From Robin Hood To Don Quixote

Resistance and Dissent in Communist Romania
From Robin Hood to Don Quixote

CRISTINA PETRESCU
Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naionale a Romniei PETRESCU, CRISTINA From Robin Hood to Don Quixote : resistance and dissent in communist Romania / Cristina Petrescu. - Bucureti : Editura Enciclopedic, 2013 ISBN 978-973-45-0670-5 329.15(498):929 351.746.1(498):929
ISBN 978-973-45-0670-5
Resistance and Dissent in Communist Romania CRISTINA PETRESCU
From Robin Hood to Don Quixote
Editura Enciclopedic 2013
Layout: Mihaela TUDOR Cover: Mariana MRZEA
EDITURA ENCICLOPEDIC
Str. Luigi Cazzavillan nr. 17, sector 1, Bucureti, 010784 Tel.: 021.317.90.35; 0372.753.773; 0731.110.662; Fax: 0378.105.781 e-mail: difuzare@universenciclopedic.ro enciclopedica2006@yahoo.com www.universenciclopedic.ro Tiparul executat la Regia Autonom Monitorul Oficial
To Drago
CONTENTS
List of Abbreviations Introduction Chapter 1 Misfit to World Politics Communist Romania vs. the Helsinki Process of International Cooperation Chapter 2 The Goma Movement Human Rights in Romanian Understanding Chapter 3 Border Revisionism vs. Minority Rights Hungarian Dissent in Romania Chapter 4 The Letter of the Six Party Veterans Against Ceauescu Chapter 5 Free Thinking in an Unfree Country? Seven Faces of Intellectual Dissent Conclusions Selected Bibliography Index
9 11
61 115 171 217 275 383 397 425
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
RFE VOA RCP RWP NSF HSWP HDUR CPSU WTO COMECON NATO CSCE MFN
Radio Free Europe Voice of America Romanian Communist Party (1965-1989) Romanian Workers Party (1948-1965) National Salvation Front Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (1956-1989) Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania Communist Party of the Soviet Union Warsaw Treaty Organization Council for Mutual Economic Assistance North Atlantic Treaty Organization Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (replaced in 1990 by OSCE) Most Favored Nation (clause)
INTRODUCTION
State of the Art and Prospects for the Future in the Study of Resistance and Dissent under Romanian Communism*
More than twenty years after the Revolution of 1989, the historical reconstruction of what one called opposition, resistance and dissent in postwar Romania remains fragmentary and often confusing. While the period following the communist takeover of power was extensively researched, the period prior to the collapse has been not only far less visited, but also vitiated by conceptual carelessness and methodological fallacies. Until 1989, the contestation of the communist regimes was covered only from the other side of the Iron Curtain, for the postwar period was a subject of propaganda and not of professional research in Romania, like in all East-Central Europe.1 Especially after the Helsinki Accords of 1975 offered a new frame for dialoguing across the Iron Curtain, isolated criticism took momentum and turned gradually into societal movements against the regimes in power in the Soviet bloc. Thus, western journalists and academics turned their attention from the
* Notes for this chapter at page 42.
12
FROM ROBIN HOOD TO DON QUIXOTE
communist elites to those who contested their rule. Beginning in the late 1970s, research on these issues produced a number of works, which aimed at covering developments throughout the region and thus included chapters on Romania too. Area or comparative studies also took into consideration the contestation of the communist regime in this country, for its domestic societal reactions seemed similar to those experienced elsewhere in the Soviet bloc.2 However, the last decade of communism brought a significant change in Romanias evolution and implicitly in the attention given to the local protests against the communist regime. Its path became increasingly divergent from that of the countries of Central Europe, for well organized dissident groups and even large opposition movements emerged there, while only few individuals dared to speak publicly against Ceauescus increasingly aberrant policies. Although in the last two years before the collapse of 1989, the number of those who criticized the Romanian communist regime grew visibly as compared to the early 1980s, these courageous individuals were only a tiny minority which never managed to organize itself in a coherent network. Thus, most western analyses dedicated to East-Central Europe before the end of communism mentioned Romania as the exception. Given the weak internal criticism of Romanian communism, this phenomenon was never subject of extensive research until 1989. Academics, as well as journalists, were more interested during the 1980s in the extreme forms of nationalism and cult of personality, which characterized late Ceauescuism, than in its feeble contestation.3 Once communism collapsed, the interest in the topic became higher than ever, inside and outside the region. The way in which communism evolved its the last decade and a half, as well as the way in which it collapsed, suggested that dissident movements were instrumental in the upheaval of 1989. Thus, most postcommunist analyses of East-Central Europe focused on the
INTRODUCTION
13
oppositional groups which were active prior to the revolutions and generally acknowledged that the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of 1975 had given a decisive impetus to the development of contesting societal movements.4 In this frame of interpretation, Romanias exceptionalism became a commonplace in area and comparative studies, for the quasi non-existence of dissident groups in this country prior to 1989 appeared as obvious. This particularity made not only the end of communism in this country non-negotiable and thus violent, but also the transition to democracy more difficult than elsewhere.5 At the same time, the Romanian resistance and dissent under the previous non-democratic regime started to be covered in greater detail than ever before, due to the newly-available archival sources and oral testimonies. Until local research emancipated itself from the legacy of the old regime, western students of Romanian communism led the way once again; their analyses showed much empathy to the few individuals who dared against all odds to oppose in a form or another to the leftwing dictatorship which dominated this country for forty-five years.6 While the interests in this topic faded away among western academics,7 the study of dissent and opposition under communism became an absorbing subject for insiders in all former communist countries. Not only local researchers, but also laypeople with highprofile in media, such as journalists and public intellectuals, dedicated themselves to the reconstruction of a topic that was taboo before 1989. Romania was not an exception in this respect.
Who Was Robin Hood The Canon of Historical Reconstruction

As everywhere in the Soviet bloc, the major aim of those who engaged in studying the recent past in post-communist Romania
14
was the uncovering of that part of history which was never told publicly before. Looking retrospectively at the achievements made in more than two decades, one could immediately notice that postcommunist reconstructions of Romanian communism have primarily tackled one period of, and one question about, this past, so that solely a certain topic imposed itself as fundamental. The direct result of this narrowly focused interest in recent history was the narrative on Romanians resistance to the communist rule (which individuals who concerned themselves with the reconstruction of the recent past turned into a cornerstone). Several factors contributed to this outcome. Because the archives of Romanian communism have remained to this day subject of thirty years of closure, the greatest majority of the researchers directed their attention to the period which followed the communist takeover of power (and avoided by default that which preceded the collapse).8 Still convinced that historical writings are not possible without a careful study of official documents, such professionals tried to explain the establishment of the communist regime in Romania and its resilience for forty-five years. Simultaneously with the work in archives, public recollections of those who survived this early period of communism revealed abominable facts about political prisons, crimes against innocent individuals and terror on a wide scale.9 Although Nicolae Ceauescu allowed references to such facts in fictional works (in order to emphasize the difference between his epoch and that of his predecessor Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej), the degree of violence employed by the Romanian communist regime was unknown to the largest majority of the population until 1989. In short, eyewitness accounts suggested that the dictatorship which Romanians experienced for forty-five years was far harsher than imagined before by those who were too young to have lived through those times of terror.
INTRODUCTION
15
The public emergence of tragic recollections from the Romanian Gulag intensified the interest of professionals and laypeople in reconstructing this early period of communism. Beyond the understandable quest for rescuing from oblivion the destinies of so many innocent victims, the public remembrance of the terror years offered an answer not only to the question about the mechanism the communist regime used to maintain its power, i.e. repression, but also to the inconvenient question about the passivity of the Romanians under communism. The autobiographical memories of the generation who experienced the communist takeover revealed not only the criminal dimension of the former regime, but also the existence of a phenomenon totally unknown before, which came to be defined as the resistance in the mountains. News about it did not reach western broadcasting agencies until 1989, so it remained practically unknown among Romanians. In reaction, this topic received the greatest attention in post-1989 historical writings, public representations and other forms of reconstructing the recent past. Indeed, the numerous volumes dedicated to this phenomenon give one the impression that courageous anti-communist resisters fought in all Romanias mountains after the communist takeover.10 At the same time, the intensive media coverage (at least as compared to other topics of the recent past) and the memorialization of this phenomenon turned it into a canonical topic of the recent past.11 Before and after 1989, it was said that Romanians only complied with the communist rule, because this country never experienced revolts such as those of 1953 in East Germany, of 1956 in Poland and Hungary, of 1968 in Poland and Czechoslovakia, of 1971, 1976, 1980-81 in Poland. It was also repeatedly underlined that Romania never had a Solidarity like Poland, and it failed to have a Charter 77 like Czechoslovakia or even some oppositional groups like Hungary and GDR. Once evidence of a fierce opposition to the communist takeover emerged not only from oral testimonies,
16
but also from archival documents, Romanians discovered that their national community was not so obedient to the former regime as previously thought. Moreover, this resistance illustrated that Romanians were among the first in East-Central Europe who revolted against the establishment of this kind of non-democratic regime. Thus, the so-called resistance in the mountains has been not only the most popular topic of research in post-communist Romania, but also an instrument (perhaps unconsciously used) for the restoration of national dignity.12 It was the resistance in the mountains that allowed one to argue in post-communism that Romanians had been also anti-communists, although the feeble contestation of Ceauescus regime suggested the opposite. On the basis of the above-described research on the recent past, one could conclude that the history of communism in Romania begins with a wave of mobilization against the regime, for the intensity of contestation after the communist takeover of power stands out in comparison to the compliance displayed afterwards. The post-Helsinki dissent in Romania appears thus weak not only in comparison to Central Europe, but also to previous local forms of social disobedience, which seemed better organized and more heroic than the mobilization against Ceauescus regime in the late 1980s. Since this volume discusses public criticism during late Romanian communism, it is worth characterizing briefly the early resistance to the communist rule to be then able to underline the differences between the two types of contestation. Of course, the two phenomena share some commonalities, among which perhaps the most significant are the weak mobilization and the poor structure in comparison to the developments in the countries of Central Europe, for none developed networks beyond the local level or the small interest groups. Beyond this general evaluation, the resistance in the mountains resembled a traditional tactic of defense, which Romanians practiced since the Middle Ages whenever devastating wars (to which they did not directly
INTRODUCTION
17
participate) took place on their territory. In response, they used to withdraw into the nearby mountains. After the coup of 23 August 1944 and the subsequent switch of sides in war, many Romanian soldiers and officers resorted again to this practice and went into hiding in various mountain areas instead of continuing fighting on the western front or returning home. As the communization of the country seemed imminent after Romania sided with the Soviet Union, many put their hopes in a new confrontation between the two superpowers. Thus, they started to organize themselves in small groups and prepare for guerilla warfare. The number of those in the mountains grew after the abolition of the monarchy to reach a peak in the early 1950s. Individuals with various social and professional backgrounds and all political orientations, such as peasants,13 students, school teachers, priests, or rank and file members of former parties,14 joined these groups in the hope that the old regime would be soon restored with American support. Such vain expectations faded away after the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, while the communist regime managed to strengthen its control over the population. Highly dependent from the support given by people in nearby villages, this type of resistance declined fast, and the resolute actions of the Securitate contributed to its suppression by the early 1960s. Briefly put, the resistance in the mountains never had the chance to develop into a coordinated movement and turn into a genuine threat to the communist rule.15 However, those who lived in hiding in the mountains escaped the totalitarian ambitions of the communist state to control all individuals. They were outlaws like the legendary Robin Hood, who lived in the woods and waited for the return of the legitimate king, while the country was run by a temporary and abusive ruler. As long as they survived, a place free of communism existed in Romania, one participant in this type of resistance argued.16
18
By contrast, other revolts against communism which students, workers or peasants stirred in resistance to the policies of the communist regime received less attention from professionals and laypeople. Yet, post-communist research highlighted their existence too, for they also supported the idea that the response of the Romanian society to the communist rule was resistance and not collaboration. Most notably, students in several university centers unsuccessfully tried to stir a similar upheaval in Romania under the influence of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.17 Besides, quite a number of local riots emerged in response to the two waves of collectivization from 1949-51 and 1957-62.18 Finally, numerous workers strikes of local amplitude occurred in response to specific problems in the process of production.19 Nevertheless, the contestation of the communist regime declined visibly after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 to practically disappear by the early 1960s. The defeat of the insurgents from the neighboring country seriously shook the Romanians nave belief in the arrival of the Americans and people gradually understood that communism was there to stay.20 The elite in power must have considered its domination over the Romanian society a fait accompli when it decided to release all political prisoners in 1964. Indeed, historical reconstructions of the recent past concur in indicating that terror was no longer used since the 1960s, for it was consent that assured the communist rule.21 This consent was reached not only due to the previos terror, but also due to a genuine increase in the living standards, which occurred with the massive migration from countryside to cities, after the communist regime launched the programs of industrialization and urbanization in 1958.22 The trend towards greater welfare changed in the late 1970s to take a really dramatic turn in the 1980s, but the Romanian opposition to the communist regime never reached again the scale of the late 1940s and early 1950s. In short, the spirit of the resistance in the mountains waned with the coming of age of a new generation,
INTRODUCTION
19
which was exclusively socialized under communism. In other words, the societal resistance to the communist takeover in Romania had no notable long-term impact. However, in the postcommunist organization of memory, the resistance in the mountains received a central position, for this phenomenon provided the much needed heroes of the recent past. Indeed, a society that emerges from a dictatorship needs healing, and the commemoration of the anti-communist heroes represented a medicine in the process of democratic consolidation. Their neglect would have been preposterous. At the same time, the overemphasis on this part of the recent past produced by default yet another historical myth of the kind the writings of the nation-state building used to produce everywhere in East-Central Europe in the nineteenth century and even after. In Romania at least, this trend in historical writing continued throughout of the twentieth century, including the communist epoch.23 The revolutionary changes of 1989 touched so little this domain that many reconstructions of the resistance in the mountains continued perhaps unconsciously the earlier trend, and produced another national myth about Romanians heroism.
Who Was (or Was Not) Don Quixote An Anti-Canon of Historical Reconstruction
While post-1989 research focused on the early period of communism, this book looks at later forms of manifesting criticism of the former regime. The individuals who are the subject of this study have been known as dissidents in western media, as well as in the academic literature dedicated to the Soviet bloc. In reference to the Romanian case, a major and obvious difference existed between the resistance in the mountains and the type of antiregime acts which this volume discusses: while the former envisaged
20
armed actions against the communist rule, the latter used only words as weapons. Moreover, while research on the resistance in the mountains highlighted (willingly or not) that anti-communist heroes existed even among Romanians, this volume does not intend to establish a counter-canon of freedom fighters. The cases which this author tackles represent only a selection based on a working definition, which dissidents in other former communist countries self-assumed. The case studies which this volume includes do not exhaust the phenomenon of Romanian dissent, but they certainly illustrate that critical intellectuals like those who stood against communist regimes in Central Europe or in the Soviet Union existed even in this country. Finally, while the reconstruction of armed resistance to the communist takeover was carried out solely in a national frame, although this was not a unique phenomenon in the Soviet bloc, this volume goes beyond state borders. The late forms of publicly expressing discontent with Ceauescus regime cannot be understood but in a transnational frame, which allows one to highlight crucial components of the dissident phenomenon, such as the exchange of critical ideas acrossthe-border and their dissemination inside the borders via external connections. Such transnational approach illustrates that more often than not dissidence in Romania inspired itself from ideas already expressed or actions already taken by critical intellectuals in Central Europe. Thus, it was hardly remarked from the other side of the Iron Curtain. Turning to the definition of the term dissident, this volume takes into account that its usage was far from being consistent, although its meaning eventually converged due to its selfacceptance by critical intellectuals in Central Europe and in the Soviet Union. Although this term referred originally to those individuals inside communist parties who diverged from the official line which the leader had established, it gradually changed its meaning to name those individuals who criticized the communist
INTRODUCTION
21
regimes mostly from outside the frame of the party. Such individuals existed since the very beginning, but they could express themselves publicly without risking immediate suppression only in the post-Stalinist period, while the Helsinki process of international cooperation offered them a language suitable for an East-West dialogue and a protection from across the Iron Curtain. In short, dissidents could emerge and survive only in the posttotalitarian phase of the communist regimes, as it is discussed below. The western coverage of events in the Soviet bloc (to which journalists as well as academics participated) gradually consecrated the use of this concept with regard to those involved in producing and disseminating uncensored materials and non-conformist discourses inside and outside their countries. The option for the term dissident represented the implicit avoidance of the more radical designation as opponent, and reflected the desire to protect individuals named as such from harmful repercussions. At the same time, the term resistance had been also avoided by westerners, for its meaning in postwar Europe referred to the armed actions against Nazism during the Second World War. It was only after 1989 that one could reconsider the Romanian resistance in the mountains and other similar manifestations in the aftermath of the war in the Soviet-occupied Europe as phenomena not only comparable to the earlier partisan movements in the Nazi-occupied Europe, but also inspired by them.24 The so-called dissidents in the Soviet bloc disliked this name. Some regarded it as confusing, while others simply resented it, for its main meaning in dictionaries suggested the implicit adoption of a perspective on social norms of behavior which duplicated that of the communist regimes. Accordingly, dissidence was a deviation from what the party-state regarded as normality, i.e. consent. More than a decade after the collapse of communism, Adam Michnik pointed out again why dissidents disliked this name which newspapers of democratic Europe and of the United States
22
used to refer to them. A dissident is a rebel, a renegade, a rare bird, whereas we were revolting against a dictatorship that we understood as a rule of a group of criminals over the majority of society. We believed that it was we who represented the overwhelming majority of the nation.25 In other words, dissidents represented the normality, and not the communist regimes, which they criticized. However, most of the critical intellectuals of East-Central Europe eventually assumed this name, though not unanimously. A famous text which influenced the thinking of many dissidents in Central Europe, as well as the analyses of many academics from the other side of the Iron Curtain, also marked the acceptance of this name. Its author, Vclav Havel, a person who would become the archetype of a dissident, opened it with a paraphrase of Marx and Engels: A specter is haunting Eastern Europe: the specter of what in the West is called dissent.26 Although members of the post-Helsinki groups which monitored human rights abuses in Czechoslovakia, such as VONS and Charter 77, accepted to be called dissidents, the liberal-oriented intellectuals who criticized the Hungarian communist regime from a similar ideological position defined themselves, and remained known, as the democratic opposition. Academic literature was more rigorous than these self-designations, although it was also dependent on the local usage of these terms.27 It was generally acknowledged that the term opposition suggested either the emergence of a mass movement of the type the Polish Solidarity became in the last years of communism, or at least the existence of a coherent and stable underground network which could provide the basis for a political alternative outside the communist party. In contrast, dissent defined isolated individuals or small groups of intellectuals who did not manage to routinize their activities and enlarge the acts of defiance beyond face-to-face communication. Nevertheless, opposition and dissent were often used as synonymous, all the more so that the border between the
INTRODUCTION
23
two was changing in time and thus was hard to define clearly at any given moment. Not only in Poland, but also in the former Czechoslovakia and Hungary dissidence transformed itself into an opposition by the time communism collapsed; in the former GDR, this transformation happened only very late and without really conceiving democratization outside the communist political system.28 This book does not aim at bringing clarity to this matter, but it needs a working definition in order to clarify on whom this volume focuses. Thus, this author returns to the definitions formulated by those persons in the Soviet bloc who accepted the identity as dissidents, which westerners had attributed to them, and further reflected on the political, social, psychological or even cultural markers of this collective identity. Vladimir Bukovsky observed that those persons whom the westerners called dissidents were above all individuals who had learned to think by themselves and who rejected the imposition of pre-established ideas about the world in which they lived. Free thinking meant harmony between ones convictions and ones words. This made it a dangerous activity in the countries of the Soviet bloc and differentiated it from the same mental operation, when performed on the other side of the Iron Curtain.29 In Roy Medvedevs sense, dissident was only that person who expressed publicly his or her criticism of the communist regime, and not only to friends whom he considered to be trustworthy. He also underlined that this criticism could have reflected different ideological convictions, left or right oriented.30 Author of the famous phrase living in truth which encapsulated the essence of what western journalists called dissidence, Vclav Havel expressed similar thoughts on this posttotalitarian phenomenon. He also pointed out that dissidents formulated their non-conformist positions and critical opinions publicly and systematically and added that these persons must commit themselves to common causes which go beyond the
24
narrow context of their immediate surrounding or special interests. In other words, dissidents should stand out for matters of public and not personal interest. Finally, Havel observed that the articulation of such criticism required adequate intellectual skills and thus, he pointed out, dissidents were writing people, people for whom the written word is the primary and often the only political medium they command, and can gain them attention, particularly from abroad. Moreover, the Czech dissident added, any other form of living in truth was either invisible or insignificant as compared to the activity of articulating in writing alternative visions on the communist-dominated societies. Thus, dissidents professional background became insignificant across the Iron Curtain as compared to their identity as critiques of the communist regimes.31 To sum up, dissidents were individuals who possessed the necessary intellectual abilities (and/or degree of education) which enabled them to understand and articulate their independent thoughts about the situation in their own countries. However, dissident activity presupposed not only a public expression of well articulated independent thinking, but also the dissemination of the critical ideas born of such thinking. Initially, dissidents from the Soviet Union and Central Europe used the so-called samizdat (do-it-yourself publications) to disseminate their ideas. This operation was not only prohibited by the communist regimes which aimed at controlling the circulation of information, but also inefficient, for only a limited public could have been reached via such means of communication. The alternative visions on the communist world articulated by dissidents could reach larger audiences in the Soviet bloc when sent to the West to circulate as tamizdat (publishing abroad) and then returned back home via western broadcasting agencies with services in vernacular languages, like Radio Free Europe (RFE) or Voice of America (VOA).32 The role of such agencies in disseminating free thinking on both sides
INTRODUCTION
25
of the Iron Curtain could not be underestimated. Especially important was their instrumental support in breaking the monopoly on information (which the communist regimes imposed) by transmitting open letters addressed to communist authorities, non-conformist writings rejected by censorship, interviews granted by dissidents to western press, essays published abroad or still in need of a western editor. Besides, these broadcasting agencies also played (aside human rights organizations and western governments) a fundamental role in protecting dissidents from harsher repressive measures. Once they disseminated information about cases of persecuted dissidents among western political milieus and civil society groups, communist authorities alleviated their treatment more often than not. In short, if dissidents no longer disappeared without trace, as it happened with so many individuals during the time of great terror, it was due to a large extent to such western broadcasting agencies. Finally, some of these agencies archived the material traces of dissent, and these sources are crucial in the case of Romania. For samizdat publications barely existed in this country, while tamizdat was also insignificant in comparison with other former communist countries, the overwhelming majority of dissident writings were produced for, disseminated via, and preserved by, these broadcasting agencies. Briefly put, Romanian dissent cannot be discussed but in a transnational frame of analysis, which highlights the journey of critical ideas to the West and then back home with the instrumental help of RFE and VOA. As hinted above, dissidence could not have developed in the heydays of Stalinism, when great terror reigned and political violence was used in order to annihilate the smallest act of defiance in its nascent state. Dissidence emerged in the post-totalitarian phase of the Soviet-type regimes in East-Central Europe, which occurred gradually not only as result of moving away from Stalinism, but also of social changes in communist societies. While repression had softened, the official ideology had lost its
26
legitimating function and mobilizing force. In this context, dissident groups could consciously develop and participate in an active effort aimed at detotalitarianization.33 Besides this crucial internal transformation of the communist system, an external factor fundamentally influenced dissent in East-Central Europe: the aforementioned Helsinki Accords of 1975. Many analysts of the region were initially skeptical about their usefulness and believed, in a surprisingly congruent manner with official views in the Soviet bloc, that this document was destined to be a second Yalta.34 These agreements established though a frame of cooperation between thirty-five communist and non-communist states in Europe and North America, which envisaged not only the increase of international security, but also the improvement of human and citizen rights in the participating countries. Although this agreement focused on inter-state collaboration, it quickly produced an unexpected societal result: dissidents from the communist countries which signed this document seized the opportunity to reframe their discontent with the respective regimes in the universal language of human rights. This does not mean that all dissidents were liberal-oriented defenders of citizen and human rights. This issue was rather alien to many individuals in East-Central Europe, who lacked the necessary background to fully grasp a problem which was central in western political thinking, but absent or distorted in local politics even before communism.35 In any case, there was a notable a number of dissidents who made a step further from domestic political traditions and rightfully presented the abuses of the communist regimes as violations of human rights, establishing in this way a dialogue with western media and politicians. At the same time, this document represented an internationally enforced legal basis which dissidents used to protect not only others, but also themselves from repressive measures, for communist authorities agreed in Helsinki to observe fundamental rights. The
INTRODUCTION
27
constitutions of the Soviet bloc countries also guaranteed basic rights, but the rule of law was never fully observed in this region.36 Unlike these constitutions, the Helsinki Accords represented a common document to which not only dissidents, but also western politicians could refer in order to ask improvements from their counterparts in the Soviet bloc. In short, the observance of human and citizen rights gradually became a central theme in West-East bilateral and multilateral meetings. The indebtedness of the communist regimes to international financial institutions helped western politicians to turn the so-called Human Dimension of the Helsinki Final Act into an effective diplomatic pressure, although it lacked a legal lever of enforcement. Consequently, what was known in western countries as dissidence in the Soviet bloc could survive and develop under regimes which remained non-democratic until the changes of 1989. While dissidence developed steadily after 1975 in the countries of Central Europe to gradually turn into an opposition able to become the alternative political elite, it underwent quite a divergent path in Romania, as hinted before. The strongest societal response which used the Helsinki frame of international cooperation occurred immediately after the conclusion of the Final Act of 1975 to practically disappear later and resurface only in the very last years of communism, but without ever reaching the initial strength.37 Dissent required commitment to problems of public interest and implicit abandonment of private or group interests, as Havel observed. Most Romanians placed though personal grievances above societal matters, and separated constantly the private and the public arenas. Thus, the main societal response to Ceauescuism was not disobedience but consent, for dissimulation guided most Romanians behavior and actions. In a society which perceives the private and the public arenas as opposite rather than complementary, dissimulation is the posture, response, and strategy that integrates the two arenas, Kenneth Jowitt aptly
28
observed. Consequently, the societal response usually does not take the form of political opposition, but of anti-political privatism, which represented in his view the stance that places family and personal interests above those of the regime as well as those of the society. In other words, it represented a response which differed not only from open dissent, but also from the individualism characteristic to western societies.38 After anti-political privatism, the second largest type of societal response to Romanian communism was not dissent but emigration. As Albert O. Hirschman argued, in a state, just like in a firm or an organization, individuals could react in case of decline only in the following ways: exit (to simply express discontent), voice (to express discontent in the hope of making a change), or loyalty (to maintain the status quo).39 While many Romanians refrained from taking any kind of action against the regime, among those who publicly expressed their discontent, many did it only for the sake of emigration, and others were pushed to eventually emigrate. In Hirschmans terms, voice was often only a preparatory step for exit in a country like Romania, where the communist regime did its best to contain the exodus to the other camp. A tiny minority, Romanian dissidents remained until the collapse of communism isolated individuals, who did not manage to organize themselves in a network. They were right when the others were wrong, but engaged in acts which the others regarded as insane before 1989 (and even after). In short, they were Don Quixotes whose patterns of thought and action contrasted to those of the Romanian society. The Revolution of 1989, which occurred in Romania in spite of the quasi non-existence of a dissident-driven opposition movement in the same year communism collapsed in the other Soviet satellites, could not turn their fight into a victory. After the regime they had criticized disappeared, former dissidents faced steady contestation rather than enjoyed public recognition, while many Romanians asked themselves why they did not have
INTRODUCTION
29
a Havel?40 Thus, the story of the former dissidents in this country is not glorious, as that of the resisters in the mountains, who rightfully received recognition at least post-mortem. Instead, their story is disenchanting, for post-communist politics rendered most of them useless, while public representations of the recent past rarely made justice to them. On the one hand, dissidents of late communism could never aspire to the central place of the late heroes from the resistance in the mountains. Although both groups were defeated, the former courageously engaged in armed actions against the communist rule. The latter only used words to confront a regime which collapsed indeed, but not because of their aggregate action. On the other hand, the few dissidents from before 1989 turned into many after 1989, for the very term as such was used (consciously and unconsciously) in contradictory ways.41 While some genuine dissidents rejected it as not radical enough,42 the non-dissidents employed it with so diverse meanings that it often came to designate all those individuals who avoided compliance to official guiding lines in the sphere of culture, and refrained from praising the party and its leader.43 The former public critics of the communist regime were too few and too heterogeneous to impose any common vision upon the recent past or at least to canonize their model of confronting the defunct regime. With so many conflicting ideas about Romanian dissent circulating in the public sphere, genuine dissidents almost disappeared from the public sphere before leaving a mark in Romanians collective memory.44
Rethinking Dissent during Romanian Communism

This volume aims at highlighting the public and explicit criticism of Ceauescus policies, which a handful of individuals articulated in the post-Helsinki period and disseminated among Romanians with the instrumental support of western broadcasting agencies.
30
In other words, it focuses only on those individuals who responded to Romanian communism by engaging themselves in similar actions like those which characterized the dissidents of Central Europe (and of the Soviet Union). Moreover, this book tackles Romanian dissent from a comparative perspective, though it does not engage in a systematic analysis of similarities with, and differences from, other former communist countries. Instead, it envisages an asymmetrical comparison, which takes an other as reference, as a normal case, to allow a better understanding of the self.45 Here the comparative perspective is necessarily westward, for Romanians had traditionally looked this way for inspiration since they aimed at establishing a modern nation-state and an adequate high culture to support national identity. Thus, the normal cases are the countries of Central Europe, where post-Helsinki dissent was, though different in strength, a significant phenomenon of late communism.46 Such a type of comparison is fundamental for this analysis in two different ways. First, it shapes the meta-narrative of this analysis in such a way as to keep this author away from the trap of writing an apologetic story about the few Romanian dissidents (in which many of those who dedicated themselves to the resistance in the mountains fell). In this way, the author remains in the area of self-critical introspection into the recent past of her country due to an inconvenient comparison between Romania and those countries where dissent was stronger. At the same time, this asymmetrical comparison which maintains the focus on Romania is not shaped by an often employed frame of interpreting dissent in Central Europe, which a posteriori considered this phenomenon a decisive factor in the collapse of communism. The quasi-absence of critical political thinking partially explains Romanias last position in the row of six countries in which communism collapsed in 1989, but dissent under Ceauescus regime was so weak that one could hardly interpret it as a preparatory step for the regime change.
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31
Thus, this author makes a virtue out of necessity, and avoids a teleological reading of Romanian dissidence.47 Second, the asymmetrical comparison with Central Europe compels the author to explain why dissidence under Romanian communism was far weaker than that in Central Europe? For the comparison has the advantage of highlighting similarities and differences, it also offers a better perspective to those interested in formulating a comprehensive answer to the aforementioned question. Analyses by western scholars have revealed a number of factors that partially explain the incapacity of the Romanian society to organize itself against the communist state. The most frequently cited reasons are: (1) political traditions specific to Orthodox countries,48 which never encouraged the development of critical movements (the sort typical to countries where Western Christianity dominates); (2) officially promoted nationalism, through which the authorities not only legitimated the regime, but also monopolized the topic of anti-Sovietism;49 and (3) an allpowerful repressive apparatus, which successfully prevented the emergence of an organized dissident movement.50 Each of these reasons explains the weakness of dissent in Romania by making implicit or explicit comparisons to other states in the former Soviet bloc. This author does not challenge this conventional knowledge about Romania, but revisits Romanian dissent by employing an asymmetrical comparison with the aim of featuring previously overlooked factors and getting beyond the mere reiteration of these tenets of the exceptionalism thesis. Accordingly, this book illustrates that even forms of publicly expressed criticism diverged from the model of Central Europe, for they were also driven by personal interests and represented a different reflection of antipolitical privatism. In other words, Romanian dissent was often a form without substance, which succumbed due to its own misconception.
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For this author does not interpret Romanian dissent as a series of actions which had as final goal the collapse of communism, this analysis contextualizes each form of contestation, it stresses the local and external factors which favored its emergence, it highlights the expressed ideas and their sources of inspiration, and it emphasizes the actual goals of these independent acts of defiance. Moreover, the volume illustrates not only how the critics of Romanian communism came to produce an alternative vision, but also how they were able to disseminate it. Thus, the asymmetrical comparison with Central Europe must be complemented by an analysis which focuses on entanglements, i.e. cultural imports and circulation of free thoughts across national borders.51 In other words, this study points out that the history of Romanian dissidence cannot be understood within national boundaries, but only in a transnational frame of analysis, which highlights (1) the transfer of dissident ideas from Central Europe to Romania, and (2) the subsequent transmission of dissident discourses among conationals. The adoption of ideas which critics of the communist regimes from other countries expressed before was a widespread practice, and the most intense such exchange took place probably between Poland and Czechoslovakia (due not only to geographical vicinity, but also to language similitude). This author illustrates that Romanian dissidents were always one step behind their colleagues in Central Europe, so by the late 1980s, at the time when the strength of the former lagged much behind that of the latter, the interest of western media in the feeble criticism of Ceauescus regime was very low. Whatever Romanian dissidents could have said, it was tremendously important in the local context of general consent, but totally banal outside, where similar thoughts had been already expressed by critical intellectuals from other communist countries. For Romanian dissidents of the 1980s could rarely make headlines in western media, they turned instead almost exclusively to western-based broadcasting agencies with
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service in the Romanian language, like RFE and VOA. As already underlined, especially the former became an indispensable institution for the very existence of Romanian dissidents not only under communism, but even after, for it is the archives of this institution that has preserved after 1989 the traces of dissident activity, i.e. open letters, papers to dissident conferences, or other critical essays and analyses. If the comparative perspective helps in answering why dissidence was so weak in this country, the transnational dimension highlights how dissent was possible in spite of all odds. Formulated otherwise, the comparison serves (self-)criticism, and the transnational approach serves the historical reconstruction. Accordingly, this analysis stresses the adverse conditions that had to be overcome in order to transmit dissident writings across the borders and make them public. Thus, this book tackles key questions regarding the means needed to maintain a dissident activity in a non-democratic state. These would include factors ranging from internal resources (channels of across-the-border communication, access to western media, duplication facilities, etc.) to external support groups (members of the Romanian emigration, human rights organizations, western journalists and politicians, etc). Such endeavors which required joint effort and human solidarity represented a forbidden transnational activity under Romanian communism. In a globalizing world that takes for granted the free circulation of persons and ideas, the former dissidents remind one that non-democratic regimes have always built real or imaginary walls. In response, free-thinking individuals have found ways to surpass their isolation and create transnational communities of like-minded people even when the Internet was not at their disposal. Without entertaining this transnational activity, no dissidence could have existed. This volume leaves out quite important manifestations of revolt against Ceauescus regime, for not all forms of disobedience under
34
communism represented a form of dissidence. Workers strikes, among which two the revolts of 1977 in the Jiu Valley and of 1987 in Braov had an important impact upon Romanian society, are not analyzed in this study. However, this author takes into account the influence of these upheavals upon Romanian dissent, and illustrates the emergence of any form of cross-class solidarity, even if ephemeral. Moreover, this book does not refer to forms of public criticism which were not openly expressed, but disguised in non-conformist literary and artistic creations. A circle like Aktionsgruppe Banat was not dissident; its members are very well aware of the meaning attributed to this term and never claimed to have been such kind of open critics. This left-oriented group (indeed a singularity among intellectuals in Romania, who kept themselves immune to Marxist ideas) concerned itself with social issues, and thus it was more politically oriented than any other non-conformist group. Their stance stirred the harsh reaction of the secret police. However, their criticism never turned explicit, but remained hidden in verses or prose with double meanings. As for the so-called resistance through culture, it neither fits into the concept which western journalist had in mind when coining the term dissident, nor corresponds to the self-definition which the critical intellectuals of Central Europe and the Soviet Union self-assumed.52 This type of resistance represented a form of avoiding conformism in the sphere of culture, which implied obedience to the ideological (and absurd) guidelines of the communist party.53 Its practitioners suffered professional marginalization and even surveillance by the secret police, whose task was to prevent any potential revolt. Yet, the resistance through culture represented a tolerated form of expressing discontent with the communist regime, for the novels, poems, essays, theatrical plays, or cinematic narratives with double meanings which passed censorship for some reason reached only a limited public. Those who practiced this type of resistance
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wanted to remain good professionals instead of turning themselves into court poets. Thus, they were held in high esteem, not only by fellow professionals, but also by broadcasters from RFE, who praised them in lack of dissidents. Yet, their endeavors illustrated distrust in politics, disinclination for civic engagement and disregard for problems of public concern beyond their immediate professional milieu. Given all the above, this volume opens with an analysis which illustrates that the Helsinki Accords of 1975 (which gave a boost to activities related to the monitoring of human rights abuses in the Soviet bloc in particular and to other forms of contesting the communist regimes in general) had a more perverse effect on Romania. As mentioned, these accords were initially conceived as a new frame of cooperation between states. Accordingly, Chapter 1 is dedicated to the influence of the Helsinki process upon Romanias international relations and illustrates that the image of no country was more affected by these agreements than that of Romania. Paradoxically, this country had initially supported this new frame of cooperation, which Ceauescu and the rest of the communist elite interpreted as a set of principles which opposed the Brezhnev Doctrine, and implicitly sheltered Romania in case of a Soviet aggression. Thus, in negotiating these agreements, Romania manifested as a maverick ally of the Soviet bloc and sided with the western states. Yet, the communist elite of this country failed to understand that this frame of international cooperation also meant a redefinition of dtente, for peace and security were intrinsically linked to the observance of human rights. Instead of improving its poor record in this matter, Ceauescu considered the western concern about the treatment of dissidents as an intolerable interference in internal affairs. Thus, Romania ended up as a great loser of the Helsinki process of cooperation at state level. At societal level though, Romanians who expressed discontent with the communist regime could be protected from
36
harsher repression, for Ceauescu eventually, albeit reluctantly, alleviated the treatment of those dissidents supported from outside the country. At the same time, the Helsinki Accords produced in this country a short-lived movement for human rights, to which Chapter 2 of this book is dedicated. Fashioned on the model of Charter 77, this collective protest emerged in the form of an open letter addressed to the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade. The document denounced the violation of basic rights that were otherwise guaranteed even in the constitution of communist Romania. Unlike its model, the Romanian protest against the abuses of Ceauescus regime did not develop a program of action. Instead, most of its supporters sought to use this collective open letter not as a means of solving problems of common interest, but as a vehicle for emigration. Thus, the task of the secret police in dissolving this emerging movement required less use of force than it was employed against the founding members of Charter 77. The Romanian communist authorities granted exit visas to all who strived for it, while the secret police could disperse the emerging movement by using predominantly softer methods of persuasion, ranging from blackmail to defame. The initiator of this failed movement, writer Paul Goma, was arrested, interrogated, pressed to retract, but in the end released due to the international pressure which the Romanian emigration initiated. In short, a collective protest which gathered initially around the same number of adherents like Charter 77 faded away in a matter of months. The miners strike in the Jiu Valley, which occurred only months later, had no connection with this intellectually driven protest, so the opportunity to accomplish a cross-class alliance on the Polish model also failed. However, this collective protest, which came to be known in Romania as the Goma movement, remains an unsurpassed moment in the history of communism in Romania, for anti-regime activities in this country never again reached such
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intensity which placed it at that time in synchronism with countries of Central Europe. After the Goma movement, criticism against the abuses of the communist regime in Romania manifested mostly via isolated dissidents. Interesting to note is that, with few notable exceptions, those who spoke publicly against, and transmitted across the Iron Curtain their dissatisfaction with, Ceauescus policies belonged either to ethnic minorities or to religious denominations other than the dominant Greek Orthodox Church. In other words, the Romanian communist regime became a target primarily for those individuals whose identities deviated from that of the majority, i.e. ethnic Romanians, who declared themselves as members of the autocephalous Romanian Orthodox Church. Indeed, Ceauescus regime seemed to envisage legal and practical methods of homogenizing the nation by erasing any differences, either ethnic or religious. Thus, members of minorities felt more oppressed than the majority, for their very cultural reproduction was endangered. This volume leaves out those individuals who publicly protested for the freedom of religious belief, for the type of discourse articulated in its frame had no direct impact on postcommunist politics. Instead, Chapter 3 analyzes the protests of the Hungarians in Transylvania, which referred exclusively to the violation of minority rights. Such initiatives had no echo among the ethnic majority, which did not identify itself with the causes minorities fought for. Given the entangled historical evolution of the two neighboring countries, Hungarians requests for the observance of minority rights were interpreted among Romanians as a manifestation of revisionism and a strategy to revise the borders under international arbitrage. In particular, the Romanian communist elite regarded the protests of the Hungarian minority as driven from Budapest and directed against the Romanian state. The Hungarian communist elite tolerated and quietly encouraged the so-called populist opposition to support the claims of the
38
Hungarians in Transylvania until it openly joined the western countries in the frame of the Helsinki process and accused Ceauescus regime of violating minority rights. This represented a final blow for communist Romania, which found itself after the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna internationally isolated because of its refusal to accept the norms of minority protection. The number of dissidents among the Romanian majority grew sensibly only in the aftermath of the Braov workers revolt of 15 November 1987. This revolt marked also a moment of spontaneous solidarity among different segments of society, at a time when shortages in the supply of foodstuffs and services had already affected not only standards of living, but also daily routines (for the largest majority of the population spent most of the time queuing). Although this revolt lasted only one day, it determined quite a number of individuals to respond publicly. It was in reaction to this strike that some former communist officials decided to formulate a criticism of Ceauescus regime from the position of those who thought of themselves as builders of a workers state. Chapter 4 discusses the emergence of the so-called letter of the six, its significance for the history of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) and its impact on western and domestic audiences. The signatories of this open letter to Ceauescu were old timers, who used to hold more or less important positions in the party hierarchy under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, but whom his successor later marginalized. This open criticism addressed to the secretary general of the party represented a gesture without precedent in a political structure which did not tolerate disobedience to the supreme leader, and always punished it with expulsion. However, the group of six hardly represented a reformist wing inside the party, of the kind that existed in all the other communist countries, pushing for changes against the opposition of the hardliners who wanted to protect the status quo. Moreover, they did not envisage any common action beyond their critical letter. However, the
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collective document which these six party veterans managed to make public in March 1989 (via western media and in spite of strict surveillance) illustrated that Ceauescus regime had lost its legitimacy even among members of the communist elite. Besides these former officials who attacked the leader of the RCP from a leftist and often dogmatic position, several critical intellectuals from outside the party bureaucracy imposed themselves as dissident thinkers. Their criticism of Ceauescus policies represented various positions, ranging from liberal left to liberal or conservative right, while the issues they tackled illustrated more or less radical stances against the communist regime. Chapter 5 is dedicated to some of the most prominent dissidents of the 1980s. The selection reflected above all the ability of these critical intellectuals to reach western media and especially RFE, for the archives of this institution represents today the main repository of Romanian dissent. Other broadcasting agencies like VOA did not preserve such writings, while other forms of disseminating Romanian dissent, i.e. samizdat and tamizdat, hardly existed, as aforementioned. Since Romanian dissidents acted mostly as isolated individuals until 1989, this chapter is inevitably a sum of separated, though sometimes entangled, stories. There were nonetheless a few collective letters of protest, for some dissidents managed to associate other individuals (who usually came from their immediate professional or local surroundings) to their protests against a specific policy or action initiated by Ceauescus regime. The most radical collective letter coagulated the efforts of two isolated dissidents into a modestly supported protest (of some eleven persons), but a powerfully articulated statement: this common letter asked for genuine elections at the Fourteenth Congress of the RCP in November 1989, which meant implicitly to put an end to Ceauescus rule. This letter did not exist materially, but only virtually; information about its existence was preserved due to RFE. However, much better coverage received
40
the so-called letter of the seven, which a group of prominent intellectuals signed and launched in March 1989, almost simultaneously with, but independent of, the letter of the six. Although this marked un unprecedented solidarity among members of Romanian intelligentsia, this open letter tackled only problems related to the special interest of the signatories in keeping Romanian culture (and its practitioners) as independent as possible from the party. These dissidents could neither contribute to the revolution nor constitute themselves into an alternative political elite after, so their legacy remains controversial, all the more so that the files of the former secret police illustrated that some of them were former sources of information for this infamous institution. Such documents constitute (after the files from the RFE archives) the second category of primary sources used by this author, yet not consistently, for not all the files of the dissidents who were active in 1989 were conserved. However, this volume does not aim at drawing a line between heroes and villains. Such an endeavor is rather doomed to failure, for the communist regime dominated society in its post-totalitarian phase by blurring the borders between victims and perpetrators. In such context, even some former victims (individuals who had been imprisoned or suffered other forms of social exclusion) turned into the willing collaborators of the secret police for the sake of integrating themselves into the new society. Moreover, any attempt at separating the inseparable is dependent not only on the files of the Securitate (which transmit above all the perspective of this institution on those whom it kept under surveillance, as well as on those who collaborated), but also on their interpretation. In this respect, one might follow the existing legislation, which proposed a set of criteria, or one might propose new criteria of separating white from black. Yet, between the extremes, individuals who publicly served the communist regime and those who openly contested it, there was a huge grey zone, which comprised so many
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twisted lives and deceptive careers that one can not easily pass definitive judgment. A certainty might have existed though: the files of the former secret police indicate a difference between what one might call the radical dissidents who criticized issues of common interest and those who only acted in defense of their group interests. It is only from the latter category that cases of duplicity emerged, cases of individuals who had provided information about colleagues to the Securitate and yet acted as if they opposed the communist regime. Instead of proposing a canon of heroes, this book only aims at reminding one who Romanian dissidents were and what they accomplished at that time. First and foremost, this author stresses the critical discourse formulated once by those who defied publicly the communist regime. After two decades of transition, could there be something fresh to be learned from the few uncensored texts which non-conformist Romanians authored and disseminated via RFE? Western journalists labeled dissidents such critical intellectuals (who emerged in other countries before Romania). Dissidents in Central Europe constituted themselves into the tip of the civil society and pushed their countries out of communism. As insiders who directly experienced left-wing dictatorships, they also attracted much interest on the other side of the Iron Curtain due to their innovative analyses, from among which some influenced political thought of the twentieth century. The daring individuals who criticized Ceauescus modernizing-nationalizing dictatorship can hardly be included among the original thinkers, for no dissident concepts or theories, and no path-breaking analyses of the communist system originated in their Romanian experience. Their critical thoughts rather reflected the influence of dissident ideas developed earlier elsewhere, seasoned sometimes with peculiarities of Romanian communism. Only a timid manifestation up to the end of the former regime, Romanian dissent envisaged strategies and goals much less daring than in
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other countries. Thus, the achievements of those who publicly criticized Ceauescus policies amounted next to nothing, if one counts only changes imposed on the regime by pressure. This is not to say, however, that the few former critics of Romanian communism should not be credited for their courage of standing against a harsh dictatorship. Dissidents of Romania were instrumental because the articulation and dissemination of their critique broke the discursive monopoly of the communist party and influenced the thinking of the silent majority who used to listen to RFE and other such transnational broadcasting agencies. Their message made the Sancho Panzas of Romania understand that Ceauescus demise was not enough: it was the communist system that must have been demolished in order to return to the normal historical track, which had led Romania closer to Europe before the detour imposed by the one-party rule. Romanias exit from communism in 1989 might have been possible without dissidents, but its road toward institutionalizing political pluralism would have been even more difficult without them. In short, this author argues that Romanian dissidents prepared a part of Romanias compliant population not so much for the Revolution of 1989, but definitely for the subsequent transition to democracy. Because they were few, the transition was more difficult than in Central Europe, but without them it might have not yet started.
Notes
1
In this book, I use East-Central Europe to designate the region which comprised all the former Soviet satellites. This overlaps with the earlierused Eastern Europe, which referred exactly to the same area at the time when the Iron Curtain separated the continent. I prefer the former to the latter not only because it rejects the language of the Cold War, but also because it suggests the discrepancy between the western and the eastern parts of this region, which the uneven development of dissidence and opposition illustrated too. The western part of East-
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Central Europe is referred in this volume as Central Europe and it is considered to include the former GDR, Poland, the former Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (not Romania). Abandoned because the Cold War made it irrelevant, Central Europe re-entered in the public usage after 1989, largely because of the efforts of intellectuals from these countries, exiles and dissidents alike. For them, Central Europe was a self-referential concept which they employed since the 1980s in order to dissociate themselves from the Soviet Union (and implicitly the rest of the communist bloc). For an introduction to the debate about the existence of Central Europe as a distinct region of the continent, see George Schpflin and Nancy Wood, eds., In Search of Central Europe (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble Books, 1989). See also Stephen R. Graubard, ed., Eastern Europe ... Central Europe ... Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991). Events such as the human rights movement which writer Paul Goma initiated, the miners strike of 1977 in the Jiu Valley, or the establishment of a Free Trade Union in 1979 captured at that time the attention of those interested in this post-Helsinki phenomenon. See chapters by Emil Freund and Vlad Georgescu in Jane Leftwich Curry, ed., Dissent in Eastern Europe (New York: Praeger, 1983), 6068 and 182-94, respectively. A study on the Soviet bloc which shortly analyzed the strike of 1977 and referred to Romanian dissent is Ivan Volgyes, Politics in Eastern Europe (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1986). An example of a regional analysis of this kind is Jacques Rupnik, The Other Europe (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989). Trond Gilbergs analysis of Romania dedicated only a few pages to intellectual dissent, which indeed appeared in the late 1980s a marginal phenomenon. He also coined the term Ceauescuism, which reminded one of the other such isms that refer to totalitarian regimes dominated by the rule of one party, one leader and one ideology. In his view, Ceauescuism was a variant of national communism, which was characterized by an unusual blend of Marxism-Leninism, traditional nationalism, and personalized features introduced by Ceauescu. Trond Gilberg, Nationalism and Communism in Romania: The Rise and Fall Ceauescus Personal Dictatorship (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), esp. 49-60. J. F. Brown, Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), Roger East, Revolutions in Eastern Europe (London: Frances Pinter, 1992), Vladimir Tismneanu, Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel (New York: The Free Press, 1992), Gale Stokes, The Walls Came
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Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan stressed the exceptional nature of the Romanian communist regime, dubbed totalitarian-sultanistic, in order to explain why Romanias transition to democracy was slower, thus diverging from that of other former communist countries in EastCentral Europe. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 344-65. A similar opinion, but based on other grounds, including the way in which Romania faced its non-democratic past, was expressed in Tony Judt, Romania between History and Europe, in Idem, Reappraisals: Reflections on the Forgotten Twentieth Century (London: William Heinemann, 2008), 250-67. The post-1989 path-breaking analyses of resistance and dissent under Romanian communism are Dennis Deletant, Ceauescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989 (London: Hurst, 1995), 235-93, and Idem, Communist Terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State, 1948-1965 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1999), 225-34. During the early transitions from communism, some scholars believed, based on the experience of countries in Central Europe, that former dissidents would be significant political actors in the process of democratization. Thus, the academic interests in such groups did not fade away until the post-communist evolution of the former communist countries in East-Central Europe contradicted this thesis. An example of analysis which highlights the role of former dissidents in the transition to democracy is Vladimir Tismneanu, Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism and Myth in Post-Communist Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). The current legislation provides a general closure period of 30 years for the large majority of the documents in the National Archives; those that can be catalogued as personal files, files that endanger the national security, documents related to foreign policy, etc. are withheld from research for even longer periods amounting to 100 years. Actually, the first post-communist Law of National Archives, which was sanctioned while the Parliament was still controlled by the party of the former communist bureaucrats Frontul Salvrii Naionale (National Salvation Front NSF), only modernized the communist archival legislation in terms of the organization of archives and the preservation of
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10
documents. It was subsequently modified twice, but mostly with regard to the procedures of documents appraisal. Law 16/2 April 1996; Law 358/6 June 2002; Government Ordinance 39/31 May 2006; Law 474/12 December 2006, Monitorul Oficial al Romniei, Nr. 71, Part I, 9 April 1996, 1-8; Nr. 476, Part I, 3 July 2002, 1-2; Nr. 486, Part I, 5 June 2006, 4-5; Nr. 1016, Part I, 21 December 2006; 2. See also www.arhivelenationale.ro (accessed 20 January 2009). These recollections received attention also because the former political prisoners were among the most active civil society groups in postcommunist Romania. They established already on 2 January 1990 Asociaia Fotilor Deinui Politici din Romnia (AFDPR), which numbered by the end of the year 98,700 members. As the first group which legalized its underground existence and then publicly advocated for the rights of its members, AFDPR became an example of selforganization. Some of its members were also politically involved and instrumental in supporting the lustration of the former secret police employees and collaborators. See Law No. 187/7 December 1999 for access to the personal file and the disclosure of the former secret police as political police, Monitorul Oficial al Romniei, No. 603, 9 December 1999, 1-5. This law is also known as the Ticu law, after its main proponent, the late Constantin Ticu Dumitrescu, president of AFDPR and senator of the National Peasant Party at that time. Several titles can give one an idea about this genre, which includes more eyewitness accounts and archival documents than historical reconstructions: Lupttorii din muni. Toma Arnuoiu. Grupul de la Nucoara: Documente ale anchetei, procesului, deteniei (Fighters into the mountains. Toma Arnuoiu. The group from Nucoara: Documents related to the interrogation, the trial, and the imprisonment) (Bucharest: Vremea, 1997); Ion Gavril-Ogoranu, Brazii se frng, dar nu se ndoiesc: Rezistena anticomunist n Munii Fgraului (Fir trees break but do not bend themselves: Anticommunist resistance in the Fgra Mountains), 6 vols. (Timioara: Marineasa, 1993-2006); Filon Verca, Parautai n Romnia vndut: Micarea de rezisten, 1944-1948 (Parachuted in betrayed Romania: The resistance movement, 1944-1948) (Timioara: Gordian, 1993); Adrian Bric, ed., Rezistena armat din Bucovina (Armed resistance in Bukovina), vol. I: 1950-1952, vol. II (with Radu Ciuceanu): 19521958 (Bucharest: INST, 2000, 2006); Idem, ed., Rezistena armat din Banat, 1945-1949 (Armed resistance in the Banat, 1945-1949) (Bucharest: INST, 2004); Radu Ciuceanu, ed., Micarea naional de
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rezisten din Oltenia (National resistance movement in Oltenia), 3 vols. (Bucharest: INST, 2003, 2004, 2007); Marian Cojoc, ed., Rezistena armat din Dobrogea, 1945-1960 (Armed resistance in Dobrogea, 1945-1960) (Bucharest: INST, 2004); tefan Bellu, Pdurea rzvrtit (The revolted forest) (Baia Mare: Gutinul, 1993), Camelia Ivan Duic, ed., Rezistena anticomunist din Maramure: Gruparea Popa, 1948-1949 (Anti-communist resistance in Maramure: The Popa group, 1948-1949). (Bucharest: INST, 2005); Liviu ranu and Theodor Brbulescu, eds., Jurnale din rezistena anticomunist: Vasile Motrescu, Mircea Dobre, 1952-1953 (Diaries of anti-communist resistance: Vasile Motrescu, Mircea Dobre, 1952-1953) (Bucharest: Nemira, 2006); Cornel Jurju and Cosmin Budeanc, Suferina nu se d la frai Mrturia Lucreiei Jurj despre rezistena anticomunist din Apuseni, 1948-1958 (One does not pass suffering to the kin Testimony of Lucreia Jurj on the anti-communist resistance in the Apuseni [Mountains], 1948-1958) (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 2002); Florica Dobre, ed.,Bande, bandii i eroi: Grupurile de rezisten i Securitatea, 1948-1968 (Gangs, bandits, and heroes: The resistance groups and the Securitate, 1948-1968) (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedic, 2004). The Romanian Gulag, its heroes, victims and perpetrators made the object of a series of documentaries broadcast beginning with 1991 by the Romanian National Television. Entitled Memorialul durerii (Memorial of Suffering), this cinematic narrative revealed for the first time the inhumane treatment received in the communist prisons by all those unjustly condemned only for having different political opinions, for refusing to hand over their piece of land or for giving a loaf of bread to those hiding in the mountains in the desperate hope of overthrowing the regime. The series of documentaries disseminated this suppressed part of recent history to a large audience and gave an impetus to research on such topics. The documentaries have been made available in written form and on DVD in 2007. In the introduction to the written version, it is mentioned that Memorialul durerii substituted the non-existent history textbooks at a time when the dignifying past of Romanian democracy was ignored or even deliberately forgotten. Lucia Hossu-Longin, Memorialul Durerii: O istorie care nu se nva la coal (Memorial of suffering: A history that one does not learn at school) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2007). A national symbol of the resistance in the mountains is the peasant woman Elisabeta Rizea from the village of Nucoara, which is located
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13
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in the close vicinity of the Fgra Mountains. She was not only instrumental in supplying food and offering temporary shelter to the rebels who hid in those mountains, but was also strong enough to resist (without betraying the fugitives) to the appalling tortures inflicted by the Securitate, which crippled her for life though. Her story, which she narrated publicly in the frame of the Memorial of Suffering in 1992, represented one of the most impressing testimonies of the communist terror. Her fragile appearance and highly principled conduct turned her into the hero of the resistance to communization, which the Romanians looked for after 1989. See also Irina Nicolau and Theodor Niu, eds., Povestea Elisabetei Rizea din Nucoara: Mrturia lui Cornel Drgoi (The story of Elisabeta Rizea from Nucoara: The testimony of Cornel Drgoi) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1991); and Aurora Liiceanu, Rnile memoriei: Nucoara i rezistena din muni (The wounds of memory: Nucoara and the resistance in the mountains) (Iai: Polirom, 2003). The number of peasants hiding in the mountains increased especially after the first wave of collectivization, which was launched in March 1949. An example of a peasant group, which the local priest organized in the Neam Mountains and maintained until 1953, was Frontul patriei (The Front of the Motherland). Neculai Popa, Represiune i rezisten n inutul Neamului (Repression and resistance in the Neam region) (Bucharest: Vremea, 2000). Although many of these groups spread (via manifestos) nationalistic and even xenophobic appeals, there is no clear evidence that this resistance was prevalently right wing. A report of the secret police from 1951 mentioned that from a total of 804 persons (from 17 different political groups), only 73 were former members of the Iron Guard. Cartea Alb a Securitii (The white book of the Securitate), vol. 2 (Bucharest: n.p., 1994), 82. An example of a far nationalist group was Haiducii lui Avram Iancu (The Outlaws of Avram Iancu), which organized itself after the re-occupation of Transylvania in 1944, in reaction to the atrocities committed under the Hungarian administration in 1940-1944. nceputurile micrii de rezisten n Romnia (The beginnings of the resistance movement in Romania), vol. 1 (Bucharest: INST, 1998). According to documents from the archives of the former secret police, it seemed that General Aurel Aldea, interior minister in the first government after 23 August 1944, tried to organize these groups into a nation-wide partisan network, called the National Resistance
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Movement. However, he was arrested at the end of May 1946 and sent to prison, where he died in 1949. Other politicians, including Iuliu Maniu, the leader of the National Peasant Party, and Dinu Brtianu, the leader of the National Liberal Party, were reluctant to collaborate with these groups, since many manifested anti-Semitic and ultra-nationalist sentiments. Many researchers though took the intention for an accomplishment, and concluded that the resistance in the mountains was a national movement. nceputurile micrii de rezisten n Romnia, 159-62 and 202-12. Ion Gavril-Ogoranu, a former Iron Guard member and survivor of the resistance in the Fgra Mountains, mentioned in his memoirs his address to some tourists whom he met at a chalet: Tell everyone that there is still a place in the kingdom of Romania which was not bowed to communism. As long as our heads are on our shoulders, this corner of the country will be free. Tell the people not to lose faith, for the day will come when the whole of Romania would be free. Pray to God for it, so help us God. Gavril-Ogoranu, Brazii se frng, dar nu se ndoiesc, vol. I (Timioara: Marineasa, 1993), 304. Because of his right-wing sympathies and extremist statements, Gavril-Ogoranu was one of the most controversial individuals from the resistance in the mountains, whom some considered a hero, while others contested as an anti-democrat. He inspired the cinematic narrative Portrait of the Fighter as a Young Man (2010), which presented him though as a freedom-fighter, not a fascist opposing communism. The works dedicated to the student revolts in 1956 include Ioana Boca, 1956 Un an de ruptur: Romnia ntre internaionalismul proletar i stalinismul antisovietic (1956 A year of rupture: Romania between the proletarian internationalism and the anti-Soviet Stalinism) (Bucharest: Fundaia Academia Civic, 2001). These were unorganized and spontaneous protests, which manifested in various forms, ranging from peaceful demonstrations to violent clashes with party activists and devastation of local party headquarters. Such riots gathered only a small number of peasants and never propagated from village to village, so the communist authorities repressed them quickly and brutally. During this second wave of collectivization, the number of peasant riots reached a peak between 1957 and 1959. As compared to the previous period, when peasants had the alternative of joining the resistance in the mountains, the riots represented in the late 1950s the main way of expressing discontent. Systematic research on the state of peasantry under communism,
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including the documentation of riots, might be grouped in two major projects. The National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism (INST) extensively engaged in covering this topic; among the volumes already published are: Octavian Roske, ed., Dosarul colectivizrii agriculturii din Romnia, 1949-1962 (The file of collectivization in Romania, 1949-1962) (Bucharest: The Romanian Parliament, 1992); Dan Ctnu and Octavian Roske, eds., Colectivizarea agriculturii n Romnia: Dimensiunea politic (Collectivization of agriculture in Romania: The Political dimension), vol. I: 1949-1953, vol. II: 19531956 (Bucharest: INST, 2000, 2005); Dan Ctnu and Octavian Roske, eds., Colectivizarea agriculturii n Romnia: Represiunea (Collectivization of agriculture in Romania: Repression), vol. I: 19491953 (Bucharest: INST, 2004); Octavian Roske, Dan Ctnu, and Florin Abraham, eds., Colectivizarea agriculturii n Romnia: Cadrul legislativ, 1949-1962 (Collectivization of agriculture in Romania: The legal frame, 1949-1962) (Bucharest: INST, 2007). There was also an international project, to which American and Romanian scholars participated. The results were published in Gail Klingman and Katherine Verdery, Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949-1962 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), Dorin Dobrincu and Constantin Iordachi, eds., rnimea i puterea: Procesul de colectivizare a agriculturii n Romnia, 19491962 (The peasantry and the power: The process of collectivization of agriculture in Romania, 1949-1962) (Iai: Polirom, 2005). Research on this issue is rather scarce, but it seems that workers unrest under communism manifested intensely only until 1958, and then after 1977. Until 1958, there were 21 strikes, out of which 13 took place in areas with working-class traditions from the interwar period. Most strikes were defensive, and were caused either by local problems related to payment and working conditions, or by the general decline in the standard of living due to price raises or consumer goods shortages. Drago Petrescu, A Treat from Below? Some Reflections on the Workers Protest in Communist Romania, Xenopoliana (Iai), No. 1-2 (1999), 142-68. Nicolae Stroescu-Stnioar, a former director of the Romanian section of RFE, remembered a discussion of 1956 with a student, who told him that the time of the resistance against communism was pass, although he agreed to hide him from the secret police. Nicolae Stroescu-Stnioar, n zodia exilului (Under the sign of exile) (Bucharest: Jurnalul Literar, 1994), 163-67.
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Some authors suggested that consent was achieved on the basis of the so-called new social contract, which was operational in all communist countries since the 1960s: while the employer, i.e. the state, guaranteed a working place for everybody, wages able to assure a modest but decent living, free medical care, free education, etc., the employees gave up the freedom of speech, the right to organize themselves, or other basic rights. Antonin J. Liehm, The New Social Contract and the Parallel Polity, in Leftwich Curry, ed., Dissent in Eastern Europe, 174-81. Industrialization had a side effect upon anti-regime protests, for the influx of workers with rural origins, who lacked the sense of cohesion and solidarity specific to those from the second or third generation of urban proletarians, weakened the potential of revolt even in the areas with stronger working-class tradition. Michael Shafir, Romania Politics, Economics and Society: Political Stagnation and Simulated Change (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), 140-41. Urbanization had its own side-effect, for its lagging behind industrialization produced the hybrid social category of peasant-workers: the commuters. They used to live in the countryside, but work in the nearby cities, and thus enjoyed the benefits of both: a secure wage from the state factory and basic foodstuffs from the personal farm. Thus, commuters were less keen to revolt. It was the long-distance migration of the working force that led to the formation of a genuine working class under communism. Revolts in the late 1970s and the 1980s occurred exactly in those areas which received the highest number of migrants from underdeveloped regions of the country, such as Moldova, for the rise of prices or the crisis in food supplies affected the these migrants profoundly, while commuters coped much better with the economic crisis of the 1980s. For more on this, see Drago Petrescu, Workers and Peasant-Workers in a Working-Class Paradise: Patterns of Working-Class Protest in Communist Romania, in Peter Hbner, Christoph Klemann, and Klaus Tenfelde, eds., Arbeiter im Staatssozialismus: Ideologischer Anspruch und Soziale Wirklichkeit (Cologne: Bhlau Verlag, 2005), 119-40. I illustrated the continuity in historical writing between the Romanticist and the communist periods in Romania in my study Historiography of Nation-building in Communist Romania, in Pavel Kolr and Milo Reznk, eds., Historische Nationsforschung im geteilten Europa, 1945-1989 (Cologne: SH Verlag, 2012), 149-67.
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A pioneering attempt to compare the movements of resistance against the two European totalitarianisms and incorporate the different ideological or regional characteristics in a global European narrative, which rejects the canonical periodization of the Cold War that separates Eastern from Western Europe and considers the the Second World War as a threshold, is Jos M. Faraldo, Europa Clandestina: Resistencias contra las occupaciones nazi y sovitica, 1938-1948 (Underground Europe: Resistance against the Nazi and Soviet occupations, 19381948) (Madrid: Aleanza Editorial, 2011). Adam Michnik, Confessions of a Converted Dissident: Essay for the Erasmus Prize 2001, Eurozine, 28 December 2001, http://www.eurozine.com/articles/ 2001-12-28-michnik-en.html (accessed 9 February 2013). Vclav Havel, The Power of the Powerless in Idem, Living in Truth (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), 36. A recent book, which approached the critical intellectuals of former Czechoslovakia from a fresh perspective in order to highlight their lived experiences under communism rather than their contribution to the collapse, perpetuates nonetheless the use of the term dissident, for none conveys better all the characteristics already associated with these individuals before 1989. Jonathan Bolton, Worlds of Dissent: Charter 77, The Plastic People of the Universe, and Czech Culture under Communism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). The Hungarian human rights oriented group, which was in many ways similar to Charter 77, defined itself as the democratic opposition in order to differentiate itself ideologically from the other two groups, the socialist and the populist oppositions. Although all referred to groups of critical intellectuals which were not more numerous than that of Charter 77, they assumed the name opposition and rejected dissidence. A volume authored by a close observant of politics in communist Hungary and the Soviet bloc, who uses these selfdenominations, is Rudolf Tks, Hungarys Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political Succession, 1957-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. 167-209. George Schpflin pointed out that one must clearly distinguish between opposition and dissent. Opposition means that there is a readiness to play a public role, to establish organizations which reject the leading role of the party and to create information networks. In other words, activity that would go beyond face-to-face contact and assume responsibility for facts beyond the individuals control. Dissent, on the other hand, was restricted to independent acts of defiance or
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disagreement, even if it was expressed overtly. He also underlined that each country conceptualized democratization in a specific way, and underlined the difference between Poland, the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the former GDR. George Schpflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 17985 and 206-210, quotation at 179-80. See also Andrew Janos synthesis East-Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre- to Postcommunism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), esp. 324-25. Bukovsky also mentioned that he preferred the term resistance to the imprecise term dissidence, but he accepted the use of the latter, for he understood that the former had a specific meaning in Western Europe, which reminded one of the armed societal actions against Nazism. Vladimir Boukovski, Prface, Recherches, No. 34, Special Issue Nous, dissidents: La dissidence en URSS, Pologne, Allemagne de LEst, Tchcoslovaquie (October 1978), 9-11. According to Roy Medvedev, a dissident is someone who disagrees in some measure with the ideological, political, economic or moral foundations that every society rests on. ... But he does more than simply disagree and think differently; he openly proclaims his dissent and demonstrates it in one way or another to his compatriots and the state. In other words, he doesnt just complain in private to his wife or close friends. Roy Medvedev, On Soviet Dissent (London: Constable, 1980). Havel, Living in Truth, 76-77. This definition is part of the essay The Power of the Powerless, which circulated widely in samizdat not only among Czechs and Slovaks, but also among Poles. It was also published in tamizdat. This essay represented an attempt at conceptualizing the essence of dissent, which Havel conceived as an exercise of living in truth. He also illustrated the opposite of dissent by using the famous parable of the greengrocer. In order to make public his allegiance to the communist regime, the greengrocer displayed in the window of his shop the slogan Proletarians from all countries, unite! It was this small merchant of fruit and vegetables, aside many other like-minded individuals, that maintained the communist system by accepting the daily lie, Havel argued. This essay also introduced the term posttotalitarian, and underlined that dissidents could not have emerged before the communist systems entered this phase. Tamizdat was obviously a concept derived from samizdat; both represented alternative paths to publication under dictatorships. While
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the latter represented a widely used term for texts which were selfpublished in order to avoid censorship, the former referred to texts which were smuggled across the border and then published abroad. A volume which approach samizdat and tamizdat from the perspective of their literary and not purely political value, and highlights how information flowed between East and West during the Cold War is Friederike Kind-Kovcs and Jessie Labov, eds., Samizdat, Tamizdat and Beyond: Transnational Media During and After Socialism (New York: Berghahn, 2013). Linz and Stepan underlined that post-totalitarianism did not represent a generic type of regime, as totalitarianism or authoritarianism, but an evolutionary type. Accordingly, post-totalitarianism occurs only after totalitarianism and can encompass a continuing varying from early post-totalitarianism, to frozen post-totalitarianism, to mature posttotalitarianism. The transition from totalitarianism to posttotalitarianism can occur as result of three distinctive but interrelated processes, which generate detotalitarianization by choice (of the leadership), by decay (of the ideology) or by societal conquest. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 42-51, and 293-343, quotations at 42 and 50, typology at 51. Many Sovietologists focused exclusively on the study of the communist elite and its power structure, for they considered that changes could have come only from above. Until the collapse of communism, it was still hard to believe that individuals from outside the political elite would eventually make the difference. Although dissent in Eastern Europe became a main topic of conferences beginning in the late 1970s, the phenomenon remained controversial. Participants from the other side of the Iron Curtain asked themselves if those who criticized the communist regimes in their own countries were a deviation from the societal norm of consenting to the social contract offered by the communist regimes, or the daring and vocal representatives of the concerns and perceptions of the society as a whole. On skepticism about the Helsinki Accords among analysts who originate in EastCentral Europe, see the volume authored by the former director of RFE, George Urban, Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War Within the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), esp. 123-36. Rudolf Tks observed that the post-Helsinki dissidence established a premiere in East-Central Europe, for until then a discrepancy in conceiving human rights in the West and the East existed. These ideas
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were fundamental for western political thinking, but only imported in East-Central Europe, where politicians adapted their meaning to the local context. In the West, the individual has historically and philosophically represented the focus of debates about human and citizen rights. On the contrary, East European political beliefs have tended to be dominated by questions of security (with a record of trade-offs for liberty), collectivism (at the expense of satisfaction of individual rights and aspirations), and a historically conditioned sense of low regard for the political efficacy of the common man. Rudolf Tks, Human Rights and Political Change in Eastern Europe, in Idem, ed., Opposition in Eastern Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 12. Thus, the communist authorities made no secret from this document, which many believed it would be as ineffective as the Yalta Agreement. In Czechoslovakia, the following joke circulated after the emergence of Charter 77: Why did Husak not sign the Charter? For he signed it in Helsinki. In Romania, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 was published in Gheorghe Gheorghe, Tratatele internaionale ale Romniei, 1965-1975 (International Treaties signed by Romania, 1965-1975) (Bucharest: Editura tiinific i Enciclopedic, 1977), 438-55. In the late 1980s, Romania was characterized in the following terms: Domestic opposition to the RCP and to Ceauescus personal rule remained extremely insignificant until the late 1970s, and it still lacks the strength and coordination of opposition in other East European countries. The same encyclopaedia article also justified the use of the term dissidence instead of opposition: In the light of its most prominent members isolation from the general population, its sporadic and localized actions, and its lack of cohesion, the domestic opposition in Romania could more properly be called dissidence, similar to that in the Soviet Union and unlike that in Poland. World Encyclopaedia of Political Systems and Parties, ed. George E. Delury, vol. 2 (New York: Facts on File, second edition 1987), s.v. Romania: Opposition, 937. According to Jowitt, dissimulation, which betrays fear and avoidance, represents a fundamental behavioural posture in regimes that attempt to penetrate within society. Kenneth Jowitt, Political Culture in Leninist Regimes, in Idem, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 50-87, quotations at page 80. In his classic study, Hirschman pointed out that members of any kind of human grouping, such as nations, businesses, organizations, etc., could react to what they perceive as a decline in the benefit of being a
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member in the following three ways: exit (which meant to terminate membership), voice (which meant to express discontent in the hope of improvement); loyalty (which meant to preserve membership out of patriotism or brand fidelity). The options exit and voice could represent economically or politically driven actions. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). This frame of analysis was applied to post-Stalinist communist systems to explain the preference for one of the two options in a given country or their prevalence at a given moment, in particular to the former GDR, where exit prevailed over voice. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic, World Politics, No. 45 (1993), 173-202; Christian Joppke, East German Dissidents and the Revolution of 1989: Social Movement in a Leninist Regime (New York: New York University Press, 1995). An article of 2011 returned to this question of the early 1990s and replied to it in the following way: From the perspective of ones qualities, maybe Romania had several Havels, but they were not recognized as such. Or maybe they did not surface because there was no morally favourable milieu in Romanian society, for political courage itself reprersents something that must be inseminated, for it grows or atrophies according to circumstances. Horaiu Pepine, Ar fi fost posibil un Havel romn? (Would have a Romanian Havel been possible?), http://www.dw.de/arfi-fost-posibil-un-havel-rom%C3%A2n/ a-15613086-1 (accessed 8 Febraury 2013). For instance, journalist Cristian Tudor Popescu argued during a television program that one should make a difference between the terms opponent and dissident (which he understood in their meaning from a general dictionary of the Romanian language) and illustrated his point by comparing two post-communist presidents: while Vclav Havel was an opponent of the former regime in his country, Ion Iliescu was only a dissident. C. T. Popescu, Disiden i opoziie (Dissent and opposition), http://decantare.wordpress.com/ 2011/12/18/ disidenta-si-opozitie/ (accessed 5 February 2013). For an article which briefly reviewed the meaning attached to the term dissident in western countries with reference to the contestation of the communist regimes in the Soviet bloc, pointing out that this actually referred to those who opposed these regimes, see Adrian Niculescu, Disidena romneasc (Romanian dissent), Observator Cultural, No. 113, 23 April 2002, http://www.observatorcultural.ro/ Dizidenta-romaneasca* articleID_ 1716-articles_details.html (accessed 5 February 2013).
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The Romanian dissident Paul Goma considered that terms like dissident, opponent, communist, fascist, anarchist, trade unionist, etc. failed to cover what he considered to be the essence of his identity, for he was fundamentally a writer. Paul Goma, Culoarea curcubeului 77: Cutremurul oamenilor. Cod Brbosul: Din dosarele Securitii, 19571977 (The colour of the rainbow 1977: The earthquake of people. Code-name Bearded Man: From the files of the Securitate, 19571977) (Iai: Polirom, 2005), 7-8. A book dedicated to him framed his anti-regime activity in terms of resistance to totalitarianism. Mihaela Azoiei, Totalitarism i rezisten n Romnia comunist: Cazul Goma (Totalitarianism and resistance in communist Romania: The Goma case) (Bucharest: Paideia, 2002). Romnia, 1945-1989: Enciclopedia regimului comunist Represiunea (Romania, 1945-1989: Encyclopedia of the communist regime The repression), ed. Octavian Roske, vol. 1, (Bucharest: INST, 2011), s.v. Disiden (Dissent), 567-80. In other former communist countries, the main political personalities of the opposition had been also only short-while acclaimed. Most of them (with really rare exceptions) ceased quickly to play a role in postcommunist politics. Krishan Kumar, 1989: Revolutionary Ideas and Ideals (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001). Former dissidents left though an enduring mark on the recent history of these countries, and thus they are part of the collective memory, albeit a controversial part in some instances. For the usefulness (and limits) of asymmetrical comparison in studying the modern history of Germany, see Jrgen Kocka, Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg, History and Theory, Vol. 38, No. 1 (February 1999), 40-50. One should though take into account the diversity between the communist regimes in East-Central Europe, which were different from that in Romania, but also different from one another. According to a typology proposed by Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski and Tka, Romanian communism belonged to the patrimonial type, like Bulgarian communism, and differed from the national-accommodative type, which existed in Poland and Hungary, as well as from the bureaucratic-authoritarian type, which the former GDR and Czechoslovakia experienced. According to the said authors, patrimonial communism can be characterized as follows: It relies on vertical chains of personal dependence between leaders in the state and party apparatus and their entourage, buttressed by extensive
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patronage and clientelist networks. ... Political power is concentrated around a small clique or an individual ruler worshiped by a personality cult. The level of rational-bureaucratic institutionalization in state and party remains low because the ruling clique penetrates the apparatus through nepotistic appointments. ... Rulers firmly repress any stirring of opposition demanding rights to participation or they co-opt potentially resourceful challengers through selective incentives. ... Patrimonial communism was likely to emerge in historical settings where a traditional authoritarian regime, assisted by compliant religious leaders, ruled over societies of poor peasants, weak cities, a thin layer of ethnic pariah immigrant entrepreneurs and merchants, a small and geographically concentrated industrial working class, and a corrupt coterie of administrators dependent on the personal whims of the ruler. Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski and Gbor Tka, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 23-24. Such a model fails to offer an all-encompassing explanation for the 1989 events, even in the case of Poland. It attributes a crucial event such as the abandonment of power by the communist rulers to internal factors, i.e. the pressure of mass demonstrations. The post-1989 dialogue between Adam Michnik and Wojciech Jaruzelski illustrated that the very decision of giving up the monopoly of power was the result of a complex of factors. Adam Michnik, Letters from Freedom: PostCold War Realities and Perspectives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 260-85. At the same time, essential external factors are underrated in analyses which focus solely on internal contestation. Gorbachevs decision to reverse the Brezhnev Doctrine and announce that the satellites of the Soviet Union must manage themselves their internal crises ranked highest among the causes that led to the collapse of communism in East-Central Europe. Two classic volumes which analyzed the changes introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and their impact on the other communist countries are Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) and Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). An analysis which encapsulates the complex of internal and external factors that led to the entangled Revolutions of 1989 is Drago Petrescu, Explaining the Romanian Revolution of 1989: Structure, Culture, and Contingency (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedic, 2010).
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For various centres of power clashed with each other in Western Europe since the Middle Ages, autonomous thinking became central to western political traditions, while civil society emerged not only independent from power structures but also powerful in relation to them. The balance of power in Eastern Europe always inclined in favour of the state, while civil society remained weak and unable to articulate or defend its interests. These political traditions of the region preceded the communist regimes, which only inherited and took advantage of the omnipotence of the state in relation to civil society. While political traditions of Eastern Europe, i.e. Europe behind the Iron Curtain, stood always in contrast to those of Western Europe, a difference existed inside the region, for more intensive entanglements existed between Central and Western Europe, which at least partially shared the same historical experience of feudalism, medieval Christian universalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation and CounterReformation and the Enlightenment. Schpflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, 5-37. The interplay between the communist regime and Romanian intellectuals, which resulted in a resurrection of the interwar nationalist discourse, has been analyzed in the already classic book of Katherine Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescus Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). Dennis Deletant has analyzed the role of the secret police in his aforementioned Ceauescu and the Securitate, and illustrated that Ceauescu changed the mission of this institution from repression to prevention of hostile actions. Romanian authors who had been not spectators but actors tried rather to justify than to explain the weakness of dissent in their country, thus they tended to emphasize the alleged omnipotence of the Securitate. In fact, the thesis of the allpowerful former secret police was so often invoked by Romanian intellectuals after the fall of the regime as an excuse for their compliance that it has become clich. Without ever comparing the institutions of the secret police in the Soviet bloc, many Romanians take for granted that the Securitate was one of the most if not the most repressive communist apparatus. An example of the kind is the preface to the collection of documents published as Marius Oprea, ed., Banalitatea rului: O istorie a Securitii n documente, 1949-1989 (The banality of evil: A history of the Securitate in documents) (Iai: Polirom, 2002). For a selection of studies which exemplifies the current historiographical trend of highlighting mutual influences and transfers among
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various cultures and societies, see Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jrgen Kocka, eds., Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives (New York: Berghahn, 2012). On the complementarity of the two approaches comparative and transnational which both aim at crossing the national borders (which represented the traditional frame of analysis in historical writing since the establishment of history as separate academic discipline in the nineteenth century), but in different ways, see Jrgen Kocka, Comparison and Beyond, History and Theory, Vol. 42, No. 1 (February 2003), 39-44. A recent debate between the Nobel Prize laureate, Herta Mller, and the Romanian philosopher Gabriel Liiceanu illustrates the conflicting interpretations of the term dissident. The latter expressed an opinion which many intellectuals in Romania shared: ones simple refusal to put his or her writing in the support of the communist regime represented if not a glorious, at least an honourable form of resisting the dictatorship, in fact, the only form of dissent possible under Ceauescus dictatorship. While she definitely stated that she was not a dissident, Mller explained that such an apolitical stance as the one which Liiceanu referred to never disturbed the regime: as proof, none of these intellectuals had problems with the secret police, so they must have been tolerated by the dictatorship. Dialogul Herta Mller-Gabriel Liiceanu, moment istoric pentru cultura romn (The Herta MllerGabriel Liiceanu debate, historical moment in Romanian culture), Romnia liber, 29 September 2010, http://www.romanialibera.ro/ cultura/ oameni/dialogul-herta-muller-gabriel-liiceanu-moment-istoricpentru-cultura-romana-200986.html (accessed 20 April 2012). This was best summarized by Gabriel Liiceanu in a speech addressed to the European College of Cultural Cooperation in 1990. Speaking about his own cultural group gathered around the late philosopher Constantin Noica, Liiceanu characterizes resistance through culture in the following terms: This model has, unquestionably, its greatness and its drawback. On the one hand ... it hampered the systematic and total destruction of culture, sticking to the idea that only the spirit can ensure the survival of a historically menaced country. But on the other hand, exactly in the name of this idea, this model turned his back to the real history, that of events. ... Noica considered the dialogue with the representatives of power - these butlers of history - a complete absurdity, so he disregarded dissidents as victims of an illusion, caught up in an unimportant fight. Neither a Havel nor an advisor to a
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Romanian Wasa emerged from Noicas school. Noica believed only in the Doomsday of culture and in the certificate one can show then. See the foreword to the new edition of Gabriel Liiceanu, Jurnalul de la Pltini: Un model paideic n cultura umanist (The Pltini diary: A paideia-like model in the humanistic culture) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1990), 13-14.
CHAPTER 1
Communist Romania vs. the Helsinki Process of International Cooperation*

