RULE 57: PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT 1) ANITA MANGILA (Petitioner) vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and LORETA GUINA (Private Respondent) 387 SCRA G.R. No. 125027 August 12, 2002 CARPIO, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. The trial court upheld the writ of attachment. FACTS: ANITA MANGILA is an exporter of sea foods and doing business under the name and style of Seafoods Products. LORETA GUINA is the President and General Manager of Air Swift International, a single registered proprietorship engaged in the freight forwarding business. Sometime in January 1988, MANGILA contracted the freight forwarding services of GUINA for shipment of MANGILAs products to Guam (USA). MANGILA agreed to pay GUINA cash on delivery. MANGILA failed to pay GUINA shipping charges amounting to P109, 376.95, which amount was never paid by the former despite several demands from the latter. Thus, on June 10, 1988, GUINA filed a Civil Case for collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. On August 1, 1988, the sheriff filed his Sheriffs Return showing that summons was not served on MANGILA. A woman found at MANGILAs house informed the sheriff that MANGILA transferred her residence to Sto. Nio, Guagua, Pampanga. The sheriff found out further that MANGILA had left the Philippines for Guam. Thus, on September 13, 1988, construing MANGILAs departure from the Philippines as done with intent to defraud her creditors, GUINA filed a Motion for Preliminary Attachment. On September 26, 1988, the trial court issued an Order of Preliminary Attachment against petitioner. The following day, the trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. On October 28, 1988 the Notice of Levy with the Order, Affidavit and Bond were served on MANGILAs household help in San Fernando, Pampanga. On November 7, 1988, MANGILA filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment without submitting herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court. She argued that since she had not been served a copy of the Complaint and the summons, therefore, the court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person. On January 13, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Discharge Attachment upon filing of MANGILAs counter-bond. The trial court, however, did not rule on the question of jurisdiction and on the validity of the writ of preliminary attachment. On December 26, 1988, GUINA applied for an alias summons, which the trial court issued on January 19, 1989. It was only on January 26, 1989 that summons was finally served on MANGILA. RTC: UPHELD the validity of the issuance of the writ of attachment. CA: AFFIRMED the Decision of the trial court. MANGILAs Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition. The crux of MANGILAs arguments rests on the question of the validity of the writ of attachment. Because of failure to serve summons on her before or simultaneously with the writs implementation, MANGILA claims that the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person and thus the service of the writ is void. ISSUE: WHETHER THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT WAS IMPROPERLY ISSUED AND SERVED. HELD: YES. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on MANGILA without first obtaining jurisdiction over her person. RATIO: (1) Issuance vs. implementation of the writ of attachment It is necessary to distinguish between the two to determine when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired to validly implement the writ. A party to a suit may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail of the provisional remedies under the Rules of Court. Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter. This phrase refers to the date of filing of the complaint which is the moment that marks the commencement of the action. The reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues. In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the SC clarified the actual time when jurisdiction should be had:

It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant - issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment - these do not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the court, either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary submission to the courts authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicants affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint xxx. (2) Three stages of the grant of a writ of preliminary attachment First, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant. The Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued on September 27, 1988 and implemented on October 28, 1988. However, the alias summons was served only on January 26, 1989 or almost three months after the implementation of the writ of attachment. The trial court had the authority to issue the Writ of Attachment on September 27 since a motion for its issuance can be filed at the commencement of the action. However, on the day the writ was implemented, the trial court should have, previously or simultaneously with the implementation of the writ, acquired jurisdiction over MANGILA. Yet, as was shown in the records of the case, the summons was actually served on MANGILA several months after the writ had been implemented. (3) EXCEPTIONS TO THE REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR OR CONTEMPORAENOUS SERVICE OF SUMMONS; REMEDIES IN CASES WHERE PERSONAL SERVICE COULD NOT BE EFFECTED ON A PARTY GUINA claims that the case falls under the exceptions to the requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons provided for in Section 5 of Rule 57. Among such exceptions are where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts or where the defendant is a resident temporarily absent therefrom xxx. GUINA asserts that when she commenced this action, she tried to serve summons on MANGILA but the latter could not be located at her customary address in Kamuning, Quezon City or at her new address in Guagua, Pampanga and that, furthermore, MANGILA was not even in Pampanga; rather, she was in Guam purportedly on a business trip. GUINA never showed that she effected substituted service on MANGILA after her personal service failed. Likewise, if it were true that GUINA could not ascertain the whereabouts of MANGILA after a diligent inquiry, still she had some other recourse under the Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules provide for certain remedies in cases where personal service could not be effected on a party. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that whenever the defendants whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation xxx. Thus, if MANGILAs whereabouts could not be ascertained after the sheriff had served the summons at her given address, then GUINA could have immediately asked the court for service of summons by publication on MANGILA. Moreover, as GUINA also claims that MANGILA was abroad at the time of the service of summons, this made MANGILA a resident who is temporarily out of the country. This is the exact situation contemplated in Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, providing for service of summons by publication. (4) The alias summons belatedly served on MANGILA cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on MANGILA without first obtaining jurisdiction over her person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.

2) VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN (Petitioner) vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Respondent)

349 SCRA January 19, 2001

G.R. No. 139941 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN was alleged to be a dummy or nominee of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in several companies said to have been illegally acquired by the Marcos spouses. As a favored business associate of the Marcoses, CHUIDIAN allegedly used false pretenses to induce the officers of the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (PHILGUARANTEE), the Board of Investments (BOI) and the Central Bank, to facilitate the procurement and issuance of a loan guarantee in favor of the Asian Reliability Company, Incorporated (ARCI) sometime in September 1980. ARCI, 98% of which was allegedly owned by CHUIDIAN, was granted a loan guarantee of Twenty-Five Million U.S. Dollars (US$25,000,000.00). While ARCI represented to PHILGUARANTEE that the loan proceeds would be used to establish five interrelated projects in the Philippines, CHUIDIAN reneged on the approved business plan and instead invested the proceeds of the loan in corporations operating in the United States. Although ARCI had received the proceeds of the loan guaranteed by PHILGUARANTEE, the former defaulted in the payments thereof, compelling PHILGUARANTEE to undertake payments for the same. Consequently, in June 1985, PHILGUARANTEE sued CHUIDIAN before the Santa Clara County Superior Court. On November 27, 1985, or three (3) months before the successful peoples revolt that toppled the Marcos dictatorship, PHILGUARANTEE entered into a compromise agreement with CHUIDIAN whereby CHUIDIAN shall assign and surrender title to all his companies in favor of the Philippine government. In return, PHILGUARANTEE shall absolve CHUIDIAN from all civil and criminal liability, and in so doing, desist from pursuing any suit against CHUIDIAN concerning the payments PHILGUARANTEE had made on CHUIDIANs defaulted loans. It was further stipulated that instead of CHUIDIAN reimbursing the payments made by PHILGUARANTEE arising from CHUIDIANs default, the Philippine government shall pay CHUIDIAN the amount of Five Million Three Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$5,300,000.00). Initial payment of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$500,000.00) was actually received by CHUIDIAN, as well as succeeding payment of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$200,000.00). The remaining balance of Four Million Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$4,600,000.00) was to be paid through an irrevocable Letter of Credit (L/C) from which CHUIDIAN would draw One Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$100,000.00) monthly. Accordingly, on December 12, 1985, L/C No. SSD-005-85 was issued for the said amount by the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Subsequently, CHUIDIAN was able to make two (2) monthly drawings from said L/C at the Los Angeles branch of the PNB. With the advent of the Aquino administration, the newly-established Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) exerted earnest efforts to search and recover money, gold, properties, stocks and other assets suspected as having been illegally acquired by the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. CHUIDIAN was among those whose assets were sequestered by the PCGG. On May 30, 1986, the PCGG issued a Sequestration Order directing the PNB to place under its custody, for and in behalf of the PCGG, the irrevocable L/C (No. SSD-005-85). Although CHUIDIAN was then residing in the United States, his name was placed in the Department of Foreign Affairs Hold Order list. On February 27, 1987, a Deed of Transfer was executed between then Secretary of Finance and then PNB President to facilitate the rehabilitation of PNB. The said Deed of Transfer provided for the transfer to the government of certain assets of PNB in exchange for which the government would assume certain liabilities of PNB, among such liabilities were the unused commercial L/Cs and Deferred L/Cs, including that listed in favor of CHUIDIAN. On July 30, 1987, the government filed before the Sandiganbayan a Civil Case against the Marcos spouses and a number of individuals known to be cronies of the Marcoses, including CHUIDIAN. The complaint sought the reconveyance, reversion, accounting and restitution of all forms of wealth allegedly procured illegally and stashed away by the defendants. While the case was pending, on March 17, 1993, the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for issuance of a writ of attachment over the L/C, citing as grounds therefor the following: (1) CHUIDIAN embezzled or fraudulently misapplied the funds of ARCI acting in a fiduciary capacity, justifying issuance of the writ under Section 1(b), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; (2) The writ is justified under Section 1(d) of the same rule as CHUIDIAN is guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action was brought, or that he concealed or disposed of the property that is the subject of the action; (3) CHUIDIAN has removed or disposed of his property with the intent of defrauding the plaintiff as justified under Section 1(c) of Rule 57; and

(4) CHUIDIAN is residing out of the country or one on whom summons may be served by publication, which justifies the writ of attachment prayed for under Section 1(e) of the same rule. On July 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution ordering the issuance of a writ of attachment against L/C No. SSD-005-85 as security for the satisfaction of judgment. Accordingly, an order of attachment was issued by the Sandiganbayan on July 19, 1993. On August 11, 1997, or almost four (4) years after the issuance of the order of attachment, CHUIDIAN filed a motion to lift the attachment based on the following grounds: First, he had returned to the Philippines; hence, the Sandiganbayans most potent ground for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment no longer existed. Since his absence in the past was the very foundation of the Sandiganbayans writ of preliminary attachment, his presence in the country warrants the immediate lifting thereof. Second, there was no evidence at all of initial fraud or subsequent concealment except for the affidavit submitted by the PCGG Chairman citing mere belief and information and not on knowledge of the facts. Third, CHUIDIAN denies that he ever disposed of his assets to defraud the Republic, and there is nothing in the records that support the Sandiganbayans erroneous conclusion on the matter. Fourth, CHUIDIAN belied the allegation that he was also a defendant in other related criminal action, for in fact, he had never been a defendant in any prosecution of any sort in the Philippines. Moreover, he could not have personally appeared in any other action because he had been deprived of his right to a travel document by the government. Fifth, the preliminary attachment was, in the first place, unwarranted because he was not guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation. In fact, the L/C was not a product of fraudulent transactions, but was the result of a US Court-approved settlement. CHUIDIAN further contends that should the attachment be allowed to continue, he will be deprived of his property without due process. The L/C was payment to CHUIDIAN in exchange for the assets he turned over to the Republic pursuant to the terms of the settlement in Case No. 575867. Said assets, however, had already been sold by the Republic and cannot be returned to CHUIDIAN should the government succeed in depriving him of the proceeds of the L/C. Since said assets were disposed of without his or the Sandiganbayans consent, it is the Republic who is fraudulently disposing of assets. Finally, CHUIDIAN stressed that throughout the four (4) years that the preliminary attachment had been in effect, the government had not set the case for hearing. Under Rule 17, Section 3, the case itself should be dismissed for laches owing to the Republics failure to pr osecute its action for an unreasonable length of time. Accordingly, the preliminary attachment, being only a temporary or ancillary remedy, must be lifted and the PNB ordered to immediately pay the proceeds of the L/C to CHUIDIAN. Sandigabayan: DENIED CHUIDIANs motion to lift attachment. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari contending that the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. ISSUE: WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED CHUIDIANS MOTION TO LIFT ATTACHMENT. HELD: NO. CHUIDIAN FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE SB gravely abused its discretion in a whimsical, capricious and arbitrary manner. There are no compelling reasons to warrant the immediate lifting of the attachment even as the main case is still pending. RATIO: (1) TWO COURSES OF ACTION ARE AVAILABLE TO CHUIDIAN TO QUASH THE ATTACHMENT. First. To file a counterbond in accordance with Rule 57, Section 12, which provides: SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. At anytime after an order of attachment has been granted, the party whose property has been attached, or the person appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice to the applicant, apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is pending, for an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the security given. The judge shall, after hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if a cash deposit is made, or a counterbond executed to the attaching creditor is filed, on behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where the application is made, in an amount equal to the value of the property attached as determined by the judge, to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. Upon the filing of such counter-bond, copy thereof shall forthwith be served on the attaching creditor or his lawyer. Upon the discharge of an attachment in accordance with the provisions of this section the property attached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party making the deposit or giving the counter-bond, or the person appearing on

his behalf, the deposit or counter-bond aforesaid standing in place of the property so released. Should such counterbond for any reason be found to be, or become, insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file an additional counter-bond, the attaching creditor may apply for a new order of attachment. or Second. To quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or improvidently issued, as provided for in Section 13 of the same Rule: SEC. 13. Discharge of attachment for improper or irregular issuance. - The party whose property has been attached may also, at any time either before or after the release of the attached property, or before any attachment shall have been actually levied, upon reasonable notice to the attaching creditor, apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the action is pending, for an order to discharge the attachment on the ground that the same was improperly or irregularly issued. If the motion be made on affidavits on the part of the party whose property has been attached, but not otherwise, the attaching creditor may oppose the same by counter-affidavits or other evidence in addition to that on which the attachment was made. After hearing, the judge shall order the discharge of the attachment if it appears that it was improperly or irregularly issued and the defect is not cured forthwith. (2) CHUIDIAN CHOSE SEC. 13, RULE 57 AS BASIS FOR HIS MOTION TO LIFT ATTACHMENT. It would appear that CHUIDIAN chose the latter because the grounds he raised assail the propriety of the issuance of the writ of attachment. By his own admission, however, he repeatedly acknowledged that his justifications to warrant the lifting of the attachment are facts or events that came to light or took place after the writ of attachment had already been implemented. More particularly, CHUIDIAN emphasized that four (4) years after the writ was issued, he had returned to the Philippines. Yet while he noted that he would have returned earlier but for the cancellation of his passport by the PCGG, he was not barred from returning to the Philippines. Then he informed the Sandiganbayan that while the case against him was pending, but after the attachment had already been executed, the government lost two (2) cases for fraud lodged against him before the U.S. Courts, thus invoking res judicata. Next, he also pointed out that the government is estopped from pursuing the case against him for failing to prosecute for the number of years that it had been pending litigation. (3) The grounds cited by CHUIDIAN have nothing to do with the issuance of the writ of attachment. SUPERVENING EVENTS ARE NOT WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THIS PARTICULAR RULE. These grounds have nothing to do with the issuance of the writ of attachment. Much less do they attack the issuance of the writ at that time as improper or irregular. And yet, the rule contemplates that the defect must be in the very issuance of the attachment writ. For instance, the attachment may be discharged under Section 13 of Rule 57 when it is proven that the allegations of the complaint were deceptively framed, or when the complaint fails to state a cause of action. Supervening events which may or may not justify the discharge of the writ are not within the purview of this particular rule. (4) There is no showing that the issuance of the writ of attachment was attended by impropriety or irregularity. Apart from seeking a reconsideration of the resolution granting the application for the writ, CHUIDIAN no longer questioned the writ itself. For four (4) long years he kept silent and did not exercise any of the remedies available to a defendant whose property or asset has been attached. It is rather too late in the day for CHUIDIAN to question the propriety of the issuance of the writ. (5) WHEN THE PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT IS ISSUED UPON A GROUND WHICH IS AT THE SAME TIME THE APPLICANTS CAUSE OF ACTION THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ALLOWED TO FILE A MOTION TO DISSOLVE THE ATTACHMENT UNDER SECTION 13 OF RULE 57. That there was no evidence of fraud on record other than the affidavit of PCGG Chairman Gunigundo does not affect the validity of the issuance of the writ. This issue of fraud touches on the very merits of the main case which accuses CHUIDIAN of committing fraudulent acts in his dealings with the government. Moreover, this alleged fraud was one of the grounds for the application of the writ, and the Sandiganbayan granted said application after it found a prima facie case of fraud committed by CHUIDIAN.

In fine, fraud was not only one of the grounds for the issuance of the preliminary attachment, it was at the same time the governments cause of action in the main case. We have uniformly held that: when the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicants cause of action; e.g., an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty, or an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud in contr acting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, the defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiffs application and affidavits on which the writ was based and consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued the reason being that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. In other words, the merits of the action would be ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the regular trial. Thus, the merits of the action in which a writ of preliminary attachment has been issued are not triable on a motion for dissolution of the attachment, otherwise an applicant for the lifting of the writ could force a trial of the merits of the case on a mere motion. It is not the Republics fault that the litigation has been protracted. There is as yet no evidence of fraud on the part of CHUIDIAN. CHUIDIAN is only one of the twenty-three (23) defendants in the main action. As such, the litigation would take longer than most cases. CHUIDIAN cannot invoke this delay in the proceedings as an excuse for not seeking the proper recourse in having the writ of attachment lifted in due time. If ever laches set in, it was CHUIDIAN, not the government, who failed to take action within a reasonable time period. Challenging the issuance of the writ of attachment four (4) years after its implementation showed CHUIDIANs apparent indifference towards the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. Thus, when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicants cause of action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is by a counterbond, in accordance with Section 12 of the same rule. This recourse, however, was not availed of by CHUIDIAN. To reiterate, there are only two ways of quashing a writ of attachment: (a) by filing a counterbond immediately; or (b) by moving to quash on the ground of improper and irregular issuance. These grounds for the dissolution of an attachment are fixed in Rule 57 of the Rules of Court and the power of the Court to dissolve an attachment is circumscribed by the grounds specified therein. CHUIDIANs motion to lift attachment failed to demonstrate any infirmity or defect in the issuance of the writ of attachment; neither did he file a counterbond. (6) To discharge the attachment at this stage of the proceedings would render inutile any favorable judgment should the government prevail in the principal action against petitioner. In sum, CHUIDIAN has failed to convince the SC that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in a whimsical, capricious and arbitrary manner. There are no compelling reasons to warrant the immediate lifting of the attachment even as the main case is still pending. On the other hand, allowing the discharge of the attachment at this stage of the proceedings would put in jeopardy the right of the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action. It would have the effect of prejudging the main case. The attachment is a mere provisional remedy to ensure the safety and preservation of the thing attached until the plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have such property applied to its satisfaction. To discharge the attachment at this stage of the proceedings would render inutile any favorable judgment should the government prevail in the principal action against petitioner. Thus, the Sandiganbayan, in issuing the questioned resolutions, which are interlocutory in nature, committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As long as the Sandiganbayan acted within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by special civil action of certiorari.

3) LUZ DU vs. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE CO. 432 SCRA G.R. No. 156580 June 14, 2004 PANGANIBAN, J.: This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which sustained the RTCs ruling that STRONGHOLD had superior rights over the subject property.

FACTS: Aurora Olarte de Leon was the registered owner of the subject property. Sometime in January 1989, De Leon sold said property to Luz Du under a Conditional Deed of Sale wherein said vendee paid a down payment of P75,000.00 leaving a balance of P95,000.00. On April 28, 1989, Aurora de Leon sold the same property to spouses Enrique and Rosita Caliwag without prior notice to Luz Du. As a result, the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in de Leons name was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in favor of the Caliwag spouses. On August 7, 1990 the writ of preliminary attachment was duly annotated at the back of the TCT in the name of the spouses Caliwag, pursuant a Civil Case initiated by Stronghold Insurance Corp., Inc. against spouses Caliwag et al. (Civil Case No. 90-1848), for allegedly defrauding STRONGHOLD and misappropriating the companys fund by falsifying and simulating purchases of documentary stamps, which action was accompanied by a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment. On December 21, 1990, DU initiated a Civil Case against Aurora de Leon and the spouses Caliwag for the annulment of the sale by De Leon in favor of the Caliwags (Civil Case No. 60319), anchored on the earlier mentioned Deed of Conditional Sale. On January 3, 1991, DU caused the annotation of a Notice Of Lis Pendens at the back of the spouses Caliwags TCT. On February 11, 1991, the decision was handed down in Civil Case No. 90-1848 in favor of STRONGHOLD. When the decision became final and executory, on March 12, 1991, a notice of levy on execution was annotated on spouses Caliwags TCT and the attached property was sold in a public auction. On August 5, 1991, the certificate of sale and the final Deed of Sale in favor of STRONGHOLD were inscribed and annotated leading to the cancellation of Spouses Caliwags TCT and in lieu thereof, a TCT was issued in the name of STRONGHOLD. On August 5, 1992, DU too was able to secure a favorable judgment in Civil Case No. 60319 and which became final and executory sometime in 1993, as well. DU commenced the present case to cancel the TCT in STRONGHOLDS name with damages claiming priority rights over the property by virtue of her Notice Of Lis Pendens under Entry No. 13305 and inscribed on January 3, 1991, and the final and executory decision in Civil Case No. 60319 she filed against spouses Caliwag. According to DU, despite her said notice of lis pendens annotated, STRONGHOLD still proceeded with the execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 90-1848 against the subject lot and ultimately the issuance of the TCT in their name. RTC: Held that there was no basis to nullify the issuance of the TCT in STRONGHOLDs name, after the latter had purchased the property in a public auction. The RTC ruled that STRONGHOLD had superior rights over the property because of the prior registration of the latters notice of levy on attachment on the TCT then in the name of spouses Caliwag. CA: SUSTAINED the RTC. The CA held (1) that since STRONGHOLDs notice of levy on attachment had been registered almost five (5) months before DUs notice of lis pendens, STRONGHOLD, therefore, enjoyed priority in time. (2) Such registration constituted constructive notice to DU and all third persons from the time of STRONGHOLDs entry, as provided under the Land Registration Act -- now the Property Registration Decree. (3) The CA also held that STRONGHOLD was a purchaser in good faith. The necessary sequels of execution and sale retroacted to the time when STRONGHOLD registered its notice of levy on attachment, at a time when there was nothing on TCT No. 2200 that would show any defect in the title or any adverse claim over the property. Hence, this Petition. DU: submits that her unregistered right over the property by way of a prior conditional sale in 1989 enjoys preference over the lien of STRONGHOLD -- a lien that was created by the registration of STRONGHOLDs levy on attachment in 1990. Maintaining that the ruling in Capistrano v. PNB was improperly applied by the Court of Appeals, she avers that unlike the circumstances in that case, the property herein had been sold to her before the levy. ISSUE 1: WHETHER A NOTICE OF LEVY ON ATTACHMENT ON THE PROPERTY IS A SUPERIOR LIEN OVER THAT OF THE UNREGISTERED RIGHT OF A BUYER OF A PROPERTY IN POSSESSION PURSUANT TO A DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE.

HELD: YES. A LEVY ON EXECUTION DULY REGISTERED TAKES PREFERENCE OVER A PRIOR UNREGISTERED SALE. RATIO: (1) Preference is given to a duly registered attachment over a subsequent notice of lis pendens, even if the beneficiary of the notice acquired the subject property before the registration of the attachment. Under the Torrens system, the auction sale of an attached realty retroacts to the date the levy was registered. An attachment that is duly annotated on a certificate of title is superior to the right of a prior but unregistered buyer. Indeed, the subsequent sale of the property to the attaching creditor must, of necessity, retroact to the date of the levy. Otherwise, the preference created by the levy would be meaningless and illusory. So that even if the prior sale is subsequently registered before the sale in execution but after the levy was duly made, the validity of the execution sale should be maintained (2) Registration is the operative act that conveys and binds lands covered by Torrens titles. Sections 51 and 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides: SEC. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. - An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Registry of Deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or the city where the land lies. SEC. 52. Constructive notice upon registration. - Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering. As the property in this case was covered by the Torrens system, the registration of STRONGHOLDs attachment was the operative act that gave validity to the transfer and created a lien upon the land in favor of respondent. (3) The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the subsequent registration of the prior sale; that was the import of Capistrano v. PNB, which held that precedence should be given to a levy on attachment or execution, whose registration was before that of the prior sale; a notice of lis pendens does not establish a lien or an encumbrance on the property affected. STRONGHOLD had already registered its levy on attachment before DU annotated her notice of lis pendens. As in Capistrano, she invokes the alleged superior right of a prior unregistered buyer to overcome STRONGHOLDs lien. If either the third-party claim or the subsequent registration of the prior sale was insufficient to defeat the previously registered attachment lien, as ruled by the Court in Capistrano, it follows that a notice of lis pendens is likewise insufficient for the same purpose. Such notice does not establish a lien or an encumbrance on the property affected. As the name suggests, a notice of lis pendens with respect to a disputed property is intended merely to inform third persons that any of their transactions in connection therewith -- if entered into subsequent to the notation -- would be subject to the result of the suit. In view of the foregoing, the CA correctly applied Capistrano, as follows: the rule now followed is that if the attachment or levy of execution, though posterior to the sale, is registered before the sale is registered, it takes precedence over the latter. The auction sale being a necessary sequel to the levy, for this was effected precisely to carry out the sale, the purchase made by STRONGHOLD at said auction should enjoy the same legal priority that the levy had over the sale in favor of DU. In other words, the auction sale retroacts to the date of the levy. Were the rule otherwise, the preference enjoyed by the levy of execution in a case like the present would be meaningless and illusory. ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE ACQUISITION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY RESPONDENT STRONGHOLD WAS TAINTED WITH BAD FAITH.

HELD: NO; WHEN STRONGHOLD REGISTERED ITS NOTICE OF ATTACHMENT, IT DID NOT KNOW THAT THE LAND BEING ATTACHED HAD BEEN SOLD TO DU. RATIO: It had no such knowledge precisely because the sale, unlike the attachment, had not been registered. a person dealing with registered property may rely on the title and be charged with notice of only such burdens and claims as are annotated thereon.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/jun2004/156580.htm - _ftn20 This principle applies with more force to this case, absent any allegation or proof that STRONGHOLD had actual knowledge of the sale to DU before the registration of its attachment. Thus, the annotation of STRONGHOLDs notice of attachment was a registration in good faith, the kind that made its prior right enforceable. Moreover, it is only after the notice of lis pendens is inscribed in the Office of the Register of Deeds that purchasers of the property become bound by the judgment in the case. As STRONGHOLD is deemed to have acquired the property -- not at the time of actual purchase but at the time of the attachment -- it was an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith.

4) D.M. WENCESLAO and ASSOCIATES, INC., and/or DOMINADOR S. DAYRIT vs. READYCON TRADING AND CONSTRUCTION CORP. 433 SCRA G.R. No. 154106 June 29, 2004 QUISUMBING, J.: This petition for review assails the CAs decision as well as its resolution denying D.M. WENCESLAOs motion for reconsideration. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC, ordering D.M. WENCESLAO and DAYRIT to pay the sum of P1,014,110.45 with interest rate of 12% per annum (compounded annually) from August 9, 1991, the date of filing of the complaint, until fully paid to READYCON TRADING AND CONSTRUCTION CORP., plus damages. FACTS: D.M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. (WENCESLAO,) is a domestic corporation, organized under and existing pursuant to Philippine laws, engaged in the construction business. Its co-petitioner, Dominador Dayrit, is the vicepresident of said company. Readycon Trading and Construction Corporation (READYCON is likewise a corporate entity organized in accordance with Philippine laws. Its primary business is the manufacture and sale of asphalt materials. WENCESLAO had a contract with the Public Estates Authority (PEA) for the improvement of the main expressway in the R-1 Toll Project along the Coastal Road in Paraaque City. To fulfill its obligations to the PEA, WENCESLAO entered into a contract with READYCON on April 16, 1991. READYCON agreed to sell to WENCESLAO asphalt materials valued at P1,178,308.75. The contract bore the signature of co-petitioner DAYRIT, as signatory officer for WENCESLAO in this agreement. Under the contract, WENCESLAO was bound to pay respondent a twenty percent (20%) downpayment, or P235,661.75, upon delivery of the materials contracted for. The balance of the contract price, amounting to P942,647, was to be paid within fifteen (15) days thereof. It was further stipulated by the parties that respondent was to furnish, deliver, lay, roll the asphalt, and if necessary, make the needed corrections on a prepared base at the jobsite. On April 22, 1991, READYCON delivered the assorted asphalt materials worth P1,150,531.75. Accordingly, WENCESLAO paid the downpayment of P235,661.75 to READYCON. Thereafter, READYCON performed its obligation to lay and roll the asphalt materials on the jobsite. Fifteen (15) days after performance of said work, READYCON demanded that WENCESLAO pay the balance of the contract price. WENCESLAO, however, ignored said demand. On May 30, 1991, the counsel for READYCON wrote a demand letter to WENCESLAO asking that it make good on the balance it owed. WENCESLAO did not reply to said demand letter. Thus, on July 19, 1991, READYCON filed a complaint with the RTC for collection of a sum of money and damages, with prayer for writ of preliminary attachment against WENCESLAO and/or DAYRIT. As READYCON timely posted the required bond of P1,150,000, its application for the writ of preliminary attachment was granted. On September 5, 1991, the RTC Sheriff attached certain assets of WENCESLAO, consisting of several heavy equipment. On September 16, 1991, WENCESLAO moved for the release of the attached equipments and posted its counter-bond. The trial court granted the motion and directed the RTC Sheriff to return the attached equipments. On September 25, 1991, the Sheriff released the attached heavy machineries to WENCESLAO.

