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Philosophie der Informationsgesellschaft Philosophy of the Information Society

Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Band XV

Volume XV

Philosophie der Informationsgesellschaft

Beiträge des 30. Internationalen Wittgenstein Symposiums

5. – 11. August 2007 Kirchberg am Wechsel

Herausgeber

Herbert Hrachovec Alois Pichler Joseph Wang

Herausgeber Herbert Hrachovec Alois Pichler Joseph Wang Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der Abteilung Kultur und

Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der Abteilung Kultur und Wissenschaft des Amtes der NÖ Landesregierung

Band XV

Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2007 Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft

Philosophy of the Information Society

Papers of the 30th International Wittgenstein Symposium

August 5 – 11, 2007 Kirchberg am Wechsel

Editors

Herbert Hrachovec Alois Pichler Joseph Wang

Wechsel Editors Herbert Hrachovec Alois Pichler Joseph Wang Printed in cooperation with the Department for Culture

Printed in cooperation with the Department for Culture and Science of the Province of Lower Austria

Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2007 Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Volume XV

Distributors

Die Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft

The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Markt 63, A-2880 Kirchberg am Wechsel Österreich/Austria

ISSN 1022-3398 All Rights Reserved Copyright 2007 by the authors

Copyright will remain with the author, rights to use with the society. No part of the material may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, and informational storage and retrieval systems without written permission from the society.

Visuelle Gestaltung: Sascha Windholz Druck: Eigner Druck, A-3040 Neulengbach

Inhalt / Contents

Inhalt / Contents

The Semantic Web in a philosophical perspective Terje Aaberge

9

The balloon effect. Eight problems related to philosophy tyrannized by information Krzysztof Abriszewski

12

Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber hat Freud nicht geschwiegen José María Ariso

15

A Database for a Prototractatus Structural Analysis and the Hypertext Version of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Luciano Bazzocchi

18

Language games of literature Ondrej Beran

21

Risk and Technoscience in the Information Society Ewa Binczyk

24

Franz Brentanos philosophisches Werk im digitalen Zeitalter Thomas Binder

27

Philosophy, Spoken Word, Written Text and Beyond Vaclav Brezina

32

From HyperNietzsche to Discovery: Digital Semantic Corpora for Virtual Research in Philosophy Katja Brunkhorst

35

Privileged Access to Information: Dretske’s Accounts of Self-Knowledge Kai-Yuan Cheng

38

Reading Wittgenstein: Texts, Contexts, and Hypertexts Istvan Danka

41

Philosophy and Computational Ontologies Stefano David / Cesare Rocchi

44

Philosophy at the crossroads. Is it possible to love wisdom in the information age? Aleksandra Maria Derra

47

Substance and Phenomenology in Tractatus Dan Dusa

50

‚Alles, was der Fall wird’: Wittgenstein und die informatische Wende in der Physik Harald Edelbauer

53

Utilizing Experiences from Knowledgebay for Digital Wittgenstein Scholarship Christian Eric Erbacher

56

How could he try to try to whistle it? Lemaire Francis Eric

59

On Roses, PI, and Understanding Craig Fox

62

Annihilation der Zeit in der Informationsgesellschaft? Georg Friedrich

65

Inhalt / Contents

Medien & Bildung Marek Graszewicz / Dominik Lewi ski

 

68

Internet as a medium Maurycy Adam Graszewicz

72

On the Very Idea of an Information Society Hajo Greif

75

Language Games and Serious Matters: Cultural Pluralism, Relativism and Rituals in the Media Ora Gruengard

78

Ornamentality: A New Puzzle for the New Media Eran Guter

 

81

Nichtsein und Grenze bei Wittgenstein W odzimierz Heflik

84

Synergetic information society: from analogue to digital mind Marek Hetmanski

87

Reasonable and Factive Entitlements Jih-Ching Ho

90

From netocracy to network-shaped thinking Philip Jones

93

Die Helsinki-Edition der Philosophischen Untersuchungen Peter Keicher

96

Wittgensteinian Will is Rousseauist Will Laurian Kertesz

100

Is

There a Second Moral Life? Peter P. Kirschenmann

103

Understanding Knowledge Society Endre Kiss

 