In a speech delivered on 8 February 1988 in the House of Representatives, Tom Lantos of California stated that Romania was the only European country where human rights conditions did not improve but worsened since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. Only a few days before, on 26 January, President Ronald Reagan had addressed a letter to Nicolae Ceauescu to warn him about his decision to discontinue next June Romanias Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause if significant improvements in the observance of human rights in this country would not be registered by that time. In his reply of 12 February 1988, the secretary general of the RCP announced the American head of state that Romania willingly renounced the benefits of the MFN status in its relations with the United States. Ceauescu also added that the interest of the USA in issues like the observance of human rights in Romania represented interference in the internal affairs of his country, which an independent state (like the one he was heading) could not tolerate. Such attitude was consistent with the policy of emancipation which
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Romania had pursued constantly in foreign relations since the early 1960s. This policy worked in the benefit of the country until the late 1970s, when a strong criticism of human rights violations suddenly emerged and managed to cross the borders before the communist authorities had the chance to suppress it. Romanias complete disrespect for human rights became increasingly visible during the 1980s and its disregard for international interventions in these matters turned this country into a pariah, which not only western democracies, but also other communist countries criticized. When Ceauescus regime collapsed in December 1989, Romania was almost completely isolated. Its foreign relations (which once represented a source of pride for the communist regime) were restricted only to non-democratic and non-European states (such as Iran, the last country visited by Ceauescu). Romanias steady decline as an international actor cannot be explained without taking into account the new dynamics in EastWest relations, which the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE introduced in 1975. Originally meant to increase security in Europe, this internationally endorsed document contributed by default to the emergence of the dissident movements, as many analyses on the collapse of communism underlined. However, these agreements were initially intended to work primarily, if not exclusively, at state level. It was the link between international security and human rights that actually made the Helsinki Accords twofold effective, i.e. in West-East interstate relations, as well as in rebuilding civil society in communist countries. On the one hand, with the institutionalization of the Helsinki process of international collaboration, the importance given to human rights in the bilateral and multilateral relations among the signatory states increased gradually. In other words, the harsh treatment applied to those who openly expressed their criticism of the communist rule became not only a headline subject for journalists, but also a topic of diplomatic meetings. Consequently, the openness of the communist regimes
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to these issues became a problem of international prestige and credibility, which directly affected the interstate relations. On the other hand, at societal level, the provisions from Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act prompted dissident and opposition movements, albeit a legal lever to enforce their implementation was not really envisaged. This influence, however, must be understood in a more comprehensive way. Crucially important was not only that, after 1975, dissident activities increased in amplitude and radicalized in message, but also that western politicians, journalists and human rights organizations started to be more and more interested in these movements, and made them thus more visible outside the communist world. Without this interest, even the impact of such activities inside their countries would have been far smaller. If in other countries of the Soviet bloc this process allowed dissident movements to develop under its protective shelter against human rights violations, no similar effect could be registered on the long term in Romania. The Helsinki Final Act gave an initial momentum to internal criticism, but it hardly contributed to the development of dissent in Romania, for the open critics continued to suffer various forms of harassment until 1989 (even though international campaigns indeed alleviated their treatment by the communist authorities). Instead, the process of cooperation which this document initiated had a significant impact on Romanias international relations, although it changed nothing in its foreign policy. Accordingly, the first part reviews the external agenda of the Romanian communist elite in the context of the dtente, the second highlights how this positioned itself during the negotiations for the Helsinki Final Act, while the third illustrates the gradual loss of credibility which the increased importance attached to human rights inflicted on the Bucharest regime. This process developed slowly and accelerated only in the late 1980s. Whereas the world was changing, Ceauescu followed dogmatically the guiding lines of external policy which his predecessor established in the early 1960s:
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rapprochement with western countries, in particular with the United States, in view of protecting the country from a potential Soviet invasion. This policy was initiated by the Romanian leadership independent of the dtente between the two blocs, which nevertheless further helped the communist regime of this country to reestablish relations with many states from the other military bloc. In particular, Romania benefited from the interest of the United States in encouraging those communist countries which manifested some independence from the Soviet Union. As long as the entire world talked about peace, the Romanian communist regime was a viable international partner, in spite of its reluctance to introduce internal reforms. The Helsinki Accords provided though the western governments with a new set of criteria to measure the progress made by each communist country. These criteria were no longer based on the external policy like in the days of dtente, but on the internal liberalization.1 While the western world attached an increasing importance to the observance of human rights in the relations to the countries of the Soviet bloc, the Romanian communist elite continued to dismiss any inquiry on dissidents as interference in internal affairs. Their earlier guidelines in foreign policy had become obsolete, but they failed to notice it. Briefly put, this chapter focuses on the perverse and atypical effects of the Helsinki process upon communist Romania, and illustrates that the incapacity of its communist elite to understand the change of priorities in international relations and adjust its foreign policy turned this country into an isolated dictatorship by 1989.
The Rise Romania as a Soviet Maverick Satellite

It was in the beginning of the 1960s that communist Romania tried to reinvent itself in international relations: from Moscows
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most servile satellite, it turned into its most dissenting ally.2 At that time, these efforts did not remain unnoticed, for western observers of the communist world had become extremely sensitive to diversity once countries in the Soviet bloc engaged on national paths of building communism.3 Once the hitherto unique model for understanding communist societies could no longer explain differences,4 analysts focused on establishing criteria for evaluating the divergence from the original Stalinist system.5 Romania attracted the interest of both politicians and scholars from western countries (especially from the United States) with small but significant actions directed against the Soviet Union. After the negotiations for the withdrawal of the Soviet Army, the communist elite in Bucharest took several other actions that conflicted with the interests of the leadership in Moscow. A vote in disagreement with the other communist countries in the United Nations or the harsh criticism against the plan for the economic division of the Soviet bloc represented indeed political decisions which rejected the tutelage of the powerful eastern neighboring country. Western countries perceived them as a reorientation in foreign policy toward closer cooperation with democratic countries, for the Romanian leadership also initiated negotiations for reestablishing diplomatic and commercial relations with non-communist states. Romanians perceived such actions as an expression of national interests against those of the Soviet Union. The Romanian communist leadership conducted though its policies according to its own reading of national interests, which envisaged the diminishing of the Soviet influence, but not a greater degree of internal liberalization. Until the underpinnings of their foreign policy became apparent to western observers or to Romanian citizens, the communist leadership of this country enjoyed international credibility and accumulated political capital. An action undertaken by this communist leadership during the Cuban missile crisis convinced the United States that Romanias
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independent position was more than fiction. The party leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, who became worried that the Soviet Union would drag Romania into a nuclear war with NATO, sent Foreign Minister Corneliu Mnescu to Washington. His mission was to assure the United States that his country intended to remain neutral in the event of a superpower military confrontation.6 Besides, the decisive moment that really brought Romania into the attention of western analysts was the opposition to Khrushchevs plan for economic integration in the Soviet bloc. During the COMECON meeting of 15 February 1963, Alexandru Brldeanu, who was Romanias representative to this supranational body, resolutely expressed the decision of his party leadership to reject such a plan which disadvantaged the economy of his country, for this was supposed to dedicate itself only to agricultural production.7 This conflict of economic nature among the communist countries made front-page news in western media. Although aware that such a conflict was not about the rejection of the centrally planned model in economy, western analysts credited Romania for this adamant resistance to Soviet control. Consequently, American analysts started to place Romania aside Poland in a ranking of the Soviet bloc countries according to the capacity of taking independent decisions in internal and external matters.8 The benefits for Romania were immediate, for the United States concluded the four-year preliminary discussions and signed a common trade agreement with Romania in June 1964. The power elite in Bucharest did not restrict to cultivating special relations with the opposing superpower, but also concluded bilateral treaties with western European countries in order to reestablish political and economic relations. As a result of this policy, Romania became the first communist state which signed a treaty of cooperation with the United States, and a few years later, in 1967, with the Federal Republic of Germany as well.
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In the meantime, the Romanian communist elite codified the guiding principles of its national path toward communism in a document which came to be widely known as the Declaration of April 1964. This fundamental party document reasserted in essence ideas already expressed by Khrushchev since 1956. Adopted in unanimity during the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers Party (RWP) on 15-22 April 1964, this act stated clearly that each communist party had the sovereign right to elaborate, choose, or change the forms and methods of the socialist construction in its country. These ideas had though a specific significance in a twofold context: on the one hand, the Sino-Soviet conflict inside the communist camp, and on the other, the dtente in the relations between the two camps. While placing itself in a neutral position regarding the dispute between the Soviet Union and China, the Romanian communist elite maintained that the principle of peaceful coexistence should govern the relations between states with different social and economic systems and even went as far as to affirm that a non-aggression pact between NATO and WTO should have been concluded. From an economic point of view, the declaration did not reject the cooperation within the COMECON, but stated that this structure must not develop itself into a supranational economy that would make void of substance national sovereignty.9 More importantly, this cooperation among communist countries should not have excluded complementary accords with western states.10 From a political point of view, the declaration represented the first attempt of a Soviet bloc country to officially articulate its perspective on the principles that must have regulated the interstate relations among communist countries, and implicitly reject the idea that the Kremlin had the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of the satellites. There is and there cannot be a father-party and a son-party, [there are no] superior parties and subordinate parties, but there is the great family of the communist and workers parties,
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which are equal in rights. According to this document, the appeasement of internal conflicts and the unity of the international communist movement could not have been achieved without respecting principles such as the equality among all parties or the non-interference in the internal affairs of another party. The latter phrase would turn into a leitmotif reiterated in all official statements of the Romanian communist elite until 1989.11 The policy of independence in the relation with the Soviet Union (which Gheorghiu-Dej had initiated) was then continued without significant change by his successor. In fact, it was Nicolae Ceauescu who received international acclaim for following adamantly this line of international conduct when he disapproved publicly of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 by troops from other WTO countries. Thus, Ceauescu (and not Gheorghiu-Dej) capitalized politically from the policy of securing autonomy in the Soviet bloc, which his balcony speech of 21 August 1968 epitomized. This episode was amply commented by all accounts on that period, so it needs no further detailing. However, it is worth stressing that neither the Romanian communist leadership participated in the political meetings nor the Romanian troops took part in the joint WTO military exercises which preceded the invasion as such. Actually, Romania was not invited to join the other states which invaded Czechoslovakia.12 Nevertheless, Ceauescu had his charismatic moment, for he had the courage to deliver a free speech which condemned the interference in the internal affairs of a fraternal country in front of a large crowd. Thus, his international prestige and internal support grew tremendously after this moment, which some characterized as his finest hour.13 At that time, the major difference between his dogmatic views and the reformist ideas, which individuals like Alexander Dubek promoted, was completely overlooked inside and outside the country.14 Although a mere follower of a policy envisaged by his predecessor, Ceauescu brought nonetheless his
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personal touch to it. In August 1968, he no longer spoke about the right of each party to decide its path to communism, but about the intangible right of each people (popor) to decide upon its own destiny, to choose the specific forms of building socialism.15 In this way, the party and the people became synonymous in official discourses, while the party leadership gained genuine legitimacy in the view of many Romanians and foreigners alike. That Ceauescu was only Gheorghiu Dejs dogmatic follower, who was incapable to develop creatively the policy envisaged by his predecessor, became apparent only when he also proved unable of understanding the changes in world politics. However, the year 1968 remained a reference point in Romanias recent history and a formative experience for Ceauescu and his power elite. The obsession of securing independence from the Soviet Union had emerged earlier out of the fear of an intervention from Moscow in the scope of changing the local party leadership, which had developed gradually since the interwar years to be then reinforced by the events in the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.16 The experience of the invasion in Czechoslovakia in 1968 added a new dimension to the fear of a Soviet interference in the affairs of the RCP. While the Romanian foreign policy with regard to the eastern neighbor remained practically unchanged until 1989, its cornerstone since 1968 was the guarding of all borders west and east from a potential military attack. The issuance of the Brezhnev Doctrine augmented the conviction that the most significant threat for the Romanian communist regime came not from Washington, but from Moscow. Since Romania already distanced itself from the decisions taken by the other members of the WTO in 1968, an invasion like the one in Czechoslovakia seemed possible and even probable. The crisis inside the communist camp passed, but Ceauescu (who considered himself an active supporter of world peace in the relations with western countries) continued to fear less an
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aggression from a capitalist country than he feared a concerted attack from the surrounding WTO countries. Thus, a new military doctrine which envisaged the permanent soldierly training of the entire population (men and women) developed since 1968.17 Moreover, the Romanian army quietly changed the goal of military instruction. Consequently, soldiers were trained to face even a potential terrestrial aggression from any direction, although all neighbors (except for Yugoslavia) were WTO countries.18 There was never an explicit public reference to a possible conflict between Romania and its fraternal countries, but Romania pursued since 1968 even more adamantly than ever the policy of rapprochement with western countries. Besides changing the military defense policy out of fear of a Soviet-led invasion, Ceauescu also changed the international allegiances of his country. When President Richard Nixon decided to include Romania on his tour back from the Pacific, where he intended to watch the landing of Apollo 11 into the ocean, the Romanian communist elite reacted promptly. There was an immediate agreement on this visit, although that implied the postponement of a party conference to which a Soviet delegation was also invited. The visit of 2-3 August 1969 was indeed a historic moment: it represented the first ever visit of an American president to a communist country (other than Roosevelts participation to the Yalta Conference). Since the end of the Second World War, the American contacts with the Soviet bloc were maintained only at a superpower level. Nixon decided to come to Bucharest in the context of the extended dtente, whose artisan was Henry Kissinger, his national security advisor and later US secretary of state. The visit to Romania was not a recompense for Ceauescus independent action in August 1968, but the first in a series that opened contacts at the highest level between the United States and the satellites of the other superpower. Nixon intended to needle the Soviets by showing them that his country was willing to have
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direct relations with the communist countries which displayed a certain degree of independence from Moscow. Thus, he could condemn the Brezhnev Doctrine in his speech delivered in Bucharest, i.e. inside the communist camp.19 Romania was preferred to others not necessarily because of its allegedly greater autonomy in the Soviet bloc, but because of the full ceremony with which Ceauescu had welcomed Nixon during his earlier visit of 1967, although the latter was not yet president and his chances to be elected were rather low at that time.20 The Romanian communist leadership used such pomp and circumstance not because they had great diplomatic skills, but because they had a provincial way of interpreting politics. Accordingly, the decision of a foreign especially western high official to visit Romania was interpreted as a reflection of the considerable importance the guests accorded to their hosts. Moreover, Ceauescu believed that a good personal relation with the American president would help him support his ambitious plans to become a key international leader at the interface between the East and the West. In short, the meeting between Nixon and Ceauescu represented a telling example of mutual misperceptions between communist and noncommunist countries. Whatever might have been the motivations on both sides, Romania became though in 1969 the first communist country which an American president visited since the beginning of the Cold War.21 For its display of autonomy from the Soviet Union and the gradual rapprochement with the United States, Romania received the MFN status in 1975. In this way, it became the second communist country (after Poland) which enjoyed the commercial facilities associated with this level of treatment.22 The MFN status was renewed every year at the recommendation of the US president provided that Romania fulfilled its obligations under the JacksonVanik amendment, which linked the renewal of this clause to freedom-of-emigration requirements. It was only in the mid-1980s
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that the increasing criticism from among Romanians signaled to American officials that this country was far from meeting the conditions for renewal. Until then, the granting of the MFN status was instrumental in supporting Ceauescus cult of personality, for the Romanian propaganda interpreted this as a reward for his alleged great international role as a mediator between the two political and military camps. The granting of the MFN status to Romania came incidentaly in the moment when the basis for a new framework of international cooperation was laid down in Helsinki. In this framework, the independence from the Soviet Union gradually came to be regarded by western countries as no longer important in evaluating the achievements of a communist country, as long as the internal consensus based on respect for human rights was not reached. However, at the moment when the Helsinki Accords were negotiated, Romania stepped once more outside the chorus of the communist countries, and sided with western countries, albeit it did not share with them the interest in human rights.
The Climax Romania as Supporter of the Helsinki Accords

The agreement for cooperation among countries from the two confronting camps of the Cold War could not have been possible in 1975 without the previous developments in international relations which came to be known as the dtente. Once the avoidance of a direct military confrontation seemed to be in the interest of both sides, the next logical step was to envisage a framework of inter-bloc collaboration. After two years of continuing deliberations, thirty-five states, i.e. all European countries (except for Albania), plus the United States and Canada, signed the Final Act of the CSCE on 1 August 1975 in Helsinki.
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One might say that this document symbolized the ultimate expression of dtente. These agreements, which were concluded because the international context had changed significantly since the beginning of the Cold War, represented on their turn a trigger for further change. As mentioned, the framework for cooperation which this document initiated modified gradually the dynamics of East-West relations, in spite of the fact that the two blocs had contradictory perspectives on its uses. While western democratic countries generally considered that international security could not be separated from the respect for human rights, the Soviet Union and its allies considered that security meant the consecration of the post-war frontiers (including the division of Germany). In short, the non-communist countries were future-oriented, while the communist countries were past-oriented and thus primarily interested in preserving the two existing spheres of influence in international affairs. As Khrushchevs policy of peaceful coexistence once envisaged, military policy must have been curtailed, while ideological confrontation must have continued. Beside the concern with validating the status quo in Europe, the Soviet Union was interested in reaching an agreement for economic cooperation. For the centrally planned economies, including that of the Soviet Union, proved increasingly unable to compete with the market economies, an international agreement for cooperation might have represented the necessary boost for recovery.23 Accordingly, the Soviet Union and its allies hoped to modernize their obsolete industries with help from the more advanced western countries. Otherwise, communist states counted on their secret police apparatuses in case this future cooperation would have had the side effect of dangerously exposing the local populations to western influences. On the contrary, the western democratic countries supported that security cannot be achieved by force, but by consent. In this way, a link was created between the issue of international security
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and the internal observance of human rights. This is not to say that western democracies had great expectations in this respect, but they nevertheless hoped that these agreements would be an inhibitor for further Soviet interventions in satellite countries. In other words, this document would no longer permit the crushing of anti-Soviet revolts, like in Hungary in 1956, or communist reform initiatives, like in Czechoslovakia in 1968.24 At the same time, it would protect the communist reformists from the satellite countries, who had been usually suppressed after these interventions. Furthermore, it was thought that the most liberalminded communists would feel less threatened not only by a Soviet-led invasion of the WTO troops, but also by a potential NATO attack. Thus, they might have gradually loosened their ties with the Kremlin and increased instead their contacts with western countries. Ultimately, they would have engaged in market-oriented reforms and ruled their countries by consent rather than repression, the western diplomats believed. Apart from the idea to stop the arms race and improve communication across the Iron Curtain, the western countries had also an interest in the development of commercial relations, just like the Soviet bloc countries. Beyond these general ideas, there was little uniformity among the liberal democracies which participated in the negotiations for the Helsinki Accords. Despite the natural and inevitable differences though, western countries argued in a surprisingly coherent manner during the negotiation of the Helsinki Accords and insisted on the introduction of Principle VII regarding the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of Basket III regarding the cooperation in humanitarian fields. At that time, most analysts considered these provisions as useless as the Yalta Agreement. However, it was this so-called Human Dimension of the Helsinki process that eroded the legitimacy of communist regimes and led in the long run to the fall of the Iron Curtain (and the subsequent reunification of Europe).25
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Besides the overall coherence of liberal democracies in negotiating the Helsinki Accords, a noticeable difference of opinion existed between Western Europe and the United States. Ironically, the positions adopted during these negotiations on the two sides of the Atlantic changed to the extent that each seemed not only to break with its traditional foreign policy, but also to adopt something from the tradition of the other. Accordingly, the countries of Western Europe incorporated much of the rhetoric about peace and international cooperation which presidents such as Woodrow Wilson or Franklin D. Roosevelt promoted. At the same time, the United States had changed their foreign policy due to Henry Kissingers vision to such an extent that this came much closer than ever before to the Realpolitik which was hitherto so characteristic of European countries.26 Accordingly, the American view on security during the negotiations for the Helsinki Accords was strictly military. The United States was primarily interested in a mutual and balanced reduction of armed forces in Europe, for this process implied more direct and palpable results than any promises to respect human rights. This is not to say that the United States was not genuinely interested in inducing changes inside the Soviet bloc. Under the Nixon administration, the presidents will of change was met by Henry Kissingers intellectual ability to conceptualize a foreign policy committed to a rapprochement between the two blocs. This represented a break with the tradition of containment, which George F. Kennan had outlined in the beginning of the Cold War.27 While direct confrontation was no longer acceptable in the era of dtente, the liberation of EastCentral Europe was not possible either. Thus, the goal of the United States was to encourage and support those communist regimes which manifested some degree of independence from the Soviet Union. As illustrated above, Romania was a frontrunner in this trend since the early 1960s. However, neither Nixon nor Kissinger did make an explicit connection between their policy of
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dtente and the issue of human rights. On the contrary, both were particularly reluctant to criticize the violation of human rights in the Soviet Union or in the other countries of East-Central Europe. Gerald Ford who signed the Helsinki Accords in 1975 did not raise the issue of human rights in international meetings either. It was only under Jimmy Carter that human rights emerged high on the agenda of American politicians, albeit with limited consequences for the Soviet bloc. Although not foreseen at the time of the negotiations, the greatest long-term achievement of western democratic countries was to link human rights to security by including this issue among the principles which should have guided the relations among the signatory states. Accordingly, Principle VII (which was included in the Final Act at the suggestion of western negotiators) affirmed: The participating states will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms because these must be an essential factor for the peace, justice, and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and cooperation among themselves as among all states. The Soviet negotiators tried to diminish the importance of this principle by subordinating it to Principle VI, which referred to the non-interference in the internal affairs of another state. Western countries insisted though that all principles were of primary significance, so that none of them could be subjected to another. Ironically enough, Romania was the only communist country which supported the western camp in its attempt to give equal priority to the issue of human rights, although its interest in this matter was nil. Then, the Soviet negotiators wanted to leave the opportunity to justify the right of their country to intervene in East-Central Europe by introducing the idea that the basic principles had to be applied only in the relations between states with different social systems, and not among states from the same bloc. However, western negotiators supported by those from Romania succeeded in introducing in
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the Preamble of the Final Act the stipulation that all principles referred to the relations among all participating states, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems. In Romanian interpretation, this provision meant an implicit repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. It was the fear of a Soviet invasion that made Romania step out from the communist bloc during negotiations and side with the western camp in insisting that all principles were of equal importance in all relations among the participating states. In short, the desire to make the Brezhnev Doctrine inoperative, which western countries shared with Romania, made the diplomats of the latter also agree that respect for human rights should be included among the guiding principles. It is also interesting to note that President Gerald Ford went directly to Bucharest after signing the Helsinki Accords on behalf of the United States. With the occasion of this second official visit of an US head of state, Ceauescu reiterated his fear of a Soviet invasion in front of the American delegation. According to Kissingers recollections of the talks, the secretary general of the RCP was obsessed that the article 53 of the UN Charter allowed the Soviet Union to intervene in the internal affairs of Romania, for this country had been an enemy state during the Second World War. The Helsinki Accords added indeed a new diplomatic barrier in front of a Soviet invasion, but Ceauescu was still afraid that the diplomatic framework of the CSCE would not offer due protection to his country.28 Beyond this specific interest, the Romanian communist leader considered the Helsinki Accords and in particular the provisions regarding human rights a dead letter, like all the other leaders from the Soviet bloc countries. In fact, Romania illustrated fully in the long run that autonomy from Moscow or closer relations with western democracies did not implicitly mean greater respect for human rights. Unlike Gheorghiu-Dej who had conceived the policy of emancipation, Ceauescu lacked pragmatism in action and flexibility in thinking.
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Such qualities enabled his predecessor to seize the opportunities which aroused after Stalins death and emancipate Romanias communist elite from the tutelage of the fraternal party of the Soviet Union. This policy inside the communist bloc was linked to one that envisaged the rapprochement with western democracies in the context of the peaceful coexistence. Ceauescu continued to guide Romanias foreign relations in accordance with the same ideas, but he could not adapt them to the post-Helsinki international context. Thus, the secretary general of the RCP persisted on speaking about peace during international meetings, while the other leaders started to talk about the observance of human rights. In the long run, the Helsinki Accords singled out the Romanian communist dictatorship, but not for supporting western countries out of fear of a Soviet invasion, but for disregarding with unmatched stubbornness the spirit of cooperation which this international document had initiated. However, Romania continued to enjoy for a while a lot of credibility for siding with western participants to the Helsinki framework of cooperation. This communist country made again separate opinion from the other Soviet bloc states during the second CSCE Follow-up Meeting, which was held in Madrid between 1980 and 1983. While the latter drafted a common paper which proposed no confidence-building measures, Romania came with a separate paper which called for more openness in international relations, especially in the military field. Referring to the multinational maneuvers near the borders of other states in such an ambiguous way that it could have referred either to NATO or to WTO, the Romanian delegation proposed that information related to major military movements, including naval and air exercises, be included in the reporting process. Its position was similar to that of the neutral and non-aligned countries, and the respective text illustrated the fact that Romania acted as if an independent state between the two military blocs.29 By the time of the third Follow-up
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Meeting in Vienna, the increased attention given to human rights by western countries had already singled out Romania as the worst observant in the Soviet bloc. The denunciation of the Romanian communist regime for its notoriously bad human rights record was the result of a long and sinuous process. Ceauescu continued to envisage himself as a mediator between the two superpowers and put a lot of energy in the hope of gaining international recognition for his alleged role as champion of world peace. However, the disregard for human rights under his leadership eroded heavily the credibility which Romania had earlier enjoyed and made western states change the hitherto benevolent attitude into one of hostility by the late 1980s.
The Decline Romania as an Isolated Dictatorship

Jimmy Carter is remembered as the first president of the United States who committed himself fully to the world-wide observance of human rights. When elected, the Helsinki Accords had already produced the first changes in the Soviet bloc: several dissidents had grasped the opportunities offered by this internationally recognized document and begun monitoring violations of human rights in their countries. These changes touched the Soviet Union as well: the Muscovite Group for the Observance of the Helsinki Accords established itself in May 1976 and enjoyed wide coverage in western media due to the active engagement of the Nobel Prize winner, nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov. This interest might have faded away after making a few newspaper headlines, if the United States did not further involve itself in this matter.30 Carter did not only emphasize his commitment to human rights in his inaugural speech, but also invited Sakharov to the White House in the beginning of his term as president. Many individuals who
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lived behind the Iron Curtain took this invitation as a sign that the new administration in Washington was taking the Basket III of the Helsinki Accords seriously. Indeed, the observance of human rights turned into a subject of diplomatic talks with representatives of the communist states, albeit not immediately and not consistently.31 Actually, the US policy toward the Soviet bloc changed little under the Carter administration. The most significant correction during his presidency was the inclusion of Hungary (aside Poland and Romania) among the communist countries which enjoyed the MFN status in recognition of the progress they had made in departing from the Soviet model.32 It was only gradually that the observance of human rights became significant in US foreign relations. In order to follow this evolution in the diplomatic field, one must remember that, until the late 1980s, the United States based its policy with regard to the Soviet bloc on the assumption that communism was there to stay. A so-called principle of differentiation guided the treatment applied to each country. This meant that countries that either showed in their external policy signs of independence from the Soviet Union or displayed tendencies of internal liberalization were encouraged to continue such trends by various incentives, mostly special trade accords. A country did not have to illustrate both trends of departing from the influence of the Kremlin. Accordingly, Romania received preferential treatment due to its autonomy from the Soviet Union and in spite of its reluctance to introduce internal reforms and respect human rights.33 The American foreign policy did not change fundamentally until the very end of communism in EastCentral Europe, in spite of repeated criticism which underlined that preferential treatment and the related encouragement should be granted only for compliance with both principles. The assumption that any Sovietized country which became less dependent on the Soviet Union actually weakened the strength of
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the communist bloc pleaded in favor of continuing this policy. At the same time, many American politicians believed that the MFN clause and other similar incentives, once granted, might work in the long run as a lever to reinforce the observance of human rights even in those countries which disregarded these issues. These suppositions actually worked in the advantage of Nicolae Ceauescu and the rest of the Romanian communist elite, for they permitted the preservation of privileged relations with the United States until the late 1980s, although the human rights record of the regime was obviously disastrous. At the same time, western politicians could hardly be aware of specific cases of basic rights violations, as long as monitors of such abuses did not exist in Romania. While small but vocal groups protested in the name of human rights in Central Europe, no enduring group such as Charter 77 or KOR emerged under Ceauescus regime. An attempt to coagulate a movement for human rights was made in 1977 by writer Paul Goma, but the secret police quickly suppressed it, while western media noticed instead that the Romanian authorities treated Goma and his followers more reasonably than the Czechoslovak regime (which had immediately arrested and brutally beaten the leaders of Charter 77). Quite the contrary, some journalists stressed, the Romanian regime tried first to negotiate with the leader of the human rights movement and applied hard measures only after this attempt failed.34 In short, Romania was seen from the other side of the Iron Curtain as performing better than others in terms of human rights at that time. Even close observers of the Soviet bloc, who acknowledged that Ceauescu could not care less about the implementation of the Helsinki provisions, still did not rank Romania last. For instance, J. F. Brown placed this country third in terms of observance of human rights in a report compiled in May 1977 for the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe of the U.S. Congress. Better records had only Poland and
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Hungary, while Bulgaria, GDR and Czechoslovakia formed the rear group, which lagged far behind Romania in this evaluation.35 Moreover, Ceauescu continued to deceive western politicians into believing that he was, if not a genuine reformer, then at least a communist leader who deserved to be supported in his endeavors to pursue an independent foreign policy within the Soviet bloc.36 Famous moments and memorable phrases which illustrate this distorted view indeed existed. The queen of the United Kingdom rode with him in the royal carriage on the streets of London, while Margaret Thatcher said that he was a man with whom one can do business. Jimmy Carter, who was more sensitive to the human rights issue than his predecessors, still received Ceauescu in official visit to Washington. Moreover, the former director of RFE George Urban recalled that the State Department asked him periodically to moderate the criticism of Ceauescus repressive domestic policy for the sake of his courageous independent foreign policy.37 This is not to say though that western politicians overlooked completely Ceauescus internal policy, which gradually came to be considered among the harshest in the Soviet bloc. However, human rights observance was not one and the same with the treatment of dissidents, but an indicator evaluated on the basis of several criteria, among which the reaction to internal public criticism was only one. For instance, the above-mentioned report outlined six criteria for measuring the performances of the states in East-Central Europe: (1) openness to internal societal pressures, such as dissident-driven protests; (2) liberalization of emigration; (3) relaxation of censorship; (4) rights specific to ethnic minorities guaranteed; (5) free entry for western citizens; and (6) notable cultural exchanges with western countries.38 If one considers all these criteria, one could see that the Romanian communist regime maintained actually rather high emigration quotas; abolished officially censorship in 1977 (though it maintained it in different guise); permitted western tourists and academics to enter the
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country; and even continued to allow regime-bounded intellectuals to travel for professional purposes beyond the Iron Curtain.39 Moreover, the lack of protest groups after the suppression of the Goma movement of 1977 supported by default Ceauescus regime, for as long as no dissident-driven protests existed, the openness toward them could not be measured. With internal criticism almost non-existent, western pressure for the observance of human rights was in fact exercised mostly in cases of emigration visa refused and ethnic or religious minorities persecuted. On an aggregate evaluation based on the criteria above, the Romanian communist authorities did not perform so poorly as to make western politicians withdraw their support for a communist leader that stood against the Soviet Union. At the same time, the very possibility to press Ceauescu to relax the internal policy depended ultimately on his will to comply. True, Romania was the first communist country which reestablished direct contacts with western democracies, and in particular with the United States. While Stalin and Khrushchev were in power, the interaction of the American administration with the communist bloc restricted itself to the relation with its spokesman, the Soviet Union. It was the Nixon administration which radically changed this mutually agreed type of communication by initiating bilateral relations with other communist countries. Without challenging the division of the world in two antagonistic camps, this turn represented an indirect acknowledgement of these countries right to domestic and foreign policies of their own.40 In short, dtente offered the very opportunity for increased diplomatic interaction with each country of the Soviet bloc. Simultaneously, these countries became more vulnerable to western pressure because of the external debt they had contracted earlier. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Soviet-dominated regimes could have simply discarded any western demands for human rights observance as interference in
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domestic affairs, as they rejected the Marshall Plan. During the 1970s, however, the economic interaction between the two blocs changed significantly, and in the new context the loans contracted by communist countries from western financial institutions could be and were used as a lever of pressure. Thus, some communist countries had to unwillingly relax the treatment of dissidents whenever western politicians intervened. Such type of pressure had limited results in the case of Romania, for Ceauescu became irritated by the insistence on such petty problems as he characterized the human rights issues and decided to pay his countrys external debt at all costs in order to increase its autonomy from the East and the West as well. Otherwise, the Romanian leader made concessions with regard to the observance of human rights not because of the Helsinki Accords, but because of another lever of diplomatic pressure: the renewal of the MFN status. As mentioned, the United States awarded Romania this trade status in 1975, in conformity with the Trade Act of 1974, which included a section 402, better known as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. This section stipulated that the MFN status could not be awarded to countries that did not have market economies, i.e. communist countries, unless they allowed free emigration.41 Nevertheless, considering that none of the communist countries could really afford to permit freedom in this respect, the amendment also mentioned that the president of the United States could waive this requirement for countries that at least eased the emigration procedures and increased the annual quotas. Each year by 3 June, the president had to submit to the American Congress the recommendation for renewal in the case of each applicable country. From the American perspective, that seemed a significant economic leverage which might have been used to improve the observance of one human right the freedom of movement in those communist countries which had received the MFN status. Until 1981, however, the renewal procedure was
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rather a routine. Romania managed every year to perform well in the very last moment, for a large number of people received an exit visa to emigrate every May. Nevertheless, this changed after the imposition of the Martial Law in Poland, which made the United States withdraw the MFN status for Poland. Beginning with 1982, the renewal of this preferential treatment was increasingly conditioned by a really significant improvement of the human rights record. Thus, the renewal of the MFN status became a yearly matter of negotiation between the United States and Romania. Both countries acknowledged that this type of special relation could not have been easily rebuilt once lost, for the conditions of award imposed by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment were harder than those of renewal.42 Obviously, the importance conferred to the preservation of this status was crucially different for each of the two partners. Ceauescu believed that Romanias MFN status had a symbolic value well beyond the economic facilities accorded, for he regarded this award as recognition of the privileged position of his country in the communist camp and of its special relations with the United States.43 In spite of the exaggerate significance atributed by the Romanian leader to a trade facility, the MFN clause proved in the end a tool of leverage with limited effect. The United States could not obtain from the Romanian communist regime more than the reunification of some families, the release of some prisoners of conscience and the permission for their emigration.44 Although these represented half-hearted and last-minute decisions, the United States preferred to ignore the steady decline in this respect, for their guidelines in the relations with the countries of East-Central Europe remained the above-mentioned principles of differentiation, which were outlined under Nixon. Thus, the degree of independence from the Soviet Union was valued even when internal liberalization was non-existent.45 This continuity in American external policy (which David B.
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Funderburk, a former US ambassador to Bucharest, explained in bureaucratic terms) favored the communist leadership of Romania. As diplomats represented a category of civil servants with a longer political career than a presidential mandate, they tried to preserve the status quo and follow the lines of policy established by predecessors rather than to challenge them. In other words, diplomatic inertia among the staff in the State Department as well as the diplomats in Bucharest assured the continuity in policy toward Romania well into the 1980s, in spite of the rapid deterioration of human rights records. It was Ambassador Funderburk who tried to trigger a change in the American policy towards Romania. He considered that the Romanian communist leadership needed a very strong warning, such as the refusal to renew the MFN clause, to really improve the observance of human rights. His endeavors had though no noticeable results until the end of his mandate in 1985.46 As late as 1986, a perceptive observer of the communist bloc as Charles Gati still defended the idea of preserving this special treatment for Romania, although he was perfectly aware that this country was a police state, and in fact, one of the toughest dictatorships in the region. Nevertheless, he considered that the conditions for which the MFN clause was awarded in 1975 were still met by Romania in 1985. To be sure, the United States extended this trade clause not because it hoped that Romania would become a democracy, but because it wanted to encourage its nationalist tendencies within the WTO. Yet, the termination of this clause, which some human rights activists advocated, meant the loss of the only leverage to exert pressure for the observance of human rights, Gati argued.47 To sum up, the inertia in American external policy toward Romania and the absence of any Helsinki monitoring groups inside this country actually left the problem of human rights observance in this country in the hands of the lobbies abroad. These groups were until the workers revolt of November 1987 the only
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significant monitors of the abuses committed by the Romanian communist leadership. However, this situation affected the perception of human rights violations, for most cases which were made public by such groups were restricted to three categories: (1) the freedom of emigration; (2) the liberty of religious worship; and (3) the situation of ethnic minorities, notably of the Hungarians in Romania. The issue of the Hungarian community in Transylvania ranked high in the international debates that dominated the Helsinki framework of cooperation in the last years before the fall of communism. This issue needs elaboration and thus it is dealt with in a separate chapter. The freedom of emigration represented another important topic of diplomatic meetings, for public protests against Ceauescus regime were more often than not driven by the desire to leave the country (and not by the idea to make something for changing the existing situation). Relatives and friends who could bear witness in front of relevant committees lobbied intensely for persons persecuted because of his or her decision to emigrate. Besides, the Romanian communities abroad often organized manifestations to raise awareness of human rights violations by Ceauescus regime, which focused actually on the release of the so-called prisoners of conscience. Although aware that such cases represented more often than not a manipulation of the Helsinki Accords for the sake of emigrating to a better life, many Romanian exiles still lobbied for the freedom of emigration. After all, the denial of this right also highlighted how unjust were the decisions taken by the communist authorities in Bucharest.48 Beside the freedom of emigration, international pressure was strongly exercised in favor of the freedom of religious worship. This regarded mostly other denominations than the Greek Orthodox, to which the largest majority of the population belonged. These religious groups benefited from the lobby of relevant specialized associations, such as the Keston College in
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London, which monitored the violation of religious freedoms and publicized such cases. Moreover, active neo-Protestant groups in western countries, especially in the United States, often took under their protection members of the same denominations, and whenever needed, crusaded for their release from prison. For instance, the above-mentioned Funderburk actively supported the Baptists in Romania. However, many cases of so-called religious dissent in Romania were also protests in the name of free emigration. In the 1980s, when the economic crisis was devastating, while malaise deep and widespread, religious conversion became an avenue for emigration.49 The Romanian communist regime made its best to counterbalance the influence of these lobbies, which Ceauescu and other communist officials considered dangerous for the external image of the country. Clients of the communist power, such as members of the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church, most notably the Bishop of Transylvania Antonie Plmdeal, but also the Chief Rabbi of Romania Moses Rosen, were repeatedly sent abroad to certify that religious freedom was observed by Ceauescus regime.50 At the same time, the Romanian authorities made some concessions regarding emigration for the sake of the renewal of the MFN clause, as mentioned.51 Besides, secret deals existed with the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel for the emigration of the Germans and of the Jews, respectively, so non-Romanians had better chances to leave the country than the members of the majority.52 Yet, Romania lost its international credibility in the 1980s exactly because of the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities. With regard to the pressure exercised by western governments upon the Romanian communist leadership for the improvement of human rights observance, it is worth stressing again Ceauescus personal view on the issue. A dogmatic leader who only followed the external policy established by his predecessor without
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readapting it to the changing international context, he could never understand why human rights preoccupied representatives of western countries. For him, this issue was related to a few protesters who claimed that human rights were violated and who were far from being representative for Romania. The former American Ambassador to Bucharest Roger Kirk argued that Ceauescu was simply unable to grasp that diplomatic agendas changed since the time of Nixon and Kissinger and act accordingly. His socialization in international politics from the late 1960s and the early 1970s made him believe that diplomatic meetings had to tackle world politics and peace on earth, not the fate of some insignificant dissidents. Moreover, Ceauescu envisaged Romania and himself as intermediaries between the two military blocs. When the issue of human rights observance surfaced in international meetings, it became quickly an extremely irritating matter for him because most protesters belonged until the late 1980s to the Hungarian minority or to religious denominations other than Greek Orthodox. These groups stood against the attempts of the Romanian communist regime at erasing their cultural identities for the sake of homogenizing the nation. Consequently, Ceauescu thought that behind the American interest in the fate of ethnic or religious minorities were Hungarian lobbies which were pressing the US to support a return of Transylvania to Hungary.53Due to his incapacity to understand that western governments attached an increasing importance to the observance of human rights in the partner non-democratic countries, Romania persisted in discriminating minorities and harassing dissidents. As his last presidential secretary Silviu Curticeanu observed, Ceauescu continued to speak about peace at the time when human rights monopolized the international agenda, and thus he turned into the most dogmatic and the least flexible leader in the Soviet bloc after the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev.54
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In fact, the fundamental changes in Soviet internal and external politics after 1985 diminished significantly the importance of a maverick country like Romania. In particular, the United States reacted by gradually modifying their benevolent attitude toward Romania. In September 1985, Secretary of State George Schultz and Vice President George Bush already told Foreign Minister tefan Andrei during an official visit to the United States that Washington was not pleased with the observance of minority rights and religious freedom in Romania.55 It was for the first time that US officials made such a bluntly remark in diplomatic terms during a bilateral meeting with a Romanian delegation. From that moment on, the renewal of the MFN clause turned increasingly problematic. The poor human rights record of the country led to a gradual deterioration of Romanias relations with western countries, while its general dogmatism in domestic policy isolated it from the other communist states. After satellites received encouragement from the Soviet leadership to follow its example and implement internal reforms, Romania turned to be the only country which refused to act accordingly. While the policy of independence from Moscow before Gorbachev represented an asset, the same policy became a liability after. Gradually, Romania lost all its partners, East and West of the Iron Curtain. The increased isolation of the country even inside the Soviet bloc became apparent with the occasion of Gorbachevs visit to Bucharest in May 1987. While the Soviet leader made in his speech repeated references to Romanias disastrous economic situation, Ceauescu did his best to look visibly bored. When the daily party newspaper Scnteia published Gorbachevs speech next day, all such critical references disappeared from the printed version.56 The second and more important turn in the perception of Romanias refusal to reform itself and improve its human rights record occurred in 1987. While internal abuses and violations of fundamental rights seemed to have touched mostly ethnic and
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religious minorities, the Romanian majority largely consented to the communist rule. The event that radically changed this perception was the workers revolt which occurred on 15 November 1987 in Braov. This revolt erupted after a long period of silence, during which only a few isolated individuals showed that the Romanian majority also suffered under Ceauescus regime. Ten years after the miners strike in the Jiu Valley of August 1977, an event of similar amplitude signaled that not only minority groups, but the Romanian majority as well contested the communist rule. It was during this revolt that workers went far beyond the feeble intellectual critical discourses of the period and turned against the secretary general of the party and asked for his resignation, according to eyewitness accounts.57 It was also after this revolt of November 1987 that, given the magnitude of the protest, western politicians and journalists could no longer ignore or downplay the abuses of Ceauescus regime. While the pace of change was accelerating almost everywhere else in the Soviet bloc, the Romanian communist regime dogmatically preserved the classical model of centralized planning and relied increasingly on the use of force to suppress any criticism. The repression of the revolt in Braov, which western journalists managed to cover due to a few Romanian dissidents, illustrated clearly that Ceauescu could not care less about the improvement of human rights in his country. Moreover, this revolt triggered a transnational activity of support inside the Soviet bloc, as well as on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Human rights activists and dissident groups in EastCentral Europe asked for a day of solidarity with the Romanian people, which should have been celebrated across the continent. Charter 77 suggested that all Europeans should turn off heating and electric lighting in their homes on 1 February 1988 as a sign of sympathy with the sufferings imposed by the communist regime on Romanias population. Not only in Paris, London, Rome,
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Bonn, and The Hague, but also in Warsaw, Budapest and Prague peaceful demonstrations and vigils were indeed held on that day in front of Romanian embassies.58 At that time, this was considered as another important step in the process of transnational coordination among opposition movements across the Soviet bloc, which had been initiated with the joint statements issued by dissident groups with the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution in October 1986.59 To sum up, the November 1987 revolt in Braov demonstrated that numerous Romanians contested Ceauescus regime, and thus attracted the sympathy of western politicians and the solidarity of eastern dissidents with those who endured this regime. After this revolt, diplomats and journalists carefully made a difference between the Romanian communist regime and the community of individuals living in this country. It was in this context that Presidents Reagan letter of 1988 cautioned Ceauescu (when he was celebrating his birthday) that the MFN clause would not be renewed that year, unless Romania changed fundamentally its attitude on the issue of human rights. Although admitting that the emigration quotas increased, Reagan urged Ceauescu to improve not only the treatment of religious and ethnic minorities, but also the economic conditions that affected the entire population. As mentioned in the beginning, the Romanian leader considered this letter an attempt at interfering in the internal affairs of his country, and thus replied on 12 February 1988 that Romania willingly renounced to the renewal of the MFN status under the conditions imposed by the JacksonVanik Amendment. Moreover, Ceauescu stressed once again that Romania was an independent country, which rejected any violation of its sovereignty.60 As he told once Nixon, the relations between the two countries were based above all on the principle of noninterference in internal affairs. With his gesture, decades of diplomatic efforts made by himself and other members of the
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Romanian communist elite during the 1960s and 1970s were ruined. This was done, however, in the name of the same principle that animated communist Romania since Gheorghiu-Dejs time: the pursuit of independent-path policies. Aware of the fact that the clause once withdrawn, it would be very difficult to rebuild the relations between the two states, the United States administration pondered for a while before actually taking this step. As this economic incentive did not seem to work as a lever for improving human rights, the special treatment for Romania was terminated eventually. While the workers revolt in Braov showed that not only the religious and ethnic minorities in Romania but also the Romanian Greek Orthodox majority contested the communist regime, other policies promoted by Ceauescu illustrated the arbitrariness of his rule. The most relevant example in this respect was the campaign for stopping the so-called systematization of the territory, which had been practically launched on 1 March 1978, but had touched mostly the urban areas until the 1980s.61 Although the intended outcome of this plan is still a matter of controversy, it is nonetheless clear that the systematization of rural settlements was perceived by the late 1980s as another megalomaniac attempt which aimed at destroying villages. After the urban landscape in many cities had been completely reshaped in accordance with Ceauescus indications, the plan was to alter irremediably the rural landscape by replacing a majority of the villages with so-called agriculturalindustrial centers. The economic situation of the country would have required other priorities, but Ceauescu persisted in carrying out this plan of systematization which allegedly intended to erase differences between rural and urban areas. For this purpose, the existing 13,500 rural settlements should have been reduced to only 6,000. At the same time, 600 new agricultural-industrial centers should have been built from the scratch. In short, had this plan been carried out, less than a half of the villages would have survived.
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At that time, the systematization of Bucharest and other major cities had already illustrated the scale of changes envisaged by this plan. Thus, most Romanians understood that the systematization of villages would also mean large scale demolitions of individual houses and forced removal of their owners into newly-constructed blocks of flats.62 Especially the Hungarian community in Romania, but to a certain extent the German minority as well, believed that they represented the main target of the plan. For they were the largest minority in the country, Hungarians took the systematization of villages for a disguised attempt to erase the material forms of their cultural heritage in Transylvania. Not only dissidents, but also the Hungarian government protested in May 1988 against the demolition of villages, which they characterized as a form of cultural genocide. This issue is analyzed in-depth in a separate chapter, but it is worth mentioning for the sake of the argument that Ceauescus plan of rural systematization opened a vehement dispute between the two neighboring countries.63 The new Hungarian leadership which replaced Jnos Kdr and his cadre took then the opportunity to publicly express what had been hitherto left to the opposition: concern about the condition of the Hungarian minority living in Romania. It is indeed ironic that the systematization of villages (against which the Hungarian leadership in Budapest reacted) was not among the otherwise numerous actions that Ceauescu directed against the members of the Hungarian community in Transylvania. Although it is hard to assess the final outcome of the plan had the communist regime not collapsed, it is clear that it would have affected Romanians and Hungarians alike. Up to the fall of communism, mainly villages around Bucharest were destroyed, while no Hungarian villages suffered the effects of rural systematization. However, this plan stirred a series of diplomatic protests, among which that of the Hungarian government was only the first. At the end of July 1988, the Austrian and the West German foreign ministers,
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Alois Mock and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, respectively, denounced the systematization of villages in Romania as a violation of human rights.64 The absurdity of the plan of rural resettlement provoked not only a wave of internal criticism and a number of protests abroad, but also caused the first western grassroots initiative in support of Romania, Operation Villages Roumains (which was launched in Belgium on 3 February 1989).65 Given this enormous wave of criticism, Romania was no longer perceived as an honorable member of the international community. After expressing reserves with regard to the Final Resolution of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna, which other countries signed on 15 January 1989, Romania turned into an obstacle to the Helsinki process. Once again, Ceauescu neither understood the stake of this framework of international cooperation, nor did he care about the consequences of isolating his country.66 After taking that step, the Romanian communist leadership was increasingly criticized for flagrant violations of human rights. On 21 February 1989, the Political Commission of the European Parliament organized a public audition dedicated to Romania. With that occasion, Romanian migrs were invited to testify on the human rights abuses committed by the communist regime and convince the members of the European Parliament to take measures against Ceauescus regime. The plan of rural systematization represented an important topic in these hearings, aside other decisions such as: the rationalization of basic foodstuffs and other products; the hospitalization in psychiatric clinics of those troublesome for the regime; the policy of forced natality. If you do not listen, if you do not support the Romanians, then we will be guilty of not helping an endangered people, one testimonies of Ceauescus abuses stated.67 Consequently, the European Parliament adopted on 16 March 1989 a resolution which condemned the suppression of basic human rights in
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Romania. There were specific mentions to: (1) the plan of rural resettlement; (2) the repression of minorities; (3) the demographic policy; and (4) the psychiatric abuses. In addition, the European Economic Community froze its talks on a new trade agreement with Romania, currently under way. A few days earlier, on 9 March 1989, the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva had adopted another resolution calling for the monitoring of the human rights violations in Romania, which was at the time the first such inquiry ordered anywhere in the last five years. The plan of demolishing villages and the situation of minority groups were singled out again as the most serious abuses of Ceauescus regime. The last time when a communist country was nominated for such an inquiry was occasioned by the introduction of the Martial Law in Poland. The novelty of this resolution regarding Romania consisted in the fact that it was for the first time ever when another WTO country, i.e. Hungary, voted against an alleged ally.68 This growing international criticism coincided with a visible multiplication of dissident actions inside Romania. Until then, Romania lagged far behind other Soviet bloc countries in this respect. Thus far, Romania also differed from these countries because western governments, and especially the United States administration, were interested in supporting the Stalinist but antiSoviet regime of Nicolae Ceauescu rather than its few domestic critics. This special treatment of the Romanian communist elite lasted in spite of the poor human rights record due to diplomatic inertia and lack of knowledge. While dissidents who could have been able to draw attention upon the cases of human rights violations were few, they could not trigger a change in the perception of Ceauescus regime and thus western countries continued to take it as an acceptable partner. As a consequence, the high international prestige which Romania and its president enjoyed since the late 1960s due to his anti-Sovietism declined
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only slowly. It deteriorated rapidly only after the coming to power of Gorbachev and the intensification of domestic protests. The former rendered as useless Ceauescus non-aligned policies in the Soviet bloc. The latter illustrated that a difference should be made between the communist elite and the rest of the population. After the poor record of human rights observance became too obvious to be overlooked, the secretary general of the RCP preferred to isolate Romania completely than to comply with international norms. The Revolution of 1989 not only removed Ceauescu from power, but also imposed active forgetting upon him. Romanians redeemed themselves after the revolution, albeit shortly, only due to the courage of a few individuals who stood against a brutal dictatorship determined to crush any popular revolt.
Notes
1
In a hearing before the US Congress Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe of May 1977, J. F. Brown pointed out that there were two levels at which the Basket III of the Helsinki Accords should work: state and societal. It was not the former, but the latter that was crucial in inducing change in the communist-dominated EastCentral Europe. He also outlined six criteria for measuring the performances of the communist states in observing human and civil rights. These criteria included: openness to internal societal pressures, such as dissident demands; liberalization of emigration; relaxation of censorship; improvement of ethnic minorities treatment; free allowance of western travellers into the respective country, and an increase in the cultural exchanges with western countries. J. F. Brown, A Framework for Helsinki Watchers, in Vojtech Mastny, ed., Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security: Analysis and Documentation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 106-14. To this day, the most perceptive insight on Romania policy of independence from the Soviet Union is Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania, 19441965 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). An excellent analysis of Romanias anti-Soviet Stalinism is Pavel Cmpeanu,
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Ceauescu, anii numrtorii inverse (Ceauescu, the countdown years) (Iai: Polirom, 2002). In the literature on post-Stalinist East-Central Europe, the concept of national communism defined the divergent paths followed by each of the satellite countries after Khrushchev launched the policy of deStalinization. National communism materialized in one or in both forms of manifestation: some degree of independence from the Soviet control (in one or more of the five possible areas, i.e. diplomatic, political, military, economic or ideological), or some degree of internal reform. H. Gordon Skilling, Communism National and International: Eastern Europe After Stalin (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 17. The classic model for analyzing a totalitarian society included six areas: (1) an elaborated guiding ideology; (2) a single mass party controlled by a dictator; (3) a system of randomly applied terror; (4) a monopoly on the circulation of information; (5) monopoly on physical violence; and (6) a monopoly on the economy, manifested by central state planning in communist societies. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956). Various factors measured the heterogeneity of the Soviet satellites, such as: (1) the change of leadership; (2) the adoption of collective leadership; (3) the abandonment of the cult of personality; (4) the lessening of terror; (5) the degree of intellectual freedom; and (6) the ideological or economic reforms. Skilling, Communism National and International, 35. According to Corneliu Mnescu, the following episode took place in October 1962, while the Sino-Soviet conflict was evolving into the direction of a split. A Romanian official delegation headed by Gheorghiu-Dej was supposed to visit the Soviet Union on its way back from Indonesia, India and Burma. Although informed that the Chinese authorities had interdicted flights over the Chinese territory, the Soviets did not warn the Romanian delegation. This incident left GheorghiuDej frightened and stupefied, and made him think that Khrushchev would have wanted the Romanian official airplane shut down in order to demonstrate that the Chinese communist leadership was capable of breaking any international rules. Khrushchev would have needed my corpse to show to the world that he was right in his dispute with Mao, Gheorghiu-Dej would have said when back to Romania. At the same time, the Soviet leadership claimed to the Romanian delegation that
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the United States had unjustifiably accused them of having installed missiles in Cuba, which they fiercely denied to have done it even in front of leaders from a fraternal country. This meeting made Gheorghiu-Dej fear that Khrushchev would drag Romania into a nuclear war with the United States without any warning. As Corneliu Mnescu confessed, Gheorghiu-Dej sent thus an official letter to the US secretary of state Dean Rusk to inform him that the Romanian leadership was not aware of the Soviet actions in Cuba and that no nuclear weapons existed on Romanian territory. Lavinia Betea, ed., Convorbiri neterminate: Corneliu Mnescu n dialog cu Lavinia Betea (Unfinished conversations: Corneliu Mnescu in dialogue with Lavinia Betea) (Iai: Polirom, 2001), 106-9. As American sources revealed, the Romanian initiative was considered at the time a major breakthrough in the relations between the two countries. During the meeting between Mnescu and Dean Rusk, the former made the position of Romanian communists clear and took thus the latter by surprise. Moreover, the Romanian foreign minister agreed with the request of the American secretary of state to verify whether any nuclear arms existed in his country. This information has been disclosed by Raymond L. Garthoff at the CWIHP Conference on New Evidence on Cold War History, Moscow, January 1993; http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/CWIHP/ BULLETINS/b5a12.htm (accessed 26 April 2002). See also Raymond L. Garthoff, A Journey Through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 149-50. During a meeting of the COMECON Executive Committee on 15 February 1963, the head of the Romanian delegation Alexandru Brldeanu stated that Romania would continue its collaboration in this economic structure on bilateral or multilateral bases, but only to the extent this collaboration did not imply a modification of its own program of development. More on the Soviet-Romanian dispute see in Ghi Ionescu, Communism in Rumania: 1944-1962 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1964). For a contemporary western account on Romanias increasingly opposing stance to the Soviet initiative of co-ordinating the centrally planned economies of the Soviet bloc countries via the COMECON, see David Floyd, Rumania: Russias Dissident Ally (New York: Praeger, 1965). In an article of 1960, Skilling had ranked Poland as a semi-dependent state in the Soviet bloc, as compared to the fully-independent Albania and Yugoslavia, and to those which he considered for various reasons
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dependent states, subject of a high degree of Soviet control and influence, i.e. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Romania. Skilling, Communism National and International, 23-25. In 1964, Skilling placed Romania aside Poland in the category of semidependent states because he took into consideration that this country had in the meantime increasingly manifested its autonomy in the bloc. Ibid., 155. This was an implicit reference to the plans drafted by the Soviet scholar E. B. Valev, an authority on Bulgaria and the Lower Danube. In an article published in a bimonthly journal of the University of Moscow, he argued that an interstate production complex should be created in the Lower Danube sector in order to exploit better the economic potential of the area, which included parts of Bulgaria, Romania and the Soviet Union, and amounted to 150,000 square kilometres and 12 million inhabitants. The Romanian reply was authored by economist Costin Murgescu, head of the Section for the History of National Economy of the Institute for Economic Research since 1956, and editor-in-chief of the scientific journal Viaa Economic (Economic Life) since 1958. It was this journal that published Murgescus article together with Valevs article in Romanian translation. Besides economic arguments against the establishment of such supranational unit, Murgescu revealed in his article what really bothered the Romanian leadership: the idea to detach a part of the country amounting to two thirds of its surface and three quarters of the population, and then attach it to another territorial unit under the pretext of greater economic benefits. After half the territory of Romania has been earmarked for the Lower Danube complex ... into what other complexes would other parts of the country be drawn? If the Valev plan had been carried out, this would have violated Romanias territorial integrity and dismembered its unity as a nation and as a state. One could observe that the obsession for national unity, so manifestly expressed under late Ceauescuism, was already present in this article. For comments on the Valev-Murgescu debate, see also Floyd, Rumania: Russias Dissident Ally, 104-7. This statement only reflected the efforts already made by Romania since the late 1950s, when it engaged in a consistent effort to establish economic contacts with western countries, including the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Austria, and Japan. For more on this, see Gheorghe Gaston Marin, n serviciul Romniei lui Gheorghiu-Dej: nsemnri din via (Serving Gheorghiu-Dejs Romania: Notes from
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my life) (Bucharest: Evenimentul Romnesc, 2000). Floyd noted that in November 1964, Gheorghe Gaston Marin, head of the State Planning Committee at the time, had told the American publisher William Randolph Hearst, Jr. that Romania would even welcome western investment in its industry. Floyd, Rumania: Russias Dissident Ally, 132. Declaraie cu privire la politica PMR n problemele micrii comuniste i muncitoreti internaionale (Statement regarding the policy of the RWP on the problems of world communist and workrs movement), Scnteia, 26 April 1964, reprint (Bucharest: Editura Politic, 1964), quotation from page 55, http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/istoria_comunism/ documente_ PMR_PCR/documente_programatice/Declaratia%20PMR%20din%20a prilie%201964%20OPTIM.pdf (accessed 15 December 2012). For an English version, see Robert V. Daniels, ed., A Documentary History of Communism and the World: From Revolution to Collapse (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1994), 216-19. For documents from the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Secretariat of the RCP, which reflect Romanias international relations since the emergence of the peaceful coexistence and until the invasion in the former Czechoslovakia, see Mihai Retegan, ed., 1968 Din primavar pn n toamn: Schi de politic extern romneasc (1968 From spring until autumn: An outline of Romanian foreign policy) (Bucharest: RAO, 1998). For the personal account of the Romanian foreign minister during the 1968 crisis, see Betea, ed., Mnescu, 177-208. The episode in August 1968 did not pass unnoticed in western countries. Ceauescus balcony speech of 21 August was reproduced aside other relevant documents regarding the Prague Spring and the reactions to it. See for instance, Robin A. Remington, Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969). Ceauescu condemned the Soviet-led invasion in Czechoslovakia because his preoccupation for preserving Romanias autonomy was far more important than the concern about the possible spread of the reforms that endangered the construction of communism (which had driven the others into invading Czechoslovakia). In this respect, the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee in the morning of 21 August 1968 is extremely relevant. In contrast, Ceauescu asked for an intervention of the WTO troops in Poland in 1989, when he realized that the communist system was in danger in
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that country. Mihnea Berindei, La Position Singulire de la Roumanie en 1968: Ceauescu et le Printemps de Prague, Revue Roumaine DHistoire, No. 1-4 (January-December 1999), 183-98. This fragment is taken from the declaration of the Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania, which was adopted in an extraordinary session on 22 August 1968. Principiile de baz ale politicii externe ale Romniei (The guiding principles of Romanias external policy), Scnteia, 23 August 1968, reprint (Bucharest: Editura Politic, 1968), quotation at page 30, http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/ istoria_comunism/documente_PMR_PCR/documente_programatice/ 1968%20Principiile%20de%20politica%20externa.pdf (accessed 15 December 2012). In fact, in the political culture of Romanian communism, the fear that the Soviet Union might interfere at any moment and replace the leading team played a crucial role since the time of the so-called factionalist struggles of the late 1920s. This fear increased after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, when Ceauescu actively participated in preventing the spread of the revolt in Romania. Then, although fearful that a revolution might throw them out, the Romanian communists learned another lesson: that in the case they were unable to maintain order, the Soviet troops might come and replace them with a more capable team. The Declaration of April 1964 explicitly mentioned the non-intervention for the purpose of changing the leadership of another party as one of the principles that should have been respected in the relations among the communist parties. For more on this enduring characteristic of the political culture of the Romanian communist elite, which survived even after the RCP asserted its independence from the Soviet Union, see Chapter 4. Drawing from the experience of August 1968, Nicolae Ceauescu, who held the position of supreme commander of the Romanian army, decided to establish paramilitary guards formed by civilians in order to prepare the entire population for the event of an invasion. Moreover, there was a visible increase in the production of military equipment. Armata romn n revoluia din decembrie 1989 (The Romanian army in the revolution of December 1989 ) (Bucharest: Editura Militar, 1998), 36. A former general of the Romanian army claimed that the rationale behind the defense of the country radically changed since 1968, for the most likely invading enemy became the WTO. Thus, the Romanian army was prepared ever since against an attack from all neighbouring countries, although these were theoretically its military
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allies. Tiberiu Urdreanu, 1989 Martor i participant (1989 Witness and participant) (Bucharest: Editura Militar, 1996), 61. For Nixons visit to Romania, see Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 155-58. Nixons first visit to Romania occurred in 1967, while his political career seemed to decline. He had lost not only the presidential elections of 1960, but also the position of governor in his native state California in 1964. It must be also noticed that Nixons visit came only second after that of the French president Charles de Gaulle, which took place in May 1968. Both presidents were received with great enthusiasm by the population of Bucharest, while many people came spontaneously to see them aside Ceauescu. For de Gaulles visit in Romania, see Sanda Stolojan, Cu de Gaulle n Romnia (With de Gaulle in Romania) (Bucharest: Albatros, 1994). It is interesting to note that the US withdrew the MFN status for Poland in 1982, after the imposition of Martial Law. In fact, the Soviet type of industrialization and, after this model, some of those in the more backward satellite countries, such as Romania, were based on an already obsolete model in the West. At the beginning of the century, Lenin and Stalin laid down their concept of industrialization at the time when western industries were in the last stage of the third industrial age, which was based on heavy industry. When this model was applied (in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and in the satellite countries after 1945), western industries had already entered in the forth age, that of automobiles and petrochemicals. While western industries moved from one age to another, the Soviet Union and its satellites did nothing but perfected an already old-fashioned model. In Daniel Chirots words, by the 1970s, the USSR had the worlds most advanced late nineteenth century economy. Daniel Chirot, What Happened in Eastern Europe in 1989?, in Idem, ed., The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of the Left: The Revolutions of 1989 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991), 3-32. Evaluating the role of western countries in general and of the United States in particular, Henry Kissinger pointed out that perceptions of these provisions changed in time: I for one was initially skeptical about the possibilities of Basket III. We did not expect the Soviet empire to collapse so quickly. ... We had supported Basket III on human rights to promote some amelioration of communist rule as well as to establish international criteria to inhibit Soviet suppression of
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revolts. ... We can rest on what was achieved without taking credit away from great men like Havel, Wasa, and their contemporaries who transformed a diplomatic enterprise into a triumph of the human spirit. Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999), 663. The western view on the Helsinki Accords was far more heterogeneous. On the one hand, the perspective of Western Europe on dtente and consequently on the CSCE agenda varied widely. France had started under Charles de Gaulle its own European dtente, which had a clearly anti-American dimension. Great Britain invested much less effort in dtente, but wanted to maintain the coherence of the western alliance, in particular to maintain the involvement of the United States in Europe. The country that was the most interested in dtente was the Federal Republic of Germany, which came with its own concept of Ostpolitik, which the Social Democratic Party during the Willy Brandts leadership promoted, and the Christian Democratic Union under Helmut Kohl continued in spite of the initial criticism towards an initiative of their political opponents. Ostpolitik was based on the idea that claims over the reunification of Germany should be left aside, for a greater cooperation between the two ideologically antagonistic German states would actually preserve the unity of the nation. In short, Ostpolitik aimed at change through rapprochement (Wandlung durch Annherung), which in the long run proved indeed successful. Willy Brandt, People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975 (London: HarperCollins, 1978). Mastny, ed., Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, 4. As national security advisor from January 1969 and secretary of state from September 1973 to January 1977, Kissinger reshaped American diplomacy via his so-called doctrine of linkage. Kissinger regarded the so called triangular relations between the USA, on the one hand, and the USSR and China, on the other, as a complex system of connections, which involved political, military, and economic relations. If the Soviets had acted inappropriately in one area, they should have been punished in another area and vice versa. This doctrine aimed at speculating the Sino-Soviet rivalry in order to limit the export of communist revolutions in the Third World countries. It envisaged concessions such as economic facilities, export of technology, or reductions in the nuclear arms race. However, it did not connect the foreign and domestic arenas. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), esp. 703-32.

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Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 660-62. Moreover, Romania argued for an international agreement on the reduction of military budgets and an interdiction on the stationing of military troops on the territory of another state. Mastny, ed., Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, 233. Andrei Sakharov, Memoirs (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 157-58. Delivered on 20 January 1977, Carters inaugural speech emphasized that human rights would constitute the moral foundation of American policy. In January 1977, the US president condemned the communist leadership of Czechoslovakia for the mistreatment of the signatories of Charter 77, and stated clearly that such action represented a violation the Helsinki Accords. Carter also put the issue of human rights on the agenda of the UN General Assembly of 17 March 1977, and emphasized that no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business. Vratislav Pechota, East European Dissent, the United States, and the Soviet Union, in Curry, ed., Dissent in Eastern Europe, 197-205. In spite of his commitment to the issue of human rights, Carter paid much more attention to the Middle East than to East-Central Europe. S. R. Ashton, In Search of Dtente: The Politics of East-West Relations Since 1945 (London: Macmillan, 1989), 143-45. This policy had a limited impact, for its principles were secret, so the countries of East-Central Europe could not really understand the logic behind the United States conduct toward them. Moreover, the policy of differentiation did not work as an economic lever either, since Western Europe did not apply any such policy of differentiation in resuming economic contacts with countries from East-Central Europe. In fact, western European countries did much more for the normalization of relations throughout the entire continent, and even for the gradual economic unification in a period when the ideological divide still remained in place. Thus, European dtente flourished during the 1980s, while the superpower dtente collapsed after the invasion in Afghanistan. Garthoff, A Journey Through the Cold War, 288. See Chapter 2 for a detailed account of this movement, including western coverage. In his report of 1977, J. F. Brown noted that Ceauescus leadership is totally out of sympathy with societal provisions of Helsinki but very
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concerned about his image in the West not just for economic reasons: Romanias policy of independence from Soviet Union necessitates Western support. Thus, he considered that Ceauescu would be willing to make further concession with regard to human rights. J. F. Brown, A Framework for Helsinki Watchers: Statement by Director of Radio Free Europe, Hearings before the Commissions on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Ninety-fifth Congress, 9 May 1977, in Mastny, ed., Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, 106-14. Mark Almond denounced the smug foolishness of western politicians (in particular British) who continued to praise Ceauescu for his prowestern attitudes. He referred, for instance, to Lord Callaghan, foreign secretary in 1975, who remembered Ceauescu even after 1989 as the rogue elephant in the Warsaw Pact who had sided with western countries during the negotiations of the Helsinki Accords and acted as a go-between the two camps. Mark Almond, The Rise and Fall of Nicolae and Elena Ceauescu (London: Chapman, 1992), 110. Almond made certainly a point when argued that western politicians often failed to grasp politics in East-Central Europe, but he embraced the thesis of the Securitate general Pacepa, who claimed that Ceauescu consciously fooled western politicians and made them take for granted his independence from the Soviet Union, while he continued to be Moscows faithful ally. Such a thesis is though questionable, in the opinion of this author. Ceauescu rather pursued unchangeably all his life the external policy toward the Soviet Union which GheorghiuDej had already traced, practically returning to a pre-communist feature of the Romanian political culture: anti-Russianism. George Urban confessed that he never considered the Helsinki Accords a useful tool in international relations, but he was nevertheless conscious that RFE (unlike VOA) should not represent the official views of the United States. Thus, he managed to avoid complying with such requests of downplaying criticism for human rights abuses. He also noted that, as director, he preserved the status of RFE as an agency which represented the conscience of all democratic nations as well as the interests of the Eastern European nations, in spite of the American financial support. Urban, Radio Free Europe, 114-15. Mastny, ed., Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, 111-12. It is interesting to note that Romania abolished censorship officially in the aftermath of the Helsinki Final Act. The Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP held on 28-29 June 1977 discussed the formal
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abrogation of censorship and its simultaneous re-institutionalization under a different form: each relevant institution, i.e. newspaper, radio and television agency, publishing house, film or theatre company, became responsible for all that came out to the public. Thus, censorship became even more severe and those in charge practically negotiated with the authors the content of their work almost word by word or image by image, while the authors themselves practiced self-censorship in order to increase their chances to pass their works for publication or broadcasting. According to Decree 472/24 December 1977, the socalled Committee for Press and Printing, which was the central office in charge of censorship, was abolished. Buletinul Oficial, No. 138, 26 December 1977, http://www.monitoruljuridic.ro/act/decret-nr-472din-24-decembrie-1977-cu-privire-la-incetarea-activitatii-comitetuluipentru-presa-si-tiparituri-emitent-consiliul-de-stat-23981.html (accessed 10 January 2013). At the same time, other decrees modified the functioning of the news agency (Decree 471/1977) and of the radio and television agency (Decree 474/1977) in such a way as to make these institutions the guardians of ideological correctness. Buletinul Oficial, No. 138, 26 December 1977, http://www.monitoruljuridic.ro/ monitorul-oficial/138/1977-12-26/ (accessed 10 January 2013). As shown above, the United States treated Romania as a favourite among the countries of the Soviet bloc beginning with the Nixon administration. This was partially the result of the personal relations established between the American president and the secretary general of the party during Nixons first visit to Romania in 1967. Senator Henry Jackson of Washington and Charles Vanik of Ohio introduced this amendment in the Trade Act of 1974 in the hope that non-democratic countries, which did not respect human rights and did not allow free emigration, would be constraint to higher emigration quotas for the sake of advantageous trade relations with the United States. For critical comments on the actual effect of this amendment, see Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 1252-53. Barack Obama repelled this amendment in December 2012. In this respect, the development of the conflict on the renewal of the MFN clause is indeed telling. In June 1982, President Reagan recommended the renewal of the MFN status for Romania, but changed the message to Bucharest, for he expressed his concerns regarding the difficulties of the emigration procedures, although
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recognized the progress made in increasing the emigration quotas. He warned for the first time that, unless progress would be made, the renewal would be in serious jeopardy next year. Reagan mentioned, however, that the spirit of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment was better respected when the clause was renewed each year, for this maintained a tool of leverage in the relations with Romania. His warning had a limited impact on Romania though. Instead of complying with these recommendations, the Romanian leadership made emigration even harder. Decree 402/1982 required all potential emigrants to pay their debts to the state and the university graduates to pay for their higher education. Buletinul Oficial, No. 95, 1 November 1982, http://legestart.ro/Decretul-402-1982-obligatiile-persoanelor-cer-lise-aproba-se-stabileasca-definitiv-strainatate-plati-integral-datoriile-pele-au-fata-stat-organizatii-socialiste-perso-(ODEyNzU-).htm (accessed 18 January 2013). Nevertheless, the MFN clause was renewed again in 1983 on the basis of Ceauescus personal assurance that he would not apply this policy. Lynne A. Davidson, Tools of Human Rights Diplomacy for East Bloc Countries, in Mastny, ed., Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security, 138-43. Pacepa, who claimed that Ceauescu acted as a mole of the Soviet Union, also suggested that the Romanian president attached to the MFN clause a purely commercial value. Ion Mihai Pacepa, Red Horizons: Chronicles of a Communist Spy Chief (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1987), 308. On the contrary, Roger Kirk and Mircea Rceanu, both diplomats and keen observers of the mutual relations between their countries, noted that Ceauescu attached a symbolic value to the MFN clause, for he believed that this special treatment represented a sort of recognition that special relations existed between Washington and Bucharest. Roger Kirk and Mircea Rceanu, Romania versus the United States: Diplomacy of the Absurd, 1985-1989 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1994), translated into Romanian as Idem, Romnia mpotriva Statelor Unite: Diplomaia absurdului, 1985-1989 (Bucharest: Silex, 1995), 19. The most notable cases were perhaps those of father Gheorghe CalciuDumitreasa, imprisoned since 1979 for his anti-regime sermons, and poet Dorin Tudoran, unemployed since 1982 for his dissident public stances. Both were allowed to emigrate in 1985 for the sake of renewing the MFN clause. As late as January 1985, Thomas Simons a member of the State Department staff at that time, who later became deputy assistant of the secretary of state confessed to General Ilie Ceauescu, brother of
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the secretary general of the RCP, that it was terribly good to be among friends, and reassured the Romanian officials that the United States wanted to preserve the hitherto good relations with Romania. David B. Funderburk, former U.S. ambassador to Romania, argued that the policy once envisaged by Nixon and Kissinger turned into routine because of the high degree of continuity among the personnel in the State Department. Unlike his predecessors, Funderburk was not a career diplomat but a political appointee and therefore an outside observer. He pointed out that diplomats in Bucharest were preoccupied more with their careers than with reassessing the situation in Romania, and thus they echoed the existing view in Washington instead of proposing changes on the basis of fresh observation on the situation in Romania. As a political ambassador and an outsider in diplomacy, Funderburk afforded to disagree with his superiors in the State Department, but the assets that allowed his independent thinking also limited his influence in Washington. Besides, his religious conservatism repelled democrats and even some republicans. David B. Funderburk, Pinstripes and Reds: An American Ambassador Caught between the State Department and Romanian Communists, 1981-1985 (Washigton, D.C.: Selous Foundation Press, 1987), translated into Romanian as Idem, Un amabsador american ntre Departamentul de Stat i Clanul Ceauescu (Munich: Jon Dumitru Verlag, 1989), esp. 30-45. Moreover, Gati considered that the respect for human rights alone should not supersede any other American interests in East-Central Europe. Thus, he endorsed a policy of differentiation, proposing that the MFN clause be awarded to the communist regimes that showed either internal liberalization, like Hungary, or some independence in terms of external policy, like Romania, but not necessarily both. Gati approved the fact that the Reagan administration continued to apply this policy, in spite of pressures from the conservatives who did not see any rationale in the principle of differentiation, for they perceived the similarities among communist countries as more important than any difference. Charles Gati, Hungary in the Soviet Bloc (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), esp. chapter entitled The United States and Eastern Europe: In Defense of Differentiation, 217-32. Many of the letters received by the French Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Romania, which was established in Paris by Romanian migrs together with French citizens, drew the attention on cases of denied emigration. Mihnea Berindei, interview by author, tape recording, Paris, 24 July 2002.
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It is interesting to note that in Chicago, where the largest Romanian community in the United States lived, there were only two Romanian Orthodox Churches, but four Baptist. The proportion becomes even more telling when one takes into consideration that Christian Orthodox believers made up 85% of Romanias population. After the US House of Representatives suspended in May 1987 Romanias MFN clause for six months because of the poor human rights record, a delegation of Romanian religious leaders who represented seven different denominations made a trip to the United States. In the hope that President Reagan would recommend nevertheless the renewal, the Romanian mission to the United Nations organized a press conference on 4 May, when the chief rabbi and the Orthodox bishop of Transylvania competed each other in praising Ceauescus regime for the liberty it allowed to religious practice. The latter emphasized that the relations between the Orthodox Church, which represented the Romanian majority, and the communist state were good. He also characterized Romania as a modern state which respected the freedom of religion, and thus let individuals made their choice. The former pointed out that a large number of Jews, which amounted to 380,000, were allowed to leave Romania since the end of the Second World War, and underlined that the Jewish cultural life under communism was better than ever in that country. Their campaign contributed to the decision of President Reagan on 3 June 1987 to recommend the renewal of the MFN clause for Romania, in spite of increased criticism related to human rights abuses. See various wire telegrams in OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 9, File Human Rights/General 1987. Ceauescu, who had the last word in the approval of emigration lists, was very reluctant to allow people to leave the country, and thus always sanctioned only a small part of the list presented to him. He acted like this not only because he considered these persons as traitors who would start criticize Romania once abroad, but also because he did not want to look like making concessions to the Americans for the renewal of the MFN clause. Mircea Rceanu remembered that one of his friends succeeded to emigrate only because he put him in a front position on the list. Rceanu, Infern 89: Povestea unui condamnat la moarte (Inferno 1989: The story of a prisoner sentenced to death) (Bucharest: Silex, 2000). Pacepa claimed that Ceauescu considered the Jews and the Germans the best Romanian export products besides oil. Pacepa, Red Horizons, 72-77. For the trade of the Jews by Ceauescus regime, see
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Radu Ioanid, The Ransom of the Jews: The Story of the Extraordinary Secret Bargain Between Romania and Israel (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2005). Documents from the archives of the Securitate about the selling of the Romanian Germans to the Federal Republic are published in Florica Dobre et al., Aciunea Recuperarea: Securitatea i emigrarea germanilor din Romnia, 1962-1989 (The action Recuperation: The Securitate and the emigration of the Germans from Romania, 1962-1989) (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedic, 2011). An interesting personal account on the diplomacy of buying the ethnic kin from Romania, which a late ambassador of Bonn to Bucharest between 1972-1976 authored, is Erwin Wickert, Die glcklichen Augen (Stuttgart: Deutche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001). Regarding the mutual misperceptions in the American-Romanian relations in the late 1980s, see Kirk and Rceanu, Romania versus the United States, esp. the epilogue, 305-24. Silviu Curticeanu, Mrturia unei istorii trite: Imagini suprapuse (Testimony of a lived history: Overlapping images) (Bucharest: Albatros, 2000). Kirk and Rceanu, Romania versus the United States, 37-40. Mark Almond, who was visiting Romania exactly at that time, made the comparison between Gorbachevs speech and its printed version. Almond, The Rise and Fall of Nicolae and Elena Ceauescu, 214. For information on the revolt, collected immediately after the event from eyewitness accounts, see OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 1, File Braov 15 Nov. 1987/Events 17-23 Nov. For more on this revolt and the reactions to it, see Chapters 4 and 5. Leaders of Solidarity, such as Zbigniew Bujak, Zbigniew Janas and Jan Litynski, demonstrated with banners which declared Solidarity with Braov and demanded Human Rights for Romanian Citizens. Fifty prominent members of the Polish opposition, such as Jacek Kuron, Wadysaw Frasyniuk and Leszek Moczulski, presented a message of protest to the Romanian embassy in Warsaw. In Prague, 60 leaders of Charter 77, among whom Vclav Havel, Anna abatov, Ladislav Lis, Martin Palou, Jir Voka, held a twenty-four-hour strike as a token of solidarity with the Romanian people. In Budapest, the vigil in front of the Romanian embassy was attended by 500 people. In his speech, Gspr Mikls Tams called for compassion and solidarity with the Romanian people, not only ethnic Hungarians, but the whole Romanian people. On 1 February 1988, vigils outside the Romanian embassies or ambassadors residences in London, Paris,
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Bonn, Rome and The Hague were also organized. Vladimir Socor, Independent Groups in Eastern Europe Urge for Support for People in Romania, Romanian Background Report, 25 February 1988, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 19, File Revolts/General 1988. Until the late 1980s, this transnational cooperation worked mostly between Poles and Czechs, but after the winds of change started to blow from Moscow, dissident groups tried to improve the across-theborder coordination in the hope of pressing more effectively all communist governments to speed up reforms. It is worth mentioning the Romanians who participated in the first such transnationally coordinated solidarity among dissidents in East-Central Europe. In October 1986, three representatives of the underground National Peasant Party, Corneliu Coposu, Nicolae Carandino and Ion Puiu, expressed their admiration for the Hungarians, who so valiantly fought for their freedom thirty years ago. Their message was announced on 22 October 1986 at a press conference which was organized by Ion Raiu, at that time a Romanian exile in London, and formerly a member of this party. Raiu had left the country in the first wave of emigration in the aftermath of the war, and thus avoided the imprisonment which the other three had to endure for 15 to 17 years. Vladimir Socor, Three Romanians Reported to Have Endorsed Joint Dissident Statement, Romanian Situation Report, 6 November 1986, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 18, File Opposition 1987. Raiu established in 1986 The World Union of the Free Romanians, which aimed at uniting all members of the Romanian emigration in western countries, and at helping dissidents at home. He returned in Romania after the Revolution of 1989 and unsuccessfully run for presidency in the first election of 1990. For his memoirs from the post-communist period, see Ion Raiu, n fine, acas: Note zilnice, decembrie 1989 - decembrie 1990 (Home, at last: Daily notes, December 1989 - December 1990) (Bucharest: Univers, 1999). It is worth stressing the difference between this letter of January 1988 and that of June 1986. The latter also urged Ceauescu to respect the obligations he assumed with regard to human rights, but the only observation referred to the treatment of religious minorities. For the text of Reagans two letters and Ceauescus answer, see Kirk and Rceanu, Romania versus the United States, 331-32 and 339. Law 59/1974 regarding the systematization of the urban and rural areas was adopted by the Grand National Assembly during the session
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of 29-30 October 1974. Buletinul Oficial, No. 138, 5 November 1974, http://www.legex.ro/Legea-59-1974-566.aspx (accessed 19 January 2013). After the earthquake of 1977, this law allowed the demolition of large parts of cities, including buildings of historical interest. On 1 March 1978, the State Council adopted a decree for the functioning of the Central Party and State Commission for the systematization of the rural and urban areas, which created the legal frame for the application of the plan which envisaged the complete restructuring of human settlements in accordance with Ceauescus indications. A testimony on the destruction of historical monuments under Ceauescu is Dinu C. Giurescu, The Razing of Romanias Past (Washington, D.C.: National Trust for Historic Preservation, 1989). For critical commentaries by RFE, see OSA/ RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/1/ Box 3803, File Villages, Systematization, Destruction. In fact, it seems that this drastic reduction in the number of villages was to be achieved not only by demolishing them, but also by uniting some of them in the same administrative unity. For more on the evolution of the Romanian-Hungarian debate over the situation of the Hungarians living in Romania since the communist takeover, see Chapter 3. The declaration of Hans-Dietrich Genscher was published in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 July 1988. The Romanian government was nonetheless able to counterattack his criticism. As neither German nor Hungarian villages were destroyed, the Romanian authorities were able to show German journalists who came to Romania to cover the systematization of villages that nothing changed in the Banat, the region where most ethnic Germans still lived. For more on this initiative, see Chapter 5. Since Romanias reservations were related to the provisions regarding the rights of minorities, the debates at this conference with the Hungarian delegates are analyzed in Chapter 3. Among those who testified were: Marie-France Ionesco, playwright Eugne Ionescos daughter, in the name of her father; Ariadna Combes, dissident Doina Corneas daughter, representing her mother who had been invited, but was not allowed by the communist regime to travel outside Romania; Dan Alexe, at the time a recent refugee in Belgium and a close friend of dissident Dan Petrescu (who was also invited to attend but was not permitted to leave Romania); Ion Vianu, the psychiatrist who took refuge in Switzerland after supporting the human rights movement of 1977, which Paul Goma initiated; and
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Mark Almond, a young historian from Oxford, who visited Romania prior to the hearing. Alain Debove, Roumanie: Les droits de lhomme devant le Parlement europen, Le Monde, 23 February 1989. It is interesting to observe that the testimony of Eugne Ionesco, which his daughter read in front of the European Parliament, was refuted by several socialist deputies on the ground that neither him nor her had been in Romania recently. By contrast, Dan Alexes testimony could not be discarded, for he had emigrated in May 1988, only several months before the hearing. Dan Alexe, interview by author, tape recording, Brussels, 20 July 2002. The vote was passed with 21 to 7. Aside Hungary, against Romania voted France, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Sweden, Portugal, and Australia. Romania tried in vain to prevent this vote by accusing Hungary of being animated by irredentist goals. Equally unsuccessful was the attempt of the Romanian delegation to find backing among the Third World countries, which had the majority in the UN panel. In addition, the Romanian expert commissioned to write a report on the human rights abuses in his country, Dumitru Mazilu, was not allowed to travel back to present his report, in spite of repeated appeals from the UN Secretary General Javier Prez de Cullar. Dan Ionescu, Romanias Growing International Isolation, Romanian Situation Report, 29 March 1989, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 5, File Dissent/General 1989.
CHAPTER 2
Human Rights in Romanian Understanding*

