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Transitioning to Neo and Max
An Investor’s Guide
Dick Forsberg & Lucas Mollan
February, 2013
Dick Forsberg
Head of Strategy
Dick Forsberg has over 40 years’ aviation industry experience working in a
variety of roles with airlines, operating lessors, arrangers and capital
providers in the areas of business strategy, industry analysis and forecasting,
asset valuation, portfolio risk management and airline credit assessment.
Prior to joining Avolon as a founding executive, he was Head of Strategy at
RBS Aviation Capital, where responsibilities included defining the trading
cycle of the business, creating and maintaining an asset valuation capability,
setting portfolio risk management criteria and determining capital allocation
targets. Prior to RBS, Dick worked with IAMG, GECAS and GPA following a 20‐
year career in the UK airline industry. Dick has a Diploma in Business Studies
and in Marketing from the UK Institute of Marketing and is a member of the
Royal Aeronautical Society. Dick is also a Director of the Board of ISTAT (The
International Society of Transport Aircraft Trading).
Lucas Mollan
Chief Technical Officer
Lucas Mollan has 29 years of experience in technical management. He
previously served as Managing Director of Thomas Cook Aircraft
Engineering where he was responsible for the provision of in house
maintenance and engineering support to the various Thomas Cook Airline
fleets, totalling over 60 aircraft. He was also responsible for the purchasing
and management of outsourced MRO services such as engine overhaul,
component support services and heavy maintenance, and for the provision
of aircraft maintenance and technical support services to third party airline
customers. Prior to this, Lucas served in senior technical roles for several UK
airlines, including Air 2000, JMC Airlines and MyTravel Airways. Lucas has
also previously worked for Airbus, assisting airlines to introduce new Airbus
aircraft into their fleet. Lucas has a Bachelor of Science (Hons) in
Aeronautical Engineering from Bristol University and is also a licensed UK CAA
Aircraft Maintenance Engineer.
Avolon
Avolon is an international aircraft leasing company. Headquartered in Ireland, with offices in Stamford CT, Hong Kong,
Shanghai, Singapore and Dubai, Avolon provides aircraft leasing and lease management services. Avolon’s investors include
three of the world’s leading private equity firms Cinven, CVC Capital Partners and Oak Hill Capital Partners and one of the
world’s leading sovereign wealth funds, Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC).
Avolon has established itself as one of the leading global players in the aircraft leasing sector, leveraging off the strong
financial backing of its owners and the extensive trading history and senior industry relationships of its management team.
Avolon has a committed fleet of 163 owned aircraft, including direct orders for 20 A320neo and 20 Boeing 737Max aircraft.
See www.avolon.aero
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank Ascend and Avitas whose databases are the source of much of the fleet and values data in this analysis.
Disclaimer
This document and any other materials contained in or accompanying this document (collectively, the “Materials”) are provided for general
information purposes only. The Materials are provided without any guarantee, condition, representation or warranty (express or implied)
as to their adequacy, correctness or completeness. Any opinions, estimates, commentary or conclusions contained in the Materials
represent the judgement of Avolon as at the date of the Materials and are subject to change without notice. The Materials are not
intended to amount to advice on which any reliance should be placed and Avolon disclaims all liability and responsibility arising from any
reliance placed on the Materials.
Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
Contents
Page
Executive Summary 2
Key Findings 3
Transitioning to Neo and Max – Detailed Analysis 4
Conclusions 18
1
Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
Executive Summary
The transition of production from a highly successful current generation of aircraft to more efficient
successors is a subject with considerable topicality. Avolon’s second white paper on industry issues
considers how the transition from A320ceo and 737NG to Neo and Max will influence the single aisle
landscape over the rest of the decade and beyond. The anticipated benefits offered by the new
models are examined, as are the challenges involved in bringing them to market.
This paper incorporates Avolon’s current forecast of aircraft deliveries and capacity growth over the
coming years and analyses the impact that the introduction of re‐engined aircraft families will have
on existing fleets, both in terms of their future operation and their residual values. How quickly will
the installed fleets of the new models grow? When will current production end? Which in service
fleets will be replaced first by the new variants? How will values of “last off the line” aircraft
perform?
At a broader level, the analysis examines the total amount of new capacity delivering into the
market over the coming years. How will new deliveries be allocated between growth and
replacement? To what extent is there excess capacity and what are the implications? Will the
liquidity of current production aircraft be impaired?
The successors to current generation A320ceos and 737NGs will deliver fuel efficiency advantages
deriving from advances in engine technology, with no other material changes to structures or
performance, and are further evolutions of the current models rather than fundamentally new
types. As such, Neo and Max do not pose a disruptive threat to the long‐standing competitive
balance between the two families. Indeed, Boeing’s decision to proceed with Max has ensured that
the status quo will be maintained at least until the end of the next decade.
Clearly, there are execution risks associated with both programs, however the level of continuity
with current models and their production processes significantly reduces the potential scale of
program slippage compared to recent widebody introductions and the airframe and engine OEMs
can bring extensive resources and experience to bear on the technological challenges presented by
the programs and their timescales.
The pattern of customer orders confirms that there is still plenty of demand for the current models,
which bodes well for their continued liquidity and attractiveness to investors. The scale of their
embedded fleets and operator bases are substantially greater than those of previous generations of
transitioning aircraft, which will also protect them from premature value loss.
The level of single aisle capacity delivering over the coming decade can be absorbed by a
combination of market growth and fleet replacement, but this will only happen if the OEMs remain
disciplined and prudent in their production rate planning. Under such circumstances, we believe that
the transition to Neo and Max will be orderly, achieved with little disruption to the investor and
operator environment and undertaken broadly within the timescales identified by the OEMs. At the
same time, current generation A320 and 737 variants will continue to benefit from strong liquidity
metrics that will support placement of used equipment by lessors through the transition period and
beyond.
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Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
Key Findings
Neo and Max represent the next evolutionary development of the A320 and 737 families and the
transition process is therefore expected to be orderly and stable. At their stated performance
levels, they will deliver real economic benefits to operators at oil prices at or above $65 per
barrel.
