Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.

L-51009 June 10, 1992 LUZON POLYMERS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT JACOBO C. CLAVE, HON. MINISTER OF LABOR BLAS OPLE and LUZON POLYMERS LABOR UNION (FFW), respondents. ROMERO, J.: This special civil action of certiorari questions the administrative grant of an emergency allowance of fifty pesos to the employees of a corporation with a capital stock of one million pesos. The emergency allowance of employees in the private sector has its origin in Presidential Decree No. 390, granting said allowance to government employees. On March 6, 1974, subsequent to the promulgation of P.D. No. 390, then President Marcos issued Letter of Instructions No. 174 to implement the policy enunciated in said decree in the private sector. He directed the Secretary of Labor "to take such measures as maybe necessary to ensure orderly and effective response by employers in the private sector." A pertinent provision of said LOI reads: 3. Determination of Amount of Allowances. 17 In the spirit of Presidential Decree No. 390 granting allowances to government employees receiving less than P600.00 monthly, employers are urged to give top priority to their lowest paid workers without prejudice, however, to extending similar assistance to higher grades of their personnel. For purposes of construing the minimum guideline, for the private sector, the following scales are recommended: For large-scale and medium-scale enterprises capitalized at P1 million to 4 million or more, P50.00 or higher; For small-scale enterprises capitalized at P100.000 to P1 million, P30 or higher; For enterprises lower than these categories, P15 or higher. (Emphasis supplied.) To explain the meaning and scope of application of LOI No. 174, on March 11, 1974, the Department of Labor issued an Interpretative Bulletin, a relevant section of which states: Sec. 5. Determination of Amount of Allowances. 17 In determining the amount of allowances that should be given by employers to meet the recommended minimum standards, the LOI has classified employers into three general categories. As an implementation policy, the Department of Labor shall consider as sufficient compliance with the scales of allowances recommended by the LOI if the following monthly allowances are given by employers: (a) P50.00 or higher where the authorized capital stock of the corporation, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings, exceeds P1 million; (b) P30.00 or higher where the authorized capital stock of the corporation, or the total assets in this case of other undertakings, is not less than P100,000.00 but not more than P1 million; and (c) P15.00 or higher where the authorized capital stock or total assets, as the case may be, is less than P100,000.00 (Emphasis supplied.) On July 31, 1974, the President issued P.D. No. 525 making mandatory the payment of emergency allowance under LOI No. 174. Pertinent sections thereof provide: Sec. 1. Effective 1 August 1974, all employers who have not paid their employees emergency allowance in accordance with Letter of Instructions No. 174 shall pay their employees who are receiving less than P600.00 a month emergency allowance of P50.00 a month if their capitalization is more than 1 million pesos, P30.00 if their capitalization is more than 100 thousand pesos but does not exceed 1 million pesos, and P15.00 if their capitalization is 100 thousand pesos or less; Provided, that this Decree shall not apply to any severely distressed industry or branch thereof, or enterprise therein, as defined by the Department of Labor in accordance with established standards and methods of determining the same. (Emphasis supplied.) xxx xxx xxx Sec. 3. The Department of Labor and the National Labor Relations Commission shall not entertain any complaints under this Decree against employers who have complied with Letter of Instructions No. 174 and filed the necessary reports with the Department of Labor.

For the guidance of those concerned, on August 5, 1974 then Secretary of Labor Blas F. Ople promulgated the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525 with the following provisions: Sec. 7. Amount of Allowances. 17 Every covered employer shall give to each of his employees who is receiving less than P600.00 a month not less than the following monthly allowances: (a) P50.00 where the authorized capital stock or total assets, whichever is applicable and higher, is P1 million or more; (b) P30.00 where the authorized capital stock or total assets, whichever is applicable and higher, is at least P100,000.00 but less than P1 million; and (c) P15.00 where the authorized capital stock or total assets, whichever is applicable and higher, is less than P100,000.00. Nothing herein shall prevent employers from granting allowances to their employees who will receive more than P600.00 a month, including the allowances. An employer, however, may grant his employees an allowance which, if added to their monthly salary, will not yield to them more than P600.00 a month. (Emphasis supplied.) Sec. 8. Compliance under LOI No. 174. 17 The Department of Labor and any of its entities, including the National Labor Relations Commission and its regional units, shall not entertain complaints against employers who have fully complied with Letter of Instructions No. 174. Where an employer has not granted to his employees the full minimum monthly allowance provided in LOI No. 174, such employer shall, within two (2) months from the effective date of these regulations, grant at least the difference between the applicable monthly allowance provided in the Decree and that actually paid the employees, retroactive to 1 August 1974. Under this statutory backdrop, petitioner, a corporation with an authorized capital stock of P1 million and total assets of P2,656,793.45 as of December 31, 1974, was named a respondent in a complaint for underpayment of emergency allowance filed before Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor in 1976 by the Luzon Polymers Labor Union (FFW) on behalf of 185 of its members. 1 Alleging that since February 1974, regular employees of petitioner corporation who were members of the union had been receiving P1.15 daily or P30.00 monthly emergency allowance, complainant-union contended that its members were entitled to P50.00 monthly emergency allowance in as much as their employer's total assets were over and above P1 million. For its part, petitioner corporation claimed that since it had fully complied with LOI No. 174, it had not underpaid its employees. Moreover, citing Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 525, it questioned the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor to entertain and hear the complaint. Noting that petitioner corporation had total assets of more than one million in 1973 and 1974 or P1,920,529.04 and P2,676,793.45, respectively, Officerin-Charge and Assistant Secretary Vicente Leogardo, Jr. ruled that petitioner had not fully complied with LOI No. 174 and therefore it could not validly invoke Sec. 8 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D.No. 525, Citing the decision of the Office of the President in "Kalinisan Workers Association (FFW) v. Kalinisan Incorporated" 2 which held that "capitalization" means the "authorized capital stock or total assets, whichever is applicable or higher" which meaning was reflected in the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525, the Assistant Secretary's order of May 23, 1977 accordingly directed the petitioner corporation to pay its complainant-employees the deficiency of the emergency allowance equivalent to P20 a month from the start of their employment but not earlier than August 1, 1974. Petitioner appealed to Secretary Ople but the latter dismissed the appeal for lack of merit in the order of February 21, 1978 and directed petitioner "to pay the difference of P20.00 as awarded in the appealed order." 3 Hence, petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the President which, through Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, likewise dismissed the appeal in an undated decision. 4 Having failed to obtain administrative relief, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari praying that Sec. 7 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525 be declared null and void "insofar as it increases the liability of employers capitalized at P1 million from P30.00 a month to P50.00 a month" and that the decision of Presidential Assistant Clave be reversed. Petitioner further prayed that execution of the questioned decision be stayed pending the resolution of the instant petition. 5 Granting this last prayer, on August 8, 1979 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the public respondents from executing the questioned decision. 6 Petitioner contends herein that: (a) in issuing the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525, particularly paragraph 7 thereof, the then Secretary of Labor exceeded his rule-making power in as much as said paragraph substantially altered and contradicted the provisions of P.D. No. 525; (b) the Secretary of Labor's order of February 21, 1978 requiring petitioner to pay the deficiency of the emergency allowance it had paid its employees, is contrary to Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 525 providing that the Department of Labor shall not entertain any complaint under said decree against employers who have complied with LOI No. 174; and (c) the decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave is contrary to law as it upholds the illegal exercise of lawmaking powers by the Secretary of Labor. At the outset, it should be clarified that P.D.No. 525 had been superseded by other decrees, notably P.D. Nos. 1123, 1614, 1634 and 1678. 7 This fact, however, is not a deterrent to the resolution of the instant petition in view of the apparent confusing provisions of the issuances and rules and regulations involved. To start with, paragraph 3 of LOI No. 174 mandates the grant of P50 a month emergency allowance for employees of "enterprises capitalized at P1 million to P4 million or more" and P30 for employees of "enterprises capitalized at P100,000 to P1 million." While the determinative factor for the amount of emergency allowance is simply the capitalization 8 of the employer concerned, the problem lies in the fact that the same provision of LOI No. 174 categorizes an enterprise capitalized at P1 million as under both the P50 and the P30 brackets of emergency allowance.