A saying of the 1980s epitomized best the condition of civil society under Ceauescus regime: Romanian dissent lives in Paris, and its name is Paul Goma.1 The presumptive authors of this phrase were members of the Romanian emigration who became embittered because the contestation of the communist system in their native country became too feeble to allow any competition with the other countries of the Soviet bloc.2 This unavoidable comparison with developments in fraternal countries (which experienced slightly different communist dictatorships but responded to their non-democratic rule in a visibly different manner) gave birth to the key question: What was wrong with these Romanians who kept consenting to Ceauescus regime? This question became more and more puzzling during the 1980s, for the contestation of the regime became decreasingly manifest, while the failure of the party-state to support the communist-style welfare system became increasingly obvious. In the last two years before the collapse of communism, a growing number of dissidents expressed themselves publicly against Ceauescus policies, but no
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collective protest grew larger than a few tens. The short-lived movement initiated by writer Paul Goma in 1977 has thus remained the reference moment of Romanian dissent under communism, as the saying above illustrates. This collective protest against the violation of human rights in Romania, which came to be known as the Goma movement, deserves a central place in the national narrative on the recent past also because at the time of its emergence it seemed comparable to its role model, Charter 77. Both collective protests had rallied around two hundred individuals initially. However, the latter managed to survive and even grow in the adverse conditions of the communist dictatorship in Czechoslovakia, while the former disappeared in a matter of months after the release of its first public document, while its main proponent ended up in exile. This chapter examines the Romanian human rights movement of 1977 in asymmetrical comparison with Charter 77 in order to highlight the causes that contributed to its rapid dismemberment. Accordingly, the analysis concentrates on the following issues: (1) the emergence of the collective protest, its most important adherents and their intended goals; (2) the transnational activity undertaken by the main proponents, their channels of across-the-border communication and their supporters outside Romania, (3) the counter-actions of the communist regime and the response of the protesters. The very idea of monitoring human rights abuses, which the goals of Charter 77 inspired (though other similar groups already existed in the Soviet bloc), was entirely novel in communist Romania. In other words, the Romanian protest responded to an external impulse rather than to the internal situation, and thus tried to fit domestic problems into a frame that Czechs and Slovaks designed (making on their turn a premiere in their country). The communist pasts of all countries in the Soviet bloc entangled with each other for forty-five years, and implicitly social unrest in these countries influenced one another often. The Romanian human
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rights protest of 1977 was not the first which guided itself by developments outside the national frame. It was, however, the first which took advantage of transnational solidarity in order to make itself known beyond national borders and survive thus its first public manifestation. Looking retrospectively to the history of social disobedience under Romanian communism, one could observe that the import of unrest began with the occasion of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.3 Actually, Romania represented the third country of the Soviet bloc where the population rebelled in 1956 against communism and the Soviet occupation. In particular, members of the Hungarian minority in Romania expressed publicly their sympathy with the revolutionaries in Budapest and other cities.4 From all social groups, students were the most rebellious, especially those from the university centers of Timioara and Cluj, where a significant Hungarian speaking population lived. The exposure to mass media in the Hungarian language pushed students in Transylvania, Hungarians and Romanians alike, to follow the example of their colleagues in Budapest who practically sparked the revolution. Thus, students in Romania reacted so quickly that the communist authorities were caught by surprise, while their petitions practically reiterated requests already made in Hungarian universities, such as: (1) the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the Romanian territory; (2) the reorientation of the Romanian foreign trade towards western countries; (3) the establishment of a fair balance of trade with the Soviet Union; and (4) the removal of Russian language and Marxism classes from curricula.5 The turmoil spread to Bucharest as well, where students also manifested against the regime. However, the communist authorities took immediate action and managed to contain all these revolts. Hundreds of students were arrested, and leaders (including Paul Goma) received long terms in prison after staged trials.6
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A Romanian Revolution of 1956 did not exist. The unrest in this country restricted to the above mentioned university centers, lasted even shorter than in the neighboring country and failed to challenge the communist regime. Unlike in Hungary, in Romania there was no reformist wing within the RWP which could have taken over power and assumed the revolutionary goals. On the contrary, the party leadership took, even before knowing about the Soviet intervention against Hungary, resolute action to suppress the protest which seemed to menace their positions.7 Moreover, in the aftermath of the revolt of 1956, a second wave of repression touched a large number of individuals, especially intellectuals who escaped the first wave of arrests which followed the communist takeover.8 To sum up, the events in the neighboring Hungary had a significant impact on Romania at communist elite and societal levels, so a moment of historical entanglement existed. While the Romanian students let themselves influenced by the ideas launched by Hungarian peers, the Romanian elite avoided the example of its counterpart in the neighboring country. After 1956, the second crucial entanglement in the Soviet bloc occurred in 1968, but then the Romanians acted at odds with the Czechs and Slovaks. While the latter debated publicly about reforms and tried to build socialism with a human face in their country, the former applauded their leader not for the support given to the Prague Spring, but for standing against the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, this entanglement did not lead to the development of a transnational solidarity any more than that of 1956. While the Romanian society strengthened its support to Ceauescus rule, those in other Soviet bloc countries became disillusioned with their communist regimes because of the decision to invade the country which experimented reforms.9 One might study various forms of disobedience under Romanian communism in national frame until 1977, but this is no longer possible in the case of the collective protest, which Goma
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initiated following the model of Charter 77. This failed human rights movement not only emerged due to a transfer of ideas across the national borders, but also survived for a couple of months only due to a transnational activity in which the key supporters of this movement engaged. Czech and Slovak intellectuals drafted their Charter in 1976, and made it public on 6 January 1977 to be immediately advertised in all major western newspapers and broadcast by agencies like RFE and VOA.10 Through such channels, news about Charter 77 reached Romania too. Similar initiatives had developed earlier in Poland, but these endeavors initiated for the purpose of limiting the abuses of the communist regimes had a far less significant effect upon Romanians. As known, prominent Polish dissidents, among whom many were of leftist orientation, reformulated the strategy of opposing communist regimes in the post-1968 context not only theoretically,11 but also practically: they directly involved themselves in defending the striking workers of 1976. Poles had also fashioned their activity in terms of human rights defense, though not as explicitly as the Czechs and Slovaks.12 Romanian intellectuals, who defined themselves (after 1989) as sympathizers of the liberal right, concerned themselves in general with cultural affairs rather than social issues. Though an attempt to establish a free trade union in Romania was registered,13 a long-lasting alliance with workers on the Polish model was never accomplished in this country. In contrast to such socially oriented cross-class activities, Charter 77 seemed an intellectually driven protest and thus stirred more interest among the Romanian intelligentsia. As documents from the archives of the secret police illustrate, this elite-based initiative was informally discussed in various groups which the Securitate had already kept under surveillance. Reactions to Charter 77 were registered during ad-hoc gatherings in the Writers Union restaurant in Bucharest, in Hungarian circles in Cluj, among university professors and Greek Catholic priests.14 However, the
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idea of defending human rights seemed not only strange, but also ineffective, and thus most individuals restricted themselves to discussions and never passed to actions. Eventually, Paul Goma took alone the initiative of expressing publicly his support to the Czechs and Slovaks who signed Charter 77 and illustrate in this way that Romanians were also against the abuses of the communist regime. His idea gained momentum, and others started to endorse a collective letter of protest, albeit the largest majority signed the document for getting an exit visa.15 For he remained the most adamant proponent of this protest (although he also had to retract many of his public statements in a letter addressed to Ceauescu), this movement is known to this day as the Goma movement. This chapter illustrates that the Romanian movement for human rights emerged largely due to the efforts of one man, survived for several months until the communist authorities took action and imprisoned him, while solving the grievances related to emigration in which most of the others were actually interested. In short, the Goma movement presented itself as a movement for human rights (in the same vein as Charter 77), but served an aggregate of personal interests instead of the common good.
A Romanian Solzhenitsyn
Paul Goma (b. 1935) was among those few writers who did not follow a mainstream career in communist Romania, but opted instead for a life on the edge. Three were the occasions when he assumed actions which triggered his marginality: when he joined the student unrest of 1956, when he decided to publish a novel abroad without approval from the party, and when he initiated the human rights movement of 1977. Although he let himself carried away by the wave of enthusiasm of August 1968 and even joined after the communist party, he did not let his critical
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judgment fade away for the sake of some meager privileges (as many others did). On this path, he was most of the time a loner, for he joined neither the group of writers who praised the regime, nor that of those who refused this shameful path and opted instead for the so-called resistance through culture. In short, his dissent represented the last stage in his out-of-the-ordinary career in Romania, which was marked from the beginning by the refusal to comply with the communist rule. In his early youth, he experienced not only the war, but also the exodus from his native Bessarabia, after this part of Romania was occupied by the Red Army in accordance with the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. While his family took refuge in Transylvania, Goma came to be shortly arrested (although just a high-school boy), for the secret police suspected him of connections with a partisan group in the nearby mountains. While a student in literature at the University of Bucharest in 1956, he tried to follow the Hungarian example and stirred unrest among his colleagues. This failed attempt attracted his immediate arrest and a sentence of two years of imprisonment, which the authorities extended with a subsequent period of house arrest that Goma spent in an isolated village of the Brgan Plain. He was released because of the general amnesty of political prisoners in 1964, and allowed (after verifications by the secret police) to enroll again as a student in literature a year later. Given his political past, the Securitate kept him under surveillance, while planning to recruit him as informant. The secret police pressed him repeatedly to collaborate with this institution, but he refused.16 While rejecting such a proposal, Goma let himself lured by Ceauescus balcony speech of August 1968, for the secretary general spoke publicly and freely (without a text prepared in advance) against the Soviet Union. As he later confessed, he joined the patriotic guards in order to defend the country against a possible Soviet invasion, and soon after became even a member of the RCP, as many other Romanians did then.17
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From a professional perspective, Goma was among the very few Romanian writers who published his works on the other side of the Iron Curtain. He did not benefit from promotion through official channels; on the contrary, he acted in defiance of the censorship which had rejected his novels and thus stirred turmoil among Romanian writers and apparatchiks in the field of culture. After a debut volume of short stories,18 Goma could no longer find a publisher willing to accept his subsequent novels, Ostinato and Ua noastr cea de toate zilele (Our everyday door).19 For a Romanian writer even more so than for authors from Central Europe, the publication abroad was not within easy reach. One must have been not only bold enough to defy the system, but also animated by some entrepreneurial spirit to find ways of sending the manuscript outside the country, while border verifications were very strict. Moreover, such a writer must have been ready to risk everything for maybe nothing. While there were good chances for the discovery of a manuscript during border control, there were bleak chances for the publication abroad, for an unknown Romanian writer was not easily accepted by western publishing houses which had to think in commercial terms. Goma was though lucky, for he discovered in Marie Thrse Kerschbaumer, an Austrian doctoral student who specialized in Romanian studies, the person willing to translate his books into German, take them across the border, and even find a publisher. It was due to her that Goma could publish with Suhrkamp in 1971 his novel Ostinato.20 The volume was launched at the Frankfurt International Book Fair as a book censored by the Romanian communist regime, and registered a tremendous and rather unexpected success.21 Thus, Suhrkamp published a year later the other novel too. The success of this book was also assured by the timing of its publication. The author of the first book about the experience of imprisonment in a communist dictatorship, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, had been ousted from the Soviet Writers Union in 1969 to receive a year
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later the Nobel Prize for Literature. Thus, the interest in such kind of literature was rather high at the time when Suhrkamp published Gomas novel and presented its author as the Romanian Solzhenitsyn.22 Indeed, the publication of this novel annoyed the Romanian communist authorities greatly, for no eyewitness accounts of the repression as One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich were ever allowed in this country, but only a kind of surrogate novels which were authored by individuals who never went through such terrible experiences.23 While Gomas book benefited from a favorable international context, it could not have met a more adversary domestic situation. Only months before its publication, Ceauescu had presented on 6 July and 9 July 1971 his guidelines for the improvement of the political-ideological education of party activists, in particular, and of all working people, in general.24 Later known as the Theses of July 1971, his ideas can be summarized as follows: (1) art and literature had to develop strictly under the control of the party, and (2) the authors sources of inspiration had to be autochthonous and not cosmopolitan, i.e. western.25 These theses came after a short period of ideological relaxation, so they marked a setback. A return to the dogmatism of the Stalinist years was not accomplished (although Ceauescu might have intended this). However, this new cultural policy represented a form of isolationism, for it also instituted increasing restrictions in the free circulation of people and information across the borders of the country. This anti-western cultural turn announced by Ceauescus speeches of July 1971 helped by default Gomas book launch in October, for Ostinato could even more convincingly be presented by its publisher as a censored volume. The Romanian delegation actually withdrew from the Frankfurt Book Fair in order to protest to Gomas unauthorized presence at the public presentation. The situation was all the more embarrassing for the Romanian official delegation that the secretary general of the party was also present
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as author at that book fair: an obscure publishing house launched a volume of his speeches. Indeed, the portrait of the Romanian writer was occupying a large place at the desk of Suhrkamp, making Ceauescus portrait look small and insignificant. For Gomas book was successfully published outside the country without any official approval, the secret police made its best to stir and then monitor the envy of other writers.26 Later on, the Romanian authorities allowed Goma to travel to the capitalist camp, when he was invited by his French publisher Gallimard. This was part of the plans to diminish the impact of his writings abroad: if allowed to travel, Goma could no longer have claimed to be persecuted, the secret police evaluated.27 At the same time, one should take into account that the isolationist effects of Ceauescus theses were not immediate; more than a decade of transition followed until the closure was complete. Thus, Goma could officially stay for a year (between June 1972 and June 1973) in a non-communist country. During this time, he had the opportunity to establish personal contacts with broadcasters from the Romanian desk of RFE, among whom the Paris-based Monica Lovinescu and Virgil Ierunca, or the director of the Romanian section of RFE in Munich, Noel Bernard. This chance proved to be essential later on, for all of them would be instrumental in supporting his protest of 1977. Also, during this stay which followed the success of Ostinato, Goma could arrange for the publication of the other censored novel Ua, and for its translation into French.28 Finally, he managed to finish in this time span a book which could not have been easily written in Romania, where the secret police could have confiscated it at any moment. This volume, which Goma entitled simply Gherla, after the name of the Transylvanian town where he was imprisoned between 1957 and 1959, represented an account of his personal experience as a political prisoner. It was published only in 1976,29 after the French version of The Gulag Archipelago, which appeared in 1973,
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registered a tremendous success. Although it never reached the notoriety of the latter, Gomas book stirred interest among western readership.30 It never triggered such high recognition as the Nobel Prize, but it increased the notoriety of its author abroad and at home, for RFE recorded Goma reading his three novels during his trip of 1972-1973 to broadcast them later. However, Goma remained for the largest majority of his colleagues a contested writer. Since he did not manage to publish any other book in Romania (except for the debut volume of 1968), many argued that it was only his alleged persecution that made his books interesting among western readers. Marginal in the community of Romanian writers, he was close only to the so-called oneiric group, not in esthetic terms, but in the common attempt to reject the interference of the party in cultural matters.31 From this group, Dumitru epeneag and Virgil Tnase who left Romania by 1977 and established in Paris, would crucially support Goma and his movement for human rights.32
The Human Rights Movement

If until 1977 Goma was essentially a writer who was censored in Romania, but successful abroad from that year on his identity as dissident and a defender of human rights overpowered that of the novelist. The protest he initiated after news on the emergence of Charter 77 reached Romania opened with a letter of solidarity with the Czechs and Slovaks who signed this document, which Goma addressed to playwright Pavel Kohout. According to his testimony, he decided to take this first step alone, after several unsuccessful attempts to convince his fellow writers to send a common message. As mentioned, the majority of his colleagues took the signatories of the Charter 77 for courageous intellectuals, but their endeavor for a useless protest.33 After drafting the letter,
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Goma managed to distribute fifteen copies among foreign diplomats during the opening of an exhibition in Bucharest on 25 January 1977. Among these was a close friend from the Embassy of Belgium, Etinne Dussart. The letter was intended for the Romanian desk of RFE, whose representatives Goma had met during his stay abroad. In his letter of solidarity, Goma argued that all individuals in East-Central Europe shared the same deprivation of basic rights, but underlined that there was a fundamental difference between Romanians and the others. Whereas Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, East-Germans, Hungarians and Bulgarians (sic) suffered because of a Russian occupation, the Romanians endured a Romanian occupation, which was even less bearable than a foreign oppression.34 After this address to Charter 77, Goma turned to no other than the secretary general of the party himself. In an open letter to Ceauescu, he invited the leader of the country to join his initiative of expressing publicly solidarity with the Czechs and Slovaks who signed the Charter 77. He pointed out to his addressee that the two of them were the only Romanians who were not afraid of the Securitate, thus only Ceauescu could follow his example. By doing this, the Romanian party leader would prove consistency with his earlier attitude of sympathy with the people of Czechoslovakia, which he had expressed when WTO members invaded this country in 1968.35 In this way, Goma argued, Ceauescu would also set an example for all Romanians, who would have then no fear to protest against the violation of human rights in communist countries.36 These two letters turned their author into a dissident, but did not actually initiate a collective action. Although his attempt to rally other writers was unsuccessful, Goma continued to search for individuals willing to support his idea of making a Romanian Charter 77. Shortly after sending the two letters presented above, he got incidentally to know some individuals who showed interest in signing a common letter of protest in the name of human rights.
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In short, the human rights movement in Romania emerged with eight initial supporters (from among whom two were Goma and his wife) in a rather haphazard way.37 The formal document that marked the birth of this collective protest was an open letter addressed to the First CSCE Follow-up Meeting, which was scheduled to take place in Belgrade beginning with 1977. Goma drafted a version, but the variant upon which all agreed was authored by one of the other signatories, painter Sergiu Manoliu, according to the testimony of the former. This explains why this collective letter contrasted sharply in style and content with the emotional and witty, but general and non-specific denouncement of the abuses under the Ceauescu regime, which one could find in the two above mentioned letters. In contrast, the collective letter to the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade used a neutral tone to enumerate the rights which the Romanian legislation theoretically guaranteed, but the authorities did not practically respect. Beside indicating the precise articles of the constitution which referred to rights that existed on paper but not in reality, this letter specifically emphasized the right to free circulation, which the Romanian communist regime (like all the others in the Soviet bloc) totally disregarded. Thus, the collective letter argued, the right to citizenship had become in fact an obligation.38 A copy of this letter, which was dated 8 February 1977, was sent to RFE to be broadcast back to Romania. Once transmitted, it appeared as if the example of the Czechs and Slovaks was contagious, since concern about the observance of human rights seemed to have gained momentum in Romania too, only a month after Charter 77. RFE was instrumental in further disseminating news about the increasing support which this collective letter registered every day. Practically, the letter to the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade could not have received so quickly new signatories without the direct involvement of RFE, from where Romanians all over the
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country found out about its very existence. It was the ability of the Romanian desk of RFE to impose its own perspective on this issue, which coincided with that of the signatories, but not necessarily with that of the agency. In general, the broadcasters of RFE were refugees from East-Central Europe, who identified themselves more often than not with dissidents at home, while the management of RFE had to ponder between the interest in supporting the internal critics of the communist regimes and the guiding policy which the financial supporters had established. The full liberty which the RFE broadcasters enjoyed before the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was limited ever since in order to avoid raising again the hopes of the domestic opponents in a western intervention against the communist regimes in EastCentral Europe. In the case of Romania though, the discrepancy between the broadcasters position and that of the agency was even sharper than in the case of other Soviet bloc countries. On the one hand, the former wanted to fully support all those who spoke against Ceauescus regime, all the more so that these were not numerous. On the other, RFE recommended a more cautious approach to those who criticized Ceauescu for the poor human rights record in his country, because the American administration still supported his independence from the Soviet Union.39 This difference is even clearer when one compares RFE, which the US Congress sponsored, with VOA, which received financial support from the American government and thus reflected even closer the official views. While the former fully supported Goma and the movement for human rights in Romania, the latter paid no attention to this collective protest.40 Nevertheless, even Romanian migrs who worked for RFE and fully sympathized with Gomas thoughts had to advocate first their case in order to induce a change in the RFE policy toward the anti-Soviet Ceauescu. Once the director of the Romanian desk Noel Bernard could impose his
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and his colleagues views on the issue, RFE practically transformed itself into Gomas spokesperson during the following months.41 Due to the permanent dissemination of news about the collective protest against human rights abuses, the Romanian communist regime found itself confronted with an emerging movement which had a precedent only in the unrest caused by the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Faced with a direct criticism for the first time since his election as secretary general of the party, Ceauescu reacted first in a corny speech of 17 February 1977, at a time when the movement had already gained momentum.42 His discourse included quite atypical references, such as quotations from the national Romanticist poet Mihai Eminescu, and appealed (once again) to Romanians patriotic feelings. Without ever mentioning Goma, Ceauescu condemned publicly the traitors of the motherland and gave a clear sign that the ongoing situation would not be further tolerated.43 During the same day, Goma noted in his diary, he began receiving menacing phones calls from angry citizens allegedly outraged by his actions which were damaging the external image of the country. Next day, agents started to guard the entrance door to his block of flats in order to hamper further contacts with potential protesters and foreign journalists. It is interesting to note that the records of the secret police and Gomas diary complement each other well. According to documents of the Securitate, the initial plan of action envisaged primarily Gomas isolation and, if possible, his persuasion into retracting, which in the parlance of the secret police was called positive influencing.44 In spite of these intimidating measures, the number of signatories grew steadily, for people continued to come, some even succeeded in passing the guards and sneaking inside, while others managed to declare their adherence by phone. The largest majority of those who supported the collective letter were common individuals, unknown to the secret police or the Romanian public. Nevertheless, three persons stood out from
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among the signatories of the letter: writer Ion Negoiescu and psychiatrist Ion Vianu, for they enjoyed some public notoriety (at least among the educated persons), and worker Vasile Paraschiv, for his previous public positions against the regime. The author and literary critic Ion Negoiescu (b. 1921 d. 1993) shared with Goma more than the professional background; he was also a political prisoner in the 1960s.45 After his fellow writer had initiated the collective protest, Negoiescu wrote a letter of solidarity and agreement which he personally handed on 3 March 1977. Goma managed then to send it abroad to be broadcast by RFE. Unlike other signatories, Negoiescu had its own position regarding the motives of protesting against the communist regime. As literary critic, he was primarily concerned with the state of Romanian literature and used this letter to express his opinions on the matter. His ideas encapsulated the concern of all those who would call themselves resisters through culture in reaction to the increased interference of the party in cultural affairs, which the above-mentioned Theses of July 1971 reaffirmed. Many other writers shared Negoiescus views, some expressed them in private (as files of the secret police illustrate), others expressed them from exile, but no-one until him expressed such criticism from inside Romania via a western broadcasting agency. In his letter to Goma, Negoiescu reviewed the evolution of Romanian literature since the communist takeover and underlined that Romanian writers experienced again the state of isolation from the European cultural trends, which had been once instituted during the period of socialist realism to be later abandoned in favor of a more liberal cultural policy. Due to the imposed return to local sources of inspiration, the contemporary Romanian literature turned, according to Negoiescu, into a memorial literature, which got used only to commemorate forefathers. The result was not the one that the communist regime intended to obtain, i.e. the valorization of national history and culture, but just the
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opposite, i.e. their mockery. The cause of this outcome laid in the promotion of mediocrity instead of real talents, which were constantly marginalized, as the author himself was when his own book Lampa lui Aladin (Aladins Lamp) had been removed from libraries and destroyed. In short, Negoiescu pointed out that Ceauescus nationalistic turn endangered the Romanian literature.46 In more general terms, his letter represented a warning about the limitations in the freedom of speech, but the terms in which Negoiescu formulated his criticism did not refer to the observance of human rights per se, but to the state of Romanian literature. Nevertheless, Negoiescu did not limit himself to an act of solidarity with Goma, but also tried to convince other fellow writers to join this collective protest. Unlike the latter, the former had better connections among the community of writers and knew that many were unsatisfied with the current situation in their domain. Negoiescu attempted first to approach Geo Bogza, a senior writer who enjoyed respect for his professionalism. He was among the very few genuine supporters of leftist ideas, which he had openly manifested since the interwar period (and not only after the communist takeover). Thus, Bogza was very critical about the return to a nationalist rhetoric which reminded one of the precommunist times. Since 1974, he had withdrawn from public life out of disgust for the cultural policy promoted by Ceauescu. However, he refused to join the protest which Goma initiated or to co-sign the letter which Negoiescu addressed to him. Like others, Bogza considered Goma a marginal writer, who entered always in conflict with his colleagues, and who was definitely not the kind of person that could give credibility to a collective protest against the regime.47 In spite of this initial failure, Negoiescu persisted in adding new signatories to the growing collective protest and succeeded in convincing psychiatrist Ion Vianu (b. 1934), son of the well-known literary critic Tudor Vianu. On 17 March 1977, they finally
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managed to contact Goma and hand him the letter of support, which Vianu had prepared nine days before. In the meantime, the surveillance of Gomas apartment had been tightened, but he was still able to maintain external contacts via his father-in-law Petre Nvodaru, an old-timer in the communist party. Thus, messages could be passed to foreign journalists who then ensured the communication to the Romanian desk of RFE. Just like Negoiescu, Vianu added to the protest his professional expertise and warned against abuses of the regime in the domain he knew best: psychiatry. He had previously the opportunity to discover that many people who had spoken in public meetings against the policies of the communist regime ended up in psychiatric hospitals, where doctors diagnosed them with severe mental disturbances and interned as dangerous persons. In general, these individuals acted out of an impulse and never thought that news about their public protest must have been transmitted outside the country in order to benefit from an international protection against the communist authorities. Since their public positions remained unknown to western media, politicians or human rights organizations, such individuals could be kept for years in psychiatric hospitals. Impressed by the fate of such hopeless individuals, Vianu authored an article in which he hinted at the practice of imprisonment in psychiatric clinics, which had affected many people who had openly expressed some critical remarks about the communist regime. Just published in October 1976, this article passed unnoticed, even though it pointed out to a practice which clearly illustrated the abuses of the communist regime, for the journal that accepted it had a rather limited public.48 At the time when Vianu authored the letter of support for the human rights movement, he had though already decided to emigrate from Romania, for he became convinced that a genuine improvement could not be expected in the near future. Yet, he still wanted to express his solidarity with Goma and the other
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signatories of the collective protest in the hope that many others would follow his example.49 Finally, Vasile Paraschiv (b. 1928 d. 2011) represented one of the most interesting cases of dissent among Romanians. Unlike Negoiescu or Vianu, he was just a worker in Ploieti, the main industrial centre of the Prahova Valley which was located some sixty km north of Bucharest, in a region known from the interwar period for its oil refineries. However, Paraschiv turned gradually into a daring critic of the communist rule, though one not very skilled in strategies of defense. Thus, he had ended as patient in a psychiatric hospital after speaking publicly against wrongdoings of the regime. Member of the communist party since he was only eighteen in 1946, Paraschiv wrote a first letter to Ceauescu in 1968 in order to denounce some abuses committed by the local party apparatus. A year later, he was interned in a clinic for mental diseases in Urlai, where he met other thirty persons who were there for a similar reason. After making a hunger strike, Paraschiv was released. Adamant in his opposition to any abusive decisions, he refused in 1976 to participate aside his fellow workers in an activity which had become gradually mandatory for students, soldiers and working people: the harvesting of crops ranging from maize to grapes. Officially, it was maintained that these agricultural activities (which should have been the job of the peasantry enrolled in collective farms) were performed by other social groups only on a voluntary base. In reality, these were imposed on workers, intellectuals, students and soldiers in Romania since the mid-1970s due to the migration of the peasantry to cities and the implicit decrease in the number of agricultural workers. Accordingly, Paraschivs refusal triggered his arrest and forceful confinement into a psychiatric clinic in Voila in early December 1976. He was though released before Christmas just in time to hear from RFE about Goma and his collective letter. On 20 February 1977,
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Paraschiv managed to contact him and add his signature to the growing protest against human right abuses.50 The list of the people who signed this letter would never be known down to the last individual, for the secret police updated daily these data, but the numbers indicated seemed to be in slight conflict from one note to the other. However, the numbers registered in RFE files (due to Gomas careful transmission of names through various channels of communication) and those from the Securitate files (which included also the lists confiscated on the day of Gomas arrest) largely converge.51Accordingly, it seems that 192 people declared their full support for the letter against human rights abuses directly, by post or by phone until Gomas arrest on 1 April 1977.52 These were the actual signatories who came to be known also via RFE, yet others tried to join even after Goma went into prison. The statistical data compiled by the secret police indicate also a total number of around 430 persons who either adhered to the letter or just tried to contact Goma.53 In order to curtail the protest and dissuade the signatories (neutralize them, in the parlance of the secret police), the Securitate gathered data about the past and present of those persons, such as previous condemnations and political allegiance, professional and educational background, age, nationality, place of residence. These records of the secret police suggest that those who manifested their interest in Gomas anti-regime action were very diverse socially. However, the largest group was that of the workers (and not of the intellectuals). The ethnic Romanians were obviously the most numerous group, but proportionally, the Germans were overrepresented. Not surprisingly, the largest age group was 25 to 45 years. Surprisingly for the regime though, the former political prisoners and members of pre-communist parties were only a small minority among Gomas supporters.54 As the number of those people who managed to contact Goma and announce their solidarity rose, the protest initiated by an
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individual was growing into a movement for the observance of human rights. Consequently, the communist authorities decided to act more efficiently in order to put an end to a situation that was becoming embarrassing for its image. The plans of action which the Securitate conceived developed in two directions: (1) Goma and his immediate circle of family, friends and possible followers, and (2) the other signatories. Upon the latter group, the secret police applied flexible methods in order to persuade them to retract rather than make use of violence. First, all six individuals who joined from the beginning Goma and his wife in signing the letter addressed to the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade received emigration passports. When the secret police carefully tried to discover the personal grievances of each individual who adhered later to this collective protest, it turned out that many considered this act a way of obtaining the exit visa which had been refused before.55 Others seized the opportunity offered by the collective protest to manifest their will to emigrate from Romania.56 The letter of support which Negoiescu addressed to Goma actually captured the perception of his protest at societal level. He opened his message of solidarity by declaring his admiration for the way in which Goma managed in a very short time to obtain the approval for emigration in the case of so many citizens whose requests had been hitherto denied. As he put it, the initiator of the Romanian human rights protest succeeded in establishing a new institution: the Goma passport.57 In short, many of those who contacted Goma were interested only in the observance of a sole right: the free circulation of persons. This was also the conclusion of the Securitate, which mentioned in repeated reports and notes that most of the people who joined Goma were only interested in obtaining an emigration passport. From the 430 persons that tried to contact Goma directly, by post or by phone, the majority had the applications for emigration rejected or pending. Others had various other personal grievances,
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mainly related to jobs, while the rest were people with mental diseases, according to the secret police. The final balance was the following: From the above mentioned total, for 184 persons the emigration application was approved; 170 retracted and many of them spoke against Gomas activity; and 76 still have some requests [at the date when the note was issued, i.e. 12 May 1978], especially related to emigration.58 This note indicates that the communist authorities treated this collective protest for the observance of human rights as the aggregate action of a number of individuals who sought to achieve not the common interest claimed in the letter, but their personal interests. Of course, this protest had no precedent, so those who joined could not know from the beginning what the reaction of the authorities would be. At the same time, the secret police faced a situation which requested their full ability to contain the spread of the protest. For the number of students protests, peasants riots or workers strikes decreased dramatically during the 1960s (due to a complex of factors which include the societal transformations that occurred under communism as well as the harsh repression of the previous decade), the secret police adapted its methods to the new reality: instead of repressing, it acted for prevention of any oppositional manifestation and applied for this purpose more sophisticated methods, ranging from intimidation to cooptation.59 In the case of the Goma movement, the reports of the secret police show that the communist authorities opted for dissolving the emerging movement by solving the personal grievances of every individual, which in the largest majority of the cases referred to emigration.60 The very fact that this strategy succeeded proves that the evaluation of the Securitate was accurate and its strategy adequate for the Romanian society, where anti-political privatism guided even collective actions.61 In other words, this emerging human rights movement was curtailed from kernel because many of its supporters were only interested in using a public protest as vehicle for emigration.
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There were though persons who did not use the collective letter to the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade as a lever to solve a personal problem. These were the cases in which the secret police changed the strategy and returned to harsher methods in order to intimidate the signatories and determine them to abjure. In such cases, information about the weakness of each individual was instrumental. Ion Negoiescu was the first among those who could be pressed to retract his solidarity with Goma and the human rights movement. As a gay person in a society where homosexuality was legally criminalized and informally condemned, he was more vulnerable than others. The law against homosexuality was not strictly enforced in Romania, but it represented a perfect means of pressure, since a public trial for such crime meant not only a harsh sentence, but also social marginalization.62 Thus, Negoiescu who had joined Goma for the sake of enlarging the writers liberties and implicitly improving the quality of Romanian literature finished by writing an article which practically disavowed his criticism of Ceauescus cultural policy. It was the central literary journal Romnia literar that published his article which praised recent literary works on the achievements of the communist regime and the happiness of contemporary working people. The bookshops full of such volumes, Negoiescu had to state, filled him with joy.63 In short, this article represented a public denial of his earlier statement of solidarity with Goma and the signatories of the collective letter (which RFE had previously broadcast) and an implicit consent for Ceauescus regime. The communist authorities tried also hard to persuade Goma to publicly express his solidarity with the regime and retract in this way his previous criticism. It was Cornel Burtic, deputy prime minister and secretary of the RCP in charge with propaganda,64 who approached him via writer Nicolae Breban.65 The latter had spoken against the Theses of July 1971 in an interview with Le Monde, for he happened to be in France at the time when
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Ceauescu delivered the respective speeches. For such a public statement, Breban lost immediately his position as editor-in-chief of Romnia literar. However, he managed to come to terms with the regime and enjoy again a special status: unlike other writers, he could travel quite often to western countries.66 When Goma asked him in 1977 to join the signatories of the human rights protest, he seemed to contemplate this idea for a while. However, he refrained himself for the sake of having published his book Bunavestire (The Annunciation), which several publishing houses had previously rejected.67 As a report of the secret police observed, Gomas persuasion to retract would have turned Breban into a celebrated hero, for the communist regime, of course.68 While his novel received green light for publication, he did his best to accomplish this job and accompanied the initiator of the collective letter to Burtics office on 22 February 1977. The communist official gave hopes to Goma that his rejected books might be also published in Romania, and tried simultaneously to persuade him to write something positive about the regime and its accomplishments. Goma indeed wrote an article in the aftermath of the earthquake of 4 March 1977, in which he argued that in such times of trouble all Romanians should act in solidarity in order to overcome the loss of human lives, as well as the material destructions.69 All these negotiations made western journalists who covered at that time developments in Czechoslovakia and Romania consider that communist authorities from the latter treated the protesters much better than those in the former. Indeed, the signatories of Charter 77 were immediately arrested, interrogated and harassed by the secret police with such vigor that the wellknown philosopher Jan Patoka died. While all these happened in Czechoslovakia, Goma was negotiating with the Romanian deputy prime minister Burtic.70 Despite the article, no deal was actually reached and the secret police went further to apply harsher measures against Goma and
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the protesters who did not seek only personal gains and thus refused to retract.71 Once again, Gomas daily notes from the period and the files of the secret police converge into the same story. For the protest received an unprecedented support with the instrumental assistance of western media, the Securitate diversified its methods and restructured its actions on four different directions: (1) to discourage and intimidate Goma, as well as those who contacted him or would try this in the future; (2) to disrepute Goma among members of the Romanian emigration and western media; (3) to counterbalance the denigrating actions of RFE; and (4) to defame Goma among the diplomatic personnel of western embassies in Bucharest.72 Accordingly, softer methods of persuasion turned into violent actions. On 19 March 1977, a former boxer with the Dinamo club, the sport club of the militia, came to Gomas residence and attacked him savagely on the pretext that his victims ingratitude toward the party made him terribly angry. The episode repeated for an entire week to end with Gomas arrest and incarceration on 1 April. This action came two days after Ceauescu had plainly stated during a meeting of the Political Executive Committee that Goma must have been arrested publicly for espionage and put on trial, while the others who signed must have been forced by all means to withdraw.73 At the same time, colleagues from the Writers Union unanimously consented to expel Goma from the organization. The transcript of the discussions among RCP leaders also illustrates Ceauescus conviction that the colleagues of the other signatories would not only turn against them with verbal criticism during the scheduled public assemblies, but also with physical aggressions.74 The wave of repression also hit Ion Vianu, who could not be persuaded to retract after RFE broadcast his letter of solidarity with Goma and the other protesters against human rights violations. Although his little child was aggressed, he did not disavow his commitment to support the collective letter to the
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CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade. Thus, the party organization from the Medical University of Bucharest, where Vianu held the position of associate professor, set up on 2 April 1977 a public meeting reminiscent of the Stalinist times. This looked very much like the Writers Union meeting during which colleagues criticized Goma for his alleged anti-party and antinational attitudes and expelled him from the organization. In a similar way, Vianus colleagues condemned him unanimously and voted for his dismissal from the university and for deferring him to the prosecutor for the crime of offending the authorities.75 For a while after Gomas arrest, people contacted Vianu in order to endorse the collective letter of protest. However, the secret police acted with great efficiency and the potential signatories were persuaded more or less gently to renounce, as the above-quoted note of the Securitate illustrates.76 In fact, the emerging movement for human rights in Romania faded away quickly after Gomas arrest. On the one hand, this was the result of the delayed but resolute action of the secret police. On the other, the protest died while still in an incipient phase because its proponents were not united and animated by a common cause, but by personal interests, related mostly to the observance of only the right to free circulation. Besides, public personalities, able to attract others to support the movement, refrained (with the above-mentioned exceptions) from joining Gomas initiative, so this died with the arrest of its prime mover. During Gomas imprisonment, the secret police constantly tried to obtain from him (either in written form or during the interrogatories) the confession regarding an alleged participation in an international plot against Romania, which would have justified the intended charges of treason and propaganda against the socialist order.77 As in other cases of dissent, the allegations must have reflected a violation of the communist legislation. Accordingly, the agents in charge with Goma insisted on his
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connections with the fascist and reactionary Romanian emigration in Paris and Munich, or on the royalties for the books he had published abroad, which might have allowed the Securitate to place him on the payroll of a foreign country.78 For RFE covered intensively Gomas efforts for strengthening the protest against human rights abuses, the communist authorities considered him a puppet guided from abroad against Ceauescus regime. After his arrest, this impression actually strengthened. While the antiregime activities faded away inside Romania, Gomas arrest determined the opposite reaction among the Romanian emigration which finally found a cause to fight for: Gomas release. Beginning with 21 April 1977, the Paris-based group of exiles organized several demonstrations in front of the Romanian embassy.79 These street manifestations took place under the banner of the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Romania, which had been just established on 26 February 1977, exactly for the purpose of defending the signatories of the collective letter.80 In fact, it was Gomas arrest that pushed the committee to organize its first collective actions of protest against Ceauescus regime. Its members succeeded in gathering no less than six hundred signatures on an appeal for Gomas release. Among those who endorsed it, there were world-wide famous French intellectuals, like Louis Aragon, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Julia Kristeva and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie. Besides, Romanians from the emigration among whom playwright Eugne Ionesco, literary critics and RFE commentators Monica Lovinescu and Virgil Ierunca, or the founder of the committee, Mihnea Berindei signed this public appeal to Ceauescu. Another protest against Gomas imprisonment was drafted in the United States and endorsed by Mircea Eliade, Matei Clinescu, Thomas Pavel, Emil Palade and Andrei erban, among others. The Romanian emigration also succeeded in quickly mobilizing several institutions in support of those who were persecuted in Romania. The French
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PEN Club admitted Goma as honorary member, while the American one sent a letter of protest to Ceauescu. It is highly probable that the direct involvement of the Committee of the French Psychiatrists saved Ion Vianu from the trial prepared against him and thus he received permission to leave Romania. RFE broadcast news about all the initiatives of the emigration in order to keep the communist regime in Bucharest informed about echoes of the Goma case on the other side of the Iron Curtain.81 Consequently, Goma was released on 6 May 1977, after a little more than a month of imprisonment.82 Yet, he had already consented under pressure to write a formal letter to Ceauescu to ask for forgiveness and promise to behave accordingly.83 After his release, he was again put under the strict surveillance of the secret police. The Securitate also intensified its actions meant to defame Goma inside and outzside the country by launching data and versions of disinformation for the purpose of counterbalancing the speculations regarding Gomas arrest, as a joint note-report of Direction I and Department D of the Ministry of the Interior formulated. Accordingly, the Securitate intended to persuade western media and diplomats that: (1) Goma was not actually arrested, but put under the protection of the authorities at his own request, for he felt threatened by those people to whom he could not get an emigration visa, (2) Goma was arrested for traffic of hard currency and drugs, (3) Goma was a victim of his own plot which he initiated in order to became famous, for he failed to reach any public notoriety with his writings.84 At the same time, the communist authorities did their best to turn Goma into an average, i.e. obedient, citizen, and thus offered him a job at the Central State Library and even a larger apartment. In the summer of 1977, Goma received an invitation to Paris from the French PEN Club, and after pondering for a while, he applied on 24 September for an exit visa for him and his family. Carefully considering the pros and cons, the Securitate decided to
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allow him to leave the country. In the end, the idea that such permission would undermine his future actions against the regime, and induce suspicion about him among intellectuals in Romania, as well as those in the emigration, prevailed over the temptation to continue persecuting him.85 In this way, Goma might have been taken as a hidden agent of the Securitate. Consequently, the entire family received passports with the visa that allowed them to travel to France, and left Romania in November 1977. When Goma left, the protest for human rights had long lost its momentum, and the secret police kept under surveillance the last of his adepts, while it strove to charge them for non-political crimes.86 However, Goma remained an objective of the Securitate under the codename Bearded Man.87 The Romanian communist regime acted with the greatest brutality to intimidate him further and, to all appearances, it was behind the savage attack on Monica Lovinescu, who had been one of Gomas most salient supporters during his protest.88 This was meant as a warning to all who wished to engage in the future in media campaigns against Ceauescu Romania. Because Goma continued to criticize the Romanian communist regime after he settled in Paris, he was also targeted, but fortunately without success: the Securitate agent who was sent to kill him defected to the free world.89 While the collective protest initiated by Goma succumbed due to the aggregate actions of the secret police and of the proponents who turned from protesters into immigrants, a major strike occurred in the summer of 1977.90 Although the two forms of expressing discontent occurred almost simultaneously and illustrated a relatively high strength as compared to other forms of social disobedience in communist Romania, no connection existed between them.91 This strike which took place at the coal mines in the Jiu Valley on 1-3 August 1977 marked symbolically the end of the social contract period. According to eyewitnesses, tens of thousands of workers participated in this protest.92 It was
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a defensive revolt, which was caused by the introduction of a new legislation regarding the retirement policy and the working conditions.93 The law came in a moment of increasing discontent with the living conditions in the Jiu Valley, a mountainous and rather isolated region, which was improper for agriculture and unilateral in industry, for no other branch except for mining developed there.94 The strike, which registered an unprecedented participation, pushed the communist authorities into adopting a tactic that would be later on employed in suppressing local protests. This meant the following: first, conciliatory promises to satisfy the demands; then, ample food supplies, but limited to the area and to a short period of time; and finally, quietly conducted transfers to other regions and close surveillance by the secret police.95 In any case, the reaction of the communist authorities was much more cautious in the case of a huge workers revolt of several days than in the case of the so-called Goma movement, which Ceauecu considered to have been driven from the outside by reactionary groups in the emigration and in RFE.96 Yet, this failed movement for human rights had an enduring impact on the communist authorities perhaps much more than on the Romanian society, for the significant support which Goma received from various social groups before the secret police was able to curtail it represented a surprise for the regime. The repercussions of this collective protest on the methods of the secret police are beyond the scope of this study, but the amplitude of the Goma case must have transformed it into a source of teaching for this institution. Although the signatories who joined the collective protest to actually get an exit visa eventually did receive it, the secret police took action in order to limit the further use of the Helsinki frame in the scope of emigration. A plan of November 1977 envisaged special actions for the time when the CSCE Follow-up Meeting unfolded in Belgrade.97 The communist authorities knew well that the exit option also represented a way
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of expressing discontent, which was visible in western countries. Besides, the secret police tried to organize better its own collection of data. Coincidentally or not, the Center of Information and Documentation, which had been established in 1971 as a separate direction in the Council of the State Security, was reorganized in May 1977 in such a way as to give priority to the communication of updated information among local branches and from all of them to the center. Such coordination permitted quicker identification of those who were potentially troublesome and implicitly a more efficient prevention.98 An earlier note the secret police from the day of Gomas arrest, which supplemented the previous plans of action for the isolation and neutralization of his activities (which the reactionary circles from the West allegedly guided) indicates that this center had a pivotal role in this last phase of suppressing the collective protest. Accordingly, representatives of this center should have worked in close coordination with Direction I of the Securitate and report every three hours the operative situation.99 This echoed the idea that the Securitate was an institution like no other, so its employees could not come to their workplace and leave at three oclock in the afternoon, after eight hours of work. They were instead required full commitment to the assigned missions. Finally, the Goma movement illustrated that RFE was an even more dangerous adversary than it was hitherto envisaged. Drawing from the experience of this collective protest, fresh analyses underlined that this agency acted under the baton of specialists from CIA, who ordered the initiation of new provocative actions by flagging the banner of the so-called human rights, which were allegedly not respected in the socialist countries, so neither in Romania.100 While the popularity of this agency among Romanians increased tremendously after 1977, as the growing number of letters received at the RFE headquarters indicated, Ceauescu and the rest of the communist elite hated
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the broadcasters of RFE and attempted several times to curtail their inimical propaganda among Romanians.101 The secret police formulated and submitted for debate an ample plan of action for the prevention, discovery and neutralization of potentially hostile activities, which redefined the enemies inside who could have submitted to the influence of such reactionary circles from the exterior. The usual suspects were grouped in four categories of enemies: (1) former members of the legionaries organization; (2) former members of the bourgeois-landowners (i.e. democratic) parties, (3) former members of the national-fascist and irredentist parties (i.e. members of the German and Hungarian minorities), and (4) former convicts for crimes against the state security (i.e. former political prisoners). The remnants of the old enemies inside Romanian society, which should have been long annihilated, became again a main target for the secret police. Accordingly, the Securitate turned against these four categories of enemies and their descendants in order to detect those persons who might author and distribute inimical writings, create clandestine channels of communication, listen and disperse the hostile news which the foreign radio agencies broadcast, act as so-called defenders of human rights and liberties, create an inadequate atmosphere among the population.102 In the highly ideological interpretation of the Romanian communist authorities, the collective protest against human rights abuses represented an antiregime alliance between hostile elements from inside and reactionary circles from outside the country, which RFE not only supported, but also (mis)guided. To conclude, the secret police was obviously instrumental in annihilating the protest against human rights violations in Romania before it had the chance to transform itself into an organized movement. However, the actions of the Securitate were not solely responsible for the rapid collapse of this initiative, which seemed in form a copy of its model Charter 77, but was in
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substance a different kind of societal manifestation. Initiated by one person, this Romanian collective protest grew considerably in a short time span: around 200 supporters surfaced in just two months. The wide echo of this protest worried the communist authorities, which nevertheless did not repress it immediately, but tried to determine each individual to retract by using different methods. Only when softer methods failed, the secret police employed harsher actions, which ranged from intimidation and public opprobrium to the use of violence and imprisonment. The arrest of the main proponent determined the first collective action of the Romanian emigration in Paris, which eventually found a cause to fight for. Thus, the protest against human rights violations in Romania was in fact the first form of social disobedience which emerged and survived because of a transnational support. Unfortunately, this protest turned to have been yet another form without substance, for most of those who rallied this civic initiative were only interested in leaving Romania for a better life in the capitalist world. Gomas idea to follow the example of Charter 77 made this Romanian collective protest look like one in defense of human rights. Thus, who once said that the Romanian dissent lives in Paris and it is named Paul Goma was actually right. He was not only the initiator of the collective protest and the person who defined it in terms of human rights, but also the crucial link that established and maintained transnational channels of communication with the broadcasters of RFE and western journalists. Without him, the incipient movement practically ceased to exist, for its proponents with different social backgrounds but precise personal interests abandoned the collective action. Besides, a fundamental difference existed between the letter to the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Belgrade and Charter 77, although both enjoyed the endorsement of comparable numbers of people. The movement of the Czechs and Slovaks had a programmatic document of action, while the collective letter of the Romanians
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only denounced the human rights abuses in Romania, without proposing concrete action for improving the situation. In short, the signature on the Romanian Charter represented a vehicle for emigration, or in other words an option for exit and not for voice. Yet, this short-lived and so-called Goma movement has remained a reference point for the societal opposition to communism in Romania, for no other public document had a similar internal endorsement and international echo. Even though no cross-class alliance was formed between this protest and the revolt of the miners in the Jiu Valley, no other intellectually driven form of contestation reached its amplitude. Instead of increasing, the number of protests decreased dramatically in the next decade. The most notable event in the following years was the attempt to establish the autonomous trade union called SLOMR, which did not have the chance to survive like its Polish counterpart, for the secret police managed again to suppress it before gaining much ground. In rest, although dissidents were not an extinct species in Romania, a far smaller number of critical intellectuals expressed themselves publicly against the communist regime in Romania than in Central Europe. However, the Goma movement does not represent a reference in the collective memory of the recent past, for it stirred after 1989 rather controversies than recognition.103 While Romanian intellectuals complained that Romania did not have a Havel (and thus neither a smooth transition from communism), Goma replied resentfully that nobody was able to see in him a Havel worth following.104 Old rivalries among writers diverted the debates from a historical reconstruction to a closing of the books, while its main proponent started to consider himself the only person entitled to pick up the stone and throw it at those who sinned. For most individuals who supported this collective protest (including Goma) had long left Romania for good, no-one played a public role in postcommunism. Thus, the Goma movement remains relevant for
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the recent pre-1989 past, but irrelevant for the post-1989 present. Such characteristics differentiate it from all the other forms of dissent discussed in the following chapters.
Notes
1 2
Quoted in Shafir, Romania Politics, Economics and Society, 168. Monica Lovinescu, author of the RFE program Teze i antiteze la Paris (Theses and Antitheses in Paris), wrote in the foreword to the second volume of her diary, which covers the period 1972-1977, the following: Paul Goma offered his country the chance of an entry in the catalogue of dissent, which the non-ideological intellectuals of the West used to recite pathetically yet lucidly. Monica Lovinescu, Seismograme: Unde Scurte II (Seismograms: Short waves 2) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1993), 8. The literature dedicated to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 is too consistent to be included in a footnote. For an early account by a native Hungarian, see Franois Fejt, Histoire des Dmocraties Populaires: Aprs Stalin (Paris: ditions du Seuil, 1969), 66-82. The Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution produced the postcommunist interpretation of the events, which became school textbook. For an English translation, see Gyrgy Litvn, ed., The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt, and Repression, 1953-1956 (London: Longman, 1996). An interesting collection of archival documents is Csaba Bks, Malcom Byrne, and Jnos M. Rainer, eds., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2002). Finally, a reappraisal forty years after, which included the entanglements with the other communist countries, is Jnos M. Rainer and Katalin Somlai, eds., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Soviet Bloc: Reactions and Repercussions (Budapest: The Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 2007). For a collection of archival documents on the events in 1956 in Romania, including notes of the secret police on the reaction of the population, as well as transcripts of the Politburo meetings, see Corneliu Lungu and Mihai Retegan, eds., 1956 Explozia: Percepii romne, iugoslave i sovietice asupra evenimentelor din Polonia i Ungaria (1956 The explosion: Romanian, Yugoslav and Soviet perceptions
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on the events in Poland and Hungary) (Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedic, 1996). On the student unrest in Timioara, see the memoirs of a leading participant in the events in Aurel Baghiu, Printre gratii (Through the bars) (Cluj-Napoca: Zamolxis, 1995). See also the oral testimonies included in Mihaela Sitariu, ed., Oaza de libertate: Timioara, 30 octombrie 1956 (The oasis of liberty: Timioara, 30 October 1956) (Iai: Polirom, 2004). Beside student revolts, writers debated on de-Stalinization in the field of culture. Its main advocate was Alexandru Jar, formerly a proponent of socialist realism. His attempt was a complete failure though, for only two other writers rallied round him, while others rather waited to see how the wind blew from the party leadership. Petre Pandrea, Memoriile mandarinului valah (The memoirs of the Wallachian mandarin) (Bucharest: Albatros, 2000), 86, 556-57 and 561-62. Vladimir Tismneanu, The Tragicomedy of Romanian Communism, in Ferenc Fehr and Andrew Arato, eds., Crisis and Reform in Eastern Europe (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1991), 121-74. Actually, post-1956 repression targeted larger segments of the population, but in particular the students who stirred revolts and the leading intellectuals, albeit not active during the Hungarian Revolution. For documents regarding the trial of a group of prominent interwar intellectuals, see Documentele procesului C. Noica, C. Pillat, Al. Paleologu, A. Acterian, S. Al-George, A. O. Teodoreanu (Documents of the trial of C. Noica, C. Pillat, Al. Paleologu, A. Acterian, S. Al-George, A. O. Teodoreanu) (Bucharest: Vremea, 1996). Romania was at odds with all the other communist countries in August 1968, for the party leadership and the society came closer than ever, while in the other countries the opposite happened: the communist elites orchestrated the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the societies disapproved it. Ceauescus speech which condemned the military invasion was probably the most spectacular manifestation of anti-Soviet nationalism in communist Romania, for it had an enormous impact on Romanians and conferred legitimacy to the single-party rule. In short, Ceauescu gave in August 1968 a proof of charisma and the communist party consolidated thus its image as defender of national interests against the Soviet Union. Among those who joined the communist party after Ceauescus electrifying balcony speech on 21 August 1968 was also Paul Goma. Even the famous Polish dissident
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10
11
12
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Adam Michnik confessed that in August 1968 the Poles admired Ceauescu and envied Romanians for having such a leader. This opinion was expressed in a TV talk show broadcast by a private channel during his visit in Romania in May 1997. For more on this, see Drago Petrescu, Continuity, Legitimacy and Identity: Understanding the Romanian August of 1968, Cuadernos de Historia Contempornea, Vol. 31 (2009), 69-88. A documented study on the emergence of Charter 77, including a prosopographical analysis and the reproduction of the main documents issued in the early years, is H. Gordon Skilling, Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981). For a later analysis, see Janusz Bugajsky, Czechoslovakia: Charter 77s Decade of Dissent (New York: Praeger, 1987). Adam Michniks The New Evolutionism is considered the pathbreaking essay which argued for gradual changes of the communist system, which could have only be achieved by reorganizing civil society and pressing constantly from below. This represented a radical switch in the strategy of the oppositional groups, which hitherto believed that really effective changes can be accomplished only from above, in association with the reformist wing of the party. The Brezhnev Doctrine though had destroyed all such hopes. For the Marxist revisionist attempts to implement reforms through the party-controlled state institutions failed, the only way to improve the system was to demand the enlargement of rights and liberties from outside the party. Adam Michnik, Letters from Prison and Other Essays (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). For a collection of crucial documents issued by dissident groups, see Gale Stokes, ed., From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documented History of Eastern Europe Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). The Workers Defense Committee (KOR) was established in 1976, after workers from factories in Radom and Ursus revolted against the communist regime. One year later, it was transformed into the Committee for Self-Defense (KSS). The most detailed history of KOR, authored by a former founding member, is Jan Jzef Lipski, KOR: A History of the Workers Defense Committee in Poland, 1976-1981 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). In February 1979, several intellectuals drafted at the request of a group of workers the charter of the first free trade union in communist Romania, which they entitled Sindicatul Liber al Oamenilor Muncii
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din Romnia (SLOMR). This document made reference in its preamble to the rights stipulated in domestic laws and the international guarantees of human rights signed by Romania. It also included other requests, such as the official recognition of unemployment, the improvement of the retirement system and of the working conditions, the abolition of voluntary labour during free time, the suppression of censorship. Emil Freund, Nascent Dissent in Romania, in Curry, ed., Dissent in Eastern Europe, 61-62. For a more comprehensive account on this Romanian attempt to create a free trade union, which included a chronology, the main documents issued by SLOMR, an interview with the founding member Vasile Paraschiv, and related comments, see LAlternative (Paris), Special issue Roumanie: Crise et repression (January 1983), 18-32. For comments regarding the emergence of Charter 77 and the usefulness of drafting a similar protest in Romania, see Cartea Alb a Securitii: Istorii Literare i Artistice, 1969-1989 (The White Book of the Securitate: Literary and Artistic Stories, 1969-1989) (Bucharest: Presa Romneas, 1996). It is interesting to note that, perhaps due to the experience of 1956, the secret police paid a particular attention to the Hungarian minority in Romania. According to an informative note of February 1977, one of the 34 intellectuals from Hungary who signed a letter of support with Charter 77 visited Cluj and encouraged the Romanian Hungarians to follow their example. The note also mentioned that most of his interlocutors were not enthusiastic and argued that it would be a useless and risky initiative. The two good but succinct accounts of the movement which Paul Goma initiated, both based on the documentation of the case published by the Romanian emigration in Paris, are Shafir, Romania Politics, Economics, Society, 168-72; and Deletant, Ceauescu and the Securitate, 235-42. The source of the former is the file of the Goma affair published by Virgil Tnase, while the latter used the issue of Limite (Limits), No. 24-25 (September 1977), which Virgil Ierunca edited and dedicated almost entirely to this subject. The latest edition of Gomas autobiographical volume on the events of 1977 also includes excerpts from his Securitate file, to which he added his comments. Gomas file comprised reports of the officer in charge with his case, who estimated that he might have been useful as informant not only because of this connections among other former political prisoners, but also because of the qualities he possessed. Yet, another note of 17 November 1969 mentioned that he refused to be
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attracted into collaboration. Goma, Culoarea curcubeului, 292-94, 297-98 and 303. For Paul Gomas account of his lived experience of August 1968, see Idem, Amnezia la romni (Amnezia to Romanians) (Bucharest: Litera, 1992), 53-55. Paul Goma, Camera de alturi (The adjoining room) (Bucharest: Editura pentru Literatur, 1968). One of the main characters of the latter novel dangerously resembled Elena Ceauescu, while the former volume focused on the theme of liberty, which the author presented as an idea that consumed a group of prisoners who tackled it obsessively during their term in jail until ended up as its prisoners. Novels about imprisonment (known as the novels of the obsessive decade) had been allowed for publication under Ceauescu, for they referred to the Gheorghiu-Dejs period and implicitly underlined that the repression of those years was long gone. Yet, most authors of these novels had never been imprisoned, so they described a fictional repression, while Goma experienced imprisonment directly. Paul Goma, Ostinato (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), translated also into French as Idem, La Cellule des librables (Paris: ditions Gallimard, 1971). The Romanian edition was published only after the collapse of communism as Idem, Ostinato (Bucharest: Univers, 1992). The story of this book made recently the subject of a TV documentary series, which is entitled Rezistena prin cultur. The documentary made no justice to the author, for the publication of this book represented much more than the so-called resistance through culture. While the proponents of this path avoided not only to praise the regime, but also to tackle delicate issues in order to be published in Romania, Goma defied the regime with a book that spoke about an inconvenient truth. http://www.mediafax.ro/cultura-media/un-documentar-despreromanul-ostinato-al-lui-paul-goma-marti-pe-tvr-cultural-9376136 (accessed 22 January 2013). On the complex of factors which contributed to the success of Gomas novels in the West, see Dumitru epeneag, Un romn n Paris (A Romanian in Paris) (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1993), 101, 104, 131, 165 and 170. The secret police registered a great failure with the publication of this novel, in spite of the fact that the border authorities managed to confiscate one version of the novel in January 1971 and the secret
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police made a careful reading of the book, as a note of 15 January 1971 illustrates. The book was though published several months later. The secret police followed attentively the reactions to the launch of Gomas book in western newspapers and among Romanian writers, while drafting plans of action to be taken in order to diminish the impact of the volume. Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 306-39. The so-called Theses of July 1971 are interpreted mostly as a reaction to Ceauescus visit to China (which took place shortly before the delivery of the above-mentioned speeches), and named accordingly the Romanian mini-cultural revolution. However, Ceauescus speeches of the late 1960s illustrate that his adversity to western influences, on the one hand, and the passion for everything national, on the other, had earlier roots. The visit to China might have only constituted the opportunity, but not the motive for isolating the Romanian culture from its western models of inspiration, which authors followed since the birth of literature in the Romanian language in the nineteenth century. Ceauescu did not express himself so bluntly; he only attacked cosmopolitanism as a manifestation of servility toward foreign creations and disregard for the local sources of inspiration. An inappropriate practice developed, comrades: to look only to what is produced elsewhere, abroad, to resort for any purpose only to imports. We are against self-abasement in front of everything that is foreign, against the derision of our language and of our nation. Nicolae Ceauescu, Propuneri de msuri pentru mbuntirea activitii politico-ideologice, de educare marxist-leninist a membrilor de partid, a tuturor oamenilor muncii 6 iulie 1971; Expunere la Consftuirea de lucru a activului de partid din domeniul ideologiei i al activitii politice i cultural-educative 9 iulie 1971 (Proposals of action for the improvement of the politicalideological activity, for the Marxist-Leninist education of party members and all working people 6 July 1971; Speech at the working meeting of the party aktiv in charge of the ideological domain and of the political and cultural-educational activities 9 July 1971) (Bucharest: Editura Politic, 1971), quotation at 48-49. For instance, during the Writers Union Conference of 22-24 May 1972, Goma was criticized by colleagues for the publication of the book abroad, for this only served his personal interests and not those of the guild, they claimed. Cartea Alb a Securitii, 35-40. A note of the secret police from 2 March 1977 illustrates that the invitation letter had been intercepted, but the officer in charge took
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the decision to let it arrive to destination (i.e. Goma) and approve his exit visa, because he believed that Gomas novel would no longer have the same impact in the West. Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 338-39. Paul Goma, Die Tr (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972), translated later into French as Idem, Elles taient quatre (Paris: ditions Gallimard, 1974). For the Romanian edition, see Idem, Ua noastr cea de toate zilele (Bucharest: Cartea Romneasc, 1992). Paul Goma, Gherla (Paris: ditions Gallimard, 1976). The Romanian version was published immediately after 1989 as Idem, Gherla (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1990). See Gomas own deposition when arrested in 1977, and the note of the secret police from 12 March, 1978, Cartea Alb a Securitii, 97-98. The group, which comprised among others Dumitru epeneag and Virgil Tnase, was rather marginal in the Writers Union. The secret police kept the group under surveillance and tried to disband the informal literary gatherings which they organized weekly. Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 377-82. Goma, epeneag and Tnase also drafted and planned to send abroad a collective letter of protest against the Theses of July 1971. Their plans were dropped though, since no other writer signed it apart from the three of them. See the note of the secret police regarding this failed attempt in Cartea Alb a Securitii, 130. In Paris, Dumitru epeneag was the editor of a literary journal, Cahiers de LEst, which published East-Central European writers who were banned in their own countries. Initially, this review was sponsored by the former Romanian diplomat Alexandru Cretzianu, who was the former ambassador of Romania to Ankara during the war, and who administered a huge fund exported under Marshal Antonescu in the idea of supporting a Romanian government in exile. In 1977, he decided to sponsor this review, but soon after was disappointed by the result. Considering that the texts were not anti-communist enough, he withdrew his financial support, so that the review continued with a minor publishing house in Paris. For critical comments on epeneags activity after emigration, see Monica Lovinescu, La apa Vavilonului 2, 1960-1980 (On the shore of Vavilon 2, 1960-1980) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2001), 168-70. Gomas personal account on the human rights movement of 1977 opens with the efforts he made to convince fellow writers to sign a letter of support for Charter 77 and registers the discouraging comments, which Bucharest-based members of the Writers Union expressed with regard to this idea. The quoted edition of his
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autobiographical novel includes also notes of the secret police on reactions to Charter 77 among writers, which confirm his version. Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 27-36 and 388-90, respectively. Fragments of the letter, in my translation: We are living in the same camp, in the same Biafra (capital: Moscow). You, Czechs and Slovaks, had a 1968, the Poles had a 1956, a 1971 and an ... always, the EastGermans had Berlin and Biermann. We, Romanians, do not have these landmarks. But suffering is not always proportional with the intensity of the revolt outcry. You (as the Poles, the East-Germans, the Hungarians and the Bulgarians) are living under Russian occupation; we, Romanians, are under Romanian occupation ultimately, more painful and more effective than a foreign one. But we live under the same yoke. ... The same lack of elementary rights, the same mockery of the individual, and the same shamelessness of lies [exists] everywhere. Everywhere: poverty, chaos in economy, demagogy, uncertainty, and terror. Paul Goma, Scrisori ntredeschise: Singur mpotriva lor (Semiopened letters: Alone against them) (Oradea: Multiprint, 1995), 56, and Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 30-31. As mentioned, the idea that Ceauescu refused to join the other WTO members in invading Czechoslovakia in August 1968 constituted a powerful legitimating tool for his rule. Until today, historical analyses of the period underline the moment when Ceauescu publicly condemned the invasion. Larry L. Watts, With Friends Like These: The Soviet Blocs Clandestine War against Romania (Bucharest: Editura Militar, 2010). However, Ceauescu did not actually decline Romanias participation, for he was never invited. Already during the preliminary talks for the WTO meeting scheduled to take place in Moscow at the end of 1968, the Romanian delegation manifested divergent opinions regarding the Six-Day War. Thus, Romania no longer participated in the last meetings before the invasion. As the participation of the satellite countries to the invasion in Czechoslovakia was symbolic and not crucial, the Soviets did not bother to call the Romanian army as well. See the testimony of Corneliu Mnescu, who was foreign minister at that time, in Betea, ed., Mnescu, 188-208. The complete version of this text is reproduced in Goma, Scrisori ntredeschise, 59, and Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 38-41. For fragments of this letter in English translation, see Deletant, Ceauescu and the Securitate, 237-38.
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This letter was signed by Goma, his wife, Ana Maria Nvodaru, and six other persons: Feher Adalbert, a worker; Gesswein Erwin, Gesswein Emilia, a couple of instrumentalists with the Bucharest Philharmonic Orchestra; Manoliu Maria, Manoliu Sergiu, mother and son, both painters; and tefnescu erban, a draftsman. OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/5/ Box 6, File Dissidents: Paul Goma. Fragments of the letter, in my translation: Rights guaranteed by domestic laws and international treaties which the governments of totalitarian states also ratified, i.e. the articles of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Romania which refer to civic rights (art. 17); the right to work (art. 18); the right to education (art. 21); the right to free association (art. 27); the freedom of speech, of press, of meetings and public demonstrations (art. 28); the freedom of thought (art. 30); the inviolability of the human beings (art. 31); and of private residence (art. 32); the secrecy of correspondence and phone conversations (art. 33); are not respected. At the same time, the right to the free circulation of human beings, ideas, information is not respected, while the right to citizenship is transformed into an obligation. ... We also consider that the extension of the principles of the non-interference into the domestic affairs to the sphere of the fundamental civic rights is unacceptable. Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 47-49, ACNSAS, File I 2217/5, 170r-170v. On the difference between RFE and VOA in terms of broadcasting policies, see Urban, Radio Free Europe, esp. 112-22. Mircea Carp, who was in 1977 the director of the Romanian Section of VOA and a person critical of Ceauescu, mentioned in his memoirs only one telling episode in the entries for 1977: the devastating earthquake of 4 March. There is no mentioning about Goma or the movement for human rights, although Carp actually visited Romania in 1977 to report on the effects of the earthquake. Mircea Carp, Vocea Americii n Romnia, 1969-1978 (Voice of America in Romania, 1969-1978) (Iai: Polirom, 1997), esp. 97-107. The internal debates regarding the broadcasting of Gomas letters by RFE are mentioned in Monica Lovinescu, La apa Vavilonului 2, 236-37. One day earlier, Ceauescu expressed himself during a meeting of the Political Executive Committee that the RCP had to take more resolute position against all these actions of some reactionary circles, of some press agencies, which try to divert attention from European security to minor problems, to the support for some even reactionary elements.
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For the transcript of the meeting of 16 February 1977, see ANIC, Fond CC of RCP Chancellery, File 12/1977, 3v-4r. See the virulent speech of Ceauescu against the unnamed traitors of the nation, in Nicolae Ceauescu, Cuvntare la Consftuirea pe ar a unitilor de control ale oamenilor muncii - 17 februarie 1977 (Speech at the national meeting of the working peoples control units 17 February 1977) (Bucharest: Editura Politic, 1977). Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 57-67. A plan of action of 11 February 1977 included the following: to positively influence (i.e. persuade to retract) Goma and the others around him, beginning with his wife and the other signatories of the collective letter (most notably the two Manolius); to disrepute Goma among other former political prisoners and fellow writers (in order to curtail the spread of this collective protest), to interrupt his channels of across-the-border communication, i.e. phone calls, contacts with journalists or diplomats (with a special mention to Etinne Dussart, who had actually sent the letters abroad). ACNSAS, File I 2217/4, 312-315. With this occasion, Negoiescu became formally an informant of the secret police, like many other individuals put in prison for political reasons, but he was later abandoned by the Securitate as not fit for the job. Reference to this episode can be found in Mirela Corlean, Pleu, agat n dosarul homosexualului Negoiescu (Pleu, entangled in gay Negoiescus file), Evenimentul zilei, 16 September 2010, http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/plesu-agatat-in-dosarul-homosexualuluinegoitescu-906065.html (accessed 7 March 2013). For a Romanian version of the letter, see Ion Negoiescu, n cunotin de cauz: Texte politice (Aware of the consequences: Political texts) (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1990), 13-18. As Negoiescu later on acknowledged in an interview to Die Welt, he thought that the goals of the protest must have been limited in order to achieve some results. As writers, the most natural thing was to ask first for the liberty of expression. From newly gained positions, it would have been then possible to go further and request for more rights. See this interview in Ibid., 26. Negoiescus account on his conversation with Bogza is included in Ibid., 33. Goma himself recalled that most of the writers expected to see what Bogza (or others equally central among writers) would do in order to decide what they would do. Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 25. That Goma was not the kind of person able to make others follow him, one can infer from the documents of the secret police regarding
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the discussions between his fellow writers at the time. Cartea Alb a Securitii, 100, and Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 388-90. Ion Vianu, Psihiatrie, antipsihiatrie, hiperpsihiatrie (Psychiatry, antipsychiatry, hyper-psychiatry), Viaa Romneasc (October 1976), 3447. See also Matei Clinescu and Ion Vianu, Amintiri n dialog (Memories in dialogue) (Bucharest: Litera, 1994), 197. Vianu continued to denounce this type of abuses after his emigration. Ion Vianu, Nous avons les moyens de vous gurir , LAlternative (Paris), No. 6 (September-October 1980), 9-10. This letter of solidarity with Goma was published in French as Ion Vianu, La mediocrite imbecile, LAlternative (Paris), Special issue Roumanie: Crise et repression (January 1983), 12. See also Clinescu and Vianu, Amintiri n dialog, 247. Actually, the highly pessimistic tone of the letter seemed as if announcing the coming of a period of profound economic crisis and malaise, which indeed came in the 1980s. Thus, many believed that nothing could be done in Romania, while the only escape was emigration to the West which, in Romanians perception, meant not only affluence, but also meritocracy. Paraschiv also authored a letter in which he explained the motives of his solidarity with Goma and the others who signed the collective protest against the violations of human rights in Romania. After this episode, he continued his peregrinations through various psychiatric hospitals and turned into a genuine symbol of this type of repression in Romania. He was repeatedly invited to western countries to testify about the treatment imposed by the communist regime on those who became troublesome. He always returned to Romania, although the authorities would have wanted him out of the country. In 1979, Paraschiv also signed the charter of the above-mentioned SLOMR. For more on his case of psychiatric internment, see LAlternative, No. 3 (March-April 1980), 59; No. 16-17 (May-August, 1982), 66-72; No. 19 (November-December 1982), 52; and La Nouvelle Alternative, No. 10 (June 1988), 35-37. For his post-communist accounts of his engagement in the Goma movement and SLOMR, his letter to Goma from his personal archive, as well as excerpts from his Securitate file, see Vasile Paraschiv, Lupta mea pentru sindicate libere n Romnia: Terorismul politic organizat de statul comunist (My struggle for free trade unions in Romania: Political terrorism organized by the communist state) (Iai: Polirom, 2005), esp. 47-49, 77-80 and 183-89.
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In order to enjoy the protection of some international organizations, Goma used all possible channels, including western journalists who succeeded in contacting him. In this way, he managed to transmit to RFE the names of all those who signed effectively or at least declared over the phone that they would like to join the protest. For this list of the signatories, see OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/5/Box 6, File Dissidents: Paul Goma. A report of 2 April 1977 indicated 192 as the number of those who actually joined Goma by 1 April 1977. ACNSAS, File I 2217/7, 205. This corresponds to a list dated August 1977, which included 192 names of persons who contacted Goma. ACNSAS, File I 2217/12, 169-176. Goma considered this list almost complete, with the exception of four or five persons, whom he remembered, but did not find on the list. Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 477-83. The data compiled by the secret police is problematic primarily because of the inconsistent use of phrases, but not only. A statistics of 1 April 1977 indicated that 430 persons had some sort of contact with the Bearded Man (au avut tangen cu Brbosul), while 192 represented showed-up individuals (elemente aprute). ACNSAS, File File I 2217/7, 81-83. Reference to this statistics is also included in Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 410-12. A later report of 20 April 1977 stated that 427 had supported Gomas actions (au susinut aciunea lui Paul Goma), out of which 232 until 1 April, the date of his arrest, and 195 after. ACNSAS, File I 2217/10, 41v. A much later report of 1980, entitled A history of the problem the inimical activity of some persons from the field of art and culture stipulated that 431 persons contacted Goma directly, by post or by phone, either to know him or to sign the letter (pentru a-l cunoate, semna ori adera la scrisoarea trimis Conferinei de la Belgrad), out of whom only 20 were from among writers and artists (din sectoarele creaiei literar-artistice). Florica Dobre et al., Securitatea: Structuri/cadre, obiective i metode (Securitatea: Structures/cadres, objectives and methods), vol. II: 1967-1989 (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedic, 2006), 525. ACNSAS, File I 2217/7, 81-83. Gomas daily notes also suggested the great diversity of the signatories, although he made special mentions about intellectuals and former political prisoners. Successive lists of the secret police, which include information about the place of residence and some data about the profession of the signatories, were preserved in many volumes of his file. See also Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 130-64.
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This was the case with the two Manolius who eventually immigrated to France and settled in Paris. Their emigration seemed to have been conditioned by the acceptance to assist the secret police in its actions which were destined to discredit Goma. Therefore, both started once in Paris to persuade the other Romanian migrs that Goma was a dangerous Soviet agent, who was not worthy of their support. Monica Lovinescu, La apa Vavilonului 2, 254. This was the case of journalist Neculai Constantin Munteanu, who would become later one of the most popular broadcasters of RFE. In the late 1980s, Romanians used to listen to his caustic comments which he delivered in the framework of the program Actualitatea Romneasc (The Romanian Actuality). This program began with a well-known tune from the works of the Romanian composer George Enescu. When one entered a block of flats around 19:00, the time when the program started, one could hear that tune coming out of most apartments, this author remembers. Interesting to add is that Neculai Constantin Munteanu accepted the deal offered by the secret police, which promised him an exit visa in exchange for refraining from a public association with Goma via RFE, as he seemed to have intended. Neculai Constantin Munteanu, Ultimii apte ani de-acas: Un ziarist n dosarele Securitii (The last seven years from home: A journalist in the files of the Securitate) (Bucharest: Curtea Veche, 2007). Negoiescu, n cunotin de cauz, 13. Cartea Alb a Securitii, 130. Yet, it should be noted that not all those who requested to emigrate were allowed to. Some testimonies indicate that there were individuals beaten until they retracted the request. See the letter of a German woman from the commune of Giarmata, near Timioara, in OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/5/ Box 6, File Dissidents: Paul Goma. As mentioned in the introduction, this is the main thesis of Deletant, Ceauescu and the Securitate. His argument is confirmed by the institutional policy of the secret police as reflected in its archives and other printed material. For instance, the editorial team of the quarterly Securitatea a periodical classified as secret and destined for the internal use of the secret police included in the programmatic article of the first issue Ceauescus directives for their institution: according to the party leader, the Securitate had to prevent, discover and annihilate all the hostile actions against the social and state order. n sprijinul muncii de securitate (In support of the security work), Securitatea, No. 1 (1968),
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http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/periodicul_securitatea/Securitatea%201 968-1-01.pdf (accessed 15 February 2013). The protest helped many people to get permission not only to emigrate but also to visit western countries for professional purposes. Dan Deliu, a poet who only later turned into a critique of the communist regime, characterized the movement for human rights which Goma initiated in the following terms: Goma is an impostor, but due to this pseudo-colleague, my wife got quickly a passport. Cartea Alb a Securitii, 104. Although it signed the Helsinki Accords, the Romanian communist regime modified the internal policy of granting passports to those who received western scholarships or invitations to conferences. Accordingly, the approval of the local party organization (to which the applicant was affiliated) became mandatory. Thus, only few applications arrived at the passport section of the Ministry of the Interior, so the cases of refusal of an exit visa were officially not numerous. Vlad Georgescu, Politic i istorie: Cazul comunitilor romni, 1944-1977 (Politics and history: The case of Romanian communists, 1944-1977) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1990), 91-92. Other methods of containing the spread of the Goma movement among writers are illustrated by the debates in the meetings of the Writers Union regarding the unpleasant possibility to have the right of its members to contract long term loans suspended. All members of the Writers Union could apply for long term loans, which were distributed from a special fund, the so-called Literary Fund. To have an idea about the amount of money borrowed by some writers, one can consider Gomas case: the writer was indebted to the Fund with 70,000 lei, which was the equivalent of a Dacia car. Since most of the writers used to get immense loans (as compared with the average income), all became worried about such an unpleasant perspective and left aside any favourable comments about Gomas protest. For more on the writers privileges under communism, see Ioana Macrea-Toma, Privilighenia: Instituii literare n comunismul romnesc (Priviligentsia: Cultural institutions in Romanian communism) (Cluj-Napoca: Casa Crii de tiin, 2009). A report of the interior minister Ion Coman of 2 April 1977 mentioned that militia initiated an investigation on Ion Negoiescu, who was known as a homosexual and as the author of an open letter to Goma. ACNSAS, File I 2217/7, 225v. A note of 4 April stated that criminal proceedings against Negoiescu had been initiated one day before, and
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mentioned that he was a sexual deviant, who used to corrupt young people (even minors) to practice homosexuality. ACNSAS, File I 2217/7, 346. For excerpts from other files of the Securitate with testimonies of that time on Negoiescus sexual deviance, as well as recently expressed recollections on the methods used then by the secret police to turn against the literary critic young writers from his immediate entourage, see Mirela Corlean, Petru Romoanu: Drama unei turntorii cu homosexuali (Petru Romoanu: The drama of a gay collaboration [with the Securitate]), Evenimentul zilei, 1 September 2010, http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/petru-romosan-drama-uneiturnatorii-cu-homosexuali-904738.html (accessed 7 March 2013). Negoiescus article was published under the title Despre patriotism (About patriotism) in Romnia literar, 14 April 1977. For Burtics political career, see CNSAS, Membrii CC al PCR, 19451989: Dicionar (The members of the CC of the RCP, 1945-1989: A dictionary) (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedic, 2004), 121-22. The intention to use Breban in order to positively influence Goma was envisaged from the very beginning, as the plan of action from 11 February 1977 illustrates. ACNSAS, File I 2217/4, 313. The case of Nicolae Breban stirred one of the fiercest post-communist controversies over the meaning of the collaboration with the Securitate as it appears from the files of this institution. After 1989, he managed to build a reputation for his novels and impose himself as one of the best writers in contemporary Romanian literature. Moreover, he was taken as a champion of the resistance through culture strategy and an alleged opponent of Ceauescus cultural policies due to his critical interview of 1971. When his collaboration with the Securitate became public, several literary critics and journalists defended Breban, stirring a debate which echoed the controversy about the relation between artistic creativity and moral conduct. Many defended him and emphasized that an individual should be remembered for his entire life and work, and not only for the collaboration with an infamous institution. The debate was published as Scriitorii i Securitatea (Writers and the Securitate), Observator Cultural, No. 574, 13 May 2011, http://www.observatorcultural.ro/Scriitorii-siSecuritatea*articleID_25307-articles_details.html (accessed 16 May 2012). A different and critical approach to the possibility of writing something worthwhile on the basis of a life experience of collaboration with the secret police (which implicitly questions the validity of resistance through culture) is expressed in Horaiu Pepine, Nicolae Breban i
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crile bolnave (Nicolae Breban and the sick books), Deutsche Welle, 7 April 2011, http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,6496841,00.html (accessed 16 May 2012). Critical comments on Breban, whom the author took for an agent of Ceauescus regime a decade before CNSAS uncovered his collaboration with the secret police, see in Lovinescu, La apa Vavilonului 2, 171-73. For the two (often conflicting) versions of the events, see Nicolae Breban, Confesiuni violente: Dialoguri cu Constantin Iftime (Violent confessions: Dialogues with Constantin Iftime) (Bucharest: DU Style, 1994), and Goma, Culoarea curcubeului, 75-93. ACNSAS, File I 2217/7, 80v. Gomas article, which was entitled Pmnt de flori (Soil for flowers), was published also in Romnia literar, 24 March 1977. Historian Florin Constantiniu considered this article as a command from the authorities which wanted to illustrate that the entire country, from the secretary general to the dissident, united to confront this calamity. Florin Constantiniu, O istorie sincer a poporului romn (A sincere history of the Romanian people) (Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedic, 1997), 518. For example, Peter Osnos wrote in Washington Post of 25 February 1977, and the RFE broadcast excerpts from this article which quoted Goma with the following: They [i.e. the Romanian authorities] closed my mouth very efficiently but without using violence. The author then explained to his readership that Goma did not want to suggest that the Romanian communist regime was liberal, for it was clearly not, but that it treated troublesome intellectuals and other discontented people in a peculiar Romanian way, which envisaged flexibility and pragmatism as much as repression. These excepts were included in a note on Goma, which Direction I of the Ministry of the Interior addressed to the Direction of Criminal Investigation of the same institution on 16 April 1977, ACNSAS, File I 2217/9, 233r-234v, quotation at 233v. For Burtics version, who claimed he was of good faith when trying to negotiate with Goma, and did not know that the secret police prepared for harsher action regardless of the negotiations, see Rodica Chelaru, ed., Culpe care nu se uit: Convorbiri cu Cornel Burtic (Faults one cannot forget: Conversations with Cornel Burtic) (Bucharest: Curtea Veche, 2001), 110-12. A plan of action from 17 March 1977 included operations of intimidation and discouragement, among which featured permanent
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harassment through phone calls, menacing letters, hostile persons, etc., in parallel with efforts to defame Goma by manipulating the western press, the personnel of western embassies and even the RFE broadcasters. ACNSAS, File I 2217/6, 109-112; also reproduced in Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 397-402. For the transcript of the meeting of 30 March 1977, see ANIC, Fond CC of RCP - Chancellery, File 42/1977, 1-5. A note signed by Ion Hobana, secretary of the Writers Union, mentioned the motives of the expulsion: His actions are incompatible with the commitment of our literary battlefront for the ideological program of the party. ... The novels published by Goma abroad without legal approval are notable because of their hostile political stance [towards the regime], scandalous [attitude] and bad taste, and not because of their high literary value. Paul Goma does not see anything good in our socialist society, which was built with such efforts by the Romanian people under the leadership of the party. The transcript of the Writers Union meeting of 13 April 1977, during which Gomas expulsion was voted, is reproduced in Cartea Alb a Securitii, 103. A note of the secret police from 20 April 1977 mentioned other writers who took a stance against Goma, whom they considered a mediocrity who disgraced the writers guild, an instrument manipulated from the outside in order to create tensions inside. Victor Tulbure made himself remarked with the statement that Goma was a butler of RFE who gathered around him a pathetic handful of societal wretches. ACNSAS, File I 2217/7, 41r-41v. A report of the interior minister Ion Coman from 3 March 1977 mentioned the efforts made in order to neutralize the actions of the reactionary circles from abroad, of the treacherous and legionary-fascists elements, which RFE reactivated, and of other persons who initiate and carry out activities hostile to our socialist order and included Ion Vianu among the 12 persons who had been put into the debate of the working collective. ACNSAS, File I 2217/7, 225-226. See also Cartea Alb a Securitii, 100. Clinescu and Vianu, Amintiri n dialog, 203. The interior minister Ion Coman had taken one day before the arrest, on 31 March 1977, the decision to initiate criminal proceedings against Goma for charges of treason and propaganda against the socialist order. ACNSAS, File I 2217/7, 53-54. Cartea Alb a Securitii, 99-100. Notes of the interrogators mentioned Gomas statements in the following terms: Goma recognized that he
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was in contact with persons (elemente in orig.) from the reactionary emigration, to whom he had been introduced during the trip abroad in 1972-1973. Among these persons are the following legionaries: Emil Cioran and Virgil Ierunca. He also recognized that during the abovementioned period he had met in Paris Pierre Emmanuel, the president of the so-called International Association for the Freedom of Culture who was unmasked by the French press as CIA agent, and whom Goma had addressed in order to publish several writings hostile to our country. ... At his domicile, various fascist writings were found during the search and confiscated; among these there were three which the legionary emigration issued. At the same time, the Securitate spread rumors that Goma was an anti-Semite who was though manipulated by the Jews of RFE. ACNSAS, File 2217/9, 106r-108v. For the chronology of the events which the Romanian emigration organized in Paris for Gomas support, see Lovinescu, Seismograme, 258. Actually, the Paris emigration had mobilized itself in the name of human rights a year before, in defense of poet Ben Corlaciu. He decided to ask for political asylum in France, and wanted his family be allowed to leave Romania as well. Thus, he started in the fall of 1976 together with several others a hunger strike on Esplanade de la Trocadro, which was nicknamed the Esplanade of human rights. Since the free circulation of persons was a fundamental right, and in lack of other mobilizing objectives, some Paris-based members of the emigration considered his cause noble enough to worth fighting for. This was at least an opportunity to draw the attention upon the domestic abuses of Ceauescus regime. Lovinescu, La apa Vavilonului 2, 223-56. For the program which the director of the Romanian section of RFE dedicated to Paul Goma, see Noel Bernard, Aici e Europa Liber (This is the Radio Free Europe) (Bucharest: Tinerama, 1991), 83-84. Actually, Goma benefited from the general amnesty with the occasion of the anniversary of one hundred years since the declaration of Romanias independence from the Ottoman Empire. ACNSAS, File I 2217/10, 253-255 and 287r-287v; Cartea Alb a Securitii, 109. ACNSAS, File I 2217/11, 266r-267v; Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 463-66. In response to Gomas application, a top secret report with two different endings was presented to Lieutenant General Iulian Vlad, at
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that time secretary of state in the Ministry of the Interior. One variant envisaged the initiation of criminal proceedings against Goma and his arrest, while the other the approval of the exit visa requested by him. ACNSAS, File I 2217/ 12, 237-239; Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 492-94. This was the recommendation of the interior minister Ion Coman and his prime-deputy Nicolae Plei, as a note of 19 December 1977 illustrated. Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 537. For the report of the secret police on Gomas activities since his release from prison, which included the proposal to grant him and his family exit visas, as well a detailed plan of action from 29 September 1977, which included various activities to be carried out after emigration in order to disgrace the objective the Bearded Man in front of the people of culture, journalists, circles of the reactionary emigration and of RFE, see ACNSAS, File 2217/12, 244r-246v; also reproduced in Goma, Culoarea Curcubeului, 495-98. For the personal account of the victim, see Lovinescu, La apa Vavilonului 2, 249-51. Pacepa stated that Ceauescu used for this job officers in the Palestine Liberation Organization. Pacepa, Red Horizons, 35. For Gomas account of the events that followed his emigration, see Paul Goma, Chass-crois (Paris: Hachette, 1983), translated into Romanian as Idem, Soldatul cinelui (The dogs soldier) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1990). This revolt opened a new period of relatively high workers unrest, at least in comparison to the 1960s and the early 1970s. Between 1977 and 1989, 13 strikes are documented at this stage of research. From this number, three took place in the mining industry, two in the petrochemical sector, and the rest in the manufacturing, especially machine building, industry. See the table compiled by Petrescu, A Threat from Below, 165-68. Some of the participants to the workers strike of August 1977 also wrote a letter to RFE, in which they not only described their actions and goals, but also announced their decision to join in this way (i.e. via the announcement of RFE) the collective protest which Goma had initiated. LAlternative (Paris), Special issue Roumanie: Crise et repression (January 1983), 13-14. A summary of an eyewitness account, which advanced the figure of 30,000 to 35,000 participants, can be found in OSA/RFE, Romanian Fond, Unit 300/60/1/837, Item 1750/86. See also Deletant, Ceauescu
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and the Securitate, 243-45. New testimonies related to the strike of 1977 are gathered in Mihai Barbu and Gheorghe Chirvas, eds., Dup douzeci de ani sau Lupeni 77 Lupeni 97 (Twenty years after or Lupeni 77 Lupeni 97) (Petroani: Cotidianul Matinal & Cameleonul, 1997); Ioan Velica and Drago tefan Velica, Lupeni 77, laboratorul puterii (Lupeni 1977, the laboratory of power) (Deva: Polidava, 2002); Mihai Barbu and Marian Boboc, eds., Lupeni 77: Sfnta Varvara versus tanti Varvara (Lupeni 1977: Saint Varvara vs. auntie Varvara) (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Fundaiei pentru Studii Europene, 2005); Marian Boboc and Mihai Barbu, Strict secret: Lupeni 1977 Filajul continu (Secret: Lupeni 1977 The surveillance continues) (Craiova: Editura MJM, 2007). Drago Petrescu estimated that the number of participants must have been smaller, based on the assumption that from the total number of 23,527 employees in all mines in the Jiu Valley, only the workers from the outgoing night shift and the ingoing morning shift could have barricaded themselves in the mine. Petrescu, Explaining the Romanian Revolution of 1989, 345. The Law 3/1977, which the Grand National Assembly approved during the session of 30 June-1 July 1977, stipulated the modification of the retirement age from fifty to fifty-five, and of the working day from six to eight hours. At the same time, some benefits for sick or disabled persons were reduced or even cancelled. OSA/RFE archives, Romanian Fond, Unit 300/60/1/Box 837, Item 1750/86, 572. See also the version slightly modified after the strike, Buletinul Oficial, No. 82, 6 August 1977, http://www.legex.ro/Legea-3-1977-625.aspx (accessed 11 February 2013). It is worth noting that this strike had the characteristics of a mature working-class protest: a leadership was established from the outset; the workers barricaded themselves in the mine, elected a leadership, organized a round-the-clock sit-down strike; and prepared a list of demands. It is interesting to note that the miners invited Ceauescu on the spot to negotiate with them. This indicates that the working class still believed in his good faith. Petrescu, Workers and PeasantWorkers, 127. Miners demands included the restoration of the former benefits annulled by the new law, as well as some requests regarding the establishment of a light industry in the region, which would have provided working places for women; the improvement of food supplies and medical care in the region; the creation of workers commissions that would sanction managers decisions. They also asked for a signed agreement that no further repressive action would be taken against the
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protesters and for an adequate coverage of the strike in the media. After a delegation led by the chairman of the Central Council of Workers Control over Economic and Social Activity, Ilie Verde, failed to appease the miners, Ceauescu came to the mine and promised to satisfy all the demands, putting an end to the strike. Indeed, some of the demands were met, but the ringleaders were forcibly moved to other regions, and remained under the surveillance of the secret police. Deletant, Ceauescu and the Securitate, 246. Vladimir Socor, Transylvanian Hungarian Underground Press on Social Problems and Strikes: Romanian Situation Report/2-6 March 1987, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/1/ Box 837. During the working meeting in which the Central Committee analyzed the causes of the strike, the participants used euphemistic language to refer to the strike and thus spoke about problems in the organization of work which the local party leadership failed to solve. For the transcript of the meeting of the Central Committe of the RCP on 4 August 1977, see ANIC, Fond CC of RCP Chancellery, File 91/1977, 1-7. For the report of 17 November 1977 regarding the action Riposte II, which had the purpose of counterbalancing the intentions of emigration among Romanians, see Dobre et al., Securitatea: Structuri/cadre, obiective i metode, vol. II, 449-54. This center had to collect data regarding the persons who were currently under surveillance from the local branches of the secret police, paying a special attention to those with reactionary political antecedents and to the former political prisoners. In this way, all pieces of information about such potentially problematic persons could be not only centralized, but also put at the disposal of all the other local branches. For the order of the Ministry of the Interior from 25 May 1977 with regard to the instructions for the reorganization of Securitate evidences, see Oprea, ed., Banaliatea rului: O istorie a Securitii n documente, 433-45. ACNSAS, File I 2217/7, 161-162. Drawing from the experience of the Goma movement, the periodical of the secret police reanalyzed the activity of RFE through the lenses of their work of preventing internal unrest. Major L. Timaru, Europa liber trecut, prezent i viitor (Radio Free Europe past, present and future), Securitatea, No. 2 (1977), 72-76, http://www.cnsas.ro/ documente/periodicul_securitatea/Securitatea%201977-2-38.pdf (accessed 11 February 2013); Cu referire la relaiile cetenilor romni
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cu diferite posturi de radio capitaliste (On Romanian citizens relations with various capitalist radio agencies), Securitatea, No. 1 (1978), 38-49, http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/periodicul_securitatea/Securitatea%2 01978-1-41.pdf (accessed 11 February 2013). Although actual proofs do not exist, it is believed that Ceauescu was behind the suspicious death of several directors of the Romanian section of RFE. The war of the Romanian communist regime against RFE intensified after 1977, once this agency became more popular among Romanians due to its implication in covering the aftermath of the earthquake, as well as the anti-regime revolts of that year. Mihnea Berindei and Gabriel Andreescu, Ultimul deceniu comunist: Scrisori ctre radio Europa Liber (The last communist decade: Letters to Radio Free Europe), vol. I (Iai: Polirom, 2010). The actions of the secret police against RFE were part of the so-called operation Melia, rebaptized Eterul after the Securitate general Pacepa defected in 1978. Their goal was to destroy the channels of communication with this agency, neutralize its impact among its audience, and infiltrate secret agents among its personnel. Mihai Pelin, Operaiunile Melia i Eterul: Istoria Europei Libere prin documente de Securitate (Operations Melia and Eterul: The history of Radio Free Europe through documents of the Securitate) (Bucharest: Compania, 2007). For this plan of action, which defines these four categories of enemies and the operations to be undertaken in order to hamper them to act against the security of the communist state, see Securitatea, No. 4 (1978), 5-9, http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/periodicul_securitatea/ Securitatea%201978-4-44.pdf (accessed 17 February 2013). Gomas autobiographical novels were though among the first to be published in Romania after 1989, while many Romanians regarded his protest as the moment when a Havel could have emerged in this country too. Since it did not, the situation in the country deteriorated heavily in the 1980s and continued to deteriorate during the transition, many argued. Such comments are summarized in Alina MungiuPippidi, La noi, Havel ar fi pierdut alegerile (To us, Havel would have lost the elections), and Eec comunitar i eec naional (The failure of the community and the failure of the nation) in Idem, Romnia: Mod de folosire (Romania: Instructions for use) (Bucharest: Staff, 1994), 9-11, and 71-73. See the collection of the review 22 (Bucharest), especially No. 34 (1990), No. 14, 15, 16 (1992) and No. 26, 27, 28 (1997). See also Paul Goma, Jurnal (Diary), 3 vols. (Bucharest: Nemira, 1997).
CHAPTER 3
Border Revisionism vs. Minority Rights

