A civil society response

to the opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villaln in cases Digital Rights Ireland et.al. (C-2 !"#2 and C-$ %"#2& regarding the Data Retention Directive 2''("2%")C

Table of contents
#. Introduction................................................................................................................# 2. *ot covered +, )- co.petence for .ar/et har.onisation...........................................2 !. Illegiti.ate and disproportionate interference 0ith funda.ental rights........................( !.2.#. Does the investigation1 detection and prosecution of serious cri.e lac/ co..unications data in the a+sence of a +lan/et retention sche.e2...................... !.2.2. 3o the prosecution of ho0 .an, serious cri.es does such e4tra co..unications data ulti.atel, .a/e a positive difference2.................................## !.2.!. Is an, such +enefit offset +, counter-productive side effects of +lan/et data retention2..............................................................................................................## !.2.%. All in all1 does +lan/et and indiscri.inate teleco..unications data retention have a statisticall, significant i.pact on cri.e or the investigation of cri.e2........#2 !.2.$. Conclusions................................................................................................#5 %. *o suspension of 6udge.ent......................................................................................22 $. Conclusion................................................................................................................2!

1. Introduction
3he +lan/et and indiscri.inate +ul/ recording of teleco..unications infor.ation on all $'' .illion )- citizens is1 according to the )uropean Data 7rotection 8upervisor1 9the .ost privac, invasive instru.ent ever adopted +, the )-:.# It is also possi+l, the .ost highl, controversial )- surveillance instru.ent and is su+6ect to protests throughout the )-. A poll of 21#;( Ger.ans found in 2'' that ( .!< opposed +lan/et data retention1 .a/ing it the .ost strongl, re6ected surveillance sche.e of all1 provo/ing .ore opposition than .easures such as +io.etric passports1 access to +an/ data1 re.ote co.puter searches and 7*R retention. 2 A 2''5 )uro+aro.eter poll found that a large .a6orit, of ( -5#< of )- citizens re6ected the idea of 9.onitoring: the Internet use or phone calls of non-suspects even in light of the fight against international terroris.. !
# http=""000.edps.europa.eu")D78>)?"0e+dav"site".,8ite"shared"Docu.ents")D78"7u+lications"8 peeches"2'#'"#'-#2-'!@Data@retention@speech@7A@)*.pdf. 2 Infas poll1 http=""000.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de"i.ages"infas-u.frage.pdf. ! Blash )uro+aro.eter1 Data 7rotection in the )uropean -nion1 Be+ruar,

>e 0elco.e the )uropean Court of CusticeDs assess.ent of the 9data retention e4peri.ent:Ds co.pati+ilit, 0ith funda.ental rights. As the Advocate GeneralDs opinion appears not to address several salient issues1 0e have decided to suppl, the follo0ing co..ents.

2. Not covered by EU competence for market harmonisation

Blanket and indiscriminate telecommunications data retention has proven superfluous and counter productive for removin! market distortions. 9 ;. It is1 in that regard1 not disputed that Directive 2''("2% constitutes an appropriate .eans of achieving the first1 for.al1 o+6ective 0hich it pursues1 na.el, ensuring the proper functioning of the internal .ar/et. 5. It .a, also +e accepted1 having regard to the discretion of the institutions1 that the har.onisation achieved +, Directive 2''("2% 0as actuall, necessar, for the purpose of reducing legal and technical differences +et0een the reEuire.ents i.posed on providers of electronic co..unications services concerning the t,pes of data to +e retained and the periods and conditions of retention.:

3he Advocate GeneralDs opinion states=

>e +elieve that there is a crucial difference +et0een the theoretical possi+ilit, that )legislation could create a .ore level pla,ing field for providers and the apparent assu.ption that the data retention directive 2''("2% specificall, is an effective device in this re gard. If one considers the actual i.pact of the directive1 ta/ing into account the )uropean Co..issionDs o0n i.ple.entation report1 % +lan/et and indiscri.inate teleco..unications data retention has proven superfluous and counter-productive for re.oving .ar/et distortions. 3he data retention directive is +ased on article ##% (#& 3B)- 0hich allo0s the )- to ap pro4i.ate national la0s 90ith the ai. of esta+lishing or ensuring the functioning of the internal .ar/et:. 3he )- argues that differing national data retention reEuire.ents 9.a, involve su+stantial invest.ent and operating costs: for service providers $1 9.a, constitute o+stacles to the free .ove.ent of electronic co..unications services: and 9give rise to distortions in co.petition +et0een underta/ings operating on the electronic co..unications .ar/et:.( >hen the data retention directive 0as adopted in 2''$"2''(1 onl, $ of the then 2$ Fe.+er 8tates reEuired co..unications service providers to retain certain co..unications data 0ithout cause1 t,picall, reEuiring the retention of less data for shorter periods of ti.e than the Directive does. Another $ Fe.+er 8tates had legislation in place that

2''51http=""ec.europa.eu"pu+lic@opinion"flash"fl@22$@en.pdf1 p. %5 (!2G#5G# H( <1 !$G2#G2$H5#<&. % Co..unication CIF(2'##&22$J see also the shado0 reports pu+lished +, )uropean Digital Rights and AK Vorrat. $ )- Court of Custice ()CC&1 C-!'#"'(1 L (5. ( )CC Advocate General1 C-!'#"'(1 L 5$.

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0ould have allo0ed the. to i.pose data retention reEuire.ents in the future. ; #$ of the then 2$ Fe.+er 8tates had not enacted an, data retention legislation. 5 3oda,1 the Directive +eing in force1 nearl, all of the Fe.+er 8tates are reEuiring service providers to retain co..unications data 0ithout cause 0ith national o+ligations var,ing 0idel, as to #. the categories of service providers affected (the Directive i.poses .ini.u. reEuire.ents onl,&1#' 2. the t,pes of co..unications data to +e retained (the Directive i.poses .ini.u. reEuire.ents onl,&1 !. the retention period for each t,pe of data (the Directive i.poses a period of (-2% .onths for certain t,pes of data and certain purposes1 other0ise not har.onised +, the Directive&1 %. the data safet, reEuire.ents (not har.onised +, the Directive&1 $. the purposes for 0hich retained data can +e used (not har.onised +, the Directive&1 (. the conditions and procedure for access to and use of the data (not har.onised +, the Directive&1 ;. the rei.+urse.ent of costs (not har.onised +, the Directive&. It is apparent fro. these facts that +, reEuiring all Fe.+er 8tates to enact +lan/et re tention legislation1 the Directive has ensued .uch higher 9invest.ent and operating costs: for service providers in the )- than the, 0ould have +een faced 0ith 0ithout the Directive1 and has resulted in a far larger patch0or/ of national +lan/et retention legislation than 0ould have e4isted 0ithout the Directive. 3he Directive thus itself constitutes an 9o+stacle to the free .ove.ent of electronic co..unications services: and 9gives rise to distortions in co.petition +et0een underta/ings operating on the electronic co..unications .ar/et:. Bro. an internal .ar/et perspective1 several options e4ist to trul, re.ove 9o+stacles to the internal .ar/et for electronic co..unications: 0ithout i.posing the concept of +lan/et and indiscri.inate teleco..unications data retention on all Fe.+er 8tates and citizens= #. 3he )- could prohi+it national legislation .andating +lan/et data retention 0ithout cause in favour of a s,ste. of e4pedited preservation and targeted collection of traffic data as agreed in the Council of )uropeDs Convention on C,+ercri.e. 2. 3he )- could reEuire Fe.+er 8tates 0ith (optional& national retention legislation in place to full, co.pensate the providers affected. !. 3he )- could reEuire Fe.+er 8tates 0ithout (optional& national retention legislation in place to i.pose a lev, on their co..unications service providers1 thus

; Megislation 0ith a vie0 to i.posing data retention o+ligations had +een enacted in ?elgiu.1 Brance1 Ital,1 Ireland1 Matvia1 Mithuania1 the *etherlands1 7oland1 8pain and the Czech Repu+lic. 5 Co..ission1 8)C(2''$&##!#. Megislation transposing the directive is not in effect in Austria1 ?elgiu. (concerning Internet data&1 the Czech Repu+lic1 Ger.an,1 Ro.ania and 80eden. ?ased on recent Constitutional Court decisions1 +lan/et retention is li/el, to +e discontinued in other Fe.+er 8tates 0here it is challenged in Constitutional Courts. #' Bor e4a.ple1 the -K and Binland do not reEuire s.all operators to retain data1 arguing that 9the costs out0eigh the +enefits:.

