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1. Introduction
MLC-DBS is an application to protect sensitive data. DB has different vulnerabilities, but peoples still have no choice to store their own data in DB systems, so the need to secure DB systems becomes an important issue. DB security remains a live area of research due to the significant role of DB on modern life and progress of malicious techniques to crack the DB. Different approaches adopted to secure DB. An MLC - DBS system may be the best under specific circumstances [9]. MLC-DBS is differs from multilevel security for DB in logical viewpoint and in the mechanism. MLCDBS Addresses applying different security layers to prevent unauthorized user to access the DB, But multilevel security for DB addresses the natural expectation that users at different levels should be able to use the same DB, with each seeing only that data for which he has appropriate authorization, and users with different authorizations sharing some data [17]. Thus, multilevel security is a forcing special arrangement between subjects and objects; the work area of multilevel security is the authorization layer, while MLC-DBS is using general techniques of information security and forcing lawyers to prevent intruder [2, 13, 18]. The established MLC-DBS implies following layers: I&A, encryption, decryption, digital signature (i.e., digests) and data type validation have been used to maintain DB integrity, audit trail, intrusion detection system, notification system, and DB backup. As well as MLC-DBS involve the creation and manipulation of DB. Manipulations include encryption and decryption of data, tables' names, and fields' names [9]. Although there are currently many forms of authentication methods, the most common method for authentication is the combination of user ID (identification) and password (authentication). A recent study shows that users practice insecure behaviors in the utilization of passwords (PW). Therefore, most systems enforce users to select strength PW [4]. In this paper, we focus on I&A layer starting from some diagrams illustrate the design of MLC-DBS system, including the general MLC-DBS diagram, and authentication diagram. Here, I use two methods of authentication: the first I&A method is based on something that user knows (i.e., PW), the second I&A is based on something that user has, where the Serial Number (SN) of USB Flash memory and CPU (also, SN, of BIOS, mother board, and hard disk could be used) are utilized. Once the authentication test procedure result is 4
International Journal of Computational Intelligence and Information Security, March 2014 Vol. 5, No. 2 ISSN: 1837-7823 "authenticated user" then the user will granted access, which is extracted from the SN of the user USB flash memory key. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: I discussed Identification and Authentication (I&A) techniques and objective. And then, I suggested some techniques for improving PW characteristics and increase PW entropy. I proposed the design method and presented the results in the context of MLC-DBS. Finally, I discussed conclusions and suggestion for future works.
3. Authentication Methods
A computer system may employ different types of authentication methods; these methods can be used alone or in combination: 1. Something the individual knows (or information key, a secret): the user should provide specific information to access the system (e.g., a PW, pass phrases, questionnaires, PIN, or cryptographic key). 5
International Journal of Computational Intelligence and Information Security, March 2014 Vol. 5, No. 2 ISSN: 1837-7823 2. Something the individual possesses (or physical keys, a token): they are objects that a user must have to access the system (e.g., magnetic cards, an ATM card or a smart card). 3. Something the individual is (a biometric) relies on user's physical attributes to grant or deny access (e.g., voice pattern, handwriting dynamics, or a fingerprint) [3, 7, 14]. 4. Something you do, such as writing a signature, typing out a pass phrase (keyboard dynamics), or how you say a phrase. Something you do is often included in the something you are category. 5. Somewhere you are, such as a specific computer terminal, dialing up from a specific phone number identified by caller ID, or dialing up from a specific country identified by your IP address. "Somewhere you are" is often included in the something you have category. Two-factor authentication occurs when two of the above mentioned factors are used to provide authentication. For example, when cashing a check at the grocery store, the driver often has to provide his drivers license (something you have) and his phone number (something you know). Once the logon credentials of the offered identity and the authentication factor(s) are provided to the system, they are checked against the DB of identities on the system. If the identity is located and the correct authentication factor(s) are provided, then the subject will be authenticated [1, 15].
