of the true an! false birth woul! be the crowning achie e$ent of the art of $i!wiferyDDyou woul! thin" soR T,E2ETET:-@ 1n!ee! 1 shoul!% -8C*2TE-@ &ell, $y art of $i!wifery is in $ost respects li"e theirsK but !iffers, in that 1 atten! $en an! not wo$enK an! loo" after their souls when they are in labour, an! not after their bo!ies@ an! the triu$ph of $y art is in thoroughly exa$ining whether the thought which the $in! of the young $an brings forth is a false i!ol or a noble an! true birth% 2n! li"e the $i!wi es, 1 a$ barren, an! the reproach which is often $a!e against $e, that 1 as" Tuestions of others an! ha e not the wit to answer the$ $yself, is ery justDDthe reason is, that the go! co$pels $e to be a $i!wife, but !oes not allow $e to bring forth% 2n! therefore 1 a$ not $yself at all wise, nor ha e 1 anything to show which is the in ention or birth of $y own soul, but those who con erse with $e profit% -o$e of the$ appear !ull enough at first, but afterwar!s, as our acTuaintance ripens, if the go! is gracious to the$, they all $a"e astonishing progressK an! this in the opinion of others as well as in their own% 1t is Tuite !ear that they ne er learne! anything fro$ $eK the $any fine !isco eries to which they cling are of their own $a"ing% +ut to $e an! the go! they owe their

!eli ery% 2n! the proof of $y wor!s is, that $any of the$ in their ignorance, either in their selfDconceit !espising $e, or falling un!er the influence of others, ha e gone away too soonK an! ha e not only lost the chil!ren of who$ 1 ha! pre iously !eli ere! the$ by an ill bringing up, but ha e stifle! whate er else they ha! in the$ by e il co$$unications, being fon!er of lies an! sha$s than of the truthK an! they ha e at last en!e! by seeing the$sel es, as others see the$, to be great fools% 2ristei!es, the son of <ysi$achus, is one of the$, an! there are $any others% The truants often return to $e, an! beg that 1 woul! consort with the$ againDDthey are rea!y to go to $e on their "neesDDan! then, if $y fa$iliar allows, which is not always the case, 1 recei e the$, an! they begin to grow again% 'ire are the pangs which $y art is able to arouse an! to allay in those who consort with $e, just li"e the pangs of wo$en in chil!birthK night an! !ay they are full of perplexity an! tra ail which is e en worse than that of the wo$en% -o $uch for the$% 2n! there are others, Theaetetus, who co$e to $e apparently ha ing nothing in the$K an! as 1 "now that they ha e no nee! of $y art, 1 coax the$ into $arrying so$e one, an! by the grace of Go! 1 can generally tell who is li"ely to !o the$ goo!% ;any of the$ 1 ha e gi en away to Pro!icus, an! $any to other inspire! sages% 1 tell you this long story, frien! Theaetetus, because 1 suspect, as in!ee! you see$ to thin" yourself, that you are in labourDDgreat with so$e conception% Co$e then to $e, who a$ a $i!wifeLs son an! $yself a $i!wife, an! !o your best to answer the Tuestions which 1 will as" you% 2n! if 1 abstract an! expose your firstDborn, because 1 !isco er upon inspection that the conception which you ha e for$e! is a ain sha!ow, !o not Tuarrel with $e on that account, as the $anner of wo$en is when their first chil!ren are ta"en fro$ the$% (or 1 ha e actually "nown so$e who were rea!y to bite $e when 1 !epri e! the$ of a !arling follyK they !i! not percei e that 1 acte! fro$ goo!will, not "nowing that no go! is the ene$y of $anDDthat was not within the range of their i!easK neither a$ 1 their ene$y in all this, but it woul! be wrong for $e to a!$it falsehoo!, or to stifle the truth% 8nce $ore, then, Theaetetus, 1 repeat $y ol! Tuestion, L&hat is "nowle!geRLDDan! !o not say that you cannot tellK but Tuit yourself li"e a $an, an! by the help of Go! you will be able to tell% T,E2ETET:-@ 2t any rate, -ocrates, after such an exhortation 1 shoul! be asha$e! of not trying to !o $y best% 9ow he who "nows percei es what he "nows, an!, as far as 1 can see at present, "nowle!ge is perception%

-8C*2TE-@ +ra ely sai!, boyK that is the way in which you shoul! express your opinion% 2n! now, let us exa$ine together this conception of yours, an! see whether it is a true birth or a $ere win!Degg@DDPou say that "nowle!ge is perceptionR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ &ell, you ha e !eli ere! yourself of a ery i$portant !octrine about "nowle!geK it is in!ee! the opinion of Protagoras, who has another way of expressing it% ;an, he says, is the $easure of all things, of the existence of things that are, an! of the nonDexistence of things that are not@DDPou ha e rea! hi$R T,E2ETET:-@ 8 yes, again an! again% -8C*2TE-@ 'oes he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you, an! to $e such as they appear to $e, an! that you an! 1 are $enR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes, he says so% -8C*2TE-@ 2 wise $an is not li"ely to tal" nonsense% <et us try to un!erstan! hi$@ the sa$e win! is blowing, an! yet one of us $ay be col! an! the other not, or one $ay be slightly an! the other ery col!R T,E2ETET:-@ Uuite true% -8C*2TE-@ 9ow is the win!, regar!e! not in relation to us but absolutely, col! or notK or are we to say, with Protagoras, that the win! is col! to hi$ who is col!, an! not to hi$ who is notR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 suppose the last% -8C*2TE-@ Then it $ust appear so to each of the$R T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! Lappears to hi$L $eans the sa$e as Lhe percei es%L

T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ Then appearing an! percei ing coinci!e in the case of hot an! col!, an! in si$ilar instancesK for things appear, or $ay be suppose! to be, to each one such as he percei es the$R T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ Then perception is always of existence, an! being the sa$e as "nowle!ge is unerringR T,E2ETET:-@ Clearly% -8C*2TE-@ 1n the na$e of the Graces, what an al$ighty wise $an Protagoras $ust ha e been# ,e spo"e these things in a parable to the co$$on her!, li"e you an! $e, but tol! the truth, Lhis Truth,L A1n allusion to a boo" of ProtagorasL which bore this title%B in secret to his own !isciples% T,E2ETET:-@ &hat !o you $ean, -ocratesR -8C*2TE-@ 1 a$ about to spea" of a high argu$ent, in which all things are sai! to be relati eK you cannot rightly call anything by any na$e, such as great or s$all, hea y or light, for the great will be s$all an! the hea y lightDDthere is no single thing or Tuality, but out of $otion an! change an! a!$ixture all things are beco$ing relati ely to one another, which Lbeco$ingL is by us incorrectly calle! being, but is really beco$ing, for nothing e er is, but all things are beco$ing% -u$$on all philosophersDD Protagoras, ,eracleitus, E$pe!ocles, an! the rest of the$, one after another, an! with the exception of Par$eni!es they will agree with you in this% -u$$on the great $asters of either "in! of poetryDDEpichar$us, the prince of Co$e!y, an! ,o$er of Trage!yK when the latter sings of L8cean whence sprang the go!s, an! $other Tethys,L !oes he not $ean that all things are the offspring, of flux an! $otionR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 thin" so%

-8C*2TE-@ 2n! who coul! ta"e up ar$s against such a great ar$y ha ing ,o$er for its general, an! not appear ri!iculousR ACo$pare Cratylus%B T,E2ETET:-@ &ho in!ee!, -ocratesR -8C*2TE-@ Pes, TheaetetusK an! there are plenty of other proofs which will show that $otion is the source of what is calle! being an! beco$ing, an! inacti ity of notDbeing an! !estructionK for fire an! war$th, which are suppose! to be the parent an! guar!ian of all other things, are born of $o e$ent an! of friction, which is a "in! of $otionKDDis not this the origin of fireR T,E2ETET:-@ 1t is% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! the race of ani$als is generate! in the sa$e wayR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! is not the bo!ily habit spoile! by rest an! i!leness, but preser e! for a long ti$e by $otion an! exerciseR T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! what of the $ental habitR 1s not the soul infor$e!, an! i$pro e!, an! preser e! by stu!y an! attention, which are $otionsK but when at rest, which in the soul only $eans want of attention an! stu!y, is uninfor$e!, an! spee!ily forgets whate er she has learne!R T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ Then $otion is a goo!, an! rest an e il, to the soul as well as to the bo!yR T,E2ETET:-@ Clearly% -8C*2TE-@ 1 $ay a!!, that breathless cal$, stillness an! the li"e waste an! i$pair, while win! an! stor$ preser eK an! the pal$ary argu$ent of all, which 1 strongly urge, is the gol!en chain in ,o$er, by which he $eans the

sun, thereby in!icating that so long as the sun an! the hea ens go roun! in their orbits, all things hu$an an! !i ine are an! are preser e!, but if they were chaine! up an! their $otions cease!, then all things woul! be !estroye!, an!, as the saying is, turne! upsi!e !own% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 belie e, -ocrates, that you ha e truly explaine! his $eaning% -8C*2TE-@ Then now apply his !octrine to perception, $y goo! frien!, an! first of all to isionK that which you call white colour is not in your eyes, an! is not a !istinct thing which exists out of the$% 2n! you $ust not assign any place to it@ for if it ha! position it woul! be, an! be at rest, an! there woul! be no process of beco$ing% T,E2ETET:-@ Then what is colourR -8C*2TE-@ <et us carry the principle which has just been affir$e!, that nothing is selfDexistent, an! then we shall see that white, blac", an! e ery other colour, arises out of the eye $eeting the appropriate $otion, an! that what we call a colour is in each case neither the acti e nor the passi e ele$ent, but so$ething which passes between the$, an! is peculiar to each percipientK are you Tuite certain that the se eral colours appear to a !og or to any ani$al whate er as they appear to youR T,E2ETET:-@ (ar fro$ it% -8C*2TE-@ 8r that anything appears the sa$e to you as to another $anR 2re you so profoun!ly con ince! of thisR *ather woul! it not be true that it ne er appears exactly the sa$e to you, because you are ne er exactly the sa$eR T,E2ETET:-@ The latter% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! if that with which 1 co$pare $yself in si7e, or which 1 apprehen! by touch, were great or white or hot, it coul! not beco$e !ifferent by $ere contact with another unless it actually change!K nor again, if the co$paring or apprehen!ing subject were great or white or hot,

coul! this, when unchange! fro$ within, beco$e change! by any approxi$ation or affection of any other thing% The fact is that in our or!inary way of spea"ing we allow oursel es to be !ri en into $ost ri!iculous an! won!erful contra!ictions, as Protagoras an! all who ta"e his line of argu$ent woul! re$ar"% T,E2ETET:-@ ,owR an! of what sort !o you $eanR -8C*2TE-@ 2 little instance will sufficiently explain $y $eaning@ ,ere are six !ice, which are $ore by a half when co$pare! with four, an! fewer by a half than twel eDDthey are $ore an! also fewer% ,ow can you or any one $aintain the contraryR T,E2ETET:-@ )ery true% -8C*2TE-@ &ell, then, suppose that Protagoras or so$e one as"s whether anything can beco$e greater or $ore if not by increasing, how woul! you answer hi$, TheaetetusR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 shoul! say L9o,L -ocrates, if 1 were to spea" $y $in! in reference to this last Tuestion, an! if 1 were not afrai! of contra!icting $y for$er answer% -8C*2TE-@ Capital# excellent# spo"en li"e an oracle, $y boy# 2n! if you reply LPes,L there will be a case for Euripi!esK for our tongue will be uncon ince!, but not our $in!% A1n allusion to the wellD"nown line of Euripi!es, ,ippol%@ e gloss o$o$och e !e thren ano$otos%B T,E2ETET:-@ )ery true% -8C*2TE-@ The thoroughbre! -ophists, who "now all that can be "nown about the $in!, an! argue only out of the superfluity of their wits, woul! ha e ha! a regular sparringD$atch o er this, an! woul! ha e "noc"e! their argu$ents together finely% +ut you an! 1, who ha e no professional ai$s, only !esire to see what is the $utual relation of these principles,DD whether they are consistent with each or not% T,E2ETET:-@ Pes, that woul! be $y !esire%

-8C*2TE-@ 2n! $ine too% +ut since this is our feeling, an! there is plenty of ti$e, why shoul! we not cal$ly an! patiently re iew our own thoughts, an! thoroughly exa$ine an! see what these appearances in us really areR 1f 1 a$ not $ista"en, they will be !escribe! by us as follows@DDfirst, that nothing can beco$e greater or less, either in nu$ber or $agnitu!e, while re$aining eTual to itselfDDyou woul! agreeR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ -econ!ly, that without a!!ition or subtraction there is no increase or !i$inution of anything, but only eTuality% T,E2ETET:-@ Uuite true% -8C*2TE-@ Thir!ly, that what was not before cannot be afterwar!s, without beco$ing an! ha ing beco$e% T,E2ETET:-@ Pes, truly% -8C*2TE-@ These three axio$s, if 1 a$ not $ista"en, are fighting with one another in our $in!s in the case of the !ice, or, again, in such a case as thisDDif 1 were to say that 1, who a$ of a certain height an! taller than you, $ay within a year, without gaining or losing in height, be not so tallDDnot that 1 shoul! ha e lost, but that you woul! ha e increase!% 1n such a case, 1 a$ afterwar!s what 1 once was not, an! yet 1 ha e not beco$eK for 1 coul! not ha e beco$e without beco$ing, neither coul! 1 ha e beco$e less without losing so$ewhat of $y heightK an! 1 coul! gi e you ten thousan! exa$ples of si$ilar contra!ictions, if we a!$it the$ at all% 1 belie e that you follow $e, TheaetetusK for 1 suspect that you ha e thought of these Tuestions before now% T,E2ETET:-@ Pes, -ocrates, an! 1 a$ a$a7e! when 1 thin" of the$K by the Go!s 1 a$# an! 1 want to "now what on earth they $eanK an! there are ti$es when $y hea! Tuite swi$s with the conte$plation of the$% -8C*2TE-@ 1 see, $y !ear Theaetetus, that Theo!orus ha! a true insight

into your nature when he sai! that you were a philosopher, for won!er is the feeling of a philosopher, an! philosophy begins in won!er% ,e was not a ba! genealogist who sai! that 1ris Athe $essenger of hea enB is the chil! of Thau$as Awon!erB% +ut !o you begin to see what is the explanation of this perplexity on the hypothesis which we attribute to ProtagorasR T,E2ETET:-@ 9ot as yet% -8C*2TE-@ Then you will be oblige! to $e if 1 help you to unearth the hi!!en LtruthL of a fa$ous $an or school% T,E2ETET:-@ To be sure, 1 shall be ery $uch oblige!% -8C*2TE-@ Ta"e a loo" roun!, then, an! see that none of the uninitiate! are listening% 9ow by the uninitiate! 1 $ean the people who belie e in nothing but what they can grasp in their han!s, an! who will not allow that action or generation or anything in isible can ha e real existence% T,E2ETET:-@ Pes, in!ee!, -ocrates, they are ery har! an! i$penetrable $ortals% -8C*2TE-@ Pes, $y boy, outer barbarians% (ar $ore ingenious are the brethren whose $ysteries 1 a$ about to re eal to you% Their first principle is, that all is $otion, an! upon this all the affections of which we were just now spea"ing are suppose! to !epen!@ there is nothing but $otion, which has two for$s, one acti e an! the other passi e, both in en!less nu$berK an! out of the union an! friction of the$ there is generate! a progeny en!less in nu$ber, ha ing two for$s, sense an! the object of sense, which are e er brea"ing forth an! co$ing to the birth at the sa$e $o$ent% The senses are ariously na$e! hearing, seeing, s$ellingK there is the sense of heat, col!, pleasure, pain, !esire, fear, an! $any $ore which ha e na$es, as well as innu$erable others which are without the$K each has its "in!re! object,DDeach ariety of colour has a correspon!ing ariety of sight, an! so with soun! an! hearing, an! with the rest of the senses an! the objects a"in to the$% 'o you see, Theaetetus, the bearings of this tale on the prece!ing argu$entR T,E2ETET:-@ 1n!ee! 1 !o not%

-8C*2TE-@ Then atten!, an! 1 will try to finish the story% The purport is that all these things are in $otion, as 1 was saying, an! that this $otion is of two "in!s, a slower an! a Tuic"erK an! the slower ele$ents ha e their $otions in the sa$e place an! with reference to things near the$, an! so they begetK but what is begotten is swifter, for it is carrie! to fro, an! $o es fro$ place to place% 2pply this to sense@DD&hen the eye an! the appropriate object $eet together an! gi e birth to whiteness an! the sensation connatural with it, which coul! not ha e been gi en by either of the$ going elsewhere, then, while the sight is flowing fro$ the eye, whiteness procee!s fro$ the object which co$bines in pro!ucing the colourK an! so the eye is fulfille! with sight, an! really sees, an! beco$es, not sight, but a seeing eyeK an! the object which co$bine! to for$ the colour is fulfille! with whiteness, an! beco$es not whiteness but a white thing, whether woo! or stone or whate er the object $ay be which happens to be coloure! white% 2n! this is true of all sensible objects, har!, war$, an! the li"e, which are si$ilarly to be regar!e!, as 1 was saying before, not as ha ing any absolute existence, but as being all of the$ of whate er "in! generate! by $otion in their intercourse with one anotherK for of the agent an! patient, as existing in separation, no trustworthy conception, as they say, can be for$e!, for the agent has no existence until unite! with the patient, an! the patient has no existence until unite! with the agentK an! that which by uniting with so$ething beco$es an agent, by $eeting with so$e other thing is con erte! into a patient% 2n! fro$ all these consi!erations, as 1 sai! at first, there arises a general reflection, that there is no one selfDexistent thing, but e erything is beco$ing an! in relationK an! being $ust be altogether abolishe!, although fro$ habit an! ignorance we are co$pelle! e en in this !iscussion to retain the use of the ter$% +ut great philosophers tell us that we are not to allow either the wor! Lso$ething,L or Lbelonging to so$ething,L or Lto $e,L or Lthis,L or Lthat,L or any other !etaining na$e to be use!, in the language of nature all things are being create! an! !estroye!, co$ing into being an! passing into new for$sK nor can any na$e fix or !etain the$K he who atte$pts to fix the$ is easily refute!% 2n! this shoul! be the way of spea"ing, not only of particulars but of aggregatesK such aggregates as are expresse! in the wor! L$an,L or Lstone,L or any na$e of an ani$al or of a class% 8 Theaetetus, are not these speculations sweet as honeyR 2n! !o you not li"e the taste of the$ in the $outhR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 !o not "now what to say, -ocratesK for, in!ee!, 1 cannot

