The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

The 1964 U.S. Presidential Election

A Case of Extreme Values

Nicholas Neuteufel

POLI 412H: United States National Elections

Prof. Jason Roberts

April 9, 2014

Neuteufel 1 The landslide of the 1964 United States presidential election may seem boring to some or even just an interesting outlier within the scope of more competitive elections. However, the massive electoral defeat of Barry Goldwater by President Lyndon Johnson offers very interesting insights into the essential components of US electioneering and a demonstration of the hypotheses of political scientists. A careful data-focused analysis reveals interesting lessons about the effectiveness of presidential campaigns and the so-called fundamentals of electoral politics (economic growth, presidential approval, etc.). This essay will argue that the 1964 Republican presidential primaries were structurally flawed and could have led to a better outcomethat is, a candidate with a higher probability of winning the general electiondespite the wariness of strategic candidates. In its second part, this essay will argue that the only truly significant campaign event was the Republican Party convention and that fundamentals were overwhelmingly in Johnsons favor. This essay also argues that Goldwaters campaign may have been very effectivedespite the tremendous loss as it overcame constraints in vote share such as party identification, presidential approval, and inter-party ideological difference. This conclusion is robust to considering Alabamas exclusion of Johnson from the ballot and confronts the narrative of Goldwater being a weak candidate. The Primaries Fifteen states and the District of Columbia held voting primaries for majority party nominees in 1964, though only the fifteen states held primaries for the Republican Party (McGillivray and Scammon 910). The Democratic primary cycle was very uneventful. Keech and Matthews go so far as to say that the primaries had literally no effect on President Johnsons prospect for nomination (100). This claim comes despite the fact that there was a candidate challenging the incumbent president. Governor George Wallace of Alabama

Neuteufel 2 campaigned in the Democratic primary, seeking to prove a point more than to challenge the President (100). Wallace campaigned in three states and received a sizable minority of votes (34% in Wisconsin, 30% in Indiana, and 43% in Maryland), but did not seriously threaten Johnsons nomination at the Democratic convention in Atlantic City (101). The lack of strong competition most probably derived from the existence what Sides and Vavreck call strategic candidates (35). Strategic candidates are individuals who seek out election years in which the playing field is tilted toward either their party or their individual candidacy (35). Strategic candidates were most probably dissuaded from running in the 1964 Democratic primaries for two reasons. First, Johnson was an incumbent president. Sides and Vavreck note that incumbent presidents are hard to beat (35). They are very strong in contests in which they run. Since 1900, only five incumbents lost the presidency, compared to fourteen incumbent winners (35). Second, Johnson was not only an incumbent, but an incumbent that was enjoying record levels of average presidential approval ratings (Gallup, Presidential Approval Ratings). There was also tremendous economic growth during the 1964 primary season. Hibbs shows that the growth of real personal disposable income during Johnsons first term was more than four percent (150). This is tremendous growth. The landslide of the 1972 presidential election when Nixon won re-election with 49 states only saw a growth in real personal disposable income of 3.5% (ibid). Given Johnsons great approval ratings and the great economic growth of the United States at the time, it is hard to imagine that any viable candidate within the Democratic Party would chose to try to seriously challenge Johnson rather than wait until an incumbent-free 1968. This suspicion is confirmed by the post-Johnson primary battle during the 1968 Democratic primary cycle.