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eli.inating an, co.petitive advantage the, .ight have as a result of not having to retain data indiscri.inatel,. %. 3he )- could a.end the Directive in such a 0a, as to i.pose li.its on (optional& national retention legislation onl,1 rather than i.pose the concept of +lan/et co..unications data on all Fe.+er 8tates1 and still create a .ore har.onised .ar/et than e4ists at present. Bor e4a.ple1 a +lan/et retention period of ' to ! .onths 0ould create a far .ore har.onised situation than i.posing a retention period of (-2% .onths. >hen proposing the data retention directive1 the Co..ission itself considered co.pulsor, co.pensation the /e, instru.ent to prevent .ar/et distortions= 93he cost rei.+urse.ent principle 0ill allo0 creating a level pla,ing field for the electronic co..unication providers in the internal .ar/et.: ## >hen the Directive 0as adopted1 ho0ever1 the one ele.ent that 0ould have contri+uted to creating a .ore level pla,ing field - cost rei.+urse.ent - 0as re.oved fro. the Directive. Net this ele.ent is a si.ple and far less invasive 0a, of preventing .ar/et distortions than tr,ing - and failing - to esta+lish a har.onised data retention sche.e throughout the )-. Interestingl,1 the Co..ission cites a stud, according to 0hich the retention costs of an I87 0ith half a .illion su+scri+ers is around '.;$ )uro per su+scri+er in the first ,ear and '.2% )uro in su+seEuent ,ears1 0ith data retrieval costs of a+out '.;' )uro per su+scri+er and ,ear. If +lan/et retention reEuire.ents have no significant i.pact on co.petition or invest.ent1 there is no 6ustification for the )- to har.onise such national legislation at all. 3he )uropean Court of Custice has repeatedl, held that the )- .a, rel, on article ##% 3B)- 0ith a vie0 to 9eli.inating appreciable distortions of co.petition: onl,.#2 If national data retention reEuire.ents result in costs of no .ore than # or 2 )uros per custo.er and ,ear1 the, cannot seriousl, +e clai.ed to apprecia+l, distort cross-+order co.petition. ?esides 0e re.ain unconvinced +, the )- Court of CusticeDs decision that )- legislation .andating the retention of data for la0 enforce.ent purposes 9have as their o+6ect the esta+lish.ent and functioning of the internal .ar/et: 0ithin the .eaning of Article ##% (#& 3B)-. If it 0ere the case that such an instru.ent 0as1 in fact1 per.issi+le1 it fol lo0s that the )- 0ould +e co.petent to har.onise all national infor.ation /eeping or other reEuire.ents i.posed on co.panies for purposes such as la0 enforce.ent1 ta4ation1 national defence and educational purposes. Bor e4a.ple the )- could har.onise ta4 record /eeping reEuire.ents or national standards for .anufacturing police 0eapons1 .ilitar, eEuip.ent or school te4t+oo/s1 all in the na.e of internal .ar/et har .onisation. In our opinion this greatl, e4ceeds the intended scope of article ##% 3B)-. #! In su..ar,1 the Directive has not onl, failed its purpose of creating a .ore level pla, ing field for service providers +ut has proven to +e counter-productive in this respect1 creating a far .ore dishar.onised situation than had e4isted +efore. 8everal alternative approaches 9consistent 0ith the o+6ective: of re.oving .ar/et distortions 90hile at the

## 8)K(2''$&%!5. #2 )CC1 C-!;(" 51 L #'(J C-$5"'51 L !2. #! 3he Ger.an Bederal Constitutional Court has held that the govern.ent .a,1 in principle1 not confer cri.inal procedure or .ilitar, co.petences on the )- e4cept for cross-+order issues= ?VerfG1 2 ?v) 2"'51 L 2$!.

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sa.e ti.e causing less interference:#% e4ist1 other than i.posing the concept of +lan/et co..unications data on all Fe.+er 8tates and citizens.

If the Union relies on internal market ob"ectives for establishin! its competence# it cannot rely on a completely different purpose $facilitatin! la% enforcement& for establishin! conformity %ith fundamental ri!hts. 9#'(. ... It is necessar,1 fro. that point of vie01 to ac/no0ledge that1 in the conte4t of e4a.ining the proportionalit, of Directive 2''("2% 0ithin the .eaning of Article $(%& 3)-1 there is actuall, roo. for ta/ing into account the ulti.ate o+6ective of preventing serious cri.e pursued +, it.:

3he Advocate GeneralDs opinion states=

3he Advocate General does not e4plain ho0 purposes outside the legal +asis of the Dir ective can +e used to support the legalit, of the instru.ent in Euestion. Ma0 enforce.ent interests cannot 6ustif, the Directive +ecause its purpose is not facilitating la0 enforce .ent. According to the settled case-la0 of the )- Court of Custice1 the interference 0ith funda.ental rights an )- .easure ensues needs to +e 6ustified +, the 9o+6ectives pursued +, the .easure chosen:.#$ 3he predo.inant o+6ective of the Data Retention Directive is ensuring the functioning of the internal .ar/et (Articles ##% and 2( 3B)-&. #( 3he )- has no co.petence in the area of la0 enforce.ent1 e4cept 0here specificall, police co-operation1 6udicial co-operation or the appro4i.ation of cri.inal la0 is concerned1 0hich is not the case 0ith data retention. #; If the )- relies on internal .ar/et o+6ectives for esta+lishing its co.petence1 it cannot rel, on a co.pletel, different purpose (facilitating la0 enforce.ent& for esta+lishing confor.it, 0ith funda.ental rights. If the proper functioning of the internal .ar/et is the 9predo.inant: purpose of the Directive1 the interference 0ith funda.ental rights that co.es 0ith it cannot +e 9predo.inantl,: 6ustified 0ith a co.pletel, different purpose 0hich the )- .a, not legall, pursue on the +asis of Article ##% 3B)-. >hile national data retention la0s have the o+6ective of facilitating the prosecution of cri.e1 the Directive has the 9o+6ective of safeguarding the proper functioning of the internal .ar/et:.#5 It is in the na.e of the internal .ar/et that the Directive reEuires even those Fe.+er 8tates to i.ple.ent +lan/et and indiscri.inate teleco..unications data retention 0hose govern.ents1 parlia.ents or constitutional courts do not consider such .easure necessar, and proportionate for the detection1 investigation and prosecution of cri.e. Insofar as the Directive o+liges all Fe.+er 8tates to enact +lan/et retention la0s in the na.e of .ar/et har.onisation1 the )- cannot pri.aril, rel, on the entirel, different o+6ective of facilitating la0 enforce.ent1 0hich it .a, not legall, pursue under the DirectiveDs legal +asis (Article ##% 3B)-&1 for 6ustification. It is plainl, disproportionate for the )- to reEuire all Fe.+er 8tates to have confidential co..unications data retained 0ithout cause1 .erel, to prevent co.petitive (dis&advantages that .ight e4ist in a 9patch0or/: situation 0here so.e Fe.+er 8tates reEuire pro viders to retain data and others reEuire deletion.
#% #$ #( #; #5 3est applied +, the )CC in case C- 2"' 1 L 5#. )CC1 C-$5"'51 L $!J C- 2"' 1 L ;%. )CC1 C-!'#"'(1 LL ;2 and 5$. Advocate General1 C-!'#"'(1 LL and #''. )CC1 C-!'#"'(1 LL ;2 and 5$.

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8o far1 there has +een no .easura+le da.age to the single .ar/et as a result of several Fe.+er 8tates having long refrained fro. enacting +lan/et data retention legislation. An interference 0ith funda.ental rights as far-reaching as the indiscri.inate retention of the entire populationDs co..unications data cannot legiti.atel, +e 6ustified and considered proportionate on the +asis of 6ustifications and o+6ectives 0hich are essentiall, econo.ic (re.oving +arriers to the internal .ar/et and distortion of co.petition&1 all the .ore so 0hen these o+6ective have Euite clearl, not +een attained1 and al.ost certainl, could not have +een attained +, the instru.ent in Euestion. 3he interest in the +etter functioning of the internal .ar/et cannot +e considered of such i.portance that it +alances or even out0eighs the negative conseEuences of the unsurpassed interference in privac, caused +, the Directive.

The 'ata (etention 'irective !oes far beyond harmonisin! pre e)istin! national data retention re*uirements. 9##$. It is necessar, in that regard1 first of all1 to e4plain that a situation in 0hich the )uropean -nion restricts itself to adopting legislation har.onising provisions invaria+l, adopted +, the .a6orit, of the Fe.+er 8tates is not co.para+le to a situation in 0hich the )uropean -nion decides1 additionall,1 to .a/e such legislation applica+le generall,.:

3he Advocate GeneralDs opinion states=

Contrar, to the Advocate GeneralDs opinion1 the )uropean -nion did not restrict itself to adopting legislation har.onising provisions invaria+l, adopted +, the .a6orit, of the Fe.+er 8tates. >hen the data retention directive 0as adopted in 2''$"2''(1 onl, $ of the then 2$ Fe.+er 8tates reEuired co..unications service providers to retain certain co..unications data 0ithout cause1 t,picall, reEuiring the retention of less data for shorter periods of ti.e than the Directive does. Another $ Fe.+er 8tates had legislation in place that 0ould have allo0ed the. to i.pose data retention reEuire.ents in the future.# #$ of the then 2$ Fe.+er 8tates had not enacted an, data retention legislation. 2' If the ai. of the directive 0as har.onisation of e4isting national +lan/et retention regi.es1 there 0ould +e no need for the )- to reEuire the introduction of ne0 +lan/et retention legislation in Fe.+er 8tates. As e4plained a+ove1 several alternative approaches 9consistent 0ith the o+6ective: of re.oving .ar/et distortions 90hile at the sa.e ti.e causing less interference:2# e4ist1 other than i.posing the concept of +lan/et co..unications data on all Fe.+er 8tates and citizens.

+undamental ri!hts do not e)tend the Union,s competences to limitin! or other%ise re!ulatin! communications data access for la% enforcement purposes. 9#2#. It has +een stated and repeated that Directive 2''("2%1 as indicated in Article % thereof1 regulates neither access to the data collected and retained nor their use1 and indeed it could not in the light of the division of areas of co.petence

3he Advocate GeneralDs opinion states=

# Megislation 0ith a vie0 to i.posing data retention o+ligations had +een enacted in ?elgiu.1 Brance1 Ital,1 Ireland1 Matvia1 Mithuania1 the *etherlands1 7oland1 8pain and the Czech Repu+lic. 2' Co..ission1 8)C(2''$&##!#. 2# 3est applied +, the )CC in case C- 2"' 1 L 5#.