Hungarian Dissent in Romania*
The rights of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania were among the issues which were never tackled publicly under Ceauescu, for he took Romanians, Hungarians, Germans, and other national groups as equal partners in building the so-called socialist nation. Yet, the communist regime in Bucharest was ideologically grounded in the most organic blend of communism and nationalism in the entire Soviet bloc. While official discourses never expressed xenophobia, members of the Hungarian community in Transylvania criticized Ceauescus silent policy of assimilation which targeted minority groups. It was from among this minority group that one of the most virulent criticisms of the Romanian communist regime emerged in the early 1980s, at a time when the majority group was mostly compliant. A taboo before the collapse, this problem surfaced in the post-communist public sphere, and stirred not only fierce societal debates, but also political controversies, while the Hungarian Democratic Union in Romania (HDUR) turned into the advocate of minority rights. Moreover, the reluctance manifested by politicians as well as
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common individuals to accept that minorities should enjoy a nondiscriminatory treatment represented one of the causes that delayed the democratic consolidation. However, Romania managed to avoid the fate of the neighboring post-1989 Yugoslavia, for the political and societal cleavages in early post-communism did not separate Romanians from Hungarians, but neo-communists from pro-Europeans.1 On the one side, there was the party of the former communist bureaucrats, the National Salvation Front (NSF), and its numerous supporters; they were not only reluctant to implement the legal, political and economic changes necessary for the democratization of the country, but also unwilling to satisfy the demands of the Hungarian community in their entirety. On the other, there was the political and civic opposition, which grouped together the remnants of the so-called historical parties and public intellectuals, former dissidents included. This rather loose group championed not only a fast and complete return to Europe, but also acknowledged that minority groups should enjoy all the rights that guaranteed their cultural reproduction. Until the electoral revolution of 1996, the refusal of the neocommunists to create the legal frame for the protection of minorities was perceived as a one of the most powerful and enduring legacies of Romanian national communism. Taken as a manifestation of outdated nationalism, if not of sheer xenophobia, this failure to comply with international requirements ranked high among the factors that contributed to Romanias belated integration into Europe. The emergence of a coalition between the so-called democratic opposition and HDUR in the mid-1990s prevented a political and societal cleavage along ethnic lines. The association of minority rights with the drive to democratization did not solve immediately the societal tensions between Romanians and Hungarians. Nevertheless, it avoided bloody ethnic conflicts, for it allowed the dialogue between those individuals in both communities who were willing to leave behind the communist
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legacy of mutual distrust. This chapter concentrates on Hungarian dissent in communist Romania. Since this kind of dissident discourse addressed almost exclusively the rights of this ethnic minority, the analysis highlights first the origins of this RomanianHungarian controversy. This chapter covers perspectives from both sides of the national border, as well as entanglements between the two communist countries. Thus, it looks at both societal and communist elite levels in the two neighboring states and illustrates their cross-border mutual influence. Accordingly, the first part reviews the evolution of official perspectives on postwar border settlement and its consequences in both communist countries. The second and third parts focus on the perspectives of dissidents in Romania and Hungary, respectively, and highlight their influence upon political elites. Briefly put, this chapter argues that the Romanian-Hungarian polemic evolved due to dissidents in both countries from a dispute over territories (as it used to be since the Treaty of Trianon) into a controversy over the internal and international recognition of minority rights.
From Border Revision to Minority Protection

Nationalist issues were not entirely absent from communist politics. This is all the more true for Romania, which had significant minority groups that were not expelled after the war (as in other countries). The source of these problems originated in the province of Transylvania, which was returned to Romania (and not to Hungary) due to the backing of the Soviet Union. This border settlement was meant to support the Romanian communists political dominance, provided that they granted equal rights to ethnic minorities, which constituted a significant part of the population in this region and a majority group in the party after the takeover of power. However, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 determined the communist
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leadership in Bucharest to slowly but steadily deprive of substance the rights granted after 1945. Against the association of Romanian communist nationalism solely with Ceauescus rule, this author illustrates that it was Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej who initiated the policies related to this ideological turn. As argued before, Ceauescu was only capable to continue the political line opened by his predecessor, but not to adapt it to new circumstances.2 The emergence of the Helsinki process of international cooperation, which stipulated the recognition of the existing borders by the thirty-five participating states, radically transformed the object of the Romanian-Hungarian dispute from a conflict on borders into one on minority rights. This did not occur because the Romanian communists felt more secure once Hungary officially accepted the postwar frontiers with the signing of the Final Act of 1975. This happened because the Helsinki process offered the Hungarian minority in Transylvania the opportunity to internationalize its problems and strengthened Hungarys position on this issue. Since the end of the First World War, Transylvania has continuously stood in the center of the Romanian-Hungarian relations even when not explicitly mentioned. In the interwar period, the bilateral relations between the two countries were practically non-existent. The trauma provoked by the Treaty of Trianon was so powerful in Hungary that integral revisionism shaped the external policy agenda of all political parties.3 At the same time, politicians in Greater Romania paid little attention to the problems of the Hungarian community, although the peace treaties included not only new frontiers but also new obligations regarding the protection of minorities.4 With policies so much opposed, neither Hungary nor Romania was interested in resuming interstate relations. During the Second World War, the two countries found themselves on the same side. However, Transylvania separated their interests, for the Second Vienna Award of 1940 had granted Hungary back a part of this region,
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while Romania continued to administer the rest. Thus, the two countries competed with each other for obtaining the control over the entire region as a reward granted by Hitler for their contribution to the war effort. Romania switched sides on 23 August 1944, while Hungary remained Germanys last ally. Nevertheless, after the war both countries found themselves once again in the same camp as satellites of the Soviet Union. The communists who came to power in East-Central Europe were supposed to bring into politics a fresh internationalist view, which would have solved the old nationalist disputes over borders under the patronage of the Soviet Union. However, pax sovietica was established through terror and painful population exchanges.5 An exception was Transylvania, where the border dispute was decided in favor of Romania, while no forceful migration of the Hungarians from this region was imposed. At the same time, the positions of the Romanian and Hungarian communists on the issue of Transylvania were only apparently internationalist, while in essence remained nationalist. A detailed analysis of the circumstances in which the entire Transylvania returned under the Romanian administration with the backing of the Soviet Union is beyond the scope of the present chapter. However, the role the national question deserves some elaboration, for the approach taken by the communist elites in both countries on the border controversy gives one an idea about their patterns of thought and action. Prior to the Second World War, the view of the RCP totally opposed the dominant and nationalist political discourse on Greater Romania, for communists regarded it as the construction of the imperialist bourgeoisie, which created a multinational state by occupying foreign territories of predominantly non-Romanian character. Consequently, the communist party asserted itself as the leading force which supported the self-determination of those oppressed nations to the point of advocating secession from Greater Romania.6 This anti-nationalist view corresponded to the
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Soviet interest in maintaining its influence on territories such as Bessarabia, where intense propaganda promoted the idea that the Moldovans from this region constituted a different nation which the Romanians had always oppressed.7 Regarding Transylvania though, the Romanian communists took a different position than in the case of Bessarabia. For the Soviet interests were nil there, the RCP condemned immediately the Second Vienna Award of 1940 as an imperialist dictate, and put the blame for that territorial loss on the bourgeois political elite.8 This territorial change under the tutelage of Nazi Germany shaped the Romanian and Hungarian communists strategies of revisionism not only during the war, but also when its end could be envisaged, for both found themselves competing for the support of the Soviet Union. Both communist parties realized that their popularity was highly dependent of the final settlement of borders. Leaving aside their internationalist allegiance, the Hungarian and Romanian communists tried hard at the time to get Moscows backing for a convenient territorial arrangement. The Hungarian communists hoped that some justice would be done and they would get, if not the entire Transylvania back, at least a larger share from it. Hungarys heavy territorial losses had been a direct result of losing the First World War, while the neighbors managed to be on the winning side. This time, both countries fought in the same coalition. Nevertheless, Romania switched sides before the end of the war, while Hungary failed to do this. This was the reason that determined Stalin to promise the Romanian communists that the entire Transylvania would be incorporated into Romania. Interesting though were the arguments used in front of the Soviet leader by the delegation of Romanian communists, which included Gheorghiu-Dej, Ana Pauker and Gheorghe Apostol. Leaving aside the thesis that supported the secession from Greater Romania on the basis of self-determination, they made use of arguments from the nationalist historical
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repertoire. Accordingly, they referred to the short-lived union of Transylvania with Moldavia and Wallachia under the medieval ruler Michael the Brave to support their case.9 At the same time, Hungarian sources maintain that the Soviet leader acted like Hitler and pushed the two communist leaderships to compete with each other for Transylvania. At a meeting in Budapest in 1945, a Soviet representative allegedly told the local communists that the entire region would belong to the country where the communists would take over power first.10 In short, each of the two communist leaderships struggled hard to convince the Soviet Union to solve this border dispute in its favor.11 Both inherited from the bourgeois predecessors this highly sensitive problem and both were aware of the fact that their chances to obtain and maintain the political control over their countries depended heavily on the postwar territorial settlement. Only two days after taking over power, the first communistdominated government of Petru Groza officially asked Stalin on 8 March 1945 to transfer the administration of Transylvania into Romanian hands. The Soviet leader approved the Romanian request next day, provided that the new government assumed the responsibility to restore order and guarantee rights for the ethnic minorities.12 Once the Soviet Union approved their request, the party leadership was indeed primarily concerned with the Hungarian unrest in Transylvania and looked for solutions that would assure them the votes of this minority community. The Romanian communists did their best to assure the Hungarians (who still hoped for a more favorable border settlement until the peace treaties were signed) that the postwar allegedly democratic Romanian state would guarantee them equal rights with the majority group.13 This is not to say that Romanian communists were better defenders of national interests than previously credited. They simply approached the so-called national question more
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pragmatically and less ideologically than reflected in the post-1989 commonplace interpretation of the recent past. The period following the communist takeover is remembered even today by some Hungarians in Romania as a sort of golden age. The Groza government guaranteed the political rights (albeit these were no longer meaningful) and cultural rights (such as the use of the Hungarian language in schools) that the Hungarian Popular Union requested. Moreover, the agrarian reform implemented by this government made no discrimination among ethnic groups.14 The Constitution of 1952, which represented the first to stipulate the leading role of the communist party in politics, also legalized an administrative reform on the Soviet model. This envisaged the establishment of the Hungarian Autonomous Region in the Transylvanian areas inhabited almost exclusively by Hungarians.15 At the same time, this constitution specified that the laws of the Romanian Popular Republic and the decisions made by the central authorities were obligatory on the territory of that region too. Thus, the real autonomy was severely restricted, to say nothing of the fact that the local elections were as fictitious as all other elections organized by the communists.16 Following the adoption of the Constitution of 1952, the Hungarian Popular Union (which had been not only the long-term companion of Romanian communists, but also the defender of its minority community) dissolved itself.17 In short, the autonomous status of the Hungarian Autonomous Region under communism was purely fictitious.18 However, the dismemberment of this political organization would represent later, under Ceauescu, a source of criticism for Romanian Hungarian dissidents. Pax sovietica was supposed to put an end to the competing nationalisms in the region in the name of internationalism, but it succeeded only in concealing the problems temporarily. After the Revolution of 1956, the tensions between the two countries surfaced again. Although Transylvania was part of postwar
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Romania, the specter of a potential new border settlement under the patronage of the Soviet Union never ceased to haunt the communist elite in Bucharest. The role of the RWP in helping the Soviet leaders to suppress the Hungarian Revolution is common knowledge.19 Moreover, the Romanian communists seized in 1956 the opportunity to associate the Hungarian attempts at reforming the communist system with border revisionism, and condemn thus both as equally dangerous.20 Gradually, the rights enjoyed by the Hungarian community (which the communist elite in Bucharest considered a matter of internal affairs) were restricted. The first anti-Hungarian actions were taken as part of the larger post-1956 wave of repression. Since students and professors of Hungarian origin at the Bolyai University in Cluj had been among the most vocal protesters after the outburst of the Revolution of 1956, this institution of higher learning in the Hungarian language was forcefully merged in June 1959 with the Romanian-language Babe University. Since the number of gatherings involving unrest was higher among the Hungarian population in the Szkler region than in other regions, the Romanian leadership decided to reorganize the country administratively. Consequently, the boundaries of the Hungarian Autonomous Region were redrawn in December 1960 in such a way as to include in this administrative unit predominantly Romanian parts as well. These anti-Hungarian actions were both anti-reformist and anti-revisionist. The communist leadership in Bucharest was obviously fearful that the critical views which were flourishing in the neighboring country would eventually spread in Romania too.21 Due to their language skills and cross-border connections, the Romanian Hungarians could absorb these reform-oriented ideas and then disseminate them among Romanians. At the same time, mutual suspicion haunted official bilateral meetings between the Hungarian and the Romanian communists. The latter continuously suspected the western neighbors for attempting to
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arrange a border resettlement.22 Since both countries were once again in the same sphere of influence, Gheorghiu-Dej and his men feared that the Hungarian leadership might persuade the Soviet Union to redraw the frontiers in a way more favorably to them, like their predecessors did with the help of Germany and Italy. The communist leadership in Bucharest inherited from the bourgeois predecessors not only the political conflict over Transylvania, but also the fear that borders might be resettled by an international arbitrage.23 This legacy of the pre-communist political culture played a crucial role in shaping the policy conducted by the Bucharest-based communist elite toward the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. On the one hand, the regime rhetorically affirmed the full equality of all ethnic groups. On the other, the Romanian leadership steadily deprived the Hungarian minority of its administrative autonomy and its control over the cultural reproduction since the time of Gheorghiu-Dej, but more adamantly under his successor. On its turn, the Hungarian communist elite watched very carefully all actions undertaken in Transylvania by the Romanian leadership. Since they had not been successful in convincing the Soviet Union to back up their territorial requests, they changed their initial approach. At the end of the Second World War, Hungary had a worse reputation in the Soviet Union than Romania, for it had remained Nazi Germanys last ally, while the neighboring country succeeded in switching sides before the end of the war.24 Thus, the Hungarian leadership under Jnos Kdr tried to distance itself from the interwar irredentist policies, and refrained not only from using a nationalist rhetoric,25 but also from making the situation of the Hungarians living in all neighboring countries a priority on their agenda. A slow but significant change in the attitude of the Budapest regime (which originated in the need to win the support of the local population and the collaboration of the diaspora) was ascertainable only around 1967,
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when references to the Hungarians living abroad grew significantly in media and academic writings. Then, it was argued that these communities could have played a constructive role in the bilateral relations with the socialist fraternal states. Moreover, Kdr pointed out once in a while to the improved cultural and educational opportunities, which minorities in Hungary enjoyed since the 1960s. In addition, the constitutional amendment of 1972 mentioned the rights of minorities as a separate category. The communist regime in Budapest did not risk much because post-Trianon Hungary was an almost ethnically homogenous country, which registered only 10% minorities. At the same time, this provision entitled the Hungarian communists to expect that the neighboring countries with large Hungarian minorities would guarantee these communities the same rights. From time to time, discourses of key Hungarian party officials included critical remarks against assimilationist policies which addressed to unnamed countries, but anyone could understand that the reference was to Romania. These oblique references might have been inspired by the Soviet Union, which wanted to remind Romania, an increasingly maverick ally, that it is still part of the communist bloc. Nevertheless, these references also illustrated that the Hungarian communists wanted to remind their fellow countrymen that the Hungarian minorities abroad were not entirely forgotten.26 Looking retrospectively, one can see that the Helsinki Accords constituted the watershed in the Romanian-Hungarian dispute over Transylvania. As already emphasized, the Final Act of 1975 is remembered rather for its contribution to the collapse of communism in 1989, for it encouraged the gradual emergence of opposition movements in the Soviet camp. However, all thirtyfive participating states also recognized the postwar border settlements when signing that document. Especially Romania welcomed the Helsinki Accords because it saw in this document a new international act that sanctioned its rights over Transylvania.
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Hungary had to accept once again the loss of its former territories. However, the Final Act of 1975 was the first postwar international document that specifically referred to individuals belonging to ethnic minorities, and mentioned that their rights are entitled to protection.27 Moreover, the Helsinki framework of follow-up meetings opened debates that led to the international recognition of minority rights as separated from individual rights. The communist regime in Budapest used this framework of collaboration in order to internationalize the issue of the rights of the Hungarians living in the neighboring states. In this way, the Hungarian-Romanian border dispute over Transylvania turned into a dispute over minority rights. However, the internationalization of minority rights in general, as well as the problem of the Hungarians living in Romania in particular, required a long and sinuous process. It involved not only the communist governments of Romania and Hungary, but also dissidents in both countries. Until the late 1980s, Hungary was reluctant to raise the problem of the Hungarians living abroad, so that the representatives of the Hungarian minority in Romania were the first who tried to internationalize the issue of their rights as a minority group.
The Rights of the Hungarian Minority Perspectives from Romania

While dissidents from among the Hungarians in Romania advocated minority rights, the Romanian communist regime considered them traitors manipulated from Budapest. The claims of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania represented a reaction to Ceauescus policies of assimilation, which targeted above all this community. Gheorghiu-Dej had only started to implement anti-Hungarian measures, while his successor continued this trend with enhanced determination and gradually restricted many
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previously enjoyed rights. The autonomous status of the region largely inhabited by ethnic Hungarians was abolished after the administrative reform of 1968. The education law of 1973 limited the possibility to pursue schooling in minority languages. The radio and television broadcastings in other languages than Romanian stopped in 1984.28 In addition, the Romanian communist regime orchestrated a quiet, but efficient policy of internal migration in order to modify the population balance in Transylvania. The practice of assigning Hungarian university graduates jobs in other regions than Transylvania had a limited effect. Nevertheless, a significant reduction in the proportion of the Hungarians in the urban areas of Transylvania occurred because of the massive migration of Romanian workers from other regions.29 Ceauescu never acknowledged openly that he aimed at building an ethnically homogeneous nation via such measures. On the contrary, he continued to talk about the equality of all internal ethnic groups. His policies were though perceived as assimilationist among the Hungarian minority, for these prevented their cultural reproduction. The first attempt to internationalize the problems faced by this community under Ceauescus dictatorship occurred before the initiation of the Helsinki process. Its author was Kroly Kirly (b. 1930), the ethnic Hungarian who was the best-placed in the communist hierarchy due to his position as alternate member of the Political Executive Committee. In 1971, he addressed to Ceauescu a first memorandum, and enraged thus the secretary general who had hitherto considered Kirly as one of his power pillars.30 That memorandum had no effect, for it changed nothing in the policies of the Romanian communist regime. Its sole consequence was Kirlys marginalization, which represented the kind of measure that any communist official expected after a conflict with the leader of the party. Since the direct appeal to Ceauescu proved to have been an illusion, Kirly decided to take
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a further step in advocating the problems of his ethnic community and addressed to relevant international institutions.31 In January 1978, he managed to transmit across the border a protest letter describing the discriminatory measures taken by the Romanian government against the Hungarian minority, which focused especially on inequities in education and employment. Although influential western newspapers, such as The Times and The New York Times, published articles commenting his letter, Kirlys singular protest had little long-term impact internally and internationally.32 At the time, Ceauescu was still credited in western countries for his external policy with regard to the Soviet Union, and western governments thus overlooked his dogmatism in conducting the domestic affairs. In spite of his limited success, Kirly remained a symbol of the Hungarian resistance to Ceauescus nationalist policies until the end of the communist regime. Once in a while, he addressed open letters to the secretary general, and granted interviews to western journalists or to the editors of Hungarian samizdat. Worth mentioning is the private meeting between Kirly and Mikhail Gorbachev in May 1987, which took place when the latter visited Romania and specifically requested to encounter the former. After this meeting, the Hungarian former senior official addressed another open letter to Ceauescu, which illustrates that he had broadened his views in the meantime. This letter went beyond the criticism related to the suppression of the ethnic Hungarians and attacked directly Ceauescus erroneous economic policies.33 This was a real turn in his views. Less than a year before, Kirly had granted an interview to Beszl, the well-known samizdat journal published by the Hungarian democratic opposition, in which he had limited himself to comment the problems of his ethnic community living in Romania. Moreover, he specifically mentioned then that Hungarians should only fight for their own community and refrain from doing the dirty work for the
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Romanians by raising their voice in defense of the common interest.34 The shortages that obviously affected individuals regardless of ethnic background changed his idea that the two communities had divergent perspectives on the Romanian communist regime (because this would have treated them differently), and implicitly no common cause. Besides, Gorbachevs attempts at reforming the communist system encouraged Kirly to broaden his criticism of Ceauescus policies, which stood in sharp contrast to the future-oriented views of the Soviet leader. The first protest against the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Romania which emerged from outside the communist bureaucracy was initiated by three Hungarian intellectuals, Gza Szcs (b. 1953), Attila Ara-Kovcs (b. 1953) and Kroly Antal Tth (b. 1942). In December 1981, they launched a samizdat journal named Ellenpontok (Counterpoints), which they dedicated exclusively to the problems of their native community in Transylvania.35 Since the Hungarian communist regime seemed to neglect these issues, while the Romanian communist regime was at their very origin, the group did not address either of these authorities, but targeted instead an international audience. At the same time, the journal intended to mobilize members of the Hungarian community in Transylvania for a fight in the name of minority rights. The situation of this ethnic group was uncomfortable not only because the communist regime in Budapest was reluctant to support its claims, but also because the western broadcasting agencies did not address their problems. For instance, RFE criticized fiercely all communist regimes, but overlooked deliberately the intricate relations among different ethnic groups in multicultural and contested regions.36 One of the rules imposed on the directors of that broadcasting agency by the sponsoring institution, the American Congress, was to avoid discussing problems related to border controversies between countries of the Soviet bloc. The protection of the Hungarian
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minority in Transylvania, whose very existence derived from the relatively recent border changes in the region, counted as a problem of this kind. Therefore, these issues were carefully avoided until Ceauescus abuses became notorious in the late 1980s. In fact, RFE attempted to harmonize the interests of the countries in EastCentral Europe via amnesia, using a formula that had proved to be successful in postwar Western Europe.37 The Ellenpontok dissident group was the first which used the Helsinki framework in order to internationalize its program. In 1982, they addressed a memorandum to the CSCE Follow-up Meeting which was unfolding in Madrid. This document epitomized the shift in approaching the problems of the Hungarian community, which the editors already announced in their journal. While previous generations advocated the preservation of their Hungarian cultural identity, but asserted at the same time their loyalty to the Romanian state, the authors of the memorandum considered the Hungarians in Transylvania as an indivisible part of the larger Hungarian nation.38 The document underlined the importance of collective rights in the protection of minority groups identities and in the preservation of their cultural values. Also, it called for the establishment of an international commission for the protection of the Romanian Hungarian interests and rights, albeit it asked for an independent body in communist Romania too. In fact, the memorandum was accompanied by a program which was addressed to the Romanian authorities and proposed legislative changes destined to improve their situation as members of a minority group. Most of the demands regarded the rights to cultural reproduction. More precisely, the program asked for cultural autonomy, which should have been guaranteed by the constitution and the relevant legislation. This presupposed the establishment of a separate schooling system from kindergarten to university, the development of Hungarian publishing houses in Romania, the liberty of the Hungarian media to deal with the real
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problems of the community, and the autonomy of the Hungarian churches. Besides modifications in the legislation, the cultural autonomy of the community required institutions of selfprotection, similar to the department of nationalities which functioned before in the Ministry of Education. Finally, the program demanded the reestablishment of the administrative autonomy in the regions inhabited predominantly by Hungarians, proportional representation in the government, equal opportunities for upward mobility regardless of the ethnic background, and the termination of the practice of resettlements, which was modifying the ethnic composition of Transylvania.39 The program of the Ellenpontok group, which one could take as representative for the Hungarian intelligentsia in Romania (at least partially), allows the drawing of three conclusions. First, these requests were self-limiting, as most of dissident criticism, which did not question the communist system, but the policies of the communist regimes. Second, these requests were strictly limited to problems characteristic to the Hungarian community in Romania and failed to even mention problems of general concern. Finally, these requests of 1982 shaped to a great extent the agenda of the post-communist Hungarian politicians in the early transition to democracy. However, the immediate influence of this memorandum was limited. Paragraph 11 from the Concluding Document of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Madrid reiterated the legitimacy of the collective rights of minority groups, but did not enlarge the provisions of the Helsinki Accords on this issue. Worth mentioning is that this memorandum was not only obstructed by the representatives of communist Romania at this conference, but also ignored by the representatives of Hungary. Pter Vrkonyi, the foreign affairs minister, made no reference to the paragraph regarding minority rights in his final address to the conference, which he delivered on 8 September 1983.40 Actually, one of the greatest obstacles encountered by dissident groups which
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attempted to address the Helsinki framework of international collaboration stemmed from the very concept of this framework. As mentioned, this envisaged an interstate dialogue, which took into account civil society groups only for the evaluation of human rights records, but it did not allow them to participate actively in the official debates. Accordingly, the rights of the Hungarian communities living abroad could have been raised either by Hungary or by their countries of residence, e.g. Romania.41 Thus, attempts by dissident groups to internationalize the problem of the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries registered a very limited success in this international framework. Since the attempt of the Ellenpontok group to find international support for their requests was not very successful, the Romanian authorities did not hesitate to arrest, interrogate and harass the authors of the memorandum, who were finally expelled to Hungary as follows: Ara-Kvacs in May 1983, Tth in July 1984, and Szcs in August 1986.42 Before leaving Romania, Szcs made a last attempt and tried to establish a dialogue at least with the Romanian authorities. He addressed several open letters to the Central Committee of the RCP, in which he asked for the improvement of the situation of the Hungarian minority by making reference again to previous institutional and administrative designs.43 While he complained that Hungary did not do much about it, Szcs suggested that Romania should propose to the United Nations to introduce in the Universal Declaration a clause on the collective rights of ethnic minorities. Moreover, he argued that the Romanian communist regime should support the establishment of an international organization for minorities, because this would contribute to the improvement of its international image.44 Beside these letters addressed to the Romanian authorities, Szcs also drafted a memorandum to the United Nations. The document was not more successful in stirring international debates on the
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issue of minority rights than the letter addressed to the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Madrid. This document is worth mentioning though, for it represented the first petition drafted by a Romanian Hungarian intellectual, which was eventually signed by a Romanian colleague too. Besides its author, not only Kirly Kroly but also Dorin Tudoran endorsed this memorandum. The latter had granted interviews to western journalists since 1982, and radicalized his views from a criticism focused on literary issues to political dissent.45 Yet, this joint protest did not create a crossethnic alliance between dissidents from the two communities, but remained a singular event. In a final attempt to keep the issue of minority rights alive, Szcs managed also to establish a successor to Ellenpontok prior to his expulsion. The new journal was entitled Erdlyi Magyar Hrgynksg (The Hungarian Press of Transylvania), and represented a mimeographed news bulletin. In spite of severe restrictions, it reached Vienna with some regularity, and it was thus widely quoted in western media. Unlike his predecessor, this bulletin did not cover just the problems specific to the Hungarian community, but reported also issues which affected all those living in Romania, such as the constant degradation of the economy, and included news on social unrest. Moreover, it made a distinction between the Romanian communist regime and the Romanian community, which Ellenpontok failed to underline. While the first dissident journal considered the traditional Romanian nationalism as the cause of Ceauescus assimilationist policies and implied that Romanians approved his xenophobic ideas, the successor publication avoided such equally xenophobic views and left thus the door open for grassroots interethnic collaboration. This change of perspective might have occurred because Erdlyi Magyar Hrgynksg addressed primarily a western audience. However, it reflected a shift in the tactic of the Hungarian dissidents as well, for they
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understood that an alliance with Romanian dissidents would have been in their advantage.46 Nevertheless, no common Romanian-Hungarian protest emerged until the late 1980s, if one overlooks the above-mentioned proposal sent to the United Nations, which had anyway a very limited impact inside or outside Romania.47 As illustrated above, the demands made by the members of the Hungarian community to the Romanian communist regime addressed only questions directly related to their situation as an ethnic minority. Thus, there was little ground for collaboration between the two communities. The first and only collective protest, which Romanians and Hungarians signed together, was an open letter against the socalled systematization of villages. Its initiator and main author was the Cluj-based Romanian dissident Doina Cornea, who managed to gather 27 other signatures before sending it across the border to be disseminated by western media; RFE broadcast it in September 1988.48 At that time, it was believed that this plan of systematization was part of Ceauescus assimilationist policies, so demolitions in rural areas would affect primarily the minority groups. Since the largest part of the Germans had already immigrated to the Federal Republic and left their villages empty, Hungarians considered that the systematization of rural settlements was a cover up for the razing of their cultural heritage in Transylvania. However, this plan of systematization actually envisaged the entire territory of Romania and both rural and urban areas. By the time communism collapsed, it affected primarily the unstructured cities in the Old Kingdom, in particular Bucharest and its environments. Nevertheless, it was the demolition of villages that mobilized western public opinion against Ceauescus regime, for such action could not have been but arbitrary and aberrant. While the winds of change already blew in other communist countries, Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania found one common ground for protest in this plan for systematization.
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Even this joint protest could have hardly occurred without Doina Cornea, who was the most popular Romanian dissident among Hungarians on both sides of the border in the late 1980s.49 Her popularity increased even more after the broadcasting of a documentary about Ceauescus Romania in December 1988, which not only western television companies, but also the Hungarian national television transmitted. In this documentary, which drew the attention on what was happening in a country not so far away but almost isolated from Europe, Cornea appeared as a symbol of the fragile opposition against a despotic regime.50 Some Hungarian dissidents considered her capable of mediating an interethnic collaboration, given also her husbands Hungarian origin. Thus, va Gyimesi-Cseke, professor at the University of Cluj and a member of the literary circle Limes, approached Cornea in 1989 on behalf of the Hungarian intellectuals. Her intention was to persuade the Romanian dissident to form together an interethnic group, which would assume the task of raising publicly issues of common interest to Romanians and Hungarians alike. Corneas reply to this proposal offers a possible explanation for the almost complete absence of collaboration across ethnic borders. She justified her refusal to accept the proposal with the argument that her potential rally to the criticism of Ceauescus policies against the Hungarian minority would have made not only the secret police but also the public opinion consider that she sold herself to foreigners.51 Moreover, Cornea stated clearly that she was indeed for transforming Romania into a country in which the Hungarian minority would not feel oppressed, but she did not support any change of frontiers. Her fears were not baseless, for the secret police always tried to incriminate dissidents as traitors of national interests. Moreover, documents from the archives of the former Securitate illustrate that this institution treated the critics of the communist regime as individuals financially sponsored from the other side of the Iron Curtain by the reactionary
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Romanian emigration, the Hungarian or the Jewish lobbies, and any kind of foreign intelligence agencies, such as CIA, etc.52 In the late 1980s, the Romanian communist regime also spread the idea that Hungarian dissidents protested because they wanted Transylvania back to Hungary with the help of the western countries. Thus, many Romanians perceived Ceauescus nationalistic policy, including the measures of anti-Hungarian character, as appropriate, albeit condemned his blueprint for Romania as the main cause of the countrys economic ruin and international isolation. The rumors about the Hungarians revisionist intentions touched a sensitive issue to all Romanians, and were very efficient in preventing the interethnic collaboration of dissidents from the two communities. Thus, the most notable pre-1989 collaboration between Romanians and Hungarians was the so-called Declaration of Budapest. This document, which emerged from outside of the Romanian borders, represented indeed a common view, but its signatories were either Hungarians from Hungary or Romanians from the emigration. It was Imre Nagys reburial in June 1989 that made several Romanian migrs come to Budapest to symbolically pay their respects in the name of the mutual friendship between the two neighboring nations. With that occasion, the members of the Romanian delegation and representatives of the Hungarian opposition signed this declaration, which acknowledged Transylvania as a space of complementariness, and a region that should be turned into a model of multiculturalism by granting each ethnic group its cultural and political autonomy. In Romania, nobody would have dared to sign such a document, all the more so that rumors about a possible border resettlement were circulating.53 After Ceauescus downfall, it seemed that interethnic problems would disappear overnight, but once the issue of minority rights surfaced into the public sphere, the Romanian society divided itself into supporters and
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opponents of the Hungarian community. Then, individuals from both ethnic groups worked against the mutual distrust that the communist regime used extensively in order to prevent any crosscultural solidarity. Many former Romanian dissidents, including Doina Cornea, Gabriel Andreescu, Dan Petrescu and Mircea Dinescu, contributed after 1989 to the building of bridges between the two communities, and their work actually prevented the spread of violent interethnic conflicts. Broadly speaking, the supporters of the so-called neo-communist power considered that the Hungarians seized the political opportunity to raise all sorts of unjustified and unacceptable requests. On the contrary, many supporters of the newly emerging democratic opposition (partially out of the guilt of failing to criticize the communist regime before its fall) defended the Hungarians in their attempt to win back the rights they once enjoyed. The refusal to satisfy the demands of the Hungarian minority in accordance with the standards accepted in democratic countries contributed to Romanias ostracism from the civilized world even after 1989, as observed above. By the time communism collapsed, the international standards for the protection of minority groups had become higher due to the efforts of dissidents from Hungary (and later of the communist regime in Budapest) to raise awareness on such problems based on the experience of the Hungarian community in Transylvania.
The Protection of the Hungarians Living Abroad Perspectives from Hungary

In search for continuities, this part returns in time to capture the origins of the international criticism of the Romanian communist regime for minority rights violations, which the Bucharest authorities largely ignored and considered an unacceptable external intervention in internal affairs. Since both the Hungarian
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communist regime and the opposition groups played a role in advocating the problem of the Hungarians living abroad, this author discusses both perspectives and emphasizes the dynamics between them. As already stressed, the Helsinki framework of international cooperation contributed by default to the condemnation of Ceauescus regime, for its representatives were unable to understand that the western countries attached an increasing importance to the observance of human rights. In this framework, Hungarian dissidents took over from Romanian Hungarian dissidents the struggle for securing new standards in the protection of minorities. They succeeded only when the Hungarian communist regime decided to back their requests on the verge of its collapse. It was a belated international reaction, which came only with the downfall of Kdrism.54 The position of the Hungarian communist leadership had been hitherto rather ambiguous. When he signed the Final Act of 1975, Kdr endorsed the inviolability of the European postwar borders in his official address, but took the opportunity to refer for the first time to an international audience to Hungarys territorial loses after the Treaty of Trianon. At the same time, the Hungarian communist regime allowed the emerging dissident groups in their country to do what they refrained from doing,55 and the so-called problem of the Hungarians living abroad became thus the issue which made all these ideologically divergent groups finally cooperate. Two out of the three dissident groups in Hungary, the populists and the democratic opposition, put this issue high on their agenda. Especially the former group (which had in writer Gyula Illys an uncontested leader) focused from the very beginning on the protection of the Hungarians living in the neighboring communist countries, which they saw as an intrinsic part of the larger Hungarian nation. Particularly important was the Hungarian community in Transylvania, which still retained the pre-modern traditions that had disappeared from Hungary. The preservation
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of their culture, a component of the Hungarian national heritage, was thus crucial. Actually, the Romanian-Hungarian dispute which was sparked in the late 1970s was initially not an interstate controversy, but an argument exchanged between officially encouraged Romanian intellectuals and unofficially tolerated Hungarian intellectuals. It is true that the openly nationalist Romanian regime encouraged this dispute, but it is also true that the allegedly non-nationalist Hungarian regime allowed its public surfacing. At its origin was an article by the populist leader Gyula Illys, who criticized the policy of ethnic discrimination pursued against the Hungarians living abroad, but without referring to Romania.56 It was certainly with the tacit approval of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP) that the populist opposition could partially pursue its program of establishing an institutional framework for maintaining cultural ties with the kin ethnic groups in the neighboring countries. In fact, the populists were tolerated as compared to other dissident groups, for they raised publicly issues that the regime had to avoid.57 They also represented the dissident group which enjoyed the greatest support among the population exactly because of the priority given to the Hungarian minorities living in the neighboring countries. Among these minority groups, the Hungarians living in Transylvania under the nationalist and assimilationist regime led by Ceauescu constituted the top of their agenda. Actually, the popularity of the populists was exclusively based on this issue. Otherwise, they proved unable to come up with a coherent program to compete with the political reforms of the democratic opposition.58 In contrast to the populists, the democratic opposition in Hungary focused initially only on the observance of individual rights. As their message had no impact outside an urban educated audience, they later included the collective rights of the Hungarian minorities abroad on their agenda. In the absence of any Helsinki Monitoring Group in
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Hungary or Romania, the democratic opposition took the task of surveying the abuses against Hungarians in other communist countries, among which the most numerous were registered in Transylvania.59 Moreover, this dissident group with liberal political orientation took the initiative of advocating the enlargement of the Helsinki framework, so that not only individual rights but also minority rights could be protected internationally. In the late 1980s, the issue of the Hungarians living in the neighboring countries united the ideologically diverse dissident groups of the populists and the democrats. It is ironical that the rapprochement of the nationally and culturally oriented populist opposition and the human rights oriented democratic opposition took place because of Ceauescus systematization plan. As aforementioned, this plan did not affect eventually the Hungarian community, but many of its members feared that it represented a cover up for the demolition of their villages in Transylvania. Nevertheless, this aberrant plan allowed the HSWP leadership to denounce the RCP in March 1988 for its policies regarding the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Significant signs of change could have been detected before Kdrs downfall, especially after the 1986 establishment of the Teleki Institute, whose mission was to focus on the Hungarians living in the neighboring countries.60 However, Kdrs last attempts to intervene in favor of the Hungarians in Transylvania were perceived by the large majority of the population as coming too late and not wholeheartedly. This was one of the reasons for which he lost during his last period of rule all the support he once enjoyed. The real change in the attitude of the Hungarian communist regime with regard to the issue of the Hungarian minorities abroad occurred after Kroly Grsz took over party leadership in May 1988. Under the pressure of the local population and of the refugees from Romania, mostly ethnic Hungarians but even Romanians, the HSWP had to openly acknowledge that this problem existed and address a formal letter
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of protest to the Romanian leadership.61 In this way, the official concern with the fate of the Hungarians living in Romania changed the boundary between prohibited and permitted in communist Hungary. Thus, a huge rally of several tens of thousands of individuals who protested against the violation of human and minority rights in the neighboring Romania could take place on 27 June 1988, although the authorities in Budapest had repressed only days earlier, on 16 June 1988, a demonstration occasioned by the commemoration of Imre Nagys execution.62 This radical change in the attitude of the Hungarian communist regime manifested not only internally, but also internationally. For the first time ever in the Helsinki framework of cooperation, the Hungarian diplomatic representative expressed concerns about the fate of his ethnic kin living in Romania, and stirred an enraged reply from the Romanian representative during the Third CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna. This exchange of replicas from the late 1980s anticipated the post-communist dialogue between the Romanian authorities and the representatives of the Hungarian minority in this country. While the Hungarian delegation openly accused the neighboring country for violating the rights of the Hungarian minority, the Romanian delegation rejected any accusations that this community would have been treated differently than the Romanian majority. This perverse argument could have been hardly refuted, for both communities suffered equally because of the deprivations imposed by Ceauescus regime. Moreover, the deputy chief of the Romanian delegation stated that Romania did not want to implement policies which reminded one of the apartheid in South Africa. The communist regime in Bucharest pretended that the cultural protection of any minority group actually meant its implicit isolation from the majority. The Hungarian delegation interpreted this argument as sheer reflection of the assimilationist policies of the Romanian authorities, and stated that Romanias refusal to admit its multinational character
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was in contradiction with the spirit and the letter of Helsinki.63 In reaction, the Romanian delegation concluded its final statement by arguing that the minority rights were not in conformity with the principles and the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act, but a pretext for interfering in the internal affairs of other states and violating their national independence and sovereignty.64 Thus, Romania refused on 19 January 1989 to sign the Concluding Document of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna. The participating states enlarged then the Helsinki framework for the observance of human rights, and agreed to protect and create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities of their territory. This was the first explicit recognition of the principle that a minority represented an entity whose collective rights were distinct from the individual rights that protected each of its members taken separately.65 Romanias reluctance to engage in respecting minority rights by signing this document accelerated its international isolation. This was though a cumulative process, in which the disregard for the demands of the Hungarian community represented only the final and decisive step. Had the Romanian-Hungarian debate occurred a decade before, this might have had less devastating results for Bucharest. Even in the mid-1980s, Romania still enjoyed a high international reputation due to its external policy, and thus many western states refrained from openly criticizing the poor human rights record of Ceauescus regime.66 As shown, the United States continued to support those countries in East-Central Europe which acted more independently from the Soviet Union, as the Nixon administration had envisaged. Moreover, many western diplomats considered for a long time that behind the criticism of Ceauescus policies regarding the Hungarian minority were the Hungarian irredentist migrs, and thus did not pay much attention to them.67 However, the Helsinki process introduced
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new indicators for measuring the performance of each communist country, which shifted the western focus from external independence to internal liberalization.68 Thus, a country like Hungary increased in the long run its international credibility, while Romania managed to ruin its. The communist regime in Budapest had gained the support of the population due to its domestic reforms, and succeeded in asserting itself as the happiest barrack in the socialist camp.69 The Bucharest regime relied solely on its alleged independence from the Soviet Union, while it not only neglected the demands of those who dared to criticize it, but it also suppressed such individuals. The Helsinki process strengthened Hungarys position in any potential dispute over the condition of minorities, and contributed by default to the improvement of its external prestige. Consequently, in the late 1980s, western countries began listening to the human-rights friendly Budapest when it was about the rights of the Romanian Hungarians rather than to the Stalinist Bucharest. It was in this context that the debate between Romania and Hungary dominated the negotiations regarding the introduction of minority rights in the Concluding Document of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna. After the collapse of communism, the new authorities in both countries found themselves as the inheritors of the dispute on the rights which the Hungarian minority in Romania should enjoy. Thus, the terrible specter of loosing Transylvania,70 which Ceauescus regime manipulated skillfully in the 1980s, made its way again into official discourses, while political leaders capitalized on nationalist issues. The initial reluctance of the Romanian neocommunist ruling elite to deal with the requests of the HDUR related to the cultural protection of their community represented yet another proof that it inherited much from the political culture of the communist elite. Much improvement was made since the early days of post-communism, largely due to international
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pressure (the requirements for the integration into the European Union) or electoral dynamics (the participation of HDUR to governing coalitions since 1996). The Hungarian minority enjoys currently rights that meet European standards. The interstate relations are not necessarily friendly, but are no longer adversarial, albeit the Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation on the FrenchGerman postwar model never occurred. Since the very existence of the Romanian-Hungarian political elite imposes a maximalist approach to minority rights, further requests for political autonomy are on their agenda. At societal level, Romanians regard these claims as sheer proof that Hungarians are not Romanias loyal citizens. However, they do not consider Hungarians as part of their nation any more than the Hungarians like to be considered part of a hypothetically civic Romanian nation. Two ethnic ideas about the nation clash with each other, for neither the Romanians nor the Hungarians think of their communities other than in cultural terms.71 Moreover, historical experiences shape collective memory and implicitly the patterns of thought and actions of both Romanians and Hungarians alike. On the one hand, the Little Entente complex, as Pierre Kende put it, makes the former interpret any Hungarian demands as a manifestation of revisionism. On the other, the Hungarian superiority complex makes members of this community regard the Romanians as revengeful oppressors. This dialogue of the deaf represents perhaps the longest surviving legacy of Romanian communism, which was more nationalist than Marxist-Leninist.
Notes
1
For more on the relation between past and present in the emergence of post-communist political and societal cleavages, see Cristina Petrescu and Drago Petrescu, Retribution, Remembering, Representation: On Romanias Incomplete Break with the Communist Past, in
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2 3
Gerhard Besier and Katarzyna Stokosa, eds., Geschichtsbilder in den postdiktatorischen Lndern Europas: Auf der Suche nach historischpolitischen Identitten (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2009), 155-82. For more on this, see Chapter 1. The impact of the Treaty of Trianon on the Hungarian society represents a painful topic for Hungarian authors, including those who deliberately avoid a nationalist stance. Lszl Kontler, Millennium in Central Europe: A History of Hungary (Budapest: Atlantisz, 1999); George Schpflin, Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe (London: Hurst, 2000). The classic book that tackles the integration of the newly incorporated territories i.e. Transylvania, the Banat, Bukovina, and Bessarabia into Greater Romania is Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 19181930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995). Paul Sfetcu, Gheorghiu-Dejs secretary, remembered a conversation between his party leader and Stalin. When the former complained about the problems with the Hungarian minority, the latter replied that he should have solved it by expelling the Hungarians in Romania over the border before the Second World War ended. Paul Sfetcu, 13 ani n anticamera lui Dej (13 years in Dejs antechamber) (Bucharest: Editura Fundaiei Culturale Romne, 2000), 269. Large excerpts from the debates during the Fourth and the Fifth Congresses of the RCP are included in Mircea Muat and Ion Ardeleanu, Romnia dup Marea Unire (Romania after the Great Unification), vol. 2, part 1: 1918-1933 (Bucharest: Editura tiinific i Enciclopedic, 1986), 596-611 and 624-41, respectively. On the Soviet efforts to create the Moldovan nation in the interwar period, which began with the establishment of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1924 on the territory known today as Transnistria and on some other adjacent parts from the Ukraine, see Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000). Actually, Romanian communists also acted in accordance with the view from Moscow. Soviet sources illustrate that Stalin was not pleased with the Second Vienna Award because the powers which made this border settlement did not consult him. It was from that time that the use of the term dictate to designate this international settlement originates. This term was later adopted in all Romanian historical writings, via Mihail Rollers postwar textbooks. The mentioned Soviet
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sources are analyzed in Florin Constantiniu, P.C.R., Ptrcanu i Transilvania, 1945-1946 (The RCP, Ptrcanu and Transylvania, 1945-1946) (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedic, 2001), 64-66. For an analysis of Mihail Rollers textbooks with regard to the interpretation of the Second Vienna Award, see Ottmar Trac, Raporturile Romno-Maghiare n timpul celui de-al Doilea Rzboi Mondial reflectate n manualele colare de istoria Romniei (The RomanianHungarian relations during the Second World War as reflected by the Romanian history textbooks), in Lucian Nastas, ed., Studii istorice romno-ungare (Romanian and Hungarian historical studies) (Iai: Fundaia Academic A.D. Xenopol, 1999), 353-60. Trac however perpetuates a commonplace of post-communist historiography, which considers Rollers textbooks as simple mystifications of national history, albeit his writings illustrate a surprising continuity with the views of the pre-communist historians. Apostol recalled this episode in Lavinia Betea, ed., Maurer i lumea de ieri: Mrturii despre stalinizarea Romniei (Maurer and the yesterday world: Testimonies on Romanias Stalinization) (Arad: Editura Ion Slavici, 1995), 260. The Romanian communists of Jewish or other ethnic origins were in favor of the Romanians right to possess the entire territory of Transylvania. In the case of those of Jewish background this can be explained by the very fact that the Transylvanian Jews under Hungarian administration perished in the Holocaust. In any case, Romanian communists commitment to the Cominternist theses of the Fifth Party Congress of 1931 regarding self-determination up to the point of secession, so much criticized later on by Ceauescu, must be reconsidered. Ion Gheorghe Maurer, himself not an ethnic Romanian, maintained that he never heard a Romanian communist arguing that Bessarabia had to be Soviet, or Transylvania Hungarian, except for Ana Pauker and others who stayed in Moscow during the war. See Ibid., 147. George Schpflin, interview by author, tape recording, London, 5 March 2003. The position of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with regard to the postwar world reorganization was not determined by the arguments of the satellite communist parties, for a committee (led by M. M. Litvinov) drafted a report which analyzed the following alternative solutions: (a) to give Northern Transylvania back to Romania; (b) to leave it to Hungary; and (c) to create an independent Transylvania under Moscows tutelage. The report was more favorable
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to Romania than to Hungary, but proposed nevertheless the third solution. Yet, the first solution had the advantage of forcing Romania to make a perpetual alliance with the Soviet Union and to put an end to its territorial claims over Bessarabia. Constantiniu, P.C.R., Ptrcanu i Transilvania, 52-55. For more on this, see Ibid., 68-92. Actually, the Romanian communists took advantage of the coup of 23 August 1944, to which they only modestly contributed, and pushed Stalin to support them to seize political power while the war was still going on. The Soviets backed them in order to have a more loyal leadership in Romania, which would support the war effort less reluctantly than the historical parties. Alfred J. Rieber, The Crack in the Plaster: Crisis in Romania and the Origins of the Cold War, Journal of Modern History, Vol. 76, No. 1 (March 2004), 62-106. This argument challenges the traditional interpretation developed by western analysts in the high days of the Cold War, according to which the Soviets had a carefully prepared plan to submit all the countries of East-Central Europe to their rule. Hugh SetonWatson, The East European Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1952). The criticism addressed to Lucreiu Ptrcanu by all the other communist leaders during the meeting of 22 June 1946 must be seen in this light. Ptrcanu had delivered his famous nationalist speech in Cluj, where he received enthusiastic applauses for his criticism of Hungarian chauvinism. From the transcript of that meeting, one could see that both Ana Pauker and Gheorghiu-Dej underlined that, after Romania took over the administration of Transylvania, the pressing problem was to appease the Hungarians and convince them of the good intentions of the communist leadership. In light of this transcript, the view that Ptrcanu was eliminated because he was the only communist animated by patriotic feelings, while all the others were Moscows blind followers, must be reconsidered. Andreea Andreescu, Lucian Nastas, and Andrea Varga, eds., Minoriti etno-culturale. Mrturii documentare: Maghiarii din Romnia, 1945-1955 (Ethnocultural minorities. Documents: The Hungarians in Romania, 19451955) (Cluj-Napoca: Ethno-Cultural Diversity Resource Center, 2002), 369-404. The requests of the Hungarian Popular Union were presented to the Groza government immediately after takeover, on 12 March 1945. These included: (1) proportional representation in the government; (2) adequate representation in local administration in the regions inhabited by Hungarians; (3) Hungarian language recognized as official
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language in Transylvania; (4) education provided in Hungarian from grammar school to university; (5) equal treatment for the religious denominations to which the Hungarians belonged; (6) theater representations in the Hungarian language; (7) free use of Hungarian national symbols; (8) re-distribution of land without ethnic discrimination; and (9) the inclusion of the Hungarian Jews in the Hungarian community. Ibid., 65-69. The autonomous status of this region was stipulated by article 19 of the Constitution of 1952, which the Grand National Assembly voted on 24 September, when Petru Groza was its president. He was then no longer prime-minister, for Gheorghiu-Dej took over this position on 2 June 1952 in order to assure his direct control over the party and the government at the same time, similar to his counterparts in the other Soviet satellite countries. The Regional Party Committee of the Hungarian Autonomous Region held a meeting in January 1954 in order to discuss the electoral campaign and the principles of selecting the candidates. These criteria of selection were class-based like in the rest of communist Romania. Ibid., 744-60. It was actually a self-dissolution, triggered by the fact that the Hungarian Popular Union had lost its importance and initial role. Ibid., 730-36. This was also observed the Romanian dissident Gabriel Andreescu, who otherwise advocated the rights of the Hungarian community in post-communism. He argued thus that any nostalgia for the autonomy granted during what Hungarians called the Groza period represents only nostalgia for symbols. Gabriel Andreescu, Ruleta: Romni i maghiari, 1990-2000 (The roulette: Romanians and Hungarians, 1990-2000) (Iai: Polirom, 2001), 206. For an account on the role played by the Romanian communists of Hungarian ethnic origin in the interrogations of the Hungarian revolutionary communists of 1956, who had been kept prisoners near Bucharest, see Christian Duplan and Vincent Giret, La vie en rouge Les pionniers: Varsovie, Prague, Budapest, Bucarest, 1944-1968 (Paris: ditions du Seuil, 1994). For Imre Nagys personal notes, the transcripts of his private conversations, and his correspondence with the Romanian party leadership while he was held hostage, together with his family, other Hungarian revolutionaries and their families, in Snagov, a small village near Bucharest, see Ileana Ioanid, ed., Imre Nagy nsemnri de la Snagov: Coresponden, rapoarte, convorbiri
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(Imre Nagy Notes from Snagov: Correspondence, reports, conversations) (Iai: Polirom, 2004). After 1956, the Romanian leadership accused those Hungarians in Romania who supported the revolution in the neighboring country of nationalism and bourgeois chauvinism. Ghi Ionescu, Communism in Romania, 1944-1962 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 294-95. For a brief analysis of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 as an identity forming experience of the Romanian communist elite, see Chapter 4. It seems that Jnos Kdr, the post-1956 leader of the Hungarian communists, stated plainly during a visit to Romania in February 1958 that Hungary had no territorial claims, and that the Hungarian minority in Transylvania was a Romanian internal affair. GheorghiuDej and his men might have understood such a statement as a green light for implementing anti-Hungarian measures. Ignc Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century (Budapest: Corvina, 1999), 403. According to Paul Sfetcu, Gheorghiu-Dejs former secretary, the Romanian leadership interpreted Kdrs speech differently, for they took it as an attempt to dissimulate the real Hungarian revisionist agenda. After this visit, Gheorghiu-Dej mentioned to his secretary that Kdr had delivered an ambiguous speech in which he had failed to mention to the Hungarians in Romania that their homeland was Romania. Paul Sfetcu, 13 ani n anticamera lui Dej, 268. Transcripts of the Politburo meetings and the available testimonies of the former nomenklatura members show that, after 1956, the Romanian leadership followed extremely carefully the statements of the Budapest-based communist elite with regard to Transylvania and the Hungarian minority living there. For instance, the Romanian communists discussed during the Politburo meeting of 20 January 1964 how to respond to the publication of an ethnographic atlas which included data about historical Hungary and included references to Transylvania. Gheorghiu-Dej and the other leaders interpreted this publication as Jnos Kdrs attempt not only to gain popularity among his fellow citizens, but also to convince the Soviets that the border settlement was unjust to Hungary. Betea, ed., Mnescu, 277-98. Hungarys failure in the Second World War endured in collective memory, especially because it contrasted to Romanias last-minute salvation, as one could grasp from the following statement: In 1944, Hungary failed to switch sides because it was closer to Germany than Romania. After 1989, closeness to the West was in Hungarys
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advantage, and helped it to be more successful than Romania in the process of European integration. Discourse of President rpd Gncz at the opening of the Conference Between Past and Future: The Revolutions of 1989 and their Aftermath, Budapest, 25-28 March 1999. The HSWP adopted in 1959 a document entitled On Bourgeois Nationalism and Socialist Patriotism, which traced the party line for years to come. This document characterized nationalism as the main ideological threat. The party line was modified only in 1974 with the adoption of a new document, which stated that national tradition was part of the socialist patriotism. Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 404-7. On the attitude of the Hungarian communist regime with regard to the Hungarians living abroad, see Raphael Vago, The Grandchildren of Trianon: Hungary and the Hungarian Minority in the Communist States (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1989). A consistent chapter on the attitudes of the Hungarian communist regime on this problem, written from a moderate nationalist perspective but sympathetic to Kdr, is included in Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 402-12. From a liberal perspective, Kdrs regime handled the issue of the Hungarians living abroad with utmost cynicism. Kontler, A History of Hungary, 454-56. The previous important document in this respect, the Charter of the United Nations, did not include any references to minority rights. In the interwar period, the institutionalization of the minority rights within the framework of the League of Nations did nothing but fueled revisionist interests, worsening relations among the states in EastCentral Europe. As a consequence, the Charter stressed individual rights, while minority protection was replaced by the principle of nondiscrimination. For instance, according to the education law of 1973, twenty-five children were needed in order to set-up a class of pupils who pursued schooling in a minority language, while no such minimum number was requested for Romanian children. Moreover, restrictions were not always legalized, but introduced into practice in a perverse way. For example, by discouraging the organization of admission exams to higher education in Hungarian, the Romanian communist regime discouraged demand for education in Hungarian at pre-university levels, and transformed the lack of supply into a lack of demand. For more on the discrimination in education, the curtailment of cultural
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opportunities and other measures directed against the Hungarian community, see Lszl Hamos, Persecution of Romanias Hungarian Minority, in Romania: A Case of Dynastic Communism (New York: Freedom House, 1989), 95-113. Although his critical account is fairly accurate, the authors thesis that Ceauescus regime made use of nationalism in order to redirect the attention from the endemic economic crisis is, at least partially, erroneous. The measures directed against the Hungarian minority were taken prior to the moment when the population at large was affected by the economic crisis. Some data would help one understand the effects of this policy. According to the census of 1930, there were 36.9% Romanians and 43% Hungarians in the urban areas of Transylvania. According to the census of 1948, there were 53.2% Romanians and 36.6% Hungarians, which meant that the ethnic balance had already changed after the war. However, the acceleration of the Romanianization in the urban areas of Transylvania is ascertainable in the census of 1977: Romanians made up 71.2%, while Hungarians only 23.9%. Per Ronns, Urbanization in Romania: A Geography of Social and Economic Change Since Independence (Stockholm: The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, 1984), 175. Given his close relation with Ceauescu, Kroly Kirly might have hoped to negotiate these issues easily. However, the general secretary was shocked by his letter, for he had considered Kirly one of his most loyal supporters. While in institutions such as the army or the secret police and in the diplomatic apparatus no members of ethnic minorities could ever get to the highest positions, the ethnic composition of the country was always carefully reflected in the party apparatus. Thus, the apparatchiks from other ethnic groups whom the leadership in Bucharest considered trustworthy had better chances of promotion in the party hierarchy. Kirly rose to prominence under Ceauescu after his appointment in 1968 as local first party secretary in the Covasna district, one of the two districts in Romania with an overwhelming Hungarian majority (over 90%). For his career, see CNSAS, Membrii CC al PCR, 349-50. According to Pacepa, Ceauescu was very pleased with Kirly, who was a passionate hunter like himself and always managed to arrange the setting of the hunts organized in his district in such a way as to allow the general secretary to return with impressive trophies. Kirly was appointed alternate member of the Political Executive Committee at the Tenth Party Congress in 1969, allegedly
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after Ceauescu brought down the biggest bear he had ever shot. Pacepa, Red Horizons, 143-44. The only representative body of the Hungarian community in communist Romania was the Council of the Workers of Hungarian Nationality. Although led by members elected from this minority, it was nothing more than a puppet organization which the communist party fully controlled. Vago, The Grandchildren of Trianon, 121-22 and 219-20, respectively. Kroly Kirlys Letter to Ceauescu, Romanian Situation Report, 13 January 1988, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 8, File Dissidents: Kroly Kirly. Kirly admitted in this interview that, since his first protest of 1971, Romanias economic situation had degraded so much that Ceauescus regime had lost also the support of the Romanian majority, which had hitherto applauded his nationalist policies. However, he explicitly said that the Hungarians must stick to their own fight for minority rights instead of seeking to enlarge their demands in such a way as to intervene on behalf of the entire population. Published first in Beszl (Budapest), No.19 (February 1987), this interview was published in English as Kroly Kirly We Have to Fight: Interview by Mikls Haraszti, East European Reporter, Vol. 2, No. 3, 57-63. Between December 1981 and January 1983, when the publication of the journal stopped after the intervention of the Romanian communist authorities, nine issues were published and distributed in Romania among the Hungarian minority, and across the borders, mostly in Hungary and among Hungarian migrs in the western countries. Actually, the editors of Ellenpontok observed from the beginning that neither the Hungarian service nor the Romanian service of RFE dealt with issues specific to Transylvania. In this respect, they did not make a difference between the Hungarian communist regime and the Hungarian migrs working for RFE. While the former failed to respond to the actions taken by the Romanian communist regime, the latter refrained even from responding to their colleagues from the Romanian service when they made hostile references to Hungarians. Ellenpontok, No. 7 (August 1982), OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 20, File Romanian samizdat 1982. However, migrs from Romania who worked for the RFE Research Institute, such as Michael Shafir and Anneli Ute Gabanyi, monitored carefully the abuses of Ceauescus regime against minorities. Moreover, the Paris-based emigration (especially Mihnea Berindei) was sensitive to
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the problems raised by the Hungarians in Romania. See for instance, Mihnea Berindei, Les minorits nationales en Roumanie, LAlternative (Paris), Special issue Roumanie: Crise et repression (January 1983), 56-66. Dissident Dorin Tudoran, who had signed a petition to the UN together with Gza Szcs, supported the Hungarians in Romania from his exile in the United States, and published their critical perspectives on the policies of the Romanian communist regime in Agora, the review for alternative culture edited by him, Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismneanu. For more on the restrictions imposed on the journalists working for RFE, see Urban, Radio Free Europe, 114. George Schpflin observed that this was a real turn in the attitude of the Hungarian intelligentsia in Transylvania and represented a response to the Romanian intolerance and xenophobia, according to the editors of Ellenpontok. George Schpfin, Transylvania: Hungarians under Romanian Rule, in Stephen Borsody, ed., The Hungarians: A Divided Nation (New Haven, CT: Center for International and Area Studies, 1988), 142. The eighth issue of Ellenpontok, which was published in October 1982, reproduced the Memorandum and the Program Proposal on the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania, which the editors addressed to the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Madrid. Worth mentioning is that the reestablishment of the administrative autonomy in the overwhelmingly Hungarian regions was requested on the basis that a precedent had been created after the communist takeover. These texts are available in English in Ibid., 148-58. See also Contrepoint, le samizdat hongrois, de Roumanie, LAlternative (Paris), No. 20 (January-February 1983), 45-46. The respective paragraph reads as follows: [The Participating States] stress also the importance of constant progress in ensuring the respect for and actual enjoyment of the rights of the persons belonging to national minorities as well as protecting their legitimate interests as provided for in the [Helsinki] Final Act. See Annex III to Pierre Kende, Communist Hungary and the Hungarian Minorities, in Borsody, ed., The Hungarians, 291. Although the right of individuals to monitor human rights abuses in their countries was formally recognized in this framework, the attempt of the United States, Great Britain and Canada to introduce a specific reference to Helsinki monitors was blocked by Romania and Czechoslovakia during the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna.
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Rolland Eggleston, Vienna Review, Report by RFE/RL correspondent, Vienna, 13 January 1989, in Vojtech Mastny, ed., The Helsinki Process and the Reintegration of Europe, 1986-1991: Analysis and Documentation (London: Frances Pinter, 1992), 135. Also worth mentioning is another aspect related to Szcs treatment by the Romanian communist authorities. Upon reading his file from the secret police archives, Szcs discovered (like Pter Esterhzy before him) that one of the informants of this institution was his own father. For Szcs reaction to this discovery, as well as documents from the Securitate archive about the surveillance of the authors of Ellenpontok, see http://halbjahresschrift.blogspot.ro/2011/08/ellenpontok.html (accessed 8 March 2013). In his letter of November 1984, Szcs asked for constitutional changes, which would have introduced the guarantee of collective nationality rights. Also, he requested again the reestablishment of the Ministry of Nationalities, which had functioned between 1944 and 1952, and the issuance of a law for nationalities. Besides, he demanded for a public debate on the restoration of Hungarian cultural institutions, for the transparency of the statistical data regarding the number of university graduates from minority groups, and for easier contacts with foreign citizens. Since he received no answer to his petition, Szcs sent a second letter in March 1985, in which he came up with evidence for the discrimination against the ethnic minorities in Romania. He argued that both Hungarians and Germans, which represented the largest ethnic groups in the country, were underrepresented in the party central structures established by the Thirteenth Party Congress in November 1984, as well as in the local organizations. Szcs also mentioned that the use of the mother tongue in education was severely restricted, the radio and television programs in other languages than Romanian were banned, and monuments related to the history of minority groups were removed. Finally, he complained about the policy of mandatory assignments after university graduation, which resulted in the dispersion of the Transylvanian Hungarian elite to other regions. See Transylvanian Hungarian Dissidents Protest the Oppression of Minorities, Romanian Situation Report, 26 June 1985, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 4, File Dissent: General. Szcs acknowledged that such an international organization would not have been able to take action against countries which violated the rights of the minority groups, but it could have drafted yearly reports on the situation of minorities, encouraged publications in minority
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languages or promoted cultural exchanges. Thus, the organization would have played an important role in the formation of the public opinion and the acceptance of a system of norms that would alleviate tensions between nations and implicitly contribute to the prevention of possible confrontations. See Proposal for the Creation of an UNSupervised International Agency to Protect the Rights of National Minorities, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 4, File Dissidents: General. For more on Dorin Tudorans activity as dissident, see Chapter 5. For a comparison between the two Hungarian samizdat publications, see Vladimir Socor, Dissent in Romania: The Diversity of Voices, Background Report, 5 June 1987, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 4, File Dissidents: General. Dorin Tudoran remembered that, after he had signed the memorandum, he was asked why he cared about the problems of the Hungarian minority, given that members of this community had killed some of his relatives. See his contribution to the round table discussion in Washington, D.C. in Romania: A Case of Dynastic Communism, 90. This was the third letter, which Cornea formally addressed to Ceauescu. Its result was her house arrest until 21 December 1989. For more on this, see Chapter 5. Information about Corneas dissident activity was disseminated also via the underground publications of the democratic opposition in Hungary. See Vladimir Socor, Romania in the Press of the Neighboring Countries, Romanian Domestic Bloc, 10 November 1988, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 7, File Dissidents: Doina Cornea. Realized by the Belgian journalist Josy Dubi, the film entitled The Red Disaster showed to western viewers a situation so shocking for individuals used to live in a normal world, that only those old enough could assimilate it with their war memories. Also, the destruction of Bucharest reminded to some of the disaster following the war or earthquakes. Josy Dubi, interview by author, tape recording, Brussels, 19 July 2002. For more on this, see Chapter 5. For the exchange of letters between Doina Cornea and va GyimesiCseke, see OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 7, File Dissidents: va Gyimesi-Cseke. The secret police wanted to make all the dissidents confess that behind their criticism against Ceauescus regime were western interests to
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destabilize Romania. Dan Petrescu, interview by author, tape recording, Bucharest, 28 April 1998. On this, see also Chapter 2. The Romanians who signed this declaration were Stelian Blnescu, Mihnea Berindei, Ariadna Combes, Ion Vianu, Dinu Zamfirescu and Mihai Korne. In this respect, it is perhaps telling that Cornea dissociated herself from this declaration, in spite of the fact that among its signatories was her daughter, Ariadna Combes. She confessed that expressions such as space of complementariness or autonomous political representation seemed to her too ambiguous to be included in such a document. Doina Cornea, Scrisori deschise i alte texte (Open letters and other texts) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1991), 95-96. From among Hungarians, most of the signatories belonged to the so-called Hungarian populist opposition, which had made from the rights of the Hungarians in the neighboring countries one of their central concerns. For comments on the uses and abuses of the Declaration of Budapest, see Andreescu, Ruleta, 277-90. Kdrism, like any other such isms which defined the personalized rule of a communist dictator, represents a concept which observers from outside the Soviet bloc defined and used. Ferenc Fehr considered that Kdrism was more than just political pragmatism, economic reforms made en-route and tolerance toward dissidents; it was a modified version of Khrushchevism, which survived because it observed the principle regarding the leading role of the party and it preserved unquestionable loyalty to the Soviet Union. In short, liberal Hungary owed its existence to the very existence of the non-liberal Soviet Union. Ferenc Fehr, Kdrism as Applied Khrushchevism, in Robert F. Miller and Ferenc Fehr, eds., Khrushchev and the Communist World (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble Books, 1984), 210-29. At the time when the Helsinki process was about to start unfolding, a bilateral meeting between Kdr and Ceauescu took place in Debrecen on 15-16 June 1977. The two communist leaders discussed the problem of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, and the communiqu stated that minority groups represented an internal affair of the country whose citizens they were. This common statement perfectly corresponded to Ceauescus position on this matter. Gyula Illys article was published in let s Irodalom, the journal of the Hungarian Writers Union. Since this criticism came from the outside of the HSWP, the Romanian reply came also from outside the RCP, but from intellectuals close to the regime, such as Mihnea Gheorghiu, the president of the Romanian Academy of Social and
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Political Sciences. The debate intensified in the 1980s, after the publication of Ion Lncrnjans book, Cuvnt despre Transilvania (Word on Transylvania), which included his personal painful memories from the time when this region was under Hungarian administration. The last stage of the dispute was reached after the publication of Bla Kpeczis History of Transylvania in 1986. Then, Romanian historians from Ilie Ceauescus team orchestrated the reply. Raphael Vago, who followed carefully the development of this dispute and detected its first signs in scarce references made in the late 1960s, maintains that it would have been impossible even in the liberal Hungary to take part in such an open debate if the regime did not want it. For more on this, see Vago, Grandchildren of Trianon, 214-60. In 1984, the populists drafted a petition which asked for the establishment of a foundation for the Hungarians abroad, a special television program dedicated to these groups, and a new ministerial position for minority affairs. It also demanded the publication of a history of Transylvania. Except for the ministerial office, all their requests were satisfied by the party leadership. Tks, Hungarys Negotiated Revolution, 197. For the increasingly radical agenda of the Hungarian democratic opposition during the 1980s, which culminated with the program of reforms of June 1987, launched under the title Social Contract, see Ibid., 181-91 and 200-202. Although mentioned in the Helsinki Accords, minority rights represented not individual but collective rights and were thus not easy to put in accordance with the western liberal tradition. In a paper prepared for the meeting of the Coordinating Committee of the Helsinki International Federation for Human Rights, held in Vienna on 5-7 March 1983, Gspr Mikls Tams came with a new framework for defining the violation of minority rights, based on three categories. The first included issues that could fit into the internationally accepted interpretation of human rights, such as the denial of free circulation of persons between the two countries, the hindrance of free flow of ideas and information, the drastic limitation of cultural exchange and the interdiction to study in Hungary. The second category comprised cases that could have been interpreted in the western conceptual framework, but which had been hardly mentioned in an international context. Such cases included: the limitation of the right to be educated in the mother tongue, the forced migration of minority members outside their native region and the
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elimination of inscriptions in minority languages. The third category included issues that required a new concept of international law in order to be tackled and which might have been interpreted as interference in internal affairs. One such example was the request to establish institutions independent from the state to deal with the problems raised by minorities, since the existing ones were only paper organizations with administrative bodies and no membership. Gspr Mikls Tams, The Position of Hungarian Minorities in the Neighboring Countries, in Violations of the Helsinki Accords: Report from Hungary prepared for The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, May 1983, 25-36, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 20, File Romanian samizdat 1983. It seems that the Teleki Institute was established after a sociological survey of 1986 showed that only 27% of high school graduates were aware of the existence of the Hungarians living in the neighboring countries, while only 39% of the adults knew about the territorial losses after the Treaty of Trianon. Thus, the Hungarian communist leadership understood that, unless they do something about it, this event would disappear from collective memory. Paul Lendvai, Hungary: The Art of Survival (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988), 38. The Plenum of the Central Committee in June 1988 made public the exchange of letters between the HSWP and the RCP regarding their mutual relations and the Hungarian minority in Romania. The former accused the latter for the intention of suppressing the Hungarian rural heritage in Transylvania via the program of village systematization. The latter proposed a bilateral meeting to discuss these problems. Although the Hungarian Consulate in Cluj was closed on 1 July 1988, the meeting between Ceauescu and Kroly Grsz took place on 28 August. However, the official meeting had no immediate results; a short press communiqu just informed on the constructive atmosphere of the bilateral talks and the desire of both parts to find a solution. Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 430. According to some sources, this rally of June 1988 gathered about 60,000 people. Rudolf Tks, Hungarys Negotiated Revolution, 287. According to other sources, there were between 30,000 and 50,000 people. Lendvai, Hungary, 124-25. For the exchange of statements between the head of the Hungarian delegation, Andr Erds, and the deputy chief of the Romanian delegation, Teodor Melecanu, see Mastny, The Helsinki Process, 17782.