Neuteufel 3 The Republican primary process, however, was much more of a contest. It began with no clear-cut choice or front-runner for the nomination (Keech and Matthews 80). In fact, the New York Times speculated in 1960 that Nixons service as vice president for eight years, his popularity with the partys rank and file, and his ideological moderation would make him the favorite (80). However, an electoral defeat for Nixon in the Californias governors race seemed to make Nelson Rockefeller the favorite in 1962 (81). Rockefeller was never able to transfer that reputation into polling success, however. Barry Goldwater, a US Senator from Arizona won the Republican nomination, despite never being a media-picked favorite, according to Keech and Matthews (82). Goldwater managed to win 38.33% of the primary popular vote as well (despite the fact that some of the fifteen states primaries were effectively off-limits to Goldwater because of favorite son candidates). Goldwater secured a strong minority of the votes and the nomination, despite a lack of national popularity among Republicans. Table 1 and Figure 1 show the Gallup preferences for GOP nominees among Republicans nationally throughout the primary season.
CANDIDATE NIXON GOLDWATER LODGE ROCKEFELLER G. ROMNEY SCRANTON JAN 29% 23% 19% 12% 8% 4% FEB 31% 20% 12% 16% 5% 7% APR 26% 14% 42% 6% 4% 4% MAY 28% 14% 37% 9% 3% 4% JUNE 25% 10% 26% 9% 5% 9% JULY 22% 22% 21% 6% 0% 20%

Table 1: Data from the Center for Range Voting, citing Gallup

Neuteufel 4

Preference of Republicans polled by Gallup for Republican nominee for President, 1964
45%

Percentage of Republicans polled

40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Jan Feb Apr May June July

Month of Poll
Nixon Goldwater Lodge Rockefeller G. Romney Scranton

Figure 1: Data from the Center for Range Voting, citing Gallup

Nixon held a consistent twenty percent to 31% share of Republican preferences nationally. Despite that national popularity, Nixon dropped out of the race before the convention. Nixon was not too serious of a campaigner and was probably a strategic candidate who dropped out thinking that campaigning against Johnson was futile. This assertion is supported by his efforts and success during the 1968 election cycle. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. peaked in April with 42% and led for most of the race, despite the fact that he spent the entirety of the primary season in Saigon acting as Americas ambassador to South Vietnam (Keech and Matthews 81). The group of citizens organizing a write-in campaign for Lodge was not able to translate his popularity with Republicans in general into a significant number of primary victories or delegates to the Republican convention in San Francisco (81). Given that Goldwater won the nomination, there is a noticeable gap between the polling data and the results from the primaries. There are a few factors that likely played a role. The first

Neuteufel 5 is the limited number of primariesthere were only fifteen voting primaries for the Republican nomination, rather than one for each state and territory. The specific demographics and favorite son trend of certain states made it hard for candidates actively campaigning to translate any national popularity into specific primary victories in multiple contests. The second problem with the primary process was the fact that there was little active campaigning by candidates other than Goldwater. As stated previously, Lodge was acting as Ambassador to South Vietnam; all votes for Lodge were write-in votes (McGillivray and Scammon 910-914). Nixon dropped out early in the contest and Rockefeller was plagued by personal issues such as a divorce and infidelity accusations (Keech and Matthews 82). However, there was more to the primaries than weaker-than-desire candidate competition. The nature of the primarys plurality forced-vote system allowed a relatively unpopular candidate, even among the general Republican base, to win the contest (The 1964 Republican Primary). The Center for Range Voting demonstrates that William Scranton would have been the Condorcet winner of the primary campaigns and probably would have won [a] range vote as well (ibid). Gallup polling data pitting other Republican candidates for the nomination versus President Johnson are very interesting and helpful in evaluating the impact of the primary system used in the 1964 cycle. Table 2 details the results of Gallup polling asking voters preferences among the three choices of Johnson, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and undecided.
CANDIDATE JOHNSON HC LODGE UNDECIDED 10-JAN 66 23 11 28-FEB 68 27 5
Table 2

18-MAR 68 27 5

19-APR 65 30 5

Table 3 details the results of Gallup polling comparing voters preferences among the three choices of Johnson, Richard Nixon, and undecided.