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+et0een the Fe.+er 8tates and the )uropean -nion. Ao0ever1 the issue 0hich no0 arises is precisel, that of 0hether the )uropean -nion .a, la, do0n a .easure such as the o+ligation to collect and retain1 over the long ter.1 the data at issue 0ithout at the sa.e ti.e regulating it 0ith guarantees on the conditions to 0hich access and use of those data are to +e su+6ect1 at least in the for. of prin ciples.: 3he Advocate GeneralDs vie0 that +lan/et data retention reEuire.ents cannot +e i.posed 0ithout regulating data access for la0 enforce.ent purposes i.plies a logical need for the -nion1 once retention has +een reEuired1 to regulate issues 0hich are clearl, out side of its co.petence. 3his goes to sho01 once again1 that the entire data retention regi.e ai.s at facilitating la0 enforce.ent and cannot rel, on .ar/et har.onisation pro visions for esta+lishing an )- co.petence. )ven if the CourtDs ruling in Ireland v. 7arlia.ent and Council 0ere to +e upheld1 ho0ever1 funda.ental rights do not1 in an, case1 esta+lish a +asis for e4tending the -nionDs co.petences to li.iting or other0ise regulating data access for la0 enforce.ent pur poses (see Article ( 3)- and Article $# (2& of the Charter of Bunda.ental Rights&. 3he )is not co.petent to legislate on the access +, govern.ent authorities to co..unications data held 0ithin their o0n territor, for la0 enforce.ent purposes1 including the li.itations of such access reEuired +, the principle of proportionalit,. 3he )- Court of Custice has ruled that the Data Retention Directive is +ased on the correct legal +asis as it 9har.onises neither the issue of access to data +, the co.petent national la0-enforce.ent authorities nor that relating to the use O...P of those data O+,P those authorities:. 22 It follo0s that the )- is not co.petent under Article ##% 3B)- to legislate on the purposes for 0hich national la0 enforce.ent agencies can access retained co..unications data. *or is the )- co.petence for police co-operation1 6udicial co-operation or the appro4i.ation of cri.inal la0 concerned 0here a govern.ent authorit, accesses data held 0ithin its o0n territor,.2! Binall, the )- is not co.petent to regulate such access under Article #( 3B)- as the access +, govern.ent authorities to co..unications data held 0ithin their o0n territor, for la0 enforce.ent purposes does not fall 0ithin the scope of -nion la0. 3he )- Court of Custice has no 6urisdiction to consider 0hether or not access to co..unications data for la0 enforce.ent purposes is in line 0ith funda.ental rights1 or 0hich reEuire.ents or guarantees need to +e satisfied. 3he national courts and the )uropean Court on Au.an Rights are co.petent in this area. 3he Fe.+er 8tates .a, regulate data access for la0 enforce.ent purposes1 and 0hen doing so are o+liged to re spect funda.ental rights as guaranteed in their national constitutions1 in the )uropean Convention on Au.an Rights and other applica+le international instru.ents (+ut not )- la0&. 3he Advocate GeneralDs opinion states= 9#25. 8i.ilarl,1 it could have +een e4pected to la, do0n the principle that Fe.+er 8tates .a, provide for e4ceptions preventing access to retained data in certain e4ceptional circu.stances or .a, prescri+e .ore stringent reEuire.ents for access in situations in 0hich access .a, infringe funda.ental rights guaranteed +, the Charter1 as in the conte4t of the right to .edical confidentialit,.: It has +een sho0n that the )- is not co.petent to legislate on access to retained data
22 )CC1 C-!'#"'(1 L 5!. 2! Advocate General1 C-!'#"'(1 LL and #''.

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+, Fe.+er 8tates for la0 enforce.ent purposes. ?esides1 even if one did not consider +lan/et and per.anent co..unications data retention disproportionate per se1 the ).ust provide for e4ceptions fro. the o+ligation to retain data1 at least for teleco..unic ations that particularl, rel, on confidentialit,. 3hese .ight include1 for e4a.ple1 co..unications 0ith individuals1 authorities and organisations active in the social or ecclesiastical fields 0hich offer advice in situations of e.otional or social need1 co.pletel, or pre do.inantl, +, telephone1 to callers 0ho nor.all, re.ain anon,.ous1 0here these organisations the.selves or their staff are su+6ect to o+ligations of confidentialit, according to national la0. Ferel, prohi+iting govern.ent access to confidential co..unications data is not good enough1 since it does not protect retained data fro. +eing illegall, accessed or unintentionall, lost.

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-. Ille!itimate and disproportionate interference %ith fundamental ri!hts

Blanket and indiscriminate telecommunications data retention has proven harmful to many sectors of society. In vie% of the scale of dama!e done to fundamental ri!hts by data retention and the lack of evidence for a statistically si!nificant impact on crime or the prosecution of crime# the concept of indiscriminately collectin! information on the daily communications of every sin!le citi.en is disproportionate and incompatible %ith fundamental ri!hts. 9#!(. Directive 2''("2% pursues a perfectl, legiti.ate o+6ective1 that is to sa,1 that of ensuring that the data collected and retained are availa+le for the purpose of the investigation1 detection and prosecution of serious cri.e1 and .a, +e regarded1 given the li.ited po0ers of revie0 that the Court .a, e4ercise in that regard1 as appropriate and even1 su+6ect to the guarantees 0ith 0hich it should +e coupled1 as necessar, for achieving that ulti.ate o+6ective. It is those guarantees 0hich1 in particular1 .a, 6ustif, the1 certainl, ver, long1 list of categories of data to +e retained1 laid do0n in Article $ of Directive 2''("2%.:

3he Advocate GeneralDs opinion states=

Contrar, to the Advocate GeneralDs opinion1 Directive 2''("2% does not ensure that data collected and retained are availa+le for la0 enforce.ent purposes. It is the Data Retention Directive itself that reEuires co..unications data to +e retained that 0ould not other0ise +e stored (Art. ( (#& Directive 2''2"$5&. >hether or not those co..unications data are .ade availa+le for la0 enforce.ent purposes is up to the Fe.+er 8tates and is outside the scope of the Data Retention Directive and -nion la0. Fe.+er 8tates are 0ithin their rights to decide not to grant an, la0 enforce.ent authorit, access to re tained co..unications data at all. 3he Co..ission argues that the Directive protects (or should protect& personal data and funda.ental rights +, setting standards concerning purpose li.itation1 retention periods and procedures for access to retained data. It is true that the Directive 0ould +e a data protection instru.ent if it set li.its on pre-e4isting national retention sche.es and i.posed safeguards onl,. In realit,1 ho0ever1 the Directive allo0s Fe.+er 8tates to go +e,ond its li.its in .ost respects (e.g. t,pes of data to +e retained1 purpose of retention& and does not address access to retained data at all. 2% Fost i.portantl,1 in i.posing a +lan/et and indiscri.inate teleco..unications data retention sche.e on all Fe.+er 8tates1 the Directive does the opposite of protecting data fro. +eing processed 0ithout consent. If the purpose of the Directive trul, 0ere to protect hu.an rights1 it 0ould +an national data retention la0s or i.pose li.its on pre-e4isting la0s rather than itself .andating such +lan/et and indiscri.inate teleco..unications data retention.

2% Recital 2$ notes that QIssues of access to data retained pursuant to this Directive [...] fall outside the scope of Community law.Q

-.1. /assive interference %ith civil liberties

The fundamental ri!hts to privacy# to the protection of personal data# to freedom of e)pression and to freedom of movement all need to be fully ackno%led!ed and considered.

3he Advocate General assesses the validit, of Directive 2''("2% 9pri.aril, fro. the perspective of interference 0ith the right to privac,:. Concerning the freedo. of e4pression1 he argues= 9$2. Birst of all1 it is true that it .ust not +e overloo/ed that the vague feeling of surveillance 0hich i.ple.entation of Directive 2''("2% .a, cause is capa+le of having a decisive influence on the e4ercise +, )uropean citizens of their freedo. of e4pression and infor.ation and that an interference 0ith the right guaranteed +, Article ## of the Charter therefore could 0ell also +e found to e4ist. It .a, +e noted1 ho0ever1 that1 Euite apart fro. the fact that the Court does not have sufficient .aterial to ena+le it to give a ruling in that regard1 that effect 0ould +e .erel, a collateral conseEuence of interference 0ith the right to privac,1 0hich is the su+6ect-.atter of a ver, careful and detailed e4a.ination +elo0.: 3his assess.ent does not address the fact that +lan/et co..unications data retention .a/es it i.possi+le for the average user to anon,.ousl, e4press or read opinions on the Internet. 8ince .ost co..ercial services record ever, user action +, the users I7 addresses (9clic/strea. logging:&1 the retention of I7 address data under the Data Retention Directive allo0s authorities to identif, the readers and pu+lishers of potentiall, an, online infor.ation. I7 retention 0ill also often prevent users fro. anon,.ousl, sending and receiving opinions via e-.ail. -8 courts have long held that the right to freedo. of e4pression enco.passes the right to receive and i.part infor.ation and ideas anon,.ousl,. 2$ Anon,.it, is often a precondition to discussing private .atters and pro+le.s (e.g. self-help groups1 helplines1 legal advice& as 0ell as to .edia research and political de+ate1 reporting or activis.. 3he Advocate GeneralDs opinion lac/s a sufficient anal,sis of the severe i.plications of +lan/et data retention on the freedo. of e4pression and infor.ation on-line. 3he Advocate GeneralDs opinion states= 9$!. In addition1 the Aigh Court does not provide the slightest e4planation of its reasons for considering Article 2# 3B)- (right of residence and .ove.ent of )uropean citizens& and Article %# of the Charter (right to good ad.inistration& relevant in assessing the validit, of Directive 2''("2%1 or even the slightest indication of the i.pact 0hich that directive could have on the free .ove.ent of citizens or on the principle of good ad.inistration1 contrar, to the reEuire.ents no0 laid do0n in Article % of the Rules of 7rocedure of the Court. Accordingl,1 the Court also has insufficient .aterial to give an, ruling in that regard.: 3his assess.ent could valua+l, have anal,sed various situations in 0hich +lan/et data retention restricts the freedo. of .ove.ent. 8o.e people are o+liged to carr, .o+ile teleco..unications devices1 for e4a.ple for professional reasons (e.g. for e.plo,er1 cus2$ -8 8upre.e Court1 3alle, v. California1 !(2 -.8. (' (# ('&J FcInt,re v. Ihio )lections Co..ission1 $#% -.8. !!% (# $&J *AAC7 v. Ala+a.a e4. rel. 7atterson1 !$; -.8. %% (# $5&J >ashington District Court1 Doe v. 23heFart.co.1 #%' B.8upp.2d #'55J see also Aigh Court of Israel1 %%%;"'; of 2$"'!"2'#'1 http=""el,on#.court.gov.il"files"';"%;'"'%%"p#'"';'%%%;'.p#'.ht.1 L ##J Cru.p1 $( 8tanford Ma0 Revie0 (2''!&1 http=""000.thefreeli+rar,.co."DataGretention<!AGprivac,1Ganon,.it,1 GandGaccounta+ilit,Gonline.-a'##'$!%#%$J Marios1 Rutgers Ma0 Record1 Vol. !;1 p. !(1 2'#'1 http=""papers.ssrn.co."sol!"papers.cf.2a+stract@idH#(%'#!!.