Many of the execution risks associated with the Neo and Max programs lie with the engine
manufacturers, who are nevertheless well equipped and resourced to meet these challenges.
Whilst Neo and Max values are still finding their equilibrium in the market, a meaningful
premium over current generation equivalents is achievable based on stated performance targets
and operating economics.
Narrowbody deliveries for the coming decade can be absorbed by the combined market
requirements for growth and fleet replacement. However, continued discipline on the part of the
OEMs with respect to production rates is a critical factor in maintaining the supply and demand
balance.
Sufficient mature aircraft will be available to absorb the replacement element of new single aisle
deliveries over the next decade. As with previous transitions, prior generations of technology will
be retired ahead of current production models.
The number of narrowbody aircraft ordered by airlines in each region, as a percentage of the
installed fleet in those regions, remains substantially below the rate of traffic growth predicted
over the next ten years, indicating a deep reservoir of unsatisfied demand for additional aircraft,
both new and used
Current production types will continue to be in demand from operators and retain high levels of
liquidity during and beyond the transition period, following the pattern of earlier generations.
Demand for new and used equipment will be underpinned by strong growth in emerging markets
and the continued development of low cost business models backed by market liberalisation.
It will take more than 8 years from service entry for Max and Neo to build a critical mass within
their respective family fleets and they are consequently not expected to directly impact values of
current generation types for a number of years.
Strong demand, large installed fleets and operator bases, limited changes to payload/range
capabilities and a deep cushion of earlier generation retirement candidates all mitigate the “last
off the line” effect on values of aircraft delivering close to the end of their production cycle and
support value retention for current A320s and 737NGs.
The appropriate treatment of aircraft acquired within the last off the line timeframe will be
informed by the expertise of the investor’s asset management team, their market intimacy and
their experience of investment and trading through previous cycles and aircraft family transitions.
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Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
Transitioning to Neo and Max – Detailed Analysis
1. Macro capacity trends
Avolon has analysed aircraft deliveries made over the past 40 years, matching new capacity inducted
into the system with stored aircraft and retirements leaving the system. The ebb and flow of seat
growth can be seen in Exhibit 1, which
Exhibit 1: Narrowbody Seat Growth
highlights both the cyclical rise and fall of seat
12%
growth and the long‐term slowing trend, from 10%
Forecast
almost 8% in the early 1970s to between 4% 8%
and 6% today and a forecast continuation 6%
around that trend line for the next ten years. 4%
2%
The use of storage to relieve periodic cyclical
0%
stresses can also be clearly seen, including ‐2%
1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 2022
during the forecast period, where we assume ‐4%
Source: Ascend
that the next cyclical downturn will reach its ‐6%
Gross capacty growth Capacity growth net of storage Trend
lowest point in 2019/20.
In a similar fashion, the allocation of additional
capacity between growth and replacement also Exhibit 2: Replacement share of NB delivery capacity
100%
follows a cyclical rhythm (Exhibit 2), with 90%
80%
growth accounting for between 35% and 80% 70%
over the past 20 years, with an average of 64%. 60%
50%
The past four years has seen replacement 40%
30%
averaging 40% with a peak close to 50%. This 20%
safety valve, supported by a growing fleet of 10%
0%
ageing aircraft, many of them in North America,
that fall within what Ed Greenslet calls “the Growth % Replacement %
killing zone”, will remain an important swing
factor throughout the remainder of the decade (Avolon’s forecast for the period is shown in red),
reflecting the delivery boom that began in the late 1980s. Single aisle retirement rates, which have
averaged 2.2% of the installed fleet over the past five years, are forecast to increase gradually, to
2.5% over the next five years, and to 2.6% out to the end of the decade.
At the currently anticipated levels of new narrowbody production, detailed below in the section
“Avolon’s World Fleet Forecast”, we expect supply and demand, as expressed by net additional seats
versus passenger traffic growth, to be broadly Exhibit 3: Single Aisle Supply & Demand Growth Indices
in sync over the next 10 years. Subject to 350
cyclical fluctuations, Avolon forecasts traffic 300
250
growth to average slightly less than 5.5% per
200
annum over the next ten years, whilst single
150
aisle capacity will increase at a little over 5.5%. 100
Exhibit 3 shows how supply and demand 50
components have tracked one another over the
past 12 years and where they are expected to Source: Avolon
NB RPM Index NB Capacity index
go in the coming years.
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Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
It is into this environment of broadly balanced supply and demand that the new Max and Neo
products will begin to deliver in the second half of the decade and their introduction, per se, does
not represent a disruptive element within the overall market dynamic. How the OEMs deal with
their overall levels of production, however, will very much influence the outcome over the next
decade and without their restraint in managing the supply/demand balance, the picture could look
very different.
2. Background to the “new” products
The launch and subsequent sales success of both Neo and Max have been enabled by the
development of new, or, at least, improved, engine technology delivering greater fuel efficiency than
current models to a significantly greater degree than the underlying ½ ‐ 1% annual increments that
the industry can routinely deliver. Quantification of that step‐wise efficiency improvement continues
to be debated, not least by the OEMs in their marketing pitches to customers, and in reality will not
be known for sure until the new aircraft have entered service. However, the gains are expected to be
in the high single digit to low double digit range which, in the context of sustained high fuel prices,
makes the proposition attractive to many, though not all, airlines.