This grey area, however, was clarified by the Interpretative Bulletin on LOI No. 174 issued by the Department of Labor. Sec. 5 thereof which is quoted above states that an employer has to pay the fifty-pesos allowance "where the authorized capital stock of the corporation, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings, exceeds P1 million or thirty pesos" where the authorized capital stock of the corporation, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings, is not less than P100,000 but not more than P1 million." Clearly then, the petitioner falls under the bracket of employers required to give a thirty-peso monthly emergency allowance under LOI No. 174 in view of the undisputed fact that it is a "domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws" with an authorized capital stock of one million pesos. 9 While said administrative interpretation of LOI No. 174 is at best merely advisory for it is only the courts which have the power to determine what LOI No. 174 really means, 10 it is significant to note that said Sec. 5 of the Interpretative Bulletin was adopted in P.D. No. 525. As aforequoted, Sec. 1 of said decree states that an emergency allowance of thirty pesos shall be given to employees of corporations with a capitalization of "more than 100 thousand pesos but does not exceed 1 million pesos." What seems to have muddled the matter are the provisions of Sec. 7 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525. Under that section, petitioner appears to have been covered by the fifty-peso bracket for it states that a monthly emergency allowance of fifty pesos is required "where the authorized capital stock or total assets, whichever is applicable and higher, is P1 million or more." It should be observed that this provision not only injects a new determinative factor, i.e., the total assets of the employer, but also provides a choice for the determinative factor: whichever is higher between the employer's authorized capital stock and its total assets. An examination of the issuances of the Department of Labor, however, reveals that said option is more apparent than real. In its Interpretative Bulletin aforementioned, the Department uses as a basis for granting the emergency allowance the "authorized capital stock, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings." The phrase "authorized capital stock" clearly refers to employers which are incorporated by law and therefore have authorized capital stocks to speak of. Total assets as a determinative factor should only refer to "other undertakings." The same Interpretative Bulletin gives a clue as to what "other undertakings" mean, Section 2 thereof states: Sec. 2. Employees Covered. 17 The LOI appeals (sic) to all employers in the private sector. Included within the scope of its application are commercial, industrial, and agricultural establishments and enterprises, as well as all undertakings, institutions and organizations which are not operated or established for profit or gain, such as schools and other institutions of learning, hospitals, and charitable and religious organizations. Excluded from the application of the LOI are employers of house-helpers and persons in the personal service of another in relation to such workers. (Emphasis supplied) (Rollo, p. 25). Considering the provisions of this section and in view of the rule of ejusdem generis, the word "undertakings" in Sec. 5 of the Interpretative Bulletin should refer only to non-profit institutions. Therefore, in categorizing said institutions for the purpose of determining the amount of emergency allowance for their employees, their "total assets" is the criterion. The petitioner herein, not being a non-profit enterprise, the determinative factor in gauging the amount of emergency allowance to be granted to its employees is its authorized capital stock. Sec. 2 of the Interpretative Bulletin is reflected in the Department of Labor's Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525. Sec. 1 provides: Sec. 1. Employees Covered. 17 The Decree shall apply to all commercial, industrial, and agricultural establishments and enterprises, as well as to all undertakings; institutions and organizations which are not primarily organized for profit or gain, except to those specifically exempted under Section 3 of these regulations. (Rollo, p. 32). Thus, the same interpretation should necessarily be attached to the phrase "total assets" in Sec. 7 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525: it should refer only to employers which are not incorporated by law and which are strictly non-profit "undertakings." Corollarily, however, "total assets" maybe the measure for determining the amount of emergency allowance for enterprises such as single proprietorships and partnerships which are not backed up by capital stocks. Sec. 7 of the Rules and Regulations, therefore, introduced a matter which is not germane to the provisions of P.D. No. 525 by considering total assets as a criterion. Moreover, it further complicated the law by the addition of the phrase "whichever is applicable and higher." In practice, the exercise of the option expressed in such phrase may lead to absurd situations. As demonstrated in this case, that which is higher, meaning petitioner's total assets, may not also be applicable because petitioner is not an "undertaking" within the purview of the Interpretative Bulletin and the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525. Consequently, Sec. 7 of the said Rules has not conformed with the standards that P.D. No. 525 prescribes. 11 Having been based on an erroneous decision of the Office of the President, it is further rendered obnoxious by the principle that an administrative agency like the Department of Labor cannot amend the law it seeks to implement. 12 We need not concern ourselves unduly with regard to petitioner's contention that the complaint for under payment of emergency allowance is barred by Sec. 3 of P.D. 525. Suffice it to say that Sec. 7 of the Rules is not the proper basis for taking cognizance of the case. As alleged by public respondents, Sec. 3 clearly states that compliance should be with LOI No. 174 and not with the implementing rules which were subsequently issued by the Department of Labor. The issue of the sufficiency of the emergency allowance granted by employers to its employees has been ventilated before this Court. 13 In none of them, however, was the validity of Sec. 7 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525 specifically put in issue as in the instant case. While this Court has always been guided by the principle that in labor cases, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the workers, we cannot close our eyes to the possible abuse of the rule making power on the part of the Secretary of Labor under the guise of promoting social justice and affording protection to labor.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Sec. 7 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525 insofar as it is contradictory to the provisions of said decree as herein by discussed, is hereby declared NULL and VOID. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on August 8, 1979 is hereby made PERMANENT. No costs. SO ORDERED. Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide Jr., J., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. L-57665 July 2, 1990 ALEJA SIBAYAN VDA. DE PINEDA, CLARA SIBAYAN VDA. DE GADDI, and MIGUELA SIBAYAN RAMENTO, petitioners, vs. The HON. TEODORO PEA, MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES; The HON. JUANITO FERNANDEZ, DIRECTOR OF MINES & GEOSCIENCES; and the KM. 21 MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION; The BAGUIO GOLD MINING COMPANY, INC.; ELVIRA DE CARMELO and JOSEPH PALENGAOAN, respondents. Rodolfo D. Dela Cruz for petitioners. Emiliano L. Gayo and Honorato Y. Aquino for private respondents. CORTES, J.: Assailed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is that part of the decision of the Director of Mines, affirmed by the Minister of Natural Resources, which declared that petitioners have abandoned and lost their rights over their mining claim. This case originated from a protest case for alleged overlapping or encroachment between two mining claims. The relevant facts are as follows: The "Ped" mining claim was located by Pedro Sibayan in January, 1932. After Sibayan's death, his heirs Miguela and Aleja Sibayan executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement wherein they waived their rights and interest over the "Ped" claim, among others, in favor of co-heir Feliza Sibayan. Feliza then transferred said claims to Sofia Reyes. The "Ullmann" mining claim was located by Elvira Carmelo in February, 1932, and was subsequently transferred to Joseph Palengaoan. In 1962, Reyes, Palengaoan and several others formed the KM. 21 Mining Association, later converted into the KM. 21 Exploration Corporation, to which the members conveyed their respective mining claims, including the "Ped" and "Ullmann" claims. Ultimately, the claims were assigned to the Baguio Gold Mining Company for operation. During this time, an amended declaration of location for the "Ullmann" claim was registered. On November 23, 1972, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. Q-17136 against Feliza Sibayan, Sofia Reyes, KM. 21 Mining Exploration Corporation, et. al., with the Court of First Instance, Quezon City, Branch IX. Petitioners claimed that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement from which private respondents derived their ownership and possession over the "Ped" claim was maliciously falsified [Annex "I" to the Petition; Rollo, pp. 78-79] and prayed for annulment of all subsequent transfers involving the mining claims. During the pre-trial of Civil Case No. Q-17136, the parties entered into an amicable settlement, agreeing that: (1) private respondents win return to petitioners the disputed mining claims, including the "Ped" claim; (2) petitioners will reimburse private respondents all expenses, like assessment taxes, incurred in the preservation of the claims; and (3) private respondents shall execute the necessary documents to reconvey the mining claims to petitioners (Annex "I" to the Petition, pp. 4-5; Rollo, p. 78-79]. Thus, the Court of First Instance rendered a decision on November 11, 1974 ordering the parties to comply with the above settlement [Decision of the Minister of Natural Resources, p. 4; Annex "E" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 52]. On July 20, 1974, petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter-complaint (Mines Administrative Case No. V-784) against private respondents for alleged overlapping and encroachment of the "Ullmann" claim over the "Ped" claim. On January 10, 1977, the Director of Mines rendered a decision declaring that there was no conflict between the "Ped" and "Ullmann" claims, the dispositive portion of which reads:

VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the protest and complaint-in-intervention should be, as hereby they are DISMISSED. Accordingly, respondents are hereby given the preferential right to possess, explore, develop, exploit and operate the area covered by their "Ullmann" claim. [Decision of the Director of Mines, p. 4; Rollo, p. 32]. Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No. 463 (Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974) took effect on May 17, 1974, the provisions of the law were made applicable to petitioners. Pres. Decree No. 463 mandates compliance with certain requirements in order for subsisting mining claims, such as the "Ped" claim, to avail of the benefits granted under the Decree. Otherwise, mining rights to the claim will be lost. The requirements are embodied in Sections 100 and 101, and Section 180 of the implementing regulations, quoted as follows: Sec. 100. Old Valid Mining Rights May Come Under This Decree. Holders of valid and subsisting mining locations and other rights under other laws, irrespective of the areas covered, may avail of the rights and privileges granted under this Decree by making the necessary application therefor and approval thereof by the Director within a period of two (2) years from the date of approval of this Decree. Sec. 101. Recognition and Survey of Old Subsisting Mining Claims. All mining grants, patents, locations, leases and permits subsisting at the time of the approval of this Decree shall be recognized if registered pursuant to Section 100 hereof. Provided, that Spanish Royal Grants and unpatented mining claims located and registered under the Act of the United States Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended, otherwise known as the "Philippine Bill", shall be surveyed within one (1) year from the approval of this Decree: Provided, further, That no such mining rights shall be recognized if there is failure to comply with the fundamental requirements of the respective grants: And provided, finally, That such grants, patents, locations, leases or permits as may be recognized by the Director after proper investigation, shall comply with the applicable provisions of this Decree, more particularly with the annual work obligations, submittal of reports, fiscal provisions and other obligations. [Emphasis supplied]. Sec. 180. Failure to File Application to Avail of the Rights and Privileges Under the Decree Mining grants, patents, locations, leases, permits and other mining rights subsisting at the time of the approval of the Decree for which no corresponding application under Section 100 and 101 of the Decree has been filed with the period provided in Section 176 hereof shall be considered to have lapsed, and the area covered thereby, shall be open to relocation as if no grant, patent, location, lease, permit and other mining rights have been made or granted thereon. Finding that petitioners failed to comply with the above-cited provisions, respondent director declared in the impugned portion of the decision that: The records of this case show that respondents submitted in evidence (Exhibit 16) a certification dated August 24, 1976 issued by our Mines Regional Officer in Baguio City to the effect that protestants [petitioners] failed to file the required application to avail for "Ped" mineral claim. Under the circumstances, and considering that the period for the filing of said application has already expired as of May 17, 1976, protestants [petitioners] have lost whatever rights they have over their mining claim involved in this case. Moreover, protestants [petitioners] failed to perform the required annual assessment work since 1952 as evidenced by the certification issued by the Mining Recorder of Benguet (Exh. 17). Needless to state that failure to perform the required annual assessment work constitutes abandonment of the mining claim [Emphasis supplied; Decision of the Director of Mines, pp. 3-4; Annex "C" to the Petition; Rollo, pp. 31-32]. On appeal to the Minister of Natural Resources, petitioners argued that respondent Director was without jurisdiction or exceeded his jurisdiction in ruling that they have lost their rights over the "Ped" mining claim, since the case was only for overlapping or encroachment and the question of whether they complied with the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463 was never placed at issue in the pleadings. On November 19, 1980, then Minister of Natural Resources Jose J. Leido disposed of the appeal thus: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant appeal is hereby dismissed and the decision, dated January 10, 1977, of the Director of Mines affirmed. SO ORDERED. [Decision of Secretary of Natural Resources, p. 10; Annex "E" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 58]. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by respondent Minister in an Order dated July 10, 1981 [Order, p. 2; Annex "L" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 110]. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Petitioners pray for an order to (1) annul that portion of the decision which declared them to have abandoned and lost their rights on their "Ped" claim; (2) require public respondents to recognize petitioners' vested rights on their "Ped" mining claim; (3) enjoin private respondents to confine themselves within the boundaries of their "Ullmann" claim; and (4) require private respondents to return to petitioners' possession the "Ped" mineral claim [Petition, p. 18; Rollo, p. 19]. Private respondents and the Solicitor General filed their respective Comments, the Solicitor General adopting petitioners' position. Private respondents then filed their Comment to the Solicitor General's Comment. Thereafter, the Solicitor General submitted his Reply. Whereupon, the case was deemed submitted for decision. Petitioners reiterate that the portion of the decision which declared petitioners to have lost and/or abandoned their rights to the "Ped" mining claim was issued without jurisdiction, in violation of due process and in grave abuse of discretion.

As counter-argument, private respondents assert that under Section 49 of Pres. Decree No. 463, when petitioners filed their protest case for overlapping of mining claims, they automatically subjected their "Ped" claim to questions on the validity of its location and on the locator's having complied with all the requirements of the Decree. The issues to be resolved in this case are (1) whether or not public respondents have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the "Ped" claim in a protest case of overlapping of mining claims; and (2) should public respondents have such jurisdiction, whether or not they committed grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction in declaring petitioners to have abandoned their mining claim. On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioners contend that public respondents may not validly and legally take cognizance of an issue not raised in the complaint, i.e., the issue of the validity of the "Ped" mining claim. This assertion is mistaken. Petitioners had filed the protest case pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 463 which vests the Bureau of Mines with jurisdiction over protests involving mining claims [Section 48, Pres. Decree No. 463]. Under the same Decree, Section 90 confers upon the Secretary of Natural Resources, upon recommendation of the Director of Mines, the authority to issue rules, regulations and orders necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of the Decree. In accordance with the statutory grant of rulemaking power, the Department Secretary on May 17, 1975 issued the Consolidated Mines Administrative Order Implementing Pres. Decree No. 463, which was published in the Official Gazette on June 16, 1975. One such implementing rule is Section 128, which respondent Minister of Natural Resources relied upon in his decision to dispose of the jurisdictional issue raise d by petitioners. Section 128 provides: Sec. 128. Issues Joined . . . The Director, or the Secretary, in case of appeals, may motu proprio look into the validity of mining claims, whether raised as an issue or not. It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies [People v. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125 (1957); Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183]. In order to be valid, the administrative regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, conform to the standards that the law prescribes [People v. Exconde, supra, citing Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 727 (1940); Pangasinan Transportation v. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil. 221 (1940)], and must relate solely to carrying into effect the general provisions of the law [U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119 (1914)]. With these guidelines, Section 128 of the implementing rules invoked by public respondents as basis for their jurisdiction cannot be tainted with invalidity. First, it was issued by the Department Head pursuant to validly delegated rule-making powers. Second, it does not contravene the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463, nor does it expand the coverage of the Decree. Section 128 merely prescribes a procedural rule to implement the general provisions of the enabling law. It does not amend or extend the provisions of the statute [People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450, citing University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376 (1953)]. Neither can it be maintained that such an implementing rule results in a denial of procedural due process, for it is axiomatic in administrative law that what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard [Catura v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-27392, January 30,1971, 37 SCRA 303, citing De Borja v. Tan, 93 Phil. 167 (1953)]. In this case, petitioners were afforded the opportunity to be heard on the validity of the "Ped" mining claim when they submitted rebuttal evidence on appeal. Section 128, being a valid implementing rule, has the force and effect of law. Thus, public respondents were duly empowered to inquire into the validity of the mining claims involved in the protest case, even if not raised in issue. Having resolved the question of jurisdiction, the Court shall next determine if public respondents acted within their jurisdiction, or if they committed grave abuse of discretion which would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for. As a rule, the courts will not interfere with purely administrative matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, and findings of fact, of the administrative agency. The exception is when there is a clear showing that the agency acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when it acted in a capricious manner such that its action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction [Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture, G.R. No. L-21167. March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Beautifont, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50141, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 481]. The petition is impressed with merit. Public respondents found that petitioners failed to comply with the requirements set by law, and thus declared petitioners to have abandoned and lost their rights over the "Ped" claim. However, respondent director's finding that petitioners failed to file the availment-application was based solely on evidence submitted by private respondents. This consisted of a certification issued by the Mines Regional Officer in Baguio City dated August 24, 1976 stating that petitioners failed to file the availment-application for the "Ped" claim within the period provided by law. The finding is effectively contradicted by the rebuttal evidence submitted by petitioners on appeal consisting of an "Affidavit to Avail of Benefits" and an "Application for Order of Survey of Mining Claim" (AppealAnnex "B" and "B-1", Rollo, pp. 47-48) filed by petitioners with the Bureau of Mines office in Manila on May 12, 1975.