Neuteufel 6
CANDIDATE JOHNSON NIXON UNDECIDED 28-FEB 69 27 4
Table 3

18-MAR 68 27 5

1-JUL 70 27 3

Table 4 shows the preferences of persons polled by Gallup between the actual nominees: Johnson and Goldwater. This set includes polls both before and after the conventions, unlike Tables 2 and 3, which have only polls before the conventions.
CANDIDATE JOHNSON GOLDWATER UNDECIDED 1-JAN 75 20 5 1-JUL 77 18 5 13-JUL 77 20 3
Table 4

9-AUG 59 31 10

16-SEP 65 29 6

18-OCT 64 29 7

2-NOV 64 29 7

The Gallup data illustrate that before the Republican nominating convention (which took place from July 13th to the 16th), both Scranton and Nixon fared better against Johnson than Goldwater did in polls of all voters. In a Gallup poll on January 22nd, Republicans polled only preferred Goldwater to President Johnson by 6 percentage points47% for Goldwater to 41% Johnson (The 1964 Republican Primary). These data show that Goldwater was divisive among Republicans when they were asked before the convention. The problem, however, is that the plurality voting system and limited number of states holding a primary allowed Goldwater to win delegates more easily, as voters either split their votes among non-Goldwater candidates and unpledged/uncommitted or started a large writein campaign. Perhaps a different voting system would have nominated a candidate more up to the task of the defeating President Johnson, even if one accounts for the impact of strategic candidates not running. (The Center for Range Voting indicates that the actively campaigning Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton would probably have been the nominee in an alternate voting world.) The strategic failure of the Republican primary was illustrated in a Gallup poll

Neuteufel 7 asking Democratic county chairs in several states which Republican candidate had the best shot (or the highest probability) of defeating Johnson in the general election. The results of the poll are shown in Table 5.
CANDIDATE
SCRANTON GOLDWATER NIXON ROCKEFELLER LODGE OTHER

VOTES 302 297 246 246 243 69

PERCENT 21.53% 21.17% 17.53% 17.53% 17.32% 4.92%

Table 5: Data from the Center for Range Voting, citing Gallup

Almost 70% of Democratic county chairpersons stated that a candidate other than Goldwater had the best shot of defeating Johnson. Thus the Republican primary system led to the nomination of a candidate that almost 70% of Democratic leaders said did not have the best shot to defeat President Johnson. The Center for Range Voting argues that any of the other candidates would have had a better chance of beating Johnson, as they were more popular among Republicans and because they were considered more moderate than Goldwater (The 1964 Republican Primary). One cannot, however, truly know that a different voting system would have resulted in a candidate with a better chance of defeating President Johnson, as a different voting system may have changed the calculus of candidates, changing their decisions to enter the primary campaign or not and whether to campaign in a different matter or not. The General Election Campaigns Even with the possibility of a better Republican candidate, the data bear out that the 1964 election was Johnsons to lose first and foremost. The fundamentals of economic growth,

Neuteufel 8 partisanship, and presidential approval were very much on Johnsons side. In addition, the Republican nominating convention was the only game-changer in terms of popular vote share. Popular vote intention, as show through Gallup trial-heat polling, was very stable throughout the general election season. This rule has two exceptions: the time period surrounding the major party nominating conventions and just before Election Day. (There were no debates between Goldwater and Johnson, so the impactor lack thereofof presidential debates cannot be tested with 1964 data.) There is a notable increase in those declaring a preference or intention to vote for Goldwater from the month of June to the remaining months. This is most probably a result of the Republican nominating convention, which took place from July 13 to July 16. Campbell, Cherry, and Wink show that Goldwater had a bump of +12.9 percentage points in pre-and-postconvention trial heat polls, while Johnson had a net change of 0 (295). Given the lack of a bump for Johnson, Goldwaters bump most probably came from Republicans previously disenchanted with the idea of supporting Goldwater. The bump certainly did not come solely from Goldwaters selection of William Miller as his running-mate; Miller and Goldwater were very similar in ideological terms (Keech and Matthews 87). These voters most probably declared themselves as undecided or uncertain and then became more confident in selecting Goldwater as a result of positive media coverage of the Republican convention. The hypothesis is also supported by the magnitude of the bump12.9 percentage points is above the mean for both outparty and Republican conventions (8.7 and 7.0 points, respectively; Campbell, Cherry, and Wink 295), which makes sense given the fractured nature of the primary popular vote and Gallup polling.