$a"e out whether you are gi ing your own opinion or only wanting to !raw $e out% -8C*2TE-@ Pou forget, $y frien!, that 1 neither "now, nor profess to "now, anything of these $attersK you are the person who is in labour, 1 a$ the barren $i!wifeK an! this is why 1 soothe you, an! offer you one goo! thing after another, that you $ay taste the$% 2n! 1 hope that 1 $ay at last help to bring your own opinion into the light of !ay@ when this has been acco$plishe!, then we will !eter$ine whether what you ha e brought forth is only a win!Degg or a real an! genuine birth% Therefore, "eep up your spirits, an! answer li"e a $an what you thin"% T,E2ETET:-@ 2s" $e% -8C*2TE-@ Then once $ore@ 1s it your opinion that nothing is but what beco$esRDDthe goo! an! the noble, as well as all the other things which we were just now $entioningR T,E2ETET:-@ &hen 1 hear you !iscoursing in this style, 1 thin" that there is a great !eal in what you say, an! 1 a$ ery rea!y to assent% -8C*2TE-@ <et us not lea e the argu$ent unfinishe!, thenK for there still re$ains to be consi!ere! an objection which $ay be raise! about !rea$s an! !iseases, in particular about $a!ness, an! the arious illusions of hearing an! sight, or of other senses% (or you "now that in all these cases the esseDpercipi theory appears to be un$ista"ably refute!, since in !rea$s an! illusions we certainly ha e false perceptionsK an! far fro$ saying that e erything is which appears, we shoul! rather say that nothing is which appears% T,E2ETET:-@ )ery true, -ocrates% -8C*2TE-@ +ut then, $y boy, how can any one conten! that "nowle!ge is perception, or that to e ery $an what appears isR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 a$ afrai! to say, -ocrates, that 1 ha e nothing to answer,

because you rebu"e! $e just now for $a"ing this excuseK but 1 certainly cannot un!erta"e to argue that $a!$en or !rea$ers thin" truly, when they i$agine, so$e of the$ that they are go!s, an! others that they can fly, an! are flying in their sleep% -8C*2TE-@ 'o you see another Tuestion which can be raise! about these pheno$ena, notably about !rea$ing an! wa"ingR T,E2ETET:-@ &hat TuestionR -8C*2TE-@ 2 Tuestion which 1 thin" that you $ust often ha e hear! persons as"@DD,ow can you !eter$ine whether at this $o$ent we are sleeping, an! all our thoughts are a !rea$K or whether we are awa"e, an! tal"ing to one another in the wa"ing stateR T,E2ETET:-@ 1n!ee!, -ocrates, 1 !o not "now how to pro e the one any $ore than the other, for in both cases the facts precisely correspon!KDDan! there is no !ifficulty in supposing that !uring all this !iscussion we ha e been tal"ing to one another in a !rea$K an! when in a !rea$ we see$ to be narrating !rea$s, the rese$blance of the two states is Tuite astonishing% -8C*2TE-@ Pou see, then, that a !oubt about the reality of sense is easily raise!, since there $ay e en be a !oubt whether we are awa"e or in a !rea$% 2n! as our ti$e is eTually !i i!e! between sleeping an! wa"ing, in either sphere of existence the soul conten!s that the thoughts which are present to our $in!s at the ti$e are trueK an! !uring one half of our li es we affir$ the truth of the one, an!, !uring the other half, of the otherK an! are eTually confi!ent of both% T,E2ETET:-@ ;ost true% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! $ay not the sa$e be sai! of $a!ness an! other !isor!ersR the !ifference is only that the ti$es are not eTual% T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly%

-8C*2TE-@ 2n! is truth or falsehoo! to be !eter$ine! by !uration of ti$eR T,E2ETET:-@ That woul! be in $any ways ri!iculous% -8C*2TE-@ +ut can you certainly !eter$ine by any other $eans which of these opinions is trueR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 !o not thin" that 1 can% -8C*2TE-@ <isten, then, to a state$ent of the other si!e of the argu$ent, which is $a!e by the cha$pions of appearance% They woul! say, as 1 i$agineDDCan that which is wholly other than so$ething, ha e the sa$e Tuality as that fro$ which it !iffersR an! obser e, Theaetetus, that the wor! LotherL $eans not Lpartially,L but Lwholly other%L T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly, putting the Tuestion as you !o, that which is wholly other cannot either potentially or in any other way be the sa$e% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! $ust therefore be a!$itte! to be unli"eR T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ 1f, then, anything happens to beco$e li"e or unli"e itself or another, when it beco$es li"e we call it the sa$eDDwhen unli"e, otherR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ &ere we not saying that there are agents $any an! infinite, an! patients $any an! infiniteR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! also that !ifferent co$binations will pro!uce results which are not the sa$e, but !ifferentR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly%

-8C*2TE-@ <et us ta"e you an! $e, or anything as an exa$ple@DDThere is -ocrates in health, an! -ocrates sic"DD2re they li"e or unli"eR T,E2ETET:-@ Pou $ean to co$pare -ocrates in health as a whole, an! -ocrates in sic"ness as a wholeR -8C*2TE-@ ExactlyK that is $y $eaning% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 answer, they are unli"e% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! if unli"e, they are otherR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! woul! you not say the sa$e of -ocrates sleeping an! wa"ing, or in any of the states which we were $entioningR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 shoul!% -8C*2TE-@ 2ll agents ha e a !ifferent patient in -ocrates, accor!ingly as he is well or ill% T,E2ETET:-@ 8f course% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! 1 who a$ the patient, an! that which is the agent, will pro!uce so$ething !ifferent in each of the two casesR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ The wine which 1 !rin" when 1 a$ in health, appears sweet an! pleasant to $eR T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ (or, as has been alrea!y ac"nowle!ge!, the patient an! agent $eet together an! pro!uce sweetness an! a perception of sweetness, which are in si$ultaneous $otion, an! the perception which co$es fro$ the patient

$a"es the tongue percipient, an! the Tuality of sweetness which arises out of an! is $o ing about the wine, $a"es the wine both to be an! to appear sweet to the healthy tongue% T,E2ETET:-@ CertainlyK that has been alrea!y ac"nowle!ge!% -8C*2TE-@ +ut when 1 a$ sic", the wine really acts upon another an! a !ifferent personR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ The co$bination of the !raught of wine, an! the -ocrates who is sic", pro!uces Tuite another resultK which is the sensation of bitterness in the tongue, an! the $otion an! creation of bitterness in an! about the wine, which beco$es not bitterness but so$ething bitterK as 1 $yself beco$e not perception but percipientR T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ There is no other object of which 1 shall e er ha e the sa$e perception, for another object woul! gi e another perception, an! woul! $a"e the percipient other an! !ifferentK nor can that object which affects $e, $eeting another subject, pro!uce the sa$e, or beco$e si$ilar, for that too woul! pro!uce another result fro$ another subject, an! beco$e !ifferent% T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ 9either can 1 by $yself, ha e this sensation, nor the object by itself, this Tuality% T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly not% -8C*2TE-@ &hen 1 percei e 1 $ust beco$e percipient of so$ethingDD there can be no such thing as percei ing an! percei ing nothingK the object, whether it beco$e sweet, bitter, or of any other Tuality, $ust ha e relation to a percipientK nothing can beco$e sweet which is sweet to no one%

T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly not% -8C*2TE-@ Then the inference is, that we Athe agent an! patientB are or beco$e in relation to one anotherK there is a law which bin!s us one to the other, but not to any other existence, nor each of us to hi$selfK an! therefore we can only be boun! to one anotherK so that whether a person says that a thing is or beco$es, he $ust say that it is or beco$es to or of or in relation to so$ething elseK but he $ust not say or allow any one else to say that anything is or beco$es absolutely@DDsuch is our conclusion% T,E2ETET:-@ )ery true, -ocrates% -8C*2TE-@ Then, if that which acts upon $e has relation to $e an! to no other, 1 an! no other a$ the percipient of itR T,E2ETET:-@ 8f course% -8C*2TE-@ Then $y perception is true to $e, being inseparable fro$ $y own beingK an!, as Protagoras says, to $yself 1 a$ ju!ge of what is an! what is not to $e% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 suppose so% -8C*2TE-@ ,ow then, if 1 ne er err, an! if $y $in! ne er trips in the conception of being or beco$ing, can 1 fail of "nowing that which 1 percei eR T,E2ETET:-@ Pou cannot% -8C*2TE-@ Then you were Tuite right in affir$ing that "nowle!ge is only perceptionK an! the $eaning turns out to be the sa$e, whether with ,o$er an! ,eracleitus, an! all that co$pany, you say that all is $otion an! flux, or with the great sage Protagoras, that $an is the $easure of all thingsK or with Theaetetus, that, gi en these pre$ises, perception is "nowle!ge% 2$ 1 not right, Theaetetus, an! is not this your newDborn chil!, of which 1 ha e !eli ere! youR &hat say youR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 cannot but agree, -ocrates%

-8C*2TE-@ Then this is the chil!, howe er he $ay turn out, which you an! 1 ha e with !ifficulty brought into the worl!% 2n! now that he is born, we $ust run roun! the hearth with hi$, an! see whether he is worth rearing, or is only a win!Degg an! a sha$% 1s he to be reare! in any case, an! not expose!R or will you bear to see hi$ rejecte!, an! not get into a passion if 1 ta"e away your firstDbornR T,E8'8*:-@ Theaetetus will not be angry, for he is ery goo!Dnature!% +ut tell $e, -ocrates, in hea enLs na$e, is this, after all, not the truthR -8C*2TE-@ Pou, Theo!orus, are a lo er of theories, an! now you innocently fancy that 1 a$ a bag full of the$, an! can easily pull one out which will o erthrow its pre!ecessor% +ut you !o not see that in reality none of these theories co$e fro$ $eK they all co$e fro$ hi$ who tal"s with $e% 1 only "now just enough to extract the$ fro$ the wis!o$ of another, an! to recei e the$ in a spirit of fairness% 2n! now 1 shall say nothing $yself, but shall en!ea our to elicit so$ething fro$ our young frien!% T,E8'8*:-@ 'o as you say, -ocratesK you are Tuite right% -8C*2TE-@ -hall 1 tell you, Theo!orus, what a$a7es $e in your acTuaintance ProtagorasR T,E8'8*:-@ &hat is itR -8C*2TE-@ 1 a$ char$e! with his !octrine, that what appears is to each one, but 1 won!er that he !i! not begin his boo" on Truth with a !eclaration that a pig or a !ogDface! baboon, or so$e other yet stranger $onster which has sensation, is the $easure of all thingsK then he $ight ha e shown a $agnificent conte$pt for our opinion of hi$ by infor$ing us at the outset that while we were re erencing hi$ li"e a Go! for his wis!o$ he was no better than a ta!pole, not to spea" of his fellowD$enDDwoul! not this ha e pro!uce! an o erpowering effectR (or if truth is only sensation, an! no $an can !iscern anotherLs feelings better than he, or has any superior right to !eter$ine whether his opinion is true or false, but each,

as we ha e se eral ti$es repeate!, is to hi$self the sole ju!ge, an! e erything that he ju!ges is true an! right, why, $y frien!, shoul! Protagoras be preferre! to the place of wis!o$ an! instruction, an! !eser e to be well pai!, an! we poor ignora$uses ha e to go to hi$, if each one is the $easure of his own wis!o$R ;ust he not be tal"ing La! captan!u$L in all thisR 1 say nothing of the ri!iculous pre!ica$ent in which $y own $i!wifery an! the whole art of !ialectic is place!K for the atte$pt to super ise or refute the notions or opinions of others woul! be a te!ious an! enor$ous piece of folly, if to each $an his own are rightK an! this $ust be the case if ProtagorasL Truth is the real truth, an! the philosopher is not $erely a$using hi$self by gi ing oracles out of the shrine of his boo"% T,E8'8*:-@ ,e was a frien! of $ine, -ocrates, as you were saying, an! therefore 1 cannot ha e hi$ refute! by $y lips, nor can 1 oppose you when 1 agree with youK please, then, to ta"e Theaetetus againK he see$e! to answer ery nicely% -8C*2TE-@ 1f you were to go into a <ace!ae$onian palestra, Theo!orus, woul! you ha e a right to loo" on at the na"e! wrestlers, so$e of the$ $a"ing a poor figure, if you !i! not strip an! gi e the$ an opportunity of ju!ging of your own personR T,E8'8*:-@ &hy not, -ocrates, if they woul! allow $e, as 1 thin" you will, in consi!eration of $y age an! stiffnessK let so$e $ore supple youth try a fall with you, an! !o not !rag $e into the gy$nasiu$% -8C*2TE-@ Pour will is $y will, Theo!orus, as the pro erbial philosophers say, an! therefore 1 will return to the sage Theaetetus@ Tell $e, Theaetetus, in reference to what 1 was saying, are you not lost in won!er, li"e $yself, when you fin! that all of a su!!en you are raise! to the le el of the wisest of $en, or in!ee! of the go!sRDDfor you woul! assu$e the $easure of Protagoras to apply to the go!s as well as $enR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly 1 shoul!, an! 1 confess to you that 1 a$ lost in won!er% 2t first hearing, 1 was Tuite satisfie! with the !octrine, that whate er appears is to each one, but now the face of things has change!%

-8C*2TE-@ &hy, $y !ear boy, you are young, an! therefore your ear is Tuic"ly caught an! your $in! influence! by popular argu$ents% Protagoras, or so$e one spea"ing on his behalf, will !oubtless say in reply,DDGoo! people, young an! ol!, you $eet an! harangue, an! bring in the go!s, whose existence or nonDexistence 1 banish fro$ writing an! speech, or you tal" about the reason of $an being !egra!e! to the le el of the brutes, which is a telling argu$ent with the $ultitu!e, but not one wor! of proof or !e$onstration !o you offer% 2ll is probability with you, an! yet surely you an! Theo!orus ha! better reflect whether you are !ispose! to a!$it of probability an! figures of speech in $atters of such i$portance% ,e or any other $athe$atician who argue! fro$ probabilities an! li"elihoo!s in geo$etry, woul! not be worth an ace% T,E2ETET:-@ +ut neither you nor we, -ocrates, woul! be satisfie! with such argu$ents% -8C*2TE-@ Then you an! Theo!orus $ean to say that we $ust loo" at the $atter in so$e other wayR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes, in Tuite another way% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! the way will be to as" whether perception is or is not the sa$e as "nowle!geK for this was the real point of our argu$ent, an! with a iew to this we raise! A!i! we notRB those $any strange Tuestions% T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ -hall we say that we "now e ery thing which we see an! hearR for exa$ple, shall we say that not ha ing learne!, we !o not hear the language of foreigners when they spea" to usR or shall we say that we not only hear, but "now what they are sayingR 8r again, if we see letters which we !o not un!erstan!, shall we say that we !o not see the$R or shall we a er that, seeing the$, we $ust "now the$R T,E2ETET:-@ &e shall say, -ocrates, that we "now what we actually see an! hear of the$DDthat is to say, we see an! "now the figure an! colour of the letters, an! we hear an! "now the ele ation or !epression of the soun! of

the$K but we !o not percei e by sight an! hearing, or "now, that which gra$$arians an! interpreters teach about the$% -8C*2TE-@ Capital, TheaetetusK an! about this there shall be no !ispute, because 1 want you to growK but there is another !ifficulty co$ing, which you will also ha e to repulse% T,E2ETET:-@ &hat is itR -8C*2TE-@ -o$e one will say, Can a $an who has e er "nown anything, an! still has an! preser es a $e$ory of that which he "nows, not "now that which he re$e$bers at the ti$e when he re$e$bersR 1 ha e, 1 fear, a te!ious way of putting a si$ple Tuestion, which is only, whether a $an who has learne!, an! re$e$bers, can fail to "nowR T,E2ETET:-@ 1$possible, -ocratesK the supposition is $onstrous% -8C*2TE-@ 2$ 1 tal"ing nonsense, thenR Thin"@ is not seeing percei ing, an! is not sight perceptionR T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! if our recent !efinition hol!s, e ery $an "nows that which he has seenR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! you woul! a!$it that there is such a thing as $e$oryR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! is $e$ory of so$ething or of nothingR T,E2ETET:-@ 8f so$ething, surely% -8C*2TE-@ 8f things learne! an! percei e!, that isR

T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ 8ften a $an re$e$bers that which he has seenR T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! if he close! his eyes, woul! he forgetR T,E2ETET:-@ &ho, -ocrates, woul! !are to say soR -8C*2TE-@ +ut we $ust say so, if the pre ious argu$ent is to be $aintaine!% T,E2ETET:-@ &hat !o you $eanR 1 a$ not Tuite sure that 1 un!erstan! you, though 1 ha e a strong suspicion that you are right% -8C*2TE-@ 2s thus@ he who sees "nows, as we say, that which he seesK for perception an! sight an! "nowle!ge are a!$itte! to be the sa$e% T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ +ut he who saw, an! has "nowle!ge of that which he saw, re$e$bers, when he closes his eyes, that which he no longer sees% T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! seeing is "nowing, an! therefore notDseeing is notD "nowingR T,E2ETET:-@ )ery true% -8C*2TE-@ Then the inference is, that a $an $ay ha e attaine! the "nowle!ge of so$ething, which he $ay re$e$ber an! yet not "now, because he !oes not seeK an! this has been affir$e! by us to be a $onstrous supposition% T,E2ETET:-@ ;ost true%

-8C*2TE-@ Thus, then, the assertion that "nowle!ge an! perception are one, in ol es a $anifest i$possibilityR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ Then they $ust be !istinguishe!R T,E2ETET:-@ 1 suppose that they $ust% -8C*2TE-@ 8nce $ore we shall ha e to begin, an! as" L&hat is "nowle!geRL an! yet, Theaetetus, what are we going to !oR T,E2ETET:-@ 2bout whatR -8C*2TE-@ <i"e a goo!DforDnothing coc", without ha ing won the ictory, we wal" away fro$ the argu$ent an! crow% T,E2ETET:-@ ,ow !o you $eanR -8C*2TE-@ 2fter the $anner of !isputers A<ys%K Phae!oK *epublicB, we were satisfie! with $ere erbal consistency, an! were well please! if in this way we coul! gain an a! antage% 2lthough professing not to be $ere Eristics, but philosophers, 1 suspect that we ha e unconsciously fallen into the error of that ingenious class of persons% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 !o not as yet un!erstan! you% -8C*2TE-@ Then 1 will try to explain $yself@ just now we as"e! the Tuestion, whether a $an who ha! learne! an! re$e$bere! coul! fail to "now, an! we showe! that a person who ha! seen $ight re$e$ber when he ha! his eyes shut an! coul! not see, an! then he woul! at the sa$e ti$e re$e$ber an! not "now% +ut this was an i$possibility% 2n! so the Protagorean fable ca$e to nought, an! yours also, who $aintaine! that "nowle!ge is the sa$e as perception%

T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! yet, $y frien!, 1 rather suspect that the result woul! ha e been !ifferent if Protagoras, who was the father of the first of the two brats, ha! been ali eK he woul! ha e ha! a great !eal to say on their behalf% +ut he is !ea!, an! we insult o er his orphan chil!K an! e en the guar!ians who$ he left, an! of who$ our frien! Theo!orus is one, are unwilling to gi e any help, an! therefore 1 suppose that 1 $ust ta"e up his cause $yself, an! see justice !oneR T,E8'8*:-@ 9ot 1, -ocrates, but rather Callias, the son of ,ipponicus, is guar!ian of his orphans% 1 was too soon !i erte! fro$ the abstractions of !ialectic to geo$etry% 9e ertheless, 1 shall be grateful to you if you assist hi$% -8C*2TE-@ )ery goo!, Theo!orusK you shall see how 1 will co$e to the rescue% 1f a person !oes not atten! to the $eaning of ter$s as they are co$$only use! in argu$ent, he $ay be in ol e! e en in greater para!oxes than these% -hall 1 explain this $atter to you or to TheaetetusR T,E8'8*:-@ To both of us, an! let the younger answerK he will incur less !isgrace if he is !isco$fite!% -8C*2TE-@ Then now let $e as" the awful Tuestion, which is this@DDCan a $an "now an! also not "now that which he "nowsR T,E8'8*:-@ ,ow shall we answer, TheaetetusR T,E2ETET:-@ ,e cannot, 1 shoul! say% -8C*2TE-@ ,e can, if you $aintain that seeing is "nowing% &hen you are i$prisone! in a well, as the saying is, an! the selfDassure! a! ersary closes one of your eyes with his han!, an! as"s whether you can see his cloa" with the eye which he has close!, how will you answer the ine itable $anR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 shoul! answer, L9ot with that eye but with the other%L