The certification issued by the Mines Regional Officer of Baguio City cannot prevail over the documents clearly evidencing the petitioners' filing the application. Not only was the application filed within the prescriptive period, it was also duly filed with the Bureau of Mines Office in Manila, the venue specified under Section 176 of the implementing rules. Private respondents argue that the documents were not filed at the proper time since they were not formally offered in evidence when the case was still before the respondent Director, and were only submitted on appeal. The contention is clearly untenable. Petitioners precisely were unaware that the validity of the "Ped" claim would be passed upon in the protest case since such was not raised as an issue. Hence it was only after the decision in the protest case was rendered that petitioners found the need to present evidence on appeal relating to the validity of the "Ped" claim. Clearly, respondent Minister gravely abused his discretion when he disregarded the rebuttal evidence submitted by petitioners which otherwise would have had the effect of reversing respondent Director's finding. As to petitioners' supposed failure to perform annual work obligations on the "Ped" claim since 1952, the conclusion is only partly correct. Annual work obligations, consisting of payment of assessment and taxes, had in fact been paid up to the year 1975, although not by petitioners. The record shows that the payor was the Baguio Gold Mining Company, to which the "Ped" claim, among others, had been assigned by private respondents for operation (Rollo, pp. 93-98.) And subsequent to 1975, petitioners paid the taxes due up to 1981, in compliance with the law's mandate ( Rollo, pp. 100-101.) All the documents showing these decisive facts were annexed to petitioners' "Rejoinder to Motion to Strike Out Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration" dated February 25, 1981, and submitted to respondent Minister [Annex "I" to the Petition, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 81-82]. That petitioners were not the actual payors of the assessment due up to 1975 can be attributed to the fact that possession of the subject claim, even up to the date when the present petition was submitted for decision, remained with private respondents, and its ownership had been in dispute in Civil Case No. Q-17136. By the terms of the amicable settlement contained in the November 11, 1974 decision in said civil case, which had long attained finality, private respondent promised to return possession of the "Ped" claim to petitioners, subject to reimbursement by petitioners of all assessments and necessary expenses paid for by private respondents. Petitioners therefore cannot be faulted with non-payment of the assessment works, since such payment was in fact made, at least until 1975, by the party to which such payment pertained. Consequently, such payment inures to the benefit of petitioners. Respondent Minister evidently knew of the existence of the amicable settlement, since he discussed the terms thereof in his decision [Decision of the Minister of Natural Resources, p. 4; Annex "E" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 52]. Nevertheless, respondent Minister overlooked the fact that from the terms of the settlement, petitioners clearly were not liable to pay the assessment works for the years in question, and that consequently there was no basis for a finding of abandonment of the "Ped" claim by petitioners. Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that public respondents had the authority to ascertain the validity of the "Ped" claim. Nevertheless, in affirming that portion of the decision of the Director of Mines declaring petitioners to have "abandoned and lost their rights" over the "Ped" claim, respondent Minister committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. That part of the decision of the Director of Mines dated January 10, 1977 in Mines Administrative Case No. V-784 declaring petitioners to have "abandoned and lost their rights" over the "Ped" mineral claim is hereby declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED. Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur. Fernan, C.J., is on leave. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988 LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL, JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTOC. BLAS, JR., ELPEDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondent. Balgos & Perez Law Offices for petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondents. GANCAYCO, J.: Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like three

(3) days before the date of the examination? Theses are the issues presented to the court by this petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 10598, * declaring null and void the other dated Ocober 21, 1986 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 86-37950 entitled " Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs. Professional Regulation Commission." The records shows the following undisputed facts: On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions: No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. 1 On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitution. Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petiton was granted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, to wit: WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious the same is hereby GRANTED and the other dated October 21, 1986 issued by respondent court is declared null and void. The respondent court is further directed to dismiss with prejudice Civil Case No. 86-37950 for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. No cost in this instance. SO ORDERED. 2 Hence, this petition. The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co-equal bodies. Thus it held That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with the Regional Trial Court is beyond question, and co-equal bodies have no power to control each other or interfere with each other's acts. 3 To strenghten its position, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza, 4 which cites Pineda vs. Lantin 5 and Philippine Pacific Fishing, Inc. vs. Luna, 6 where this Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the two being co-equal bodies. After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case, We rule in favor of the petitioner. The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why this Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission was that this was so provided for by the law. In Pineda vs. Lantin, We explained that whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagree with an order or ruling of the Securities and Exchange Commission, he cannot seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction since under the Rules of Court and Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act No. 635, creating and setting forth the powers and functions of the old Securities and Exchange Commission, his remedy is to go the Supreme Court on a petition for review. Likewise, in Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna, it was stressed that if an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission is erroneous, the appropriate remedy take is first, within the Commission itself, then, to the Supreme Court as mandated in Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the law creating the new Securities and Exchange Commission. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The respondent court erred when it place the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Professional Regulation Commsision in the same category. As alraedy mentioned, with respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. Unlike Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is no provision in Presidential Decree No. 223, creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court. Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a

resolution of the respondent Professional Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. 7 What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. 8 Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). In Medalla vs. Sayo, 9 this rule was thoroughly propounded on, to wit: In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the residential Executive Asssistant is concerned, there should be no question but that the power of judicial review should be upheld. The following rulings buttress this conclusion: The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to recognize the most important principle in our system of government, i.e., the separation of powers into three co-equal departments, the executives, the legislative and the judicial, each supreme within its own assigned powers and duties. When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or implement it (the law). A judicial review of the President's decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the Courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the jucucial review of all administrative acts of all administrative officers. 10 Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II , 11 is another case in point. Here, "the Executive Office"' of the Department of Education and Culture issued Memorandum Order No. 93 under the authority of then Secretary of Education Juan Manuel. As in this case, a complaint for injunction was filed with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the enforcement of the circular would impair some contracts already entered into by public school teachers. It was the contention of petitioner therein that "the Court of First Instance is not empowered to amend, reverse and modify what is otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the memorandum circular issued by the Executive Office which has the force and effect of law." In resolving the issue, We held: ... We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case No. II-240 (8) because the plaintiff therein asked the lower court for relief, in the form of injunction, in defense of a legal right (freedom to enter into contracts) ..... Hence there is a clear infringement of private respondent's constitutional right to enter into agreements not contrary to law, which might run the risk of being violated by the threatened implementation of Executive Office Memorandum Circular No. 93, dated February 5, 1968, which prohibits, with certain exceptions, cashiers and disbursing officers from honoring special powers of attorney executed by the payee employees. The respondent Court is not only right but duty bound to take cognizance of cases of this nature wherein a constitutional and statutory right is allegedly infringed by the administrative action of a government office. Courts of first Instance have original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, Republic Act 296, as amended) . 12 (Emphasis supplied.) In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 13 We ruled that a judge of the Court of First Instance has the authority to decide on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its validity had been contested before the Secretary of Justice and an opinion thereon had been rendered. In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by the respondent Professional Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides: SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise: xxx xxx xxx (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The contention is devoid of merit. In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. In Black's Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation . 14 This does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to

