FouIf Tree AnoIysis

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HAZOP
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Fault tree analysis
-DeIinition
-Logic Symbols
-Events and Faults
-Examples
-FTA methodology
!
-Team
-HAZOP Methodology
-Report (Format and Example)
FouIf free AnoIysis
A common tool using graphics and statistics
to analyze an event and predict how and
how oIten it will Iail
Logic SymboIs
Fault tree analysis is based on logic symbols.
The Iollowing symbols are used
in Iault tree construction to explain the relationships.
1. OR Gate
2. And Gate
3. INHIBIT Gate
4. DELAY Gate
AMD 0ofe
One oI main gates
used.
The output above will
occur iI the two events
below both occur.
OP 0ofe
The second main gate
used.
The output above will
occur iI either oI one
or more events
happens below.
MHT 0ofe
It Indicates that the out put event occurs when
input event occurs and the inhibit condition is
satisIied.
Example:
DELAY CATE
Indicates that the output event occurs when
the input event has occurred and the
speciIied delay time has expired.
Three Moin Evenfs
Primary Event
(Basic, Undeveloped, External)
Intermediate Event
Expanded Event
Primory Evenfs
Made up oI basic, undeveloped, and
external events
A time in the event where the process or
system might Iail
ample: Fault occurs within the intended
environment: pressure vessel rupture disc
Iunctions within pressure that is within
designed limit. Failure of 6uipment
osic Evenf
Nothing is leading up to the event
Can be like a machine breaking
unexpectedly
A circle is used to represent the event in the
Iault tree
&ndeveIoped Evenf
Events that don`t have a major eIIect on the
system
Also events that there is not enough
inIormation about
Represented by a diamond in the Iault tree
ExfernoI Evenf
The external or house event represents a
condition or event that is assumed to exist
as a boundary condition Ior the Iault tree
A house shape in a Iault tree
nfermediofe Evenf
The intermediate event represents a Iault
event that results Irom the interactions oI
other Iault
Sometimes linked by (and/or) gates
Exponded Evenf
Complex event that needs another Iault tree
to explain
The Iault tree Ior the expanded event is not
directly shown in current Iault tree
Shown by a triangle on the Iault tree
0rouping of Equipmenf fouIfs ore
foiIures
It can be grouped into three classes..
!rimary faults & failures
2$econdary faults & failures
3ommand faults & failures
The primary Iault is the primary event while secondary Iault
and command Iault are intermediate events.
Secondory fouIf
Fault occurs when the intended environment
exceeds :
Pressure vessel rupture disc Iunctions
because some external Iault causes the
internal pressure increases designed limit.
Not the Failure oI Equipment but due an
external Iorce.
ommond fouIf
Equipment operates normally and
component operates normally but operates
in wrong time and wrong place.
,250 A temperature alarm Iails to
announce a high temperature in a process
because the temperature sensor has Iailed .
The alarm Iailure is a command Iailure .
MinimoI uf Sefs
List oI combinations oI equipment and
human Iailures those are suIIicient to result
in the accident. These are called as minimal
cut sets.
Miniofure -fouIf free
Pressure fonk
.3; Tree
FTA mefhodoIogy
It breaks down accident into its
contributing equipment Iailures and /or
human errors .
It is a reverse thinking technique
Immediate causes are listed , examined until
the analyst identiIies the basic cause oI each
event .
MefhodoIogy of FouIf Tree onoIysis
A Iour step method
Problem DeIinition
Fault tree construction
Fault tree solution
Minimal cut set ranking
ProbIem Definifion
Problem deIinition consists oI ...
efining the top event (ie the accident event which the
subject of fault tree analysis)
efining analysis boundary conditions including .
un allowed events
existing events
system physical bounds
level oI resolution
Other assumptions
FouIf free consfrucfion
RULES TO BE FOLLOWED
the statements are to be entered in event boxes and circles
as Iaults.
State precisely what Iault is, where Iault is and when it
occurs.
Where and what species the equipment and its relevant
Iailed state.
Statement must be complete.