WENCESLAO admitted that it owed READYCON. However, it alleged that their contract was not merely one of sale but also of service, namely, that READYCON shall lay the asphalt in accordance with the specifications and standards imposed by and acceptable to the government. WENCESLAO also alleged that READYCON agreed that the balance in the payments would be settled only after the government had accepted READYCONs work as to its quality in laying the asphalt. By way of counterclaim, WENCESLAO prayed for the payment of damages caused by the filing of READYCONs complaint and the issuance of the writ of attachment despite lack of cause. RTC: Rendered judgment IN FAVOR of READYCON. CA: AFFIRMED in toto the RTC Decision. The CA found that contrary to WENCESLAOs assertion, malice and bad faith in obtaining a writ of attachment must be proved before a claim for damages on account of wrongful attachment will prosper, citing Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 196 SCRA 29 (1991). The CA stressed that the trial court found neither malice nor bad faith relative to the filing of the complaint and the obtaining of the writ of attachment. Also, according to the CA, WENCESLAO did not adduce evidence to show that the attachment caused damage to the pieces of heavy equipment subject of the levy on attachment. Hence, the instant petition wherein WENCESLAO argues, among others, the liability of READYCON for damages caused by the issuance and enforcement of the writ of preliminary attachment. WENCESLAO: relying mainly on Lazatin v. Twano and Castro, 112 Phil. 733 (1961), where the SC held that actual or compensatory damages may be recovered for wrongful, though not malicious, attachment. Lazatin also held that attorneys fees may be recovered under Article 2208 of the Civil Code. WENCESLAO contend that Lazatin applies in the instant case because the wrongful attachment of WENCESLAOs equipment resulted in a paralysis of its operations, causing it to sustain a loss of P100,000 per day in terms of accomplishment of work. Since the attachment lasted 19 days it suffered a total loss of P1.9 million. Aside from that, it had to spend P50,000 on the pullout of the equipment and another P100,000 to repair and restore them to their former working condition. READYCON: counters that inasmuch as a preliminary attachment is an available ancillary remedy under the rules, a penalty cannot be meted out for the enforcement of a right, such as in this case when it sought such relief. It stresses that the writ was legally issued by the RTC, upon a finding that READYCON sought the relief without malice or bad faith. Furthermore, WENCESLAO failed to show concrete and credible proof of the damages it suffered. The issuance of a writ and its enforcement entail a rigorous process where the court found that it was not attended by malice or bad faith. It cites Mindanao Savings and Loan Association v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 480 (1989), to the effect where a counter-bond is filed, the right to question the irregularity and propriety of the writ of attachment must be deemed waived since the ground for the issuance of the writ forms the core of the complaint. ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE FILING OF A COUNTER-BOND IS TANTAMOUNT TO A WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO QUESTION THE IRREGULARITY AND PROPRIETY OF THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT. HELD: NO; THE POSTING OF A COUNTER-BOND IS NOT TANTAMOUNT TO A WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO DAMAGES ARISING FROM A WRONGFUL ATTACHMENT. RATIO: The attachment debtor cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the issuance of the attachment writ by simply availing himself of one way of discharging the attachment writ, instead of the other. The SC has, in previous cases such as Calderon v. Intermediate Appellate Court, ruled that: Whether the attachment was discharged by either of the two (2) ways indicated in the law, i.e., by filing a counterbond or by showing that the order of attachment was improperly or irregularly issued, the liability of the surety on the attachment bond subsists because the final reckoning is when the Court shall finally adjudge that the attaching creditor was not entitled to the issuance of the attachment writ in the first place. The attachment debtor cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the issuance of the attachment writ by simply availing himself of one way of discharging the attachment writ, instead of the other. Moreover, the filing of a counterbond is a speedier way of discharging the attachment writ maliciously sought out by the attaching party creditor instead of the other way, which in most instances would require presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot easily be settled in a pending incident of the case. ISSUE 2: WHETHER READYCON IS LIABLE TO WENCESLAO FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE ISSUANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT.

HELD: NO. WENCESLAO IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES. RATIO: (1) There is no hard and fast rule that bad faith or malice must be proved to recover any form of damages; Mere existence of malice and bad faith would not per se warrant the award of actual or compensatory damages. In Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank, the SC found bad faith and malice to be present, thereby warranting the award of moral and exemplary damages. But the SC denied the award of actual damages for want of evidence to show said damages. For the mere existence of malice and bad faith would not per se warrant the award of actual or compensatory damages. To grant such damages, sufficient proof thereon is required. (2) In the present case, proof of malice and bad faith are unnecessary. Just like in Lazatin and MC Engineering, what is involved here is the issue of actual and compensatory damages, therefore, proof of malice and bad faith are unnecessary. (3) Both the trial and the appellate courts held that the complaint had merit. The two courts found READYCON entitled to a writ of preliminary attachment as a provisional remedy by which the property of the defendant is taken into custody of the law as a security for the satisfaction of any judgment which the plaintiff may recover. Rule 57, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that: SEC. 4. Condition of applicants bond. - The party applying for the order must thereafter give a bond executed to the adverse party in the amount fixed by the court in its order granting the issuance of the writ, conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto . In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found no reason to rule that READYCON was not entitled to issuance of the writ. There is likewise no reason to rule that the writ is improper or illegal. If WENCESLAO suffered damages as a result, it is merely because it did not heed the demand letter of READYCON in the first place. WENCESLAO could have averted such damage if it immediately filed a counter-bond or a deposit in order to lift the writ at once. It did not, and must bear its own loss, if any, on that account.

5) SOFIA TORRES, et al. vs. NICANOR SATSATIN, et al. 605 SCRA G.R. No. 166759 November 25, 2009 PERALTA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the CA and its Resolution denying SOFIA TORRES et al.s motion for reconsideration. FACTS: The TORRES siblings, Sofia, Fructosa, and Mario each own adjacent 20,000 square meters track of land at Barrio Lankaan, Dasmarias, Cavite, covered by their respective Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs). Sometime in 1997, the TORRES siblings authorized NICANOR SATSATIN, through a Special Power of Attorney, to negotiate for the sale of the properties. Sometime in 1999, NICANOR offered to sell the properties to SOLAR RESOURCES, INC. SOLAR allegedly agreed to purchase the three parcels of land. TORRES siblings claim that: (1) NICANOR was supposed to remit to them the total amount of P28,000,000.00 or P9,333,333.00 each. (2) That SOLAR has already paid the entire purchase price of P35,000,000.00 to NICANOR in Thirty-Two (32) post-dated checks which the latter encashed/deposited on their respective due dates. (3) That during the period from January 2000 to April 2002, NICANOR allegedly acquired a house and lot at Vista Grande BF Resort Village, Las Pias City and a car, which he registered in the names of his unemployed children. However, notwithstanding the receipt of the entire payment for the subject property, NICANOR only remitted the total amount ofP9,000,000.00, leaving an unremitted balance of P19,000,000.00. Despite repeated verbal and written demands, NICANOR failed to remit to them the balance of P19,000,000.00. Consequently, on October 25, 2002, the TORRES siblings filed before the RTC a Complaint for sum of money and damages, against NICANOR, his wife, and children. On October 30, 2002, the TORRES siblings filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment, alleging among other things: that NICANOR, et al. are about to depart the Philippines; that they have

properties, real and personal in Metro Manila and in the nearby provinces; that the amount due them is P19,000,000.00 above all other claims; that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced; and that they are willing to post a bond fixed by the court to answer for all costs which may be adjudged to NICANOR, et al. and all damages which the latter may sustain by reason of the attachment prayed for, if it shall be finally adjudged that the TORRES siblings are not entitled thereto. Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order directing the TORRES siblings to post a bond in the amount ofP7,000,000.00 before the court issues the writ of attachment. On November 15, 2002, the TORRES siblings filed a Motion for Deputation of Sheriff, informing the court that they have already filed an attachment bond. They also prayed that a sheriff be deputized to serve the writ of attachment that would be issued by the court. The RTC granted the above motion and deputized the sheriff, together with police security assistance, to serve the writ of attachment. RTC: thereafter, issued a Writ of Attachment dated November 15, 2002, directing the sheriff to attach the estate, real or personal NICANOR, et al. On November 19, 2002, a copy of the writ of attachment was served upon the respondents. On the same date, the sheriff levied the real and personal properties of the respondent, including household appliances, cars, and a parcel of land located at Las Pias, Manila. On November 21, 2002, summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served upon NICANOR, et al. On the same day NICANOR, et al. filed their answer (November 29, 2002), they also filed a Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment anchored on the following grounds: the bond was issued before the issuance of the writ of attachment; the writ of attachment was issued before the summons was received by the respondents; the sheriff did not serve copies of the application for attachment, order of attachment, plaintiffs af fidavit, and attachment bond, to the respondents; the sheriff did not submit a sheriffs return in violation of the Rules; and the grounds cited for the issuance of the writ are baseless and devoid of merit. In the alternative, NICANOR, et al. offered to post a counter-bond for the lifting of the writ of attachment. RTC DENIED NICANORs motion, but at the same time, directed NICANOR, et al to file a counter -bond. On a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, NICANOR, et al. argued that the subject writ was improper and irregular having been issued and enforced without the lower court acquiring jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents. They maintained that the writ of attachment was implemented without serving upon them the summons together with the complaint. They also argued that the bond issued in favor of the TORRES siblings was defective because the bonding company failed to obtain the proper clearance that it can transact business with the RTC of Dasmarias, Cavite. They added that the various clearances which were issued in favor of the bonding company were applicable only in the courts of the cities of Pasay, Pasig, Manila, and Makati, but not in the RTC, Imus, Cavite. CA: found that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC and, thereby, ordered the Writ of Attachment issued by the RTC LIFTED. Hence, this petition, wherein the TORRES siblings argue that, as in the case of FCY Construction Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the only way the subject writ of attachment can be dissolved is by a counter-bond. They claim that NICANOR, et al. are not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the hearing on the motion for the dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial on the merits, considering that the writ of preliminary attachment was issued upon a ground which is, at the same time, the applicants cause of action. They insist that the determination of the existence of grounds to discharge a writ of attachment rests in the sound discretion of the lower court. They argue that the Certification issued by the Office of the Administrator and the Certifications issued by the clerks of court of the RTCs of Dasmarias and Imus, Cavite, would show that the bonds offered by Western Guaranty Corporation, the bonding company which issued the bond, may be accepted by the RTCs of Dasmarias and Imus, Cavite, and that the said bonding company has no pending liability with the government. ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RTC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GRANTING THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT DESPITE THE BOND BEING INSUFFICIENT AND HAVING BEEN IMPROPERLY ISSUED.

HELD: NO, THE CA CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN APPROVING THE BOND POSTED BY PETITIONERS DESPITE THE FACT THAT NOT ALL THE REQUISITES FOR ITS APPROVAL WERE COMPLIED WITH. RATIO: (1) In accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that all the requisites for its approval are met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected. Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme Court showing that the company concerned is qualified to transact business which is valid only for thirty (30) days from the date of its issuance. However, it is apparent that the Certification issued by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) at the time the bond was issued clearly show that the bonds offered by Western Guaranty Corporation may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati, Pasay, and Pasig. Therefore, the surety bond issued by the bonding company should not have been accepted by the RTC of Dasmarias since the certification secured by the bonding company from the OCA at the time of the issuance of the bond certified that it may only be accepted in the abovementioned cities. Thus, the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it issued the writ of attachment founded on the said bond. ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN ORDERING THE LIFTING OF THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13, RULE 57 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. HELD: NO, THE CA CORRECTLY ORDERED THE LIFTNG OF THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT BASED ON SECTION 13 OF RULE 57. RATIO: (1) Whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of defendant, an order of attachment and writ of attachment, these do not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained by the court. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy of the applicants affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required by Section 5 of Rule 57 , but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the complaint. (2) Once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. The grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant. Thus, it is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also upon consideration of fairness, to apprise the defendant of the complaint against him and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the grounds therefor that prior or contemporaneously to the serving of the writ of attachment, service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint, the application for attachment, the applicants affidavit and bond, and the order must be served upon him. (3) In the instant case, at the time the writ was implemented, the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the persons of NICANOR, et al. since no summons was yet served upon them. Consequently, even if the writ of attachment was validly issued, it was improperly or irregularly enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and affect NICANOR, et al. At the time the trial court issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, it can validly to do so since the motion for its issuance can be filed at the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment. However, at the time the writ was implemented, the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent since no summons was yet served upon them. The proper officer should have previously or simultaneously with the implementation of the writ of attachment, served a copy of the summons upon the respondents in order for the trial court to have acquired jurisdiction upon them and for the writ to have binding effect.

(4) The grounds on which the NICANOR, et al. base the lifting of the writ of attachment are the irregularities in its issuance and in the service of the writ; not the TORRES siblingscause of action. Although an attachment may not be dissolved by a showing of its irregular or improper issuance if it is upon a ground which is at the same time the applicants cause of action in the main case, since an anomalous situation would result if the issues of the main case would be ventilated and resolved in a mere hearing of a motion. However, the same is not applicable in the case bar. It is clear from NICANOR, et al.s pleadings that the grounds on which they base the lifting of the writ of attachment are the irregularities in its issuance and in the service of the writ; not petitioners cause of action.

ISSUE 3: WHETHER NICANOR, ET AL. ARE BARRED BY ESTOPPEL FROM QUESTIONING THE ORDERS OF THE RTC ISSUING THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT. HELD: NO, THE ATTACHMENT DEBTOR CANNOT BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED ANY DEFECT IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE ATTACHMENT WRIT BY SIMPLY AVAILING HIMSELF OF ONE WAY OF DISCHARGING THE ATTACHMENT WRIT, INSTEAD OF THE OTHER. RATIO: (1) Whether the attachment was discharged by either of the two ways indicated in the law, the attachment debtor cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the issuance of the attachment writ by simply availing himself of one way of discharging the attachment writ, instead of the other. There are two ways of discharging the attachment. First, to file a counter-bond in accordance with Section 12 of Rule 57. Second[,] [t]o quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or improvidently issued, as provided for in Section 13 of the same rule. Whether the attachment was discharged by either of the two ways indicated in the law, the attachment debtor cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the issuance of the attachment writ by simply availing himself of one way of discharging the attachment writ, instead of the other. The filing of a counter-bond is merely a speedier way of discharging the attachment writ instead of the other way.

6) METRO, INC. et al. (Petitioners) vs. LARAS GIFTS AND DECORS, INC., et al. (Respondents) 606 SCRA 175 G.R. No. 171741 November 27, 2009 CARPIO, J.: This is a petition for review of the Decision of the CA granting the petition for certiorari of PETITIONERS (Laras Gifts and Decors, Inc., Luis Villafuerte, Jr., and Lara Maria R. Villafuerte) and its Resolution denying RESPONDENTS (Metro Inc., Frederick Juan, and Liza Juan) motion for reconsideration. FACTS: Laras Gifts and Decors Inc. (LGD) and Metro, Inc. are corporations engaged in the business of manufacturing, producing, selling and exporting handicrafts. Luis Villafuerte, Jr. and Lara Maria R. Villafuerte are the president and vice-president of LGD respectively. Frederick Juan and Liza Juan are the principal officers of Metro, Inc. Sometime in 2001, PETITIONERS and RESPONDENTS agreed that RESPONDENTS would endorse to PETITIONERS purchase orders received by RESPONDENTS from their buyers in the United States of America in exchange for a 15% commission, to be shared equally by RESPONDENTS and LGDs agent. The terms of the agreement were later embodied in an e-mail labeled as the 2001 Agreement. In May 2003, RESPONDENTS filed with the RTC a complaint against PETITIONERS for sum of money and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. The RTC granted RESPONDENTS prayer and issued the writ of attachment against the properties and assets of PETITIONERS. On 26 June 2003, PETITIONERS filed a motion to discharge the writ of attachment. PETITIONERS argued that the writ of attachment should be discharged on the following grounds: (1) that the 2001 agreement was not a valid contract because it did not show that there was a meeting of the minds between the parties; (2) assuming that the 2001 agreement was a valid contract, the same was inadmissible because RESPONDENTS failed to authenticate it in accordance with the Rules on Electronic Evidence; (3) that RESPONDENTS failed to substantiate their allegations of fraud with specific acts or deeds showing how PETITIONERS defrauded them; and (4) that respondents failed to establish that the unpaid commissions were already due and demandable. RTC: GRANTED PETITIONERS motion and LIFTED the writ of attachment for lack of evidence of fraud.

RESPONDENTS filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the discharge of the writ of attachment without requiring PETITIONERS to post a counter-bond. CA: ANNULLED and SET ASIDE the Order of the RTC. It held that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the discharge of the writ of attachment without requiring PETITIONERS to post a counterbond. The CA said that when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time also the applicants cause of action, courts are precluded from hearing the motion for dissolution of the writ when such hearing would necessarily force a trial on the merits of a case on a mere motion. The CA pointed out that, in this case, fraud was not only alleged as the ground for the issuance of the writ of attachment, but was actually the core of RESPONDENTS complaint. The CA declared that the only way that the writ of attachment can be discharged is by posting a counter-bond in accordance with Section 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Hence, this petition, wherein PETITIONERS insist that RESPONDENTS failed to show that the writ of attachment was issued upon a ground which is at the same time also RESPONDENTS cause of action. PETITIONERS maintain that RESPONDENTS amended complaint was not an action based on fraud but was a simple case for collection of sum of money plus damages. ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS IMPROPERLY ISSUED SUCH THAT IT MAY BE DISCHARGED WITHOUT THE FILING OF A COUNTER-BOND. HELD: NO, THE RULE THAT WHEN THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT IS ISSUED UPON A GROUND WHICH IS AT THE SAME TIME THE APPLICANTS CAUSE OF ACTION, THE ONLY OTHER WAY THE WRIT CAN BE LIFTED OR DISSOLVED IS BY A COUNTER-BOND IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE. RATIO: (1) To sustain an attachment based on Section 1(d), Rule 57, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The basis of RESPONDENTS application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment is Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court which provides: SEC. 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. At the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that maybe recovered in the following cases: x x x (d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof; x x x In Liberty Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the SC explained: To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the other party into giving consent which he would not have otherwise given. To constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud should be committed upon contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, as it is in this case. (2) The applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtors mere non -payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. (3) RESPONDENTS allegation that PETITIONERS undertook to sell exclusively and only through JRP/LGD for Target Stores Corporation but that PETITIONERS transacted directly with RESPONDENTS foreign buyer is sufficient allegation of fraud to support their application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Since the writ of preliminary attachment was properly issued, the only way it can be dissolved is by filing a counter-bond in accordance with Section 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. RESPONDENTS alleged the following in support of their prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment:

5. Sometime in early 2001, defendant Frederick Juan approached plaintiff spouses and asked them to help defendants export business. Defendants enticed plaintiffs to enter into a business deal. He proposed to plaintiff spouses the following: a. That plaintiffs transfer and endorse to defendant Metro some of the Purchase Orders (POs) they will receive from their US buyers; b. That defendants will sell exclusively and only thru plaintiffs for their US buyer; 6. After several discussions on the matter and further inducement on the part of defendant spouses, plaintiff spouses agreed. Thus, on April 21, 2001, defendant spouses confirmed and finalized the agreement in a letter-document entitled 2001 Agreement they emailed to plaintiff spouses XXX. 20. Defendants are guilty of fraud committed both at the inception of the agreement and in the performance of the obligation. Through machinations and schemes, defendants successfully enticed plaintiffs to enter into the 2001 Agreement. In order to secure plaintiffs full trust in them and lure plaintiffs to endorse more POs and increase the volume of the orders, defendants during the early part, remitted to plaintiffs shares under the Agreement. 21. However, soon thereafter, just when the orders increased and the amount involved likewise increased, defendants suddenly, without any justifiable reasons and in pure bad faith and fraud, abandoned their contractual obligations to remit to plaintiffs their shares. And worse, defendants transacted directly with plaintiffs foreign buyer to the latters exclusion and damage. Clearly, defendants planned everything from the beginning, employed ploy and machinations to defraud plaintiffs, and consequently take from them a valuable client. 22. Defendants are likewise guilty of fraud by violating the trust and confidence reposed upon them by plaintiffs. Defendants received the proceeds of plaintiffs LCs with the clear obligation of remitting 15% thereof to the plaintiffs. Their refusal and failure to remit the said amount despite demand constitutes a breach of trust amounting to malice and fraud. The RESPONDENTS allegation that PETITIONERS un dertook to sell exclusively and only through JRP/LGD for Target Stores Corporation but that PETITIONERS transacted directly with RESPONDENTS foreign buyer is sufficient allegation of fraud to support their application for a writ of preliminary attachment. (4) THE CAS RELIANCE ON CHUIDIAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN, FCY CONSTRUCTION GROUP, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS, AND LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS IS PROPER. The rule that when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicants cause of action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is by a counter -bond is applicable in this case. It is clear that in RESPONDENTS amended complaint of fraud is not only alleged as a ground for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment, but it is also the core of RESPONDENTS complaint. The fear of the CA that PETITIONERS could force a trial on the merits of the case on the strength of a mere motion to dissolve the attachment has a basis.

RULE 58: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 1) TERESITA V. IDOLOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. 352 SCRA G.R. No. 141853 February 7, 2001 GONZAGA-REYES, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by TERESITA IDOLOR which seeks to set aside the decision of the CA which reversed the Order of the RTC granting IDOLORs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and the resolution denying IDOLORs motion for reconsideration. FACTS: On March 21, 1994, to secure a loan of P520,000.00, IDOLOR executed in favor of GUMERSINDO DE GUZMAN a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage on or before September 20, 1994. On September 21, 1996, ILUMINADA DE GUZMAN, wife of GUMERSINDO, filed a complaint against IDOLOR before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Barangay Ramon Magsaysay, Quezon City, which resulted in a Kasunduang Pag-aayos, wherein the parties agreed to (a) a 90-day grace period to allow IDOLOR to settle the

loaned amount and that (b) failure to settle the above account on or before December 21, 1996, IDOLOR agrees to execute a deed of sale with the agreement to repurchase without interest within one year. IDOLOR failed to comply with her undertaking; thus GUMERSINDO filed a motion for execution before the Office of the Barangay captain who subsequently issued a certification to file action. On March 21, 1997, GUMERSINDO filed an extra judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage pursuant to the parties agreement set forth in the real estate mortgage dated March 21, 1994. On May 23, 1997, the mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to GUMERSINDO, as the highest bidder and consequently, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997. On June 25, 1998, IDOLOR filed with the RTC a complaint for annulment of Sheriffs Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction against Deputy Sheriffs Marino Cachero and Rodolfo Lescano and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City alleging among others alleged irregularity and lack of notice in the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings subject of the real estate mortgage. In the meantime, a temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court. RTC: ISSUED a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Deputy Sheriffs and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City from causing the issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject property in favor of the DE GUZMAN spouses. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the DE GUZMAN spouses. CA: On a petition for certiorari, the CA GRANTED the petition and ANNULLED the assailed writ of preliminary injunction. IDOLORs motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition, wherein IDOLOR claims that her proprietary right over the subject parcel of land was not yet lost since her right to redeem the subject land for a period of one year had neither lapsed nor run as the sheriffs certificate of sale was null and void; that she and the general public have not been validly notified of the auction sale conducted by respondent sheriffs; that the newspaper utilized in the publication of the notice of sale was not a newspaper of general circulation. ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENJOINING THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RESPONDENTS FROM CAUSING THE ISSUANCE OF A FINAL DEED OF SALE AND CONSOLIDATION OF OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IN FAVOR OF THE DE GUZMAN SPOUSES. HELD: YES, IDOLOR HAS NOT SHOWN THAT SHE IS ENTITLED TO THE EQUITABLE RELIEF OF INJUNCTION. RATIO: (1) Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. The existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. (2) IDOLOR has no more proprietary right to speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction. The mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to GUMERSINDO on May 23, 1997 and the sheriffs certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997. IDOLOR had one year from the registration of the sheriffs sale to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her right on or before June 23, 1998, thus spouses DE GUZMAN are now entitled to a conveyance and possession of the foreclosed property.

When IDOLOR filed her complaint for annulment of sheriffs sale against GUMERSINDO with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on June 25, 1998, she failed to show sufficient interest or title in the property sought to be protected as her right of redemption had already expired on June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2) days before the filing of the complaint. (3) It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought - in other words, that she shows no equity. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. (4) The Kasunduang Pag-aayos does not support IDOLORs contention that it novated the real estate mortgage since the will to novate did not appear by express agreement of the parties nor the old and the new contracts were incompatible in all points. Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation by a subsequent one which terminates it, either by changing its objects or principal conditions, or by substituting a new debtor in place of the old one, or by subrogating a third person to the rights of the creditor. Under the law, novation is never presumed. The parties to a contract must expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one. Accordingly, it was held that no novation of a contract had occurred when the new agreement entered into between the parties was intended to give life to the old one. IDOLOR expressly recognized in the Kasunduan the existence and the validity of the old obligation where she acknowledged her long overdue account since September 20, 1994 which was secured by a real estate mortgage and asked for a ninety (90) days grace period to settle her obligation on or before December 21, 1996 and that upon failure to do so, she will execute a deed of sale with a right to repurchase without interest within one year in favor of private respondents. Where the parties to the new obligation expressly recognize the continuing existence and validity of the old one, where, in other words, the parties expressly negated the lapsing of the old obligation, there can be no novation. Notably, the provision in the Kasunduang Pag-aayos regarding the execution of a deed of sale with right to repurchase within one year would have the same effect as the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage wherein IDOLOR was given one year from the registration of the sheriffs sale in the Registry of pr operty to redeem the property, i.e., failure to exercise the right of redemption would entitle the purchaser to possession of the property. It is not proper to consider an obligation novated by unimportant modifications which do not alter its essence. The period to pay the total amount of IDOLORs indebtedness inclusive of interest expired on December 21, 1996 and IDOLOR failed to execute a deed of sale with right to repurchase on the said date up to the time spouses DE GUZMAN filed their petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. IDOLORs failure to comply with her undertaking in the kasunduan to settle her obligation effectively delayed spouses DE GUZMANs right to extra-judicially foreclose the real estate mortgage which right accrued as far back as 1994. Thus, IDOLOR has not shown that she is entitled to the equitable relief of injunction. 2. RIMEO S. GUSTILO, complainant, vs. HON. RICARDO S. REAL, SR., Presiding Judge, 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Victorias-Manapla, Negros Occidental, respondent. 353 SCRA 1 A.M. No. MTJ-00-1250 February 28, 2001 QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: Respondent Judge Ricardo S. Real, Sr., of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Victorias-Manapla, Negros Occidental with gross misconduct, gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner was a candidate for punong barangay of Barangay Punta Mesa, Manapla, Negros Occidental. During the elections, the votes resulted into a tie between petitioner and his lone ooponent. The breaking of the tie by the Board of Canvassers was favor and he was proclaimed duly elected punong barangay of Punta Mesa, Manapla. His opponent filed an election protest which sought recounting of ballots in two precincts, preliminary

prohibitory injunction, and damages. Respondent ordered the issuance of summons to the parties and set the hearing on June 6, 1997. Libo-on filed a motion to advance the hearing to May 29 and 30, 1997. The hearing was advanced to May 29 and 30, 1997 cancelling the hearing for June 6, 1997. Complainant avers that he was not furnished a copy of this Order dated May 28, 1997. On May 30, 1997, complainant took his oath of office as punong barangay. That same day, he also filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Silay City, Negros Occidental, Branch 69 docketed as Special Civil Action No. 1936-69.The RTC lifted the TRO issued by respondent and declared as null and void the order nullifying complainant's proclamation as duly elected punong barangay. Believing that respondent could not decide Civil Case No. 703-M impartially, complainant moved for his inhibition. Respondent denied complainant's motion for inhibition and after hearing Libo-on's motion for permanent injunction, issued a second TRO to maintain the status quo between the contending parties. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of violating Rules 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, by knowingly rendering an unjust order, gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and bias and partiality. HELD: The COURT finds respondent judge GUILTY of violating Rules 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, knowingly rendering an unjust order, gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and bias and partiality. RATIO: Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides: 2. The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a summary hearingconducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records are transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted immediately after raffle (Emphasis supplied). xxx 4. With the exception of the provisions which necessarily involve multiple-sala stations, these rules shall apply to single-sala stations especially with regard to immediate notice to all parties of all applications for TRO. The foregoing clearly show that whenever an application for a TRO is filed, the court may act on the application only after all parties have been notified and heard in a summary hearing. In other words, a summary hearing may not be dispensed with. In the instant case, respondent admits that he issued the injunctive writ sought on May 29, 1997 after receiving the applicant's evidence ex parte. His failure to abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing the first TRO is grave abuse of authority, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: (1) there must be aright in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction to be directed is a violation of such right.The onus probandi is on movant to show that there exists a right to be protected, which is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined. Further, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent a serious damage. In this case, complainant had been duly proclaimed as the winning candidate for punong barangay. He had taken his oath of office. Unless his election was annulled, he was entitled to all the rights of said office. We do not see how the complainant's exercise of such rights would cause an irreparable injury or violate the right of the losing candidate so as to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order "to maintain the status quo." We see no reason to disagree with the finding of the OCA that the evident purpose of the second TRO was to prevent complainant from participating in the election of the Liga ng mga Barangay. Respondent must be held liable for violating Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that, "In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion, or fear of criticism."

3. MICHAEL J. LAGROSAS, Petitioner, - versus - BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB (PHIL.), INC./MEAD JOHNSON PHIL., RICHARD SMYTH as General Manager and FERDIE SARFATI, as Medical Sales Director,Respondents. x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB (PHIL.), INC./MEAD JOHNSON PHIL., Petitioner, - versus - COURT OF APPEALS and MICHAEL J. LAGROSAS, Respondents. 565 SCRA G.R. No. 168637 September 12, 2008 QUISUMBING, J.: FACTS: Petitioner is an employee of respondent. He was terminated after accidentally hitting his former girlfriend, who was his co-employee, when he saw her with Menguito following a district meeting in Alabang Town Center. Petitioner filed a case for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter declared that the dismissal was illegal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision but it later reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter after a motion for reconsideration. The arbiter issued a writ of execution. Bristol-Myers moved to quash the writ of execution contending that it timely filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. RULING OF CA: The court gave due course to the petition of Bristol-Myers and issued a TRO enjoining the enforcement of the writ of execution and notice of garnishment. Upon the expiration of TRO, the appellate court issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Bristol-Myers moved to release the TRO cash bond and injunction cash bond in view of the Decision dated January 28, 2005. The motion was denied as premature since the decision is not yet final and executor due to Lagrosas appeal to SC, and since the writ of preliminary injunction was issued pendent lite. ISSUE: Whether the cash bond for injunction should be released? HELD: Yes. By its Decision dated January 28, 2005, the appellate court disposed of the case by granting BristolMyers petition and reinstating the Decision dated September 24, 2002 of the NLRC which dismissed the complaint for dismissal. It also ordered the discharge of the TRO cash bond and injunction cash bond. Thus, both conditions of the writ of preliminary injunction were satisfied. RATIO: It is settled that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. A preliminary injunction may be granted only when, among other things, the applicant, not explicitly exempted, files with the court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued. Notably, the appellate court ruled that Lagrosas had no right to the monetary awards granted by the labor arbiter and the NLRC, and that the implementation of the writ of execution and notices of garnishment was properly enjoined. This in effect amounted to a finding that Lagrosas did not sustain any damage by reason of the injunction. To reiterate, the injunction bond is intended to protect Lagrosas against loss or damage by reason of the injunction only. Contrary to Lagrosas claim, it is not a security for the judgment award by the labor arbiter.