106

Old Patterns, New Bewitchments Zsuzsanna Kondor

109

Forms of Life as Forms of Culture Kristijan Krka / Josip Lukin

112

Medienphilosophie als ethisches Projekt? Vilém Flussers Wittgenstein Matthias Kroß

115

Wittgenstein registrieren Wilhelm Krüger

 

119

Wittgensteinian Reflections on the Unavoidability of Gettier’s Counterexamples Lev Lamberov

122

Wittgenstein’s programme of a New Logic Timm Lampert

 

125

The Erosion of Certainty Silvia Lanzetta

128

Wittgenstein and Logical Analysis Montgomery Link

131

A

Digital Turn In Philosophy and Wittgenstein about “Is” Vladimir Olegovich Lobovikov

134

Wikiwebs für Kommunikationsprozesse Michael Luger / Andrea Adelsburg / Daniel Kuby / Daniel

Schmid

138

Farewell to the Resolute Reading of the Tractatus? Tuomas William Manninen

141

Wittgenstein on the Meaning of Life: From Theory to Therapy Michael Maurer

144

Inhalt / Contents

(Re)-Constructing the Semantic Architecture of Wittgenstein’s Vermischte Bemerkungen Kerstin Mayr

147

Logic of finiteness: intellectual systems in the information era: 2. Limits to diversity, exactness, and economy Lidia A. Mazhul / Vladimir M. Petrov

150

Russell, Wittgenstein, and the Project for “Analytic Philosophy” Nikolay Milkov

153

Internet: some collateral effects Fábio Jesus Miranda

156

Wittgenstein versus Mauthner: Two critiques of language, two mysticisms Elena Nájera

159

The Epistemology of “Text” Meaning:

The Context is the Proof-Conditions Upon Which We Prove the Truth of Our Interpretation of the Text Dan Nesher

162

Unnatural Nonsense? On the expectancy of consistency in the Tractatus Yrsa Neuman

166

Ethical Tasks of Media Advocacy in the 21 st Century Giridhari Lal Pandit

169

PhiloSURFical: browse Wittgenstein’s world with the Semantic Web Michele Pasin

174

Logic of finiteness: intellectual systems in the information era: 1. Types of structural changes and tendencies Vladimir M. Petrov / Lidia A. Mazhul

177

The Wikipedia: Knowledge as social, fallible, externalist and holistic Manuel Pinedo-García / Cristina Borgoni-Gonçalves, Granada, Spain

180

Retrieving Culture from Language Marcos Paiva Pinheiro / Jorge Alam Pereira dos Santos, Brasília, Brazil

183

Analytische Medientheorie? – Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Medientheorie und analytischer Philosophie Martin Pleitz

185

‘Seeing-as’ and forms of life Regina Queiroz

189

Medien zwischen Medien-, Wissenschafts- und Technikphilosophie Ulrike Ramming

192

Scepticism and Later Wittgenstein Priyambada Sarkar

196

Globalisierte Produktion von (akademischem) Wissen – ein Wettbewerbsspiel. Ursula Schneider

199

Philosophy as Development of Conceptual Technologies Murilo Rocha Seabra / Marcos Paiva Pinheiro

203

The Possibility and Limits of Communication: A Wittgensteinian Perspective Rui Silva

205

Re-Discovering Wittgenstein Deirdre Christine Page Smith

208

Ethics, Language and the Development of Wittgenstein’s Thought in Ms 139a Deirdre Christine Page Smith

211

Wittgenstein’s Approach to the Language-Reasoning Use of Propositions Alexandr Sobancev

214

Storing, processing and transmitting linked chunks of structured text Sindre Sørensen

217

Melvin’s A.I. dilemma: Should robots work on Sundays? Ivan Spaji / Josipa Grigi

221

Inhalt / Contents

What Do Digital and Linguistic Turns Have in Common? Marcin Trybulec

224

Sraffa’s Impact on Wittgenstein Matthias Unterhuber

227

Against the Idea of a “Third” Wittgenstein Nuno Venturinha

230

Die subjektiven Wirklichkeiten einer Welt Thomas Wachtendorf

233

Culture and Value Revisited – Draft of a new electronic edition Joseph Wang

236

Wittgenstein and Kant on Judgments of Taste: Situations versus Faculties Christian Helmut Wenzel