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This statement of the Romanian delegation at the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna was delivered on 15 January 1989. See Ibid., 14142. For more on the international recognition of minority rights, see Ibid., 245-53. This was true especially for the United States. As late as 1985, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who once closely collaborated with Henry Kissinger, the main proponent of dtente in US politics, dismissed Ceauescus western critics as influenced by Hungarian irredentist emigration circles. Almond, The Rise and Fall of Nicolae and Elena Ceauescu, 265. Even after the launching of the systematization plan in 1988, the French ambassador to Bucharest still feared that criticism of this plan might have been just a Hungarian attempt to manipulate western governments against Romania, as Coen Stork, a former ambassador of Holland to Bucharest in the late 1980s, remembered. Indeed, western governments reacted to the plan of systematization later than the Hungarian communist regime, which protested first in May 1988. The Austrian and the German governments warned Bucharest against this plan only in July 1988. All these three countries were concerned about their ethnic kin living in Romania. Other governments were unable to grasp the significance of systematization of rural and urban areas. Even a well-informed ambassador as Coen Stork, who followed very closely what was happening in Romania, understood the intentions behind this plan only after discussing freely with a refugee from Romania in Budapest. Coen Stork, interview by author, tape recording, Amsterdam, 3 April 2003. Obviously, this shift did not occur but after a long period of time. In spite of the fact that the communist regimes in Romania and Hungary were perhaps the most contrasting in the entire Soviet bloc, the two countries enjoyed for a while an equal international prestige. This was valid at least for the United States, which conducted its external policy toward the WTO countries in accordance with clearly defined principles of differentiation, which George Bush disclosed in a speech held in Vienna on 21 September 1983, when he was vice-president. He mentioned then that his country perceived with equal benevolence both Romania and Hungary, the former for its external policy of manifested independence from the Soviet Union, while the latter for its internal policy of reforms aiming at distancing it from the Soviet economic model. For more on this, see Chapter 1.
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A symbolic moment was in 1977, when Hungary became, after Poland and Romania, the third country from the Soviet Bloc to receive from the United States the MFN status. Consequently, the crown of Saint Stephen, kept in the US as a war trophy, was returned to Hungary where it actually belonged. In the early 1990s, this was still a very sensitive issue not only in Romania after so many years of Ceauescuism, but also in Hungary, for public awareness of the Hungarian communities outside the country and the discriminations against them increased by 1989, after both the communist regime and the opposition groups raised these issues internally and internationally. A survey of 1989 among members of the Hungarian intelligentsia showed that 83% of the sample considered the Treaty of Trianon as unjust. Moreover, 34% thought that its consequences could be reversed. Since the borders drawn at the Conference in Potsdam could have been undone, then so could be the territorial settlements after the First World War. Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, 461. Romanians refer to the article 1 of the constitution, which stipulates that Romania is a national and unitary state, as a symbolic return to the interwar traditions, which the Constitution of 1923 encapsulated. Hungarians regard this article as an epitome of ethnic assimilation and constantly propose to change the definition of the Romanian state from national into multi-national. At the same time, the Status Law which was adopted by the Hungarian Parliament in 2001 also promoted the ethnic concept of the nation, which conflicted with the attempts of the neighboring states to promote a civic concept of the nation and conceive the Hungarian minorities as part of their national communities. Andreescu, Ruleta, 339-44.
CHAPTER 4
Party Veterans Against Ceauescu*

On 10 March 1989, BBC broadcast an open letter addressed to Ceauescu by six former senior party officials. These veterans were mentioned in the end of the text in the following order: Gheorghe Apostol, Alexandru Brldeanu, Corneliu Mnescu, Constantin Prvulescu, Grigore Ion Rceanu and Silviu Brucan.1 The authors of what would come to be known as the letter of the six had pursued similar political careers: all had joined the communist party since it was a clandestine organization and rose to prominence after the takeover of power; some were quite influential under Gheorghiu-Dej, but all were later marginalized by his successor, Nicolae Ceauescu. Rceanu was the sole exception, as he had been already expelled from the party in 1958 during the so-called purge of the old-timers. Already alienated from the inner circle of power, these six party veterans could have been hardly considered a significant faction of the Romanian communist elite. Yet, it was for the first time ever that a group, however small and hierarchically insignificant, dared to criticize
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publicly the policy of the supreme party leader. In other words, this protest represented a break in the monolithism that characterized the political (sub)culture of the Romanian communist elite. The patterns of thought and action which defined this group (and implicitly the six authors of the open letter) were directly influenced by its identity forming experiences, as Kenneth Jowitt observed.2 Accordingly, this chapter begins by briefly examining those past experiences that made monolithism such an enduring feature of this political (sub)culture that singularized the RCP within the Soviet bloc until the above-mentioned letter surfaced publicly. Then, the author continues by analyzing the conditions in which this small-scale protest of former nomenklatura emerged,3 the reaction of Ceauescus regime when confronted with an unprecedented public criticism, the reception of this letter inside the country, as well as abroad, and finally its legacy in postcommunism. In short, this chapter illustrates that the open criticism which the six party veterans formulated in 1989 represented a breakthrough in the monolithism which characterized hitherto the Romanian communist elite, yet just a reiteration of ideas already expressed in the Soviet bloc: these old-timers adapted the language of human rights to perestroika and glasnost in the hope of provoking Ceauescus downfall.
Identity Forming Experiences of the Romanian Communist Elite

Many western analyses of the Soviet bloc acknowledged that a necessary although not sufficient step toward political change in communist regimes was the emergence of a reform-oriented wing within the party. Such an evolution occurred only after Stalins death, once his successor Nikita Khrushchev launched the so-called de-Stalinization, which many satellites leaders then mirrored.
THE LETTER OF THE SIX
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A reformist wing within the party developed and strengthened wherever strong autochthonous revisionist views existed among party-affiliated intellectuals able to interact with like-minded officials and persuade them that reforms represented a necessary step for the survival of the system.4 In Romania, no such openminded faction of the party ever emerged, while Marxist revisionism was hardly a matter of debate in intellectual circles. Before the communist takeover, left-oriented intellectuals were only a few, as hardly anyone studied seriously Marx or Engels, to say nothing of Lenin. Implicitly, the communist party rarely attracted Romanian intellectuals, and thus it remained up to the end of the Second World War a tiny political group, which comprised mostly socially marginal and poorly educated individuals.5 After the communist takeover, very few of the partys newly affiliated intellectuals came to really understand Marxism, although opportunists who jumped in the winning political boat were not in small numbers. Books published in Romania were full of quotations from Marx, Engels or Lenin. However, the respective authors browsed such readings only to pick up fragments that they used often with a different meaning either as a display of obedience to the regime or as a clever justification of personal ideas. Consequently, a revisionist current could never emerge from amidst intellectuals that did not come to study even the orthodox doctrine.6 As for party officials, the Marxist thinking was acquired only in the abridged version of the Stalinist interpretation, the only one considered valid even after the death of the Soviet dictator. Thus, ideological debates never occurred within the framework of party institutions, while the main guidelines for the construction of communism remained practically unchanged during the forty-five years of single-party rule.7 In fact, ever since the aborted effort of Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chiinevschi to launch a de-Stalinization in 1956, any attempt to depart from dogmas
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specific to the Stalinist period was punished with marginalization from political life. Between the early 1950s, when Gheorghiu-Dej initiated his struggle to remove all opponents, and the early 1970s, when Nicolae Ceauescu succeeded in consolidating his position as uncontested leader, the Romanian communist elite suffered a tremendous transformation. At the end of this process, all that remained from the party leadership was a bunch of trembling apparatchiks, incapable or unwilling to oppose the decisions of the secretary general.8 In short, the RCP was the least divided party in the Soviet bloc, which never experienced turmoil within its ranks, and never underwent events similar to the Hungarian Revolution or the Prague Spring. Even after Mikhail Gorbachev explicitly encouraged reformists in the satellite countries to implement reforms in accordance with those underway in the Soviet Union, the RCP continued to be a monolithic party, whose elite did not dare to question the conservative line imposed from the top. Given the weak tradition of revisionism and the hitherto party monolithism, the open letter addressed to Nicolae Ceauescu by six old-timers came as a shock for the secretary general, who had been always confident in the rightfulness of his dogmatic policy. This criticism represented the first challenge to the supreme leader since the above-mentioned aborted attempt of initiating a type of de-Stalinization. As observers of Romanian communism argued, a so-called fear of factionalism made the Romanian communist elite behave so coherently since the takeover of power.9 Moreover, the post-1989 views expressed by former officials suggested that the fear of factionalism within the party was an essential and distinctive element of the political culture of Romanian communism. From among the signatories, Gheorghe Apostol declared: I have made myself a myth from the unity of the party, while Alexandru Brldeanu stated in the same vein: We feared factionalism more than leprosy.10 Ceauescu, an old-timer himself,
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was always afraid not of a popular revolt, but of a coup initiated from within the party, according to Silviu Curticeanu, his last presidential secretary.11 All these testimonies indicate that the fright of severe punishment for the mortal sin of factionalism remained unaltered even after the RCP expressed its right to autonomy within the communist camp, and showed that the patterns of thinking and action characteristic to its leadership went in the early 1960s through a major change. Two previous experiences marked for life all old-timers, who continued to think that factionalism had to be avoided at all costs. First, there were the so-called factionalist struggles of 1928-29, which determined the interference of the Kremlin in the internal clashes of the RCP. These interventions eventually ended with the change of the satellite party leader and his arbitrary punishment, which more often than not meant death. In this terrifying experience originated the fear of the Romanian communists for the intrusion of the Soviet leaders. Besides, another murderous episode, which occurred during the takeover of power, further shaped patterns of thought and action among party veterans. The brutal killing of tefan Fori, the Moscow-appointed leader of the party, who was nonetheless unable to extent his control beyond the tiny underground faction, reminded everyone that an extreme punishment could also come from within. The decision to eliminate Fori was not taken in the Soviet Union, but in Romania. Responsible for this murder were the leaders of the other two rival factions of the party: Gheorghiu-Dej and Ana Pauker. The former, the uncontested head of the powerful and monolithic group which went together through the experience of prison, was directly involved in the repression of his potential rival. The latter, the most prominent personality of the so-called Muscovite group, comprising those who had spent the war years in the Soviet Union, contributed at least by tacitly approving this killing.
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These two traumatic experiences represented two different lessons for Romanian communists, but both contributed to the consolidation of party monolithism. The first episode illustrated that the Soviet Union might interfere at any moment of instability within the party in order to change the faction that was incapable of maintaining order. This represented the legacy from the period of the complete dependence on the communist party in the Soviet Union, with which the factionalist struggles of 1928-29 were associated. Beside this early experience, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 strengthened the idea that as long as the local elite lacked internal legitimacy and its power depended on the Soviet Union, any conflict at the top or revolt from below would always determine the intervention of the Kremlin. Actually, the Romanian communist elite perceived the turmoil in the neighboring country through the perspective of its own past experiences during the factionalist struggles. As Gheorghiu-Dej asserted, the lesson of the events in Hungary was that the ideological unity of the party must be defended at all costs.12 Otherwise, any split at the top (which the emergence of a reformist faction might have caused) meant that the Soviet Union would intervene and take sides with the team which would prove more loyal and more capable of controlling the party and the society.13 It was this enduring pattern of understanding the relation with the Kremlin that made Gheorghiu-Dej so anxious to convince Khrushchev to withdraw the Soviet Army from Romania in 1958. In contrast, the second episode mentioned above referred rather to the intra-party relations than to the interference of the Soviet Union. As such, it explains why this fear of factionalism survived even after the independence from the CPSU was internationally asserted. From the bloody murder of tefan Fori, the party leader who entered in conflict with the faction of the communists from the Caransebe prison, the generation of old-timers learned that internal struggles led to the suppression of the leaders who were unable to control the entire
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organization. Behind any political contestation of a leader was hidden the metal bar destined to crush the head, as sociologist Pavel Cmpeanu, himself member of the party since the underground period, put it.14 Beside these two formative experiences, the period of the struggle for power also left an enduring legacy in the political culture of the Romanian communist elite and reinforced the idea that the party unity was a precious asset. These internal battles for party domination included the following main episodes: the purge of Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca and Teohari Georgescu in 1952, the trial and execution of Lucreiu Ptrcanu in 1954, and the removal of Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chiinevschi from the Politburo in 1957.15 If the stake of the first two was the elimination of important rivals from outside Gheorghiu-Dejs group of prisons, the third purge had a different significance. The ousting of Constantinescu and Chiinevschi followed a conflict within the same hitherto monolithic faction of old-timers, who intensely socialized together in the adverse environment of prisons, mainly in the one located in the city of Caransebe.16 This premiere represented a warning for all those who would ever think to publicly criticize the supreme leader. In addition, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RWP in 1958 illustrated that the party control over its members extended beyond the public domain. With that occasion, a considerable number of old-timers with less important positions in the party hierarchy (including one of the signatories of the letter of the six, Grigore Rceanu) were removed from their positions. They were accused of expressing criticism outside party meetings, which was a euphemistic phrase for gossiping about the leadership in private meetings. Accordingly, the resolution of this plenum called all party members to be vigilant and repress the manifestation of any such forms of factionalism.17 After setting such an example, which was followed by another round of careful verifications of all members in 1959-60, no
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criticism was ever heard within the party meetings until Prvulescus critical speech at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1979. This internal coherence was the direct consequence of the aforementioned internal struggles for power, as well as their reinterpretation. The winning faction, which Gheorghiu-Dej led to victory over the others, could impose a posteriori its own version of the conflicts and canonize it as such. During the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RWP in November-December 1961, Gheorghiu-Dej presented the history of the party as a victorious struggle of good against evil, which opposed two groups: the locals (pmnteni), which he duly guided, and the Muscovites, which included the purged factions, from among which he particularly mentioned the trio PaukerLucaGeorgescu and the duo ConstantinescuChiinevschi. In this way, the bloody conflict for the control of the party was turned into a source of political legitimacy. Gheorghiu-Dej could not only present himself as an initiator of de-Stalinization before Khrushchev, but also redefine all his former and prospective opponents as Stalinists.18 This speech inspired the partition of postwar history of the party into an internationalist period, when the communization of the country took prevalence over national interests, and a national period, when the party returned to Romanian values and defended the country against the Soviet interference. This codification of the history of the RCP remained along the same lines until 1989 and even after.19 Ceauescu introduced only one change in order to obscure the role of his predecessor in affirming the independence of the party from the Soviet Union. While the turn from one period to the other occurred in Gheorghiu-Dejs version after the elimination of those responsible for Romanias Sovietization against national interests (i.e. his purged rivals), in Ceauescus variant his leadership marked the turn.20 The reinterpretation of these internal conflicts for political domination as generated by a principled debate on the right of each party to decide upon its
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policy, which the winners supported against those who wanted to follow directives from the Soviet Union, made any further internal polemic against Ceauescu impossible. As long as he presented himself as the defender of national interests, his opponents could not be but defenders of Soviet interests, i.e. traitors. With this meaning attached to any conflict with the supreme leader, the Romanian communist elite transformed itself into the most coherent, albeit dogmatic, elite in the communist bloc. When analyzed against this tradition of monolithism, the letter of the six appears indeed as a breakthrough. However, if compared to developments in Central Europe, where communism was already on the brink of collapse when this letter was released, the open protest of a small group of marginalized apparatchiks who asked the RCP to introduce reforms appeared not only insignificant, but also obsolete. The high time of Marxist revisionism, which developed in Central Europe once deStalinization was launched by Khrushchev, was long gone. It ended with the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968, after hopes for changes from within the party were blown away by the Brezhnev Doctrine.21 However, Gorbachev shortly revived the idea that reform-minded communists could have restructured the system, and the six Romanian party veterans must have been actually influenced by such thinking coming from the Soviet Union. The leader of CPSU supported, almost two decades later, similar ideas as the Czechs and Slovaks envisaged in 1968, but he had (unlike them) the necessary authority to make communists from satellite countries emulate his thinking.22 Thus, the six old-timers who had never been reform-minded before took nonetheless a step into this direction in 1989. The letter of the six had an equally outdated message as its source of inspiration, but it marked not only the first collective protest inside the RCP since 1956, but also a turn in the relation with the Soviet Union. Hitherto only punishment
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was expected to come from there, while in the late 1980s, it was the wind of change which came from Moscow even inside the RCP. Taking into account the monolithism and anti-Sovietism that dominated for years the political culture of the Romanian communist elite, the six former party officials marked indeed a change. However, they did not represent a reformist wing of the party; they did not even represent a coherent group.
The Six Party Veterans, Their Backgrounds and Their Motivations

All signatories of this letter of protest had similar formative experiences even beyond the above-mentioned common traumatic episodes, for all were among those who experienced marginalization inside the party. The most important among them was Gheorghe Apostol (b. 1913 d. 2010), Gheorghiu-Dejs closest and most docile collaborator. They knew each other from the time when both were workers in the city of Galai. For a while, it was even believed that he would be Gheorghiu-Dejs successor to the party leadership. Apostol had joined the communist movement in the mid-1930s to spend most of the time between 1937 and 1944 deprived of liberty. He was part of the team of communists who submitted to Gheorghiu-Dejs authority while socializing together in the Caransebe prison. After the party conference of 1945, Apostol became member of the Central Committee, and had the task to supervise the activity of the trade unions. After the merge of the communists with the breakaway socialists in February 1948, he became member of the Politburo of the newly founded RWP. When Gheorghiu-Dej wanted to simulate the establishment of a collective leadership in accordance with the new fashion in Moscow, he appointed Apostol as first secretary of the party in April 1954. For a short time, Gheorghiu-Dej kept for
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himself only the presidency of the Council of Ministers, but he rapidly corrected the error of giving up the control of the party apparatus and took over both prerogatives once again in October 1955. Yet, this mimicked experiment of sharing the power prerogatives illustrated that, at that time, Apostol was number two in the party.23 When Gheorghiu-Dej died in March 1965, Apostol was still considered the most likely successor given the close life-time relationship with the late supreme leader. However, the Politburo members elected Ceauescu as secretary general. Ion Gheorghe Maurer, at that time the president of the Council of Ministers, was the key player who decided in favor of this candidacy.24 From that moment on, Apostols career declined rapidly. At the Tenth Party Congress in 1969, he was no longer elected member of the Politburo, which Ceauescu redefined since the Ninth Congress as the Standing Presidium. He was not even included in the Central Committee. Consequently, Apostol sent an angry letter to the central newspaper of the party, Scnteia (The Spark), in which he severely criticized Ceauescu for imposing amnesia about Gheorghiu-Dejs achievements to such an extent that even his name was no longer mentioned in official discourses.25 Obviously, this letter was never published. Apostol continued his political career, but in lower offices. After being director general of the General Directorate of State Reserves from 1969 until 1975, he was appointed in a position completely outside the party hierarchy, in a Bucharest enterprise. Between May 1977 and August 1988, he was though sent ambassador in several countries of Latin America, an office that forced him to stay even more isolated from other marginalized old-timers.26 However, Apostol used to meet regularly his colleague of generation, the Bessarabian born Alexandru Brldeanu, and comment together current political events. These two former senior officials constituted the nucleus out of which the letter of the six was later born.27
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A graduate from the University of Iai who specialized in economics, Alexandru Brldeanu (b. 1911 d. 1997) joined the communist movement in the mid-1930s, while still a student. The leftist currents were considerably stronger in Iai than in Bucharest, especially in the university milieus. After graduation, Brldeanu became assistant professor at his alma mater in the Department of Economics, Faculty of Law. After the Soviet troops occupied Bessarabia in June 1940, he established in Kishinev, where he worked for the Institute of Scientific Research. When the Romanian army reoccupied this region in June 1941, Brldeanu moved further into the Soviet Union. During this time, he worked for the Romanian service of Radio Moscow and studied at the Plekhanov Institute for Planning. After the war, he returned to Romania to have a brilliant career as the artisan of the centrally planned economy. Brldeanu became secretary general in the Ministry of National Economy in 1946, foreign trade minister in 1948, vice president of the State Planning Committee in 1953 and then president in 1955. In the same year, he was also appointed deputy prime-minister in charge with economic issues, and Romanias permanent representative to the COMECON.28 In 1955, he also joined the high-ranking party apparatus as newly elected member of the Central Committee. In 1962, he became alternate member of the Politburo and from 1965 until 1969 full member of the Standing Presidium and of the Political Executive Committee. In his capacity of Romanias representative to the COMECON, Brldeanu raised to political prominence. His finest hour, which brought him and his country western acclaim, was the aforementioned meeting of 15 February 1963, when Brldeanu transmitted Romanias decision to continue collaboration with partners in this economic organism on its own terms, and not in those dictated by the Soviet Union.29 At that time, he was credited internationally as being the Romanian Ota ik, the individual most capable of conceiving a blueprint for
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restructuring the planned economy. Indeed, Brldeanu was the main artisan of the plan for economic reforms of 1967. As he claimed after 1989, his plan followed closely Gheorghiu-Dejs ideas on improving the Romanian economy, which the late party leader had intended to pursue, had it not been for his death. According not only to Brldeanu, but also to Apostol and Maurer, Gheorghiu-Dej had envisaged the implementation of an economic policy similar to that of Jnos Kdr, once Romanian society was under the control of the party.30 On the contrary, Ceauescu was never willing to revisit the plans for economic development outlined in the early 1960s, which had been sketched at the time when the building of a local industry able to secure the economic independence within the Soviet bloc was at stake. Thus, the secretary general not only opposed adamantly Brldeanus strategy for economic reform of 1967, but also forced him to retire, so that no-one could stand against the policy of investing primarily (and thus disproportionately) in industry. Accordingly, Brldeanu lost his position of deputy prime-minister in January 1969 and his membership of partys leading bodies later that year, at the Tenth Party Congress.31 Aside Brldeanu, the most internationally known from all the signatories was Corneliu Mnescu, communist Romanias former representative to the United Nations and its longest-surviving foreign affairs minister. Mnescu (b. 1916 d. 2000) came from a working-class family of communist militants from the Prahova Valley, the most industrialized region of interwar Romania, which had thus stronger leftist traditions than the rest of the country. In 1936, while a student in law in Bucharest, he joined the communist youth movement, which was at the time an illegal organization. After 1989, he claimed that this political option was determined not by the family tradition but by his own anti-fascist convictions.32 During the war, he worked for the Institute of Statistics, where many leftist albeit non-communist personalities
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were also employed. Among these, there were reputed scholars, such as sociologist Anton Golopenia, who ended his life in the communist prisons, or demographer Sabin Manuil, who managed to leave Romania for the United States after the war. As an employee of that institute, Mnescu was involved in the census made in Transnistria in 1941, after this region was occupied by the Romanian troops which supported the German invasion of the Soviet Union. After the coup of 23 August 1944 which removed the pro-German military leadership, Mnescu enrolled the patriotic guards organized by the communists. Until the late 1950s, he held only minor positions in the military. According to the files of the Ptrcanu trial, Mnescu was on the verge of being connected to this group of alleged traitors due to his participation in the census in Transnistria aside others involved in this trial. For the communist party, the very occupation of this region was a manifestation of Romanian imperialism, which the Cominterninspired theses of the Fifth Party Congress in 1931 condemned. Given his controversial past, Mnescu began his political career only later. He became director in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then ambassador to Hungary in 1960. A year later, GheorghiuDej appointed him quite unexpectedly foreign affairs minister. This promotion represented practically an inclusion among the key persons from the inner circle of power exactly at the moment when the party leader initiated his new policy of rapprochement with the West.33 Simultaneously, Mnescu became the head of the Romanian delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In this capacity, he ran for, and was elected as, chairman of the twenty-second session of the UN in 1967. From his front position in the diplomatic apparatus, Mnescu actively participated in the efforts of achieving international recognition for the policy of independence from the Soviet Union. Thus, he could hold the office of foreign affairs minister until 23 October 1972, quite some time after the death of his benefactor, Gheorghiu-Dej. This
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performance makes him one of the longest-surviving officials from among those raised by Romanias first communist dictator. Only Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Emil Bodnra, the two Politburo members who were instrumental in supporting Ceauescus candidacy, managed to maintain their positions for a longer period of time. Thus, it may be argued that Mnescu assured Romanias continuity in external policy until Ceauescu succeeded in consolidating his power.34 In fact, Mnescus career within the party apparatus began only in 1965, when he was elected member of the Central Committee at the Ninth Party Congress. After his release from the position of head of the Romanian diplomacy, Mnescu held several rather symbolic offices until 1977, when he was sent ambassador to France.35 From 1979, he was also Romanias permanent delegate to UNESCO. In 1982, he lost both positions, and in 1984, at the Thirteenth Party Congress, he was no longer among those elected in the Central Committee, and entered in a period of complete marginalization. The only signatory of the letter who was among the founding fathers of the RCP was Constantin Prvulescu (b. 1895 d. 1992). A volunteer in the Red Army during the civil war in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution of 1917, he was also among the Romanian socialists who established a new party in 1921, which they unconditionally affiliated to the Third International. After the factionalist struggles of 1928-29, he became member of the Central Committee. Arrested and imprisoned with other prominent communists in 1936, he spent three years in jail before evading. After a short stay in the Soviet Union, Prvulescu returned to Romania and, during the war years, was active in the underground under the leadership of tefan Fori, the controversial general secretary of the party appointed by Moscow in 1940. He sided with Fori during the mutually incriminating exchange of letters with the contesting faction which emerged from prisons,36 but betrayed him a year later. In April 1944, Prvulescu, together
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with Emil Bodnra and Iosif Ranghe, ousted Fori and took over the party leadership as a triumvirate. All three were among the very few communists who had connections with both the underground and the prison groups, so all could easily switch sides. Nevertheless, all had to step down in September 1944, after those who spent the war years in the Soviet Union returned to Romania, and the party leadership was taken over by a quadriga formed by two communists from among those who came back from Moscow, i.e. Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca, and two from the locally based groups, i.e. Gheorghiu-Dej and Teohari Georgescu.37 Appointed president of the Central Control Commission of the Central Committee in 1945, Prvulescu held thus a key position in the party apparatus, which empowered him with the verification of all members.38 After the purge of the Pauker-LucaGeorgescu group in 1952, he was among those who entered the Politburo to replace those ousted. However, Prvulescu lost his seats in the Politburo and Central Committee at the Second Congress of the RWP in 1960. He made the tactical mistake of joining Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chiinevschi in their criticism addressed to Gheorghiu-Dej after Khrushchevs Secret Speech of 1956. He was initially spared the fate of the other two, who were purged in 1957, because he presumably went to Gheorghiu-Dej to inform him about the intention of the others.39 During the Plenum of the Central Committee in NovemberDecember 1961 (when Gheorghiu-Dej reinterpreted the history of the party purges as a struggle between his local faction and the Muscovite one, which included all those who were in the meantime ousted), the supreme leader accused Prvulescu openly for his socalled wavering of 1956.40 Under Ceauescu, this veteran was directly involved, as president of the Central Commission of Revision, in the reexamination of the accusations made against those who had been purged in the 1950s, which led to the public recognition of their innocence in 1968. These rehabilitations were
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made only selectively though: while some of those ousted were cleared, among them Lucreiu Ptrcanu and tefan Fori, others, in particular the alien communists Pauker and Luca, were not.41 Obviously, the public recognition of their unjustified purge was not meant to make justice to these individuals, but to condemn those officials who were directly responsible, i.e. the party supreme leader Gheorghiu-Dej and the internal affairs minister Alexandru Drghici. In short, it was a closure of books inside the party to which Prvulescu contributed as well. However, he lost his leading position in the Central Commission of Revision at the Tenth Party Congress in 1969, but retained his membership in this key control structure until 1979.42 His most glorious moment came at the Twelfth Party Congress in November 1979. Although the list of approved speakers did not include him, Prvulescu stood up while the congress meeting was live on TV, and asked to be allowed to express his opinion. Ceauescu made the error of allowing him to speak, and thus a singular moment in the history of the RCP took place: the live transmission of an open criticism articulated during a party meeting. Actually, since the above-mentioned debates that followed Khrushchevs Secret Speech of 1956, when Constantinescu and Chiinevschi obliquely criticized Gheorghiu-Dej, no other party member dared to express any opinion against that of the supreme leader. Prvulescu accused Ceauescu directly and managed to state plainly before being silenced that the secretary general had put his personal interests above those of the party. However, he was alone in his criticism and isolated from most of the elite members who had no interest in joining him. Most of those present at the congress owed their careers to Ceauescu. These newly raised apparatchiks saw in Prvulescu a hopeless old man who was unable to understand that the power relations had changed. As no-one joined him in speaking the truth, this
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episode ended without consequences for Ceauescus domination within the RCP. Like Prvulescu, Grigore Rceanu had also joined the communist movement well before the takeover of power. Unlike most communists, he managed to avoid imprisonment, and stayed active in the underground faction under the leadership of tefan Fori. According to a short biography made by his step son Mircea, Grigore Rceanu was among the organizers of the workers demonstration, which was held on 1 September 1940 in Braov. This protest was caused by the passing of northwestern Transylvania under Hungarian administration, in accordance with the provisions of the Second Vienna Award. Rceanus involvement in this demonstration was not that much a manifestation of his allegiance to national interests, for in this particular case the interests of the Soviet Union went aside those of Romania: this international decision must have been condemned for it was taken without the consultation of Moscow. Besides, there was no territorial conflict of interests between the two countries with regard to Transylvania. However, Rceanu also drafted a memorandum on the problem of Bessarabia and Bukovina, territories of Romania which the Red Army occupied in June 1940.43 This gesture opened a conflict with the party secretary Fori. Thus, he was excluded from the party in 1942, but nonetheless reintegrated in 1944 out of the need to mobilize all possible forces for taking over the state institutions. Once the communists managed to get full control of Romanian politics, Rceanu held various positions in the party apparatus, but never at the highest level. Among the six veterans, he was the only one that came to be marginalized under Gheorghiu-Dej. Aside sixteen other old-timers, Rceanu was among those who were severely criticized for antiparty manifestations at the Plenum of the Central Committee of 9-13 June 1958. All these party members had allegedly formed a
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factionalist group, which used to hold unprincipled and factionalist debates, as aforementioned. In the communist wooden language, this phrase meant discussions about the party policy, which were not only critical but also private, i.e. held outside the official framework of party meetings.44 For the Romanian leadership was obsessed with the unity of the party, any divergent opinion was taken as a platform for the development of a potential faction. As Apostol reiterated in his concluding speech to the Plenum of 1958, the existence of party factions is incompatible with the organizational and ideological principles of our party and thus it cannot be tolerated.45 The individuals targeted by this criticism, however, were not a coherent faction which menaced the unity of the party. Unlike Constantinescu and Chiinevschi who indeed tried to undermine the authority of the supreme leader in 1956, and thus could have been considered the nucleus of a factionalist group, these veterans did nothing else but whispered their dissatisfaction. Some did not even know each other, to say nothing of a common critical position. Moreover, all were in the lower ranks of the party. Those leaders who had been purged earlier (in 1952 and 1957) represented potential challengers of Gheorghiu-Dejs top position, but the old-timers criticized at the Plenum of the Central Committee of 1958 (including Rceanu) were no real threat. At that moment, the struggle for power was already concluded in favor of Gheorghiu-Dej, who nonetheless considered that a stick was needed to frighten the apparatus for the sake of maintaining the unity of the party.46 During this plenum, two signatories of the letter of 1989 were among Rceanus accusers: besides the already-mentioned Apostol, it was Prvulescu who chaired then the Party Control Commission. In this capacity, he had conducted the interrogatories of those who were to be incriminated, including Rceanu, and established their guilt. Also worth mentioning is Ceauescu, whom GheorghiuDej designated for the delivery of the main accusatory speech.47
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Rceanus atypical past provided Ceauescu with plenty of material to be used against him. Accordingly, Rceanu was accused of collaborating on a nationalist and anti-Soviet platform with the leader of the National Peasant Party Iuliu Maniu and of implicitly undermining the antifascist efforts of the communists. He was also charged for siding with the traitor tefan Fori and for weakening in this way the unity of the party. Moreover, the main accusation was that the group had intended to organize a meeting in order to get together several hundreds of marginalized old-timers and create a split between veterans and non-veterans, between those who held high-ranking positions and those who did not. In this respect, Rceanus declarations were taken as proof of guilt: he had argued in private discussions that a Petfi Circle, like the one which had functioned in Hungary between 1953 and 1956, must have been established in Romania as well.48 Consequently, Rceanu was for the second time deprived of his party membership, together with such a prominent figure among oldtimers as Constantin Doncea, former colleague of Gheorghiu-Dej at the Grivia Railway Repair Shops and organizer of the strike of 1933.49 His wife, Ileana Rceanu, was also among the persons who were accused during this plenum. She lost thus her position of alternate member of the Central Committee for adopting a conciliatory attitude with regard to the anti-party position of her husband, or in other words, for failing to inform the leadership.50 Although Ceauescu was the main accuser at the Plenum of 1958, it was also he who silently rehabilitated at the Plenum of April 1968 those ousted then, together with other victims of the Gheorghiu-Dej era. Moreover, Mircea Rceanu, Ileanas son with the underground communist Andrei Bernath, who was later adopted by Grigore, could pursue a successful diplomatic career under Ceauescu. In 1989, however, Mircea involved himself in supporting the authors of the letter and had thus to bear even more drastic consequences than them.
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Finally, Silviu Brucan (b. 1916 d. 2006) was the last signatory of the letter (as mentioned at the end of the text and announced by broadcasting agencies), but its main author (according to himself). A communist of Jewish origin, he also joined the movement before the Second World War. Since the coup of 23 August 1944 and until 1956, Brucan was the acting editor of the central newspaper of the party, Scnteia. In this capacity, he wrote propaganda articles almost daily in the late 1940s. In his editorials, Brucan accused the leaders of the other parties of fascist convictions, following the logic that considered all anticommunists as fascists. As the Yalta Agreement had legalized the purge of those who had collaborated during the war with the fascists, Brucan asked publicly that democratic politicians, such as the leaders of the National Peasant Party Iuliu Maniu and National Liberal Party Dinu Brtianu, be put to trial and severely condemned as fascists.51 From 1956 to 1959, Brucan was Romanias ambassador to Washington, at a time when relations between the two countries were minimal. From 1959 to 1962, he continued his diplomatic career as Romanias ambassador to the United Nations. Then, Brucan was appointed head of the newly established Romanian Television. Since 1966, he also taught Marxism at the University of Bucharest, although he did not have the required formal education. Nevertheless, Brucan was repeatedly invited as visiting professor of social sciences at universities in the United States, United Kingdom and France in the 1970s and 1980s. To the best knowledge of this author, he was the only prominent Romanian communist who managed at that time to publish books outside the country under his own name, except for Ceauescu himself.52 Between 1971 and 1983, three volumes by Brucan appeared at American publishing houses which promoted left-oriented social analyses of communist societies.53 It was only his fourth book World Socialism at the Crossroads that argued for the necessity of reforming the communist system. The
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source of his inspiration was not the reform-oriented communism of the 1960s, but the works of Lenin. In fact, this most radical among Brucans books was published only in 1987, when this view had already been advocated by Mikhail Gorbachev. However, his plea for the removal of the Stalinist legacy in economy was rooted in the New Economic Policy of the early 1920s. Central planning, which Brucan observed to be no longer compatible with the current stage of industrial development, needed to be improved, he affirmed. This required the introduction of some market mechanisms, which should have replaced the purely political and ideological decisions that governed the economies of the communist countries. Brucan acknowledged, however, that economic reforms must have been accompanied by political reforms. Like the Prague Spring leaders and Gorbachev before him, he conceived pluralism only within the framework of the communist party. This could have been achieved by allowing factions to exist. In his own words, factions must be legalized. This view represented in fact a return to Lenins democratic centralism, which Stalin perverted in order to suppress any divergent views. As the unity of the party in thought and action represented an obsession of the Romanian communist elite, Brucans volume appeared indeed revolutionary and directed against Ceauescu, the secretary general who adamantly opposed any reforms.54 Interestingly enough, Brucan sticked to the same ideas even after 1989. It was he who advocated the transformation of the NSF, the ad-hoc organism created during the revolution, into a political party in which pluralism must have been assured by the existence of factions.55 Besides this book, Brucan expressed these reform-oriented views in an interview granted immediately after the workers revolt in November 1987 to the UPI reporter Nick Thorpe. After social unrest reached a peak at the end of the 1970s, workers in Romania barely revolted during the 1980s, although the economic conditions worsened steadily.56 Thus, the strike which broke up
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on 15 November 1987 at the Steagul Rou (The Red Flag) Truck Factory in Braov came as a shock. This protest emerged when shortages already represented an endemic phenomenon, which affected the supply of all basic products and services, such as foodstuffs, gasoline, heating fuel, running water, electricity, central heating, etc. It was, however, a heavy blow to the communist authorities which had always claimed to represent the working class. The event that precipitated the strike was a severe reduction of workers due payment. In reaction to the non-fulfillment of the plan, the management, which was under the constraint of the legislation regarding the so-called self-management of industrial units of production, decided to keep the balance by operating wage cuts. Although this spontaneous protest had economic grounds initially, it turned eventually into a political protest, as eyewitnesses claimed. It was for the first time when a crowd shouted in a public space in Romania: Down with Ceauescu! Although the protest spread to other factories in the city, in particular to Tractorul (The Tractor), and many other citizens joined the manifestation, the protest lasted for one day only. On the one hand, the quick and effective repression hampered the potential participation of many others who were also unsatisfied with Ceauescus policies. On the other hand, it was the poor organization of this strike in the form of a violent street demonstration, instead of a round-theclock sit-down non-violent one that allowed the authorities to suppress quickly the emerging movement.57 Brucan defined this event as a watershed in Romanias political history as a socialist state, for this illustrated that the stability of the regime, which had been hitherto based on consent, could no longer be assured without repression. Since the revolt in Braov represented an unprecedented street demonstration of thousands of workers whom the regime pretended to represent, the Romanian communist elite had to confront a major decision, he underlined. Accordingly, the party leadership had to choose between mass
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repression and the genuine effort of dealing with the serious problems that the population faced, all the more so that these resulted directly from the partys foolish policy of avoiding reforms. Because of such earlier mistakes, the crisis charged the bill of every Romanian.58 Brucans initiative of expressing his views publicly had a profound impact on some of the other signatories, notably on Apostol, who recognized that he thought the same, but did not dare to say it openly. Thus, Brucan was, in spite of his lower ranking party position, among those whom he contacted later and proposed to join the other veterans in a common protest. Briefly put, a workers revolt in a workers state provoked these marginalized party bureaucrats to come together and express their disapproval for the policies of Ceauescus regime. The six veterans who were briefly presented above made a crucial step in the late 1988 and participated in the drafting of the open letter of protest. They were neither part of a reformist wing within the party nor a well-organized group which aimed to take over power after precipitating Ceauescus downfall. Moreover, some of them never got to know the others neither during the affair of the letter nor after the fall of communism. The six oldtimers were communists who had already reached the age of 70, and became unhappy because the current party leader ruined what they considered to have been the achievements of their generation, i.e. Romanias independent position in relation to the Soviet Union and its rapprochement with the West.59 However, one must give them credit for their courage of acting while under the surveillance of the secret police. Because their telephones were listened and their walls bugged, they had to meet in parks or on roofs, and put the radio loud when discussing inside. Unlike other veterans, such as Ion Gheorghe Maurer (whom Ceauescu also marginalized, although he had been instrumental in his election as secretary general), the six signatories of the letter risked the tranquility of their retired existences and the privileges they still had in comparison with the rest of the population.60
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The Open Letter, Its Message and Its Reception

The story of the letter is not easy to reconstruct in detail because the post-1989 testimonies of the five signatories (Prvulescu died without leaving his version) are often contradictory. After the fall of communism, Brucan tried to take most of the credit for the letter, and went as far as to claim that Apostol betrayed the others to the Securitate during interrogations. On the contrary, the others acknowledged in their public testimonies Apostols centrality in this affair. Accordingly, it was Apostol who took the initiative of approaching members of the old guard in order to issue a public protest against Ceauescu and who recruited alone all the other signatories.61 Yet, Apostol honestly admitted that Brucans public criticism after the Braov revolt gave him the very idea of the open letter.62 After his release from the diplomatic post in Brazil in the summer of 1988, he initiated his endeavors of contacting potential supporters of a collective protest. Considering the inertia of compliance which characterized the communist elite, Apostol targeted primarily former prominent officials who were removed by Ceauescu. In other words, the most likely persons to join his initiative were those who had a personal reason to be against the supreme leader beside any other disagreement over political issues. Thus, Apostol contacted first Brldeanu, who was known for his dispute with Ceauescu over economic issues, Prvulescu, who had openly criticized the secretary general in 1979, and Mnescu, who had been eliminated without reason from the position of foreign affairs minister in 1972. Beside these three, he also approached Brucan. Although he was never a first rank communist official as the others, he had proved with his public declarations after the workers protest of 1987 to have adequate channels of transmission outside Romania, which none of the others had. For other prominent communists refrained themselves from taking such a
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risk as signing a protest letter, Apostol contacted finally Grigore Rceanu through his son, Mircea. The latter worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Apostol had thus working relations with him.63 No common letter would have existed without Apostol, as no letter would have reached western media without Brucan. Apostol contacted all the other five, but they hardly knew each other. Some had met and even had working relations when in power, such as Brldeanu and Mnescu, but never met during the letter affair. Moreover, a person like Rceanu, who was expelled from the party in 1958, was completely unknown to all the others, perhaps with the exception of a founding father of the party as Prvulescu. Brucan minimized Apostols role by accusing him of treason and supported his hypothesis with the fact that he suffered the least after the release of the letter. This allegation, as well as Brucans ability to use their collective letter in order to put himself on the political map of post-communist Romania, embittered the others. However, no-one, not even Apostol, denied the crucial role played by Brucan in sending the letter abroad. In 1989, no member of the Romanian communist elite had any experience in issuing an open protest. Some signatories of the letter did not even acknowledge the crucial role of western broadcasting agencies in making their message known to a wide audience outside the country and in protecting them from subsequent retaliation. For Prvulescu, their open protest should have been an internal affair, a closure of books between them and Ceauescu, which had nothing to do with the capitalist West.64 In fact, even Apostol recognized that he had understood the importance of communicating with western media due to the interview granted by Brucan after the 1987 revolt in Braov. Brucan was also the one who composed the text of the letter which was released to the press. As in the case of many other protest letters written behind the Iron Curtain, a piece of paper with the
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text and the signatures on it did not exist as such. The letter of the six was a gentlemens agreement, as Mnescu put it.65 After drafting various preliminary versions to which all contributed with comments, the signatories entrusted the writing of the final version to Brucan, who was about to leave Romania for the United States and United Kingdom. How did the letter arrive to BBC, the first news agency which broadcast the letter, it is still unclear. Brucan maintained that he first returned from his journey and only then sent it abroad, because he was told that the launching of this open protest would be more efficient if this was done from Romania. He claimed to have posted on 27 February 1989 several copies of the letter, which were addressed to private individuals in London and Vienna, but destined for BBC and Associated Press, respectively. Since nothing happened in a week, Brucan tried another channel of communication: he managed to give another copy to the political counselor of the American Embassy in Bucharest, who sent then photocopies to other embassies, including the British and the Dutch ones.66 The former ambassador of Holland to Bucharest Coen Stork confirmed this part of the story. Otherwise, it does not seem very plausible that Brucan managed to send some other copies by regular post from Bucharest while he was already under surveillance.67 These difficulties of communicating with western media from communist Romania, as well as the identity of those who endorsed the letter, conferred more significance to this open protest than its actual content. However, some of the main ideas raised by the six former party veterans are worth mentioning because these are relevant for the mindset of the political elite which the signatories represented. On the one hand, the letter which was drafted as an appeal addressed to Ceauescu tried to be in tune with the spirit that dominated the international meetings of the last decade. If not all of them, at least Brucan was aware that they had to address primarily an external audience, so the letter had to include
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references to the Helsinki Accords and the observance of human rights. On the other hand, the text perfectly reflected the political culture in which the signatories had been socialized, which was marked by a strange combination between failed de-Stalinization and openness to the West. Accordingly, the letter was composed of three main parts: one focused on violations of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Romania and implicitly of the Final Act of the CSCE in Helsinki; a second dealt with the economic crisis and its consequences, while a third assessed which errors that the party leadership made under Ceauescu deteriorated the international prestige of the country. Thus, the message of the six old-timers appeared quite revolutionary for the Romanian communist elite, but seemed outdated as compared to criticism already expressed in other countries of the Soviet bloc, not only by civil society groups, but also by prominent communist leaders, including Gorbachev. The first part of the letter opened with a categorical denunciation of Ceauescus disregard for the rule of law: The international community is reproaching you the nonobservance of the Helsinki Accords, which you signed. Romanian citizens are reproaching you the nonobservance of the constitution, which you swore to respect. The letter continued by providing concrete examples of indisputable violations of the existing legislation by the party leadership to conclude with a statement which invited Ceauescu to recognize that a society cannot function if the authorities, starting from the top, show disrespect for law. The examples of illegal actions included some of the most absurd measures from Ceauescus blueprint for a future communist Romania, aside the misuse of the secret police. For article 36 of the constitution protected the right to personal property, the plan of rural systematization, which presupposed in fact the peasants forced removal from their private houses to blocks of flats, was illegal. The building of the so-called civic center of Bucharest,
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which required a huge investment that the public budget did not include, represented a violation of the laws regulating constructions and financing. Regarding the Securitate, the letter stressed that it was created to defend the socialist order against the exploiting classes, but Ceauescu turned it against workers demanding their rights, against old party members and against honest intellectuals exercising their right to petition ... and the freedom of speech. This detour of the secret police from its original mission also illustrated the disrespect for the rule of law, for it led to the violation of rights guaranteed by articles 34 and 28 of the constitution. In short, the six veterans formulated their criticism of Ceauescus regime by referring as much as possible to violations of internal laws or international agreements on human rights in order to arouse the interest of a western audience.68 At the same time, the argument of the letter suggested that it was a time when private property was respected in communist Romania and when its laws were carefully observed. Moreover, the signatories seemed to assume that the secret police was originally a necessary institution, with a legitimate mission.69 Although the six veterans pretended to represent democratic convictions, such as respect for the rule of law and human rights, their unarticulated premise that things went well in communist Romania before Ceauescu betrayed their background of unreformed communists. The second part of the letter concentrated on the economic problems faced by the country due to the mismanagement of both industry and agriculture. The text correctly pointed out that the leadership of the RCP was responsible for the refusal to evaluate realistically the causes that led the country into crisis and devise accordingly strategies for economic recovery. Instead, the members of the Political Executive Committee had only past-oriented views and continued to take decisions ideologically, urging workers to fulfill the unfulfilled plan of the previous year, previous semester or previous month. Following a logic similar to that applied to
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the analysis of the secret police activity, the authors of the letter did not denounce the central planning as responsible for the bankruptcy of the Romanian economy. On the contrary, they claimed that the plan no longer works, as if it was a time when it did. As already noted, Brucan had pleaded in his latest book for the introduction of some market mechanisms to reform the faulty planned economy, following the model already proposed by Gorbachev. However, no references to such ideas could be found in the letter of the six. Indeed, debates on the opportunity of introducing economic reforms never really took place within party structures. Although these ideas had circulated in the Soviet bloc for decades to become the new orthodoxy in the Soviet Union by the late 1980s, the signatories of the letter proved reluctant to refer to such kind of changes in the centrally planned economy. Their critical assessment of Romanias economic crisis was as pastoriented as the ideas expressed during the meetings of the Political Executive Committee, to which the letter referred to. Like the communist leadership in power, its six critics seemed to believe in the centrally planned economy and assume that it was a time when this was successful. Finally, the letter referred to Ceauescus policy as the cause that led to the loss of Romanias international prestige. When the letter surfaced publicly, the country was almost isolated from former western partners, as well as from eastern fraternal states. As already illustrated, the reluctance to sign the Concluding Document of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna (because of the references to minority rights) represented a final step that turned Ceauescus Romania into a pariah among the countries that formally agreed in 1975 in Helsinki to work together for the observance of human rights.70 Thus, the six party veterans denounced the policy of forced assimilation of minorities which had pushed many members of these ethnic communities to emigrate from Romania. Moreover, they condemned Ceauescu
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because his foolish policies isolated the country and destroyed its diplomatic and commercial relations with western countries. At that time, Romania had just willingly renounced to the MFN clause in order to avoid either its withdrawal or its further use by the United States as lever for the protection of persecuted dissidents. The European Economic Community had already refused to extend its commercial agreements with Romania. Thus, the authors of the letter stated that Ceauescu had to comply with the provisions of the Helsinki Accords in order to take the country out of its isolation and restore the relations with other countries. Romania is and remains a European country and as such it must advance with the Helsinki process and not turn against it. To sum up, the letter focused only on Ceauescus abuses and violations of the constitution and implied by default that his communist predecessors distinguished themselves as law-abiding leaders. Thus, many perceived this message as limited, albeit acknowledged its emergence, given the scarcity of open criticism in Romania. For instance, Michael Shafir observed in his assessment of the letter made for the RFE Research Institute that the signatories failed to recognize their own political responsibility for driving Romania into one of the worst periods from its past, making in this way their appeal more credible.71 Unable to conceive the change of system, the six authors had in mind a very limited goal, as they also acknowledged after 1989: they could only think as far as Ceauescus downfall. As Apostol put it, Ceauescu must have been determined to step down from the leadership of the party for his anti-national and anti-popular policy.72 Gorbachevs visit to Bucharest made them understand that even the Soviet Union wanted another leader in Bucharest, one who would pursue in Romania a reform-oriented policy on the model initiated in Moscow.73 Accordingly, the signatories of the letter hoped that once their critical message became internationally known, it would trigger such an external pressure from western countries, as well
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as from the Soviet Union, that Ceauescu would forcefully retire. At the time when the letter was released, such a change seemed radical enough, for the downfall of communism was hardly envisaged even in countries like Poland or Hungary. Yet, the pastoriented message of this letter did not represent anything else than the lament of some old-timers for the passing of the heyday of communism in the Soviet bloc. After 1989, Brucan defended the limited message of the letter against its anti-communist critiques by underlining that a political action must not go beyond the level of conscience held by a certain society at a given time.74 His assessment was contradicted by the very fact that on 22 December 1989, when Ion Iliescu announced that finally one could unrestrictedly build socialism with human face in Romania, the crowds gathered in front of the Central Committee headquarters shouted: No more communism! According to the evaluations made by the RFE Research Institute at that time, only a third of their respondents expressed favorable opinions on the protest of the six party veterans. From among the optimistic interviewees, some mentioned that its importance lied in the fact that a split in the party leadership finally occurred. Others believed that, after this letter, the number of those who expressed publicly their dissatisfaction with the regime would increase. The others thought that the six veterans succeeded at least to boost the morale of the overburdened population. Those respondents who were rather pessimists said that the letter would not produce any change in Romania because Ceauescu used to do only what he wanted, no matter what. In short, the letter of the six was not met with great enthusiasm by Romanians.75 To its poor reception contributed also the general ignorance about the six authors, for their early removal from office (the last purge from politics reflected in daily newspapers was Mnescus in 1972) attracted also amnesia upon them. Thus, the younger Romanians never even heard their names mentioned in media before the letter.
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Interestingly enough, the favorable comments on this letter made by western broadcasting agencies (which represented the only alternative source of information for Romanians) influenced very little the public opinion inside the country. The divergence of views among the different news agencies could partially explain this. For instance, the Romanian desk of RFE, which was by far the most listened broadcasting agency, expressed rather mixed opinions. While the Munich section took into consideration the scarcity of protests in Romania and thus presented the letter as an important document coming from inside the RCP, the Paris section was rather reserved in its comments on this letter authored by old-timers. The latter insisted much more on the significance of the simultaneously released letter of the seven which marked the first collective protest expressed by literary and artistic personalities.76 VOA, which had a more limited influence on the Romanian audience than RFE, conveyed yet a different message. In one of its broadcastings, the former dissident Dorin Tudoran drew the attention on the fact that the letter of protest authored by the six party veterans had a tremendous international impact. Thus, he argued that it should not be disregarded by Romanians for exactly the same reason that made it interesting for the West: the very position of the signatories within the communist system.77 BBC, which had in Dennis Deletant its main informant, also considered the letter as an important event given the previous compliance of prominent party members. Although the letter stirred such comments abroad, most Romanians registered its message with indifference. Even those who made their critical voices heard in the following months did not refer to this letter, so it could hardly be considered as an act that stimulated further criticism. The letter of the six was also amply commented in western media. The relative importance of its signatories was better known outside Romania, where information about the leadership in the
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communist world was not erased every time a person was removed from office (as it happened regularly behind the Iron Curtain). Given the scarcity of protests coming from Romania, this letter represented news even though its message was insignificant in comparison with debates in other communist parties from the Soviet bloc. News agencies, such as Reuters and Associated Press, hurried to comment the letter in extenso, while important dailies, such as The Independent in London or Le Monde in Paris, considered the event spectacular enough to dedicate to it long articles on 13 March 1989, three days after the letter was first broadcast by BBC.78 Besides, numerous other prestigious newspapers of various orientations published detailed articles on this letter on 15 and 16 March.79 Criticism against Ceauescu was for the first time more exotic than his aberrant policies which had hitherto focused the interest of western journalists covering Romanian politics. The extensive comments on the letter in western media would have nonetheless passed without triggering any change, had it not been for the western governments which paid attention to this protest against Ceauescus policies. Faced with an unprecedented wave of criticism formulated by western officials, the Romanian communist regime reacted in a way reminiscent of the Stalinist period, which was all the more anachronistic that the rest of communist Europe was heading in the opposite direction. The six authors of the letter were summoned to the headquarters of the secret police in Bucharest, interrogated at length and then put under round-the-clock surveillance. None of the veterans was thrown into prison though, which illustrates that even Ceauescu refrained himself from resorting to measures characteristic of the earlier period of terror, when people had been imprisoned arbitrarily, without any genuine proof of guilt and without any trial. Even in the most Stalinist country in the Soviet bloc, such abuses could no longer take place, for news about the infringement of ones liberty could have been
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transmitted to western press agencies in spite of the strict control maintained by the secret police. Thus, the Bucharest regime isolated exactly those of the signatories who had been once involved in international relations and could still have connections on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Accordingly, Brldeanu, Brucan, and Mnescu were removed from their residences in an exclusivist neighborhood in northern Bucharest, where all nomenklatura members used to live, and forced into house arrest in the outskirts of the capital. Mnescu, who tried to oppose, was taken out by force with the help of the anti-terrorist special units.80 It was actually this harsh treatment of the signatories that outraged western governments and pushed them to increase their diplomatic pressure upon the Romanian communist regime.81 The letter had been incidentally broadcast one day after the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva adopted a resolution calling for an inquiry into the human rights abuses in Romania. As mentioned, this resolution was voted not only by western countries, but by Hungary as well, while other communist countries abstained from voting. The adoption of this resolution marked an unprecedented split in the Soviet bloc and isolated Romania from the communist states which wanted to illustrate that they were different. Moreover, the letter emerged at the time when the European Parliament, following the hearing on Romania of 21 February 1989, was about to vote a resolution which condemned the suppression of fundamental rights in this country.82 Briefly put, the timing of the letter could not have been worse for Ceauescus regime, for it coincided with the increased international criticism of its abuses, which countries on both sides of the Iron Curtain formulated. Besides, it overlapped with the intensification of intellectual dissent among prominent personalities from the sphere of culture.83 This noticeable escalation of internal criticism triggered further measures meant to isolate Romania internationally. On 16 March 1989, France recalled its
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ambassador to Bucharest for consultations and postponed bilateral talks on economic issues in order to show its disapproval of Romanias appalling human rights record. It also warned the Romanian government against any further repressive measures imposed on the six signatories of the letter. On 17 March, Great Britain accused Romania of outright violation of human rights, and asked it to stop harassing the six party veterans. Federal Republic of Germany canceled a joint meeting on economic issues and recalled its ambassador to Bonn, after the police hampered him to meet Mnescu.84 When the German ambassador returned to Bucharest, he brought an official invitation for Mnescu on behalf of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West German foreign affairs minister. The State Department of the United States also advised the Romanian government to take no repressive measures against the six former senior officials.85 Even the communist authorities in Budapest, which had already criticized the non-observance of the rights of the Hungarian minority in the neighboring country, reacted to the letter. The speaker of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Istvn Komorczki characterized the protest of the six party veterans as a major event, albeit refrained from mentioning Ceauescus non-communist critics. Moreover, the Hungarian daily Npszabadsg took the opportunity to praise the six authors for their courage to confront Ceauescu. The reaction of Ceauescus regime to this chorus of international criticism seemed to have been driven by idea that none of these foreign countries should have intervened in Romanias internal affairs. Few days after the release of the letter, the Romanian news agency Agerpres delivered a communiqu of the prosecutor general, who announced that a grave act of treason had been uncovered. The party daily Scnteia published also this news which reported that Mircea Rceanu, stepson of Grigore Rceanu, formerly in the diplomatic service, had placed himself at the service of a foreign power and was caught in the act. Since his
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alleged recruitment of 1974, Rceanu had been supposedly engaged in an intensive activity of treason. Consequently, he would be put on trial and condemned according to the Romanian laws, informed the communiqu. The betrayal of state interests was punished at the time in Romania with the death penalty.86 After the release of such shocking news for Romanians who used to hear about such affairs only by word of mouth, the local party organizations from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (where Rceanu had been employed) organized meetings in order to ask publicly for the capital punishment.87 When the letter came out publicly in March, Mircea Rceanu had been already under arrest and interrogation since 31 January 1989. He was not only the stepson of one author, but also Apostols former supervisor in his capacity of deputy director of the Fifth Directorate in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in charge with Romanias relations with Central and South American countries. This position had indeed enabled Mircea Rceanu to put Apostol in contact with his adoptive father, Grigore, as it was later acknowledged by both. Otherwise, his alleged connections with the unnamed foreign power had nothing to do with the letter of the six.88 The Romanian authorities seized nonetheless the opportunity and made Rceanu part of the letter affair. The connection between the six signatories and a person accused of espionage intended to inculcate the idea that an inimical power inspired the criticism which the open letter directed against Ceauescu and his policies, and to implicitly discredit its content. A long article published on 17 March 1989 in Scnteia stated that any call for the reform of the existing system was, if not pure navet, then outright treason. History had demonstrated, according to the article, that perfidious treacherous watchwords always preceded the attempts to undermine the national independence. Although these battle cries could seem an invitation to liberalism and anarchy, to which people might rally
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with distressing navet, they were in fact used in ill faith by treacherous people. Scnteia also warned against dishonest intentions which were disguised in a different cloak. Accordingly, the article implied that any calling for the observance of human rights could not be but ordered from outside the country. Moreover, for the letter came out soon after Romania expressed its reserves for the Concluding Document of the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna, the article insinuated that citizens who talked about rights were in fact hiding behind such discourse a betrayal of state interests.89 The article never referred to the letter of the six or to its authors. Instead, it tried to influence public opinion against it by implying that all those who raised questions of human rights were nothing else but rotten traitors who received financial reward from a foreign state to denigrate their own. These individuals contributed thus to the interference of a foreign country in Romanias internal affairs, to use the communist parlance. This was by no means a new tactic. Critics of the communist regimes were in general persuaded or pressed to confess that they were serving the interests of a foreign country. When Goma tried to establish a human rights movement, Ceauescu referred to him (albeit without mentioning his name) as to a Judah ready to betray for a couple of silver coins. In the political thinking of Romanian communists, any criticism must have been linked with the treason of the state interests in the benefit of an inimical country. A change nonetheless occurred with the letter of the six. Until then, the foreign adverse power was implicitly one from the capitalist camp. Besides, the neighboring Hungary became once again in history an inimical state, after its communist authorities not only allowed the populist dissidents to criticize the Bucharest policy toward the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, but also raised themselves this issue internationally. When the letter of the former communist officials came out, Romania was the target of criticism expressed
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by governments from both sides of the Iron Curtain. Thus, the above-mentioned article implied that the signatories might have been in the service of both Washington and Moscow. Accordingly, the six authors were made responsible for denigrating Romanias image and implicitly for encouraging the international criticism which was already coming from West and East. This letter did not stimulate other prominent party members to openly criticize the communist regime. It did not inspire the thoughts of other non-communist dissidents either. The allegedly revisionist position of the signatories was compatible only with that of other apparatchiks who were though less daring in expressing themselves publicly. One such communist official was Ion Iliescu, later Romanias first post-communist president, but in 1989 just a second rank party bureaucrat, who had been excluded from the Central Committee at the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1984 and put in charge of the Technical Publishing House. Although marginalized by Ceauescu for his moderate reformist views, Iliescu came into the public attention in the late 1980s due to rumors that he used to be close friend with Gorbachev during the time spent in Moscow for university studies.90 Vlad Georgescu, the director of the Romanian desk of RFE, made a parallel between Brucans book of 1987 and an article published in the same year by Iliescu in Romnia literar.91 However, none of the authors of the letter mentioned that any of them might have tried to contact Iliescu in order to convince him to sign the common protest against Ceauescu. Moreover, Iliescu denied to have encountered any of the six signatories at the time of the letter affair.92 He recalled that he was continuously under surveillance, so he was also avoided by former party or work associates. That must have been a letter of the veterans and he had no place among them, acknowledged Iliescu after 1989.93 During his first appearance on TV after Ceauescus fall in the evening of 22 December, Iliescu invited all those who could engage
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themselves in the reconstruction of Romania, the signatories of this letter included, to support the subsequent transformation of the country. He referred to them as to the six veterans of the party, who proved their patriotism addressing to the country, appealing to reason and to (sic!) Ceauescu.94 Nevertheless, the political influence of the signatories after the fall of communism was very uneven. Since they never actually met during the letter affair, they did not act as a group of interests when this was suddenly allowed. Only three, Mnescu, Brldeanu and Brucan, were finally included in the Committee of the NSF, but only the last two really played a significant role in post-1989 politics, while the other three never actually counted.95 Yet, the legacy of the letter was not insignificant in post-communist Romania. As Cmpeanu observed, the letter of the six crucially influenced the political life after 1989 not necessarily because of the contribution of its authors, but because the party which controlled the early transition emerged from like-minded party bureaucrats. It was from the group of party veterans that the small team which took over political power, taking advantage of the popular wave and the candor of dissidents, indeed emerged. The Revolution of 1989, Cmpeanu argued, did not oppose anti-communist forces to the existing communist party, but a group of old-timers with reformist views to a dictator who hated reforms. The letter did not provoke the revolution, but it provided the first critical assessment of Ceauescus dictatorship. While former members of historical parties had been unable to organize themselves before 1989, former high ranking communist officials succeeded to stand out from the compliant communist elite.96 Moreover, the alternative political force which emerged in the aftermath of the anti-communist revolution originated in this type of thinking and from inside the communist party. The results upon democratic consolidation were indeed severe, for their patterns of thought and action dominated the early stages of the transition to democracy.
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Notes
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On 10 March, BBC broadcast only excerpts from the letter of the six. RFE broadcast the full text on the next day. In the following days, all important western news agencies and newspapers of all political orientations published comments on this letter. For the text of the letter, see OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 18, File Open Letters: The Group of Six. The letter was integrally reproduced in Silviu Brucan, Generaia irosit (The lost generation) (Bucharest: Universul & Calistrat Hoga, 1992), 190-94, and Cmpeanu, Ceauescu, anii numrtorii inverse, 287-89. Political culture, i.e. the values and beliefs which confer meaning to the political process and shape the set of rules which govern atttitudes and behavior in a political system, has lost its central place in political science. Since it deals with a subjective dimesion of politics, which takes into account the collective past of a political system, as well as the members personal experiences, is no longer a significant concept in political science, which is increasingly focusing on quantitative analyses on the expense of qualitative ones (like those who explored political culture). However, this concept was quite often used by Sovietologists, who underlined the high polarization between elites and community in communist societies (as compared to democratic societies), and proposed accordingly typologies of distinguishable political cultures (called sometimes subcultures). Although different authors used various distinctions, these nonetheless overlap, for all emphasized the dichotomy party-state vs. community. Kenneth Jowitt argued in an article of 1974 that one should distinguish between elite political culture, which was shaped by the identity-forming experiences of its members, and the regime political culture, which refers to the responses to the institutional definition of political, social and economic life. Both should be distinguished from the community political culture which was shaped by the historical relationship between the regime and the community. For a reprint version, see Kenneth Jowitt, Political Culture in Leninist Regimes, in Idem, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 50-87. Nomenklatura included all individuals who held a position in the governmental system or in the party hierarchy in a communist state. The term nomenklatura was popularized by the Soviet dissident Michael Voslensky, who published his former samizdat as tamizdat in the United States. His anatomy of the Soviet system was preceded by
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Milovan Djilas very influential analysis, which represented the first critical view of an insider on the transformation of the revolutionary communist elite after taking over power. Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (New York: Praeger, 1957); Michael Voslensky, Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class. An Insiders Report (New York: Doubleday Publishing, 1984). The late Polish-born Marxist philosopher Leszek Koakowski authored the path-breaking study which supported this argument. See his Main Currents of Marxism, vol. 3: The Breakdown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 450-530. Based on an extensive study of documents from the archives of the communist party and of the interwar secret services, Stelian Tnase depicted Hieronymus Bosch-like portraits of the most prominent party old-timers and illustrated the long series of betrayals and assassinations that marked from the very beginning the network of communist militants acting on Romanian territory. Stelian Tnase, Clienii lu Tanti Varvara (Auntie Varvaras Clients) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2005). An interesting insiders view on the tiny group of communists in interwar Romania described the small gang that eventually managed to take over power in Romania as a heteroclite grouping of individuals, who came together out of frustration with the defective democracy: Hungarians and Bulgarians who wanted the separation from Romania, workers that saw themselves masters of factories, Jews scared of anti-Semitism, unemployed people without any definite qualification or with mediocre training, politicians with unfulfilled ambitions, ugly or Bovary-like housewives, children who did not want to go to school; it is from this world that the party activists were recruited before the war. Everyone felt unjustly treated and hampered in fulfilling his or her dreams. Herbert (Belu) Zilber, Actor n procesul Ptrcanu: Prima versiune a memoriilor lui Belu Zilber (Actor in the Ptrcanu trial: The first version of Belu Zilbers memoirs) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1997), 25. Vladimir Tismneanu, From Arrogance to Irrelevance: Avatars of Marxism in Romania, in Raymond Taras, ed., The Road to Disillusion: From Critical Marxism to Postcommunism in Eastern Europe (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 135-50. Some former members of the nomenklatura bore witness to the early concentration of decision-making in the hands of the party leader and a few other individuals who substituted themselves to the Politburo, the party structure which should have taken the decisions. Besides, the Central Committee was a purely decorative institution, for no real debates ever took place during its meetings, according to Sorin Toma
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who made this assessment in a letter to Vladimir Tismneanu. A copy of this letter is in the possession of the author. A communist since the party was in the underground, Sorin Toma became editor-in-chief of the party daily Scnteia in 1947 and member of the Central Committee in 1955. He was expelled from the party in 1963, but readmitted in 1970. Until his retirement in 1975, Toma worked as editor at Editura tiinific (later on Editura tiinific i Enciclopedic). CNSAS, Membrii CC al PCR, 578-79. In 1988, Toma immigrated with his family to Israel and was the most important former party official who came to live abroad. This letter was also sent to RFE, which broadcast excerpts from it in July-August 1989. OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 9, File Dissidents: Sorin Toma. Vladimir Tismneanu, Fantoma lui Gheorghiu-Dej (The phantom of Gheorghiu-Dej) (Bucharest: Univers, 1995). Michael Shafir proposed the concept of faction-anxiety in order to explain that the great cohesion of the generation of old-timers was not determined by ethnic, social, or educational homogeneity, but by the common experience of the factionalist struggles. Shafir, Romania Politics, Economics and Society, 65-84. The significance of the factionalist struggles in the political culture of Romanian communism was also discussed in Vladimir Tismneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). For the testimonies of these party veterans, see Lavinia Betea, ed., Maurer, 275; and Idem, ed., Alexandru Brldeanu despre Dej, Ceauescu i Iliescu: Convorbiri (Alexandru Brldeanu on Dej, Ceauescu and Iliescu: Conversations) (Bucharest: Evenimentul Romnesc, 1998), 305. Silviu Curticeanu, Mrturia unei istorii trite: Imagini suprapuse (Testimony of a lived history: Overlapping images) (Bucharest: Albatros, 2000), 322 and 363. In a speech delivered at the conference of the local party organization from the Hungarian Autonomous Region (which was held on 16 December 1956), Gheorghiu-Dej acknowledged that the Romanian communist elite learnt two lessons from the events in the neighboring country. The first referred to the importance of maintaining the ideological unity of the party, its unity of will and action. This must have been assured by suppressing any deviation from the party discipline. The second referred to the demands of the masses which must never be disregarded. The subsequent evolution of the party illustrated that Ceauescu learnt well the first lesson, but forgot about
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the second. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole i cuvntri, 1955-1959 (Articles and speeches, 1955-1959) (Bucharest: Editura Politic, 1960), 201. In 1956, Ceauescu was directly involved in the application of the RWP measures destined to contain from a nutshell a revolution like that in Hungary and thus he understood that only the full party control over society could have spared the Romanian communist elite of the Red Army intervention. After he succeeded Gheorghiu-Dej, Ceauescu made explicit (with the occasion of the forty-fifth anniversary of the RCP in May 1966) that party members were not allowed to have any direct personal relationship with members of the CPSU. It is inadmissible, under any form, that a party member establish relations with a representative of another party over the head of the leadership. Mark Almond, The Rise and Fall of Nicolae and Elena Ceauescu, 215. Pavel Cmpeanu, Ceauescu, 106-7. For the purges of several prominent Romanian communist militants under Gheorghiu-Dej, see Robert Levy, Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); and Lavinia Betea, Lucreiu Ptrcanu: Moartea unui lider comunist Studiu de caz (Lucreiu Ptrcanu: The death of a communist leader A case study) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2001). A marginal member of the group from prisons, Pavel Cmpeanu observed that this faction acted really monolithically after the takeover of power and managed to occupy all the key positions, except the Ministries of Finances and Foreign Affairs, which were headed by Vasile Luca and Ana Pauker, respectively. Episodes such as the killing of tefan Fori, the purges of Lucreiu Ptrcanu, Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca represented the natural elimination of intruders from the party leadership, which the faction from prisons dominated. The attempt by Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chiinevschi to challenge Gheorghiu-Dejs authority marked the first internal conflict within the hitherto monolithic group from prisons. Influenced by Khrushchevs Secret Speech, these two members of the Poliburo tried in March-April 1956 to put under question the activity of the supreme leader in the name of de-Stalinization. They were unable to rally others, apart from Constantin Prvulescu who pondered for a while the idea of joining them. Otherwise, both acted in solidarity with the rest of the elite in suppressing the incipient revolt in October 1956. This failed attempt led to their purge from the Politburo in 1957. Cmpeanu, Ceauescu, 43 and 59.