4. NELSON JENOSA and his son NIO CARLO JENOSA, SOCORRO CANTO and her son PATRICK CANTO, CYNTHIA APALISOK and her daughter CYNDY APALISOK, EDUARDO VARGAS and his son CLINT EDUARD VARGAS, and NELIA DURO and her son NONELL GREGORY DURO, Petitioners, vs. REV. FR. JOSE RENE C. DELARIARTE, O.S.A., in his capacity as the incumbent Principal of the High School Department of the University of San Agustin, and the

UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, herein represented by its incumbent President REV. FR. MANUEL G. VERGARA, O.S.A., Respondents. G.R. No. 172138 September 8, 2010 CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: Some students of the University, among them petitioners Nio Carlo Jenosa, Patrick Canto, Cyndy Apalisok, Clint Eduard Vargas, and Nonell Gregory Duro (petitioner students), were caught engaging in hazing outside the school premises. A meeting between school authorities and the students parents was conducted. The parties agreed that, instead of the possibility of being charged and found guilty of hazing, the students who participated in the hazing incident as initiators, including petitioner students, would just transfer to another school, while those who participated as neophytes would be suspended for one month. The parents of the apprehended students, including petitioners, affixed their signatures to the minutes of the meeting to signify their conformity. In view of the agreement, the University did not anymore convene the Committee on Student Discipline (COSD) to investigate the hazing incident. The parents of petitioner students (petitioner parents) sent a letter to the University President urging him not to implement the 28 November 2002 agreement. According to petitioner parents, the Principal, without convening the COSD, decided to order the immediate transfer of petitioner students. Petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and damages assailing the Principals decision to order the immediate transfer of petitioner students as a violation of their right to due process because COSD was not convened. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and directed respondents to admit petitioner students during the pendency of the case. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. Respondents alleged that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and that petitioners were guilty of forum shopping. Said motion was denied and respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners then wrote the DepEd and asked that it direct the University to release the report cards and other credentials of petitioner students. The University replied that it could not release petitioner students report cards due to their pending disciplinary case with the COSD. Petitioners filed another complaint for mandatory injunction praying for the release of petitioner students report cards and other credentials. The two cases were consolidated by the trial court. RULING OF RTC: The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and directed the University to release petitioner students report cards and other credentials. The MR filed by respondents was denied. A spec ial civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals by the respondents insisting that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. RULING OF THE CA: CA granted respondents petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the civil ca ses for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because of petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies or for being premature. According to the Court of Appeals, petitioners should have waited for the action of the DepEd or of the University President before resorting to judicial action. ISSUE: Whether or not the mandatory injunction should be granted. HELD: No. the Principal had the authority to order the immediate transfer of petitioner students because of their agreement. Petitioner parents affixed their signatures to the minutes of the 28 November 2002 meeting and signified their conformity to transfer their children to another school. Petitioners Socorro Canto and Nelia Duro even wrote a letter to inform the University that they would transfer their children to another school and requested for the pertinent papers needed for the transfer. In turn, the University did not anymore convene the COSD. The University agreed that it would no longer conduct disciplinary proceedings and instead issue the transfer credentials of petitioner students. Then petitioners reneged on their agreement without any justifiable reason. RATIO: Since petitioners present complaint is one for injunction, and injunction is the strong arm of equity, petitioners must come to court with clean hands. In University of the Philippines v. Hon. Catungal, Jr., a case involving student misconduct, this Court ruled:

Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must apply for it must come with equity or with clean hands. This is so because among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity, and (2) he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. Here, petitioners, having reneged on their agreement without any justifiable reason, come to court with unclean hands. This Court may deny a litigant relief if his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest as to the controversy in issue. RECEIVERSHIP 1. SPOUSES MANUEL A. AGUILAR and YOLANDA C. AGUILAR, petitioners, vs.THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, respondent. G.R. No. 157911 September 19, 2006 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: FACTS: Petitioners obtained a loan from respondent Manila Banking Corporation, secured by real estate mortgage. When they failed to pay their obligation, the mortgaged property was judicially foreclosed. Respondent was the winning bidder at public auction sale. Instead of redeeming the property, petitioners filed for complaint for annulment of the foreclosure sale of property. A compromise agreement was entered between the parties, but still petitioners failed to comply. Then respondent filed a Motion for issuance of Writ of Execution to enforce the Decision which was granted by the RTC. Petitioners filed several motions to delay the execution of judgment. Included are the following: first, a Manifestation praying for deferment of the enforcement of the writ of execution until July 31, 1990 because petitioners have a pending proposal for the settlement of their judgment debt; second, an Ex-Parte Motion to Recall the Court's Order dated December 5, 1991 claiming that their obligation was novated by the Letter dated June 7, 1991 from respondent's Statutory Receiver; third, a six-page Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, reiterating that the Decision dated January 30, 1987 can no longer be executed on mere motion since it is st more than five years old. (1 division denied the petition for violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts and failure to show special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances that justify a disregard of the rule); fourth; petitioners filed with RTC Omnibus Motion to quash the Writ of Execution insisting anew on their novation and prescription theories; fifth, Urgent Motion for Inhibition which was denied by the Presiding Judge instead she inhibited herself to show that she has no interest therein. RULING OF RTC: RTC issued an Omnibus Order denying the Omnibus Motion to quash the writ of execution and for consignation, as well as the motion to cite petitioners in contempt and the ex parte motion for an order to divest petitioners' title to respondent. Since there was no MR filed, a Writ of Execution was issued. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, reiterating that the Decision dated January 30, 1987 cannot be executed by mere motion since more than five years have elapsed. RULING OF CA: CA denied the petition for certiorari. It held that since the delays were occasioned by petitioners' own initiative and for their own advantage, the five-year period allowed for the enforcement of the judgment by motion have been interrupted or suspended. The MR was likewise denied. ISSUE: Whether petitioners are still obliged to pay interest on a loan to a bank under receivership? HELD: YES. On the arguments relating to the effect of respondent's receivership, petitioners brought this matter for the first time in RTC Branch 165 in their Omnibus Motion dated March 5, 2001, fourteen years after respondent was placed under receivership and was ordered to close operation in 1987. The belated invocation of such circumstance speaks strongly of the staleness of their claim.

RATIO: When a bank is placed under receivership, it would only not be able to do new business , that is, to grant new loans or to accept new deposits. However, the receiver of the bank is in fact obliged to collect debts owing to the bank, which debts form part of the assets of the bank. Thus, petitioners' obligation to pay interest subsists even when respondent was placed under receivership. The respondent's receivership is an extraneous circumstance and has no effect on petitioners' obligation. 2. SPS. CESAR A. LARROBIS, JR. and VIRGINIA S. LARROBIS, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, respondent. G.R. No. 135706 October 1, 2004 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: FACTS: On March 3, 1980, petitioner spouses contracted a monetary loan with respondent Philippine Veterans Bank evidenced by a promissory note, and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage executed on their lot together with the improvements thereon. The bank went bankrupt and was placed under receivership/liquidation by the Central Bank from April 25, 1985 until August 1992. The bank, through Francisco Go, sent the spouses a demand letter for "accounts receivable" which pertains to the insurance premiums advanced by respondent bank over the mortgaged property of petitioners. More than fourteen years from the time the loan became due and demandable, respondent bank filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of petitioners property. The property was sold in a public auction by Sheriff Arthur Cabigon with Philippine Veterans Bank as the lone bidder. , petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC, Cebu City, to declare the extra-judicial foreclosure and the subsequent sale thereof to respondent bank null and void. RULING OF THE RTC: The RTC dismissed the complaint, by holdi ng that the banks right to foreclose the mortgaged property prescribes in ten (10) years but such period was interrupted when it was placed under receivership. Petitioners MR was denied. Thus, the present petition for review. ISSUE: Whether or not the period within which the respondent bank was placed under receivership and liquidation proceedings may be considered a fortuitous event which interrupted the running of the prescriptive period in bringing actions. HELD: No. The period within which respondent bank was placed under receivership and liquidation proceedings does not constitute a fortuitous event which interrupted the prescriptive period in bringing actions. RATIO: In Provident Savings Bank vs. Court of Appeals, the court stated that: When a bank is prohibited from continuing to do business by the Central Bank and a receiver is appointed for such bank, that bank would not be able to do new business, i.e., to grant new loans or to accept new deposits. However, the receiver of the bank is in fact obliged to collect debts owing to the bank, which debts form part of the assets of the bank. The receiver must assemble the assets and pay the obligation of the bank under receivership, and take steps to prevent dissipation of such assets. Accordingly, the receiver of the bank is obliged to collect pre-existing debts due to the bank, and in connection therewith, to foreclose mortgages securing such debts. In this case, it is not disputed that Philippine Veterans Bank was placed under receivership by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank by virtue of Resolution No. 364 on April 25, 1985, pursuant to Section 29 of the Central Bank Act on insolvency of banks. Unlike Provident Savings Bank, there was no legal prohibition imposed upon herein respondent to deter its receiver and liquidator from performing their obligations under the law. Thus, the ruling laid down in the Provident case cannot apply in the case at bar. There is also no truth to respondents claim that it could not continue doing business from the peri od of April 1985 to August 1992, the time it was under receivership. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, respondent was even

able to send petitioners a demand letter, through Francisco Go, on August 23, 1985 for "accounts receivable in the total amount of P6,345.00 as of August 15, 1984" for the insurance premiums advanced by respondent bank over the mortgaged property of petitioners. How it could send a demand letter on unpaid insurance premiums and not foreclose the mortgage during the time it was "prohibited from doing business" was not adequately explained by respondent. (3) ANA MARIA KORUGA vs.TEODORO ARCENAS, JR., et al. G.R. No. 168332 June 19, 2009 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x TEODORO O. ARCENAS, JR., et al. vs. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, Br 138, RTC Makati City, and ANA MARIA KORUGA G.R. No. 169053 June 19, 2009 NACHURA, J.: CASE: Two petitions that originated from a Complaint filed by Koruga before the RTC Makati City against the Board of Directors of Banco Filipino and the Members of the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) for violation of the Corporation Code, for inspection of records of a corporation by a stockholder, for receivership, and for the creation of a management committee. FACTS: G.R. No. 168332: A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 praying for the annulment of the CA Resolution (April 18, 2005) granting the prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction of therein petitioners Arcenas, et al. Koruga is a minority stockholder of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank. She filed a complaint against Arcenas, et al. Korugas Complaint charged defendants with violation of Sections 31 to 34 of the Corporation Code, prohibiting self-dealing and conflict of interest of directors and officers; invoked her right to inspect the corporations records under Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code; and prayed for Receivership and Creation of a Management Committee, pursuant to Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Securities Regulation Code, the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies, the General Banking Law of 2000, and the New Central Bank Act. She accused the directors and officers of Banco Filipino of engaging in unsafe, unsound, and fraudulent banking practices, more particularly, acts that violate the prohibition on self-dealing. On September 12, 2003, Arcenas, et al. filed their Answer raising, among others, the trial courts lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. They also filed a Manifestation and Motion seeking the dismissal of the case on the following grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; (c) forum-shopping; and (d) for being a nuisance/harassment suit. They then moved that the trial court rule on their affirmative defenses, dismiss the intra-corporate case, and set the case for preliminary hearing. Ruling of the RTC: Denied the Manifestation and Motion. The RTC ruled that the result of the procedure sought by defendants Arcenas, et al. is for the Court to conduct a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses raised by them in their Answer. This [is] proscribed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intracorporate (sic) Controversies because when a preliminary hearing is conducted it is "as if a Motion to Dismiss was filed" (Rule 16, Section 6, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). A Motion to Dismiss is a prohibited pleading under the Interim Rules, for which reason, no favorable consideration can be given to the Manifestation and Motion of defendants, Arcenas, et al. Arcenas, et al. moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the motion. Arcenas, et al. filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary retraining order (TRO). Ruling of the CA: The CA issued a 60-day TRO enjoining Judge Marella from conducting further proceedings in the case.

The RTC issued a Notice of Pre-trial setting the case for pre-trial. Arcenas, et al. filed a Manifestation and Motion before the CA, reiterating their application for a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting a writ of preliminary injunction. Dissatisfied, Koruga filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Koruga alleged that the CA effectively gave due course to Arcenas, et al.s petition when it issued a writ of preliminary injunction without factual or legal basis. She prayed that the Court restrain the CA from implementing the writ of preliminary injunction and, after due proceedings, make the injunction against the assailed CA Resolution permanent. In their Comment, Arcenas, et al. allege, among others, that the Petition may have already been rendered moot and academic by the July 20, 2005 CA Decision, which denied their Petition, and held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders, and thus ordered the RTC to proceed with the trial of the case. Meanwhile, this Court issued a Resolution granting the prayer for a TRO and enjoining the Presiding Judge of Makati RTC from proceeding with the hearing of the case upon the filing by Arcenas, et al. of a P50,000.00 bond. Koruga filed a motion to lift the TRO, which this Court denied on July 5, 2006. G.R. No. 169053: A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction filed by Arcenas, et al. In their Petition, Arcenas, et al. asked the Court to set aside the Decision (July 20, 2005) of the CA which denied their petition, having found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Makati RTC. Arcenas, et al. anchored their prayer on the ground, among others that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is vested by law in the BSP. ISSUE 1: Whether the writ of preliminary injunction should be annulled. HELD: The Petition in G.R. No. 168332 has become moot and academic. The writ of preliminary injunction being questioned had effectively been dissolved by the CAs July 20, 2005 Decision. Accordingly, there is no necessity to restrain the implementation of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA on April 18, 2005, since it no longer exists.However, this Court finds that the CA erred in upholding the jurisdiction of, and remanding the case to, the RTC. ISSUE 2: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to proceed with the complaint filed by Koruga against Arcenas, et al. HELD: NO. The CA erred in upholding the jurisdiction of, and remanding the case to, the RTC. It is the BSP that has jurisdiction over the case. RATIO: It is clear that the acts complained of pertain to the conduct of Banco Filipinos banking business. A bank, as defined in the General Banking Law, refers to an entity engaged in the lending of funds obtained in the form of deposits. In this country, that task is delegated to the BSP, which pursuant to its Charter, is authorized to administer the monetary, banking, and credit system of the Philippines. It is further authorized to take the necessary steps against any banking institution if its continued operation would cause prejudice to its depositors, creditors and the general public as well. The law vests in the BSP the supervision over operations and activities of banks. Koruga's allegations call for the examination of the allegedly questionable loans. Whether these loans are covered by the prohibition on self-dealing is a matter for the BSP to determine. These are not ordinary intracorporate matters; rather, they involve banking activities which are, by law, regulated and supervised by the BSP. Furthermore, the authority to determine whether a bank is conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner is also vested in the Monetary Board as provided by the General Banking Law of 2000. Finally, the New Central Bank Act grants the Monetary Board the power to impose administrative sanctions on the erring bank. ISSUE 3: Whether the provisions of the Corporation Code is applicable to the Koruga's complaint and whether the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies, or Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on Receivership would apply to this case HELD: NO. Korugas invocation of the provisions of the Corporation Code is misplaced. RATIO: In an earlier case with similar antecedents, the Court ruled that the Corporation Code is a general law applying to all types of corporations, while the New Central Bank Act regulates specifically banks and other financial institutions, including the dissolution and liquidation thereof. As between a general and special law, the latter shall prevail generalia specialibus non derogant.

Consequently, it is not the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies, or Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on Receivership, that would apply to this case. Instead, Sections 29 and 30 of the New Central Bank Act should be followed. On the strength of these provisions, it is the Monetary Board that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings for receivership of banks. Crystal clear in Section 30 is the provision that says the "appointment of a receiver under this section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board." The term "exclusively" connotes that only the Monetary Board can resolve the issue of whether a bank is to be placed under receivership and, upon an affirmative finding, it also has authority to appoint a receiver. This is further affirmed by the fact that the law allows the Monetary Board to take action "summarily and without need for prior hearing." And, as a clincher, the law explicitly provides that "actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on a petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction." 1avvphi1 From the foregoing disquisition, there is no doubt that the RTC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a suit that seeks to place Banco Filipino under receivership. The courts jurisdiction could only be invoked after the Monetary Board had taken action on the matter and only on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, there is one other reason why Korugas complaint before the RTC cannot prosper. Given he r own admission and the same is likewise supported by evidence that she is merely a minority stockholder of Banco Filipino, she would not have the standing to question the Monetary Boards action. Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act provides: The petition for certiorari may only be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock within ten (10) days from receipt by the board of directors of the institution of the order directing receivership, liquidation or conservatorship. All the foregoing discussion yields the inevitable conclusion that the CA erred in upholding the jurisdiction of, and remanding the case to, the RTC. Given that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, its refusal to dismiss the case on that ground amounted to grave abuse of discretion. (4) EVELINA CHAVEZ and AIDA CHAVEZ-DELES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ATTY. FIDELA VARGAS G.R. No. 174356 January 20, 2010 ABAD, J. CASE: This case is about the propriety of the CA, which hears the case on appeal, placing the property in dispute under receivership upon a claim that the defendant has been remiss in making an accounting to the plaintiff of the fruits of such property. FACTS: Respondent Fidela Vargas owned a 5-hectare mixed coconut land and rice fields in Sorsogon. Petitioner Evelina Chavez had been staying in a remote portion of the land with her family, planting coconut seedlings on the land and supervising the harvest of coconut and palay. Fidela and Evelina agreed to divide the gross sales of all products from the land between themselves. Fidela claimed that Evelina had failed to remit her share of the profits and, despite demand to turn over the administration of the property to Fidela, had refused to do so. Consequently, Fidela filed a complaint against Evelina and her daughter, Aida Deles, who was assisting her mother, for recovery of possession, rent, and damages with prayer for the immediate appointment of a receiver before the RTC. In their answer, Evelina and Aida claimed that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since it actually involved an agrarian dispute. Ruling of the RTC: After hearing, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction based on Fidelas admission that Evelina and Aida were tenants. As tenants, the defendants also shared in the gross sales of the harvest. The court threw out Fidelas claim that, since Evelina and her family received the land already planted with fruit-bearing trees, they could not be regarded as tenants. Cultivation, said the court, included the tending and

caring of the trees. The court also regarded as relevant Fidelas pending application for a 5 -hectare retention and Evelinas pending protest relative to her 3-hectare beneficiary share. Dissatisfied, Fidela appealed to the CA. She also filed with that court a motion for the appointment of a receiver. Ruling of the CA: On April 12, 2006 the CA granted the motion and ordained receivership of the land, noting that there appeared to be a need to preserve the property and its fruits in light of Fidelas allegation that Evelina and Aida failed to account for her share of such fruits. Parenthetically, Fidela also filed 3 estafa cases with the RTC, Olongapo City and a complaint for dispossession with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) against Evelina and Aida. In all these cases, Fidela asked for the immediate appointment of a receiver for the property. Issue 1: Whether or not respondent Fidela is guilty of forum shopping considering that she had earlier filed identical applications for receivership over the subject properties in the criminal cases she filed with the RTC, Olongapo City against petitioners Evelina and Aida and in the administrative case that she filed against them before the DARAB Held: No. Ratio: By forum shopping, a party initiates two or more actions in separate tribunals, grounded on the 4 same cause, trusting that one or the other tribunal would favorably dispose of the matter. The elements of forum shopping are the same as in litis pendentia where the final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. The elements of forum shopping are: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. Here, however, the various suits Fidela initiated against Evelina and Aida involved different causes of action and sought different reliefs. The present civil action that she filed with the RTC sought to recover possession of the property based on Evelina and Aidas failure to account for its fruits. The estafa cases she filed with the RTC accused the two of misappropriating and converting her share in the harvests for their own benefit. Her complaint for dispossession under Republic Act 8048 with the DARAB sought to dispossess the two for allegedly cutting coconut trees without the prior authority of Fidela or of the Philippine Coconut Authority. The above cases are similar only in that they involved the same parties and Fidela sought the placing of the properties under receivership in all of them. But receivership is not an action. It is but an auxiliary remedy, a mere incident of the suit to help achieve its purpose. Consequently, it cannot be said that the grant of receivership in one case will amount to res judicata on the merits of the other cases. The grant or denial of this provisional remedy will still depend on the need for it in the particular action. Issue 2: Whether or not the CA erred in granting respondent Fidelas application for receivership. Held: The CA erred in granting receivership over the property in dispute in this case. Ratio: For one thing, a petition for receivership under Section 1(b), Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the property or fund subject of the action is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, necessitating its protection or preservation. Its object is the prevention of imminent danger to the property. If the action does not require such protection or preservation, the remedy is not receivership. Here Fidelas main gripe is that Evelina and Aida deprived her of her share of the lands produce. She does not claim that the land or its productive capacity would disappear or be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. Nor does Fidela claim that the land has been materially injured, necessitating its protection and preservation. Because 7 receivership is a harsh remedy that can be granted only in extreme situations, Fidela must prove a clear right to its issuance. But she has not. Indeed, in none of the other cases she filed against Evelina and Aida has that remedy 8 been granted her. Besides, the RTC dismissed Fidelas action for lack of ju risdiction over the case, holding that the issues it raised properly belong to the DARAB. The case before the CA is but an offshoot of that RTC case. Given that the RTC has found that it had no jurisdiction over the case, it would seem more prudent for the CA to first provisionally determine that the RTC had jurisdiction before granting receivership which is but an incident of the main action. The Court GRANTS the petition. The receivership is LIFTED.

REPLEVIN (1) JOSE OROSA and MARTHA OROSA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FCP CREDIT CORPORATION G.R. No. 111080 April 5, 2000 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Case: Petition for review assailing the decision of the CA which affirmed the ruling of RTC. Facts: Private respondent FCP Credit Corporation filed a complaint for replevin and damages in the RTC Manila against petitioner Jose Orosa and one John Doe to recover possession of a 1983 Ford Laser 1.5 Sedan with Motor and Serial No. SUNKBT-14584. The complaint alleged that petitioner purchased the subject motor vehicle on installment from Fiesta Motor Sales Corporation. He executed and delivered to Fiesta Motor Sales Corp. a promissory note in the sum of P133,824.00 payable in monthly installments. To secure payment, petitioner executed a chattel mortgage over the subject motor vehicle in favor of Fiesta Motor Sales Corp. Fiesta Motor Sales assigned the promissory note and chattel mortgage to private respondent FCP Credit Corporation. The complaint further alleged that petitioner failed to pay part of the installment which fell due on July 28, 1984 as well as three (3) consecutive installment which fell due on August 28, September 28, and October 28, 1984. Consequently, private respondent FCP Credit Corporation demanded from petitioner payment of the entire outstanding balance of the obligation amounting to P106,154.48 with accrued interest and to surrender the vehicle which petitioner was allegedly detaining. Ruling of the RTC: After trial, the lower court dismissed private respondent's complaint. The trial court ruled that private respondent FCP had no reason to file the present action since petitioner already paid the installments for the months of July to November 1984, which are the sole bases of the complaint. The lower court declared that private respondent was not entitled to the writ of replevin, and was liable to petitioner for actual damages under the replevin bond it filed. Ruling on petitioner's counterclaim, the trial court stated that there was no legal or factual basis for the writ of replevin and that its enforcement by the sheriff was "highly irregular, and unlawful, done, as it was, under shades of extortion, threats and force." The trial court ordered private respondent to pay moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Private respondent was also ordered to return to petitioner the 1983 Ford Laser 1.5 5 Sedan, or its equivalent, in kind or value in cash, as of date of judgment and to pay the costs of the suit. On June 7, 1988, a "Supplemental Decision" was rendered by the trial court ordering private respondent's surety, Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. to jointly and severally [with private respondent] return to petitioner the 1983 Ford Laser 1.5 Sedan or its, equivalent in kind or in cash and to pay the damages specified in the main decision to the extent of the value of the replevin bond in the amount of P210,000.00. The surety company filed with the CA a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 14938) to annul the Order of the trial court denying its motion for partial reconsideration, as well as the Supplemental Decision. On the other hand, private respondent appealed the decision of the RTC Manila to the CA (CA-G.R. CV No. 25929). Ruling of the CA: The surety company's petition for certiorari was dismissed and upheld the trial court's order of execution pending appeal. On November 6, 1989, the SC affirmed the CA (1st Division) decision, but deleted the order for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal. Meanwhile, in private respondent's appeal, the CA (8th Division) partially affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Hence, this petition for review. Issue 1: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to a writ of replevin. Held: No. Ratio: The Court also agrees with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred when it ordered private respondent to return the subject car or its equivalent considering that petitioner had not yet fully paid the purchase price. Verily, to sustain the trial court's decision would amount to unjust enrichment. The CA was correct when it instead ordered private respondent to return, not the car itself, but only the amount equivalent to the fourteen installments actually paid with interest. Issue 2: Whether the CA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when reversed a final decision of a coequal division of the CA (Special 1st Division, and which was sustained by the SC in a final decision which cases have the same causes of actions, same set of facts, the same parties and the same relief.

Held: No. Ratio: Jurisdiction is simply the power or authority to hear a case. The appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to review decisions and orders of lower courts is conferred by BP Blg. 129. More importantly, petitioner cannot now assail the CA's jurisdiction after having actively participated in the appeal and after praying for affirmative relief. Neither can petitioner argue that res judicata bars the determination of the present case. The two cases involve different subject matters, parties and seek different reliefs. The petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 14938) was for certiorari with injunction, brought by Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. alleging that there was grave abuse of discretion when the trial court adjudged it liable for damages without due process, in violation of Rule 60, Section 10 in relation to Rule 57, Section 20, of the Rules of Court. The surety also questioned the propriety of the writ of execution issued by the trial court pending appeal. On the other hand, CA-G.R. CV No. 25929 was filed by petitioner Orosa under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court raising alleged errors of law on the part of the trial court. The subject of the appeal was the main decision, while the subject of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 14938 was the Supplemental Decision. The decisions of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 14938 and the Supreme Court did not pass on the merits of this case. It merely ruled on the issues of whether the surety, Stronghold Insurance, Co., Inc., can be held jointly and solidarily liable with plaintiff-appellant and whether execution pending appeal is proper under the facts and circumstances of this case. Consequently, this Court is not estopped from reviewing the conclusions reached by the court a quo. The petition is DENIED, and the CA Decision and its Resolution are AFFIRMED. (2) SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., vs. REGINA ASTORGA G.R. No. 148132 January 28, 2008 x---------------------------------------------------x SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., vs. REGINA ASTORGA G.R. No. 151079 January 28, 2008 x---------------------------------------------------x REGINA ASTORGA vs. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. and ANN MARGARET V. SANTIAGO G.R. No. 151372 NACHURA, J. Case: 3 consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Facts: Regina Astorga (Astorga) was employed by respondent Smart Communications, Inc. (SMART) as District Sales Manager of the Corporate Sales Marketing Group/ Fixed Services Division (CSMG/FSD). As District Sales Manager, Astorga enjoyed additional benefits, among others, a car plan. In February 1998, SMART launched an organizational realignment to achieve more efficient operations. SMART entered into a joint venture agreement with NTT of Japan, and formed SMART-NTT Multimedia, Inc. (SNMI). Since SNMI was formed to do the sales and marketing work, SMART abolished the CSMG/FSD, Astorgas division. SNMI agreed to absorb the CSMG personnel who would be recommended by SMART. SMART then conducted a performance evaluation of CSMG personnel and those who garnered the highest ratings were favorably recommended to SNMI. Astorga landed last in the performance evaluation, thus, she was not recommended by SMART. SMART, nonetheless, offered her a supervisory position in the Customer Care Department, but she refused the offer because the position carried lower salary rank and rate. Despite the abolition of the CSMG/FSD, Astorga continued reporting for work. But SMART issued a memorandum advising Astorga of the termination of her employment on ground of redundancy. The termination of her employment prompted Astorga to file a Complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries and other benefits with prayer for moral and exemplary damages against SMART and Ann Margaret Santiago (Santiago). SMART responded that there was valid termination. It argued that Astorga was dismissed by reason of redundancy, which is an authorized cause for termination of employment, and the dismissal was effected in accordance with the requirements of the Labor Code. The redundancy of Astorgas position was the result of the abolition of CSMG and the creation of a specialized and more technically equipped SNMI, which is a valid and 10 legitimate exercise of management prerogative. January 28, 2008

In the meantime, SMART sent a letter to Astorga demanding that she pay the current market value of the Honda Civic Sedan which was given to her under the companys car plan program, or to surrender the same to the company for proper disposition. Astorga, however, failed and refused to do either, thus prompting SMART to file a suit for replevin (Civil Case No. 98-1936) with RTC Makati. Astorga moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of (i) lack of jurisdiction; (ii) failure to state a cause of action; (iii) litis pendentia; and (iv) forum-shopping. Astorga posited that the regular courts have no jurisdiction over the complaint because the subject thereof pertains to a benefit arising from an employment contract; hence, jurisdiction over the same is vested in the labor tribunal and not in regular courts. Labor Arbiter on Astorga's case for Illegal Dismissal: Pending resolution of Astorgas motion to dismiss the replevin case, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision declaring Astorgas dismissal from employment illegal. While recognizing SMARTs right to abolish any of its departments, the Labor Arbiter held th at such right should be exercised in good faith and for causes beyond its control. The Arbiter found the abolition of CSMG done neither in good faith nor for causes beyond the control of SMART, but a ploy to terminate Astorgas employment. The Arbiter also ruled that contracting out the functions performed by Astorga to an in-house agency like SNMI was illegal, citing Section 7(e), Rule VIII-A of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code. Ruling of the RTC on replevin case: Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order denying Astorgas motion to dismiss the replevin case. In so ruling, the RTC ratiocinated that the case is to enforce a right of possession over a company car assigned to Astorga under a car plan privilege arrangement. The car is registered in the name of the SMART. Recovery thereof via replevin suit is allowed by Rule 60 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which is undoubtedly within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Astorga filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it. Astorga elevated the denial of her motion via certiorari to the CA. Ruling of the CA on replevin case: In its Decision, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA granted the petition and, consequently, dismissed the replevin case, it held that the case is intertwined with Astorgas complaint for illegal dismissal; thus, it is the labor tribunal that has rightful jurisdiction over the complaint. SMARTs motion for reconsideration having been denied, it elevated the case to this Court. NLRC on Astorga's case for Illegal Dismissal: Meanwhile, SMART also appealed the unfavorable ruling of the Labor Arbiter in the illegal dismissal case to the NLRC. In its Decision , the NLRC sustained Astorgas dismissal. Reversing the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC declared the abolition of CSMG and the creation of SNMI to do the sales and marketing services for SMART a valid organizational action. It overruled the Labor Arbiters ruling that SNMI is an in house agency, holding that it lacked legal basis. It also declared that contracting, subcontracting and streamlining of operations for the purpose of increasing efficiency are allowed under the law. The NLRC further found erroneous the Labor Arbiters disquisition that redundancy to be valid must be impelled by e conomic reasons, and upheld the redundancy measures undertaken by SMART. Astorga filed a motion for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied it. Astorga then went to the CA via certiorari. Ruling of the CA on the case for Illegal Dismissal: The CA rendered a Decision affirming with modification the resolutions of the NLRC. In gist, the CA agreed with the NLRC that the reorganization undertaken by SMART resulting in the abolition of CSMG was a legitimate exercise of management prerogative. It rejected Astorgas posturing that her non-absorption into SNMI was tainted with bad faith. However, the CA found that SMART failed to comply with the mandatory one-month notice prior to the intended termination. Accordingly, the CA imposed a penalty equivalent to Astorgas one-month salary for this non-compliance. The CA also set aside the NLRCs order for the return of the company vehicle holding that this issue is not essentially a labor concern, but is civil in nature, and thus, within the competence of the regular court to decide. It added that the matter had not been fully ventilated before the NLRC, but in the regular court. Astorga filed a MR which was partially granted, while SMART's MR was denied. Astorga and SMART came to us with their respective petitions for review assailing the CA rulings. Issue 1: Whether the dismissal of the replevin case filed with the RTC Makati City allegedly for lack of jurisdiction was proper. Held: No. The CA committed reversible error when it overturned the RTC ruling and ordered the dismissal of the replevin case for lack of jurisdiction. Contrary to the CAs ratiocination, the RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in denying Astorgas motion to dismiss. SMARTs demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor,
24

but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations. As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Ratio: Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one having right to possession to recover property in specie from one 30 who has wrongfully taken or detained the property. The term may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may 31 be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action. That the action commenced by SMART against Astorga in the RTC Makati City was one for replevin hardly admits of doubt. In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante, this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC over the replevin suit, explained: Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property. The question of whether or not a party has the right of possession over the property involved and if so, whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said property as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters. xxxx The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case. The respective issues raised in each forum can be resolved independently on the other. In fact in 18 November 1986, the NLRC in the case before it had issued an Injunctive Writ enjoining the petitioners from blocking the free ingress and egress to the Vessel and ordering the petitioners to disembark and vacate. That aspect of the controversy is properly settled under the Labor Code. So also with petitioners right to picket. But the determination of the question of who has the better right to take possession of the Vessel and whether petitioners can deprive the Charterer, as the legal possessor of the Vessel, of that right to possess in addressed to the competence of Civil Courts. In thus ruling, this Court is not sanctioning split jurisdiction but defining avenues of jurisdiction as laid down by pertinent laws. Issue 2: On the validity of Astorgas dismissal. Held: Astorga's dismissal was valid. The organizational realignment introduced by SMART, which culminated in the abolition of CSMG/FSD and ter mination of Astorgas employment was an honest effort to make SMARTs sales and marketing departments more efficient and competitive. Ratio: Astorga was terminated due to redundancy, which is one of the authorized causes for the dismissal of an employee. The characterization of an employees services as superfluous or no longer necessary and, therefore, properly terminable, is an exercise of business judgment on the part of the employer. The wisdom and soundness of such characterization or decision is not subject to discretionary review provided, of course, that a 36 violation of law or arbitrary or malicious action is not shown. Indeed, out of our concern for those lesser circumstanced in life, this Court has inclined towards the worker and upheld his cause in most of his conflicts with his employer. This favored treatment is consonant with the social justice policy of the Constitution. But while tilting the scales of justice in favor of workers, the 38 fundamental law also guarantees the right of the employer to reasonable returns for his investment. In this light, we must acknowledge the prerogative of the employer to adopt such measures as will promote greater efficiency, reduce overhead costs and enhance prospects of economic gains, albeit always within the framework of existing laws. Accordingly, the Court sustained the reorganization and redundancy program undertaken by SMART. However, as aptly found by the CA, SMART failed to comply with the mandated one (1) month notice prior to termination. Be that as it may, this procedural infirmity would not render the termin ation of Astorgas employment illegal. The validity of termination can exist independently of the procedural infirmity of the dismissal. In DAP Corporation v. CA, the Court found the dismissal of the employees therein valid and for authorized cause even if the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code. This Court upheld the dismissal, but held the employer liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements. (3) KENNETH HAO vs. ABE ANDRES, Sheriff IV, RTC Br 16, Davao City A.M. No. P-07-2384 June 18, 2008