Unlike most previous new or upgraded models, Neo and Max were not developed in response to
specific shortfalls in payload/range performance, though some variants will be improved during the
upgrade process. Nor do their manufacturers claim compelling maintenance cost benefits. Their
advantage lies almost exclusively in their fuel efficiency, which the airframers seek, in their pricing
strategies, to share more or less equally between
Exhibit 4: Oil Price Forecast
themselves and the airlines. A comparative cost and Consensus of 22 analysts (US$ per BBL)
revenue analysis carried out by Avolon indicates that oil Brent WTI Std Dev (WTI)
2013 107.62 93.82 12.32
prices above $65 per barrel ‐ a level that consensus oil 2014 110.06 99.43 13.87
price forecasts suggest will be comfortably exceeded on a 2015 109.17 99.84 14.29
2016 108.27 102.67 17.69
long‐term trend (see Exhibit 4) ‐ will support the
2017 109.76 103.72 18.72
economics of new technology products at a price 2018‐22 115.48 106.05 21.37
premium that reflects 50/50 value sharing on the part of Source: Consensus Economics Inc.
the OEMs.
Because the changes are limited to those features that deliver the improved fuel efficiency, airlines
will not face the usual challenges and costs associated with a “traditional” fleet roll‐over programme
and instead will be able to bleed these new models into their existing A320ceo and 737NG fleets,
crew complements, networks and maintenance programs far more easily than has been the case
with any previous transition. This avoidance of expenditure and disruption will both encourage
operators to sign up to the new products and at the same time not precipitate wholesale early fleet
replacements.
The enhanced engine performance is currently being offered by two power‐plant manufacturers ‐
Pratt & Whitney and CFM. The former, whose share of the single aisle market has been in decline
since the 737‐200 ended production in 1988, created the opportunity for Neo and Max to become a
reality when they announced the development of a geared fan 2‐shaft (or “2½ shaft”) engine
capable of powering aircraft at least up to A321 size (30,000lbs‐plus thrust) and, having secured
launch applications on the Mitsubishi MRJ and Bombardier C‐Series, were able to demonstrate the
5
Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
effectiveness of their engine design and architecture during 2008 in static tests and on test flights,
including a series performed by Airbus.
Having won over the sceptics (including, critically, Airbus) and demonstrated strong fuel burn
improvement and noise credentials, the cat was out of the metaphorical bag and it became
increasingly difficult for the airframers to maintain their comfortable single‐aisle duopoly by arguing
that the lack of advancement in engine technology was preventing new models from being
developed. Airbus announced the launch of the Neo in November 2010 and, given the existing dual
engine offering on A320s, it was incumbent on CFM to provide a competing engine. The engine they
offered was the LEAP‐X, which had already been launched on the C919 program in 2009 having
grown out of an existing CFM development program, LEAP56, which dates back to 2005. The LEAP‐X
engine will use advanced materials and a two‐stage HPT design to achieve similar performance
improvements relative to current in service engines. CFM’s commitment to the LEAP also supported
Boeing’s decision, in July 2011, to proceed with the 737Max family following a protracted period of
review, analysis and soul‐searching. In the end, the Neo proposition was too powerful for Boeing to
ignore and the American Airlines Neo order announced soon after the 2011 Paris Air Show triggered
the launch of the 737Max, restoring market equilibrium and the single aisle status quo between the
two manufacturers.
Both aircraft programs come with not insignificant execution risk, although the OEMs position their
products as evolutionary, not revolutionary. Neither airframe will undergo major reworking,
although the 737 has been the more challenging of the two to modify, with tighter ground
clearances for the engines in particular. The A320 family is already undergoing structural
modifications to accommodate Sharklets and, although further wing strengthening will be needed to
take the heavier engines, little else is required beyond the obvious changes to engine pylons and
nacelles.
Whilst initially the P&W Geared Turbofan was thought to present greater engineering risks than the
new LEAP engine, extensive testing and development work removed many of the concerns over the
reliability and robustness of the geared turbofan architecture and even GE, who were amongst the
loudest critics of gearbox technology, appear to have softened their criticism. However, the new
geared shaft arrangement is still to be tested in service. Beyond the gearbox, the rest of the GTF
engine is fairly conventional and, indeed, has fewer parts than similar designs, removing weight and
cost.
CFM will incorporate significant new technology in the LEAP, which will enable the engine to
produce similar fuel savings. This includes a new composite fan system which is both light and highly
efficient. A significant amount of this technology has already been developed for larger GE engines
such as the GE90 and GEnx, and will be scaled down to the 20‐30,000 lb thrust category. Since CFM
agreed final design parameters with the airframe OEMs and launched the engines for A320 and 737
some two years after P&W, they will also be later to market ‐ 9 to 12 months after the GTF on the
A320 and as sole source on the 737Max in 2017.
Each of the engine manufacturers is producing a family of related engines for different applications
with different thrust requirements (Exhibit 5), however the development and evolution of these
families carry different levels of risk. The PW1000G family of engines is being developed in four
variants, for the MRJ, C‐Series, MC‐21 and Neo, each of which is, in reality, a different engine despite
6
Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
the similarities in architecture and design features. In Exhibit 5: Engine Family Applications
PW1000G Family
addition, the recently announced PW1700G and 1900G Engine Application Thrust Class Fan Diam.
applications for the proposed re‐engined E‐Jets family PW1200G MRJ 15-17,000 lbs. 56"
PW1500G CSeries 19-24,000 lbs. 73"
will use basically the same cores as the 1200G and PW1100G A320neo 24-33,000 lbs. 81"
PW1400G Irkut MC-21 28-31,000 lbs. 81"
1500G, although they will have different fuel and vane
PW1700G* E175G2 15,000 lbs. 56"
schedules and other specifics to reflect airframe PW1900G* E190/195G2 19-22,000 lbs. 73"
*Subject to Embraer launch approval
installation changes. The added complexity of managing
several parallel programs should not be under‐ LEAP Family
Engine Application Thrust Class Fan Diam.
estimated. LEAP-1A A320neo 24-33,000 lbs. 78"
LEAP-1B 737MAX 20-28,000 lbs. 68.4"
LEAP-1C C919 28-30,000 lbs. 75"
In contrast, the various LEAP engines are all in a similar
thrust class and the core hardware for both the ‐1A and ‐1C will be identical, according to CFM,
whilst the ‐1B will have a smaller core, tailored to the smaller fan size required on the 737. This
lower number of variants should give CFM an advantage over P&W in respect of production ramp
for the high volume of engines they will need to produce for the major airframers.