239

A Note on Wittgenstein and Nietzsche Peter K. Westergaard

242

Diffidere aude – Wahrheit im Internet und der Konsens der Netzgemeinschaft Christian Zelger

245

Utilizing OWL for Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Amélie Zöllner-Weber / Alois Pichler

248

Spontaneous Orders in Social Capital Architecture Gloria L. Zuniga

251

Language games of literature

Ondrej Beran, Prague, Czech Republic

Language games are bound to particular contexts. An utterance (a move in the game) is made under certain input circumstances and has certain practical purpose. The use of language in a game is governed by rules. They are not explicit (they are learned practically, as a skill) – but perhaps they can be expressed explicitly ex post. I.e.:

(almost) everyone is able to form sentences understood by others in the intended sense and to use them in such situations, in which they are usually (“correctly”) used. But not everyone is able to state explicitly, how a correctly formed expression is to be recognized, and what are the rules of its correct usage. Can we – at least potentially – grasp explicitly the rules of the correct formation and the correct usage of the expressions of any language game? (and are there always any such rules at all? – cf. Wittgen- stein 2005, p. 25)

A popular counterexample – i.e. of a game, that is

no doubt meaningful, but its rules cannot be grasped ex- plicitly (as it seems) – is literature. This is so in two senses. Firstly concerning the rules of the correct formation and the correct usage of literature (i.e.: what can be taken as litera- ture?); secondly concerning the rules of the right usage of value judgments like “This is a beautiful poem”. However, we presume that literature can be distinguished meaning- fully from non-literature, as well as good literature from bad one.

The problem may be trivial: for there is a lot of in- structions for the creative writing, and a lot of theories in aesthetics, philosophy of art, theory of literature. The diffi- culty lies in the abundance. The rules of the correct use of the language game of shopping in a store seem to be rather simple and uniform; whereas the existing “rules” of the right literature production and the right evaluation defi- nitely not.

If we want to keep the view that literature nonethe-

less is a meaningful language game, we must demonstrate that it’s possible to distinguish between literature and non- literature – as well as between “big” and “not big” – even if the borderline wasn’t sharp. But the game of literature is not like the others. So the distinction literary/non-literary will probably differ, too.

The idea, that the language of literature differs from any other use of language, is not unusual. For example Heidegger says that whereas poetry (and art) just shows, “reveals” things in their pure existence, as they are, the ordinary language expresses and shapes the whole of the “interpretation” of this world, which is a system of practical connections and consequences. (Heidegger 1977 § 34; 1954, p. 190ff)

This is surely an impressive view, but also literature (and the theory of literature) has its position in the context of our practical experience (the word “literature” has a more or less definite meaning, that one can learn). “Practi- cal” does not mean that the use of a literary language ex- pression or of an esthetical judgment can bring us some immediate (physical?) benefit. This cannot be said about many linguistic activities, including the non-literary ones. “Practical” means here, that also literature and aesthetics originate in some intersubjective frame of circumstances and consequences and must obey some rough rules in order to get into this frame. What we call “literature” must

fulfill some formal necessities (it is a language unit, either printed on a paper, or traded orally) and is usually received

in a certain manner – it is read or listened to under certain

circumstances: if the recipients have time and mind for it, if they want to evoke some mood or effect, and so on. These criteria are not unlimited: in a certain mood, under certain circumstances, or in order to evoke some effect, literature

is just not used – for example in the army, if a private asks

an officer for/tells him anything, he definitely does not use

a language manner that we usually call “literary”. What we

qualify as “literature”, has a restricted use (let’s say in the sense sketched above).