International Journal of Computational Intelligence and Information Security, March 2014 Vol. 5, No. 2 ISSN: 1837-7823 identification number do not match or are invalid, the user is cannot access. The most common used physical keys are magnetic card, smart card and specialized calculators. These keys are widely used because they provide a higher level of security than PW alone, simple to use, and are relatively unobtrusive. The greatest problem with physical keys arises when they are lost or broken, making authorized access to the system impossible until the key is replaced. Although some techniques are based solely on something the user possesses, most of the techniques are combined with something the user knows. This combination can provide significantly stronger security than either something the user knows or possesses alone. Token devices are a form of something you have. Tokens are PW-generating devices that subjects must carry with them. A token can be a static PW device, such as an ATM card. To use an ATM card, the subject must supply the token (the ATM card itself) and his PIN. Tokens can also be one-time or dynamic PW devices that look a bit like small calculators. The device displays a string of characters (a PW) for the subject to enter into the system. There are four types of token devices: 1. Static tokens, 2. Synchronous dynamic PW tokens, 3. Asynchronous dynamic PW tokens, 4. Challenge-response tokens. A static token can be a swipe card, a smart card, a floppy disk, a USB RAM dongle, or even something as simple as a key to operate as a physical lock. Static tokens offer a physical means to provide identity [16]. Another example of static token is the Universal Serial Bus (USB) flash memory, computer hardware's specification (i.e., the SN of a hard disk, Mother board, BIOS, Central Processor Unit (CPU) etc) [1, 15].
7. Improving PW Characteristics
The types of PW are: static; always remain the same, dynamic; change after a specified interval of time or use, one-time PW or single-use PW; changed every time they are used (variant of dynamic PW). One-time PW has high security, but have a problem with distribution and protection of PW list. Although many methods of I&A exist, the traditional method is still the most common method for authentication (i.e., The combination of user ID and PW). On the other hand, a recent study shows that users practice insecure behaviors in using of PW. Thus, PWconsiders the weakest link in authentication mechanism, but it could be efficient if selected intelligently and managed properly. Therefore, in the following I propose improving PW characteristics, mainly by increasing PW entropy [4, 8, 10]. 1. PW secrecy, security of the PW system depends upon keeping PW secret, therefore avoid write it down, and never tell it to anyone. But as a fact, if the PW is not easy to remember, people toward to write it down, it may seem reasonable; however, it has a risky. Just a risky of writing PW down is telling a PW to another person. Never allow PW to be transmitted in clear text or with weak encryption over the network. 2. PW attributes: users can be instructed, or the system can force them to select a PW:1. with a certain minimum length, 2. with special characters, 3. that is unrelated to their user ID, and dont reuse part of your name, logon name, e-mail address, employee number, social security number, phone number, extension, or other identifying name or code, 4. do not use dictionary words, or industry acronyms, 5. use nonstandard capitalization and spelling, 6. switch letters and replace letters with numbers. PW that is generally accepted have at least eight characters, but according to the Sans Institute Password Policy PW should contain at least fifteen alphanumeric characters, at least one of which is a number, symbol, or punctuation mark. In general, a user's PW should be both easy to remember but difficult to guess or a PW should appear randomly yet is familiar and meaningful to the user. A good method for selecting a strong PW use the first or last letters from each word in memorable phrase and then mix in some numbers or punctuation, for example, 7
International Journal of Computational Intelligence and Information Security, March 2014 Vol. 5, No. 2 ISSN: 1837-7823 starting the phrase " I will never forget to wash behind my ears" and producing "Iwnf2wbme!" as a PW. This often results in a relatively strong PW that is difficult to guess but easy to remember. Also, one may suggest encrypting their PW by a strong cryptographic algorithm and store it [4]. 3. Storing user names and PW, in all PW schemes the system must maintain storage of user names and corresponding PW to be used in the authentication process. This store should be secure. Secure means the PW should be stored in such a way that the application can compute and compare PW presented to it as part of an authentication scheme, but the DB should not be able to use or read by anyone; even administrative users or by an adversary who manages to compromise the system. 4. PW generators: if users are not allowed to generate their own PW, they cannot pick easy-to-guess PW. Some generators create only pronounceable non-words to help users remember them. However, users tend to write down hard-to-remember PW. 5. Limits attempts to login: many systems can be configured to lock a user ID after a set number of failed login attempts. This helps to prevent guessing of PW. 6. Changing PW: periodic changing of PW can reduce the damage done by stealing PW and can make brute-force attempts to break into systems more difficult. Too frequent changes, however, can be irritating to users. 7. Use PW verification tools and PW cracking tools against your own PWDB file. Any accounts with a weak or discovered PW should be informed to change their PW. 8. Disable user accounts that have short periods of inactivity, such as a week or a month. And delete the user accounts that are no longer used. 9. Train users the necessity of maintaining security and the use of strong PW. Warn them about writing down or sharing PW. Offer tips to prevent shoulder surfing or keyboard logging to capture PW. Offer tips and recommendations on how to create strong PW. 10. The strength of information system security varies from a system to another. Therefore, we should avoid using same PW for the multiple account system. People have multiple accounts and they may reuse the same passwords for them, if hackers can gain access to one account, other accounts also cracked. For example, many users of email accounts have cracked because the users reuse the same PW for email system and a Facebook account. In reality, most users do not understand security problems. To obtain secure system by using PW, the system should help users implementing (as much as possible) the previous list of improving techniques.
