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History doesnt submit to the definition of science, it is not verifiable by experimentation and it does not lead to laws that permit prevision. 1- Explain this statement of Hal in and state the problematic it raises. !" pts# $- %iscuss this statement in the li&ht of the opinions which claim that history is a science. !' pts# (- )n your opinion, is there a benefit from studyin& History* +ustify your answer. !, pts#

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As scientific enquiry crowns in amazing technical accomplishments, our postut

modern world tends to substantiate the scientific model. Science, combined with sophisticated technology, has left its ivory tower to amaze us in our daily lives. science aims before anything at securing the essentials for man!ind. "reatment of diseases and their prevention, weather forecast and earthqua!e prediction# these are but a few of the things we need in order to maintain a healthy life. Are we to give credit to science for its accomplishments in the preservation of human life or for less vital things li!e lu$ury products% "he answer to this question depends on a$iological considerations and will not be directly answered here, but it can nevertheless point out the value which is lin!ed to scientific labeling. &e value science because it has the power to predict, because it can, in other words, !eep its promises. &hether the product of this assertiveness is a theory, a vital ob'ect, or a sophisticated creation is not at sta!e# the most important here is this assertiveness that (istory is accused of lac!ing. )(istory doesn*t submit to the definition of science, it is not verifiable by e$perimentation and it does not lead to laws that permit prevision+. "his statement of (al!in discredits (istory on the ground of its lac! of assuredness. (istory is characterized in comparison with science. ,ocus is on what it doesn-t have rather than on what it does have. (istory, according to the author-s quote, is not .verifiable by e$perimentation. and is not characterized by restrictive laws. /t goes without saying that

it is implied that science submits to e$perimentation and does lead to universal laws that .permit prevision.. &hat is e$perimentation% 0$perimentation consists in observation, classification, hypothesis and verification. 1aturally we observe what is observable, i.e. a physical and tangible ob'ect. 2lassification is the mind-s activity that organizes the scattered data gathered by observation. (ypothesis grants unity to classification as it connects the different categories into one single process. ,inally, verification is realized through the repetition of the process, whether naturally or artificially, in order to ma!e sure the phenomenon is reproducible according to the hypothesis. 1ow, does (istory share any of the activities cited above% "o begin with, does (istory ma!e observations% 2learly it does if we consider historical facts as matters of facts. ut are they matters of facts li!e factual ob'ects which are perceived by the senses% &ell for one thing, we are never absolutely sure events too! place e$actly as narrated. Suspicion is even greater if we doubt that the event ever too! place. ,or e$ample, we !now very little about the life of (omer, the ancient 3ree! poet to whom is attributed the authorship of the /liad and the 4dyssey. Some argue that (omer did not even e$ist and that the epic poem was a compilation of a very old oral tradition. 4thers say it is impossible for multiple authors to write in the same style, concluding that (omer did in fact e$ist. "he common 'o!e has it that the poems were not written by (omer, )but by another man of the same name+. /n this case, con'ectures do not attain evidence, leaving the mystery of the epic poet forever unresolved. /n other words, (istory observes but not in the same manner as science does. /t recognizes a thing to have e$isted if it has enough historical documents that support its e$istence but it cannot, in the case of historical revisionism, settle for a final answer. &hat about classification% (istory classifies events according to different criteria, the latter generally depending on the historian-s methodology. &hile some historians group events according to a preconceived pattern, e.g. (istory-s progress according to 4ccident-s values, others insist on discontinuity, i.e. a succession of events without a predefined goal. &e could argue that a rational (istory is more scientific than an .empirical. one because rationality is compatible with scientific causality. /nversely, we could argue that a discontinuous (istory agrees more with the scientific model since it