- #' -

to.er or patient contacts& or for .edical reasons (e.g. e.ergenc, +uttons&. 8o.e vehicles carr, +uilt-in .o+ile teleco..unications devices (e.g. toll s,ste.s& and this 0ill gro01 0ith the use of eCall s,ste.s. As .o+ile device users location is +eing recorded ever, ti.e the, receive a .essage1 forced users can no longer .ove 0ithout +eing trac/ed. 3here are .an, situations in 0hich people 0ant to prevent disclosure of locations to an,+od,1 +e in for private reasons (e.g. related to health or se4ualit,& or for professional reasons (e.g. related to clients or negotiations&. ?lan/et data retention li.its citizens a+ilit, to .ove anon,.ousl, and1 in certain situations1 0ill prevent the. fro. see/ing places co.pletel, 0here the, cannot ris/ +eing seen. 3he Advocate GeneralDs opinion states= 9($. ... 3he issue 0hich arises in such cases is not ,et that of the guarantees re lating to data processing +ut1 at an earlier stage1 that of the data as such1 that is to sa,1 the fact that it has +een possi+le to record the circu.stances of a personRs private life in the for. of data1 data 0hich can conseEuentl, +e su+6ect to infor.ation processing.: 3his interpretation of 9processing: is not in line 0ith the one generall, recognised in )la0. 3he collection and storage of personal data constitutes data processing (see Art. 2 (+& Data 7rotection Directive&. Article 5 (2& of the Charter therefore provides that personal data .ust +e collected and stored 9fairl, for specified purposes and on the +asis of the consent of the person concerned or so.e other legiti.ate +asis laid do0n +, la0:. It therefore needs to +e e4a.ined 0hether the indiscri.inate .ass retention of co..unications data 96ust in case: it .ight +e needed for a future investigation of serious cri.e constitutes a 9specified purpose: or not. 3here is also a need to e4a.ine 0hether there is1 or can +e1 a 9legiti.ate +asis laid do0n +, la0: for such a practice. In su..ar,1 0e criticize a deficient anal,sis +, the Advocate General of the CharterDs relevant provisions. All relevant funda.ental rights (Articles ;1 51 ## and 2# of the Charter& need to +e full, anal,sed for co.pliance.

Blanket and indiscriminate telecommunications data retention has proven harmful to many sectors of society.

Indiscri.inatel, and per.anentl, capturing and storing infor.ation on the co..unications1 locations and Internet access of all citizens is not a legiti.ate o+6ective in a de.ocratic societ,. >ith a +lan/et and indiscri.inate teleco..unications data retention regi.e in place1 sensitive infor.ation a+out social contacts (including +usiness contacts&1 .ove.ents and the private lives (e.g. contacts 0ith ph,sicians1 la0,ers1 0or/ers councils1 ps,cholo gists1 helplines1 etc& of $'' .illion )uropeans is collected in the a+sence of an, suspicion. 3eleco..unications data retention under.ines professional confidentialit,1 creating the per.anent ris/ of data losses and data a+uses and deters citizens fro. .a/ing confidential co..unications via electronic co..unication net0or/s. It has not +een de.onstrated that the ostensi+le legal reason (har.onisation& or actual reason (la0 enforce.ent& for the Directive has S or could S generate +enefits that 0ould render this proportionate. ?lan/et retention has a .a6or i.pact on consu.ers in that the, can no longer use teleco..unications in situations that legiti.atel, reEuire non-tracea+ilit,.

- ## -

A poll2( of #1''' Ger.ans in 2''5 found that indiscri.inate +ul/ data retention is acting as a serious deterrent to the use of telephones1 .o+ile phones1 e-.ail and Internet. 3he surve, conducted +, research institute Borsa found that 0ith co..unications data retention in place1 one in t0o Ger.ans 0ould refrain fro. contacting a .arriage counsellor1 a ps,chotherapist or a drug a+use counsellor +, telephone1 .o+ile phone or e-.ail if the, needed their help. Ine in thirteen people said the, had alread, refrained fro. using telephone1 .o+ile phone or e.ail at least once +ecause of data retention1 0hich e4trapolates to (.$ .illion Ger.ans in total. 3here can +e no dou+t that o+structing confidential access to help facilities poses a danger to the ph,sical and .ental health of people in need as 0ell as of the people around the.. 3he Ger.an >or/ing Group on Data Retention has received a.ple reports on negative effects of data retention1 0hich have +een su..arised in its response to the Co..issionDs evaluation Euestionnaire.2; 3he indiscri.inate retention of all co..unications data has +een sho0n to disrupt confidential co..unications in .an, areas1 affecting victi.s of se4ual a+use1 political activists1 6ournalists1 accountants1 la0,ers1 +usiness.en1 ps,chotherapists1 drugs advisers and crisis line operators.

Citizens 0ho refuse to use tracea+le co..unications channels act rationall, as there have +een concrete e4a.ples of a+use of co..unications data=

In 2''(1 #; .illion sets of .o+ile phone su+scri+er data 0ere sold +, e.plo,ees of 3-Fo+ile1 a.ong the. secret telephone nu.+ers of .inisters1 politicians1 for.er Ger.an heads of state1 econo.ic leaders1 +illionaires and church officials.25 In Ireland1 a detective sergeant in the Irish policeDs intelligence division is +eing investigated over clai.s that she used her position to chec/ her for.er loverDs phone records.2 In Ger.an, an intelligence officer 0as charged in 2''; 0ith having a+used his po0ers to sp, on his 0ifeRs lover.!'

Although these a+use cases cannot al0a,s +e directl, lin/ed to the data retention directive1 it is clear that the directive re.oves the onl, trul, effective 0a, to prevent such data a+use1 0hich is not collecting such sensitive infor.ation in the first place. Fore 0idespread than cases of a+use are cases of co..unications data falsel, incri.inating innocent persons of offences not co..itted +, the. or not co..itted at all. Co..unications data are particularl, prone to errors as it is eas, to .a/e .ista/es in the process of identif,ing a su+scri+er (e.g. transposed digits1 .is.atching ti.e zones& and +ecause co..unications data relate to a line or an account 0hich can +e shared
2( Borsa1 Ipinions of citizens on data retention1 2 Cune 2''51 http=""000.eco.de"do/u.ente"2''5'('2@Borsa@VD8@-.frage.pdf or http=""000.0e+citation.org"$sMe35Go6. 2; Ant0orten auf den Brage+ogen der )uropTischen Ko..ission vo. !'.' .2'' zur Vorratsdatenspeicherung1 http=""000.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de"i.ages"ant0orten@/o..ission@vds@2'' -##-#!.pdf1 p. 2. 25 Deutsche >elle1 3ele/o. 8a,s Data Bro. #; Fillion Custo.ers >as 8tolen1 % Icto+er 2''51 http=""000.d0-0orld.de"d0"article"'11!( '#!21''.ht.l. 2 http=""000.t6.cint,re.co."2'##"'2"6udges-report-reveals-allegations-that.ht.l. !' http=""000.0e+citation.org"Euer,2urlHhttp<!A<2B<2B000.+erlinonline.de<2B+erliner-zeitung <2Barchiv<2B.+in<2Bdu.p.fcgi<2B2'';<2B'5!#<2Bpoliti/<2B''(2<2Binde4.ht.lUdateH2'##-'!2(.

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(e.g. pu+lic 0ifi hotspot&. Co..unications data have ti.e and again resulted in innocent citizens +eing put under surveillance1 having their houses searched1 +eing arrested or +eing pu+licl, accused of a+horrent offences the, had not co..itted. Also location data is often used to investigate a large nu.+er of la0-a+iding citizens si.pl, for having +een close to a scene of cri.e. ?lan/et and indiscri.inate teleco..unications data retention under.ines the protection of 6ournalistic sources and thus co.pro.ises the freedo. of the press1 da.aging preconditions of our open and de.ocratic societ,=

In a poll of #1%5 Ger.an 6ournalists co..issioned in 2''51 one in fourteen 6ournalists reported that the a0areness of all co..unications data +eing retained had at least once had a negative effect on contacts 0ith their sources. !# 3he ina+ilit, to electronicall, receive infor.ation through untracea+le channels 0ith +lan/et data retention in place affects not onl, the press1 +ut all 0atchdogs including govern.ent authorities. Ger.an teleco..unications giant Deutsche 3ele/o. illegall, used teleco..unications traffic and location data to sp, on a+out (' individuals including critical 6ournalists1 .anagers and union leaders in order to tr, to find lea/s. 3he co.pan, used its o0n data pool as 0ell as that of a do.estic co.petitor and of a foreign co.pan,.!2 In 7oland retained teleco..unications traffic and su+scri+er data 0as used in 2''$-2''; +, t0o .a6or intelligence agencies to illegall, disclose 6ournalistic sources 0ithout an, 6udicial control.!! In the *etherlands1 retained data 0as used to reveal anon,.ous sources of a 6ournalist that had nothing to do 0ith a cri.inal investigation. Also teleco..unications data of non-suspects 0ere accessed .erel, +ecause people had the sa.e first na.e as the suspect.!%

3he Article 2 Group has stressed that ris/s of +reaches of confidentialit, are inherent in the storage of an, traffic data. !$ Inl, erased data is safe data. 3hat is 0h, the e7rivac, directive 2''2"$5")C esta+lished the principle that traffic data .ust +e deleted as soon as no longer needed for the purpose of the trans.ission of a co..unication.