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QUISUMBING, J. Case: An administrative complaint for gross neglect of duty, grave abuse of authority (oppression) and violation of RA No. 3019 filed by complainant Hao against respondent Andres, Sheriff IV of RTC Davao City, Br 16. Facts: Complainant Hao is one of the defendants in a civil case for replevin (Civil Case No. 31, 127-2005) entitled "Zenaida Silver, doing trade and business under the name and style ZHS Commercial v. Loreto Hao, Atty. Amado Cantos, Kenneth Hao and John Does," pending before the RTC Davao City. Judge Fuentes issued an Order of Seizure against 22 motor vehicles allegedly owned by the complainant. On the strength of the said order, Andres was able to seize 9 of the subject motor vehicles. In his Affidavit-Complaint against Andres before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Hao alleged that Andres gave undue advantage to Zenaida Silver in the implementation of the order and that Andres seized the 9 motor vehicles in an oppressive manner. Hao also averred that Andres was accompanied by unidentified armed personnel on board a military vehicle which was excessive since there were no resistance from them. Hao also discovered that the place where the seized motor vehicles were is actually owned by Silver. In view of the approval of the complainants counter-replevin bond, Judge Carpio ordered Andres to immediately cease and desist from further implementing the order of seizure, and to return the seized motor vehicles including its accessories to their lawful owners. However, 8 of the 9 seized motor vehicles were reported missing. In his report, Andres stated that he was shocked to find that the motor vehicles were already missing. Andres claimed the motor vehicles were still intact when he inspected it. Subsequently, Hao reported that 3 of the carnapped vehicles were recovered by the police. He then accused Andres of conspiring and conniving with Atty. Macadangdang (Silvers counsel) and the policemen in the carnapping of the motor vehicles. Hao also accused Andres of concealing the depository receipts from them and pointed out that the depository receipts show that Silver and Atty. Macadangdang were the ones who chose the policemen who will guard the motor vehicles. In his Comment, Andres vehemently denied violating Rep. Act No. 3019 and committing gross neglect of duty. Andres denied implementing the Order of Seizure in an oppressive manner. He negated the speculations that he was involved in the disappearance of the seized motor vehicles as he claims to be the one who reported the incident to the court and the police. Andres insisted that the guarding of properties under custodia legis by policemen is not prohibited, but is even adopted by the court. Hence, he prays that he be held not liable for the loss of the vehicles and that he be relieved of his duty to return the vehicles. The case was referred to Executive Judge Fuentes for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Investigation Report, Judge Fuentes found Andres guilty of serious negligence in the custody of the nine motor vehicles. He recommended that Andres be suspended from office. Ruling of the OCA: The OCA disagreed with the observations of Judge Fuentes. It recommended that Andres be held liable only for simple neglect of duty. Issue: Whether Andres should be liable for gross neglect of duty. Held: Yes. Andres failed to live up to the standards required of his position. The number of instances that Andres strayed from the regular course observed in the proper implementation of the orders of the court cannot be countenanced. Thus, taking into account the numerous times he was found negligent and careless of his duties coupled with his utter disregard of legal procedures, he cannot be considered guilty merely of simple negligence. His acts constitute gross negligence. Ratio: Being an officer of the court, Andres must be aware that there are well-defined steps provided in the Rules of Court regarding the proper implementation of a writ of replevin and/or an order of seizure. The Rules, likewise, is explicit on the duty of the sheriff in its implementation. To recapitulate what should be common knowledge to sheriffs, the pertinent provisions of Rule 60, of the Rules of Court are quoted hereunder: SEC. 4. Duty of the sheriff.Upon receiving such order, the sheriff must serve a copy thereof on the adverse party, together with a copy of the application, affidavit and bond, and must forthwith take the property, if it be in the possession of the adverse party, or his agent, and retain it in his custody. If the property or any part thereof be concealed in a building or enclosure, the sheriff must demand its delivery, and if it be not delivered, he must cause the building or enclosure to be broken open and take the property into his possession. After the sheriff has taken possession of the property as herein provided, he must keep it in a secure place and shall be responsible for its delivery to the party entitled thereto upon receiving his fees and necessary expenses for taking and keeping the same.(Emphasis supplied.) SEC. 6. Disposition of property by sheriff.If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties

thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and the court affirms its approval of the applicants bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse party. (Emphasis supplied.) (1) First, the rules provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. In accordance with the said rules, Andres should have waited no less than five days in order to give the complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the seized motor vehicles by filing a counter-bond. This, he failed to do. Records show that Andres immediately took possession of two of the subject motor vehicles. Simultaneously, as evidenced by the depository receipts, Silver received from Andres the seized motor vehicles. Consequently, there is no question that Silver was already in possession of the nine seized vehicles immediately after seizure. Thus, Andres committed a clear violation of Section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court with regard to the proper disposal of the property. It matters not that Silver was in possession of the seized vehicles merely for safekeeping as stated in the depository receipts. The rule is clear that the property seized should not be immediately delivered to the plaintiff, 23 and the sheriff must retain custody of the seized property for at least five days. Hence, the act of Andres in delivering the seized vehicles immediately after seizure to Silver for whatever purpose, without observing the fiveday requirement finds no legal justification. 24 In Pardo v. Velasco, this Court held that Respondent as an officer of the Court is charged with certain ministerial duties which must be performed faithfully to the letter. Every provision in the Revised Rules of Court has a specific reason or objective. In this case, the purpose of the five (5) days is to give a chance to the defendant to object to the sufficiency of the 25 bond or the surety or sureties thereon or require the return of the property by filing a counterbond . (Emphasis supplied.) In Sebastian v. Valino, this Court reiterated that Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. The sheriff must retain it in his custody for five days and he shall return it to 27 the defendant, if the latter, as in the instant case, requires its return and files a counterbond. (Emphasis supplied.) Likewise, Andres claim that he had no knowledge that the compound is owned by Silver fails to convince us. Regardless of who actually owns the compound, the fact remains that Andres delivered the vehicles to Silver 28 prematurely. It violates the rule requiring him to safekeep the vehicles in his custody. The alleged lack of facility to store the seized vehicles is unacceptable considering that he should have deposited the same in a bonded warehouse. If this was not feasible, he should have sought prior authorization from the court issuing the writ before delivering the vehicles to Silver. (2) Second, it must be stressed that from the moment an order of delivery in replevin is executed by taking possession of the property specified therein, such property is in custodia legis. As legal custodian, it is Andres duty to safekeep the seized motor vehicles. Hence, when he passed his duty to safeguard the motor vehicles to Silver, he committed a clear neglect of duty. (3) Third, we are appalled that even after PO3 Despe reported the unauthorized duplication of the vehicles keys, Andres failed to take extra precautionary measures to ensure the safety of the vehicles. It is obvious that the vehicles were put at risk by the unauthorized duplication of the keys of the vehicles. Neither did he immediately report the incident to the police or to the court. The loss of the motor vehicles could have been prevented if Andres immediately asked the court for an order to transfer the vehicles to another secured place as soon as he discovered the unauthorized duplication. Under these circumstances, even an ordinary prudent man would have exercised extra diligence. His warning to the policemen to closely watch the vehicles was insufficient. Andres cannot toss back to Silver or to the policemen the responsibility for the loss of the motor vehicles since he remains chiefly responsible for their safekeeping as legal custodian thereof. Indeed, Andres failure to take the necessary precaution and proper monitoring of the vehicles to ensure its safety constitutes plain negligence. (4) Fourth, despite the cease and desist order, Andres failed to return the motor vehicles to their lawful owners. Instead of returning the motor vehicles immediately as directed, he opted to write Silver and demand that she put up an indemnity bond to secure the third-party claims. Consequently, due to his delay, the eventual loss of the motor vehicles rendered the order to return the seized vehicles ineffectual to the prejudice of the complaining owners.
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It must be stressed that as court custodian, it was Andres responsibility to ensure that the motor vehicles were safely kept and that the same were readily available upon order of the court or demand of the parties concerned. Specifically, sheriffs, being ranking officers of the court and agents of the law, must discharge their duties with great care and diligence. In serving and implementing court writs, as well as processes and orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without affecting adversely the proper dispensation of justice. Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and as agents of the law, high standards of performance are 29 expected of them. Hence, his failure to return the motor vehicles at the time when its return was still feasible constitutes another instance of neglect of duty. 30 (5) Fifth, as found by the OCA, we agree that Andres also disregarded the provisions of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court with regard to payment of expenses. 31 Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the procedure for the execution of writs and other processes are: First, the sheriff must make an estimate of the expenses to be incurred by him; Second, he must obtain court approval for such estimated expenses; Third, the approved estimated expenses shall be deposited by the interested party with the Clerk of Court and ex officio sheriff; Fourth, the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount to the executing sheriff; and Fifth, the executing sheriff shall liquidate his expenses within the same period for rendering a return on the writ. In this case, no estimate of sheriffs expenses was submitted to the court by Andres. Without approval of the court, he also allowed Silver to pay directly to the policemen the expenses for the safeguarding of the motor 32 vehicles including their meals. Obviously, this practice departed from the accepted procedure provided in the Rules of Court. (6) As we have previously ruled: Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own 33 property. (Emphasis supplied.) Gross neglect, on the other hand, is such neglect from the gravity of the case, or the frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten the public welfare . The term 34 does not necessarily include willful neglect or intentional official wrongdoing. (Emphasis supplied.) Good faith on the part of Andres, or lack of it, in proceeding to properly execute his mandate would be of no moment, for he is chargeable with the knowledge that being an officer of the court tasked therefor, it behooves him to make due compliance. He is expected to live up to the exacting standards of his office and his conduct must 35 at all times be characterized by rectitude and forthrightness, and so above suspicion and mistrust as well. Thus, an act of gross neglect resulting in loss of properties in custodia legis ruins the confidence lodged by the parties to a suit or the citizenry in our judicial process. Those responsible for such act or omission cannot escape the disciplinary power of this Court. Issue: Grave abuse of authority (oppression). Held: Anent the allegation of grave abuse of authority (oppression). Records show that Andres started enforcing the writ of replevin/order of seizure on the same day that the order of seizure was issued. He also 36 admitted that he took the vehicles of persons who are not parties to the replevin case. He further admitted that he took one vehicle belonging to a certain Junard Escudero without the latters knowledge and even c aused the duplication of its keys in order that it may be taken by Andres. Certainly, these are indications that Andres enforced the order of seizure with undue haste and without giving the complainant prior notice or reasonable time to deliver the motor vehicles. Hence, Andres is guilty of grave abuse of authority (oppression). Ratio: When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate. However, the prompt implementation of an order of seizure is called for only in instances where there is no question regarding 38 the right of the plaintiff to the property. Where there is such a question, the prudent recourse for Andres is to desist from executing the order and convey the information to his judge and to the plaintiff. True, sheriffs must comply with their mandated ministerial duty to implement writs promptly and expeditiously, but equally true is the principle that sheriffs by the nature of their functions must at all times conduct themselves with propriety and decorum and act above suspicion. There must be no room for anyone to conjecture that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs as officers of the court have conspired with any of the parties to a case to obtain a favorable judgment or immediate execution. The sheriff is at the front line as representative of the judiciary and by his act he may build or destroy the institution.

Issue: Graft and Corruption (Violation of RA No. 3019) Held: As to the charge of graft and corruption, it must be stressed that the same is criminal in nature, thus, the resolution thereof cannot be threshed out in the instant administrative proceeding. The Court also takes note that there is a pending criminal case for carnapping against Andres; hence, with more reason that the Court cannot rule on the allegation of graft and corruption as it may preempt the court in its resolution of the said case. 4. TERLYNGRACE RIVERA vs. FLORENCIO L. VARGAS G.R. No. 165895 June 5, 2009 Nachura, J.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated November 18, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78529, as well as its October 20, 2004 Resolution, denying the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Terlyngrace Rivera (Rivera).

Facts:

Vargas, plaintiff-respondent, claims that he owns a 150 T/H rock crushing plant located in Sariaya, Quezon. He alleged that the equipment was entrusted to petitioners husband, Jan T. Rivera, who died sometime in late 2002, as caretaker of respondents construction aggregates business in Batangas. According to Vargas, petitioner failed to return the said equipment after her husbands death despite his repeated demands. Thus, he filed a complaint Rivera, defendant-petitioner, and several John Does before Branch 02 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, for the recovery of said equipment. The complaint was accompanied by a prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin and the necessary bond amounting to P2,400,000.00.

Summons dated February 24, 2003 was served upon petitioner through her personal secretary on April 28, 2003 at 8 her residence in Paraaque City. Interestingly, however, the writ of replevin was served upon and signed by a certain Joseph Rejumo, the security guard on duty in petitioners crushing plant in Sariaya, Quezon on April 29, 2003, contrary to the sheriffs return stating that the writ was served upon Rivera.

On May 8, 2003, Rivera filed her answer, manifestation, and motion for the acceptance of petitioners redelivery bond. In her answer, defendant countered that the rock-crushing plant was ceded in favor of her husband as his share following the dissolution of the partnership form ed between Jan Rivera and respondents wife, Iluminada Vargas (Iluminada), on May 28, 1998, while the partnerships second rock -crushing plant in Cagayan was ceded in favor of Iluminada. She further averred that from the time that the partnership was dissolved sometime in 2000 until Jan Riveras death in late 2002, it was petitioners husband who exercised ownership over the said equipment without any disturbance from respondent

Ruling of the RTC:

RTC disapproved the petitioners redelivery bond applicati on for failure to comply with the requirements under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. The RTC indirectly faulted petitioner for her failure to file the application for redelivery bond within five (5) days from the date of seizure as provided in the Rules of Court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was also denied.

Ruling of the CA:

CA also denied the petition for lack of merit.

Petitioner argues that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying her counterbond on the ground that it was filed out of time. She contends that the mandatory five-day period did not even begin to run in this case due to the improper service of the writ of replevin, contrary to Section 4 of Rule 60.

Sole Issue:

What is the effect of a writ of replevin that has been improperly served?

Held:

Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the constitutional guaranty on procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. If the writ was not served upon the adverse party but was instead merely handed to a person who is neither an agent of the adverse party nor a person authorized to receive court processes on his behalf, the service thereof is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid, running afoul of the statutory and constitutional requirements. The service is likewise invalid if the writ of replevin was served without the required documents. Under these circumstances, no right to seize and to detain the property shall pass, the act of the sheriff being both unlawful and unconstitutional.

Ratio: In the case at bar, petitioner avers that the writ of replevin was served upon the security guard where the rock39 crushing plant to be seized was located. The signature of the receiving party indicates that the writ was received on April 29, 2003 by a certain Joseph Rejumo, the guard on duty in a plant in Sariaya, Quezon, where the property 40 to be seized was located, and witnessed by Claudio Palatino, respondents caretaker. The sheriffs 41 return, however, peremptorily states that both the writ of replevin and the summons were served upon Rivera. On May 8, 2003, or nine (9) days after the writ was served on the security guard, petitioner filed an answer to the complaint accompanied by a prayer for the approval of her redelivery bond. The RTC, however, denied the redelivery bond for having been filed beyond the five-day mandatory period prescribed in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule

60. But since the writ was invalidly served, petitioner is correct in contending that there is no reckoning point from which the mandatory five-day period shall commence to run. The trial court is reminded that not only should the writ or order of replevin comply with all the requirements as to 43 matters of form or contents prescribed by the Rules of Court. The writ must also satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective: i.e. it should be directed to the officer who is authorized to serve it; and it should be served upon the person who not only has the possession or custody of the property involved but who is also a party or agent of a party to the action. Consequently, a trial court is deemed to have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction with respect to the ancillary action of replevin if it seizes and detains a personalty on the basis of a writ that was improperly served, such as what happened in this case. At the outset, petitioners proper remedy should have been to file a motion to quash the writ of replevin or a motion to vacate the order of seizure. Nevertheless, petitioners filing o f an application for a redelivery bond, while not necessary, did not thereby waive her right to question the improper service. It now becomes imperative for the trial court to restore the parties to their former positions by returning the seized property to petitioner and by discharging the replevin bond filed by respondent. The trial, with respect to the main action, shall continue. Respondent may, however, file a new application for replevin should he choose to do so. 5. ROGER V. NAVARRO vs.HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and KAREN T. GO, doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009 Brion, J.

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This is a petition for review on certiorari that seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated October 3 16, 2001 and Resolution dated May 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64701. These CA rulings affirmed the July 26, 4 5 2000 and March 7, 2001 orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, denying petitioner Roger V. Navarros (Navarro) motion to dismiss.

Facts: On September 12, 1998, respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints, before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarros possession.

First COMPLAINT:

Karen Go, the plaintiff, the owner of Kargo Enterprises (engaged in the business of buying and selling motor vehicles including hauling trucks and other heavy equipment), located in Bulua, CDO, entered into a lease agreement with Roger Navarro, the defendant, on August 8, 1997 involving a certain motor vehicle (Description: FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE/Serial No. FK416K-51680 /Motor No. 6D15-338735/Plate No. GHK-378) as evidenced by a LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE. In the agreement, KARGO ENTERPRISES represented by GLENN O. GO, its Manager. In accordance with the provisions of the above LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE, defendant delivered unto plaintiff six (6) post-dated checks each in the amount of SIXTY-SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE & 33/100 PESOS

(P66,333.33) which were supposedly in payment of the agreed rentals. When the fifth and sixth checks, respectively dated January 8, 1998 and February 8, 1998, were presented for payment and/or credit, the same were dishonored and/or returned by the drawee bank for the common reason that the current deposit account against which the said checks were issued did not have sufficient funds to cover the amounts thereof. Demands, written and oral, were made of defendant to pay the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX & 66/100 PESOS (P132,666.66), or to return the subject motor vehicle as also provided for in the LEASE AGREEMENT WITH RIGHT TO PURCHASE, but said demands were, and still are, in vain to the great damage and injury of herein plaintiff.

Second COMPLAINT:

The second complaint contained essentially the same allegations as the first complaint, except that the Lease Agreement with Option to Purchase involved is dated October 1, 1997 and the motor vehicle leased is described as follows Make/Type FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE/Serial No. FK416K-510528/Motor No. 6D14-423403. It also alleged that Navarro delivered three post-dated checks, each for the amount ofP100,000.00, to Karen Go in payment of the agreed rentals; however, the third check was dishonored when presented for payment.

Ruling of the RTC:

First decision:

On October 12, 1998 and October 14, 1998, the RTC issued writs of replevin for both cases; as a result, the Sheriff seized the two vehicles and delivered them to the possession of Karen Go.

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In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease agreements) the actionable documents on which the complaints were based. On Navarros motion, both cases were duly consolidated on December 13, 1999. In its May 8, 2000 order, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the complaints did not state a cause of action. In response to the motion for reconsideration Karen Go, the RTC issued another order dated July 26, 2000 setting aside the order of dismissal. Acting on the presumption that Glenn Gos leasing business is a conjugal property, the RTC held that Karen Go had sufficient interest in his leasing business to file the action against Navarro. However, the RTC held that Karen Go should have included her husband, Glenn Go, in the complaint based on Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court (Rules). Thus, the lower court ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff.1avvphi1

Ruling of the CA:

When the RTC denied Navarros motion for reconsideration on March 7, 2001, Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, essentially contending that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. On October 16, 2001, the CA denied Navarros petition and affirmed the RTCs order.

Issue 1: Whether Karen Go, the who filed the complaints, and not Glenn Go is real party-in-interest?

Held: Yes

Ratio: The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Interestingly, although Navarro admits that Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo Enterprises, he still insists that Karen Go is not a real party-in-interest in the case. According to Navarro, while the lease contracts were in Kargo Enterprises name, this was merely a trade name without a juridical personality, so the actual parties to the lease agreements were Navarro and Glenn Go, to the exclusion of Karen Go.

Issue 2: Whether the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the inclusion of Glenn Go as coplaintiff, since this in effect created a cause of action for the complaints when in truth, there was none?

Held: No.

Ratio: The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this case is the business name Kargo Enterprises. The name appears in the title of the Complaint where the plaintiff was identified as "KAREN T. GO doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES," and this identification was repeated in the first paragraph of the Complaint. Paragraph 2 defined the business KARGO ENTERPRISES undertakes. Paragraph 3 continued with the allegation that the defendant "leased from plaintiff a certain motor vehicle" that was thereafter described. Significantly, the Complaint specifies and attaches as its integral part the Lease Agreement that underlies the transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant. Again, the name KARGO ENTERPRISES entered the picture as this Lease Agreement provides: This agreement, made and entered into by and between: GLENN O. GO, of legal age, married, with post office address at xxx, herein referred to as the LESSOR-SELLER; representing KARGO ENTERPRISES as its Manager, xxx

thus, expressly pointing to KARGO ENTERPRISES as the principal that Glenn O. Go represented. In other words, by the express terms of this Lease Agreement, Glenn Go did sign the agreement only as the manager of Kargo Enterprises and the latter is clearly the real party to the lease agreements. As Navarro correctly points out, Kargo Enterprises is a sole proprietorship, which is neither a natural person, nor a juridical person, as defined by Article 44 of the Civil Code

Thus, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules, Kargo Enterprises cannot be a party to a civil action.

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Issue 3: Who is the proper party to file an action based on a contract in the name of Kargo Enterprises?

Held: We faced a similar question in Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza, where we said: Finally, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in court. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual, and requires the proprietor or owner thereof to secure licenses and permits, register the business name, and pay taxes to the national government. It does not vest juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in court. Thus, the complaint in the court below should have been filed in the name of the owner of Juasing Hardware. The allegation in the body of the complaint would show that the suit is brought by such person as proprietor or owner of the business conducted under the name and style Juasing Hardware. The descriptive words "doing business as 18 Juasing Hardware" may be added to the title of the case, as is customarily done. [Emphasis supplied.] This conclusion should be read in relation with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules, which states: SEC. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarros contention, Karen Go is the real party -in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises. Whether Glenn Go can legally sign the Lease Agreement in his capacity as a manager of Kargo Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, is a question we do not decide, as this is a matter for the trial court to consider in a trial on the merits. Issue 4: Whether the RTC erred in requiring the inclusion of Glenn Go as plaintiff? Held: No. Ratio: Article 108 of the Family Code provides: Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. This provision is practically the same as the Civil Code provision it superseded:

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Art. 147. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter. In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property." Taken with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds used to finance the four checks used to pay for petitioners stock subscriptions, and with the presumption that the credits themselves are part of conjugal funds, Article 1811 makes Quirino and Milagros de Guzman co-owners of the alleged credit. Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may separately bring an action for the recovery thereof. In the fairly recent cases of Baloloy v. Hular and Adlawan v. Adlawan, we held that, in a coownership, co-owners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned property without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his coowners. In the latter case and in that of De Guia v. Court of Appeals, we also held that Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides that any of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment, covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession. In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their 25 participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. [Emphasis supplied.] Under this ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring an action against Navarro to recover possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which they co-own. This conclusion is consistent with Article 124 of the Family Code, supporting as it does the position that either spouse may act on behalf of the conjugal partnership, so long as they do not dispose of or encumber the property in question without the other spouses consent. On this basis, we hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules, which states: Section 4. Spouses as parties. Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law. Non-joinder of indispensable parties not ground to dismiss action Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, we have held in a number of cases that the misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action. As we 27 stated in Macababbad v. Masirag: Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor nonjoinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action, thus: Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. In Domingo v. Scheer, this Court held that the proper remedy when a party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed.
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Issue 5: Whether demand not required prior to filing of replevin action? Held: No. Ratio: In arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of replevin is filed, Navarro apparently likens a replevin action to an unlawful detainer. For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states: Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond. The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts: (a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof; (b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief; (c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and (d) The actual market value of the property. The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant in the action. We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin. More importantly, Navarro is no longer in the position to claim that a prior demand is necessary, as he has already admitted in his Answers that he had received the letters that Karen Go sent him, demanding that he either pay his unpaid obligations or return the leased motor vehicles. Navarros position that a demand is necessary and has not been made is therefore totally unmeritorious. 6. SPOUSES NORMANDY and RUTH BAUTISTA vs. ERNESTO L. SULA, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City A.M. No. P-04-1920 August 17, 2007 Carpio, J. Facts: On 6 December 2003, Ruth B. Bautista (Ruth) borrowed P300,000 from Ceniza C. Glor (Glor). The loan, payable in three months, bore a monthly interest of five percent. The three-month period commenced on 6 December 2003 and expired on 6 March 2004. To secure the loan, Ruth executed a chattel mortgage over her Honda CRV in favor of Glor. Upon failure to pay, Glor demanded payment but to no avail. Even the vehicle was refused to be surrendered to Glor. Thus, on 6 May 2004, Glor filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 98, Quezon City (trial court), a civil 3 case for judicial foreclosure of chattel mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin.

Thereafter, the trial court issued a writ of replevin dated 14 May 2004 directing Ernesto L. Sula (respondent), Sheriff IV of the trial court, to take possession of the vehicle and keep it in his custody and to keep the said property in his possession for five (5) days. At the expiration of that period, he is directed to deliver the property to Glor upon payment of the latter of proper fees. Respondent enforced the writ on 17 May 2004. On 20 May 2004, spouses Normandy R. Bautista and Ruth B. 6 Bautista (complainants) filed with the trial court an urgent motion for the return of the vehicle and submission of 7 counter-bond. On 21 May 2004, complainants filed a motion to withdraw the urgent motion, attaching thereto an 8 omnibus motion for entry of appearance, urgent setting of hearing, and redelivery of the vehicle to them. Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 60, complainants required the return of the vehicle to them by filing a counter-bond and serving Glor a copy of the counter-bond. Trial court failed to approve complainants counter-bond, Glor asked respondent to delivery the property to her. In 11 a letter dated 26 May 2004, complainants asked respondent not to deliver the vehicle to Glor because (1) pursuant to Section 5, they had required the return of the vehicle to them and filed the corresponding counter-bond; (2) the vehicles delivery to Glor was not justified under Section 6; and (3) there was no order from the trial court directing 12 the delivery to Glor. In a letter dated 26 May 2004, Glor reiterated her demand on respondent to deliver the vehicle to her; otherwise, she would be constrained to pursue legal actions against him. On 26 May 2004, complainants alleged that respondent approached them in the Quezon City Hall of Justice building asking them to wait for him by the benches at the back of the second floor. There, respondent told them that he was willing to ignore Glors request in exchange for P20,000. With a little hesitation, they offered himP3,000 and promised to give the balance on the following day. Respondent agreed and immediately received theP3,000. On the next day, however, complainants did not give the balance. They asked respondent if he could give them more time to raise the money. Respondent was irked by this. On 26 May 2004, complainants alleged that respondent approached them in the Quezon City Hall of Justice building asking them to wait for him by the benches at the back of the second floor. There, respondent told them that he was willing to ignore Glors request in exchange for P20,000. With a little hesitation, they offered himP3,000 and promised to give the balance on the following day. Respondent agreed and immediately received theP3,000. On the next day, however, complainants did not give the balance. They asked respondent if he could give them more time to raise the money. Respondent was irked by this. Without waiting for the trial courts instructions regarding the vehicle, respondent filed his sheriffs return on 28 May 2004 stating that he had already delivered the vehicle to Glor. On 31 May 2004, complainants alleged that they went to the trial court to check on the vehicle and to look for respondent. There, respondent admitted to them that he had already delivered the vehicle to Glor he acted on his own discretion. Complainants asked respondent how much he received from Glor and why he did not give them a chance to fulfill their agreement. He just said "pasensiyahan na lang tayo." On 2 and 7 June 2004, complainants filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Court 17 Administrator (OCA), respectively, a joint affidavit-complaint against respondent. Since the acts complained of were related to respondents functions as an officer of the court, the Office of the Ombudsman, in its 1st 18 Indorsement dated 20 July 2004, referred the matter to the OCA. In his comment dated 4 August 2004, respondent prayed that the instant case be dismissed. OCAs Report and Recommendation: In its memorandum dated 14 October 2004, the OCA found that respondent erred when he released the vehicle to Glor without waiting for the trial courts instructions on who had a better right over the vehicle. The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that respondent be held liable for grave abuse of authority and fined P4,000. The OCA recommended that the charges for violation of the Anti21 19 5

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross ignorance of the law, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Issue 1: Whether the respondent is guilty of the Charge of Violation of theAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service? Held: No.