Neuteufel 9 Table 6 and Figure 2 show the results of Gallup trial-heat polling asking the voters preferences for President.

Month of Poll June July August September October

Lyndon B. Johnson (D) % 77% 76% 62% 59% 65% 65% 62% 64% 64%

Barry Goldwater (R) % 18% 20% 26% 31% 29% 29% 32% 29% 36%

Table 6: Gallup trial-heat polling data throughout the general election season

Gallup Trial Heat Presidential Polling (June - October 1964)

90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Percentage of Respondents

Chronological Number of Poll (1 & 2, June; 3 & 4, July; 5, August; 6 & 7, September; 8 & 9, October)
Lyndon B. Johnson (D) % 2 per. Mov. Avg. (Lyndon B. Johnson (D) %) Barry Goldwater (R) % 2 per. Mov. Avg. (Barry Goldwater (R) %)

Figure 2: Data taken from Gallup (Gallup Presidential Election Trial-Heat)

The trial-heat polling pitting Goldwater against Johnson mirror the approval and disapproval ratings of Johnson as president for the most part. This is because in general presidential approval is a significant signal and a good proxy for vote intentions throughout a campaign (Erickson and Wlezien). In fact, when including presidential approval in a model for

Neuteufel 10 popular vote share, the independent impact of the economy as a fundamental disappears (ibid). 1964 is a good example to demonstrate presidential approvals impact on US presidential elections. Figure 3 shows the approval versus disapproval of President Johnson from his ascension to office after the Kennedy assassination to November 25th (after the election), using Gallup data. Note that against includes both actual against votes and all other. Since no approval data exist from June 25th to November 25th, the data are interpolated.

Johnson Approval versus Disapproval, December 1963November 1964

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 12/5/1963 1/16/1964 1/30/1964 2/13/1964 2/27/1964 3/12/1964 3/26/1964 4/23/1964 5/21/1964 6/18/1964 7/16/1964 7/30/1964 8/13/1964 8/27/1964 9/10/1964 10/8/1964 12/19/1963 10/22/1964 11/5/1964

Percentage

9/24/1964

4/9/1964

5/7/1964

6/4/1964

7/2/1964

1/2/1964

Date of Poll (Interpolated from 6/25 to 11/25, as no data exist)

Approve Disapprove

Figure 3: From Gallup (Gallup Presidential Approval) and Roper Center (Presidential Approval for President Johnson)

Johnsons approval was very high during his first term. In fact, it set a precedent for highest average approval rating of a presidential term (Gallup, Gallup Presidential Approval Ratings). Figure 4 shows the average Gallup approval rating for select US Presidents during their first terms of office. Johnson had the highest average of all of the presidents since Gallup began collecting presidential approval datahis first-term approval rating average was 74.2% (ibid). This 74.2% is very high in comparison to the average first-term approval rating of the

11/19/1964

Neuteufel 11 presidents considered (excluding Johnson): 56.68%. In fact, Johnsons first-term approval rating is 1.686 standard deviations above the mean first-term presidential approval rating. This achievement is more impressive when one considers that Johnsons peak approval was only fifth among the eleven presidents. His peak approval rating came at 79% in February 1964 (ibid), helping to ward off serious primary challengers, but not helping to seriously distort the average approval rating of his first term.

Average first-term Gallup Presidential approval rating

80 70

Approval Rating (%)

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Harry Truman John Kennedy Gerald Ford Dwight Eisenhower Ronald Reagan Richard Nixon Jimmy Carter Bill Clinton George H.W. Bush

Presidents of the United States

Figure 4: Data from Gallup (Presidential Approval Ratings)

Johnsons record high approval ratings throughout the polling window (from his ascension to office until the election) and the relatively stable trial-heat polling data demonstrate a lack of true game-changing events outside of the Republican convention. A true gamechanger would probably have shifted voters approval or disapproval of the sitting president in some way. One problem with this analysis, however, is a lack of presidential approval datathe

