Case Digest of Tanada vs. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446 TANADA V.

TUVERA FACTS: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concerns as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable they must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Taada et al seek a writ of mandamus to compel Tuvera to publish and/or to cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various Presidential Decrees (PDs), Letters of Instructions(LOIs), Proclamations(PPs), Executive Orders(EOs), and Administrative Orders(AOs).

ISSUE: Whether or not the various PDs et al must be published before they shall take effect.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the Official Gazette as they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the present case where the president may on his own issue laws. The clear objective of this provision is to give the public general adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat. Publication is indispensable.

366 scra 437 Foreign Law Divorce GARCIA vs. RECIO GR No. 138322 october 2, 2002

FACTS: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the Australian Family Court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen. Subsequently, respondent entered into marriage with petitioner a Filipina on January 12, 1994. Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Responded contended that his prior marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry petitioner. The trial court rendered the decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent dissolved and both parties can now remarry. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated him to remarry.

HELD: The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on the records, the court cannot conclude that respondent who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Neither can the court grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under Australian law he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid down the following basic legal principles; a marriage between two Filipino cannot be dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.

D.M. Consunji vs. CA TITLE: D.M. Consunji Inc. v Court of Appeals CITATION: GR No. 137873, April 20, 2001 | 357 SCRA 249 FACTS: Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM. Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work as carpenter at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building were on board a platform. Jose was crushed to death when the platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety. PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Joses widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to receive support from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000. DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision. ISSUE: Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund. HELD: The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code. Maria Juergo was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioners personnel. Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom.

Miciano vs Brimo TITLE: Juan Miciano v Andre Brimo CITATION: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867 FACTS: Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Micianos participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen. ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimos estates. HELD: Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions. The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.

Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983. The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Roehr vs. Garcia GR No. 142820 June 20, 2003 Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, aGerman citizen, married a Filipina, Carmen Rodriguez in Germany. The marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Makati. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by the trial court. The petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Cout of First Instance of HamburgBlankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father. Issue: Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as support and custody of the children can be determined in our courts Held: Yes. In order to take effect, a foreign judgement must clearly show that the opposing party has been given ample opportunity to do so under the Rules of Civel Procedure. Accoringly, the respondent was not given the opportunity to challenge the judgement of the German Court, therefore, legal effects of divorcemust be determined in our courts. The court held that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental costudy

Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes TITLE: Nikko Hotel Manila vs. Reyes CITATION: GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005 FACTS: Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka Amang Bisaya, an entertainment artist. There are two versions of the story: Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hot els former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latters gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotels Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation. Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filarts sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filarts group. She wasnt able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesnt want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party. During the plaintiffs cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered very close because we nearly kissed each other. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lims intention to relay the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.

HELD: Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Quisumbing vs MERALCO TITLE: Sps. Quisumbing vs. MERALCO CITATION: GR No. 142943, April 3, 2002

FACTS: The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house located at #94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendants inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house and observed as standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the plaintiffs secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had been tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the information to the owners of the house. The inspectors advised that the meter be brought in their laboratory for further verifications. In the event that the meter was indeed tampered, defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple. After an hour, inspectors returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the couple that unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric supply will be disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.

ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done without due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBINGs rights, feelings, social and business reputation and therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages.

HELD: Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including attorneys fees. Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right against the deprivation of property without due process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of example or correction for public. SC recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal use of electricity. However, any action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the people. Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) mayimmediately disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board. During the inspection, no government official or ERB representative was present.

Petitioners claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply proof and was premised only upon Lornas testimony. These are compensation for an injury that will put the injure position where it was before it was injured. Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals 219 scra 115 Article 21 of the Civil Code

This is an appeal by certiorari. On October 27, 1987, without the assistance of counsel, private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the alleged violation of

their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her country; other petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student, before August 20, 1987 the latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that they get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the filing of complaint, petitioners attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of the complaint. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent and denied all allegations against him. After trial on the merits, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. HELD: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a mans promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP vs COURT OF APPEALS

176 SCRA 778 August 25, 1989

Facts: 10 November 1972, herein private respondent Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a crook and a swindler, ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscals Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed. Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January 1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You Filipinos cannot be trusted.) as well as against Tobias (crook, and swindler); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED. Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

University of the East vs Jader TITLE: University of the East vs. Jader CITATION: GR No. 132344, February 7, 2000 FACTS: Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-88. During his last year, 1stsemester, he failed to take the regular final examination in Practical Court 1where he was given an incomplete grade remarks. He filed an application for removal of the incomplete grade given by Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after the payment of required fees. He took the exam on March 28 and on May 30, the professor gave him a grade of 5. The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April 16, 1988, 3PM. In the invitation, his name appeared. In preparation for the bar exam, he took a leave of absence from work from April 20Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class review in FEU. Upon learning of such deficiency, he dropped his review classes and was not able to take the bar exam. Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, sleepless nights due to UEs negligence.