Ratio: Complainants bear the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. "Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 34 conclusion." In the instant case, complainants failed to substantiate the allegation that respondent violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Aside from their bare allegation that respondent demanded and received money from them, complainants did not present any substantial evidence to support the charge. The only pieces of evidence they offered were (1) respondents admission in his reply that he approached complainants in the Hall of Justice building and (2) a witness who could testify on respondents alleged acts of demanding and receiving money from the complainants: From the very words of the respondent Sheriff himself (page 5 of his Reply), he admitted to have [sic] APPROACHED US when he furnished us a copy of his Manifestation x x x. Why then did the respondent Sheriff approached [sic] us when his Manifestation is addressed and concerns only the Court? To put to rest that this is just a bare allegation, a third person is willing to present herself to the investigation of this Honorable Office to testify to the truth of the circumstances of the said incident which she personally witnessedbut which [sic] we could not reveal her identity at the moment upon her own request because the said person makes her living in the hallway of the Hall of Justice 35 of Quezon City. Complainants, however, never appeared in any of the investigations, nor presented their witness. The fact that respondent approached complainants in the Hall of Justice building is not enough basis for this Court to conclude that respondent demanded and received money from them. On complainants witness, the OCA found that "*t+he alleged fear from harassment of the complainants unnamed witness *precluding her+ to testify against the 36 respondent unless the latter is suspended from office is purely speculative." Complainants failed to present the quantum of evidence required to hold respondent liable. There is also no sufficient evidence to prove that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. As the OCA correctly held, "[t]he charges for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service must likewise fail, for insufficiency of evidence; if 37 there was any fault by herein respondent, it was his overzealousness to perform his duty." Issue 2: Whether the respondent is guilty of simple misconduct? Held: Yes. He is suspended for 6 months.

Ratio: The Court, however, finds respondent liable for simple misconduct. Simple misconduct has been defined as 38 an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers. It is an unlawful 39 behavior. "Misconduct in office is any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, willful in character. It generally means wrongful, improper, unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, 40 obstinate, or intentional purpose although it may not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent." It must be stressed that the prerogatives of Sheriffs do not give them any discretion to determine who among the parties is entitled to possession of the subject property. The appropriate course of action should have been for respondent to wait for the instructions of the court as to whom he will release the property since he had already asked for its guidance through his Manifestation which was submitted to the court virtually at the close of office

hours on 26 May 2004. Yet the following morning, he suddenly decided to release the car to the plaintiff without waiting for any court order on the matter. Such apparent haste raised questions on his actions and leaves doubts as to his intent or interest in the case. The purpose of the five (5) day period in Section 6, Rule 60 is to give defendants in a replevin case a chance to require the return of the property by filing a counter[-]bond. Considering that there was no court order to release the property to the applicant/plaintiff and the complainants were able to require the return of the property and file their counter[-]bond within the five (5) day period required by the Rules, respondent should have been more circumspect in releasing the property to the plaintiff/applicant . By hastily deciding to release the seized property to the plaintiff/applicant without waiting for the courts order, respondent patently abused his authority. (Emphasis ours) Indeed, respondent went beyond the call of his duties when he delivered the vehicle to Glor. The writ of replevin issued by the trial court specifically stated that the vehicle shall be delivered to Glor subject to the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60. Yet, respondent opted to ignore these provisions. Good faith on respondents part, or lack of i t, would be of no moment for he is chargeable with the knowledge that being an officer of the court, his duty is to comply with the Rules. Under Section 5, Rule 60, complainants may require the return of the vehicle by (1) posting a counter-bond in double the value of the vehicle and (2) serving Glor with a copy of the counter-bond. Both requirements must be complied with before the vehicle is delivered to Glor

7. SPOUSES DEO BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. G.R. No. 182963 June 3, 2013 Peralta, J.

AGNER

and

MARICON

AGNER

vs.

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the April 30, 2007 Decision and May 19, 2008 Resolution of the 3 Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 86021, which affirmed the August 11, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Manila City. Facts: On February 15, 2001, petitioners spouses Deo Agner and Maricon Agner executed a Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage in favor of Citimotors, Inc. The contract provides, among others, that: for receiving the amount of Php834, 768.00, petitioners shall pay Php 17,391.00 every 15th day of each succeeding month until fully paid; the loan is secured by a 2001 Mitsubishi Adventure Super Sport; and an interest of 6% per month shall be imposed for failure to pay each installment on or before the stated due date. On the same day, Citimotors, Inc. assigned all its rights, title and interests in the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage to ABN AMRO Savings Bank, Inc. (ABN AMRO), which, on May 31, 2002, likewise assigned the same to respondent BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. For failure to pay four successive installments from May 15, 2002 to August 15, 2002, respondent, through counsel, sent to petitioners a demand letter dated August 29, 2002, declaring the entire obligation as due and demandable 6 and requiring to pay Php576,664.04, or surrender the mortgaged vehicle immediately upon receiving the letter. As the demand was left unheeded, respondent filed on October 4, 2002 an action for Replevin and Damages before the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). Ruling of the RTC: 7 8 A writ of replevin was issued. Despite this, the subject vehicle was not seized. Trial on the merits ensued. On August 11, 2005, the Manila RTC Br. 33 ruled for the respondent and ordered petitioners to jointly and severally pay the amount of Php576,664.04 plus interest at the rate of 72% per annum from August 20, 2002 until fully paid, and the costs of suit.

Ruling of the CA: Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), but the CA affirmed the lower courts decision and, subsequently, denied the motion for reconsideration. Issue 1:Whether respondent has cause of action, because the Deed of Assignment executed in its favor did not specifically mention ABN AMROs account receivable from petitioners

Held: Yes. Ratio: It would be sufficient to state that the matter surrounding the Deed of Assignment had already been considered by the trial court and the CA. Likewise, it is an issue of fact that is not a proper subject of a petition for review under Rule 45. An issue is factual when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts, or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and 11 the probabilities of the situation. Time and again, We stress that this Court is not a trier of facts and generally does not weigh anew evidence which lower courts have passed upon.

Issue 2: Whether the petitioners can be considered to have defaulted in payment for lack of competent proof that they received the demand letter?

Held: Yes Ratio: records bear that both verbal and written demands were in fact made by respondent prior to the institution 12 of the case against petitioners. Even assuming, for arguments sake, that no demand letter was sent by respondent, there is really no need for it because petitioners legally waived the necessity of notice or demand in the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage, which they voluntarily and knowingly signed in favor of respondents predecessor-in-interest.

A provision on waiver of notice or demand has been recognized as legal and valid in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. 13 Court of Appeals, wherein We held: The Civil Code in Article 1169 provides that one incurs in delay or is in default from the time the obligor demands the fulfillment of the obligation from the obligee. However, the law expressly provides that demand is not necessary under certain circumstances, and one of these circumstances is when the parties expressly waive demand. Hence, since the co-signors expressly waived demand in the promissory notes, demand was unnecessary for them to be in default. Further, the Court even ruled in Navarro v. Escobido that prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing in Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on the possessor of the property before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed. Also, petitioners representation that they have not received a demand letter is completely inconsequential as the mere act of sending it would suffice. The Court cannot yield to petitioners denial in receiving respondents demand letter. To note, their postal address evidently remained unchanged from the time they executed the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage up to time the case was filed against them. Thus, the presumption that "a letter duly
15

directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail" stands in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary.

17

Issue 3: Whether the remedy of resorting to both actions of replevin and collection of sum of money is contrary to 9 the provision of Article 1484 of the Civil Code and the Elisco Tool Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of 10 Appeals ruling.

Held: No Ratio: In Elisco Too vs. CA, he Court therein ruled: The remedies provided for in Art. 1484 are alternative, not cumulative. The exercise of one bars the exercise of the others. This limitation applies to contracts purporting to be leases of personal property with option to buy by virtue of Art. 1485. The condition that the lessor has deprived the lessee of possession or enjoyment of the thing for the purpose of applying Art. 1485 was fulfilled in this case by the filing by petitioner of the complaint for replevin to recover possession of movable property. By virtue of the writ of seizure issued by the trial court, the deputy sheriff seized the vehicle on August 6, 1986 and thereby deprived private respondents of its use. The car was not returned to private respondent until April 16, 1989, after two (2) years and eight (8) months, upon issuance by the Court of Appeals of a writ of execution. Petitioner prayed that private respondents be made to pay the sum of P39,054.86, the amount that they were supposed to pay as of May 1986, plus interest at the legal rate. At the same time, it prayed for the issuance of a writ of replevin or the delivery to it of the motor vehicle "complete with accessories and equipment." In the event the car could not be delivered to petitioner, it was prayed that private respondent Rolando Lantan be made to pay petitioner the amount of P60,000.00, the "estimated actual value" of the car, "plus accrued monthly rentals thereof with interests at the rate of fourteen percent (14%) per annum until fully paid." This prayer of course cannot be granted, even assuming that private respondents have defaulted in the payment of their obligation. This led the trial court to say that petitioner wanted to eat its cake and have it too. In contrast, respondent in this case prayed: (a) Before trial, and upon filing and approval of the bond, to forthwith issue a Writ of Replevin ordering the seizure of the motor vehicle above-described, complete with all its accessories and equipments, together with the Registration Certificate thereof, and direct the delivery thereof to plaintiff in accordance with law and after due hearing, to confirm the said seizure; (b) Or, in the event that manual delivery of the said motor vehicle cannot be effected to render judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant(s) ordering them to pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum ofP576,664.04 plus interest and/or late payment charges thereon at the rate of 72% per annum from August 20, 2002 until fully paid; (c) In either case, to order defendant(s) to pay jointly and severally: (1) the sum of P297,857.54 as attorneys fees, liquidated damages, bonding fees and other expenses incurred in the seizure of the said motor vehicle; and (2) the costs of suit. Plaintiff further prays for such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.

Compared with Elisco, the vehicle subject matter of this case was never recovered and delivered to respondent despite the issuance of a writ of replevin. As there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of the use and enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent pursued, commenced or concluded its actual foreclosure. The trial court, therefore, rightfully granted the alternative prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent to the remedy of "exacting fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly, there is no double 30 recovery or unjust enrichment to speak of. SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE 1. MANUEL DE ASIS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Kalookan City and GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS represented by her mother/guardian VIRCEL D. ANDRES G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999 PURISIMA, J. Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 oft he Revised Rules of Court seeking to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's Orders, dated November 25, 1993 and February 4, 1994, respectively, denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in Civil Case No. C-16107, entitled "Glen Camil Andres de Asis, etc. vs. Manuel de Asis", and the motion for reconsideration. Facts: On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres, (the herein private respondent) in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis, alleging that the defendant Manuel de Asis (the petitioner here) is the father of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands. In his Answer, petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor and theorized that he cannot therefore be required to provide support for him. On July 4, 1989, private respondent Vircel D. Andres, through counsel, sent in a manifestation withdrawing the petition. By virtue of the said manifestation, both the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to move for the dismissal of the case. Acting thereupon, the Regional Trial Court a quo issued the following Order of August 8, 1989, dismissing Civil Case No. Q-88-935 with prejudice. On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian/mother, Vircel D. Andres. The complaint contains prayers among others of: 1. support in arrears (P2,000 per month) since June 1987; 2. allowance of P5,000/month; 3. support pendent elite of P5,000.00. On October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of res judicata, alleging that Civil Case C-16107 is barred by the prior judgment which dismissed with prejudice Civil Case Q -88-935. Ruling of the RTC: In the Order dated November 25, 1993 denying subject motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order met the same fate. It was likewise denied. Ruling of the CA: On June 7, 1996, the Court of Appeals found that the said Petition devoid of merit and dismissed the same. Issue: Whether or not the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court, and holding that an action for support cannot be barred by res judicata?

Held: No Ratio: The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article 301 of the Civil Code, the law in point, reads: Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. . . . Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. Art. 2035, ibid, provides, that: No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of courts; (6) Future legitime. The raison d' etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or compromise of the right to support is stated, thus: The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounce; hence, support which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced. xxx xxx xxx To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden. This is contrary to public policy. In the case at bar, respondent minor's mother, who was the plaintiff in the first case, manifested that she was withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who denied his paternity over the child. Since the right to claim for support is predicated on the existence of filiation between the minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe that such manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support from him puts the issue to rest and bars any and all future complaint for support. The manifestation sent in by respondent's mother in the first case, which acknowledged that it would be useless to pursue its complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondent's mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.

It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be binding upon the respondent, such an admission is at most evidentiary and does not conclusively establish the lack of filiation.

Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's theory that the dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case Q-88-935 has the 7 effect of res judicata on the subsequent case for support. The case of Advincula vs. Advincula comes to the fore. In Advincula, the minor, Manuela Advincula, instituted a case for acknowledgment and support against her putative father, Manuel Advincula. On motion of both parties and for the reason that the "plaintiff has lost interest and is no longer interested in continuing the case against the defendant and has no further evidence to introduce in support of the complaint", the case was dismissed. Thereafter, a similar case was instituted by Manuela, which the defendant moved to dismiss, theorizing that the dismissal of the first case precluded the filing of the second case. In disposing such case, this Court ruled, thus: The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional because the amount may be increased or decreased depending upon the means of the giver and the needs of the recipient (Art. 297); and that the right to receive support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligator (Art .301). Furthermore, the right to support can not be waived or transferred to third parties and future support cannot be the subject of compromise (Art. 2035; Coral v. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3135, cited in IV Civil Code by Padilla, p. 648; 1956 Ed.). This being true, it is indisputable that the present action for support can be brought, notwithstanding the fact the previous case filed against the same defendant was dismissed. And it also appearing that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3553, was not an adjudication upon the merits, as heretofore shown, the right of herein plaintiff-appellant to reiterate her suit for support and acknowledgment is available, as her needs arise. Once the needs of plaintiff arise, she has the right to bring an action for support, for it is only then that her cause for action is accrues.. . . xxx xxx xxx It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status of a persons and future support, cannot be the subject of compromise (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil Code). Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not bar the filing of another action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant. (emphasis supplied). Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case Q-88-935 and the lower court's pronouncement that such dismissal was with prejudice, the second action for support may still prosper. CASE 2 PEOPLE vs. MANAHAN G.R. No. 128157 September 29, 1999 303 SCRA Bellosillo, J. Automatic review on the decision of the court a quo finding the accused guilty of rape and sentencing to death and ordering to ACKNOWLEDGE AND SUPPORT the offspring of his indiscretion.

FACTS: The accused, a married man, was charged and convicted of the crime of rape before the RTC and was ordered to indemnify the victim, acknowledge and support the offspring of his indiscretion. Accused interposed as a defense that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and reiterates that he and the complaining witness were lovers, and that their sexual congress was consensual. RTC: found guilty of rape and sentenced to death. He was also ordered to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 as moral damages, pay the costs, and acknowledge and support the offspring of his indiscretion. CA: ISSUE: Whether or not the accused shall be ordered to support the offspring of his indiscretion. HELD: YES. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so," and "in every case to support the offspring." RATIO: Compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in 16 doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As pronounced by this Court in People v. Guerrero, the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently, that portion of the judgment under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, we sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordance with law. SC affirmed the conviction of the accused but modifying the sentence from death to Reclusion Perpetua, deleting the portion of the decision of the trial court ordering the accused, a married man to ACKNOWLEDGE the child Melanie Tibigar being contrary to law and jurisprudence but sustaining the Order of SUPPORT. CASE 3 ALBERTO LOPEZ vs. CA G.R. No. 148510, September 29, 1999 315 SCRA Carpio Morales, J. Petition for Review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure FACTS: The RTC of Malabon rendered a decision in Civil Case declaring the nullity of marriage between Cherry Pie Lopez and Alberto Lopez a.k.a Cesar Lopez (petitioner). The decision became final and executory based on a 2 certification. Petitioner moved to reconsider the support aspect of the decision but was denied. the RTC, acting on petitioners Notice of Appeal, gave it due course and directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals "as soon as possible." Petitioner paid before the RTC a total of Sixty (P60.00) Pesos as docket fees. CA: For petitioners failure to pay the full amount of P520.00 docket fees, the Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal. 7 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate courts Resolution, but it was denied on the grounds that the motion did not contain an affidavit or proof of service and that it did not state on its face the material dates determinative of its timeliness. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied on the ground that no second motion by the same party can be entertained. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may file a motion for modification of the amount of support notwithstanding the dismissal of the petition. HELD: Yes. the dismissal of the petition notwithstanding, petitioner is not without remedy. For as what he seeks to assail is the amount of support he was adjudged to provide, he can file a motion with the trial court for its modification since a judgment granting support never becomes final.

Case 4 MONTEFALCON VS VASQUEZ G.R. No. 165016 554 SCRA QUISUMBING, J. Petition for Review assailing the decision of the CA reversing the decision of the RTC on the Complaint for Acknowledgment and Support FACTS: Petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and support against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC. Alleging that her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he 5 signed as father. According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as support for Laurence since Laurence was born in 1993. Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance despite repeated demands. Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family. RTC: On petitioners' motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in default for failure to file an answer despite the substituted service of summons. Judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiffs Dolores Montefalcon and her minor child Laurence Montefalcon and against defendant Ronnie S. Vasquez who is hereby ordered to Acknowledge plaintiff Laurence Montefalcon as his illegitimate child with Dolores Montefalcon Give support to the said minor in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS monthly commencing on June 1, 1993. CA: ISSUE: reversed the decision of the RTC and remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. whether or not the child, Laurence is entitled to support from the respondent.
26 4

June 17, 2008

HELD: YES. Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may be 27 established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under Article 172, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) through record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by admission of filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned; or in default of these two, by open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. RATIO: Laurence's record of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of evidence to prove paternity and filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores. He signed as father in Laurence's certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied the data entered in it. Thus, it is a competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. In fact, if the child had been recognized by any of the modes in the first paragraph of Article 172, there is no further need to file any action for acknowledgment because any of said modes is by itself a 28 consummated act. As filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. Petitioners were able to prove that Laurence needs Vasquez's support and that Vasquez is capable of giving such support. Dolores testified that she spent around P200,000 for Laurence; she spends P8,000 a month for his schooling and their subsistence. She told the 29 lower court Vasquez was earning US$535 monthly based on his January 10, 2000 contract of employment with 30 Fathom Ship Management and his seafarer information sheet. That income, if converted at the prevailing rate, would be more than sufficient to cover the monthly support for Laurence. 31 Under Article 195 (4) of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his illegitimate child. The amount is variable. There is no final judgment thereof as it shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and 32 the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or 33 increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and

transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Under the premises, the award of P5,000 monthly support to Laurence is reasonable, and not excessive nor exorbitant. CASE 5 LIM VS LIM G.R. No. 163209 604 SCRA 691 CARPIO, J. October 30, 2009

34

Petition for review on Support respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edwards family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income. Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising situation." Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the RTC for support. RTC: rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to "jointly" provideP40,000 monthly support to respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability. CA: ISSUE: affirmed the trial court. whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

HELD: YES. However, we modify the appealed judgment by limiting petitioners liability to the amount of monthly support needed by respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III only. Petitioners Liable to Provide 9 10 Support but only to their Grandchildren. By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on 11 provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their 12 liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or 13 suspension during the childrens minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward 14 exercised parental authority over their children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latters offspring ends with them. Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe constriction of the scope of familial obligation to give support. In the first place, the governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. While both areas share a 15 common ground in that parental authority encompasses the obligation to provide legal support, they differ in other concerns including the duration of the obligation and its concurrence among relatives of differing 16 degrees. Thus, although the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the 17 emancipation of the child, the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime.. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latters inability to provide sufficient support. As we observed in another case raising the ancillary issue of an ascendants obligation to give support in light of the fathers sufficient means:

Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art. 199. We agree with this view. There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandson's legal 18 support. x x x (Emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted) Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents basic needs. This inability of Edward and Che ryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, 19 both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.1avvphi1 However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from 20 the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond. Unfortunately, Cheryls share from the amount of monthly support the trial court awarded cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are 21 constrained to remand the case to the trial court for this limited purpose. Petitioners Precluded from Availing of the Alternative Option Under Article 204 of the Civil Code, as Amended As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of the Civil Code, as amended, and pray that they be allowed to fulfill their obligation by maintaining respondents at petitioners Makati res idence. The option is unavailable to petitioners. The application of Article 204 which provides that The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (Emphasis supplied) is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons entitled to rec eive support are petitioners grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is the scene of her husbands infidelity. While not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryls charge against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bringing the case within the ambit of the exception clause of Article 204, precluding its application. CASE 5 LIM-LUA VS LIM G.R. Nos. 175279-80 697 SCRA 237 VILLARAMA, JR., J. June 5, 2013

petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 FACTS: Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua before the RTC. In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner

sought the amount ofP500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondents huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad. RTC: issued an Order granting support pendent lite. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Respondent filed petition for certiorari in the CA. CA: CA rendered its Decision, finding merit in respondents contention that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting P250,000.00 monthly support to petitioner without evidence to prove his actual income. Motion for reconsideration was denied; i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of PhP2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2) children; ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred by him subject to the deductions aforementioned. iii. DIRECTING the issuance of a permanent writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUE: whether or not the honorable court erred in ordering the deduction of the amount of php2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of php3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of the respondent to the petitioner and their children. HELD: The SC declared that the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
9

As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the mother money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued support pendente lite. The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of petitioner, should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal. INTERPLEADER 1. ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARKS CORPORATION vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NORTH PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION OF THE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS 165 SCRA 439 G.R. No. 73794 September 19, 1988 PARAS, J.: A special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus seeking to set aside the resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate Court ordering ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARKS CORPORATION (ETERNAL GARDENS) to deposit whatever amounts due from it under the Land Development Agreement.

FACTS: ETERNAL GARDENS and NORTH PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION CORPORATION OF THE SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS (MISSION) are corporations duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. They executed a Land Development Agreement whereby ETERNAL GARDENS undertook to introduce and construct at its own expense and responsibility necessary improvements on the property owned by MISSION into a memorial park to be subdivided into and sold as memorial plot lots, at a stipulated area and price per lot. Out of the proceeds from the sale, MISION is entitled to receive 40% of the net gross collection from the project to be remitted monthly by ETERNAL GARDENS to MISSION. On the same date MISSION executed in favor of ETERNAL GARDENS a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage on the lots with titles involved in the land development project. The deed was supplemented by a Sale of Real Property with Mortgage and Special Conditions dated October 28, 1978. The amounts paid by ETERNAL GARDENS were to be considered as part of the 40% due under the Land Development Agreement. Thereafter, MAYSILO ESTATE asserted its claim of ownership over the parcel of land in question. Confronted with such conflicting claims, ETERNAL GARDENS as plaintiff filed a complaint for interpleader against MISSION and MAYSILO ESTATE before the then CFI of Rizal, alleging among others, that in view of the conflicting

claims of ownership of MISSION and MAYSILO ESTATE over the properties subject matter of the contracts, over which ETERNAL GARDENS has no claim of ownership except as a purchaser thereof, and to protect the interests of ETERNAL GARDENS which has no interest in the subject matter of the dispute and is willing to pay whoever is entitled or declared to be the owners of said properties, the defendants should be required to interplead and litigate their several claims between themselves. CFI: Issued separate Orders requiring the defendants, MISSION and MAYSILO ESTATE to interplead and denying MISSIONs motion for the placing on judicial deposit the amounts due and unpaid from ETERNAL GARDENS. IAC: ORDERED ETERNAL GARDENS to deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement with a reputable bank to be the depository trustee of the said amounts to be paid to whoever shall be found entitled thereto. ISSUE: WHETHER THE IAC ERRED IN REQUIRING ETERNAL GARDENS TO PLACE UNDER JUDICIAL DEPOSIT THE AMOUNTS DUE FROM IT UNDER THE LAND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT. HELD: NO. THERE IS NO REASON FOR ETERNAL GARDENS OBJECTIONS TO THE DEPOSIT OF THE AMOUNTS IN LITIGATION AFTER HAVING ASKED FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF THE LOWER COURT BY FILING A COMPLAINT FOR INTERPLEADER WHERE THE DEPOSIT OF AFORESAID AMOUNTS IS NOT ONLY REQUIRED BY THE NATURE OF THE ACTION BUT IS ETERNAL GARDENS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION UNDER THE LAND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. RATIO: 1) The essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the court. It is a rule founded on justice and equity: "that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto." 2) More than twenty million pesos are involved, so that on interest alone for savings or time deposit would be considerable, now accruing in favor of the Eternal Gardens. Such is in violation of the very essence of the complaint for interpleader as it clearly runs against the interest of justice in this case.

2.

WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. vs. LEE E. WON alias RAMON LEE and BIENVENIDO A. TAN 70 SCRA 165 G.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976 CASTRO, C.J.: An appeal from the order of the CFI dismissing the WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB's complaint for interpleader upon the grounds of failure to state a cause of action and res judicata.

FACTS: The Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock, civic and athletic corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, filed a complaint in interpleader, alleging: (a) that the defendant LEE E. WON claims ownership of its membership fee certificate 201, by virtue of the decision rendered in a civil case entitled " Lee E. Won alias Ramon Lee vs. Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc.", pursuant to which decision membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 was issued on October 17, 1963 by the deputy clerk of court of the said CFI of Manila, for and in behalf of the president and the secretary of THE CORPORATION and of the People's Bank & Trust Company as transfer agent of the said CORPORATION, pursuant to the order of September 23, 1963 in the said case; (b) that the defendant BIENVENIDO A. TAN, on the other hand, claims to be lawful owner of the same membership fee certificate by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 issued to him on July 24, 1950 pursuant to an assignment made in his favor by "Swan, Culbertson and Fritz," the original owner and holder of said membership fee certificate; (c) that under its articles of incorporation and by-laws THE CORPORATION is authorized to issue a maximum of 400 membership fee certificates to persons duly elected or admitted to proprietary membership, all of which have been issued as early as December 1939; (d) that it claims no interest whatsoever in the said membership fee certificate; (e) that it has no means of determining who of the two defendants is the lawful owner thereof; (f) that it is without power to issue two separate certificates for the same membership fee certificate 201, or to issue another membership fee certificate to the defendant LEE, without violating its articles of incorporation and by-laws; and (g) that the membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 held by the defendant TAN and the membership fee certificate 201-serial No. 1478 issued to the defendant LEE

proceed from the same membership fee certificate 201, originally issued in the name of "Swan, Culbertson and Fritz". The Corporation prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring LEE and TAN to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims; and (b) judgment be rendered declaring who of the two is the lawful owner of membership fee certificate 201, and ordering the surrender and cancellation of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued in the name of LEE. CFI: DISMISSED the complaint based on bar by prior judgment and failure to state a cause of action. THE CORPORATION: Contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint, instead of compelling the LEE and TAN to interplead because there actually are conflicting claims between the latter with respect to the ownership of membership fee certificate 201. ISSUE: WHETHER THE REMEDY OF INTERPLEADER IS PROPER AND TIMELY. HELD: NO. THE CORPORATION ALLOWED CIVIL CASE 26044 TO PROCEED TO FINAL JUDGMENT. AND IT OFFERED NO SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION FOR ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEAD TAN IN THE SAME LITIGATION. IN THIS FACTUAL SITUATION, IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS INTERPLEADER SUIT CANNOT PROSPER BECAUSE IT WAS FILED MUCH TOO LATE. RATIO: 1) There is no question that the subject matter of the present controversy, i.e., the membership fee certificate 201, is proper for an interpleader suit. What is here disputed is the propriety and timeliness of the remedy in the light of the facts and circumstances obtaining. The action of interpleader, under the Code of Civil Procedure, is a remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability. The procedure under the Rules of Court is the same as that under the Code of Civil Procedure, except that under the former the remedy of interpleader is available regardless of the nature of the subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under the latter an interpleader suit is proper only if the subject-matter of the controversy is personal property or relates to the performance of an obligation. 2) A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court. He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred. 3) A stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the latter. 4) THE CORPORATION cannot be said to have acted with diligence such that it may properly invoke the remedy of interpleader. THE CORPORATION was aware of the conflicting claims of LEE and TAN with respect to membership fee certificate 201 long before it filed the present interpleader suit. It had been recognizing TAN as the lawful owner thereof. It was sued by LEE who also claimed the same membership fee certificate. Yet it did not interplead TAN. It preferred to proceed with the litigation (civil case 26044) and to defend itself therein. As a matter of fact, final judgment was rendered against it and said judgment has already been executed. It is, therefore, too late for it to invoke the remedy of interpleader. THE CORPORATION has not shown any justifiable reason why it did not file an application for interpleader in civil case 26044 to compel LEE and TAN to litigate between themselves their conflicting claims of ownership. It was only after adverse final judgment was rendered against it that the remedy of interpleader was invoked by it. By

then it was too late, because to be entitled to this remedy the applicant must be able to show that he has not been made independently liable to any of the claimants. And since THE CORPORATION is already liable to LEE under a final judgment, the present interpleader suit is clearly improper and unavailing. 5) Having elected to take its chances of success in civil case 26044, with full knowledge of all the fact, THE CORPORATION must submit to the consequences of defeat. To permit THE CORPORATION to bring LEE to court after the latter's successful establishment of his rights in civil case 26044 to the membership fee certificate 201, is to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits, which is one of the purposes of an action of interpleader, with the possibility that the latter would lose the benefits of the favorable judgment; this cannot be allowed. 6) It is well settled, both by reasons and authority, that one who asks the interposition of a court of equity to compel others, claiming property in his hands, to interplead, must do so before putting them to the test of trials at law. The remedy by interpleader is afforded to protect the party from the annoyance and hazard of two or more actions touching the same property or demand; but one who, with knowledge of all the facts, neglects to avail himself of the relief, or elects to take the chances for success in the actions at law, ought to submit to the consequences of defeat. To permit an unsuccessful defendant to compel the successful plaintiffs to interplead, is to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits; to put upon the shoulders of others the burden which he asks may be taken from his own. 7) A successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment.

3.

SUBHASH C. PASRICHA and JOSEPHINE A. PASRICHA vs. DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC. 548 SCRA 273 G.R. No. 136409 March 14, 2008 NACHURA, J.: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the CA Decision dismissing the petition filed by JOSEPHINE and SUBHASH PASRICHA.