International Journal of Computational Intelligence and Information Security, March 2014 Vol. 5, No. 2 ISSN: 1837-7823 the proposed MLC-DBS, the flash key is used as a user ID identifier; beside to PW it holds the user ID number. 7. Audit trail records all the necessary information about the user tries to access DB, whether they are permitted to access or not.
Start Authentication
Yes valid hardware Yes Entering PW & user ID Yes Encryption Visit count>1? Yes No
No
Trail No
No
International Journal of Computational Intelligence and Information Security, March 2014 Vol. 5, No. 2 ISSN: 1837-7823 be stolen, so it is a strong way of selecting cryptographic key [11, 13]. B. Saving User ID and PW The user must define his PW and user ID at his first visit to MLC-DBS, also the user can change this PW at any time later. User ID and PW will be stored after encryption. C. Checking User ID and PW If the comparison between the provided user ID and PW with the pre-stored ones indicate match, then the user will grant access, otherwise he cannot access. The pre-registered user ID and PW should be encrypted. Therefore the PW checking operation should imply decryption of both the PW and user ID.
Algorithm Encryption key generation Input: user name, creation time Output: EncKey //get user name from operating system setUserN=user name //determine creation time of application file setCrY=year of the creation time setCrM=month of the creation time setCrD=day of the creation time setCrH=hour of the creation time setEncKey=concatenate UserN, CrY, CrM, CrD and CrH End
9.2 I&A Based on Something that User Possesses This operation is carried out by specifying some attributes of the computer's hardware as system signature (i.e., the SN of the BIOS, M.B, H.D, CPU and USB flash memory). Each of these elements has a unique SN, MLC-DBS checks one or more of these hardware's. In the designed MLC-DBS the SN of more than one hardware element is utilized, because some of these elements may not have SN, so at least one of the chosen hardware elements should have a SN. The main advantage of using hardware signature for authentication is to restrict the operation of MLC-DBS on specific machines whose elements are owned by the user, the major disadvantage of using hardware authentication is the complicated procedure that should be followed if any one of the checked hardware elements is replaced or its characteristics (e.g., disks formatted) are changed, in such cases a new installation to the application MLC-DBS must be generated because the new or reformatted parts have new signature value. MLC-DBS could be designed to run on a specific computer, i.e., select checking hardware for specific computer. Also, it could be designed to run on any computer, i.e., select the portable device for checking hardware such as USB flash memory or mobile phone. MLC-DBS security technique is interacting with the selected hardware.