-8C*2TE-@ Then you see an! !o not see the sa$e thing at the sa$e ti$e% T,E2ETET:-@ Pes, in a certain sense% -8C*2TE-@ 9one of that, he will replyK 1 !o not as" or bi! you answer in what sense you "now, but only whether you "now that which you !o not "now% Pou ha e been pro e! to see that which you !o not seeK an! you ha e alrea!y a!$itte! that seeing is "nowing, an! that notDseeing is notD"nowing@ 1 lea e you to !raw the inference% T,E2ETET:-@ PesK the inference is the contra!ictory of $y assertion% -8C*2TE-@ Pes, $y $ar el, an! there $ight ha e been yet worse things in store for you, if an opponent ha! gone on to as" whether you can ha e a sharp an! also a !ull "nowle!ge, an! whether you can "now near, but not at a !istance, or "now the sa$e thing with $ore or less intensity, an! so on without en!% -uch Tuestions $ight ha e been put to you by a lightDar$e! $ercenary, who argue! for pay% ,e woul! ha e lain in wait for you, an! when you too" up the position, that sense is "nowle!ge, he woul! ha e $a!e an assault upon hearing, s$elling, an! the other sensesKDDhe woul! ha e shown you no $ercyK an! while you were lost in en y an! a!$iration of his wis!o$, he woul! ha e got you into his net, out of which you woul! not ha e escape! until you ha! co$e to an un!erstan!ing about the su$ to be pai! for your release% &ell, you as", an! how will Protagoras reinforce his positionR -hall 1 answer for hi$R T,E2ETET:-@ +y all $eans% -8C*2TE-@ ,e will repeat all those things which we ha e been urging on his behalf, an! then he will close with us in !is!ain, an! say@DDThe worthy -ocrates as"e! a little boy, whether the sa$e $an coul! re$e$ber an! not "now the sa$e thing, an! the boy sai! 9o, because he was frightene!, an! coul! not see what was co$ing, an! then -ocrates $a!e fun of poor $e% The

truth is, 8 slatternly -ocrates, that when you as" Tuestions about any assertion of $ine, an! the person as"e! is foun! tripping, if he has answere! as 1 shoul! ha e answere!, then 1 a$ refute!, but if he answers so$ething else, then he is refute! an! not 1% (or !o you really suppose that any one woul! a!$it the $e$ory which a $an has of an i$pression which has passe! away to be the sa$e with that which he experience! at the ti$eR 2ssure!ly not% 8r woul! he hesitate to ac"nowle!ge that the sa$e $an $ay "now an! not "now the sa$e thingR 8r, if he is afrai! of $a"ing this a!$ission, woul! he e er grant that one who has beco$e unli"e is the sa$e as before he beca$e unli"eR 8r woul! he a!$it that a $an is one at all, an! not rather $any an! infinite as the changes which ta"e place in hi$R 1 spea" by the car! in or!er to a oi! entangle$ents of wor!s% +ut, 8 $y goo! sir, he will say, co$e to the argu$ent in a $ore generous spiritK an! either show, if you can, that our sensations are not relati e an! in!i i!ual, or, if you a!$it the$ to be so, pro e that this !oes not in ol e the conseTuence that the appearance beco$es, or, if you will ha e the wor!, is, to the in!i i!ual only% 2s to your tal" about pigs an! baboons, you are yourself beha ing li"e a pig, an! you teach your hearers to $a"e sport of $y writings in the sa$e ignorant $annerK but this is not to your cre!it% (or 1 !eclare that the truth is as 1 ha e written, an! that each of us is a $easure of existence an! of nonDexistence% Pet one $an $ay be a thousan! ti$es better than another in proportion as !ifferent things are an! appear to hi$% 2n! 1 a$ far fro$ saying that wis!o$ an! the wise $an ha e no existenceK but 1 say that the wise $an is he who $a"es the e ils which appear an! are to a $an, into goo!s which are an! appear to hi$% 2n! 1 woul! beg you not to press $y wor!s in the letter, but to ta"e the $eaning of the$ as 1 will explain the$% *e$e$ber what has been alrea!y sai!,DDthat to the sic" $an his foo! appears to be an! is bitter, an! to the $an in health the opposite of bitter% 9ow 1 cannot concei e that one of these $en can be or ought to be $a!e wiser than the other@ nor can you assert that the sic" $an because he has one i$pression is foolish, an! the healthy $an because he has another is wiseK but the one state reTuires to be change! into the other, the worse into the better% 2s in e!ucation, a change of state has to be effecte!, an! the sophist acco$plishes by wor!s the change which the physician wor"s by the ai! of !rugs% 9ot that any one e er $a!e another thin" truly, who pre iously thought falsely% (or no one can thin" what is not, or, thin" anything !ifferent fro$ that which he

feelsK an! this is always true% +ut as the inferior habit of $in! has thoughts of "in!re! nature, so 1 concei e that a goo! $in! causes $en to ha e goo! thoughtsK an! these which the inexperience! call true, 1 $aintain to be only better, an! not truer than others% 2n!, 8 $y !ear -ocrates, 1 !o not call wise $en ta!poles@ far fro$ itK 1 say that they are the physicians of the hu$an bo!y, an! the husban!$en of plantsDDfor the husban!$en also ta"e away the e il an! !isor!ere! sensations of plants, an! infuse into the$ goo! an! healthy sensationsDDaye an! true onesK an! the wise an! goo! rhetoricians $a"e the goo! instea! of the e il to see$ just to statesK for whate er appears to a state to be just an! fair, so long as it is regar!e! as such, is just an! fair to itK but the teacher of wis!o$ causes the goo! to ta"e the place of the e il, both in appearance an! in reality% 2n! in li"e $anner the -ophist who is able to train his pupils in this spirit is a wise $an, an! !eser es to be well pai! by the$% 2n! so one $an is wiser than anotherK an! no one thin"s falsely, an! you, whether you will or not, $ust en!ure to be a $easure% 8n these foun!ations the argu$ent stan!s fir$, which you, -ocrates, $ay, if you please, o erthrow by an opposite argu$ent, or if you li"e you $ay put Tuestions to $eDDa $etho! to which no intelligent person will object, Tuite the re erse% +ut 1 $ust beg you to put fair Tuestions@ for there is great inconsistency in saying that you ha e a 7eal for irtue, an! then always beha ing unfairly in argu$ent% The unfairness of which 1 co$plain is that you !o not !istinguish between $ere !isputation an! !ialectic@ the !isputer $ay trip up his opponent as often as he li"es, an! $a"e funK but the !ialectician will be in earnest, an! only correct his a! ersary when necessary, telling hi$ the errors into which he has fallen through his own fault, or that of the co$pany which he has pre iously "ept% 1f you !o so, your a! ersary will lay the bla$e of his own confusion an! perplexity on hi$self, an! not on you% ,e will follow an! lo e you, an! will hate hi$self, an! escape fro$ hi$self into philosophy, in or!er that he $ay beco$e !ifferent fro$ what he was% +ut the other $o!e of arguing, which is practise! by the $any, will ha e just the opposite effect upon hi$K an! as he grows ol!er, instea! of turning philosopher, he will co$e to hate philosophy% 1 woul! reco$$en! you, therefore, as 1 sai! before, not to encourage yourself in this pole$ical an! contro ersial te$per, but to fin! out, in a frien!ly an! congenial spirit, what we really $ean when we say that all things are in $otion, an! that to e ery in!i i!ual an! state what appears, is% 1n this $anner you will consi!er whether "nowle!ge an! sensation are the sa$e or !ifferent, but you will not argue, as you were just now !oing, fro$ the custo$ary use of na$es an! wor!s, which the ulgar per ert in all sorts of

ways, causing infinite perplexity to one another% -uch, Theo!orus, is the ery slight help which 1 a$ able to offer to your ol! frien!K ha! he been li ing, he woul! ha e helpe! hi$self in a far $ore gloriose style% T,E8'8*:-@ Pou are jesting, -ocratesK in!ee!, your !efence of hi$ has been $ost alorous% -8C*2TE-@ Than" you, frien!K an! 1 hope that you obser e! Protagoras bi!!ing us be serious, as the text, L;an is the $easure of all things,L was a sole$n oneK an! he reproache! us with $a"ing a boy the $e!iu$ of !iscourse, an! sai! that the boyLs ti$i!ity was $a!e to tell against his argu$entK he also !eclare! that we $a!e a jo"e of hi$% T,E8'8*:-@ ,ow coul! 1 fail to obser e all that, -ocratesR -8C*2TE-@ &ell, an! shall we !o as he saysR T,E8'8*:-@ +y all $eans% -8C*2TE-@ +ut if his wishes are to be regar!e!, you an! 1 $ust ta"e up the argu$ent, an! in all seriousness, an! as" an! answer one another, for you see that the rest of us are nothing but boys% 1n no other way can we escape the i$putation, that in our fresh analysis of his thesis we are $a"ing fun with boys% T,E8'8*:-@ &ell, but is not Theaetetus better able to follow a philosophical enTuiry than a great $any $en who ha e long bear!sR -8C*2TE-@ Pes, Theo!orus, but not better than youK an! therefore please not to i$agine that 1 a$ to !efen! by e ery $eans in $y power your !eparte! frien!K an! that you are to !efen! nothing an! nobo!y% 2t any rate, $y goo! $an, !o not sheer off until we "now whether you are a true $easure of !iagra$s, or whether all $en are eTually $easures an! sufficient for the$sel es in astrono$y an! geo$etry, an! the other branches of "nowle!ge in which you are suppose! to excel the$%

T,E8'8*:-@ ,e who is sitting by you, -ocrates, will not easily a oi! being !rawn into an argu$entK an! when 1 sai! just now that you woul! excuse $e, an! not, li"e the <ace!ae$onians, co$pel $e to strip an! fight, 1 was tal"ing nonsenseDD1 shoul! rather co$pare you to -cirrhon, who threw tra ellers fro$ the roc"sK for the <ace!ae$onian rule is Lstrip or !epart,L but you see$ to go about your wor" $ore after the fashion of 2ntaeus@ you will not allow any one who approaches you to !epart until you ha e strippe! hi$, an! he has been co$pelle! to try a fall with you in argu$ent% -8C*2TE-@ There, Theo!orus, you ha e hit off precisely the nature of $y co$plaintK but 1 a$ e en $ore pugnacious than the giants of ol!, for 1 ha e $et with no en! of heroesK $any a ,eracles, $any a Theseus, $ighty in wor!s, has bro"en $y hea!K ne ertheless 1 a$ always at this rough exercise, which inspires $e li"e a passion% Please, then, to try a fall with $e, whereby you will !o yourself goo! as well as $e% T,E8'8*:-@ 1 consentK lea! $e whither you will, for 1 "now that you are li"e !estinyK no $an can escape fro$ any argu$ent which you $ay wea e for hi$% +ut 1 a$ not !ispose! to go further than you suggest% -8C*2TE-@ 8nce will be enoughK an! now ta"e particular care that we !o not again unwittingly expose oursel es to the reproach of tal"ing chil!ishly% T,E8'8*:-@ 1 will !o $y best to a oi! that error% -8C*2TE-@ 1n the first place, let us return to our ol! objection, an! see whether we were right in bla$ing an! ta"ing offence at Protagoras on the groun! that he assu$e! all to be eTual an! sufficient in wis!o$K although he a!$itte! that there was a better an! worse, an! that in respect of this, so$e who as he sai! were the wise excelle! others% T,E8'8*:-@ )ery true% -8C*2TE-@ ,a! Protagoras been li ing an! answere! for hi$self, instea! of our answering for hi$, there woul! ha e been no nee! of our re iewing or

reinforcing the argu$ent% +ut as he is not here, an! so$e one $ay accuse us of spea"ing without authority on his behalf, ha! we not better co$e to a clearer agree$ent about his $eaning, for a great !eal $ay be at sta"eR T,E8'8*:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ Then let us obtain, not through any thir! person, but fro$ his own state$ent an! in the fewest wor!s possible, the basis of agree$ent% T,E8'8*:-@ 1n what wayR -8C*2TE-@ 1n this way@DD,is wor!s are, L&hat see$s to a $an, is to hi$%L T,E8'8*:-@ Pes, so he says% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! are not we, Protagoras, uttering the opinion of $an, or rather of all $an"in!, when we say that e ery one thin"s hi$self wiser than other $en in so$e things, an! their inferior in othersR 1n the hour of !anger, when they are in perils of war, or of the sea, or of sic"ness, !o they not loo" up to their co$$an!ers as if they were go!s, an! expect sal ation fro$ the$, only because they excel the$ in "nowle!geR 1s not the worl! full of $en in their se eral e$ploy$ents, who are loo"ing for teachers an! rulers of the$sel es an! of the ani$alsR an! there are plenty who thin" that they are able to teach an! able to rule% 9ow, in all this is i$plie! that ignorance an! wis!o$ exist a$ong the$, at least in their own opinion% T,E8'8*:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! wis!o$ is assu$e! by the$ to be true thought, an! ignorance to be false opinion% T,E8'8*:-@ Exactly% -8C*2TE-@ ,ow then, Protagoras, woul! you ha e us treat the argu$entR -hall we say that the opinions of $en are always true, or so$eti$es true an! so$eti$es falseR 1n either case, the result is the sa$e, an! their opinions are not always true, but so$eti$es true an! so$eti$es false% (or tell $e, Theo!orus, !o you suppose that you yourself, or any other follower

of Protagoras, woul! conten! that no one !ee$s another ignorant or $ista"en in his opinionR T,E8'8*:-@ The thing is incre!ible, -ocrates% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! yet that absur!ity is necessarily in ol e! in the thesis which !eclares $an to be the $easure of all things% T,E8'8*:-@ ,ow soR -8C*2TE-@ &hy, suppose that you !eter$ine in your own $in! so$ething to be true, an! !eclare your opinion to $eK let us assu$e, as he argues, that this is true to you% 9ow, if so, you $ust either say that the rest of us are not the ju!ges of this opinion or ju!g$ent of yours, or that we ju!ge you always to ha e a true opinionR +ut are there not thousan!s upon thousan!s who, whene er you for$ a ju!g$ent, ta"e up ar$s against you an! are of an opposite ju!g$ent an! opinion, !ee$ing that you ju!ge falselyR T,E8'8*:-@ Pes, in!ee!, -ocrates, thousan!s an! tens of thousan!s, as ,o$er says, who gi e $e a worl! of trouble% -8C*2TE-@ &ell, but are we to assert that what you thin" is true to you an! false to the ten thousan! othersR T,E8'8*:-@ 9o other inference see$s to be possible% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! how about Protagoras hi$selfR 1f neither he nor the $ultitu!e thought, as in!ee! they !o not thin", that $an is the $easure of all things, $ust it not follow that the truth of which Protagoras wrote woul! be true to no oneR +ut if you suppose that he hi$self thought this, an! that the $ultitu!e !oes not agree with hi$, you $ust begin by allowing that in whate er proportion the $any are $ore than one, in that proportion his truth is $ore untrue than true% T,E8'8*:-@ That woul! follow if the truth is suppose! to ary with in!i i!ual opinion%

-8C*2TE-@ 2n! the best of the jo"e is, that he ac"nowle!ges the truth of their opinion who belie e his own opinion to be falseK for he a!$its that the opinions of all $en are true% T,E8'8*:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! !oes he not allow that his own opinion is false, if he a!$its that the opinion of those who thin" hi$ false is trueR T,E8'8*:-@ 8f course% -8C*2TE-@ &hereas the other si!e !o not a!$it that they spea" falselyR T,E8'8*:-@ They !o not% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! he, as $ay be inferre! fro$ his writings, agrees that this opinion is also true% T,E8'8*:-@ Clearly% -8C*2TE-@ Then all $an"in!, beginning with Protagoras, will conten!, or rather, 1 shoul! say that he will allow, when he conce!es that his a! ersary has a true opinionDDProtagoras, 1 say, will hi$self allow that neither a !og nor any or!inary $an is the $easure of anything which he has not learne!DDa$ 1 not rightR T,E8'8*:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! the truth of Protagoras being !oubte! by all, will be true neither to hi$self to any one elseR T,E8'8*:-@ 1 thin", -ocrates, that we are running $y ol! frien! too har!% -8C*2TE-@ +ut 1 !o not "now that we are going beyon! the truth% 'oubtless, as he is ol!er, he $ay be expecte! to be wiser than we are% 2n! if he coul! only just get his hea! out of the worl! below, he woul! ha e o erthrown both of us again an! again, $e for tal"ing nonsense an! you for assenting to $e, an! ha e been off an! un!ergroun! in a trice% +ut as he is not within call, we $ust $a"e the best use of our own faculties, such as

they are, an! spea" out what appears to us to be true% 2n! one thing which no one will !eny is, that there are great !ifferences in the un!erstan!ings of $en% T,E8'8*:-@ 1n that opinion 1 Tuite agree% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! is there not $ost li"ely to be fir$ groun! in the !istinction which we were in!icating on behalf of Protagoras, i7% that $ost things, an! all i$$e!iate sensations, such as hot, !ry, sweet, are only such as they appearK if howe er !ifference of opinion is to be allowe! at all, surely we $ust allow it in respect of health or !iseaseR for e ery wo$an, chil!, or li ing creature has not such a "nowle!ge of what con!uces to health as to enable the$ to cure the$sel es% T,E8'8*:-@ 1 Tuite agree% -8C*2TE-@ 8r again, in politics, while affir$ing that just an! unjust, honourable an! !isgraceful, holy an! unholy, are in reality to each state such as the state thin"s an! $a"es lawful, an! that in !eter$ining these $atters no in!i i!ual or state is wiser than another, still the followers of Protagoras will not !eny that in !eter$ining what is or is not expe!ient for the co$$unity one state is wiser an! one counsellor better than anotherDDthey will scarcely enture to $aintain, that what a city enacts in the belief that it is expe!ient will always be really expe!ient% +ut in the other case, 1 $ean when they spea" of justice an! injustice, piety an! i$piety, they are confi!ent that in nature these ha e no existence or essence of their ownDDthe truth is that which is agree! on at the ti$e of the agree$ent, an! as long as the agree$ent lastsK an! this is the philosophy of $any who !o not altogether go along with Protagoras% ,ere arises a new Tuestion, Theo!orus, which threatens to be $ore serious than the last% T,E8'8*:-@ &ell, -ocrates, we ha e plenty of leisure% -8C*2TE-@ That is true, an! your re$ar" recalls to $y $in! an obser ation which 1 ha e often $a!e, that those who ha e passe! their !ays in the pursuit of philosophy are ri!iculously at fault when they ha e to appear an! spea" in court% ,ow natural is this#