-.2. 0ack of necessity for la% enforcement

Blanket and indiscriminate telecommunications data retention has proven superfluous for the detection# investi!ation and prosecution of serious crime.

It is unclear 0hat evidential +asis on 0hich the Advocate General +ases his vie0 that +lan/et data retention is 9necessar, for achieving that ulti.ate o+6ective: of enhancing
!# Fe,en"8pringer"7faff-RVdiger1 Bree Cournalists in Ger.an,1 2' Fa, 2''51 http=""000.df6v.de"filead.in"user@upload"pdf"DBCV@8tudie@Breie@Cournalisten.pdf or http=""000.0e+citation.org"$sMdWIt$$1 p. 22. !2 AK Vorrat1 3here is no such thing as secure data1 http=""0i/i.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de"i.ages"Aeft@@es@gi+t@/eine@sicheren@daten@en.pdf. !! AK Vorrat1 3here is no such thing as secure data1 http=""0i/i.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de"i.ages"Aeft@@es@gi+t@/eine@sicheren@daten@en.pdf. !% AK Vorrat1 3here is no such thing as secure data1 http=""0i/i.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de"i.ages"Aeft@@es@gi+t@/eine@sicheren@daten@en.pdf. !$ Article 2 Data 7rotection >or/ing 7art,1 Report '#"2'#' (>7 #;2& of #! Cul, 2'#'1 http=""ec.europa.eu"6ustice"policies"privac,"docs"0pdocs"2'#'"0p#;2@en.pdf1 p. 2.

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la0 enforce.ent (L #!(&. Birst of all1 la0 enforce.ent interests cannot 6ustif, the Directive +ecause its purpose is not facilitating la0 enforce.ent. According to the settled case-la0 of the )- Court of Custice1 the interference 0ith funda.ental rights an )- .easure ensues needs to +e 6ustified +, the 9o+6ectives pursued +, the .easure chosen:. !( 3he predo.inant o+6ective of the Data Retention Directive is ensuring the functioning of the internal .ar/et (Articles ##% and 2( 3B)-&.!; 3he )- has no co.petence in the area of la0 enforce.ent1 e4cept 0here specificall, police co-operation1 6udicial co-operation or the appro4i.ation of cri.inal la0 is concerned1 0hich is not the case 0ith data retention. !5 If the )- relies on internal .ar/et o+6ectives for esta+lishing its co.petence1 it cannot rel, on a co.pletel, different purpose (facilitating la0 enforce.ent& for esta+lishing confor.it, 0ith funda.ental rights. If the proper functioning of the internal .ar/et is the 9predo.inant: pur pose of the Directive1 the interference 0ith funda.ental rights that co.es 0ith it cannot +e 9predo.inantl,: 6ustified 0ith a co.pletel, different purpose 0hich the )- .a, not legall, pursue on the +asis of Article ##% 3B)-. If la0 enforce.ent purposes 0ere to +e considered1 the follo0ing points 0ould need to +e e4a.ined=

!.2.#. Does the investigation1 detection and prosecution of serious cri.e lac/ co..unications data in the a+sence of a +lan/et retention sche.e2
A 0ealth of co..unications data is availa+le for la0 enforce.ent purposes even 0here providers are in principle o+liged to erase such data upon the ter.ination of each co..unication (see Article ( of directive 2''2"$5")C&. Ma0 enforce.ent authorities can reEuest providers preserve co..unications data that is availa+le 0hile a co..unication is ongoing (e.g. Internet access&. Ma0 enforce.ent authorities can reEuest access to co..unications data providers retain for +illing purposes (e.g. telephone records&. Ma0 enforce.ent authorities can order providers to preserve data relating to future co..unications of suspects. 3he evidence presented +, the Co..ission to 6ustif, +lan/et retention .ostl, concerns situations 0here 9useful: co..unications data 0as availa+le in Fe.+er 8tates that have transposed the Directive. Access statistics and e4a.ples of usefulness fail to de.onstrate necessit, though +ecause it is not sho0n that the data 0ould have +een lac/ing in the a+sence of a +lan/et retention sche.e. Fost of the evidence presented +, the Co..ission is irrelevant +ecause it fails to identif, the reason for 0hich 9useful: co..unications data 0as retained (i.e. co..ercial purposes1 reEuest +, la0 enforce .ent authorities or +lan/et retention reEuire.ents&1 thus failing to de.onstrate that the data 0ould have +een lac/ing in the a+sence of a +lan/et retention sche.e. Bor e4a.ple1 the co..unications data used to investigate the 2''% Fadrid +o.+ings 0ere availa+le in the a+sence of a +lan/et retention sche.e. )ven 0here la0 enforce.ent authorities access data specificall, retained in accordance 0ith retention o+ligations1 the sa.e data .a, have +een availa+le in the a+sence of such o+ligations. 3he evaluation report fails to de.onstrate that an, +enefits co..unications data .a, have for prosecuting cri.e depend specificall, on +lan/et retention sche.es and cannot li/e0ise +e achieved under
!( )CC1 C-$5"'51 L $!J C- 2"' 1 L ;%. !; )CC1 C-!'#"'(1 LL ;2 and 5$. !5 Advocate General1 C-!'#"'(1 LL and #''.

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targeted data preservation sche.es. 3he possi+le occasional utilit, of access to co..unications data +, la0 enforce.ent agencies does not .ean that there 0as a need to retain such data indiscri.inatel,. 3he )uropean Court of Au.an Rights has consistentl, held that .ere usefulness does not satisf, the test of necessit,. ! In a case concerning the retention of +io.etric data1 the )uropean Court of Au.an Rights criticised data such as no0 presented +, the Co..ission= 9It is true1 as pointed out +, the applicants1 that the figures do not reveal the e4tent to 0hich this Dlin/D 0ith cri.e scenes resulted in convictions of the persons concerned or the nu.+er of convictions that 0ere contingent on the retention of the sa.ples of unconvicted persons. *or do the, de.onstrate that the high nu.+er of successful .atches 0ith cri.e-scene stains 0as onl, .ade possi+le through indefinite retention of D*A records of all such persons. OXP Net such .atches could have +een .ade even in the a+sence of the present sche.e OXP.: %' In order to e4a.ine in ho0 .an, cases the investigation1 detection and prosecution of serious cri.e lac/s co..unications data1 the situation in countries 0here no +lan/et retention reEuire.ents are or 0as in place needs to +e anal,sed1 0hich the Co..ission fails to do. An evaluation 0hich fails to address countries 0hich have not transposed the allegedl, 9necessar,: Directive is1 +, definition1 inadeEuate. An independent stud, co..issioned +, the Ger.an govern.ent found that a.ong a sa.ple set of #.2$; la0 enforce.ent reEuests for traffic data .ade in 2''$1 onl, %< of reEuests could not +e (full,& served for a lac/ of retained data. %# 3he Ger.an Bederal Cri.e Agenc, (?KA& counted onl, !5# cri.inal investigation procedures in 0hich traffic data 0as lac/ing in 2''$ %2 and 55' unsuccessful data reEuests in 2'#' %!. In vie0 of the total of a+out ( .illion cri.inal investigations per ,ear in Ger.an,1 no .ore than '.'#< of cri.inal investigation procedures 0ere potentiall, affected +, a lac/ of traffic data. %% 8i.ilarl, a Dutch stud, of ($ case files found that reEuests for traffic data could 9nearl, al0a,s: +e served even in the a+sence of co.pulsor, data retention. %$ 3he cases studied 0ere al.ost all solved or helped using traffic data that 0as availa+le 0ithout co.pulsor, data retention.%( It follo0s that in .ost cases1 sufficient co..unications data for the investigation1 detection and prosecution of serious cri.e is availa+le 0ithout +lan/et retention o+ligations.
! 8ilver v. -K (# 5!& $ )ARR !%;1 L ;. %' )CtAR1 Farper v -nited Kingdo. (2'' & %5 )ARR $'1 L ##(. %# Fa4 7lanc/ Institute for Boreign and International Cri.inal Ma01 3he Right of Discover, Concerning 3eleco..unication 3raffic Data According to LL #''g1 #''h of the Ger.an Code of Cri.inal 7rocedure1 Farch 2''51 http=""dip2#.+undestag.de"dip2#"+td"#("'5%"#('5%!%.pdf1 p. #$'. %2 8tarosti/1 7leadings of #; Farch 2''51 http=""000.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de"i.ages"schriftsatz@2''5-'!-#;.pdf1 p. 2. %! ?KA1 Report of #; 8epte.+er 2'#'1 p. (. %% 8tarosti/1 7leadings of #; Farch 2''51 http=""000.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de"i.ages"schriftsatz@2''5-'!-#;.pdf1 p. 2. %$ )ras.us -niversit, Rotterda.1 >ho retains so.ething has so.ething1 2''$1 http=""000.erfgoedinspectie.nl"uploads"pu+lications">ie<2'0at<2'+e0aart.pdf1 p. %!. %( )ras.us -niversit, Rotterda.1 >ho retains so.ething has so.ething1 2''$1 http=""000.erfgoedinspectie.nl"uploads"pu+lications">ie<2'0at<2'+e0aart.pdf1 p. 25.