.3; ;ree so3;on
UN!QUELY !DENT!Y ALL CATES AND BAS!C EvENTS
RESOLvE ALL CATES !N TO BAS!C EvENTS
RENOvE DUPL!CATE EvENTS W!TH!N SETS
DELETE ALL SUPERSETS (SETS THAT CONTA!N ANOTHER SET AS A
SUB SET)
MinimoI cuf sef ronking
Ranking minimal cut set is the Iinal step oI Iault
tree analysis. Ranking each cut set will give the
individual reason or combined reasons.
Ranking two event cut set gives details oI ..
1. Human error
2. Active equipment Iailure
3. Passive equipment Iailure
HAZOP
A ard and !erability study (HAZOP) is a
structured and systematic examination oI a
planned or existing process or operation in order
to identiIy and evaluate problems that may
represent risks to personnel or equipment, or
prevent eIIicient operation.
HAZOP is a structured HAZOP is a structured brainstorming brainstorming method methodIor Ior
the analysis. the analysis.
"uoIify of fhe feom
Teom
HAZOP is normally done by a particular
team.
The team comprises oI multidisciplinary
experts.
Ho;op-feom(min-o,mox-9)
Study leader or Chairman
Recorder or Secretary
Designer
User
Specialist
Maintainer
MefhodoIogy-Peporf formof
Polerl|a|
cause ol lre
dev|al|or
E.g.
F|oW/No
Corsequerces
ol lre cause
ard lre
dev|al|or |lse|l
Ary ex|sl|rg
dev|ces lral
preverl lre
cause or
ra|e |ls
corsequeces
|ess pa|rlu|
Acl|ors lo
rerove lre
cause or
r|l|gale lre
corse-
querces
Dev.;on C.se
Conseqence
S.eg.rds Ac;on
To Compressor nlet
Teams tend to quickly identify alarms, shut-downs
and controls, and claim them for safeguards.
An alarm not tested may not work when called upon
nlet Line to do so.
Nuisance alarms are frequently bypassed and are
not effective as safeguards.
Often operators are not monitoring control panel.
Valve in manual Automatic control routines are often set in manual
mode.
FV
1
LAH
LC
1
HAZOP-ExompIe
TypicoI HAZOP worksheef
Company Nova Revision 0 ate 02-Jun-97
Location Corunna wg No. Cor -123-4567 Page 1
Leader RAH Proc es JB Research Op Tech
Scribe GFR nstr'ts GH Electrical HH Other
Prod'n PM Mech FD Safety MN Other
Node No. 1 escribe Transfer Ethane from Deethanizer to C2 KO Pot
Intention The intent is to transfer 150,000 Ib/hr of C2/C2= mix at 300 psig and at -30 F for the startup period.
Guide Wrd High Param FIow ev'n High FIow
PossibIe Causes
1 FV-1 Wide open
2 Line break.
3
Consequences
1 High level in KO pot with liquid carry-over to compressor with serious damage to rotor. Potential hydrocarbons release.
2 Potential hydrocarbon release.
3
Safeguards
1 High level alarm LAH-1
2 High - High level alarm HHLA - 1 shutdown.
3 Vessel inspection yearly.
Recommendation / Actions Respib By ate
1 Consider limiting flow orifice, auto S trip on High-High level, smart check valve. 1 JB 01-Jan-99
2 etermine extent of typical hydrocarbon release. 2 PM 15-Jan-99
3 Set-up vessel inspection yearly. 3 FD 30-Jan-99
Peferences
FTA by Dr.John Andrews.
FTA by CliIton A.Ericson II.
HAZOP by Marvin Rausand.
HAZOP Introduction by Zhang Wei, Wu Zhangjin.
The HAZOP Method Irom ACUTECH.
HAZOP Guide Irom PORI.
HAZOP-a knol by Ian Sutton.
Guest Lecture by ProI.Ramakrishnan.
HAZOP by Jersi R.Nawrocki.
Guidelines Ior HAZOP by American Ins. OI Ch. Engineers(AIChE)
Risk Analysis Irom ETH.
http://www.eogogics.com/