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Private critical discussions were denounced as manifestations of factionalism, or more precisely as factionalist and unprincipled talks (discuii fracioniste i fr de principii). Party members were supposed to express their views only in an institutionalized frame, and not in private. For the transcript of the Plenum of 1958, see Alina Tudor and Dan Ctnu, eds., Amurgul ilegalitilor: Plenara PMR din 9-13 iunie 1958 (The old-timers sunset: The Plenum of the RWP of 9-13 June 1958) (Bucharest: Vremea, 2000). It is interesting to note that Gheorghiu-Dej also reused this interpretation of party history in order to pay lip service to the Soviet leadership. His report at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RWP was also presented later at the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU. With this occasion, the Romanian leader made a parallel between the post-Stalinist conflicts inside CPSU and those inside RWP, implicitly between Khrushchev and himself. Accordingly, GheorghiuDej characterized these conflicts as a sharp and principled struggle between creative and revolutionary Marxism and dogmatism a struggle between old and new (sic!). Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole i cuvntri, 1961-1962 (Articles and speeches, 1955-1959) (Bucharest: Editura Politic, 1962), 175-226, quotation at page 196. This interpretation of party history was challenged after 1989. While an insider like Cmpeanu still argued that the internal party conflicts produced a divide between the Moscow-obedient and the nationaloriented communists, Tismneanu illustrated the existence of three factions whose debates had nothing to do with principles or ideas, but with the unyielding will to control the party. Vladimir Tismneanu, The Road to Cominform: Internationalism, Factionalism and National Communism in Romania, 1944-1948, Sfera Politicii (Bucharest), No. 1 (1992), 14-15, Pavel Cmpeanu, Note asupra PCR n anii 4050 (Notes on the RCP in the 1940s-1950s), Sfera Politicii (Bucharest), No. 2 (1993), 18-19, Vladimir Tismneanu, Chestiuni de metod (Problems of method), Sfera Politicii (Bucharest), No. 3 (1993), 29-30. However, Ceauescus strategy of obscuring Gheorghiu-Dejs role in this party struggle which the alleged defenders of national interests won was successful because he could capitalize politically on the discourse of 21 August 1968, when Romanians acclaimed him for condemning the Soviet-led intervention of the WTO troops in Czechoslovakia. Such an interpretation of party history was conveyed by many former nomenklatura members who wrote memoirs or granted interviews after 1989. Most notably, Paul Niculescu-Mizil
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elaborated on the thesis of the two periods, internationalist and nationalist, in his two post-communist books, O istorie trit (A lived history) (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedic, 1997); and Idem, De la Comintern la comunism naional (From Comintern to national communism) (Bucharest: Evenimentul Romnesc, 2001). A good selection of documents and a detailed narrative of the events related to the Prague Spring are included in Jaromr Navrtil et al., eds., The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998). When asked by his Czech friend and fellow communist reformer Zdenek Mlynr about the difference between the Prague Spring and his perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev answered that it consisted only in the nineteen years of delay. Mikhail Gorbachev and Zdenek Mlynr, Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). Before appointed first secretary of the party, Apostol had been deputy prime-minister from 1952 to 1954. After losing this leading position in the party hierarchy in 1955, he took over the control of the trade unions as president of the Central Council of Trade Unions. In 1961, Apostol was again appointed in an executive office as first deputy prime-minister. In 1967, two years after Gheorghiu-Dejs death, he returned once again to trade unions as chairman of the General Confederation. CNSAS, Membrii CC al PCR, 74-75. The former nomenklatura seemed to agree that Ceauescu was not among the persons who Gheorghiu-Dej would have wanted to succeed him, although he had gained his confidence after playing an instrumental role in eliminating Constantinescu and Chiinevschi in 1956, and rose thus to prominence in the party leadership. By 1965, Gheorghiu-Dej had already noticed Ceauescus dogmatism, which manifested especially during the collectivization of agriculture. The key player in supporting Ceauescus candidacy in 1965 was Maurer, who recognized that Gheorghiu-Dej told him on his deathbed that his choice for a successor would have been Apostol. At the same time, Maurer claimed that he nonetheless decided to support Ceauescu for two reasons. First, because he wanted to avoid a split at the top and second, because he considered him pugnacious enough to continue the national line initiated by Gheorghiu-Dej. Corroborating the conflicting stories of these events narrated by the two surviving members of the Politburo of 1965, Maurer and Apostol, with those of lower-ranking communist leaders who did not witness the decisive
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meeting but lived through this event from the distance, one can grasp Ceauescus backstage maneuvers which assured him the support of a majority of the Politburo. For Apostols account, see Betea, ed., Maurer, 272-75. For Maurers testimony, see Ibid., 172-77. As distant observers, Brldeanu and Mizil offered more balanced views on the episode of Ceauescus election. Betea, ed., Brldeanu, 177-84; and Paul Niculescu-Mizil, O istorie trit, 378-91. For an English translation of this letter, see Deletant, Communist Terror in Romania, 291-92. In May 1977, Apostol became Romanias ambassador to Argentina and, from August 1981, also non-resident ambassador to Uruguay. His last diplomatic appointment was ambassador to Brazil beginning with September 1983. Apostol was finally forced to retire and returned to Bucharest in 1988. Apostol left his personal view on the evolution of the RCP, including the episodes related to Gheorghiu-Dejs succession, which he lost to Ceauescu, and the open letter of 1989, in Ion Jianu, ed., Gheorghe Apostol i Scrisoarea celor ase (Gheorghe Apostol and the letter of the six) (Bucharest: Curtea Veche, 2008), 25-72. CNSAS, Membrii CC al PCR, 92-93. The international significance of this moment for communist Romania is briefly analyzed in Chapter 1. For Brldeanus personal account on his opposition to Khrushchevs plans to assign each satellite country the economic branches that it should solely develop, see Betea, ed., Brldeanu, 150-51. According to the party veterans who signed the letter, Gheorghiu-Dej was determined to relax the domestic policy after he had succeeded in securing Romanias military, economic and even political independence in the communist camp. Brldeanu claimed that Gheorghiu-Dej intended to grant autonomy to collective farms, allowing them to function according to the free market mechanisms. Betea, ed., Brldeanu, 112 and 156. Apostol went as far as to argue that Gheorghiu-Dej intended to head Romania towards both economic and political liberalization after a higher degree of independence from the Soviet Union was secured. Maurer also stated that it was only death that stopped Gheorghiu-Dej from implementing his plan of economic reforms. Betea, ed., Maurer, 151-52 and 265. Between 1965 and 1967, Brldeanu was even first deputy primeminister aside Apostol and Emil Bodnra. Between 1967 and 1969, he took over the lower position of deputy prime-minister (when first
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deputy prime-minister was appointed a rising star in Romanian politics, Ilie Verde). In 1966, when Brldeanu lost his position as Romanias representative to COMECON, he was appointed president of the National Council for Scientific Research, position that he held only for one year. CNSAS, Membrii CC al PCR, 92-93. Betea, ed., Mnescu, 32. According to Paul Sfetcu, Gheorghiu-Dejs secretary, George Macovescu was a stronger counter-candidate to the position of foreign affairs minister in 1961. Mnescus appointment was surprising, for Macovescu had at that time a much longer career and implicitly experience in diplomacy. He had begun as charg daffaires to the Romanian legation in London immediately after the communist takeover and reached by 1961 the position of foreign affairs deputy minister. Paul Sfetcu, 13 ani n anticamera lui Dej, 205-207. For an account on Macovescus early career as diplomat in London, see Egon Balas, The Will to Freedom: A Perilous Journey Through Fascism and Communism (Syracuse, NY: University of Syracuse Press, 2000). For more on Macovescus career, including his involvement in the Writers Union, see Chapter 5. The rumors on Mnescus dismissal were that Ceauescu had become envious on his international success, while Elena was jealous of the beauty of the foreign affairs ministers wife. For the really adventurous episode of his replacement, see Betea, ed., Mnescu, 216-35. In 1969, Mnescu was also appointed member of the Defense Council, position which he held until 1974. In 1973, he became vice president of the National Council of the Socialist Unity Front. In 1975, Mnescu was assigned a symbolic position in the Grand National Assembly, the president of the Commission for Foreign Policy and International Economic Cooperation, from which he was replaced in 1977 to be sent ambassador to France. CNSAS, Membrii CC al PCR, 386-87. For more on the power struggle between the Fori underground faction and Gheorghiu-Dejs prison faction, which manifested during the war years through an exchange of letters, see Cmpeanu, Ceauescu, 106-38. Documents from the former archives of the pre-communist secret police regarding the clandestine party activity coordinated by Fori, as well as the transcripts of the interrogatories taken in 19671968 by the commission set up for the reinvestigation of Fori killing, are included in Dan Ctnu and Ioan Chiper, eds., Cazul tefan Fori: Lupta pentru putere n P.C.R. de la Gheorghiu-Dej la Ceauescu (The tefan Fori case: The power struggle within the RCP from GheorghiuDej to Ceauescu) (Bucharest: Vremea, 1999).

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Before his imprisonment of 1941, Teohari Georgescu was offered, while in Moscow in 1940, the position of secretary general of the party, but he refused it. Thus, Fori took over the leadership of the party, but managed to control only the tiny faction which was active in underground on the Romanian territory. Ibid., 7-8. After the merge of the RCP with the Romanian Social-Democratic Party in February 1948, the Central Control Commission of the Central Committee verified between November 1948 and April 1950 all party members, and expelled almost half of them. If in May 1948 the newly established RWP had 1,057,428 registered members, at the Second Congress of the RWP in December 1955 the membership of the party amounted to only 538,815. CNSAS, Membrii CC al PCR, 21. For Prvulescus testimony about his involvement in the actions planned by Constantinescu and Chiinevschi in 1956, which was made with the occasion of the reexamination of the Fori case in 1967-1968, see Ctnu and Chiper, Cazul tefan Fori, 309-39. The transcript of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RWP of 30 November 5 December 1961 is also included in Elis NeagoePlea and Liviu Plea, eds., Dosarul Ana Pauker: Plenara Comitetului Central al Partidului Muncitoresc Romn din 30 noiembrie 5 decembrie 1961 (The Ana Pauker file: The Plenum of the Central Committee of the RWP of 30 November 5 December 1961), vol. I (Bucharest: Nemira & CNSAS, 2006). For Gheorghiu-Dejs reassessment of party struggles, see esp. 133-212. Other documents issued by the commission for the investigations meant to rehabilitate the communist victims, see Gheorghe Buzatu and Mircea Chirioiu, eds., Agresiunea comunismului n Romnia: Documente din arhivele secrete, 1944-1989 (The communist aggression in Romania: Documents from the secret archives, 1944-1989) (Bucharest: Paideia, 1998). CNSAS, Membrii CC al PCR, 461-63. Rceanu, Infern 89, 27-29. This meeting of the Central Committee had remained in the party folklore as the plenum about vigilance. For more on its significance, see Tismneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, 165-67. Tudor and Ctnu, eds., Amurgul ilegalitilor, 220. Thus, the attack upon them, as well as Rceanus marginalization, did not mark the end of the struggle for power in the party, as some authors assumed. For instance, Alina Tudor and Dan Ctnu presented the Plenum of the Central Committee of 1958 as Gheorghiu-Dejs last step in his quest for absolute power in the RWP. Ibid., 5-11.
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Ceauescu was instrumental in discovering those documents from the Stalinist period which could have been used in 1957 to accuse Miron Constantinescu of having been a Stalinist himself. Although this was a rather easy task since before Stalins death all party leaders had delivered at some point speeches praising the Soviet leader, GheorghiuDej was nonetheless impressed by Ceauescus ability to manipulate these documents and asked him to conduct the campaign against party veterans in 1958. Betea, ed., Brldeanu, 130. Tudor and Ctnu, eds., Amurgul ilegalitilor, 26-29, and 49-50. Constantin Donceas purge of 1958 had a special significance. Aside Dumitru Petrescu, he had been among the organizers of the strike at Grivia Repair Shops of 1933, to which Gheorghiu-Dej had participated. Both were arrested, but managed to evade with the help of the Comintern. Gheorghiu-Dej was put in prison too, but he was too afraid of the possibility to be shot by the guards that he preferred to remain in prison, while Doncea and Petrescu escaped. Cmpeanu, Ceauescu, 96. When the History Institute of the Party started to gather oral testimonies on the strike of 1933 from former participants, Doncea took the opportunity to emphasize his leading role and overshadow Gheorghiu-Dejs contribution to the events. This must have attracted the jealousy of the supreme leader and implicitly his removal of 1958. At that time, Dumitru Petrescu had already been expelled for antiparty activity during the Plenum of the Central Committee of 1617 June 1956. A veteran of the communist movement, Ileana Rceanu was forced to accuse her husband during the plenum of 1958. However, she criticized her husband only for personal deficiencies and not for deviations from the party line or discipline, which represented the type of incriminating accusations that could not be used against him. For her position, see Tudor and Ctnu, eds., Amurgul ilegalitilor, 91-102. For the final decision of the plenum of 1958, which included the accusations and sentences for all 17 veterans involved, see Ibid., 239-42. For a selection of Brucans articles, see erban Rdulescu-Zoner, Daniela Bue and Beatrice Marinescu, eds., Instaurarea totalitarismului comunist n Romnia (The establishment of the communist totalitarianism in Romania) (Bucharest: Cavallioti, 1995), esp. 207-27. Pavel Cmpeanu authored an original analysis of the communist system, but he published it abroad under pseudonym in order to avoid unpleasant consequences. His book was released with a foreword by Alfred G. Meyer as Felipe Garcia Casals, The Syncretic Society (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1980). Cmpeanus argument was that the political,
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social and economic order envisaged by Marx could not be implemented in countries where capitalism was not mature enough but by the use of force, or in other words, by a Stalinist regime. In 1986, Cmpeanu extended his earlier analysis, and published it this time under his own name, assuming also the identity of Casals. Pavel Cmpeanu, The Origins of Stalinism: From Leninist Revolution to Stalinist Society (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1986). For an account on the pubblication of these two books and the consequences upon their author, see Pavel Cmpeanu, Povestea unei cri aprute n Statele Unite (The story of a book published in the United States), Observator Cultural, No. 103, 12 February 2002, http://www.observatorcultural.ro/ Povesteaunei-carti-aparute-in-Statele-Unite*articleID_104-articles_details.html (accessed 13 March 2013). Silviu Brucan, The Dissolution of Power (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971); Idem, The Dialectic of World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1978); and Idem, The Post-Brezhnev Era (New York: Praeger, 1983). As compared to Cmpeanu, Brucan was not an original thinker, but his books are worth mentioning because they filled a void. As an insider of the communist system, Brucan added the missing voice of a Romanian political leader to the already existing chorus of critical voices from the region. Silviu Brucan, World Socialism at the Crossroads: An Insiders View (New York: Praeger, 1987). Betea, ed., Brldeanu, 236. A notable exception was the miners strike of 1981, which occurred in northern Oltenia. Gheorghe Gorun, Rezistena la comunism: Motru 981 (Resistance to communism: Motru 1981) (Cluj-Napoca: Clusium, 2005). For an analysis of the repressive measures taken against those who revolted, see Raluca Nicoleta Spiridon, Revolta Minerilor de la Motru din 19 octombrie 1981 (The Revolt of Miners from Motru on 19 October 1981), http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/motru/ Motru%20final.pdf (accessed 9 February 2013). Unlike the miners who revolted in the Jiu Valley in 1977, when participants barricaded themselves in the mine and asked to negotiate with Ceauescu their requests, the workers in Braov went out in protest and turned against the secretary general, for nobody entertained any longer the illusion that he might be on the side of the working class. It is interesting to note that this revolt occurred in a Sunday when local elections took place, so more people than in a normal weekend day were on the streets. Many of them joined the initial group of around 300-400 workers from the Steagul Rou Truck Factory, and
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increased their number to 3,000-4,000, according to eyewitness accounts. The crowd headed to the local headquarters of the party, where many demonstrators entered the building. No important official was to be found, but a huge table set for a sumptuous dinner enraged people, made them react violently and devastate all furniture or equipment by throwing it through the windows. By the afternoon, the special intervention troops came with water cannons and dispersed the crowd in one hour, putting an end to the short-lived protest. The violent behavior of the participants allowed the authorities to arrest many of them under the pretext that they were hooligans who had disturbed the local elections. The arrest was followed by brutal interrogations, violent treatment, a mock trial and sentences to be executed at pre-established working places, which meant displacement from Braov. Vasile Gogea, Fragmente salvate, 1975-1989 (Saved fragments, 1975-1989) (Iai: Polirom, 1996); Marius Oprea and Stejrel Olaru, eds., Ziua care nu se uit: 15 noiembrie 1987, Braov (The day one should not forget: 15 November 1987, Braov) (Iai: Polirom, 2002); Romulus Rusan, ed., O zi de toamn, cndva: 15 noiembrie 1987 Braov (One autumn day, some day: 15 November 1987 Braov) (Bucharest: Fundaia Academia Civic, 2004). An article by Nick Thorpe, the UPI reporter who interviewed Brucan, was published in The Independent on 28 November 1987. See also Romanian Official Denounces Hardships under Ceauescu, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Unit, 300/60/3/Box 6, File Dissidents: Silviu Brucan. Mnescu pointed out that Romanias situation at the end of the 1980s was similar to that of Hungary at the end of the Second World War, when the latter lost everything because of its failure to switch sides. On the contrary, Hungary was the Trojan horse in the communist camp in 1989, while Romania remained the last bastion of Stalinism. Thus, Mnescu bitterly acknowledged, Romania lost everything that was built by him and others who acted at the interface with the West during the 1960s and 1970s. Betea, ed., Mnescu, 245. When asked why one could not find among them such an important person as Maurer, who would have given weight to the letter, some of the signatories replied that he was avoided on purpose. They considered that Maurer was too close to Ceauescu to be trusted and too interested in his well being to risk losing it. Silviu Brucan, Generaia irosit, 182; Betea, ed., Mnescu, 236-237; Rceanu, Infern 89, 400. Rceanu clearly indicated Apostol as the person who had the idea of the letter, while Mnescu remembered that he was the fourth person
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contacted directly by Apostol. At the same time, Brldeanu implied that the letter was a joint initiative taken by Apostol and himself. Although Brucan distorted the entire story as to take most of the credit for the letter, he also acknowledged that it was Apostol who approached him with the idea to organize a collective protest of the old party veterans. Rceanu, Infern 89, 399; Betea, ed., Mnescu, 240; Idem, ed., Brldeanu, 217; Brucan, Generaia irosit, 179. Betea, ed., Maurer, 281. Aside Apostol, it seems that only Mnescu tried on his turn to recruit others, but without success. According to his version of the events, most persons he approached motivated their refusal by acknowledging to have been afraid, either of tortures or of losing their privileges as former veterans. In the late 1980s, these privileges meant access to better medical facilities and special food shops. However insignificant these might seem now, they were of great importance during the deep economic crisis of the 1980s. Mnescu recalled that he tried to convince Jnos Fazekas to put his signature on the letter, but he was refused. After the revolution, Fazekas tried to get some credit from Mnescus attempt to recruit him by stressing the fact that the Securitate managed to record their conversation, which took place on a roof. He affirmed that he refrained from joining this collective protest because he wanted to be able to defend the others after their arrest. Besides, the letter did not touch directly the problem of the Hungarian minority, which was of primary interest to him. Betea, ed., Mnescu, 236 and 238. Some of the others did not even think that the protest letter must have been sent to western broadcasting agencies in order to have a genuine impact. Prvulescu resented the idea of involving a western agency in what he saw as an internal problem of the RCP. Even Apostol thought that one of the copies must be anyway sent to Ceauescu directly, and confessed that he was surprised to see that Brucan sent copies only abroad. Betea, ed., Maurer, 282-83. Idem, ed., Mnescu, 239. Brucan, Generaia irosit, 199-200. Brldeanu and Mnescu thought that Brucan had probably left copies of the letter while abroad, giving instructions to be broadcast only after his return to Romania. Betea, ed., Brldeanu, 220; Idem, ed., Mnescu, 239. The other examples of illegal actions included: the harassment of individuals who contacted foreign citizens, for the decree that forbade Romanian citizens to have such contacts was never approved by the Grand National Assembly; the forced work on Sundays, for it violated
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the provisions of article 19 of the constitution and of the labor code; the violation of mail and telephone conversations, for the right to privacy was guaranteed by article 34 of the constitution. Michael Shafir pointed out to these limitations in his assessment of the letter for RFE. See Former Senior Officials Protest Ceauescus Policies, Romanian Situation Report, 29 March 1989, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 18, File Open Letters: The Group of Six. See chapters 1 and 3 for the details regarding Romanias position at this conference. Shafir, Former Senior RCP Officials Protest Ceauescus Policies, 7. In fact, the generation of Stalinist leaders from East-Central Europe never revised self-critically their past. The interviews taken by Teresa Toranska immediately after the emergence of the Solidarity movement to representatives of the Stalinist generation of Polish communist leaders are very telling in this respect. None of the interviewees tried to reassess his past in a critical way in the hope to attract some sympathy by acknowledging mistakes. Instead, all took the opportunity to defend the credo of their generation of communists who seized power immediately after the Second World War in order to build a brighter future, but destroyed so many lives. Teresa Toranska, Them: Stalins Polish Puppets (New York: Harper and Row, 1987). Betea, ed., Maurer, 283. As a diplomat, Mnescu could understand better that Gorbachevs criticism of the Brezhnev era, which targeted stagnation, corruption and nepotism, referred in a very oblique way to the situation in Romania. Betea, ed., Mnescu, 242. Brucan, Generaia irosit, 195. This represents the result of a survey made by RFE on 241 Romanian respondents, interviewed between 20 April and 16 June 1989. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that awareness of the letter was much higher among people with university education (74%), among men (55%) and among people over 30 years of age (53%). 68% of the interviewees mentioned that they had first heard about the letter from radio and 28% from word of mouth. From among those who gave radio as source of information, 63% cited RFE, 9% BBC and 6% VOA. See Research Memorandum 1/89, August 1989, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 18, File Open Letters: The Group of Six. For the impact of the letter among the listeners of RFE, see also Nestor Ratesh, Listeners Mail, No. 109, 2 April 1989,
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OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond 300/60/3/Box 18, File Open Letters: The Group of Six. Monica Lovinescu noted in her diary on 27 March 1989: Browsing the broadcastings of RFE ... I can see not only that the letter of the six senior members of the party was broadcast, but also that it was given a (too?) great importance. She also bitterly observed that the signatories failed to criticize the very essence of the communist system, referring to the constitution as if it had been a monument of human rights which they would have verbatim respected while in office. ... Since in Munich there is a lot of fuss about it, I will take the moral laxity of not commenting it in my broadcastings from Paris. Monica Lovinescu, Pragul: Unde Scurte V (The threshold: Short waves 5) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1995), 154-55. During a program of VOA, the former dissident Dorin Tudoran acknowledged that the six veterans were responsible for their contribution to the Stalinization of Romania and for their mediocrity as party bureaucrats, but this did not alter the significance of their open letter. Whether we like it or not, governments of the world react much more promptly and substantially when such (former or current) political figures are ostracized than in the case when the victims of repression are, lets say, some writers. His comments for the radio were later published as Dorin Tudoran, Romnia i/sau Cazul Arpagic: Ieirea din adolescen (Romania and/or The Arpagic Case: The exit from adolescence), Agora, Vol. II, No. 2 (July 1989), 9-18, quotation from page 12. It is interesting to note that Nick Thorpe speculated in his article in The Independent on the possible influence of the Soviet Union in the emergence of this letter. Quoted in the article was Jonathan Eyal, at the time researcher at the Institute for Soviet Studies, who did not venture to draw the same conclusion, but acknowledged nonetheless that a party revolt for the sake of saving socialism was an ideal formula even for the Soviets. Nick Thorpe, Socialism discredited, The Independent, 13 March 1989. Among the other newspapers which published the text of the letter and/or related comments, there were New York Times and Philadelphia Inquirer in the United States; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Sddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau and Die Welt in Germany; The Times and The Independent in Great Britain, Le Monde and Libration in France, Le Soir in Belgium, and Il Giornale in Italy. RFE made a detailed press review of the letter of the six in Domestic Bloc, No. 531, 13 March 1989, and Domestic Bloc, No. 533, 15 March
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1989, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 18, File Open Letters: The Group of Six. Brldeanu was accused of selling objects from the national heritage fond on the black market, which represented an accusation meant to transform him into an ordinary law breaker. When removed from his house, he was relocated in Bucharest though. Betea, ed., Brldeanu, 219-27. In order to isolate them from foreign embassies, Brucan and Mnescu were installed in the outskirts of the capital, in suburbs where the living conditions were much poorer. The latter complained to have endured hardships characteristic to the lowest living standards even in Romania: in his house in the Chitila suburb was raining through the roof. Betea, ed., Mnescu, 247. Apostol was not removed from his house, so Brucan used this as an illustration of his betrayal during the secret police investigations, as mentioned. Brucan, Generaia irosit, 204. Both Brldeanu and Mnescu rejected Brucans hypothesis. Betea, ed., Mnescu, 248-49. In the late 1980s, the Hungarian communist regime was increasingly critical of Ceauescus policies regarding minorities, as emphasized in Chapter 3. In fact, the more absurd Ceauescus internal policies were, the more credible the accusations made by the Hungarian minority in Transylvania and by the communist regime in Hungary became. For more on this and the resolution adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights, see Chapter 1. For more on the dissent of critical intellectuals, see Chapter 5. Romania on the Dock: Persecution of Dissidents and Other Violations of Human Rights, Romanian Situation Report, 4 May 1989, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 18, File Open Letters: The Group of Six. A US senator and a congressman, who held the positions of chairman and vice chairman of the Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe, respectively, expressed their solidarity with the six signatories who were courageous enough to criticize their leadership for heading Romania into a disastrous situation. U.S. Joins International Protests against Romania, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 18, File Open Letters: The Group of Six. The communiqu was published in Scnteia and broadcast by Radio Bucharest on 14 March 1989. Agerpres delivered it in English the same day. The transcript of the meeting held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14 March was published after the revolution as Cazul Rceanu, Romnia liber, 21, 25, 26 and 28 January 1990.

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Mircea Rceanus memoirs did not fully elucidate this affair, for they fail to make any reference to the nature of his connections with the American Embassy in Bucharest. He only mentioned that he had fought with the specific means of a diplomat against the communist regime. His account of the letter affair seemed nonetheless plausible. Except for facilitating Apostols contact with his adoptive father, Rceanu had only a vague idea about what the veterans were preparing, while the six did not want to implicate him in their affair. Mircea Rceanu, Infern 89, 31-38. What connection could be between the alleged human rights claimed by hostile imperialist propaganda in their attempts to interfere in the Romanian internal affairs and the legal regulations aimed at safeguarding the interests of the people and their right to build their own destiny freely and independently? asked rhetorically the journalist from the party daily. Scnteia, 17 March 1989. This author remembers that rumors which credited Iliescu as Ceauescus possible successor because of his supposed friendship with Mikhail Gorbachev circulated in Romania prior to the Revolution of 1989. Vlad Georgescu, Reading Brucan, 19 December 1987, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 6, File Dissidents: Silviu Brucan. Iliescu maintained that he had met Mnescu only accidentally on the street, while he had never encountered Brldeanu since the time of his removal from the Central Committee. Ion Iliescu, Revoluia trit (A lived revolution) (Bucharest: Editura Redaciei Publicaiilor pentru Strintate, 1995), 15. The only persons with whom Iliescu acknowledged to have ever discussed a possible coup were General Nicolae Militaru, who would become the first post-communist defense minister, General Ion Ioni, who died of cancer in 1987, too soon to ever had a chance to act, and Virgil Mgureanu, who would be appointed after 1989 the director of the Romanian Intelligence Service. Ibid., 34. In his conversations with Vladimir Tismneanu, Ion Iliescu denied once again to have ever been contacted by any of the six signatories, rejecting in this way the supposition that fear might have hampered him to join the party veterans. Ion Iliescu and Vladimir Tismneanu, Marele oc din finalul unui secol scurt: Despre comunism, post-comunism, democraie (The great shock at the end of a short century: On communism, post-communism, democracy) (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedic, 2004), 172-76.
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Clin Cernianu, Diplomaia lupilor (The diplomacy of the wolves) (Bucharest: Nemira, 1997), 117. This second marginalization from politics embittered them, as one could grasp from their testimonies. Prvulescu was very old at the time of the revolution, but Apostol and Rceanu went to the headquarters of the Central Committee after Iliescu delivered the communiqu of the NSF on the evening of 22 December 1989, which made reference to the six veterans among others that had defied the dictatorship. However, neither the author of this public appeal nor Brucan, who had arrived there earlier, received them. Moreover, Brucan declared on the national television on 4 January 1990 that he was the initiator of the letter, while Apostol was the traitor who turned against the others during the investigation of the secret police. For more on this, see also Rceanu, Infern 89, 145-55. Mnescu, whose name was on the lips of many Romanians as Ceauescus possible successor, had no chance to arrive from his arrest house in Chitila in Bucharest on the evening of 22 December. He received though a position in the Committee of the NSF, but did not really play an active role in politics after 1989. He enjoyed only the privileges granted to all those who received the so-called certificate of revolutionary, which entitled the possessor to free travel within Romania and tax exemption, which was an useless privilege for a retired person like him. Betea, ed., Mnescu, 252-54. Cmpeanu, Ceauescu, 268.
CHAPTER 5
Free Thinking in an Unfree Country?

Seven Faces of Intellectual Dissent*
In an interview granted in 1990 to a Parisian journal, the Czechborn French historian Jacques Rupnik observed that Romanian intellectuals longed for Europe, but their country never knew intellectual dissent. He differentiated then the countries of Central Europe, where civil society organized itself against the communist party-state, from Romania, where civil society was always too weak to emerge as a significant opponent. His comment reproduced in fact the commonplace knowledge on the countries which had just experienced a change of regime in 1989. As repeatedly emphasized, dissidents in communist Romania had been not only fewer, but also less organized than those in Central Europe. The latter not only formulated an articulated criticism of the communist regimes in their countries, but also monitored human rights violations and, in the case of Poland, built even a cross-class alliance with the working class. The Romanian dissidents had been no less courageous than those in Central Europe; on the contrary, they risked even more because they were fewer and thus easier to
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suppress.1 They renounced willingly to their tranquil existences to criticize openly the policies of Ceauescus regime and liberated themselves from a life of daily lies to which consent obliged. Their actions did not trigger any modification in communist policies, nor did these directly contribute to the regime change of 1989. Most Romanian dissidents remained isolated and thus unable to aggregate the grievances of other individuals in a common protest. Sometimes, the criticism of one dissident attracted that of others, who defended the former against the harassment of the communist authorities and addressed for this purpose to western embassies, media or human rights organizations. The number of outspoken dissidents increased especially after the workers revolt in 1987, but no network of organized opposition emerged by the time the revolution erupted in December 1989. Thus, the regime change found the critical intellectuals unprepared to constitute themselves into a political alternative to the defunct communist party. It was the successor party of the RCP the NSF that not only filled the power vacuum, but also won the first free elections. Given the above, this chapter presents a selection of chronologically ordered micro-historical studies of dissent, which focus on intellectuals who used their abilities of learned individuals in order to formulate a critique of the Romanian communist regime. Although there was little collaboration among them, some of the seven cases of dissent discussed below crossed their paths, and these notable exceptions are emphasized in this text. These seven cases do not exhaust the list of those who tried with more or less success, at some point or another in the evolution of Romanian communism, to express publicly their disagreement with the policies of the regime. They are the result of a selection. The cases presented in this chapter correspond to the ideological diversity of intellectual dissent in other communist countries, although some Romanian viewpoints are better represented than others. Yet, the selection is not meant to illustrate the variety of dissident
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ideas under Ceauescus regime, but the willingness and ability of those few dissidents to transmit their ideas across the national border to the West in order to reach the audience at home. Accordingly, the seven cases analyzed in this chapter refer to those dissidents who managed to become the most visible among Romanians inside the country due to the assistance in conveying their thoughts that they received from abroad, in particular from diaspora. The Romanian migrs who supported the critics of Ceauescus regime most efficiently were those who worked for western broadcasting agencies, among which RFE ranked the highest. In lack of samizdat and tamizdat publications, it was exclusively the effort of these people that made possible the dissemination of dissidents messages among Romanians. When many individuals felt that the decaying communist regime was acting against their interests, but were unable to understand what was actually not functioning, dissidents offered an answer. Their messages reflected often concern with problems which were far from those of the average individual, but dissidents criticism represented a safety valve for the anger accumulated by Romanians, even when such criticism was not properly understood. When this criticism helped others clarify their own views, it represented a catalyst for revolt. However, in a country which neither experienced reforms from above nor movements from bellow, it was not the content of public criticism which counted, but its very existence. This chapter analyzes the context which generated the turn of each intellectual into a dissident, the content of their critical messages and their transnational relations, which made their ideas circulate and thus exist. Briefly put, it illustrates that Romanian dissidents (with one exception) did not envisage the change of the communist system, but their free thoughts nonetheless prepared the ground for the post-communist institutionalization of political pluralism.
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A Romanian Sakharov Mihai Botez

While Goma was attempting to establish a human rights movement in 1977, two esteemed professionals in their domains mathematician Mihai Botez (b. 1940 d. 1995) and historian Vlad Georgescu (b. 1937 d. 1988) tried to found in Bucharest a flying university on the Polish model. No connection existed between these two endeavors which had different goals, albeit similar grounds: the discontent with the policies of Ceauescus regime. The clandestine university remained only a project, for other intellectuals did not support their idea, while the secret police did not allow its development.2 In spite of this initial failure, each of the two played later a crucial role in stimulating the emergence of intellectual dissent in Romania, although from different positions. Vlad Georgescu suffered the most after their attempt of 1977: he was arrested for three months because the secret police discovered in his home the manuscript of a book which heavily criticized the historical writings authored after the communist takeover. After his release, he took advantage of a grant offered by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars to escape from Romania. This presidential memorial which supports independent research on key issues for international (and national) politics had also sponsored Mihai Botez, who became in 1976 the first Romanian fellow of this center. Unlike his friend who returned after a three-month stage, Georgescu decided to emigrate from his native country where he had already experienced imprisonment. Due to this decision, he could play later a crucial role in backing for almost a decade his friends solitary dissidence. Actually, Botez turned dissident due to Georgescus help, for the latter left Romania in 1979 taking upon him the first message which the former ever addressed to RFE.3 After his appointment as director of the Romanian desk of RFE in 1983 and until his
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untimely death in 1988,4 Georgescu constantly broadcast the letters which Botez managed to send at a mutually agreed address in Munich via various channels of communication.5 Moreover, Georgescu used his position of authority at RFE to broadcast news about all those who dared to criticize Ceauescus regime at a time of profound decay in Romania, and supported in this way their careers as dissidents. Among them was poet Dorin Tudoran, the first Romanian writer who radicalized his criticism from literary to political dissent.6 Georgescus role was fundamental in counterbalancing the policy of this broadcasting agency, which recommended caution whenever Romanians criticized directly Ceauescu, for the good relations between the United States and a communist country with an anti-Soviet leader must have been maintained. Due to his efforts, very radical anti-Ceauescu messages could still find their way to the Romanian audience.7 Beside the support given to other critics of the communist rule, Georgescu articulated his own criticism in the form of a study on Romanian postwar historiography. The cause of this arrest in 1977, this analysis was broadcast by RFE in 1982, and remained until after the collapse of communism the only historical writing which illustrated the communist practice of reinterpreting the past in accordance with political decisions.8 His death in 1988 interrupted the career of one of the most active directors of the Romanian desk of RFE. He was not only able to keep a balance between the radical position of the anti-communist emigration and the policy of the agency, but also practical enough to promote critical views of all political orientations, including those of former communist officials (which were disregarded by other commentators of RFE). Turning to Mihai Botezs career as dissident, one can say that this originated in the belief that only the dialogue between the political elite and Romanias intellectuals could have solved the ongoing economic crisis, as his memorandum of 1979 clarified. The sole result of this appeal to the communist authorities (which
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found out about it from RFE) was Botezs removal from his office of director at the Institute for Forecasting and Development Studies in Bucharest. This was the beginning of the end of what could have been a splendid professional career: Botez received only the modest position of researcher at the Faculty of Mathematics, University of Bucharest, albeit he had been the youngest Romanian (aged 26) with a doctoral degree in statistical mathematics. Only eight years after defending his thesis, he became the founding director of the above-mentioned institute. Until his removal, Botez was on a fast track of upward mobility, which was quite exceptional in a communist society where promotions depended not on merits but on docility and aging.9 After his professional marginalization, Botez pursued nonetheless his dissident endeavors and sent periodically letters to Vlad Georgescu to be broadcast by RFE. His main goal, he claimed, was to demonstrate that it was possible to live in Romania and speak freely without suffering much harassment. In this way, Botez hoped to convince more people to follow his example, but this did not really happen. At the same time, he wanted to contradict an idea which the communist regime tried hard to propagandize. Accordingly, no genuine dissidents existed in Romania, but only people who protested publicly to receive emigration passports and make in this way a better living for themselves.10 In other words, Botez engaged on a third (and solitary) way between two mainstreams: those who stayed in Romania but fully consented to the communist rule and those who emigrated because only outside the country one could have spoken freely. In Hirschmans terms, it was an option for voice, while most decided between loyalty and exit. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Botez was indeed among the few Romanian dissidents and arguably the most prominent given the number of critical essays and letters that he managed to write and send across the border. These messages (which were addressed to RFE) were also destined to protect him: the simple mentioning of his name during
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broadcastings was, in his view, a signal sent to the communist regime that his friends from abroad continued to support him.11 Botezs dissident texts consisted not only of his private correspondence with Vlad Georgescu, but also of memoirs which he directly addressed to the Central Committee, but sent also to RFE to be popularized among Romanians. Until 1987, he drafted several such unofficial reports in which he tackled primarily the causes of Romanias economic crisis. Former adviser to important party leaders, Botez actually acted as if he continued to hold such a position when drafting his dissident texts. Nevertheless, he was a person most qualified to devise such an analysis, for which other dissidents were not professionally prepared. Thus, his texts remain to this day an invaluable source for understanding the failures of the Romanian-style centrally planned economy. While his letters to Vlad Georgescu contained the sociological observations of a lonely dissident in Bucharest in the 1980s, his memoirs to the Central Committee represented a veritable anatomy of a decaying economy. In 1982, after basic foodstuffs were rationed and the economic crisis began to overburden the population, Botez sent his first memoir in which he warned against the long-term effects of the shortages. This extreme penury endangered the very biological existence of the nation, Botez argued. In his view, the main cause of the economic crisis was Romanias unbalanced developmental strategy, which had envisaged the growth of industries completely dependent on raw materials from import or external markets, while it had neglected completely the agricultural sector. The rapid industrial development, which was accompanied by a fast but deficient urbanization, had also very serious social consequences in Botezs view: the peasantry was uprooted, while a new genuine working class had no time to emerge. To sum up, the memoir argued that this disastrous situation represented the direct consequence of the communist leaderships refusal to engage
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in a dialogue with the Romanian society and adjust its policies accordingly.12 Botez reiterated his critical analysis of the RCPs plans for economic development in another memorandum of 1985. It was not the non-fulfillment of the development plans which caused the increasingly precarious situation of the Romanian economy, he argued. On the contrary, the economic disaster was the logical and inevitable consequence of the fulfillment of these plans, based on erroneous anticipations of the evolution of the world economy and unrealistic estimations of the countrys resources and needs.13 In his view, the communist leadership made a great mistake not because it elaborated an erroneous developmental strategy in the early 1970s, but because it refused to re-evaluate it when the internal and external conditions changed. Instead of revising these plans, the RCP preferred to constrain the population to pay the costs of its errors by cutting the supplies of foodstuffs and utilities, such as electricity, gas, heating or hot water. Since the export of Romanian products (which were non-competitive because of the inefficiency of the industry) could not cover the external debts, the communist leadership decided to cut drastically the internal consumption. This measure was all the more absurd that it led to insignificant savings, but obliged the population to endure immense sufferings only for showing to western creditors that Romania was a good debtor. In short, Botez maintained that Romanians suffered for the illusory goal of saving the international prestige of their country. This lucid evaluation of Ceauescus policies warned against the high social costs imposed by the communist elite, and argued that these were not only unbearable for the population, but also absurd from the perspective of an economic analyst.14 While a dissident in Romania, Mihai Botez benefited from the protection offered by the very mentioning of his name during RFE broadcastings, but he could not have continued sending his critical
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analyses across the border without the help of foreign journalists visiting Romania, to whom he granted hundreds of interviews, according to his own estimation. Besides, he received crucial support from Bucharest-based western diplomats. He had especially good relations with American diplomats, among whom Ambassador Funderburk who marked a radical change in his countrys policy toward communist Romania, urging Washington to no longer ignore Ceauescus poor human rights record.15 These friendly relations must have helped him in formulating another important critical analysis, which tackled the Romanian-American relations since 1968. This perceptive study of 1985 could not have been written without consulting an insider. Until completing this text, Botez had spent in the United States only three months, and this happened eight years before the elaboration of the analysis which covered the topic until the time of writing.16 This study represented a double criticism, for it targeted not only Ceauescus notorious disregard for human rights, but also the American policy of supporting the communist regime in Bucharest more than its critics. The analysis began by reviewing the rapprochement between the two countries under the Nixon administration. The good bilateral relations established at that time went beyond the mutual sympathy between the two heads of state. Then, politicians in Washington believed that one could have discussed freely about Soviet expansionism or Soviet interventionism in the internal affairs of the other communist countries only in Bucharest. Thus, there was little interest in what those who criticized Ceauescu had to say, argued Botez on the basis of his personal experience while a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center in 1976. This attitude toward Romanian critical intellectuals stood out when compared to the support offered to dissidents from other communist countries. As for Romania, Botez underlined that its leadership was unable to perceive the redefinition of American priorities in
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foreign relations after the Helsinki process started to unfold. While the observance of human rights gradually became more important in Washington than the independence from the Soviet Union, the Bucharest regime continued to harass its critics.17 Botez also criticized obliquely the United States for not making a clear difference between the Romanian communist leadership and the Romanian people. In 1968, the two seemed to be in full agreement, for the latter applauded the condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia publicly expressed by the former. However, the Romanian communist leaderships support for the introduction of Martial Law in Poland, argued Botez, proved that it ruled over the Romanian people in exactly the same brutal way. In conclusion, he recommended to the American administration to introduce in its foreign policy toward Romania the same distinction between the leadership and the people, which was operational in the case of other communist countries. The preservation of the same policy from the late 1960s would actually be beneficial only for the Romanian communist elite, which could thus maintain an undeserved international prestige.18 It is not known if Botezs study of 1985 had an impact on the American foreign policy, but it seems likely to have one on the attitude of the communist authorities toward him, for after years of harassment he was suddenly allowed to travel freely across the Iron Curtain. In October 1985, Botez was allowed (quite unexpectedly after more than a decade of repeated refusals of an exit visa) to attend the dissident congress El Espacio cultural europeo in Madrid.19 There he presented a paper on the role that intellectuals must have played in shaping the public opinion in their countries, and argued that each intellectual should set a personal example of emancipation from the control of the party via the pursuit of non-ideological professionalism. The main goal of such self-limited and non-heroic attitude toward the party was practical. With such view, Botez reminded one more of the
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technocrat he actually was than of a dissident with artistic or literary background, as were most critical intellectuals in the Soviet bloc.20 During this trip outside Romania, Botez took the opportunity to grant interviews to Vlad Georgescu and Virgil Ierunca to be broadcast by RFE. Given his intention to return, he confined himself to discussions related to his scientific career or to his latest and most comprehensive study of the communist system, at that time a work-in-progress.21 Elaborated in the early 1980s, this critical structural analysis of communism represented a more systematic inquiry into the dysfunctional characteristics of the system than his memoirs to the Central Committee. However, his conclusion predicted the long-term stability of the system.22 If one takes this analysis as the essence of Botez thinking, then one can define his dissident views as the self-limiting vision of a communist reformist of the kind many others emerged in Central Europe, especially from among intellectuals with scientific, technical and economic backgrounds.23 He had never defined himself in such terms. However, his very persistence in writing memoirs to the Central Committee illustrate that he still believed that the communist system could have been changed from above, while dissidents in Central Europe had abandoned this hope after the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968. After his return to Romania, Botez further pursued his dissident endeavors and continued to grant interviews to western journalists. In 1986, he and his wife Mariana Celac were the only Bucharestbased people who dared to meet foreign press correspondents and denounce the increasingly aberrant policies of the Romanian communist regime. Other critical intellectuals had either left the country or did not yet initiate their dissent. In the late 1980s, the most pressing issue seemed to be the plan of systematization, so most internal and external criticism focused on it. An architect by training, Mariana Celac could comment from a professional perspective on the demolition of Bucharest and the construction
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of the hideous Casa Poporului (The House of the People).24 On his turn, Botez openly expressed his disagreement with the regime by voting no at the referendum when the population was allegedly consulted on the intended cutting of the military expenses and the acceleration of Romanias disarmament. Ceauescu had vainly hoped that such decisions would boost his chances for a Nobel Peace Prize. Botez made his views known across borders via RFE and justified his decision by resorting to a legalist argument, mentioning that the distribution of financial funds was not subject of public review.25 His attitude made the communist authorities start harassing him. The secret police had interrogated him repeatedly, but without employing violence. In 1986, angry unknown hooligans beat Botez savagely on the street, so he had to be treated in a hospital after this experience. Nevertheless, he continued to grant interviews to western journalists, whenever he had the chance to encounter one. Before Gorbachevs visit to Bucharest in May 1987, Botez gave an interview to the French weekly LExpress, in which he reiterated his convictions on the stability of the system. However, he also affirmed that Romanians hoped at that time in the intervention of the Soviet Union, which might have supported an alternative to Ceauescus dogmatic rule. After the publication of this interview, the communist authorities transferred him to a regional computer center in the city of Tulcea in order to isolate him completely from western journalists.26 Shortly after, Botez received an exit visa for the United States on the condition to leave the country for good.27 This was the end of his dissident career, which was one of the longest in communist Romania. He emigrated before having the chance to join his forces with other critical intellectuals, whose number grew notably after the workers in Braov revolted in November 1987. Unlike him, his wife remained in Romania until the collapse of the regime, and experienced directly this last period of communism.
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As for Botez, he provided numerous testimonies about the violations of human rights by the Ceauescu regime after his arrival in the United States. After the collapse of communism, he accepted to be Romanias ambassador to the United Nations in 1992 and then to Washington in 1994. In this capacity, he might have succeeded in improving a little the negative image which his country had because of the obvious and numerous continuities between the pre- and post-1989 ruling elites. However, the acceptance of these positions made him a controversial figure among those who openly sided with the political opposition to the so-called neo-communists, for this group included practically all the other former dissidents. The opening of the secret police files (which occurred only after his premature death) illustrated that Botez wrote notes or transmitted verbally information (later transcribed on paper by a Securitate officer) on fellow dissident Dorin Tudoran. The respective documents were from the time when Botez was not only under surveillance because of his own public anti-regime statements, but also instrumental in helping his friend logistically as well as psychologically to endure the loneliness of dissent. Such a discovery (which was made public with the publication of Tudorans file) reopened the controversy around the authenticity of Botezs dissent, and raised again questions about the very meaning of offering information to the secret police before 1989. On the one hand, it was argued that all those who were under strict surveillance, with their phone conversations listened and their apartment walls bugged, provided unconsciously precious information to the Securitate. This transforms practically large categories into unintentional informers, and at the same time absolves everyone of any guilt. On the other, it is obvious that the post-1989 legal framework concerning the opening of the Securitate files incriminates those individuals who willingly (i.e. not while imprisoned or constraint by circumstances) furnished information that they knew perfectly to be harmful.
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Between the two extremes, there were quite a number of intermediary situations, and Botez seemed to have been pushed by the Securitate into such a position. The documents available so far illustrate that Botez assessed Tudorans intentions for the secret police under his own name (and not a codename). Moreover, he did this in such a way as to make no voluntary harm by providing fresh or incriminating information.28 Like many others, Botez might have indeed entertained the illusion of outsmarting the secret police officers and thus accepted to write those notes. One must not forget though that he was one of the persons whose careers were ruined because of public criticism against Ceauescus regime. At the same time, his notes from Tudorans file, if interpreted through the lenses of the Romanian legislation, would not make him a collaborator of the Securitate, had he be still alive.
From Voice to Exit Dorin Tudoran

At the time when Mihai Botez changed his mind and decided to emigrate from Romania, most of the other earlier dissidents had followed the same path. Since their criticism was neither tolerated by the regime nor duplicated by other fellow intellectuals, Ceauescus open critics beginning with Goma eventually expressed their disagreement by exiling themselves. Such final decisions did not turn these dissidents into mere protesters for the sake of an exit visa. Unlike the latter group, who seized the first opportunity offered to them to leave Romania for the prospect of a better life in a western country, the former lost either their liberty or their tranquil lives because of public and repeated protests. Among them, Gomas dissident career was the shortest, but he endured harsher harassment and imprisonment because he managed to achieve something that no-one after him did: to aggregate the discontent of hundreds of
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individuals. Mihai Botezs dissent lasted much longer because he acted in almost complete isolation. As mentioned, there was (besides him) only one other public personality who dared to criticize publicly Ceauescus regime in the early 1980s: Dorin Tudoran (b. 1945). At that time, literary critics placed him among the most promising authors in the generation of Romanian writers born after the war. Tudoran had published several volumes of poetry, reportage and interviews, from among which two had received the prestigious Writers Union Prize. However, Tudoran emerged since 1976 as one of those young authors who conflicted with the older generation of writers. Their criticism referred mostly to the administrative practices established in the frame of the Writers Union, but targeted the poor professional standards of the previous generation as well. Tudoran was also among those writers who could benefit from the liberalization of the 1960s in the field of culture. Moreover, until the closure which the so-called Theses of July 1971 had announced was complete, he could travel outside Romania for professional purposes. Between 1979 and 1981, Tudoran was in France and West Germany for several times and could thus establish contacts with members of the emigration, including employees of RFE. In this way, he opened his path toward dissent, for these Romanian migrs recommended Tudoran later to western journalists who visited Romania, and these encounters allowed him not only to express his criticism of Ceauescus regime, but also to build channels of communication across the border.29 Moreover, Tudorans dissent would have evolved much slower without such previously established personal connections, because professional standards obliged western broadcasting agencies (RFE included) to verify the credibility of any newly emerging critic of the communist regimes, if completely unknown. Tudorans dissidence originated in an internal conflict, which erupted during the Writers Union Conference in July 1981.
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Violent debates opposed then two groups of authors and created a cleavage in the community of writers which lasted at least until the end of the communist regime. This conflict generated not only Tudorans dissent of the early 1980s, but also that of other writers who nevertheless refrained from expressing publicly their criticism until the late 1980s. During the national conference of 1981, the writers who had built their careers on their work and not on hypocritical allegiance to the party defended their relative autonomy within the Writers Union from the intrusion of those authors who were subservient to the dogmas of Ceauescus regime. The dispute was multifaceted, but in general creativity, professionalism and non-conformism conflicted with mediocrity, ineptitude and conformism. It was a polemic which reminded one the interwar dispute between westernizers and autochthonists, for once again two visions on Romanian culture confronted each other.30 One was rooted in European ideas and values (as the founding fathers of modern Romanian state and nation envisaged), while the other on national tradition (as Ceauescu and his apparatchiks in the field of culture actually demanded in accordance with the Theses of July 1971).31 Mapping the literary field in Romania in the 1980s is beyond the scope of this volume, but a very general view on the confronting camps is necessary for understanding the origins of public criticism, which Tudoran expressed first. Other writers involved in this conflict would also decide to follow his path, but only years later. The first group included authors from two generations: already established writers, such as Eugen Jebeleanu, Geo Bogza and Dan Deliu, and younger and promising writers, such as Dorin Tudoran and Mircea Dinescu, among others. Those from the older generation had been close to the communist regime after the takeover of power, yet at least some of them belonged to the category of true believers (rather than opportunistic supporters of the regime), for they sympathized with the left from
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the interwar period (and not only after the communists came to rule the country). Their political influence decreased under Ceauescu, who promoted a new generation of court writers. The younger authors from this group were mostly detached from politics and interested rather in professional issues. In spite of differences, both generations had one thing in common: both enjoyed a high esteem among colleagues, which was entirely based on their work. Their group opposed those writers who paid lip service to the party for material or other gains. This second group included some talented writers, but their careers relied not on professionalism, but on compliance and connections in the party hierarchy. Among those in this group were famous court writers, such as novelist Eugen Barbu, also the editor-in-chief of Sptmna (The Week), a journal which attacked constantly and violently the Romanian migrs who were in charge of RFE programs, and poets Adrian Punescu and Corneliu Vadim Tudor (both among the most controversial politicians of post-1989 Romania). Their group of conformist writers managed to increase its influence in the Writers Union in 1981 by imposing its candidate for chairmanship, D. R. Popescu, who replaced the former head of this association, George Macovescu, whom the opposing group supported for a new mandate.32 This victory was not complete, for the party writers remained in minority in the steering council.33 Yet, this dispute would dominate the literary debates in the last decade of communism. Moreover, it would determine some writers from the first group to radicalize their views in the late 1980s and turn into dissidents who spoke publicly against the cultural policy of the regime. However, it was only Tudoran who began to express publicly his criticism soon after this conflict over influence in the Writers Union. This was initially directed only against the poverty of professional standards among writers. In fact, his early dissidence was a reflection of the polemics in the Writers Union which
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opposed craftsmanship to imposture.34 Tudoran launched a series of polemical articles which exposed cases of plagiarism in works of writers from the group obedient to the party. While claiming to represent national values in Romanian culture, some of these less skilled authors inspired themselves from little known foreign sources, such was Tudorans victim, poet Ion Gheorghe. A colleague from the literary journal Luceafrul (Morning Star), this poet published verses from Lao Tse as if his own. Tudoran article which unmasked this plagiarism was sent to RFE in March 1982 to be broadcast not as an anonymous text (as many used to request in order to protect themselves), but with his name specifically mentioned.35 Consequently, Tudoran was dismissed from his position at this literary journal and banned from publication. In a communist regime where the state was the sole employer, these abusive decisions deprived one of any means of financial support.36 However, his pioneering attempt to unmask the imposture in the camp of the party writers had some sequels, for the exposure of plagiarism continued and even touched highly protected and influential authors, such as Eugen Barbu.37 Like Botez before him, Tudoran also inspired his criticism from an unmitigated experience, from examples of wrongdoings which were familiar to him. While Botez repeatedly referred to faults in the economy, Tudoran concerned himself initially with the state of the Romanian literature. However, he evolved from his early views restricted to problems of culture to a critique of the communist regime. In 1983, Tudoran was the first dissident who radicalized himself to the point of affirming that the arbitrariness of decision-making resided in the very essence of the communist system, while fellow dissident Botez continued to believe in the capacity of the communist system to reform itself. However, the two dissidents tried to join their efforts. It was Tudoran who contacted Botez, for he was in 1983 already known for his technocratic but critical views due to the RFE broadcastings.
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The latter helped him to send several of his texts to RFE via his excellent channels of communication. Moreover, Vlad Georgescu gave a particular attention to Tudoran due to Botezs recommendation, although he had first the impression of dealing with a person interested only in emigration.38 At the same time, Tudoran became increasingly critical and started to tackle issues outside his field and immediate interests, albeit he continued to monitor problems related to Romanian literature. In an interview which he granted to a Vienna-based correspondent of France Presse on 7 September 1983, Tudoran clearly stated that Ceauescus regime represented an absolute dictatorship, while the party was reduced to a simple appendix to his personal rule.39 Worth mentioning is also the broadcasting of the Radio Suisse Romande on 28 May 1984, which discussed the re-opening of the works for the DanubeBlack Sea Canal, a decision which reminded one of the Stalinist period. The radio agency included a telephone interview with Tudoran, who used this opportunity not only to comment on the moral and material decay among Romanians, but also to point to the communist system as the cause of this decay.40 As mentioned in a previous chapter, he co-signed a memorandum, which Gza Szcs initiated and addressed to the United Nations in order to draw the attention upon the violations of minority rights in Ceauescus Romania. In doing this, Tudoran made indeed a premiere, for no other dissident of Romanian origin before him endorsed a public document which stood in defense of the rights of the Hungarian community in Transylvania.41 Nevertheless, Tudorans most important dissident text remains his seventy-page-long essay on the condition of intellectuals in communist Romania. Written in the early 1984, this analysis was published in French in LAlternative, the review which covered closely the dissident movements in East-Central Europe. At that time, it was evaluated as the most radical text of a Romanian dissident since Paul Goma. To this day, it represents the best
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concise, yet comprehensive study which was written on this subject by an insider. Tudoran focused primarily on the causes of his colleagues submissiveness to the communist regime and compared systematically the intellectuals in Romania to their peers in Central Europe. Among the factors which generated compliance, this analysis highlighted the different local political traditions; the terror of the first decade-and-a-half of communism, which made many to capitulate morally; the complete dependence on the state for professional survival; and the skillful manipulation of vertical mobility by the communist authorities. However, the compliance of the largest majority of intellectuals in Romania was above all a direct consequence of Ceauescus personal rule and of the Romanian communist system, Tudoran argued. The conclusion of this essay raised the idea that Romanian intellectuals had to assume their responsibilities to society by learning more from their predecessors from the generation of 1848, who had succeeded in breaking with the political traditions of submissiveness. Moreover, Tudoran pleaded for an alliance with other social groups on the Polish model. This was a prerequisite for the development of those non-bloody barricades, which should have limited the abuses of the communist system at least, given that its change was then inconceivable.42 After expressing publicly his increasingly radical ideas, Tudoran concluded that he had reached the limits of what could have been achieved in this way and decided to leave Romania. Still banned from publication, he filled the emigration application for the entire family in April 1984; the United States granted him an entry visa shortly after, in July 1984. However, the Romanian authorities denied Tudoran an emigration visa and threatened him with a trial according to criminal laws. Thus, he entered hunger strikes repeatedly and wrote several open letters to Ceauescu, in which he explained why he was forced to emigrate. He argued that this option represented a fundamental human right which the
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communist authorities should respect; its violation was similar to the terrorist practice of taking hostages. In Tudorans words, he was political hostage because he expressed his right of leaving not his country, but a dictatorship.43 A great campaign for his release was organized by the Romanian emigration, during which the Paris-based French League for the Defense of Human Rights in Romania and the employees of RFE played again a crucial role.44 This league initiated an appeal for his freedom of movement, which internationally renowned writers, historians and political scientists signed. As Tudoran managed to keep contact with them, the appeal described all measures that the Romanian authorities had taken against him and illustrated that the situation of the entire family was intolerable.45 He finally got an exit visa on 2 July 1985, but not because of this appeal, but because the American Congress was about to put under question the renewal of Romanias MFN status. After his immigration to the United States, Tudoran supported his family from the income received as waiter, then from a scholarship offered by George Soros, to finally get in 1987 the position of editor for VOA, which he upheld until 1990. Perhaps his greatest achievement was the 1987 establishment of Agora, the first review which was dedicated to the alternative culture in the Romanian language. Funds from the National Endowment for Democracy supported this enterprise, while Paul Goma, Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismneanu assisted Tudorans publishing activity.46 Only few writers living in Romania dared to publish in this review, so the editors welcomed contributions from the exile as well. Two generations of migrs are represented in this review. From the first post-1945 wave of emigration, either consecrated authors, such as Eugne Ionesco, Mircea Eliade and Emil Cioran, or popular radio broadcasters from RFE, such as Monica Lovinescu and Virgil Ierunca, published in Agora. From the more recent migrs, there were some authors who had never been dissidents
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while in Romania, and others who had expressed publicly their critical views before leaving the country. One could count in the former group Matei Clinescu, Virgil Nemoianu, Victor Ieronim Stoichi and Ioan Petru Culianu, and in the latter Paul Goma, Ion Negoiescu, Mihai Botez, Gza Szcs and even William Totok. Finally, from among those who still lived in Romania and risked to publish abroad under their real name but without official approval, most were already known for their dissident stances, such as Dan Petrescu, Liviu Cangeopol, Mircea Dinescu, Dan Deliu and Luca Piu.47 Tudoran was himself among the authors who contributed to Agora, especially to argue again that the Romanian intellectuals had to adopt a more radical stance against the abuses of the communist regime than the so-called resistance through culture, which represented only a passive and self-limiting attitude.48 Moreover, he argued that all those courageous enough to protest against the communist regime, including the six former party officials, should unite their efforts.49 Agora was too shortlived to have an influence among Romanians. Nevertheless, this review was the first and only venue of publication, which those writers who were banned in Romania could use as an alternative path to the Romanian audience, albeit its distribution was limited given the difficulties of communication across the borders.
The Che Guevara Look-Alike Anti-Communist Radu Filipescu

The international campaign in Dorin Tudorans support illustrates that the Romanian communist authorities were hardly sensitive to external pressure, for they considered this as interference in the internal affairs of the country. Yet, his final release indicates that it was only this kind of international assistance that eventually protected those isolated individuals who had started their little
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wars against the Romanian communist regime. Completely different was the fate of those who raised their voice publicly but without making themselves known beyond the Iron Curtain, for such individuals could stay imprisoned for years. The case of dissident Radu Filipescu (b. 1955) shows that political prisoners existed in Romania even in the 1980s, albeit officially all had been released in 1964. At the same time, this case exemplifies that the negative campaigns in western media and the advocacy of international human rights organizations were not only able to release a political hostage like Tudoran, but also a genuine political prisoner with a long-term sentence. An engineer by training, Filipescu never authored critical analyses of the communist regime, but adopted instead a more pragmatic approach than those who made a living as writers. Although from a well-to-do family (by the standards from communist Romania),50 Filipescu started to be preoccupied with the misery of daily life which most of his country fellows (though not that much himself) had to endure in the 1980s. Thus, he came to the simple conclusion that Ceauescu must go before anything could change for the better in the country. For this was a largely shared (albeit rarely publicly expressed) idea among Romanians, Filipescu envisaged himself as a catalyst of popular revolt. All that was needed, he naively thought, was to settle for a date and a place for a huge anti-Ceauescu manifestation to which he intended to invite as many people as possible via manifestos directly distributed in postal boxes. Filipescus main problem was the multiplication of manifestos. Before the age of personal computers, one used typewriters, but only up to six copies could have been made with the help of indigo paper. Photocopying machines existed in state enterprises, but these could not have been used by others than those who were put officially in charge. Thus, Filipescu had to imagine how to organize independently the multiplication of the manifestos; his background
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in engineering helped him to find an innovative solution. He asked a friend who traveled abroad to bring him a device which he could use to imprint letters on a plastic band. With this device, Filipescu made the matrix of the manifesto. Then, he used indigo paper to impress the text from the matrix on sheets of paper. Using this method, he printed alone in the basement of his parents apartment around 10,000 manifestos by the beginning of 1983. The text he imprinted represented a call for a meeting of all those unhappy with Ceauescus rule.51 During the night of 20 January 1983, he distributed all printed manifestos with the help of a friend. To his consternation, no-one came at the time and in the place scheduled for the manifestation. The communist authorities already discovered what he planned, albeit not his identity. Some individuals handed the manifestos they received to the militia or the secret police. The successful multiplication and distribution of the manifestos took the institutions of coercion by surprise, and determined the communist authorities to take immediate action. A new decree enhanced the control over the use of photocopying and typing machines, forbade private individuals to own any multiplication devices, and conditioned the legal ownership of typewriters on the authorization from the militia.52 However, the decree did not interfere with Filipescus innovative method of print, which did not require the use of any machine mentioned in this legal text. Consequently, he persevered in the mission which he had assumed and imprinted another 15,000 manifestos. Their text invited again people to a manifestation of dissatisfaction with the ongoing state of affairs, but this time the meeting was scheduled periodically: every Sunday beginning with 22 May 1983, in a central place of Bucharest. While Filipescu was distributing the last 1,000 manifestos during the night of 7 May (which was the Orthodox Easter night), he was caught by secret police agents and arrested. The incident was not caused by the ability of this institution to detect the author of the manifestos, but by an
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unfortunate coincidence: Filipescu entered in a block of flats where some agents were keeping another person under surveillance.53 He was thus arrested and brought to trial on 12 September 1983. Although his family had connections even in the party hierarchy, Filipescus deed was too serious to be solved by this kind of arrangements. He was found guilty of propaganda against the socialist order and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment, according to article 166, paragraph 2, of the Criminal Code. He was then sent to complete this term in the prison of Aiud, one of the most feared in Romania.54 Filipescu was a political prisoner between October 1983 and March 1986. His parents used all their contacts in Romania and abroad to popularize the case of their son and plead for his release, but their endeavors required careful preparation. To send letters to western media or human rights organizations was possible only if someone assumed the task of posting them from abroad. A flight attendant, who was also a friend of the family, learned by heart the text of the letter which the parents had composed, then wrote it down from memory during one of her regular trips to West Germany and sent copies to RFE, Amnesty International and the French newspaper Libration.55 However, the difficulties of acrossthe-border communication did not stop here. Unlike Tudoran, who had established contacts among the Romanian emigration prior to his dissent, Filipescu was totally unknown. Thus, the employees of RFE followed strictly the rule of checking news from three sources before they broadcast information about this case of human rights violation.56 Filipescu was lucky though, because his parents resorted also to Amnesty International. This human rights organization defended him the most, for the very mission assumed since its establishment in 1961 was to stop such acts of injustice.57 Nevertheless, the Romanian communist regime did not release him immediately after Amnesty International, then civil society organizations and ultimately the Romanian emigration started to
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organize media campaigns for popularizing Filipescus case. Initially, the regime reacted to this international criticism only by improving the prison standards, which western journalists described as totally inadequate for the twentieth century.58 The state of the prisons which Filipescu directly experienced in the 1980s, albeit poor by standards respected in a democratic country, were nonetheless better than in the 1950s. Then, prisons were rather institutions of extermination, as the surviving political prisoners of the period recalled.59 However, the situation in the Romanian penitentiaries in the 1980s was worse not only as compared to western standards, but also to those respected by other communist countries: while Filipescu considered that permission to read books represented a significant achievement (which was reached during his term), Havel and Michnik were allowed to have typewriters, which they used to compose their famous letters from prison.60 The Romanian communist regime terminated Filipescus detention only after it was efficiently threatened. His family was able to set in motion a lobby in the American Senate (with the help of two family friends who had established in the US), so that the renewal of Romanias MFN clause was conditioned by Filipescus release. It was only then that the Romanian communist regime considered that it was worth responding to pressure and set him free in 1986, albeit he remained under strict surveillance.61 This experience taught Filipescu how crucial was the internationalization of each case of human rights violation. Thus, he dedicated himself after the release from prison to the cause of all political prisoners whom he encountered, and subsequently tried to make their names known to RFE and to organizations concerned with the defense of human rights. Together with those who were gradually released, Filipescu established in 1987 a free trade union entitled Libertatea (Liberty). This group became internationally visible after drafting a program of reforms, which
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its members sent in May 1988 to the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna. Beyond requests mostly specific to a trade union, such as the improvement of working conditions and of food supplies, the program asked for the release of political prisoners. Besides, it included more general, but more radical demands. Accordingly, the union asked for free elections; free circulation of information; the abolition of censorship and the discontinuation of ethnic oppression.62 Although followed day-and-night by secret police agents,63 Filipescu was inventive enough to deceive his shadows and thus sent quite a number of critical texts across the border, mostly using his contact person from Amnesty International, who was also an employee of the West German embassy in Bucharest.64 However, Filipescus constant surveillance hampered the growth of this trade union, which could never gain new members, albeit some people did try to contact him for the purpose of joining this initiative. Although he knew well that these internationally oriented actions were of crucial importance, Filipescu believed that the solution to Romanias problems must come from the inside. Astonished by the degradation of daily life during his three-year term in prison, he persisted on his endeavors of stirring a revolt with the help of manifestos. In September 1987, he made another attempt, but this time acting in the limits of the Romanian laws. Instead of calling people to manifest against Ceauescu, he wanted to organize a kind of referendum. Those who were happy with Ceauescu should have gathered every Friday on his new boulevard, Victoria Socialismului (Victory of Socialism), while those unpleased with him to the site where once stood the church of Sfnta Vineri (Saint Friday), which the communist authorities had demolished.65 Moreover, he addressed a letter to the prosecutor general to announce his intention to go every Friday to the place formerly occupied by that church to manifest his dissatisfaction with the regime.66 The result was his new arrest. With this occasion, he experienced for the first time the darkest side of the secret police.
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In 1983, officers of the Securitate proudly told him that only militia used violence against individuals, while their institution had more sophisticated methods of interrogation. In 1987, the same officers beat Filipescu violently in order to make him confess how he sent the texts abroad.67 His second arrest was also part of the post-Braov wave of repression, which touched many others. Filipescu, Mariana Celac and Doina Cornea were particularly targeted because of their critical interviews to the French television channel Antenne 2. Confronted with this violence, Filipescu desperately concluded that the last resort was to shoot Ceauescu.68 He could see his dream of liberating Romanians from this dictatorship fulfilled when the revolution irrupted in Bucharest on 21 December 1989. Those people whom he kept inviting for seven years to demonstrate their discontent with the communist regime were finally doing exactly what he had envisaged: an anticommunist manifestation, so Filipescu recalled the upheaval of 1989. After the revolution, he was among the founding members of the Group for Social Dialogue, and remained involved not only in civic activities, but also in the process of coming to terms whith the communist past. In this respect, he is a former dissident who managed to reconcile completely with his own recent past, for one cannot detect (like in other cases) any trace of bitterness or resentment in Filipescus autobiographical recollections, which resemble a fairy tale in which the good defeats the bad.
Living in Truth in Romania Gabriel Andreescu

As shown above, Radu Filipescu conceived his dissidence as a pragmatic and goal-oriented activity, and differed thus from the dissidents who were writing people (as Havel put it) and who concerned themselves with the elaboration of critical analyses of
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the communist regimes. The difference in background explained to a great extent the difference in approach. Another technocrat dissident, physicist Gabriel Andreescu (b. 1952), also opted for a rather practical approach, albeit not for immediate action, as Filipescu did before him. Like mathematician Mihai Botez, who authored quite a number of texts on the reforms which the communist system needed, Andreescu expressed in writing his ideas about change too. While Botez developed a socio-economical analysis of communism and proposed a strategy of implementing changes from above, Andreescu envisaged a strategy of opposing the regime from below. The former resembled the communist reformists in Central Europe, who believed in the capacity of the system to adapt itself and survive. The latter adopted the post1968 dissident perspective, according to which the real changes might come only from outside the party, in particular from the aggregate action of the ordinary individuals who decide to live in truth instead of consenting to the communist rule by inertia. In short, Andreescus ideas resembled those already expressed by critical intellectuals from Central Europe, which turned gradually into commonplaces of dissident thinking in the Soviet bloc. By the time he emerged as an open critic of the Romanian communist regime, there was little place left for originality; most ideas had been already expressed in other communist countries where dissidence grew earlier and stronger. Andreescus road to dissent began with the reading of banned books, which nonetheless circulated underground.69 He recalled that The Gulag Archipelago shaped his understanding of the communist system and stirred his interest in other readings which exceeded his professional horizon, such as the works of Alexis de Tocqueville and Raymond Aron. Beginning with 1981, he repeatedly tried to send to RFE his letters, which represented the ideas of an autodidact who aimed at formulating a philosophy of dissent. Until 1984, he did not manage to send even one, although
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he lived in Bucharest where channels of across-the-border communication could be found easier than in the provinces. His failures illustrate once again the importance of personal contacts abroad or/and in embassies (as Botez or Tudoran had) in helping a prospective dissident to convey his message publicly. Between 1984 and 1987, Andreescu managed to join a network of people who were engaged in transmitting across the border information about the abuses of the communist regime, mainly about unsolved requests for emigration. Using their channels of communication, he was finally able to forward his own texts to Vlad Georgescu at RFE. However, his activity was not disrupted by the communist authorities until late, when the secret police observed his regular meetings with a diplomat and thus arrested him on 24 December 1987. He was then briefly detained until January 1988. This short arrest was also part of the wave of increased repression which followed the revolt of November 1987 in Braov. After his release from prison, Andreescu came to be known as one of the major dissidents in late communist Romania. Thus, he was invited to attend the conference which the Polish Solidarity organized in August 1988 in Krakow in order to reunite dissidents from EastCentral Europe with human rights activists from western countries. The invitation was addressed to other prominent Romanian dissidents, but the communist authorities denied the passport needed to travel to Poland to all of them. Some managed though to send their messages to this conference, which took place under Lech Wasas patronage.70 Andreescu was one of them. His open letter began by emphasizing the need for across-the-border collaboration among dissidents from the countries which were governed by the holly alliance of authoritarianism. Then, Andreescu detailed his ideas about post-Gorbachev dissent. Since glasnost and perestroika had made the heroic gestures for the sake of awakening people from their inertia unnecessary, he believed that the time for widespread resistance among large strata
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of the population had come. The goal of this resistance from below was the introduction of reforms from above, such as those already implemented in the Soviet Union. This idea was not new, but Andreescus supporting examples derived from his direct experience. As a scientific professional, he reacted to the submissiveness of his colleagues and of others alike, whom the Romanian communist regime had reduced to blind executors of the arbitrary policies which originated in the indications from above. If these people ceased to pay lip service to the party and refused to carry out the apparatchiks erroneous decisions (which were affecting all domains), then these individuals would regain their professional dignity. In other words, Andreescu called the Romanian citizens in general, the intellectuals and the professionals in particular, to speak the truth at least in matters related to their fields of expertise.71 Beyond his virtual participation to this conference, Andreescu pursued his dissident career by granting critical interviews to western journalists. He managed also to publish some articles in foreign newspapers, which referred again to his strategy of resisting the communist system.72 Some of his texts which tackled the social anomalies provoked by the erroneous policies of the communist regime reached RFE too, and implicitly the Romanian audience.73 By January 1989, Andreescu had become prominent enough as dissident to be among those Romanians who were invited to testify to the abuses of Ceauescus regime before the Standing Committee for Human Rights of the European Parliament. Obviously, the communist authorities did not allow him to participate to this event, as they did not permit him later to attend the Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE. Hampered twice to honor an invitation, Andreescu decided to take resolute action and went on a hunger strike in his apartment on the opening day of the mentioned conference, which started in Paris on 30 May and lasted until 23 June 1989. His intention
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was to draw the attention of this forum (via western journalists) on the violation of human rights in Romania. He succeeded in granting an interview to the French television, in which he appealed to all signatories of the Helsinki Accords and asked them to press Romania to respect the rights it assumed to observe. This represented an opportunity for these countries to show their solidarity with those Romanians who tried to resist the communist regime, Andreescu argued. 74 He also drafted a letter to the participants to the CSCE Meeting in Paris, in which he reiterated his appeal for international support in favor of the observance of human rights in Romania. While the communist leadership claimed that the international monitoring of human rights represented a violation of Romanias independence and sovereignty, Andreescu pointed out that the Romanians were neither independent nor sovereign. Like Paul Goma a decade earlier, he underlined that his fellow countrymen were under the occupation of their own Romanian communist leadership. Andreescu also emphasized that the observance of human rights represented a precondition for a stable peace, as leaders of Charter 77 and other democratic dissident groups in Central Europe argued before. Finally, he rightly observed that the failure of the Romanian communist elite to understand this connection contributed to the isolation of the country. Accordingly, he asked the participants to this conference to make the Romanian authorities understand that they could no longer separate between world peace and human rights.75 His desperate appeals to western diplomatic pressure actually revealed his pessimism about the capacity of the Romanians to organize from inside the country an opposition to the communist regime. This attitude was characteristic to most dissidents in Romania in the late 1980s. They assumed their roles of public critics of the communist regime without counting too much on the willingness of others to follow their example. It was their personal desire to liberate themselves
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from the daily lie that made them adopt a public critical stance rather than the conviction that some larger movement could be eventually established. Andreescus focus on human rights, which he illustrated in his dissident writings, did not cease with the collapse of communism. After 1989, he was among the most fervent defenders of minority rights as founder of the Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Romania The Romanian Helsinki Committee (APADOR-CH). In particular, he advocated the rights of the Hungarian minority in Romania and analyzed systematically the process of historical reconciliation between Romanians and Hungarians. He is perhaps the only former critic of Ceauescus regime who turned his pre-1989 dissident interests into a post-1989 profession.76
A Transylvanian Discourse in Defense of Tradition Doina Cornea

From the few Romanian dissidents known abroad in the late 1980s, it was Doina Cornea (b. 1929) who succeeded in triggering the largest international joint action against Ceauescus arbitrary decisions. She managed not only to attract the support of most western European governments (in particular those of France and Belgium), but also to inspire the largest western civil society network of grassroots transnational solidarity: Operation Villages Roumains. This achievement is all the more extraordinary that she resided in a provincial city, unlike all the above-discussed dissidents, who lived in Bucharest. In the capital city, the opportunities to maintain channels of across-the-border communication were far greater than anywhere else in the country due to the proximity of foreign embassies. A former lecturer in French language and literature at the University of Cluj, Cornea became more visible than other Romanian dissidents due not only
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to her courage, but also to the advantage of having close relatives outside the borders. Her daughter and son-in-law lived in France, and both committed themselves to support her dissident activity and arouse the attention of relevant institutions and organizations upon the issues which she raised. Although Cornea became very visible only after the revolt of 1987 in Braov, her dissent had begun in the early 1980s as a direct result of her attempts at improving the courses taught at the university. Her first attempt of breaking the uniformity of the curricula was to teach Paul Gomas writings. Since this author had initiated a collective protest against the violation of human rights, Corneas experiment was immediately interrupted by the university hierarchs. She did not give up though. After her daughter had moved to France, she could receive books that were not available to others. Thus, she made some unofficial translations from French into Romanian and distributed them among her friends as samizdat issues. In parallel, she referred to works by these authors during in-class debates.77 Among them was Mircea Eliade, a former member of the so-called generation of 1927. He was known for his encyclopedic erudition which proved instrumental after his emigration from Romania, for Eliade became a prominent historian of religions in the United States and arguably the most famous Romanian abroad at that time. As refugee (and supporter of the extreme right in interwar Romania), he was not included in the canon established by the communist regime.78 From among his works published abroad, Cornea translated and used in her classes an interview granted to a French writer, which focused on Eliades life and career (without referring to his interwar political option, which surfaced publicly only later in the West).79 Corneas purpose was to offer a better role model to her students than the communist canon did. This teaching initiative would later put an end to her university career, for she would be criticized not for her letters to RFE, but for introducing an unofficial translation from Eliade.80
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In parallel to these attempts at improving the teaching activity, Cornea sent a first letter to RFE in 1982. This text originated also in her preoccupation with the state of education in communist Romania. She argued that only a renewal on the basis of genuine values of the Romanian culture could provide the young and vulnerable generation with the necessary intellectual strength to resist the indoctrinating attacks of the communist regime. When this text was broadcast, her name was mentioned by mistake, although she had asked not to be revealed as the author of the letter. Consequently, she was not only interrogated by the secret police, but also severely criticized by colleagues at the university, where she was already known for her attempts at breaking the uniformity and conformity of teaching. By the beginning of the next academic year, Cornea was ousted from her position and forced into an early retirement. This left her though more time to dedicate to dissident activities. Thus, she continued to send periodically to RFE letters dealing especially with problems related to the education of the young generations, which had the potential of redeeming morally the nation if taught to speak the truth, she argued.81 Unlike the secular intellectuals who also stated that truth must prevail over official lies, Cornea did not take this idea from other dissidents in Central Europe, but from the moral-Christian tradition. She was a member of the Eastern-rite Catholic Church in Transylvania (also known as the Greek Catholic Church), which the communist regime banned in 1948, and forced thus in the underground. At the same time, her ideas came close to those expressed in the sermons which the Orthodox priest Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasa addressed in 1978 to young people in a church in Bucharest. The seven homilies which he delivered before his arrest were published by Romanian exiles, and Cornea came to know them during a trip to Paris.82
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A turn in Corneas activity occurred in 1987, when she began to address her letters not only to RFE, but also to Ceauescu. Her first message to the head of the state and party referred again to the desolating state of the Romanian education. This time she not only analyzed the causes of decay, but also proposed a detailed program for educational reform, which envisaged the de-politicization of schooling, the autonomy of higher education, the free circulation of books and professors, the reintroduction of banned authors in textbooks and of religion in school curricula.83 The revolt of 15 November 1987 marked yet another turn in her dissident activity, which intensified ever since, albeit her surveillance by the secret police strengthened considerably. News about this revolt reached Romanians via western broadcasting agencies that covered extensively this event during which the workers in Braov shouted for the first time ever in communist Romania: Down with Ceauescu! As shown before, this revolt convinced many that the discontent with the communist regime was widespread, and pushed some to speak out against the ongoing state of affairs in Romania. Unlike others, Cornea reacted by manifesting her solidarity with the courageous workers. Her first and very nave action was to post in her window a banner which supported the strikers. Although noticed by the people passing by, this message did not stir any particular reaction from the secret police. However, after she managed on 19 November 1987 to spread around 160 manifestos (which she had overnight handwritten), Cornea was immediately arrested and brutally interrogated. The secret police avoided to build against her a political case, and tried instead to pass Cornea for a common criminal who unlawfully kept foreign currency at home. Due to a fortunate coincidence, Antenne 2 broadcast on 10 December a film in which the French journalist Christian Duplan presented the disastrous situation in communist Romania, and included really dramatic scenes from the demolitions in Bucharest. The
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author had visited Romania in October 1987, and interviewed Radu Filipescu, Mariana Celac and Cornea, as already mentioned.84 In the end, this documentary worked as a means of pressure, for Cornea felt that the tone of the interrogators became milder. She was eventually released on 24 December 1987, but put nonetheless under very strict surveillance. In the following two years, Cornea emerged as a leading dissident in communist Romania. Her most important critical analysis came to be known under the label the letter of 23 August, for this was the date of its broadcast by RFE, which coincided with the national day during communism. This document was her second open letter to Ceauescu, and represented her most elaborated program of political, economic and social reforms. Many ideas had been expressed before by others, yet none of the dissident texts included such a comprehensive and radical program. Like Botez had pointed out before, Cornea also underlined that the communist authorities must stop taking arbitrary measures, and engage instead in a dialogue with the Romanian society. In this way, the party leadership would understand that the largest majority considered that political and economic reforms represented the only way out of the ongoing crisis. On Corneas list, political reforms came ahead the economic ones. The former included such fundamental changes as the independence of state institutions from the communist party and the separation of the three state powers. Besides, Cornea underlined that Ceauescus cult of personality must be terminated, while the citizens rights of expression and free association must be restored. She also advocated for the establishment of an independent periodical in order to break the regimes monopoly on information. Her economic reforms envisaged the dismantlement of state ownership, especially in agriculture; the encouragement of free competition; the decentralization of the management; and the concentration of state
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investments on those economic sectors which had proved to be internationally viable.85 Given that Cornea was under very strict surveillance, it is worth detailing how this text arrived to RFE. At the time when she was drafting the said letter, she received the invitation to attend the conference organized by Solidarity in August 1988 in Krakow (which Gabriel Andreescu also received). Thus, Cornea intended to respond to this invitation by sending a text to be read there publicly, for the Romanian authorities did not let any dissident attend this event.86 Like Andreescu independently thought, she conceived the address to this conference as a plea for the establishment of across-the-border cooperation against the communist regimes.87 Because her text should have reached Krakow before the beginning of the conference, Cornea wrote it with minuscule fonts on cigarette paper, and sewed it in the head of a handicraft doll together with the letter of 23 August, which she had written before but had no chance to send. Then, she started to look for a person who might have been able to take the doll abroad. By coincidence, Cornea saw a car with foreign plates while going out of the church after the Sunday mass, so she rushed to hand the doll to the people inside the car before the secret police agent who followed her had the chance to intervene. Out of sheer luck, the Belgian journalist Josy Dubi was in that car as an undercover tourist. He had come to Romania in the scope of making a film about Ceauescus disastrous rule. Dubi took the doll, albeit reluctantly, for he thought that this tempestuous meeting might have been a provocation. After this accidental meeting in Cluj, he was constantly followed by the secret police, which successfully hampered next day a second encounter with Cornea, upon which they had agreed. After Dubi checked Corneas identity with the Belgian embassy in Bucharest, and understood how fortunate he was to meet one of Romanias leading dissidents, he made his best to return to Cluj and interview
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her. A former sailor with an adventurous spirit, Dubi managed to deceive the secret police agents who followed his car, and after a race through the streets of Cluj worthy of Hollywood films, he bumped into Corneas house. Due to this meeting, the Belgian journalist took with him across the border not only the doll with the two texts inside, but also the footage with Doina Cornea, which he included in his film The Red Disaster.88 On the way back, he handed the doll with the two letters to the RFE studio in Munich, and contributed with this occasion to several broadcastings about Romania, during which he narrated his own recent experience in this country.89 These series of fortunate circumstances that allowed Corneas messages to reach RFE epitomize the adversities that all Romanians (especially those from provincial cities) faced when trying to make their criticism public via western media. Beside the letter of 23 August, Cornea authored several others in 1988-1989. Two of these letters represented mementos of events that were never mentioned publicly. At the anniversary of one year since the revolt of 1987 in Braov, Cornea addressed an open letter to the workers who protested then, and send it to RFE in order to pay tribute to their courage. At least those who listened to this broadcasting agency could thus remember them, she thought.90 Iulius Filip, a worker from Cluj who had addressed in 1981 a letter of support to the Polish free trade union Solidarity, also signed this letter.91 At the fortieth anniversary of the forceful reunification of the Romanian Greek Catholic Church with the Orthodox Church in 1948, Cornea and six other members from this persecuted religious group addressed a letter to Pope John Paul II to ask him to support the reestablishment of their church.92 However, Cornea became widely known for the letter against the systematization of villages, which the communist regime accelerated in the late 1980s. This was her third open letter to Ceauescu, which became in the end a collective protest endorsed by 28 people, among whom a group of workers from Zrneti and
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members of the above-mentioned independent trade union Libertatea. This protest united Romanians and Hungarians alike. Cornea and the other signatories brought historical and philosophical arguments for the preservation of villages in Romania. In comparison with Corneas program of reforms, which was pragmatic and future-oriented, the letter against the systematization of villages was nostalgic and past-oriented. The village spirituality, as Cornea formulated, represented the essence of Romanian identity, so the plan that envisaged the resettlement of peasants into blocks of flats was nothing less than an attempt to destroy the soul of the nation. In order to put an end to rumors, she asked Ceauescu to disclose publicly the final goals of this so-called plan of systematization and then organize a national referendum on this matter of common concern.93 The broadcasting of this letter by RFE practically transformed Corneas round-theclock surveillance into house arrest. The secret police made its best not only to fully isolate her from any possible external contact, but also to intimidate her. While harassed in the open, she had also to face the indifference of others, and even the rejection of the closest friends (which embittered her the most).94 This state of strict surveillance lasted until the downfall of the regime in December 1989. Although deserted by friends inside, Cornea received from outside the greatest assistance a Romanian dissident ever got in his or her fight against the communist regime. At the time when the secret police kept her completely isolated, this support from across the borders made her continue. In particular, her warning against the demolition of villages stirred outrage among western audiences and mobilized internationally the critics of the absurd policies promoted by Ceauescus regime. Beside the letter above, which was destined mostly for the Romanian public, the aberrant plan of systematization became known to a wider audience via the documentary made by the above-mentioned Josy Dubi, to which
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Cornea also contributed. This documentary included images that no other journalist was able to film before. Aware of the fact that in Romania he was not allowed to film freely, Dubi pretended to be a tourist accompanied in vacation by his alleged lady-friend, in reality his camerawoman. They shot with the camera hidden under the jacket or in a bag, and succeeded in immortalizing images which no-one captured before. Even more important was that Dubi managed to get the tape of his film out of Romania. He tricked the custom officers who searched him and his companion up to the skin and their car to the smallest detail (due to his encounter with Cornea), but did not figure out where he had hidden the incriminating materials. Dubi had put the sixteenmm video tape inside audio cassettes. When the Romanian custom officers wanted to listen to the cassettes found in the car, Dubi distracted the attention of the guards and put his lady-friend to hide these in her underwear, for she already passed the bodily verifications. In this simple way, the film was saved.95 Broadcast first by the Belgian television on 7 December 1988, few days before the fortieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this documentary benefited also from an extensive press advertisement prior to the release. Thus, the film not only registered a very large audience in Belgium, but in many other western countries, for other television channels broadcast it immediately after.96 The western viewers were really shocked by this documentary, which presented a situation so appalling for individuals who lived under a democratic regime, that only the old people who lived through the last world war could relate the images in the film with their personal experiences. The completely empty shops seemed all the more intriguing that they existed not in impoverished Africa, but in another European country that could have been reached by plane in a few hours. The large scale demolition of Bucharest reminded of natural disasters as earthquakes or wartime bombardments. In addition, Doina
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Corneas fragile appearance was the shock image of the film: the western viewer could not have remained untouched by the Mother Theresa look-alike woman, who was standing alone against Ceauescus oppressive regime. Although her words were not really intelligible, she seemed to embody the nations redemption from a miserable and humiliating existence. In short, her image greatly enhanced the message of The Red Disaster, which not only prepared the ground for the launching of the civil society network Operation Villages Roumains, but also determined the incredible success of this grassroots initiative throughout Western Europe. This documentary had actually a double effect in western countries, at state and societal levels. It triggered a new wave of diplomatic appeals to the Romanian communist leadership, which was not only asked to stop harassing Cornea, but also to revise its abusive policies. The debate in the European Parliament on 21 February 1989 was part of the international criticism against communist Romania.97 At the same time, the documentary informed a wider audience than written media about the effects of Ceauescus policies upon the Romanian population, in particular about the absurd plan of transforming villages into socalled agricultural centers by replacing individual houses with blocks of flats. When a group of Belgian left-wing intellectuals announced the establishment of Operation Villages Roumains on 22 December 1988, the audience was already prepared for it. The scope of this association was to fight against Ceauescus systematization plan by encouraging as many western communes as possible to fraternize with a particular Romanian village. As these rural communities behind the Iron Curtain were beyond reach, the western local authorities had to inform in writing Ceauescu about their initiative. The practice of establishing such decentralized links among small communities from different countries already existed in Western Europe. The organizers only thought that they could use it to protect Romanian villages from
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destruction. Their initiative represented a transnational protest against the communist regime in Bucharest, and at the same time, a moral support for Romanians. Up to the collapse of communism, this Belgian grassroots initiative expanded to other western countries as well, while many Romanian migrs contributed to the success of this idea.98 In the end, Operation Villages Roumains became the largest ever network of transnational support against the abuses of Ceauescus regime. At the same time, Cornea emerged as the very symbol of the feeble but resolute opposition to this dictatorship. In December 1989, she was greeted as a leading public figure, and ever since played a significant public role. Initially, Cornea was put on top of the list (together with several other dissidents) of the ad-hoc established Council of the NSF on 22 December 1989. Since this political body was dominated by neo-communists interested only in seizing power in postcommunism, she withdrew on 23 January 1990, and engaged in supporting the emerging political opposition and the reestablishment of civil society. Against the political domination of the neo-communists, Cornea also actively participated in preserving the memory which was banned under communism.
The Tip of the Iceberg in Iai Dan Petrescu