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!.2.2. 3o the prosecution of ho0 .an, serious cri.es does such e4tra co..unications data ulti.atel, .a/e a positive difference2
>here other0ise unavaila+le co..unications data is accessed +, la0 enforce.ent authorities under a +lan/et retention sche.e1 this data often .a/es no difference to the outco.e of the cri.inal investigation. Iften an investigation 0ill +e unsuccessful 0hether or not co..unications data is availa+le. Bor e4a.ple1 co..unications data can +e 0ithout +enefit to an investigation 0here the, lead to a pu+lic telephone +ooth1 a pu+lic Internet cafY1 a pu+lic Internet access point1 a V7* 9anon,.ising: service1 a pre paid .o+ile telephone card not correctl, registered +, the su+scri+er or a device the user of 0hich at the relevant ti.e cannot +e esta+lished. In the other hand1 .an, cri.inal offences are successfull, prosecuted in spite of the unavaila+ilit, of co..unications data +, using other evidence. 3he .a/ing availa+le of .ore data to la0 enforce.ent agencies does therefore not in itself de.onstrate that this e4tra data 0as necessar, for the prosecution of serious cri.e. Availa+ilit, is not necessit,. Ma0 enforce.ent authorities in states that reEuire the deletion of co..unications data often present statistics on ho0 .an, reEuests for co..unications data 0ere not served due to a lac/ of co..unications data. 3his evidence is irrelevant +ecause it fails to de.onstrate an, influence e4tra data 0ould have had on the outco.e of these investigations. Mi/e0ise1 the nu.+er of cases in 0hich retained data is used and 0hich result in cri.inal prosecutions does not de.onstrate that +lan/et retention ulti.atel, .ade a difference to the outco.e of these cases1 i.e. to the prosecution of serious cri.e. An independent stud, co..issioned +, the Ger.an govern.ent found that a+out one third of the suspects in procedures 0ith unsuccessful reEuests for co..unications data 0ere still ta/en to court on the +asis of other evidence. %; Foreover ;2< of the investigations 0ith full, successful reEuests for traffic data did still not result in an indict.ent. %5 All in all1 +lan/et data retention 0ould have .ade a difference to onl, '.''2< of cri.inal investigations.% 3his nu.+er does not change significantl, 0hen ta/ing into account that in the a+sence of a +lan/et data retention sche.e1 less reEuests for data are .ade in the first place.$'

!.2.!. Is an, such +enefit offset +, counter-productive side effects of +lan/et data retention2
It has +een sho0n that +lan/et retention o+ligations .a, .a/e a positive difference to the prosecution of a s.all fraction of all cri.inal offences. )ven so1 such o+ligations can not +e considered necessar, for the prosecution of serious cri.e if +enefits in so.e cases are offset +, counter-productive side effects on the prosecution of serious cri.e in other cases. 3he indiscri.inate retention of co..unications data 0ithout cause has counter-productive effects on the prosecution of serious cri.e in that it furthers the use of circu. vention techniEues and other co..unication channels (e.g. Internet cafYs1 pu+lic 0ire %; 8tarosti/1 7leadings of #; Farch 2''51 http=""000.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de"i.ages"schriftsatz@2''5-'!-#;.pdf1 %5 8tarosti/1 7leadings of #; Farch 2''51 http=""000.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de"i.ages"schriftsatz@2''5-'!-#;.pdf1 % 8tarosti/1 7leadings of #; Farch 2''51 http=""000.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de"i.ages"schriftsatz@2''5-'!-#;.pdf1 $' 8tarosti/1 7leadings of #; Farch 2''51 http=""000.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de"i.ages"schriftsatz@2''5-'!-#;.pdf1 p. 2. p. 2. p. 2. p. 2.

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less Internet access points1 anon,.isation services1 pu+lic telephones1 unregistered .o+ile telephone cards1 non-electronic co..unications channels&. According to a representative poll after the i.ple.entation of the Directive in Ger.an,1 2%.(< of Ger.ans de clared that the, use or intend to use pu+lic Internet cafYs1 $ .5< said that the, use or intend to use an Internet access provider that does not retain co..unications data 0ithout cause1 and %(.%< of Ger.ans declared that the, use or intend to use Internet anon,.isation technolog,.$# 8uch avoidance +ehaviour can not onl, render retained data .eaningless +ut also frustrate .ore targeted investigation techniEues that 0ould other0ise have +een availa+le for the investigation and prosecution of serious cri.e. Iverall1 +lan/et data retention can thus +e counterproductive to cri.inal investigations1 facilitating a fe01 +ut rendering .an, .ore futile. Also retained data is .ostl, used for prosecuting pett, cri.e such as .inor fraud or file sharing. ?, t,ing up la0 enforce.ent resources 0ith the .ass prosecution of pett, cri.e1 +lan/et retention can ha.per the investigation of trul, serious cri.e (e.g. organised cri.e&.

!.2.%. All in all1 does +lan/et and indiscri.inate teleco..unications data retention have a statisticall, significant i.pact on cri.e or the investigation of cri.e2
A .eaningful assess.ent of net effectiveness of +lan/et retention sche.es needs to loo/ at 0hether1 in a given countr,1 serious cri.e as a 0hole is prosecuted .ore effectivel, under a +lan/et retention sche.e than under a targeted investigation sche.e. Aas the introduction of a +lan/et retention sche.e led to an increase in the nu.+er of conde. nations1 acEuittals1 the closure or discontinuation of cases1 or the prevention of cri.es2 Did 8tates operating 0ith targeted instru.ents achieve a si.ilar nu.+er of conde.nations1 acEuittals1 the closure or discontinuation of cases1 and the prevention of cri.es as 8tates operating 0ith +lan/et retention2 3he evaluation report fails to assess the effectiveness of la0 enforce.ent in Fe.+er 8tates and non-Fe.+er 8tates that do not have a +lan/et retention sche.e in place. Fan, la0 enforce.ent agencies around the 0orld operate successfull, 0ithout rel,ing on +lan/et data retention. A.ong these states are Austria1 Ger.an,1 Greece1 *or0a,1 Ro.ania1 80eden and Canada. 3he a+sence of data retention legislation does not lead to a rise in cri.e in those states1 or to a decrease in cri.e clearance rates1 not even in regard to Internet cri.e. *or did the co.ing into force of data retention legislation have an, statisticall, significant effect on cri.e or cri.e clearance. 3his is e4e.plified +, statistics pu+lished +, the Ger.an Bederal Cri.e Agenc, (?KA&=

$# infas institute poll1 http=""000.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de"i.ages"infas-u.frage.pdf.

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- #5 -

-# -

>ith data retention in effect1 .ore serious cri.inal acts (2'' = #(15#%& 0ere registered +, Ger.an police than +efore (2'';= #$1; '&1 and a s.aller proportion 0ere cleared up (2'' = 5!.$<& than +efore the introduction of +lan/et retention of co..unications data (2'';= 5%.%<&. Mi/e0ise1 after the additional retention of Internet data +egan in 2'' 1 the nu.+er of registered Internet offences surged fro. #(;1%$# in 2''5 to 2'(1 ' in 2'' 1 0hile the clear-up rate for Internet cri.e dropped (2''5= ; .5<1 2'' = ;$.;<&. $2 In the a+sence of a +lan/et traffic data retention regi.e1 Ger.an la0 enforce.ent agencies have consistentl, cleared .ore than ('< of all reported Internet offences1 significantl, outperfor.ing the average cri.e clearance rate of a+out $'<. 3he co.ing into force of data retention legislation did not have an, statisticall, significant effect on cri.e rates or cri.e clearance rates. After data retention 0as discontinued in Ger.an, follo0ing the Constitutional Court ruling1 Internet cri.e continued to +e cleared .ore often than offline cri.e.$! 3his picture is confir.ed +, statistics pu+lished +, the Finistr, of the Interior of the Czech Repu+lic and +, the 7olice of the Czech Repu+lic=

$2 Ar+eits/reis Vorratsdatenspeicherung anal,sis1 http=""000.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de"i.ages"data@retention@effectiveness@report@2'##-'#-2(.pdf. $! Ar+eits/reis Vorratsdatenspeicherung1 http=""000.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de"content"vie0"%!$"; "lang1en".

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- 2# -

8tatistics pu+lished +, the Austrian Finistr, of the Interior sho0 that the a+sence of +lan/et data retention legislation does not result in a rise in cri.e or a drop in cri.e clearance=

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3he 8cientific 8ervices of the Ger.an 7arlia.ent have anal,sed 93he practical effects of data retention on cri.e clearance rates in )- Fe.+er 8tates:. 3he report co.pared cri.e clearance rates throughout the )- and concluded as follo0s= 9In .ost states cri.e clearance rates have not changed significantl, +et0een 2''$ and 2'#'. Inl, in Matvia did the cri.e clearance rate rise significantl, in 2'';. 3his is related to a ne0 Cri.inal 7rocedure Ma0 though and is not reported to +e connected to the transposition of the )- Data Retention Directive.: $% *ot0ithstanding the co.prehensive evidence presented a+ove1 0e 0ould li/e to recall that it is not the applicantDs tas/ to prove +lan/et data retention superfluous. It is rather the proponents of this .easure 0ho +ear the onus of proof regarding the alleged necessit, of +lan/et data retention.

!.2.$. Conclusion
-sefulness to la0 enforce.ent is not necessit,. Access statistics and anecdotal evidence such as presented in the Co..issionDs evaluation report do not de.onstrate a need for +lan/et data retention. 8uccessful reEuests for traffic data retained under directive 2''("2%")C do not prove that data 0ould other0ise have +een lac/ing1 despite the co..ercial +illing data stored under directive 2''2"$5")C and e4tra data stored in co.pli ance 0ith specific 6udicial orders. )ven 0here e4tra data is disclosed under data retention sche.es1 it often has no influence on the outco.e of investigation procedures or +enefits are offset +, avoidance +ehaviour a.ong citizens. 3he Euota of cri.inal investiga$% 8cientific 8ervices of the Ger.an 7arlia.ent1 Report >D ; S !''' S '!("##1 http=""000.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de"i.ages"8achstand@'!(-##.doc4.