3. Neo and Max production milestones
Milestones for the 737Max include a firm configuration freeze in mid‐‘13, start of major assembly in
early 2015, first flight in the second half of 2016 and EIS for the ‐8 in mid‐2017, with the ‐9 and ‐7
following at 9 to 12 month intervals.
Neo development is running around half a year ahead of Max, with service entry targeted for
October 2015. However, whilst Airbus plans to move into final assembly within about 12 months of
design freeze, Boeing is scheduling a longer gap, presumably linked to the lag in development of the
LEAP engine, which is therefore a pacing item in the critical path for Max. Boeing is also showing a
longer elapsed time for major assembly, but this is likely to be due to the different production
methods applied, with Boeing undertaking much more of the 737 fabrication in‐house compared to
the A320 final assembly line (“FAL”) where
Exhibit 6: Neo & Max Major Milestones
completed major structures are joined. 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Exhibit 6 sets out the planned project A320neo
320 319 321
development timelines for each of the
PW1100
products.
LEAP‐1A
Service entry of the smaller and larger family
737 Max
members has been indicated by the OEMs, ‐8 ‐9 ‐7
but will ultimately be dictated not only by the LEAP‐1B
status of the programs but also by the profile Concept Commence FETT
freeze Major Assembly
of the order books, which currently look to Design First
EIS
freeze Flight
favour advancement of the larger models.
Airbus has commitments from three airlines for 35 A319s, with potentially more within AMR’s Neo
order, however Boeing has booked no specific ‐7Max orders and their recent announcement of a BBJ
Max program included the ‐8 and ‐9, but with no mention of a ‐7. In comparison, the A321neo has
over 300 commitments and the 737‐9Max 150+.
7
Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
Whilst the performance of CFM in delivering the LEAP engine into production is clearly crucial for the
on‐time service entry of Max, it is no less important for Neo’s CFM customers, the first of which are
scheduled to take delivery of aircraft from March 2016 onwards.
Also critical is the performance of P&W for the launch of the Neo program. Their engine will
doubtless benefit from the earlier on‐wing experience gained on C‐Series and MRJ aircraft, although
programme slippage means that the extent of in service data collection will be less than the
manufacturer had originally hoped for. Nevertheless, the benefits of early performance telemetry
should translate directly into the PW1100G, where the first engine build has been completed and
entered the test program, with test flights on schedule to commence in Spring 2013.
On balance, we believe that the production ramp‐up challenge for CFM is greater than for P&W
because of the larger numbers involved as the supplier for both Neo and Max and also the
technology going into these engines. For example, whilst there is no concern that CFM will be able to
produce composite fan blades, as they have done so very successfully for the GE90 and GEnx, the
volume requirement is dramatically greater. CFM will establish two Fan Blade production facilities,
one in the US and one in France to mitigate this. Greater use of additive manufacturing (3‐D printing)
will require additional production facilities, which GE/CFM are addressing by bringing some supply
chain partners in‐house. The use of CMCs (Ceramic Matrix Composites) in the LEAP engine, although
already in use in military engines, drives a ground‐breaking increase in manufacturing volume which
will require similar innovative solutions.
4. Neo and Max order status
Both Neo and Max have enjoyed very strong initial sales success, with commitments running
significantly higher than their predecessors achieved at the same stage of introduction (Exhibit 7).
Even when annual commitments are measured as a proportion of the in service narrowbody fleet,
which normalises for the underlying growth in the market (Exhibit 8), these models are performing
very strongly, with the effects of Airbus’s early sales strategy particularly clear to see. Indeed, the
A320neo has become the most successful product launch to date, outstripping even the 787.
Exhibit 7: Cumulative commitments since launch Exhibit 8: Annual commitments as % of in service NB fleet
2000
14%
1800
Cumulative commitments
Percent of in‐service fleet
1600 12%
1400 10%
1200
8%
1000
800 6%
600 4%
400
2%
200 Source: Ascend
Source: Ascend 0%
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Years since launch Years since launch
737 (CFMI) 737 (NG) 737 Max A320ceo A320neo 737 (CFMI) 737 (NG) 737 Max A320ceo A320neo
By mid‐February 2013, Airbus had secured almost 1900 commitments for the Neo family (Exhibit 9),
whilst Boeing had passed 1200 Max commitments. Airbus secured an early lead over Boeing in the
tally of orders due to their earlier launch and an extremely successful high intensity campaign in the
lead up to the 2011 Paris Air Show, where they announced over 600 new Neo commitments
8
Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
comprising 2/3rds of the show total. The Neo customer Exhibit 9: Neo Commitments
base now includes 29 airlines and 9 lessors, the latter 35
accounting for 23% of the backlog. 305
With the Neo program firmly established from a demand
perspective, Airbus’ primary objective in 2012 was to 1557
ensure that additional A320ceo sales were booked to
support production through the transition period. Their
sales efforts have been rewarded with a very solid skyline A319 A320 A321
Source: Ascend
which, when near‐term over‐booking is taken into
consideration, leaves them with very manageable levels of unsold capacity through to the end of the
decade (estimated at less than 500 units across Ceo and Neo).
Although Boeing’s early Max campaigns were hampered by
the lack of a firm design freeze, performance data and Exhibit 10: Max Commitments
pricing information, sales activity stepped up significantly in
2012. Limited information around detailed design and
516
performance data may explain why 40% of the Boeing 558
backlog of over 1200 aircraft is currently not assigned to a
specific model (Exhibit 10). Customers include 12 airlines 154
and 6 lessors, with lessors also taking 23% of the backlog.
Boeing also has a strong backlog of NGs, but a significantly
737‐8 737‐9 tba
larger proportion of unsold production than Airbus heading Source: Ascend
into the transition period (see section 7 below, “A320 and
737 backlog”).