FACTS: DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC. (REALTY COMPANY) and the PASRICHAs executed two Contracts of Lease whereby the former, as lessor, agreed to lease to the latter Units 22, 24, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the San Luis Building, located at 1006 M.Y. Orosa cor. T.M. Kalaw Streets, Ermita, Manila. The PASRICHAs, in turn, agreed to pay monthly rentals. While the contracts were in effect, PASRICHAs dealt with Francis Pacheco (PACHECO), then General Manager of the REALTY COMPANY. Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by Roswinda Bautista (MS. BAUTISTA), the REALTY COMPANYs General Manager/Treasurer. The PASRICHAs religiously paid the monthly rentals until May 1992. After that, however, despite repeated demands, the PASRICHAs continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent. The REALTY COMPANY made a final demand on the PASRICHAs for the payment of the accrued rentals amounting to P916,585.58. Because the PASRICHAs still refused to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed by the REALTY COMPANY through its representative, MS. BAUTISTA. The PASRICHAs admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent but claimed that such refusal was justified because of the internal squabble in the REALTY COMPANY as to the person authorized to receive payment. MeTC: DISMISSED the complaint for ejectment. While it considered the PASRICHAs non-payment of rentals as unjustified, the court, nevertheless, dismissed the complaint because of MS. BAUTISTAs alleged lack of authority to sue on behalf of the REALTY COMPANY.

RTC: REVERSED AND SET ASIDE the MeTC Decision. It ordered the PASRICHAs to vacate the leased premises and to pay the REALTY COMPANY the accrued rents in arrears. Th e court adopted the MeTCs finding on the PASRICHAs unjustified refusal to pay the rent, which is a valid ground for ejectment. It, however, faulted the MeTC in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of capacity to sue. Instead, it upheld MS. BAUTISTAs authority to represent the REALTY COMPANY notwithstanding the absence of a board resolution to that effect, since her authority was implied from her power as a general manager/treasurer of the company. CA: AFFIRMED the RTC Decision.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE PASRICHAS NON-PAYMENT OF RENT WAS JUSTIFIED. HELD: NO. RATIO: 1) In a civil case, the conclusions of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal by the Supreme Court. Albeit the rule admits of exceptions, not one of them obtains in this case. The MeTC, the RTC and the CA all found that the PASRICHAs failed to perform their obligation to pay the stipulated rent. 2) That the PASRICHAs did not know to whom payment should be made does not justify their failure to pay rentals because if such were the case, they were not without any remedy. They should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on the consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader. 3) Article 1256 of the Civil Code Article 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due. Consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the following cases: xxxx (4) When two or more persons claim the same right to collect; xxxx Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of a judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation in other cases. In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced the effect of payment of the rentals. The rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not imputable to him. The PASRICHAs claim that they made a written tender of payment and actually prepared vouchers for their monthly rentals. But that was insufficient to constitute a valid tender of payment. Even assuming that it was valid tender, still, it would not constitute payment for want of consignation of the amount. Well-settled is the rule that tender of payment must be accompanied by consignation in order that the effects of payment may be produced. 4) Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court Section 1. When interpleader proper. Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves. Thus, an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability. 5) Instead of availing of the above remedies, the PASRICHAs opted to refrain from making payments.

4.

BANK OF COMMERCE vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS 681 SCRA 521 G.R. No. 154470-71 September 24, 2012 BRION, J.: Two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, on pure questions of law, filed by the BANK OF COMMERCE (BOC) and the BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP). They assail the RTC Orders dismissing (i) the petition filed by the Planters Development Bank (PDB), (ii) the "counterclaim" filed by the BOC, and (iii) the counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader filed by the BSP; and denied the BOCs and the BSPs motions for reconsideration. FACTS: The case involves transactions involving two sets of Central Bank Bills (CB Bills), the nature of which transactions the PDB and the BOC cannot agree on. Upon learning that the subject CB Bills have been transferred the PDB informed the Officer-in-Charge of the BSPs Government Securities Department, LAGRIMAS NUQUI, of the PDBs claim over these CB bills, based on the Detached Assignments in its possession. The PDB requested the BSP to record its claim in the BSPs books, to put the BSP on formal notice that whoever is in possession of said bills is not a holder in due course, explaining that its non-possession of the CB bills is "on account of imperfect negotiations thereof and/or subsequent setoff or transfer." NUQUI responded that the BSP was "not in a position at that point in time to determine who is and who is not the holder in due course since it is not privy to all acts involving the transfers or negotiation" of the CB bills. In light of BSPs response and the impending maturity of the CB bills, the PDB filed with the RTC two separate petitions for Mandamus, Prohibition and Injunction with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, one for each set of CB Bills. PDB: essentially claims that in both the April 15, 1994 transaction (involving the first set of CB bills) and the April 19, 1994 transaction (involving the second set of CB bills), there was no intent on its part to transfer title of the CB bills, as shown by its non-issuance of a detached assignment in favor of the BOC and Bancap, respectively. The PDB particularly alleges that it merely "warehoused" the first set of CB bills with the BOC, as security collateral. BOC: argued that the PDB has no cause of action against it since the PDB is no longer the owner of the CB bills. The BOC asserted that the (i) transactions covering the subject sets of CB bills - were valid contracts of sale, followed by a transfer of title. BSP: countered that the PDB cannot invoke Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 because this section applies only to an "owner" and a "person presenting the bond," of which the PDB is neither. The PDB has not presented to the BSP any assignment of the subject CB bills, duly recorded in the BSPs books, in its favor to clothe it with the status of an "owner." Alternatively, the BSP asked that an interpleader suit be allowed between and among the claimants to the subject CB bills on the position that while it is able and willing to pay the subject CB bills face value, it is duty bound to ensure that payment is made to the rightful owner . RTC: (1) On September 28, 2000, the RTC granted the BSPs motion to interplead and, accordingly, required the BOC to amend its Answer and for the conflicting claimants to comment thereon. In October 2000, the BOC filed its Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, reiterating its earlier arguments asserting ownership over the subject CB bills. Without any opposition or objection from the PDB, the RTC admitted the BOCs Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims. PDB: In May 2001, filed an Omnibus Motion, questioning the RTCs jurisdiction over the BOCs additional counterclaims. The PDB argues that its petitions pray for the BSP (not the RTC) to determine who among the conflicting claimants to the CB bills stands in the position of the bona fide holder for value. The RTC cannot entertain the BOCs counterclaim, regardless of its nature, because it is the BSP which has jurisdiction to determine who is entitled to receive the proceeds of the CB bills. RTC: (2) In a January 10, 2002 Order, the RTC DISMISSED the PDBs petition, the BOCs counterclaim and the BSPs counter -complaint/cross-claim for interpleader, holding that under CB Circular No. 28, it has no jurisdiction (i) over the BOCs counterclaims and (ii) to resolve the issue of ownership of the CB bills. With the denial of their separate motions for reconsideration, the BOC and the BSP separately filed the present petitions for review on certiorari. THE BOCS and THE BSPS PETITIONS: The BOC argues that the present cases do not fall within the limited provision of Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28, which contemplates only of three situations: first, where the fraudulent assignment is not coupled with a notice to the BSP, it can grant no relief; second, where the fraudulent

assignment is coupled with a notice of fraud to the BSP, it will make a notation against the assignment and require the owner and the holder to substantiate their claims; and third, where the case does not fall on either of the first two situations, the BSP will have to await action on the assignment pending settlement of the case, whether by agreement or by court order. The PDBs case cannot fall under the first two situations. With particular regard to the second situation, CB Circular No. 28 requires that the conflict must be between an "owner" and a "holder," for the BSP to exercise its limited jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims; and the word "owner" here refers to the registered owner giving notice of the fraud to the BSP. The PDB, however, is not the registered owner nor is it in possession (holder) of the CB bills. Consequently, the PDBs case can only fall under the third situation which leaves the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, with the authority to resolve the issue of ownership of a registered bond (the CB bills) not falling in either of the first two situations. Assuming arguendo that the PDBs case falls under the second situation i.e., the BSP has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership of the CB bills the more recent CB Circular No. 769-80 (Rules and Regulations Governing Central Bank Certificates of Indebtedness) already superseded CB Circular No. 28, and, in particular, effectively amended Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28. Unlike CB Circular No. 28, CB Circular No. 769-80 limited the BSPs authority to the mere issuance and circularization of a "stop order" against the transfer, exchange and redemption upon sworn notice of a fraudulent assignment. Under this Circular, the BSP shall only continue to withhold action until the dispute is ended by an amicable settlement or by judicial determination. Given the more passive stance of the BSP the very agency tasked to enforce the circulars involved - under CB Circular No. 769-80, the RTCs dismissal of the BOCs counterclaims is palpably erroneous. Lastly, since NUQUIs office (Government Securities Department) had already been ab olished, it can no longer adjudicate the dispute under the second situation covered by CB Circular No. 28. The abolition of NUQUIs office is not only consistent with the BSPs Charter but, more importantly, with CB Circular No. 769 -80, which removed the BSPs adjudicative authority over fraudulent assignments. ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE BSP HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE ADJUDICATION OF THE OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT CB BILLS. HELD: NO. RATIO: 1) BSP has quasi-judicial powers over a class of cases which does not include the adjudication of ownership of the CB bills in question. The BSP is not simply a corporate entity but qualifies as an administrative agency created, pursuant to constitutional mandate, to carry out a particular governmental function. To be able to perform its role as central monetary authority, the Constitution granted it fiscal and administrative autonomy. While the very nature of an administrative agency and the raison d'tre for its creation and proliferation dictate a grant of quasi-judicial power to it, the matters over which it may exercise this power must find sufficient anchorage on its enabling law, either by express provision or by necessary implication. Once found, the quasijudicial power partakes of the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, to hear and determine a class of cases within its peculiar competence and expertise. In other words, the provisions of the enabling statute are the yardsticks by which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers an administrative agency may exercise, as defined in the enabling act of such agency. 2) What the law grants the BSP is a continuing role to shape and carry out the countrys monetary policy not the authority to adjudicate competing claims of ownership over the securities it has issued since this authority would not fall under the BSPs purposes under its charter. 3) In the exercise of its plenary legislative power, Congress may create administrative agencies endowed with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. Necessarily, Congress likewise defines the limits of an agencys jurisdiction in the same manner as it defines the jurisdiction of courts. The absence of any express or implied statutory power to adjudicate conflicting claims of ownership or entitlement to the proceeds of its certificates of indebtedness finds complement in the similar absence of any technical matter that would call for the BSPs special expertise or competence. ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE RTC CORRECTLY DISMISSED PDBS PETITION ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION.

HELD: NO. RATIO: 1) Not only the parties themselves, but more so the courts, are bound by the rule on non-waiver of jurisdiction; courts may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte1. Even indulging the RTC, if it believes that jurisdiction over the BOCs counterclaims and the BSPs counterclaim/crossclaim for interpleader calls for the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the allowance of the PDBs petition even becomes imperative because courts may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte. Without emasculating its jurisdiction, the RTC could have properly dismissed the PDBs petition but on the ground that mandamus does not lie against the BSP; but even this correct alternative is no longer plausible since the BSP, as a respondent below, already properly brought before the RTC the remaining conflicting claims over the subject CB bills by way of a counterclaim/crossclaim for interpleader. 2) Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides when an interpleader is proper; The remedy of an action of interpleader131 is designed to protect a person against double vexation in respect of a single liability. An action for interpleader requires, as an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against the stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter) who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants. Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single proceeding to determine conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the possibility of having to pay more than once on a single liability. 3) When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, in reality a new action arises; the remedy of interpleader, when proper, merely provides an avenue for the conflicting claims on the same subject matter. Where the claims of the interpleaders themselves are brought to the fore, the stakeholder as plaintiff is relegated merely to the role of initiating the suit. In short, the remedy of interpleader, when proper, merely provides an avenue for the conflicting claims on the same subject matter to be threshed out in an action. 4) The grant of the order to interplead effectively sustained the propriety of the BSPs resort to this procedural device. In granting the BSPs motion, the RTC acted on the correct premise that it has jurisdiction to reso lve the parties conflicting claims over the CB bills - consistent with the rules and the parties conduct - and accordingly required the BOC to amend its answer and for the PDB to comment thereon. Suddenly, however, the PDB made an about-face and questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC. Swayed by the PDBs argument, the RTC dismissed even the PDBs petition - which means that it did not actually compel the BSP to resolve the BOCs and the PDBs claims. Without the motion to interplead and the order grantin g it, the RTC could only dismiss the PDBs petition since it is the RTC which has jurisdiction to resolve the parties conflicting claims not the BSP. Given that the motion to interplead has been actually filed, the RTC could not have really granted the relief originally sought in the PDBs petition since the RTCs order granting the BSPs motion to interplead - to which the PDB in fact acquiesced into effectively resulted in the dismissal of the PDBs petition. This is not altered by the fact that the PDB additionally prayed in its petition for damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit against the public respondents because the grant of the order to interplead effectively sustained the propriety of the BSPs resort to this procedural device. 5.1) Interpleader AS A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION (a) The BSPs counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader DOES NOT run counter to general procedures While BSP did not initiate the interpleader suit through an original complaint but through its Answer, this circumstance understandable considering that insofar as the BSP is concerned, the PDB does not possess any right to have its claim recorded in the BSPs books; consequently, the PDB cannot properly be considered even as a potential claimant to the proceeds of the CB bills upon maturity. Thus, the interpleader was only an alternative position, made only in the BSPs Answer.

1 sua sponte. Latin term meaning "of one's own accord." It refers to when the court addresses an issue that has not been presented for consideration by the litigants.

The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is primarily governed by the specific provisions in Rule 62 of the Rules of Court and secondarily by the provisions applicable to ordinary civil actions. Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-ininterpleader as part of, although separate and independent from, the answer. Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court does not include a complaint-in-interpleader as a claim, a form of defense, or as an objection that a defendant may be allowed to put up in his answer or in a motion to dismiss. This does not mean, howe ver, that the BSPs counter-complaint/crossclaim for interpleader runs counter to general procedures. (b) Apart from a pleading, the rules allow party to seek an affirmative relief from the court through the procedural device of a motion. (c) Interpleader may be considered as a stakeholders remedy to prevent a wrong, that is, from making payment to one not entitled to it, thereby rendering itself vulnerable to lawsuit/s from those legally entitled to payment. (d) In an interpleader suit a claim is contained in the answer-(of the conflicting claimants)-in interpleader. Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to govern the uniqueness of its application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, governing ordinary civil actions, a partys claim is asserted in a complaint, counterclaim, crossclaim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention. In an interpleader suit, however, a claim is not required to be contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-(of the conflicting claimants)-in interpleader. This claim is different from the counter-claim (or cross-claim, third party-complaint) which is separately allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule 62. 5.2) For purposes of payment of filing fees, both the BOC and the PDB, properly as defendants-in-interpleader, must be assessed the payment of the correct docket fee arising from their respective claims. (a) Section 7, Rule 62 only pertain to the docket and lawful fees to be paid by the one who initiated the interpleader suit, and who, under the Rules, actually claims no interest whatever in the subject matter. By constituting a lien on the subject matter of the action, Section 7 in effect only aims to actually compensate the complainant-in-interpleader, who happens to be the stakeholder unfortunate enough to get caught in a legal crossfire between two or more conflicting claimants, for the faultless trouble it found itself into. Since the defendants in- interpleader are actually the ones who make a claim - only that it was extraordinarily done through the procedural device of interpleader - then to them devolves the duty to pay the docket fees prescribed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. DECLARATORY RELIEF 1. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., et al. 374 SCRA 262 G.R. No. 101783 January 23, 2002 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Petition for review on certiorari challenging the Decision of the RTC and its Order denying the motion for reconsideration of the said Decision.

FACTS: On September 11, 1974, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, with the objective of enabling the grantees of electric franchises to reduce their rates "within the reach of consumers", promulgated Presidential Decree No. 551 providing for the reduction from 5% to 2% of the franchise tax paid by electric companies. On February 5, 1982, the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., (PCFI) filed with the Board of Energy (BOE) a "Petition for Specific Performance, Damages and Violation of P. D. No. 551" against the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) (BOE Case No. 82-198). PCFI sought for the immediate refund by MERALCO to its customers of all the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551, through the reduction of its franchise tax from 5% to 2%. It moored its petition on Section 4 of P.D. No. 551 which provides: All the savings realized by electric franchise holders from the reduction of the franchise tax under Section 1 and tariff reductions and tax credits under Sections 2 and 3, shall be passed on to the ultimate consumer . The Secretary of Finance shall promulgate rules and regulations and devise a reporting systems to carry out the provisions of this Decree." BOE (in BOE Case No. 82-198): DISMISSED the petition, declaring that MERALCO was authorized to retain the disputed savings through a BOE Order, which Order had long been final for the oppositors failure to appeal the same. G.R. No. 63018: PCFI filed a Petition for Certiorari with the SC.

SC: There is NO grave abuse of discretion warranting the setting aside of the BOE Order. The SC found that the March 10, 1980 judgment rendered in BOE Case No. 79-692, where MERALCO had filed a motion for authority to defer passing on to customers the savings from the reduction of franchise taxes, was not appealed or questioned by PCFI. Instead, they filed BOE Case No. 82-198 on February 5, 1982 or almost two years later, raising the same issues against the same parties. BOEs questioned decision in Case No. 82 -198 used the facts in BOE Case No. 79692 for its conclusions. Thus, the SC held that not only had the March 10, 1980 decision confirmed the findings of the Minister of Finance on MERALCOs accounts and finances but in filing the second case, PCFI was asking fo r a readjudication of the same issues in another challenge to these same findings. Four years thereafter, PCFI and a certain Edgardo S. Isip filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief. RTC: DECLARED NULL AND VOID the Resolution of the SC in G.R. No. 63018 and on the basis of the Dissenting Opinion of the late Justice Claudio Teehankee, held that the disputed savings belong to the consumers. MERALCOs Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari. MERALCO: contends that the action is already barred by prior judgments, referring to a) the SCs Resolution in G.R. No. 63018 sustaining the BOE's Decision; and b) the Order of the same Board in BOE Case No. 79692, both holding that MERALCO is authorized to retain its savings realized under P.D. 551. MERALCO likewise argues that the RTC cannot annul the SCs Resolution in G.R. No. 63018 considering that trial courts cannot set aside decisions of a superior court. And lastly, Meralco maintains that PCFI can no longer avail of the remedy of an action for declaratory relief in view of the rule that such action should be filed before a violation of the statute occurred. PCFI: argue that the SC's Resolution in G.R. No. 63018 cannot be a bar to the instant action for declaratory relief considering that it did not delve on the essential issue raised in the latter case, i.e., who is entitled to the savings. Further, they claim that public interest would be defeated by the application of res judicata. ISSUE: WHETHER THE REMEDY OF DECLARATORY RELIEF IS STILL AVAILABLE TO PCFI. HELD: NO. RATIO: 1) The issue - whether or not MERALCO is duly authorized to retain the savings resulting from the reduction of the franchise tax under P.D. No. 551 as long as its rate of return falls below the 12 % allowable rate recognized in this jurisdiction has long been settled. Thus, the relitigation of the same issue cannot be sanctioned under the principle of res judicata. 2) All the requisites for res judicata are extant in the records and thus, beyond dispute. Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. In res judicata, the judgment in the first action is considered conclusive as to every matter offered and received therein, as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose, and all other matters that could have been adjudged therein. For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must concur: 1) there must be a final judgment or order; 2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; 3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and 4) there must be, between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. 3) The RTC's Decision granting PCFI and Isip's petition for declaratory relief is in direct derogation of the principle of res judicata. Twice, it has been settled that MERALCO is duly authorized to retain the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551 as long as its rate of return falls below the 12% allowable rate. The pronouncement of the BOE in BOE Case No. 82-198 finding such fact to be "beyond question" is clear and not susceptible of equivocation. This pronouncement was sustained by the SC in G.R. No. 63018. In finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the BOE, the SC saw the wisdom of its assailed Decision. 4) The purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract etc. for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, AND NOT to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof. An action for declaratory relief may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract etc., to which it refers. The petition gives a practical remedy in ending controversies which have not reached the stage where other relief is immediately available. It supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of obligations, invasion of rights, and the commission of wrongs.

5) PCFI brought the petition for declaratory relief long after the alleged violation of P.D. No. 551. 2. Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent. G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004 PANGANIBAN, J.: CASE: Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 3 4 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 49). The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a 5 Petition for Declaratory Relief filed before the RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano "Mike" Z. Velarde, together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-respondents. FACTS: On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his co-respondents Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate. Velarde filed a Motion to dismiss before the trial court owing to the fact that alleged that the questioned SJS Petition did not state a cause of action and that there was no justiciable controversy. RULING OF RTC: The trial courts junked the Velarde petitions because RTC has jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents were violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the petition has raised only a question of law. As to the issue of the separation of church and state, it stated that "endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause." Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration before the trial court for failure of the the decision to state material facts and the dispositive portion, but the same were denied by the court. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUES: In its oral argument dated April 13, 2004, the Supreme Court condensed Velardes issues and divided it into 2 groups: A. Procedural Issues 1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy? 2. Did it state a cause of action? 3. Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief? B. Substantive Issues 1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court? 2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against said candidates? HELD: Petition for Review GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action. RATIO: Procedural Issues:
1 2

1. NO. A justiciable controversy to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory . A petition filed with the trial court should contain a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim. The SJS Petition fell short of the requirements to constitutue a jusiciable controversy. Because (a) It stated no ultimate facts. The petition simply theorized that the people elected who were endorsed by these religious leaders might become beholden to the latter. (b) It did not sufficiently state a declaration of its rights and duties, what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein, and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the constitution, (c) The petition did not pray for a stoppage of violated rights. It merely sought an opinion of the trial court. However, courts are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion. The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a timehonored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right. 2. NO. A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter. (Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800) Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter. The court held that the complaints failure to state a cause of action became a ground for its outright dismissal. The Court found nothing in the SJS Petition to suggest that an explicit allegation of fact that SJS had a legal right to protect. In special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened . The justices could only infer that the interest from its allegation was its mention of its (SJS) thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested. Aside from the fact that this general averment did not constitute a legal right or interest, the courts inferred interest too vague and speculative in character. Rules require that the interest must be material to the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument. To bolster its point, the SJS cited the Corpus Juris Secundum and submitted that the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action does not seek to enforce a claim against the defendant, but sought a judicial declaration of the rights of the parties for the purpose of guiding their future conduct, and the essential distinction between a declaratory judgment action and the usual action is that no actual wrong need have been committed or loss have occurred in order to sustain the declaratory judgment action , although there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded . 3. NO. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act . Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved. SJS has no legal interest in the controversy and has failed to establish how the resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure it. Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. If the petition were to be valid, it should satisfy:

First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation, particularly that of Congress' taxing power. Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, such as the deprivation of votes or barring of suffrage to its constituents. Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too general and beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Substantive Issues

1. NO. The Constitution commands that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based . No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor. Consistent with this are Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, Administrative Circular No. 1. which states that : A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered. The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court. The assailed Decision contains no statement of facts (much less an assessment or analysis thereof) or of the courts findings as to the probable facts. The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the action and the question or issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked. The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her Decision with the clause SO ORDERED. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void. 2. It is not legally possible to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that the constitutionality of a statute or act will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned.

3. EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA, petitioners, vs. BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent. G.R. No. 150806 January 28, 2008 NACHURA, J.:

CASE: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision of the Court of Appeals 2 (CA), dated September 3, 2001, in CA-G.R. CV No. 67784, and its Resolution dated November 19, 2001. The assailed 3 Decision affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 136, dated May 9, 2000 in Civil Case No. 98-411. FACTS: In May 1997, respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, represented by its president Ramon 4 H. Garcia, renewed its Contract of Lease with Ponciano L. Almeda (Ponciano), as lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia and father of petitioner Romel Almeda. Under the said contract, Ponciano agreed to lease a portion of the Almeda Compound, located at 2208 Pasong Tamo Street, Makati City, consisting of 7,348.25 square meters, for a monthly rental of P1,107,348.69, for a term of four (4) years from May 1, 1997 unless sooner terminated as 5 provided in the contract. The contract of lease contained the following pertinent provisions which gave rise to the instant case: SIXTH - In case the assessment should hereafter be increased or any new tax, charge or burden be imposed by authorities on the leased premises are located, LESSEE shall pay, the additional rental or charge corresponding to the portion hereby leased; provided, however, that in the event that the present assessment or tax on said property should be reduced, LESSEE shall be entitled to reduction in the stipulated rental, likewise in proportion to the portion leased by him; SEVENTH - In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency should supervene, the value of Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment; Ponciano died during the effectivity of the contract, and his wife and son dealt with the lessee. The lessor then advised the lessee that they shall assess and collect Value Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly rentals. Lessee contended that this is not possible because the rentals already included VAT. On January 26 1998, lessee received a letter from lessor informing the former that its monthly rental should be increased by 73% pursuant to condition No. 7 of the contract and Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Lessee refused to pay the VAT adjusted rentals. On February 18, 1998 Bathala Marketing instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice. In turn, Almeda filed an action for ejectment, rescission and damages against respondent for failure of the latter to vacate the premises after the demand made by the former. Almeda moved for the dismissal of the declaratory relief case for being an improper remedy considering that respondent was already in breach of the obligation and that the case would not end the litigation and settle the rights of the parties.

RULING OF RTC: On May 9, 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of Bathala Marketing and against the Almedas. The trial court denied petitioners their right to pass on to respondent the burden of paying the VAT since it was not a new tax that would call for the application of the sixth clause of the contract. The court, likewise, denied their right to collect the demanded increase in rental, there being no extraordinary inflation or devaluation as provided for in the seventh clause of the contract. Because of the payment made by respondent of the rental adjustment demanded by petitioners, the court ordered the restitution by the latter to the former of the amounts paid, notwithstanding the well-established rule that in an action for declaratory relief, other than a declaration of rights and obligations, affirmative reliefs are not sought by or awarded to the parties. RULING OF CA: Petitioners elevated the aforesaid case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC decision. The appellate court agreed with the conclusions of law and the application of the decisional rules on the matter made by the RTC. However, it found that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in granting affirmative relief to the respondent, particularly the restitution of its excess payment. ISSUES: 1) Whether the action for declaratory relief is proper; 2) Whether respondent is liable to pay 10% VAT pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 7716;

3) Whether the amount of rentals due the petitioners should be adjusted by reason of extraordinary inflation or devaluation. RULING: YES. Petitioners insist that respondent was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed, thus, respondent is barred from filing an action for declaratory relief. However, after petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed, respondent complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that respondent committed an act constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred from instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory relief. Petitioners further claim that the instant petition is not proper because a separate action for rescission, ejectment and damages had been commenced before another court; thus, the construction of the subject contractual provisions should be ventilated in the same forum. As a rule, the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer. In this case, however, the trial court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal, initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief. 2) No. Petitioners are estopped from shifting to respondent the burden of paying the VAT. Petitioners' reliance on the sixth condition of the contract is, likewise, unavailing. This provision clearly states that respondent can only be held liable for new taxes imposed after the effectivity of the contract of lease, that is, after May 1997, and only if they pertain to the lot and the building where the leased premises are located. Considering that RA 7716 took effect in 1994, the VAT cannot be considered as a "new tax" in May 1997, as to fall within the coverage of the sixth stipulation. 3) No. The factual circumstances obtaining in the present case do not make out a case of extraordinary inflation or devaluation as would justify the application of Article 1250 of the Civil Code. We would like to stress that the erosion of the value of the Philippine peso in the past three or four decades, starting in the mid-sixties, is characteristic of most currencies. And while the Court may take judicial notice of the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine currency in that span of time, such downward trend of the peso cannot be considered as the extraordinary phenomenon contemplated by Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, absent an official pronouncement or declaration by competent authorities of the existence of extraordinary inflation during a given 25 period, the effects of extraordinary inflation are not to be applied. 5. ERLINDA REYES and ROSEMARIE MATIENZO, Petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ, Presiding, Branch 49, Metropolitan Trial Court, Caloocan City; SPOUSES BERNARD and FLORENCIA PERL, represented by Attorney-in-Fact BENJAMIN MUCIO; HON. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES, Presiding, Branch 124, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City and SEGUNDO BAUTISTA, Respondents. G.R. No. 137794 August 11, 2010 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: CASE: Consolidated Petitions for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition. FACTS: The parcels of land which are the subject matter of these cases are part of the Tala Estate, situated between the boundaries of Caloocan City and Quezon City and encompassing an area of 7,007.9515 hectares more or less. The first case was commenced on December 11, 1996, by respondent Segundo Bautista, a registered owner of the parcel of land occupied by spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo. The case was a complaint for

Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership of Real Property (Recovery case) against the latter spouses with the RTC Caloocan City, Branch 124.Thereafter, a separate but related action, was initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands on December 27, 1996, before the Quezon City RTC, Branch 85 a complaint for Annulment of Title/Reversion (Annulment/Reversion case) against Biyaya Corporation and the Register of Deeds of the Cities of Pasig, Caloocan, and Quezon, the City of Manila, and the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority involving the Tala Estate. The case sought to declare null and void the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Biyaya Corporation, and all derivative titles emanating therefrom, and to declare the land in suit to be reverted to it as part of the patrimonial property of the State, and the same be awarded to the actual occupants. One of the intervenors therein is Samahan ng Maliliit na Magkakapitbahay (SAMAKABA) of which petitioners Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo are members. The RTC in the Annulment/Reversion case issued a Preliminary Injunction (Injunction) freezing all ejectment cases involving the Tala Estate pending in the MeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan City. Sps. Matienzo filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the Recovery case which was denied by the Caloocan City RTC. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. The second case, spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl filed an ejectment complaint on June 25, 1997, against Erlinda Reyes before the Caloocan City MeTC, Branch 49.O n July 8, 1997, spouses Perl filed the third case, an ejectment action against Sergio Abejero. These two ejectment cases were consolidated (Ejectment cases). Erlinda Reyes moved for the suspension of the proceedings and/or for the dismissal of these cases citing the Injunction issued RTC Quezon City. MeTC did not entertain Reyess motion, in stead, it required her to submit a position paper. Then on April 16, 1999, the trial court issued a Decision ordering Erlinda to vacate the contested property. The Recovery case and the Ejectment cases converged when petitioners Rosemarie Matienzo and Erlinda Reyes, joined on March 25, 1999 in filing directly with this Court the instant petition denominated as "Declaratory Relief,Certiorari, and Prohibition," they asked that the proceedings in the Ejectment cases and the Recovery case be declared null and void for violating the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC. During the pendency of this case, the ejectment cases ran its course which prompted Sps. Bautista to file motion for execution, Reyes then sought for motion to suspend the RTC proceedings which was granted by the SC by issuing a TRO restraining the implementation of the writ of execution. ISSUE: 1) Whether or not declaratory relief is the proper remedy. 2) Whether or not Ejectment cases should be suspended due to the pendency of the Annulment/Reversion case. HELD: 1) Declaratory relief is not the proper remedy because a court order is not one of those subjects to be examined under Rule 63. The proper remedy that petitioner Erlinda Reyes could have utilized from the denial of her motion to suspend proceedings in the Caloocan City MeTC was to file a motion for reconsideration and, if it is denied, to file a petition for certiorari before the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, petitioner Matienzo should have filed a special civil action on certiorari also under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals from the denial of her motion by the Caloocan City RTC. The necessity of filing the petition to the RTC in the case of Erlinda Reyes and to the Court of Appeals in the case of Matienzo is dictated by the principle of the hierarchy of courts. Both petitions must be filed within 60 days from the receipt or notice of the denial of the motion to suspend proceedings or from the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Despite the available remedy, petitioners still insists in filing the petition. At all events, even if this petition delves on questions of law, there is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for according to this Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief which advances only questions of law. Finally, while a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition if it has far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved, there is no allegation of facts by petitioner tending to show that she is entitled to such a writ. The judicial policy must thus remain that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it, except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or when exceptional and

compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction. 2) NO. The established rule is that a pending civil action for ownership such as annulment of title shall not ipso facto suspend an ejectment proceeding. The Court explained that the rationale for this is that in an ejectment case, the issue is possession, while in an annulment case the issue is ownership.In fact, an ejectment case can be 62 tried apart from an annulment case. Although there is an exception to this rule, petitioners failed to justify that this case falls within said exception. The words of the Court on this matter are instructive: In the absence of a concrete showing of compelling equitable reasons at least comparable and under circumstances analogous to Amagan, we cannot override the established rule that a pending civil action for ownership shall not ipso facto suspend an ejectment proceeding. Additionally, to allow a suspension on the basis of the reasons the petitioners presented in this case would create the dangerous precedent of allowing an ejectment suit to be suspended by an action filed in another court by parties who are not involved or affected by the ejectment suit. 6. CARMEN DANAO MALANA, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, EVELYN DANAO, FERMINA DANAO, LETICIA DANAO and LEONORA DANAO, the last two are represented herein by their Attorney-in-Fact, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, Petitioners, vs. BENIGNO TAPPA, JERRY REYNA, SATURNINO CAMBRI and SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND MARIA LIGUTAN, Respondents. G.R. No. 181303 September 17, 2009 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: CASE: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Orders dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007, and 31 October 2007, rendered by Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, which dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the Complaint of petitioners. FACTS: The Danaos (petitioners) filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages against Tappa, et. al. (respondents) alleging that they are the owners of the parcel of land subject of this case, which they inherited from Anastacio Danao who died intestate. During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to Joaquin Boncad, to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it. However, the relatives of Consuelo continued in occupying the land after her death, they had already built their houses and claimed ownership over the same. Averring that they already need the land, the Danaos demanded respondents to vacate the land but the latter refused. The dispute was brought before the Lupong Tagapamayapa respondents asserted that they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership. Maintaining that the documents were highly dubious, falsified and incapable of proving ownership which created a cloud on their title, petitioners filed before the RTC a Complaint to remove such cloud from their title, with claim for damages and attorne ys fees. RULING OF THE RTC: The RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground that it has no jurisdiction. Citing R.A. 7691 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the subject property had a value of less than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners action to recover the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC. Petitioners filed Motion for Reconsideration arguing that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents, and following Section 1 of Rule 63 the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The said motion was denied because according to the RTC an action to quiet title is a real action and because the amount of the property is below P20,000.00 which RTC has no jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the action for declaratory relief is within the jurisdiction of RTC?