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tions the outco.e of 0hich depends specificall, on +lan/et co..unications data retention is e4ceedingl, s.all (a+out '.'#<& and apparentl, at least offset +, the counter-productive effects that +lan/et retention has on the prosecution of serious cri.e. 8tudies prove that the co..unications data availa+le 0ithout data retention are generall, sufficient for effective cri.inal investigations. According to cri.e statistics1 serious cri.e is investigated and prosecuted 6ust as effectivel, 0ith targeted investigation tech niEues that do not rel, on +lan/et retention. ?lan/et data retention has for ,ears proven to +e superfluous in .an, states across )urope1 such as Austria1 ?elgiu. (for Internet data&1 the Czech Repu+lic1 Ger.an,1 Ro.ania and 80eden. 3hese states prosecuted cri.e 6ust as effectivel, using targeted instru.ents1 such as the data preservation regi.e agreed in the Council of )urope Convention on C,+ercri.e. ?esides1 facilitating the prosecution of cri.e is not identical to safet,. 3he prevalence of serious cri.es is no lo0er in states 0here co..unications data are +eing retained indiscri.inatel,. 3here is no indication that teleco..unications data retention provides for +etter protection against cri.e.

-.-. Assessment of proportionality and relevant "urisprudence

Blanket and indiscriminate telecommunications data retention has proven to violate fundamental ri!hts and unable to stand its !round a!ainst court challen!es.

Contrar, to the Advocate GeneralDs opinion (L #!$&1 the proportionalit, of the indiscri.inate retention of data i.posed +, Directive 2''("2% reEuires a particularl, detailed indepth e4a.ination1 considering the funda.ental1 vast conseEuences of +lan/et co..unications data retention on a de.ocratic societ,. It is unclear to us on 0hat +asis the Advocate general .a/es his assertions in L #!$ 3he Directive clai.s in recital 22 that it respects the funda.ental rights and o+serves the principles recognised1 in particular1 +, the Charter of Bunda.ental Rights of the )uropean -nion. Ao0ever in vie0 of the DirectiveDs at Euestiona+le and unproven +ene fits and the 0idespread har. caused +, it1 s,ste.aticall, retaining co..unications data on the entire population cannot +e considered a strictl, necessar, and proportionate .easure in a de.ocratic societ,= De.ocratic states in )urope and +e,ond prosecute cri.e effectivel, 0ithout indiscri.inate +lan/et retention. After all1 offline cri.e can +e prosecuted 0ithout lists of the peopleDs past co..unications or 0herea+outs1 too. ?lan/et retention appears to have no statisticall, significant i.pact on the cri.e clearance rate. )nhancing the prosecution of cri.e is not identical to safet,. 3here is no evidence that less cri.e 0as +eing co..itted in states that have i.ple.ented a polic, of indiscri.inate co..unications data retention than in other states. In chasing a s.all and unEuantified nu.+er of cri.inal offenders 0ho can +e prosecuted on the +asis of +lan/et reten tion onl,1 the proponents of indiscri.inate data retention lose sight of the fact that confidential and untracea+le co..unications protect the lives1 health and li+ert, of far .ore innocent persons1 for e4a.ple 0here counselling services can convince violent fa.il, fathers or paedophiles to ta/e up therap,. 3he 0illingness to co..unicate 0ith counsel lors and see/ help often depends on the availa+ilit, of untracea+le co..unications channels. Bor e4a.ple1 a Ger.an helpline could convince a ,oung .an to give up plans

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for a raid on his school in 2'';. Aad co..unications data +een retained1 the student .a, never have called and .a, have carried out his plan. At an, rate1 ;< of all citizens 0hose co..unications are +eing recorded under +lan/et retention sche.es in a given ,ear are not even suspected of a cri.inal offence $$ and use their telephones1 .o+ile phones and the Internet for entirel, legal and legiti.ate purposes. )ven if +lan/et and indiscri.inate retention of co..unications data did contri+ute to the detection1 investigation and prosecution of serious cri.e1 it fails to stri/e a fair +alance +et0een the co.peting pu+lic and private interests1 constituting a disproportionate interference 0ith the )- citizensD right to respect for their private life. 3he )Court of Custice should follo0 the Constitutional Court of Ro.ania as 0ell as the )uropean Court of Au.an RightsDs Farper 6udge.ent and annul the Directive for violating the )- Charter of Bunda.ental Rights. In 2'' 1 the Ro.anian Constitutional Court ruled that data retention per se +reached Article 5 of the )uropean Convention on Au.an Rights. 3he Court argued that the 9continuous li.itation of privac,: that co.es 0ith +lan/et co..unications data retention 9.a/es the essence of the right disappear.: Data retention 9eEuall, addresses all the la0 su+6ects1 regardless of 0hether the, have co..itted penal cri.es or not or 0hether the, are the su+6ect of a penal investigation or not1 0hich is li/el, to overturn the presu.p tion of innocence and to transfor. a priori all users of electronic co..unication services or pu+lic co..unication net0or/s into people suscepti+le of co..itting terroris. cri.es or other serious cri.es. Ma0 2 5"2''5 applies practicall, to all ph,sical and legal users of electronic co..unication services or pu+lic co..unication net0or/s1 so it cannot +e considered to +e in agree.ent 0ith the provisions in the Constitution and the Convention for the 7rotection of Au.an Rights and Bunda.ental Breedo.s regarding the guaranteeing of the rights to private life1 secrec, of the correspondence and freedo. of e4pression.:$( Fa/ing reference to case-la0 of the )uropean Court of Au.an Rights1 the Ro.anian Constitutional Court did not onl, Euestion the co.pati+ilit, of +lan/et retention 0ith Article 5 of the )uropean Convention on Au.an Rights1 it definitivel, ruled that it is inco.pati+le. In 2'#'1 the Bederal Constitutional Court of Ger.an, annulled the Ger.an data retention reEuire.ents for violating the right to secrec, of teleco..unications. $; 3he Court considered that +lan/et retention 9constitutes a particularl, serious encroach.ent 0ith an effect +roader that an,thing in the legal s,ste. to date.: ?lan/et retention 9is capa+le of creating a diffusel, threatening feeling of +eing 0atched 0hich can i.pair a free e4ercise of funda.ental rights in .an, areas.: It is 9part of the constitutional identit, of the Bederal Repu+lic of Ger.an, that the citizensR en6o,.ent of freedo. .a, not +e totall, recorded and registered:. In 2'##1 the Constitutional Court of the Czech Repu+lic annulled the Czech data retention provisions for violating the rule of la0 as 0ell as the rights to data protection and in for.ational self-deter.ination.$5 In the reasons given for the 6udge.ent1 the Constitu$$ In 2'#21 21' %1##5 of 5'1$2#1''' inha+itants in Ger.an, 0ere suspected of a cri.inal offence= Bederal Cri.e Agenc,1 https=""000.+/a.de"8haredDocs"Do0nloads"D)"7u+li/ationen"7olizeilicheKri.inalstatisti/"2'#2"p/s 2'#2Cahr+uch1te.plateIdHra01propert,Hpu+licationBile.pdf""p/s2'#2Cahr+uch.pdf1 p. . $( Constitutional Court of Ro.ania1 decision of 5 Icto+er 2'' 1 http=""000.legiinternet.ro"english"6urisprudenta-it-ro.ania"decizii-it"ro.anian-constitutional-court-decisionregarding-data-retention.ht.l. $; Bederal Constitutional Court of Ger.an,1 decision of 2 Farch 2'#'1 http=""000.+verfg.de"en"press"+vg#'-'##en.ht.l. $5 Constitutional Court of the Czech Repu+lic1 decision of !# Farch 2'##1

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tional Court e4pressed funda.ental dou+ts 90hether1 having regard to the intensit, of the interference and the .,riad of private sector users of electronic co..unications1 +lan/et retention of traffic and location data of al.ost all electronic co..unications is necessar, and appropriate:. Referring to cri.e statistics1 the Court pointed out that 9+lan/et retention of traffic and location data had little effect on reducing the nu.+er of co..itted serious cri.es:. 3here are further co.plaints pending +efore the Aungarian Constitutional Court $ 1 the Irish Aigh Court and the Austrian Constitutional Court. In 2'#'1 the Irish Aigh Court found that data retention had the potential to +e of 9i.portance to the 0hole nature of our societ,:. 9OIPt is clear that 0here surveillance is underta/en it .ust +e 6ustified and generall, should +e targeted:. 3he Austrian Constitutional Court noted that data retention 9al.ost e4clusivel, affects persons 0ho do not give cause for their data +eing stored: and that there 0as 9a heightened ris/ of a+use:. It concluded that the interference in Euestion 9appears disproportionate1 not least +ecause of prevailing dou+ts as to its suit a+ilit, for reaching the intended purpose:. (' 3he Grand Cha.+er of the )uropean Court of Au.an Rights found in 2''5 that the retention of +io.etrics on .ere suspects +reached Article 5 of the )uropean Convention on Au.an Rights= 9In conclusion1 the Court finds that the +lan/et and indiscri.inate nature of the po0ers of retention of the fingerprints1 cellular sa.ples and D*A profiles of persons suspected +ut not convicted of offences1 as applied in the case of the present applicants1 fails to stri/e a fair +alance +et0een the co.peting pu+lic and private interests and that the respondent 8tate has overstepped an, accepta+le .argin of appreciation in this regard. Accordingl,1 the retention at issue constitutes a disproportionate interference 0ith the applicantsD right to respect for private life and cannot +e regarded as necessar, in a de.ocratic societ,. 3his conclusion o+viates the need for the Court to consider the applicantsD criticis. regarding the adeEuac, of certain particular safeguards1 such as too +road an access to the personal data concerned and insufficient protection against the .isuse or a+use of such data.: (# 3his assess.ent of the collection of identification data on $ .illion citizens (2 .ust1 a fortiori1 appl, to the .uch larger collection of infor.ation on the dail, co..unications of $'' .illion citizens throughout the )-. 3he CourtDs finding did not rel, on retention periods1 +ut on the fact that personal data of persons not convicted of offences 0ere +eing retained indiscri.inatel,1 as is the case 0ith Directive 2''("2%. In 2'#'1 the )- Court of Custice annulled )- legislation reEuiring +lan/et processing of personal data (pu+lication on the Internet& for disproportionatel, interfering 0ith the funda.ental right to privac,1 arguing that alternative1 targeted .easures 0ere availa+le 90hich 0ould +e consistent 0ith the o+6ective: of the )- act 90hile at the sa.e ti.e
http=""000.concourt.cz"clane/"GetBile2idH$';$. $ Aungarian Civil Mi+erties -nion1 Constitutional Co.plaint Biled +, ACM- Against Aungarian 3eleco. Data Retention Regulations1 2 Cune 2''51 http=""tasz.hu"en"data-protection"constitutional-co.plaintfiled-hclu-against-hungarian-teleco.-data-retention-regulat. (' Constitutional Court of Austria1 decision of 25 *ove.+er 2'#21 http=""000.vfgh.gv.at"c.s"vfghsite"attach.ents"#"%"$"CA''';"CF8#!(!( 22!5 "vorlage@vorratsdatenspeicherung@english.pdf. (# )uropean Court of Au.an Rights1 decision of % Dece.+er 2''51 http=""000.0e+citation.org"$g(Bzd?r%1 L #2$. (2 Au.an Genetics Co..ission1 *othing to hide1 nothing to Bear21 *ove.+er 2'' 1 http=""000.hgc.gov.u/"-ploadDocs"Doc7u+"Docu.ent"*othing<2'to<2'hide1<2'nothing<2'to <2'fear<2'-<2'online<2'version.pdf1 p. %.