T,E8'8*:-@ &hat !o you $eanR -8C*2TE-@ 1 $ean to say, that those who ha e been traine! in philosophy an! liberal pursuits are as unli"e those who fro$ their youth upwar!s ha e been "noc"ing about in the courts an! such places, as a free$an is in bree!ing unli"e a sla e% T,E8'8*:-@ 1n what is the !ifference seenR -8C*2TE-@ 1n the leisure spo"en of by you, which a free$an can always co$$an!@ he has his tal" out in peace, an!, li"e oursel es, he wan!ers at will fro$ one subject to another, an! fro$ a secon! to a thir!,DDif the fancy ta"es hi$, he begins again, as we are !oing now, caring not whether his wor!s are $any or fewK his only ai$ is to attain the truth% +ut the lawyer is always in a hurryK there is the water of the clepsy!ra !ri ing hi$ on, an! not allowing hi$ to expatiate at will@ an! there is his a! ersary stan!ing o er hi$, enforcing his rightsK the in!ict$ent, which in their phraseology is ter$e! the affi!a it, is recite! at the ti$e@ an! fro$ this he $ust not !e iate% ,e is a ser ant, an! is continually !isputing about a fellowDser ant before his $aster, who is seate!, an! has the cause in his han!sK the trial is ne er about so$e in!ifferent $atter, but always concerns hi$selfK an! often the race is for his life% The conseTuence has been, that he has beco$e "een an! shrew!K he has learne! how to flatter his $aster in wor! an! in!ulge hi$ in !ee!K but his soul is s$all an! unrighteous% ,is con!ition, which has been that of a sla e fro$ his youth upwar!s, has !epri e! hi$ of growth an! uprightness an! in!epen!enceK !angers an! fears, which were too $uch for his truth an! honesty, ca$e upon hi$ in early years, when the ten!erness of youth was uneTual to the$, an! he has been !ri en into croo"e! waysK fro$ the first he has practise! !eception an! retaliation, an! has beco$e stunte! an! warpe!% 2n! so he has passe! out of youth into $anhoo!, ha ing no soun!ness in hi$K an! is now, as he thin"s, a $aster in wis!o$% -uch is the lawyer, Theo!orus% &ill you ha e the co$panion picture of the philosopher, who is of our brotherhoo!K or shall we return to the argu$entR 'o not let us abuse the free!o$ of !igression which we clai$% T,E8'8*:-@ 9ay, -ocrates, not until we ha e finishe! what we are aboutK for you truly sai! that we belong to a brotherhoo! which is free, an! are not the ser ants of the argu$entK but the argu$ent is our ser ant, an! $ust

wait our leisure% &ho is our ju!geR 8r where is the spectator ha ing any right to censure or control us, as he $ight the poetsR -8C*2TE-@ Then, as this is your wish, 1 will !escribe the lea!ersK for there is no use in tal"ing about the inferior sort% 1n the first place, the lor!s of philosophy ha e ne er, fro$ their youth upwar!s, "nown their way to the 2gora, or the !icastery, or the council, or any other political asse$blyK they neither see nor hear the laws or !ecrees, as they are calle!, of the state written or recite!K the eagerness of political societies in the attain$ent of officesDDclubs, an! banTuets, an! re els, an! singingD$ai!ens,DD!o not enter e en into their !rea$s% &hether any e ent has turne! out well or ill in the city, what !isgrace $ay ha e !escen!e! to any one fro$ his ancestors, $ale or fe$ale, are $atters of which the philosopher no $ore "nows than he can tell, as they say, how $any pints are containe! in the ocean% 9either is he conscious of his ignorance% (or he !oes not hol! aloof in or!er that he $ay gain a reputationK but the truth is, that the outer for$ of hi$ only is in the city@ his $in!, !is!aining the littlenesses an! nothingnesses of hu$an things, is Lflying all abroa!L as Pin!ar says, $easuring earth an! hea en an! the things which are un!er an! on the earth an! abo e the hea en, interrogating the whole nature of each an! all in their entirety, but not con!escen!ing to anything which is within reach% T,E8'8*:-@ &hat !o you $ean, -ocratesR -8C*2TE-@ 1 will illustrate $y $eaning, Theo!orus, by the jest which the cle er witty Thracian han!$ai! is sai! to ha e $a!e about Thales, when he fell into a well as he was loo"ing up at the stars% -he sai!, that he was so eager to "now what was going on in hea en, that he coul! not see what was before his feet% This is a jest which is eTually applicable to all philosophers% (or the philosopher is wholly unacTuainte! with his nextD !oor neighbourK he is ignorant, not only of what he is !oing, but he har!ly "nows whether he is a $an or an ani$alK he is searching into the essence of $an, an! busy in enTuiring what belongs to such a nature to !o or suffer !ifferent fro$ any otherKDD1 thin" that you un!erstan! $e, Theo!orusR T,E8'8*:-@ 1 !o, an! what you say is true% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! thus, $y frien!, on e ery occasion, pri ate as well as

public, as 1 sai! at first, when he appears in a lawDcourt, or in any place in which he has to spea" of things which are at his feet an! before his eyes, he is the jest, not only of Thracian han!$ai!s but of the general her!, tu$bling into wells an! e ery sort of !isaster through his inexperience% ,is aw"war!ness is fearful, an! gi es the i$pression of i$becility% &hen he is re ile!, he has nothing personal to say in answer to the ci ilities of his a! ersaries, for he "nows no scan!als of any one, an! they !o not interest hi$K an! therefore he is laughe! at for his sheepishnessK an! when others are being praise! an! glorifie!, in the si$plicity of his heart he cannot help going into fits of laughter, so that he see$s to be a !ownright i!iot% &hen he hears a tyrant or "ing eulogi7e!, he fancies that he is listening to the praises of so$e "eeper of cattleDDa swineher!, or shepher!, or perhaps a cowher!, who is congratulate! on the Tuantity of $il" which he sTuee7es fro$ the$K an! he re$ar"s that the creature who$ they ten!, an! out of who$ they sTuee7e the wealth, is of a less tractable an! $ore insi!ious nature% Then, again, he obser es that the great $an is of necessity as illD$annere! an! une!ucate! as any shepher!DDfor he has no leisure, an! he is surroun!e! by a wall, which is his $ountainDpen% ,earing of enor$ous lan!e! proprietors of ten thousan! acres an! $ore, our philosopher !ee$s this to be a trifle, because he has been accusto$e! to thin" of the whole earthK an! when they sing the praises of fa$ily, an! say that so$e one is a gentle$an because he can show se en generations of wealthy ancestors, he thin"s that their senti$ents only betray a !ull an! narrow ision in those who utter the$, an! who are not e!ucate! enough to loo" at the whole, nor to consi!er that e ery $an has ha! thousan!s an! ten thousan!s of progenitors, an! a$ong the$ ha e been rich an! poor, "ings an! sla es, ,ellenes an! barbarians, innu$erable% 2n! when people pri!e the$sel es on ha ing a pe!igree of twentyDfi e ancestors, which goes bac" to ,eracles, the son of 2$phitryon, he cannot un!erstan! their po erty of i!eas% &hy are they unable to calculate that 2$phitryon ha! a twentyDfifth ancestor, who $ight ha e been anybo!y, an! was such as fortune $a!e hi$, an! he ha! a fiftieth, an! so onR ,e a$uses hi$self with the notion that they cannot count, an! thin"s that a little arith$etic woul! ha e got ri! of their senseless anity% 9ow, in all these cases our philosopher is !eri!e! by the ulgar, partly because he is thought to !espise the$, an! also because he is ignorant of what is before hi$, an! always at a loss% T,E8'8*:-@ That is ery true, -ocrates%

-8C*2TE-@ +ut, 8 $y frien!, when he !raws the other into upper air, an! gets hi$ out of his pleas an! rejoin!ers into the conte$plation of justice an! injustice in their own nature an! in their !ifference fro$ one another an! fro$ all other thingsK or fro$ the co$$onplaces about the happiness of a "ing or of a rich $an to the consi!eration of go ern$ent, an! of hu$an happiness an! $isery in generalDDwhat they are, an! how a $an is to attain the one an! a oi! the otherDDwhen that narrow, "een, little legal $in! is calle! to account about all this, he gi es the philosopher his re engeK for !i77ie! by the height at which he is hanging, whence he loo"s !own into space, which is a strange experience to hi$, he being !is$aye!, an! lost, an! sta$$ering bro"en wor!s, is laughe! at, not by Thracian han!$ai!ens or any other une!ucate! persons, for they ha e no eye for the situation, but by e ery $an who has not been brought up a sla e% -uch are the two characters, Theo!orus@ the one of the free$an, who has been traine! in liberty an! leisure, who$ you call the philosopher,DDhi$ we cannot bla$e because he appears si$ple an! of no account when he has to perfor$ so$e $enial tas", such as pac"ing up be!Dclothes, or fla ouring a sauce or fawning speechK the other character is that of the $an who is able to !o all this "in! of ser ice s$artly an! neatly, but "nows not how to wear his cloa" li"e a gentle$anK still less with the $usic of !iscourse can he hy$n the true life aright which is li e! by i$$ortals or $en blesse! of hea en% T,E8'8*:-@ 1f you coul! only persua!e e erybo!y, -ocrates, as you !o $e, of the truth of your wor!s, there woul! be $ore peace an! fewer e ils a$ong $en% -8C*2TE-@ E ils, Theo!orus, can ne er pass awayK for there $ust always re$ain so$ething which is antagonistic to goo!% ,a ing no place a$ong the go!s in hea en, of necessity they ho er aroun! the $ortal nature, an! this earthly sphere% &herefore we ought to fly away fro$ earth to hea en as Tuic"ly as we canK an! to fly away is to beco$e li"e Go!, as far as this is possibleK an! to beco$e li"e hi$, is to beco$e holy, just, an! wise% +ut, 8 $y frien!, you cannot easily con ince $an"in! that they shoul! pursue irtue or a oi! ice, not $erely in or!er that a $an $ay see$ to be goo!, which is the reason gi en by the worl!, an! in $y ju!g$ent is only a repetition of an ol! wi esL fable% &hereas, the truth is that Go! is ne er

in any way unrighteousDDhe is perfect righteousnessK an! he of us who is the $ost righteous is $ost li"e hi$% ,erein is seen the true cle erness of a $an, an! also his nothingness an! want of $anhoo!% (or to "now this is true wis!o$ an! irtue, an! ignorance of this is $anifest folly an! ice% 2ll other "in!s of wis!o$ or cle erness, which see$ only, such as the wis!o$ of politicians, or the wis!o$ of the arts, are coarse an! ulgar% The unrighteous $an, or the sayer an! !oer of unholy things, ha! far better not be encourage! in the illusion that his roguery is cle erK for $en glory in their sha$eDDthey fancy that they hear others saying of the$, LThese are not $ere goo!DforDnothing persons, $ere bur!ens of the earth, but such as $en shoul! be who $ean to !well safely in a state%L <et us tell the$ that they are all the $ore truly what they !o not thin" they are because they !o not "now itK for they !o not "now the penalty of injustice, which abo e all things they ought to "nowDDnot stripes an! !eath, as they suppose, which e ilD!oers often escape, but a penalty which cannot be escape!% T,E8'8*:-@ &hat is thatR -8C*2TE-@ There are two patterns eternally set before the$K the one blesse! an! !i ine, the other go!less an! wretche!@ but they !o not see the$, or percei e that in their utter folly an! infatuation they are growing li"e the one an! unli"e the other, by reason of their e il !ee!sK an! the penalty is, that they lea! a life answering to the pattern which they are growing li"e% 2n! if we tell the$, that unless they !epart fro$ their cunning, the place of innocence will not recei e the$ after !eathK an! that here on earth, they will li e e er in the li"eness of their own e il sel es, an! with e il frien!sDDwhen they hear this they in their superior cunning will see$ to be listening to the tal" of i!iots% T,E8'8*:-@ )ery true, -ocrates% -8C*2TE-@ Too true, $y frien!, as 1 well "nowK there is, howe er, one peculiarity in their case@ when they begin to reason in pri ate about their !isli"e of philosophy, if they ha e the courage to hear the argu$ent out, an! !o not run away, they grow at last strangely !iscontente! with the$sel esK their rhetoric fa!es away, an! they beco$e helpless as chil!ren% These howe er are !igressions fro$ which we $ust now !esist, or they will o erflow, an! !rown the original argu$entK to which, if you please, we will now return%

T,E8'8*:-@ (or $y part, -ocrates, 1 woul! rather ha e the !igressions, for at $y age 1 fin! the$ easier to followK but if you wish, let us go bac" to the argu$ent% -8C*2TE-@ ,a! we not reache! the point at which the partisans of the perpetual flux, who say that things are as they see$ to each one, were confi!ently $aintaining that the or!inances which the state co$$an!e! an! thought just, were just to the state which i$pose! the$, while they were in forceK this was especially asserte! of justiceK but as to the goo!, no one ha! any longer the har!ihoo! to conten! of any or!inances which the state thought an! enacte! to be goo! that these, while they were in force, were really goo!KDDhe who sai! so woul! be playing with the na$e Lgoo!,L an! woul! not touch the real TuestionDDit woul! be a $oc"ery, woul! it notR T,E8'8*:-@ Certainly it woul!% -8C*2TE-@ ,e ought not to spea" of the na$e, but of the thing which is conte$plate! un!er the na$e% T,E8'8*:-@ *ight% -8C*2TE-@ &hate er be the ter$ use!, the goo! or expe!ient is the ai$ of legislation, an! as far as she has an opinion, the state i$poses all laws with a iew to the greatest expe!iencyK can legislation ha e any other ai$R T,E8'8*:-@ Certainly not% -8C*2TE-@ +ut is the ai$ attaine! alwaysR !o not $ista"es often happenR T,E8'8*:-@ Pes, 1 thin" that there are $ista"es% -8C*2TE-@ The possibility of error will be $ore !istinctly recognise!, if we put the Tuestion in reference to the whole class un!er which the goo! or expe!ient falls% That whole class has to !o with the future, an! laws are passe! un!er the i!ea that they will be useful in afterDti$eK which, in other wor!s, is the future% T,E8'8*:-@ )ery true%

-8C*2TE-@ -uppose now, that we as" Protagoras, or one of his !isciples, a Tuestion@DD8, Protagoras, we will say to hi$, ;an is, as you !eclare, the $easure of all thingsDDwhite, hea y, light@ of all such things he is the ju!geK for he has the criterion of the$ in hi$self, an! when he thin"s that things are such as he experiences the$ to be, he thin"s what is an! is true to hi$self% 1s it not soR T,E8'8*:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! !o you exten! your !octrine, Protagoras Aas we shall further sayB, to the future as well as to the presentK an! has he the criterion not only of what in his opinion is but of what will be, an! !o things always happen to hi$ as he expecte!R (or exa$ple, ta"e the case of heat@DD&hen an or!inary $an thin"s that he is going to ha e a fe er, an! that this "in! of heat is co$ing on, an! another person, who is a physician, thin"s the contrary, whose opinion is li"ely to pro e rightR 8r are they both rightR DDhe will ha e a heat an! fe er in his own ju!g$ent, an! not ha e a fe er in the physicianLs ju!g$entR T,E8'8*:-@ ,ow lu!icrous# -8C*2TE-@ 2n! the inegrower, if 1 a$ not $ista"en, is a better ju!ge of the sweetness or !ryness of the intage which is not yet gathere! than the harpDplayerR T,E8'8*:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! in $usical co$position the $usician will "now better than the training $aster what the training $aster hi$self will hereafter thin" har$onious or the re erseR T,E8'8*:-@ 8f course% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! the coo" will be a better ju!ge than the guest, who is not a

coo", of the pleasure to be !eri e! fro$ the !inner which is in preparationK for of present or past pleasure we are not as yet arguingK but can we say that e ery one will be to hi$self the best ju!ge of the pleasure which will see$ to be an! will be to hi$ in the futureRDDnay, woul! not you, Protagoras, better guess which argu$ents in a court woul! con ince any one of us than the or!inary $anR T,E8'8*:-@ Certainly, -ocrates, he use! to profess in the strongest $anner that he was the superior of all $en in this respect% -8C*2TE-@ To be sure, frien!@ who woul! ha e pai! a large su$ for the pri ilege of tal"ing to hi$, if he ha! really persua!e! his isitors that neither a prophet nor any other $an was better able to ju!ge what will be an! see$ to be in the future than e ery one coul! for hi$selfR T,E8'8*:-@ &ho in!ee!R -8C*2TE-@ 2n! legislation an! expe!iency are all concerne! with the futureK an! e ery one will a!$it that states, in passing laws, $ust often fail of their highest interestsR T,E8'8*:-@ Uuite true% -8C*2TE-@ Then we $ay fairly argue against your $aster, that he $ust a!$it one $an to be wiser than another, an! that the wiser is a $easure@ but 1, who "now nothing, a$ not at all oblige! to accept the honour which the a! ocate of Protagoras was just now forcing upon $e, whether 1 woul! or not, of being a $easure of anything% T,E8'8*:-@ That is the best refutation of hi$, -ocratesK although he is also caught when he ascribes truth to the opinions of others, who gi e the lie !irect to his own opinion% -8C*2TE-@ There are $any ways, Theo!orus, in which the !octrine that e ery opinion of e ery $an is true $ay be refute!K but there is $ore !ifficulty in pro ing that states of feeling, which are present to a $an, an! out of

which arise sensations an! opinions in accor!ance with the$, are also untrue% 2n! ery li"ely 1 ha e been tal"ing nonsense about the$K for they $ay be unassailable, an! those who say that there is clear e i!ence of the$, an! that they are $atters of "nowle!ge, $ay probably be rightK in which case our frien! Theaetetus was not so far fro$ the $ar" when he i!entifie! perception an! "nowle!ge% 2n! therefore let us !raw nearer, as the a! ocate of Protagoras !esiresK an! gi e the truth of the uni ersal flux a ring@ is the theory soun! or notR at any rate, no s$all war is raging about it, an! there are co$bination not a few% T,E8'8*:-@ 9o s$all, war, in!ee!, for in 1onia the sect $a"es rapi! stri!esK the !isciples of ,eracleitus are $ost energetic uphol!ers of the !octrine% -8C*2TE-@ Then we are the $ore boun!, $y !ear Theo!orus, to exa$ine the Tuestion fro$ the foun!ation as it is set forth by the$sel es% T,E8'8*:-@ Certainly we are% 2bout these speculations of ,eracleitus, which, as you say, are as ol! as ,o$er, or e en ol!er still, the Ephesians the$sel es, who profess to "now the$, are !ownright $a!, an! you cannot tal" with the$ on the subject% (or, in accor!ance with their textDboo"s, they are always in $otionK but as for !welling upon an argu$ent or a Tuestion, an! Tuietly as"ing an! answering in turn, they can no $ore !o so than they can flyK or rather, the !eter$ination of these fellows not to ha e a particle of rest in the$ is $ore than the ut$ost powers of negation can express% 1f you as" any of the$ a Tuestion, he will pro!uce, as fro$ a Tui er, sayings brief an! !ar", an! shoot the$ at youK an! if you inTuire the reason of what he has sai!, you will be hit by so$e other newDfangle! wor!, an! will $a"e no way with any of the$, nor they with one anotherK their great care is, not to allow of any settle! principle either in their argu$ents or in their $in!s, concei ing, as 1 i$agine, that any such principle woul! be stationaryK for they are at war with the stationary, an! !o what they can to !ri e it out e erywhere% -8C*2TE-@ 1 suppose, Theo!orus, that you ha e only seen the$ when they were fighting, an! ha e ne er staye! with the$ in ti$e of peace, for they are no frien!s of yoursK an! their peace !octrines are only co$$unicate! by the$ at leisure, as 1 i$agine, to those !isciples of theirs who$ they want

to $a"e li"e the$sel es% T,E8'8*:-@ 'isciples# $y goo! sir, they ha e noneK $en of their sort are not one anotherLs !isciples, but they grow up at their own sweet will, an! get their inspiration anywhere, each of the$ saying of his neighbour that he "nows nothing% (ro$ these $en, then, as 1 was going to re$ar", you will ne er get a reason, whether with their will or without their willK we $ust ta"e the Tuestion out of their han!s, an! $a"e the analysis oursel es, as if we were !oing geo$etrical proble$% -8C*2TE-@ Uuite right tooK but as touching the aforesai! proble$, ha e we not hear! fro$ the ancients, who conceale! their wis!o$ fro$ the $any in poetical figures, that 8ceanus an! Tethys, the origin of all things, are strea$s, an! that nothing is at restR 2n! now the $o!erns, in their superior wis!o$, ha e !eclare! the sa$e openly, that the cobbler too $ay hear an! learn of the$, an! no longer foolishly i$agine that so$e things are at rest an! others in $otionDDha ing learne! that all is $otion, he will !uly honour his teachers% 1 ha! al$ost forgotten the opposite !octrine, Theo!orus, L2lone +eing re$ains un$o e!, which is the na$e for the all%L This is the language of Par$eni!es, ;elissus, an! their followers, who stoutly $aintain that all being is one an! selfDcontaine!, an! has no place in which to $o e% &hat shall we !o, frien!, with all these peopleK for, a! ancing step by step, we ha e i$perceptibly got between the co$batants, an!, unless we can protect our retreat, we shall pay the penalty of our rashnessDDli"e the players in the palaestra who are caught upon the line, an! are !ragge! !ifferent ways by the two parties% Therefore 1 thin" that we ha! better begin by consi!ering those who$ we first accoste!, Lthe ri erDgo!s,L an!, if we fin! any truth in the$, we will help the$ to pull us o er, an! try to get away fro$ the others% +ut if the partisans of Lthe wholeL appear to spea" $ore truly, we will fly off fro$ the party which woul! $o e the i$$o able, to the$% 2n! if 1 fin! that neither of the$ ha e anything reasonable to say, we shall be in a ri!iculous position, ha ing so great a conceit of our own poor opinion an! rejecting that of ancient an! fa$ous $en% 8 Theo!orus, !o you thin" that there is any use in procee!ing when the !anger is so greatR