10. Results
The implemented MLC-DBS is demonstrated by providing figures captured during the testing phase. Here, I illustrate the implementation by capturing debug window to show what is going on when the MLC-DBS is running, most of these debug windows will not appear during the real-time application of MLC-DBS; so that debug windows are put just for demonstration. In the following subsections the application of the established I&A in MLC-DBS is clarified. 10.1 Generate Cryptographic Key Two methods of I&A are used in MLC-DBS, the first method depends on something that the user knows, and the second depends on something that user possesses. But before the stage of I&A, the MLC-DBS must generate cryptographic key to encrypt/decrypt user ID and PW. Generate Cryptographic Key is shown by this example, if the creation date and time of the file "MLC10
International Journal of Computational Intelligence and Information Security, March 2014 Vol. 5, No. 2 ISSN: 1837-7823 DBS.exe" is "25/5/2006, 10:14:01", respectively, and the system user name is "Nooruldeen" the generated cryptographic key will be "1F4C68CA=ur%n1Owueijpv", as shown in Figure 2. 10.2 I&A Based on Something the User Knows MLC-DBS use PW schema as a method of I&A which is based on something the user knows. Here, the way of using PW is illustrated, as well as some of the techniques conducted to improve PW security are present. On login screen a user ID must be entered in the user text box, the user will have 15 second to write the correct PW, otherwise MLC-DBS will terminate its execution if it is not provided with the correct PW, the time limitation restricts the illegal attempts from conducting a long sequence of trail PW. This constraint on the login time is one of the steps to improve the PW security. This limitation is indicated in MLC-DBS visually by two ways: first, by a number shows remaining time from the 15 seconds, and the second way be displaying a progress bar at the bottom of the screen window. The time limitations make the attacker anxious, because he tries to steal secret information and he has a limited time. Once the MLC-DBS is shut down due to delays in correct PW entry, the user can run it again. The time limitation technique could be supported by the following ways: (1) the number of failed trials could be limited up to 3 attempts during the day (for example), (2) all the involved information associated with each attempt to run MLC-DBS will recorded in audit trails, which can give good information about the attack nature.
If the user ID is "Nooruldeen", and the PW is "123456", it will be encrypted and saved in a file "Readme.mls" as "IAcO?W" and "E??", respectively. With MLC-DBS, the administrator can change user ID and PW by using the form shown in the Figure 3. MLC-DBS uses numerous features to improve PW security, such as PW length, encryption, and ability to change the PW.
Figure 3: Change PW
10.3 I&A Based on Something the User Possesses MLC-DBS uses some computer hardware signature to accomplish the I&A task. By checking the hard disk, USB flash memory, CPU, and BIOS the established MLC-DBS will be attached logically to those hardware. Figure 4 illustrates the message associated with the process of checking the hard disk SN, the listed codes imply the steps of comparing the pre-registered hard disk SN. With the found computer hard disk SN during the starting, the check between the two is necessary to decide whether MLC-DBS is working on the same installed computer or not. Therefore, the computer SN is treated as a system's signature. The pre-registered SN is captured during the installation phase of MLC-DBS, then encrypted and stored as a part of the system package.
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International Journal of Computational Intelligence and Information Security, March 2014 Vol. 5, No. 2 ISSN: 1837-7823
Figure 5 shows a capture of the message that clarifies the process of checking legal flash memory. The involved steps of checking the flash memory are similar to the steps of checking the hard disk. Figure 5 also, illustrates part of the code used to match the detected SN of the flash disk, during the start operation of MLCDBS with the pre-defined number. Figure 6 shows the printed message when the two SNs did not match.
International Journal of Computational Intelligence and Information Security, March 2014 Vol. 5, No. 2 ISSN: 1837-7823 managed properly. Therefore, we should improving PW characteristics, increasing PW entropy, and combing it with other methods. However, a PW should be both easy to remember but difficult to guess; a PW should appear random, but familiar and meaningful to the user. In this paper I presented two methods of authentication: the first I&A method is based on something that user knows (i.e., PW), the second I&A is based on something that user has, where the SN of USB Flash memory and CPU (also, SN, of BIOS, mother board, and hard disk could be used) are utilized. For future works, I will present MLC-DBS with other layers such as: encryption, decryption, digital signature, audit trail, intrusion detection system, notification system, and DB backup. As well as MLC-DBS involve the creation and manipulation of DB. Manipulations include encryption and decryption of data, tables' names, and fields' names.
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