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causing less interference 0ith Othe citizenDsP right to respect for their private life:. (! It has +een sho0n that in the case of Directive 2''("2%")C1 alternatives to i.posing +lan/et retention on all Fe.+er 8tates are availa+le 0hich 0ould +e consistent 0ith the DirectiveDs o+6ective of safeguarding the proper functioning of the internal .ar/et 0hile at the sa.e ti.e causing far less interference 0ith the citizenDs right to respect for their private life.

Blanket data retention transforms the e)ception from fundamental ri!hts into an absolute rule and thus makes the essence of the ri!hts disappear. 9#%%. It should1 in that regard1 +e pointed out in the first place that an accu.ulation of data at indeter.inate locations in c,+erspace such as the accu.ulation at issue1 0hich al0a,s concerns actual and particular persons1 tends1 0hatever its duration1 to +e perceived as an ano.al,. In principle1 such a state of ZretentionR of data relating to the private lives of individuals1 even if it re.ains 6ust that1 should never e4ist and1 0here it does1 should e4ist onl, having regard to other reEuire.ents of societ,. 8uch a situation can onl, +e e4ceptional and therefore cannot e4tend in ti.e +e,ond the period necessar,.:

3he Advocate GeneralDs opinion states=

It is correct that the storage of data relating to the private lives of individuals can +e per.itted onl, in e4ceptional circu.stances in a de.ocratic societ,. 3his is e4actl, 0h, the per.anent and indiscri.inate retention of co..unications data1 i.e. the routine collection of infor.ation concerning the ever,da, +ehaviour of the entire population1 is .anifestl, disproportionate= 93he legal o+ligation that foresees the continuous retention of personal data transfor.s though the e4ception fro. the principle of effective protection of privac, right and freedo. of e4pression1 into an a+solute rule. 3he right appears as +eing regulated in a negative .anner1 its positive role losing its prevailing role. ... 3herefore1 the regulation of a positive o+ligation that foresees the continuous li.itation of the privac, right and the secrec, of correspondence .a/es the essence of the right disappear +, re.oving the safeguards regarding its e4ecution. ... Ao0ever1 la0 2 5"2''5 i.poses the o+ligation of a continuous retention of traffic data... 0ithout considering the necessit, for the cessation of the li.itation once the deter.inant cause has disappeared.:(% In order to preserve the right to privac, and confidentialit, of co..unications in an infor.ation societ,1 +lan/et and indiscri.inate teleco..unications data retention reEuire.ents .ust +e suppressed in favour of e4pedited preservation and targeted collection of traffic data that is needed for a specific investigation. A targeted and proportionate s,ste. as agreed in the Council of )uropeDs Convention on C,+ercri.e should +e esta+lished1 targeting suspects of serious cri.e instead of placing all $'' .illion )- citizens under general suspicion.

(! )CC1 C- 2"' and C- !"' 1 L 5#. (% Constitutional Court of Ro.ania1 decision of 5 Icto+er 2'' 1 http=""000.as/theeu.org"de"reEuest"2#"response"#$!"attach"$">issen+ach<2'Anne4<2'2.pdf.

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1. No suspension of "ud!ement

2tayin! the findin! of invalidity of the 'ata (etention 'irective %ould create a dan!erous precedent and undermine the effectiveness of fundamental ri!hts. 9#$5. It is appropriate1 in those circu.stances1 to suspend the effects of the finding that Directive 2''("2% is invalid pending adoption +, the )uropean -nion legislature of the .easures necessar, to re.ed, the invalidit, found to e4ist1 +ut such .easures .ust +e adopted 0ithin a reasona+le period.:

3he Advocate GeneralDs opinion states=

>e strongl, disagree. It is our assertion that the finding of invalidit, should not +e suspended. Binding the directive invalid 0ill allo0 the legislature1 for the first ti.e1 to .a/e a full and proper assess.ent of all options1 including the option of targeted data preser vation1 having regard to all findings concerning the effects of data retention1 as 0ell as other current develop.ents (i.e. international sp,ing scandals&. 3he Court .a, consider definitive effects of an act 0hich it has declared void onl, e4ceptionall, 0here it is 6ustified +, overriding considerations of legal certaint,. Declaring the Data Retention Directive void does not raise an, issues of legal certaint,. 3he effects of such 6udge.ent are ver, clear1 and are the sa.e as if the illegal Directive had not +een adopted in the first place. Fe.+er 8tates re.ain free to adopt legislative .easures to restrict the o+ligation to erase co..unications data 0hen such restriction constitutes a necessar,1 appropriate and proportionate .easure 0ithin a de.ocratic societ, (Art. #$ of Directive 2''2"$5&. ?, referring to 9overriding considerations of legal certaint,:1 the Court .eans 9the calling into Euestion of the charging or pa,.ent of su.s of .one, effected on the +asis of that .easure in respect of the period prior to the date of the 6udge.ent:. ($ In the case of 8ociYtY RYgie *et0or/s v Direction de contr[le fiscal Rh[ne-Alpes ?ourgogne1 C-!!!"';1 the Brench govern.ent feared that recovering su.s for ,ears past .ight put the finances and ver, e4istence of local radio stations in 6eopard, and the pluralit, of the .edia could +e threatened. Annulling Directive 2''("2% clearl, does not call into Euestion an, trans action effected in the past. 3he .ere alleged 9relevance and even urgenc, of the ulti.ate o+6ectives: of an act at issue have never in the past led the Court to uphold a severe violation of funda.ental rights. In the case of )uropean 7arlia.ent v Council1 C-!#;"'%1 the Court sa0 no reason to sta, its decision. *or did it in the 8chec/e case. 3here is no good reason 0h,1 in the case of the .ost grave violation of funda.ental rights of all1 the Court should deviate fro. its 6urisprudence. 8uch deviation 0ould create a dangerous precedent and under.ine the effectiveness of our funda.ental rights. It should +e noted that none of the national constitutional courts that found data retention la0s in violation of funda.ental rights sa0 a reason to sta, their decision.

($ )CC1 C-225"

1 L !(.

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3. 4onclusion

The EU must no lon!er force blanket and indiscriminate telecommunications data retention on its /ember 2tates but prohibit such la%s in favour of e)pedited preservation and tar!eted collection of traffic data that is needed for a specific investi!ation.

Considering legal develop.ents since 2''$1 the scale of the da.age done to funda.ental rights +, the Directive1 the dangers generated +, the .ere e4istence of unnecessar, data+ases of e4tre.el, sensitive personal data1 the unproven effectiveness of data retention for prosecuting serious cri.e and the e4istence of less invasive alternatives1 such as targeted collection of traffic data as agreed in the Council of )uropeDs Convention on C,+ercri.e1 the )- Court of Custice should prohi+it national +lan/et data retention la0s. 8uch an approach 0ould target suspects of serious cri.e instead of placing all $'' .illion )- citizens under general suspicion. According to the )- Court of Custice1 the )- is co.petent to har.onise 0hether or not teleco..unications providers retain co..unications data for la0 enforce.ent purposes. 3he )- therefore has the po0er to har.onise the internal .ar/et +, outla0ing national +lan/et retention reEuire.ents. 3his 0ould +e +roadl, analogous to the har.onisation effected +, )- legislation on to+acco advertising1 for e4a.ple. According to its evaluation report1 the Co..ission intends to pursue the ai. of har.onisation +, placing la0-a+iding citizens under general suspicion throughout the )-. 3his approach has not onl, failed +, its o0n standards +ut is costing .illions of )uros1 puts the privac, of innocent people at ris/1 disrupts confidential co..unications and paves the 0a, for an ever-increasing .ass accu.ulation of infor.ation a+out the entire population. >e +elieve that such invasive surveillance of the entire population as co.es 0ith +lan/et and indiscri.inate teleco..unications data retention is unaccepta+le. Representatives of the citizens1 the .edia1 professionals and industr, collectivel, re6ect this polic,. 3he )- .ust loo/ +e,ond re-using the e4isting failed approach. Conclusions .ust +e dra0n fro. the e4periences of countries that have not i.ple.ented the Directive. 3he )- needs to a+andon the failed data retention e4peri.ent and e.+race targeted1 funda.ental rights-co.pliant investigation .ethods. >e urge the )- Court of Custice to protect our funda.ental rights +, finding the principle of indiscri.inate co..unications data retention in violation 0ith these guarantees.

Revised version of 16 March !1"

Arbeitskreis 5orratsdatenspeicherun! $6erman 7orkin! 6roup on 'ata (etention& 3he Ar+eits/reis Vorratsdatenspeicherung (AK Vorrat& is a Ger.an,-0ide organisation 0hich ca.paigns against e4tensive surveillance in general and the +lan/et logging of teleco..unications data in particular. Ao.epage and contact details= http=""000.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de"2langHen

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