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Yoella Bereby-Meyer
Shelly Fisk
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Yoella Bereby-Meyer
Dept. of Psychology
yoella@bgu..ac.il
This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation grant number: 146/05
Standard economic models assume that people exclusively pursue material self-
trust and reciprocity affect behavior. This study examined whether negative
Thus, fairness considerations are not inborn but rather, develop with age.
People value outcomes that fit their expectations about fairness and strongly disfavor
outcomes which deviate from them (Lowenstein, Thompson & Bazerman, 1989).
They tend to reward others' cooperative behaviors, while punishing the uncooperative,
even when these actions of reward or punishment are costly to them (Rabin, 1993).
Such fairness preferences help achieve and maintain cooperation in human societies.
on negative reciprocity, i.e., a person's tendency to take costly actions that harm
another because he/she perceived the other's intentional behavior as harmful (Cox,
preferences (Fehr, Bernhard & Rockenbach, 2008) and specifically, about the origin
of negative reciprocity.
often used to study fairness. Players are randomly assigned the role of proposer or
responder. The proposer divides a sum of money between him/herself and the
responder. The responder must decide whether to accept or reject the proposed
receives anything. The rational economic model dictates that the responder should
accept any proposal greater than zero, and the proposer should offer the smallest
Proposers, on average, ask for less than 70% of the total sum. Responders
often reject profitable, but unequal, offers (Guth, Schmittberger & Schwarze, 1982).
They are willing to pay to punish their opponent if he/she asked for too much.
However, when the unfair offer was a result of a random device, a lower rejection rate
Much of the deviation from the rational model results from proposers' strategic
considerations, as evident by differing results between the Ultimatum Game and its
variant, entitled the Dictator Game, in which the responder cannot reject an offer
Game have shown that children's tendency to reject unfair offers increases with age
(eg., Murnighan & Saxon, 1998). However, it is not clear whether children aim to
negative reciprocity.
Experiment:
old) and 57 sixth graders (12 year old) participated in the experiment.
Design:
(PUG), proposer in the dictator game (PDG), responder in the ultimatum game with a
human proposer (RUG), responder in the ultimatum game with a random device
(RUGR).
The children were randomly assigned to the different conditions. The
experiment was conducted with each child individually. Children were told that none
of the participating children know against whom they are playing. In each condition,
Procedure:
In the PUG condition, the child received 10 tokens to divide between him/her
and another child. Two possible divisions were presented to him/her: an equal split
(5:5) or a biased split (8:2). The child was told that the rules dictate that if the
The PDG condition was identical to the PUG except that the children in the
In the RUG condition, the child was asked to state his/her decision if the
proposal will be 5:5 and if the proposal will be 8:2. The child was told that he/she
will be rewarded according to the actual proposal and his/her stated response to that
proposal. This "strategy method" guaranties equal numbers of observations for each
In the RUGR condition the child was told that a bingo machine generates a
proposed division by drawing one out of an equal number of yellow and purple balls,
with yellow representing an equal split (5:5) and purple representing a biased split
(8:2). The experimenter demonstrated the operation of the bingo device to the child.
Subsequently, the child was asked for his/her decision in the instance that the machine
draws a 5:5 and in the case that it draws an 8:2 division. It was emphasized to the
game's results that could be exchanged for an educational product (e.g., pens,
notebooks etc).
game as a function of age (A) and rejection rate for the unfair 8:2 proposal made by a
human proposer or a random device for the three age groups (B).
model as they are primarily concerned with personal payoffs. They rarely reject unfair
offers, regardless of the proposers' identity (child or random device). Older children
were more likely to reject unfair offers from human proposers than from a random
device (z=2.08 and z=2.84 for second and sixth graders, respectively, P < 0.05 for
both comparisons). This behavior indicates the emergence of fairness norms and
equal rates when playing either the Dictator or Ultimatum Games. Second and sixth
graders propose fewer unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game than in the Dictator Game
(z=-2.63 and z=-2.29 for the two age groups, P<0.01), indicating the development of
negative reciprocity evolves with age. It adds to recent finding regarding negative
reciprocity (Kesar, Converse, Wang & Epley, 2008) by showing the adherence to
References:
Blount, S. (1995). When social outcomes aren’t fair: The effect of causal attributions
131-144.
Cox, J.C. (2004). How to identify trust and reciprocity. Games and Economic
Fehr, E., Bernhard, H., & Rockenbach, B. (2008). Egalitarianism in young children.
Forsythe, R., Horowitz J. L., Savin N. E., & Sefton, M. (1994). Fairness in simple
367-388.
Keysar, B., Converse, B., Wandg, J., & Epley, N. (2008). Reciprocity is not give and
Lowenstein, G., Thompson, L., & Bazerman, M. H. (1989). Social utility and decision
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. The