T,E8'8*:-@ 9ay, -ocrates, not to exa$ine thoroughly what the two parties ha e to say woul! be Tuite intolerable% -8C*2TE-@ Then exa$ine we $ust, since you, who were so reluctant to begin, are so eager to procee!% The nature of $otion appears to be the Tuestion with which we begin% &hat !o they $ean when they say that all things are in $otionR 1s there only one "in! of $otion, or, as 1 rather incline to thin", twoR 1 shoul! li"e to ha e your opinion upon this point in a!!ition to $y own, that 1 $ay err, if 1 $ust err, in your co$panyK tell $e, then, when a thing changes fro$ one place to another, or goes roun! in the sa$e place, is not that what is calle! $otionR T,E8'8*:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ ,ere then we ha e one "in! of $otion% +ut when a thing, re$aining on the sa$e spot, grows ol!, or beco$es blac" fro$ being white, or har! fro$ being soft, or un!ergoes any other change, $ay not this be properly calle! $otion of another "in!R T,E8'8*:-@ 1 thin" so% -8C*2TE-@ -ay rather that it $ust be so% 8f $otion then there are these two "in!s, Lchange,L an! L$otion in place%L T,E8'8*:-@ Pou are right% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! now, ha ing $a!e this !istinction, let us a!!ress oursel es to those who say that all is $otion, an! as" the$ whether all things accor!ing to the$ ha e the two "in!s of $otion, an! are change! as well as $o e in place, or is one thing $o e! in both ways, an! another in one onlyR T,E8'8*:-@ 1n!ee!, 1 !o not "now what to answerK but 1 thin" they woul! say that all things are $o e! in both ways%

-8C*2TE-@ Pes, co$ra!eK for, if not, they woul! ha e to say that the sa$e things are in $otion an! at rest, an! there woul! be no $ore truth in saying that all things are in $otion, than that all things are at rest% T,E8'8*:-@ To be sure% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! if they are to be in $otion, an! nothing is to be !e oi! of $otion, all things $ust always ha e e ery sort of $otionR T,E8'8*:-@ ;ost true% -8C*2TE-@ Consi!er a further point@ !i! we not un!erstan! the$ to explain the generation of heat, whiteness, or anything else, in so$e such $anner as the following@DDwere they not saying that each of the$ is $o ing between the agent an! the patient, together with a perception, an! that the patient ceases to be a percei ing power an! beco$es a percipient, an! the agent a Tuale instea! of a TualityR 1 suspect that Tuality $ay appear a strange an! uncouth ter$ to you, an! that you !o not un!erstan! the abstract expression% Then 1 will ta"e concrete instances@ 1 $ean to say that the pro!ucing power or agent beco$es neither heat nor whiteness but hot an! white, an! the li"e of other things% (or 1 $ust repeat what 1 sai! before, that neither the agent nor patient ha e any absolute existence, but when they co$e together an! generate sensations an! their objects, the one beco$es a thing of a certain Tuality, an! the other a percipient% Pou re$e$berR T,E8'8*:-@ 8f course% -8C*2TE-@ &e $ay lea e the !etails of their theory unexa$ine!, but we $ust not forget to as" the$ the only Tuestion with which we are concerne!@ 2re all things in $otion an! fluxR T,E8'8*:-@ Pes, they will reply% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! they are $o e! in both those ways which we !istinguishe!, that is to say, they $o e in place an! are also change!R

T,E8'8*:-@ 8f course, if the $otion is to be perfect% -8C*2TE-@ 1f they only $o e! in place an! were not change!, we shoul! be able to say what is the nature of the things which are in $otion an! fluxR T,E8'8*:-@ Exactly% -8C*2TE-@ +ut now, since not e en white continues to flow white, an! whiteness itself is a flux or change which is passing into another colour, an! is ne er to be caught stan!ing still, can the na$e of any colour be rightly use! at allR T,E8'8*:-@ ,ow is that possible, -ocrates, either in the case of this or of any other TualityDDif while we are using the wor! the object is escaping in the fluxR -8C*2TE-@ 2n! what woul! you say of perceptions, such as sight an! hearing, or any other "in! of perceptionR 1s there any stopping in the act of seeing an! hearingR T,E8'8*:-@ Certainly not, if all things are in $otion% -8C*2TE-@ Then we $ust not spea" of seeing any $ore than of notD seeing, nor of any other perception $ore than of any nonDperception, if all things parta"e of e ery "in! of $otionR T,E8'8*:-@ Certainly not% -8C*2TE-@ Pet perception is "nowle!ge@ so at least Theaetetus an! 1 were saying% T,E8'8*:-@ )ery true% -8C*2TE-@ Then when we were as"e! what is "nowle!ge, we no $ore answere! what is "nowle!ge than what is not "nowle!geR

T,E8'8*:-@ 1 suppose not% -8C*2TE-@ ,ere, then, is a fine result@ we correcte! our first answer in our eagerness to pro e that nothing is at rest% +ut if nothing is at rest, e ery answer upon whate er subject is eTually right@ you $ay say that a thing is or is not thusK or, if you prefer, Lbeco$esL thusK an! if we say Lbeco$es,L we shall not then ha$per the$ with wor!s expressi e of rest% T,E8'8*:-@ Uuite true% -8C*2TE-@ Pes, Theo!orus, except in saying LthusL an! Lnot thus%L +ut you ought not to use the wor! Lthus,L for there is no $otion in LthusL or in Lnot thus%L The $aintainers of the !octrine ha e as yet no wor!s in which to express the$sel es, an! $ust get a new language% 1 "now of no wor! that will suit the$, except perhaps Lno how,L which is perfectly in!efinite% T,E8'8*:-@ Pes, that is a $anner of spea"ing in which they will be Tuite at ho$e% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! so, Theo!orus, we ha e got ri! of your frien! without assenting to his !octrine, that e ery $an is the $easure of all thingsDDa wise $an only is a $easureK neither can we allow that "nowle!ge is perception, certainly not on the hypothesis of a perpetual flux, unless perchance our frien! Theaetetus is able to con ince us that it is% T,E8'8*:-@ )ery goo!, -ocratesK an! now that the argu$ent about the !octrine of Protagoras has been co$plete!, 1 a$ absol e! fro$ answeringK for this was the agree$ent% T,E2ETET:-@ 9ot, Theo!orus, until you an! -ocrates ha e !iscusse! the !octrine of those who say that all things are at rest, as you were proposing% T,E8'8*:-@ Pou, Theaetetus, who are a young rogue, $ust not instigate your el!ers to a breach of faith, but shoul! prepare to answer -ocrates in the re$ain!er of the argu$ent%

T,E2ETET:-@ Pes, if he wishesK but 1 woul! rather ha e hear! about the !octrine of rest% T,E8'8*:-@ 1n ite -ocrates to an argu$entDDin ite horse$en to the open plainK !o but as" hi$, an! he will answer% -8C*2TE-@ 9e ertheless, Theo!orus, 1 a$ afrai! that 1 shall not be able to co$ply with the reTuest of Theaetetus% T,E8'8*:-@ 9ot co$ply# for what reasonR -8C*2TE-@ ;y reason is that 1 ha e a "in! of re erenceK not so $uch for ;elissus an! the others, who say that L2ll is one an! at rest,L as for the great lea!er hi$self, Par$eni!es, enerable an! awful, as in ,o$eric language he $ay be calle!KDDhi$ 1 shoul! be asha$e! to approach in a spirit unworthy of hi$% 1 $et hi$ when he was an ol! $an, an! 1 was a $ere youth, an! he appeare! to $e to ha e a glorious !epth of $in!% 2n! 1 a$ afrai! that we $ay not un!erstan! his wor!s, an! $ay be still further fro$ un!erstan!ing his $eaningK abo e all 1 fear that the nature of "nowle!ge, which is the $ain subject of our !iscussion, $ay be thrust out of sight by the unbi!!en guests who will co$e pouring in upon our feast of !iscourse, if we let the$ inDDbesi!es, the Tuestion which is now stirring is of i$$ense extent, an! will be treate! unfairly if only consi!ere! by the wayK or if treate! a!eTuately an! at length, will put into the sha!e the other Tuestion of "nowle!ge% 9either the one nor the other can be allowe!K but 1 $ust try by $y art of $i!wifery to !eli er Theaetetus of his conceptions about "nowle!ge% T,E2ETET:-@ )ery wellK !o so if you will% -8C*2TE-@ Then now, Theaetetus, ta"e another iew of the subject@ you answere! that "nowle!ge is perceptionR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 !i!% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! if any one were to as" you@ &ith what !oes a $an see blac"

an! white coloursR an! with what !oes he hear high an! low soun!sRDDyou woul! say, if 1 a$ not $ista"en, L&ith the eyes an! with the ears%L T,E2ETET:-@ 1 shoul!% -8C*2TE-@ The free use of wor!s an! phrases, rather than $inute precision, is generally characteristic of a liberal e!ucation, an! the opposite is pe!anticK but so$eti$es precision is necessary, an! 1 belie e that the answer which you ha e just gi en is open to the charge of incorrectnessK for which is $ore correct, to say that we see or hear with the eyes an! with the ears, or through the eyes an! through the ears% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 shoul! say Lthrough,L -ocrates, rather than Lwith%L -8C*2TE-@ Pes, $y boy, for no one can suppose that in each of us, as in a sort of Trojan horse, there are perche! a nu$ber of unconnecte! senses, which !o not all $eet in so$e one nature, the $in!, or whate er we please to call it, of which they are the instru$ents, an! with which through the$ we percei e objects of sense% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 agree with you in that opinion% -8C*2TE-@ The reason why 1 a$ thus precise is, because 1 want to "now whether, when we percei e blac" an! white through the eyes, an! again, other Tualities through other organs, we !o not percei e the$ with one an! the sa$e part of oursel es, an!, if you were as"e!, you $ight refer all such perceptions to the bo!y% Perhaps, howe er, 1 ha! better allow you to answer for yourself an! not interfere% Tell $e, then, are not the organs through which you percei e war$ an! har! an! light an! sweet, organs of the bo!yR T,E2ETET:-@ 8f the bo!y, certainly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! you woul! a!$it that what you percei e through one faculty you cannot percei e through anotherK the objects of hearing, for exa$ple, cannot be percei e! through sight, or the objects of sight through hearingR

T,E2ETET:-@ 8f course not% -8C*2TE-@ 1f you ha e any thought about both of the$, this co$$on perception cannot co$e to you, either through the one or the other organR T,E2ETET:-@ 1t cannot% -8C*2TE-@ ,ow about soun!s an! colours@ in the first place you woul! a!$it that they both existR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! that either of the$ is !ifferent fro$ the other, an! the sa$e with itselfR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! that both are two an! each of the$ oneR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ Pou can further obser e whether they are li"e or unli"e one anotherR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 !are say% -8C*2TE-@ +ut through what !o you percei e all this about the$R for neither through hearing nor yet through seeing can you apprehen! that which they ha e in co$$on% <et $e gi e you an illustration of the point at issue@DD1f there were any $eaning in as"ing whether soun!s an! colours are saline or not, you woul! be able to tell $e what faculty woul! consi!er the Tuestion% 1t woul! not be sight or hearing, but so$e other% T,E2ETET:-@ CertainlyK the faculty of taste% -8C*2TE-@ )ery goo!K an! now tell $e what is the power which !iscerns, not only in sensible objects, but in all things, uni ersal notions, such as those which are calle! being an! notDbeing, an! those others about which we were just as"ingDDwhat organs will you assign for the perception of these

notionsR T,E2ETET:-@ Pou are thin"ing of being an! not being, li"eness an! unli"eness, sa$eness an! !ifference, an! also of unity an! other nu$bers which are applie! to objects of senseK an! you $ean to as", through what bo!ily organ the soul percei es o!! an! e en nu$bers an! other arith$etical conceptions% -8C*2TE-@ Pou follow $e excellently, TheaetetusK that is precisely what 1 a$ as"ing% T,E2ETET:-@ 1n!ee!, -ocrates, 1 cannot answerK $y only notion is, that these, unli"e objects of sense, ha e no separate organ, but that the $in!, by a power of her own, conte$plates the uni ersals in all things% -8C*2TE-@ Pou are a beauty, Theaetetus, an! not ugly, as Theo!orus was sayingK for he who utters the beautiful is hi$self beautiful an! goo!% 2n! besi!es being beautiful, you ha e !one $e a "in!ness in releasing $e fro$ a ery long !iscussion, if you are clear that the soul iews so$e things by herself an! others through the bo!ily organs% (or that was $y own opinion, an! 1 wante! you to agree with $e% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 a$ Tuite clear% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! to which class woul! you refer being or essenceK for this, of all our notions, is the $ost uni ersalR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 shoul! say, to that class which the soul aspires to "now of herself% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! woul! you say this also of li"e an! unli"e, sa$e an! otherR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! woul! you say the sa$e of the noble an! base, an! of goo! an! e ilR

T,E2ETET:-@ These 1 concei e to be notions which are essentially relati e, an! which the soul also percei es by co$paring in herself things past an! present with the future% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! !oes she not percei e the har!ness of that which is har! by the touch, an! the softness of that which is soft eTually by the touchR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ +ut their essence an! what they are, an! their opposition to one another, an! the essential nature of this opposition, the soul herself en!ea ours to !eci!e for us by the re iew an! co$parison of the$R T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ The si$ple sensations which reach the soul through the bo!y are gi en at birth to $en an! ani$als by nature, but their reflections on the being an! use of the$ are slowly an! har!ly gaine!, if they are e er gaine!, by e!ucation an! long experience% T,E2ETET:-@ 2ssure!ly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! can a $an attain truth who fails of attaining beingR T,E2ETET:-@ 1$possible% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! can he who $isses the truth of anything, ha e a "nowle!ge of that thingR T,E2ETET:-@ ,e cannot% -8C*2TE-@ Then "nowle!ge !oes not consist in i$pressions of sense, but in reasoning about the$K in that only, an! not in the $ere i$pression, truth

an! being can be attaine!R T,E2ETET:-@ Clearly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! woul! you call the two processes by the sa$e na$e, when there is so great a !ifference between the$R T,E2ETET:-@ That woul! certainly not be right% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! what na$e woul! you gi e to seeing, hearing, s$elling, being col! an! being hotR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 shoul! call all of the$ percei ingDDwhat other na$e coul! be gi en to the$R -8C*2TE-@ Perception woul! be the collecti e na$e of the$R T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ &hich, as we say, has no part in the attain$ent of truth any $ore than of beingR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly not% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! therefore not in science or "nowle!geR T,E2ETET:-@ 9o% -8C*2TE-@ Then perception, Theaetetus, can ne er be the sa$e as "nowle!ge or scienceR T,E2ETET:-@ Clearly not, -ocratesK an! "nowle!ge has now been $ost !istinctly pro e! to be !ifferent fro$ perception% -8C*2TE-@ +ut the original ai$ of our !iscussion was to fin! out rather what "nowle!ge is than what it is notK at the sa$e ti$e we ha e $a!e so$e

progress, for we no longer see" for "nowle!ge in perception at all, but in that other process, howe er calle!, in which the $in! is alone an! engage! with being% T,E2ETET:-@ Pou $ean, -ocrates, if 1 a$ not $ista"en, what is calle! thin"ing or opining% -8C*2TE-@ Pou concei e truly% 2n! now, $y frien!, please to begin again at this pointK an! ha ing wipe! out of your $e$ory all that has prece!e!, see if you ha e arri e! at any clearer iew, an! once $ore say what is "nowle!ge% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 cannot say, -ocrates, that all opinion is "nowle!ge, because there $ay be a false opinionK but 1 will enture to assert, that "nowle!ge is true opinion@ let this then be $y replyK an! if this is hereafter !ispro e!, 1 $ust try to fin! another% -8C*2TE-@ That is the way in which you ought to answer, Theaetetus, an! not in your for$er hesitating strain, for if we are bol! we shall gain one of two a! antagesK either we shall fin! what we see", or we shall be less li"ely to thin" that we "now what we !o not "nowDDin either case we shall be richly rewar!e!% 2n! now, what are you sayingRDD2re there two sorts of opinion, one true an! the other falseK an! !o you !efine "nowle!ge to be the trueR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes, accor!ing to $y present iew% -8C*2TE-@ 1s it still worth our while to resu$e the !iscussion touching opinionR T,E2ETET:-@ To what are you allu!ingR -8C*2TE-@ There is a point which often troubles $e, an! is a great perplexity to $e, both in regar! to $yself an! others% 1 cannot $a"e out the nature or origin of the $ental experience to which 1 refer% T,E2ETET:-@ Pray what is itR

-8C*2TE-@ ,ow there can be false opinionDDthat !ifficulty still troubles the eye of $y $in!K an! 1 a$ uncertain whether 1 shall lea e the Tuestion, or begin o er again in a new way% T,E2ETET:-@ +egin again, -ocrates,DDat least if you thin" that there is the slightest necessity for !oing so% &ere not you an! Theo!orus just now re$ar"ing ery truly, that in !iscussions of this "in! we $ay ta"e our own ti$eR -8C*2TE-@ Pou are Tuite right, an! perhaps there will be no har$ in retracing our steps an! beginning again% +etter a little which is well !one, than a great !eal i$perfectly% T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ &ell, an! what is the !ifficultyR 'o we not spea" of false opinion, an! say that one $an hol!s a false an! another a true opinion, as though there were so$e natural !istinction between the$R T,E2ETET:-@ &e certainly say so% -8C*2TE-@ 2ll things an! e erything are either "nown or not "nown% 1 lea e out of iew the inter$e!iate conceptions of learning an! forgetting, because they ha e nothing to !o with our present Tuestion% T,E2ETET:-@ There can be no !oubt, -ocrates, if you exclu!e these, that there is no other alternati e but "nowing or not "nowing a thing% -8C*2TE-@ That point being now !eter$ine!, $ust we not say that he who has an opinion, $ust ha e an opinion about so$ething which he "nows or !oes not "nowR T,E2ETET:-@ ,e $ust% -8C*2TE-@ ,e who "nows, cannot but "nowK an! he who !oes not "now, cannot "nowR

T,E2ETET:-@ 8f course% -8C*2TE-@ &hat shall we say thenR &hen a $an has a false opinion !oes he thin" that which he "nows to be so$e other thing which he "nows, an! "nowing both, is he at the sa$e ti$e ignorant of bothR T,E2ETET:-@ That, -ocrates, is i$possible% -8C*2TE-@ +ut perhaps he thin"s of so$ething which he !oes not "now as so$e other thing which he !oes not "nowK for exa$ple, he "nows neither Theaetetus nor -ocrates, an! yet he fancies that Theaetetus is -ocrates, or -ocrates TheaetetusR T,E2ETET:-@ ,ow can heR -8C*2TE-@ +ut surely he cannot suppose what he "nows to be what he !oes not "now, or what he !oes not "now to be what he "nowsR T,E2ETET:-@ That woul! be $onstrous% -8C*2TE-@ &here, then, is false opinionR (or if all things are either "nown or un"nown, there can be no opinion which is not co$prehen!e! un!er this alternati e, an! so false opinion is exclu!e!% T,E2ETET:-@ ;ost true% -8C*2TE-@ -uppose that we re$o e the Tuestion out of the sphere of "nowing or not "nowing, into that of being an! notDbeing% T,E2ETET:-@ &hat !o you $eanR -8C*2TE-@ ;ay we not suspect the si$ple truth to be that he who thin"s about anything, that which is not, will necessarily thin" what is false, whate er in other respects $ay be the state of his $in!R