The lion’s share of commitments to date has been for the “flagship” A320neo and 737‐8Max models,
with still muted demand for the larger variants and seemingly low interest in the smaller family
members. This distribution reflects the current market trend towards up‐scaling, with several
traditional A319 and 737‐700 operators now taking incremental A320ceos and 737‐800s in a move
to reduce seat‐mile costs, the industry having largely proven its ability to fill marginal additional
seats through more efficient and powerful inventory management technology. This trend is
expected to be maintained and future sales of smaller family members can be expected to be below
the ratios achieved on the current models. In addition, the additional weight of Neo and Max arising
from the larger engines will have a greater impact on the smallest family members, which should
logically deliver the smallest fuel burn improvement.
Whilst CFM has sole supplier status on the 737Max, the two Exhibit 11: Neo Engine Commitments
engine providers have been running effective campaigns to
651
secure market share on the Neo program, with each 568
currently at close to 50% of both orders and customers
(Exhibit 11). This balanced market is likely to be maintained,
643
assuming that the performance of both engine types proves
to be comparable, with both OEMs regarding their
campaigns as having moved beyond the start‐up phase. Source: Ascend
P&W CFM tba
9
Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
An important point to note is that, since the launch of Neo in November 2010, Airbus has secured
more than 850 further Ceo commitments (including 300 in 2012), whilst over 600 additional 737NGs
have also been ordered since the first Max commitment from American Airlines some 18 months
ago. These are significant numbers that make a strong statement in support of the current
generation aircraft. They also maintain an historic trend – almost 350 737 Classics were ordered
following the launch of the NG and similar proportions (over 15%) of the total delivered Ceo and NG
fleets are expected to be ordered between the launch of the successor and the end of production.
5. Neo and Max production and delivery ramp‐up
Current OEM plans for service entry of the various new models assume a moderate ramp‐up over
three to four years, with a corresponding decline in output of current types. Airbus anticipates the
first A320neos entering service in late 2015, with A321neos and A319neos following over the course
of 2016. The current process of transitioning Ceo production to the modified wing design required
for sharklets would suggest that A320 and A319 introduction will be linked due to their common
wing structure, with the A321neo the last to enter service due to its requirement for separate wing
jigs. However, countering that assumption is the probability that the A321neo will have significantly
greater demand than the A319, pushing for an earlier EIS.
Boeing has indicated that Max deliveries will commence in 2017, initially with the ‐8, followed in 9‐
12 month intervals by the ‐9 and ‐7. With a common wing installation, the industrial phasing issues
facing the A320 family do not apply and it is most likely that the ‐9 will follow the ‐8, assuming that
no order for ‐7s (from Southwest, for example) creates a customer requirement for the smaller
model that outweighs the current expectation that the ‐9 will be the stronger seller.
Whilst the ramp‐up of recent new widebody models from both Airbus and Boeing might suggest that
transition could take significantly longer than three or four years, the fact that both Neo and Max
are developments of current production types will minimise manufacturing, supply chain and
assembly line issues. If, as both airframers contend, they succeed in keeping engineering changes to
a minimum beyond what is required to accommodate the new engines, this should be borne out in
fact, with the engine providers placed under greatest pressure to meet their contracted output
levels.
Neither CFM nor P&W has suggested other than that they will be fully ready to meet the production
transition and ramp‐up rates guided by the airframers and both are expected to have supply chain
and production capacity available to meet demand for new engines and, in the case of CFM, also
maintain the required level of CFM56 deliveries across the transition of both competing types.
6. Avolon’s single aisle fleet forecast
Avolon regularly undertakes detailed market forecasts of commercial jet supply and demand looking
out over a 20 year time horizon and has developed a proprietary World Fleet Forecast model
(“WFF”) to support a range of business decisions. The model considers order, delivery, storage,
retirement and conversion activity across close to 100 individual aircraft types including in‐
production, out of production and future planned production models. The WFF, which supports
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Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
much of the forward‐looking analysis in this paper, includes transitions from current to new
generation A320s and 737s over a three to four year period towards the end of this decade, as
currently signalled by the OEMs and supported by order backlogs. The WFF also considers the extent
to which new deliveries, of all types both current and new, will meet market requirements for
capacity growth versus operator requirements for fleet replacement, recognising that the balance
between the two will be influenced not only by the availability of new aircraft but also the wider
industry cycle. This is determined by macro‐economic assumptions, including a ten year average
global GDP growth rate of 3.2%. On the output side of the analysis, underlying passenger growth
averages 5.4% and capacity (ASMs) 5.7% over the same timeframe, with an average narrowbody
retirement rate equivalent to 2.6% of the installed fleet and an average retirement age of 25.8 years.
The issue of overall production rates is also considered and appropriate assumptions made. Over the
past 12 months, the more combative OEM predictions of future rate increases have been
moderated, due the sustained global economic weakness and a more prudent view of the potential
supply chain and manufacturing risks that may occur in the run up to and during the transition
period. In our view, it would make sense for the OEMs to plan to book and build fewer current
generation A320s and 737s as they approach the end of their production, for several reasons:
first, customers will sense that they have additional pricing power for current generation
models if the OEMs are determined to keep output at 42 aircraft a month throughout,
versus tapering to a lower number;
second, any production issues that do arise would be more easily mitigated by having the
larger buffer that would derive from building fewer aircraft overall;
third, pricing of new models will not have the benefit of fully amortised development costs
and the required premium will be more achievable if the comparison is not with discounted
end of line current models;
fourth, investors and lenders are increasingly taking potential last off the line value effects
into their calculations and the proportion of lessor commitments in A320ceo and 737NG
backlogs falls away from the middle of the decade, leaving a widening financing gap for
others, including the OEMs, to bridge.
Avolon, in its delivery forecasts, which are Exhibit 12: Avolon A320 & 737 Annual Delivery Forecast
summarised for the A320 and 737 fleets in 600
Exhibit 12, expects both Airbus and Boeing to 500
stay at or below 42 single aisle aircraft per 400
month, through to the end of the decade, with 300
200
an element of current model reduction likely
100
during the transition period as a way of
0
managing production risk. Beyond 2020, rates 2013 2014
2013 2014 2015
2015 2016 2017
2016 2017 2018 2018 2019 2020
2019 2020 2021 2022
2021 2022
market demand.