only describes facts without predetermining their meaning in advance. &hatever the case, we can clearly see that there is room for debate about methodology and that this debate wea!ens (istory-s assertiveness. "he same goes for hypothesis which follows certain methodological indications that are not, unfortunately, universally shared by all historians. ,inally, verification is not part of the historian-s activity since his ob'ect of study is in the past. &e understand that (istory, as a discipline, functions differently from science on the technical level. &hile it can be said to share observation, classification and hypothesis with science, the way it practices these activities differs from scientific enquiry. 5ltimately, divergence is total when it comes to verification. &e understand now why (al!in reduces e$perimentation to verification when e$cluding (istory from the realm of science, verification being at the core of scientific e$perimentation. Science aims to provide certainty and it can only do so by presenting reliable, tested and verified !nowledge. (al!in-s argument would have been wea!er if he had only focused on observation for e$ample. ecause despite the intangible character of past events, (istory is still before anything a descriptive report of what happened in the past. /n that sense, invo!ing scientific verification is a good way to undermine (istory-s scientificity. "o push even further (al!in-s point of view, for the sa!e of clarity rather than endorsement, we could argue that even at the observation level, there is a great gap separating science from (istory since (istory not only does not describe tangible ob'ects but also interprets these ob'ects by the mere fact of describing them. 1o matter if the historian !nows it or not, he is interpreting the events he is spea!ing about because his ob'ect, the event, is semantic, i.e. it has a meaning, it means something, and that the words chosen to convey this meaning is not without being biased. 6ilthey, an authority in the philosophy of hermeneutics, distinguishes between e$planation and comprehension. Science aims to e$plain the world whereas (umanities see! its comprehension. &hat is the difference between comprehension and e$planation% "o e$plain something is to shed light on its mechanism, to ma!e !nown how the phenomenon functions or, simply said, to uncover the cause which stands behind the effect. 5nderstanding something is different. "o understand is to ascribe a meaning to the phenomenon observed by replacing it in a wider ensemble.

"o grasp the meaning of something can be thought of as superior to the sole analysis of its structure. (istory is synthetic7 it gives an overview of human e$istence. ut what historians see as an advantage, scientists see as a flaw# to confer a meaning to the march of (istory is profoundly sub'ective, opens into a fruitless debate and, most importantly, is not verifiable. /n the last part of his statement, (al!ins refers to (istory-s inability to establish laws from which prevision could spring. "his flaw is the logical consequence of the historian-s supposed sub'ectivity# the meaning conferred to the phenomenon cannot be imposed once and for all as there is always room for criticism. /n that sense, one cannot predict a future event by the sole !nowledge of a past event. Since both the past and the future events are interpreted, their conformity, i.e. the prediction of an identical event in the future on the basis of a past event, depends greatly on the meaning ascribed to the past event and the anticipated meaning given to the future one. 8oreover, (istory is created by humans and it can be strongly argued that human behavior is not predictable. 0ven if it is to a certain e$tent, it evades the impartial causality that lies behind natural phenomena. (istorians don*t have a laboratory to test, say, the behavior of a political figure. Sometimes, war*s outcome depends greatly on chance. "he 1azis e$perienced their first defeat because of the e$treme cold weather in the Soviet 5nion9 : and ;) "he arguments we have gathered so far are acceptable but they are not

definitive, e$actly li!e the critique that science throws at (istory. "he claim that (istory is not scientific is not scientific< /sn*t it true that we cannot )verify+ (istory*s lac! of scientificity 'ust li!e (istory is unable to verify its hypotheses% ,or this reason, an alternative argumentation is possible and many have been able to reconcile (istory with science. /n the world of philosophy, the most remar!able effort in that direction is signed by (egel, the philosopher of (istory par e$cellence. ut before we go into his idea, let us see if all we said above was founded on solid grounds. ,irst, let us begin by e$cavating the implicit idea behind (il!in*s statement. /t is assumed that we should always give credence to scientific theories. Science is the truth, there are those who believe and those who don*t# too bad for those who don*t because they will remain ignorant. "he