T,E2ETET:-@ That, again, is not unli"ely, -ocrates% -8C*2TE-@ Then suppose so$e one to say to us, Theaetetus@DD1s it possible for any $an to thin" that which is not, either as a selfDexistent substance or as a pre!icate of so$ething elseR 2n! suppose that we answer, LPes, he can, when he thin"s what is not true%LDDThat will be our answerR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ +ut is there any parallel to thisR T,E2ETET:-@ &hat !o you $eanR -8C*2TE-@ Can a $an see so$ething an! yet see nothingR T,E2ETET:-@ 1$possible% -8C*2TE-@ +ut if he sees any one thing, he sees so$ething that exists% 'o you suppose that what is one is e er to be foun! a$ong nonDexisting thingsR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 !o not% -8C*2TE-@ ,e then who sees so$e one thing, sees so$ething which isR T,E2ETET:-@ Clearly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! he who hears anything, hears so$e one thing, an! hears that which isR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! he who touches anything, touches so$ething which is one an! therefore isR T,E2ETET:-@ That again is true%

-8C*2TE-@ 2n! !oes not he who thin"s, thin" so$e one thingR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! !oes not he who thin"s so$e one thing, thin" so$ething which isR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 agree% -8C*2TE-@ Then he who thin"s of that which is not, thin"s of nothingR T,E2ETET:-@ Clearly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! he who thin"s of nothing, !oes not thin" at allR T,E2ETET:-@ 8b iously% -8C*2TE-@ Then no one can thin" that which is not, either as a selfD existent substance or as a pre!icate of so$ething elseR T,E2ETET:-@ Clearly not% -8C*2TE-@ Then to thin" falsely is !ifferent fro$ thin"ing that which is notR T,E2ETET:-@ 1t woul! see$ so% -8C*2TE-@ Then false opinion has no existence in us, either in the sphere of being or of "nowle!geR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly not% -8C*2TE-@ +ut $ay not the following be the !escription of what we express by this na$eR T,E2ETET:-@ &hatR -8C*2TE-@ ;ay we not suppose that false opinion or thought is a sort of

hetero!oxyK a person $ay $a"e an exchange in his $in!, an! say that one real object is another real object% (or thus he always thin"s that which is, but he puts one thing in place of anotherK an! $issing the ai$ of his thoughts, he $ay be truly sai! to ha e false opinion% T,E2ETET:-@ 9ow you appear to $e to ha e spo"en the exact truth@ when a $an puts the base in the place of the noble, or the noble in the place of the base, then he has truly false opinion% -8C*2TE-@ 1 see, Theaetetus, that your fear has !isappeare!, an! that you are beginning to !espise $e% T,E2ETET:-@ &hat $a"es you say soR -8C*2TE-@ Pou thin", if 1 a$ not $ista"en, that your Ltruly falseL is safe fro$ censure, an! that 1 shall ne er as" whether there can be a swift which is slow, or a hea y which is light, or any other selfDcontra!ictory thing, which wor"s, not accor!ing to its own nature, but accor!ing to that of its opposite% +ut 1 will not insist upon this, for 1 !o not wish nee!lessly to !iscourage you% 2n! so you are satisfie! that false opinion is hetero!oxy, or the thought of so$ething elseR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 a$% -8C*2TE-@ 1t is possible then upon your iew for the $in! to concei e of one thing as anotherR T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ +ut $ust not the $in!, or thin"ing power, which $isplaces the$, ha e a conception either of both objects or of one of the$R T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ Either together or in successionR T,E2ETET:-@ )ery goo!%

-8C*2TE-@ 2n! !o you $ean by concei ing, the sa$e which 1 $eanR T,E2ETET:-@ &hat is thatR -8C*2TE-@ 1 $ean the con ersation which the soul hol!s with herself in consi!ering of anything% 1 spea" of what 1 scarcely un!erstan!K but the soul when thin"ing appears to $e to be just tal"ingDDas"ing Tuestions of herself an! answering the$, affir$ing an! !enying% 2n! when she has arri e! at a !ecision, either gra!ually or by a su!!en i$pulse, an! has at last agree!, an! !oes not !oubt, this is calle! her opinion% 1 say, then, that to for$ an opinion is to spea", an! opinion is a wor! spo"en,DD1 $ean, to oneself an! in silence, not alou! or to another@ &hat thin" youR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 agree% -8C*2TE-@ Then when any one thin"s of one thing as another, he is saying to hi$self that one thing is anotherR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ +ut !o you e er re$e$ber saying to yourself that the noble is certainly base, or the unjust justK or, best of allDDha e you e er atte$pte! to con ince yourself that one thing is anotherR 9ay, not e en in sleep, !i! you e er enture to say to yourself that o!! is e en, or anything of the "in!R T,E2ETET:-@ 9e er% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! !o you suppose that any other $an, either in his senses or out of the$, e er seriously trie! to persua!e hi$self that an ox is a horse, or that two are oneR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly not% -8C*2TE-@ +ut if thin"ing is tal"ing to oneself, no one spea"ing an! thin"ing of two objects, an! apprehen!ing the$ both in his soul, will say an! thin" that the one is the other of the$, an! 1 $ust a!!, that e en you, lo er of !ispute as you are, ha! better let the wor! LotherL alone Ai%e%

not insist that LoneL an! LotherL are the sa$e A+oth wor!s in Gree" are calle! eteron@ co$pare Par$en%K Euthy!%BB% 1 $ean to say, that no one thin"s the noble to be base, or anything of the "in!% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 will gi e up the wor! Lother,L -ocratesK an! 1 agree to what you say% -8C*2TE-@ 1f a $an has both of the$ in his thoughts, he cannot thin" that the one of the$ is the otherR T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ 9either, if he has one of the$ only in his $in! an! not the other, can he thin" that one is the otherR T,E2ETET:-@ TrueK for we shoul! ha e to suppose that he apprehen!s that which is not in his thoughts at all% -8C*2TE-@ Then no one who has either both or only one of the two objects in his $in! can thin" that the one is the other% 2n! therefore, he who $aintains that false opinion is hetero!oxy is tal"ing nonsenseK for neither in this, any $ore than in the pre ious way, can false opinion exist in us% T,E2ETET:-@ 9o% -8C*2TE-@ +ut if, Theaetetus, this is not a!$itte!, we shall be !ri en into $any absur!ities% T,E2ETET:-@ &hat are theyR -8C*2TE-@ 1 will not tell you until 1 ha e en!ea oure! to consi!er the $atter fro$ e ery point of iew% (or 1 shoul! be asha$e! of us if we were !ri en in our perplexity to a!$it the absur! conseTuences of which 1 spea"% +ut if we fin! the solution, an! get away fro$ the$, we $ay regar! the$ only as the !ifficulties of others, an! the ri!icule will not attach to us% 8n the other han!, if we utterly fail, 1 suppose that we $ust be hu$ble, an! allow the argu$ent to tra$ple us un!er foot, as the seaDsic" passenger

is tra$ple! upon by the sailor, an! to !o anything to us% <isten, then, while 1 tell you how 1 hope to fin! a way out of our !ifficulty% T,E2ETET:-@ <et $e hear% -8C*2TE-@ 1 thin" that we were wrong in !enying that a $an coul! thin" what he "new to be what he !i! not "nowK an! that there is a way in which such a !eception is possible% T,E2ETET:-@ Pou $ean to say, as 1 suspecte! at the ti$e, that 1 $ay "now -ocrates, an! at a !istance see so$e one who is un"nown to $e, an! who$ 1 $ista"e for hi$DDthen the !eception will occurR -8C*2TE-@ +ut has not that position been relinTuishe! by us, because in ol ing the absur!ity that we shoul! "now an! not "now the things which we "nowR T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ <et us $a"e the assertion in another for$, which $ay or $ay not ha e a fa ourable issueK but as we are in a great strait, e ery argu$ent shoul! be turne! o er an! teste!% Tell $e, then, whether 1 a$ right in saying that you $ay learn a thing which at one ti$e you !i! not "nowR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly you $ay% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! another an! anotherR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 1 woul! ha e you i$agine, then, that there exists in the $in! of $an a bloc" of wax, which is of !ifferent si7es in !ifferent $enK har!er, $oister, an! ha ing $ore or less of purity in one than another, an! in so$e of an inter$e!iate Tuality% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 see%

-8C*2TE-@ <et us say that this tablet is a gift of ;e$ory, the $other of the ;usesK an! that when we wish to re$e$ber anything which we ha e seen, or hear!, or thought in our own $in!s, we hol! the wax to the perceptions an! thoughts, an! in that $aterial recei e the i$pression of the$ as fro$ the seal of a ringK an! that we re$e$ber an! "now what is i$printe! as long as the i$age lastsK but when the i$age is efface!, or cannot be ta"en, then we forget an! !o not "now% T,E2ETET:-@ )ery goo!% -8C*2TE-@ 9ow, when a person has this "nowle!ge, an! is consi!ering so$ething which he sees or hears, $ay not false opinion arise in the following $annerR T,E2ETET:-@ 1n what $annerR -8C*2TE-@ &hen he thin"s what he "nows, so$eti$es to be what he "nows, an! so$eti$es to be what he !oes not "now% &e were wrong before in !enying the possibility of this% T,E2ETET:-@ 2n! how woul! you a$en! the for$er state$entR -8C*2TE-@ 1 shoul! begin by $a"ing a list of the i$possible cases which $ust be exclu!e!% A.B 9o one can thin" one thing to be another when he !oes not percei e either of the$, but has the $e$orial or seal of both of the$ in his $in!K nor can any $ista"ing of one thing for another occur, when he only "nows one, an! !oes not "now, an! has no i$pression of the otherK nor can he thin" that one thing which he !oes not "now is another thing which he !oes not "now, or that what he !oes not "now is what he "nowsK nor A2B that one thing which he percei es is another thing which he percei es, or that so$ething which he percei es is so$ething which he !oes not percei eK or that so$ething which he !oes not percei e is so$ething else which he !oes not percei eK or that so$ething which he !oes not percei e is so$ething which he percei esK nor again AFB can he thin" that so$ething which he "nows an! percei es, an! of which he has the i$pression coinci!ing with sense, is so$ething else which he "nows an! percei es, an!

of which he has the i$pression coinci!ing with senseKDDthis last case, if possible, is still $ore inconcei able than the othersK nor AEB can he thin" that so$ething which he "nows an! percei es, an! of which he has the $e$orial coinci!ing with sense, is so$ething else which he "nowsK nor so long as these agree, can he thin" that a thing which he "nows an! percei es is another thing which he percei esK or that a thing which he !oes not "now an! !oes not percei e, is the sa$e as another thing which he !oes not "now an! !oes not percei eKDDnor again, can he suppose that a thing which he !oes not "now an! !oes not percei e is the sa$e as another thing which he !oes not "nowK or that a thing which he !oes not "now an! !oes not percei e is another thing which he !oes not percei e@DD2ll these utterly an! absolutely exclu!e the possibility of false opinion% The only cases, if any, which re$ain, are the following% T,E2ETET:-@ &hat are theyR 1f you tell $e, 1 $ay perhaps un!erstan! you betterK but at present 1 a$ unable to follow you% -8C*2TE-@ 2 person $ay thin" that so$e things which he "nows, or which he percei es an! !oes not "now, are so$e other things which he "nows an! percei esK or that so$e things which he "nows an! percei es, are other things which he "nows an! percei es% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 un!erstan! you less than e er now% -8C*2TE-@ ,ear $e once $ore, then@DD1, "nowing Theo!orus, an! re$e$bering in $y own $in! what sort of person he is, an! also what sort of person Theaetetus is, at one ti$e see the$, an! at another ti$e !o not see the$, an! so$eti$es 1 touch the$, an! at another ti$e not, or at one ti$e 1 $ay hear the$ or percei e the$ in so$e other way, an! at another ti$e not percei e the$, but still 1 re$e$ber the$, an! "now the$ in $y own $in!% T,E2ETET:-@ )ery true% -8C*2TE-@ Then, first of all, 1 want you to un!erstan! that a $an $ay or $ay not percei e sensibly that which he "nows%

T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! that which he !oes not "now will so$eti$es not be percei e! by hi$ an! so$eti$es will be percei e! an! only percei e!R T,E2ETET:-@ That is also true% -8C*2TE-@ -ee whether you can follow $e better now@ -ocrates can recogni7e Theo!orus an! Theaetetus, but he sees neither of the$, nor !oes he percei e the$ in any other wayK he cannot then by any possibility i$agine in his own $in! that Theaetetus is Theo!orus% 2$ 1 not rightR T,E2ETET:-@ Pou are Tuite right% -8C*2TE-@ Then that was the first case of which 1 spo"e% T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ The secon! case was, that 1, "nowing one of you an! not "nowing the other, an! percei ing neither, can ne er thin" hi$ who$ 1 "now to be hi$ who$ 1 !o not "now% T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ 1n the thir! case, not "nowing an! not percei ing either of you, 1 cannot thin" that one of you who$ 1 !o not "now is the other who$ 1 !o not "now% 1 nee! not again go o er the catalogue of exclu!e! cases, in which 1 cannot for$ a false opinion about you an! Theo!orus, either when 1 "now both or when 1 a$ in ignorance of both, or when 1 "now one an! not the other% 2n! the sa$e of percei ing@ !o you un!erstan! $eR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 !o% -8C*2TE-@ The only possibility of erroneous opinion is, when "nowing you

an! Theo!orus, an! ha ing on the waxen bloc" the i$pression of both of you gi en as by a seal, but seeing you i$perfectly an! at a !istance, 1 try to assign the right i$pression of $e$ory to the right isual i$pression, an! to fit this into its own print@ if 1 succee!, recognition will ta"e placeK but if 1 fail an! transpose the$, putting the foot into the wrong shoeDD that is to say, putting the ision of either of you on to the wrong i$pression, or if $y $in!, li"e the sight in a $irror, which is transferre! fro$ right to left, err by reason of so$e si$ilar affection, then Lhetero!oxyL an! false opinion ensues% T,E2ETET:-@ Pes, -ocrates, you ha e !escribe! the nature of opinion with won!erful exactness% -8C*2TE-@ 8r again, when 1 "now both of you, an! percei e as well as "now one of you, but not the other, an! $y "nowle!ge of hi$ !oes not accor! with perceptionDDthat was the case put by $e just now which you !i! not un!erstan!% T,E2ETET:-@ 9o, 1 !i! not% -8C*2TE-@ 1 $eant to say, that when a person "nows an! percei es one of you, his "nowle!ge coinci!es with his perception, he will ne er thin" hi$ to be so$e other person, who$ he "nows an! percei es, an! the "nowle!ge of who$ coinci!es with his perceptionDDfor that also was a case suppose!% T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ +ut there was an o$ission of the further case, in which, as we now say, false opinion $ay arise, when "nowing both, an! seeing, or ha ing so$e other sensible perception of both, 1 fail in hol!ing the seal o er against the correspon!ing sensationK li"e a ba! archer, 1 $iss an! fall wi!e of the $ar"DDan! this is calle! falsehoo!% T,E2ETET:-@ PesK it is rightly so calle!%

-8C*2TE-@ &hen, therefore, perception is present to one of the seals or i$pressions but not to the other, an! the $in! fits the seal of the absent perception on the one which is present, in any case of this sort the $in! is !ecei e!K in a wor!, if our iew is soun!, there can be no error or !eception about things which a $an !oes not "now an! has ne er percei e!, but only in things which are "nown an! percei e!K in these alone opinion turns an! twists about, an! beco$es alternately true an! falseKDDtrue when the seals an! i$pressions of sense $eet straight an! oppositeDDfalse when they go awry an! croo"e!% T,E2ETET:-@ 2n! is not that, -ocrates, nobly sai!R -8C*2TE-@ 9obly# yesK but wait a little an! hear the explanation, an! then you will say so with $ore reasonK for to thin" truly is noble an! to be !ecei e! is base% T,E2ETET:-@ :n!oubte!ly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! the origin of truth an! error is as follows@DD&hen the wax in the soul of any one is !eep an! abun!ant, an! s$ooth an! perfectly te$pere!, then the i$pressions which pass through the senses an! sin" into the heart of the soul, as ,o$er says in a parable, $eaning to in!icate the li"eness of the soul to wax AVerh VerhosBK these, 1 say, being pure an! clear, an! ha ing a sufficient !epth of wax, are also lasting, an! $in!s, such as these, easily learn an! easily retain, an! are not liable to confusion, but ha e true thoughts, for they ha e plenty of roo$, an! ha ing clear i$pressions of things, as we ter$ the$, Tuic"ly !istribute the$ into their proper places on the bloc"% 2n! such $en are calle! wise% 'o you agreeR T,E2ETET:-@ Entirely% -8C*2TE-@ +ut when the heart of any one is shaggyDDa Tuality which the allDwise poet co$$en!s, or $u!!y an! of i$pure wax, or ery soft, or ery har!, then there is a correspon!ing !efect in the $in!DDthe soft are goo! at learning, but apt to forgetK an! the har! are the re erseK the shaggy an! rugge! an! gritty, or those who ha e an a!$ixture of earth or !ung in their co$position, ha e the i$pressions in!istinct, as also the har!, for there is no !epth in the$K an! the soft too are in!istinct, for their

i$pressions are easily confuse! an! efface!% Pet greater is the in!istinctness when they are all jostle! together in a little soul, which has no roo$% These are the natures which ha e false opinionK for when they see or hear or thin" of anything, they are slow in assigning the right objects to the right i$pressionsDDin their stupi!ity they confuse the$, an! are apt to see an! hear an! thin" a$issDDan! such $en are sai! to be !ecei e! in their "nowle!ge of objects, an! ignorant% T,E2ETET:-@ 9o $an, -ocrates, can say anything truer than that% -8C*2TE-@ Then now we $ay a!$it the existence of false opinion in usR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! of true opinion alsoR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ &e ha e at length satisfactorily pro en beyon! a !oubt there are these two sorts of opinionR T,E2ETET:-@ :n!oubte!ly% -8C*2TE-@ 2las, Theaetetus, what a tireso$e creature is a $an who is fon! of tal"ing# T,E2ETET:-@ &hat $a"es you say soR -8C*2TE-@ +ecause 1 a$ !isheartene! at $y own stupi!ity an! tireso$e garrulityK for what other ter$ will !escribe the habit of a $an who is always arguing on all si!es of a TuestionK whose !ulness cannot be con ince!, an! who will ne er lea e offR T,E2ETET:-@ +ut what puts you out of heartR -8C*2TE-@ 1 a$ not only out of heart, but in positi e !espairK for 1 !o not "now what to answer if any one were to as" $e@DD8 -ocrates, ha e you in!ee! !isco ere! that false opinion arises neither in the co$parison of

perceptions with one another nor yet in thought, but in union of thought an! perceptionR Pes, 1 shall say, with the co$placence of one who thin"s that he has $a!e a noble !isco ery% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 see no reason why we shoul! be asha$e! of our !e$onstration, -ocrates% -8C*2TE-@ ,e will say@ Pou $ean to argue that the $an who$ we only thin" of an! !o not see, cannot be confuse! with the horse which we !o not see or touch, but only thin" of an! !o not percei eR That 1 belie e to be $y $eaning, 1 shall reply% T,E2ETET:-@ Uuite right% -8C*2TE-@ &ell, then, he will say, accor!ing to that argu$ent, the nu$ber ele en, which is only thought, can ne er be $ista"en for twel e, which is only thought@ ,ow woul! you answer hi$R T,E2ETET:-@ 1 shoul! say that a $ista"e $ay ery li"ely arise between the ele en or twel e which are seen or han!le!, but that no si$ilar $ista"e can arise between the ele en an! twel e which are in the $in!% -8C*2TE-@ &ell, but !o you thin" that no one e er put before his own $in! fi e an! se en,DD1 !o not $ean fi e or se en $en or horses, but fi e or se en in the abstract, which, as we say, are recor!e! on the waxen bloc", an! in which false opinion is hel! to be i$possibleK !i! no $an e er as" hi$self how $any these nu$bers $a"e when a!!e! together, an! answer that they are ele en, while another thin"s that they are twel e, or woul! all agree in thin"ing an! saying that they are twel eR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly notK $any woul! thin" that they are ele en, an! in the higher nu$bers the chance of error is greater stillK for 1 assu$e you to be spea"ing of nu$bers in general%