7. A320 and 737 backlogs
Both Airbus and Boeing are sitting on record levels of order backlog, fuelled by strong demand from
airlines and lessors to secure capacity for growth and fleet replacement. Such is the apparent
demand for delivery slots that an element of speculative ordering by airlines has started to appear,
11
Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
increasing the risk of excess capacity being built. This risk has been recognised by the OEMs, which
have been deliberately over‐booking their production since the onset of the down‐turn in order to
reduce the risk of building unsold aircraft (“white‐tails”). The process of over‐booking has been
allied with the development of sophisticated processes for monitoring and managing near‐term
delivery slots, which in Airbus is dubbed the “Watchtower” process. This on‐going granular review of
production allows the manufacturers to move delivery positions around in the 18 month window
prior to build completion, accelerating some customer positions whilst deferring and, in a few cases,
cancelling others.
The position today, as reported by Ascend and Exhibit 13: A320 Delivery Skyline
shown in Exhibits 13 and 14, is that both Airbus 700
and Boeing are over‐sold in the near term, with 600
500
a subsequent easing of the backlog out to the
400
transition into the new products, whereupon 300
the level of firm orders and commitments 200
increases once again. As noted earlier, Airbus 100
0
signed up 300 additional A320ceo family 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
received commitments for over 600 737NGs Exhibit 14: 737 Delivery Skyline
since launching Max. Consequently, the order 600
deficit for current generation types is not as 500
great as might have been expected, leaving 400
Airbus in particular with a very manageable 300
sales task for the current models. 200
100
The lessor direct order component of the single
0
aisle backlog also falls beyond 2014/15, but 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
variants before falling away again as the time Exhibit 15: Lessor Share of Current Backlog
horizon stretches into the next decade, beyond Commitments as at mid‐Feb '13
35%
the limit of when most investors would be 30%
prepared to commit (Exhibit 15). Nevertheless, 25%
as additional commitments are made by airlines 20%
15%
and lessors alike, the lessor shares of both 10%
backlogs are expected to return to and stabilise 5%
around the 20%‐25% range by the end of the 0%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
decade. Lessor share of A320s Lessor share of 737s
Source: Ascend, Avolon estimates
8. Single aisle fleet evolution and replacement trends
Historically, it has taken many years for new models to establish a dominant share of the installed
fleet and to begin to replace their immediate predecessors. Attrition of earlier generation fleets
through the natural retirement process occurs first, as can be seen from Exhibit 16, which also shows
how the rate of retirement of the 1st generation fleet (Trident, 727, 1‐11, etc) accelerated following
12
Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
the introduction of the 3rd generation (737NG, Exhibit 16: History of In Service Fleet Evolution
14000
A320ceo), with 2nd generation (737 Classic, 1st Gen: Trident, Caravelle, 727, 737‐200, F28, DC9, 1‐11
12000 2nd Gen: 737 Classic, A320feo*, F100, MD80, 757, BAe146, Avro RJ
In service jet fleet
8000 * A320feo denotes pre 1996 models
years or more.
6000
4000
In the case of Neo and Max, parallels can be 2000
drawn with the introduction of earlier versions 0
1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
of the 737 family, where successive
3rd Generation 2nd Generation 1st Generation
“replacement” variants operated alongside a
virtually undiminished fleet of previous generation aircraft for a number of years. In the case of Max
and Neo, the transition impact on the current generation will be further diluted by the significantly
larger installed fleet compared to previous such transitions. When the 737 Classic entered service,
1100 737‐1/200s had been ordered, of which 1000 had delivered. When the NG entered service 13
years later, 1800 Classics had been delivered out of 2000 orders, almost double the size of the 737‐
200 fleet at the same point. By the time that the Max enters service, more than 6000 NGs will have
been delivered, almost all of which will still be active, and over 6000 A320ceo family aircraft will be
also in service out of a likely total order book of 6700. These levels are three times larger than the
installed base at the start of current generation fleet operations, as Exhibits 17 and 18 illustrate.
Exhibit 17: In‐service 737 fleet evolution Exhibit 18: In‐service A320 fleet evolution
10000 12000
737NG 11000
9000 ~6700 orders A320ceo
10000 ~6700 orders
8000 ~ 6200 in service
9000 ~6000 in service
In service jet fleet
737 Classic
In service jet fleet
7000 8000
2000 orders
6000 1800 in service 7000
5000 6000
5000 A320feo
4000 737-200
4000 500 orders
3000 1100 orders
460 in service
1000 in service 3000
2000 2000
1000 1000
0 0
1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019 2023 2027 2031
737‐200 737 Classic 737NG 737 Max Source: Ascend * feo = first engine option A320feo* A320ceo A320neo Source: Ascend
Exhibit 19: Fleet Share Trends From Service Entry
Looked at another way, it took 5 years for the
80%
737 Classic fleet to achieve a 35% share of the 70%
60%
737 market (considered to be the point at which 50%
values of the previous generation begin to be 40%
30%
impacted) and 7 years for NGs to do the same. 20%
10%
Avolon forecasts that it will take 8 years, until 0%
2025, for the 737Max to account for 35% of the 1 2 3 4 5 6
Years since EIS
7 8 9 10
fleet (see Exhibit 19). Exhibit 20: NB Retirement Candidates (>22 years)
6000
These fleet shares are built up through a 5000
combination of new deliveries and installed
Number of aircraft
4000
fleet retirements. As noted earlier, more 3000
retirement candidates than ever before will be 2000
reaching an appropriate age through the rest of 1000
this decade, reflecting the surge in orders and 0
13
Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
20, there are currently more than 3,000 single aisle aircraft that will be over 22 years old by 2016
and thus at the forefront of the replacement process. This number, which will grow with the passage
of time to more than 4000 by the beginning of the next decade, includes 737 Classics, MD80s, 757s
and some early A320s. At the same time, as the new Neo and Max models start to deliver in greater
numbers, more than 60% of them on average will be required to meet market growth requirements.