implement its purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations. The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer. 15 In this case, the issue presented was whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over a case involving an order of the Commission on Elections awarding a contract to a private party which originated from an invitation to bid. The said issue came about because under the laws then in force, final awards, judgments, decisions or orders of the Commission on Elections fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Hence, it has been consistently held that "it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections relative to the conduct of elections and the enforcement of election laws." 16 As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in saidcase, We said: We are however, far from convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions, of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis supplied.) xxx xxx xxx We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned order was issued; and that this order of the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt order may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts. (Emphasis supplied.) 17 One other case that should be mentioned in this regard is Salud vs. Central Bank of the Philippines. 18 Here, petitioner Central Bank, like respondent in this case, argued that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, orders of the Monetary Board are appealable only to the Intermediate Appellate Court. Thus: The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate, for the very first time, that the Monetary Board is among the "quasijudicial ... boards" whose judgments are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the IAC; hence, it is only said Court, "to the exclusion of the Regional Trial Courts," that may review the Monetary Board's resolutions. 19 Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following pronouncement: The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The IAC has no appellate jurisdiction over resolution or orders of the Monetary Board. No law prescribes any mode of appeal from the Monetary Board to the IAC. 20 In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution. Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction, We find it imperative to decide once and for all the validity of Resolution No. 105 so as to provide the much awaited relief to those who are and will be affected by it. Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, collge or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions . ... 21 The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period. It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. 22 Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United States Supreme Court:

The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings and vocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and giv to them their highest enjoyment. 23 Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full fledged public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. At this juncture, We call attention to Our pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 24 regarding academic freedom to wit: ... It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed. In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution No. 105 null and void and of no force and effect for being unconstitutional. This decision is immediately executory. No costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa and Cruz, JJ., concur. Grio-Aquino, J., took no part. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991 HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents. NARVASA, J.:p The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication? The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth. 1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those

who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3 Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4 2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5 3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8 4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded." 5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10 6. Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring his attendance therein. 11 On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cario) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition: To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence. xxx xxx xxx 7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14 8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.: a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17 9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cario's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced

without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra). It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition. The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues: 1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and 2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike. The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely. The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22 The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25 (1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights; (2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court; (3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection; (4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; (5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; (6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families; (7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights; (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority; (9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and (11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law. As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26 But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings. "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29 "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31 In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32 Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34 Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court. The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them. This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done. In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case ( i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ, concur. EN BANC G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975 SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations, and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner, vs. HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public Service Officer of Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY SITUATED, respondents. Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Ist. Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners. Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents. MARTIN, J.: This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.", which reads as follows: IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied). Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. 2 Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities: 3 b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines. c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... . h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency. For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation. 4 Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein." Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality. On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order: IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).

Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for reconsideration first filed on the fundamental submission that the Order is a patent nullity. 6 As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of factfinding investigations. It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. 10 We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" 11 with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none. Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules of Court 13 to abridge its application. The seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon witnesses and the authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise shall be "subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly seized upon to require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the Rules, a specific case must be pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court's judicial or adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial subpoena can be issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized, however, that an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the "restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code could mean the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear. 15 Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown 16 and even before the issuance of a complaint. 17 It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. 19 Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light. 20 Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. 21 In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant. 22 There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions 23 fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, 24 is reasonably relevant to the investigations. We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to adversary proceedings. 25 In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 26 the Court ruled that since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth against the respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a proceeding criminal or penal in nature, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 27 the same approach was followed in the administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice the medical profession. Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing any administrative charge. 28 He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges. 29 Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise. 30 Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against selfincrimination. A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power of the President of the Philippines to issue subpoena. 31 More tersely stated, respondents would now challenge, in a collateral way, the validity of the basic authority, Executive Order No. 4, as amended in part by Executive Order No. 88. Unfortunately, for reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force and effect of statutes 32 cannot be collaterally impeached. 33 Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now. 34 The settled rule is that the Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. 35

Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue. WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set aside and declared of no force and effect. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Castro, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur. Makalintal, C.J., concurs in the result. Barredo, Makasiar, and Concepcion, Jr., JJ, took no part. Separate Opinions Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 77707 August 8, 1988 PEDRO W. GUERZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF ENERGY UTILIZATION, F. C. CAASI JR., and PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondents. Llego, Llego & Collera for petitioner. Florentino G. Dumlao, Jr. for respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. CORTES, J.: Raised by petitioner to this Court is the issue of whether or not the Bureau of Energy Utilization, the agency charged with regulating the operations and trade practices of the petroleum industry, has the power to order a service station operator-lessee to vacate the service station and to turn over its possession to the oil company-lessor upon the expiration of the dealership and lease agreements. The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: Basic antecedent facts show that on January 9, 1981 petitioner Pedro Guerzon executed with Basic Landoil Energy Corporation, which was later acquired by respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, a contract denominated as "Service Station Lease" for the use and operation of respondent SHELL's properties, facilities and equipment, which included four (4) pieces of fuel dispensing Pumps and one (1) piece air compressor, for a period of five (5) years from January 15, 1981 and ending on January 14, 1986. On January 7, 1981 petitioner likewise executed with the same Corporation a "Dealer's Sales Contract" for the sale by petitioner of respondent SHELL's petroleum and other products in the leased service station which contract expired April 12,1986. On April 13,1981, respondent Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) approved the Dealer's Sales Contract pursuant to which petitioner was appointed dealer of SHELL's gasoline and other petroleum products which he was to sell at the gasoline station located at Cagayan de Oro City. On the same day, respondent BEU issued a certificate of authority in petitioner's favor, which had a 5-year period of validity, in line with the terms of the contract. Paragraph 9 of the Service Station Lease Contract provides: The cancellation or termination of the Dealer's Sales Contract executed between the COMPANY and the LESSEE on January 7,1981 shall automatically cancel this Lease. As early as January 2, 1986 respondent SHELL through its District ManagerReseller Mindanao wrote to petitioner informing him that the Company was not renewing the Dealer's Sales Contract which was to expire on April 12, 1986 together with the service station lease and reminding him to take appropriate steps to wind up his business activities at the station and, on the appropriate date to hand over the station with all its facilities and equipment to the representative of respondent. A copy of this letter was furnished respondent BEU, through the latter's Mindanao Division Office. On April 12, 1986, respondent SHELL wrote petitioner reiterating the decision not to extend the Dealer's Sales Contract, demanding the surrender of the station premises and all company owned equipment to the respondent's representative. On April 15, 1986 respondent BEU, through respondent Caasi, Jr., officer- in-charge of its Mindanao Division Office, issued the assailed order directing the petitioner as follows:

(1) immediately vacate the service station abovementioned and turn it over to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation; and (2) show cause in writing, under oath within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why no administrative and/or criminal proceedings shall be instituted against you for the aforesaid violation. The order directed that a copy of the same be furnished the PCINP Commander of Cagayan de Oro City, requesting prompt and effective enforcement of the directive and submitting to the BEU of the result of the action taken thereon. On April 22, 1986, pursuant to the order of April 15, 1986, respondent SHELL, accompanied by law enforcement officers, was able to secure possession of the gasoline station in question together with the requisite equipments and accessories, and turned them over to the control of the personnel of respondent SHELL who accompanied them. On May 9, 1986, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental a complaint for certiorari, injunction and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction (Civil Case No. 10619) to annul the disputed order dated April 15, 1986 of respondent F.C. Caasi, Jr., but on September 18,1986 this complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to annul the order of a quasi-judicial body of equivalent category as the Regional Trial Court. [Rollo, pp. 37-39.] Thus, petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction against Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, F.C. Caasi, Jr. and the Bureau of Energy Utilization seeking the annulment of respondent Caasi, Jr.'s order dated April 15, 1986 and the restoration to petitioner of possession of the service station and the equipment removed therefrom. In a decision promulgated on February 10, 1987, the Court of Appeals denied due course and dismissed the petition after holding the disputed order valid and the proceedings undertaken to implement the same sanctioned by Presidential Decree No. 1206, as amended. Hence, petitioner's recourse to this Court. In his petition for review, petitioner ascribed the following errors to the Court of Appeals: I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT BUREAU OF ENERGY UTILIZATION HAS JURISDICTION TO EJECT THE PETITIONER FROM THE GASOLINE SERVICE STATION LEASED. II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO NECESSITY OF ANY NOTICE AND HEARING PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE DISPUTED ORDER ISSUED BY RESPONDENT BUREAU OF ENERGY UTILIZATION ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO VACATE THE LEASED PREMISES. [Rollo, p. 13] The controversy revolves around the assailed order issued by respondent F.C. Caasi, Jr., Officer-in-Charge of the Mindanao Division Office of the Bureau of Energy Utilization, which reads: 15 April 1986 Mr. Pedro W. Guerzon Corner Velez-Recto Streets Cagayan de Oro City Sir: We were officially informed by Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation that you refused to vacate its company-owned service station at the above address despite the fact that you were advised by Shell in its letter of January 02, 1986 that it will not renew the Dealer's Sales Contract between yourself and the company upon its expiration on April 12,1986. Your continued occupancy of the service station is not only considered a violation of BEU laws, rules and regulations but is also detrimental to the interests of the parties concerned and the public. In view thereof, you are hereby directed to: (1) immediately vacate the service station abovementioned and turn it over to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation; and (2) show cause in writing, under oath within ten (1O) days from receipt hereof why no administrative and/or criminal proceedings shall be instituted against you for the aforesaid violation.

Let a copy of this directive be furnished the PC-INP Commander of Cagayan de Oro City, who is hereby requested to cause the prompt and effective enforcement hereof and to submit to this Bureau the result/s of the action/s taken thereon. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) F.C. CAASI JR. Officer-in-Charge cc: PC/INP Commander Cagayan de Oro City Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation Sasa, Davao City/Cagayan de Oro City BEU-Manila [Rollo, p. 122; Emphasis supplied.] As stated at the outset, whether or not it is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Energy Utilization to issue the above order is the primary issue to be resolved. The Solicitor General contends that since petitioner's license to sell petroleum products expired on April 12,1986, when his dealership and lease contracts expired, as of the following day, April 13, 1986 he was engaged in illegal trading in petroleum products in violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 33 [Rollo, pp. 100-101.] The pertinent provisions of B.P. No. 33 state: Sec. 2. Prohibited Acts.The following acts are prohibited and penalized: (a) Illegal trading in petroleum and/or petroleum products; xxx xxx xxx Sec. 3. Definition of terms.For the purposes of this Act, the si following terms shall be understood to mean: Illegal trading in petroleum and/or petroleum products-the sale or distribution of petroleum products for profit without license or authority from the Government; non-issuance of receipts by licensed traders; misrepresentation as to quality and/or quantity; an sa oil companies, distributors and/or dealers violative of government rules and regulations. xxx xxx xxx Thus, concludes the Solicitor General, the Bureau of Energy nation had the power to issue, and was justified in issuing, the order to vacate pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1206, as amended, the pertinent portion of which provides: Sec. 7. Bureau of Energy Utilization.There is created in the Department a Bureau of Energy Utilization, hereafter referred to in this Section as the Bureau, which shall have the following powers and functions, among others: xxx xxx xxx e. After due notice and hearing, impose and collect a fine not exceeding One Thousand Pesos, for every violation or noncompliance with any term or condition of any certificate, license, or permit issued by the Bureau or of any of its orders, decisions, rules and regulations. The fine so imposed shall be paid to the Bureau, and failure to pay the fine within the time specified in the order or decision of the Bureau or failure to cease and discontinue the violation or noncompliance shall be deemed good and sufficient reason for the suspension, closure or stoppage of operations of the establishment of the person guilty of the violation or non-compliance. In case the violation or default is committed by a corporation or association, the manager or person who has charge of the management of the corporation or association and the officers or directors thereof who have ordered or authorized the violation or default shall be solidarily liable for the payment of the fine. The Bureau shall have the power and authority to issue corresponding writs of execution directing the City Sheriff or provincial Sheriff or other peace officers whom it may appoint to enforce the fine or the order of closure, suspension or stoppage of operations. Payment may also be enforced by appropriate action brought in a court of competent jurisdiction. The remedy provided herein shall not be a bar to or affect any other remedy under existing laws, but shall be cumulative and additional to such remedies; xxx xxx xxx

However, the Solicitor General's line of reasoning is fatally flawed by the failure of the facts to support it. From a cursory reading of the assailed order, it is readily apparent that the order is premised on petitioner's refusal to vacate the service station in spite of the expiration and non-renewal of his dealership and lease agreements with respondent Shell. Nowhere in the order is it stated that petitioner had engaged in illegal trading in petroleum products or had committed any other violation of B.P. Blg. 33. The order merely makes a vague reference to a "violation of BEU laws, rules and regulations," without stating the specific provision violated. That petitioner had engaged in illegal trading in petroleum products cannot even be implied from the wording of the assailed order. But then, even if petitioner was indeed engaged in illegal trading in petroleum products, there was no basis under B.P. Blg. 33 to order him to vacate the service station and to turn it over to respondent Shell. Illegal trading in petroleum products is a criminal act wherein the injured party is the State. Respondent Shell is not even alleged by the Solicitor General as a private party prejudiced and, therefore, it can claim no relief if a criminal case is instituted. * Even on the assumption that petitioner's continued occupancy and operation of the service station constituted a violation of a law or regulation, still the Court has no recourse but to rule against the legality of the order, the Bureau of Energy Utilization not being empowered to issue it. Section 7 of P.D. No. 1206, as amended, is very clear as to the courses of action that the Bureau of Energy Utilization may take in case of a violation or non- compliance with any term or condition of any certificate, license or permit issued by the Bureau or any of its orders, decisions, rules or regulations. The Bureau may: (1) impose a fine not exceeding P1,000.00; and (2) in case of failure to pay the fine imposed or to cease and discontinue the violation or non-compliance, order the suspension, closure or stoppage of operations of the establishment of the guilty party. Its authority is limited to these two (2) options. It can do no more, as there is nothing in P.D. No. 1206, as amended, which empowers the Bureau to issue an order to vacate in case of a violation. As it is, jurisdiction to order a lessee to vacate the leased premises is vested in the civil courts in an appropriate case for unlawful detainer or accion publiciana [Secs. 19(2) and 33(2), B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.] There is nothing in P.D. No. 1206, as amended, that would suggest that the same or similar jurisdiction has been granted to the Bureau of Energy Utilization. It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof [Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No. L-23004, June 30,1965,14 SCRA 620; Sy v. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-41480, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 570.] That issuing the order to vacate was the most effective way of stopping any illegal trading in petroleum products is no excuse for a deviation from this rule. Otherwise, adherence to the rule of law would be rendered meaningless. Moreover, contrary to the Solicitor General's theory, the text of the assailed order leaves no room for doubt that it was issued in connection with an adjudication of the contractual dispute between respondent Shell and petitioner. But then the Bureau of Energy Utilization, like its predecessor, the defunct Oil Industry Commission, has no power to decide contractual disputes between gasoline dealers and oil companies, in the absence of an express provision of law granting to it such power [see Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Oil Industry Commission, G.R. No. L-41315, November 13, 1986,145 SCRA 433.] As explicitly stated in the law, in connection with the exercise of quasi-judicial powers, the Bureau's jurisdiction is limited to cases involving violation or non-compliance with any term or condition of any certificate, license or permit issued by it or of any of its orders, decisions, rules or regulations. Viewed from any angle, respondent F.C. Caasi, Jr., in issuing the assailed order, acted beyond his authority and overstepped the powers granted by P.D. No. 1206, as amended. The assailed order was, therefore, null and void. Even if the issuance of the order to vacate was within the authority of respondent Caasi, Jr., still its nullity is apparent because of the failure to comply with the requirement of notice and hearing. That P.D. No. 1206, as amended, requires notice and hearing before any administrative penalty provided in Sec. (7)e may be imposed is patent. Sec. (7)e provides for a gradation of penalties of which the imposition of a fine in an amount not exceeding P1,000.00 is the least severe, and requires that even before a fine is imposed notice and an opportunity to be heard be given to the offender. While the order dated April 15, 1986 is null and void, the Court, however, finds itself unable to issue the writ of mandatory injunction prayed for ordering respondent Shell to restore possession of the service station and the equipment and facilities therein to petitioner. Petitioner himself had admitted in his petition that his dealership and lease agreements with respondent Shell had already expired. Recognized the validity of the termination of the agreements, he requested for their renewal. However, this request was denied. [Rollo, p. 9] Undeniably, after April 12, 1986, any right petitioner had to possess the service station and the equipment and facilities therein had been extinguished. No basis for an affirmative relief therefore exist. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 10, 1987 is REVERSED and the Order dated April 15,1986 issued by respondent Caasi, Jr. of the Bureau of Energy Utilization is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. However, the right of petitioner to the possession of the service station and the equipment and facilities having been extinguished, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction is DENIED. SO ORDERED. Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur. Fernan, C.J., took no part. Footnotes * B.P. Blg. 33 penalizes a person guilty of illegal trading in petroleum products with a fine of not less than P2,000.00 but not more than P10,000.00, or imprisonment of at least 2 months but not more than 1 year, or both, in the discretion of the court. Furthermore, the Petroleum products subject of the offense shall be forfeited in favor of the Government, provided that if the products have already been delivered and paid the payment shall be the subject of the forfeiture, and if the seller who has not yet delivered has been fully paid, he shall return the payment received to the buyer. If the offender is a trader his license shall also be cancelled. [Sec. 7]