faultfinder is relegated to the status of infidel found in the religious discourse. ut what if science wasn*t always right% &e !now that scientific theories are always changing and that new e$periments are leading to new descriptions of nature. 0instein supplanted 1ewton, =lanc! supplanted 0instein, (eisenberg supplanted =lanc! and so on9 /t seems that the comple$ity of natural phenomena cannot be confined in theory, thus sustaining research. =lato as!s this question in his dialogue 8eno# how do we loo! for something if we don*t !now what we are loo!ing for% And if we do !now what we are loo!ing for, then why are we searching for it% &e !now that science is searching and that its search is crowning in more and more amazing innovations. ut we do not !now e$actly what we are loo!ing for. 0instein regretted having disclosed his nuclear theory which led to the invention of the nuclear bomb. So where does all this lead to% /f we are optimistic, we may say that science substitutes theories because it is finding more accurate descriptions of the natural world. "o be more pessimistic, we can consider that scientific theorization is wandering because its purpose is not defined. Science is becoming more and more fragmented due to its hyperspecialization. Already in 1>;?, (usserl deplored science*s lac! of unity, a fragmentation translating in the isolation of scientists and their confinement to their field. "his fragmentation, even if on the analytical level @technical level) is profitable, ma!es the credence we uncritically give to science loo! blind. (egel proposes another definition of science, one that is fully compatible with (istory. Science is gnosis, !nowledge in the vast sense, but not any !nowledge# real and true !nowledge. /f we start from this definition, all we need to do is prove that (istory is real and true !nowledge in order to manifest its compatibility with science. ut first of all, what is true and real% "he two notions are interdependent but can nevertheless be distinguished. ,or e$ample, the statement )a triangle has three sides+ is true but is not necessarily real because / could be imagining the triangle in my mind. /nversely, / could perceive something as real without it being true. ,or e$ample, / )feel+ the sun is a few hundred !ilometers away while it is tremendously more distant. (egel is loo!ing after truth and reality at the same time. According to him, true !nowledge is an infallible !nowledge. "he model for infallible !nowledge is mathematics where things, once well defined, cannot form but one sequence. 8athematics represents the realm of the spirit.

4n the other hand real !nowledge is what pertains to human e$istence. Since for (egel, the ultimate reality is in the community, the !nowledge of man!ind finds it pea! in (istory from which we can learn the totality of human e$istence. 1ow, how is (istory a science or rather, what ma!es (istory a science% According to (egel, (istory is the ob'ectivation of "ruth, its materialization. Spirit is embodied in human (istory, fully immanent to (istory, to the e$tent that if one desires !nowing "ruth, he should study (istory or, inversely, if one see!s reality, he should study logic @mathematics). (istory, in the sense of historical events, is the embodiment of gnosis. "o attain true and real !nowledge, i.e. science, one has to study (istory, in the sense of the discipline that pertains to historical events. 4ne cannot but benefit from the study of (istory since men naturally thrive for !nowledge. Aet*s go bac! to the assessment of (il!in*s statement. /f (istory is !nowledge, why can*t we call it a science% Besorting to (istory*s infalsifiability, to use a word invented by Carl =opper, is not convincing since science itself is not always verifiable. (ow can we verify the )big bang+ theory or 6arwin*s theory of evolution% (ow can we )e$periment+ the infinity of space% ut even if science is, to a certain degree, verifiable, in any case more verifiable than (istory is, this does not necessarily discredit (istory as a quest for "ruth. Some may even argue that (istory is too ob'ective to be truthful, since it is relying more and more on documents, similarly to archeology, rather than proposing a meaning and orientation to its findings. 5ltimately, we have to as! ourselves# why is sub'ectivity relegated to the realm of ignorance by )scientific religiosity+% Sub'ectivity seems to connote disagreement when we can thin! of it as a common basis for agreement since all humans are sub'ective, i.e. they loo! for meaning in the world around them, not only for technical information. /f we need to ultimately invo!e the argument of practicality pertaining to the value of science, we should pay attention not to overestimate the products of science if their purpose is not always defined. Secondly, science does not always offer practicalities# not all earthqua!es are predicted, some diseases can still not be cured. 1ot to forget that science at the very beginning of its birth was a theoretical view of the world before becoming an instrumental tool whose function is to engineer the natural world. "hirdly, the laws that science establishes constitute the internal

intelligence of nature, its inherent structure. /n other words, the scientist discovers the laws of nature7 he does not create them e$ nihilo. Aast but not least, (istory can foresee possibilities in the future, based on a solid !nowledge of universal human e$perience, even if it does not have the power to foretell. /t thus remains a precious tool to prepare the future. Amnesia is of no use to the anticipatory mind.