The pool of eligible retirement candidates will Exhibit 21: A320 & 737 deliveries will not outrun replacement pool
therefore remain deep enough to absorb the 12000
Candidate pool = 737s, A320s, 757s & MD80/90s
Cum deliveries, retirements
remaining 30‐40% of new deliveries and, as 10000
8000
greater quantities of A320s and 737NGs start to
6000
hit 25 years themselves in the first half of the 4000
next decade, the pipeline of suitably aged 2000
0
feedstock will be further replenished, avoiding 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
the cannibalisation of younger aircraft fleets A320 & 737 ‐ For Replacement A320 & 737 ‐ For Growth
Retirement candidates 23+ years Excess retiral candidates
(Exhibit 21). Source: Ascend, Avolon WFF
Avolon’s forecast of fleet development through
Exhibit 22: In Service Single Aisle Fleet Evolution
the transition period is shown in Exhibit 22,
30000 1st Gen: Trident, Caravelle, 727, 737‐200, F28, DC9, 1‐11
which echoes the earlier patterns of fleet 2nd Gen: 737 Classic, A320feo*, F100, MD80, 757, BAe146, Avro RJ
25000
In service jet fleet
evolution in the years to come. The very large 20000
3rd Gen: 737NG, A320ceo, MD90, B717, E190/195
4th Gen: A320neo, 737Max, CS300
installed base of current generation aircraft, 15000 * A320feo denotes pre 1996 models
more than double the “cushion” in place when 10000
the last fleet transition took place, provides a 5000
natural protection from mass premature 0
1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 2017 2021 2025 2029
retirement and will support a smoother
1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation 4th Generation
transition for the Ceo and NG than was the case
for earlier aircraft types.
9. Asset value considerations
The point at which the values of current and past generation fleets start to be impacted by the new
technology being introduced is the subject of wide debate. However, the lessons of previous
transitions are clear and provide strong guidance for the coming years. Exhibits 23 and 24 show the
market value trends of a number of in service aircraft types during the period when their successors
were launched and subsequently entered service.
The first exhibit considers the impact on seven Exhibit 23: Market Value Indices Through 737 Classic Transition
7 year old aircraft
year old examples of aircraft in service when the 240
737 Classic family was announced in 1981 and 220
B737 Classic
200 launch EIS
entered service in 1984, where a strong upward 180
CMV Index
value trend continued across the installed fleet 160
140
types. The second exhibit shows the same value 120
trends for seven year old examples of fleets in 100
80 Source: Ascend
service when the 737NG was launched and 60
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
introduced in late 1993 and 1997 respectively,
B737-200 727-200 DC9
14
Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
Exhibit 24: Market Value Indices Through 737NG Transition
plus a 20 year old 737‐200 and DC9. In this case, 7 year old aircraft
all of the younger incumbent fleets saw values 120
moving in step through the cycle recovery and 100
into the following downturn. However, whilst 80
CMV Index
values of the immediate previous generation 60
B737NG
launch EIS
types subsequently rebounded strongly through 40
20
the next cycle recovery, those of earlier Source: Ascend
-
generations did not, with the oldest 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Whilst appraisers have started to develop their views of the Neo and Max products and their
expected values, most are still not advanced in determining their opinions and take a conservative
approach when applying a value premium. Early pricing points, especially for Neo transactions, may
not be reliable indicators of the long term value relationship between new and current models as
the engine manufacturers are likely to have participated to some extent in incentivising customers in
order to establish market share, remembering that, whilst these aircraft do not represent launch
products for the airframers, their power‐plants do for at least one of the engine producers.
Nevertheless, the consensus of appraiser opinion is that a premium will be achieved for both Neo
and Max relative to current specification aircraft, the size of which will ultimately be driven by the
dollar value of the operating efficiencies achieved and the extent to which the OEMs are willing to
share that with the operators.
The issue of last off the line value compression is also receiving industry and media attention, with a
concern that long‐term values of aircraft delivered during the last five years of their production cycle
will decline faster than earlier examples, as has been the case with previous generations. Exhibits 25
and 26 show base value indices for 737‐300s built between zero and five years from the end of
production, as recorded by Ascend and Avitas. Although the two appraisers present slightly different
historical value profiles, the message appears to be consistent – that values of aircraft delivering
closer to the end of the production cycle have converged with those of earlier vintages ‐ although
the post‐9/11 era lies in the middle of these charts, adding a further complication to the analysis.
Percentage of original value retained
100
100
80 1993 1993
80
1995 1995
60 60
1997 1997
40 1999 40 1999
20 20
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Source: Ascend Years Since Delivery Source: Avitas Years since delivery
Notwithstanding all of the factors discussed earlier that support a softer landing for the current
generation of aircraft (substantially larger fleets and operator bases, limited changes to
payload/range capabilities, cushion of earlier generation retirement candidates, etc), it would be
naïve to dismiss the potential for some level of value compression on last off the line A320ceo and
737NG variants. Experienced investors will understand the need for prudence when assessing
15
Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
appropriate current generation aircraft pricing points through the transition period. The level of
pricing adjustment required should be determined by all of the elements included in the pricing of
acquisitions, the terms of any associated leases and the wider business model of the investor, rather
than by a simple pro‐rata lowering of the acquisition price. For each investor, the appropriate
treatment of aircraft acquired within the last off the line timeframe will be informed by the specifics
of the transaction, the expertise of the asset management team, their market intimacy and their
experience of investment and trading through previous cycles and aircraft family transitions.
10. Where will today’s used aircraft go?
Current market conditions, some seven years from the end of production of the A320ceo and 737NG
families, might suggest that placement prospects for these types during the transition period are
diminishing. From a lessor’s perspective, sustained liquidity is perhaps the most significant factor
influencing investment decisions and the continued ability to place current portfolios on economic
leases with operators will be a critical test. Several liquidity measures can be benchmarked against
the performance of earlier generations of aircraft (with the 737 Classic being the most relevant
example) to give some perspective to more recent market trends.