HELD: NO. The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect. To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 should be considered. The mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00. As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC. Furthermore, court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action. In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact , said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latters express claim of ownership over the subject property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners title. Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object ones recovery of possession over the real property as owner. 7. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF SUBIC, Petitioners, vs. HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, Respondent. G.R. No. 179579 February 1, 2012 SERENO, J.: CASE: Petition for Review under Rule 45, assailing the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), which nullified the Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 27- 2003 on the tariff classification of wheat issued, by petitioner Commissioner of Customs. FACTS: On 7 November 2003, Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. The regulation provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%. CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release of the articles that were the subject of protest required the importer to post a cash bond to cover the tariff differential. On 19 December 2003, Hypermix filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. It anticipated the implementation of the regulation on its imported and perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit from China. They contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center. They also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported food grade wheat,

it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing them to pay 133% more than was proper. Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated when the regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all. Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature. RULING OF RTC: RTC issued a TRO effective for 20 days from notice. Petitioner filed Motion to Dismiss alleging that (1) the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, because respondent was asking for a judicial determination of the classification of wheat; (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper; (3) CMO 272003 was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of respondent were speculative and premature, because the Bureau of Customs (BOC) had yet to examine respondents products. They likewise opposed the application for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that they had not inflicted any injury through the issuance of the regulation; and that the action would be contrary to the rule that administrative issuances are assumed valid until declared otherwise. On March 10, 2005, the RTC issued a decision granting the petition and declaring the CMO 27-2003 invalid and no effect. The RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, given that the issue raised by respondent concerned the quasi-legislative powers of petitioners. It likewise stated that a petition for declaratory relief was the proper remedy, and that respondent was the proper party to file it. The court considered that respondent was a regular importer, and that the latter would be subjected to the application of the regulation in future transactions. With regard to the validity of the regulation, the trial court found that petitioners had not followed the basic requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003. RULING OF THE CA: Petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003.The appellate court dismissed the appeal contending that since the regulation affected substantial rights of petitioners and other importers, petitioners should have observed the requirements of notice, hearing and publication. ISSUE: Whether or not the action for declaratory relief is proper? HELD: YES. The court found that the Petition filed by Hypermix meet the requirements of an action for declaratory relief, to wit: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by petitioner Commissioner of Customs. In Smart Communications vs. NTC, it was held that, the determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests. Petitioners are summarily imposing a tariff rate that respondent is refusing to pay. Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the implementation of CMO 272003. Respondent has adequately shown that, as a regular importer of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it has actually made shipments of wheat from China to Subic. The shipment was set to arrive in December 2003. Upon its arrival, it would be subjected to the conditions of CMO 27-2003. The regulation calls for the imposition of different tariff rates, depending on the factors enumerated therein. Thus, respondent alleged that it would be made to pay the 7% tariff applied to feed grade wheat, instead of the 3% tariff on food grade wheat. In addition, respondent would have to go through the procedure under CMO 27-2003, which would undoubtedly toll its time and resources.

Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination, because litigation is inevitable for the simple and uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in the enumeration of flour millers classified as food grade wheat importers. Thus, as the trial court stated, it would have to file a protest case each time it imports food grade wheat and be subjected to the 7% tariff. It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the circumstances of the case. Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of respondent as explained above, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code. When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. In summary, petitioners violated respondents right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27 -2003 when they failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise violated respondents right to equal protection of laws when they provided for an unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation. Finally, petitioner Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles. CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS 1. G.R. No. 157659 Petitioner, BERSAMIN, J.: CASE: By petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner appeals the decision (March 17, 2003), whereby the CA dismissed his petition for certiorari. Facts: In 1968, the petitioner obtained two loans totaling P34,000.00 from respondent GSIS. To secure the performance of his obligations, he mortgaged two parcels of land registered under his and his wife Marcelina Mallaris names. However, he paid GSIS about ten years after contracting the obligations on ly P10,000.00 on May 1 22, 1978 and P20,000.00 on August 11, 1978. After reminding the petitioner of his unpaid obligation, GSIS sent on November 2, 1981 a telegraphic demand to him to update his account. On November 10, 1981, he requested a final accounting, but did not do anything more. Nearly three years later, on March 21, 1984, GSIS applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage by reason of his failure to settle his account. On November 22, 1984, he requested an updated computation of his outstanding account. On November 29, 1984, he persuaded the sheriff to hold the publication of the foreclosure notice in abeyance, to await action on his pending request for final accounting (that is, taking his payments of P30,000.00 made in 1978 into account). On December 13, 1984, GSIS responded to his request and rendered a detailed explanation of the account. On May 30, 1985, it sent another updated statement of account. On July 21, 1986, it finally commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against him because he had meanwhile made no further payments. On August 22, 1986, the petitioner sued GSIS and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga in the RTC, Br 44, in San Fernando, Pampanga to enjoin them from proceeding against him for injunction (with an application for preliminary injunction). RTC: The RTC ultimately decided in his favor, nullifying the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale; cancelling TCT No. 284272-R and TCT No. 284273-R already issued in the name of GSIS; and reinstating TCT No. 3 61171-R and TCT No. 54835-R in his and his wifes names. GSIS appealed the adverse decision to the CA, which reversed the RTC on March 27, 1996.
4

January 25, 2010

ELIGIO P. MALLARI vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PAMPANGA

124468).

The petitioner elevated the CA decision to this Court via petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No.
6

On September 16, 1996, this Court denied his petition for review. On January 15, 1997, this Court turned 7 down his motion for reconsideration. As a result, the CA decision dated March 27, 1996 became final and executory, rendering unassailable both the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale held on September 22, 1986, and the issuance of TCT No. 284272-R and TCT No. 284273-R in the name of GSIS. GSIS thus filed an ex parte motion for execution and for a writ of possession on September 2, 8 9 1999. Granting the ex parte motion on October 8, 1999, the RTC issued a writ of execution cum writ of possession 10 on October 21, 1999, ordering the sheriff to place GSIS in possession of the properties. The sheriff failed to serve the writ, however, partly because of the petitioners request for an extension of time within which to vacate the properties. It is noted that GSIS acceded to the request. Yet, the petitioner did not voluntarily vacate the properties, but instead filed a motion for reconsideration 12 and/or to quash the writ of execution on March 27, 2000. Also, the petitioner commenced a second case against GSIS and the provincial sheriff in the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga (Civil Case No. 12053), ostensibly for consignation (coupled with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order). However, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 12053 on November 10, 2000 on the ground of res judicata, impelling him to 13 appeal the dismissal to the CA (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 70300). In the meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion dated April 5, 2000 in Civil Case No. 7802 to hold GSIS, et 14 al. in contempt of court for painting the fence of the properties during the pendency of his motion for 15 reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution . He filed another motion in the same case, dated April 17, 2000, to hold GSIS and its local manager Arnulfo B. Cardenas in contempt of court for ordering the electric company to cut off the electric services to the properties during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration and/or to 16 quash the writ of execution. > To prevent the Presiding Judge of Branch 44 of the RTC from resolving the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 7802, GSIS moved to inhibit him for alleged partiality towards the petitioner as borne out by his failure to act on themotion for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution , motions for contempt of court, and motion forissuance of break open order for more than a year from their filing, praying that the case be re-raffled to another 17 branch of the RTC. Consequently, Civil Case No. 7802 was re-assigned to Branch 48, whose Presiding Judge then denied the motions for contempt of court on July 30, 2001, and directed the Branch Clerk of Court to cause the re18 implementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession dated October 21, 1999. The petitioner sought reconsideration, but the Presiding Judge of Branch 48 denied his motion for 20 reconsideration on February 11, 2002. Ruling of the CA By petition for certiorari filed in the CA, the petitioner assailed the orders of February 11, 2002, July 30, 21 2001, October 21, 1999, and October 8, 1999. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether the CA erred in refusing "to accept the nullity of the orders" of the RTC. Held: NO. The petition for review on certiorari absolutely lacks merit. Ratio: Petition for Certiorari in CA was Filed Beyond Reglementary Period The petition assailed before the CA on certiorari the following orders of the RTC, to wit: 1. The order dated October 8, 1999 (granting the ex parte motion for execution and/or issuance of the writ 25 of execution cum writ of possession of GSIS);
19

2. The order dated October 21, 1999 (directing the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession 26 in favor of GSIS); 3. The order dated July 30, 2001 (requiring the Branch Clerk of Court to cause the re-implementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession, and dismissing the motions to hold GSIS, et al. in 27 contempt); and 4. The order dated February 11, 2002 (denying the motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001 28 seeking the reconsideration of the order dated July 30, 2001). The July 30, 2001 order denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution, and motion to hold GSIS, Tony Dimatulac, et al. and Arnulfo Cardenas in contempt; and declared GSISs motion for issuance of break open order and for designation of special sheriff from GSIS Legal Services Group as premature. In turn, the motion for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution denied by the order of July 30, 2001 had merely challenged the orders of October 8, 1999 and October 21, 1999 (granting the writ of execution cum writ of possession as a matter of course). Considering that the motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001 denied by the order dated February 11, 2002 was in reality and effect a prohibited second motion for reconsideration vis--vis the orders dated October 21, 1999 and October 8, 1999, the assailed orders dated July 30, 2001, October 21, 1999, and October 8, 1999 could no longer be subject to attack by certiorari. Thus, the petition for certiorari filed only in March 2002 was already improper and tardy for being made beyond the 60-day limitation defined in Section 4, 29 Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which requires a petition for certiorari to be filed "not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution ," or, in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, "the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion." It is worth emphasizing that the 60-day limitation is considered inextendible, because the limitation has been prescribed to avoid any unreasonable delay that violates the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy 30 disposition of their cases. 2. RAMON C. GONZALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, A.M. No. CA-10-49-J CARPIO MORALES, J.: Facts: Ramon C. Gonzales (complainant), then a member of Alabang Country Club, Incorporated (ACCI) who was vying for a seat in its Board of Directors (the Board), was charged by the Board with having falsified proxy forms for the 2004 election of Board members. That drew him to file a complaint before the RTC Muntinlupa City (Civil Case No. 04-122-Ramon C. Gonzalez v. Alabang Country Club, Inc., for damages)-(the civil case). Complainant was later disqualified as a candidate and ousted as a member of the ACCI. He thus amended his complaint in the civil case by impleading the members of the Board at the time material to his expulsion, the newly elected members, and the members of the Nomination and Election Committee. And he added, as cause of action, the nullification of his disqualification and expulsion in the reliefs prayed for. RTC: Br 256 of the Muntinlupa RTC decided the civil case in complainants favor, and issued a writ of execution allowing him to resume his rights as a member of ACCI. The defendants in the civil case assailed the trial courts decision before the CA via petition for review with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP. No. 89358). This case was consolidated with related cases in which herein complainant was the respondent. CA: The appellate court issued a TRO against the execution of the decision in the civil case, drawing complainant to move for its lifting, alleging that ACCI had already voluntarily executed the decision in the civil case. His motion was, however, denied. When the TRO expired, the 9th Division of the CA issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Complainant challenged the appellate courts issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction via petition for certiorari filed before the Supreme Court. In the meantime, complainant, through counsel, filed before the appellate court a Motion for Inhibition of respondent because, by his claim, the issuance of the writ was against the law. January 28, 2010

SC on the petition for certiorari: By Resolution(April 11, 2007), the Court dismissed complainants petition 4 for certiorari "for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned [appellate courts+ Resolution is tainted with grave abuse of discretion." More than a year later or on August 20, 2008, complainant filed a letter-complaint before the SC, alleging that: (1) On September 29, 2005, or almost three (3) years ago to date, he asked his lawyer to file a Motion for Inhibition against the ponente, Justice Amelita G. Tolentino because the issuance of the injunction was obviously against the law. Up to the present, the [motion for] inhibition has not been acted upon. (2) I also understand that cases involving intra-corporate controversy must be resolved as soon as possible because of [their] nature. The affairs of corporations cannot be suspended or left undecided longer than is necessary. In my case, I ran x x x for the term June 2004-June 2006 and a decision was rendered on April 4, 2005. The decision was raised to the Court of Appeals in May 2005. At that time, if the Decision was not restrained, or the case acted upon quickly as should have been the case, there was still an opportunity for me to have been duly elected and to have served as director. Because of the inaction of Justice Tolentino which is against the rule governing intra-corporate dispute, this opportunity was forever lost to me. (3) As can be seen in the Resolutions issued in the cases, they were also furnished to a certain Atty. Felisberto Verano [Atty. Verano] who is not even a counsel of record in the case nor has he entered formally his appearance. Atty. Verano is the brother of then Congresswoman Lorna Verano-Yap of Paraaque and she was instrumental in having Justice Tolentino appointed to her present post. In fact, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was even addressed to Atty. Verano and not to any of the two (2) counsels of record for the Club. This is highly suspicious and anomalous. x x x (4) x x x I am bringing this matter to your attention because I have reason to believe that Justice Tolentino is not innocent when she granted the Writ of Injunction and totally failed to act on the petitions. This is a favor to Atty. Verano to whose sister Justice Tolentino owes a debt of gratitude for her position. In view of the scandal now besetting the CA, and recalling the removal of another associate justice last year, the taint of dishonesty and corruption may not be isolated, and in this case, the questionable inclusion of Atty. Verano should be immediately investigated, especially when there exists a link between Justice Tolentino and the Veranos. The inclusion of his name may be there to remind Justice Tolentino about his interest in the case. In a parallel move, complainant filed on August 21, 2008 before the appellate court an Urgent Verified MotionReiterating Motion for Inhibition (of Ponenteherein respondent Justice Amelita G. Tolentino). This Court referred the letter-complaint to CA Presiding Justice Conrado Vasquez for appropriate action. Respondent's Comment: By Order of October 8, 2008, respondent inhibited herself from CA-G.R. SP No. 8 9 89788. On October 14, 2008, she filed her Comment on the letter-complaint. She claimed that there was nothing anomalous in furnishing Atty. Verano with a copy of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals, since he signed as collaborating counsel in the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 89788. She added that she did not know Atty. Verano and "former Paraaque Congresswoman Lorna Verano Yap" (Lorna) who she claimed was never a congresswoman of Paraaque. Respecting the delay in resolving the Motion for Inhibition, respondent claimed that in view of complainants filing of the petition for certiorari before the SC, she d eemed it appropriate to defer any action on the motion in deference to the authority of this Court to resolve the issues raised before it. Issues: In sum, the present administrative case complains against: 1) the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, 2) the delay in the resolution by respondent of the Motion for Inhibition, 3) the furnishing of copies of Resolutions of the appellate court to Atty. Verano, and 4) the delay in the resolution by respondent of the cases on the merits. Ruling: (1) Since the Court has, as reflected above, found in herein complainants petition for certiorari that the issuance by the appellate court of a writ of preliminary injunction was not attended with grave abuse of discretion, the Court shall dwell on the other specified complaints against respondent.

The records show that indeed Atty. Verano signed the Petition for Review as collaborating counsel. He was, therefore, entitled to receive a copy of the appellate courts resolutions including that which direc ted the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. In any event, the order to issue the writ of preliminary injunction was the collective act of the members of the 9th Division of the Court. Bautista v. Abdulwahid enlightens: x x x The Court of Appeals is a collegiate court whose members reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. Thus, we have held that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper. 14 Consequently, the filing of charges against a single member of a division of the appellate court is inappropriate. (2) Respecting the complaint about the delay in resolving complainants Motion for Inhibition, the Court notes that the motion was filed on September 29, 2005 after complainant filed before this Court on September 8, 2005 a petition for certiorari to assail the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. As earlier stated, the Court resolved the petition for certiorari on April 11, 2007. It was only on October 8, 2008, however, or only after complainant filed on August 20, 2008 the letter-complaint which this Court referred to the Court of Appeals, and after complainant also filed on Augsut 21, 2008 a reiterative motion for inhibition, that respondent resolved the motion by granting it. Article VIII, Section 15 (1) of the Constitution directs: All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from the date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. Respondents justification for the delay in resolving the motion for inhibition in deference to the authority of this Court to resolve the issues raised in the petition for certiorari do es not impress. Section 7 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for certiorari shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding with the case. This rule must be strictly adhered to by appellate and lower courts notwithstanding the possibility that the proceedings undertaken by them tend to or would render nugatory the pending petition before this Court. But even gratuitously crediting respondents justification for the delay, since the Court resolved complainants petition for certiorari on April 11, 2007, still, given the nature and history of the cases, respondent unduly delayed the resolution of a mere motion for inhibition only on October 8, 2008, after the Court referred the present complaint to the appellate court and after complainant filed a reiterative motion. Under Section 9 (1) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a less serious charge. Under Section 11 (B) of the same rule, the following sanctions may be imposed on judges of regular and special courts and justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan who commit less serious offenses: 1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or 2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. Under the circumstances, this Court deems it appropriate to impose a fine of P15,000 on respondent. Respondent is found GUILTY of undue delay in rendering an order, and is FINED P15,000, with WARNING that commission of the same or similar infraction shall be faulted strictly. 3. G.R. No. 181643 November 17, 2010
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MICHELLE I. PINEDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Ninth Division) and the DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, represented by Assistant Secretary CAMILO MIGUEL M. MONTESA MENDOZA, J.: CASE: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Michelle I. Pineda (Pineda) seeking to annul and set aside the Decision of the CA, which reversed the Order of the RTC, Br 153, Pasig City (RTC) directing the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining respondent Department of Education (DepEd) from enforcing its decision to cancel a 5-year lease of the school canteen. Facts: It appears from the records that on May 14, 2004, Pineda entered into a Memorandum of 2 Agreement (May-MOA) with Lakandula High School (LHS) represented by its principal, Dr. Alice B. Blas (Dr. Blas), for

a 5-year lease of the school canteen with a monthly rental of P20,000.00 and an additional P4,000.00 monthly for the schools feeding program as well as medicines for the school clinic. Therea fter, Pineda renovated the canteen 3 and equipped it with new utensils, tables, chairs, and electric fans. The faculty and personnel of LHS sent a letter to the Division School Superintendent, Dr. Ma. Luisa 4 Quiones (Dr. Quiones), questioning the validity of the May-MOA. Dr. Blas sent a letter-reply and an exchange of 5 6 correspondence followed. Meanwhile, Pineda and Dr. Blas executed another MOA (August-MOA) superseding the May-MOA. This time, the August-MOA followed the standard form under Department Order No. 95, Series of 7 1998 or the "Revised Implementing Guidelines for the Turnover of School Canteens to Teachers Cooperatives." In this regard, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent Isabelita Santos (Ms. Santos)and Administrative Officer Vicente N. Macarubbo (Mr. Macarubbo) wrote a letter to Dr. Quiones relaying their observations on the controversy and recommending that their findings "be submitted to the DepEd - Central Office for its final word on 8 the matter." Ms. Santos and Mr. Macarubbo were of the view that Dr. Blas did not violate any rule in executing the August-MOA. They even found the lease to Pineda beneficial to the school. Thus, Dr. Quiones wrote the DepEd seeking its decision on the matter. Respondent DepEd, through Undersecretary Jose Luis Martin Gascon (Usec. Gascon),declared the AugustMOA "null and void ab initio" and ordered it "cancelled." Pineda was also ordered to "cease and desist" from further managing and operating the canteen. DepEd made clear that the management and operation of the 9 canteen should revert to the Home Economics Department of the School. This prompted Pineda to file a petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC. RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining the enforcement of Usec. Gascons decision. DepEd, represented by Usec. Gascon, Dr. Quiones and Ms. Olympiada Camilo (Ms. Camilo), who succeeded Dr. Blas as School Principal, sought the dismissal of Pinedas petition before the RTC on the 11 ground that the latter failed to state a cause of action. The trial court denied its motion. For said reason, DepEd, this time represented by Assistant Secretary Camilo Miguel Montesa (Asec. Montesa), filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking to set aside the orders of the RTC. CA on Petition for certiorari filed by DepEd: The CA affirmed the order of the RTC denying DepEds motion to dismiss but reversed its order granting the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. According to the CA, DepEds order cancelling the August -MOA had already been partially implemented as Pineda herself recognized such fact in her amended petition before the RTC. In effect, this was the status quo. In addition, the CA held that Pineda appeared to have no clear or unmistakable right to be protected since the MOA that granted her the right to operate the school canteen was, in fact, invalidated by the DepEd for not being sanctioned by its existing rules and regulations. Finally, the CA also held that there was no pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which would warrant the issuance of the injunctive writ as the purported damage to Pineda, if she 12 would not able to operate the canteen, was readily quantifiable. Hence, Pineda filed this petition for certiorari. Issue (1) Whether CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when instead of dismissing the petition filed by DepEd, it gave due course to it, notwithstanding the fact that it was not a party at all and hence, with no locus standi. Pineda argues that the CA gravely abused its discretion in entertaining the petition for certiorari of DepEd considering that Asec. Montesa was not the proper party to file the petition. She adds that, even assuming that DepEd had the locus standi to file said petition before the CA, Asec. Montesa was not duly authorized to do so. Held (1): No. In her petition for certiorari before the RTC, Pineda impleaded Usec. Gascon, Dr. Quiones and Ms. Camilo in their official capacities as Undersecretary of DepEd, Division Superintendent and Principal of Lakandula High School, respectively. Although the petition mentioned that Usec. Gascon was merely a nominal party, it stated therein that Dr. Quiones and Ms. Camilo were being sued for "having been tasked to immediately carry out" his order of February 11, 2005. The Court is of the view that DepEd was the proper party and Usec. Gascon, Dr. Quiones and Ms. Camilo were just its representatives. Thus, they were sued in their official capacities. A review of Usec. Gascons order discloses that the cancellation of Pinedas August -MOA was pursuant to DepEds existing guidelines on the turn over of school canteens to teachers cooperatives, laid out in Department Order No. 95, series of 1998. He was simply applying a DepEd policy when he ordered the August-MOA cancelled. So, what was actually being assailed by Pineda in her petition before the RTC was the implementation of DepEds 15 existing guidelines with the nullification of the August-MOA entered into by Dr. Blas, then principal of LHS. As Asec. Montesa merely took over the functions of Usec. Gascon, he is certainly authorized to institute the petition

before the CA in order to advance and pursue the policies of his office DepEd. Applying Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, DepEd is the real party in interest for it will surely be affected, favorably or unfavorably, by the final resolution of the case before the RTC. Thus, it would be absurd not to recognize the legal standing of Asec. Montesa, as representative of DepEd, but consider Dr. Quiones and Ms. Camilo as the proper parties when they were merely tasked to implement a directive emanating from a superior official (Asec. Montesa) of the DepEd. Issue (2) Whether CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it did not dismiss outright the petition since no motion for reconsideration was filed from the orders of the RTC, in violation of Section 4, Rule 65. Pineda questions DepEds failure to move for reconsideration before going to the CA on certiorari. Held: No. As previously discussed, the present case concerns the implementation or application of a DepEd policy which had been enjoined by the RTC. Certainly, there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interest of the government. Moreover, the subject matter of the case involves the operation of the canteen of a public secondary school. This is of public interest for it affects the welfare of the students, thus, justifying the relaxation of the settled rule. Ratio: The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed 16 to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. There are, however, recognized exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a motion for 17 reconsideration. In the case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, it was written: The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as where the order is a patent nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable; where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to 18 object; and where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. (underscoring supplied) Still on the second ground, Pineda points out that the March 14, 2005 Order of the RTC was received by the DepEd on March 16, 2005 and the latter filed its petition before the CA on June 28, 2005, which was beyond the sixty (60)-day reglementary period. Going over DepEds petition before t he CA, it appears that DepEd reckoned the 60-day period from June 28, 2005, the date of its receipt of the June 7, 2005 Order of the RTC. Pinedas Comment and Memorandum, however, did not raise this procedural lapse as an issue. Instead, Pineda put forth her own arguments in support of the two RTC orders. The rule in pleadings and practice is that that no new issue in a case can be raised in a pleading which by 19 due diligence could have been raised in previous pleadings. Thus, it is too late in the day for Pineda to question the procedural lapse. Issue (3) Whether CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dissolved the writ of injunction issued by the RTC, thereby unjustifiably interfering with the lower court's discretion in issuing writ of injunction in favor of petitioner. Held: No. At any rate, the Court finds no cogent reason for the reversal and setting aside by the CA of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the RTC. The very writ of preliminary injunction set aside by the 20 CA could no longer lie for the acts sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished or consummated. The DepEd already prohibited Pineda from operating the school canteen. As correctly ruled by the CA in its questioned decision, since Pineda had ceased the operation of the school canteen since 2005, the RTCs preliminary writ should be set aside as there was nothing more to enjoin. The Court agrees with the CA when it explained: Ratio: A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.