-8C*2TE-@ ExactlyK an! 1 want you to consi!er whether this !oes not i$ply that the twel e in the waxen bloc" are suppose! to be ele enR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes, that see$s to be the case% -8C*2TE-@ Then !o we not co$e bac" to the ol! !ifficultyR (or he who $a"es such a $ista"e !oes thin" one thing which he "nows to be another thing which he "nowsK but this, as we sai!, was i$possible, an! affor!e! an irresistible proof of the nonDexistence of false opinion, because otherwise the sa$e person woul! ine itably "now an! not "now the sa$e thing at the sa$e ti$e% T,E2ETET:-@ ;ost true% -8C*2TE-@ Then false opinion cannot be explaine! as a confusion of thought an! sense, for in that case we coul! not ha e been $ista"en about pure conceptions of thoughtK an! thus we are oblige! to say, either that false opinion !oes not exist, or that a $an $ay not "now that which he "nowsKDD which alternati e !o you preferR T,E2ETET:-@ 1t is har! to !eter$ine, -ocrates% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! yet the argu$ent will scarcely a!$it of both% +ut, as we are at our witsL en!, suppose that we !o a sha$eless thingR T,E2ETET:-@ &hat is itR -8C*2TE-@ <et us atte$pt to explain the erb Lto "now%L T,E2ETET:-@ 2n! why shoul! that be sha$elessR -8C*2TE-@ Pou see$ not to be aware that the whole of our !iscussion fro$ the ery beginning has been a search after "nowle!ge, of which we are assu$e! not to "now the nature% T,E2ETET:-@ 9ay, but 1 a$ well aware%

-8C*2TE-@ 2n! is it not sha$eless when we !o not "now what "nowle!ge is, to be explaining the erb Lto "nowLR The truth is, Theaetetus, that we ha e long been infecte! with logical i$purity% Thousan!s of ti$es ha e we repeate! the wor!s Lwe "now,L an! L!o not "now,L an! Lwe ha e or ha e not science or "nowle!ge,L as if we coul! un!erstan! what we are saying to one another, so long as we re$ain ignorant about "nowle!geK an! at this $o$ent we are using the wor!s Lwe un!erstan!,L Lwe are ignorant,L as though we coul! still e$ploy the$ when !epri e! of "nowle!ge or science% T,E2ETET:-@ +ut if you a oi! these expressions, -ocrates, how will you e er argue at allR -8C*2TE-@ 1 coul! not, being the $an 1 a$% The case woul! be !ifferent if 1 were a true hero of !ialectic@ an! 8 that such an one were present# for he woul! ha e tol! us to a oi! the use of these ter$sK at the sa$e ti$e he woul! not ha e spare! in you an! $e the faults which 1 ha e note!% +ut, seeing that we are no great wits, shall 1 enture to say what "nowing isR for 1 thin" that the atte$pt $ay be worth $a"ing% T,E2ETET:-@ Then by all $eans enture, an! no one shall fin! fault with you for using the forbi!!en ter$s% -8C*2TE-@ Pou ha e hear! the co$$on explanation of the erb Lto "nowLR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 thin" so, but 1 !o not re$e$ber it at the $o$ent% -8C*2TE-@ They explain the wor! Lto "nowL as $eaning Lto ha e "nowle!ge%L T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ 1 shoul! li"e to $a"e a slight change, an! say Lto possessL "nowle!ge% T,E2ETET:-@ ,ow !o the two expressions !ifferR

-8C*2TE-@ Perhaps there $ay be no !ifferenceK but still 1 shoul! li"e you to hear $y iew, that you $ay help $e to test it% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 will, if 1 can% -8C*2TE-@ 1 shoul! !istinguish Lha ingL fro$ LpossessingL@ for exa$ple, a $an $ay buy an! "eep un!er his control a gar$ent which he !oes not wearK an! then we shoul! say, not that he has, but that he possesses the gar$ent% T,E2ETET:-@ 1t woul! be the correct expression% -8C*2TE-@ &ell, $ay not a $an LpossessL an! yet not Lha eL "nowle!ge in the sense of which 1 a$ spea"ingR 2s you $ay suppose a $an to ha e caught wil! bir!sDD!o es or any other bir!sDDan! to be "eeping the$ in an a iary which he has constructe! at ho$eK we $ight say of hi$ in one sense, that he always has the$ because he possesses the$, $ight we notR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! yet, in another sense, he has none of the$K but they are in his power, an! he has got the$ un!er his han! in an enclosure of his own, an! can ta"e an! ha e the$ whene er he li"esKDDhe can catch any which he li"es, an! let the bir! go again, an! he $ay !o so as often as he pleases% T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ 8nce $ore, then, as in what prece!e! we $a!e a sort of waxen fig$ent in the $in!, so let us now suppose that in the $in! of each $an there is an a iary of all sorts of bir!sDDso$e floc"ing together apart fro$ the rest, others in s$all groups, others solitary, flying anywhere an! e erywhere% T,E2ETET:-@ <et us i$agine such an a iaryDDan! what is to followR -8C*2TE-@ &e $ay suppose that the bir!s are "in!s of "nowle!ge, an! that

when we were chil!ren, this receptacle was e$ptyK whene er a $an has gotten an! !etaine! in the enclosure a "in! of "nowle!ge, he $ay be sai! to ha e learne! or !isco ere! the thing which is the subject of the "nowle!ge@ an! this is to "now% T,E2ETET:-@ Grante!% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! further, when any one wishes to catch any of these "nowle!ges or sciences, an! ha ing ta"en, to hol! it, an! again to let the$ go, how will he express hi$selfRDDwill he !escribe the LcatchingL of the$ an! the original LpossessionL in the sa$e wor!sR 1 will $a"e $y $eaning clearer by an exa$ple@DDPou a!$it that there is an art of arith$eticR T,E2ETET:-@ To be sure% -8C*2TE-@ Concei e this un!er the for$ of a hunt after the science of o!! an! e en in general% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 follow% -8C*2TE-@ ,a ing the use of the art, the arith$etician, if 1 a$ not $ista"en, has the conceptions of nu$ber un!er his han!, an! can trans$it the$ to another% T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! when trans$itting the$ he $ay be sai! to teach the$, an! when recei ing to learn the$, an! when recei ing to learn the$, an! when ha ing the$ in possession in the aforesai! a iary he $ay be sai! to "now the$% T,E2ETET:-@ Exactly% -8C*2TE-@ 2tten! to what follows@ $ust not the perfect arith$etician "now all nu$bers, for he has the science of all nu$bers in his $in!R

T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! he can rec"on abstract nu$bers in his hea!, or things about hi$ which are nu$erableR T,E2ETET:-@ 8f course he can% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! to rec"on is si$ply to consi!er how $uch such an! such a nu$ber a$ounts toR T,E2ETET:-@ )ery true% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! so he appears to be searching into so$ething which he "nows, as if he !i! not "now it, for we ha e alrea!y a!$itte! that he "nows all nu$bersKDDyou ha e hear! these perplexing Tuestions raise!R T,E2ETET:-@ 1 ha e% -8C*2TE-@ ;ay we not pursue the i$age of the !o es, an! say that the chase after "nowle!ge is of two "in!sR one "in! is prior to possession an! for the sa"e of possession, an! the other for the sa"e of ta"ing an! hol!ing in the han!s that which is possesse! alrea!y% 2n! thus, when a $an has learne! an! "nown so$ething long ago, he $ay resu$e an! get hol! of the "nowle!ge which he has long possesse!, but has not at han! in his $in!% T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ That was $y reason for as"ing how we ought to spea" when an arith$etician sets about nu$bering, or a gra$$arian about rea!ingR -hall we say, that although he "nows, he co$es bac" to hi$self to learn what he alrea!y "nowsR T,E2ETET:-@ 1t woul! be too absur!, -ocrates% -8C*2TE-@ -hall we say then that he is going to rea! or nu$ber what he

!oes not "now, although we ha e a!$itte! that he "nows all letters an! all nu$bersR T,E2ETET:-@ That, again, woul! be an absur!ity% -8C*2TE-@ Then shall we say that about na$es we care nothingRDDany one $ay twist an! turn the wor!s L"nowingL an! LlearningL in any way which he li"es, but since we ha e !eter$ine! that the possession of "nowle!ge is not the ha ing or using it, we !o assert that a $an cannot not possess that which he possessesK an!, therefore, in no case can a $an not "now that which he "nows, but he $ay get a false opinion about itK for he $ay ha e the "nowle!ge, not of this particular thing, but of so$e otherKDDwhen the arious nu$bers an! for$s of "nowle!ge are flying about in the a iary, an! wishing to capture a certain sort of "nowle!ge out of the general store, he ta"es the wrong one by $ista"e, that is to say, when he thought ele en to be twel e, he got hol! of the ringD!o e which he ha! in his $in!, when he wante! the pigeon% T,E2ETET:-@ 2 ery rational explanation% -8C*2TE-@ +ut when he catches the one which he wants, then he is not !ecei e!, an! has an opinion of what is, an! thus false an! true opinion $ay exist, an! the !ifficulties which were pre iously raise! !isappear% 1 !are say that you agree with $e, !o you notR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! so we are ri! of the !ifficulty of a $anLs not "nowing what he "nows, for we are not !ri en to the inference that he !oes not possess what he possesses, whether he be or be not !ecei e!% 2n! yet 1 fear that a greater !ifficulty is loo"ing in at the win!ow% T,E2ETET:-@ &hat is itR -8C*2TE-@ ,ow can the exchange of one "nowle!ge for another e er beco$e false opinionR

T,E2ETET:-@ &hat !o you $eanR -8C*2TE-@ 1n the first place, how can a $an who has the "nowle!ge of anything be ignorant of that which he "nows, not by reason of ignorance, but by reason of his own "nowle!geR 2n!, again, is it not an extre$e absur!ity that he shoul! suppose another thing to be this, an! this to be another thingKDDthat, ha ing "nowle!ge present with hi$ in his $in!, he shoul! still "now nothing an! be ignorant of all thingsRDDyou $ight as well argue that ignorance $ay $a"e a $an "now, an! blin!ness $a"e hi$ see, as that "nowle!ge can $a"e hi$ ignorant% T,E2ETET:-@ Perhaps, -ocrates, we $ay ha e been wrong in $a"ing only for$s of "nowle!ge our bir!s@ whereas there ought to ha e been for$s of ignorance as well, flying about together in the $in!, an! then he who sought to ta"e one of the$ $ight so$eti$es catch a for$ of "nowle!ge, an! so$eti$es a for$ of ignoranceK an! thus he woul! ha e a false opinion fro$ ignorance, but a true one fro$ "nowle!ge, about the sa$e thing% -8C*2TE-@ 1 cannot help praising you, Theaetetus, an! yet 1 $ust beg you to reconsi!er your wor!s% <et us grant what you sayDDthen, accor!ing to you, he who ta"es ignorance will ha e a false opinionDDa$ 1 rightR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ ,e will certainly not thin" that he has a false opinionR T,E2ETET:-@ 8f course not% -8C*2TE-@ ,e will thin" that his opinion is true, an! he will fancy that he "nows the things about which he has been !ecei e!R T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ Then he will thin" that he has capture! "nowle!ge an! not ignoranceR T,E2ETET:-@ Clearly%

-8C*2TE-@ 2n! thus, after going a long way roun!, we are once $ore face to face with our original !ifficulty% The hero of !ialectic will retort upon us@DDL8 $y excellent frien!s, he will say, laughing, if a $an "nows the for$ of ignorance an! the for$ of "nowle!ge, can he thin" that one of the$ which he "nows is the other which he "nowsR or, if he "nows neither of the$, can he thin" that the one which he "nows not is another which he "nows notR or, if he "nows one an! not the other, can he thin" the one which he "nows to be the one which he !oes not "nowR or the one which he !oes not "now to be the one which he "nowsR or will you tell $e that there are other for$s of "nowle!ge which !istinguish the right an! wrong bir!s, an! which the owner "eeps in so$e other a iaries or gra en on waxen bloc"s accor!ing to your foolish i$ages, an! which he $ay be sai! to "now while he possesses the$, e en though he ha e the$ not at han! in his $in!R 2n! thus, in a perpetual circle, you will be co$pelle! to go roun! an! roun!, an! you will $a"e no progress%L &hat are we to say in reply, TheaetetusR T,E2ETET:-@ 1n!ee!, -ocrates, 1 !o not "now what we are to say% -8C*2TE-@ 2re not his reproaches just, an! !oes not the argu$ent truly show that we are wrong in see"ing for false opinion until we "now what "nowle!ge isK that $ust be first ascertaine!K then, the nature of false opinionR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 cannot but agree with you, -ocrates, so far as we ha e yet gone% -8C*2TE-@ Then, once $ore, what shall we say that "nowle!ge isRDDfor we are not going to lose heart as yet% T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly, 1 shall not lose heart, if you !o not% -8C*2TE-@ &hat !efinition will be $ost consistent with our for$er iewsR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 cannot thin" of any but our ol! one, -ocrates%

-8C*2TE-@ &hat was itR T,E2ETET:-@ Vnowle!ge was sai! by us to be true opinionK an! true opinion is surely unerring, an! the results which follow fro$ it are all noble an! goo!% -8C*2TE-@ ,e who le! the way into the ri er, Theaetetus, sai! LThe experi$ent will showKL an! perhaps if we go forwar! in the search, we $ay stu$ble upon the thing which we are loo"ing forK but if we stay where we are, nothing will co$e to light% T,E2ETET:-@ )ery trueK let us go forwar! an! try% -8C*2TE-@ The trail soon co$es to an en!, for a whole profession is against us% T,E2ETET:-@ ,ow is that, an! what profession !o you $eanR -8C*2TE-@ The profession of the great wise ones who are calle! orators an! lawyersK for these persua!e $en by their art an! $a"e the$ thin" whate er they li"e, but they !o not teach the$% 'o you i$agine that there are any teachers in the worl! so cle er as to be able to con ince others of the truth about acts of robbery or iolence, of which they were not eyeD witnesses, while a little water is flowing in the clepsy!raR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly not, they can only persua!e the$% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! woul! you not say that persua!ing the$ is $a"ing the$ ha e an opinionR T,E2ETET:-@ To be sure% -8C*2TE-@ &hen, therefore, ju!ges are justly persua!e! about $atters which you can "now only by seeing the$, an! not in any other way, an! when thus ju!ging of the$ fro$ report they attain a true opinion about the$, they

ju!ge without "nowle!ge, an! yet are rightly persua!e!, if they ha e ju!ge! well% T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! yet, 8 $y frien!, if true opinion in law courts an! "nowle!ge are the sa$e, the perfect ju!ge coul! not ha e ju!ge! rightly without "nowle!geK an! therefore 1 $ust infer that they are not the sa$e% T,E2ETET:-@ That is a !istinction, -ocrates, which 1 ha e hear! $a!e by so$e one else, but 1 ha! forgotten it% ,e sai! that true opinion, co$bine! with reason, was "nowle!ge, but that the opinion which ha! no reason was out of the sphere of "nowle!geK an! that things of which there is no rational account are not "nowableDDsuch was the singular expression which he use!DDan! that things which ha e a reason or explanation are "nowable% -8C*2TE-@ ExcellentK but then, how !i! he !istinguish between things which are an! are not L"nowableLR 1 wish that you woul! repeat to $e what he sai!, an! then 1 shall "now whether you an! 1 ha e hear! the sa$e tale% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 !o not "now whether 1 can recall itK but if another person woul! tell $e, 1 thin" that 1 coul! follow hi$% -8C*2TE-@ <et $e gi e you, then, a !rea$ in return for a !rea$@DD ;ethought that 1 too ha! a !rea$, an! 1 hear! in $y !rea$ that the pri$e al letters or ele$ents out of which you an! 1 an! all other things are co$poun!e!, ha e no reason or explanationK you can only na$e the$, but no pre!icate can be either affir$e! or !enie! of the$, for in the one case existence, in the other nonDexistence is alrea!y i$plie!, neither of which $ust be a!!e!, if you $ean to spea" of this or that thing by itself alone% 1t shoul! not be calle! itself, or that, or each, or alone, or this, or the li"eK for these go about e erywhere an! are applie! to all things, but are !istinct fro$ the$K whereas, if the first ele$ents coul! be !escribe!, an! ha! a !efinition of their own, they woul! be spo"en of apart fro$ all else% +ut none of these pri$e al ele$ents can be !efine!K they can only be na$e!, for they ha e nothing but a na$e, an! the things which are co$poun!e! of the$,

as they are co$plex, are expresse! by a co$bination of na$es, for the co$bination of na$es is the essence of a !efinition% Thus, then, the ele$ents or letters are only objects of perception, an! cannot be !efine! or "nownK but the syllables or co$binations of the$ are "nown an! expresse!, an! are apprehen!e! by true opinion% &hen, therefore, any one for$s the true opinion of anything without rational explanation, you $ay say that his $in! is truly exercise!, but has no "nowle!geK for he who cannot gi e an! recei e a reason for a thing, has no "nowle!ge of that thingK but when he a!!s rational explanation, then, he is perfecte! in "nowle!ge an! $ay be all that 1 ha e been !enying of hi$% &as that the for$ in which the !rea$ appeare! to youR T,E2ETET:-@ Precisely% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! you allow an! $aintain that true opinion, co$bine! with !efinition or rational explanation, is "nowle!geR T,E2ETET:-@ Exactly% -8C*2TE-@ Then $ay we assu$e, Theaetetus, that toD!ay, an! in this casual $anner, we ha e foun! a truth which in for$er ti$es $any wise $en ha e grown ol! an! ha e not foun!R T,E2ETET:-@ 2t any rate, -ocrates, 1 a$ satisfie! with the present state$ent% -8C*2TE-@ &hich is probably correctDDfor how can there be "nowle!ge apart fro$ !efinition an! true opinionR 2n! yet there is one point in what has been sai! which !oes not Tuite satisfy $e% T,E2ETET:-@ &hat was itR -8C*2TE-@ &hat $ight see$ to be the $ost ingenious notion of all@DD That the ele$ents or letters are un"nown, but the co$bination or syllables "nown% T,E2ETET:-@ 2n! was that wrongR

-8C*2TE-@ &e shall soon "nowK for we ha e as hostages the instances which the author of the argu$ent hi$self use!% T,E2ETET:-@ &hat hostagesR -8C*2TE-@ The letters, which are the cle$entsK an! the syllables, which are the co$binationsKDDhe reasone!, !i! he not, fro$ the letters of the alphabetR T,E2ETET:-@ PesK he !i!% -8C*2TE-@ <et us ta"e the$ an! put the$ to the test, or rather, test oursel es@DD&hat was the way in which we learne! lettersR an!, first of all, are we right in saying that syllables ha e a !efinition, but that letters ha e no !efinitionR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 thin" so% -8C*2TE-@ 1 thin" so tooK for, suppose that so$e one as"s you to spell the first syllable of $y na$e@DDTheaetetus, he says, what is -8R T,E2ETET:-@ 1 shoul! reply - an! 8% -8C*2TE-@ That is the !efinition which you woul! gi e of the syllableR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 shoul!% -8C*2TE-@ 1 wish that you woul! gi e $e a si$ilar !efinition of the -% T,E2ETET:-@ +ut how can any one, -ocrates, tell the ele$ents of an ele$entR 1 can only reply, that - is a consonant, a $ere noise, as of the tongue hissingK +, an! $ost other letters, again, are neither owelDsoun!s nor noises% Thus letters $ay be $ost truly sai! to be un!efine!K for e en the $ost !istinct of the$, which are the se en owels, ha e a soun! only, but no !efinition at all% -8C*2TE-@ Then, 1 suppose, $y frien!, that we ha e been so far right in our i!ea about "nowle!geR