If Doina Cornea succeeded in aggregating the first collective protest in Romania since the Goma movement, the Iai-based writer Dan Petrescu (b. 1949) was the first Romanian dissident who clearly stated that communism must go.99 Unlike other dissidents, who only reflected on the reform of the communist system, or the workers in Braov, who only asked for Ceauescus ousting, he dared to say publicly that the change of the entire political system that created a leader like him was imperative. From his first
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dissident text in January 1988, Petrescu marked a radical turn from the earlier self-limiting criticism and pushed other dissidents to radicalize their discourses. Unlike other intellectuals, who started and pursued their dissidence as solitary critics of the communist regime, he enjoyed the support of his group of friends in the city of Iai. In this former capital of the historical province of Moldova, several young intellectuals had established themselves as a nonconformist circle with a distinctive cultural identity.100 This groups origin was linked to the journal Dialog, a publication addressed primarily to students. Although the journal did not have a long history stretching back before communism, it did enjoy a local prestige due to the fact that it was published under the auspices of the University of Iai, which was the oldest institution of higher learning in the so-called Old Kingdom of Romania. This journal attempted at breaking the discursive monopoly of the party-state by publishing as many texts as possible in dissonance with the chorus of communist officialdom, which could be found in all publications, even in Dialog. From their time as humanities students, the members of this group contributed articles to this provincial university journal and some even joined its editorial board. It was actually due to their contributions that Dialog turned increasingly into a non-conformist publication. In order to deceive censorship, these authors used subtle and indirect expressions to conceal the intended messages. While Bucharest journals with broader circulation were strictly supervised, this provincial publication took advantage of its marginality and targeted those educated readers who were able to decode fine-spun critical thoughts on the regime. For instance, an author disguised his criticism of the communist ideology referring to the founding fathers Marx and Engels as Hegels shaggy epigones. Though far from explicit, the journals messages constituted a form of dissenting from an otherwise regime-obedient public discourse,
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albeit a form that was still tolerated. Harsh reviews of books written by the court poets who celebrated the party and the supreme leader, though completely justified by journalistic professionalism, were uniquely daring in a country where nearly every publication spoke only praise for the regime. The article series highlighting historical monuments menaced by demolition suggested an implicit criticism of the plan of urban systematization, which envisaged the complete rebuilding of central areas in all major cities, and implicitly the razing of entire heritage districts. Most amusingly, the front-page reproductions of ridiculous paintings glorifying Romanias dictator (usually the work of inept sycophants) represented exaggerations that discerning readers grasped as mockeries of the cult of personality.101 Simply put, members of this group prodded the boundaries of encoded language, testing time and again the limits of public discourse. Their articles would not have been published without the tacit complicity of the officials who were ideologically responsible for censoring such a small publication with a limited public.102 Thus, Dialog was able to print articles with political allusions that would not have been permitted elsewhere.103 In some cases, risky articles were purposefully allowed into the public sphere in order to function as a kind of safety valve for the appeasement of the discontented population (of course, effective only among those few individuals who were able to understand the encrypted language of the journal). This arrangement sustaining the existence of inactive, but dissident-minded citizens endured as long as tongue-in-cheek critical journalism remained basically unnoticed by the authorities and thus harmless to the authors. This cat-andmouse game came to an end as soon as one member of the group, who was incidentally Dan Petrescu, crossed unintentionally the line of tolerated criticism. In May 1983, he sent via a French friend a private letter abroad, in which he mocked the regimes mania for discovering the Tracian roots of the Romanians.104 After the
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letter was accidentally discovered at the border check,105 most members of the group were arrested, repeatedly interrogated and pressured by the secret police to confess to plotting against the socialist order. The letter was not different in substance or style from articles published in Dialog, but it bore witness for the existence of a transnational dialogue which was critical to the communist regime. The harsh reaction to the discovery of this international correspondence illustrated vividly the narrow limits of public expression under Romanian communism. While a local journal with a limited audience could publish undisturbed mocking thoughts about the regime, the communist regime did not allow the dissemination of such messages to broader audiences, especially to a public outside Romania. With this crackdown, the secret police confiscated all books and publications in foreign languages which agents found in the individuals residences (including, for example, even benign novels by Charles Dickens).106 The circulation of ideas across the borders was under strict control, so any publication introduced unofficially was dubious. With the occasion of these house searches, the collective novel authored by four members of the group, which was ready to circulate in samizdat, was also confiscated.107 However, no-one from among those arrested was sent to prison. The direct consequence of this episode was the tightening of control on the publication policies, which deprived by default a whole generation of young writers to make their literary debut. In contrast, the communist regime had more toleration for their colleagues of generation, who only distanced themselves aesthetically, rather than politically, from official dogmas in the field of culture. The young writers from Iai should have belonged to the group which came to be known in Romanian literature as the generation of the 1980s, had they followed a normal professional track. However, the members of this group remained little known among the Romanian audience,
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for they were practically banned from publication after this affair. Unable to overcome the difficulty of circulating samizdat in a country where every typewriter was annually registered at the police station, they were effectively silenced. Although the arrests interrupted the group experiment of challenging the censorship with encoded language, the subsequent interrogations by the secret police fostered the cohesion among the group members. This solidarity would rear its head later on, when some of them eventually decided to speak out against the regime. However, the expulsion from the communist-controlled public sphere did not radicalize immediately the former Dialog group members into seeking out alternative modes of expression or entering into open dissent. After the short-lived experience of testing the limits of official toleration on taboo subjects, these writers retreated into strictly professional pursuits, and tried to maintain their work at international standards. This was the path travelled by Romanias writers, who neither willingly praised the regime nor dared to criticize it publicly, but attempted instead to resist through culture. The increasingly nationalist Romanian communist regime regarded even this pursuit as a serious affront to the spirit imposed in the sphere of culture by the Theses of July 1971. As mentioned earlier, these theses had gradually imposed complete autarky in the literary and artistic domains for the sake of creating a Romanian culture free of foreign influences. The resistance through culture represented a form of disagreement with this officially imposed cultural policy, but one that was tolerated by the communist authorities. Its practitioners attracted often the surveillance of the secret police, but not the harassment which this institution applied to dissidents.108 Only years later, some members of this group decided to abandon this apolitical path. The routinization of silent resistance and the continued rareness of public criticism against the regime raise again the question: what made someone to become an open
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critic of communism in Romania, a country where no dissident movement existed? As in the cases discussed before, this decision was a matter of not only personal reflection, but also favourable circumstances, in particular depended on the existence of a transnational connection. Of the members of the Dialog group, it was Dan Petrescu who first decided to become a dissident. This step was taken following two subsequent coincidences. The first experience involved the personal opportunity to build contacts in the free world. During a visit to Paris (his first visit ever to the other side of the Iron Curtain), members of the diaspora asked Petrescu to become a contact person for western journalists in search of learning more about Ceauescus Romania than one could gain from official sources. The second event in Petrescus story was the major revolt of November 1987 in Braov, which not only caught the attention of western media, but also pushed other Romanians to speak publicly against the regime. This strike revealed the countrys unbearable situation to an outside world that knew very little about life in Romania in the absence of a dissident movement able to offer alternative news. In effect, it reoriented the agenda of western journalists, who had been hitherto covering Ceauescus aberrant policies, and refocused their attention on these policies reverberations in Romanian society. In short, Petrescus dissent started exactly when his country started to attract increasing attention on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Without the Braov workers revolt, Romania would not have jumped to the front-page. Without his visit to Paris, no journalist would have known to look for Petrescu, and he might have never realized the chance to break free from isolation in the provincial city of Iai. After granting his first interview to Gilles Schiller, journalist for the French newspaper Libration, Petrescu himself did not fully realize that in this way he had become a dissident.109 The transcript of this interview was published under the title Ceauescu is Not
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the Only Blameworthy Person on 27 January 1988, one day after the national celebration of secretary generals birthday.110 Petrescu said nothing entirely original, but adapted to the Romanian context ideas expressed before by critical intellectuals in Central Europe, who had initiated earlier their dissident careers.111 Such approach was not new; as mentioned, Romanias perpetually weak civil society obliged its intellectuals to rely on the appropriation of already established models, which western broadcasting agencies disseminated all across the Soviet bloc. More so than other Romanian dissidents, Petrescus topics of discussion the ubiquity of guilt, the imperative for moral regeneration, the necessity to create an alliance between workers and intellectuals resembled the writings of prominent dissidents in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. His most important idea is perhaps captured by the interviews title: the secretary general of the party was not the only person responsible for Romanias disastrous situation. This view completely contradicted the belief held by most Romanians, including the workers of Braov, that all problems would be solved if Ceauescu disappeared. No real change could occur, Petrescu argued, until the dismantling of the communist system, which permitted Ceauescus arbitrary and despotic rule. This was the first time that a Romanian dissident endorsed the need to overthrow the communist regime as a whole. One dissident gesture always followed another. During the last two years of communism, Petrescu established himself as one of the most lucid and radical dissidents, in addition to being among the most prolific. Like in the case of other dissidents, it is not possible to reconstruct fully his activity, for many essays were irremediably lost.112 In the surviving texts, few recurrent ideas are worth mentioning. In an essay entitled Little Study about the Anatomy of Evil, Petrescu expanded on ideas first expressed in an interview which was smuggled out of the country by a French lecturer living in Iai.113 In this essay, he reiterated that the main
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source of evil was the communist system itself and not just the people who embodied it. While most Romanians believed that the communist regime survived (in spite of obvious unpopularity) thanks only to the secret police, Petrescu pointed out that the consent of the silent and obedient population actually maintained this regime in power. His view echoed Vclav Havels more famous statement on the complicity of the greengrocer, who unquestioningly complied with the communist rule and made that public by displaying in his shop window the well-known slogan Proletarians from all countries, unite!114 Warning the public about the ubiquity of guilt, Petrescu also challenged conventional wisdom about the omnipresence and invincibility of the Romanian secret police. As mentioned, the memory of the repression which followed the communist takeover worked as an inhibitor of revolt, for Romanians were convinced that the secret police was capable to detect any act of disobedience and punish it accordingly. Its effectiveness relied on a wide network of undercover informants, as in other communist countries. Thus, Romanians believed that communist citizens fell in two mutually exclusive categories: (1) employees and collaborators of the Securitate, and (2) innocent victims of the former. For it was impossible to know in which category ones friends and neighbors were, twenty-two million people let themselves controlled by the fear of a mythically powerful secret police. Petrescu challenged this commonly accepted view in his most original dissident essay, which he conceived as a letter symbolically addressed to the Securitate. He detailed in this text all means of harassment which the secret police used against his friends in order to discourage them to maintain the contact with him, a person already known for his public criticism of the regime. In other words, this text constituted itself into a genuine testimony on the methods which the Securitate employed for preventing the development of any dissident network. However, this mocking letter has remained
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memorable for Petrescus commonsensical observation that, in a country where nothing worked properly, there could never be a single institution that worked perfectly, not even the secret police.115 Actually, his dissident pursuit represented an illustration of his thesis on the Securitate. By the fall of communism, Petrescu had become the most prominent dissident in Romania, second only to the Cluj-based Doina Cornea, more widely known because of her appearance in the film The Red Disaster. Of the other surviving texts, it is worth examining a paper which Petrescu addressed to the international conference Ein Traum von Europa, held in West Berlin in May 1988. Although the Romanian authorities did not allow Petrescu to attend the event, this invitation (made by Literaturhaus Berlin) marked his symbolic entrance into the greater family of dissidents in the Soviet bloc. His perspective represented the worldview from what was then the most isolated country in Europe on what at that time seemed to be the hypothetical reunification of the continent. In his address to this conference, he acknowledged that the West and the East were equally responsible for the division of Europe. Thus, he pleaded (as many others before him) for an alliance across the Iron Curtain, which critics of the communist regimes on both sides should establish in order to put an end to the segregation of the continent. Because Romania was in a desperate state, this country could turn into a catalyst of such an alliance, Petrescu argued. From the perspective of today, this message appears banal, but when regarded in context, it illustrates once again the widespread dissident convictions that only transnational solidarity would put an end to the non-democratic experiments in the Soviet bloc. At that time, the reference to the unification of Europe was rather metaphoric; today one can read his text as a prophetic one.116 An international career as anti-communist critic represented also a shield against the secret police. Like others before, Petrescu
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found himself monitored by the secret police the moment he spoke out publicly against the regime. Some agents watched day-andnight over his house, while others were responsible for following him or his wife in case they went out. Microphones were installed inside his walls from the neighbouring apartment, and his phone line was cut, while his friends were warned to stay away. As in Corneas case, a great deal was done to isolate him from all possible contacts with the outside world.117 Petrescu was though not imprisoned, for western media intensely publicized his case. Once again, the strategy of maintaining contacts across the Iron Curtain proved the only means of surviving as a dissident in Romania, where anti-regime networks did not exist. Above all, support received from co-nationals abroad was instrumental in establishing his visibility in western media, as well as his physical safety at home. News about Petrescu and his encounters with the secret police were continuously broadcast by RFE thanks to the involvement of Paris-based Romanian expatriates, in particular of Mihnea Berindei and the League for the Defense of Human Rights in Romania.118 The Romanian community in the United States (especially Petrescus brother-in-law, Ioan Petru Culianu, who was known as Mircea Eliades closest academic collaborator, and former dissident Dorin Tudoran) also offered its support to Petrescu, mainly through VOA. At the same time, Petrescus dissidence would not have been possible without the backing of local intellectuals, particularly those from the community of former Dialog contributors. Its members avoided open dissidence, but nonetheless contributed to Petrescus success. Most importantly, these persons helped Petrescu send his work abroad, when this had become a nearly impossible task, for the police set up twenty-four-hour surveillance of his home. This network of friends maintained foreign contacts and assumed all the risks of engaging in a forbidden across-the-border activity. They risked their own safety less than Petrescu did by
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speaking out his criticism of the regime, but their role as the hidden part of the iceberg whose task was to support the tip was instrumental. In short, Petrescus open dissent, the only activity which was visible inside and outside Romania via western media, was possible because others who remained unknown to the public acted in solidarity. While Doina Cornea determined the spontaneous reaction of those who followed her in protesting against the regime, the group from Iai planned acts jointly in advance. As Petrescu put it, the others were also prepared to replace him in the event that he was arrested and dragged to one of the basements of the secret police. One might say that a kernel of civil society was emerging in the provincial city of Iai. However, only a handful of intellectuals from this circle actually followed in Petrescus footsteps. The second Iai-based dissident was Liviu Cangeopol (b. 1954), who sent to Libration a piece in the form of an interview intriguingly entitled Be Satisfied Mister Ceauescu: You Will Make History! He observed ironically that the ongoing period would remain a reference-point in Romanian history, but not for any glorious accomplishments, as the secretary general believed. This period would be remembered only because communism had transformed Romanians into a self-loathing people incapable of political opposition. Like Petrescu, Cangeopol also argued that it was not only the communist leadership responsible for Romanias state of decay in the late 1980s, but also the population which silently accepted the hardships of the regime.119 These two Iai-based intellectuals were among the very few Romanians who dared to publish tamizdat, despite of the strict surveillance of the secret police.120 It was the above-mentioned review Agora, the first ever western-produced Romanian publication dedicated to alternative culture, which published their full-book-length dialogue. Their enterprise also marked the first ever collaboration between two critical intellectuals on a common
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project, a vital step in ending the isolation that crippled Romanian dissent.121 Moreover, this uncensored essay represented the singular dissident text of such proportions ever produced in communist Romania, approaching in content the dissident thinking of Central Europe. The exchange of ideas between Petrescu and Cangeopol was typewritten in the summer of 1988 at the residence of the former. Addressing issues ranging from the poverty of daily life to the absurdity of party policies, the two authors captured the essence of everyday life in Romania in the last years of communism, and produced a sociological-political analysis of the countrys situation based on first-hand information. More importantly, their book advocated openly and clearly for changing the political foundation of society, not merely reforming the regime. Thus, in the history of anti-communist dissent in Romania, these dissidents common work remains the most radical and comprehensive criticism of the communist system. 122 Beyond the political meaning, this uncensored text illustrates the perils of any transnational enterprise directed against a regime that aimed at isolating the Romanian society from the rest of the world. At the time of writing, the Securitate not only followed constantly both authors moves, but also listened to their conversations via the electronic devices installed in the walls of Petrescus house. In the face of such challenges, Petrescu and Cangeopol scripted their dialogue on a typewriter alternatively and in complete silence. In other words, the conversation that this uncensored text reflected never took actually place but on paper. The travel of this text to the West illustrates again the seriousness of obstacles in any across-the-border transfer of perilous messages. The typewritten draft was transferred at another location to audiocassettes, at which point the tape was packaged and finally sent abroad via an Italian lecturer based at the University of Iai, who was ultimately expelled from Romania for her encounters with Petrescu and the rest of the group. The tapes were hidden in
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jars of beauty cream in order to pass successfully through border control. The Italian lecturer sent then the tapes to the Romanian desk of RFE in Paris, from where these were resent to another member of this group, who had in the meantime succeeded in immigrating to Belgium. Transcribed on paper in Brussels, this text could finally find its way to the publisher in the United States.123 These considerable efforts to export material to the West and the subsequent difficulties in transcription delayed the publication of this dissident text until after the fall of communism. Consequently, it lost most of its prospective audience to the avalanche of events that unfolded in a now post-communist Romania, and it never received the reception it deserved. Nevertheless, with the success alone of writing and sending their manuscript abroad, Petrescu and Cangeopol proved the fallibility of the Securitate, and demonstrated the secret polices inability to repress every act of defiance.124 They showed the world that, even in Romania, it was possible to fool a most ubiquitous and secretive state institution, if clever and adventurous enough. Judging by secret police records, the Securitate suspected that Petrescu was up to something, but it could not figure out exactly what. Thanks to the decision to meet and work in total silence, Petrescu and Cangeopol finished their manuscript before authorities learned for certain what they were doing.125 On the subject of the Securitate and its capacity to suppress free speech in Romania, the telephone interview between Petrescu and RFE represented yet another reminder that this institution was not invincible. This was the first and only such interview with a Romanian dissident from within the country. In Petrescus own words, the very fact that this telephone conversation could take place in the face of the around-the-clock police surveillance illustrated that there could never be a single institution that worked perfectly in a country where nothing worked properly.126 During this famous interview of 8 October 1989, Petrescu announced
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that he and ten others supported a petition which opposed Ceauescus re-election at the Fourteenth Congress of the RCP in November 1989.127 This collective petition (like many others before) did not exist materially; those who endorsed it transmitted their support verbally in order to avoid the interception of the secret police. The novelty of the petition consisted in the merge between two developing civil society nuclei from two different cities: Iai (the network around Petrescu himself) and Cluj (the supporters of Doina Cornea).128 As Petrescu later confessed, the petition made him think for the first time ever that communism could really be brought down even in Romania.129 However, the popular revolt of December 1989 occurred before the few Romanian dissidents could organize their own solidarity.130 After communism, Petrescu was the dissident who played the least significant public role from among those who dared to challenge the communist regime when this involved the entanglement with the secret police. Far more important turned to be in post-communism those individuals who did not openly express themselves against, but only silently resisted to, the former regime. Such individuals tried to overcome their deficit of legitimacy by engaging themselves, at least after 1989, in condemning the communist crimes and abuses. Their commitment was beneficial for the birth of civil society and of political pluralism, all the more so that it opposed the overwhelming domination of the neocommunists who managed to win the first two rounds of free elections. Their fervor in condemning the former regime was also beneficial for the democratic consolidation, for it represented a kind of break with the past in a country which increasingly regarded the Revolution of 1989 as unfinished. Finally, their interest in the dark side of the recent past rescued from oblivion the memory which was suppressed under communism. However, their centrality in the public sphere (especially during the early transition) contributed by default to the marginalization of genuine
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dissidents. Quicker than in other countries, former Romanian critical intelelctuals lost their public relevance in post-communism (with notable exceptions). Dan Petrescu turned from Ceauescus challenger into a book editor. Although the two postures seem so aloof from each other, both reflect the former dissidents interest in making new ideas circulate freely.
The Revolt of the Intellectual Establishment Solidarity around Mircea Dinescu

Although Dan Petrescu or Doina Cornea authored quite a number of critical analyses of the communist system and rallied many others to their open letters, it was only the joint protest of several influential intellectuals in Bucharest that seemed to announce that Ceauescus rule could no longer count on consent. The criticism addressed by these prominent personalities was self-limiting, although communism was already falling apart in other countries of the Soviet bloc when their collective protest surfaced publicly. Yet, its importance resided not in the content of the message, but in its very existence, for a larger-than-ever number of prominent intellectuals acted in solidarity against the arbitrariness of the communist regime. All were associated with the non-conformist and pro-European group of authors who defended professionalism in the sphere of culture against its ideological submission to the communist party. The above-mentioned dispute in the Writers Union, in which Dorin Tudorans dissidence originated, was only an expression of this confrontation.131 As a note of the secret police observed, a greater sense of solidarity developed inside this group, for its members addressed in time several petitions to the communist authorities in order to protest against arbitrary decisions which affected some of them (and not necessarily all).132 The addressee of this joint protest, which emerged in March 1989,
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represented a novelty. While the earlier letters were sent only to relevant authorities, the open letter of 1989 was sent to RFE as well. The writer who practically triggered the revolt of the intellectual establishment was poet Mircea Dinescu (b. 1950). As mentioned, he was (aside Dorin Tudoran) among the most turbulent nonconformist authors at the conference of the Writers Union in 1981, but he did not turn a dissident after, like his fellow contester. However, Dinescus attitude did not remain unnoticed, for the secret police received detailed information about the conflict and used it in order to tame his rebellious spirit.133 Apparently, the event that made Dinescu take a more radical stance against Ceauescus rule was his visit of 1988 to the Soviet Union, where he went at the invitation of the Writers Union from this country. During this visit, he granted an interview to Radio Moscow, which was then broadcast on 25 August. Dinescu took this opportunity to express his admiration for Mikhail Gorbachev and his reforms, which he came to know better during this stay.134 In the Soviet Union, his thoughts were in full agreement with the official views, but they conflicted with the views of the Romanian communist leadership, which regarded (rightfully) the reforms in the neighboring country as perilous to the regime. After his return, Dinescu found out that his latest volume of poetry Moartea citete ziarul (Death is reading the newspaper) was rejected by censorship, so he decided to go further than he dared when he was interviewed by Radio Moscow. Moreover, he tried to rally others in a common protest against Ceauescus policies. Thus, he invited at his parentsin-law house a number of intellectuals from his non-conformist circle. Counting those present at the meeting on 7 October 1988 and those whose endorsement Dinescu hoped to get later, one could characterize this potential protest only as modestly ambitious, for not more than 20 people were envisaged as possible signatories; others were too untrustworthy to be even contacted.
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In other communist countries, such letter would have gone unnoticed, but it would have marked indeed a great change in Romania. However, this collective protest did not even develop beyond its kernel, for those present at the meeting could not decide upon the message. Dinescu had drafted a working document, which was radical enough to be criticized by those who favored a more cautious or a more pragmatic approach. He referred to all aberrant decisions taken by the Romanian communist leadership, such as the plan of systematization, the excessive and nonecological industrialization, the tight ideological control and the autarky imposed on the Romanian culture. His conclusion stressed that a change of orientation was needed in Romania, given that the wind of change was already blowing in the region. Those present at the meeting criticized especially the ambiguous conclusion, for the call for a change could have been interpreted in various ways: as an appeal for reforms similar to those in the Soviet Union, as a call for the replacement of the party leadership or even as a demand for a change of the communist system. In spite of precautions, this debate was recorded by the secret police.135 Consequently, all those present at this meeting were summoned by party, institutional or professional organizations (to which each of them was directly subordinated), and persuaded to draw back. Thus, the collective protest came to an end before it actually started.136 However, Dinescu decided to go on alone, counting on the support of his friends from abroad.137 As a person repeatedly invited to western embassies in Bucharest, he also relied on several diplomatic channels of communication across the Iron Curtain. Accordingly, Dinescu framed his first dissident text, which he wrote in December 1988, as a self-interview and sent it abroad together with his rejected volume of poetry via the Dutch ambassador to Bucharest Coen Stork.138 His text was directed to journalist Gilles Schiller from Libration, who had already
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manifested an interest in Romanian dissidents.139 Dinescus text was published though only on 17 March 1989, immediately after BBC and other western news agencies broadcast the letter of the party veterans. This critical document authored by former highranking communists stirred the interest in Dinescus interview too, illustrating that his text alone could not have made any headlines, given the unfolding avalanche of changes in other communist countries. Moreover, Dinescu confined himself in this text to arguments in favor of reforms in the style of Gorbachev. In other words, the message of this interview was very similar to that of the letter of the six, although there was no consultation between Dinescu and the party veterans. Both documents pointed out that the abuses of the communist regime represented violations of the Romanian constitution, that the secret police turned against those whom it should have defended and that the extensive export of foodstuffs led to the starvation of the population.140 None of the two texts surpassed the limits of change established in the Soviet Union, at the time when the Polish Round Table Talks (between the communist leadership and the representatives of the opposition) were already taking place in Warsaw. Thus, these messages coming from Bucharest seemed outdated to a western observer of the Soviet bloc. Yet, both messages underlined by default that Ceauescus rule was also obsolete, even among communist countries, and both let the outside world know that a growing number of Romanians resented this rule. The publication of Dinescus letter coincided with the broadcasting of yet another letter, whose author was Dan Deliu (b. 1927 d. 1992). Member of the communist party since 1945 and of the Central Committee of the Union of Communist Youth between 1956 and 1969, he became later increasingly marginal in this political organization. Although he had been a promoter of socialist realism after the communist takeover and quite famous for poems which glorified the working class, Deliu was also among
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the few who criticized the Romanian-style cultural revolution which Ceauescu launched with his Theses of July 1971. Together with Eugen Jebeleanu and Geo Bogza, he established himself as a mentor of the new generation of non-conformist writers. Beginning with 1984, Deliu addressed several letters to the local party organization in Bucharest (to which the Writers Union belonged) in order to draw the attention upon the daily misery of the average Romanian.141 Between 1981 and 1985, he was among the few who dared to support Dorin Tudoran in his dissidence, and defy the controversial chairman of the Writers Union D. R. Popescu.142 Moreover, he resigned from the communist party, making a decision that only two other writers, Paul Goma and Dorin Tudoran, dared to make before him.143 While his previous letters of protest had only an internal circuit and thus no real impact, Deliu sent the letter of March 1989 to RFE as well, although it was framed as an open letter to Ceauescu. As he confessed, he deliberately decided to change his earlier tactic in the hope that his criticism would reach not only Ceauescu, but also a western audience, and force the secretary general to react to the content of his criticism in other ways than before. His previous letter of 1988, which Deliu had sent to Ceauescu in order to denounce the plan of systematization, had only one effect, according to his experience: the close monitoring of his intentions by listening to phone conversations and violating postal correspondence. Like the letter of the party veterans and Dinescus self-interview, Delius text of 1989 also pointed out to the violation of the constitution and to the deep crisis caused by the mismanagement of the economy. Unlike the six former senior officials, who implied that they were ready to cooperate with the party leadership for alleviating the economic crisis, Deliu made it clear that he had no expectations from the Romanian communist elite, for it already proved incapable of changing its erroneous policies.144 Actually, the letter which Deliu addressed to Ceauescu
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was far more radical than the other two, for it accused directly the secretary general of turning his rule into a hereditary monarchy and of acting as if the entire country was his own estate. The timing of Delius letter was essential, for his criticism added to that of the others who sent messages outside Romania, and created thus abroad the sense that the dissatisfaction with Ceauescus regime was rapidly expanding. Actually, it was not the criticism as such that bothered the communist authorities, but its reception across the borders. The dissemination of Dinescus and Delius critical ideas from the other side of the Iron Curtain determined the secret police to strengthen immediately their surveillance. As with Dan Petrescu or Doina Cornea before, the Securitate instituted the round-theclock surveillance of both Deliu and Dinescu in order to prevent them from any further external contact. Since several packs of coffee were found during a search of Delius residence, the authorities threatened him with a trial on charges of trafficking goods, for this product could be bought at that time only on the black market. Thus, he began a hunger strike in protest, but he gave up after he had to be hospitalized and ended his dissent.145 At the same time, Dinescu was expelled from the party and dismissed from the editorial board of the literary weekly Romnia literar.146 Actually, these actions were taken three days before the publication of his interview in Libration. The legal basis of the charges against him was Decree 408 of December 1985, which outlined some measures related to the defense of the state secret that in fact severely restricted the direct contacts between Romanian citizens and foreigners. In particular, article 13 stipulated that only the Ministry of External Affairs approved the participation of Romanian citizens to events organized by diplomatic missions in Romania.147 Since Dinescu attended some receptions organized by foreign embassies without such permission, he implicitly violated Decree 408. The subsequent publication of
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his self-interview represented further proof that he had ignored the said decree. In reaction to his dismissal from Romnia literar by the editorin-chief D. R. Popescu, Dinescu addressed a letter of protest to the chairman of the Writers Union, who was actually the same person. As leader of the only professional organization of writers in Romania, D. R. Popescu should have acted as a trade union leader, Dinescu argued. His letter of complaint (which he also sent to RFE from where it was broadcast on 24 March 1989) was ultimately an exercise of style, for one could not expect it to have an effect upon D. R. Popescus decision, which higher authorities dictated. However, Dinescus letter was symptomatic for the atmosphere of mutual suspicion which dominated Romania during the last years of the communist dictatorship. Besides his protest against an unjust dismissal, Dinescu included in this letter the narration of an event which allegedly took place in a communist country in the Far East. Two Romanian writers who were visiting that country were taken by surprise when the waiter came with a soup, for which they expressed desire in their private conversation, but which they never actually ordered. The only logical explanation was that they had drunk tea from two superb porcelain microphones when discussing with each other in the restaurant, Dinescu maintained. Then, he drew a parallel with another event which he and Deliu witnessed in the restaurant of the Writers Union in Bucharest. According to his account, the Securitate also had such sophisticated electronic devices as microphones planted in porcelain plates that it could listen from distance to the conversations in this restaurant. It is not clear to this day if this event was real or it was only a figment of Dinescus imagination. The story nonetheless encapsulated perfectly a commonplace of that time, according to which the secret police was so powerful that it could keep under surveillance everyone and at all times.148
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The harsh action taken against Dinescu inspired though more than his metaphoric protest addressed to the chairman of the Writers Union, for it immediately galvanized the reaction of several other prominent intellectuals. They also sent a letter of protest to D. R. Popescu, which came to be known ever since as the letter of the seven, although nine Romanian intellectuals endorsed it eventually. This letter is remembered as an act of unprecedented solidarity among the non-conformist writers to whom intellectuals with other professional backgrounds affiliated themselves. It was indeed the first collective letter which the Bucharest-based intellectual establishment issued. However, the message of the letter hardly represented a step further from the guild solidarity already expressed by authors from this group whenever the communist regime touched one of them. The novelty consisted once again in the tactic: this letter, like those of Dinescu and Deliu before, was also sent to RFE so that not only the communist authorities, but also Romanians inside and outside the country heard about it. The initial seven signatories were among those whom Dinescu had invited several months before to sign the above-mentioned aborted joint letter of protest. The message of the text which they addressed on 9 April 1989 to the chairman of the Writers Union was self-limited not only compared to criticism expressed in other communist countries, including the USSR, but also to that of other Romanian dissidents. The authors refrained from criticizing Ceauescus policies in other areas than culture, but warned against the increasing party interference in the fields of arts and literature. Accordingly, Dinescus arbitrary dismissal reminded one of the persecutions perpetrated against non-aligned intellectuals during the Stalinist years. The decision of banning a talented writer from publication, the authors of this letter argued, represented an action taken against the Romanian culture, for valuable works would thus never be published.149
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Besides expressing their solidarity with Dinescu, the signatories manifested their concern about the earlier interdiction of another non-conformist writer, poetess Ana Blandiana (b. 1942), who had imposed herself as a leading Bucharest-based author of verses with hidden meanings. In the fall of 1988, she had been blacklisted for the second time. Her first ban from publication had occurred in 1984 because of some verses that hinted at the grim realities of everyday life under communism.150 After Blandianas first interdiction, her poems circulated underground all across Romania, transmitted in hand-written copies.151 Her second ban from publication was triggered by a book of poems for children, which the communist authorities considered disturbing and thus ordered to be withdrawn from bookshops. Inspired by her own tomcat, Blandiana imagined this animal in postures that reminded everyone of Ceauescus so-called working visits and of his cult of personality.152 On 3 March 1989, exactly six months after her interdiction of publication, she addressed a letter to Ceauescu and asked to be removed from the black list. Index of Censorship, the world-famous magazine which campaigns for the freedom of expression, published Blandianas open letter together with poems from Mircea Dinescus censored volume. The two Romanian poets were the only writers from inside the country who ever published in this magazine. Paul Goma and Dorin Tudoran also contributed, but only after emigration.153 The letter of the seven came out when Blandiana and Dinescu were among the blacklisted, and the authors made reference to both in order to strengthen their case. Although this letter aimed only at preserving the status quo in the field of culture, its authors stood ultimately in defense of the freedom of speech. Their message did not represent a radical criticism of the regime, but the extensive comments of the RFE broadcasters attached to it a great significance.154 Thus, Romanians regarded this unprecedented solidarity among intellectuals as a
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signal that the time was ripe for the revolt of the passive vegetal people, to which one of Blandianas banned poems referred once. In alphabetical order, the seven initial authors of this letter were Geo Bogza, tefan Augustin Doina, Dan Hulic, Alexandru Paleologu, Octavian Paler, Andrei Pleu, Mihai ora. Three of the signatories, Bogza, Doina and Paler, were members of the Steering Council of the Writers Union and represented the non-conformist wing of this organization. A leftist intellectual and a prominent journalist since the interwar period, Bogza (b. 1908 d. 1993) was still active in 1989 as columnist for the literary weekly Romnia literar. A former true believer, he had been also a companion of the party after the takeover and received thus high rewards, like the membership in the Romanian Academy.155 As mentioned, Ion Negoiescu had tried in 1977 to convince him to co-sign his letter addressed to Paul Goma, but Bogza refused in spite of his full agreement with the message.156 In 1989, he joined a group of intellectuals whom he must have considered as similarly important in Romnaian culture. Doina (b. 1922 d. 2002) was a prominent poet, who had been imprisoned for one year in the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution. In the 1960s, he was allowed to publish again, entered in the communist literary canon and some of his poems were even included in textbooks. Posthumously, he was uncovered as former collaborator of the secret police, but at that time he enjoyed a very high reputation among his fellow writers and the larger audience, due not only to his poems, but also to their favorable reception among RFE broadcasters.157 Dan Hulic (b. 1932) was an essayist mostly known in his capacity as editorin-chief of Secolul 20 (The Twentieth Century), a high-quality review which represented a stronghold of the pro-European writers, and probably the only publication in communist Romania to really keep professional standards at an international level.158 Hulic had made important connections in Paris even beyond the circle of the Romanian emigration. For he managed to make Secolul 20
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visible outside the borders, this publication received in November 1987 the Prize for the Best Review Dedicated to Arts and Literature in the World, which was awarded with the occasion of the UNESCO Biennale organized by the Centre Georges Pompidou. At that time, the further publication of the review was threatened by the Romanian communist authorities, which had though to resume its issuance after this international recognition. Paler (b. 1926 d. 2007) was one of the most successful and popular Romanian essayists. From all the signatories of this letter, he had the most prominent career in the communist party. Paler had been alternate member of the Central Committee of the RCP between 1974 and 1979 and deputy in the Grand National Assembly from 1980 to 1985. Yet, he was criticized for one of his novels and removed from his position as director of the daily Romnia liber in 1983. Paleologu (b. 1919 d. 2005) was a literary critic and essayist, who was considered the youngest member, and the last survivor, of the interwar generation who searched for the essence of Romanianness. This generation included Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran, Eugne Ionesco and Constantin Noica, among others. In 1947, Paleologu was expelled from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after Ana Pauker took over the control of this institution. In the 1950s, he lived for many years in hiding in a small mountain town, where philosopher Constantin Noica was on house arrest. Unlike the abovementioned colleagues of generation, Noica did not emigrate because of the communist takeover. Instead, he decided to transmit to younger intellectuals the values of his generation. Also because of his connections with Noica, Paleologu was involved in a famous trial of 1960 and imprisoned for several years until the general amnesty of 1964. He was another signatory of this letter who had collaborated with the secret police, but one who had the dignity to publicly confess his submission to this infamous institution.159 An art historian and a philosopher, Pleu (b. 1948) is today one
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of Romanias leading public intellectuals, but at that time he was rather a junior partner as compared to the other signatories of the letter. Beginning with the 1970s, he and Gabriel Liiceanu were Noicas closest disciples, who attended the private seminaries which their mentor used to hold in Pltini, an isolated mountain resort near Sibiu. Pleus support for this petition represented a departure from Noicas teachings, although the main argument of the collective letter reflected his mentors ideas about the supremacy of culture over politics. Noica had placed the writing of books and the implicit contribution of their authors to the Romanian culture well above any political activity (such as the drafting of protest letters), which he considered to be of ephemeral relevance. Since any politically oriented action against the regime would lead to imprisonment or, at best, to the interdiction of publication, its result represented a twofold loss. It was not only the respective author who would lose the possibility to express his thoughts, but also the Romanian culture which would lose an intellectual, Noica believed. Finally, ora (b. 1916) is another leading Romanian philosopher, who developed leftist views in his youth, unlike other colleagues of generation. He had entered under the influence of anti-fascist intellectual circles in Paris, where he completed his university studies during the war. In 1948, he returned to Romania and, among others, contributed to the development of new publishing houses. Although he did not publish much under communism, he imposed himself as a main figure of the renewal that followed the period of socialist realism. Prior to this letter, both Pleu and ora had been involved in 1982 in the affair of the so-called Meditaia transcedental (The Transcendental Meditation), because of which many intellectuals were marginalized, while the Department of Psychology from the University of Bucharest was closed.160 All the letters mentioned in this part (like most of the texts authored by Romanian dissidents) would have gone unnoticed at
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that time in other communist countries. In Romania, however, the accelerated release of such open letters in the spring of 1989 looked like an avalanche of critical thoughts which prominent intellectuals expressed. The Romanian authorities reacted again quickly and hit the authors of this letter where it hurt them the most: all except for Bogza were banned from publication. Besides, Pleu was forcefully transferred out of Bucharest, for he was among those persons whom western embassies used to invite to their receptions. In spite of his noteworthy professional background, he was assigned a low-level position in a museum in a small and remote place.161 In the spring of 1989, such kinds of measures were unusual in the Soviet bloc. This type of outdated harassment immediately provoked sixty intellectuals from the Romanian diaspora to issue a declaration of solidarity with the blacklisted writers and a protest against their harsh treatment. Forty prominent intellectuals from France also expressed their support for these newly emerging Romanian dissidents. Among them was not only the Romanian-born playwright Eugne Ionesco, who had endorsed such actions since the Goma movement, but also the essayist Emil Cioran, who gave his signature on such a public document for the first time in his life in exile.162 Once again, from the outside it seemed that Romanian intellectuals finally decided to take a firm stance against Ceauescus abusive policies. For this reason, the Romanian emigration could mobilize a wider support for the persecuted intellectuals than in the case of the isolated dissidents. Indeed, this unprecedented series of open letters did not stop in spite of the dissidents harassment, which the Romanian communist regime carried out irrespective of international protests. By that time, it became clear that the communist authorities resorted to harsh and instant actions against those who dared to transmit their criticism across the borders, but it could no longer keep these people in prison, as in the heydays of terror. Thus, the
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series of messages which expressed publicly solidarity with those persecuted continued.163 Alexandru Clinescu (b. 1945), a literary critic and professor at the University of Iai, who mentored the above-discussed non-conformist circle formed around Dialog and was thus removed from his editorial position at this student journal in 1983, announced RFE that he also endorsed the letter of the seven.164 Radu Enescu (b. 1925 d. 1994), literary critic and editor-in-chief of magazine Familia in Oradea, expressed his solidarity with Clinescu and the seven signatories in a letter which he also addressed to D. R. Popescu on 28 September 1989. In this letter, Enescu announced his decision to place himself on the list of the banned authors, for any new publication represented a dishonor for its author in the conditions in which the most prominent intellectuals were blacklisted.165 In this way, the socalled letter of the seven was in the end endorsed by nine persons. In response, Dinescu reiterated his criticism of Ceauescus cultural policies, and expressed on his turn his solidarity with those who publicly supported him and with all other dissidents. In a letter of 22 June 1989, he accused the authorities for the devastation of the Romanian culture through censorship, and the leadership of the Writers Union for being the obedient tool of the communist regime. He also underlined, as the seven did it before, the similarities between the abuses carried out in the 1980s against the most prominent writers and the crimes in the 1950s, which Ceauescu once criticized as characteristic for Gheorghiu-Dejs leadership style. Finally, Dinescu declared himself in complete agreement with all writers who suffered because of the messages of protest addressed to the chairman of the Writers Union or for other acts of dissent.166 The last sign of solidarity among those connected in a way or the other with the sphere of culture came on the brink of the revolution. In December 1989, a letter signed by eighteen writers from a younger generation (as compared to the authors of the
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letter of the seven) reached RFE. The message of this text was similar to all the above, for the signatories limited themselves to express their solidarity with Dinescu and the other banned writers, besides denouncing Ceauescus cultural policy.167 The broadcasting of this letter on 14 December 1989, only two days before the revolt in Timioara, represented the final page of an imaginary dissident file, which the criticism expressed by poet Mircea Dinescu opened in March 1989.168 Gradually, this file transformed itself into an index of censorship, for each intellectual who dared to express his solidarity with the protesters became blacklisted. This directory of banned writers comprised some of the most reputed cultural personalities in communist Romania. Yet, this criticism was significant only because of the prestige of those who endorsed it, for their messages (except for those authored by Dinescu and Deliu) were self-limiting. The state of affairs in the sphere of culture (which affected them directly) stirred their revolt, and not other abusive decisions of the regime, which affected the entire Romanian society. Nevertheless, the series of open letters that triggered one another represented an unprecedented wave of mobilization among Romanian intellectuals, and marked the abandonment of private interests for group interests, albeit not for societal interests as well. Although narrowly focused, these letters represented a step forward from the resistance through culture, which had hitherto refused the ideological obedience to the regime, but respected the limits of tolerated non-conformism for the sake of publishing. The intellectuals who protested in 1989 were not imprisoned, but suffered various forms of persecution ranging from the interdiction of publication to house arrest and professional relocation. The purpose of this harassment was the complete isolation of the protesters from those who could have helped them sent other messages abroad. However, the secret police was not capable to stop completely the circulation of dissident texts across the border,
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although the number of those who engaged themselves in such activities was very small. In spite of round-the-clock surveillance, Dinescu still managed to send to West Germany a last dissident essay, which was dated 11 November 1989. With the help of a Polish diplomat, this text entitled The Mammoth and the Literature was smuggled outside Romania, so Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung published it approximately a month later, on 13 December. Dinescus last dissident text represented a call for rebellion, for a genuine writers strike in his words. Although this strike should have only saved the reputation of the Romanian culture (and not demolish communism), Dinescu emphasized though that the hitherto tactic of passive resistance had proved its inefficiency. After the Theses of July 1971, the regime successfully marginalized all the honest writers who refrained themselves from supporting Ceauescus aberrant cultural policies. From such marginal positions, Romanian non-conformist writers proved incapable of defending their profession from the ideological intrusion of the communist regime, maintained Dinescu. This impotence became clear in 1981, when writers had to accept the man whom the party imposed as chairman of their professional organization, i.e. D. R. Popescu. In short, when Romania was on the brink of the revolution and communism was already gone in the other Soviet satellite countries, Dinescu was still urging his fellow writers to adopt a more radical attitude toward Ceauescus regime. The Revolution of December 1989 came before they had the chance to organize themselves. Thus, the Romanian dissidents mentioned in this chapter did not play a significant role in the change of the regime, but some did afterwards. The self-appointed leaders of the NSF co-opted some of the above-mentioned dissidents; their names were included on the list of those persons called by the communiqu of 22 December 1989 to contribute to the democratic reconstruction of Romania. Doina Cornea, Ana Blandiana and Mircea Dinescu became in the heat
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of the revolution members of the Council of the NSF, and thus legitimated the first (and ad-hoc) legislative assembly of postcommunist Romania. Cornea and Blandiana resigned shortly, once the former communist apparatchiks announced that they intended to turn the NSF into a political party and run in the coming elections. Andrei Pleu, Mihai ora and Dan Petrescu entered in the first post-communist government. Their influence did not last long, the longest surviving of them, Pleu, finished his mandate as culture minister in 1991. Few of the former dissidents adhered to the newly-established political parties; those who did this (for instance Doina or Paleologu) were not necessarily the most virtuous of them. However, all former dissidents (with the exception of Botez) opposed publicly to the political domination of the NSF and its acolytes, which came to be known as neocommunists. Although most kept a low profile in politics, many former dissidents played a crucial role in the development of civil society after 1989. Aside other intellectuals who had refrained from praising Ceauescu or the communist party before 1989, dissidents discussed above established the reflection circle Grupul pentru Dialog Social (The Group for Social Dialogue) and the nongovernmental organization Aliana Civic (The Civic Alliance). Both civic initiatives supported the democratic consolidation in Romania, at a time when the prospects of European integration were close to nil. If the largest majority of the Romanian intellectuals did not dissent before 1989, they tried to play a similar public role at least after. In a country where the successor communist party dominated post-communist politics, the reestablishment of political pluralism would have been much more difficult without the former dissidents and their post-1989 fellow travelers. Besides, former dissidents were instrumental in the processes of reorganizing the memory of communism in the public sphere and of coming to terms with the recent past. Blandiana was
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the driving force behind the Sighet Memorial, while Dinescu and Pleu were among those who were involved in the process of uncovering the former Securitate officers and collaborators.169 However, in the larger group of post-communist anti-communists, dissidents were only a tiny minority. Thus, their influence upon society was considerably less significant than that of their peers in Central Europe. Yet, without them and those who emulated their public commitment after 1989, Romania might have shared the fate of those countries of the ex-Soviet space, which changed the communist dictatorship for other forms of non-democratic rule.
Notes
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In the late 1980s, widespread fear inhibited revolt against the Romanian communist regime. Those who nonetheless became dissidents had to overcome their own anxiety. The fear was institutionalized mostly through rumors, but not only. The death of engineer Gheorghe Ursu frightened many Romanians into keeping their mouth shut. Ursu was imprisoned in 1985 (after his secret diary with critical remarks on the communist regime and the presidential couple was disclosed by colleagues) and savagely beaten to death. However, his cruel destiny was really unique, for none of the real dissidents of the 1970s and the 1980s died. In fact, Ursu was not an open critic of the regime, and this might have sealed his fate, for his family did not transmit across the borders information about his abusive imprisonment, so he could not be protected from abroad. Yet, his tragic death deepened the conviction that all those who dared to express any critical view would end in the same way. For the report about Ursus death, see Cartea Alb a Securitii, 503. An informative note of the secret police from 5 April 1977 mentioned that Vlad Georgescu, whose father was a landowner and a legionnaire, was arrested and accused of betrayal of state secrets. Cartea Alb a Securitii, 99-100. The letter pretended to represent a memorandum addressed to Ceauescu by an alleged group of Romanian intellectuals. See this text in Mihai Botez, Scrisori ctre Vlad Georgescu (Letters to Vlad Georgescu)
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(Bucharest: Editura Fundaiei Culturale Romne, 2003), 13-15. Vlad Georgescu sent this memorandum from Washington to the director of RFE Noel Bernard, and added his explanatory letter in which he specified that Botez was not a dissident of passport. This remark was meant to increase the credibility of his friend, who was totally unknown to RFE at that time. On 19 September 1979, Georgescu wrote to Botez to congratulate him for the broadcasting of his memorandum, which had marked his exit from anonymity. For the texts of these two letters, see OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 5, File Dissidents: Mihai Botez (1979-1981). Vlad Georgescu succeeded in this office Mihai Cismrescu, who had died of cancer in 1983. As hinted before, this position attracted upon its holder the hostility of Ceauescus regime. After Noel Bernard, who ended his life quite unexpectedly in 1981, Cismrescu was the second director of the Romanian desk of RFE whose death aroused suspicion. Vlad Georgescu was unfortunately the third who passed away suddenly in 1988. This coincidence made the Romanian employees of RFE become really worried about the intentions of the communist leadership in Bucharest. Monica Lovinescu, Jurnal, 1985-1988 (Diary, 1985-1988) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2003), 268. Their speculations became certitudes after Ion Mihai Pacepa, the former chief of the Direction for Foreign Intelligence of the secret police who defected to the West, claimed that Ceauescu repeatedly used a procedure conventionally named Radu to provoke lethal forms of cancer to all those he considered enemies of the regime by irradiating them. Pacepa, Red Horizons, 145-46. This was the only exchange of letters between a dissident and RFE that took place with some regularity. This was possible not only because of Botezs numerous trustable transnational connections (via foreign citizens living in Romania), but also because of their previously agreed system of communication. Accordingly, each of Botezs letters had a special code which was meant to authenticate its provenance and avoid taking seriously false letters. For the entire collection of Botezs letters, see OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 6, Files Dissidents: Mihai Botez (1981-1985). For instance, Monica Lovinescu recalled that Vlad Georgescu was instrumental in convincing the American leadership to allow broadcastings about Dorin Tudorans case. Monica Lovinescu, Jurnal, 1981-1984 (Diary, 1981-1984) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2002), 32.
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Many critics of Ceauescus regime, such as Paul Goma or Dorin Tudoran, had repeatedly criticized Vlad Georgescu for censoring their too violently anti-Ceauescu articles, before they understood that he intended to make these acceptable for broadcasting. Lovinescu, Jurnal, 1985-1988, 69 and 226. The policy of RFE was to avoid three issues: the frontier problems, the nurture of unrest (as it had happened in the case of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956) and the insults addressed to heads of states. Monica Lovinescu, interview by author, tape recording, Paris, 2 August 2002. Georgescus study was also a great editorial success for Jon Dumitru Verlag (a Munich-based publishing house established by a Romanian migr), which issued two successive editions, in 1981 and 1983. This study was also among the first writings recuperated in post-communist Romania and the first which analyzed the periodical and radical rewriting of the national narrative since the communist takeover. Georgescu, Politic i istorie. Besides, Georgescus condensed version of the history of the Romanians represented the first non-ideological account on Romania under communism that was written by a Romanian historian. For the first printed version, see Idem, Istoria romnilor: De la origini pn n zilele noastre (History of Romanians: From origins to the present) (Los Angeles: A.R.A., 1984). His fulminating career might have been indebted (to some extent, not exclusively) to the influence of his brother-in-law Sergiu Celac, who was at that time a top communist official and Ceauescus personal translator of Russian and English. In this capacity, Celac was official translator during the meetings with both Soviet party leaders (such as Leonid Brezhnev) and American presidents (such as Richard Nixon or Gerald Ford). Botez, Scrisori, 135. In Ceauescus view, these friends were from the CIA. The secretary general took all employees of RFE as hidden CIA agents. Monica Lovinescu, interview by author, Paris, 2 August 2002. As for dissidents, the secret police always tried to find out from the interrogatories which western secret service paid them to betray their country, as illustrated before. Botez was no exception in this respect. Botez, Fi de disident, (CV as dissident), in Idem, Scrisori, 145. This memoir of 1982 was also sent to RFE, and Vlad Georgescu appreciated it as one of Botezs most important texts. In 1987, after the Bucharest-based dissident was relocated in Tulcea to be isolated
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from foreign journalists, Georgescu returned to this memorandum of 1982 because he considered this text as representative for Botezs criticism against the communist regime. Vlad Georgescu, Again about Mihai Botez, Editorial No. 17, 27 June 1987, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 6, File Dissidents: Mihai Botez (19871991). Botez argued that the development of such industries as metallurgy or petrochemistry proved to be disastrous because of the low efficiency of the machinery and the high level of energy consumption, which increased the price of the final product and limited severely the margins of the profit on the international market. In addition, the energy supply for these industries required imports, which were made on the expenses of exporting products from other economic branches. Mihai Botez, Romnia 1985: Cteva note (Romania 1985: A few notes), 1-2, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 6, File Dissidents: Mihai Botez (1985-1986). Regarding the costs supported by the population, Botez observed that the RCP perverted the process of development, imposing subdevelopment through de-electrification (electricity supplies were cut up to six hours daily), de-automation (the use of electric appliances was discouraged via propaganda), de-urbanization (the normal urban services, from running water to local transportation, were no longer provided). See Ibid., 5-6. As he was among the very few Romanians who criticized Ceauescus rule in the early 1980s, Botez might have also influenced many foreign embassies to reconsider the previous benevolent attitude toward the Romanian communist leadership. Ambassador Funderburk might have been among those who became sensitive to Romanias domestic problems and especially to the cases of human rights violations due to Botez, albeit he argued that it was the other way round: Romanian dissidents, such as Mihai Botez, assumed his point of view. Funderburk, Pinstripes and Reds, 235. A political ambassador sent by the US to Bucharest, Funderburk could afford to be less conformist than a career diplomat and thus put under question the application of the so-called policy of differentiation with regard to Romania. As mentioned, this guiding principle in foreign relations with Soviet satellites stipulated that the American administration sought to establish special relations with those countries which engaged in either implementing internal liberalization or achieving external independence, but not necessarily both. For more on this, see Chapter 1.
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The forty-page-long analysis was broadcast by RFE in five episodes during the month of February 1986. Mihai Botez, Relaiile dintre guvernul SUA i Romnia ntre 1968-1984 (The relations between the US government and Romania, 1968-1984), OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 6, File Dissidents: Mihai Botez (19851986). This study was published in French in LAutre Europe (Paris), No. 10 (August 1986), 122-45. Since many persons for whom the American diplomats manifested concern were either of Hungarian origin or of Jewish background, the Romanian communist leadership was convinced that behind this interest hid Hungarian and Jewish lobbies. Kirk and Rceanu, Romania versus the United States, 305-24. It seems that Botez made enemies for himself in the United States because of this personal perspective on the Romanian-American relations. Many had taken him for a Soviet spy, as Botez confessed to Monica Lovinescu in 1987, when he had already left Romania for the United States. Lovinescu, Jurnal, 1985-1988, 235. Botez requested an exit visa for 34 times since 1976, but the Romanian authorities constantly rejected his application. Thus, this surprising change of tactics might have been triggered by the hope that Botez would seize this opportunity to emigrate. See Botezs interview granted to Vronique Soul, Le visa de la 35e heure, Libration (Paris), 910 November 1985. In any case, no-one from among the other nine Romanian intellectuals who were invited to attend this congress at Gomas suggestion was granted an exit visa. Lovinescu, Jurnal, 19851988, 68 and 72. Reference to this paper in Mihai Botez, Intelectualii din Europa de Est (Intellectuals of Eastern Europe) (Bucharest: Editura Fundaiei Culturale Romne, 1993), esp. 88-100. Ieruncas Half Hour, No. 150, 20 November 1985, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 6, File Dissidents; Mihai Botez (1985-1986). Before the collapse of communism, Botez tried repeatedly but without success to publish it with a western publishing house, as it came out from his exchange of letters with Vlad Georgescu. The conclusion of the book offers an explanation to the fact that, unlike his other shorter dissident essays, this volume was published only posthumously in Romania, at the initiative of his sister, as Mihai Botez, Lumea a doua (The Second World) (Bucharest: DU Style, 1997). Among his other writings, which were published in Romania after the collapse of
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communism, is Idem, Romnii despre ei nii (Romanians about themselves) (Bucharest: Litera, 1992). Monica Lovinescu argued that his long-term commitment to demonstrating that one could speak freely in Romania without serious consequences made him speak in the end only what he could. Thus, he argued for the stability of a system that proved otherwise incapable of offering something better than Kdrism. Lovinescu, Jurnal, 19851988, 78. Mariana Celac granted in May 1986 an interview to the Dutch television. Lovinescu, Jurnal, 1985-1988, 175. See Botezs short biography in Juliusz Stroynowski, Whos Who in the Socialist Countries of Europe: A Biographical Encyclopedia of more than 12,600 Leading Personalities, vol. 1 (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1989), 150. Gorbachevs visit to Romania took place between 25 and 27 May 1987. The interview with Botez was published in LExpress (Paris), 28 May 1987. Robert Delmance, Mihai Botez: Le Sakharov Roumain, La Croix (Paris), 15 September, 1987. Because Tudoran left Romania well before the collapse of communism, his file was among those which the archives of the former secret police preserved. In contrast, the files of the dissidents who were active in 1989 had been probably destroyed, for thus far no trace of them was found. The numerous documents preserved in this so-called file of informative surveillance (dosar de urmrire informativ, acronym DUI) include plans of action and reports of daily surveillance, which referred to both dissidents, Botez and Tudoran. There are also notes about Tudoran, which Botez authored, and reports about discussions with Botez on various subjects including Tudorans potential intentions, which secret police officers wrote down. Dorin Tudoran, Eu, fiul lor: Dosar de Securitate (I, their son: A Securitate file) (Iai: Polirom, 2010), 283-84, 356-59, 379 and 382-83. The establishment of direct personal connections between the emigration and the potential dissidents was mutually important, for the latter were very few, while the former constantly needed such genuine sources of information for their programs. After news about the miners strike of 1981 (which occurred in Motru) crossed the Iron Curtain, Monica Lovinescu noted that she could not find among her contacts in Romania anyone else but Tudoran to recommend to the French journalists who wanted to make an inquiry on this event. Lovinescu, Jurnal, 1981-1984, 32. It is also interesting to observe that
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an informative note of the secret police, dated 3 May 1984, mentioned that, during his visits abroad, Tudoran informed employees of RFE about the conflicts among writers, which they used later in their propaganda against Ceauescus regime. Cartea Alb a Securitii, 299. The autochthonists of Ceauescus regime were known as protochronists, for they documented that more often than not Romanians were pioneers in arts, literature or even political thinking. Contrary to the westernizers who argued that Romanian culture must develop in synchronism with European culture, the protochronists maintained that Romanian culture did not need to be in synchronism, for it was ahead more often than not. For more on the manifestations of protochronism in literature, philosophy and history, see Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism, 152-300. See also Alexandra Tomi, O istorie glorioas: Dosarul protocronismului romnesc (A glorious history: The file of Romanian protochronism) (Bucharest: Cartea Romneasc, 2007). For more on this, see Cristina Petrescu, Eastern Europe, Central Europe or Europe? A Comparative Analysis of Central European Dissent and Romanian Resistance through Culture, in Jos M. Faraldo, Paulina Gulinska-Jurgiel, and Christian Domnitz, eds., Europa im Ostblock: Vorstellungen und Diskurse (1945-1991) (Cologne: Bhlau Verlag, 2008), 231-49. George Macovescu (b. 1913 d. 2002) was member of the communist party since 1936, and member of the Central Committee of the RCP between 1969 and 1984. He made a high profile career in diplomacy and served as foreign affairs minister between 1972 (when he replaced Corneliu Mnescu) and 1978 (when he was replaced by tefan Andrei). He was also deputy in the Grand National Assembly between 1969 and 1985. However, he made in parallel a literary career and emerged as very influential in the Writers Union, where he occupied the position of chairman between 1972 and 1981, and that of member of the Steering Council after 1981. Macovescu left his personal account on the conflicts during the Conference of the Writers Union in 1981 in his posthumously published diary. George Macovescu, Jurnal (Diary), vol. I: 1952-1982 (Bucharest: Domino, 2006), 213-39. D. R. Popescu (b. 1935) joined the party in 1961. He rose to prominence under Ceauescu, who appointed him alternative member of the Central Committee in 1969, and full member in 1979, position which he held until 1989. Since 1975, he was also deputy in the Grand National Assembly. In 1981, D. R. Popescu emerged as the youngest
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ever chairman of the Writers Union. Thus, he pretended that this conflict opposed two generations, not conformists to non-conformists. His best known work (translated into English with permission from the communist party) is D. R. Popescu, Royal Hunting (Northampton, MA: Interlink Publishing, 1988). For the political careers of the two presidents of Writers Union, see CNSAS, Membrii CC al PCR, 36970 and 481-82, respectively. An informative note from the files of the secret police, dated 8 July 1981, observed that the number of writers in the Steering Council who were under ongoing surveillance increased from 37 to 48 after this national conference. On the contrary, the number of writers who were also members of the Central Committee or of the Grand National Assembly decreased. The note concluded by warning about the increasing influence of the Bogza-Deliu-Jebeleanu group in the Writers Union. Cartea Alb a Securitii, 219-20. For more on the conflicts during this national conference, see Ibid., 205-27. Tudoran resigned from the Steering Council after the election of D. R. Popescu as chairman of the Writers Union. A note of the secret police alluded to the fact that he and Dinescu were actually expelled at indications from above. Cartea Alb a Securitii, 221-22. Lovinescu, Jurnal, 1981-1984, 77. Romanian Situation Report/16, RFE Research, 2 November 1984, in OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 9, File Dissidents: Dorin Tudoran. When Eugen Barbu attacked him for accepting to serve the foreign interests of those who conducted an inimical propaganda against Romania, Tudoran could not reply via Romanian mass media. Thus, he sent an open letter to RFE, which was the only broadcasting agency that could have provided the necessary frame for a debate, as he pointed in the letter. Tudoran, Eu, fiul lor, 529-33. The letters sent by Mihai Botez to Vlad Georgescu illustrate that he repeatedly recommended Tudoran as a reliable person, argued in favor of supporting his emigration and then pleaded for his employment at RFE. Botez, Scrisori, 89, 97, 100, 111, 116 and 126. See also Lovinescu, Jurnal, 1981-1984, 182. See his short autobiography in Dorin Tudoran, Kakistocraia (Kakistocracy) (Kishinev: Arc, 1998), 76. His sudden radicalization was observed by those who followed closely public criticism emerging from Romania. Ibid., 230 and 236. Ibid., 76.
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The preparatory meetings between Szcs and Tudoran were recalled by the latter, who remembered that they communicated only in writing and burned the respective pieces of paper after reading. Thus, the communist authorities could not find out about their memorandum, in spite of the fact that both were under surveillance at that time. Tudoran, Eu, fiul lor, 44. Since this text was too long (Mihnea Berindei had asked him for only 20 pages), excerpts from his essay (in Marie-France Ionescos translation into French) were published in two parts. Dorin Tudoran, De la condition de lintellectuel roumain, LAlternative (Paris), No. 29 (September-October 1984), 42-50, and No. 30 (November-December 1984), 43-50. The unabridged text in French was published in Ethos (Paris), No. 5 (1985). The Romanian version was published as Idem, Frig sau fric? Sau despre condiia intelectualului romn de azi (Fear or Cold? On the condition of the Romanian intellectual today), in Kakistocraia, 31-75. For the letter addressed to Ceauescu, see Cartea Alb a Securitii, 322-23, and Tudoran, Eu, fiul lor, 524-28. Excerpts were reproduced in the French media, including newspapers such as Libration (Paris), 21 November 1984, and Le Monde (Paris), 29 April 1985. The campaign was launched because the communist authorities refused to process his application for a visa. On the contrary, there were efforts to persuade him to withdraw his request. As party member, Tudoran was summoned by the Bucharest local party committee, to which the organization of the Writers Union belonged, and advised to reconsider his application and put an end to the international campaign in his support. Cartea Alb a Securitii, 315-19. The list included famous names such as Eugne Ionesco, Fernando Arrabal, Claude Mauriac, Paul Thibault, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Michel Heller, Alain Besanon, Pierre Hassner, Andr Glucksmann, besides members of the Russian, Polish, Czech and Hungarian emigrations. Moreover, the European Parliament in Strasbourg introduced an urgent motion in order to discuss Tudorans situation. Vladimir Socor, Dissident Writer Disappears, Romanian Situation Report/10, 26 June 1985, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 9, File Dissidents: Dorin Tudoran. During the campaign for Tudorans liberation, the American ambassador in Bucharest David B. Funderburk announced his resignation in May 1985, and granted an interview to Washington Post, in which he severely criticized the repeated violations of human rights in communist
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Romania. Monica Lovinescu noted in her diary that this was the most ample campaign organized by the Romanian emigration until 1985. For more on the staging of this campaign, see Lovinescu, Jurnal, 19811984, 336 and 340; and Idem, Jurnal 1985-1988, 26-27, 31-32, 35, 37 and 40. Agora was published in association with Foreign Policy Research Institute Philadelphia, for three of the editors were associate researchers at this institute in the late 1980s. The editors claimed to have distributed this review in Romania as well, albeit with great difficulty. Agora was published until 1992. Only one non-dissident intellectual published under his own name while the communist regime was still in power in Romania: Bogdan Ghiu. See Agora, Vol. II, No. 1 (1989). Others, such as Mariana Marin or Liviu Ioan Stoiciu, sent probably their texts before the fall of the regime, but these were published only in the first issue after the Revolution of 1989. See Agora, Vol. III, No. 1 (1990). The others, such as Sorin Antohi and Mircea Iorgulescu, published under pseudonyms. See Antohis dialogue with Dan Petrescu in Agora, Vol. II, No. 2 (1989), and Grigore Negrescus essay in Agora, Vol. I, No. 1 (1987). Coincidentally or not, the two authors who published under pseudonyms in Agora before 1989 proved to have been sources of the secret police. Antohi confessed himself. Sorin Antohi, Poliie politic: Cele dou fee ale turntoriei (Political police: The two sides of collaboration), in Clin-Andrei Mihilescu, ed., Cum era?... Cam aa: Amintiri din anii comunismului [romnesc] (How was it? ... Something like that: Recollections from the time of [Romanian] communism) (Bucharest: Curtea Veche, 2006), 138-46. Mircea Iogulescu was identified by CNSAS as the informant Dorin from Tudorans file, and the official communication was made public in Tudoran, Eu, fiul lor, 521. As mentioned in the introduction, the fundamental text which defined the so-called resistance through culture as a specific way of opposing communism in Ceauescus Romania, in fact the only possible in a country controlled by the Securitate, is the introduction to the postcommunist edition of Liiceanu, Jurnalul de la Pltini, 13-14. This diary, which was published first in 1983, represented in itself a model of daily resistance through culture, a repertoire of topics of reflection and a list of canonical readings for all intellectuals who wanted to evade the misery of everyday life under communism. A different, critical view on what represented resistance through culture is to be found
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in Vintil Mihilescu, tia eram noi (These were we), in ClinAndrei Mihilescu, ed., Cum era?... Cam aa, 18-26. Dorin Tudoran considered the passivity of the Romanian intellectuals a sign of political immaturity and labeled this apathy the Arpagic syndrome, after a famous piece of poetry which Ana Blandiana authored. He pleaded for making a clear difference between the writers who criticized the communist regime openly and the authors of texts with hidden meanings. Tudoran, Romnia i/sau Cazul Arpagic. He lived with his family in central Bucharest, in one of the precommunist neighborhoods, while the largest majority of the urban population lived in the blocks of flats which the communist regime built in more marginal areas of the city. Besides, his family had a summer residence in Snagov, on the lake where the recreation villas for Ceauescu and other communist officials were located too. Moreover, the family income must have been high above the average in a communist society, for his father was a reputed physician at one of the main hospitals in Bucharest. In short, Filipescu was among those Romanians who suffered the least because of the economic crisis. The story of Radu Filipescu is narrated in great detail in Herma Kpernik Kennel, Jogging cu Securitatea: Rezistena tnrului Radu Filipescu (Jogging with the Securitate: Young Radu Filipescus Resistance) (Bucharest: Universal Dalsi, 1998). Because the author is specialized in writing books for children, her story resembles to a great extent a fairy tale told to a public for which Ceauescus Romania was a completely unknown and strange world. However, the accuracy of events was not affected by the style of the narrative, as Radu Filipescu assured this author. For the text of these manifestos, see Ibid., 42 and 45. The Decree 98/28 March 1983 stipulated that the multiplication of written materials in all state enterprises had to be supervised by the Ministry of the Interior, while this activity outside state enterprises was strictly forbidden. Private individuals were permitted to own only typewriting machines and only on the basis of an authorization granted by the militia, which the owners had to renew periodically. For this purpose, every owner had to present to the militia a sample writing, which could be used to trace the origin of any typewritten manifesto (in a similar way as personal imprints are used to trace criminals). See Decret 98/1983 privind regimul aparatelor de multiplicat, materialelor necesare reproducerii scrierilor i al mainilor de scris (Decree 98/1983 regarding the use of multiplication machines, of the materials necessary for
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reproduction and of typewriters), Buletinul Oficial, No. 21, 30 March 1983, http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=1293 (accessed 9 November 2012). Decree 98/1983 was in the first package of communist laws which the Decree-law 1/26 December 1989 of the Council of the NSF abrogated in the aftermath of the revolution. See Monitorul Oficial, No. 4, 27 December 1989, http://www.cdep.ro/pls/ legis/legis_pck.htp_act?ida=1 (accessed 24 November 2012). Immediately after his arrest, the secret police went to search his parents house and discovered thus how he managed to multiply the manifestos. During the search, which lasted the entire Easter night, the secret police agents used the opportunity to enjoy themselves with the whisky and the coffee found in the apartment. When the Filipescu family returned a few days later, the neighbors told them that there was a great party in their apartment. Radu Filipescu, interview by author, tape recording, Bucharest, 25 April 1998. It is interesting to observe that the secret police used to cover its actions under a veneer of legality. Filipescus manifestos were anti-Ceauescu, but no Romanian law condemned the actions against the head of the party. Thus, the secret police asked him to sign a declaration that he had distributed manifestos against the socialist order, which was punishable by law. In short, the secret police urged Filipescu to sign a false declaration in order to ensure the legality of his arrest. For the text of this letter, see OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 8, File Dissidents: Radu Filipescu. However, RFE supported the campaign for his release, after information about his arrest proved correct. See the series of broadcastings in the frame of the program Tinerama, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 8, File Dissidents: Radu Filipescu. Amnesty International was established in 1961 by the British lawyer G. Beneson for the purpose of protecting two Portuguese students sentenced to seven years of imprisonment for drinking a toast to freedom. His article The Forgotten Prisoners, which was published in several influential newspapers, made a great impact on a worldwide audience and set in motion shortly after the first international campaign in defense of human rights. Amnesty International lobbied for Filipescu in West German media and supported the campaign for his liberation initiated by high school students from a small city in Switzerland. Filipescus supporters also made use of the celebration of the United Nations Year of the Youth in 1985 to boost their international appeal.
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It is indeed ironical that this celebration had been proposed by Romania in 1983. An example of improvements of the imprisonment conditions was the permission to read books from the jail library. This occurred after Filipescu transmitted abroad via his parents that in prison one could not read books. Kennel, Jogging cu Securitatea, 161. Recollections of prison life in the late 1940s and the 1950s are numerous. Among such terrifying yet touching stories are Constantin Cesianu, Salvat din infern (Saved from inferno) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1992), Corneliu Coposu, Dialoguri cu Vartan Arachelian (Dialogues with Vartan Arachelian) (Bucharest: Anastasia, 1991), Ion Diaconescu, Temnia: Destinul generaiei noastre (The prison: A destiny of our generation) (Bucharest: Nemira, 1998), Constantin Ticu Dumitrescu, Mrturie i document (Witness account and document), 3 vols. (Iai: Polirom, 2008), Adriana Georgescu, La nceput a fost sfritul (In the beginning there was the end) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1992), Constantin C. Giurescu, Cinci ani i dou luni n penitenciarul de la Sighet, 7 mai 1950 - 5 iulie 1955 (Five years and two months in the Sighet penitentiary, 7 May 1950 - 5 July 1955) (Bucharest: Editura Fundaiei Culturale Romne, 1994), Ion Ioanid, nchisoarea noastr cea de toate zilele (Our everyday prison), 5 vols. (Bucharest: Albatros, 1991-1996), Aurel Sergiu Marinescu, Prizonier n propria ar: Amintiri din gulagul romnesc (Prisoner in one owns country: Memories from the Romanian Gulag), 3 vols. (Bucharest: Editura DU Style, 19961997), Nicolae Mrgineanu, Amfiteatre i nchisori: Mrturii asupra unui veac zbuciumat (Amphitheaters and prisons: Testimonies about a tormented century) (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1991), Nicolae Steinhardt, Jurnalul fericirii (Journal of blissfulness) (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1991). When the Group for Social Dialogue in Bucharest received in 1990 an electric typewriter as gift, the members were told that Havel received the same model while he was imprisoned. Radu Filipescu, interview by author, tape recording, Bucharest, 25 April 1998. Filipescu was released in March 1986, but he could not resume his former job as an engineer until February 1987. Moreover, his father was forced into early retirement, in spite of the fact that he was a highly reputed physician. During his sons imprisonment, he played a crucial role in creating a network of support abroad and a network of solidarity inside, which included the families of other political prisoners. Kennel, Jogging cu Securitatea, 208-10. These abusive measures had the opposite effect than envisaged by the regime, for Filipescus father became
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himself a semi-dissident, who did not disclose himself as an open critic of the regime, but helped arrested dissidents, such as the journalists Petre Mihai Bcanu, Anton Uncu and Mihai Creang. Ibid., 275-76. For the text of the letter, see Dmocratiser la Roumanie: Lettre du syndicat Libert adresse la Confrence de Vienne, La Nouvelle Alternative (Paris), No. 13 (March 1989), 43-44. Filipescu recalled with amusement the challenges which his shadows had to overcome while following him. One day after his old and fat shadow could not keep the running pace with him and lost thus his trace completely, the Securitate replaced this agent with an athlete from the sports club Dinamo. With another occasion, Filipescus followers, who had to drive with very high speed their car to be able to keep the pace with his fast-running motorcycle, complained that all were in danger to make an accident. It is also interesting to note that Filipescu get used so much with the secret agents in charge with his surveillance that they ceased to see each others as enemies and reached in the end a tacit deal. Kennel, Jogging cu Securitatea, 222-23. The first contact with this person was established by a fortunate coincidence. Immediately after his release, she was sent by Amnesty International to verify if he was indeed free. With this occasion, they established to communicate regularly by hiding texts beneath rocks and bushes in the park nearby Filipescus house, and in this way they could maintain a long-term contact. Radu Filipescu, interview by author, tape recording, Sighet, 5 July 2002. In order to avoid a potential arrest while distributing the manifestos in postal boxes, Filipescu chose a different strategy of dissemination. Thus, he launched the manifestos from the last floor of a department store in the center of Bucharest. Moreover, he pretended that the author of this call for a manifestation was the Romanian Democratic Action, a group with unknown membership which had nonetheless announced his emergence in 1986 via RFE. For more on the preparation of this action, see Kennel, Jogging cu Securitatea, 214-16. In 1987, the Romanian Democratic Action launched a twelve-point program, which included such radical demands as the return to a parliamentary democracy, the introduction of free market mechanisms, the separation of the church from the state and the protection of ethnic minorities. Jir Pehe, Independent Movements in Eastern Europe, Background Report/228, 17 November 1988, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 18, File Opposition (1988-1989). In 1988, this group was among the only three civil society groups in
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Romania (besides the above-discussed Hungarian Press of Transylvania and the association Free Romania, which Romanian refugees in Hungary founded), while in Poland were 56, in Czechoslovakia 17, in Hungary 13, and in the GDR 7. However, no news from, or about, this group ever emerged after the fall of communism. In this letter, which was dated 9 November 1987, he also complained that he was constantly followed and his house was periodically searched, while various individuals were pushing him to emigrate. The letter was also sent to RFE. OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 8, File Dissidents: Radu Filipescu. Filipescus testimony illustrates that the communist regime returned to the use of political violence, after years in which it did not have to resort to such methods. Repression in Romania had reached its peak in the 1950s, as in the other Soviet satellites. Then, it followed a descending curve under Gheorghiu-Dej, while an ascending one under Ceauescu, especially after 1977. Cmpeanu, Ceauescu, 233. He had actually better opportunities than other Romanians to carry out such a plan, for his parents summer residence on the Snagov Lake stood on the opposite shore from Ceauescus vila. Filipescu hoped to be able to shoot Ceauescu from the rich vegetation which grew on the margins of the lake. Kennel, Jogging cu Securitatea, 257-64. Andreescu recalled his dissident activity in two successive volumes, the first was entirely based on what he remembered, while the second included also memories stirred by the reading of the files which the Securitate opened to his friends and relatives, for his own was destroyed. Gabriel Andreescu, Spre o filozofie a disidenei (Towards a philosophy of dissent) (Bucharest: Litera, 1992), and Idem, L-am urt pe Ceauescu: Ani, oameni, disiden (I hated Ceauescu: Years, people, dissidence) (Iai: Polirom, 2009). Besides Andreescu, Doina Cornea also succeeded in sending her message. Both had to be very inventive. For instance, Andreescus text was written on cigarette paper with minuscule fonts in order to be easily hidden. For the text of the letter to the Krakow conference, see OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 6, File Dissidents: Gabriel Andreescu. For more on his publications in western media, see erban Orescu, Gabriel Andreescu: Medalion, 30 May 1989, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 6, File Dissidents: Gabriel Andreescu (1989-1991).