George W. Bush

Lyndon Johnson

Neuteufel 12 time period from June to November is interpolated. One significant historical event during this time period was Congressional passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing the use of conventional military force by President Johnson in Southeast Asia (Iraq versus Vietnam). Gallup did not begin polling on the Vietnam military incursion until May of 1965. There is little reason to believe that this was controversial or meaningful for the election since the American public has a general ignorance of foreign policy matters and bipartisan support for the Resolution (it passed the Senate 88-2). This hypothesis is supported by a lack of meaningful change in Gallup trial-heat polling data during or just after August (see Figure 2). Breaking down the Returns The 1964 election became notorious as a landslide, a result which surprised none at the time (Keech and Matthews 84). Despite the landslide status of the election, however, there is evidence that the Goldwater campaign performed very well and exceeded the expectations of vote share models. This is most probably because Goldwaters popular vote share exceeded the constraints of party identification, inter-party ideological difference, and presidential approval, even when one considers Alabamas exclusion of Johnson from the ballot. Erickson and Wlezien identify partisanship as a fundamental for the general election, as it sets the terms for how party-affiliated voters determine for whom they will vote. 1964 offers a mixed bag of examples and support for this idea. Democratic Party identification in 1964 was the highest it has ever been in recorded US history. 51% of registered voters identified as Democrats in 1964 (Independents Take). That majority represented a net partisanship rate of 26 percentage points over Republicans, who appealed to 25% of the registered voting population (ibid). 1964 marked the apex of net partisanship, at least since 1939 (ibid). This stark divide does help to partially explain the magnitude of the landslide that occurred in 1964.

Neuteufel 13 While a record partisan divide almost certainly helped drive the margin between Johnson and Goldwater, national exit polling done by Gallup shows that there was significant cross-party voting during the election. Twenty percent of Republicans polled voted for the Democratic nominee, Johnson (Election Polls). This divide probably occurred because of division within the Republican Party (discussed previously). However, cross-party voting went both ways, at least in responses to exit polling. Thirteen percent of registered Democrats polled voted for Goldwater (ibid). Independents split 56-44 for Johnson (ibid). Thus national exit polling suggests that partisanship was not as much a constraining factor in vote choice in the 1964 election as other elections, when cross-party voting was lower (ibid). One possible explanation for the increase in cross-party voting is an increase in ideological difference. Paddock analyzes the platforms of eleven states Republican and Democratic parties, looking at seven different areas: capitalism, redistribution, internal sovereignty, labor, universalism, foreign/defense, and overall ideology (756-757). Figure X details the inter-party differences in ideology scores from 1956, 1960, and 1964. Larger values in either the positive or negative direction indicate a larger difference; positive values indicate when the Democrats were more liberal on an issue than Republicans that year and negative values indicate when Republicans were deemed more liberal than Democrats that year.

Neuteufel 14

Inter-party differences in mean ideology scores for eleven states

Difference (Dem Liberalism - GOP Liberalism)
2 1.5 1 0.5 0

Capitalism

Redistribution

Universalism

Foreign/Defense

Labor

-0.5

Internal Sovereignty

Issue
1960 1964

1956

Figure 5: Data from Paddock (756)

In each of the seven areas, the inter-party difference grew from 1960 to 1964. This increase in difference most probably comes from the platforms of selected state Republican parties becoming more conservative. This hypothesis makes sense given an increase in Democratic Party affiliation (to a historic high), the activism and direction of Goldwater Republicans, and the relatively common agenda of Kennedy and Johnson. This increase in interparty ideological difference makes the results more impressive for the Goldwater campaign, as it probably distanced the Republican Party from the median voterin a year where 51% of voters identified as Democrats. A third constraint on a candidates voter share is the approval of the sitting president (whether or not the election is a re-election). This is because presidential approval serves as a good proxy for Americans view of the economy, partisanship, and more (Erikson and Wlezien). Presidential approval also models actual vote intentions extremely welleven better than actual