But if we try to understand literature this way, prob- lems arise. For this is a sketch of the rules of the usage of the literary language game; and the rules of the correct formation of the expressions are not touched. “Bring me sugar” is definitely a correctly formed sentence, that can be used correctly under certain circumstances (and under some others not). “Milk me sugar” seems not to be a cor- rectly formed sentence. But it can be meaningfully used, as well as the seemingly incorrect “sentence” the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe – namely just as literature. And this is the problem. In any other language game – as it seems – the correct formation of the expres- sions is a prerequisite for possible meaningful and correct usage. In the literary language game, the correct usage becomes independent from the correct formation of the expressions. Perhaps the notion of the “correct formation” loses its sense at all within literature? (cf. Wittgenstein 1958, § 498)

Literature seems to be an open and dynamic game. We cannot say in advance, what is a correctly formed liter- ary language expression, we cannot also state easily (if at all), which language phenomena don’t belong into litera- ture. We have seen that – under normal circumstances – a correctly formed expression is one that can be used mean- ingfully in a language game. But imagine the most improb- able expression from the most distant context (mathemat-

) – we can never

say it cannot be used in the literary language game (in a

ics, warfare, chemistry, economy, sport,

literary work, even in a “good” one) – and who knows:

An astonishing result

seems to follow from this: the language game of literature

encapsulates somehow (in potentia?) all the other games.

We can say, in a sense, that the distinction between literary and non-literary differs from most of other distinc-

tions between something and non-something. When something is qualified as “not big”, it cannot be qualified as “big” in the same meaning. This is an idealization, too. The cellular phones in 1995 were not big in comparison with those in the year 1990, but are big in comparison with the present types. The concrete use of almost all concepts changes through time. But this process is extremely rapid in the case of “literature” – it seems to subvert over and over a possible distinction between literary and non- literary. It is noteworthy that this process does not proceed

in both directions. We can state, that some language move

maybe it has already been used

was a non-literary one, but in the very same moment it can be incorporated in a literary work and become literary. Non-literary seems to tend steadily into literature. But not in the reversed direction. From this reason, we cannot state firmly what is literary – is the sentence “I like yellow

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Language games of literature — Ondrej Beran

cats” a literary one? Nobody knows (whereas we can

much rather state, whether it can be a “scientific” sentence or an “army” one). But once something is admitted “offi-

”), can it be

non-literary anymore? So we can say what is non-literary, but not always what is literary; and literature seems to occupy more and more the position of non-literature. So:

isn’t there anything paradoxical in what we call “literature”? (One can say: when everything becomes literature, noth- ing will be literature anymore.)

As well as all the language games, literature should have its rules, too – in order to be a language game at all. The rules are established by means of a custom or institu- tion, which is intersubjective (Wittgenstein 1958, § 199). Grammatical sentences (rules) seem to be fixed, whereas the “ordinary sentences” not. Of course, rules change, too. However, the dynamics of their change is much slower. They are almost in all cases implicit – they are often even not perfected. There can be language games that are meaningful only “more or less”. And their rules are “made up (or changed) as we go along”. (Wittgenstein 1958, § 83) In a sense, literature proves itself to be just this type of language game.

The non-literary language moves (like “Two pints of beer, please”) also can be made under very various cir- cumstances and for very various goals. But their use is “more correct” in certain contexts and “less correct” in other contexts. The sentence is uttered “more naturally” by someone sitting in a beer house, having a certain ex- pected result (two pints of beer brought), than – let’s say – by a student in an university lecture about mathematics. But this doesn’t mean, that the latter utterance cannot be meaningful – that it cannot cause the effect, for which it was directly designed and planned by the speaker – the deportation of the speaker from the lecture hall by the uni- versity security guard, for example. The difference be- tween meaningfulness of these two kinds is actually not qualitative, I think (not so Wittgenstein – see 1958, § 498). The first type of use is so to speak a “default” one, whereas the second is “deviant” – but both are meaningful in their appropriate way. We can talk about “default” use of literature, too. A sonnet about moonlight can be foisted into a company annual report or declaimed to the sales- man in a food store (to the question, what I would like) – but this is a less “default” (and in this sense less meaning- ful) use of literature.