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000 SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents. MELO, J.: The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the government's ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamental writ. The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop: On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties. On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State). On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC): A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty less than one year). (p. 14, Rollo.) On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo). Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime. Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request. In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons:

1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting documents from the United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069. Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available. It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents. 2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. The United States had to secure orders from the concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United States District Courts. In this particular extradition request the United States Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information. This Department's denial of your request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests. 3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. (pp. 77-78, Rollo.) Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo). The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion. After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied. On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing: WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said date. SO ORDERED. (pp. 110-111, Rollo.) Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that: PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE: I.

BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I.E., TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES; II. PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW; III. THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND IV. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY. (pp. 19-20, Rollo.) On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO) providing: NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or persons acting in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684. GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999. (pp. 120-121, Rollo.) The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed their respective memoranda. From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent. However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues of which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the extradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between private respondent's basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty? The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the substantive merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court. To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows: The Extradition Request The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by: 1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having equivalent legal force; 2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of, and the time and place of the commission of these acts;

3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation or description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and 4. Such other documents or information in support of the request. (Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.) Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides . . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case. The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task? In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by: 1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity and probable location of the person sought; 2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case; 3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for which extradition is requested; 4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense; 5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the execution of punishment for the offense; 6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said Article, as applicable. (Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.) 7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable cause for his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been committed there; 8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; and 9. A copy of the charging document. (Paragraph 3, ibid.) The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying documents received in support of the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in the Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs). In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation." The Extradition Petition Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.). The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee. The Extradition Hearing The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not

inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.). The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).1wphi1.nt With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query presents itself: What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings? A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers. However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to the Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of Justice had no obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private respondent insisted on the following; (1) the right to be furnished the request and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's opposition to the request. The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to participate in the process of evaluation. Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative determination? The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power. In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one or the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means or accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64). The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution. In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.

The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court. It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436). In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of one's license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property. Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth against a respondent which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature. The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one's property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense. By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty. Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, petitioner's Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority for petitioner's conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing. As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserved these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments. The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due process are interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in

order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366). Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106). True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64). In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant. These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as: 1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution; 2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and 3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been claimed. Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described situations mentioned above? Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S. Government. American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is based on the Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly as possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all the elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face of the papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding state at the time the offense charged was committed, and that the person demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the demanding state before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are then filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such papers and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of the instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the government of the asylum state to effect extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment , information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney is directory . However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853). In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the executive authority of the Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular officer having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815). In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated September 13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are basically governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit: 1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests for the provincial arrest of an individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel. 2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the Department of Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a declaration confirming that a formal request has been made, that the treaty is in full force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as

extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents have been authenticated in accordance with the federal statute that ensures admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing. 3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in support of the extradition request ( Ibid.) 4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign country. The court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person sought and that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.) 5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having received a "complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having committed any of the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international extradition proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).] 6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates its determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies the person's extraditability. The court then forwards this certification of extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C. 3186). 7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of the requesting government in seeking his extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present whatever information he deems relevant to the Secretary of State, who makes the final determination whether to surrender an individual to the foreign government concerned. From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends with one entity the Department of State which has the power to evaluate the request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on the court's determination of extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the petition for extradition. Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the person sought to be extradited be given due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern is the possible delay in the evaluation process. We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Supreme Court ruling: The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency . Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less , and perhaps more, than mediocre ones. (Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656) The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that no right that of liberty secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency. (pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.) In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked: One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]). There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty." Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not, in the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled

to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that federal and statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the requested state has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing of the extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements will not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition. In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers in his Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be dispensed with? Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is private respondent precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest. Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside. Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III which reads: Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official records documents. The general right guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.). Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. On the other hand, private respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested with public interest and matters which are of purely private interest only becomes material when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes the right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly affected thereby, his right to information becomes absolute. The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any citizen has "standing". When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action has a direct bearing on his life, and may either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the government ( Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official records, and in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions. In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action from the U.S. Government. No official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of foreign relations with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming. We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant controversy: Would private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution? First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations.

The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the and land no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12). The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.). In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence. Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure as an " ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents. We disagree. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410). Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial. The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during trial. A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises. One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application by analogy. Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioner's theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ or habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it"? Petitioner's theory would also infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition petition has already been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. . ." Can petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient thereto? The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative proceeding is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections to the Requested State's non-performance of its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration. How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?

Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals: . . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to us that an employee must be informed of the charges preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remain consistent with the constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his defenses. . . . (at p. 671) Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process rights of the respondent. In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible. We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised. Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Purisima, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Davide, Jr., C.J., I join Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent. Puno, J., please see dissent. Vitug, J., see separate opinion. Kapunan, J., see separate concurring opinion. Panganiban, J., please see my dissenting opinion. Mendoza, J., I join the dissents of Puno and Panganiban, JJ. Quisumbing, J., with concurring opinion. Pardo, J., I join J. Puno & J. Panganiban. Gonzaga-Reyes, J., I join the dissent of Justices Puno & Panganiban. Ynares-Santiago, J., please see separate concurring opinion. THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 149335. July 1, 2003]

EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR, petitioner, vs. LUIS BUNDALIAN, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, Executive Secretary, Office of the President, AND GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, Secretary, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), respondents. DECISION PUNO, J.: In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated April 18, 2001, affirming the decision of the Office of the President in Administrative Order No. 12 ordering petitioners dismis sal as Regional Director of the Department

of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for unexplained wealth. Petitioners dismissal originated from an unverified letter-complaint, dated July 15, 1995, addressed by private respondent LUIS BUNDALIAN to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. Private respondent accused petitioner, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019. Private respondent charged that in 1993, petitioner and his wife purchased a house and lot at 907 North Bel Aire Drive, Burbank, Los Angeles, California, making a down payment of US$100,000.00. He further alleged that petitioners in-laws who were living in California had a poor credit standing due to a number of debts and they could not have purchased such an expensive property for petitioner and his wife. Private respondent accused petitioner of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects. Private respondent attached to his letter-complaint the following documents: a) a copy of a Grant Deed, dated May 27, 1993, where spouses David and Judith Tedesco granted the subject property to petitioner and his wife; b) a copy of the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by petitioner and his wife in California appointing petitioners sister -in-law Estela D. Fajardo as their attorney-in-fact, to negotiate and execute all documents and requirements to complete the purchase of the subject property; and, c) an excerpt from the newspaper column of Lito A. Catapusan in the Manila Bulletin, entitled Beatwatch, where it was repor ted that a lowranking, multimillionaire DPWH employee, traveled to Europe and the U.S. with his family, purchased an expensive house in California, appointed a woman through an SPA to manage the subject property and had hidden and unexplained wealth in the Philippines and in the U.S. Accordingly, the letter-complaint and its attached documents were indorsed by the Philippine Consulate General of San Francisco, California, to the Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) for investigation. Petitioner, represented by counsel, submitted his counter-affidavit before the PCAGC alleging that the real owner of the subject property was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo. Petitioner explained that in view of the unstable condition of government service in 1991, his wife inquired from her family in the U.S. about their possible emigration to the States. They were advised by an immigration lawyer that it would be an advantage if they had real property in the U.S. Fajardo intimated to them that she was interested in buying a house and lot in Burbank, California, but could not do so at that time as there was a provision in her mortgage contract prohibiting her to purchase another property pending full payment of a real estate she earlier acquired in Palmdale, Los Angeles. Fajardo offered to buy the Burbank property and put the title in the names of petitioner and his wife to support their emigration plans and to enable her at the same time to circumvent the prohibition in her mortgage contract. Petitioner likewise pointed out that the charge against him was the subject of similar cases filed before the Ombudsman He attached to his counter-affidavit the Consolidated Investigation Report of the Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of evidence. From May 29, 1996 until March 13, 1997, the PCAGC conducted its own investigation of the complaint. While petitioner participated in the proceedings and submitted various pleadings and documents through his counsel, private respondent-complainant could not be located as his Philippine address could not be ascertained. In the course of the investigation, the PCAGC repeatedly required petitioner to submit his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and Personal Data Sheet. Petitioner ignored these directives and submitted only his Service Record. He likewise adduced in evidence the checks allegedly issued by his sister-in-law to pay for the house and lot in Burbank, California. When the PCAGC requested the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to furnish it with copies of petitioners SALN from 1992 -1994, it was informed that petitioner failed to file his SALN for those years. After the investigation, the PCAGC, in its Report to the Office of the President, made the following findings: Petitioner purchased a house and lot in Burbank, California, for US$195,000.00 (or P3.9M at the exchange rate prevailing in 1993). The sale was evidenced by a Grant Deed. The PCAGC concluded that the petitioner could not have been able to afford to buy the property on his annual income of P168,648.00 in 1993 as appearing on his Service Record. It likewise found petitioners explanation as unusual, largely unsubstantiated, unbelievable and self -serving. The PCAGC noted that instead of adducing evidence, petitioners counsel exerted more effort in filing pleadings and motion to dismiss on the groun d of forum shopping. It also took against petitioner his refusal to submit his SALN and ITR despite the undertaking made by his counsel which raised the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. The PCAGC concluded that as petitioners acquisition of the subject property was manifestly out of proportion to his salary, it has been unlawfully acquired. Thus, it recommended petitioners dismissal from service pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019. On August 24, 1998, the Office of the President, concurring with the findings and adopting the recommendation of the PCAGC, issued Administrative Order No. 12,1< ordering petitioners dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government benefits. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied. His appeal to the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed Hence, this petition for review where petitioner raises the following issues for resolution: first, whether he was denied due process in the investigation before the PCAGC; second, whether his guilt was proved by substantial evidence; and, third, whether the earlier dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case before the PCAGC moot and academic. On the issue of due process, petitioner submits that the PCAGC committed infractions of the cardinal rules of administrative due process when it relied on Bundalians unverified letter-complaint. He gripes that his counter-affidavit should have been given more weight as the unverified complaint constitutes hearsay evidence. Moreover, petitioner insists that in ruling against him, the PCAGC failed to respect his right to confront and cross-examine the complainant as the latter never appeared in any of the hearings before the PCAGC nor did he send a representative therein. We find no merit in his contentions. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain o nes side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. In the case at bar, the PCAGC exerted efforts to notify the complainant of the proceedings but his Philippine residence could not be located ]--> Be that as it may, petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due process because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. Petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before it. He

was duly represented by counsel. He filed his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of Administrative Order No. 12 issued by the President and eventually filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. He cannot now be allowed to challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the investigation. Neither can we sustain petitioners contention that the charge against him was unsupported by substantial evidence as it was contained in an unverified complaint. The lack of verification of the administrative complaint and the non-appearance of the complainant at the investigation did not divest the PCAGC of its authority to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. Under Section 3 of Executive Order No. 151 creating the PCAGC, complaints involving graft and corruption may be filed before it in any form or manner against presidential appointees in the executive department. Indeed, it is not totally uncommon that a government agency is given a wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its investigative powers. The Ombudsman, under the Constitution, is directed to act on any complaint likewise filed in any form and manner concerning official acts or omissions. The Court Administrator of this Court investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but even anonymous complaints filed against court employees or officials for violation of the Code of Ethical Conduct. This policy has been adopted in line with the serious effort of the government to minimize, if not eradicate, graft and corruption in the service. It is well to remember that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decidedThis was afforded to the petitioner in the case at bar. On the second issue, there is a need to lay down the basic principles in administrative investigations. First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.2<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[11]<!--[endif]--> Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned.3<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[12]<!--[endif]--> In the case at bar, petitioner admitted that the subject property was in his name. However, he insisted that it was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo who paid for the property in installments. He submitted as proof thereof the checks issued by Fajardo as payment for the amortizations of the property. His evidence, however, likewise fail to convince us. First, the record is bereft of evidence to prove the alleged internal arrangement petitioner entered into with Fajardo. He did not submit her affidavit to the investigating body nor did she testify before it regarding her ownership of the Burbank property. Second, the checks allegedly issued by Fajardo to pay for the monthly amortizations on the property have no evidentiary weigh t as Fajardos mere issuance thereof cannot prove petitioners non-ownership of the property. Fajardo would naturally issue the checks as she was appointed by petitioner as attorney-in-fact and the latter would naturally course through her the payments for the Burbank property. Thi rd, petitioners own evidence contradict his position. We cannot reconcile petitioners denial of ownership of the property with the loan statement 4<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[13]<!--[endif]--> he adduced showing that he obtained a loan from the World Savings and Loan Association for $195,000.00 on June 23, 1993 to finance the acquisition of the property. Then, three (3) years later, on May 30, 1996, petitioner and his wife executed a Quitclaim Deed 5<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[14]<!--[endif]--> donating the Burbank property to his sisters-in-law Estela and Rose Fajardo allegedly to prove his non-ownership of the property. It is obvious that the Quitclaim Deed is a mere afterthought, having been executed only after a complaint for unexplained wealth was lodged against petitioner. Why the Quitclaim Deed included Rose Fajardo when it was only Estela Fajardo who allegedly owned the property was not explained on the record. Petit ioners evidence failed to clarify the issue as it produced, rather than settled, more questions. Petitioner admitted that the Grant Deed over the property was in his name. He never denied the existence and due execution of the Grant Deed and the Special Power of Attorney he conferred to Estela Fajardo with respect to the acquisition of the Burbank property. With these admissions, the burden of proof was shifted to petitioner to prove non-ownership of the property. He cannot now ask this Court to remand the case to the PCAGC for reception of additional evidence as, in the absence of any errors of law, it is not within the Courts power to do so. He had every opportunity to adduce his evidence before the PCAGC. Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioners stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative

powers.6 Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGCs investi gation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar. Thus, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly sustained petitioners dismissal from service as the complaint and its supp orting documents established that he acquired a property whose value is disproportionate to his income in the government service, unless he has other sources of income which he failed to reveal. His liability was proved by substantial evidence. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.