The first of these key measures of liquidity, and a crucial one for lessors, is the size of the operator
base. Today, as can be seen in Exhibit 27, the A320ceo family has well over 200 operators and the
737NG family more than 150, 1.5x to 2x higher Exhibit 27: Number of Operators
than the 737 Classic fleet reached in 1992, at a 300
"x" = ~7 years from production end
similar point in its production cycle around
Number of airline operators
250
seven years before the end of production. This 200
x
operator base differential is significant even 150 x
taking into account their relative installed fleet 100 x
sizes, where again the A320 and 737 families 50
Source: Ascend
have a clear advantage over previous aircraft 0
1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
types, with in‐service fleets already more than
737 Classic 737NG
double that of 737 Classics at their peak. A320 family A320 (Post‐'96) family
The second point to note is that the average
Exhibit 28: Average Fleet Size
fleet size of current A320 and 737NG families is
30
2x ‐ 3x larger than that of 737 Classics at the
Number of aircraft
25 x
same point in their production cycles (Exhibit
20 x
28), making the absorption of incremental 15
aircraft into airline fleets easier to manage 10 x
whilst the absolute requirement for additional 5
growth aircraft is also greater. The fall‐off in 0
Source: Ascend
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Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
out of older owned aircraft as a quid pro quo for placing new deliveries or by providing bridging
capacity for operators awaiting delivery of their own orders, which for customers of the new
products may well extend into the next decade. This is expected to represent a significant
proportion of fleet mobility around the end of the decade.
The changing patterns of regional traffic growth are also increasingly driving demand for additional
single aisle capacity, both new and used, facilitated by the emergence of new low cost and hybrid
airlines in many developing markets. These new business models, which already account for 40% of
Airbus and Boeing single aisle orders, frequently operate across political borders thanks to a steady
momentum in market liberalisation and new opportunities to develop alliances and joint venture
partnerships.
With levels of traffic demand already materially shifting from mature western markets to the
emerging economies of Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East (Exhibit 29), the geographic
balance of new single aisle aircraft orders has also migrated since the 1990s (Exhibit 30).
regions, remains substantially below the rate of 60%
regional traffic growth predicted over the next 40%
ten years, indicating a deep reservoir of still 20%
unsatisfied demand for additional narrowbody 0%
APAC North Latin America Europe MEA
deliveries (Exhibit 31), many of which will come America
NB Fleet Increase on Order 10 year traffic growth
from the used equipment channel given the Source: Ascend, Boeing, Avolon analysis
existing levels of backlog in OEM order books.
Exhibit 32: Air Travel Propensity
Demand growth in emerging markets is 100
underpinned not only by liberalisation, Ireland
10
economic activity and rising disposable income, Qatar
Trips per Capita (2008)
but by the realities of population growth, 1
UK
Germany
USA Australia
infrastructure links in many of the world’s most India
Passengers carried by airlines domiciled in the country; vertical axis plotted on log scale
0.01 Sources: ICAO, IMF, Global Insight , Boeing
aviation a critical component of the global economy, long‐term sustained growth can confidently be
expected, as the air travel propensity chart (Exhibit 32) clearly illustrates.
17
Transitioning to Neo & Max – An Investor’s Guide
Conclusions
Single aisle capacity growth is currently running at between 4% and 6% per annum. Storage is
effectively used to mitigate peak cyclical over‐supply.
The overall level of narrowbody deliveries currently planned for the coming decade can be
absorbed by the global market’s combined requirements for growth and fleet replacement.
However, continued discipline on the part of the OEMs with respect to production rates is a
critical factor in maintaining the supply and demand balance.
A deep and renewable pool of ageing aircraft will be available to absorb the replacement element
of new deliveries, expected to average 40% of the total over the next decade. As with previous
transitions, prior generations of technology will be retired ahead of current production models.
Neo and Max represent the next evolutionary development of the A320 and 737 families and the
transition process is therefore expected to be orderly and stable.
Max and Neo will deliver real economic benefits to operators at oil prices at or above $65 per
barrel, however they must deliver the fuel efficiencies that are being claimed.
Many of the execution risks associated with the Neo and Max programs lie with the engine
manufacturers, who are nevertheless well equipped and resourced to meet the considerable
industrial and technology challenges remaining.
With little airframe‐related evolution involved, delays emanating from the airframers or their
non‐powerplant supply chain are not expected to follow the recent trend for widebody products.
Whilst Neo and Max values are still finding their equilibrium in the market, a meaningful
premium over current generation equivalents is achievable based on stated performance targets
and operating economics.
The number of narrowbody aircraft ordered by airlines in each region, as a percentage of the
installed fleet in those regions, remains substantially below the rate of traffic growth predicted
over the next ten years, indicating a deep reservoir of unsatisfied demand for additional aircraft,
both new and used
Current production types will continue to be in demand from operators and retain high levels of
liquidity during and beyond the transition period, following the pattern of earlier generations.
Demand will be underpinned by strong growth in emerging markets and the continued
development of low cost business models backed by market liberalisation.
Other factors, including large installed fleet and operator bases, limited changes to
payload/range capabilities and a deep cushion of earlier generation retirement candidates also
mitigate the “last off the line” effect on values of aircraft delivering close to the end of their
production cycle and support value retention for current A320s and 737NGs.
The appropriate treatment of aircraft acquired within the last off the line timeframe will be
informed by the expertise of the investor’s asset management team, their market intimacy and
their experience of investment and trading through previous cycles and aircraft family transitions.
It will take more than 8 years from service entry for Max and Neo to build a 35% share of their
respective family fleets, reflecting the very large installed base of current generation aircraft that
will be in service – three times that of the previous transitional fleets.
Consequently, Neo and Max are not expected to directly impact values of current generation
types for a number of years, with evidence from previous transitions pointing to the main impact
being felt by prior generation models.
18