cially” as literary (like “To be or not to be

In the case of literature, there is a strong zeal to state explicitly, what is literature and what is not, and also what is its social purpose, so to speak. But once some- thing is stated explicitly, the subversive nature of literature manifests itself – someone uses the definition and tries to create something that can be called “literature”, but is dif- ferent from the view of the theory of literature. Perhaps we can grasp the notion “literature” just by means of this crite- rion of its self-revaluating (hermeneutical) and rules- breaking nature. It is in a sense true; but not fully: literature cannot break all the limits, without measure – otherwise the distinction between literature and non-literature would vanish at all. On the other hand, the distinction between literature and non-literature is not like the distinction be- tween big and not big: anything non-literary can become literary and to state what is literary is not easy.

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This paradoxical nature of literature is probably what Heidegger had in mind: our non-literary language games and concepts are ruled by a certain pragmatical respect:

the delimitation of the distinction big/not big can change in time, but not dramatically, it is rather fixed and sharp. This is mainly because “big” is a pragmatical concept, that we use to “cope with” pragmatical needs (cf. Rorty 1980). Literature doesn’t function quite like this. Our literary lan- guage games don’t “cope with” anything, at least not in the same way as the games operating with concepts like “big” or similar. Literature has a certain frame delimiting it from non-literature, and this frame is given intersubjectively, but compared to other “coping-with” games, that are rather “sports” (see Lance 1998), literature is a “pure game”, its notion is given by a “pure” convention (there is a very vague “coping relation” in its case, if any). However, the limit exists.

As this limit is given conventionally, it faces two problems: firstly, the subversive, self-hermeneutical nature of literature is still trying to reinterpret (or break) this limit. This activity is made possible both by the absence of a clear pragmatical “coping-with” function, and by many ex-

) literature is,

purported by the theory of literature. And how can we ex- plain the fact that there are many examples of “officially admitted” literature, not trying to break the definition limits at all? Most of the literary production totally lacks this am- bition, and still is literature. This points to the second prob- lem of the conventional definition of literature. The fact is, that there is no one convention on what is literature, there are many, and each one quite probably has counterexam- ples (including the “subversive/rules-breaking” conception sketched above). The generality of the one word “litera- ture” proves itself to be misleading. We are tempted by our “craving for generality” to believe that there must be one corresponding thing, as there is one word. But it is neither the case of “Beauty” or “Good” (see Wittgenstein 2005, p. 17f), nor of “literature”.

There is no one, but a plenty of games called “litera- ture”, bound with each other by the “family resemblance”. However, the nature of literature is queer – literature, or rather some of the literary games behave parasitic with respect to the theory of literature. Whereas we can clear the darkness about “Good”, if we try to describe all the facets of the use of the word “good” – and sometimes we can show this way that some particular uses of the word don’t make sense – literature behaves contrariwise. The attempts to grasp or describe the sense of “literature” cause a multiplication and some more complications in the “family” of literary language games.

We can conclude with the following remarks: the limit between literature and non-literature exists, but is somehow “unilaterally open” – one can rather distinguish non-literature from literature than literature from non- literature. This is because some (hermeneutical) language games of literature still tend to reinterpret their own rules, or rather to extend them continuously into the realm of non-literature. Literature doesn’t “cope (directly?) with” pragmatical needs like some other games, it is rather a more “purely conventional” game. So there are very many literary language games – of a very large, complicated and diversified family. The activity of the theory of literature proves to be a Sisyphus’ work: it provides a material for further complication and diversification rather than a clear- ing.

plicit definitions of what (real, valuable,

Work on this paper was supported by the grant No. 401/03/H047 of the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic.

Language games of literature — Ondrej Beran

Literature

Heidegger, Martin 1954 “Dichterisch wohnet der Mensch”, in Vor- träge und Aufsätze, Pfullingen.

Heidegger, Martin 1977 Sein und Zeit, Frankfurt a.M.

Lance, Mark 1998 “Some Reflections on the Sport of Language”, in James Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology, Oxford.

Rorty, Richard 1980 Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Prince- ton.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1958 Philosophische Untersuchungen, Ox- ford.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig 2005 The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford.

Email: ondrejberan@yahoo.com

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