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See for instance, Ieruncas Half Hour, No. 114, 3 May 1989, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 6, File Dissidents: Gabriel Andreescu (1989-1991). More precisely, he declared a hunger strike in protest against the offensive of the authorities against culture, the xenophobia of Ceauescus regime and the practice of considering public criticism as a form of treason. Vlad Socor, Dissidents Make Themselves Heard Again, Romanian Situation Report/5, 16 June 1989, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 6, File Dissidents: Gabriel Andreescu (1989-1991). For the text of the letter to the CSCE Meeting in Paris, see OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 6, File Dissidents: Gabriel Andreescu (1989-1991). Gabriel Andreescu, Pages from the Romanian-Hungarian Reconciliation, 1989-1999: The Role of Civic Organizations (Washington, D.C.: Institute of International Education, 2001); Idem, Naiuni i minoriti (Nations and minorities) (Iai: Polirom, 2004); Idem, Schimbri ale hrii etnice a Romniei (Changes of Romanias ethnic map) (ClujNapoca: Centrul pentru Diversitate Etnocultural, 2005). Preoccupied with the dissemination of censored authors among the young generation, Cornea produced by herself a samizdat of which only 6 issues circulated. Cornea could produce these self-made publications in a very limited number, for she could only multiply them by typewriting, while the access to copying machines was strictly supervised, as shown above. For more on her pre-dissident activity, see Doina Cornea, Libert? Entretiens avec Michel Combes (Paris: Criterion, 1990), 9-47. Eliade had become by the 1970s a well reputed professor, who established himself at the University of Chicago. Thus, the Romanian communist regime started to court him assiduously in the hope of persuading him to either return to Romania or lobby for it. His political involvement with the far-right Iron Guard, for which the communist newspapers severely criticized him in the 1950s, was no longer seen as an impediment by Ceauescus increasingly nationalist regime. Thus, his monumental three-volume History of Religions was translated into Romanian in the 1980s. However, his works published in exile remained blacklisted, and thus their reading was still incriminating, albeit no longer leading to imprisonment like in the 1950s. Then, a large group of Bucharest-based intellectuals, which included Eliades former colleagues and friends, were brought to trial because his novel
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Fort interdite was discovered to a person from this group upon her return from Paris. For testimonies of those intellectuals involved in this trial, see Stelian Tnase, Anatomia mistificrii, 1944-1989 (The anatomy of mystification, 1944-1989) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1997). Mircea Eliade, Lpreuve du labyrinthe: Entretiens avec Claude-Henri Rocquet (Paris: Belfond, 1978). As mentioned, this book-length interview was published before news about Elides involvement with the Iron Guard came into the open in western countries. Today, this volume is seen as part of Eliades own numerous attempts at rewriting his past in such a way as to obscure his youthful political allegiance. For more on this, see Florin urcanu, Mircea Eliade: Le prisonnier de lhistoire (Paris: ditions La Dcouverte, 2003). In her foreword to this translation, which was published in Romania after 1989, Cornea stated: The young reader, who is unfortunately used to certain patterns of thinking, will be amazed from the beginning by the freedom, the openness and the creativity in Eliades thinking. Doina Cornea, Cteva observaii din partea traductoarei (Some comments by the translator, in Mircea Eliade, ncercarea labirintului (The test of the labyrinth) (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1992), 5. Cornea, Scrisori deschise i alte texte, 13-57. Former political prisoner between 1948 and 1964, father Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasa was the only priest in the Orthodox Church who dared to criticize the demolition of churches in Bucharest, which started in the aftermath of the earthquake of 1977. Beginning with 8 March 1978, he delivered a series of seven sermons which called the young students in theology to speak the truth. He was thus arrested again, but the Romanian emigration set up a huge campaign for his release. However, he was set free (together with Dorin Tudoran) only after the American administration threatened the communist authorities in Bucharest with the termination of Romanias MFN status. His sermons were published first in exile and circulated among the Romanian emigration. Cornea confessed to have read them while on a trip to Paris. Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasa, apte cuvinte ctre tineri (Seven words to young people) (Munich: Jon Dumitru Verlag, 1978). In her program of educational reforms, she also stressed the need to modify the school curricula in order to increase the importance of humanistic disciplines. These fields of study had been given lesser and lesser importance after the reform of the education of 1978 introduced a hierarchy of school disciplines. According to this law, scientific disciplines, i.e. mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, were more important than
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others, for they developed knowledge about the world and provided the basis for understanding the latest technical and scientific discoveries. For the text of the letter, see Cornea, Scrisori deschise, 58-62. For the law of education, see Buletinul Oficial, No. 113, 26 December 1978, http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=10480 (accessed 12 November 2012). Together with Vincent Giret, Christian Duplan was part of a new wave of French journalists who interested themselves in communist Europe. Both traveled extensively in Romania, while keeping a low profile, and thus managed to meet some of those known as critics of the communist regime, to interview them and then convey their criticism via western media. For an evaluation of their support for Romanian dissidents, see Monica Lovinescu, Jurnal, 1985-1988, 256. This is a text that she wrote at the request of two workers from Cluj, Iulius Filip and Dumitru Alexandru Pop, who were together with Radu Filipescu the founding members of the free trade union Libertatea. Both also co-signed Corneas third open letter to Ceauescu, known as the letter against the systematization of villages. For the text of the letter of 23 August, see Cornea, Scrisori deschise, 74-81. See also Vlad Socor, Belgian Concern for a Romanian Dissident, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 7, File Dissidents: Doina Cornea (1987-1988). In fact, the authorities stopped the invitation letter sent to Cornea, so she could find out about this only via RFE. When she went to the militia station to ask for a passport to travel to Poland, the officer in charge pretended that he could not grant it without the official invitation. Cornea, Libert?, 88-89. In this letter, Cornea acknowledged that dissent in late communist Romania represented a far weaker challenge to the regime than the resistance which followed the takeover of power. She explained the weakness of civil society in the 1980s by the terror of the 1950s. Repression of that period left an enduring legacy among Romanians, who continued to perceive the regime as criminal as it used to be once, albeit only a few people experienced imprisonment in late communism. Cornea, Scrisori deschise, 69-73. Josy Dubi was the editor of Cest voir, a program of the Belgian television in French language. He had made documentaries about more than 80 countries and was very experienced in filming in countries under dictatorial regimes, such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, Iran, Iraq or Afghanistan. Dubi was the last journalist who interviewed Salvador
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Allende, few hours before the coup detat of 1973, and the first who filmed Lisbon few hours after the Carnation Revolution of 1974. Josy Dubi, interview by author, tape recording, Brussels, 19 July 2002. Emil Hurezeanu, Cazul Doina Cornea n actualitate I (Doina Corneas case in attention, part I), 21 December 1988, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 7, File Dissidents: Doina Cornea (1987-1988). In this letter, Cornea paid homage to the courage of those workers who revolted on 15 November 1987. She underlined that their action, although unsuccessful, had a symbolic meaning, because it redeemed the dignity of all those who, out of fear and resignation, had come to accept circumstances that are unacceptable. Although defeated, the Braov workers decisively contributed to the rejection of daily lies, Cornea pointed out. Cornea, Scrisori deschise, 65-66. Because of this letter, Iulius Filip was persecuted by the communist authorities until he left Romania for the United States in 1988. He became more famous in Poland than he ever was in Romania due to his letter in support of Solidarity. For a short biography of Iulius Filip, see http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/mart65_89/ ifilip/ifilip.htm (accessed 13 November 2012). This letter of 1 December 1988 asked the pope to press the Romanian communist regime to reestablish the Greek Catholic Church, which had survived in the underground since its interdiction in 1948. The letter specifically rejected the idea of joining the Roman Catholic Church, to which many members of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania belonged. A common view among Transylvanian Romanians is that the establishment of the Greek Catholic Church in the eighteenth century represented the only way of preserving the ethnic identity while accepting the conversion to the Catholic faith, which the Habsburg Empire imposed. Romanians accepted the Catholic faith under the condition to preserve the Byzantine rite, and implicitly their autonomy from the Hungarian-dominated Roman Catholic Church. This was the only way to avoid Magyarization, Romanian Transylvanians believed. For the text of this open letter, see Cornea, Scrisori deschise, 86-88. This letter had been drafted before the above-discussed letter of 23 August, but broadcast only after it, on 9 September 1988. Cornea, Scrisori deschise, 82-85. Cornea, Libert?, 91-96.

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Josy Dubi, interview by author, tape recording, Brussels, 19 July 2002. The film was reviewed before its broadcasting in many newspapers, such as La Libre Belgique, which highly recommended it. The great audience registered during the first broadcasting by the Belgian television in French language determined other broadcasting agencies, such as the Swiss, the Swedish, the Norwegian, the Portuguese, the French, the Italian and the Hungarian televisions, to transmit this film few days later. Beside protesting against the demolition of villages, Cornea mobilized western politicians not only to inquire about her fate, but also to press the Romanian leadership to stop harassing disidents. On 19 December 1988, Leo Tindemans, the Belgian foreign affairs minister, asked the Romanian ambassador to Brussels Gheorghe Ciucu about Doina Cornea. The president of the Social Christian Party Grard Dprez also wrote to Ciucu to demand that Corneas permanent surveillance be lifted. Moreover, the Commission of External Affairs of the Belgian Parliament organized on 22 December 1988 a debate on the situation in Romania and proposed the revision of all bilateral accords between the two countries as a means of pressure. Emil Hurezeanu, Cazul Doinei Cornea n actualitate II (Doina Corneas case in attention, part II), 22 December 1988, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 7, File Dissidents: Doina Cornea (1987-1988). The success of this initiative in Belgium surpassed the initiators expectations, according to the testimony of Paul Hermant, the president of the association. By the beginning of March 1989, 220 from the total of 281 Belgian communes had already adopted Romanian villages. The main criterion of selecting the twin Romanian village, considering that knowledge about this country was almost nonexistent among the Belgian population, was the similarity of the geographical conditions. In this way, the Belgians supposed that villagers from the two countries would have at least something to share: their agricultural experiences. With the help of the Belgian television (in particular of Dubi), of the French League for the Defense of Human Rights in Romania (on behalf of which Mihnea Berindei and Dinu Zamfirescu were very active), and of other organizations (such as Mdicins Sans Frontires), this initiative spread in France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Spain, Italy and Portugal. Paul Hermant and Eric Masquelier, interview by author, tape recording, Brussels, 18 July 2002.
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The name Petrescu is probably the third most widespread family name in Romania. This author is not a relative of the former dissident Dan Petrescu, like she is no relative of Elena Ceauescu, ne Petrescu. The group of Iai was worth assigning a place on the map of the Romanian non-conformist intellectual circles under communism. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Correspondence from Bucharest: Intellectuals as Political Actors in Eastern Europe. The Romanian Case, East European Politics and Societies, No. 10 (Spring 1996), 333-64, republished in a slightly different version as Idem, Romanian Political Intellectuals Before and After the Revolution, in Andrs Bozki, ed., Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999), 73-100. See also Mihai ora, Rdcina nevzut a rezistenei romne (The unseen origin of the Romanian resistance), Transilvania (Sibiu), No. 1-2 (1992), 92-96. A particularly funny example is the January 1983 issue, which should have been dedicated to the anniversary of Ceauescus birthday (celebrated with great pomp every year on 26 January). The front cover reproduced a painting which represented the presidential couple admiring a portrait of the medieval ruler, Stephen the Great (14571504). Stephen was arguably the most important king of historical Moldova and a staunch defender of the independence of his lands, for which he fought numerous battles against the invading Turks and Poles. In short, he was a very appropriate personality to compare to Ceauescu, the alleged defender of Romanias independence from the Soviet Union. The painter, however, was so stupid that he chose to manifest his subservience to Ceauescus cult of personality by depicting Stephen going out of his portrait on the wall to toast glasses with Elena and Nicolae, who were sitting in front of that painting. Needless to say, such representation could have been read either as a clumsy attempt to please the leader, or as a very intelligent way of ridiculing Ceauescus ambition to present himself as the last in the row in Romanias historical pantheon. For the treatment of publications with limited public by the communist regimes, see the volume authored by Kdrs cultural czar Gyrgy Aczl, Culture and Socialist Democracy (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975). In this respect, it is also interesting to make a comparison between Dialog, published by the University of Iai, and Opinia studeneasc (The students opinion), published by the local communist youth
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organization. Although both addressed practically the same public, the former was more critical than the latter. In 1980, the communist regime celebrated 2050 years since the establishment of the first Romanian state. The search for the ancient Tracian and Dacian roots of the Romanian people was part of an entire trend of pushing the origins of the nation as far back in history as possible in order to counterattack the Hungarian view on the Romanians, which maintained that this ethnic group came to Transylvania from the south of the Danube only in the thirteenth century. This implicitly meant that, in the tenth century, the Hungarians were the first in this region, where they only found a deserted land. For more on this controversy with the Hungarians, see Cristina Petrescu, Who Was the First in Transylvania: On the Origins of the Romanian-Hungarian Controversy over Minority Rights, Studia Politica (Bucharest), Vol. III, No. 4 (2003), 1119-48. Petrescus friend, upon whom the letter was found by border guards, was in fact a French lecturer at the University of Iai at that time. He narrated this episode in Romain Rchou, Un Franais chez les Roumains, LAlternative (Paris), No. 27-28 (May-August 1984), 48-51. Dan and Thrse Petrescu, interview by author, tape recording, Bucharest, 21 April 2001; Dan Alexe, interview by author, tape recording, Brussels, 20 July 2002. On the arrest and interrogations, see also Dan Alexe, Interview with Liviu Cangeopol, Lupta (Paris), November 1989, 5-6. See also the list made by the secret police with the items confiscated from Alexandru Clinescus home reproduced in the second Romanian edition of Dan Petrescu and Liviu Cangeopol, Ce-ar mai fi de spus: Convorbiri libere ntr-o ar ocupat (What remains to be said: Free conversations in an occupied country) (Bucharest: Nemira, 2000). Alexandru Clinescu was a professor at the University of Iai, a mentor of the group and the editor-in-chief of Dialog until May 1983, when dismissed from this position with the occasion of the secret police investigation. Later on, in 1989, Clinescu would sign aside other prominent Romanian intellectuals the so-called letter of the seven. Dan Petrescu, interview by author, tape recording, Bucharest, 28 April 1998. Actually, the surveillance of the individuals who dedicated themselves to literary or artistic professions represented a major objective of the secret police. One of the so-called problem files of the Securitate was entitled The inimical activities unfolded by some persons from the
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fields of art and culture, in short Art and Culture. This file was opened on 17 January 1974, and targeted members of the Writers Union and the similar associations of painters, composers, film-makers, etc. For more on this, see Carmen Chivu and Mihai Albu, eds., Dosarele Securitii: Studii de Caz (Files of the Securitate: Case studies) (Iai: Polirom, 2007), 73-82. In June 1987, Dan Petrescu participated in Paris to a conference dedicated to Mircea Eliade, who had recently passed away. With this occasion, he met Mihnea Berindei, the leader of the League for the Defense of Human Rights in Romania, who complained that the Parisbased emigration was forced to turn down all the French journalists who were constantly asking for contacts among Romanian intellectuals willing to speak freely about the current situation in the country. Petrescu promised that from then on he would be ready to speak with any western journalist. Soon after his return from Paris, journalist Gilles Schiller (alias Jean Stern) arrived in Iai and Alexandru Clinescu directed him to Petrescus house. With Schiller at his door, Dan Petrescu decided on the spot to grant him an interview and speak for all those who did not dare to do it. Dan Petrescu, interview by author, tape recording, Bucharest, 28 April 1998. The text was later on broadcast by RFE, and literary critic Monica Lovinescu commented it on 5 February 1988 in the framework of her series Teze i antiteze la Paris (Theses and antitheses in Paris). OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 6, File Dissidents: Dan Petrescu. A replica on the behalf of the Romanian culturniks, to use Vlad Georgescus label for the intellectuals obedient to the regime, was given in Mircea Radu Iacoban, Minciuna are picioare scurte (The lie has short legs), Contemporanul (Bucharest), 26 February 1988. An excellent synthesis of the theory and practice of dissidence in Central Europe, i.e. Poland, the former Czechoslovakia and Hungary, is Barbara Falk, The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe: Citizen Intellectuals and Philosopher Kings (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003). As samizdat did not circulate in Romania, the publics only access to free information came via western broadcasting agencies. For this reason, Petrescu sent his writings to the Romanian desks of RFE and VOA, like all other Romanian dissidents did. Only a few of his essays reached western newspapers and magazines. Of those never published, some were lost forever with the destruction of the VOA archives and
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the transfer of the RFE documents from Munich to Prague and then to Budapest. This essay was sent abroad with another French lecturer at the University of Iai, Thomas Bazin. Fragments were published in Libration on 15 February 1988. The entire text was also broadcast by RFE. For the complete version of the essay, see Petrescu and Cangeopol, Ce-ar mai fi de spus, 236-43. It was this belief that motivated him to speak his mind publicly in the name of all those who were afraid or unable to speak up, Petrescu confessed in a later interview to a French press agency. The interview was granted in April 1988 in Iai, but it arrived in Paris only at the beginning of the next year, when it was also broadcast by RFE. Virgil Ierunca, Povestea vorbei (The story of the word), No. 662, 8 February 1989, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 6, File Dissidents: Dan Petrescu. See also Petrescu and Cangeopol, Ce-ar mai fi de spus, 268-79. In fact, the journalists were fortunate not to take with them the footage, because the next day the secret police surprised them while interviewing people on the streets of Iai, so all filmed materials were immediately confiscated. The interview granted by Petrescu was sent to Paris later, when a reliable messenger was found. Parts of this interview were broadcast on 26 January 1989 by France 3 during Nol Mamres program Rsistances, which was dedicated to the above-mentioned film The Red Disaster by the Belgian journalist Josy Dubi. This letter was broadcast by RFE on 30 August 1989. OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 6, File Dissidents: Dan Petrescu. See also Petrescu and Cangeopol, Ce-ar mai fi de spus, 258-67. The text addressed to the conference was broadcast by RFE with comments by Vlad Georgescu himself. OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 6, File Dissidents: Dan Petrescu. See also Petrescu and Cangeopol, Ce-ar mai fi de spus, 251-57. A note of the secret police from October 1989 mentioned all the measures taken by this institution in order to put an end to Petrescus dissent. These measures were extremely diverse, ranging from strict surveillance to forcing him into emigration. Also, the secret police initiated campaigns to discredit him among his western supporters. A copy of this document, which was discovered among documents of the secret police in the problem file Art and culture, is in the
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possession of the author. Otherwise, Petrescus file of informative surveillance was not found in the archives of the former Securitate. Mihnea Berindei, interview by author, tape recording, Paris, 24 July 2002. The text was published partially in Libration on 5 April 1988. The next day, it was broadcast by RFE. OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 6, File Dissidents: Liviu Cangeopol. This text has also an interesting story. When it arrived in Paris, it could not have been published immediately, because the League for the Defense of Human Rights in Romania needed more personal data than a simple name in order to protect Cangeopol effectively. In the meantime, some French journalists in search of intellectuals willing to grant interviews were sent to him, and the Romanian authorities found his name on their list. Thus, the secret police started to look for Cangeopol before he had the chance to have published anything abroad. This forced him to hide until the moment when he turned dissident with the appearance of this text, and could implicitly benefit from an international protection. Liviu Cangeopol, interview by author, tape recording, New York, 17 May 2000. Dan Petrescu published in Agora beginning with its second issue of May 1988, and up to the fall of communism, he was present in every issue. Liviu Cangeopol published for the first time in the issue of January 1989, while still in Romania, and continued his collaboration after his emigration to the United States. See Agora, Vol. I, No. 2 (May 1988); Vol. II, No. 1 (January 1989); and No. 2 (July 1989). That was, however, their only common enterprise. While Petrescu continued his dissident activity inside Romania, Cangeopol became convinced that communism was to stay in this country, so he decided to emigrate and left for the United States in September 1989. Liviu Cangeopol, interview by author, tape recording, New York, 17 May 2000. Dan Petrescu and Liviu Cangeopol, Ce-ar mai fi de spus: Convorbiri libere ntr-o ar ocupat (What remains to be said: Free conversations in an occupied country), Agora, Vol. III, No. 1 (February 1990), 45-258. The transcription of the text was made by Dan Alexe, who was about to become the third dissident from Iai when he suddenly opted for immigration to Belgium. Dan Alexe, interview by author, tape recording, Brussels, 20 July 2002. A letter addressed by him to Dan
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Petrescu was published together with the dialogue in Agora, and it was also included in the two versions published after 1989 in Romania. Petrescu and Cangeopol, Ce-ar mai fi de spus, 9-10. The economic crisis was so deep by the end of the 1980s that it affected the secret police apparatus and collaborators to the same extent as the rest of the citizens. At that time, all basic goods sugar, edible oil, bread, butter, eggs, meat were rationed, while other goods could be bought only in the place of residence. The shadow following Petrescus wife stayed together with her in line to buy some hundred grams of salami or a piece of cheese. Dan and Thrse Petrescu, interview by author, tape recording, Bucharest, 21 April 2001. Finally, after news that their book had successfully crossed the Iron Curtain reached Romania via RFE, the secret agents in charge of following Petrescu and Cangeopol were severely punished. Cartea Alb a Securitii, 372-75. This interview was given using the telephone of a friend in Iai, who was not under the surveillance of the secret police. However, the success of the operation relied on Petrescus ability to ditch his shadowing agent before arriving at his friends home at the preset hour when Neculai Constantin Munteanu, the RFE journalist from the Romanian desk in charge of the popular program Actualitatea romneasc (Romanian Actualities), was to call. Dan Petrescu, interview by author, tape recording, Bucharest, 28 April 1998. News about this petition reached western media via the French journalist Gilles Schiller from Libration, the reporter who had interviewed Petrescu the first time. The signatories from Iai were: Dan Petrescu; Luca Piu, an intellectual from the group around Petrescu who participated also in the telephone interview with RFE; Liviu Antonesei, another intellectual from their group; Filip Rdui, in whose house the interview took place; Eugen Amarandei and Gabriela Iavolschi, Petrescus neighbors; and Alexandru Tacu, a librarian who visited Petrescu several times. Mariana Marin, a young poet from Bucharest and good friend of the group around Petrescu, also endorsed the petition. The signatories from Cluj were Doina Cornea and her former students Gina and Dan Smplean, who also signed before her open letter to the pope. This enumeration gives one some idea about the way in which signatures on such protest letters were gathered. Dan Petrescu, interview by author, tape recording, 28 April 1998, Bucharest. An account of the complicated endeavors of collecting
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around the country signatures for this protest is Liviu Antonesei, Jurnal din anii ciumei, 1987-1989: ncercri de sociologie spontan (Diary from the years of the plague, 1987-1989: Attempts at spontaneous sociology) (Iai: Polirom, 1995), 94-116. It is worth remembering that, in Iai, there was an attempt to stir a popular revolt against the communist regime few days before the revolt in Timioara. Manifestos calling for a demonstration in the Unirii Square on 14 December 1989, 16:00, circulated in the city, and thus many gathered at the established date and place, but the secret police hampered effectively the aggregation of this collective protest. For testimonies on this event, see Cassian Maria Spiridon, Iai, 14 decembrie 1989: nceptutul Revoluiei Romne (Iai, 14 December 1989: The beginning of the Romanian Revolution) (Iai: Timpul, 1994). After this conference of the Writers Union in 1981, when D. R. Popescu was elected chairman in spite of the opposition of the nonconformist wing, no other conference of this organization took place until the fall of communism. Thus, D. R. Popescu was still the chairman of the Writers Union in 1989, while the influence of the non-conformist writers decreased steadily during this decade. An informative note of the secret police can be read as a veritable map of the literary world. This note mentioned that the non-conformist group was animated by a stronger spirit of solidarity than their opponents, which was tested in several difficult moments for the members of this group. To have an idea about the experiences which shaped their spirit of solidarity, these occasions were: Octavian Palers dismissal from the daily Romnia liber, Georgeta Dimisianus forced transfer from Cartea Romneasc Publishing House, or Mircea Dinescus and Ana Blandianas problems with the publication of their poems. Analiza informaiilor i evalurea situaiei operative din domeniul creaiei literare (The analysis of information and the evaluation of the operative situation from the literary domain), Cartea Alb a Securitii, 357-59. See in this respect the report which the secret police made on him in 1985, when Dinescu asked permission to go on a scholarship in Italy. Cartea Alb a Securitii, 313. During this interview, Dinescu not only expressed enthusiasm for perestroika and glasnost, but also emphasized their implications for writers: once allowed to speak their mind freely, they ceased to be the simple instruments of the party. His interview was noticed by RFE
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researchers. Michael Shafir, A Light from the East: A Romanian Writer Hails Perestroika on Radio Moscow, RFE Research, Romanian Situation Report, 16 September 1988, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 7, File Dissidents: Mircea Dinescu. It is not clear why Dinescu decided to call these intellectuals in his parents-in-law house, but this family relation was later speculated against him. Because his father-in-law was of Hungarian origin, and his mother-in-law had Soviet citizenship, rumors that Dinescu was a foreign agent started to circulate (probably launched by the secret police which had applied the same strategy before with other dissidents). Deletant, Ceauescu and the Securitate, 280. Those who were party members and members of the Writers Union, but had no other institutional affiliation, such as Mircea Dinescu, Mircea Iorgulescu or Octavian Paler, were summoned to the Party Municipal Committee of Bucharest, to which they belonged. tefan Augustin Doina was convoked by the leadership of the Writers Union. As an employee of the University of Bucharest, Nicolae Manolescu was called by the leadership of this institution. Similarly, Andrei Pleu and Gabriel Liiceanu were convoked at the Institute for Belle Arts, where they were researchers. This gives one an idea about the close interaction between the secret police and other institutions, beginning with local party organizations, for the purpose of containing any potential revolt in its incipient phase. For the transcript of their debates regarding the message of the collective letter and the plans of action to be taken in order to contain this form of protest, see Cartea Alb a Securitii, 394-416. Before inviting others to discuss the collective letter, Dinescu contacted first Dennis Deletant, whom he knew for several years, and asked for his support in stirring the interest of British mass media in his dissent. After Libration published Dinescus self-interview and the secret police instituted his round-the-clock surveillance, Deletant made public via The Independent and BBC the harassment suffered by Dinescu and those who expressed their solidarity with him. Deletants support for dissidents did not go unnoticed in communist Romania, where he was no longer allowed to enter until the fall of communism. Dennis Deletant, interview by author, Bucharest, 18 July 2003. This volume of poetry was published in Romanian as Mircea Dinescu, Moartea citete ziarul (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1989). Coen Stork, interview by author, tape recording, Amsterdam, 3 April 2003.
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For the complete text of the interview, see Gilles Schiller, Entretien avec Mircea Dinescu, Les Temps Modernes, No. 513 (April 1989), 17-28. For comments on the similarities between Dinescus letter and the letter of the six, see Michael Shafir, Romanian Poet Mircea Dinescu Criticizes Ceauescus Policies and Appeals for Reforms, 21 March 1989, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 7, File Dissidents: Mircea Dinescu. For Delius first letter of 25 December 1984, and the plan of action against him devised by the secret police, see Cartea Alb a Securitii, 312-13. In 1985, Deliu read out to D. R. Popescu a letter which Tudoran addressed to him. For more on this, see Dorin Tudoran, De bun voie: Autobiografia mea (Willingly: My autobiography) (Aarhus: Nord, 1986), xviii-xx. Shafir, Romania Politics, Economics and Society, 171. Deliu addressed to Ceauescu by using the appellative Mister President in order to underline that he no longer considered him a comrade, for the secretary general had alienated himself from the party members when he had started to believe that he was greater than anyone else. For more on this letter, see Michael Shafir, Another Open Letter to Ceauescu Protesting His Policies, 17 March 1989, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 7, File Dissidents: Dan Deliu. Ambassador Stork visited Deliu after his release from the hospital in order to see if he could help him, but Deliu declared that he preferred to be left in peace in the future. Coen Stork, interview by author, tape recording, Amsterdam, 3 April 2003. Romnia literar represented the last bastion of the non-conformist writers in Romania until the death of its editor-in-chief George Ivacu in 1988. The communist party managed then to impose as successor the obedient writer D. R. Popescu, who was also the chairman of the Writers Union since the national conference of 1981. In this way, the non-conformists had lost all platforms for public expression. Decree 408/1985 also stipulated that Romanian citizens had to report all contacts with foreigners within 24 hours. Moreover, Romanian citizens were forbidden to offer lodgings to foreign visitors other than first degree family relatives. From its formulation, it seems that the decree targeted two categories: the Romanian intellectuals in Bucharest, who used to attend receptions at western embassies, and the Hungarians who were receiving frequent visits of friends and relatives
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from the neighboring country. The text of Decree 408 was never made public, but its provisions are discussed in Alina Ilinca and Liviu Marius Bejenaru, Secretomanie i controlul informaiilor n Romnia socialist, 1965-1989 (Mania for secrets and the control of information in socialist Romania, 1965-1989), Arhivele Totalitarismului, No. 3-4 (2006), 146-57, and No. 3-4 (2007), 85-98, http://www.cnsas.ro/documente/istoria_comunism/studii_articole/acti vitati_plan_intern/Secretomanie%20si%20controlul%20informatiilor. pdf (accessed 23 November 2012). Decree 408/1985 was among the first communist laws which were abolished by the Council of the NSF. See Decree-law 4/29 December 1989, http://www.legex.ro/Decretullege-4-1989-885.aspx (accessed 24 November 2012). Dinescu narrated that some colleagues told him that after he and Deliu left the restaurant of the Writers Union, somebody came and looked desperately for a certain plate, which was taken by mistake from the table where they sat to be washed. Thus, both returned on 14 March 1989 to check whether indeed someone listened to their conversations. Because at some point the waiter changed the bread plate, Deliu took with him that plate in order to study it better at home. However, his briefcase was stolen immediately after he left the restaurant. After this event, Dinescu concluded that the respective plate must have been in fact a sophisticated microphone. For the text of the letter, see OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 7, File Dissidents: Mircea Dinescu. See also http://jurnalul.ro/vechiul-site/editorial/scinteia/ special/protestul-poetului-mircea-dinescu-la-uniunea-scriitorilor501611.html (accessed 24 November 2012). RFE broadcast this letter on 21 April 1989. For the text of the letter of the seven, see Domestic Bloc, No. 560, 21 April 1989, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 18, File Open Letters: The Group of Seven. Blandiana succeeded in publishing several such poems in the literary student journal Amfiteatru, which had a more limited public than central newspapers and thus a more relaxed censorship policy. Perhaps the most known was the poem Totul (Everything) of 1984, which enlisted banal items from everyday life (leaves, cats, bumblebees, words or tears) together with items that reminded everyone of the combination between recurring problems (lines for food, disrupted public transportation, black market products) and official propaganda (flags, portraits, discourses) that were so typical of Ceauescuism. However, it was said that the reference made in this poem to the boys
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on Calea Victoriei (the oldest and most important street in Bucharest), in whom all readers recognized the Securitate agents guarding Ceauescus daily route to the party central headquarters, attracted her banning from further publication. This author remembers to have read the poem Eu cred (I think) in the mid-1980s, when she saw it circulating in handwritten copies. This poem criticized the lack of dissent in Ceauescus Romania and contained a memorable reference to the Romanians, who were seen by Blandiana as a vegetal people, which quietly awaited its leaves to fall. Just like plants, Romanians were incapable of revolting against an adverse fate, as the closing verses of this pessimistic poem suggested: Who had ever seen / A revolting tree? This tomcat called Arpagic (Scallion) became a symbol of the literature with hidden meanings created under Romanian communism. Blandiana depicted this tomcat as a superstar whom everyone acclaimed, welcomed with bread and salt, and greeted with pomp everywhere he went. He praised or admonished the persons surrounding him, while everyone willingly and even gratefully obeyed his orders. The fictional scenes depicted by Blandiana resembled very much the familiar scenes (broadcast practically everyday on television or illustrated in newspapers) which showed Ceauescu inspecting factories, working sites or agricultural farms, and delivering recommendations about how things should be further handled. Individuals in Romania generally felt compelled to follow these indications, although many were meaningless or even absurd. This poem was included in the volume Ana Blandiana, ntmplri de pe strada mea (Occurrences on my street) (Bucharest: Ion Creang, 1988). Banned was not only Blandianas book, but also her permanent column in Romnia literar, which the above-mentioned D. R. Popescu terminated. With an introductory piece by Dennis Deletant (who characterized the silence imposed on these writers and on others who criticized the Romanian communist regime as crimes against the spirit), the two poets made their cases against Ceauescus newly reinforced censorship internationally known in: Mircea Dinescu, Death Reads the Newspaper; Ana Blandiana, The Most Famous Tomcat in Town: How One of Romanias Best Poets Was Banned for Publishing a Childrens Poem About a Cat, Index of Censorship, Vol. 18, No. 8 (September 1989), 32-35. http://ioc.sagepub.com/content/ 18/8/34.full.pdf+html (accessed 6 August 2012). Goma was repeatedly present in this magazine after 1978, while Tudoran after 1986.

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After Blandianas dismissal because of the above-mentioned volume of poems for children, Monica Lovinescu dedicated to her an entire program on 21 October 1988, and then mentioned her repeatedly during the year 1989. Lovinescu, Pragul, esp. 98-101. For more on Bogza, see Diana Turconi, ed., Eu snt inta: Geo Bogza n dialog cu Diana Turconi (I am the target: Geo Bogza in dialogue with Diana Turconi) (Bucharest: DU Style, 1996). Ion Negoiescu affirmed that Bogza refused because he pretended not to know Paul Goma. At the same time, Negoiescu believed that Bogza was still a convinced communist, for whom what was happening was just a sad interlude. Negoiescu, n cunotin de cauz, 33. Doina was uncovered in 2003 as collaborator of the secret police, which had recruited him in 1958, before his release from prison. Although he was also put under the surveillance of the Securitate from 1979, he continued to inform the secret police about fellow writers, as the records of this institution illustrate. An interesting series of articles analyzed the works of Doina in parallel with his Securitate files, and elucidated the multifaceted personality of this canonical writer, who managed to be at the same time a pillar of the resistance through culture, whom Monica Lovinescu and Virgil Ierunca praised as such, and a collaborator of the Securitate, who assumed the mission of informing about his friends from RFE, among others. George Florian Neagoe, Un proces literar: tefan Augustin Ocna (A literary trial: tefan Augustin Ocna), Cultura, 9 February 2012, http://revistacultura.ro/nou/2012/02/un-proces-literar-stefan-augustinocnas/ (accessed 22 February 2013), Idem, Europa liber i tefan Augustin Doina (RFE and tefan Augustin Doina), Cultura, 15 March 2012, http://revistacultura.ro/nou/2012/03/%e2%80%9eeuropa-liber% e2%80%9c-si-stefan-aug-doinas/ (accessed 22 February 2013). See a note of the secret police on Dan Hulic in Cartea Alb a Securitii, 439-40. For the public confession of collaboration with the secret police, see Alexandru Paleologu and Stelian Tnase, Sfidarea memoriei (The Defiance of Memory) (Bucharest: DU Style, 1996), esp. 186-89. CNSAS officially identified him as collaborator of the former secret police in 2000 and published the result of its inquiry in Monitorul Oficial, No. 573, 29 November 2000, http://www.cnsas.ro/ documente/monitoare/2000/MO%202000.11.29_573.pdf (accessed 22 February 2013). For a list of intellectuals put under discussion by the party because of this affair, see Cartea Alb a Securitii, 254.
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Pleu was transferred to the Memorial House of George Enescu in Tescani, a small village in northern Moldova. His experience in this remote place was encapsulated in a volume, which is notable because of a great absence: Pleu wrote his diary in exile as if Tescani in 1989 would have been isolated from the rest of the world. No reference to the rapidly unfolding political events in the Soviet satellites is included in this diary. Andrei Pleu, Jurnalul de la Tescani (The Diary from Tescani) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1993). French Scene, No. 118, 1 June 1989, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 4, File Dissent: General. On 8 April 1989, novelist and literary critic Aurel Drago Munteanu also addressed a letter to the chairman of the Writers Union D. R. Popescu, which he sent to RFE as well. His letter objected to the harassment of writers like Dinescu, Deliu and Blandiana. Besides, he urged Popescu to observe the statute of the writers professional association which he headed, and act accordingly in defending the members who were unjustly persecuted. In October 1988, Munteanu had resigned from the party after he had publicly criticized not only Ceauescus cultural policies, but also the discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities. Consequently, he had been ousted from his position at the literary weekly Luceafrul and banned from publication. For A.D. Munteanus letter, see OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 7, File Dissidents: A.D. Munteanu. Alexandru Clinescu, interview by author, tape recording, Iai, 2 September 2001. For Radu Enescus letter, see Cartea Alb a Securitii, 456-57. For the text of this letter, see OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 7, File Dissidents: Mircea Dinescu. Beside Dinescu, ora and Paleologu sent during the year 1989 new letters of protest to the chairman of the Writers Union. These texts reiterated time and again the already expressed criticism against the cultural policy of the Romanian communist regime. In particular, all protested against the abusive measure of blacklisting the writers who dared to rebel. In his letter of 11 November 1989, Paleologu qualified the measures taken against the rebellious writers as ridiculous and useless ultimately, since all these writers could not have been erased from public memory by a sheer administrative action. On his turn, ora denounced again, in a letter dated 17 November 1989, the abusive elimination from literary life of all writers who signed letters of protest. The texts of these two
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letters are also to be found in Dinescus file. OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 7, File Dissidents: Mircea Dinescu. The signatories of the so-called letter of the eighteen were Anca Vasiliu, Anca Oroveanu, Andrei Cornea, Radu Bercea, Magdalena Ghica, Stelian Tnase, Ioan Buduca, Carmen Francesca Banciu, Gheorghe Iova, Dan Ciachir, Doru Mare, Bogdan Ghiu, Alin Teodorescu, Dan Oprescu, Liviu Ioan Stoiciu, Mariana Marin, Angela Marinescu and Dana Arsene. For comments on this text, see Intensification of Dissent in Romania, OSA/RFE Archives, Romanian Fond, 300/60/3/Box 7, File Dissidents: Mircea Dinescu. Alina Mungiu quotes one of the signatories of the letter of the eighteen who had confessed that the news about their letter, which was announced in the frame of a RFE program at a time when the Revolution of 1989 had already begun in Timioara, made him ashamed of the limited cultural requests. Mungiu, Romnii dup 89, 97. For more on the process of dealing with the communist past in postcommunist Romania, see Cristina Petrescu and Drago Petrescu, The Piteti Syndrome: A Romanian Vergangenheitsbewltigung?, in Stefan Troebst, ed., Postdiktatorische Geschichtskulturen im Sden und Osten Europas: Bestandsaufnahme und Forschungsperspektiven (Gtingen: Wallstein, 2010), 502-618.
CONCLUSIONS
This volume has argued that dissent in Ceauescus Romania was a transnational enterprise. Its success depended on the ability of dissidents to transmit to western broadcasting agencies, in particular to RFE, their criticism of the communist regime. From the other side of the Iron Curtain, their ideas were then disseminated among fellow citizens. This analysis could not avoid answering the key question: Why Romanian dissent under Ceauescu remained restricted to isolated acts of defiance, which never evolved into a network of solidarity against the communist rule? In the very formulation of this question, there is an inferred comparison with those countries of the Soviet bloc where dissidents (taking advantage of the Helsinki process of cooperation) gradually organized themselves into an opposition that contributed to the breakdown of communist dictatorships. Those were the countries of Central Europe. This author opted to compare Romania to these countries, for such a perspective is implicitly self-critical. Romanian exceptionalism under communism and even after, which any such comparison with Central Europe immediately illuminates, was not restricted only to the phenomenon of intellectual dissent. It also included: (1) the weakness of the leftist intellectual traditions, the marginality of revisionism and the
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non-existence of a reformist wing in the communist party; (2) the strong nationalistic turn initiated in the early 1960s, which transformed Romania into a maverick, supposedly independent, satellite of the Soviet Union, and Nicolae Ceauescu into the greatest national dissident after his condemnation of the WTO invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; (3) the personalized rule of the secretary general and the extremeness of his personality cult, which made the Romanian variant of communism come closer in the 1980s to a sultanistic than to a post-totalitarian regime; (4) the feeble manifestation of social disobedience (intellectual dissent included) in spite of the unmatched decline in the living standards during the last decade before the regime change of 1989; (5) the bloodiness of the revolution that ended the communist experiment in Romania; and (6) the massive support won in the first free elections by the second and the third echelons of the former RCP, at a time when alternative elites enjoyed electoral successes in other former Soviet satellites. This volume went beyond reiterating main tenets of Romanian exceptionalism, for it has analyzed Romanian dissent not only from a self-critical comparative perspective, but also in a transnational frame (instead of an artificially isolated national one). Thus, it did not challenge but enriched conventional knowledge on communist Romania. On the basis of asymmetrical comparisons, this study has suggested that the difficult emergence of public criticism under Ceauescus regime was conditioned by a combination of nationspecific factors, which worked differently at various moments in the evolution of the regime, but all worked conjunctly at any given time. Such revolt-inhibiting factors were the political traditions of submission to the powers-that-be, which differentiate Greek Orthodox countries from those where Western Christianity dominates; the monopolization of the nationalist discourse by the communist regime itself; and, last but not least, the efficiency of the Securitate, which destroyed in status nascendi any attempt at
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organizing an anti-regime network of solidarity. By comparing Romania with countries of Central Europe, one understands that none of these factors can explain alone the weakness of intellectual dissent in this country. Generally speaking, it is undeniable that political traditions in Romania differ not only from those of the West, where critical thinking and social disobedience have powerful historical roots, but also from the traditions of Central Europe, where significant and active oppositional networks developed after the institutionalization of the Helsinki frame of cooperation. In contrast, such oppositional networks never emerged or never represented a genuine threat to the communist regime in the countries east of the cultural-religious fault line that divides the continent between Western and Eastern Christianity. Moreover, dissident activity in Ceauescus Romania presents a curious discrepancy between the behaviour of the Greek Orthodox majority and that of other ethnic and religious groups. With the exception of a short-lived Goma movement of 1977, it was primarily from among the Hungarian ethnic minority or other religious denominations that criticism of Ceauescus policies emerged until the late 1980s. In other words, only atypical citizens (who were not ethnic Romanians of Greek Orthodox faith) seemed frustrated by the communist rule. At the same time, Romanians employed the Helsinki framework mainly for the purpose of emigrating from their country and not for protesting against human rights violations. The public interest in such an issue as human rights had no historical roots in Romania and the adversity of the communist regime did not trigger a change in this respect, as it did in other countries. However, if one compares the opposition of Romanian Hungarians to Ceauescus assimilationist measures, one could see that this was noticeable when measured against Romanians dissent, but weak in contrast to the resistance posed by Hungarians living in the former Czechoslovakia. Although the communist
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regime in Prague had no better reputation on the repression of dissidents, a Committee to Defend the Rights of the Hungarian Ethnic Minority functioned from the late 1970s until the fall of communism in this country. In Romania, the treatment of the Hungarian minority was even worse than in Czechoslovakia, but no such long-surviving committee existed. The failure of Hungarians to organize a lasting protest movement in Romania draws into question explanations of Romanians submissiveness exclusively based on the peculiarity of political traditions specific to Eastern Christianity. Moreover, if one returns in time to the phenomenon dubbed the resistance in the mountains from the early years of communism, one could no longer affirm that Greek Orthodox Romanians always submitted to the dictatorial rule. Such developments, which occurred also elsewhere during the late 1940s and 1950s, were hardly conducive to building an organized movement that would challenge the regime. Yet, in the Romanian context, this limited expression of resistance amounted to a significant form of opposition, which was larger in participatory terms than any other developed in the post-Helsinki period. Briefly put, long-term pre-modern cultural influences on modern political behaviour can not solely explain societys silence under Ceauescu. Turning to the examination of those nation-specific factors linked to the political and societal changes that took place under communism, one could immediately notice that the role of the secret police as instrument of control ranks highest among the cited elements. It has been said of the Securitate that it was the most efficient institution of its kind except perhaps for the Stasi which acted in the most brutal Stalinist style to destroy the real and perceived opponents to Romanian communism. It is important to remember, however, that control methods in the 1970s and 1980s differed fundamentally from those of the Stalinist times, when the secret police in Romania, as in all Soviet-occupied countries, was the primary institution charged with applying terror
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randomly in order to destroy any potential of revolt. This goal was actually achieved in the early 1960s, with the destruction of the pre-communist political, economic and intellectual elite in the Romanian Gulag. The release of political prisoners in 1964 illustrates that the regime was by that time confident enough in its victory over the Romanian society. Simultaneously, the communist-style welfare system provided legitimacy for the regime and secured the compliance of large segments of the population. Since suppression was no longer necessary to ensure stability, the use of random terror was gradually replaced with the tactic of prevention by widespread surveillance. This, of course, did not mean that no dissident was ever again imprisoned, but the extent of terror was far less significant than in the earlier period. The secret police employed in the 1970s and the 1980s different methods ranging from solving the protesters personal grievances to forcing the defiant dissidents into emigration. The collapse of the Goma movement perfectly illustrates that the Securitate did not need to resort to large-scale violence in order to curtail a collective protest. Many individuals protested only for the sake of obtaining an exit visa. However, the same aborted human rights movement served as a teaching case for the Securitate, which refined its strategies of coping with such manifestations of social discontent and improved the ability to fulfil its mission. Nevertheless, the secret police managed to control the Romanian society because its widespread perception surpassed its ability to act. The image of the omnipotent and merciless Securitate from the 1950s haunted many individuals until the end of the regime and even afterwards. Besides, one did not have to experience the Romanian Gulag to fear the secret police, for rumours about its efficiency in discovering and annihilating any act of defying the regime represented a commonplace of Romanian communism. Dissidents like Dan Petrescu pointed out that in a country where nothing worked properly, there could not have
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been a sole institution that worked perfectly, and illustrated this assertion through their own non-conformist acts. Yet, the crucial role of the secret police apparatus in crushing individual and collective anti-regime revolts must not be downplayed. When the endemic shortages of the late 1980s drastically limited the capacity of the regime to assure consent and thus workers openly protested, the communist authorities brutally repressed these revolts. Nevertheless, it could not unrestrictedly persecute the freethinking intellectuals protected by transnational networks of solidarity, which Romanian diaspora, western media or international human rights organizations set up. The dissidents known in the West were indeed harassed, but not suppressed. The very increase in the number of dissidents in the late 1980s demonstrates the ultimate failure of the Securitate and calls into question the widely perceived perfection of this Romanian-style repressive institution. As for the nationalistic policy instituted by the Romanian communist elite, it indeed restrained many from expressing public criticism in the 1960s and the 1970s. Romanians knew well enough that communism was not the best of all worlds, but their local leadership made at least the best of a bad situation, and succeeded where neighbours failed or did not even struggle: to ensure a larger degree of independence from the Soviet Union, so many believed. Beginning with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1958, Romania gained its autonomy from the Kremlin undertaking over the next decade several political steps away from the Soviet tutelage, while reorienting itself once again to the West. This apparently liberal policy attracted Romanians, intellectuals included, for the RCP seemed to have turned into the defender of national interests. Ceauescus speech of August 1968 which condemned the invasion in Czechoslovakia marked the high peak of his popularity inside and outside the country. He came thus to be internationally perceived as the strongest dissenter in the Soviet bloc, albeit he pursued a very dogmatic domestic policy. The
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internal support that Ceauescus regime enjoyed in the 1960s vanished by the early 1980s. Beginning with intellectual circles, Ceauescus nationalist policies lost their popularity when the authorities started to promote cultural productions inspired by autochthonous values in place of western-influenced works. The result was cultural autarky and de-professionalization. The crisis of the Romanian culture accompanied an economic disaster, which affected the daily lives of every citizen. Unparalleled in the Soviet bloc, Romanias difficult economic situation also originated in the regimes nationalism, for it was mainly provoked by the absurd policy of reclaiming financial independence by paying the external debt. By the mid-1980s, nationalist dogmatism transformed Romania into one of the most Stalinist countries in Europe (surpassed perhaps only by Albania). After Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and began to reform the Soviet Union, nationalism lost nearly all appeal among Romanians (remaining popular only among those with anti-Hungarian prejudices). Thus, nationalism during Ceauescus regime did more to isolate Romania than any other factors, setting it apart from both the East and the West and failing entirely to defend supposed national interests. As for its influence in limiting the potential of revolt, nationalism contributed indeed to the discouragement of dissent, even after the collapse in living standards robbed this policy of all political legitimacy, if in a subtler and more perverse way than before. In the context of the Helsinki process of international cooperation, the degree to which a Soviet bloc country honoured its commitment to human rights was highly dependent on the degree to which western officials, media or relevant organizations were aware of the abuses committed inside that country. Thus, these agreements had minimal influence upon Romania. When foreign diplomats raised concerns about human rights violations banned under the Helsinki Accords, Ceauescu perceived this as an attempt to interfere in Romanias internal affairs. His reaction
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was in part fuelled by the fact that, until the late 1980s, western criticism involved mostly abuses against ethnic and religious minorities (and not against the Romanian majority). In absence of legal levers to enforce the observance of human rights, Ceauescu rejected most western attempts to intervene in the protection of some dissident. The only mechanism that worked with the secretary general of the RCP was the renewal of the MFN status by the United States. For he took great pride in preserving his status as conduit between the East and the West, he made emigration concessions for dissidents and others who sought to emigrate. When the number of protests against human rights abuses grew, he preferred to renounce the MFN status in 1988 rather than respond to external pressure. In the late 1960s, Ceauescus nationalism brought the regime popularity and thus downplayed dissent in Romania. By the early 1980s, nationalism gradually lost its legitimating power, but the communist leadership continued to be driven by nationalism when it abused dissidents and treated with carelessness the international concern with human rights, even when it damaged Romanias reputation. In other words, Ceauescus nationalism made him disregard any external pressure for alleviating dissidents treatment, and thus contributed indirectly to the inhibition of public criticism of his aberrant policies. In addition to the asymmetrical comparison, the transnational frame of analysis has provided a new methodological perspective and completed the analysis above. While the comparison has illustrated how nation-specific factors worked, the analysis of crossborder travel of dissident ideas has highlighted a series of conjunctural factors which also contributed to the poverty of Romanian dissent. In general, dissent in communist countries was evaluated until 1989 only from the West and implicitly in accordance with its visibility on the other side of the Iron Curtain. In the case of Romania, all traces of dissent were conserved
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exclusively outside the national borders, for no local record of independend thinking was possible as long as samizdat was almost non-existent and completely non-preserved. Thus, former dissidents in this country are today remembered only through the critical thoughts which reached western broadcasting agencies or got published across national borders (and implicitly commented by these agencies too). It is only from the archives of such media institutions that our current knowledge of dissidents under Romanian communism relies. In short, the present reconstruction of dissent is as dependent today on the past transnational connections as it was the very survival of regimes critics before 1989. However, one must consider that quite a number of factors heavily diminished the across-the-borders visibility of Romanian dissidents. The Goma movement taught the communist authorities that contacts with foreign citizens must be prevented at all costs. Thus, critical intellectuals from Romania had less opportunities to become known abroad than their counterparts in Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary, who though not always freer to travel had more chances to deliver their messages to western journalists, academics and diplomats. While talented journalists or scholars who were allowed to visit Central Europe under communism advocated the cause of dissidents from these countries, Romanians were left mostly on their own behind the Iron Curtain. Thus, Romanian dissidents visibility depended almost entirely on their ability to find channels of communication with those abroad, who would make them known and offer some kind of protection too. Of these contacts abroad, most significant were the collaborators of the Romanian desks of RFE in Munich and Paris (and to some degree those of VOA in Washington, D.C.). They were in most cases the direct recipients of dissident messages, or if not, they amply commented on the presence of Romanian intellectuals in western media. Thus, the reconstruction of dissent under Ceauescus rule inevitably focuses on those
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individuals who had a transnational communication to RFE, which (unlike others) carefully preserved its archives from that period. If others addressed open letters to party leaders or verbally formulated critical remarks to the policies of the regime, but failed to make themselves known abroad so that RFE eventually received news about them too, their criticism albeit publicly expressed was doomed to obscurity from the very beginning. The transnational frame of analysis also highlights that Romanian dissidents let themselves inspired by dissidents from Central Europe. Without a Charter 77, it is hard to believe that Goma would have initiated a collective protest against human rights violations in a country where no interest in such issues was expressed ever before. Although the import of political ideas from Central Europe was instrumental in activating Romanian dissent, the same type of cultural transfer had also the opposite effect. As long as the manifestation of discontent with Ceauescus regime seemed comparable to that in other countries, as during the shortlived Goma movement, echoing ideas already expressed helped Romanian dissent become visible abroad. When dissent became restricted to several isolated acts of defying the communist regime, at a time when networks of aggregated action developed in other countries of the Soviet bloc, Romanian critical intellectuals were almost invisible on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The Braov workers revolt in November 1987, arguably the first declared antiCeauescu collective action, produced indeed a wave of mobilization against Ceauescus rule as compared to earlier periods. However, this occurred at a time when communism was already heavily contested in Central Europe. Besides, the Soviet Union itself had settled an example of reforms and encouraged its satellites to follow it. Romania was at odds with all the other countries of the communist bloc, for only a handful of dissidents spoke about changes in this country. Consequently, western journalists preferred at that time to report on the Soviet Union
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(important for the twists imposed from above), Poland (exceptional for the evolution from below), or even the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary or the GDR (for more visible activism). In a strange historical paradox, while journalists and documentary-filmmakers coming to Romania searched desperately for intellectuals able to explain the situation of the country, Romanian intellectuals who tried to get their critical essays published found it very difficult to interest western newspapers. Their subject matter, however essential in the Romanian context, was all too familiar to Westerners, for the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks or Hungarians had said something similar before and exhausted their interest. In this context, late Ceauescuism bizarre for its megalomania, cult of personality, xenophobic nationalism, and delirious programs of complete urban and rural reconstruction was far more attentiongrabbing in the West than the work of its few critics. If the reception of the few Romanian critical intellectuals outside the national borders was so poor as compared to their peers in Central Europe, how could one evaluate their impact inside their own country? Generally speaking, their messages were rather far away from the problems of the average Romanian, who tried hard to cope with the misery of daily life in the late 1980s. The Hungarian dissidents focused on the rights of their ethnic community, so most Romanians felt these issues aloof from their immediate concerns. The letter of the six party veterans envisaged the reformation of the communist system at a time when Romanians endured the deepest shortages because this system failed to produce welfare for them. The letter of the seven public intellectuals criticized Ceauescus regime for destroying the Romanian culture, when the everyday hardships were so burdensome that only a few individuals remained interested in matters beyond biological survival. From among the isolated critical intellectuals, some had emigrated until 1989, while others talked about too abstract issues to have an influence upon
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Romanians. Of those still in Romania in 1989, only Doina Cornea and Dan Petrescu adapted their criticism to specific local problems, albeit they also absorbed ideas which dissidents from other Soviet bloc countries expressed before. Their anti-communist perspectives were rooted in different intellectual traditions, but both proved receptive to issues which were of wider interest than those of their immediate milieu. Thus, their criticism of Ceauescus policies represents (even to the reader of today) an anatomy of a decaying dictatorship. All the above might suggest that the reception of most dissident messages must have been rather low. At the same time, one might also argue that it was not the content that counted, but the very existence of critical discourses. For some Romanians, the criticism of Ceauescus policies represented a safety valve even when not fully understood. The largest majority of those who experienced the deprivations of late Ceauescuism knew well that this regime was acting against their interests, and dissidents spoke openly about something that others were either unable to put into words or unwilling to formulate publicly before 1989. Romania was the last in the row of six countries where communism collapsed in 1989, yet this happened in the same year as in the countries where significant opposition groups existed. To this day, the Revolution of 1989 stirs the fiercest controversies, for no convincing answer was formulated to questions such as: (1) what made the diffuse individual discontent aggregate into a popular revolt; (2) who was responsible for the death of more than 1,000 people during the bloody events; (3) how can one asses the nature of the regime change and its outcome. One issue seems fairly clear: the few active Romanian dissidents played no significant role in this regime change. Thus, todays researcher reconstructing this phenomenon should refrain from employing any teleological schemes that interpret any act of defying the former regime as a preparatory step for the final blow of communism. While in Central Europe dissidents took advantage of the Helsinki
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process, organized themselves gradually into stable networks of opposition before 1989 and thus directly participated in the negotiations that led to the collapse of communism in their countries, no such developments occurred in Romania in that period. In this country, the population seemed to have resisted communism much stronger after the takeover of power by a single party than prior to the collapse of the regime, which this party established and maintained for forty-five years. Moreover, no continuity existed between the forms of opposition from the early days of communism and the forms of dissent that developed after the mid-1970s. The critical intellectuals of late communism did not even consider (at least until late 1989) that they could contribute to the downfall of the regime. These men and women sought instead to put an end to the dichotomy that split their public and private lives. They acted right, like Don Quixote, when all the others were wrong. The silent mass of Sancho Panzas did not follow their example before 1989. Once communism collapsed, former dissidents became heroes for a short while, but they did not emerge as role models of the transition. Most disappeared quickly from the public sphere and fell gradually into national oblivion. For Romanians badly needed to restore their national dignity after enduring silently Ceauescus abuses, those who resisted in the mountains as Robin Hoods were turned into the anti-communist heroes of the recent past. In the organization of collective memory, the few dissidents using words as weapons could not compete with the courageous armed freedom fighters. What is then the legacy of Romanian dissent, if any? Looking retrospectively, one could hardly imagine the institutionalization of post-communist political pluralism without the prior existence of dissidents. Although political parties were established after 1989 without their participation, civil society organized itself through the active involvement of some former dissidents against the domination of
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the so-called neo-communists. In short, these critical intellectuals did not contribute to the collapse of communism in 1989, but they did contribute to the democratic consolidation afterwards. Obviously, former dissidents were unable to disturb many from the pursuit of anti-political privatism. Yet, they influenced likeminded individuals, who aimed at emulating them at least in postcommunism. Because they were only a few, the transition was longer and more difficult than elsewhere. Without their example of thinking freely when feedom was heavily restricted, Romanian post-communist democracy might not have existed.
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Archives
Open Society Archives/Records of Radio Free Europe (OSA/RFE) Romanian Fond Archives of the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (ACNSAS) Fond Informativ National Archives of Romania, Bucharest (ANIC) Fond CC al PCR Cancelarie
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Alexe, Dan (Brussels, 20 July 2002) Berindei, Mihnea (Paris, 24 July 2002) Cangeopol, Liviu (New York, 17 May 2000) Clinescu, Alexandru (Iai, 2 September 2001) Cornea, Doina (Sighetu Marmaiei, 5 July 2002) Deletant, Dennis (Bucharest, 18 July 2003) Dubi, Josy (Brussels, 19 July 2002) Filipescu, Radu (Bucharest, 25 April 1998; Sighetu Marmaiei, 5 July 2002) Goma, Paul (Paris, 30 July 2002) Hermant, Paul (Brussels, 18 July 2002) Ierunca, Virgil (Paris, 2 August 2002) Lovinescu, Monica (Paris, 2 August 2002) Masquelier, Eric (Brussels, 18 July 2002) Petrescu, Dan (Bucharest, 28 April 1998; 21 April 2001) Petrescu, Thrse (Bucharest, 21 April 2001)
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Schpflin, George (London, 5 March 2003) Stork, Coen (Amsterdam, 3 April 2003) Tudoran, Dorin (Washington, D.C., 2 July 2000)
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LAlternative (1980-1984) Agora (1987-1990) Buletinul Oficial (1974-1989) Dialog (1981-1983) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1977-1989) Index of Censorship (1972-1989) The Independent (1977-1989) Libration (1977-1989) Le Monde (1977-1989) La Nouvelle Alternative (1988-1989) Scnteia (1977-1989) Securitatea (1968-1989)
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INDEX
A Adalbert, Feher 157 Aktionsgruppe Banat 34 Alexe, Dan 113, 114, 369, 372 Almond, Mark 106, 111, 114 Amarandei, Eugen 373 Amnesty International 299, 301, 359, 361 Andreescu, Gabriel 170, 193, 203, 204, 212, 216, 302307, 312, 362, 363 Andrei, tefan 90, 354 Antohi, Sorin 357 Antonesei, Liviu 373, 374 Apostol, Gheorghe 176, 202, 217, 220, 226, 227, 229, 235, 240 242, 247, 253, 262, 263, 268, 269, 272274 Aragon, Louis 141 Ara-Kovcs, Attila 185, 188 Arrabal, Fernando 356 B Barbu, Eugen 291, 292, 355 Bazin, Thomas 371 Bcanu, Petre Mihai 361
Brldeanu, Alexandru 66, 99, 217, 220, 227229, 241, 242, 251, 256, 259, 263, 264, 266, 267, 269, 272, 273 Beauvoir, Simone de 141 Berindei, Mihnea 109, 141, 170, 208, 209, 212, 326, 356, 367, 370, 372 Bernard, Noel 124, 128, 166, 349 Besanon, Alain 356 Blandiana, Ana 339, 340, 346, 347, 358, 374, 377380 Bodnra, Emil 231, 232, 263 Bogza, Geo 131, 158, 290, 335, 340, 343, 355, 379 Botez, Mihai 278289, 292, 293, 296, 303, 304, 311, 347, 349 353, 355 Brandt, Willy 104 Braov, workers revolt of 1987 38, 86, 238, 304, 308, 310, 313, 322 Brtianu, Dinu 48, 237 Brezhnev, Leonid 57, 77, 151, 225, 267, 270, 350
426
FROM ROBIN HOOD TO DON QUIXOTE 358, 362, 363, 368, 376, 378, 380, 383385, 388395 Ceauescu, Elena 106, 111, 153, 215, 260, 368 Celac, Mariana 285, 302, 311, 353 Central Europe 11, 12, 16, 19, 20, 22, 2427, 30, 31, 32, 34, 37, 41 44, 5254, 56-58, 75, 76, 80 82, 85, 91, 97, 98, 105, 106, 109, 112, 126, 128, 148, 175, 186, 198, 201, 203, 206, 225, 270, 275, 285, 293, 294, 303, 304, 306, 309, 323, 328, 348, 354, 368, 370, 383, 385, 391 394 Chiinevschi, Iosif 219, 223, 224, 232, 233, 235, 260, 262, 265 Cioran, Emil 166, 295, 341, 343 Cismrescu, Mihai 349 Coman, Ion 162, 165, 167 Combes, Ariadna 113, 212 Constantinescu, Miron 219, 223, 224, 232, 233, 235, 260, 262, 265, 266 Coposu, Corneliu 112, 360 Cornea, Doina 113, 190, 191, 193, 211, 212, 302, 307317, 325 327, 330, 331, 336, 346, 347, 362367, 373, 381, 394 Creang, Mihai 361 CSCE Follow-up Meetings Belgrade 36, 127, 135, 137, 140, 144, 147 Madrid 78, 186, 187, 189, 209 Vienna 38, 95, 197-199, 209, 215, 246, 254, 301 Paris 305, 306, 363 Culianu, Ioan Petru 296, 326 Curticeanu, Silviu 89, 111, 221, 259 Czechoslovakia
Brezhnev Doctrine 35, 57, 69, 71, 77, 151, 225 Brucan, Silviu 217, 237243, 246, 248, 251, 255257, 266270, 272274 Bujak, Zbigniew 111 Bukovsky, Vladimir 23, 52 Bush, George 90, 215 C Calciu-Dumitreasa, Gheorghe 108, 309, 364 Cangeopol, Liviu 296, 327-329, 369, 371-373 Carandino, Nicolae 112 Carp, Mircea 157 Carter, Jimmy 76, 79, 80, 82, 105 Clinescu, Alexandru 344, 369, 370, 380 Cmpeanu, Pavel 97, 223, 256, 257, 260, 261, 264, 266, 267, 274, 362 Ceauescu, Nicolae 12, 14, 16, 20, 29, 30, 32, 33, 3639, 4143, 54, 59, 61, 62, 68, 70, 72, 8183, 87, 88, 9197, 101, 102, 105, 108, 110, 112, 113, 115, 118, 121, 123, 124, 128, 131, 137, 139, 141, 150, 154, 158, 161, 163, 164, 166, 171, 174, 182 186, 189192, 194, 196199, 207, 208, 211213, 215, 217, 218, 220, 224, 231, 234, 239, 240, 244247, 250256, 261 263, 266, 270, 272274, 276 279, 282, 283, 286, 288290, 293, 294, 298, 305, 307, 311, 312, 314, 316, 317, 322, 323, 330332, 334, 336, 338, 339, 343346, 349351, 354, 357,
INDEX Prague Spring 74, 101, 118, 220, 225, 238, 262, 285 invasion of August 1968 68, 69, 101, 118, 150, 156, 261, 284, 384, 388 Charter 77 15, 22, 36, 51, 81, 91, 105, 111, 116, 119, 120, 125 127, 138, 146, 147, 151, 152, 155, 156, 306, 392 VONS 22 D Declaration of April 1964 102 Declaration of Budapest 192, 212 Deletant, Dennis 44, 58, 152, 156, 161, 167, 169, 249, 263, 375, 378 Dprez, Grard 367 Deliu, Dan 162, 290, 296, 334338, 345, 355, 376, 377, 380 Dinescu, Mircea 193, 290, 296, 331 339, 344346, 348, 355, 374 378, 380, 381 Doina, tefan Augustin 340, 347, 375, 379 Doncea, Constantin 236, 266 Dubek, Alexander 68 Dubi, Josy 211, 312315, 365367, 371 Dumitrescu, Constantin Ticu 45, 360 Dussart, Etinne 126, 158 E Eliade, Mircea 141, 295, 308, 326, 341, 363, 364, 370 Enescu, Radu 344, 380 Engels, Friedrich 22, 219, 318 Erds, Andr 214 Esterhzy, Pter 210 Eyal, Jonathan 271
427
F Fazekas, Jnos 269 Filip, Iulius 313, 365, 366 Filipescu, Radu 296-303, 311, 358362, 365 Ford, Gerald 76, 77, 350 Fori, tefan 221, 222, 231-234, 236, 260, 264, 265 Frasyniuk, Wadysaw 111 Funderburk, David B. 86, 88, 109, 283, 351, 356 G Gabanyi, Anneli Ute 208 Gaulle, Charles de 103, 104 Gavril-Ogoranu, Ion 45, 48 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich 95, 113, 252 Georgescu, Teohari 223, 224, 232, 265 Georgescu, Vlad 43, 255, 273, 278281, 285, 293, 304, 348352, 355, 370, 371 Gesswein, Emilia and Erwin 157 Gheorghe, Ion 292 Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe 14, 38, 44, 66, 68, 69, 77, 93, 98100, 106, 153, 174, 176, 180, 182, 201, 203205, 217, 220224, 226, 227, 229, 230, 232236, 259266, 344, 362 Gheorghiu, Mihnea 212 Ghiu, Bogdan 357, 381 Glucksmann, Andr 356 Golopenia, Anton 230 Goma, Paul 7, 36, 37, 43, 56, 81, 83, 113, 115117, 120, 147, 149, 150, 152, 153, 155157, 160, 161, 165167, 170, 254, 278, 288, 293, 295, 296, 306, 308, 335, 339, 340, 350, 379
428
FROM ROBIN HOOD TO DON QUIXOTE democratic opposition 22, 51, 172, 184, 194196, 211, 213 populist opposition 37, 51, 194 196, 212, 213 socialist opposition 51 I Iavolschi, Gabriela 373 Ierunca, Virgil 124, 141, 152, 166, 285, 295, 371, 379 Iliescu, Ion 55, 248, 255, 259, 273, 274 Illys, Gyula 194, 195, 212 Ionesco, Eugne 113, 114, 141, 295, 341, 343, 356 Ionesco, Marie-France 113, 356 Iorgulescu, Mircea 357, 375 J Jackson-Vanik Amendment 71, 84, 85, 92, 108 Jackson, Henry 107 Janas, Zbigniew 111 Jar, Alexandru 150 Jaruzelski, Wojciech 57 Jebeleanu, Eugen 290, 335 Jiu Valley, miners strike of 1977 34, 36, 43, 91, 143, 144, 148, 167, 168, 267 Jowitt, Kenneth 27, 54, 97, 218, 257 K Kdr, Jnos 94, 180, 181, 194, 196, 205, 206, 212, 214, 229 Kennan, George F. 75 Kerschbaumer, Marie Thrse 122 Khrushchev, Nikita 66, 67, 73, 83, 98, 99, 212, 218, 222, 224, 225, 232, 233, 260, 261, 263
Gorbachev, Mikhail 57, 89, 90, 97, 111, 184, 185, 220, 225, 238, 244, 246, 247, 255, 262, 270, 273, 286, 304, 332, 334, 353, 389 Grsz, Kroly 196, 214 Groza, Petru 177, 204 Gyimesi-Cseke, va 191, 211 H Hassner, Pierre 356 Havel, Vclav 2224, 27, 29, 43, 51, 52, 55, 59, 104, 111, 148, 170, 300, 302, 324, 360 Hulic, Dan 340, 379 Heller, Michel 356 Helsinki Accords/Final Act of CSCE 11, 13, 26, 27, 35, 36, 53, 54, 61-64, 72, 74-80, 84, 87, 97, 104-106, 162, 174, 181, 182, 187, 194, 198, 209, 213, 214, 244, 247, 306, 389 Helsinki process of international cooperation 7, 21, 27, 35, 38, 61, 62, 64, 74, 78, 87, 95, 174, 182, 183, 186, 188, 194, 196199, 210, 212, 214, 247, 284, 383, 385, 394 Hermant, Paul 367 Hirschman, Albert O. 28, 54, 55, 280 Hungarian Democratic Union in Romania (HDUR) 171, 172, 199, 200 Hungary Revolution of 1956 15, 17, 18, 69, 74, 92, 102, 117, 128, 129, 149, 150, 173, 179, 205, 220, 222, 340, 350 Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP) 195, 196, 206, 212, 214
INDEX Kirly, Kroly 183185, 189, 207, 208 Kirk, Roger 89, 108 Kissinger, Henry 70, 75, 77, 89, 103 105, 107, 109, 215 Kohl, Helmut 104 Kohout, Pavel 125 Komorczki, Istvn 252 Kpeczi, Bla 213 Korne, Mihai 212 Kristeva, Julia 141 Kuro, Jacek 111 L Lantos, Tom 61 Lncrnjan, Ion 213 Lenin, Vladimir 103, 219, 238 Le Roy Ladurie, Emmanuel 141, 356 Liiceanu, Gabriel 59, 60, 342, 375 Lis, Ladislav 111 Lityski, Jan 111 Lovinescu, Monica 124, 141, 143, 149, 155, 157, 161, 271, 295, 349, 350, 352, 353, 357, 365, 370, 379 Luca, Vasile 223, 224, 232, 233, 260, 296, 373 M Macovescu, George 264, 291, 354 Maniu, Iuliu 48, 236, 237 Manolescu, Nicolae 375 Manoliu, Maria and Sergiu 157, 158, 161 Manuil, Sabin 230 Marin, Mariana 357, 373, 381 Marshall Plan 84 Marx, Karl 22, 219, 267, 318 Maurer, Ion Gheorghe 202, 227, 229, 231, 240, 259, 262, 263, 268 270
429
Mauriac, Claude 356 Mazilu, Dumitru 114 Mgureanu, Virgil 273 Mnescu, Corneliu 66, 98, 99, 101, 156, 205, 217, 229231, 241 243, 248, 251, 252, 256, 264, 268270, 272274, 354 Medvedev, Roy 23, 52 Melecanu, Teodor 214 Mock, Alois 95 Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause 61, 71, 72, 80, 81, 8486, 88, 90, 92, 103, 107110, 216, 247, 295, 300, 364, 390 Michnik, Adam 21, 51, 57, 151, 300 Militaru, Nicolae 273 Mlyn, Zdenk 262 Moczulski, Leszek 111 Mller, Herta 59 Munteanu, Aurel Drago 380 Munteanu, Neculai Constantin 161, 373 Murgescu, Costin 100 Muscovite Group for the Observance of the Helsinki Accords 79 N Nagy, Imre 192, 197, 204, 205 National Salvation Front (NSF) 44, 172, 238, 256, 274, 317, 346, 347, 359, 377 Nvodaru, Ana Maria 157 Negoiescu, Ion 130133, 135, 137, 158, 161163, 296, 340, 379 Niculescu-Mizil, Paul 261, 263 Nixon, Richard 70, 71, 75, 83, 85, 89, 92, 103, 107, 109, 198, 283, 350 Noica, Constantin 59, 60, 150, 341, 342
430
O
FROM ROBIN HOOD TO DON QUIXOTE Popescu, D. R. 291, 335, 337, 338, 344, 346, 354, 355, 374, 376, 378, 380 Puiu, Ion 112 R Radio Free Europe (RFE) 24, 25, 33, 35, 3942, 49, 53, 82, 106, 110114, 119, 124130, 132 134, 137, 139, 141, 142, 144 147, 149, 157, 160, 161, 164170, 185, 186, 190, 208 211, 214, 247249, 255, 257, 259, 268, 270273, 277282, 285, 286, 289, 291293, 295, 299, 300, 303305, 308314, 326, 329, 332, 335, 337340, 344, 345, 349352, 354356, 359, 361363, 365367, 370 377, 379381, 383, 391, 392 Ranghe, Iosif 232 Raiu, Ion 112 Rceanu, Grigore Ion 217, 223, 234 236, 242, 252, 266, 274 Rceanu, Ileana 236, 266 Rceanu, Mircea 108, 110112, 236, 252, 253, 265, 268, 272274, 352 Rdui, Filip 373 Reagan, Ronald 61, 92, 107110, 112 resistance in the mountains 1521, 29, 30, 46-48, 386 Revolution of 1989 11, 12, 28, 42, 57, 97, 102, 112, 168, 256, 276, 302, 314, 317, 330, 346, 381, 394 Ribbentrop-Molotov, Pact 121 Rizea, Elisabeta 46, 47 Roller, Mihail 201, 202
Operation Villages Roumains 95, 307, 316, 317 P Pacepa, Ion Mihai 108, 170, 349 Palade, Emil 141 Paleologu, Alexandru 150, 340, 341, 347, 379, 380 Paler, Octavian 340, 341, 374, 375 Palou, Martin 111 Paraschiv, Vasile 130, 133, 134, 152, 159 Patoka, Jan 138 Pauker, Ana 176, 202, 203, 221224, 232, 233, 260, 265, 341 Pavel, Thomas 141 Ptrcanu, Lucreiu 202, 203, 223, 230, 233, 258, 260 Prvulescu, Constantin 217, 224, 231235, 241, 242, 260, 265, 269, 274 Prez de Cullar, Javier 114 Petrescu, Dan 113, 193, 212, 296, 317319, 322331, 336, 347, 357, 368373, 387, 394 Petrescu, Dumitru 266 Piu, Luca 296, 373 Plmdeal, Antonie 88 Plei, Nicolae 167 Pleu, Andrei 158, 340343, 347, 348, 375, 380 Poland KOR-KSS 81, 151 Solidarity 15, 22, 111, 270, 304, 312, 313, 331, 366 Martial Law 85, 96, 103, 284 Round Table Talks 334 Pop, Dumitru Alexandru 365
INDEX Romanian Communist Party (RCP) 38, 39, 54, 61, 69, 77, 78, 97, 101, 102, 106, 109, 121, 137, 139, 157, 158, 163, 165, 169, 175, 176, 188, 196, 201, 202, 212, 214, 218, 220, 221, 224 226, 231, 233, 234, 245, 249, 260, 261, 263265, 269, 270, 276, 282, 330, 341, 351, 354, 384, 388, 390 Romanian Workers Party (RWP) 67, 101, 118, 179, 223, 224, 226, 232, 260, 261, 265 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 75 Rosen, Moses 88 S abatov, Anna 111 Sakharov, Andrei 79, 105 samizdat 24, 25, 39, 52, 53, 184, 185, 208, 209, 211, 214, 257, 277, 308, 320, 321, 363, 370, 391 Sartre, Jean-Paul 141 Smplean, Gina and Dan 373 Schiller, Gilles 322, 333, 370, 373, 376 Schpflin, George 43, 51, 52, 201, 202, 209 Schultz, George 90 Securitate/ secret police 17, 34, 36, 40, 41, 44, 46, 47, 49, 56, 58, 59, 73, 81, 111, 119, 121, 124, 126, 129, 130, 134149, 152156, 158161, 163170, 191, 207, 210, 211, 240, 241, 244246, 250, 251, 264, 269, 272274, 278, 286288, 298, 301, 302, 304, 309, 310, 312 314, 320, 321, 324337, 340, 341, 345, 348350, 353355,
431
357359, 361, 362, 369376, 378, 379, 384, 386388 Shafir, Michael 50, 208, 247, 259, 270, 375, 376 ik, Ota 228 SLOMR 148, 152, 159 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr 120, 122, 123 Soviet Union 17, 20, 24, 30, 34, 43, 54, 57, 6469, 7173, 7580, 83, 85, 97, 98, 100, 102, 103, 105, 106, 108, 117, 121, 128, 150, 173, 175177, 179181, 184, 198, 199, 202, 203, 212, 215, 220222, 224, 225, 228, 230232, 234, 240, 246248, 263, 271, 284, 286, 305, 332 334, 368, 384, 388, 389, 392 Stalin, Joseph 43, 78, 83, 98, 103, 149, 176, 177, 201, 203, 218, 238, 266, 270 Stoichi, Victor Ieronim 296 Stoiciu, Liviu Ioan 357, 381 Stork, Coen 215, 243, 333, 375, 376 Szcs, Gza 185, 188, 189, 209, 210, 293, 296, 356
erban, Andrei 141 ora, Mihai 340, 342, 347, 368, 380 tefnescu, erban 157 T Tacu, Alexandru 373 Tams, Gspr Mikls 111, 213, 214 tamizdat 24, 25, 39, 52, 53, 257, 277, 327 Tnase, Virgil 125, 152, 155, 258, 364, 379, 381 Thatcher, Margaret 82
432
FROM ROBIN HOOD TO DON QUIXOTE 294, 295, 308, 326, 329, 352, 366, 372, 390 Ursu, Gheorghe 348 V Valev, E. B. 100 Vanik, Charles 107 Vrkonyi, Pter 187 Verde, Ilie 169, 264 Vianu, Ion 113, 130, 131, 139, 142, 159, 165, 212 Vienna Award, Second 174, 176, 201, 202, 234 Voice of America (VOA) 24, 25, 33, 39, 106, 119, 128, 157, 249, 270, 271, 295, 326, 370, 391 Voka, Ji 111 W Wasa, Lech 60, 104, 304 Wilson, Woodrow 75 Woodrow Wilson Center 278, 283 Y Yalta Agreement 54, 74, 237 Z Zamfirescu, Dinu 212, 367
Theses of July 1971 123, 130, 137, 154, 289, 290, 321, 346 Thibault, Paul 356 Tindemans, Leo 367 Toma, Sorin 258, 259 Toraska, Teresa 270 Tth, Kroly Antal 185, 188 Totok, William 296 Trianon, Treaty of 173, 174, 194, 201, 214, 216 Tudor, Corneliu Vadim 291 Tudoran, Dorin 108, 189, 209, 211, 249, 271, 279, 287297, 299, 304, 326, 331, 332, 335, 339, 349, 350, 353358, 364, 376, 378 epeneag, Dumitru 125, 153, 155 U Uncu, Anton 361 United States 21, 61, 6466, 7072, 75, 77, 7981, 8386, 88, 90, 93, 96, 99, 100, 103112, 141, 198, 209, 215, 216, 230, 237, 243, 247, 252, 257, 267, 271, 279, 283, 284, 286, 287,

From Robin Hood To Don Quixote - Resistance and Dissent in Communist Romania

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From Robin Hood To Don Quixote - Resistance and Dissent in Communist Romania

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Resistance and Dissent in Communist Romania

Resistance and Dissent in Communist Romania CRISTINA PETRESCU

From Robin Hood to Don Quixote

Editura Enciclopedic 2013

Layout: Mihaela TUDOR Cover: Mariana MRZEA

61 115 171 217 275 383 397 425

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Who Was Robin Hood The Canon of Historical Reconstruction

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Rethinking Dissent during Romanian Communism

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Communist Romania vs. the Helsinki Process of International Cooperation*

Misfit to World Politics

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The Rise Romania as a Soviet Maverick Satellite

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The Climax Romania as Supporter of the Helsinki Accords

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The Decline Romania as an Isolated Dictatorship

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