Overall

Neuteufel 15 vote intention polls at times (Erikson and Wlezien). Thus presidential approval can be seen as an expectation of vote share for candidates (or at least, as a constraint on possible vote share). For the challenger, presidential disapproval serves as the expectation, which makes sense given a referendum view of re-elections (or in the case of Johnson, incumbent first election). The fact remains that Goldwater was trounced in popular vote. He won only 38.233% of the popular vote, excluding Alabama, to Johnsons 61.677% (Leip; Peters, 1964 Presidential Election Results). However, Goldwater outperformed expectations given by presidential approval. Considering Johnsons highest disapproval of 1964 (30% of those polled on 11/25/1964, after the election; Gallup), Goldwater won an additional 8.2% of the popular vote (Gallup; Presidential Approval for President Johnson). If one uses interpolation to find the expected approval on Election Day, Goldwater beats presidential disapproval by nine percentage points. If one uses the last day of full presidential approval data available before Election Day, Goldwater beat expectations by thirteen percentage points. These performances above expectations came despite both an all-time high in Democratic Party identification and a greater distance of Republican ideology from the median voter. Another piece of evidence showing the possibility of an effective Goldwater campaign is James Stimsons measure of the national policy mood, which attempts to show how liberal or conservative the general public of the United States is. Stimsons data are especially useful beginning at the end of 1958, when data are given on a quarter-year basis. Figure 6 shows the national policy mood of the United States from 1952 (the beginning of data collection) to the fourth quarter of 1964.

Neuteufel 16

National Policy Mood of the United States (1952 - 1964)

Liberalism (higher = more liberal) 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1958d 1959a 1959b 1959c 1959d 1960a 1960b 1960c 1960d 1961a 1961b 1961c 1961d 1962a 1962b 1962c 1962d 1963a 1963b 1963c 1963d 1964a 1964b 1964c 1964d Year (1952-1958) or Quarter-Year (4Q 1958 to 4Q 1964) (Dotted line is the two-period moving average)
Figure 6: Data from Stimson (n.p.)

71.896 70.6 71.001 66.133 65.668 60.712 66.179 64.72663.829 64.663 54.021 67.167 61.075 60.316 65.231 58.836 58.47 58.903 65.848 65.629 56.397 63.663 64.039 65.857 58.646 52.015 47.703 57.072 56.123 56.444 55.769 53.294

The window in question is from 1963d to 1963c, the period from Johnsons succession of Kennedy to the day of the 1964 election. The US national policy mood experiences a noticeable decrease beginning in the first quarter of 1964 (1964a) to the third-quarter of 1964 (1964c). Such a conservative shift did not occur at all during the 1960 presidential election. During the 1960 general election season, there was a remarkable increase in liberalism according to Stimsons data. A very different shift occurred during the 1964 election cycle. The 1964 decrease in national policy mood score meant a more conservative population, or at least, a population more receptive to conservative arguments. This probably resulted from conservative activism and political mobilization for Republicans, as presidential approval remained stable throughout the period (Gallup, Presidential Approval Ratings). This is supported by the previous analysis of Goldwaters vote share exceeding expectations set by presidential approval despite the height of Democratic affiliation in 1964 and greater ideological distance from the median voter.

Neuteufel 17 One last piece of evidence for a more generous evaluation of Goldwaters campaign comes from Douglas Hibbs Bread and Peace model of presidential election vote share. His model uses the weighted-average growth of real disposable personal income per capita during the sitting presidential term and casualties from US involvement in foreign wars to predict the vote share of the incumbent partys candidate (149). Since 1964 did not see a significant number of casualties in the Vietnam conflict before Election Day, the economic indicator is the one used to predict the vote share for Johnson. Figure 7 is Hibbs (150) diagram showing the vote share of the incumbent party as a percentage on the y-axis and the economic growth indicator on the xaxis. The line shows the expected vote share.