T,E2ETET:-@ PesK 1 thin" that we ha e% -8C*2TE-@ &ell, but ha e we been right in $aintaining that the syllables can be "nown, but not the lettersR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 thin" so% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! !o we $ean by a syllable two letters, or if there are $ore, all of the$, or a single i!ea which arises out of the co$bination of the$R T,E2ETET:-@ 1 shoul! say that we $ean all the letters% -8C*2TE-@ Ta"e the case of the two letters - an! 8, which for$ the first syllable of $y own na$eK $ust not he who "nows the syllable, "now both of the$R T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ ,e "nows, that is, the - an! 8R T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ +ut can he be ignorant of either singly an! yet "now both togetherR T,E2ETET:-@ -uch a supposition, -ocrates, is $onstrous an! un$eaning% -8C*2TE-@ +ut if he cannot "now both without "nowing each, then if he is e er to "now the syllable, he $ust "now the letters firstK an! thus the fine theory has again ta"en wings an! !eparte!% T,E2ETET:-@ Pes, with won!erful celerity% -8C*2TE-@ Pes, we !i! not "eep watch properly% Perhaps we ought to ha e $aintaine! that a syllable is not the letters, but rather one single i!ea fra$e! out of the$, ha ing a separate for$ !istinct fro$ the$%

T,E2ETET:-@ )ery trueK an! a $ore li"ely notion than the other% -8C*2TE-@ Ta"e careK let us not be cowar!s an! betray a great an! i$posing theory% T,E2ETET:-@ 9o, in!ee!% -8C*2TE-@ <et us assu$e then, as we now say, that the syllable is a si$ple for$ arising out of the se eral co$binations of har$onious ele$entsDDof letters or of any other ele$ents% T,E2ETET:-@ )ery goo!% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! it $ust ha e no parts% T,E2ETET:-@ &hyR -8C*2TE-@ +ecause that which has parts $ust be a whole of all the parts% 8r woul! you say that a whole, although for$e! out of the parts, is a single notion !ifferent fro$ all the partsR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 shoul!% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! woul! you say that all an! the whole are the sa$e, or !ifferentR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 a$ not certainK but, as you li"e $e to answer at once, 1 shall ha7ar! the reply, that they are !ifferent% -8C*2TE-@ 1 appro e of your rea!iness, Theaetetus, but 1 $ust ta"e ti$e to thin" whether 1 eTually appro e of your answer% T,E2ETET:-@ PesK the answer is the point% -8C*2TE-@ 2ccor!ing to this new iew, the whole is suppose! to !iffer fro$

allR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ &ell, but is there any !ifference between all Ain the pluralB an! the all Ain the singularBR Ta"e the case of nu$ber@DD&hen we say one, two, three, four, fi e, sixK or when we say twice three, or three ti$es two, or four an! two, or three an! two an! one, are we spea"ing of the sa$e or of !ifferent nu$bersR T,E2ETET:-@ 8f the sa$e% -8C*2TE-@ That is of sixR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! in each for$ of expression we spo"e of all the sixR T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ 2gain, in spea"ing of all Ain the pluralB is there not one thing which we expressR T,E2ETET:-@ 8f course there is% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! that is sixR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ Then in pre!icating the wor! LallL of things $easure! by nu$ber, we pre!icate at the sa$e ti$e a singular an! a pluralR T,E2ETET:-@ Clearly we !o% -8C*2TE-@ 2gain, the nu$ber of the acre an! the acre are the sa$eK are they notR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes%

-8C*2TE-@ 2n! the nu$ber of the sta!iu$ in li"e $anner is the sta!iu$R T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! the ar$y is the nu$ber of the ar$yK an! in all si$ilar cases, the entire nu$ber of anything is the entire thingR T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! the nu$ber of each is the parts of eachR T,E2ETET:-@ Exactly% -8C*2TE-@ Then as $any things as ha e parts are $a!e up of partsR T,E2ETET:-@ Clearly% -8C*2TE-@ +ut all the parts are a!$itte! to be the all, if the entire nu$ber is the allR T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ Then the whole is not $a!e up of parts, for it woul! be the all, if consisting of all the partsR T,E2ETET:-@ That is the inference% -8C*2TE-@ +ut is a part a part of anything but the wholeR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes, of the all% -8C*2TE-@ Pou $a"e a aliant !efence, Theaetetus% 2n! yet is not the all that of which nothing is wantingR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! is not a whole li"ewise that fro$ which nothing is absentR

but that fro$ which anything is absent is neither a whole nor allKDDif wanting in anything, both eTually lose their entirety of nature% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 now thin" that there is no !ifference between a whole an! all% -8C*2TE-@ +ut were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the parts will be a whole an! allR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ Then, as 1 was saying before, $ust not the alternati e be that either the syllable is not the letters, an! then the letters are not parts of the syllable, or that the syllable will be the sa$e with the letters, an! will therefore be eTually "nown with the$R T,E2ETET:-@ Pou are right% -8C*2TE-@ 2n!, in or!er to a oi! this, we suppose it to be !ifferent fro$ the$R T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ +ut if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell $e of any other parts of syllables, which are not lettersR T,E2ETET:-@ 9o, in!ee!, -ocratesK for if 1 a!$it the existence of parts in a syllable, it woul! be ri!iculous in $e to gi e up letters an! see" for other parts% -8C*2TE-@ Uuite true, Theaetetus, an! therefore, accor!ing to our present iew, a syllable $ust surely be so$e in!i isible for$R T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ +ut !o you re$e$ber, $y frien!, that only a little while ago we a!$itte! an! appro e! the state$ent, that of the first ele$ents out of

which all other things are co$poun!e! there coul! be no !efinition, because each of the$ when ta"en by itself is unco$poun!e!K nor can one rightly attribute to the$ the wor!s LbeingL or Lthis,L because they are alien an! inappropriate wor!s, an! for this reason the letters or ele$ents were in!efinable an! un"nownR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 re$e$ber% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! is not this also the reason why they are si$ple an! in!i isibleR 1 can see no other% T,E2ETET:-@ 9o other reason can be gi en% -8C*2TE-@ Then is not the syllable in the sa$e case as the ele$ents or letters, if it has no parts an! is one for$R T,E2ETET:-@ To be sure% -8C*2TE-@ 1f, then, a syllable is a whole, an! has $any parts or letters, the letters as well as the syllable $ust be intelligible an! expressible, since all the parts are ac"nowle!ge! to be the sa$e as the wholeR T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ +ut if it be one an! in!i isible, then the syllables an! the letters are ali"e un!efine! an! un"nown, an! for the sa$e reasonR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 cannot !eny that% -8C*2TE-@ &e cannot, therefore, agree in the opinion of hi$ who says that the syllable can be "nown an! expresse!, but not the letters% T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly notK if we $ay trust the argu$ent% -8C*2TE-@ &ell, but will you not be eTually incline! to !isagree with hi$, when you re$e$ber your own experience in learning to rea!R T,E2ETET:-@ &hat experienceR

-8C*2TE-@ &hy, that in learning you were "ept trying to !istinguish the separate letters both by the eye an! by the ear, in or!er that, when you hear! the$ spo"en or saw the$ written, you $ight not be confuse! by their position% T,E2ETET:-@ )ery true% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! is the e!ucation of the harpDplayer co$plete unless he can tell what string answers to a particular noteK the notes, as e ery one woul! allow, are the ele$ents or letters of $usicR T,E2ETET:-@ Exactly% -8C*2TE-@ Then, if we argue fro$ the letters an! syllables which we "now to other si$ples an! co$poun!s, we shall say that the letters or si$ple ele$ents as a class are $uch $ore certainly "nown than the syllables, an! $uch $ore in!ispensable to a perfect "nowle!ge of any subjectK an! if so$e one says that the syllable is "nown an! the letter un"nown, we shall consi!er that either intentionally or unintentionally he is tal"ing nonsenseR T,E2ETET:-@ Exactly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! there $ight be gi en other proofs of this belief, if 1 a$ not $ista"en% +ut !o not let us in loo"ing for the$ lose sight of the Tuestion before us, which is the $eaning of the state$ent, that right opinion with rational !efinition or explanation is the $ost perfect for$ of "nowle!ge% T,E2ETET:-@ &e $ust not% -8C*2TE-@ &ell, an! what is the $eaning of the ter$ LexplanationLR 1 thin" that we ha e a choice of three $eanings% T,E2ETET:-@ &hat are theyR -8C*2TE-@ 1n the first place, the $eaning $ay be, $anifesting oneLs

thought by the oice with erbs an! nouns, i$aging an opinion in the strea$ which flows fro$ the lips, as in a $irror or water% 'oes not explanation appear to be of this natureR T,E2ETET:-@ CertainlyK he who so $anifests his thought, is sai! to explain hi$self% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! e ery one who is not born !eaf or !u$b is able sooner or later to $anifest what he thin"s of anythingK an! if so, all those who ha e a right opinion about anything will also ha e right explanationK nor will right opinion be anywhere foun! to exist apart fro$ "nowle!ge% T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ <et us not, therefore, hastily charge hi$ who ga e this account of "nowle!ge with uttering an un$eaning wor!K for perhaps he only inten!e! to say, that when a person was as"e! what was the nature of anything, he shoul! be able to answer his Tuestioner by gi ing the ele$ents of the thing% T,E2ETET:-@ 2s for exa$ple, -ocrates%%%R -8C*2TE-@ 2s, for exa$ple, when ,esio! says that a waggon is $a!e up of a hun!re! plan"s% 9ow, neither you nor 1 coul! !escribe all of the$ in!i i!uallyK but if any one as"e! what is a waggon, we shoul! be content to answer, that a waggon consists of wheels, axle, bo!y, ri$s, yo"e% T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! our opponent will probably laugh at us, just as he woul! if we professe! to be gra$$arians an! to gi e a gra$$atical account of the na$e of Theaetetus, an! yet coul! only tell the syllables an! not the letters of your na$eDDthat woul! be true opinion, an! not "nowle!geK for "nowle!ge, as has been alrea!y re$ar"e!, is not attaine! until, co$bine! with true opinion, there is an enu$eration of the ele$ents out of which

anything is co$pose!% T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 1n the sa$e general way, we $ight also ha e true opinion about a waggonK but he who can !escribe its essence by an enu$eration of the hun!re! plan"s, a!!s rational explanation to true opinion, an! instea! of opinion has art an! "nowle!ge of the nature of a waggon, in that he attains to the whole through the ele$ents% T,E2ETET:-@ 2n! !o you not agree in that iew, -ocratesR -8C*2TE-@ 1f you !o, $y frien!K but 1 want to "now first, whether you a!$it the resolution of all things into their ele$ents to be a rational explanation of the$, an! the consi!eration of the$ in syllables or larger co$binations of the$ to be irrationalDDis this your iewR T,E2ETET:-@ Precisely% -8C*2TE-@ &ell, an! !o you concei e that a $an has "nowle!ge of any ele$ent who at one ti$e affir$s an! at another ti$e !enies that ele$ent of so$ething, or thin"s that the sa$e thing is co$pose! of !ifferent ele$ents at !ifferent ti$esR T,E2ETET:-@ 2ssure!ly not% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! !o you not re$e$ber that in your case an! in that of others this often occurre! in the process of learning to rea!R T,E2ETET:-@ Pou $ean that 1 $istoo" the letters an! $isspelt the syllablesR -8C*2TE-@ Pes% T,E2ETET:-@ To be sureK 1 perfectly re$e$ber, an! 1 a$ ery far fro$ supposing that they who are in this con!ition ha e "nowle!ge% -8C*2TE-@ &hen a person at the ti$e of learning writes the na$e of

Theaetetus, an! thin"s that he ought to write an! !oes write Th an! eK but, again, $eaning to write the na$e of Theo!o!orus, thin"s that he ought to write an! !oes write T an! eDDcan we suppose that he "nows the first syllables of your two na$esR T,E2ETET:-@ &e ha e alrea!y a!$itte! that such a one has not yet attaine! "nowle!ge% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! in li"e $anner be $ay enu$erate without "nowing the$ the secon! an! thir! an! fourth syllables of your na$eR T,E2ETET:-@ ,e $ay% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! in that case, when he "nows the or!er of the letters an! can write the$ out correctly, he has right opinionR T,E2ETET:-@ Clearly% -8C*2TE-@ +ut although we a!$it that he has right opinion, he will still be without "nowle!geR T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! yet he will ha e explanation, as well as right opinion, for he "new the or!er of the letters when he wroteK an! this we a!$it to be explanation% T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ Then, $y frien!, there is such a thing as right opinion unite! with !efinition or explanation, which !oes not as yet attain to the exactness of "nowle!ge% T,E2ETET:-@ 1t woul! see$ so% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! what we fancie! to be a perfect !efinition of "nowle!ge is a

!rea$ only% +ut perhaps we ha! better not say so as yet, for were there not three explanations of "nowle!ge, one of which $ust, as we sai!, be a!opte! by hi$ who $aintains "nowle!ge to be true opinion co$bine! with rational explanationR 2n! ery li"ely there $ay be foun! so$e one who will not prefer this but the thir!% T,E2ETET:-@ Pou are Tuite rightK there is still one re$aining% The first was the i$age or expression of the $in! in speechK the secon!, which has just been $entione!, is a way of reaching the whole by an enu$eration of the ele$ents% +ut what is the thir! !efinitionR -8C*2TE-@ There is, further, the popular notion of telling the $ar" or sign of !ifference which !istinguishes the thing in Tuestion fro$ all others% T,E2ETET:-@ Can you gi e $e any exa$ple of such a !efinitionR -8C*2TE-@ 2s, for exa$ple, in the case of the sun, 1 thin" that you woul! be contente! with the state$ent that the sun is the brightest of the hea enly bo!ies which re ol e about the earth% T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly% -8C*2TE-@ :n!erstan! why@DDthe reason is, as 1 was just now saying, that if you get at the !ifference an! !istinguishing characteristic of each thing, then, as $any persons affir$, you will get at the !efinition or explanation of itK but while you lay hol! only of the co$$on an! not of the characteristic notion, you will only ha e the !efinition of those things to which this co$$on Tuality belongs% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 un!erstan! you, an! your account of !efinition is in $y ju!g$ent correct% -8C*2TE-@ +ut he, who ha ing right opinion about anything, can fin! out the !ifference which !istinguishes it fro$ other things will "now that of which before he ha! only an opinion% T,E2ETET:-@ PesK that is what we are $aintaining%

-8C*2TE-@ 9e ertheless, Theaetetus, on a nearer iew, 1 fin! $yself Tuite !isappointe!K the picture, which at a !istance was not so ba!, has now beco$e altogether unintelligible% T,E2ETET:-@ &hat !o you $eanR -8C*2TE-@ 1 will en!ea our to explain@ 1 will suppose $yself to ha e true opinion of you, an! if to this 1 a!! your !efinition, then 1 ha e "nowle!ge, but if not, opinion only% T,E2ETET:-@ Pes% -8C*2TE-@ The !efinition was assu$e! to be the interpretation of your !ifference% T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ +ut when 1 ha! only opinion, 1 ha! no conception of your !istinguishing characteristics% T,E2ETET:-@ 1 suppose not% -8C*2TE-@ Then 1 $ust ha e concei e! of so$e general or co$$on nature which no $ore belonge! to you than to another% T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ Tell $e, nowDD,ow in that case coul! 1 ha e for$e! a ju!g$ent of you any $ore than of any one elseR -uppose that 1 i$agine Theaetetus to be a $an who has nose, eyes, an! $outh, an! e ery other $e$ber co$pleteK how woul! that enable $e to !istinguish Theaetetus fro$ Theo!orus, or fro$ so$e outer barbarianR T,E2ETET:-@ ,ow coul! itR

-8C*2TE-@ 8r if 1 ha! further concei e! of you, not only as ha ing nose an! eyes, but as ha ing a snub nose an! pro$inent eyes, shoul! 1 ha e any $ore notion of you than of $yself an! others who rese$ble $eR T,E2ETET:-@ Certainly not% -8C*2TE-@ -urely 1 can ha e no conception of Theaetetus until your snubD nose!ness has left an i$pression on $y $in! !ifferent fro$ the snubD nose!ness of all others who$ 1 ha e e er seen, an! until your other peculiarities ha e a li"e !istinctnessK an! so when 1 $eet you toD$orrow the right opinion will be reDcalle!R T,E2ETET:-@ ;ost true% -8C*2TE-@ Then right opinion i$plies the perception of !ifferencesR T,E2ETET:-@ Clearly% -8C*2TE-@ &hat, then, shall we say of a!!ing reason or explanation to right opinionR 1f the $eaning is, that we shoul! for$ an opinion of the way in which so$ething !iffers fro$ another thing, the proposal is ri!iculous% T,E2ETET:-@ ,ow soR -8C*2TE-@ &e are suppose! to acTuire a right opinion of the !ifferences which !istinguish one thing fro$ another when we ha e alrea!y a right opinion of the$, an! so we go roun! an! roun!@DDthe re olution of the scytal, or pestle, or any other rotatory $achine, in the sa$e circles, is as nothing co$pare! with such a reTuire$entK an! we $ay be truly !escribe! as the blin! !irecting the blin!K for to a!! those things which we alrea!y ha e, in or!er that we $ay learn what we alrea!y thin", is li"e a soul utterly benighte!% T,E2ETET:-@ Tell $eK what were you going to say just now, when you as"e! the TuestionR

-8C*2TE-@ 1f, $y boy, the argu$ent, in spea"ing of a!!ing the !efinition, ha! use! the wor! to L"now,L an! not $erely Lha e an opinionL of the !ifference, this which is the $ost pro$ising of all the !efinitions of "nowle!ge woul! ha e co$e to a pretty en!, for to "now is surely to acTuire "nowle!ge% T,E2ETET:-@ True% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! so, when the Tuestion is as"e!, &hat is "nowle!geR this fair argu$ent will answer L*ight opinion with "nowle!ge,LDD"nowle!ge, that is, of !ifference, for this, as the sai! argu$ent $aintains, is a!!ing the !efinition% T,E2ETET:-@ That see$s to be true% -8C*2TE-@ +ut how utterly foolish, when we are as"ing what is "nowle!ge, that the reply shoul! only be, right opinion with "nowle!ge of !ifference or of anything# 2n! so, Theaetetus, "nowle!ge is neither sensation nor true opinion, nor yet !efinition an! explanation acco$panying an! a!!e! to true opinionR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 suppose not% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! are you still in labour an! tra ail, $y !ear frien!, or ha e you brought all that you ha e to say about "nowle!ge to the birthR T,E2ETET:-@ 1 a$ sure, -ocrates, that you ha e elicite! fro$ $e a goo! !eal $ore than e er was in $e% -8C*2TE-@ 2n! !oes not $y art show that you ha e brought forth win!, an! that the offspring of your brain are not worth bringing upR T,E2ETET:-@ )ery true% -8C*2TE-@ +ut if, Theaetetus, you shoul! e er concei e afresh, you will be

all the better for the present in estigation, an! if not, you will be soberer an! hu$bler an! gentler to other $en, an! will be too $o!est to fancy that you "now what you !o not "now% These are the li$its of $y artK 1 can no further go, nor !o 1 "now aught of the things which great an! fa$ous $en "now or ha e "nown in this or for$er ages% The office of a $i!wife 1, li"e $y $other, ha e recei e! fro$ Go!K she !eli ere! wo$en, 1 !eli er $enK but they $ust be young an! noble an! fair% 2n! now 1 ha e to go to the porch of the Ving 2rchon, where 1 a$ to $eet ;eletus an! his in!ict$ent% ToD$orrow $orning, Theo!orus, 1 shall hope to see you again at this place%

En! of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Theaetetus, by Plato