Status quo is defined as the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the actual controversy, that which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court must not make use of its injunctive relief to alter such status. Finally, while the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the trial court, grave abuse of discretion is committed when it does not maintain the status quo which is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested status which preceded the actual controversy. If there is such a commission, it is correctible 22 through a writ of certiorari. In this case, the status quo ante litem or the state of affairs existing at the time of the filing of the case was that Pineda was already prohibited from operating the school canteen. For said reason, the trial court cannot make use of its injunctive power to change said status. The petition is DENIED. 4. G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS and DR. OLIVIA C. CAOILI in her capacity as Secretary of the Board vs. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Br 87, RTC Quezon City and RAMON P. NADAL ROMERO, J.:

5. G.R. No. 70484 January 29, 1988 ROMAN C. TUASON and REMEDIOS V. TUASON, by attorney-in-fact Trinidad S. Viado vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS, CALOOCAN City, et al. NARVASA, J.: A more despotic, capricious, oppressive and unjustifiable exercise of government power than that manifested in this case can scarcely be found in the sordid annals of the martial law regime. Relief to the victims must be as it is hereby extended by the grant to them of the extraordinary writ of certiorari and prohibition condemning as unconstitutional, and annulling and perpetually enjoining the acts complained of. Facts: Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On April 6, 1965, with funds pooled from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. (hereafter simply, Carmel) a piece of land measuring about 8,756 square meters, in the latter's subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale, Carmel's Torrens title (No. 64007) over the lot was cancelled and a new one (No. 8314) issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took possession of their property. Some 8 years thereafter, the Tuasons' travails began. They woke up one morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the land they had purchased with their hard-earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the subdivision had been "declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof." On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day after the declaration of martial law Mr. Ferdinand Marcos, then president of the country, invoking his emergency powers, issued PD No. 293 with immediate effect. The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public (the Tuasons being among the buyers). The land bought by Carmel was part of the Tala Estate (one of the so-called "Friar Lands"). Carmel had bought the land under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended. Said PD No. 293 made the finding that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price. It adjudged that ... according to the records of the Bureau of Lands, neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed 3 by the Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of said Association stand. Hence, title to said land has remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines, any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic of the Philippines being therefore null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy. Upon this adjudgment, Mr. Marcos invalidated the titles of Carmel Farms, Inc. and all those derived therefrom, and declared as aforestated "the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. the present bona fide
2

occupants" of the lots which, in consequence, thereby became open to them for "disposition and sale ... pursuant 4 to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended." It seems to have completely escaped Mr. Marcos' attention that his decree contained contradictory declarations. While acknowledging on the one hand that the lots in the Carmel Subdivision were occupied by the buyers thereof, and in fact the latter's dwellings stood thereon, he states on the other that the "members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. (are) the present bona fide occupants" of all said lots . The latter averment is not only essentially inconsistent with the former but is both a physical and legal fallacy. Well known is the rule of physics that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time. And the absurdity of the subsumed proposition is self-evident for persons not in possession of land, who probably have not even set foot thereon, cannot be deemed "occupants" thereof, much less "bona fide" occupants. But this notwithstanding, and upon the factual premise already indicated, Mr. Marcos disposed of the land of the petitioner spouses and others similarly situated. The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not only of the 5 constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain but also of the provisions of the Land Registration 6 Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles; and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be compensated for the loss from the Assurance Fund. Mr. Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the decree. In his comment on the petition, he questioned the propriety of the remedy of certiorari resorted to by the petitioners, it not appearing that the public respondents were being sued as judicial or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Petitions for intervention have of late been filed by sixty-four (64) persons, members of the "Consuelo Heights Homeowners Association" headed by Tomasa Bartolome, on the claim that they, too, had been divested of their lands by the same PD No. 293, adopting as their own the allegations and prayer embodied in the Tuasons' petition. Issue: Whether the remedy of petition for certiorari is proper. Held: Yes. Ratio: (1) It is true that the extraodinary writ of certiorari may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power. The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts 10 essentially constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of jurisdiction which is the power and authority to hear 11 or try and decide or determine a cause. He adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of ... (the) Association (of homeowners) stand." And applying the law to that situation, he made the adjudication that "title to said land has remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines," and that 'any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic ... (were) null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy. These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, 12 as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the martial law regime.
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(2) In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for prohibition if the 13 averments of the former sufficiently made out a case for the latter. Considered in this wise, it will also appear that an executive officer had acted without jurisdiction exercised judicial power not granted to him by the Constitution or the laws and had furthermore performed the act in violation of the constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected. The Court will grant such relief as may be proper and efficacious in the premises even if not specifically sought or set out in the prayer of the appropriate pleading, the permissible relief being determined 14 after all not by the prayer but by the basic averments of the parties' pleadings. There is no dispute about the fact that title to the land purchased by Carmel was actually issued to it by the Government. This of course gives rise to the strong presumption that official duty has been regularly 15 performed, that official duty being in this case the ascertainment by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands of the fulfillment of the condition prescribed by law for such issuance, i.e., the payment in full of the price, together with all accrued interest. Against this presumption there is no evidence. It must hence be accorded full sway in these proceedings. Furthermore, the title having been duly issued to Carmel, it became "effective in the manner provided 16 in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act." Ruling: PD No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts. The public respondents are directed to cancel the inscription on the titles of the petitioners and the petitioners in intervention of the memorandum declaring their titles null and void and declaring the property therein respectively described open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. to do whatever else is needful to restore the titles to full effect and efficacy; and henceforth to refrain, cease and desist from implementing any provision or part of said Presidential Decree No. 293. No pronouncement as to costs. 6. RE: Material Data Rule G.R. No. 146197 June 27, 2005 SECURITY BANK CORPORATION (formerly Security Bank and Trust Company) vs. INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY, THE BRANCH SHERIFF, RTC of Muntinlupa City, Br 256, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY, CARPIO, J.: The Case: Before this Court is a petition for review assailing the 2000 Resolutions of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 56534. The CA denied the petition of Security Bank and Trust Company ("Security Bank") for failure to comply with Section 3 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Supreme Court Circular No. 39-98. Facts: On 20 September 1996, Security Bank as mortgagee and Innovatech Development and Management Corporation ("Innovatech") as mortgagor entered into a real estate mortgage. Innovatech secured its P25,000,000 loan from Security Bank with a mortgage on fourteen condominium units located at Tito Jovy Tower, Buencamino St., Alabang, Muntinlupa City. In a letter, Innovatechs Vice-President and Treasurer, respectively, informed Security Bank that Innovatech sold the fourteen condominium units to Indiana Aerospace University ("Indiana") of Mactan, Cebu. Innovatech provided 5 Security Bank with copies of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage it made with Indiana as well as Indianas loan application with Bank of Southeast Asia for P69,000,000. According to Innovatech, part of the proceeds of Indianas loan with the Bank of Southeast Asia would be used to pay the loan with Security Bank. The loan with Security Bank matured on 19 September 1997 without payment from either Innovatech or Indiana. Consequently, Security Bank filed a petition for notarial foreclosure of the fourteen condominium units under Act 6 No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. The public auction was held on 29 January 1998, at 10:00 a.m., at the City Hall of Muntinlupa City. During the public auction, the condominium units were sold for P32,839,290 to Security Bank as the only and highest bidder. Innovatech filed an action against Security Bank for Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and Certificate of Sale, Reconveyance of Properties and Damages with Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. RTC: On 26 March 1998, the RTC Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 ("trial court") granted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in favor of Innovatech. The 26 March 1998 Order became the subject of a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 49326) filed by Security Bank before the CA.
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CA: In its Decision(24 August 1999), the CA dismissed Security Banks petition for lack of merit. However, in an Amended Decision (8 June 2000), the CA set aside its 24 August 1999 Decision and nullified the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. Innovatech filed a MR of the Amended Decision but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution. Innovatech filed a petition, (G.R. No. 152157), before the Supreme Court. The SC denied the petition and denied with finality Innovatechs MR. Meanwhile, on 22 June 1998, Indiana filed a Complaint-in-Intervention with prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction. The trial court issued an Order granting the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Security Bank moved for reconsideration of the Order, which the trial court denied for lack of merit. Security Bank went to the Court of Appeals for relief. CA Resolutions: In its assailed Resolution(22 Feb 2000) the CA denied due course to Security Banks petition. The CA ruled that the petition does not indicate the dates when petitioner received a copy of the Order dated 01 February 1999 and when the Motion for Reconsideration was filed in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Circular 39-98. Security Bank filed a MR, which the CA denied. Hence, the recourse to this Court. The Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing Security Banks petition on mere technicality despite the banks substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Circular No. 3998. Held: Yes. The Rules clearly provide that non-compliance with any of the requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. If we apply the Rules strictly, we cannot fault the Court of Appeals for dismissing Security Banks petition. The CA merely followed the Rules. However, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction this Court may disregard procedural lapses so that a case may be resolved on its merits based on the evidence presented by the 17 18 parties. Rules of procedure should promote, not defeat, substantial justice. Hence, the Court may opt to apply 19 the Rules liberally to resolve the substantial issues raised by the parties. Ratio: The material dates required to be stated in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the date of receipt of the notice of the judgment or final order or resolution; (2) the date of filing of the motion for new trial or for reconsideration; and (3) the date of receipt of the notice of denial of the motion.
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Contrary to the CAs findings, Security Bank correctly asserted that page 13 of its petition s tates the date of filing of 21 the motion for reconsideration on 23 February 1999, or thirteen days after the receipt of the Order. The petition also states the date of receipt of notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration filed before the trial court. Hence, the petition only lacked the date of receipt of the trial courts Order of 1 February 1999 that was the subject of the motion for reconsideration. The stamped date on the Order of 1 February 1999 annexed to the petition is not clear enough for the Court of 22 Appeals to determine when Security Banks counsel received a copy of the Order. However, upon filing its motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, Security Bank attached another copy of the Order of 1 February 23 1999. This time, the stamped date of receipt of the Order shows that the Security Banks counsel received the Order on 10 February 1999. When Security Bank furnished the CA with the copy of the trial courts Order bearing the stamped date o f its receipt, it showed its willingness to rectify its omission. Security Bank, in effect, substantially complied with the Rules. The rationale for requiring the statement of material dates is to determine the timeliness of filing of the petition. Clearly, Security Bank filed the motion for reconsideration with the trial court on time. Security Bank also filed the petition before the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period. The Court reiterates that there is ample

jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance of a party may call for the relaxation of the 24 rules of procedure. In the recent case of Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acua , we held that "the failure to comply with the rule on a statement of material dates in the petition may be excused since the dates are evident from the records." The more material date for purposes of appeal to the Court of Appeals is the date of receipt of the trial courts order denying the motion for reconsideration, which date is admittedly stated in the petition in the present case. The other material dates may be gleaned from the records of the case if reasonably evident. Thus, in this case 26 the Court deems it proper to relax the Rules to give all the parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. 2. ARTEMIO T. TORRES, JR., Petitioner, vs. SPS. DRS. EDGARDO AGUINALDO & NELIA T. TORRESAGUINALDO, Respondents. G.R. No. 164268 June 28, 2005 Ynares-Santiago, J. This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 22, 2004 in CA-G.R. 3 SP No. 77818, and its resolution dated June 28, 2004 denying reconsideration thereof. Facts: Sps. Aguinaldo filed in the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila a complaint for falsification of public documents against Torres, Jr. They alleged that titles to their properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-93596, T-87764, and T-87765, were transferred without their knowledge and consent in the name of Torres 5 through a forged Deed of Sale dated July 21, 1979. Torres denied the allegation and contends that Sps. Aguinaldo sold the subject properties to him as evidenced by the March 10, 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale. OCP finds probable cause and recommended the filing of information in MTC of Manila on 3 October 2001. On appeal to the Secretary of Justice, OCPs findings were reversed and ordered the withdrawal of the information. MTC Ruling: MTC granted the Motion to Withdraw Information on 11 June 2003. it should be noted that the Torres was not arraigned. CA Ruling: Aguinaldos petition for certiorari was granted by CA on 22 March 2004. Issue 1: Whether the order of the MTC-Manila dated June 11, 2003 granting the motion to withdraw the information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed by Aguinaldo for the purpose of reinstating the April 30, 2001 resolution of the OCP of Manila; and in the alternative, whether the rule on provisional dismissal under Section 8, Rule 117 applies. Held: No.
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Ratio: A motion to withdraw information differs from a motion to dismiss. While both put an end to an action filed in court, their legal effect varies. The order granting the withdrawal of the information attains finality after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, without prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon reinvestigation. On the other hand, the order granting a motion to dismiss becomes final fifteen (15) days after receipt thereof, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order achieves finality . In Baares II v. Balising, a motion to dismiss was filed thus putting into place the time-bar rule on provisional dismissal.

Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to withdraw information is not time-barred and does not fall within the ambit of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the law on provisional dismissal becomes operative once the judge dismisses, with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party: (a) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived; or (b) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment of more than six (6) years, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. There is provisional dismissal when a motion filed expressly for that purpose complies with the following requisites, viz.: (1) It must be with the express consent of the accused; and (2) There must be notice to the offended party. Section 8, Rule 117 contemplates the filing of a motion to dismiss, and not a motion to withdraw information. Thus, the law on provisional dismissal does not apply in the present case. Even assuming that the Motion to Withdraw Information is the same as a Motion to Dismiss, we do not find that it complied with the above requisites. The Motion to Withdraw Information was filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor and approved by the City Prosecutor without the conformity of the accused, herein petitioner Torres. Thus, it cannot be said that the motion was filed with his express consent as required under Section 8, Rule 117. Issue 2: Whether Aguinaldo committed forum shopping. Held: No. Ratio: The cases they filed against petitioner are based on distinct causes of action. Besides, a certificate of nonforum shopping is required only in civil complaints under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. 23 In People v. Ferrer, we held that such certificate is not even necessary in criminal cases and distinct causes of action. Issue 3: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in reinstating the April 30, 2001 order of the OCP of Manila finding probable cause against petitioner. Held: Yes. Ratio: The Court of Appeals erred in relying solely on the affidavit-complaint and the NBI report and disregarding totally the counter-affidavit and documentary evidence of petitioner. It is well to note that Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure not only requires the submission of the complaint and the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents, but also directs the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. Section 4 thereof also mandates the investigating prosecutor to certify under oath in the information that the accused was informed of the complaint and the evidence against him, and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Thus, in determining the existence or absence of probable cause, the investigating officer shall examine the complaint and documents in support thereof as well as the controverting evidence presented by the defense. While the validity and merits of a partys defense or accusation and the admissibility of the testimonies and evidence are best ventilated in a full blown trial, still, in a preliminary investigation, a proper consideration of the complaint and supporting evidence as well as the controverting evidence, is warranted to determine the persons who may be reasonably charged with the crime. The determination must be based on the totality of evidence presented by both parties. Prescinding from these premises, we find that the Justice Secretary did not abuse his discretion in examining both the evidence presented by the complainant and the accused in determining the existence or the lack of probable cause.
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There is basis in his finding that no probable cause exists. The complaint and the 1979 Deed of Sale do not connect petitioner with the crime of falsification. While the NBI report showed that the 1979 Deed of Sale was falsified, there is no showing that petitioner was the author thereof. We cannot discern direct and personal participation by the petitioner in the alleged forged deed. While a finding of probable cause rests on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the accused, the existence of such facts and circumstance must be strong enough to create a rational and logical nexus between the acts and omissions and the accused.

8. LIBERAL PARTY, represented by its President Manuel A. Roxas II and Secretary General Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NACIONALISTA PARTY, represented by its President Manuel B. Villar and NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, allegedly represented by its Chairman Faustino S. Dy, Jr.,Respondents. G.R. No. 191771 May 6, 2010 BRION, J. This case poses to the Court, at this very late stage of our election period, issues involving the registration of political coalitions, the grant of accreditation to the dominant parties under the first time ever automated election system in the country, and validity of the COMELEC en bancs (en banc) authority to act on the registration of political coalitions. The challenged ruling is a Per Curiam Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated April 12, 2010 in SPP-10-(DM) granting the application for registration of the Nacionalista Party Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPNPC or coalition) and deferring the question of the coalitions dom inant minority status to a future resolution. The 2 3 challenge comes from the Liberal Party (LP) through a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or a status quo order. We issued a status quo order through our Resolution of April 20, 2010. Facts: On July 14, 2009, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8646 setting August 17, 2009 as the last day for the filing of petitions for registration of political parties. On January 21, 2010, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8752, providing, among others, for the rules for the filing of petitions for accreditation for the determination of the dominant majority party, the dominant minority party, ten major national parties, and two major local parties for the May 10, 2010 elections. Resolution No. 8752 also set the deadline for filing of petitions for accreditation on February 12, 2010 and required that accreditation applicants be registered political parties, organizations or coalitions. On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for accreditation as dominant minority party. On the same date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC) filed a petition for registration as a coalition (NP-NPC) and asked that "it be recognized and accredited as the dominant minority party 4 for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections." It was docketed as an SPP (DM) case, indicating pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 that it was an accreditation case. LP opposed the application of NPC on the following grounds: (a) it was not a duly registered coalition of political parties at the time of filing of their petition for accreditation as dominant minority party; (b) COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for registration as a coalition because the petition should have been first brought before the proper Division; (c) the petition for registration as a coalition was filed with the Clerk of the Commission instead of the Law Department in violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; (d) the petition was
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filed beyond the deadline (17 August 2009); and (e) the respective chapters, incumbents and candidates of the NP and the NPC separately cannot be taken into account for purposes of accreditation as dominant minority party because the NP-NPC as a coalition is an entirely different entity. The COMELEC issued an Order dated February 16, 2010 and a Notice of Hearing on February 17, 2010 setting for hearing the petitions for accreditation for the purpose of determining the dominant majority party, dominant minority party, ten (10) major national parties and two (2) major local parties in connection with the May 10, 2010 elections. Among the petitions set for hearing were the LPs and the NP-NPCs petitions for accreditation as the dominant minority party. On March 9, 2010, the LP presented Rep. Lualhati Antonino (a member of the NPCs National Convention) as its 7 witness. Rep. Antonino testified, among others, that the NPC National Convention did not authorize its National 8 Central Committee to enter into a coalition with the NP, and that neither the National Convention nor the general 9 membership was ever consulted about the merger with the NP. On March 10, 2010, the NP-NPC presented former Gov. Faustino Dy, Jr. as its witness to refute Rep. Antoninos 10 testimony. On March 15, 2010, the LP and the NP-NPC filed their respective Memoranda. COMELEC RESOLUTION: (a) On April 12, 2010, the en banc granted the NP-NPCs petition for registration as a coalition through the Resolution assailed in the present case. In the same Resolution, the en banc deferred the resolution of the NP-NPCs application for accreditation as dominant minority party. (b) On the issue of jurisdiction, the en banc citing Baytan v. Comelec held that the registration of coalitions involves the exercise of its administrative powers and not its quasi-judicial powers; hence, the en banc can directly act on it. (c) The en banc ruled further that although the NP-NPCs failure to file the petition with the Law Department constituted a violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure (COMELEC Rules), the en banc has the discretion to 13 suspend the application of the rules in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases; in any case, the authority to approve or deny the Law Departments recommendation on the registration of the coalition rests with the en banc. (d) On the timeliness of the filing of the petition, the en banc held that no rule exists setting a deadline for the registration of coalitions. It opined that the registration of a coalition is simply a recognition by the COMELEC of a political reality. It held that if the NP-NPC is genuine, then the approval of its registration by the COMELEC is a mere recognition of an "operative fact." (e) On the merits, the en banc found that both the NP and the NPC have validly agreed to join forces for political or election purposes. It held that the NP-NPC satisfactorily submitted all the documentary requirements to prove the mergers validity. It opined, too, that if the Constitution and By -Laws of either the NP or the NPC was violated by the merger, the representatives or members of either party possess the legal standing to question the coalition; the LP, a stranger to the internal dynamics of both parties, does not have this required standing. Commissioner Rene Sarmiento opposed the resolution on various grounds. First, he ruled that COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction over the petition for registration. Second, he took the position that the relaxation of the Rules is inappropriate in the present case. His third point is that no valid coalition was formed between the NP and the NPC. The dissent also branded the NP-NPC as a sham whose sole purpose was to secure dominant minority party status. Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out as his last point that the NP-NPC cannot seek accreditation as the dominant minority party without the requisite recognition by the COMELEC. The dissent also noted that the NP-NPC could no longer seek accreditation since the deadline for filing a petition for accreditation had lapsed.
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Issue 1: Should the petition be dismissed outright for procedural and technical infirmities? Held: No. Ratio: We have indicated many times in the past that a primary factor in considering technical and procedural objections is the nature of the issues involved. We have been strict when the issues are solely confined to the [21] parties private interests and carry no massive ripple effects directly affecting the public, but have viewed with [22] liberality the technical and procedural threshold issues raised when grave public interests are involved. Our liberality has even gone beyond the purely technical and procedural where Court intervention has become [23] [24] [25] imperative. Thus, we have recognized exceptions to the threshold issues of ripeness and mootness of the [26] petitions before us, as well as questions on locus standi. We have also brushed aside procedural technicalities where the issues raised, because of the paramount public interest involved and their gravity, novelty or weight as precedents deserve the Courts attention and active intervention. We see every reason to be liberal in the present case in view of interests involved which are indisputably important to the coming electoral exercise now fast approaching. The registration of political parties, their accreditation as dominant parties, and the benefits these recognitions provide particularly, the on-line real time electronic transmission of election results from the Board of Election Inspectors ( BEI) through the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines; the immediate access to official election results; the per diems from the government that watchers of accredited parties enjoy; and the representation at the printing, storage and distribution of ballots that the dominant-party status brings constitute distinct advantages to any party and its candidates, if only in terms of [28] the ready information enabling them to react faster to developing situations. The value of these advantages exponentially rises in an election under an automated system whose effectiveness and reliability, even at this late stage, are question marks to some. To the public, the proper registration and the accreditation of dominant parties are evidence of equitable party representation at the scene of electoral action, and translate in no small measure to transparency and to the elections credibility. Thus, our focus is on the core issues that confront us and the parties, by-passing the technical and procedural questions raised that do not anyway affect the integrity of the petition before us or prejudice the parties involved, and concentrating as well on the issues that would resolve the case soonest so that the parties involved and the COMELEC can move on to their assigned time-sensitive roles and tasks in the coming elections. We note that while the respondents placed in issue defects in the attachments to the petition, their objection is a formal one as they do not deny the existence and basic correctness of these attachments. We see no resulting harm or prejudice therefore if we overrule the objection raised, given the weight of the counterbalancing factors [29] we considered above. We do not likewise find the failure to formally implead the NP-NPC a sufficient reason to dismiss the petition outright. Without any finally confirmed registration in the coalitions favor, N P-NPC does not legally exist as a coalition with a personality separate and distinct from the component NP and NPC parties. We find it sufficient that the NP and the NPC have separately been impleaded; as of the moment, they are the real parties-in-interest as they are the parties truly interested in legally establishing the existence of their coalition. Again, we find no resulting harm or prejudice in the omission to implead NP-NPC, as the component parties have voiced out the concerns the coalition would have raised had it been impleaded as a separate and properly existing personality. The respondents next argue that the petitions cited grounds are mere errors of law and do not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This objection can be read as a facial objection to the petition or as a substantive one that goes into the merits of the petition. We will discuss under the present topic the facial objection, as it is a threshold issue that determines whether we shall proceed to consider the case or simply dismiss the petition outright.

A facial objection is meritorious if, expressly and on the face of the petition , what is evident as cited grounds are erroneous applications of the law rather than grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. After due consideration, we conclude that the petition passes the facial objection test. Issue 2: Is the present petition premature since its object is to foreclose a ruling on the unsettled NP-NPC issue?

Held: No. Ratio: The root of the present petition is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC for registration as a coalition and accreditation as the dominant minority party. While the en banc claimed that it had jurisdiction over the registration of coalitions and in fact decreed the NP-NPCs registration, it strangely did not rule on the accreditation aspect of the petition. The registration of a coalition and the accreditation of a dominant minority party are two separate matters that are substantively distinct from each other. Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our 32 election laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties. The present petition has openly stated its objective of forestalling the accreditation of the respondent NP-NPC; the petition expressly and frontally sought the issuance of a writ of prohibition and restraining order to prevent the COMELEC from accrediting a coalition that is not registered as a party . The combination of a petition for certiorari and for prohibition under the circumstances of the present case is fully justified, as the registration and the accreditation that the petition covers are linked with and in fact sequentially follow one another. Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow. Where the registration is flawed for having been attended by grave abuse of discretion, as alleged in the petition, the filing of a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a preliminary injunction can only be expected as a logical remedial move; otherwise, accreditation, unless restrained, will follow. Thus, from the point of view of prohibition, there is absolutely no prematurity as its avowed intent is in fact to forestall an event the accreditation that according to the assailed Resolution shall soon take place. From the point of view of the petition for certiorariquestioning the registration made, no prematurity issue is involved as the nullification of a past and accomplished act is prayed for. From these perspectives, the OSG objection based on prematurity is shown to be completely groundless. Issue 3: Is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC, viewed as a petition for registration, time-barred? Held: Yes. The NP-NPCs petition for registration as a coalition is time -barred. Thus, the en banc was wrong in ordering the out-of-time registration of the NP-NPC coalition. Ratio: Admittedly, Resolution No. 8646 simply states that August 17, 2009 is the "[L]ast day for filing petitions for registration of political parties," without mentioning "organizations and coalitions" in the way that the three entities are separately mentioned under Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution and Rule 32, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules. Resolution No. 8646, however, is simply a listing of electoral activities and deadlines for the May 10, 2010 elections; it is not in any way a resolution aimed at establishing distinctions among "political parties, organizations, and coalitions." In the absence of any note, explanation or reason why the deadline only mentions political parties, the term "political parties" should be understood in its generic sense that covers political organizations and political coalitions as well. To rule otherwise is to introduce, through a COMELEC deadline-setting resolution, a meaning or intent into Section 2(5), Article IX-C, which was not clearly intended by the Constitution or by the COMELEC Rules; Resolution No. 8646

would effectively differentiate between political parties, on the one hand, and political organizations and coalitions, on the other. Issue 4: Is the NP-NPC an "operative fact" that the COMELEC simply has to note and recognize without need of registration?

Held: No. Ratio: Political coalitions need to register in accordance with the established norms and procedures, if they are to be recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different legal personality from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with other similarly registered parties. If they want to coalesce with one another without the formal registration of their coalition, they can do so on their own in the exercise of their and their members democratic freedom of choice, but they cannot receive official recognition for their coalition. Or they can choose to secure the registration of their coalition in order to be accorded the privileges accruing to registered coalitions, including the right to be accredited as a dominant majority or minority party. There are no ifs and buts about these constitutional terms. Issue 5: Does the en banc have jurisdiction at the first instance to entertain the petition? Issue 6: On the merits and assuming that the en banc has jurisdiction, did it gravely abuse its discretion when it allowed the registration of the NP-NPC? Issue 7: Was due process observed in granting the registration? Issue 8: Did the coalition take place as required by law: Issue 9: in terms of compliance with internal rules of the NP and the NPC? Issue 10: in terms of the consent to or support for, and the lack of objection to, the coalition? Held: Aside from the threshold and timeliness questions we have extensively discussed, this case raises other important questions as well that, without the time constraints the coming elections impose on us, would have been fertile areas for discussion in exploring the limits and parameters of COMELEC authority on the registration of coalitions. These questions, however, are not for us to answer now, given our time constraints and the decisive impact on the present case of our ruling on timeliness. Thus, we reserve for another case and another time the answers to these no less important questions. We solely rule for now that the en banc gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own deadline in ruling on the registration of the NP-NPC as a coalition. In so ruling, we emphasize that the matter of party registration raises critical election concerns that should be handled with discretion commensurate with the importance of elections to our democratic system. The COMELEC should be at its most strict in implementing and complying with the standards and procedures the Constitution and our laws impose. 1avvphi1 In light of the time constraints facing the COMELEC and the parties as the election is no more than a week away, we find it compelling to declare this Decision immediately executory. 9. FIDELA R. ANGELES, Petitioner, vs. The SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, and SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., Respondents. G.R. No. 142549 March 9, 2010 Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Facts: On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals, all of them claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and alleging that they are entitled to inherit her proportional share in the parcels of land located in Quezon City and in the municipalities of Caloocan and Malabon, Province of Rizal, commenced a special civil action for partition and accounting of the property otherwise known as Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994, allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. C-424 in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 120. Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo Estate. They also had led this Court to believe that OCT No. 994 was registered twice, thus, in Metropolitan 4 Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals, reiterated in Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court Of 5 Appeals, the Court held that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, and not May 3, 1917, was the valid title by virtue of the prior registration rule. In the RTC Order sought to be implemented, Judge Jaime D. Discaya granted the partition and accounting prayed for by plaintiffs in that case; directed the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-owners, including petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of land with an aggregate area of One Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty-Nine square meters (105,969 sq. m.), more or less; and ordered that said parcels of land be sold, subject to the confirmation of the Court, and the proceeds be divided among the plaintiffs in proportion to their respective interests in the property. Any sale of above-mentioned lots shall be subject to confirmation by this Court pursuant to Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner alleges that the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City refused to comply with the RTC Order because they were still awaiting word from the LRA Administrator before proceeding. Counsel for petitioner then requested the LRA Administrator to direct said Registers of Deeds to comply with the Order. The LRA Administrator, Mr. Alfredo R. Enriquez sent petitioner a letter-reply informing him that his request cannot be granted due to the directive of the Secretary of Justice as a result of the inquiry conducted by the Composite Fact-Finding Committee (created under DOJ Department Order No. 137) finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19 April 1919). The letter-reply further stated that OCT No. 994 was intact and was being kept in the LRA "to prevent its alteration and tampering." Petitioner avers that respondent Guingona, in issuing the 1st Indorsement, made a substantive modification of the ruling made by this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Luis Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals. She further avers that "[n]ot even the Secretary of Justice has the power or authority to set aside or alter an established ruling made by the highest Court of the land."
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Petitioner claims that respondent Guingona was the one who caused the issuance by the LRA Administrator of Circular No. 97-11 dated October 3, 1997, which had the same legal effect on other cases similarly situated without hearing or notice to the parties-in-interest, and that this was contemptuous and contumacious and calls for 15 "condemnation and reproof of the highest degree." Petitioner alleges that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely ministerial duty, that she and her coplaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 cannot avail of the benefits granted to them by the Order, and that she has no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, other than this action." Respondent Guingona contends that he was no longer the Secretary of Justice, therefore, he did not anymore possess the mandatory duties being compelled to be performed in this case by way of a writ of mandamus; he had no more duty resulting from the said position and could not perform an act that pertained to said duty, even if he

wanted to; and since he did not have the powers and duties of the Secretary of Justice, he was therefore not a real party-in-interest in this case. Respondent Guingona avers that he was prompted to issue DOJ Department Order No. 137 dated April 13, 1997 creating a committee due to several complaints received by the Office of the Secretary of Justice in February 1997. Respondent Guingona contends that it can be gleaned from the purpose of the creation of the committee that its fact-finding investigation was merely administrative to formulate and recommend policies, procedures and courses of action which the DOJ, the LRA, the Office of the Solicitor General and other agencies of the DOJ can adopt with regard to the problem of the proliferation of fake land titles, including those that relate to the Maysilo Estate. Issue: Whether public respondents unlawfully neglected to perform their duties by their refusal to issue the questioned transfer certificates of title to petitioner and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) or have unlawfully excluded petitioner from the use and enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as would warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus against said public respondents. Held: No.

Ratio: Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial 27 dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists. It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular 28 way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. Therefore, we must look into the alleged right of petitioner and see if compliance with the RTC Order is compellable by mandamus; or, in the alternative, find out if substantial doubt exists to justify public respondents refusal to comply with said Order. Did public respondents have sufficient legal basis to refuse to grant petitioners request? In this regard, we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration Authority instructive, to wit: That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration. xxxx x x x Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded. But where the right 30 sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue. (Emphasis ours.)
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As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases where they find that such would result to the double titling of the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case, which involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of Deeds cannot be compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since there were existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject parcels of land and there was reason to question the rights of those requesting for the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA Administrator be mandated by the Court to require the Register of Deeds to comply with said Order, for we find merit in the explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his letter-reply that cites the 1st Indorsement issued by respondent Guingona, LRA Circular No. 9731 11, and Senate Committee Report No. 1031, as reasons for his refusal to grant petitioners request. There was, therefore, sufficient basis for public respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC Order, given the finding, contained in the cited documents, that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly anchored their rights, did not exist. As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous cases decided by this Court which have held that there are two existing OCT No. 994, dated differently, and the one from which she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) derived their rights was dated earlier, hence, was the superior title. Regrettably, petitioners claim no longer has a leg to stand on. As we held in the 2007 Manotok case: The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court should be affirmed or set aside is whether or not the titles invoked by the respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are void or otherwise should not be recognized by this Court. Since the true basic factual predicate concerning OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one such OCT differs from that expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become virtually functus officio except on the basis of the 35 "law of the case" doctrine, and can no longer be relied upon as precedents. Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly issued on April 19, 1917 validly and actually exists, given the following conclusions made by this Court in the 2007 Manotok case: First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on [19] April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when the title took effect. Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. x x x. Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at 36 bar. (Emphases supplied.) 10. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010. Bersamin, J. FACTS: This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the
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JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed. ISSUE 1: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing. HELD: Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. Issue 2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. Held: There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process. Issue 3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice. Held: Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of

appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. Issue 4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC. HELD: Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.