Figure 7: From Hibbs (150)

Neuteufel 18 Hibbs model actually predicts a one-to-two percent greater vote share for Johnson.1 However, the decrease in the national policy mood and Goldwaters performance above presidential disapproval demonstrate that the election result was not Johnson underperforming, but perhaps a better-than-expected Goldwater campaign. Goldwaters 1964 vote share thus beats Eriksons and Wleziens measure focusing on presidential approval and Hibbs model focusing on economic growth in spite of two constraints and even when one considers the fact that Alabama excluded Johnson from the ballot. Conclusion The 1964 election has a great deal of implications for both US electoral politics and the conservative movement that arose from the ashes of Goldwaters defeat. George F. Will wrote in 1998 that Goldwater knew that he meant more than the loss of 44 states in one election, including a change of his party to a more conservative one. Will went on to say that Goldwater did not need to fear, as [p]erhaps he sensed that he had won the future and that 1964 was only a premonition and a beginning, that the 27,178,188 of us who voted for him in 1964 believe he won, it just took 16 years to count the votes. Will conveniently forgets the context in which Goldwater won the nomination. The 1964 Republican primary process was not nearly as competitive as other Republican primary years. It only included fifteen voting states in which Goldwater competed against a man living in South Vietnam propelled by a write-in campaign (Lodge), a strategic candidate who dropped out of the race early (Nixon), and other moderates among whom many Republicans split their votes. The plurality system of voting helped Goldwater by fracturing votes. A change of voting systems

Though he does not account for the impact of Alabamas exclusion of Johnson, as this paper did earlier. However, Alabamas impact on national vote share is negligible.

Neuteufel 19 from a plurality system to a range or Condorcet vote could have helped Republicans pick a more moderate candidate, even in spite of the reluctance of strategic candidates. This means that Goldwater may not have shifted the Republican Party solely through his primary campaign, as some would argue. Wills argument does, however, make more sense in the general election context of 1964. The only significant event (or game-changer) in terms of popular vote share in polling data seems to have been the Republican convention, which led to a 12.9 percentage point bump for Goldwater. The convention and Goldwaters campaign seemed to help Republican unity, despite animosity between Rockefeller and Goldwater. At the very least, the convention probably persuaded more Republicans to oppose Johnson and vote for Goldwater. No other event had a truly significant on the available data from Gallup, including the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which led to later escalation in Vietnam. The lack of game-changer events underlined the importance of the fundamentals, including record high average presidential approval for a first term and tremendous economic growth. This essay, however, confronts the notion that Goldwater was a weak candidate. Perhaps there is something to Wills argument in that respect. Goldwater lost in a tremendous land-slide, of course, but he did outperform the expectations of two notable vote share models. He outperformed presidential disapproval (a standard put forth by Erikson and Wlezien) by at least eight percentage points and Hibbs model of bread and peace by at least one percentage point. He beat these models despite a greater ideological difference from the median voter (compared to 1960) and an all-time high in Democratic Party identification. Additional support for this hypothesis comes from quarterly national policy mood data showing that the general public of the US became more conservative in mood over the course of the 1964 campaign cycle, in

Neuteufel 20 contrast to the becoming-more-liberal trend of the 1960 general election season. These claims are robust to account for Alabamas exclusion of President Johnson from the ballot. 1964 thus acts as an example of the importance of fundamentals in structuring presidential elections and constraining the possible vote share of the candidates. Nevertheless, there is a good deal of evidence that Goldwaters campaign was more effective than is generally believed, even when one accounts for the exclusion of Johnson from the ballot in Alabama. Despite this campaign effectiveness in terms of popular vote share over expectations, Goldwater was not able to translate that campaign effectiveness into Electoral College success. There was little for Goldwater to do meaningfully while Johnson was enjoying incredible success in presidential approval and economic growth. There is some solace, then, for conservatives in the fact that Reagan served to take up the mantle of Goldwater during a time in which the fundamentals were much more favorable for Goldwaters and Reagans party and were much less a constraint on the campaign asserting Goldwaters ideas. Further research should be done to see how Goldwater outperformed these models or if there is some ceiling on the effectiveness of these models in cases of extreme values (in terms of economic and political fundamentals). Given Goldwaters possible impact on national policy mood and his outperforming multiple models, however, there may be some credit due to Goldwater and Republicans from 1964 that has not been given yet.