ISSUE: Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into believing JADER satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case. Can he claim moral damages?

HELD: SC held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to respondent for the latters actual damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent should not have been awarded moral damages though JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations as what CA held because its also respondents duty to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, he should have been responsible in ensuring that all his affairs specifically those in relation with his academic achievement are in order. Before taking the bar examinations, it doesnt only entail a mental preparation on the subjects but there are othe r prerequisites such as documentation and submission of requirements which prospective examinee must meet. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is DELETED.

Pe vs Pe TITLE: Pe vs. Pe CITATION: 5 SCRA 200

FACTS: Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory in Gasan Marinduque who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and was given access to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each other. Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolitas affection. The case on moral damages was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolitas family on the ground of moral, good custom and public policy due to their illicit affair.

HELD: Alfonso committed an injury to Lolitas family in a manner c ontrary to morals, good customs and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

Tenchavez vs Escano TITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano CITATION: 15 SCRA 355 FACTS: 27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and gobetween who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila. Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD: Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages. WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows; (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao; (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees; (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

St. Louis Realty Corp. vs CA TITLE: St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA CITATION: 133 SCRA 179 FACTS: Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio. St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading where the heart is. This was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramils house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite that it was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramils counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadios real house but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published. ISSUE: Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil. HELD: St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ". The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement for the reason that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.

Spouses Yu vs PCIB TITLE: Spouses Yu vs. PCIB CITATION: GR No. 147902, March 17, 2006 FACTS: Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their title, interest, and participation over several parcels of land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in favor of the Philippine Commercial International Bank, respondent and highest bidder, as security for the payment of a loan. As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and penalties due thereon, respondent filed petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on the Dagupan City properties on July 21, 1998. City Sheriff issued notice of extra-judicial sale on August 3, 1998 scheduling the auction sale on September 10, 1998. Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor of respondent, the highest bidder. The sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan City on October 1, 1998. After two months before the expiration of the redemption period, respondent filed an ex-parte petition for writ of possession before RTC of Dagupan. Petitioners complaint on annulment of certificate of sale and motion to dismiss and to strike out testimony of Rodante Manuel was denied by said RTC. Motion for reconsideration was then filed on February 14, 2000 arguing that the complaint on annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial issue to the filed ex-parte petition for writ of possession, the resolution of which is determinative of propriety of the issuance of a Writ of Possession. ISSUE: Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. HELD: Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in a special proceeding since the two cases are both civil in nature which can proceed separately and take their own direction independently of each other. A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because issue raised in civil action would be determinative de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.

Donato vs Luna TITLE: Donato vs. Luna CITATION: GR No. 53642, April 15, 1988 FACTS: An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before the petitioners arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering into the marriage which was Donatos second since she had no previous knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that Donato already previously married. ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question. HELD: Petitioner Leonilo Donato cant apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

Quimiguing vs Icao TITLE: Quimiguing vs Icao CITATION: 34 SCRA 132 FACTS: Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action. ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages. HELD: Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742. Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned. Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused. WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

Geluz vs CA TITLE: Geluz vs CA CITATION: 2 SCRA 801 FACTS: Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latters daughter Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesnt have any idea nor given his consent on the abortion. ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from the physician who caused the same. HELD: The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial court and Court of Appeals predicated. Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral damages evidently becaus e Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wifes indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows that hes after obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.

De Jesus vs Syquia TITLE: De Jesus v Syquia CITATION: 58 Phil 866 FACTS: Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendants brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and juniors sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila. After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time. It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned. ISSUES: 1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity. 2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco. HELD: The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status. Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension.

Cui vs Arellano University TITLE: Emetrio Cui v Arellano University CITATION: GR NO. L15127, May 30, 1961 | 112 Phil 135 FACTS: Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College of Law from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellanos issuance of his TOR. On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of private schools, colleges and universities. Part of the memorandum states that the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school. ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant provided by Arellano University. HELD: The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null and void.

The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing defendants counterclaim.