Neuteufel 21 Works Cited Campbell, J. E., L. L. Cherry, and K. A. Wink. "The Convention Bump." American Politics Research 20.3 (1992): 287-307. SAGE Publications. Web. 30 Mar. 2014. "Election Polls -- Presidential Vote by Groups (1964)." Gallup Dot Com. Gallup, Inc., 2014. Web. 30 Mar. 2014. Erickson, Robert S., and Christopher Wlezien. The Timeline of Presidential Elections: How Campaigns Do (and Do Not) Matter. Kindle ed. N.p.: Amazon, 2012. Print. "Gallup Presidential Election Trial-Heat Trends, 1936-2008." Gallup Presidential Election TrialHeat Trends, 1936-2004. Gallup, Inc., n.d. Web. 07 Apr. 2014. Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. "Bread and Peace Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections." Public Choice 104 (2000): 149-80. Douglas Hibbs' Personal Website. Web. 29 Mar. 2014. "Independents Take Center Stage in Obama Era." Pew Research Center for the People and the Press RSS. N.p., 21 May 2009. Web. 30 Mar. 2014. "Iraq Versus Vietnam: A Comparison of Public Opinion." GALLUP. Gallup, Inc., 24 Aug. 2005. Web. 05 Apr. 2014. Keech, William R., and Donald R. Matthews. The Party's Choice. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1976. Print. Leip, David. "1964 Presidential Election." US Election Atlas. N.p., 2012. Web. 30 Mar. 2014. McGillivray, Alice V., and Richard M. Scammon. America at the Polls, 1960-1992 Kennedy to Clinton: A Handbook of American Presidential Election Statistics. Vol. 1. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1994. Print. Paddock, Joel. "Inter-Party Ideological Differences in Eleven State Parties: 1956-1980." The Western Political Quarterly 45.3 (1992): 751-60. JSTOR. Web. 29 Mar. 2014.

Neuteufel 22 Peters, Gerhard. "1964 Presidential Election." 1964 Presidential Election. The American Presidency Project, n.d. Web. 28 Mar. 2014. Peters, Gerhard. "1964 Presidential Election Results." 1964 Presidential Election. N.p., n.d. Web. 04 Apr. 2014. "Presidential Approval for President Johnson." Presidential Approval for President Johnson. The Roper Center, n.d. Web. 08 Apr. 2014. "Presidential Approval Ratings -- Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends." Presidential Approval Ratings. Gallup, Inc., n.d. Web. 29 Mar. 2014. "Reading Book "The Gallup Polls, Public Opinion 1935-1971"" Gallup Data. The Center for Range Voting, n.d. Web. 1 Apr. 2014. "The Republican 1964 Primary." Keech & Matthews on Republican 1964 Primary. The Center for Range Voting, n.d. Web. 05 Apr. 2014. Sides, John, and Lynn Vavreck. The Gamble: Choice and Chance in the 2012 Presidential Election. Kindle ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. Kindle Edition. Stimson, James. "Policy Mood." Policy Mood. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2011. Web. 05 Apr. 2014. Will, George F. "The Cheerful Malcontent." The Washington Post. N.p., 31 May 1998. Web. 8 Apr. 2014.

Neuteufel 23 Appendix: Union Membership

Union Membership versus Johnson Vote Share (1964)

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Percentage

US State or D.C. (in alphabetical order, omitted for clarity) (First orange dot is Alabama, where Johnson was not on the ballot)
Union Membership Percentage Johnson Vote Share Percentage

r = 0.341176 (with Alabama); r = 0.381499 (without) r2s = 0.116401 and 0.145541

Union Membership versus Turn-out of Voting Age Population (VAP)

90% 80% 70%

Percentage

60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

US State and D.C. (alphabetically, excluded for clarity)

Union Membership Rate Turn-out of VAP

r = 0.502540057 with Alabama; r2 = 0.252546509 r = 0.50724746 without; r2 = 0.257299986